The late Polish-born Pope, John Paul II, famously used to say that Europe ought to breathe with two lungs, an eastern one and a western one. But it took decades and Russia’s war in Ukraine for the European Union to seek the full reunification of its Eastern Neighborhood into the European family. Russia’s attack on Ukraine in February 2022 prompted policymakers in EU Member State capitals and Brussels to rethink the geopolitical importance of enlargement policy, often described as one of the EU’s most successful foreign policy tools, as well as its most transformational policy.
Once-sceptical capitals like Paris or The Hague, which had in the past put obstacles in place that contributed to an enlargement “stalemate” for more than a decade, seem now to embrace the view that the Union’s expansion is a geopolitical imperative. Their leaders even advocate for expansion of the EU’s membership as a requirement for long-term security and stability. French President Emmanuel Macron currently holds that the faster EU enlargement proceeds, the better it will be for the Union.[1] This geopolitical imperative prompted the European Council to open negotiation talks with Ukraine and Moldova and make Georgia a candidate state in December 2023,[2] as well as to open accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina in March 2024.[3]
Still, while there is clearly at present a strong political will among EU Member States to integrate Ukraine and Moldova, questions remain about the fate of the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries – i.e. Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia. A potent mix of difficult-to-resolve status issues and bilateral problems, democratic backsliding and other domestic political problems, weak reform record, socioeconomic malaise and EU Member States’ fatigue with the Western Balkans have brought the future of EU relations with the region into question. The situation on the ground is also compounded by disputes between candidate countries and EU Member States, as Bulgaria’s blocking of North Macedonia’s accession and the recent new crisis between Greece and Albania clearly demonstrate.
Many would agree that politically sensitive concessions or trade-offs will be required on the part of EU Member States to bring the Western Balkan countries into the European family, or at the very least “a leap of faith” to accept that the region’s complex and interlocking problems will be dealt with gradually and only in parallel with a forceful reinvigoration and acceleration of the region’s accession process.
Additionally, the strengthening of far-right parties in both the European Parliament and its Member States could complicate things further. This partly owes to the fact that some of these parties, which could soon be shaping government policy in several Member States, are, generally speaking, not in favour of new accessions, either of the entire Western Balkans or of certain countries of the region. Or in other cases, such as Orban’s Hungary, EU countries may be nominally in favour of enlargement, but they distrust rule of law as the cornerstone of the EU accession process. The rise of the far right, therefore, presents a twin problem of either undermining new membership perspectives as a whole, or weakening the EU’s conditionality and thus the transformative potential of enlargement policy.
Additionally, there is no certainty that Member States will be willing to commit to serious negotiations about or agree on necessary institutional reforms within the EU in order to secure the bloc’s ability to function with more than 30 members. Therefore, there are many political and technical challenges ahead, especially following the recent European Parliament elections, as well as forthcoming elections in key Member States.
Finally, we should mention that the very likely re-election of Donald Trump to the White House in November 2024 could also present challenges for EU enlargement. In such a scenario, the EU will be challenged to develop policy in a number of areas, while having a rather hostile counterpart in Washington DC: from taking on the main responsibility for supporting the defence of Ukraine to responding to the challenges of climate crisis, technology regulation, trade and competitiveness and China policy. All these may become too tall a task for European policymakers, making them question the urgency of enlargement, forcing them to rethink their own strategic priorities or re-emphasizing concerns over the Union’s “absorption capacity.”
In what follows, we briefly review some of the key policy issues and dilemmas that arise from the renewed interest in enlargement policy, and especially the question of how the Western Balkans may be affected by the re-organization of the Union’s Eastern Partnership, through offering membership perspective to three eastern European countries.
For over 20 years, the EU
has not been able to deliver
its long-awaited promises
to the Western Balkans
The Current State of Play in Western Balkan Accessions
For over 20 years, the EU has not been able to deliver its long-awaited promises to the Western Balkans, as they were declared in the June 2003 Thessaloniki Summit: the promise that the “future of the Balkans is within the EU” once they meet the Copenhagen criteria.[4] This has caused not only less appetite on behalf of the region’s governments to reform, but also, and most importantly, has undermined the Balkan peoples’ faith in the Union. A recent regional opinion poll has shown a significant drop in the percentage of North Macedonian citizens’ support for joining the EU – standing currently at 68% – while only 40% of respondents in Serbia are in favour.[5] According to the same poll, only in three of the six Western Balkan countries do the majority of respondents think that the EU is serious in its intention to offer membership to the region.
In an obvious attempt to reverse this trend, the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, declared in her State of the Union address of September 2023 that the European Union should respond to the “call of history” and admit a large group of new members, including from the Western Balkans.[6] A few weeks earlier, in late August 2023, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, promised a specific date for new accessions: “It’s time to get rid of the ambiguities… I believe we must be ready — on both sides — to enlarge by 2030.”[7] By this deadline the President of the European Council hopes to break a vicious circle of indecisiveness over enlargement, as it would be “ambitious but realistic… The date is close enough to feel achievable and worth the political investment by elected leaders in the candidate states.”
In March 2024, the European Commission adopted a communication on pre- enlargement reforms and policy reviews, as a process aiming to facilitate future accessions.[8] The communication mentions a list of necessary reforms for a merit -based, reversible “gradual integration,” focusing on issues such as enhancing connectivity, climate and environmental commitments, food security, social and economic convergence, migration and border control management and the budget. With this recommendation the Commission wants to ensure both the EU and prospective members are comprehensively prepared for enlargement.
Additionally, in November 2023, the Commission adopted a new Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, for which the European Council and the European Parliament recently agreed in principle.[9] The plan aims to foster socioeconomic convergence between the countries of the region and the Union. The resources made available amount to six billion euros for the period 2024-2027, comprising two billion euros in grants and the rest in soft loans provided by the EU. The countries of the region are asked to draw up a programme of reforms in socioeconomic convergence, which will then be examined and approved by the Commission. The procedures are aligned with the national recovery and resilience plans envisaged for the EU Member States.
Most importantly, the disbursement of funds will be conditional on a series of reforms that the Commission envisages will prepare the Western Balkan countries for access to the single market. The Growth Plan is also designed to facilitate the prior enhancement of the Common Regional Market, and it has in-built guarantees for the prevention of blockages due to bilateral disputes among Western Balkan states.
The plan envisages, for example, that no Western Balkan country can block another country’s advancement in the process of accessing the single market. There is also a specific clause requiring both Serbia and Kosovo to demonstrate a constructive commitment to the normalization of bilateral relations, so that the obligations arising from this new financial instrument can be implemented. A series of incentives and disincentives are also included, including the redistribution of funds of those states that do not implement the reforms to others that do. However, the difference seems to be that the proposed methodology of gradual integration into the formal enlargement process through the opening of “chapters” has not yet been linked with the Growth Plan. But this missing element could be addressed by clarifying the terms of the plan’s requirements.
Despite the ostensible progress in technical
solutions aimed at stimulating reforms,
few new ideas have been offered for bilateral
issues and disputes between EU Member States
and Western Balkan countries
Bilateral Disputes
Despite the ostensible progress in technical solutions aimed at stimulating reforms, few new ideas have been offered for bilateral issues and disputes between EU Member States and Western Balkan countries that repeatedly delay or block progress towards EU accession. As a reminder of this predicament, North Macedonia is still blocked from opening accession negotiation chapters until it amends its constitution in accordance to the demands of Bulgaria, which have been accepted by the EU and introduced as an informal but powerful conditionality. The North Macedonian centre-left government, which had largely acquiesced to the conditions, has recently experienced a massive electoral defeat. The new right-wing government plainly rejects the compromise over the constitutional amendments and demands in return EU guarantees that Bulgaria will not impose new conditions along Skopje’s accession path.
The new government also enraged the government in Athens by insisting on not using the country’s new, mutually-agreed name. Greece has signalled its determination to return to the policy of blocking North Macedonia’s accession path, unless the government in Skopje respects the letter and spirit of the Prespa Agreement, which resolved the so-called “name dispute” between the two countries. Greece has also indicated a readiness to block Albania’s progress over the alleged illegal imprisonment of an ethnic Greek mayor-elect. Relations between Athens and Tirana have deteriorated over this issue, while the EU has shied away from passing judgement in the crisis.
As of late, Croatia is also angered with accession frontrunner Montenegro, over a resolution in the Montenegrin Parliament on the Second World War Jasenovac concentration camp. Zagreb seems willing to show its strength when decisions on Montenegro’s accession are to be taken in Brussels. Similar challenges and disputes are likely to arise between the “eastern trio” candidates (Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia) and EU Member States, such as Hungary.
Overall, it seems that inter-state problems continue to blur the EU’s vision for the region. Bilateral disputes and asymmetrical power relations between EU Member States and candidates for accession are likely to remain key problems that obstruct enlargement policy in the years to come, with the EU seemingly unable to learn lessons from similar problems in the past (e.g. Slovenia-Croatia border dispute or the Prespa Agreement) and devoid of a willingness to develop new tools that will allow Brussels to adopt a more proactive and constructive approach to these problems. And that’s despite the fact that the promise of European integration does have the potential to accelerate the settlement of bilateral disputes.[10]
The potential increase of the EU to 30+ Member States
raises questions of governability and functionality,
as it will have an impact on the internal decision-making
process, balance of power among Member States
and voting rights
The EU’s Own Homework
A key challenge for enlargement remains concern over the EU’s difficulty in reaching consensus on urgent and complex policy problems. This became more than evident in the obstacles posed by Hungary in EU decision-making over Ukraine and the war effort. But in principle, this problem may be extended to any critical policy area. The potential increase of the EU to 30+ Member States raises questions of governability and functionality, as it will have an impact on the internal decision-making process, balance of power among Member States and voting rights. Despite rhetorical support for enlargement from all EU Member States, consensus will have to be reached about the reforms that may be required before the next wave of accessions.
Last year, a group of German and French experts proposed a long list of institutional reforms to make the EU ready for enlargement by 2030.[11] The report conceives a new architecture of an enlarged EU, reintroducing the idea of concentric circles of integration. The report proposes a great number of reforms to ensure that the EU is ready for new accessions, but also in order to facilitate the process and ensure that the candidates’ hopes for membership will become future-proof. But radical solutions to streamline the decision-making process are seen by some Member States as attempts to limit the role of the smaller Member States to the benefit of the larger ones.[12]
One of the main debates is over the question of the extension of qualified majority voting (hereafter QMV). Hungary’s recent veto threats in the Council have made QMV more appealing to many Member States. The debate over how QMV may be used in the future is flourishing.[13] For many, extending QMV to foreign and security policy issues is the necessary next step for making the EU a more geopolitical actor. A noticeably large group of nine Member States – namely, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia and Spain – launched the Group of Friends for Qualified Majority Voting in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.[14] In a joint statement, they stressed that they are “convinced that EU foreign policy needs adapted processes and procedures in order to strengthen the EU as a foreign policy actor.”[15]
But some observers insist that extending QMV to foreign and security policy will be a difficult pill to swallow for many Member States, and instead the focus should be on using QMV in enlargement policy. For example, the Franco-German group of experts has proposed extending QMV to all the intermediate steps of accession negotiations. A more recent German-Slovene non-paper also adopts the idea in principle, though proposing a compromise solution for introducing QMV to fewer instances of decisions over enlargement policy.[16]
For their part, some other Member States, including Greece, Cyprus, Malta and Hungary, remain highly sceptical or stand against the extension of QMV, which they consider an important tool for protecting their national interests.[17] For this reason perhaps, following the December 2023 European Council, many have put forward the idea of the so-called “constructive abstention,” which has enabled the EU to open Ukraine’s accession talks, despite Hungary’s reluctance.[18]
But the QMV issue is just one element of the EU’s internal reform. France, which in 2020 pushed for revising the EU’s enlargement methodology, is seeking a deep transformation of the European project, as President Macron asserted in Bratislava in May 2023. He specifically said that the EU needed to enlarge and “be rethought very extensively with regard to its governance and its aims.”[19] The German government is also favouring a deepening of European integration, with Chancellor Scholz saying in August 2022 in Prague that enlargement was dependent on institutional changes.[20] Scholz has many times put forward the idea of extending QMV to foreign policy and taxation, but an extensive use of differentiated integration that could potentially radically transform the EU is not among Germany’s priorities.
Other EU Member States, including the eastern countries in favour of the EU’s hopes for Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, have not articulated their approach, which could mean that they are sceptical about major institutional changes. That was reflected in a statement made by Poland’s Donald Tusk in October in Brussels, when he commented that “regardless of the French and German positions [on EU reforms], revolutionary changes are not needed.”[21] Poland seems to consider that internal reforms could eventually become obstacles for the Union’s enlargement to the East.
Finally, the Friends of the Western Balkans, a group of Member States that includes Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Greece, Italy, Slovakia and Slovenia, have also intensified their consultations and coordination in order to make sure that the enlargement process, which at present seems to be driven primarily by Ukraine, does not neglect the Western Balkans, which have sat in Europe’s waiting room for more than two decades. In June 2024, the group of countries presented another declaration in which ideas were promoted and political imperatives highlighted, all in the direction of accelerating the accession process of the region and making sure that the Western Balkan countries are not left behind.[22]
Foreign Policy Orientation
The war in Ukraine has again raised concerns over security issues in the Western Balkans. In fact, with Russia and China increasingly aligned, the EU is particularly alarmed over their influence in the region. Apart from the obvious unease over these countries’ active pursuit of increased political and economic footprint in the region, what is probably a more complex issue to approach is the so-called “domestic demand” for non-Western influence. That is, tendencies, either at the level of political elites or in society, for closer relations with non-Western powers, or for geopolitical counter-balances to the overpowering influence of the EU and the US in the region.
Starting from the outlook of the elites, Serbia is the classic case of the country whose dominant political elites seek to maintain advanced relations not only with the West, but also with geopolitical rivals, such as China and Russia, and other increasingly influential regional powers, such as Turkey or the United Arab Emirates. Equidistance between major Western and non-Western powers is enshrined in the Serbian constitution, and the country, under the current President Aleksandar Vucic, has built increasingly strong ties with Beijing and Moscow, while at the same time gradually diverging from both the EU standards in rule of law and democracy and the geopolitical choices of the EU and the US. A more extreme case of a political elite questioning the ties with the EU and the US and building strong association with Moscow is the leadership of Bosnia’s Republika Srpska, under the guidance of Milorad Dodik, surely the region’s leading pro-Moscow politician. Interestingly, both Republika Srpska and Serbia, over the years, have cultivated strong political and economic ties with Budapest, and both entities enjoy Viktor Orban’s support inside the EU.
Another issue that should be mentioned here is the stances of the six Western Balkan countries when it comes to actual alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy, a condition for eventual membership in the group. Of the six, Serbia is the least aligned, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only the three member states of NATO, Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia, have 100% alignment with the EU in foreign and security policy. Therefore, the EU needs to secure more provisions and conditionalities to ensure better alignment of all candidate countries with its foreign policy and its main geostrategic directions.
The EU needs to secure more provisions
and conditionalities to ensure better alignment
of all candidate countries with its foreign policy
and its main geostrategic directions
When it comes to societal trends, in the recent regional opinion poll of the International Republican Institute, which we mentioned above, there is a striking finding. Only respondents in Albania and Kosovo unequivocally support their countries’ pro-Western orientation. For the remaining four Western Balkan states (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and North Macedonia) respondents opt for varying degrees of a balance between the EU/West and Russia.[23] In Serbia, which has traditionally been the most ambivalent in its foreign policy orientation, respondents are overwhelmingly in favour of either a clearly pro-Russian orientation or equal distance between the West and Russia. Things look more positive for the pro-Western orientation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where 39% opt for a pro-Western only option and another 12% for a pro-Western orientation with some measure of relations with Russia.
For Montenegro, a NATO member state, but also a country that has experienced severe political polarization between pro-Western parties and forces that highlight their attachment to Serbia, the overwhelmingly and primarily pro-Western orientation camps total 50%, while the remainder is split between those who opt for a pro-Russian orientation and those who prefer equal distance between the two sides. Finally, in North Macedonia, a recent NATO entrant, the appeal of the West seems to be in free fall compared with previous decades, probably as a result of the frustration over the country’s stalled EU accession process, despite the painful compromises reached with neighbouring Greece and Bulgaria.
Accession Process and Absorption Capacity
The EU emphasizes that accession is a merit-based process. At the same time, it underlines that Ukraine’s membership is a geopolitical and strategic imperative. The same argument is also used for the Western Balkans’ EU future. This means that the EU will soon need to weigh these interests against objective progress in reforms made by those countries. It seems that membership is not only a question of these countries complying with the required Copenhagen criteria; geopolitical and security interests should and do play a significant role, as this has become clear in Kyiv and Chisinau’s rapid progress in accession since the start of the war in 2022.
The EU, therefore, seems to be facing yet another dilemma. If it becomes overly strict in the full compliance with the required criteria before membership, the Union could miss a historic opportunity of re-uniting Europe and removing countries from the orbit of Moscow’s expansionist project. But if it ignores serious deficiencies, it risks taking on unresolved problems or accepting new members that are not fully prepared, which could undermine the EU’s decision-making and overall functioning, including jeopardizing the integrity of key institutional pillars, such as, for example, the single market.
Another issue is that of the Union’s absorption capacity. Ukraine’s potential membership raises a number of dilemmas about financial costs, geopolitical risks and the prospect of intra-EU redistribution of power and prestige. In contrast, the Western Balkans with a combined population of 17 million do not pose any real challenge for the absorption capacity of the EU. Similarly, the inclusion of the Western Balkans in the EU will hardly have a noteworthy economic impact or cost for existing Member States.
In contrast, more absorption capacity concerns may be raised around the question of the EU’s functionality. For many in Europe it is simply unthinkable that the inclusion of the Western Balkans would bring six more Commissioners from the region, six new governments around the table, potentially slowing down the decision-making process and offering countless new opportunities for vetoes on the basis of real or perceived threats to the national interests of small Balkan states. In addition, the close association of Viktor Orban, the main disruptor in the EU, with a number of countries and political leaderships in the Balkans is a reminder of the risks associated with expanding the Union. For mainstream political elites in the EU, the prospect of post-accession democratic backsliding and/or allowing in members that may switch sides to strengthen the regressive powers of Europe’s illiberal members, is simply an anathema. At the end of the day, this could prove to be the simplest but most effective argument against enlarging the EU.
Popular Support in the EU and Political Implications
At present, solidarity with Ukraine is running high in Europe. A recent poll conducted on behalf of the European Council of Foreign Relations found that Europeans are keen to support Ukraine’s accession, despite the obvious economic and security risks, while also supporting Moldova and Montenegro joining the EU.[24] In contrast, they stand against Turkey joining the EU, and are rather neutral when it comes to the candidacies of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, North Macedonia and Serbia.
Substantially, the poll shows a division between old and new EU Member States on the timing of the Union’s enlargement with respondents in Austria, Denmark, Germany and France suggesting that the EU should not be adding new Member States at this moment, and those in Romania and Poland strongly supporting the opposite.
In most EU Member States, far-right and populist parties are on the rise; the 2024 European Parliament elections saw a major shift to the right in many countries, with populist radical right parties gaining votes and seats across the EU, and centre-left and green parties in decline. More anti-European populists could top the polls in several Member States, while some are already in government or are expected to do so in the coming period. While not all far-right parties are necessarily against enlargement, some are expected to make things much more difficult for candidate states. The new right-wing government led by Dutch nationalist Geert Wilders has already clarified that EU enlargement will not be supported, unless countries fulfil all the relevant criteria. Overall, this turn to the right is likely to have significant consequences for European-level policies, which will affect the foreign policy choices available to the EU.
Additionally, since the war in Ukraine, enlargement has been increasingly seen as a security imperative, but illiberal actors have used this to undermine the centrality of rule of law and fundamental rights in the narrative on enlargement. These voices will presumably push for the process to be driven by individual interests, transactionalism and strategic outlooks that have little to do with conditionality. For instance, Hungary is pushing for the acceleration of Serbia’s EU accession, justifying its support for an autocratic regime and using as an argument the strengthening of the Union’s security. And that’s despite the fact that there have been clear signs of Serbia’s democratic backsliding and divergence from the EU in many policy areas in the last decade or so.
Especially following the EU elections, the further weakening of governments in certain Member States, like for example Germany, will also have an impact on the decision-making process at the European Council. Hungary, and its Prime Minister Viktor Orban, has already expressed a keen interest in keeping the enlargement portfolio, which could eventually have negative consequences for the enlargement process to the east and the southeast.
The EU and its Member States must
make the right moves and offer the right
signals to all candidate countries to ensure
them that their membership perspective is real
Conclusions
Member states’ leaders and EU institutions talk the right talk when it comes to enlargement. But it remains uncertain whether they will actually walk the walk. Only concrete steps will secure the EU’s credibility when it comes to the new momentum for enlargement. A concrete vision and strategy, consensus building and the necessary resources for enlargement are the prerequisites for success.
Geopolitical “grey zones” and ambiguous security situations on the EU’s external borders are interlinked and should be discussed together. However, the two groups, namely Ukraine and Moldova on the one hand and the Western Balkans on the other, diverge in many ways: from their foreign policy orientation and the sense of threat from Russia, to the urgency felt in Brussels to promote certain accessions, the consequences for the Union’s own absorption capacity and the domestic political and socioeconomic situation in the candidate countries.
Ukraine is still a country at war, with many uncertainties surrounding its future. The recent EU decisions to formally begin accession negotiations with Ukraine, which were in fact accompanied by crucial financial support, are heading in the right direction, but could still be endangered by the possibility that with the potential re-election of Donald Trump in the US, Europe could be left alone to supply Kyiv with the necessary military equipment. Without this critical military aid, however, its accession negotiations would not amount to much in the face of Russia’s continuous aggression.
For the Western Balkans, the recent Growth Plan could remain an empty letter if it is not directly linked with certain negotiating chapters, critical reforms and the process of gradual integration into the EU. Without these there will be no real incentives for reforms and willingness to overcome bilateral disputes in the candidate countries. Overall, the project will remain ineffective.
However, the EU needs to offer both a credible roadmap for deeper integration of the candidate countries in the coming years and clarity over its own path for the necessary reforms. There should be a common approach linking both reforms and enlargement in a gradual manner, as well as a process that will measure progress.
Another important element is public opinion and how it will be convinced to consent to an expanded Union. The EU has so far avoided a major public debate for fear of making things worse, especially ahead of the European elections. But history has shown that if the Union wants to reform and make progress on enlargement, it cannot avoid public debate on all the related issues. European societies will have to be convinced that enlargement is both feasible for the EU and beneficial for existing Member States.
Finally, and independently of the necessary legwork to be done with public opinion and the internal reforms in the EU, the Union should also understand that it has to reverse the effects of the decaying enlargement policy from the previous decade. The EU and its Member States must make the right moves and offer the right signals to all candidate countries to ensure them that their membership perspective is real. Without this necessary signalling, the reforms in the candidate states may never get off the ground. The geopolitical moment for the EU will be lost. And the European continent will remain divided and an easy target for the geopolitical pressures of major authoritarian powers and other emerging international players.
[1] Slovakia – GLOBSEC summit in Bratislava – Closing speech by M. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic (31/05/23) www.elysee.fr/en/emmanuel-macron/2023/06/01/globsec-summit-in-bratislava.
[2] European Council Conclusions (15-12-23) www.consilium.europa.eu/media/68967/europeancouncilconclusions-14-15-12-2023-en.pdf.
[3] European Council Conclusions (22-03-24) www.consilium.europa.eu/media/70880/euco-conclusions-2122032024.pdf.
[4] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_03_163.
[5] International Republican Institute, “Western Balkans Regional Poll, February–March 2024.” Available: www.iri.org/resources/western-balkans-regional-poll-february-march-2024-full/.
[6] European Commission: State of the Union (13-09-23) https://state-of-the-union.ec.europa.eu/state-union-2023_en.
[7] Speech by President Charles Michel at the Bled Strategic Forum (23-08-23) www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/08/28/speech-by-president-charles-michel-at-the-bled-strategic-forum/.
[8] European Commission: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council on pre-enlargement reforms and policy reviews (Brussels, 20-03-24) https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/926b3cb2-f027-40b6-ac7b-2c198a164c94_en?filename=COM_2024_146_1_EN.pdf.
[9] European Parliament New support plan for Western Balkans: better governance, bolstering EU values (11-03-24) www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240311IPR19202/new-support-plan-for-western-balkans-better-governance-bolstering-eu-values.
[10] Armakolas, Ioannis “The Promise of European Integration: Breathing New Life into the Settlement of Bilateral Disputes.” Institute for Human Sciences-IWM, Vienna, 30 October 2023. Available: www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/the-promise-of-european-integration-breathing-new-life-into-the.
[11] Franco-German working group on EU Institutional Reform, “Sailing on High Seas – Reforming and Enlarging the EU for the 21st Century.” Report, October 2023. Available: www.auswaertiges-amt.de/blob/2617322/4d0e0010ffcd8c0079e21329bbbb3332/230919-rfaa-deu-fra-bericht-data.pdf.
[12] Buras, Piotr and Morina, Engjellushe “Catch-27: The contradictory thinking about enlargement in the EU.” Report, European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2023. Available: https://ecfr.eu/publication/catch-27-the-contradictory-thinking-about-enlargement-in-the-eu/.
[13] Zweers, Wouter; Ioannides, Isabelle; Nechev, Zoran and Dimitrov, Nikola “Unblocking decision-making in EU enlargement: Qualified Majority Voting as a way forward?” Clingendael, DGAP, ELIAMEP and Solutions, 2024. Available: www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/PB_Unblocking_decision-making_in_EU_enlargement.pdf.
[14] Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministries on the Launch of the Group of Friends on Qualified Majority Voting in EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (May 2023) https://europeanunion.diplomatie.belgium.be/sites/default/files/2023-06/Joint%20Statement%20of%20the%20Foreign%20Ministries%20on%20the%20Launch%20of%20the%20Group%20of%20Friends%20on.pdf.
[15] ibid
[16] “Non-paper on a more efficient Enlargement Process – suggestions for technical amendments to the Enlargement Methodology” (unofficial ideas document attributed to the governments of Germany and Slovenia).
[17] European Parliament: Qualified majority voting in common foreign and security policy: A cost of non-Europe report (19-08-23) www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2023/740243/EPRS_STU(2023)740243_EN.pdf.
[18] EUR-Lex Constructive abstention (positive abstention) https://eur-lex.europa.eu/FR/legal-content/glossary/abstention-constructive-positive-abstention.html.
[19] ibid
[20] Speech by Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz at the Charles University in Prague (29-08-22) www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/scholz-speech-prague-charles-university-2080752.
[21] Deutsche Welle (25-10-13) www.dw.com/pl/tusk-szykuje-bruksel%C4%99-na-sw%C3%B3j-rz%C4%85d/a-67211119.
[22] “Göttweig Appeal for Western Balkans’ Enlargement by the Friends of the Western Balkans and their Western Balkan partners.” 21 June 2024.
[23] International Republican Institute, “Western Balkans Regional Poll, February–March 2024.” Available: www.iri.org/resources/western-balkans-regional-poll-february-march-2024-full/.
[24] ECFR poll (December 2023) https://ecfr.eu/publication/europeans-open-to-ukraine-joining-the-eu-despite-security-risks.