This is not the first time the EU is exposing its internal differences regarding conflicts in the Middle East. Yet, this is arguably the moment in which these divisions may have a more profound impact. Firstly, because the war in Gaza has taken on an unprecedented magnitude, with more than 35,000 people killed during the first six months of the conflict, the majority women and children. Secondly, because EU leaders have very clearly positioned themselves on this conflict and have very often followed different lines, further accentuating an image of disunity. Thirdly, because the rest of the world has noticed the cracks in EU foreign policy, which will influence their assessments of future relations with the EU based on European positions on this conflict.
This article sheds light on the many divisions that are fracturing EU policy towards this conflict. It starts by highlighting that this situation has arisen despite the EU’s longstanding history of constructive engagement in creating opportunities for regional peace. However, in recent years, the deadlock of the peace process and recurrent obstructionism by some Member States have severely undermined the EU’s capacity to act effectively.
Following the 7 October attacks by Hamas and despite a short-lived consensus on condemning these atrocious acts, differences clearly emerged regarding the assistance provided to Palestinian actors or organizations working in Palestine, such as UNRWA, whether the recognition of Palestine as a state by the EU or by its Member States could revamp the peace process and how to put pressure on Israel to minimize the suffering and destruction in Gaza and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. As we will see, Member States have very different ideas on all those matters, with divisions even reaching the EU institutions. The way in which the EU manages these divisions will shape its reputation in the Middle East and beyond.
Nostalgic EU: Remembering Unity and Audacity
In looking back at the European Union’s involvement in the Middle East, there is a wistful sense of longing for a time when the EU stood together and made a constructive impact on this region. This feeling is especially strong when we think about how the EU managed to bring together countries with diverse views on the Middle East and find common ground. The EU was able to bridge gaps between Member States with differing opinions – balancing those who sympathized with the Palestinian or Arab cause with others who had closer ties to Israel. It also found a common ground between those that wanted the EU to be assertive and have a different line to the one expressed by the US and those that invoked the need to preserve a transatlantic alignment on this and many other sensitive issues.
From its early days, the EU has grappled with these conflicting viewpoints, yet it somehow found a way to navigate them successfully. The roots of European Foreign Policy stretch back to the 1970s when the European Economic Community (EEC) initiated the European Political Cooperation, a rather informal scheme for information sharing, dialogue and coordinated efforts that became the embryo of today’s foreign and security policy. In fact, the Middle East became a testing ground for this new methodology of work, with landmark events like the launch of the Euro-Arab dialogue in 1973 – a bold move following the oil shock – and the groundbreaking Venice Declaration of 1980. In that declaration, the then nine-member EEC supported Palestine’s right to self-determination and endorsed the involvement of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the peace efforts.
The 1990s brought renewed energy to EU engagement in the Middle East. Hosting the first peace conference in a European capital, Madrid, in 1991, showed the EU’s commitment to resolving the region’s conflicts and its willingness to play a meaningful role in international relations at a time when the world was changing rapidly with the end of the Cold War. By embracing the Oslo Accords two years later, the EU pledged substantial aid and support for the Palestinian National Authority, including massive investments like the Gaza airport, tragically destroyed by Israel soon after it became operational. The launch of the Barcelona Process in 1995 also epitomized collective hopes for regional cooperation and peace and the EU’s willingness to contribute to it. By inviting Palestine to join as a full participant, this initiative created new and unprecedented avenues for political dialogue, confidence-building and practical collaboration among Israel, Palestine and their Arab and European neighbours.
Despite fading hopes since the late 1990s, the EU remained dedicated to keep the Middle East peace process alive. Decisions like appointing the first Special Representative for the Middle East, Miguel Angel Moratinos, and deploying CFSP missions in Rafah underscored the EU’s ongoing engagement on the ground. Being part of the Quartet – alongside the UN, US and Russia also reflected that the most influential global players acknowledged the EU’s say in this conflict. Through all those initiatives, the EU has determinedly advocated for a two-state solution. However, the actions of the conflicting parties were making it increasingly difficult to turn this vision into a reality.
Before the Storm: Fading Hopes and Obstructive Practices
Since 2005, the EU faced mounting challenges in its declared efforts to sustain the Middle East peace process. Despite its commitment to a two-state solution, the EU found itself increasingly impotent in reversing the stagnation and decline of the peace process. Repeated declarations of support for a two-state solution were undermined by ongoing actions on the ground, such as the expansion of illegal Israeli settlements or disunity among Palestinians, which continued to erode the feasibility of this vision. The EU’s inability to revert those trends highlighted its limited influence in altering the course of the conflict, and some observers argued the EU was trapped in the logic of the Oslo Accords, even though it was clear that these were not delivering (del Sarto, 2019).
In fact, this period also saw growing divisions within the EU itself. The internal discord was starkly illustrated by differing stances on the international stage, such as the divergent responses to Palestine’s status as a member of UNESCO and its recognition as an observer state in the UN. These discrepancies revealed a fractured EU, struggling to present a unified front on critical issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Moreover, the sense of urgency surrounding the Arab-Israeli conflict further diminished as the EU’s attention was diverted to other pressing crises. First and foremost, leaders were preoccupied with addressing the political and economic crises affecting many European countries and the EU integration process itself. Secondly, on the foreign policy front, and more specifically in the Southern Neighbourhood, other priorities such as the conflicts in Syria, Libya and Yemen, along with the ensuing migratory crisis, captured the remaining political attention. These events, combined with limited expectations of making a meaningful impact due to the paralysis of the peace process, relegated the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to a lower priority, diluting the EU’s diplomatic and strategic efforts in the region.
Additionally, the Abraham Accords, which saw Israel normalize relations with several Arab countries thanks to the mediation of the Trump administration, later supported by Biden, also altered the way in which extra-regional actors tackled the possibility of peace in the Middle East. The EU could not but support these agreements, recognizing their potential to foster regional stability, but by doing so it underestimated the extent to which these diplomatic moves exacerbated Palestinian frustration and accentuated a feeling of abandonment.
The sense of urgency surrounding
the Arab-Israeli conflict further
diminished as the EU’s attention
was diverted to other pressing crises
Compounding these issues was the EU’s increasing paralysis due to internal vetoes. Since 2016, countries such as Hungary have blocked the EU from adopting new positions on critical matters related to Israel and Palestine, including responses to settlement expansions and the US announcement to move its embassy to Jerusalem. This internal deadlock forced the EU to resort to alternative methods to express its stance, such as issuing statements through the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP) or having individual Member States or EU ambassadors on the ground release statements reflecting previously agreed positions (Akgül-Açıkmeşe et al., 2023). The goal was for conflicting parties and relevant international players to continue to perceive, despite these divisions and obstructionist tactics, that there is still a European position and a vision on how to put an end to this decades-long conflict, even when not all the Member States backed it. Even this semblance of an EU policy was compromised due to the cacophonic messages sent by EU leaders since 7 October.
Reacting to 7 October: Unity and Cacophony
The terrorist attacks of 7 October triggered a strong feeling of empathy and solidarity with the victims. The response of European leaders and the institutions was unequivocal. The statement on behalf of the EU by the High Representative released the very same day of the terrorist attacks condemned “in the strongest possible terms the multiple and indiscriminate attacks across Israel by Hamas,” and called “for an immediate cessation of these senseless attacks and violence, which will only further increase tensions on the ground and seriously undermine Palestinian people’s aspirations for peace.” It added that “the EU stands in solidarity with Israel, which has the right to defend itself in line with international law, in the face of such violent and indiscriminate attacks,” also recalling “the importance of working towards a lasting and sustainable peace through reinvigorated efforts in the Middle East Peace Process.”[1] The same messages were reiterated in a statement from the members of the European Council on 15 October and in the video conference convened by the Permanent President of the Council, Charles Michel, on 17 October.
Despite this apparent unity, which contrasts with many previous instances where EU members failed to find a common position regarding the conflict, some cracks began to appear. A case in point was the visit by Ursula von der Leyen and Roberta Metsola to Israel on 13 October. The controversy stemmed from their message of unconditional support for Israel, conveyed in meetings with Israeli authorities and through social networks. For some, the issue was the content of the message; for others, the problem lay in the fact that they were not entitled to speak on behalf of the EU on foreign policy matters. Both elements – taking sides and overstepping their authority – were highlighted in an unprecedented letter signed by hundreds of EU staffers criticizing von der Leyen’s actions. The letter also warned of the “European cacophony” resulting from these actions.”[2]
The divergent vote of EU states in the UN
confirmed the divisions within the EU […]
The message this and subsequent votes sent
was that when it came to the Middle East,
a united European Foreign Policy was an illusion
Within the European Parliament, Iratxe Garcia, president of the Socialist & Democrats group, argued that the two Presidents “had the duty to represent the position of the Union as a whole, including its Member States” and that “with their visit to Israel they failed, upholding an unacceptable bias that can only cause harm.” Nathalie Loiseau, a senior MEP of the Renew Group and a former minister of European Affairs tweeted “I don’t understand what the President of the European Commission has to do with the foreign policy of the EU, which she is not in charge of.”[3] Reacting to those controversies, Josep Borrell also stated during a press conference in Beijing, in response to a journalist inquiring about von der Leyen’s authority to speak on foreign policy matters, that “the position of the European Union on foreign policy is being determined by the European Union Council and by the Foreign Affairs Ministers Council, because the common foreign policy of the European Union is an intergovernmental policy, it’s not a community policy.”
The ongoing grievances triggered by this visit, evident even months later, illustrate the depth of interinstitutional quarrels. In an interview with El País in February 2024, Josep Borrell criticized von der Leyen’s trip, stating that “with such an absolutely pro-Israel stance, representing no one but herself on a matter of international policy, it has had a high geopolitical cost for Europe.”[4] Similarly, in June 2024, Charles Michel told several European journalists, “We paid the bill” referring to the damage to the EU’s image in the region and expressing regret over the Commission President making statements “without any legitimacy.”[5]
Arguably, the unconditional pro-Israeli view by von der Leyen may have also pushed other European leaders to visibly display that her position did not represent them. A case in point was the visit by the premiers of Spain and Belgium, Pedro Sanchez and Alexander De Croo, to Israel, Palestine and Egypt in November 2023. During this visit, the two leaders condemned the Hamas attacks and called for the release of the hostages, but they also stressed the need to revive the two-state solution and the protection of the civilian population in Gaza. Whereas von der Leyen’s response was praised by the Israeli authorities, Sanchez and De Croo’s visit triggered a diplomatic spat, with the Israeli Foreign Minister going as far as accusing them of “supporting terrorism.”[6]
Additionally, the divergent vote of EU states in the UN confirmed the divisions within the EU. On 27 October 2023, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution ES-10/21 calling for an immediate and sustained humanitarian truce and cessation of hostilities, while condemning all acts of violence aimed at Palestinian and Israeli civilians and demanding all parties to immediately and fully comply with their obligations under international law. Four of the 14 members that opposed the resolutions are members of the EU (Austria, Croatia, Czechia and Hungary) and although seven EU members – including France and Spain – voted in favour, most EU countries abstained. The message this and subsequent votes in the UN General Assembly sent was that when it came to the Middle East, a united European Foreign Policy was an illusion, and many commentators contrasted this with the EU’s vow to act as a geopolitical union. The well-read column by Charlemagne in The Economist affirmed that “Europe’s response to the crisis started off badly and got steadily worse.”[7]
The votes in the UN regarding the cease-fire and the inconsistent messages addressed to the Israeli leadership are just some of the ways in which the EU exposed its internal divergences. Now, let’s analyse the differences among Member States and within EU institutions on two key issues: whether to adjust humanitarian aid for the Palestinians and the appropriateness of recognizing Palestine as a state.
Aid Politics: Upgrading or Downgrading
Since the 1990s the European Union has been the biggest provider of external assistance to the Palestinians, making this one of the areas where a policy change could have a greater impact. Although the EU has maintained a no-contact policy with Hamas, it has continued to work with the Ramallah-based Palestinian National Authority, Palestinian civil society organizations and Humanitarian agencies that are active not only in the West Bank but also in Gaza.
One of the first controversies on the reactions to the new spiral of conflict in Gaza erupted when the EU Commission for the Neighbourhood, the Hungarian Oliver Varhelyi. announced on X (formerly Twitter) that the Commission would review aid to Palestinians, suspending all payments and postponing all new budget proposals.[8] This statement, made on 9 October, was quickly refuted by the Commission spokesperson Eric Mamer, revealing that Varhelyi’s announcement was not preceded by any consultation with any member of the Commission College.[9] Clearly revealing the existence of very different views on this matter, Janez Lenarcic, the European Commissioner for Crisis Management, also used X to clarify that “humanitarian aid to Palestinians in need will continue as long as needed.”
The controversy escalated as several Member States, including France, Ireland, Spain and Luxembourg, rejected plans to cut off aid, as this would only worsen the already dire situation in the Gaza Strip. In an attempt to translate words into deeds, the government of Spain announced that it would double its aid to the Palestinian people. The government had already increased the planned 17 million euros for cooperation with Palestine by an additional 4 million euros, following the escalation of the conflict triggered by Hamas’ terrorist attack against Israel on 7 October. Amid the controversy sparked by Varhelyi’s announcement, Spanish diplomatic sources have confirmed that this amount would be doubled.[10]
Yet, some EU Member States stood with Várhelyi, including his home country, Hungary, and also the Czech Republic. The lack of consensus among Member States became evident on 10 October when the EU ministers of foreign affairs held an informal video conference to discuss the situation in Israel and the region following the Hamas attacks. The read-out from this meeting noted that “an overwhelming majority of ministers stated that cooperation with the Palestinian Authority should continue, and EU funds should not be discontinued,” acknowledging that some EU countries were in favour of stopping, reducing or withdrawing this aid.[11]
A few months later, in January 2024, Israel made a series of allegations against the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), pointing at the fact that some of its workers could have been involved in the October terrorist attacks. Despite repeated calls by the UN secretary general not to do so, this led a few important donors to announce that they would stop their support for an organisation that plays a vital role in providing basic humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian population in Gaza, as well as in the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, and neighbouring countries such as Jordan. The divergent reaction of EU members regarding this case also epitomized the extent to which the EU is far from achieving a unified stance on key issues related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For instance, the Netherlands announced that they would stop the funding to UNRWA, while France, Germany and Italy decided to resume their contribution in April, after finding that Israel had not provided any evidence to back its claims – although also specifying that rigorous controls would be introduced to ensure the correct use of this assistance -, while Spain, Ireland and Portugal, among other countries, responded to the controversy announcing additional contributions to this agency.
Palestinian Statehood: Moral and Strategic Conflicting Arguments
Whether and when to recognize Palestine as a state was a divisive issue within the EU well before the October attacks. Most EU members expected to recognize the State of Palestine as part of the negotiated settlement for the conflict. Yet, as the peace process collapsed, the Swedish government decided to explore alternative options. In October 2014, Sweden became the first Western European country to recognize the State of Palestine. This recognition was driven by the belief that acknowledging Palestinian statehood would help level the playing field in peace negotiations and encourage a more balanced dialogue between the two parties. Prior to Sweden’s recognition, the two neutral Mediterranean countries (Malta and Cyprus) as well as several eastern European countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania) had already recognized Palestine as a state. Yet, those recognitions preceded the launch of the Peace Process in the early 1990s and their accession into the EU in the 2000s. This is why Stockholm’s decision was far more relevant when discussing the cohesiveness of EU foreign policy, prompting a debate on whether this was a sign of de-Europeanization or an attempt to lead a different European policy (Aggestam and Bicchi, 2019).
Sweden’s decision was preceded by other signs of disunity, such as the differing votes on whether to admit Palestine as a full member in UNESCO in 2011 and the vote on General Assembly resolution 67/19 on upgrading Palestine’s status to a non-member observer state in November 2012. In that consequential vote, 14 out of the 27 members voted favourably, 13 abstained, and one – the Czech Republic – opposed. Fragmentation was even greater regarding UNESCO membership. At that time, five countries, including Germany, opposed, while 12, including France, voted in favour, and ten others abstained. Intense discussions among EU Member States highlighted the risks of projecting themselves as a disunited group on such a central issue. One alternative that had been considered was for the EU to collectively abstain. However, some Member States rejected this option, arguing that it could easily be seen as a sign of paralysis or even irrelevance.
The magnitude of the humanitarian crisis provoked by the Israeli military’s retaliation in Gaza following the October 2023 Hamas-led attacks, and the fact that the risk of obsolescence of the two-state solution was higher than ever before, pushed other European countries to follow the paths taken by Sweden ten years earlier. Spain and Ireland, together with a non-EU country, Norway, synchronized their decisions to recognize Palestinian statehood. A few weeks later, Slovenia followed suit, despite Israel’s virulent response and threats such as the Israeli Foreign Affairs Minister warning that “those who harm us, we will harm in return.”[12] In the absence of consensus at the EU on the issue of recognition, the High Representative Josep Borrell just expressed that he took note of the announcement made by two EU Member States and that he would “relentlessly work with all Member States to promote a common EU position based on a two-state solution.”[13]
Evidencing once more that this common position was still a matter of contention, in May 2024 the EU members were once again divided in their voting regarding the UN General Assembly, recognizing that Palestine qualifies for full membership and recommending the UN Security Council reconsider the matter positively. The resolution won a resounding majority of 143 votes in favour, including some EU members that had not yet recognized Palestine such as Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Slovakia and, quite significantly, France as well. 25 abstained, including many EU members. Finally, nine nations voted against the text, among which were two EU countries: Hungary and the Czech Republic.
Forever Divided?
While the emotional shock of the Hamas-led attacks in October 2023 briefly revived a unified European position, as the days and months went by, cracks in EU foreign policy became visible. The initial solidarity gave way to familiar disagreements, revealing deep-rooted divergences in national interests and perspectives on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The President of the European Commission’s prominent support for Israel raised concerns among some Member States and within the EU’s complex inter-institutional framework. These concerns were rooted in the substance of von der Leyen’s stance, the way it was presented, and the fact that it was an overstep in authority. Later on, controversies arose over whether to upgrade or downgrade humanitarian assistance for Palestinians and on the convenience and timing of recognizing Palestine as a state. These divisions were visible through contradictory, even cacophonic, political communication as well as in major votes in the UN.
Persistent divisions and inconsistent
approaches continue to limit the EU’s
projection as a relevant and constructive
actor on the global stage
This display of divergences overshadows the fact that there are some elements on which EU members agree. First and foremost is the realization that peace and stability in the Middle East are of utmost importance for the EU. Due to geographical and social proximities, the negative consequences of conflict escalation could easily reach the EU itself. Secondly, there is an awareness that it is crucial to prevent this new phase of the conflict from evolving into a full-fledged regional conflict involving neighbouring countries and antagonistic regional powers. Thirdly, there is a conviction that dialogue and negotiation are the means through which peace can be achieved. Fourthly, there is a willingness to participate in any collective attempt to attain this goal. Despite these elements, which could bring the EU together, differences quickly arise when it comes to the discussion on how to achieve these goals.
Since the 1970s, the Middle East has been a litmus test for the ambition, autonomy and cohesiveness of EU foreign policy. In that vein, it is fair to say that the examination of its current shape is not particularly encouraging, as persistent divisions and inconsistent approaches continue to limit the EU’s projection as a relevant and constructive actor on the global stage. Some analysts go as far as qualifying it as a “diplomatic and moral shipwreck” (Kausch, 2024). This is even more worrying in an international context characterized by great power competition, proliferating insecurities and the erosion of the norms and institutions that the EU and its members have contributed to establishing. Among other things, it could easily compromise the EU’s attempts to reach out to the Global South (Fernandez Molina, 2024).
Yet, the history of the EU and its foreign policy shows that in the most critical situations, solutions are found and wounds are healed. 20 years ago, the EU was also extremely fractured over whether to support the US intervention in Iraq, and yet, it was able to overcome these divisions and give a major push to its foreign and security policy.
Rebuilding the EU’s image as a constructive and cohesive force for peace in the Middle East should be a priority in the new political cycle initiated after the 2024 European Parliament elections. This is easier said than done, if only because it involves acknowledging the mistakes made by some of the same individuals now tasked with correcting them. Ultimately, success will depend heavily on factors beyond the control of those steering EU foreign policy, such as the priorities and strategies of the conflicting parties, the conditions for de-escalation and negotiation, and the stance of the US administration following the November elections. Yet, even in the most adverse circumstances, it would benefit the EU to internalize that differing national policies and sensitivities should not prevent it from working on areas where broad consensus still exists. When consensus is impossible, the EU should welcome groups of member countries coordinating and joining forces to achieve goals that align with the spirit of the EU’s pre-agreed positions. The alternatives are obstructionism, paralysis or an equally undesirable unity in inaction.
References
Aggestam, L. and Bicchi, B. “New Directions in EU Foreign Policy Governance: Cross-loading, Leadership and Informal Groupings.” in Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 57, No. 3 (May 2019), p. 515-532, DOI 10.1111/jcms.12846.
Akgül-Açikmeşe, S., et al. “Stalled by division: EU internal contestation over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.” JOINT Research Paper no. 19, 2023, www.jointproject.eu/2023/02/22/stalled-by-division-eu-internal-contestation-over-the-israeli-palestinian-conflict/.
Del Sarto, R.A. “Stuck in the Logic of Oslo: Europe and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict.” Middle East Journal, LXXIII:3 (2019), 376–396.
Fernández Molina. I. “Costuras que saltan y remiendos.” Real Instituto Elcano, 13 June 2024. www.realinstitutoelcano.org/comentarios/costuras-que-saltan-y-remiendos/.
Kausch, K. “A Decade of Deadlock. The EU’s Shipwreck on Palestine Embodies the EU’s Blockade Problem.” JOINT Briefs. March 2024. www.jointproject.eu/2024/03/14/a-decade-of-deadlock-the-eus-shipwreck-on-palestine-embodies-the-eus-blockade-problem/.
[1] Council of the EU, “Statement by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the attacks against Israel.” 7 October 2023. Available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/10/07/statement-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-attacks-against-israel/.
[2] Pugnet, A. & Basso, D “EU staff criticise von der Leyen over Israel stance.” Euractiv, 20 October 2023. Available at: www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/eu-staff-criticise-von-der-leyen-over-israel-stance/.
[3] “Von der Leyen accused of ‘unacceptable bias’ toward Israel.” Politico, 14 October 2024, Available at: www.politico.eu/article/von-der-leyen-visit-israel-gaza-hamas-conflict-bias/.
[4] Pérez. C. “Borrell: ‘Putin y Trump aún no han ganado, pero pueden ganar; Europa tiene que despertar’” El País, 25 February 2024. Available at: https://elpais.com/internacional/2024-02-25/borrell-putin-y-trump-aun-no-han-ganado-pero-pueden-ganar-europa-tiene-que-despertar.html?event_log=oklogin.
[5] Sánchez Nicolás, E. “Michel: we’ve ‘paid the bill’ for von der Leyen’s ‘geopolitical’ commission” EUObsever, 3 June 2024. Available at: https://euobserver.com/eu-political/ar70197388.
[6] Faggionato, G. “Israel accuses Spain, Belgium leaders of backing ‘terrorism’ after Gaza remarks” Politico, 25 November 2023, available at: www.politico.eu/article/israel-gaza-belgium-spain-supporting-terrorism-terror-war-sanchez-de-croo/.
[7] www.economist.com/europe/2023/10/19/the-eus-response-to-the-crisis-in-israel-exposes-its-limits.
[8] Várhelyi, O. post on X, 9 October 2023, 2.44 pm. Available here: https://x.com/OliverVarhelyi/status/1711362068056613294.
[9] Moens, B. et al. “Europe struggles to present consistent messaging on Palestinian aid.” Politico, 10 October 2023. www.politico.eu/article/europe-battles-to-present-common-front-on-palestinian-aid/.
[10] González. M. “España duplicará su ayuda al pueblo palestino y superará los 40 millones.” El País, 30 October 2023. Available at: https://elpais.com/espana/2023-10-30/espana-duplicara-su-ayuda-al-pueblo-palestino-y-superara-los-40-millones.html.
[11] Foreign Affairs Council. Informal video conference of foreign affairs ministers, 10 October 2023. Available at: www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2023/10/10/.
[12] Katz. I. Post on X. 27 May 2024, 8.24 am. Available at: https://x.com/Israel_katz/status/1794977866297328058.
[13] Borrell, J. Post on X, 22 May 2024, 6:49 pm. Available at: https://x.com/JosepBorrellF/status/1793323426792235045.
Header photo: Participation of Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, to a commemoration and Solemn Moment in Solidarity with the victims of the Terror Attacks in Israel. Photographer: Lukasz Kobus. © European Union, 2023