The Sahel is on the move and it cannot be stopped, but its movement is forced and involuntary. Populations are fleeing the new conflicts that have broken out in areas ripe for armed insurgencies, where state control of the territory is a chimera and economic, criminal, legal and natural resources largely explain the slide towards insecurity. First, there are the various insurgent movements that have been taking up arms against the central governments for over a decade. More recently, other wars have broken out between armed groups and the Central Sahel states that are trying to use their security forces, with help from mercenaries, to control the region (Mesa, 2022).
As a result of these various forms of violence, Mauritania, the most stable country in the Sahelo-Saharan region, is suffering the impact of an unusual influx of migratory flows. Most of these migrants are Peul refugees from herding families in the Macina region of central Mali, who are forced to leave behind their homes and, even worse, their main source of livelihood virtually overnight (Cartier, 2013). The relocation of Mali’s livestock farming to the nearest border has even further complicated the situation, as the lack of rainfall and frequent droughts, coupled with high temperatures, exacerbate the vulnerability of the displaced people. These people moreover run the risk of losing their cattle, their sole means of subsistence and their raison d’être.
Mauritania, the most stable country
in the Sahelo-Saharan region, is
suffering the impact of an unusual
influx of migratory flows
This reality is compounded by the friction between Malian refugees and local Mauritanian communities, who are forced to share the same economic area and scarce resources, which, at times, gives rise to tensions and additional challenges for achieving social cohesion and sustainable development in the region. The camps in the Mauritanian border region of Hodh El Chargui receive aid from various United Nations (UN) agencies, such as the World Food Programme, which assists more than a hundred thousand people there. But the constant inflow of refugees following the resumption, in late 2023, of the conflict between armed groups from northern and central Mali and Wagner Group mercenaries, supported by the Malian armed forces, makes it difficult to provide quality care. Food supplies are scarce, as are potable water and medical care. The only resources mobilized to assist refugees are those from the UN.
Mauritania is demonstrating a strong commitment to protecting and providing humanitarian assistance to migrants by maintaining an open-door policy, as long as the refugees remain at the border and do not move on towards the capital. The implementation of greater international cooperation mechanisms and increased support for the government are now crucial to improve living conditions for the refugees, victims of the Sahel crisis, which is already being replicated in other border areas, such as that with Niger.
The Nigerien region of Tahoua, in particular, has become a refuge for countless people displaced from Menaka, in north-eastern Mali, where fierce battles have been waged between the Dawsahak Tuaregs and members of the self-styled Islamic State in this part of the Sahel. The year 2023 was one of the bloodiest for this strategic border point connecting Mali and Niger, which, in addition to being a major drug trafficking route, is also an area dedicated to pastoralism and livestock farming. Due to the multidimensional nature of the conflict’s origin, the situation is extremely complex. Tensions arise not only due to ideological pressures, whether jihadist or nationalist, but also economic factors, which are at the root of the new wars in the Sahel and have been pitting shepherds, herders and farmers against each other for years.
The combination of prolonged droughts and the growing amount of land farmed by sedentary populations has considerably reduced the space available for livestock grazing. This has led to numerous displacements along the Mali-Niger border, where Peul and Tuareg herders clash over increasingly scarce resources. As a result, most of the Malian refugees in Tahoua are herders and shepherds, forced to flee to north-eastern Niger, a vast desert region that today is home to 128,858 people who have fled their homes, of whom 76,161 are internally displaced people, 42,460 are Malian refugees and the remaining 10,237 people, primarily Nigerien returnees.
Fleeing from the atrocities and the relentless climate of insecurity, especially in the turbulent Menaka region, in 2023, new waves of Malian migrants found refuge in quiet neighbouring towns in Niger, such as Tchin-Tabaraden, Telemcess and Tillia. These internal migrations, a constant since the 2012 crisis in northern Mali, are not seeking a route to Europe, but to remain within the Sahelian borders. They are mostly Tamashek or Peul families with ties to the land and to herding and/or pastoralist economic activities (Hameth Ba, 2007). For anthropological reasons, these local communities are not usually candidates for intercontinental emigration across the Mediterranean or Atlantic, but rather seek solely to settle and stay in safe areas.
These intracontinental migrations
are circular, regular and forced and,
in the central Sahel, happen on a much
greater scale than the irregular
intercontinental migrations
These intracontinental migrations are circular, regular and forced and, in the central Sahel, happen on a much greater scale than the irregular intercontinental migrations affecting other southern Sahelian communities, such as the Malinke or Bambara, who prepare their migratory plans for months or even years. Leaving Africa requires contacts and large sums of money to finance border crossings beyond the control of security forces, bribe government officials and pay the mafias that manage the migration routes off the continent.
These networks have turned illegal migration into a key source of revenue for the countries of the Sahel, although regular migration is still the most massive and important. The difference between the two lies in their cost. The movements of internal migrants do not feed the mafias that engage in people smuggling and trafficking, whereas migrants seeking to cross the continental border do fund this other criminal economic activity, which moreover exposes them to situations of extreme violence.
Passage along the Niger-Libya corridor is dangerous, and those who pursue it are exposed to systematic violations of their fundamental human rights. Human rights protection in Libya is practically non-existent, and the deep division between the east and west of the country, where the de facto powers vie for control of both the legal and criminal economy, hardly encourages their promotion. The underground dimension of migration has a negative impact as it increases the costs of the “journey” and allows migrants to be subjected to demeaning treatment. Libya’s ruling elites act, first, by managing the waves of migrants seeking to continue on to Europe and, second, by holding them in detention centres in deplorable conditions before expelling them, in response to Europe’s demands and its policy of outsourcing border control.
The current paradox is that key countries for migration, such as Niger, have stopped cooperating with Europe on migration control, unlike in 2015, when Niger toughened its migration-related measures by passing a series of laws criminalizing the outflow and inflow of migrants, thereby sealing off traditional routes and opening up illegal alternatives that exposed migrants to even greater risks.
In the wake of Niger’s crisis with France, entailing the expulsion of French troops from Operation Barkhane and all other security arrangements led by France or its European partners, passage through Niger once again encourages migration, albeit this time in an organized and regular way. The suspension of any type of cooperation with EU countries has affected not only Niger, but also Mali and Burkina Faso. The three Central Sahelian countries have formed an unprecedented alliance of opposition to European policy and aligned themselves with Russia. The geopolitical transformation in the Sahelo-Saharan region, with three countries cutting their ties with their traditional partners, has undone years of cooperation on security matters and, especially, on the control of migratory flows.
The sub-Saharan African countries’ migration control mechanisms, with Niger at the epicentre of the movements, more specifically, the north of the country, in Agadez, an area with an influx of people and all manner of goods, have changed since the creation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).[1] The new powers are military officers who seized the presidency through coups d’état, which they justified by pointing to the deteriorating security conditions of the population, despite the French-led international intervention. France itself participated in Niger’s strong securitization and made numerous efforts to prevent migration flows from sub-Saharan Africa from entering the Mediterranean.
French and European financial support enabled the acquisition of drones to monitor the routes, the training of Nigerien gendarmes, and the procuring of military intelligence resources aimed at dismantling the networks at the source. However, none of this succeeded in stopping the flows of clandestine migrants, as the smuggling networks simply eschewed conventional routes in favour of alternative ones, rendering migrants even more vulnerable. What seemed clear on the northern shore of the Mediterranean was not nearly as clear in the south, where the repressive measures taken against migration were so severe that their unpopularity also impacted the EU’s image in terms of respect for human rights. In the Sahel, thousands of people make a direct or indirect living from migration; iron-clad control of these flows destroys jobs and further weakens migrants’ positions. The South’s perspective thus calls for better management of migrants’ movement in order to prevent violations of their basic rights.
Niger’s response to France following the latter’s attempt to intervene militarily to restore Mohamed Bazoum to power – after he was deposed by General Abdourahmane Tchiani – has been the most radical to date. The Niger corridor has been opened wide to migrants, who have returned to traditional and safe routes. Even the routière highway police have stopped criminalizing people seeking to reach Agadez in order to continue on to Libya and begun, instead, to arrange convoys from the bus station in Niamey, the Nigerien capital.
The organization of irregular migration begins at the bus station in the Nigerien capital, from where it proceeds to the checkpoints that regularize the passage of lorries, cars, taxis and any other means of transportation carrying migrants from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This organization rivals the AES made up of Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso, which withdrew from ECOWAS in response to a geopolitics dominated by the French agenda in a move that has driven these Central Sahelian countries towards pro-Russian alignments.
It is migrations from Sahelian countries, faced with increasingly impoverished economies, that have reactivated the Atlantic route used by these migrants. The impact of the economic sanctions imposed on Mali following Assimi Goita’s military coup on the lives of Malians has been so strong that it has also influenced plans to migrate outside the continent. Malians are not only directly fleeing from the armed violence in their country but also from the economic consequences of the war and internal political crises. Political instability also impacts extracontinental mobility. In Senegal, former President Macky Sall’s 2024 attempt to remain in power by changing the date of the elections,[2] restrictions on individual freedoms, and the arbitrary arrests of Sall’s opponents during a long term of office also marked by scenes of violence and countless deaths have pushed thousands of citizens to set out in rickety skiffs for the Canary Islands. Senegal has elected a new president, Bassirou Diomaye Faye, in whom a population calling for distancing from France and a new economic model that will help mitigate inequalities between social classes has placed its hopes. The first consequences of this political change are starting to be seen in the declining number of skiffs departing with Senegalese on board. There is hope for change for Senegal, and this worries Europe, as the country is no longer the pro-French stronghold it once was but instead is edging closer to the military juntas of the Central Sahel and their radical break with Paris.
The Atlantic migrations have been led mainly by Senegalese, along with black Mauritanians and, more recently, Malians. People’s disaffection towards the central powers extends beyond Senegal. In a constitutional coup in Guinea Bissau, President Umaro Sissoco flouted the Constitution by dissolving Parliament by decree; in other central sub-Saharan African countries, such as Cameroon, where Paul Biya is all but president for life, corruption runs extremely deep, considering that the country harbours the most important natural resources in all Central Africa.
Despite the wealth associated with oil, gas, minerals, timber and the agricultural sector (with coffee, cotton and cocoa), most of the population wants to leave the country, making Cameroon one of the main emigration countries in this part of Africa. Unfortunately, there are no signs of change pointing towards alternation in Cameroon or in any other central Sahelian country. Chad, for example, is likewise governed by an authoritarian regime that has recently perpetuated itself in power.
Thus, movements both within the Sahel countries and from them towards Europe are increasingly frequent due to the rise of new military regimes that should be working to usher in social and economic changes to countries with young but unemployed workforces. This situation is compounded by regular outbreaks of violence between armed organizations, with the ensuing impact on the economic basis for thousands of households and the livestock and agricultural sectors.
The repression and unchecked violence
are conducive to recruitment by jihadist
groups, which take advantage of the desperation
and fear caused by state violence in the affected
communities to gain followers
Violence is not only a problem when it occurs in the context of militias, terrorist organizations or organized crime groups, but also when it is perpetrated by irregular forces or self-defence militias promoted by the Sahelian states themselves – the Peul community has been hardest hit by this violence. This alarming situation further undermines the protection of local communities, as denounced by the InternationalCrisis Group. The non-governmental organization has warned of the self-defence groups created in Burkina Faso since 2014 to restore security, which have fuelled local violence against the Peul community.[3] In particular, since 2019, young volunteers mobilized by the state (Homeland Defence Volunteers) have undertaken sporadic operations in central and northern Burkina Faso and in the Soum region, theoretically, to fight against jihadists.
Paradoxically, the response of the Burkinabe government, which, with the support of Russian mercenaries, has been targeting the Peul civilian population, is encouraging jihadist recruitment, as a means of protection against the state. This spiral of violence, marked by abuses by the armed forces, is causing many people to flee in any direction that might enable greater stability.
Human Rights Watch (HRW)[4] also joined the chorus of international voices denouncing the massacre of the Peul community in Burkina Faso. On 20 April 2023, in the village of Karma, in the north of the country, uniformed men, allegedly belonging to the Burkinabe armed forces, killed 136 civilians, including women and children. Eyewitnesses described scenes of extreme brutality, with summary executions and point-blank shootings of people attempting to flee or seek shelter.
The repression and unchecked violence have not only resulted in numerous deaths, but also exacerbated insecurity and caused the forced displacement of the region’s population. According to HRW, these acts of extreme violence contribute to a cycle of violence and the emergence of an environment of impunity that are conducive to recruitment by jihadist groups, which take advantage of the desperation and fear caused by state violence in the affected communities to gain followers.
The Burkinabe government has come under fire for its lack of control over the security forces and its reliance on irregular armed groups, which has led to abuses and human rights violations. The international community, including through the UN and other human rights organizations, has called for a thorough and impartial investigation to clarify the facts and bring those responsible to justice.
Senegal, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and Sudan, the last of the Sahelian countries, have been exporting a steady stream of migrants since April 2023, when fighting broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). These two military forces have historically had a tense and competitive relationship despite being on the same side of the country’s power structure. Once again, disputes over control and influence, especially in terms of military and political leadership, have resulted in open clashes, generating one of the most aggressive waves of forced mobility in recent times.
The violence has forced millions of people to flee their homes. Around 8 million people have been displaced both within and outside the country, seeking refuge in safer places within Sudan itself or in neighbouring countries such as Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia or South Sudan.[5]
The war has exacerbated food insecurity, with many areas facing food shortages. Sanitary conditions have also deteriorated, with limited access to drinking water and health services. Malnutrition and waterborne diseases have become significant threats to both the displaced population and the host communities.
These Sudanese migrations are mostly intra-regional, although the displacement was so expansive that fleeing Sudanese also reached the borders of North Africa. Until a cease fire agreement can be reached, the influx of Sudanese migrants will continue, not only towards Chad, Egypt and Libya, but also towards Europe, which, over the past year, has shored up its cooperation with the countries of transit for extra-continental migrations (Tunisia, Mauritania, Morocco and Libya). These countries near the Mediterranean are finding it increasingly difficult to cope with the growing migratory pressure from the Sahel. Hence, despite European investment in the control of the southern borders and the commitment of these southern neighbours to address border control needs, North African countries are increasingly reluctant to shoulder the responsibility for this border policy that is costing Europe so dearly.
References
Boyer, F. & Mounkaila, H. “Européanisation des politiques migratoires au Sahel: Le Niger dans l’imbroglio sécuritaire” in Grégoire, Emmanuel (ed.), L’État réhabilité en Afrique: Réinventer les politiques publiques à l’ère néolibérale (pp. 267-285). Paris: Karthala, 2018. https://doi.org/10.3917/kart.grego.2018.01.0269.
Cartier, Diana. La crise au Mali sous l’angle de la migration. IOM, 2013. www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/documents/Mali-Migration-Crisis-June-2013-FR.pdf.
Mesa, Beatriz: Los grupos armados del Sahel. Conflicto y economía criminal en el norte de Mali. Madrid: Libros de La Catarata, 2022.
Hameth Ba, Abdoul. Acteurs et territoires du Sahel. Lyon: ENS Éditions, 2007. https://doi.org/10.4000/books.enseditions.896.
[1] https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/ar20-fr.pdf.
[2] https://theconversation.com/macky-sall-remet-en-cause-les-fondements-democratiques-du-senegal-223044.
[3] www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/2023-12/313-burkina-vdp.pdf.
[4] www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/25/burkina-faso-army-massacres-223-villagers.
[5] Médecins Sans Frontières, “Crise au Soudan”, 19 May 2023, updated 19 January 2024, www.medecinssansfrontieres.ca/crise-au-soudan/. Retrieved: 1/05/2024.