As countries across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region advance their digital transformations, China has emerged as a pivotal partner, offering both technological capabilities and strategic alignment. While energy remains the bedrock of MENA-China relations – Chinese oil imports from the region continue to rise, particularly from major exporters such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq – the scope of cooperation has expanded markedly to encompass the digital and technological domains. Chinese technology firms have established a growing presence in MENA’s digital ecosystems, capitalizing on their cost advantage and flexible commercial models. Companies such as Huawei, Alibaba, Tencent, and SenseTime provide hardware and software solutions at significantly lower costs than their Western competitors, often estimated to be more affordable, making them particularly attractive to price-sensitive governments and institutions.
The launch of the Digital Silk Road (DSR) in 2015, through an official Chinese policy document, further institutionalized and extended China’s digital influence globally. Often described as the technological arm of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the DSR operates through a loosely defined framework, primarily composed of non-binding instruments such as Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) and strategic cooperation agreements. Much like the BRI itself, the DSR serves more as an umbrella label than a strictly defined initiative, encompassing a wide array of digital, telecommunications and data-related activities, all led by Chinese firms.
Following the disruptions to numerous BRI projects during the Covid-19 pandemic, the DSR has assumed increased importance in Beijing’s foreign policy strategy. It aims to strengthen digital connectivity among BRI-affiliated states by promoting the development of physical and digital infrastructure. On the physical front, the DSR emphasizes the rollout of fibre-optic networks, 5G systems, data centres and smart city technologies, sectors in which Chinese firms such as Huawei and ZTE dominate due to their capacity to offer high-quality infrastructure at substantially lower costs than their European or American counterparts. In the realm of digital services, Chinese platforms including TikTok, Weixin (WeChat), Didi and Alibaba are increasingly facilitating transnational communication, commerce and mobility. The DSR also extends into outer space through China’s BeiDou satellite navigation system, which provides global positioning services as a direct alternative to the United States’ GPS.
China’s engagement with the MENA
region through the Digital Silk Road
draws upon a longer ideological and
geopolitical tradition
China’s engagement with the MENA region through the DSR also draws upon a longer ideological and geopolitical tradition. From Mao Zedong’s “Three Worlds Theory” to Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative, successive Chinese leaderships have cultivated ties with the Global South by emphasizing shared experiences of colonialism, non-interference and mutual development. Despite their differing political and economic systems, MENA states share several structural features: most are classified as middle-income countries, possess youthful and increasingly tech-savvy populations and exhibit relatively high internet penetration rates. Their geographical proximity to European markets further enhances the region’s strategic importance for China’s digital ambitions. This significance was first articulated in China’s 13th Five-Year Plan, released by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC) in 2016, which explicitly called for the establishment of an “online Silk Road with Arab countries and others through high-speed fibre-optic infrastructure.”[1]
China’s global digital expansion has become a lightning rod in international debates — routinely spotlighted in media reports, think tank analyses, and high-level conferences, where it is often framed as “concerning.” Much of the existing literature casts China’s growing digital footprint as a direct threat to American dominance over the global internet. But the assumption that Chinese firms are simply exporting Beijing’s model of internet governance to the MENA region deserves a more critical look. For many governments across the region, the rise of Chinese tech offers a strategic opening: a chance to fast-track digital transformation, reduce reliance on hydrocarbons and hedge their geopolitical bets by moving beyond dependence on the US and EU. The following analysis explores why Chinese digital giants have gained such traction in the MENA region.
Cost Competitive Infrastructure
One of the main reasons behind the growing momentum of Chinese digital firms in the MENA region lies in their significant price advantage and access to state-backed financing mechanisms. Companies like Huawei and ZTE have emerged as central players in expanding ICT infrastructure across the Global South, including in MENA. Their ability to deliver affordable yet technically sophisticated equipment has made them highly attractive in countries with constrained public budgets.
The cost competitiveness of Chinese ICT firms is underpinned by three main factors. First, the Chinese state has prioritized the telecommunications equipment industry as a strategic sector, offering substantial support to national champions such as Huawei and ZTE. This includes grants, subsidized loans, investments in R&D and skills training, all of which drive down production and operational costs. As a result, Huawei and ZTE can offer equipment that is 20–30% cheaper than rivals like Ericsson and Nokia, without compromising on quality. These lower costs are particularly attractive to telecom operators in developing countries, who face high upfront costs for upgrading digital infrastructure.
Second, Chinese firms benefit from economies of scale due to their access to the large domestic market, low labour costs, and integration into global value chains. Their global production networks and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) further reduce input costs by facilitating cheaper sourcing from other BRI member countries. This reinforces their ability to deliver competitively priced, high-quality ICT infrastructure.
Third, Chinese ICT vendors gain a crucial edge through access to state-backed development finance. Under the “EPC + F” model (Engineering, Procurement, Construction plus Financing) Chinese firms not only supply and install the equipment, but also arrange the financing through institutions like the Export-Import Bank of China or the China Development Bank. For instance, in 2018, Huawei brokered a $200 million vendor-financing deal between Telecom Egypt and Chinese lenders to support Egypt’s 4G rollout.[2] The CEO of Telecom Egypt praised the deal for providing long-term financing on favourable terms and streamlining procurement through Huawei’s bundled package. Such financing arrangements give Chinese vendors an advantage over Western firms, which are constrained by OECD-DAC rules that prohibit tied aid. In contrast, Chinese full-package deals enable faster, more cost-efficient infrastructure development. In capital-scarce contexts, this can significantly accelerate digital transformation.
By intensifying competition,
Huawei and ZTE have helped reduce
the overall cost of connectivity
in the region, making them important
actors in MENA’s digital transition
Finally, the mere presence of Chinese firms in the market helps drive prices down by increasing competition. Without them, European firms would dominate, likely raising infrastructure costs. By intensifying competition, Huawei and ZTE have helped reduce the overall cost of connectivity in the region, making them important actors in MENA’s digital transition.
Adapting to Local Digital Development Visions
Contrary to Western narratives suggesting China exports rigid digital authoritarianism, Chinese tech firms have shown remarkable flexibility in adapting to diverse national visions of digital development across the Global South.[3] In the MENA region, their rapid expansion stems not only from cost competitiveness and concessional loans, but also from pragmatic alignment with host country priorities. Rather than imposing one-size-fits-all governance frameworks, Chinese firms actively tailor offerings to each country’s institutional, cultural and political contexts.
This adaptability is evident in how Chinese tech companies position themselves as partners in implementing state-led digital strategies across the region. From North Africa to the Gulf, governments have launched ambitious national programmes to upgrade digital infrastructure, boost technological innovation and diversify economies beyond oil.
In Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030 emphasizes AI, cloud computing and smart governance. During President Xi Jinping’s visit to Saudi Arabia in December 2022, a memorandum was inked with Huawei entailing collaboration in cloud computing, artificial intelligence (AI) and building high-tech complexes in Saudi cities.[4] The deal was part of a broader “comprehensive strategic partnership agreement” that saw the consolidation of relations between the two countries. Xi described his visit as a “pioneering trip” to open “a new era” of energy and tech relations with the Arab world. Alibaba Cloud established a regional data centre in Jeddah in 2022, partnering with the Saudi Company for Artificial Intelligence (SCAI) to support local AI development and data sovereignty. Tencent Cloud partnered with the Saudi Ministry of Communications and Information Technology on smart city solutions and digital health services.
The UAE’s Digital Government Strategy 2025 promotes e-governance, smart services and digital economy contribution to non-oil GDP. Alibaba Cloud launched a Dubai data centre, while Huawei provides 5G infrastructure, smart city technologies and AI training programmes with local universities and government agencies. Egypt’s “Digital Egypt” strategy, part of its ICT2030 vision, modernizes public services, promotes digital entrepreneurship and supports AI-based economic solutions. Huawei signed agreements to establish an OpenLab for domestic innovation[5] and partnered with the Egyptian government to deploy the country’s first integrated cloud computing and AI platform, a foundational step for AI development in Africa.
These examples demonstrate that Chinese firms are not carriers of monolithic digital governance models. Their MENA success stems from engaging with and adapting to local digital development visions. By embedding themselves in national strategies and responding to host government priorities, Chinese firms have positioned themselves as responsive, pragmatic and increasingly indispensable partners in the region’s digital transitions.
Here, it is important to discuss the question of digital authoritarianism. Many observers have interpreted the diffusion of digital authoritarian practices across the MENA region as evidence of a top-down export of China’s digital governance model. Scholars and policymakers often suggest that the alignment of Chinese firms with an authoritarian state at home makes them natural allies for regimes in the region seeking to enhance digital capabilities while maintaining strict control over information flows. In Digital Authoritarianism in the Middle East,[6] Marc Owen Jones documents how several Arab governments have deployed digital tools for surveillance, censorship and the manipulation of online discourse – drawing frequent parallels with China’s domestic model. This has reinforced the perception that Chinese firms are not just exporting technology but also facilitating the adoption of governance frameworks that undermine digital rights and civic space.
However, this narrative overlooks the agency of MENA governments and the broader political economy of digital infrastructure development. Recent research suggests that the uptake of authoritarian-leaning digital governance models is largely demand-driven, reflecting domestic political priorities rather than Chinese coercion or the country’s deliberate export of norms. Chinese firms have demonstrated a high degree of political flexibility, operating across a wide spectrum of political regimes, including electoral democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian states, and adjusting their strategies accordingly. Rather than imposing a monolithic model, they have adapted to existing configurations of power, aligning their services with local interests and governance styles.
Emphasizing Tech Transfer Initiatives
Another factor underpinning the growing popularity of Chinese digital firms among MENA governments is their strong emphasis on technology transfer and capacity building. These companies do not simply present themselves as infrastructure providers; rather, they actively position themselves as enablers of autonomous digital development in the Global South. Chinese firms often promote the idea that the success of China’s own digital economy – marked by rapid growth alongside firm state control – can be replicated elsewhere, offering an appealing model for governments in the region that seek to foster digital modernization without compromising political authority.
To this end, firms like Huawei, Alibaba, and SenseTime have rolled out an array of training programmes, university partnerships and research collaborations aimed at enhancing local digital capabilities. Huawei, for instance, has established ICT Academies in Morocco, Egypt and Algeria in partnership with public universities, offering training in areas such as AI, cloud computing and 5G technology. The company’s Seeds for the Future programme, which operates in several MENA countries, brings top-performing students to China for immersive training in advanced ICT applications and cross-cultural exchange. Such initiatives help to foster local expertise, deepen institutional linkages and enhance the legitimacy of Chinese firms as long-term partners in national digital strategies.
Alibaba Cloud has similarly prioritized regional capacity building. At GITEX Global 2023, the company reaffirmed its commitment to training over 55,000 individuals across the Middle East and Africa through its Academic Empowerment Programme. Through collaborations with universities such as Khalifa University in the UAE and the Hashemite University in Jordan, Alibaba offers students and researchers practical experience with cloud infrastructure, big data tools, and AI technologies, areas that are central to state-led development strategies across the region.
This emphasis on skills transfer and local integration is particularly significant in the Gulf, where building knowledge economies has become a national priority following the 2014 drop in oil prices. In countries such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Oman, China’s digital footprint has expanded in tandem with growing demand for advanced ICT infrastructure and high-skilled employment. SenseTime, one of China’s leading AI firms, announced the establishment of its Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) R&D headquarters in the UAE, with plans to create hundreds of jobs at its AI Centre of Excellence, primarily for engineers and technical staff.[7] Meanwhile, Alibaba has secured agreements to store cloud data in Oman and has established a significant operational presence in Saudi Arabia, contributing to the Kingdom’s ambition to localize digital infrastructure and retain control over data flows.
Chinese firms to embed themselves
in the institutional fabric of MENA’s
digital economies — not only through
infrastructure provision, but by aligning
with state priorities on job creation
Taken together, these initiatives reflect a broader strategy by Chinese firms to embed themselves in the institutional fabric of MENA’s digital economies — not only through infrastructure provision, but by aligning with state priorities on job creation, technological sovereignty and human capital development. The extent to which meaningful technology transfer takes place remains debatable. While many firms emphasize their commitment to capacity building, such claims often serve primarily to appeal to regional leaders, with limited evidence of substantial or effective transfer of technological know-how.[8]
Conclusion
China’s growing role in MENA’s digital transformation is neither accidental nor imposed. It reflects a pragmatic alignment between the commercial strategies of Chinese firms and the development priorities of governments across the region. By offering affordable infrastructure, flexible financing and tailored support for national digital visions, and emphasizing technology transfer programmes, Chinese companies have become central players in MENA’s evolving digital landscape. Their success lies not in exporting a uniform model of governance, but in adapting to diverse political contexts and embedding themselves in local digital development agendas. Yet the future trajectory of this engagement remains uncertain. As technological competition between the United States and China deepens, MENA’s digital ecosystems may increasingly become sites of geopolitical contestation, shaped by competing visions of digital order, data governance and infrastructure standards. In this shifting landscape, the ability of MENA governments to navigate external rivalries while advancing their own developmental goals will play a decisive role in determining the direction and cha
[1] Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCCPC), 2016. The 13th Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China (2016–2020). Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press. P.71. Available at: https://en.ndrc.gov.cn/policies/202105/P020210527785800103339.pdf.
[2] Le Maistre, Ray “Huawei Helps Telecom Egypt Secure a $200 M Loan to Fund 4G Rollout.” Connecting Africa 30 May 2018, Available at: www.connectingafrica.com/4g-networks/huawei-helps-telecom-egypt-secure-a-200m-loan-to-fund-4g-rollout.
[3] Oreglia, Elisa; Ren, Hongyi and Liao, Chia-Chi “The Puzzle of the Digital Silk Road.” in Digital Silk Road in Central Asia: Present and Future, ed. Kassenova, Nargis and Duprey, Brendan, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, 2021 and Sawahel, Wagdy “Seeking Soft Power, China Expands Activities in Arab Higher Education.” 1 February 2016, www.al-fanarmedia.org/2016/02/seeking-soft-power-china-expands-activities-in-arab-higer/.
[4] El Yaakoubi, Aziz and Baptista, Eduardo “Saudi Arabia Signs Huawei Deal, Deepening China Ties on Xi Visit.” Reuters, 8 December 2022, www.reuters.com/world/saudi-lays-lavish-welcome-chinas-xi-heralds-new-era-relations-2022-12-08.
[5] Huawei, “Huawei Announces New OpenLab in Cairo to Build ICT Ecosystem in Northern Africa.” Huawei (press release), 2017, www.huawei.com/en/news/2017/12/Huawei-NewOpenLab-Cairo.
[6] Jones, Marc Owen Digital Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Deception, Disinformation and Social Media, London: Hurst, 2022.
[7] Senstime, “SenseTime to Establish EMEA R&D Headquarters in Abu Dhabi.” www.sensetime.com/en/news-detail/3911?categoryId=1072.
[8] El-Kadi, Tin Hinane. “Learning along the Digital Silk Road? Technology transfer, power, and Chinese ICT corporations in North Africa.” The Information Society, 40(2), 2024, 136–153. https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2024.2317060.a-migration-deal/.
Header photo: Chinese Sense Robot at the Digital Forum in Almaty 2025, Kazakhstan. 01.31 2025 (Shutterstock)