The Conflict in Yemen: Hopes for Peaced Dashed Once Again
In the autumn of 2023, the prospect of at least a partial peace in Yemen seemed closer than ever. The rounds of direct contacts held for the first time between the Houthis – the Zaydi insurgent group that has controlled 30% of Yemeni territory since 2014 – and one of their main enemies, Saudi Arabia, had culminated in a preliminary agreement on a draft roadmap. The progress on the negotiations after nearly a decade of war was testament to the Saudis’ willingness to end their involvement in the conflict – due to pressure to fulfil the 2030 Agenda and the war’s high economic and moral costs – as well as to the realization that neither side could prevail militarily and, especially, to the need to put an end to a conflict with devastating humanitarian consequences for Yemen.
One party that was conspicuously absent from the rounds of talks was the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), considered Yemen’s internationally recognized government. This body was created in the spring of 2022 with the aim of overcoming the differences between the various factions at war with the Houthis – Salafist, Muslim Brotherhood, secessionist, pro-Emirati, pro-Saudi, and former President Saleh loyalist, among others – and uniting them under a single political and military command. In the negotiations, Saudi Arabia acted as a mediator, rather than a party to the conflict. Its strategy consisted of reaching an agreement conducive to its interests and imposing it on the PLC, given the Council’s enormous dependence on Riyadh.
The provisional roadmap announced by UN Special Envoy Hans Grundberg prioritized the humanitarian and economic situation in Yemen and included measures such as a commitment to implement a definitive ceasefire, payment of public-sector salaries, the easing of restrictions on the Sana’a airport and Hudaydah port, the opening of roads, and resumption of oil exports. It also provided for a political process of inter-Yemeni reconciliation.[1] Although the preliminary agreement was still in its infancy and was far from being an inclusive process – it was more of a political arrangement between Houthis and Saudis imposed on the PLC – it at least provided a starting point for peace.
However, the attacks perpetrated by Hamas on 7 October 2023 and the brutal offensive launched by Israel on Gaza in their wake marked a turning point. The negotiations were interrupted and the roadmap, abandoned, due, among other things, to the emergence of a new source of tension: the conflict in the Red Sea.
Motivations for the Escalation in the Red Sea
For the Houthis, defending Palestine and confronting Israel is not only a moral duty given the current situation in Gaza; it is directly related to one of the group’s raisons d’être, summed up since 2001 in its trademark slogan, the sarkha (scream), “God is great, death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews, victory to Islam.” Palestine’s defence is, therefore, one of the core threads of the Houthi narrative, allowing them to tap into traditional Yemeni solidarity with the Palestinian people. While this pro-Palestinian sentiment is genuine and widely shared by Yemenis, that does not mean that the Houthis have not also capitalized on it militarily, politically and propagandistically through their attacks in the Red Sea.
In the military arena, they have demonstrated their growing weapons capability. Equipped with an increasingly sophisticated arsenal and more effective tactics, they have proved capable of hitting distant targets and evading high-tech anti-aircraft systems. Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, which promised a direct front against Israel, has likewise proved an effective mobilization tool.[2] It is estimated to have netted more than 100,000 new recruits, who will likely be deployed against the domestic enemy. In the political arena, they have managed to emphasize their membership in the Axis of Resistance and, although they formally defend their autonomy from Iran, their dependence on that country both financially and for intelligence and arms supply is undeniable, especially in the wake of the heavy blows dealt to Hamas and Hezbollah and the fall of Bashar al-Assad.
The Houthis present themselves as victim-heroes
taking on global powers and seek to divert attention
from their failures in governance and endeavour
to delegitimize their internal adversaries
If, in the past decade, the war against the Coalition allowed them to establish themselves as a significant regional actor, their direct confrontation with the US and Israel has now offered them the chance to carve out a space for themselves on the international stage. It is in this sense that the Red Sea attacks contribute to their propaganda goals: the Houthis reaffirm their commitment to Palestine and conceive of the attacks as a moral duty, regardless of the consequences. In so doing, they present themselves as victim-heroes[3] taking on global powers, encourage their base – decimated after a decade of famine and war – and successfully seek sympathizers beyond their own borders. At the same time, they manage to divert attention from their failures in governance and endeavour to delegitimize their internal adversaries, whom they accuse, at best, of half-heartedness and, more often, of treason. Their criticism of the secessionists – who have voiced a willingness to normalize relations and even cooperate militarily with Israel[4] – has been especially virulent.
The Importance of the Red Sea: Challenges to Global Trade and Regional Security
The Red Sea is an enclave of great geostrategic importance, connecting the Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean and enabling a vital trade route between Africa, Asia and Europe. It is a narrow strip of sea that is very easy to blockade given the existing chokepoints at either end: the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal.
Before the Houthis launched their attacks, 15% of international maritime trade, nearly 35% of the world’s container ships, and 60% of oil and gas exports to Europe passed through the Red Sea. The attacks have forced many international shipping companies to seek alternative routes around Africa via the Cape of Good Hope, a makeshift route that has significantly increased shipping costs and times and has disrupted the supply chain.
The volatility in the Red Sea predates
the outbreak of the conflict in Gaza.
The region has been subject to growing
militarization for years
However, the volatility in the Red Sea predates the outbreak of the conflict in Gaza. The region has been subject to growing militarization for years, led by countries such as the US, Iran, China, Israel, Russia, Japan, Italy and the United Arab Emirates. In recent years, it has moreover been one of the scenes of the growing hostility between Iran and Israel, in the form of reciprocal attacks in an undeclared maritime war. Before 7 October, the Houthis had already laid underwater mines and attacked and hijacked Saudi and Emirati ships. But it was in the wake of Israel’s offensive in Gaza that the attacks intensified and took on an international dimension. Seemingly reactively, the Houthis gradually intensified and expanded their targets: from Israeli ships to British and American commercial and military vessels, eventually coming to encompass all Israel-bound ships in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea. At the same time, they launched a campaign of increasingly sophisticated missile strikes that have managed to reach Israeli territory, killing one person in Tel Aviv in the summer of 2024. From the start of the Gaza offensive until December 2024, the Houthis carried out more than 470 attacks, hijacked the commercial ship Galaxy Leader, sank the MV Rubymar and MV Tutor, and killed three US marines.[5]
International Responses to the Conflict in the Red Sea
Some international powers have responded to the Houthi escalation by intervening in the region. At first, the US opted for a defensive strategy, establishing, together with nine other nations, Operation Prosperity Guardian. It later deemed this operation insufficient and decided, together with Great Britain, to launch a new operation, this time offensive: Poison Archer. The aim was to carry out airstrikes on Houthi military bases in order to degrade their military capabilities and ratchet up the deterrent pressure. After a year and more than 930 attacks, the results were questioned, as it did not seem to have diminished the Houthi’s ability or willingness to continue carrying out attacks in the Red Sea.
In fact, these types of attacks did not stop until January 2025, coinciding with the ceasefire in Gaza – thereby reinforcing the narrative that the escalation is a product of the Israeli offensive. In March 2025, the Houthis exclusively resumed their direct attacks on Israeli territory, in response to Tel Aviv’s blockade preventing humanitarian aid from accessing Gaza.
The most dangerous ties to emerge in recent years
are those between the Houthis and al-Qaeda and
the Somali group Al-Shabaab. These alliances
are built on the lucrative smuggling business
Europe, in contrast, has taken a more moderate stance. In early 2024, it launched Operation Aspides, for exclusively defensive purposes. Other powers, such as Russia and China, have managed to secure commitments not to be attacked in exchange for their support in international organizations. There are indications that Russia has supplied intelligence and weapons to the group. However, the most dangerous ties to emerge in recent years are those between the Houthis and al-Qaeda and the Somali group Al-Shabaab.[6] These unnatural alliances transcend sectarian discourses and are built on the lucrative smuggling business.
One of the first measures taken by the Trump Administration was to re-designate the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, a controversial decision due to its potential impact on the already strained humanitarian situation in Yemen. The US also reinforced its military strategy with a new eight-week offensive: Operation Rough Rider, the deadliest and most intense to date. The operation differed notably from its predecessor in intensity, intent and objectives. In addition to being pre-emptive – no attacks had been reported – it sought, for the first time, to undermine the Houthi leadership. The US struck more than a thousand targets over the course of two months, taking out nearly 600 combatants, including senior and mid-ranking militia commanders. Factions within the PLC repeatedly sought US cover to launch a ground offensive. However, the operation abruptly ended in early May 2025 with the announcement of an Omani-brokered ceasefire agreement between the Houthis and the US. Israel, which was not even informed of the talks, was excluded from the deal.
A New Houthi Victory?
For the Houthis, the ceasefire with the US is a new victory. In recent months, they have rolled out an intense campaign called Madri – a colloquialism for the Arabic ma adri or “I don’t know” – urging the local population not to post images, figures about the wounded, or the exact locations of strikes on social media. They thus hope to retain control of the narrative and, above all, of the silence. The aim is to play down the impact of the bombings, confuse the adversary, and foster the image of the Yemeni people’s infinite resilience.
The PLC’s sidelining from the negotiations and the brutal Israeli offensive in Gaza are some of the factors that have contributed to the dizzying rise of the Houthis, who, in just three decades, have evolved from a local militia to the de facto government of northern Yemen – capable of taking on, and even symbolically defeating, Saudi Arabia and, now, the US, as well. Given the group’s considerable disruptive capabilities, high tolerance for suffering, and old and new regional alliances, it is not hard to imagine a repeat of the Red Sea attacks. In this sense, regional security and, especially, peace in Yemen remain on the very distant horizon.
[1] https://osesgy.unmissions.org/update-efforts-secure-un-roadmap-end-war-yemen.
[2] Nevola, Luca, “The Houthis’ Militarization Machine,” ISPI, 17 December 24, www.ispionline.it/en/publication/the-houthis-militarization-machine-194526.
[3] Kendall Elisabeth, “The Houthis’ forgotten war goes global,” Engelsberg Ideas, January 2024, https://engelsbergideas.com/essays/the-houthis-forgotten-war-goes-global/.
[4] www.newarab.com/news/yemens-stc-ready-work-israel-against-houthis.
[5] ACLED, Red Sea Attacks Dashboard, https://acleddata.com/yemen-conflict-observatory/red-sea-attacks-dashboard/#1707908374225-329692ad-51d5.
[6] United Nations, Panel of Experts, October 2024, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/259/53/pdf/n2425953.pdf.
Header photo: Everyday Yemen women activist street message ‘Hands Off Yemen’. Damascus Street, Sanaa, Yemen. 16/05/2015. Julien Harneis CC BY-SA 2.0