Syria’s political transition has reached a significant crossroads months after the fall of the Assad regime in early December 2024. While the momentous breakdown of the regime after more than 13 years of civil war has spurred a collective sentiment of joy and hope for the future, the current leadership in Damascus with Ahmad al-Sharaa serving as President is facing enormous challenges and unresolved questions – from international sanctions to foreign threats of violence, sectarian strife or refugee return.
The Syrian civil war, which has claimed over 350,000 lives by conservative estimates and displaced more than half of the country’s population, is indeed one of the most devastating humanitarian crises of the 21st century. As of early 2025, more than 6 million Syrians remain refugees abroad, and another 7 million are internally displaced within Syria. The majority of refugees reside in Turkey (more than 3 million registered), Lebanon (1.5 million), Jordan (around 700,000) and Iraq, although hundreds of thousands have also sought refuge in Europe and beyond. Syrian refugees have endured prolonged displacement, with many now in exile for over a decade. They face dire economic conditions, legal precarity and growing xenophobia in host states. This prolonged crisis has intensified calls for return—both from Syrian authorities and host states overwhelmed by economic strain or aiming to leverage refugee flows to further geopolitical agendas, even more so after the downfall of the Assad regime.
The manner in which refugee return is handled
will serve as a litmus test for the legitimacy
and direction of Syria’s political transition
In this regard, this article seeks to address and unpack the question of refugee return, its embeddedness into a complex international set of (geo)political relations, and its capital importance for the success of an inclusive, civic and prosperous political transition in Syria. The manner in which refugee return is handled will serve as a litmus test for the legitimacy and direction of Syria’s political transition. At the same time, it challenges the post-Assad leadership to redefine the direction of social, economic and material reconstruction.
The Dangers of Instrumentalizing the Refugee Question
Since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, displacement has not only been a humanitarian tragedy but also a political currency used by a wide range of actors for strategic ends. Notably, the emergence of the Islamic State in 2014-2015 and the severe intensification and fragmentation of violence in Syria from those years prompted a massive refugee wave towards neighbouring countries in the region and the European Union (EU), which placed the issue of refugees at the very centre of the Syrian conflict and its geopolitical engagement.
Since then, we started seeing a dual instrumentalization – both from hosting countries and the Assad regime. On the one hand, the European Union approached the refugee crisis with a mixture of humanitarian commitment and political self-preservation. The influx of Syrians into Europe in 2015–2016 sparked intense domestic political reactions, fuelling the rise of far-right populism and reshaping immigration discourse across the continent. In response, the EU increasingly externalized its migration responsibilities, funding containment policies in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan and supporting returns often under ambiguous voluntariness. While the EU maintained that conditions for return were not yet met under Assad, several Member States were pushing for repatriation and normalization with the regime.
The EU increasingly externalized its migration
responsibilities, funding containment policies in
Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan and supporting
returns often under ambiguous voluntariness
On the other hand, the regime of Bashar al-Assad was very adamant, especially from 2019 onwards, in mobilizing the refugee question to ensure its political stability and survival. By encouraging selective returns, often with threats of conscription and coercive security measures, the regime sought to present itself as the only viable force capable of creating an eventual post-war order in Syria. This strategy was mutually reinforced by the politics of reconstruction and diplomatic rehabilitation, which made Assad’s fall challenging to envisage before the surprising events that unfolded in December 2024.
Hence, in the post-Assad context, this legacy of instrumentalization must be accounted for and challenged. Any future engagement with the issue, whether by the EU leadership, Syrian authorities or neighbouring countries, must prioritize the agency, safety and dignity of the Syrians themselves, despite the existing geopolitical interests and pressures against asylum policies, especially from anti-immigration governments. Indeed, officials in Turkey, Austria, Denmark and Bulgaria have started publicly discussing the option of repatriating Syrian refugees. Others, including France, Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Greece, have frozen asylum applications from Syria. Refugee return, if not dealt with caution, political responsibility and the primacy of Syrians’ interests, risks fuelling the tensions and grievances that form part of a very fragile post-Assad scenario in Syria.
Are Syrians Returning Home? Challenges after Assad’s Fall
In the immediate aftermath of Assad’s fall, the question of whether refugees are returning—and under what conditions—has emerged as a significant issue for the transitional authorities in Damascus. According to UNHCR estimates of early April 2025, around 400,000 Syrians have returned home from neighbouring countries since December. In addition, more than 1 million internally displaced people have also returned to their homes. Hence, while there are indeed returns from Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan – particularly due to the dire conditions for refugees in these countries – many factors and challenges are preventing and discouraging the mass return of refugees to Syria.
One year ago, UNHCR head Filippo Grandi advanced a framework that pointed at a two-prong set of obstacles for return: protection challenges, including legal and security impediments, and material issues, including reconstruction, provision of services and humanitarian assistance. While the downfall of Assad has indeed opened the door to return, this has not been translated into meaningful recovery, and Grandi’s framework is still very much applicable. First, Syria remains far from stable, and while the end of the Assad regime has put an end to fears of arbitrary detention or conscription, security concerns are still substantial. Most notably, the al-Sharaa government’s difficulties in unifying military control, the unknown fate of Syria’s northeast, clashes with Druze militiamen in the southwest, Israel’s occupation and aggression and the spread of sectarian violence against civilians on the coast all show the enormous fragility of the current scenario throughout the country.
Material deficits, combined with insecurity,
reinforce the perception among many refugees
that return is unsafe, undignified and premature
Beyond security, socio-material conditions pose a second major barrier to return. Years of war have left behind widespread ruination: critical infrastructure—including hospitals, schools, roads and housing—remains destroyed or severely degraded, with Housing, Land and Property (HLP) rights far from guaranteed. The lack of basic services, including electricity, water and sanitation, makes dignified return almost impossible for most refugees. The Syrian economy is in freefall, with unemployment rampant and local markets in disarray. Without shelter, jobs, abundant humanitarian assistance or functioning institutions, return becomes a matter of survival rather than a step toward reintegration. These material deficits, combined with insecurity, reinforce the perception among many refugees that return is unsafe, undignified and premature—risking further destabilization unless systematically addressed.
A Roadmap: Refugee Return and Ensuring Political Transition in Syria
Many Syrians had been dreaming of “a day after” Assad for more than a decade, and the swift, surprising crumbling of the regime in early December 2024 has provided a whole new institutional, political, social and ideological scenario that Syrians inside and outside the country are still getting to grips with. While much of the decision-making regarding the future of Syria must be done by Syrians and the country’s authorities themselves, the question of refugee return is most sustainable and positive when it is addressed with active international engagement that seeks stabilization, reconciliation and reconstruction. This includes policy decisions balancing refugees’ desire to remain and return and understanding that Syria’s political transition depends, among other things, on the conditions, adequacy and sustainability of refugee return.
Host countries must acknowledge that displacement will likely continue for years. Experiences from Bosnia and other complex armed conflicts show just how long return and reintegration in former war-torn societies can take. The UNHCR’s positio regarding return from December last year remains unchanged: Syria is not yet safe and return should follow meaningful progress on security, humanitarian and societal issues. In the meantime, governments should reassure Syrians of short-term stability in their legal status in host countries. While the examination of asylum requests may be postponed, as many states have defended, this should not be an indefinite situation, and vague announcements regarding status or the threat of a legal limbo must be avoided.
A coordinated, well-supported and timely large-scale
return is key for the success of Syria’s political
transition; failure to do so will have severe
consequences for Syria and neighbouring countries
A coordinated, well-supported and timely large-scale return is key for the success of Syria’s political transition; failure to do so will have severe consequences for Syria and neighbouring countries. Allowing “go-and-see” visits can help Syrians assess local conditions, particularly given the dire conditions on the ground regarding housing, land and property, as unlawful seizure has been commonplace throughout the civil war. This would support document recovery, resolve disputes and ensure that return does not end in a secondary displacement. Moreover, a stable and sustainable refugee return requires the multilateral, durable and ample provision of reintegration support – including development and humanitarian aid. Economically, returnees must be seen as assets, not burdens. Many possess skills, capital and networks that can contribute to rebuilding Syria’s shattered economy.
Nevertheless, even arguably more important is the returnees’ political role on the long road ahead towards a civic, resilient and inclusive political system in Syria. Reintegration should be linked to political inclusion, institutional strength, legal protection and political participation, mainly concerning local governance, where returnees’ engagement can help institutionalize trust and materialize a much-needed sense of a collectively shared Syrian polity.
Concluding Remarks
The fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 marked the end of an era of authoritarianism and more than a decade of civil war, opening a long-awaited window of opportunity for Syrians. However, the country’s political transition and future remain fragile and highly uncertain, shaped by institutional deficiencies, lack of security control, growing sectarian tensions and geopolitical competition. The return of millions of Syrians has rapidly emerged as a central defining element of the country’s new chapter, but despite the initial rush of optimism, a cautionary approach seems more adequate to deal with the immense existing challenges and ensure the sustainability of return and the safety and dignity of Syrians themselves.
Indeed, for return to be meaningful, it must be voluntary, safe and anchored in dignity. This requires a clear break from past practices of instrumentalization. The new authorities in Damascus must engage in credible legal, institutional, security and economic reforms to ensure that returnees find long-term stability. Meanwhile, in cooperation with the UN and other appropriate partners, international actors such as European and regional host countries must avoid engaging with the question as a convenient political solution or a geopolitical manoeuvre. Instead, Syrian refugees and the question of return should be approached as vital to rebuilding Syria’s social fabric, catalysing reconstruction and helping materialize the promises of a genuinely national, civic post-Assad political project.
References
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Grandi, Filippo. “High Commissioner’s Statement at the Brussels Syria Conference.” UNHCR, 27 May 2024. Available at: www.unhcr.org/news/speeches-and-statements/high-commissioner-s-statement-brussels-syria-conference. (Accessed: 6 May 2025).
Le Monde. “Several European Countries Suspend Syrians’ Asylum Request.” Le Monde, 9 December 2024. Available at: www.lemonde.fr/en/europe/article/2024/12/09/several-european-countries-suspend-syrian-asylum-requests_6735799_143.html. (Accessed: 6 May 2025).
Marks, Jesse and Lang, Hardin. “Beyond the Fall: Rebuilding Syria after Assad.” Refugees International, 2 May 2025. Available at: www.refugeesinternational.org/reports-briefs/beyond-the-fall-rebuilding-syria-after-assad/. (Accessed: 6 May 2025).
UNHCR. “UNHCR: Needs Intensify as 400,000 Syrians Return.” 11 April 2025. Available at: www.unhcr.org/news/briefing-notes/unhcr-needs-intensify-400-000-syrians-return. (Accessed: 5 May 2025).
UNHCR. “Voluntary Returns of Syrian Refugees and IDPs: Three-Month Impact Report.” 11 April 2025. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/voluntary-returns-syrian-refugees-and-idps-three-month-impact-report-january-march-2025. (Accessed: 6 May 2025).
Header photo: Syrians celebrate the toppling of the Assad regime. Germany, 8 December 2024. Shutterstock.