VMRO-DPMNE Coming to Power; Empty Bravado
VMRO-DPMNE’s coming to power following the 8 May 2024 parliamentary elections in North Macedonia caused quite a stir. VMRO-DPMNE came to power totally rejecting the foreign policy of its predecessor and, particularly, its handling of relations with Greece and Bulgaria. For VMRO-DPMNE, the 2017 Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation with Bulgaria, the Prespa Agreement and the so-called French proposal, which constituted the basis for the 2022 agreement on the start of North Macedonia’s EU accession process, were “bad agreements for Macedonia’s national interests.” Concerning the new constitutional name of the country, the new Prime Minister and leader of VMRO-DPMNE, Christian Mickoski, made it clear during the pre-election campaign that he regards it as “shameful” and would not utter the adjective “North” publicly. Furthermore, according to VMRO-DPMNE’s narrative, which enjoyed overwhelming support by the bulk of ethnic Macedonian voters during the last elections, the above-mentioned agreements “have undermined the identity and national dignity of ethnic Macedonians” and should be overturned (Christidis 2024).
Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the presidential and parliamentary elections, there was a noticeable deterioration in North Macedonia’s relations with Greece. First, as a result of the new President’s (Siljanovska-Davkova) refusal to take the oath on the country’s constitutional name; and then, as a result of Mickoski’s insistence that, internally, he would refuse to utter the adjective “North,” although many would point out that the new Prime Minister quickly compromised his initial position, as he took the oath on “North Macedonia’s Constitution,” while also accepting that “abroad he would use the constitutional name of the country.” Both Siljanovska-Davkova and Mickoski used flimsy legal arguments, claiming that they were not violating the Prespa Agreement (“it is our basic human right”), while overlooking the fact that they are not ordinary citizens but state officials (Christidis 2024).
Seeking to Revise the July 2022 EU Agreement Not the Prespa Agreement
The new government quickly realized that, concerning the Prespa Agreement, there was very little room for manoeuvre, beyond refusing domestically to use the country’s full name. North Macedonia’s key Western allies and partners would simply not tolerate any effective challenge of an agreement that has normalized relations between Greece and North Macedonia, advanced regional stability and de facto operated as an example of a much needed compromise, in a region where important issues remain open, most obviously Belgrade-Pristina relations. Thus, it is indicative that, during Mickoski’s first official visit to Washington as North Macedonia’s Prime Minister, he would publicly adhere to the constitutional name of his country (SAIS Foreign Policy Institute 2024). Furthermore, any intentions of denouncing the agreement were lacking the necessary internal political consensus, as the agreement was still supported by the main opposition, the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia, and, most importantly, by all the ethnic Albanian political parties that are fervent supporters of North Macedonia’s Euro-Atlantic integration.
Instead, the new coalition government led by Mickoski turned its attention to the issue of the July 2022 agreement with the EU, according to which a previous amendment of the Constitution of North Macedonia, with the inclusion of ethnic Bulgarian in its preamble, is necessary for the accession negotiations to begin. The government engaged in a series of discussions with European officials seeking to get a new agreement, whereby the constitutional reforms would indeed take place, but they would be implemented following the accession of North Macedonia into the EU, the so-called “French proposal plus” (Nikolic 2024). Those efforts did not bear fruit, as Sofia refused to consent, maintaining an atmosphere of constant tension in Skopje-Sofia relations.
Pushing Forward Interconnectivity: Advancing Transport and Energy Ties with Greece
Although openly rejecting the Prespa Agreement and being critical of Greece on a number of issues (including on how it has implemented the Prespa Agreement), Mickoski’s government has in fact prioritized developing transport and energy connectivity with Greece. The new government has declared as one of its main priorities upgrading North Macedonia’s transport and energy connectivity. Regarding the former, two important pan-European corridors cross North Macedonia: Corridor 10, connecting central Europe to the Aegean Sea, running through North Macedonia from the border with Serbia to the Greek border at Gevgelija; and Corridor 8, connecting the Adriatic Sea (Albania) with the Black Sea (Bulgaria). Corridor 8 is very much at an initial stage, especially its rail route – in practice there is no rail line connecting Albania with North Macedonia, or North Macedonia with Bulgaria. Since coming to power, the Mickoski government has emphasized a number of technical and financial difficulties concerning the completion of the rail line connecting Skopje with the Macedonian-Bulgarian border, as part of Corridor 8. Government officials, however, have not hidden their preference in upgrading Corridor 10, especially concerning the rail connection. Thus, the new Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Transport Aleksandar Nikoloski stated at the beginning of July 2024: “For me, the most beneficial project for Macedonia is the construction of a high-speed rail from Skopje to Thessaloniki, which should operate at 200 kilometres per hour for passengers and up to 160 kilometres per hour for cargo. This would allow all cargo destined for central Europe to pass through Macedonia, with travel time from Skopje to Thessaloniki reduced to about 1 hour and 15 minutes. This rail line would also extend north to Nis, Belgrade, Novi Sad, Subotica and Budapest, becoming the main artery of central Europe. This way, Macedonia would regain its key position in the Balkans.” (quoted at Gjorgjioska, 2024). While talking at the Southeast Europe Connectivity Forum in Thessaloniki in October 2024, Nikolovski repeated that “Our commitment to enhancing connectivity across Southeast Europe is unwavering. The high-speed railway on Corridor X will be a major step towards making our region more competitive and integrated” (quoted at Gjorgjioska, 2024).
Although openly rejecting the Prespa Agreement
Mickoski’s government has in fact prioritized
developing transport and energy connectivity
with Greece
Mickoski’s government has also pushed forward energy connectivity with Greece. Although critical of the energy policy of the previous government, including energy projects involving private Greek companies, the new government has continued working on the interconnection of the North Macedonian and Greek gas systems. Such an interconnection would link North Macedonia with the Greek part of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) that transfers Azeri gas all the way to Italy, allowing North Macedonia to diversify its gas imports, as right now it is totally dependent on Russian gas coming to North Macedonia from a pipeline crossing Bulgarian territory. It is indicative of Skopje’s intentions in this respect that in November 2024, North Macedonia’s state-owned power utility, ESM, signed a memorandum of understanding with Azerbaijan’s state energy company, SOCAR. A connection to the Greek gas system would also provide access to the liquefied natural gas terminal in the northern Greek port city of Alexandroupoli. Nikoloski has declared that: “Our aim is to ensure stable, reliable energy for North Macedonia and our neighbours. This pipeline represents a strategic step in achieving energy independence in uncertain global times” (quoted at Gjorgjioska, 2024).
Ideology versus Pragmatism, Choosing the Latter; Mickoski’s Government Adopting “Mitsotakis’s Paradigm”
The New Democracy (ND) party that won the Greek parliamentary elections in June 2019, under the leadership of Kyriakos Mitsotakis, had rejected the Prespa Agreement and voted against its ratification, as it regarded it as “bad for Greek national interests.” The new Greek government was then called to manage relations with North Macedonia under the twin dynamics of a hostile domestic electorate on the one hand, and the realization of a highly supportive international setting for the agreement on the other. It chose to attempt a difficult “balancing act.” Internally, it maintained at large the narrative of a “bad agreement for Greek national interests,” meticulously avoiding any positive commentary for the agreement. At the same time, however, Athens, in practice, worked towards advancing bilateral relations with North Macedonia in selective areas. Especially on energy cooperation and connectivity, as Athens would seek to bolster Greece’s position as an energy hub in southeastern Europe, particularly following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, while also promoting the growth of bilateral trade and Greek investments in North Macedonia (Christidis 2024). Clearly, the new Macedonian government is following the same strategy.
Both governments in power regard
the Prespa Agreement as a
“bad one for their respective
national interests”
There is little doubt that as far as the Prespa Agreement is concerned, it could have been going through a critical juncture. Both governments in power, in Greece since June 2019, and in North Macedonia since June 2024, regard the Prespa Agreement as a “bad one for their respective national interests.” And both would have had considerable domestic support in any attempt to denounce it legally. In a different international setting that could not have been ruled out. However, both the European Union and the United States stand firmly behind the agreement as a pillar of regional stability in southeastern Europe, something that, following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, is even more important. In effect, support for the agreement from Brussels and Washington has acted as guarantee for its continuous survival. That leaves little room for manoeuvre for both countries’ governments, which have chosen to be “realistic” and, instead, are working selectively on the implementation of the opportunities generated by the agreement and the advance of Greece-North Macedonia relations.
Bibliography
Christidis, Yorgos. “The state of relations between Greece and North Macedonia – six years after the signing of the Prespa Agreement.” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Athens, 1 July 2024, https://athens.fes.de/event/the-state-of-relations-between-greece-and-north-macedonia-six-years-after-the-signing-of-the-prespa-agreement.html.
Gjorgjioska, Marija Adela. “North Macedonia Political Briefing: From Stalled to Strategic: Macedonia’s Bold New transport and Connectivity Agenda.” Weekly Briefing, China-CEE Institute, Vol. 76, No 1, November 2024, https://china-cee.eu/2024/11/12/north-macedonia-political-briefing-from-stalled-to-strategic-macedonias-bold-new-transport-and-connectivity-agenda/.
Nikolik, Nevenka. “Mucunski: French proposal plus is to stop bilateralization of EU accession talks, Mickoski to present in Brussels everything discussed in past period.” mia.mk, 16 September 2024, https://mia.mk/story/mucunski-french-proposal-plus-is-to-stop-bilateralization-of-eu-accession-talks-mickoski-to-present-in-brussels-everything-discussed-in-past-period.
“Prime Minister Hristijan Mickoski: New Priorities for North Macedonia.” Interview at the SAIS Foreign Policy Institute, 8 July 2024, www.fpi.sais.jhu.edu/past-events/prime-minister-hristijan-mickoski.
Header photo: Signing ceremony of Prespa Agreement between Greece and the Republic of North Macedonia. 12 June 2018. © European Commission. Photographer: Tomislav Georgiev