The Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, initiated in 2011 under the facilitation and mediation of the European Union, is one of Europe’s most complex and enduring diplomatic negotiations. It seeks to normalize relations between Serbia, which does not recognize Kosovo’s independence, and Kosovo, which declared independence in 2008 after breaking away from Serbia. The EU has made it clear that progress in the dialogue is a precondition for both Kosovo and Serbia’s eventual EU membership. Despite the parties reaching some agreements over the years, tensions remain high, and the process has been fraught with political and practical challenges.

Furthermore, broader regional and international dynamics are affecting the future of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue. In recent years, the Western Balkans has remained a fragile region, with ethnic tensions simmering not just in Kosovo and Serbia, but also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia and Montenegro. The EU has sought to stabilize the region by promoting European integration, but enlargement fatigue within the EU, combined with the slow pace of reforms in the Western Balkans, has led to frustration.

Internationally, the rivalry between the West and Russia plays a significant role. The war in Ukraine has heightened tensions between the West and Russia, and Serbia’s close ties with Moscow have put it in a difficult position. While Serbia seeks EU membership, it has refused to join Western sanctions against Russia, maintaining its historical alliance with Moscow. This balancing act complicates Serbia’s position in the dialogue process, as it seeks to placate both the EU and Russia.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has hugely affected the normalization of relations between Kosovo and Serbia, amid fears of renewed conflict – particularly in the north of Kosovo. Since the start of the war, the EU-led dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia has suffered several setbacks, primarily due to deep disagreements on what the vision of a lasting and sustainable solution for the Serb community in Kosovo, notably again in the north, should be. However, the war has injected a sense of urgency for the EU to address the dialogue process. This led to a new EU-led diplomatic effort that culminated in the finalization of the second Brussels Basic Agreement in February 2023 and its implementation in March that year. Despite this initial enthusiasm, relations have since quickly soured.

As of 2025, the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue is at a critical juncture. A key milestone in the process was the 2013 Brussels Agreement, which aimed to normalize relations by focusing on technical issues, such as the integration of Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo into its legal system and ensuring greater autonomy for them. However, the implementation of this agreement has stalled due to disagreements over the formation of the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities (ASM), which Serbia insists should have executive powers, while Kosovo views it as a threat to its sovereignty.

The dialogue has also been disrupted by periodic escalations in tensions, such as in 2022 when clashes occurred in North Kosovo over car license plate regulations. Both sides have used nationalist rhetoric, making it difficult for leaders in Kosovo and Serbia to maintain domestic political support for the dialogue. The EU and the United States continue to exert pressure on both sides to make progress, but concrete results remain elusive.

Both sides have used nationalist rhetoric, making it
difficult for leaders in Kosovo and Serbia to maintain
domestic political support for the dialogue. The EU
and the US continue to exert pressure on both sides
to make progress, but concrete results remain elusive

Given the increased interest of the EU – against the background of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine – to push for peace and stability in the Western Balkans, it needs to continuously invest in the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue, move beyond the impasse and mitigate Russian influence in the process. The latest proposal, tabled in 2023 by the EU special representatives and supported by Germany, France and other Member States, as well as the US, known as the Basic Agreement on the Normalization of Relations between Kosovo and Serbia, centres on improving relations between the two, without directly addressing the contentious issue of sovereignty. The EU remains committed to seeing this proposal implemented. The new EU institutional set up after the recent European parliamentary election suggests that there will be a renewed impetus on the process. The EU-facilitated dialogue process continues to enjoy the support of the main Member States and the US administration. Additionally, the appointment of the new EU special representative holds potential for new momentum and offers another opportunity for finding a long-lasting solution during this EU institutional mandate.

However, the obstacle of EU Member States’ non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence remains. Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and Spain are not yet ready to take the decision of recognizing Kosovo as independent. All five Member States cite their own internal reasons for this position vis-à-vis Kosovo, they also maintain that once an agreement with Serbia is reached in normalizing relations, they would be able to reassess their position. Spain, for its part, refuses to recognize Kosovo due to concerns about its own internal separatist movements, particularly in the Basque Country and Catalonia. The Spanish government views Kosovo’s declaration of independence as a potential precedent that could encourage separatist tendencies within Spain. Yet, Spain and the four other non-recognizing EU Member States have in many ways been supportive of Kosovo’s path towards its integration into the EU, for example by tacitly agreeing to the EU’s Stabilization and Association Agreement with Kosovo, and to Kosovo’s visa liberalization with the EU.

Key Issues on the Path ahead

Nonetheless, the future of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue is uncertain and fraught with challenges. While the EU remains committed to facilitate and mediate the process, the deep-rooted nature of the conflict, combined with nationalist politics and international rivalries, makes a breakthrough difficult. Incremental progress on technical issues is likely to continue, but without a resolution of the recognition issue, the dialogue may remain incomplete. For lasting peace and stability in the region, both Kosovo and Serbia will need to make difficult compromises, and the international community will need to provide sustained and balanced support. The coming months and years will be crucial in determining whether the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue can lead to a durable solution, or whether the conflict will continue to cast a shadow over the Western Balkans.

For lasting peace and stability
in the region, both Kosovo
and Serbia will need to make
difficult compromises

New thinking on how to design a dialogue process that would be implementable and lead to a normalization of relations and, subsequently, mutual recognition is a must. At the same time, several issues need urgent attention and space for discussion:

Security:Necessary steps must be taken to improve the security situation on the ground. In recent months and years, the security situation in Kosovo, and especially in the north of Kosovo, has been marred with conflicts and incidents, some of which have resulted in fatalities. To create conducive conditions for sustainable peace in Kosovo, it is important to establish a secure environment for all. KFOR has strengthened its presence, especially in the north, and, together with other security institutions of Kosovo, aims to ensure safety across the region. Nonetheless, problems persist and the situation remains fragile.

Integration of Kosovo Serbs and normalization of relations among communities:While the integration of Kosovo Serbs into Kosovo institutions is crucial for the successful normalization of relations, the failed local elections in April do not bode well for the prosperity of the community in the north. The withdrawal of Serbs from Kosovo’s institutions in November 2022 created a vacuum in the local administration and other institutions such as the judiciary and police. The return of Serbs to the institutions is paramount to their further integration. Kosovo institutions should provide a free and democratic election process, whilst the Serbian government should refrain from influencing the Serb community regarding their participation in the process.

For the EU to be credible in its offer to Kosovo,
it first needs to have one joint understanding
among its Member States on how to treat
Kosovo’s statehood, considering that five
Member States do not recognize Kosovo

EU enlargement and regional cooperation:The EU needs to assess whether and how a solution to the Kosovo-Serbia dispute might pave the way for enlargement and enhance regional cooperation. Accelerating the EU process for both Kosovo and Serbia and making the promise of membership more tangible could help incentivize the parties to implement reached agreements. For the EU to be credible in its offer to Kosovo, it first needs to have one joint understanding among its Member States on how to treat Kosovo’s statehood, considering that five Member States do not recognize Kosovo. Finding a solution to the Kosovo-Serbia dispute will unlock potential for regional cooperation, which would further deepen integration into the EU for the whole region. 

What’s Next?

Since the incident in the village in Banjska in September 2023, there has been no high-level meeting between the leaders to speak off, despite efforts made by Borrell and the EU’s special representative to bring the leaders together in Brussels. This period has also been marred by the lack of development in track one diplomacy. On the ground in Kosovo, the government took decisions to ban the use of the dinar and the use of the Serbian postal service in Kosovo. These decisions, together with the latest attempts to open the bridge in Mitrovica, have prompted the Quint and EU representatives to publicly reprimand Kosovo.

Both parties maintain their intransigent stances, and both seem to have no plans to move towards the normalization of relations. Yet, the structural problems obstructing the implementation of many agreements to date, including the latest one proposed by the EU, remain. Kosovo claims to accept the Basic Agreement in its entirety, while Serbia takes issue with both its form and content, as stipulated in the letter sent by the former Prime Minister Ana Brnabic to the EU. This differing interpretation of the Basic Agreement has caused the asymmetry to grow even more. The Kosovar leadership fears that once Serbia “gets what it wants” (meaning the association of Serb majority municipalities), it will no longer be interested in normalizing relations with Kosovo. As a result, Kosovo’s status quo will continue and the country’s bid to strengthen its statehood will likely stall (or be blocked), along with any hope of gaining further international recognition.

In Serbia, the Kosovo issue remains highly politicized. As the corrosion of media independence continues, it only strengthens the views of the majority in Serbia, who are not prepared to “give-up” Kosovo and would rather sacrifice their future EU membership if need be. In the EU, the prevailing opinion is that the parties do not have the necessary political will to normalize relations. Yet, the EU is determined to continue along the same path, extend the mandate of the EU special representative and aim for the Basic Agreement to be fully endorsed and implemented. According to EU officials there have been some steps forward, and EU Member States remain committed and supportive of the work the EU special representative has done. For the EU, stability of the Western Balkans is crucial, and finding a durable solution to the dispute between Kosovo and Serbia is imperative to further the integration of the region into the EU. The Basic Agreement is viewed by EU Member States as double binding, between Kosovo and Serbia, and between each country and the EU.    

Given the complexity of the Kosovo-Serbia dialogue, several possible scenarios could unfold in the coming years:

Regional integration and the EU accession as a solution: A more optimistic scenario envisions the EU accelerating the accession process for both Kosovo and Serbia, making the promise of membership more tangible. This could incentivize both sides to make concessions. However, this scenario is contingent on the EU’s internal politics and its willingness to prioritize the Western Balkans in its enlargement strategy.

Incremental progress without full recognition: One likely scenario is that the dialogue will continue to yield incremental progress on technical issues without resolving the fundamental issue of recognition. The EU may facilitate agreements on issues such as energy, trade and the movement of people, but Serbia will continue to refuse to recognize Kosovo formally. This scenario would keep the dialogue alive but unresolved, with the potential for periodic crises.

Breakthrough (final) agreement: Although unlikely in the near term, a breakthrough agreement could occur if external pressure, particularly from the EU and the US, leads to a comprehensive normalization deal. Such a deal could involve mutual recognition or a creative compromise that allows Serbia to maintain its position while enabling Kosovo to gain wider international recognition. However, this scenario depends on significant changes in domestic political dynamics in both Kosovo and Serbia.

Stagnation and escalation of tensions: Another scenario is that the dialogue could stagnate entirely, leading to an escalation of tensions. Nationalist forces in both countries could take advantage of the lack of progress to stoke ethnic tensions, potentially resulting in violence, particularly in the north of Kosovo where the Serb minority is concentrated. This scenario would be particularly destabilizing for the region and could require more robust international intervention.

Photo: Hashim Thaçi, President of Kosovo, on the right, and Josep Borrell, within the framework of the visit to Kosovo and Serbia of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission. Pristina, Kosovo, 30-01-2020. EC – Audiovisual Service. Photographer: Armend Nimani