Jordan is reeling from the combined effects of war and recent shifts in the international aid architecture. As a direct neighbour of Israel, it is strongly affected by the war on Gaza personally, politically and economically. Recent drastic reductions in international assistance have further exacerbated the country’s tense socioeconomic and political situation. They have not only affected vulnerable populations but also the urban middle classes, deteriorating living standards for a large swath of the population.
Tense Political and Security Situation
Jordan’s political and security situation continues to be impacted by the ongoing war on Gaza. Around half the population is estimated to identify as Palestinian, and many have extended family in the West Bank and Gaza. Non-Palestinian Jordanians also feel profoundly connected with what is happening. The regional situation is reverberating deeply inside the country.
This manifests itself in many ways. For example, the war has triggered widespread domestic dissatisfaction and reinvigorated Jordan’s protest movement. Protestors have taken issue not only with Israeli policy, but also Jordan’s continuing ties to Israel and the US military presence in Jordan. They have highlighted and scrutinized the actions Jordanian authorities have (not) taken to intervene in the war.[1]
These protests have been met with an increasingly harsh response. Police have broken up demonstrations with tear gas and batons, arresting pro-Gaza activists en masse.[2] Pro-Palestinian online activism and independent journalism overall have also been progressively criminalized. Key to this crackdown is a recently revised cybercrime law, which allows authorities to use vaguely defined offences like “provoking strife” to curb freedom of expression and detain, prosecute and harshly punish individuals.
In September 2024, Jordan held parliamentary elections under a new electoral law designed to strengthen political parties and weaken kinship-based representation. Subsequently, Jafar Hassan, a close confidant of King Abdullah II, was appointed as the new Prime Minister, supposedly to rebuild trust between citizens and government institutions. Despite demonstrative attempts to reach out to ordinary people across the country, this strategy was counteracted by the ways in which the government treated opposition groups.
Jordanian authorities banned all activities
of the Muslim Brotherhood (…) This political
shift marks a decisive break in the decades-long
alliance between the royal family and the brotherhood
The Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, won 20% of the parliamentary seats. This result was largely due to their vocal support for the anti-Israeli protests and support for armed resistance in Gaza. Nine months later, in May 2025, Jordanian authorities exposed an alleged plot by members of the brotherhood to carry out attacks in the Kingdom and formally banned all activities of the Muslim Brotherhood. The move, which was widely seen as resulting from Saudi, UAE, Israeli and US pressure, also demonstrates Jordan’s own uneasiness with rising support for the brotherhood.[3] While the IAF itself was not banned by the date of writing, criminalization of the party is certainly a possibility. This political shift marks a decisive break in the decades-long alliance between the royal family and the brotherhood and reflects a growing tendency within the regime to treat the group as a security threat.
On a broader societal level, the perceived inaction of Jordan’s Western allies in the face of mass atrocities has strengthened popular resolve to boycott Western products, with a reported 83% of the population actively adhering to the boycott in mid-2024.[4] It has also led to a newfound reserve towards Western organizations. Civil society organizations have cancelled long-standing partnerships with European or American donors, professionals have quit jobs with development agencies like USAID or GIZ and civil society actors have openly decried the hypocrisy of supporting human rights or women’s empowerment projects while turning a blind eye towards war crimes in Gaza.[5]
Economic Ramifications
The war has also impacted Jordan’s economic situation and outlook. International tourism, which was booming before October 2023, plummeted in 2024 and only started to pick up slowly in early 2025. While the sectoral loss was partially offset by increased receipts from GCC tourists and expats, such tourism is overwhelmingly concentrated in the capital, Amman.[6] Much of the tourism infrastructure in rural areas, and the labour force associated with it, has sat idle.
Domestic demand weakened notably in 2024, which combined with reduced prices for key export commodities to negatively affect government revenue. The overall 2.5% real GDP growth rate for 2024 (as compared to 2.7% in 2023) was interpreted in different ways, particularly given the boycott. While some observers highlighted increased domestic manufacturing due to increased demand for local products, others pointed to the boycott’s negative effect on employment, particularly for those working in support sectors around Western chains, such as delivery drivers.
Unemployment slightly decreased overall (from 22.3% in 2023 to 21.4% in 2024) but remains staggeringly high in comparison to pre-Covid levels. In response to these figures, and in line with its “Economic Modernisation Vision,” the Jordanian government has tightened rules for recruiting foreign labour. It has also launched a regularization campaign, which in practice has meant increased inspections in sectors known for informally employing non-Jordanian workers, penalties for businesses employing undocumented workers, and growing deportation numbers.
Jordan’s economy also strongly depends
on the flow of overseas development
assistance, and recent changes in the architecture
of international aid have deeply affected it
Despite these measures, the country remains structurally reliant on informal and foreign labour in several key sectors. Sustainably changing the makeup of the labour force in this way is unlikely. But, in the short term, it causes difficulties for the large numbers of non-Jordanians, often refugees, who rely on informal labour to keep themselves afloat.
Jordan’s economy also strongly depends on the flow of overseas development assistance (ODA), and recent changes in the architecture of international aid have deeply affected it. Overall funding levels remained relatively stable in 2024. But the cuts accompanying President Trump’s return to office and the destruction of USAID, as well as reductions in ODA by other significant donors such as the UK, have threatened many ongoing activities in Jordan in strategically important sectors.
Part of the originally committed US funding was reinstated after King Abdullah visited the US in February 2025, particularly direct budget support and military aid. US support for a new desalination plant has also been reinstated, a critical win given that Jordan is now the second water scarcest country in the world. The Jordanian government was also able to secure additional aid (grants and loans) from alternative donors, such as the EU, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the IMF.[7] However, the cuts will continue to impact humanitarian action and support for civil society organizations working on issues like women’s rights, human rights, labour rights or refugee rights and protection.
The cuts do not only affect the vulnerable groups that were being served. They have also dealt a severe blow to the livelihoods of the educated middle class of Amman, who use the comparatively high wages and benefits provided by international organizations to maintain their living standards. Given that there are few other such opportunities, and that unemployment remains particularly high for university graduates, this loss has the potential to be politically destabilizing. Many middle-class professionals, let go overnight due to funding cuts, have resorted to Uber driving and are seeking to emigrate as quickly as possible.
Durable Solutions for Refugees?
The response to forced displacement has been hit hardest by the changing aid architecture. Jordan continues to host large numbers of Syrian refugees (around 535,000 registered refugees as of late May 2025), as well as smaller numbers from Iraq, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia and other East African countries.
Syrians in Jordan are closely observing the changing situation in Syria, and more than 70,000 registered refugees had returned between the fall of former President Bashar al-Assad and late May 2025.[8] However, most Syrians are not willing or able to return due to a lack of safety (particularly in Syria’s Deraa province, where many Syrians residing in Jordan are from) and economic opportunities. They still require humanitarian support and employment.
Both are in short supply however. Funding levels for the refugee response, already in steep decline in 2024, have taken an even deeper plunge in 2025. In the wake of the US cuts, international governmental and non-governmental organizations have cancelled entire areas of programming, either because they were funded directly by the US government or because they are not deemed as life-saving. Caught off-guard by the suddenness of the cuts, organizations have struggled to coordinate – a situation that has created severe service gaps for very vulnerable populations. Health (including mental health) and disability services have dramatically reduced, as has educational programming. Basic needs services like recurrent cash assistance have been reduced to almost meaningless figures (15 JOD or about $21 per month per person) and extremely limited numbers of recipients. The previously established referral system between organizations with different specializations has largely broken down.[9]
Changes to donor and government policy around work and work permits have further added to the stress felt by Syrians. International work permit subsidies have ceased, social security payments and work permit costs have risen as a result and many related fees are now being retroactively levied. The result has been the creation of a debt crisis within the Syrian population of Jordan, and the inability of most Syrian workers to afford a work permit.[10]
At the same time, the above-mentioned “regularization campaign” has effectively pushed many Syrians and other irregular workers out of the labour market. While there have, as of May 2025, been almost no deportations of Syrian refugees, the tightening of regulations, along with dramatic reductions of support, has created a strong push for people to return to Syria. In late April 2025, almost half of those surveyed about their reasons for returning stated the problems they were facing in Jordan as decisive for their decision-making.[11]
After years of celebrating the Jordan Compact (the push to integrate Syrians into the Jordanian labour market) and supporting it through numerous forms of livelihoods programming, the refugee response is being quickly reduced back to emergency life-saving measures. In order to survive this shift, more and more Syrians are resorting to negative coping strategies. Syrians, once often envied by other population groups in Jordan, are now in a similar situation to other refugees.
Palestinian refugees served by UNRWA have also felt the continued strain the agency is under. Many donors suspended their support for the agency in the wake of allegations that UNRWA staffers were involved in the 7 October attack on Israel or had direct links to Hamas. While most resumed their committed funding by mid-2024, the US, the most important donor country, did not. This has left UNRWA education, health and relief services, already forced to operate at minimum level due to previous rounds of funding cuts, further stretched.
Finally, not only has US funding for humanitarian action in the country been severely curtailed, but also resettlement has been halted. Those who had already gone through the interview process are now in limbo, and thousands of other refugees on the waiting list are doomed to keep waiting indefinitely. This is particularly dramatic for non-Syrian refugees, who have never been eligible for work permits and whose only hope for a better life is eventual resettlement.
In sum, the continuing war on Gaza and the dramatic shifts of the international aid landscape have made 2024 a very difficult year for Jordan. The effects on large parts of its population, and its civil society life, will be lasting.
[1] Ryan, Curtis, “The Impact of the Gaza War on Jordan’s Domestic and International Politics.” POMEPS Studies, 51/2024, 69-73.
[2] “Jordan: Stop cracking down on pro-Gaza protests and release those charged for exercising their freedoms of assembly and expression.” Amnesty International, 11 April 2024. www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2024/04/jordan-stop-cracking-down-on-pro-gaza-protests-and-release-those-charged-for-exercising-their-freedoms-of-assembly-and-expression/.
[3] Quilliam, Neil, “Jordan’s ban on the Muslim Brotherhood is no surprise but comes against a dangerous backdrop.” Chatham House, 2 May 2025. www.chathamhouse.org/2025/05/jordans-ban-muslim-brotherhood-no-surprise-comes-against-dangerous-backdrop.
[4]Abu Dalhoum, Mohammed, “Unpacking Narratives Around Western Boycotts and Unemployment in Jordan.” Fikra Forum, 29 July 2024. www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/unpacking-narratives-around-western-boycotts-and-unemployment-jordan.
[5] Aloul, Sahar “The masks are off: a letter to the intl. development community.” Jordan News, 17 November 2023. www.jordannews.jo/Section-36/Opinion/The-masks-are-off-a-letter-to-the-intl-development-community-32372.
[6] “Tourism Annual Review 2024.” Ministry of Tourism and Antiquities, Amman, 2025.
[7] Al-Khalisi, Suleiman, “Exclusive: Jordan wins Trump Aid Carve-out for strategic projects and support.” Reuters, 30 April 2025. www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/jordan-wins-trump-aid-carve-out-strategic-projects-support-2025-04-30/.
[8] “Regional Flash Update #29, Syria Situation Crisis.” UNHCR, 30 May 2025.
[9] Informal conversations with INGO workers in Jordan, May 2025.
[10] Fawaz, Ali; Lenner, Katharina; Sadder, Israa; Shehada, Rayan and Turner, Lewis “Sky-high fees with few benefits: What’s wrong with social security for Syrians in Jordan.” The New Humanitarian, 5 September 2024. www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2024/09/05/sky-high-fees-few-benefits-whats-wrong-social-security-syrians-jordan.
[11] “Regional Flash Update, #26, Syria Situation Crisis.” UNHCR, 9 May 2025.
Header photo: A child is standing on a high surface holding a phone filming a protest for Palestine. People were protesting the forced expulsion of the families in Sheikh Jarrah and the deadly airstrikes on Gaza. The protest was held at an empty land near Alkalouty mosque in Amman. This was one among many protests held at the time. 11.05.2021. Raya Sharbain. CC BY-SA 4.0