Israel’s relations in the Middle East and the Mediterranean are in the midst of a transformative period. The positive momentum generated following the Abraham Accords was flipped on its head after the Hamas terror attack of 7 October 2023. Since then, Israel has mostly been engaged in fighting – in Gaza against Hamas; in Lebanon against Hezbollah; directly with Iran, for the first time; in Yemen, against the Houthis; and in Syria, following the downfall of Bashar al-Assad. Impacted by the trauma of 7 October, as well as by deep-rooted insecurities and more recent domestic tensions, Israel has been seeking to reshape regional realities to its favour and enhance its security. It has done so in ways that have generated heavy regional criticism and damaged Israel’s global standing. Yet, Israel sustained its ties in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, albeit in a more limited scope, and as time went by and regional transitions took place, new diplomatic opportunities emerged.

This article presents a recap and analysis of these processes. It kicks off with a specific focus on 7 October and the Gaza war, in terms of their impact on Israel’s regional cooperation, policies towards the Palestinian issue and domestic politics. It then moves on to review various types of regional confrontations – both military and diplomatic ones – that Israel faced in the region, with Iran, Syria, Lebanon and Turkey. In doing so, the article stresses processes of both continuity and change, spells out indicators for potential positive progress moving forward and highlights the need for moderation and pro-diplomacy attitudes in order to help Israel and its neighbours transition from a bleak period of conflict to a brighter future of cooperation.

7 October and the Gaza War

Following the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020, Israel enjoyed enhanced diplomatic relations and multi-sector cooperation with key Arab countries, and benefited from new minilateral and inter-regional initiatives. In parallel, however, Israel continued to oppose an Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution and took actions aimed at blocking the feasibility of ever reaching such a formula for peace. Domestic developments in Israeli politics and society, including a rise of extremism and democratic backsliding provided a context that limited the ability to maximize regional cooperation and leverage it for Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking. The Hamas attack on 7 October, and the war in Gaza that followed, had a negative impact on these different issues and became the key factors for determining Israel’s future trajectory in the region.

Pre-7 October & Gaza War Trends

Israel’s regional cooperation – Israel’s first decades were characterized by a fight for survival, regional isolation and a mindset of a people dwelling alone. Peace treaties with Egypt (1979) and Jordan (1994), as well as mutual recognition with the PLO (1993) have gradually changed this reality. Despite setbacks and challenges, they generally emphasized the promise of diplomacy, opened new prospects of regional integration and cooperation and generated hopes for peace. A reversal of this trend in the early 2000s, given the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process (1999) and the start of the second intifada (2000), led to the downgrading or cutting of Israel’s ties with Arab and Muslim states (although the formal peace treaties remained in place).

Things changed for the better again in the 2010s, in a process eventually culminating with the signing of the Abraham Accords (2020), leading to normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and Morocco, and to recurring efforts to reach such agreements with additional regional actors. This improvement of Israel’s situation in the Middle East generated more diplomatic recognition by Arab states, more bilateral engagement and cooperations, more visibility, diversity and positivity in ties; the launching of minilateral (Negev Forum, Prosperity Project) and inter-regional (I2U2 – India, Israel, US, UAE; IMEC – India-Middle East-Europe Corridor) initiatives; and a positive shift in Israeli public opinion towards the feasibility and benefit of regional cooperation.

Israel’s policies and attitudes towards the Palestinian issue – Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan were enabled following steps taken on the Palestinian issue (Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s 1977 Palestinian self-rule plan; the 1993 Israel-PLO Oslo Accord), which were short of a resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Later, the Arab League, as well as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, endorsed the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative (API) that conditioned normalized relations with Israel on the actual resolution of its conflict with the Palestinians (and Syria). The Abraham Accords were made possible after a mere commitment by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to step back from his intention to annex Palestinian territories in the West Bank. This was understood in Israel as proof that the sequence of the API can be reversed, and that normalization of Israel-Arab ties may in fact be a prelude to Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, or even a way to bypass and avoid it, rather than a consequence of reaching the two-state solution.

With that in mind, Israeli policies that sought to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state and to enhance Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip (sustaining the intra-Palestinian West Bank-Gaza Strip divide, settlement expansion, weakening the Palestinian Authority and military actions) were intensified. For many in Israel, the Palestinian issue lost some of its importance and urgency, given developments in Israel-Arab relations and a shift in international priorities. An emphasis on conflict management, rather than conflict resolution, was on the rise, with a prevailing Israeli belief that the so-called status quo in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict could be sustained for the long-term.

Israel’s domestic politics – Since Netanyahu came back to power in 2009, Israel has mostly been under right-wing leadership, which opposes an Israeli-Palestinian two-state solution but is generally supportive of practical cooperation with Arab states. Except for 2021-2022, Netanyahu has been Prime Minister throughout. Whenever his coalitions included centrist figures, who held positions related to regional diplomacy (Tzipi Livni in 2013-2014; Gabi Ashkenazi in 2020-2021) progress was made in Israel-Arab relations (including the Abraham Accords), while positions on the Palestinian issue were somewhat more moderate. When Netanyahu had to rely on far-right elements, such as the coalition that has been in place since December 2022, pro-active actions to block the two-state solution have intensified, and Israel-Arab relations have deteriorated.

During the short tenure of the ideologically-diverse coalition led by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, in 2021-2022, real progress was made in Israel’s regional relations – including the rehabilitation of ties with Jordan and Turkey, the launch of the Negev Forum, and the revitalization of engagement channels with the Palestinian Authority. Over the years, Israel’s political spectrum has shifted to the right, but as trust in Netanyahu’s leadership eroded, initially due to corruption charges, contestants to Netanyahu emerged from within the right-wing ideological base. The dividing line within Israeli politics shifted from left vs right to pro vs anti Netanyahu. In parallel, Israel has been experiencing a process of democratic backsliding (most notably, with an attempted judicial overhaul) and a weakening of the state system (including its foreign service), which has taken its toll on the country’s social cohesion, global standing, international alliances and regional diplomacy.

Impact of 7 October & the Gaza War

The 7 October Hamas attack and the subsequent Gaza war have had a profound impact on nearly all aspects related to Israeli society, diplomacy, security and economy.

On Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking, 7 October and the Gaza war sidelined pro-peace discourse and activism in Israel. Israeli society experienced a trauma that eroded any trust the people had in the Palestinians, and it was mobilized around existential needs and fears, as a direct consequence of the war and driven by a desperate desire for the release of the hostages. Many in Israel lost faith in prospects of peace with the Palestinians; became even more reluctant to make territorial concessions and support a two-state solution; adopted an inward-looking focus on security needs and on pro-actively countering potential threats; took an aggressive stance towards regional and international actors that highlighted Palestinian suffering or advocated Palestinian statehood; increasingly supported Israeli control over Palestinian territories; and legitimized extremist ideas and practices against Palestinians. Israelis were not sufficiently exposed by their media outlets to what was happening in Gaza, largely supported the war and many were indifferent to Palestinian suffering.

Nevertheless, as the war went on, so the opposition to it grew, accompanied by an increased understanding of the urgency to deal with – rather than dismiss – the Palestinian issue, and a comprehension that military gains are not enough and must be coupled with diplomatic efforts to end the war and bring the hostages back home. However, when it came to diplomacy, Israel looked to rely only on the US, and even more so after the reelection of Donald Trump as US President – who had no intention of calling for a two-state solution. In parallel, Israel decided not to take part in – and at times actively opposed – other international initiatives related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, such as the Global Alliance for the Implementation of the Two-State Solution, and the international conference on the two-state solution led by France and Saudi Arabia. Israel also warned countries against recognizing a Palestinian state, and took diplomatic measures against those that chose to do so.

When it came to diplomacy, Israel looked
to rely only on the US, and even more so
after the reelection of Donald Trump – who
had no intention of calling for a two-state solution

On regional cooperation, the war waged on Gaza stoked tensions – on different levels – with all Arab and Muslim countries. Criticism of Israel was on the rise, especially among public opinion; levels of Israel-Arab diplomatic representations were de facto downgraded; mutual visits and public engagement between Israeli and Arab officials declined; minilateral and inter-regional cooperative mechanisms were largely put on hold; and efforts for additional normalization agreements stalled. Prior to 7 October, Israel and Saudi Arabia were seemingly heading towards a diplomatic breakthrough that would have enabled normalization, but the Gaza war changed that course. Saudi Arabia, while maintaining ambiguity on its specific conditions from Israel for normalization, has made it clear that the war has to end first, and that a clear pathway towards the establishment of a Palestinian state should be put in place. Prospects for Israeli-Saudi normalization were put on the back burner, but both countries are still thought to be strategically interested in normalizing ties, and it is expected that once the Gaza war ends, Trump will re-prioritize the issue and can actually deliver on his promises.

Despite the Gaza war’s negative impact on Israel-Arab relations, strategic decisions that were previously made by Arab countries to engage in formal relations with Israel were not reversed; diplomatic ties were not severed (unlike what happened after the outbreak of the 2nd intifada in 2000); bilateral agreements serving central needs – such as water and energy – remained in place; security and economic coordination to counter certain implications of the war took place – sometimes behind the scenes – and proved to be effective; and Arab countries – Egypt and Qatar – played a key role in efforts to mediate ceasefires and hostage releases. Noteworthy for Israelis was the Emirati decision to continue flying to Israel as usual, at a time when multiple European and American carriers suspended such flights. Also in the Mediterranean, regional cooperation continued – albeit with greater difficulty in convening all sides and implementing collaborative endeavours –, whether in the field of energy or via regional organizations of which Israel, Palestine and Arab countries are equal members.

On the domestic front, most Israelis did not approve of Netanyahu’s leadership – before, during and after 7 October. Consecutive public opinions indicated that Israel saw its Prime Minister as responsible for what had happened, wished for early elections and yearned for new leadership. Unlike the security establishment, Netanyahu refused to take any responsibility and blocked efforts to launch a State Commission of Inquiry into the lead up and events of 7 October. Initially, the war led to a centrist party joining Netanyahu’s coalition, but this did not last long, and eventually Israel continued to be ruled by a coalition dependent on far-right parties that openly opposed and tried to block ceasefire agreements.

Political survival became a central factor
guiding Netanyahu’s actions, in the face
of his growing unpopularity and the mounting
criminal allegations and investigations
he and his associates were facing

Political survival became a central factor guiding Netanyahu’s actions, in the face of his growing unpopularity and the mounting criminal allegations and investigations he and his associates were facing. This gave momentum to further democratic backsliding and renewed efforts to advance the judicial overhaul – in parallel to constant public protests and political efforts to call early elections. As time went by, Netanyahu stepped up efforts to put an end to his trial, also mobilizing Trump’s public support to this end; to place the blame for 7 October on the security establishment, rather than on himself; and to tilt the political landscape in his favour – in the lead up to Israel’s next general elections, scheduled for 2026, via controversial messaging and legislative initiatives.

Regional Confrontations

Following 7 October, Israel’s security concerns were not limited to its fight against Hamas. Israel faced a prolonged period of multi-front confrontations, spearheaded by the Iran-led Axis of Resistance and involving Hezbollah, the Houthis and even Iraqi militias. Israel was not accustomed to such a strategic reality, and responded with a new security doctrine and approach, also impacted by the trauma of 7 October. Israel felt the need to take overt military actions within other countries’ territories, to counter intentions and capabilities to damage it. Beyond military confrontations throughout the region – most notably in Lebanon, Syria and Iran – Israel also faced a diplomatic confrontation with Turkey, which some feared might escalate further.

Israel-Iran

The 12 days of Israel-Iran confrontation in June 2025 were unprecedented. Yet, they did not happen in a void. The two countries, which have been exchanging blows for years via proxy actions and covert operations, openly attacked each other for the first time in April and October 2024. While quickly contained at the time, these incidents set a spiral in motion. In addition, Israel’s strikes helped to weaken Iran’s air defence systems – thus easing the way for the June 2025 attacks – and the results of Iran’s strikes indicated that Israel – together with the US and regional countries – can effectively defend against such threats.

With Trump in the white House, Israel has enjoyed further backing for its intentions vis-à-vis Iran. And, its intentions in June 2025 were focused on significantly damaging Iran’s nuclear project and ballistic missile capabilities. Some in Israel hoped that such actions – weakening Iran and humiliating the regime – would catalyze domestic actions for regime change in Tehran, but this was not a stated goal of the Israeli operation. The nearly two weeks of fighting demonstrated Israel’s military superiority over Iran, its airspace dominance and the relative freedom of action it enjoys. It did, however, cause an unprecedented level of damage to Israel’s major cities.

Israel succeeded in damaging Iran’s military capacities and managed to mobilize the US to take action against its nuclear facilities. Nevertheless, the extent of damage and impact is still unclear. Multiple actors are publishing contradicting assessments about the actual impact of Israeli and American strikes. The common assumption that Iran’s nuclear project was not eliminated due to the strikes, but rather merely delayed, leads to speculations that further rounds of Israel-Iran confrontation are only a matter of time, despite the immediate interest of both sides – as well as the US – to make the ceasefire work, at least for now.

The ceasefire, however, did not result from meaningful diplomatic processes and is not enshrined in any formal document specifying longer term rules of engagement. Rather, it came to life via a social media post by the US President, and included no content beyond an ad hoc cessation of hostilities. The core ideological, security and diplomatic causes for the Israel-Iran conflict remain intact, even after the events of June 2025, and this is cause for concern regarding possible future confrontations. A US-Iran diplomatic breakthrough, in the form of a new agreement related to Iran’s nuclear project may assist in steering Israel-Iran dynamics away from conflict and setting them on a somewhat better course.

Israel-Syria

The rapid and unexpected transition in Syria, with the downfall of Assad in December 2024, prompted Israel to recalibrate policies and actions. During years of civil war in Syria, Israel’s priorities was to limit the Iranian presence and influence in the country, prevent the delivery of advanced weaponry to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria, coordinate its airstrikes in Syria with Russia to avoid mistaken confrontations and showcase a preference to maintaining Assad’s central regime over a spiralling chaos.

Israel’s initial reactions to the transition in Syria were in line with how it usually responds to changes in the region – a mix of caution, scepticism and focus on potential threats, often accompanied by exaggerations and overreactions. Israel adopted a highly alarmist approach towards Syria’s transition, depicting al-Sharaa as almost evil, vowing to protect minorities (especially Druze) from the emerging centralized government, seizing territory and maintaining military presence inside Syria, carrying out intense airstrikes to dismantle Syria’s military, and lobbying the US and EU to keep sanctions on Syria intact.

Following Trump’s visit to the Gulf in May 2025, during which he met with al-Sharaa, spoke positively about him, announced his intent to lift sanctions and indicated the goal of having Syria join the Abraham Accords, Israel’s policies began to change. There was a downturn in negative rhetoric regarding al-Sharaa, a decline in the scope of Israeli military operations inside Syria (at least until Israel’s forceful response inside Syria, in mid-July, to protect the Druze community in the Al-Suwayda area),, the launch of indirect – and then direct – dialogue channels between Israeli and Syrian officials, and a growing discourse about the two countries reaching formal arrangements or agreements relatively soon. During the Israel-Iran confrontation, it was clear that Syria aligned with US expectations.

Positive momentum has been picking up pace between Israel and Syria, and direct engagement is becoming normalized. Nevertheless, these relations are different to those Israel enjoys with Gulf states it has normalized ties with. There are territorial disputes on the Golan Heights dating back to 1967. Peace efforts between Israel and Syria were launched as early as 1992 but did not come to fruition. The two countries are still in a state of conflict, which cannot be disregarded. Events in Al-Suwayda were a clear reminder of that.

Mutual recognition, an interim agreement, the inclusion of Syria in regional mechanisms in which Israel is a member and the further legitimization of official and unofficial interactions between both countries could realistically be the next steps to take. Pushing Syria too early and too quickly towards full normalization with Israel, as Trump seems to be doing – might backfire. Skilled diplomacy is needed to make the most out of these new opportunities, delicately manage sources of tensions and escalation, and move Israel-Syria relations forward step by step. 

Israel-Lebanon

In Israel, Lebanon was mostly perceived for years as a battleground vis-à-vis Hezbollah, rather than as a neighbouring state. The domestic strife and political dysfunction within Lebanon reinforced this. Yet, a gradual process of change has been taking place. The devastating 2020 Beirut port explosion generated first-of-its-kind sympathy from Israelis. The mayor of Tel Aviv lit up the municipality building with the Lebanese flag, catching many by surprise given the bilateral state of war between the two countries. Gradually, the perception that stability and prosperity in Lebanon is in Israel’s interest became more widespread.

Once Hezbollah joined the fight against Israel, the day after 7 October, Israel chose to focus its attacks on Hezbollah targets, not on Lebanese state infrastructure as it had in the past. The distinction between Hezbollah and Lebanon continued throughout the months of confrontation. The signing of the 2022 Israel-Lebanon maritime border agreement, after a decade of failed negotiations, showed that diplomacy between the countries can actually work. Furthermore, Israel’s 2024 success in dramatically weakening Hezbollah and limiting Iran’s influence in Lebanon, were conducive to the future of Israel-Lebanon relations, as was the temporary ceasefire reached in November 2024. A sense of new opportunities in Israel-Lebanon relations emerged, especially given the end of the political crisis in Lebanon, resulting in a moderate and Western-backed leadership.

Both Israel and Lebanon support the implementation of UNSCR 1701, and when the Israel-Iran confrontation took place, Lebanon’s leadership stated that it does not allow Hezbollah to strike Israel from Lebanon’s territory. In parallel, Lebanon was working with Palestinian President Abbas to collect weapons from Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, and acted to put Hezbollah weapons under state control. Experts talking about prospects for future Israel-Lebanon peace became a more common phenomenon, backed by US statements about Lebanon possibly joining the Abraham Accords.

But, the road to peace and normalization is long and winding. Engagement with Israel is still illegal in Lebanon, and contacts are limited to security issues, often held under UN auspices. Practical sticking points remain between the countries, including a long-standing land border dispute, and the need for a full Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. In 2025, Israel and Lebanon announced the launch of working groups to deal with contested issues, and these should be leveraged to legitimize and enhance bilateral engagement – even if discreet and indirect at first. Furthermore, technical issues – such as energy – could serve as a positive agenda for cooperation that can be advanced via multilateral frameworks, such as the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, which Lebanon could be encouraged to join.

Israel-Turkey

Prior to 7 October, Israel-Turkey relations had taken a surprising turn. The two countries, which have ongoing diplomatic relations since 1949 – albeit multiple ups and downs – were recovering from ruptures in ties. Following the 2010 flotilla incident and the subsequent deep crisis in ties, there was a rapprochement in 2016. A renewed crisis – over Gaza and Jerusalem – emerged in 2018, culminating in another rapprochement in 2022. While the establishment of Netanyahu’s far-right coalition in late 2022 damaged Israel-Arab relations, progress continued with Turkey. Less than three weeks before 7 October, Netanyahu and Erdogan met in New York – on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, where they indicated intentions for mutual visits and cooperation.

The Gaza war turned this course of events on its head. Erdogan sided with Hamas, refusing to label it as a terror organization, voiced hostility and threats towards Israel and took actions that limited bilateral ties. This generated aggressive responses from the Israeli government. Civilian connections between the countries also suffered. In culture, sports, civil society, academia and tourism the Israel-Turkey disconnect grew, and ties hit rock bottom. As a consequence, Turkey was sidelined from mediation efforts related to Gaza, and Israel further deepened ties with Turkey’s rivals in the eastern Mediterranean – Cyprus and Greece.

The transition in Syria initially fuelled tensions further, with Syria emerging as a new Turkish sphere of influence. It was reported that Turkey was considering establishing military bases inside Syria and supported the re-building of Syria’s military. This was a no-go for Israel, while Israeli actions within Syrian territory were a red flag for Turkey. Media and populist politicians in both countries began warning against a future confrontation, overlooking the key facts that both countries maintain diplomatic ties and are close allies of the US.

As Israel’s Syrian policy changed for the better, reports emerged of talks between Israel and Turkey in Azerbaijan. The two countries wisely acknowledged the need for engagement, security coordination and the establishment of a deconfliction mechanism related to Syria. Future improvements in Israel-Syria ties, should these indeed materialize, may set a warmer tone between Israel and Turkey, especially if that were coupled with an end to the Gaza war.

Nevertheless, after two failed rapprochements and given Erdogan’s reactions during the Gaza war, Israel has little belief in the possibility of a strategic warming of ties with Erdogan. Turkey may not be enthusiastic about cooperating more closely with Netanyahu either. In such a context, establishing reasonable working relations on shared strategic interests could be good enough, and might also create a space for ordinary Israelis and Turks to reconnect, perhaps regarding the challenges both societies are facing, such as the need to confront democratic backsliding and protect liberal values.

For nearly two years, the 7 October Hamas attack, the Gaza war and multiple regional confrontations took a heavy toll on peoples, societies and countries in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, diplomatic opportunities for a more peaceful, secure and prosperous region still exist, and have been more intensely discussed following the June 2025 Israel-Iran confrontation. The chance of their materialization largely depends on an end to the Gaza war, the domestic empowerment of moderate and practical leaders and effective international diplomatic involvement. The region awaits a transition from warfare to peacemaking, from confrontation to cooperation.  

Header Photo: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is greeted at the White House in Washington by President Donald Trump. April 7, 2025.  (Official White House Photo by Daniel Torok) “P20250516DT-0781” by The White House, United States Government Work