The Spectres of Three Anniversaries

The past year marked three significant anniversaries for Cyprus. The first — reflecting the internationalization of the Cyprus issue — was the 60th anniversary of the deployment of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in 1964, following intense intercommunal violence between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the young, then, decolonized Republic of Cyprus (RoC).

The second milestone marked 50 years since Türkiye’s military intervention on the island in July 1974, launched in response to a coup d’état orchestrated by Greek and Greek Cypriot ultra-nationalists seeking Enosis (union with Greece). The intervention evolved into a prolonged military occupation and a de facto division of the island along ethnic lines, with the internationally recognized RoC controlled by the Greek Cypriots in the south, and a Turkish Cypriot administration established in the north — recognized only by Türkiye as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The events of 1974 served as proof of the continued entanglement of the Cyprus issue with broader Greek–Turkish tensions.

The third anniversary — twenty years since Cyprus’s accession to the European Union in 2004 — signifies the Europeanization of the conflict. That same year, a UN-sponsored reunification proposal known as the Annan Plan reached the stage of simultaneous referenda in both communities — the first and only time this has occurred. Despite its foundation in a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation, the plan was decisively rejected by the Greek Cypriot electorate, while Turkish Cypriots voted in favour. As a result, Cyprus joined the EU as a divided island.

This article argues that any assessment of the current obstacles to resolving the Cyprus issue must consider the intersecting impact of these three anniversaries, and the international, European and bilateral (Greek–Turkish) dynamics that continue to shape the island’s geopolitical trajectory. In particular, I contend that the failure of the Annan Plan in 2004 represents a critical juncture whose long-term implications have been underestimated. Understanding this failure sheds light on Türkiye’s evolving stance on Cyprus, especially in the context of its shifting position in post-2004 EU–Türkiye relations. This lens offers a more nuanced view of Türkiye’s regional posture and strategic calculations in an increasingly volatile Middle Eastern landscape.

The Annan Plan and the Europeanization of a Turkish–Greek Proxy Conflict

Few would disagree that the Cyprus issue is rooted in — and shaped by — the enduring symbolic, political and territorial rivalries between Greece and Türkiye. Conflict transformation scholars argue that the engagement of a third party in binary identity conflicts can shift the framing of the dispute. This was precisely the positive dynamic that led to the development of the Annan Plan in the early 2000s, with the EU playing the pivotal role (Heraclides, 2003).

Energized by the prospect of Cyprus joining the EU, and supported by the broader aura of Europeanization in Greek–Turkish relations since 1999, the political climate seemed favourable at the turn of the millennium: Turkish Cypriots, historically wary of federal solutions since the events of 1964, began to view a European future within a unified Cyprus more positively than their isolated and unrecognized state.

Meanwhile, Türkiye’s newly elected Justice and Development Party (AKP) government and its Prime Minister, R.T. Erdoğan, clashed with the stronghold of the military establishment and reversed the country’s long-standing securitized approach to Cyprus with what became known as Türkiye’s “new Cyprus policy” (İşeri, 2019). Erdoğan backed a reunification deal for Cyprus as a gateway to Türkiye’s own EU accession. This historical shift in Turkish foreign policy paved the way for the Annan Plan to reach the referendum stage, with Erdoğan forcing the withdrawal of obstructionist Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş from the negotiations, in favour of the pro-unification TRNC Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat.

However, this shift caught the Greek Cypriot leadership off guard. Despite a long-standing rhetorical commitment to reunification, Greek Cypriot political elites and society appeared unprepared for a rapid federal settlement, raising concerns about the plan’s functionality, balance and security provisions. President Tassos Papadopoulos — despite having negotiated the Annan Plan with Talat — campaigned against it. The result was an overwhelming 75.8% rejection by Greek Cypriots, in stark contrast to the 64.9% of Turkish Cypriots who voted in favour.

De-Europeanization and Indifference

The failure of the Annan Plan had more far-reaching consequences than is often acknowledged — not necessarily because it ended prospects for a federal solution (which resumed in 2008), but because it disrupted Türkiye’s European trajectory. Although some positive outcomes emerged — such as the opening of crossing points and new cross-communal initiatives — the plan’s failure severed a key symbolic and political link between Türkiye and the EU, triggering a process of de-Europeanization.

The failure of the Annan Plan severed
a key symbolic and political link
between Türkiye and the EU, triggering
a process of de-Europeanization

When Türkiye’s support for the plan yielded no reward in its EU bid, pro-European actors in Ankara lost ground to the so-called Eurasianists. In 2005, Türkiye declared formal non-recognition of the RoC — referring to it since as the “Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus,” closing its ports to Cyprus-flagged ships, while Erdogan increasingly accused the EU of double standards. It is, in hindsight, a historical irony that the same year (2005) marked the formal opening of Türkiye’s EU accession talks. Over the following years, Turkish foreign policy shifted away from the EU and toward the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Global South. This shift emphasized the identity of a “new Türkiye” as an independent Muslim middle power, weakening both its EU reform agenda and its traditional Western alignments.

Cyprus, in this post-2004 period, became a secondary issue in Turkish foreign policy. In Greece, the debt crisis and a sense of strategic complacency following RoC’s EU accession produced a similar indifference. The only, possibly, positive effect of this away-from-the-spotlight period and double detachment (from Turkey and Greece) was that it allowed Cypriots to explore a more “Cyprus-owned” (Sözen and Şahin, 2024) process for the island’s reunification, which culminated in the Crans-Montana talks a decade later (see below).

However, when Cyprus returned to regional and international attention, it did so in a de-Europeanized and securitized context. What had once been framed through European integration was now shaped by energy geopolitics, hard security and fragmented international norms.

Politics of “Power”: Hydrocarbonizing and Internationalizing Cyprus

The 2010s brought two major developments with direct implications for Cyprus.

First, Türkiye rapidly expanded its economic, diplomatic and military reach, abandoning its “soft power” and “zero problems with neighbours” doctrine in favour of coercive diplomacy. This shift became evident amid the Syrian civil war, through Türkiye’s support for anti-Assad militias and its military interventions against the Kurdish YPG and the Islamic State. Meanwhile, its defence industry grew into a key economic driver, expanding Ankara’s influence across the Global South and positioning it as a regional powerbroker from Libya to Nagorno-Karabakh.

Second, the discovery of gas reserves off Israel (2009–2010) drew regional focus to eastern Mediterranean maritime claims. Cyprus re-emerged as a strategic concern following the RoC’s first gas discovery in its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 2011.

Though the RoC had signed EEZ agreements with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel in the 2000s, with only moderate reaction from Türkiye, the confirmation of gas reserves, and the entry of international energy firms into the equation shifted geopolitical perceptions. Türkiye responded by dispatching the Piri Reis vessel for seismic research in the area, and signing a continental shelf agreement with the Turkish Cypriot administration. Cyprus, internationalized via hydrocarbonization, became embedded in a regional “energy security complex” (İşeri, 2019).

The Return of Greek–Turkish Zero-Sum Politics

In the absence of a broader normative framework for regional cooperation, both Greece and Türkiye re-entered the Cyprus question by projecting escalating EEZ and maritime disputes onto the island.

This time, the stakes were higher. Regional alliances were forged, reinforcing zero-sum perceptions: any EEZ delimitation move by one actor was seen as a threat by another. Within this securitized setting, Greece and the RoC aligned with Türkiye’s regional rivals, like Israel and General Sisi’s Egypt. The EastMed pipeline proposal (Greece-RoC-Israel) emerged in 2015, and, although later shelved, it laid the groundwork for the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) in 2019, which expanded the triadic block to include Egypt, France, and Italy (as well as Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority) — all of which excluded Türkiye, Syria and Libya from their planning.

In the absence of a broader normative framework
for regional cooperation, both Greece and Türkiye
re-entered the Cyprus question by projecting
escalating EEZ and maritime disputes onto the island

In response, Türkiye formally embraced the Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine — a once-marginal ultranationalist narrative that called for greater maritime assertiveness — which gained official backing after 2018. Its adoption was marked by the production of a new seismic research vessel fleet, and the framing of Cyprus, and the Greek islands, as obstacles to the projection of Türkiye’s maritime interests. The apex came with the controversial 2019 Turkish–Libyan maritime deal and Türkiye’s gunboat diplomacy, used to deter the opposing block’s energy explorations.

Coda: From Crans-Montana to Damascus?

Against this backdrop of rising regional tension, the 2017 Crans-Montana talks was the last serious UN-led reunification effort. With pro-federalist Cypriot leaders in office and rhetorical support from Ankara and Athens, expectations were cautiously optimistic.

Yet, in retrospect, Crans-Montana appears today as a failed interlude, undermined not by lack of technical preparation, but by the securitized regional and international context in which it unfolded. Its collapse was followed by even greater entrenchment: in Türkiye, “negotiation fatigue” gave way to a pro–two-state stance for Cyprus, which Turkish diplomacy had openly favoured since the permanent division of the island (Yiallourides and Sözen, 2025; Sözen and Şahin, 2024). The focus has shifted from Crans-Montana to Damascus.

Conclusion

Two decades ago, even amid the Annan Plan’s failure, Cyprus’s division still felt reversible. Today, the legacies of 1964 and 1974 weigh more heavily than in 2004. The Annan Plan’s rejection triggered de-Europeanization and a strategic pivot in Türkiye’s foreign policy toward a Eurasian and MENA-oriented framework. As Cyprus became entangled in energy and security rivalries, its relevance grew — but so did the obstacles to resolution.

While some analysts have warned of the futility of energy conflicts and advocate for regional cooperation on renewables and environmental protection (Grigoriadis and Çetin, 2024), recent disputes — such as those over the Cyprus–Greece undersea electricity cable or proposed Aegean Marine Protected Areas — show that securitized interests adapt to new arenas. The medium may shift; the rivalry remains.

As this article goes to press, the tensions surrounding Iran are rising, Türkiye–Israel friction is intensifying and new fronts — like the announced maritime deals between Ankara and Damascus — threaten to implicate Cyprus again.

If de-escalation is possible, it lies not with external actors, but with a reframing of the conflict by Türkiye and Greece, whose rivalry underpins the region’s maritime tensions. Responsibility rests squarely with their political elites to redefine engagement and make possible a post-securitized regional order.

References

Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. and Çetin, Deniz. “Energy Transition in the Eastern Mediterranean: Turning the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) into a Regional Opportunity.” ELIAMEP, 2024. www.eliamep.gr/en/energy-transition-in-the-eastern-mediterranean-turning-the-east-mediterranean-gas-forum-emgf-into-a-regional-opportunity/.

Heraclides, Alexis. “The 55 Year Cyprus Debacle: A Bird’s Eye View.” Cyprus Review, vol. 15, n. 2: 65–80, 2003.

İşeri, Emre. “Turkey’s (Energy) Security Concerns and Cyprus.” In A. Heraclides and G. Çakmak (Eds.) Greece and Turkey in Conflict and Cooperation: From Europeanization to De-Europeanization. London: Routledge, 2019.

Sözen, Ahmet, and Şahin, Devrim. “Renewing Hope for Cyprus Peace: a Novel Approach to Reconcile the Negotiation Positions of the Turkish Cypriot Side and the Greek Cypriot Side.” New Perspectives on Turkey, vol 72: 70–89, 2024.

Yiallourides, Constantinos and Sözen, Ahmet. “The Cyprus–Türkiye Maritime Boundary.” Swisspeace Policy Brief, January 2025. www.swisspeace.ch/articles/the-cyprustuerkiye-maritime-boundary.

Recommended Bibliography

Heraclides, Alexis., and Çakmak, Gizem (Eds.). Greece and Turkey in Conflict and Cooperation: From Europeanization to De-Europeanization. London: Routledge, 2019.

Gingeras, Ryan. “Blue Homeland: The Heated Politics Behind Turkey’s New Maritime Strategy.” War on the Rocks, 2 June 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/blue-homeland-the-heated-politics-behind-turkeys-new-maritime-strategy/.

Kutlay, Mustafa., and Öniş, Ziya. “Understanding oscillations in Turkish foreign policy: pathways to unusual middle power activism.” Third World Quarterly, vol. 42, n. 12, 3051–3069, 2021.

Stergiou, Andreas. The Greek-Turkish Maritime Dispute. Resisting the Future. Cham: Springer, 2022.

Header photo: Turkish drilling vessel Yavuz is escorted by Turkish Navy frigate TCG Gemlik (F-492) in the eastern Mediterranean Sea off Cyprus, August 6, 2019. Picture taken August 6, 2019. REUTERS/Murad Sezer