Since the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP) came to power in 2002, its influence and activity in the Middle East region has increased markedly compared to previous periods. It was not the first Turkish government to turn its attention to this area of the world. In the 1980s, Turgut Ozal’s Administrations fostered relations with Middle Eastern and North African countries in the context of opening up to new markets, in contrast to the traditional Kemalist elite, which was more focused on relations with the United States and European countries, with which Ozal maintained close collaboration in a wide variety of areas. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the USSR, meanwhile, opened the door to a new role for Turkey in the international arena. The apparent loss of strategic and defensive relevance in the Western bloc after the collapse of the USSR vis-à-vis its traditional Western allies provided an opportunity to explore new scenarios and diversify its relations with third countries. Ismail Cem, the Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1997 to 2002, also stood out in this vein in his aim to design a foreign policy that would lend global relevance to Turkey, a country he saw as firmly anchored in the West, but with a hybrid European and Asian identity. With a much more open and possibilist geopolitical vision, he was the architect of a historic rapprochement between Greece and Turkey and one of the promoters of the Adana agreement with Syria signed in 1998, a country that the Turkish army had threatened with military intervention, given its support for the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK), classified as a terrorist group by Turkey, the United States and the European Union (EU). This agreement resulted in the expulsion of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan from Syria, a move that facilitated his subsequent arrest in Kenya in 1999. Turkey’s second Africa Action Plan was also adopted during his term, namely in 1998, reflecting the implementation of a multidimensional foreign policy.
The rise of the AKP to power in November 2002 would continue and deepen the Turkish government’s notable activity in the international arena, with not only the different foreign ministers in office since then standing out, but also the prime minister and the successive presidents who have held office since then. The diversification and intensification of relations with countries in the region would in no way harm relations with the European Union during the AKP’s first term in office. Indeed, the ruling party succeeded in opening negotiations on the road to full membership in 2005. At that time, soft power tools predominated and it was time to implement the slogan “zero problems with neighbours.”
Turkey and the Middle East during and after the Arab Spring
Analysts point to a later stage in the AKP’s foreign policy coinciding with the Arab Spring. At that point, Ahmet Davutoglu, who had taken up the post in 2009 after having served as the presidential advisor on foreign affairs since 2003, was already foreign minister. Davutoglu’s geopolitical perspective, set forth in his book “Strategic Depth,” published in 2001, placed Turkey at the centre of the regional map and gave it a key role in the Middle East as a result of its geographical location, the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire, and its majority culture and religion, Sunni Islam. The vindication of Islam as a fundamental part of Turkish national identity was undoubtedly one of the most radical departures from previous administrations. In terms of foreign policy tools, from this period onwards there would be increasing recourse to hard power and coercive diplomacy. At the same time, the government took partisan stances on conflicts in the region, leading to a break with the political regime of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt, following the 2013 coup that overthrew Mohamed Morsi, or with the regime of Bashar al-Assad in the context of the Syrian civil war.
This marked interventionism in the region came at the same time as the ruling elite began to develop a growing anti-Western discourse, already quite notably staged, to criticize and denigrate the Gezi protests that took place against the Turkish government in 2013.
In the context of the shift in the Arab Spring, the AKP government, for its part, supported movements and parties around the Muslim Brotherhood. This alignment brought Turkey and Qatar closer together, but eroded relations with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, which in turn strengthened relations with Israel, Greece and Cyprus, resulting in Turkey’s marginalization in the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum and exacerbating tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean waters. The murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul in October 2018 further strained relations with the Gulf state, as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan pointed a finger at the royal family, and more specifically at Mohammed bin Salman (without explicitly naming him), as the instigator. Saudi Arabia imposed an informal boycott of Turkish products in response. Both countries have also supported different groups in conflict in Libya: Turkey has been instrumental in sustaining the Government of National Accord and Riyadh has supported military leader Khalifa Haftar. The Turkish government’s foreign policy adviser, Ibrahim Kalin, defended Turkish foreign policy at the time, stressing the “precious loneliness” Turkey was willing to face in exchange for unilaterally maintaining its positions in the region.
The 2016 coup attempt distanced Turkey from the United States, which was directly accused of having sponsored it, and from EU countries for their perceived lukewarm support on the night of the coup. This context encouraged a rapprochement with Russia, a country of fundamental importance to Turkey in both economic and security matters.
The economic crisis that began to seriously damage Turkey’s finances in 2018 contributed, however, to a shift in foreign policy that called for the “normalization” of relations with a wide range of state actors as of 2021. Contacts with the governments of Greece, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and even Israel were significantly and progressively reoriented and improved. Meanwhile, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 allowed Turkey to position itself as a useful actor for mediation or facilitation, as it had privileged relations with both the Ukrainian and Russian governments, which also helped to relaunch its international role.
The significant activism of Turkish foreign policy and its marked “strategic autonomy” has led Turkey to be described as an emerging or regional-global power due to its geostrategic relevance, its growing global ambitions, and its questioning of the distribution of power in the international sphere, which has even led it to promote the restructuring of the international organizations to which it belongs. Erdogan’s statement criticizing the structure of the UN Security Council with the phrase “the world is bigger than five” is a case in point.
Turkey’s Role as an Emerging Power
The multipolar world of the 21st century has opened the door to the emergence of new states from highly disparate geographical areas. In contrast to traditional middle powers, the emerging middle powers in this context are characterized by belonging to the semi-periphery of the global economy, suffering significant economic inequalities and experiencing strong political tensions, despite having democratic regimes and significant influence in their regional sphere (Jordan, 2003). The search for international status is one of the major incentives encouraging them to promote cooperation initiatives with third countries, in which there is a notable, growing recourse to informal multilateralism with ad hoc coalitions to address specific problems and situations (Hafner-Burton et al, 2009; Flemes, 2013).
Although Turkey is not a major power, it has been categorized as an emerging power, with a great capacity to act independently, resist pressure from major powers, and exert its influence as a regional actor (Süsler, 2019). Its foreign policy is characterized by pronounced activity and the use of all kinds of soft power tools, coercive diplomacy and hard power, especially in the Middle East region, which is the focus of this paper.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 allowed Turkey
to position itself as a useful actor for mediation or
facilitation, as it had privileged relations with both
the Ukrainian and Russian governments
In the sphere of soft power, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), established in 1992, has played a relevant role. In its official activity report published in 2021, the agency indicated Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and, above all, Palestine, recipient of $33.945 billion, as the main recipient countries of aid in the Middle East. TIKA’s development and humanitarian aid projects have contributed to promoting relations with third countries and projecting Turkey’s international image.
In another area of its foreign policy, the increasingly frequent use of hard power tools has gone hand in hand with the development of a powerful arms industry. In the 2025 ranking published by Global Firepower (GFP), which evaluates and classifies the military capacity of countries, Turkey is ranked 9th out of 145. Moreover, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Turkey has consolidated its position as one of the world’s leading arms exporters. During the 2020-2024 period, Turkey accounted for approximately 28% of arms exports from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, while Israel accounted for 52%. In the world ranking, the Turkey ranked 11th among the world’s largest arms suppliers for the same period, allocating 33% of its sales to Middle Eastern countries. In this area, sales of the famous Bayraktar TB2 drones stand out, a company run by one of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s sons-in-law. Military expansion in the MENA region has also been notable: Turkey has military bases in Qatar and Somalia, and troops permanently stationed in Iraq and Syria. It has also signed defence cooperation agreements with countries such as Libya, Jordan and the current Syrian government.
Authors such as Kutlay and Öniş (2021) argue that there are domestic factors that help explain the Turkish government’s recurrent use of military power and coercive diplomacy in recent years, aimed at achieving greater popularity and diverting attention from domestic issues.
Turkey’s Response to the Genocide in Gaza[1]
The Middle East region has been in turmoil since late 2023. The Israeli government responded to the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023 with the continuous bombardment of the population and civilian infrastructure in Gaza and the obstruction of humanitarian aid. As a result, the State of Israel is being prosecuted by the International Court of Justice on charges of genocide. In addition, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant received arrest warrants for war crimes and crimes against humanity issued by the International Criminal Court, which also ordered the arrest of the head of Hamas’ military wing, Diab Ibrahim al Masri (known as Deif), for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Israel and Gaza during and after the attack of 7 October 2023.
Relations between Israel and Turkey have historically been unstable, with periods of intense cooperation and others of extreme friction. After a decade of sharp ups and downs, the two countries re-established diplomatic relations in 2022 and decided to usher in a new era between them. The war in Gaza has significantly eroded this rapprochement. While Turkey called for calm and advocated a de-escalation of the conflict after the Hamas attack on October 7, offering itself as a mediator in the conflict, its rhetoric hardened after the attack on the Al-Ahli hospital in 2023. The Turkish president accused Israel of the attack and called it a crime against humanity. Ankara’s trade sanctions on Israel and its official request to join South Africa’s genocide case against Israel brought before the International Court of Justice in August 2024 have distanced the two administrations.
TIKA’s development and humanitarian
aid projects have contributed to promoting
relations with third countries and projecting
Turkey’s international image
Turkey’s capacity to act as a mediator in the current situation has been significantly reduced, on the one hand, by the deterioration of its diplomatic relations with Israel and, on the other, by the weakening of Hamas’s political wing – with which Ankara maintained closer ties – vis-à-vis the organisation’s military wing. Moreover, Turkey’s leading role in this area has been displaced by the significant influence of Arab countries that have intervened directly in the negotiations between Israel and Hamas or have put forth proposals for the reconstruction of Gaza, with the aim of avoiding the forced displacement of the Palestinian population that the implementation of US President Donald Trump’s plans for Gaza would entail. The Arab League, in fact, approved an Egyptian-designed reconstruction plan for Gaza in March 2025, to be carried out in three phases, with an estimated funding of $53 billion, which envisages keeping the Gazan population on its territory.
For its part, the Turkish government has unilaterally exercised coercive diplomacy with Israel through economic sanctions, which have been widely criticized at home as insufficient. At the same time, in line with the possibilities available to an emerging middle power, it has used international forums and organizations to call for a permanent ceasefire, condemn the Israeli offensive and advocate a two-state solution based on a united territory that includes the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, under the rule of the Palestinian Authority.
Turkey in the Face of Post-Assad Siria
The Israeli offensive has not only focused on Gaza, but has expanded to Lebanon, Syria and Iran. The resulting balance of power in the region has been significantly affected. The weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon and the overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria have diminished Iran’s influence in these countries. The geopolitical vision deployed by the Iranian political elite in the region has been termed “strategic depth,” since, while not promoting territorial expansion, Iran’s “forward defence” strategy would aim to deter its adversaries before threats reach Iran’s borders.
This is where the so-called “axis of resistance,” which included the al-Assad regime and Iranian-backed militias in Syria and Iraq, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and Palestinian factions such as Hamas, plays a major role. This axis is ideologically based on opposition to US influence in the Middle East and confrontation with Israel. While Iran’s influence beyond its borders has recently been severely curtailed, it remains a key state in the dynamics of the region. The process of negotiations with the United States to prevent the development of Iran’s nuclear programme has raised certain expectations that a new war front, such as the one sponsored by Israel against Tehran, could be avoided. Although the margin for success in these negotiations is slim, one of the factors that could contribute to a successful outcome is the support of Gulf countries, in particular Saudi Arabia. The recent rapprochement between the Iranian and Saudi governments fostered by China helps to explain this new approach, as well as plans to promote the country internationally and diversify its economy, which require projecting a less convulsive image of the region.
Iran’s loss of influence in Syria has, precisely, boosted the influence of the Saudi and Turkish governments in that country. Although the rapprochement between these two middle powers took place before the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad, the change brought about by the Syrian government has encouraged them to collaborate jointly in its stabilization and reconstruction. Indeed, Donald Trump acknowledged the influence of these two countries when deciding to lift economic sanctions on Syria, a key point in paving the way for reconstruction. While the importance of Turkey in the new Syria has been clearly emphasized, the role of Saudi Arabia in this regard is no less negligible. It is important to underline that Saudi Arabia was the first country visited by the new interim president of the Syrian Arab Republic, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and that the Saudi and Qatari governments have paid off Syria’s debt to the World Bank, which will allow the country to request new loans. Riyadh also served as the basis for the meeting between Donald Trump and Syrian President al-Sharaa in May 2025, which the Turkish president joined by telephone.
The Turkish government has unilaterally
exercised coercive diplomacy with Israel
through economic sanctions, which have
been widely criticized at home as insufficient
Turkey, for its part, developed its relationship with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), whose leader is the current Syrian president, during the Syrian civil war, during its years of military opposition to the al-Assad regime, despite being designated as a terrorist organization by the United Nations. Its disassociation from al-Qaeda in 2016 favoured this collaboration. Foreign support was key to the survival of HTS, which, based in Idlib, prevented a massive influx of new Syrian refugees into Turkey, an issue that was high on Turkey’s political agenda. In the new context, while Turkey cannot provide economic aid on the scale of Saudi Arabia, its influence on the new Syrian regime is significant, economically, militarily and politically.
On the political front, it is worth noting that the United States ambassador to Ankara, Thomas Barrack, is also the US special envoy to Syria. Regarding the design of the future of Syria, the Turkish government has openly stated its territorial aspirations for the new state, which include forming a unitary state, as opposed to federalist proposals. Along these lines, it is interested in preventing the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish government in northern Syria, more specifically, in the so-called Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), controlled politically by the Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) and militarily by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), whose core is the People’s Protection Units and Women’s Protection Units (YPG/YPJ), a military force, in turn, of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD). The agreement reached by SDF Commander-in-Chief Mazloum Abdi and al-Sharaa in March 2025 provided for the integration of the SDF into the Syrian National Army and the transfer of control of the AANES-administered area, including borders, airports and oil fields, to the Syrian government for the first time since 2012. The agreement also recognized the Kurdish community as an integral part of the Syrian state and pledged to guarantee their citizenship and constitutional rights, as well as to ensure the right of all Syrians to participate or be politically represented in national politics, regardless of their religion or ethnicity. The Turkish government gave a “cautious” welcome to the agreement, facilitated by US mediation, but expressed its determination to monitor its implementation.
In parallel to these negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian government, a new peace process was taking shape in Turkey between the Turkish government and PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. Abdullah Ocalan’s call for the PKK to lay down its arms by February 2025, which involved the group’s organizations deployed in several countries, opens the door to a historic solution to the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. Compared to previous negotiations, this one has the support of the parties with the greatest political weight in parliament, including the ruling AKP, the cautious support of the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), or that of parties as opposed to each other as the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the pro-Kurdish Equality and People’s Democracy Party (DEM). It is also supported by the Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq (KRG) and has undoubtedly benefited from the agreement reached in Syria between Abdi and al-Sharaa. The domestic context, however, is not optimal, as this agreement requires significant political reforms in Turkey at a time of democratic regression. A large number of political representatives and officials of CHP-controlled municipalities have been arrested, including the mayor of Istanbul and future presidential candidate, Ekrem Imamoglu, raising concerns for the survival of the main opposition party. In any case, there are many incentives for successfully concluding the peace process, as it would not only solve a problem that has hindered Turkey’s democratization process for decades, but would also free Turkey externally from a vulnerable flank that it has in the past accused Israel and Iran of exploiting to foster instability through direct or indirect support for Kurdish armed groups.
With regard to Turkey’s influence on the Syrian economy, economic relations between the two countries have deepened significantly since the fall of al-Assad. In January 2025, Turkey re-established flights to Syria and increased its exports in the same month by 35.5% compared to the previous year. Likewise, negotiations have begun to revitalize the free trade agreement between the two countries that has been suspended since 2011. Turkey hopes that the reconstruction of Syria will offer investment opportunities for its companies in sectors such as construction and energy.
Finally, in the area of defence and security, the Turkish government is participating in the formation and training of the new Syrian army. Negotiations to sign a bilateral defence agreement began in December 2024, and in April 2025, Turkey began manoeuvres to control the Syrian air base known as T4. The Turkish government currently has 20,000 troops deployed in the neighbouring country and has not set a specific date for their withdrawal. Israel’s attacks on Syria and Turkey’s presence there have increased the risk of direct conflict between the Israeli and Turkish governments. In order to avoid escalation, US-mediated technical talks have been held in Azerbaijan.
Turkey has increased its influence in the region in the face of all these events, especially through its role in the new configuration of the Syrian state and government. Its position as an emerging middle power has given it a special weight that will undoubtedly be strengthened if it establishes a successful support network, a key resource for middle powers. Along these lines, its “pragmatic cooperation” with Saudi Arabia is an example of this. However, a large part of its regional alliances and relations, such as the Turkish president’s remarkably good relationship with the US president, lack solid institutional foundations, which can subject them to significant fluctuations.
Bibliography:
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Hafner-Burton, Emilie M.; Kahler, Miles and Montgomery, Alexander H. “Network Analysis for International Relations” in International Organization, 63 (3): 559-592, (Summer, 2009).
Jordaan, Eduard. “The Concept of a Middle Power in International Relations: Distinguishing between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers” in Politikon, 30 (1): 165-181, 2003.
Kutlay, Mustafa and Öniş, Ziya. “Understanding Oscillations in Turkish Foreign Policy: Pathways to Unusual Middle Power Activism”, in Third World Quarterly, 42 (12): 3051-3069, 2021.
Süsler, Buğra. “Turkey: An Emerging Middle Power in a Changing World?”, in LSE IDEAS, 2019.
[1] The term genocide has been adopted here in line with the terminology used by some of the world’s most reputable scholars in Genocide and Holocaust Studies, including Melanie O’Brien, President of the International Association of Genocide Scholars. See van Laarhoven, Kasper; Peek, Eva and Walters, D. Zeven. “Grenommeerde wetenschappers vrijwel eensgezind: Israël pleegt in Gaza genocide,” NRC, 04.05.2025.lantic Council, Issue Brief, March 2025, www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/present-without-impact-how-the-middle-east-perceives-chinas-diplomatic-engagement/