As in his first term, US President Donald Trump reserved his first state visit for Saudi Arabia, where he met with Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman on 13 May 2025. The visit confirmed US$600 billion worth of contracts pocketed by Washington, including the purchase of US$142 billion in military equipment by the Saudi kingdom. It also saw President Trump announce the lifting of US sanctions against Syria, much to the satisfaction of the Saudis. More present than ever alongside Israel in its war against Hamas and its allies (the Houthis), and making a point of bringing the Iranians back to the international negotiating table on the nuclear issue, Washington is reasserting its major influence in and around the Middle East. China, on the other hand, seems conspicuously absent.

Yet over the past two decades, its presence and interests in the region have grown considerably. Beijing has signed Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships, its highest level of bilateral relations, with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt; Strategic Partnerships with Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Syria; Cooperation Partnerships with Lebanon and Yemen; and a Comprehensive Innovation Partnership with Israel. In 2022, China underlined the importance it attaches to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia through major political gestures: organizing the China-Arab States and China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States Summits in Riyadh in December 2022, which President Xi Jinping himself attended; and finally, the proposal, made to the Kingdom and accepted by Riyadh, to become a “dialogue partner” of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

The importance China has given to the Middle East over the last two decades is consistent with its grand strategy, the ambition of which is to restore the country’s status as a world power. But while China’s presence in the region has grown and diversified, current events seem a priori to put the actual impact of its influence into perspective.

China’s Ambition to Regain Global Influence

While the very concept of a Chinese grand strategy remains controversial, China today has the most outspoken grand strategy of any of today’s powers, as Andrew S. Erickson explains.[1] This grand strategy is being very openly asserted by President Xi Jinping, for whom it is embodied in the Chinese dream of a “great rejuvenation of the Nation,” a process that aims to restore China’s position and status as a major economic, military and political power, lost to Western countries. The idea is that internally, it will bring shared prosperity, combined with an effective social welfare system. Externally, it should result in China becoming a world leader in terms of influence. The “great rejuvenation of the Nation” is to be accompanied by the transformation of the country’s armed forces to world-class level, which will both achieve the “complete unification of China” and protect national interests at home and abroad. Lastly, China says it wishes to reconfigure global governance to lend greater prominence to the countries of the Global South, but also to its vision of international order and its interests. To achieve this, the Chinese authorities are using both existing international bodies and the organizations, institutions and forums created under its aegis, such as the BRICS group and the SCO.

Achieving these three major objectives, under the leadership of an omnipresent Chinese Communist Party, requires the pursuit of significant economic growth. In this respect, the Silk Roads project or Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013 by Xi Jinping is seen as one of the main tools of China’s grand strategy. This vast economic project also contributes to the country’s international political influence. Conceived as a plan to globally connect foreign economies to China through the construction of infrastructure and by other means, it is intended to bring prosperity (and therefore security) to the territories it links, while providing China economic outlets for its products, businesses and workforce and, conversely, enabling it to obtain supplies. This vision of Chinese expansion has been described as three concentric circles encompassing the states concerned in order of proximity and importance to China, which forms the core.

Chinese expansion has been described as three concentric
circles in order of proximity and importance to China (…)
Situated in the third circle of this spiral, the Mediterranean
holds a special place in China’s expansion plan

Situated in the third circle of this spiral, the Mediterranean holds a special place in China’s expansion plan, even if it is not central. Beijing has divided the Mediterranean into two camps: an Arab Mediterranean and a European Mediterranean, linked in particular to the European Union, its main global trading partner, with Israel and Turkey regarded as appendages. The Arab Mediterranean comprises two sub-regions: North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, which China associates with the Middle East. This approach is reflected in the structures used by Beijing to interact with the states in the region. Two long-standing forums foster China’s relations with the States of the Arab Mediterranean: The China-Africa Forum (2000) and the China-Arab World Cooperation Forum (2004).

Both bodies are of major political and strategic importance to Beijing, which can use them to work towards restructuring international governance and defending its own interests. These regional mechanisms remain very flexible; they are essentially structures for holding meetings, but are not intended to institutionalize regional cooperation under the aegis of China, and this undoubtedly facilitates Beijing’s pragmatic and sometimes opportunistic policies. The BRICs are becoming an international arena for the states in (and around) the Middle East region, and therefore a very important tool in the construction of a “China-centric multipolar” international order. In 2024, Iran, Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia joined the BRICS as full members. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE became “dialogue partners” within the SCO when Iran was admitted as a member in 2023.

A Growing Chinese Presence in the Middle East

Major Economic Interests

Since the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative, the countries in and around the Middle East have become key economic partners for China. China’s economic, financial and material contributions in areas as diverse as infrastructure, healthcare and new technologies are significant assets for countries facing development challenges or seeking to diversify their economies. Conversely, Beijing needs to be supplied with resources, but also to sell its production in order to maintain its economic growth. This economic interdependence is not diminished by the renewed trade war between Beijing and Washington; quite the contrary.

Firstly, Beijing always seeks to secure its energy supplies from the region. Six countries (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iran, Oman, Qatar and Kuwait) feature in the top 10 of China’s hydrocarbon suppliers. Egypt is the only country where, from 2001 to 2023, the value of Chinese energy imports fell by almost 90%, from $1,822 million to $195 million. In contrast, Libya increased the amount of Chinese energy imports 42-fold over the same period, despite the internal difficulties of 2011. These figures are still well below those of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In 2023, the latter two countries reported energy exports to China of US$35,188 million and US$54,758 million respectively.[2] Overall, China’s crude oil imports from the region have risen from 3.2 million barrels/day in 2014 to 5.2 million barrels/day in 2023.[3] [CG1] China has also invested in local energy sectors: it has acquired a dominant position in the Iraqi oil sector and imports 90% of the crude oil that its own companies extract in partnership with local public companies. Similarly, it has offered Saudi oil companies the opportunity to acquire shares or enter into joint ventures in its refining plants in China. The Saudi company Aramco owns 25% of the Refining and Petrochemical Company Ltd in Fujian province, controlled by the state-owned SINOPEC Corp. with a refinery capacity of 280,000 bpd and 1.1 million tonnes of ethylene per year. In March 2023, Aramco announced that it was acquiring a 10% stake in China’s Rongsheng Petrochemical Company, an investment of US$3.6 billion.[4] Beijing has signed similar agreements with Qatar to secure its natural gas imports.

China also sees the Middle Eastern countries as important markets for its goods and services. It is one of the top ten sources of imports for these countries. Between 2018 and 2022, manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment accounted for more than 85% of Chinese exports to the region. In 2022, trade between China and the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council amounted to US$331 billion, compared with US$39 billion for North African states and US$23 billion for the countries of the Levant.[5] Beijing has not only bought supplies and goods, but has also ensured that its private and public companies have a more permanent foothold in the region. Among the major sectors in which China has set up operations are renewable energies, new technologies (AI) and telecommunications, echoing Xi Jinping’s 2014 desire to add a digital component to the Belt and Road Initiative. During the Chinese President’s visit in December 2022, the Saudi government and Huawei signed a memorandum for the provision of cloud computing and the construction of high-tech complexes in Saudi cities.

To support its trade flows, and in line with the Belt and Road plan, China has increased its infrastructure investments (roads, railways, ports) in these countries, financed by loans granted either by Chinese commercial banks or by the Asian Investment Bank. Chinese companies are involved in two dozen ports around four regions: the Persian Gulf, the Suez Canal, and the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb and Gibraltar. Not only have these investments been an asset for the Chinese companies chosen to carry them out with their own national workforce, but they also help improve the logistics of Chinese trade. According to data compiled by the ChinaMed Project,[6] the value of contracts secured by Chinese companies in the five Mediterranean states of the Middle East and the Levant went from US$9,527 million in 2016 to US$6,207 million in 2022, while in the latter year the figure reached US$9,710 billion in Saudi Arabia. The contracts signed and/or the needs of local companies have increased the number of Chinese contract workers, from 6,816 in 2016 to 22,205 in 2022.

Over the past two decades, China’s involvement in the Middle East has been primarily based on the expansion and diversification of its economic relations, and has helped to make China a major, valued partner for local governments. In the process, Beijing has also touted its model of governance and development to autocratic states, which largely embrace this “doxa.”

Over the past two decades, China’s involvement
in the Middle East has been primarily based
on the expansion and diversification of its
economic relations, and has helped to make
China a major, valued partner for local governments

A Minor Security Presence

Since Xi Jinping came to power, China has endeavoured to step up its security presence in the region, even though it remains far inferior to that of other Western powers such as the United States or Great Britain. Increasing its international security footprint is in line with China’s grand strategy of turning its People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and in particular its navy, into a force of global stature, capable of projecting itself around the world, like that of the United States. There is also a more pragmatic and effective reason: the need to protect its interests in the region.

As in other parts of the world, China has been working to increase its security presence and influence in Middle Eastern countries. This is reflected in an increase in its exports of arms and security technologies (surveillance, smart cities). Between 2003 and 2023, Beijing is estimated to have increased its arms exports to the Middle East by 80%. Since 2014, for example, Beijing has been supplying the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In 2017, the two partners signed an agreement to build a “Rainbow” (Caihong-4 or CH-4) drone factory in Saudi Arabia. Beijing and the countries in the region have also stepped up their joint military exercises. In 2023, Beijing undertook joint exercises with Kuwait, Oman, the UAE and Saudi Arabia. In 2024, exercises were held between the Chinese air force (PLAAF) and that of the UAE in Xinjiang, which included the deployment of 6 DAD/Dassault Mirage 2000-9 jet fighters, and this interested the PLA in terms of both Western military strategies and equipment. Finally, recall that China opened its first military base in Djibouti (a supply base) in 2017. In 2022, the Biden administration firmly opposed the establishment of a second Chinese base in the UAE: the idea had emerged and raised concerns in Washington following China’s construction of a factory at Abu Dhabi’s Khalifa Port.

The expansion of Chinese interests is leading to its growing material and human presence abroad, and consequently, exposure to greater risks. Beijing has a rising number of nationals based in the Middle East: an estimated 300,000 individuals, including 4,000 entrepreneurs, mainly located in the UAE. For two decades now, the Chinese authorities have been looking at ways of securing this presence. The protection of “overseas” interests has become a pillar of Chinese foreign policy since Jiang Zemin and especially Hu Jintao, who developed a broad vision of national security that includes the protection of people and their property “overseas.” It now forms part of its broader framework of considering and implementing the securitisation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

This is reflected in a strengthening of China’s consular capacities, which are necessary and efficient, but nevertheless insufficient when open conflicts threaten populations. China has had to intervene militarily three times to rescue its nationals: The first operation to bring Chinese civilians to safety (a Non-combatant Evacuation Operation) by the Chinese military involved 35,000 Chinese nationals in Libya following the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011; the second, in 2015, rescued 513 Chinese from Yemen; and finally in 2023, the armed forces took part in evacuating 1,300 Chinese and foreign nationals from South Sudan. Securing Chinese interests also means placing greater demands on Chinese companies, which must organize themselves and take charge of this protection. Generally speaking, the strategy for protecting Chinese interests, whether public or private, includes greater use of private Chinese (or foreign) security companies, which have a strong presence in Middle Eastern countries.

A Mediator Role?

In addition to the need to effectively secure a greater material and human presence abroad, the Chinese authorities are considering playing a more proactive role in maintaining and/or resolving conflicts, without, however, abandoning the principle of non-interference. China’s actions abroad are presented as being based on “creative commitments.” Chinese intermediation in conflicts is undoubtedly a means that Beijing wishes to use to achieve this end. As the framework document on the Global Security Initiative (2023) indicates, China declares that it is committed to the peaceful resolution of disputes and differences between states through dialogue and consultation. China’s involvement in the signing of the agreement enabling the resumption of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 was an opportunity to provide tangible proof of the successful implementation of these Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy principles, even though its intervention merely completed negotiations that had been well underway under the auspices of Oman and Iraq. Similarly, the meeting of 14 Palestinian factions in Beijing in 2024 under the auspices of the Chinese authorities, which led to the signing of an agreement, was presented as pursuing the same dynamic of peacefully managing the region’s conflicts.

China’s political and diplomatic stance is broadly welcomed by the states of the Middle East. They appreciate the Chinese position of non-interference and the fact that China does not openly oppose the United States in the region, by “demanding”, for instance, that countries distance themselves from Washington, as it has managed to do in Europe and especially in Asia. Beijing knows that its partners in the Middle East, with the exception of Iran, have no desire to be caught in the stranglehold of a Cold War that forces them to choose between Beijing and Washington. Indeed, some Chinese researchers and think tanks are inclined towards closer cooperation between the Middle Eastern states, China and the United States to resolve the region’s crises and conflicts. 

China, Relegated to the Political and Security Shadow of the United States?

China under Pressure

The conflict between Israel and Hamas is forcing Beijing to reposition itself and undermine its principle of non-interference. On 8 October 2023, Beijing reacted to the Hamas attack on Israel with a statement from its Foreign Ministry spokesperson. Four days later, it condemned the Israeli military intervention in the Palestinian territories and reiterated the need to resume talks to resolve the Palestinian issue. Since then, China has adopted a “neutral pro-Palestinian” stance, constantly calling for a ceasefire, particularly within the United Nations Security Council, and denouncing Washington as a state that is simply adding fuel to the fire. While Beijing’s very firm stance is putting a strain on its future relations with Israel, which were already experiencing a marked slowdown, it also goes some way to winning favour with the Arab states, to whom China continues to present itself as a responsible, peaceful state that defends the rights of the most disadvantaged.

But the current war is also having an impact on Chinese economic interests in the region. Attacks on commercial vessels by Houthi forces in the Bab el-Mandeb strait are slowing Chinese cargo ships headed for the Suez Canal and Egypt, even if they are mostly spared. There has been a marked slowdown in exports to the European Union and the Maghreb countries, as well as in imports from these countries to China. This situation, combined with the war in Ukraine, which is effectively cutting China off from European markets, is forcing it to prioritize the countries bordering the Black Sea or those of Central Europe. China’s repositioning in the Mediterranean following these two conflicts must also be interpreted in light of Sino-American relations. In both cases, these wars have increased the weight of US presence and exacerbated the competition between Washington and Beijing. A constant since the Obama and Trump-1 presidencies, Sino-American rivalry was fleshed out under President Biden with more systematic measures for countering Chinese expansion, and is intensifying with the Trump-2 administration and its military commitment to Israel. Faced with this situation, Beijing remains wait-and-see, and in fact, while Chinese specialists on the region analyse the current conflict situation in the Middle East, they are careful not to mention the role that China could play in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

China: Cautious and Transactional

The current crisis in the Middle East is revealing the reality of China’s capabilities in the region. Unsurprisingly, and despite the desire expressed by local leaders to see China become more politically involved, Chinese influence remains more economic than political. In a survey of regional experts on China, Jonathan Fulton reveals their considerable scepticism about China’s willingness and ability to take on a greater political role in the region.[7] China is seen as having adopted a cautious stance on regional issues, a stance that is explained by the fact that it has neither the desire nor the security capabilities to play the role of security guarantor. According to these experts, the United States remains the primary security provider. China’s diplomatic presence in Middle Eastern states plays a leveraging role in negotiations with Western countries, especially Washington.

China is described as a pragmatic player, looking after its own interests, as evidenced by its decision not to participate in joint naval patrols in the Red Sea in 2023 and 2024 to counter Houthi attacks on commercial shipping. But regional experts on China, particularly those in Egypt, say this comes as no surprise, because they know that Beijing will not project military forces outside its own region, let alone in the Middle East. This state of affairs, which seems unlikely to change in the future, does not detract from China’s economic influence in the region, which is seen as too deeply rooted and important to be replaced.

Conclusion

China is pursuing its ambition to become (once again) an international power, and the Middle East occupies an important place in this strategy. Beijing’s regional footprint there is more economic than security-related, and its political role is akin to that of a peaceful mediator. The war between Israel and Hamas and its regional consequences are shaking up China’s economic and political positions. In the eyes of regional experts, Beijing seems once again to be relegated to a secondary political role in favour of the United States. But in areas such as the Middle East and the Levant, which are as conflict-ridden as they are unstable, and which, moreover, are a long way from its main geographical base, this position is perhaps not one that China dislikes

^[1] Erickson, Andrew S. “China,” in:Balzacq, Thierry; Dombrowski, Peter; & Reich, Simon (eds.), Comparative Grand Strategy: A Framework and Cases, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2019.

[2] Marange, Céline & Pina, Carine, “Les ambitions de la Russie et de la Chine en Méditerranée”, IRSEM, Etude n° 120, October 2024, p. 48. www.irsem.fr/storage/file_manager_files/2025/03/etude-irsem-120-marange-pina.pdf.

[3] Nouwens, Meia, et al, “The Evolving Dynamics of China’s Middle East and North Africa Strategy: Future Scenario,” The International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2025, p. 10. www.iiss.org/research-paper/2025/05/the-evolving-dynamics-of-chinas-middle-east-and-north-africa-strategy/.

[4] Reuters, “Saudi-China Energy, Trade and Investment Ties,” 9 December 2022.

[5] Nouwens, Meia, et al op. cit.

[6] The ChinaMed Project: Looking at China’s Role in the Mediterranean Region, www.chinamed.it/.

[7] FULTON, Jonathan, “Present without impact? How the Middle East perceives China’s diplomatic engagement,” Atlantic Council, Issue Brief, March 2025, www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/present-without-impact-how-the-middle-east-perceives-chinas-diplomatic-engagement/

Header photo: ROTTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS – JANUARY 11, 2016: Container ship CSCL Globe of the China Shipping Line moored at the Euromax Terminal at the Maasvlakte in the Port of Rotterdam, The Netherlands. (Shutterstock)