The 2025 spring season has witnessed major developments in Europe’s neighbourhood, not only in Ukraine, but also in the MENA region, with the Israel-Palestine conflict, the Israel-Iran conflict and the US military operation in Iran. These events are having a distinctly negative impact on Europe’s and the EU’s influence in the region, especially when put in perspective with EU policy over the past 45 years.
The EU Has Had Better Times (1980-2001)
Over the decades, the European Union’s geopolitical influence in the region has been mainly exercised through formal declarations (e.g. the 1980 Venice Declaration on the Middle East Peace Process), and its visibility ensured by strong personalities such as Javier Solana and Miguel Angel Moratinos. The political impact of the Venice Declaration was massive since it meant that, for the first time, European leaders recognized both Israel’s right to live in peace and security and the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. Since then, the European Union has always advocated the goal of a two-state solution.
But, over the years, there has not been much in the way of real policy that commits the entire European Union based on actionable economic and military instruments, with the exception of trade and/or travel and/or financial sanctions imposed on Libya (1993, 2011), Iraq (1990, lifted in 2003), Syria (2013, lifted partially in 2025) and Turkey (2019).
The EU’s influence in the region probably reached a peak in the initial years of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, created at the Barcelona Conference of November 1995. This spectacular meeting and process were seen by the southern EU governments as a necessary re-balancing act after the massive support provided by the EU to eastern European countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and were met initially with support from non-EU partner countries around the Mediterranean. The consultation process conducted before the conference and the co-management procedures used during the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership were welcomed as innovative, despite the reluctance of many non-EU authoritarian leaders in the MENA region, who disliked the formal involvement of their countries’ civil societies and human rights activists.
The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty
made little difference, despite the creation
of a new foreign policy instrument known
as the European External Action Service
EU influence later dwindled as a consequence of external events (the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, and the subsequent terrorist attacks in Tunisia, the UK and Spain among others) and the ensuing security and counter-terrorism priority. It also suffered from divergences within the EU (in particular France under then President Nicolas Sarkozy). The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty made little difference, despite the creation of a new foreign policy instrument known as the European External Action Service, tasked with providing the EU High Representative – supposed to be the equivalent of an EU “foreign minister” – with supporting services at headquarters and in delegations abroad – supposed to be the equivalent of a foreign ministry and its embassies –, since national diplomatic systems often showed reluctance in accepting the implied transfer of power in a highly emblematic domain, that of foreign policy.
A distinctive feature of this ambitious new foreign policy architecture is that a significant proportion of policy decisions has moved from the EU Foreign Ministers Council to the European Council of Heads of State and Government. This evolution entailed two negative consequences. First, foreign policy issues began “competing” with the European Council’s domestic agenda. Second, taking foreign policy decisions, at head of state and government level and often amid serious crises, brought 27 different sets of domestic issues to the table, including a give-and-take process that mixes foreign and domestic agendas.
A Sense of Powerlessness
The EU’s influence in the current geopolitical context is even less visible, especially after the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, and the ensuing Israeli retaliation. A European Parliament summary of the multiform reaction of European institutions reflects the shock and confusion within the EU policymaking structure. Arguably, this tragedy created a sense of powerlessness in the European Union.
Both Netanyahu and Trump have demonstrated their strong alliance and their independence in shaping policy in the region. The American and Israeli power in terms of intelligence, capacity to project military force, capacity to resist pressure from peer powers and public information policy has reached an all-time high. In two instances – the war in Gaza and Iran’s nuclear programme – the US-Israeli alliance has not only resulted in massive casualties, but also failed to provide a lasting solution to the complex issues at hand, i.e. the future of the Palestinian people and a pacified relationship with the State of Iran. In addition, both Israel and the US largely ignore the views of European states about the MENA region, since they both considers themselves to be immune from adverse consequences.
Beyond the EU, the current developments in the MENA region
have underlined the predominance of decisions made by Trump
over any other power centre, be it China, the Gulf countries,
Russia, the United Kingdom or the “Global South”
Beyond the European Union, the current developments in the MENA region have underlined the predominance of decisions made by US President Donald Trump over any other power centre, be it China, the Gulf countries, Russia, the United Kingdom or the “Global South.” The sheer military superiority of the United States, linked with the non-conventional methods of the country’s president, leads to a sort of “unipolar policymaking process” in what is much touted as a “multipolar world.” A recent example is a bilateral US-China deal on critical raw materials, despite a host of other conflictual topics between the two countries (trade, Ukraine, Iran, Taiwan).
A wider issue is nuclear proliferation. Currently nine countries admit to possessing nuclear weapons and all or part of the delivery mechanisms (land, sea, air): China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Iran’s accession to this restricted “nuclear club” could trigger new initiatives in the MENA region, with Saudi Arabia, among others, potentially tempted to start a process in that direction. Turkey presents a somewhat different situation due to Russia’s full control of its future nuclear electricity production plant (and therefore of its technology) in Akkuyu, and to the fact that it also hosts US nuclear warheads at the Incirlik joint air force base.
How to Exert Political and Economic Power?
Reinstating European Union influence in the MENA region will be a painstaking process, with major obstacles within the region and within the EU itself.
One current initiative is the New Pact for the Mediterranean being prepared by the European Commission for autumn 2025, under the leadership of Commissioner Dubravka Šuica. A vast process of consultations with the governments concerned has begun, as well as a study conducted by 120 think tanks and research centres from 30 countries, including EuroMesco (this process, led by IEMed, culminated in June 2025 in Brussels).
One major one will be the clash
within MENA countries between
authoritarian regimes
and a freedom-aspiring civil society
The process towards a more pro-active EU policy in the MENA region is fraught with risks. One major one will be the clash within MENA countries between authoritarian regimes and a freedom-aspiring civil society, the former wanting to monopolize political relations with the European Union, and the latter wanting to use a renewed EU-MENA relationship to foster their claims toward fundamental freedoms. Another hurdle will be the recurrent “hierarchy of crises”: much like in the early-1990s when the return of eastern European countries to the free world dwarfed the claims of Europe’s southern neighbourhood, we could see crises like the prolonged Russian war on Ukraine, Iran’s military nuclear programme or uncertainties such as the future of NATO and US support to European security taking precedence in the debates within the European Council of Heads of State and Government. In this context, close consultations between the European Union and the United Kingdom may provide additional clout in formulating policies concerning the MENA region.
More generally, the exercise of the European Union’s political power in the MENA region is part of a wider process, i.e. the formation and implementation of its foreign policy. Clearly, the framework provided by the Lisbon Treaty (including the creation of the European External Action Service) is not well suited to coping with today’s momentous developments. And neither are other institutions such as NATO, or incipient non-institutional initiatives such as the European Political Community or western Europe’s “coalition of the willing.” As expressed by Pierre Vimont : “Amid escalating international crises, Europe appears ill-equipped to offer effective diplomatic solutions.” A debate has now started on how to fill the current void.
Header photo: The Ukrainian flag displayed on the Berlaymont building. © European Union, 2025