Palestinians and the Establishment of Israel
For a people with a relatively small population, the Palestinians have enormous issues. Yet, as gargantuan as these issues are, the principle behind them is elementary. The Palestinians, like any other of the world’s nations, seek their own state where they can live in dignity and peace. The Palestinian question has been a destabilising factor for the entire region for decades, a region which would no doubt benefit politically and economically from lasting peace for the Palestinian people.
The history of the Palestinians is not a simple one, fraught with conflict, strife, exile and determination. Although the Zionist encroachment on Palestine dates back to the 1870s, in the name of brevity, the cutoff point for this article is the immediate period leading up to the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. The war, exile, occupation and fragmentation that ensued for the next 60 years have resulted in a weakened and divided leadership in the West Bank and Gaza. The culmination of factors, both external and of our own hand has brought us exactly where we are today, a people coerced into a quasi-government framework and who continue to seek independence and sovereignty.
On November 29 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted on its partition plan, which allocated 56.5% of Palestine to a Jewish state and 43% to an Arab state with an international enclave around Jerusalem. Arab representatives walked out of the session, ultimately rejecting the plan. Clashes quickly erupted between Palestinians and Jews, after which Britain recommended to the UN that its Mandate end on May 15 1948.
Jewish gangs then started to bring arms into Palestine and fighting between these groups and the Palestinians intensified, with the Deir Yassin and Ayn al Zaytoun massacres in April and May of that year marking the start of an all-out war. After the State of Israel was declared on May 15, Arab armies entered Palestine in a feeble bid to overcome Jewish forces but were driven out 14 months later, leaving thousands of Palestinians dead and approximately 800,000 in exile. Thus began the journey of a dispossessed and oppressed nation seeking statehood, liberation and independence.
1967 and Beyond
It was between the war of 1948 and Israel’s subsequent occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights in 1967 that the Palestinians began to carve out a revolutionary identity from their catastrophe, aimed at regaining Palestine and rectifying the historical injustice committed against them. By this time over a million Palestinians were living in exile, in refugee camps throughout neighbouring Arab countries – namely Jordan, Syria and Lebanon – in addition to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Palestinians wanted to regain their lost homeland and help those who were expelled from their homes to return safely. Unfortunately, many of those homes had now been destroyed, with new Israeli settlements erected in their place. 85% of Palestine’s villages were annihilated by Zionist forces in the 1948 War in order to make room for the influx of Jewish immigrants, most of whom came from Europe.
The goal of Zionism was to create a homeland exclusively for the Jews even at the expense of its indigenous population. A statement made by Israel’s first Minister of Education Ben-Zion Dinur in 1954 sums up the early Israeli attitude towards the Palestinians. “In our country there is room only for the Jews. We shall say to the Arabs: Get out! If they don’t agree, if they resist, we shall drive them out by force.” It didn’t take long for Israel to continue with the realisation of this goal. Thirteen years later, the 1967 War broke out after invading Arab armies tried to recapture Palestine. They were swiftly defeated in six days and Israel subsequently occupied the remaining parts of Palestine, including Jerusalem.
It took time for the Palestinians to regroup and restructure themselves into an organised political body. This materialised in the form of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), established in 1964 by the Arab League of Nations and recognised as the official and sole representative of the Palestinian people. Fatah, which later became and still remains as the mainstream faction in Palestinian politics, was first formed in the late 1950s by none other than Yasser Arafat, the man in the chequered kuffiyeh who would lead the Palestinians through a revolution, two uprisings – or intifadas – and peace agreements with Israel, before spending the last two years of his life holed up in his presidential compound in Ramallah, besieged by the government of Israel’s then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. He later died in August 2004 in a Paris hospital. Regardless of the mistakes Arafat made throughout the course of history and during his time as leader of Fatah, the PLO and later the Palestinian Authority, Palestinians will always regard him as the father of the revolution and the man who put Palestine on the map. Sadly, his lifelong dream of praying at the Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem would never materialise, but the legacy he left behind has been both a factor of unity and division among all Palestinians, both inside Palestine and in the Diaspora.
The PLO
While Fatah remained at the helm of authority in the fledgling PLO, other factions would be born concomitantly with the 1967 War. The occupation of the remainder of Palestine threw its people into yet another tailspin, with even more Palestinians sent into a life of exile, some for the second time around. The PLO, of course, was banned from establishing its base in Palestine and became the people’s de facto government in exile. It first held office in Damascus, Syria, then Lebanon and finally Tunisia before returning to the occupied Palestinian territories after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. While there are a number of Palestinian factions within and outside of the PLO, only a handful play a crucial role in the shaping of Palestinian politics today.
Behind Fatah in the PLO hierarchy, is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the leftist movement that applied a Marxist-Leninist ideology to the case of Palestine. Led by the charismatic George Habash, the PFLP, which was created just after the 1967 War, became known for its adoption of armed struggle against Israel and its unbending stance towards the liberation of all of Palestine “from the River [Jordan] to the [Mediterranean] Sea.”
The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) quickly splintered off from the PFLP in 1969 and has been led ever since by Nayef Hawtemeh, a Jordanian who believed strongly in Arab nationalism, espousing the idea of Arab responsibility for the liberation of Palestine.
The Rise of Hamas
Hamas, whose inception came in tandem with the first Palestinian intifada in 1987 has now taken on the role of the strongest opposing authority to the PLO. This opposition has manifested itself in the worst split in Palestinian history both politically and geographically, with Hamas in control of the Gaza Strip and Fatah and the Palestinian Authority commandeering the West Bank. The years leading up to the split are crucial to understanding the predicament the Palestinians find themselves in today and perhaps offer a clue as to how the situation could be remedied.
In the first months after the creation of Hamas – the Islamic Resistance Movement – in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by the movement’s spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the PLO factions and the Islamic movement fought side by side against their Israeli occupier. While some may posit that Hamas was created and actually nurtured by external parties to somehow offer an alternative leadership to the PLO, the fact remains that it was not until almost a year later that the real differences began to surface.
Although Hamas, considered as the Palestinian interpretation of the Muslim Brotherhood, did advocate for an Islamic republic in Palestine, it did not butt heads with the secular PLO until the chairman, Yasser Arafat made his historic declaration of statehood in Algiers on November 15 1988. In his speech, Arafat renounced violence and terrorism, recognised Israel’s right to exist and accepted the idea of two states for two peoples based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. With this recognition, the Palestinians had officially conceded 78% of historical Palestine and accepted a state on the remaining 22%. Most felt the concession was more than enough. For many, it was too much.
Hamas, along with the PFLP and DFLP, rejected the notion of relinquishing the Palestinian right to armed struggle. However, the latter two maintained a cautious balance within the corridors of the PLO, which remained the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people both in and outside of Palestine. Hamas was – and is – not a member of the PLO and so felt no compulsion to adhere to the concessions. Thus began the start of a deep rift between the two movements and ideologies, with Palestinians on the street gradually turning to Hamas in direct proportion to their growing disenchantment with the PLO’s leadership.
Madrid, Oslo and the Peace Process
In 1991, the Madrid Conference convened on October 30 marking the first attempt at bringing the feuding parties to the table. For the Palestinians, this was a landmark event, turning the course of history in the direction of negotiations, a course that would prove long and arduous and ultimately a failure. At the time, of course, this was not the sentiment. Although Israel refused to accept any PLO representation at the table – Palestinians from the occupied territories were invited to the conference instead – the Palestinians knew this was the first step in what they hoped would be their final journey to statehood.
Indeed, the conference led to vigorous bilateral talks until the Declaration of Principles, commonly known as the Oslo Accords, was signed in a fanfare of celebration on the White House Lawn on September 13 1993. One stipulation of the accords was that the PLO, the Palestinians’ representative in exile, would be allowed to return home. Subsequently, the Palestinian Authority was established to govern the people of the West Bank and Gaza (Jerusalem was excluded) and the PLO’s Chairman, Yasser Arafat was given a hero’s homecoming. He was soon voted in as the Palestinian Authority’s first President and was meant to lead his people, through mutual agreement with Israel, to the 1999 finish line for final status issues and the creation of a Palestinian state.
This never came to pass. What transpired between then and now has mired Palestinians into more agreements, more restrictions and less hope for independence. The split between Hamas and Fatah has been equally as detrimental, polarising the entire population into a ‘for or against’ mentality, something which Palestinians had hitherto avoided in all their years of revolution.
The Hamas-Fatah Divide
Throughout the Oslo years Palestinians went from being hopeful to despondent. The accords, an agreement that Hamas vehemently rejected, were a slew of legal jargon, restrictions and stipulations on the Palestinians and Israelis which were to be honoured if the 1999 deadline was ever to be met. One of the most important stipulations in the Oslo Accords was about illegal Jewish settlements in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem. Critics of the Palestinians say, and rightly so, that they did not secure definite wording against settlements on their land, which allowed for Israel to exploit the accords and continue settlement building. However, two clauses in the initial DOP and the follow-up Interim Agreement of 1995 did obligate the parties to preserve the entirety of the land that should have become the Palestinian state. Article IV of the DOP states: “The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.”
More importantly, Article XXXI of the Interim Agreement states the following: “Neither side shall initiate or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.”
These two clauses were, from a Palestinian perspective, directly in reference to Israel’s settlement policy and should have obligated Israel to refrain from any additional settlement building. It is common knowledge, however, that during the Oslo years, the opposite was the case: settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem doubled, as did the construction of homes.
This did not sit well with Hamas, the emerging Islamic movement that was, by all definitions, the antithesis of the politically malleable and secular PLO and PA, the latter’s executive arm. As Palestinians watched settlements grow and Israel’s occupation only become more entrenched they became equally disenchanted with the Fatah-led PA. The tension between the two sides came to a head in 1996 when Israeli authorities began excavations beneath Jerusalem’s al Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest site in Islam in the heart of the Old City. Clashes ensued and the PA took on the role of the ‘long arm of the law’ rounding up scores of Hamas activists and imprisoning them in Palestinian jails.
Furthermore, as Hamas began its campaign of suicide bombings inside Israel in 1996 the PA, on orders from Israel and bound to their pledge to fight terrorism, continued to arrest and persecute Hamas activists throughout the West Bank and Gaza.
This newly formed dichotomy in Palestinian society created great tension between the movements and by association, the people. Many saw the PA’s job of arresting fellow Palestinians as doing Israel’s ‘dirty work’; an unenviable task indeed. With Hamas becoming more entrenched in Gaza, traditionally more conservative than its sister entity, the West Bank, the fear among Fatah officials and secular Palestinians was that Hamas would gain popularity at breakneck speed.
The rift only grew wider and deeper after the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004. Arafat, despite his faults, was able to mobilise the people around his leadership and keep civil war at bay throughout his long years of ruling. His successor, Mahmoud Abbas, was not as skilful. Without the popular platform Arafat enjoyed, Abbas was unable to stop united political loyalties unravelling, and Palestinians saw themselves at either end of a polarised spectrum. It was not until 2006, however, that the real rift between the two became dangerously clear. The parliamentary elections that took place under the insistence of the international community ended in shocking results, even for Hamas itself.
Hamas Rises to Power
On January 25 2006, Hamas scored a sweeping victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections, winning 74 of the 132 seats and thus ending Fatah’s historical control over the Palestinian Authority. Hamas was then accorded by the President to form a government, which was unsurprisingly rejected by the international community and Israel for its majority Hamas makeup. Foreign aid was cut to the Palestinians on the premise that Hamas had not accepted the three Quartet conditions for participating in the peace process: recognising Israel, renouncing violence and respecting past agreements.
But it was not only the international community that rejected Hamas’ rise to power. Fatah, accustomed to being at the helm of Palestinian leadership, both during its revolutionary years and when it took on the role of quasi-government, was more than willing to allow pressure to build on the Islamic movement in Gaza to bend to the will of the international community or be isolated completely. The two rival forces began armed clashes in Gaza, which culminated in March, April and May of 2007, just months after Hamas and Fatah signed the Mecca Agreement to form a national unity government. Evidently, the agreement did not have the desired effect and the clashes claimed over 100 lives across the two sides. By June 2007, Hamas had ousted Fatah from the Strip and assumed complete authority over Gaza. The coup had been completed and the rift, which had taken root years earlier, had reached its apex, a dangerous point from which we are still suffering today.
Palestinian Divisions and the Peace Process
These events were the beginning of a black page in Palestinian history. The international community, led by the United States, backed President Abbas and his separate efforts to form a government in the West Bank, a move Hamas claimed to be unconstitutional. Hamas, in the meantime, remained besieged in the Gaza Strip after Israel clamped down a strangling siege on its coastal area, closely monitoring every item that went in and out of the Strip. Their rationale was of course that Hamas was a ‘terrorist’ organisation that perpetrated violent acts against Israeli citizens and must therefore be sanctioned. The international community was of the same opinion, refusing to deal with the all-Hamas government now in place in Gaza and ruling nonetheless with an iron fist.
By the time Hamas had taken power in Gaza, the peace process was way into the danger zone. The Aqsa Intifada, which broke out on September 28 2000 had already turned into Israel’s newest excuse to crack down on Palestinian resistance and continue with its long term plan of expropriating more Palestinian land and delaying any final settlement that may lead to the establishment of a contiguous and viable Palestinian state.
After stop and go efforts to reignite the peace process and somehow salvage the tattered Oslo Agreements, negotiations were restarted in 2010 by the new US President Barack Obama in the form of ‘proximity talks’ between the two sides. Hamas, of course was still out of the picture and continued to reject its diplomatic isolation, despite intermittent efforts to appease the international government during the years of its rule. For example, just after his election into parliament in 2006, Hamas politburo chief Khaled Meshaal said from Damascus that even though his movement would never recognise Israel per se, it would agree to a long-term truce with Israel if the latter withdrew from land occupied in 1967.
This had little impact on the international community and tensions continued to fester between Hamas in Gaza and Fatah and the PA in the West Bank. Arrests of activists from both sides did not help the matter and accusations were flung both ways, pushing any hopes of reconciliation even further away.
The proximity talks, which were officially launched in September 2010 under the auspices of the United States, did not last long. Three weeks into the talks, the Palestinians withdrew, citing Israel’s refusal to renew its moratorium on settlement building in the West Bank as a breach of the agreement. Talks have yet to resume, with President Abbas holding his ground on the condition that Israel halt settlement building before the two sides return to the table, a condition Israel continues to reject.
Calls for Reconciliation and the Arab Revolution
Unfortunately, it is not only the peace process that faltered. Efforts towards reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah also failed time and again, which in turn affected peace efforts with Israel. Critics among the Palestinians argued that no Palestinian elections and certainly no peace agreement could ever be fully reached in the shadow of the rift between the Palestinian factions. This proved to be true, with even President Abbas stating that national elections, slated to take place in September 2011, would not be held if reconciliation with Hamas was not achieved.
Hamas also agreed, at least in principle. However, the two sides have become so entrenched in their false seats of power, there is no telling who will blink first.
The revolutions in the Arab world have stirred things up, and hopefully for the better. With the call for change from Arab peoples suffering under sometimes ruthless dictators, the Palestinians made demands of their own. The people, in mass demonstrations, in sit-ins and hunger strikes are now calling on their leaders to put aside their differences and reconcile.
Today, there is finally hope that the leaderships in both Gaza and the West Bank are listening. President Abbas has met with Hamas officials in the West Bank and is expected to travel to the Gaza Strip in the near future to end the rift and form a national unity government with Hamas. Once this major feat is achieved, the Palestinians can focus their efforts on the important task at hand, which is ending Israel’s occupation of Palestine and bringing stability to the region at large. All Palestinians, regardless of their political or religious affiliation, want the same thing, their freedom.