Disinformation and Freedom of Expression in the Euro-Mediterranean Region
Introduction
In recent years, disinformation has become one of the most significant challenges to democratic governance, the protection of fundamental rights, and social cohesion. In the Euro-Mediterranean region, this challenge is intensified by political instability, geopolitical tensions, uneven democratic standards, and fragile information ecosystems. This article briefly reflects on the key issues around the concepts of disinformation and freedom of expression, with a particular focus on the evolving regulatory and policy responses at both European and regional levels.
A key element to be underscored from the very outset is that while disinformation constitutes a genuine threat to democratic processes and public trust, responses to it must remain firmly anchored in international human rights standards. In particular, freedom of expression must not be undermined in the name of combating false or misleading information. Instead, disinformation should be addressed as a systemic phenomenon requiring structural, institutional, and societal responses.
The Concept of Information Disorder and Disinformation
To properly understand disinformation, it is necessary to situate it within the broader notion of the “information disorder,” a framework developed by the Council of Europe in 2017,[1] where the concepts of mis-, dis- and mal-information are defined and formulated.
The European Commission defines disinformation as “the creation, presentation, and dissemination of verifiably false or misleading information for economic gain or with the intention of deceiving the public, where such conduct may cause public harm.” Importantly, disinformation is not necessarily associated with isolated pieces of content or immediate, observable damage. Rather, it often operates through accumulation, repetition, and narrative construction, gradually eroding trust in institutions, media, and democratic processes. This cumulative and structural nature of disinformation poses serious challenges for systems that are traditionally designed to address discrete unlawful acts rather than ongoing patterns of influence.
Moreover, as harmful as it can be, the concept of disinformation is not necessarily related to the more limited notion of illegal content (defamation, misleading advertising, etc.).
Disinformation and Freedom of Expression
A key issue I address in this article is the relationship between disinformation and freedom of expression. Under international and European human rights law, freedom of expression protects all forms of speech, including information that “shocks, disturbs, or offends,” in the words of the European Court of Human Rights. Crucially, truthfulness is not a condition for protection. False information, opinions, and even misleading statements may fall within the scope of protected expression.
States therefore face a delicate balancing exercise. While disinformation can justify restrictions on freedom of expression in certain exceptional circumstances, such restrictions must always meet strict requirements of legality, necessity, and proportionality. Broad or vague limitations based on concepts such as “fake news” or “rumours” are incompatible with these standards.
At the same time, states have positive obligations. These include promoting access to information, ensuring media pluralism and diversity, and fostering conditions in which reliable, independent journalism can thrive. In my view, these positive obligations are often overlooked in favour of restrictive approaches that ultimately weaken democratic resilience.
Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI)
In recent policy debates, increasing attention has been paid to Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). As defined by the European External Action Service (EEAS) of the European Union (EU), FIMI refers to coordinated and intentional patterns of behaviour − often not illegal − that threaten democratic values, political procedures, and public trust.[2]
What distinguishes FIMI from traditional understandings of disinformation is its systemic character. The focus is not on individual false statements, but on sustained campaigns that manipulate information environments through amplification, coordination, and exploitation of social divisions. These campaigns may involve state and non-state actors operating through proxies across borders.
The EU’s response to FIMI reflects this systemic understanding. Rather than prioritising content removal, the EU has developed toolkits centred on situational awareness, institutional cooperation, and strategic communication. This approach is more compatible with freedom of expression standards and better suited to addressing complex influence operations.
The Role of the State
It is very important to properly understand the role of states in both producing and responding to disinformation. It is essential to acknowledge that states themselves are often significant sources of disinformation, whether through propaganda, selective disclosure, or manipulation of public narratives.
In many contexts, particularly outside consolidated democracies, governments have relied on measures such as internet shutdowns, criminal sanctions for spreading “false news,” and intrusive regulation of online platforms. These measures are frequently justified on grounds of national security or public order, yet they tend to be ineffective and deeply harmful to freedom of expression.
By contrast, European regulatory developments illustrate a more nuanced approach. The Digital Services Act (DSA) in the EU,[3] in particular, represents a shift away from content-based regulation towards systemic risk governance.
The Digital Services Act and Systemic Risk Management
The DSA introduces due diligence obligations for online platforms, with enhanced responsibilities for very large online platforms and search engines. Rather than requiring platforms to identify and remove disinformation as such, the DSA focuses on systemic risks arising from platform design, algorithms, and business models.
These risks include negative effects on fundamental rights, civic discourse, electoral processes, public security, public health, and the wellbeing of minors. Platforms are required to assess these risks and adopt reasonable, proportionate, and effective mitigation measures.
From a freedom of expression perspective, this approach is significant. It avoids placing public authorities in the role of arbiters of truth and instead targets the structural conditions that enable disinformation to spread at scale. Instruments such as the Code of Practice on Disinformation further reinforce this co-regulatory and preventive model. However, there have also been several critical voices pointing at the fact that this approach has the risk of pushing platforms towards the pro-active elimination of protected speech for the sake of compliance with such preventive regulatory requirements. A key factor would be the need to avoid the imposition of the significant penalties contemplated in this law.
Platform Responses and the Role of Big Tech
Alongside regulatory developments, it is also important to understand how major technology platforms have responded to disinformation through their own governance systems. These responses are primarily implemented through private terms of service and community standards rather than legal obligations, raising important questions about accountability and transparency.
Platforms increasingly distinguish between misinformation and disinformation, and have moved from broad fact-checking initiatives towards targeted interventions addressing specific risks, such as electoral interference, public health misinformation, and coordinated inauthentic behaviour. Measures such as community notes, labelling of AI-generated content, and transparency around political advertising reflect this evolution.
However, these developments also illustrate the growing privatisation of decisions that have profound implications for public discourse. This underscores the need for regulatory oversight that respects fundamental rights while ensuring platform accountability.
The Euro-Mediterranean Context
In the Euro-Mediterranean region, responses to disinformation are often characterised by restrictive legal frameworks. Many states have criminalised disinformation, fake news, rumours, or attacks on national symbols and institutions. These laws are frequently accompanied by extensive surveillance of media, online activity, and private communications.
Such approaches are compounded by state propaganda, limited access to public information, weak judicial safeguards, and low levels of digital literacy. While international initiatives such as the EU Task Force South and EUvsDisinfo contribute to countering external influence, their impact is constrained by structural inequalities.
Conclusion
In conclusion, disinformation cannot be effectively addressed through censorship, criminalisation, or emergency powers. Such measures risk undermining freedom of expression and democratic legitimacy while failing to address the structural drivers of information disorder.
A sustainable response requires a holistic approach that combines regulatory oversight of digital platforms, institutional resilience, media pluralism, access to information, and digital literacy. By treating disinformation as a systemic challenge rather than a content problem, it is possible to protect democratic processes without sacrificing fundamental rights.
In the Euro-Mediterranean region in particular, defending freedom of expression is not an obstacle to countering disinformation, it is a prerequisite for doing so effectively.
[1] https://www.coe.int/en/web/freedom-expression/information-disorder
[2] https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/information-integrity-and-countering-foreign-information-manipulation-interference-fimi_en
[3] https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/digital-services-act
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