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Foreword

Senén Florensa
Executive President
European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed),
Barcelona

Twenty years ago the Heads of State and Government from Europe and the southern and eastern Mediterranean met in Barcelona to sign an ambitious and optimistic declaration. In so doing, they made a pledge to work towards making the Mediterranean area one of peace, understanding and shared prosperity through the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership within the framework of the Barcelona Process.

Unfortunately, the Mediterranean area is far from reaching this goal of peace and prosperity, and perhaps even further from intercultural understanding. Not only are the conflicts that hindered the initial launch of the Process still alive, but the situation has been exacerbated by fresh conflicts such as those ongoing in Syria or Libya.

Confidence that conflicts in the Middle East would be resolved waned as the area entrenched itself in a dead end marked by cycles of violence from one side or another. Meanwhile, conflicts continued in the Mediterranean area: the unacknowledged, bloody civil war in Algeria, al-Qaeda terrorism, the war in Lebanon, the occupation and ongoing war and violence in Iraq, and now the current panorama marked by war and violence in Syria and Libya and the indiscriminate terrorism of Daesh. The Mediterranean region is far from being the area of peace that was dreamed of 20 years ago, and seems further from reaching this goal today than it did then.

The instability has also hampered economic development. Although, thanks to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, reforms and free trade agreements certain countries have witnessed advances in their development, the continuing structural problems, reticence of European collaboration together with the impact of the global financial crisis, which has been particularly virulent among the Mediterranean countries of the EU, have left the region even further from being one of shared prosperity.

After the outbreak of the Arab Springs, it seemed as if democracy would develop and take hold in the southern Mediterranean. However, what subsequent events have shown is the diversity of models that exist across the Arab world. The various evolutions of these ‘springs’ and the array of very different situations have prompted us to begin this edition of the Yearbook with a series of articles on the crisis and the new agenda of the Arab States. The first theme of the section Keys analyses the changing role of the State in Arab countries, the role of the military or civil society in the new realities and, lastly, the failed, and almost no longer existing, states, such as the post-Gaddafi Libya, and the difficult construction of a successful democratic state en route to consolidating its position, as is the case of Tunisia.

Tunisia’s democratic consolidation is under threat from the second of the themes in Keys: the ‘jihadism and violence in the Arab world,’ which has hit Tunisia in the area it most needs to develop, its economic development, by attacking the strategic but highly volatile tourism sector. This section analyses the roots of this jihadist violence, the expansion of Daesh in Syria and Iraq and its presence in North Africa and the Sahel; a jihadism that shows its willingness to wreak terror through roughly planned massacres and which has extended from the Middle East towards the rest of the world. DAESH acts as a magnet for young people from Arab, European and African countries, as well as from other parts of the world, thereby enabling it to unleash its senseless
violence - in Paris, on the beaches of Tunisia, in Libya, Turkey or Sinai, not to mention Syria and Iraq.
The third and last theme in the Yearbook’s Keys section is determined by the two previous ones, since their evolution is changing the regional order. The geopolitics of the Mediterranean is in constant mutation: the role of the Gulf countries, the implication of the United States, the consequences of reconfiguring the regional stage in the Maghreb or the influence of the new energy models in the geopolitics of the Middle East are some of the themes addressed in this section.

Fittingly, in this edition the Dossier section focuses on the twenty years of the Barcelona Process, the evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the changes in the region itself. The Dossier thereby addresses the different areas of Euro-Mediterranean relations: democratic transitions, security, economic development, trade integration, social transformations or the role of migration. And this has not been done solely from the perspective of the changing policies and structure of the Partnership over the last twenty years, but also taking into account the far-reaching changes in the region, as well as the actions and decisions that need to be taken to make a definitive improvement in the effectiveness of the policy of cooperation and partnership with the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries and the neighbours’ new neighbours. The Dossier draws reflections on both the evolution of the Process and the challenges the future holds for Euro-Mediterranean relations.

As in previous editions, the articles in the Panorama section complete the preceding sections, complementing them through a multitude of themes. Although not as crucial as those addressed in the initial sections, they do present themes of great interest regarding the situation in the Mediterranean region and encompass a comprehensive range of issues and geographies. There are, therefore, articles that complement themes from Keys or Dossier, such as jihadism in Europe, terrorist attacks on energy infrastructure, the role of the Kurds in the Syrian war or the role of Russia in the Middle East. The selection of articles also encompasses a host of other issues including: the internal politics of the Mediterranean countries; the informal economy; the drama of illegal immigration; investments in the Gulf countries; the effect of non-conventional hydrocarbons; the role of the media in the transitions; the fight against the squandering of resources; the comic boom in the Arab world; and the situation of women and refugees; looking to provide the political, economic, social and cultural keys of the Mediterranean agenda.

The perfect complement for the articles found in the Yearbook is its extensive Appendices which give readers interested in the Mediterranean region direct and clear information through a selection of statistics for each country across as many sectors and areas as possible, as well as a comprehensive series of chronologies. In addition, the Appendices contain specific sections on electoral processes, the situation of agreements with the EU or Mediterranean immigration within the EU, and European cooperation with Mediterranean countries.

Let us not allow the dark clouds of the present to overshadow the fact that the drive and values of ‘95, with the strengthening of political, economic and cultural cooperation among Mediterranean countries, will enable us to keep moving forward.

Twenty years ago, it seemed as if the push to develop Euro-Mediterranean relations would effectively transform the Mediterranean region into an area of peace and prosperity. This goal may well seem far from being accomplished twenty years later, at a time of heightened tensions both in the northern and southern Mediterranean. However, let us not allow the dark clouds of the present to overshadow the fact that the drive and values of ‘95, with the strengthening of political, economic and cultural cooperation among Mediterranean countries, will enable us, albeit step by step, and hindered by stumbling blocks and steps backward, to keep moving forward. This has been our incentive in compiling the Yearbook, year after year, looking to improve each edition in order to provide our readers with the best product possible, which will help us to understand and improve the future of all countries in our region.
Perspectives
The Mediterranean shores have not been such a tense place since the end of World War II. The conflict in Syria has killed some 250,000 people. Libya has been struggling for years to find peace and unity. A terrorist organisation is trying to redefine the borders of the Middle East and North Africa and old crises are far from being solved. The long stalemate in the Middle East peace process is proving to be increasingly unsustainable: violence will spiral if we do not move decisively towards a two-state solution. Conflict and instability have forced thousands of men and women to flee their countries towards the northern shore of the Mediterranean, via land and sea: humans have always left their homes in search of a better future, but one has to go back to the post-war mass resettlements to find a comparable phenomenon in our region. Too many have died pursuing the dream of a more human life.

It is a grim scenario and every day we face new calls to action. As we tackle the latest emergencies, though, we must keep in mind how we reached this point. Together as a European Union, together as an international community. No single country can put in place a truly effective action by its own: no country alone can save the lives of so many people who cross the Mediterranean, as we do every day, nor find political solutions to the crises in Syria and Libya, nor address the other root causes of migration such as poverty or climate change.

Such historical circumstances demand an understanding of our history and an imaginative effort to find a new path for the future. Our solutions must focus not just on the next weeks and months, but on the years to come. The crisis the Middle East is going through is political. The decades-long tension between Sunni and Shia forces is now joined by clashes between alternative blocs inside the Sunni world. Rising powers versus old alliances, secular versus religious groups, one school of political Islam versus another. Against this background, sectarianism has prospered. The result has been the destabilisation of entire countries, with spill-over effects hitting the whole world. The foundations of the Middle Eastern social fabric have come under attack and it may take years, or decades, to heal the wound. But we cannot accept sectarianism as the basis for a new order in the Middle East and North Africa. We cannot accept the drawing of borders along sectarian lines. Doing so would destroy the unique richness of the region. Such a complex puzzle will not be solved overnight.

As a political crisis, it will certainly not be solved by military means: political crises require political solutions, and political solutions require patience, wisdom, courage and leadership. Regional powers need to stop waging proxy wars against each other and agree to sit at the negotiating table. In war-torn countries, we need processes of national reconciliation to put an end to the conflicts. This is true in Syria as it is in Yemen and in Libya. Politics is as crucial as military force for the ultimate defeat of Da’esh, al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups. The threat they pose goes beyond their territorial gains and the atrocities they perpetrate: they are trying to pervert a noble religion for their own cynical and apocalyptic goals.

The agreement we reached in Vienna on Iran’s nuclear programme can be an important step towards a different regional dynamic. The deal is first and foremost a non-proliferation agreement, but it can
also open a new chapter in regional politics. And the multi-lateral approach that led to the deal can serve as a model for other crises.

A more cooperative regional scenario could also benefit immensely from the reprise of peace talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians. After so many years, restarting the peace process may seem like an illusion. Still, this is no excuse for not trying. In years of regional turmoil, some believe the Middle East Peace Process will be put aside. It will not; at least not by Europe. More resolve and more creativity will be necessary. I am personally involved in trying to define a new regional framework that will allow for a resumption of negotiations. All regional and international actors agree on the need for such an approach: we all face the same threats, including the rise of extremist groups and failing states. In these tough times, peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians could send a powerful message to the whole region and the whole world.

A new and more cooperative order for the Mediterranean and the Middle East might need a major accord among all regional players. But we will need more than this. As we recall the last decades of Mediterranean history, we cannot forget the events of just four years ago. For too long, people were peripheral to the political processes, too distant from the decision-making affecting their lives and livelihoods. And then, in 2011, it was the people who rewrote the script. They said enough is enough. They took to the streets with protests and demands for freedom and dignity. And bravery came at a huge cost.

We have spent the past few years discussing whether the Arab ‘Spring’ has fully bloomed or disappeared too soon. What has not disappeared is the reason why these youngsters rose up. Their demands and aspirations will not go away. A new order for the Mediterranean and the Middle East will not emerge until the issues they raised are fully addressed: the call for inclusive and functioning democracies, rule of law and respect of fundamental human rights.

There are so many young people who simply ask for a place in their societies. They ask for an opportunity to be listened to and to contribute. They ask for an opportunity and they do not get their fair shot. We all bear a responsibility for the society we create. We have to give back hope to the younger generations. We need inclusive societies. We need effective democracies. This is the best answer we can give. And this is true on both shores of the sea.

Of course Europe, North Africa and the Middle East have different societies and economies: but in all continents peace, stability and prosperity ultimately depend on the quality of our democracies, on the opportunities we guarantee our youths. Education will, therefore, be crucial – there is nothing terrorists fear more than education. Reducing unemployment will be crucial. Human and civil rights will be crucial.

Some are fostering the fear of an ‘invasion’ of Europe. If you compare the numbers of people arriving with the overall population of Europe, it is clear there is no invasion: the figure is well below one per cent. But this is not just a matter of statistics. Throughout our history, the sea has been a link between civilisations, more than it has been a border. Europe would not be the same had Christianity not spread from the Middle East, where it was born, or had the Arabs not brought their algebra to the northern shore. Of course there have been wars dividing our peoples – just as they have divided the peoples of Europe. The European Union has guaranteed seventy years of unprecedented peace and prosperity for its Member States. Now, with our Mediterranean partners, it is time to start writing a new page for the whole region.
Keys
Crisis and New Agenda of the Arab States

The State of the Arab State: Stocktaking and Reorientation

Bahgat Korany
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As an alienated, and alienating, besieged structure, the Arab State is in crisis. This crisis is not, however, Lowi’s “fiscal crisis,” but a deep and chronic one. It predates the Arab Spring rather than – as occasionally claimed – being caused by it. Why has this crisis arisen and is there a way out?

To try to answer these two basic questions, this article is backed by three indexes and divided into four sections. Section I identifies some main characteristics of the Arab State. Section II traces and reviews some influential pioneering research on the Arab State, undertaken by both international analysts and well-established Arab scholars. Section III focuses more closely on the basic deficiency of the State, its ‘credibility’ or legitimacy crisis due to its ‘fakeness’ and a widening gap between what is said and done. Finally, Section IV suggests a reorientation in dealing with the State’s ‘deep determinants’ of (mis)performance. It is proposed that, analytically, instead of mainly focusing on state institutions – which are often too formal and diverge from practice – efforts should be directed towards decoding the States’ functioning/effectiveness. The concept of governance is introduced and measured through six indicators used by the World Bank. The different Arab states are then ranked in terms of governance or lack thereof. The conclusion brings the paper’s threads together, linking governance to legitimacy, mainly as this legitimacy theory is developed by Max Weber. The paper suggests, however, a complement: a legitimacy of achievement/performance based on state-society partnership.

Beyond Overgeneralisation: Dissecting Patterns of the Arab State

Three features characterise the Arab State:

1. The State is central, both in its legal privileges and in people’s collective psychology. In the 1950s and 1960s the Algerians, for instance, fought for eight bloody years in a savage war and paid “one million martyrs.” The objective was to change their status from a DOM – département d’outre-mer, part of France – to an independent state. They won and became independent in 1962. Similarly, the Palestinians have been fighting for over 60 years to free their state from an occupying power, Israel. The Israelis themselves say they have fought for centuries to get a Hebrew state as home to all Jews. In short, people go to war and are ready to pay with their lives to get their state (Spruyt 2009).

This state centrality dominates even in pan-organisations that purport to go beyond it. The main regional organisation, the League of Arab States (LAS) – established in 1945, actually before the establishment of the UN – aimed to embody the Arabs’ aspiration for unity and the (re) creation of “one nation from the (Arab) Gulf to the (Pacific) Ocean.” Yet a content analysis of its 48-article charter shows that the territorial Arab State and its national sovereignty are central in just less than 50% of the articles, 22 articles to be precise. In order to respect state sovereignty, LAS resolutions are taken unanimously, i.e. each state from tiny Djibouti to founding-member and influential Saudi Arabia has the power to veto.

2. Though we tend to overgeneralise in talking about the Arab State, the 22 Arab states are diverse. For instance, they are distinct in their
daily living and in their capacity to meet their people’s economic demands, e.g. as ‘Haves’ and ‘Have-Not’s,’ oil-producing and oil-less countries. The per capita income of the Qatari is about 50 times that of his neighbour the Yemeni – with all that this huge income gap entails. Demographically, Qatar’s native population is less than the inhabitants of one of Cairo’s medium-size districts. Egypt itself is about 25% of the whole Arab population, more than the combined population of its four immediate North-African neighbours: Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. All the population combined of such oil-powers as Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar and the UAE are approximately 70% of Cairo. Income and demographic gaps do not only have economic effects but socio-political ones as well.

3. The Arab State is **fierce**; repressive rather than strong. Its basic regime is extremely intolerant. Any form of political opposition is generally assimilated in most of these states to hostility (Porter 2013). Sadam’s Iraq was notable for the physical liquidation of its opponents and was accused of using poisonous gas against its Kurdish citizens. Gaddafi solemnly declared that he would pursue his Libyan opponents and assassinate them wherever they were in the world; and if he were accused of being a terrorist, he would readily accept the honour! There are now over 220,000 victims of civil war in Assad’s Syria, after four years of a bloody civil war, with hundreds of thousands more maimed; more than four million refugees and probably an equal number of IDPs – internally displaced persons. And the war goes on. As we will see in discussing the Arab State’s pattern of governance, in less infamous cases widespread arbitrariness still replaces the basic rule of Law.

### Research on the Arab State Comes of Age

The Arab world has inherited state centrality which had been prevalent across time and space (Tilly, 1975). The recent Oxford Handbook of Political Science qualifies the discipline as “the discipline of the State” (Goodin, 2009-3-61). But despite its centrality, the Arab State has been under-researched and scientifically under-analysed. Most Arab theorising focused on ‘bigger entities’: the Umma/caliphate in Islamic political thought, or the ‘anti-colonial Arab nation’ in pan-Arab analysis. We do come across some aspects of elite theory applied to the State, or Pluralism theory in approaching Lebanon or a form of Marxist analysis in dealing with the anti-colonial State as in the case of the short-lived South Yemen and especially Nasserist Egypt. These, however, did not lead to a systematic and accumulative research programme around a consensual definition of the State. About 30 years ago, I surveyed the widespread use of the term ‘State’ to find about 27 definitions (Korany 1987). But the most quoted and dominant are variations of either the Weberian or the Marxist standard definitions. The Weberian definition emphasises the State’s legal sovereign aspect and its monopoly of the use of force. The Marxist one, however, linked the State to the general theory of modes of production; class structure and the State as the exploiting superstructure or a proxy for the bourgeois capitalist class and thus a reflection of the economic infrastructure.

It was in fact about 30 years ago that two big transnational projects focused on the Arab State, or some basic aspects of it. Not only did each assemble a huge and effective research team but they were also based on an explicit research programme. The result is a noticeable jump in the research design and findings regarding the Arab State in a relatively short time. Essentially one of these two projects is worldwide and the other was confined to Arab scholars as part of a general futurology project exploring scenarios for the ‘Arab nation.’

The first, under the leadership of the Instituto Affari Internazionali (G. Luciani et al.), resulted in four volumes in English, dealing with major issues such as the foundations of different Arab states; the rentier State; the durability of the Arab State and its relations with the opposition; and finally problems of regional integration. The project was truly international in two respects: a) in terms of its contributors from Europe, North America and of course the Arab World; and b) in its collective leadership: four non-European contributors joined as editors: from Adeed Dawisha and Ghassan Salamé to Hazem Beblawi and William Zartman.

As for the purely Arab collective project, it was initiated by the Centre of Arab Unity Studies in Beirut – certainly the most respected and well-established
pan-Arab institution then and at present. The project – generously financed as the most collective project regrouping Arab researchers – dealt with four areas of research: the Arabs and the World; the Future of the Arab State and Society; the trajectories and challenges of Economic Development; and a fourth mainly methodological research area focused on the problems of modelling. In addition to the synthesis volume of each of the first two research areas and an overall volume on the Future of the Arab Nation (ti-tled Challenges and Choices), at least eight volumes were duly published by individual contributors. What linked all these contributions together was the main focus: scenarios of the future of the Arab world. These are three, the first is the most desired but a bit utopian: achievement of complete integrative Arab unity. The third is the present one of Arab ‘national’ fragmentation among various territorial states jealous of their sovereignty. In between is a second, rather reformist scenario of regional grouping around a geographical area, e.g. the Nile Valley or the Gulf; or an issue: e.g. food security or military industries. For our topic, the synthesis volume on the “Future of State and Society in the Arab Homeland” by Saad El-Din Ibrahim is basic to the analysis of the Arab State then and – in many respects – even now. For the English-speaking reader, the volume by a member of this research group, the late Nazih Ayubi (1995) gives a taste of the range of this sub-group on state and society. These two transnational research projects represented a huge advance in dissecting the Arab State according to standard and worldwide scientific practices. Thirty years later, where are we?

### TABLE 1: Human Development Index (HDI) Value*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>..</td>
<td>Very high human development</td>
<td>0.880</td>
<td>0.885</td>
<td>0.887</td>
<td>0.889</td>
<td>0.890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>..</td>
<td>High human development</td>
<td>0.715</td>
<td>0.723</td>
<td>0.729</td>
<td>0.733</td>
<td>0.735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>..</td>
<td>Medium human development</td>
<td>0.593</td>
<td>0.601</td>
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* The Human Development Index is a composite index measuring average achievement in three basic dimensions of human development – a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of living. See Technical note 1 (http://hdr.undp.org/en) for details on how the HDI is calculated. Data in the tables are those available about 195 countries to the Human Development Report Office as of 15 November, 2013, unless otherwise specified.
The Arab State is increasingly on the research agenda, either published or in solid PhD dissertations, or both (e.g. A. Saouli, 2014). There is now confirmation of the pitfalls of the Arab State, as laid out in "Alien, Besieged yet Here to Stay" (Korany, 1987). The teasing out of quantitative data about the Arab State from world databanks further confirms two aspects: 1) The diverse trajectories of different Arab states away from the dream of a unified Arab state, (an objective that is becoming, despite rhetoric, increasingly illusory); and 2) overall stagnation in the political field that provoked continuous mass protests until they became the 2011 Tsunami known as the Arab Spring (Kamrava, 2015). Two indexes on Human development (2009–2014) and the Fragile/Failed State are eloquent in this respect (see Table 1 and Table 2).

The two indexes show either stagnation or even deterioration in almost all cases. In fact, the Arab State is, on the whole, incapable of evolving and delivering. It suffers from a credibility crisis. We will come to this issue in more detail in section IV below when we discuss the third index on governance.

The Present Arab State: Its Credibility Crisis

State legitimacy crisis is another designation, as I will show in the next section. Legitimacy and capacity to govern go together.

Contrary to expectations, there has been – following the Arab Spring – a regain of interest in, and need for, the State – both at the mass level and even among sceptics. Recently published research (Hilal et al., 2015) about the Return of the State in Egypt has been welcomed by the media and is becoming almost an immediate bestseller.
This regain of interest in the primacy/centrality of the State is motivated by the fluidity of the political situation following uncontrolled street politics and the collapse of law and order, even in established authoritative and authoritarian states such as Egypt or Tunisia. This law and order collapse takes much more stark form in cases such as Libya or Yemen where other actors – militias, warlords, organised crime – are taking over at the expense of any state authority. Mass nostalgia for a minimum of stability is also on the rise.

But did not these masses revolt against this state and its conception of law and order? Has (fickle) mass public opinion changed its mood so fast and so starkly? Is there a puzzle in this sharp volte-face? Though the State is still central in people’s collective psychology, they usually revolt – violently or not – against its “fakeness” (Cammet et Diwan, 2014). Contrary to the European experience in state-formation (Tilly, 1975), the Arab State has been reduced to its regime, not the other way around. The regime and its clients have hijacked the State. Though this State presented itself – according to the accepted definition of the State – as a set of ‘legal-national’ set of institutions, in reality and actual practice it was not (Brand 2014). It was not even Hobbs’ Leviathan, this monster acting above conflicting social or ethnic groups. It is not only corruption at the highest level, but also and primarily, this façade of standard modern institutions flagrantly negated by actual functioning based on very particularistic affiliations, e.g. tribal, shilla or old-boy networks, or simply financial profit (Hertog et al., 2013). It is what I called else-

where the neo-patrimonial State, where the distinction between private and public property is blurred (Korany, 2014). To clarify this wide discrepancy between the professional, impersonal and institutional façade and personalised, corrupt day-to-day functioning, we will take the example of ‘tribalism.’

Despite official refutation, it is not true that tribalism has disappeared. A country such as Saudi Arabia is explicitly tribal, indeed the official name indicates its origins and official frame of reference of its founder the Al-Saud tribe. Other countries might not be so explicit, but Bahrain is Al-Khalifa, Kuwait is Al-Sabah; Qatar is Al-Hamad… This tribal basis and frame of reference – as opposed to the modern, legal-rational façade – is a pure continuation of early practices in Arab-Islamic history in its different facets: from Al-Omayyad and Al-Abbasid empires to the Al-Othman or Ottoman empire. The 14th century sociologist, Ibn Khaldun – the Weber or Marx of the Arab World – based his concept of the rise/demise of governing political authority on ‘Asabiyya, i.e. tribal kinship/esprit de corps.’ Asabiyya continues to characterise many governing regimes at present. Raison d’état becomes raison de famille/tribe.

One cannot account for the maintenance of Jordan’s monarchy without taking into consideration its tribal support system or Morocco’s without the top authority coordination and even inter-marriage with the Berbers

Even in times of successful coups/revolutions, the tribal element is present and kicking. Thus Yemen’s 1962 revolution that established the republican regime could not do without the tribes. It is now documented that the fate of the emerging republic hung on the role of principal tribes. These were involved by proxy in the Saudi-Egyptian fight, and would rally troups in return for money from both sides (Dergham, 2015). Once the war was over in the 1960s, tribal Sheikhs participated as such in Parliament and have

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1 The problem is not this tribal phenomenon as such, but rather its repeated official negation compared to its dominant and routine practice at the State’s highest level. The problem is this credibility gap of stakeholders and their basis of legitimacy.
created a tribal confederation as a means of co-management and interaction with the State. Though less explicit, one cannot account for the maintenance of Jordan’s monarchy without taking into consideration its tribal support system or Morocco’s without the top authority coordination and even inter-marriage with the Berbers. Even in revolutionary regimes such as Gaddafi’s Libya, tribalism was part and parcel of the new regime. Gaddafi went on to condemn at the beginning of his new regime tribal culture/behaviour as a negation of the revolutionary ethos and spirit, only to replace members of his own tribe – the Qadhaffiya – at the helm of the different sinews of power. As recently as May 2015, and to control Libya’s civil war and avoid complete institutional collapse, Egypt continued this tribally-based ethos and engineered a meeting of “Libyan tribes” - so officially announced.

Governance is not a function solely, or even primarily, of the use of force but rather of legitimacy, of acceptance of political authority by its people, or at least their majority. This is where the present state deficit and deficiency are glaring.

Even the Syrian uprising against the Assad regime from Dara’a was based on tribal coordination. Indeed the ‘Friday of Tribes’ capitalized on the networks of Al-Zaki and Al-Masalmeh tribes (Dirgham 2015). Similarly, in Iraq the Al-Asha’ar tribe is attempting to shape post-Saddam-Iraq. In the fight against ISIL, states are now collaborating with tribes in delivering aid. Jordan’s Minister of Information was very explicit. He stated that Jordan plans to train fighters from Arab tribes in both Syria and Iraq to defeat ISIL. This is indicative of state subordination in its prime responsibility: maintenance of basic security. It denotes a lack of effectiveness compared to tribes and the increasing failure of governance.

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From State (Façade) Institutions to their Process and Effectiveness: Measuring Governance

The proliferation of this relatively new concept of governance is due to the increasing challenges to authority and the need for coordination and management at all levels. Consequently, the issue of governance complexity can be expressed in the form of a straightforward equation, inspired by the work of M. Weber:

\[ G = L + F \]

\( G \) (governance) equals and is a function of the presence of \( L \) (legitimacy) and the use of \( F \) (force) in combination. Legitimacy or voluntary acceptance by the majority of the population is the basis and principle of governance. The use of force against recalcitrants, usually a minority of the population, is the exception and last resort. In other words, there is a basic inference in this \( L \) and \( F \) ratio, an inverse relationship. The more legitimate political authority is, the less need there is for the use of force, and vice versa. Indeed, repeated use of force reflects not governance but rather its failure.

In the present context, the Arab State is force-dependent as shown by various indicators: rising budget of police and army; low status on the freedom of the Press Index; low credibility of election results; even when these are not widely rigged; fragility and ineffectiveness of legislatures; scepticism about juridical independence; and widespread discrepancy between what the constitution says and usual practice at the different levels of authority. The result is a prevalence of the state of emergency: Palestine 2007-present, Sudan 2005-present, Iraq 2004-present, Algeria 1992-2011, Egypt 1981-2012 and Syria 1963-April 2011 or until the regime went into a civil war.
The World Bank has produced the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). These six indicators summarise the views on the quality of governance provided by a large number of enterprises, citizens and firms. How do the Arab countries fare in this respect? I.e. How do they rank compared to the 215 countries included in the dataset? (See Table 3).

**Conclusion**

This article on the state of the Arab State opened by surveying some state characteristics and assessing world and ‘native’ research on this state’s origins and evolution. Our main thesis is that the Arab State is in crisis because it is imported (Badie 1985), alienated and fake in what it says/presents in its mimicry of so-called institutions. The two indexes of Human Development and Fragile/Failed State confirm this state’s crisis. To go beyond the façade, it is suggested that analysis focuses not on structure but on process through the dissecting governance challenges and dynamics. Six indicators of governance are then applied and the table shows where the Arab State stands compared to some of its peers. One of the main findings is that in its mode of governance, the different types of the Arab State count mainly on force and emergency laws rather than legitimacy or voluntary acceptance by its people.

Max Weber is the name most associated with the concept of legitimacy. According to Weber, the main types of legitimacy are: traditional (e.g. tribal), charismatic (of leadership) and national-legal (e.g. modern institutions). While the Arab State claims...
to be the State of institution, its real basis is either pseudo-charismatic (the claimed ‘Baraka’ of the great man at the top) and/or traditional/tribal. The immediate way out for such a state is a two-fold strategy: a) reduce this discrepancy and credibility crisis; and b) work for a new type of legitimacy, one based on achievement, i.e. cumulative problem-solving in partnership with all its people, with whatever elements such a partnership entails.

Bibliography


The Arab uprisings that swept the Arab world in 2011 were driven by many catalysts, either short term (in the first place the death by immolation of the young street vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi in Tunisia and the ensuing social rage against regimes) or structural (socio-economic difficulties, enduring authoritarian rule, new generations, etc.). The surge of mass, street politics with exuberant large-scale crowds gathered in public spaces was unprecedented; after all one of the most symbolic and essential features of authoritarian 'normal' governance over a given polity is its exclusive control of public spaces. The prospects for change were, therefore, very real. At the same time, the character and reactions of one particular state institution, the military, also framed the various trajectories of transition and their different paths.

Once characterised by the general prevalence of enduring authoritarian rule, the Arab world was then driven into a process of transition, a process of change from one type of regime (entrenched authoritarian rule corseting political and economic dynamics for decades) to other potential types of regimes. The latter were characterised by a complex mixture of strong societal pressures towards democratisation, or at least some changes in state-society relations, the weight of ‘surviving’-re-emerging actors, especially those posted in state institutions (the police, the judiciary, the media), the fuelling of counter-revolutionary trends, the electoral surge of different kinds of Islamism (the Muslim Brotherhood, the Salafis) and, in some cases, the derailments of transitional processes into civil wars. In such unstable settings, the rebuilding of new regimes has been especially chaotic; a far cry from textbook transitions to democracy. The difficulties have been made evident by the persistent role of military actors in most cases, rather than the revival of opened (democratic) political processes, the rebuilding of new civilianised political systems, the (democratic) control on the armed forces and security sector reform.

The Military, the State and the Arab Uprisings

Why did the military adopt such a central role? On the one hand, authoritarian regimes lacked legitimacy, with no ideas, norms, institutions or social bases for support that they could rely on in order to justify their enduring rule. Their day-to-day workings were based on a set of ‘appearances’ (normalcy in public spaces) and on the exclusive control by the ruler and his associated clique over major decisions. And they were ultimately buttressed by repression, coercion, or at least fear emanating from such prospects (‘the wall of fear’ as the Arab expression puts it). As revealed by the sudden shockwave of the 2011 uprisings, these regimes were founded on shaky foundations: they were very harsh, yet at the same time fragile. The search by regimes for sources of support when severely contested quickly fell on the military, due to a lack of sources for legitimacy, other than

1 Bahgat KORANY, “A microcosm of the Arab Spring, sociology of Tahrir square,” in Mehran KAMRAVI, ed, Beyond the Arab Spring, London, Hurst, 2014.

As a corollary, Syria since 2011 has set about engineering the worst-case scenario, a descent into chaos, to sustain their rule. Authoritarian regimes had drawn up implicit ‘pacts’ with their respective militaries: they could keep it small in size, compensating this with hypertrophied security and paramilitary forces (the Ministry of Interior in Tunisia due to Ben Ali’s military background) or parallel armies as in Libya (and Gaddafi was far more systematic in using tribal recruitment and allegiance, even when compared with a country like Yemen, considered the archetypal case of tribalism); or they could exert huge social engineering in the officers’ corps to position loyal officers at key posts based on ethnic, confessional or tribal ties (Alawites in Syria, Sunnis in Bahrain, Sanhan tribesmen in Yemen); or, finally, they could draw up an implicit pact of support whereby the powerful military enjoyed some kind of ‘toned-down’ institutional autonomy based on privileges, particularly economic ones (Egypt).

On the other hand, the Arab uprisings were essentially a battle over the State, with struggles between very divergent points of view: those who considered that the problem was the authoritarian ruler and his clique – mostly people posted in the state apparatus and considered by others as ‘remnants (fouloul)’ of the old regime –; others who argued for gradualist reforms (some kind of accountability and rule of law); and finally those who pleaded for structural bottom-up changes in the name of (transitional) justice or revolutionary legitimacy – the so-called young revolutionaries (al-shabab al-thawra) in Egypt or revolutionaries (al-thuwwar) in Libya. In such an intricate interplay, one essential state institution was the military, assuming it maintained a degree of cohesion during the transition process – the counterexample was the small and disorganised Libyan military or what remained of it after years of Gaddafi favouring ‘the people in arms (al-chaab al-musallah).’ The military was associated with the State much more openly and overtly than other institutions, such as the police or the judiciary – the latter were also endowed with a strong ‘sense of State’ in Egypt and Tunisia. The military projected an image of itself as the embodiment of the nation, its ultimate protector in nationalist terms, at the service of the country, and held the socio-cultural sway, especially for conscripted armies (often filtered conscription) – but such a cultural weight as the military meant very different things in similarly nationalist armies. For instance, Tunisian officers’ loyalist attitude towards civilian rule, as compared with Egyptian officers’ sense of acting for Egypt but also as ‘owners’ of the State since 1952.

The uprisings acted as ‘stress tests’ deeply challenging the ‘normal’ workings of authoritarian rule, and then served as litmus tests that revealed the true nature of the military: as a corps keeping some cohesiveness of its own, or as a mere tool used by the incumbent regime to repress, or finally in Libya as a non-existent entity.

The uprisings acted as ‘stress tests’ deeply challenging the ‘normal’ workings of authoritarian rule, and hence calling for the military’s potential intervention, and then served as litmus tests that revealed the true nature of the military: as a corps keeping some cohesiveness of its own, or as a mere tool used by the incumbent regime to repress, or finally in Libya as a non-existent entity. The military could either refuse to open fire on insurrectionist, yet mainly peaceful, mass demonstrations (at least compared with the highly asymmetric level of violence unleashed by regimes through their security forces), as happened in Tunisia and Egypt. Or, it could take part in repression, either for a short while, as in Bahrain, or in enduring and widespread repression. In the latter case, the military either remained as an effective tool for repression, despite major defections from the officers’ corps, as in Syria, or broke into two halves (those siding with the revolution vs. those remaining loyal to the incumbent regime), as in Yemen, or finally explode in many parts, as in Libya, and fuel an eight-month civil war.3 As a result, the military,

that for years occupied a place in the background, like a kind of black box, found itself thrown into direct and open politics – and this after there being very few external analysts of Arab militaries in ‘normal’ authoritarian times, before the Arab uprisings, if compared, for instance, with the number of analysts of Islamism.

The Huge Challenges of Transition and the Tunisian Exception

An essential intervening factor should be stressed: beyond the generic and sometimes misleading vocabulary of ‘transition,’ transitions are not all comparable. When compared with former cases of transitions in Southern Europe (Greece, Portugal, Spain), Latin America or Eastern Europe (after 1989), transitions in the Arab World are messier and less clearly framed than their predecessors. The former were often ‘pacted transitions,’ based on agreements drawn up between elites (moderates from the opposition and reformists from the regime). And in Latin America, a tradition of constitutionalism had persisted in a pattern of alternating civilian and military rule, with a memory of civilian politics in churches, labour unions, parties, judiciary institutions and civil society. In such settings, mass mobilisations occurred during transitions, but they were kind of ‘cork events’ that disappeared thereafter, with revived political processes taking over and with political elites (new or old ones) moving forward through elections, party building and institution (re)building.

Quite differently in the Arab world since 2011, street politics, which is not a unified actor, has been much more active and re-energised by frustration with the lack of tangible progress or with attempts by leaders or groups (the military, the Muslim Brotherhood) to treat people the same way authoritarian regimes had been doing for years. And after decades of authoritarian destructive rule, the institutional setting was in a dire state (as exemplified by cases as different as Egypt and Libya): the unravelling of authoritarian regimes that had acted as exclusive ‘owners’ of the State, led to all levels of the state apparatus to unravel, with bureaucracies either dysfunctional or dying, some elements of state institutions (especially the police) being targeted, and the disarray extending to numerous sectors, including the business community, whose top layers (‘crony capitalists’) had cultivated close links with authoritarian regimes.

So Tunisia has positioned itself as an exception with its ability to gradually extract itself from such a morass – though it was also shaken by the political assassinations of two opposition figures, which was something new to the country. The Tunisian military is one that is hyper-loyalist, whose officers are middle-class civil servants with very little experience of political engagement, endowed with a staunch sense of the State and regard for the protection of national sovereignty, without interfering in internal or regional disputes. There was some kind of control (authoritarian) of the armed forces under Bourguiba and Ben Ali, and a civilianised Defence Ministry has been an essential point of departure for transition. Size also matters; Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s starving of military resources and limiting its operations reduced the army’s size influencing the perceptions of the officers’ corps with a nationalist but not hegemonic Tunisian military. In 2011, the Tunisian military smoothly handed power over to civilians to rebuild the Tunisian polity and played no political role beyond guaranteeing stability until elections were held in October 2011, and then in the context of acute threats of terrorism on the Tunisian borders (especially with Libya) and in the southern restive and mountainous borderland with Algeria.

In 2011, the Tunisian military smoothly handed power over to civilians to rebuild the Tunisian polity and played no political role beyond guaranteeing stability until elections were held in October 2011

In parallel, institutional rebuilding played an essential complementary role giving further reason for the military to step aside. The institutional tradition was ‘hijacked’ by the Ben Ali regime but not destroyed by its workings: a ‘sense of the State’ (the State as the pillar of the nation and not just a tool in the hands of the regime in power) was preserved by numerous actors, middle bureaucrats, lawyers, university professors, jurists, trade unionists, civil
society activists, human rights defenders, etc., along with military officers. These actors were able to revive the Tunisian statist tradition after the fall of the Ben Ali regime through the ‘Instance supérieure pour la réalisation des objectifs de la révolution, la réforme politique et la transition démocratique.’ And furthermore, civil society came in concert to play a role as watchdog on crucial issues (such as women, freedom, individual rights) and to pressure political elites towards consensus, with an essential role for trade unions (in particular the UGTT). As a result, the main difficulties in Tunisia came not from a huge military lobbying to preserve certain interests, but from the institutional weight of parts of the former regime (the Ministry of Interior, the justice apparatus) and the absence of transitional justice.

The ‘Elephant in the China Shop’ and the Revenge of the State under Military Guidance in Egypt

Read in strict parallel, the Egyptian case displays the exact opposite features. This is the essential difference with Tunisia, beyond the similar role of the military in easing the early phase of transition in both countries. The transitional phase in Egypt was long, without a roadmap for transformation or to secure some kind of consensus among political forces for ‘robust competition’ and constructive deliberation. In Tunisia, political forces were aware of the potential disagreements and started building temporary institutions, until they forged some kind of consensus to proceed on and settled on a Constitution. In Egypt, the exact opposite happened, as exemplified by the unstable institutional rebuilding, with a referendum on a few constitutional articles, superseded by a constitutional declaration by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), then a supplementary constitutional declaration by the SCAF, then the Morsi Constitution and thereafter the Al-Sisi Constitution. No consensus was forged between political forces; instead, political divisions on the Constitution or on simple political decisions were transformed into existential and ideological issues (the identity of the State, the ‘civic State,’ the place of shari’a), displaying a strong ideological polarisation among Egypt’s political forces, with a rift opening in 2012-13 between two heterogeneous yet increasingly delimited camps, the Muslim Brotherhood vs. other political forces.

The main difficulties in Tunisia came not from a huge military lobbying to preserve certain interests, but from the institutional weight of parts of the former regime (the Ministry of Interior, the justice apparatus) and the absence of transitional justice.

In the middle, the military could position itself as the behind-the-scenes guardian of Egypt in a very proactive way. After the calamitous experience of direct rule by the SCAF, the ease with which President Morsi managed to force the SCAF out of power in August 2012 confirmed the military’s exhaustion and the army leadership’s broad-mindedness – particularly among the younger generals in the upper echelons of the SCAF, for instance General Al-Sisi – in entering into a tacit deal with the newly elected President Morsi in order to extricate itself from power and let civilians govern Egypt. The regime’s apparent civilianisation, a feature unseen in Egypt since 1952, with a civilian-elected President and vice-President, was not the end result of some regained civilian oversight over the military. As an indication of the tacit agreement between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood, the 2012 (Morsi) Constitution gave in to all the demands of the military, including an autonomous budget and complete autonomy over its own affairs, immunity from prosecution in civilian courts and a veto in high politics by being associated to crucial decisions. The essential task of General Sisi during Morsi’s rule was to restore the military’s credibility: and the stunning fact is how successful the military was in restoring its popularity.

4 Others put the problem the other way: the military went to Morsi to offer such a deal.
and translating its own narrative into a kind of legitimacy adopting the role of guardian of the Egyptian polity (or in its own language, “the saviour of Egypt, *inqadh Masr*”) and in making Egyptians completely forget one year and a half of calamitous misrule by the SCAF.

But such a ‘quietist’ military stance could only be viable if the Muslim Brotherhood ruled Egypt smoothly – with direct military intervention remaining an option in case of failure, and not a foregone conclusion, as alluded to by numerous officers in the Egyptian press during Morsi’s rule. This did not materialise\(^5\) and the military overthrew Morsi on 3 July 2013 amidst a backdrop of popular mobilisations that granted the military the legitimacy to intervene: the coup d’état was rife with ambiguities, as many Egyptians deeply resented Morsi’s governance but genuinely did not want the President to be overthrown by the military or to witness the massacre that was committed against the Muslim Brotherhood’s sit-in in Rabaa square.

The military, or at least the parts of it (the military intelligence) around General (then Marshall, then President) Al-Sisi, has now rebuilt the regime based on an ‘authoritarian pact’ with the police, the media, the judiciary, the bureaucracy, certain businessmen, etc., legitimising itself by its ability to restore stability (*istiqrar*) in the country. The military has now taken centre stage with a new, previously unseen militarisation of power. In the 2013-15 period, the military-led regime has sought a general and systematic de-politicisation of Egypt’s political space and destroyed the street politics that had been active from 2011 to 2013 through the harsh repression of dissident voices ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood, intellectuals, bloggers, media anchors, university students, NGOs and religious preachers, to soccer fans. It has instilled an atmosphere of fear through heavy propaganda, while waging a ‘war on terrorism’ against alleged threats, ranging from jihadist groups to an array of different opponents, including the banned Muslim Brotherhood. And it has offered populist promises of economic improvement (with huge Saudi and Emirati funding).

### State Implosions and Hybrid Security Sectors in Yemen and Libya

In Yemen and Libya, the very poor shape of the security sector, in particular the armed forces, at the moment of transition and the ensuing decay of the security sector – called in policy-oriented jargon the “hybrid security sector,” accounting for the blurred relations and often indeterminacy between on the one hand ‘official’ security forces, those related to the Defence or Interior ministries, and on the other hand *ad hoc*-recruited security forces such as tribal forces in Yemen or local militias in Libya\(^6\) – have severely harmed political processes and even precluded the very possibility of political games and the advances of transition. This is quite different in Egypt where the military acts ‘above the mess,’ presenting itself as an arbitrator, and the decaying security sector and absence of a restored Weberian state monopoly on arms have fuelled a political mess that is very detrimental to transition.

With the enfeeblement of the authoritarian grip of the Saleh regime (and the assassination attempt against Saleh) and the Gulf Cooperation Council’s transition plan (the election of President Hadi, a former vice-President under Saleh and officer), military/security high commanders have become ‘warlords.’ Although this is not in the traditional African sense of the term (Somalia, Sierra Leone), but rather as actors controlling fiefdoms, namely ‘their’ units/brigades: with those siding with the uprising counterbalancing the remnants of Saleh’s relatives who have remained influential in the military and security apparatus, along with President Hadi attempting to introduce reforms in the armed forces’ organisational structure. In Libya, the absence of a huge military corps was not an asset for easier transition, a kind of welcomed ‘*tabula rasa*’ when compared with the heavy weight of the Egyptian military in the political system. Militias/brigades (*kata’ib*), recruited on a local basis – though some have a very ideological agenda or are related to foreign projects of al-Qaeda or more recently the Islamic State/Da’esh – have filled the void and embedded themselves in the political process and in Libya’s social fabric.

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And these specificities of the security sector have been reinforced by the lengthy transition in Yemen (with the ‘national dialogue’ that was to some extent disconnected from the real problems in the Mövenpick Hotel sessions in Sanaa) and the weaknesses of civilian institutions in Libya (the absence of state institutions and the huge tasks facing new rulers after the fall of Gaddafi). These essential features were instrumental in buttressing and ratcheting up a transition process in Tunisia, but were absent in Yemen and Libya. The Yemeni national unity government, composed of different political parties, did not work for the transition President and the transition period lingered as President Hadi’s two-year term ended and the deadline for the completion of the national dialogue approached. In Libya, the weak government in 2011-14 did nothing but help to create an environment that exacerbated the Libyans’ very paradoxical stance towards militias: Libyans resent their aggressive rule, but at the same time rely on them (hence the inflated figures regarding militiamen when compared with the real numbers who fought in the civil war against Gaddafi). In both countries, no real political institution-building took place to smooth the transition and displace the role of official or unofficial militias (or ‘officialised,’ such as Libyan militias that are registered as militias with their own chains of command by the Interior or Defence ministries).

Then in Yemen in September 2014, some northern actors, the revivalist Zaydi Huthis, capitalised on protests against a subsidy lift and a more general resentment against the transitional government to take power in Sanaa. This was helped with the tacit complicity of a few insiders, first among them former President Saleh and his supporters in the security apparatus, in the dreadful context of the growing threat of advancing al-Qaeda factions in several southern provinces. In Libya, the equilibrium of militias that governed the country, along with a weak central government from 2011 to 2014, cracked in May-June 2014 after a military campaign to ‘cleanse’ Islamists was launched by retired General Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi-era official and then long-time dissident. Thereafter, multiple factions have coalesced into two rival yet heteroclite camps (‘Operation Dignity’ vs. ‘Operation Libya Dawn’) drawing the lineaments of a civil war, with two rival governments vying for control over the country and its huge wealth of natural resources and regional interventions (Egypt, United Arab Emirates) entering the fray.

Modest Harvest: Counterrevolutions or Transitional Processes Still in Motion?

Four years after the beginning of the Arab uprisings, regardless of their complex outcomes and different trajectories, the harvest in terms of institutional reforms and democratic transitions is elusive and at best modest, except in one case (Tunisia). The role of military actors remains pivotal in most cases, either through their enduring, weighty and domineering presence (Egypt until 2013, Yemen until 2014), or through their absence, their dereliction and the ensuing difficulties to restore minimal security and a state monopoly through violent means (Libya and Yemen after 2014), or with the military in Egypt in 2013 benefiting from the pitfalls of transition to take direct power. This is indicative of the difficulties of transitions and their shortcomings, along with the role of a strong regional counterrevolutionary force either due to the resilience of entrenched authoritarian rule (Bahrain, Syria) or the pro-active policies of conservative monarchies (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates), based on other rationales (the fear of organisational actors such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Sunnis vs. Shias), but with indirect and powerful effects on local balances of power (Yemen, Libya, Syria), or in order to buttress the new military-led Egyptian regime.

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The long Tunisian transition has contributed to clarifying the nature of the revolutionary phenomenon that has gripped the country since December 2010. Social revolt? Democratic revolution? At first, two forces combined to create the conviction that ‘the Revolution of liberty and dignity’ that had put an end to over twenty years of despotism and corruption was to essentially found the Welfare State and build democracy. This was the revolution’s primary aim.

The sudden rise of the Islamist Ennahdha party, with its plans to establish an Islamic State, has raised an issue from another era. Such a project condemns democratic aspirations and, moreover, calls into question the progressive acquis that distinguishes Tunisia and expresses its aspiration to modernity. Ennahdha’s intentions have thus triggered a crude battle for choice of society, with progressives aiming to assert the modernist vision, save the acquis and consolidate the democratic objective of the revolution. For its part, the Ennahdha party dramatically prevailed through an amalgam of populism, violence and overwhelming electoral victories; the October 2011 elections raised it to the rank of leading party (89 parliamentary seats out of 217); it dominated the transition government for two years (2012 and 2013) and caused constant tension in the National Constituent Assembly, where its representatives mobilised as a bloc in an attempt to introduce regressive provisions into the future constitution; it moreover covered up barbarous acts of violence, alien to Tunisian mores. Two political assassinations of Ennahdha adversaries in 2013 remain unpunished. At the appeal of civil society, massive demonstrations were held to protest against said party’s actions and initiatives. In August 2013, the protests reached the scale of a true blockade of the institutions, to the point of forcing Ennahdha, just before elections, to relinquish power to a non-partisan government appointed precisely to prepare the forthcoming elections. At the time, the ousting of President Morsi in Egypt (3 July 2013) had already broken its self-assurance: it began to consider the scope of such a precedent. By the same token, the Ennahdha MPs, who were blocking a series of fundamental provisions of the draft constitution, yielded on every point, suddenly converted to the idea of a liberal, democratic and republican constitution. The January 2014 Constitution is a decisive step on the road to a democratic Tunisia.

Ennahdha’s spirit had been broken. Its fall should have marginalised it, returning the original focus and purpose to the Revolution. Throughout 2014, this hope animated the progressive electorate, convinced that Ennahdha’s decline would sink it and relieve the transition of a parasitic interference. What force would represent a religious, regressive political party that, in addition, failed the test of power and has murky links with political violence? An ephemeral force? An opportunistic or marginal one? The test, at least, led Ennahdha to tone down its demands, change its discourse and endorse the new Constitution, which enshrines fundamental freedoms.

What was the actual response of the electorate? The October 2014 elections simply placed Ennahdha in second place within the new Assembly, giving it nearly a third of the seats (69 out of 217). After the rise of Islamic parties in the region, from Morocco to Egypt, and after the 2014 elections in Tunisia itself, there is no longer room for doubt: it must well be admitted that a respectable portion of the electorate believes in the Islamic project. Hence, the construc-
tion of democracy cannot forgo a ‘historic compromise’ with the forces professing allegiance to the religious frame of reference. The new order called upon to control the destiny of Tunisia must now reconcile social demands, the democratic imperative and Islamic identity. These components of post-revolutionary Tunisia’s social and political reality call for an innovative, unprecedented approach vulnerable to confrontation and instability, but not necessarily to regression. This is certainly the path to the only political progress permitted in Arab societies, until now destined to remain under the vagaries of tutelary authoritarianism, with its good and bad days.

The day after the October 2014 elections, the winning party, Nidaa Tounes (86 of 217 seats), formed a coalition government of the four leading parties, including Ennahdha, which is pursuing the quasi-democratic discourse it adopted over a year earlier. The historic compromise is in the making. By taking the effort to synergise contradictory yet evolving forces, the 2nd Republic is betting on building a democratic Arab State.

Genesis and Imperatives of the Democratic Transition (2011-2014)

The social argument was the primary cause of the Tunisian revolution. It drew its strength from the contrast between the opulence of the relatives and clientele gravitating around the ousted President and the misery in the suburbs; it also drew its strength from the imbalance between coastal Tunisia, where the bulk of economic activity, urban infrastructure and social services are concentrated, and inland Tunisia, deficient in infrastructures and basic services and often beset by idleness and despair as well as trafficking by a sector of youth making its way through delinquency and the parallel economy associated with the cross-border markets of Libya and Algeria. The inland provinces had slipped into the shadow economy. The sundry trafficking undermined state institutions. Mafia rings, taken up by Ben Ali circles, were besieging the entire country, taking with them entire sections of the customs and tax administrations, municipal authorities, and security and state services. The State had been hit.

Two social powder kegs exploded: first in January 2008, the Gafsa mining region, then in August 2010, Ben Guerdane, on the border with Libya. Popular violence and the subsequent police and legal repression were but the prelude to the dramatic events that would lead to the regime’s overthrow. The Third Estate was no longer afraid; it was in these areas that the December 2010 revolt broke out, and where popular discontent with all the transition governments and with the first government of the Second Republic has continued to February 2015. This is also where voter turnout has been the lowest.

The legislative and presidential elections that closed the transition phase in 2014 revealed more than a social divide: the south and the west on the one hand, and the north and east on the other, comprise heterogeneous electoral districts. This dichotomy constitutes a specific test for Tunisian reconstruction. Moreover, the future of nearly a million unemployed people and as many precarious workers, all of whom have gone to primary and secondary school and some to university, is essentially the responsibility of the State. The Welfare State constitutes the fundamental objective of the Second Republic.

The democratic imperative drew its strength from the struggle against Ben Ali’s despotic regime. It also drew its strength from the Tunisian society’s tradition of reform, progress and modernisation, dating back to the mid-19th century with the emancipation of slaves in 1846, the Fundamental Pact – a genuine Human Rights Charter – in 1857 and the first Tunisian Constitution in 1861. The colonial era (1881-1956) stimulated the will for modernisation and the aspiration to found a parliament, seat of national sovereignty. In the wake of independence, Tunisia undertook in-depth reform that changed society and mindsets. As of 1956, a series of reforms instituted gender equality, the prohibition of polygamy, legal divorce, family planning, the elimination of
tribal continuity and the generalisation of schooling in two languages, Arabic and French, from primary school to higher education. These reforms put an end to the patriarchal family, instilled a sense of individual autonomy and initiated the impetus towards state secularisation.

The democratic imperative also drew its strength from the Tunisian society’s tradition of reform, progress and modernisation, dating back to the mid-19th century.

Nonetheless, the progress made thanks to planned global development policy as of 1962 and the economic liberalisation effected in the mid-1990s were not accompanied by measures of political liberalisation allowing democracy and the entrenchment of freedoms. Quite to the contrary, the concentration of powers, the all-powerfulness of the police, electoral fraud, state predation, the censorship of the media… these ordinary shortcomings of despotic regimes were carried to grotesque extremes under Ben Ali. The perspective of a sixth presidential term, launched through a media campaign beginning in July 2010, less than a year after his re-election in October 2009 for a fifth term, attested to a suicidal blindness. These ailments and their very excess matured the demand for democracy. Increasingly urgent demands for political openness were expressed throughout the country and, at the time, recommended by the main Western partners. Among the ranks of the opposition, democracy represented the solution to all the country’s ills.

Was there another alternative? Islamist leaders apparently entertained such a hope, but they were condemned to silence. Among opposition parties, only one – the Progressive Democratic Party – deigned to invite them to its meetings; they attended this political circle obliged to maintain complete silence. Besides, who would have believed in a redeeming Islamic project? The parties of the democratic opposition, numbering three, and the active civil society institutions – namely the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH) and the Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATDF) – were fiercely hostile to the Islamic project. In broader circles of human rights activists, who were mainly recruited from universities and the liberal professions, the Islamic movement was rejected as much as the regime in power. Islamist activists were, however, defended by democrats, not for their political choice, but in principle, and because they were ignominiously persecuted at the least pretext by the all-powerful political police, an institution of epic brutality. The democratic alternative seemed uncontested at the time.

The new opportunities presented by the post-Arab uprising developments in Syria triggered an eagerness in the PKK to exploit those opportunities and strengthen its hand vis-a-vis the AKP government in its negotiations.

As soon as Ben Ali disappeared from the political arena on 14 January 2011, the national unity government that took charge of the country’s administration hastened to improve the climate: release of political prisoners, lifting of media and social network censorship, legalisation of pending political parties and recognition of new parties, issuance of passports to exiles, who began retuning en masse, lifting of lawsuits against the LTDH – which was then being harassed via some thirty court cases – and the institution of a subsidy for young unemployed degree-holders. At the same time, the dominant party (Democratic Constitutional Rally – RCD), the political police and the Chamber of Deputies were dissolved. And finally, three National Commissions were created – one for political reform, another on corruption and embezzlement, and the third on armed violence and damages registered during the Revolution. In a matter of weeks, a new society asserted itself: one that assumed the country’s destiny and planned its future. The Tunisian de-

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1 The Tunisian Revolution officially caused less than 3,000 victims (injuries or deaths). According to the “Report of the National Commission to establish the events relative to abuse and violations registered during the period from 17 December 2010 to the end of its mandate,” a document in Arabic published in Tunis in April 2012, the total number of victims was 338 casualties and 2,147 injured. The additional assessment, up to July 2014, revealed a death toll of 61 and 173 injured, in addition to 50 casualties among terrorist ranks.
Democracy began taking shape at this stage, drunk with freedom and hope. The society was discovering, analysing and questioning itself. Political parties, media and civil society organisations of all persuasions multiplied; debate forums flourished on radio stations and television channels; image-supported field surveys extended to grey areas; interviews began to reveal new faces. For the first time, opinion polls and survey agencies appeared, measuring the political spectrum, its convergences and divergences, and qualifying and categorising them. Tunisia had achieved a pluralist breakthrough. Free and plural debates contributed to asserting the choice of society as liberal and democratic.

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A Radical Change. The national unity government advocated amending the Constitution (of 1 June 1959) and organising legislative and presidential elections on the new basis within six months. This plan was immediately rejected by certain political parties and the national trade union, which, through a strong street protest movement, demanded the abolition of the Constitution and the election of a constituent assembly. It was this radical approach that prevailed.

The following administration, taking office on 28 February, had the mandate of organising elections for the Constituent Assembly. The process expressed the will to do away with a system marked by an authoritarianism and paternalism that demobilised, disempowered and infantilised the citizenry; the constitution in effect was rejected outright: its abolition symbolised a new start. Finally, the marginalisation of inland regions was understood as a consequence of excessive government centralisation: only a new constitution would allow an improved balance of powers and balance among the regions.

On the social order, various demonstrations by youth and the arts world expressed the will to break with the norms of the past. The respective roles of the State and the citizens changed radically in the wake of the Revolution.

The Principle of Exclusion. In the Political Reform Commission, the principle was widely accepted that the social and political order should be a collective construction based on participation, the representativeness of the actors and the free exchange of ideas. Voices were raised, however, to contest the voting or running of members of the former ruling party in the elections for the Constituent Assembly. The principle of exclusion thus posed became the object of debate, insofar as whether the ultimate choice should be left to the voter. The exclusion provision was adopted for the 23 October 2011 elections, affecting 3,000 former government officials, the RCD party leadership and those having publicly supported the plan for a sixth presidential term. The possibility of maintaining this sanction for the duration of five years was discussed in 2014 by the Constituent Assembly but eventually discarded. The principle of limiting the age of candidates for presidential elections, supported by various parties in the Assembly, was likewise discarded. Thenceforth, only the principle of non-exclusion prevailed.

Insofar as the substance, the Constituent Assembly retained the principle of transitional justice; in December 2013 it created an independent Truth and Dignity Commission entrusted with investigating serious human rights violations committed from July 1955 to December 2013. The Commission, which began operating on 10 December 2014, stated it received 6,500 claims in three months.


The Tunisian transition dodged none of the difficulties inherent to the democratic option. Far from any interference from the military, it experienced turbulent vicissitudes without ceasing to develop the foundations of a new order based on consensus and a search for excellence, in an endogenous process open to participation by everyone. It resulted in a general agreement accepted by all. The new
regime is the outcome of a consensual approach, even if it remains economically fragile and specially targeted by the terrorist rings assailing the region. What principles and institutions distinguish the new regime? Seven major principles can be observed at this stage:

1. **Individual Security.** Political progress begins with the security of the individual. Before the Revolution, no-one was safe from arbitrariness in Tunisia: power was wielded through intimidation and terror. There were sudden attacks against different individuals at different times, who were rendered nearly powerless to make their voices heard, have their rights upheld, or defend their honour, property and person. Until the 21st century, prison, torture and assassination were the government’s means.

The conquest of individual security does not only involve the rights enshrined in the Constitution or in legislation, but extends to the ensemble of institutions forming the architecture of society, institutions that structure the collective defence of freedom and check arbitrariness.

The conquest of individual security does not only involve the rights enshrined in the Constitution or in legislation, but extends to the ensemble of institutions forming the architecture of society, institutions that structure the collective defence of freedom and check arbitrariness. The independence of the justice system, the coherence of Institutions, the freedom of the media, and the responsibility of civil society are indivisible: the democratic order is a whole. It is the conjunction of institutions and freedoms that lend a sense of safety, create confidence and eliminate the threat of arbitrary power. The change of political order comes at this price.

2. **The Status of Women** falls within the logic of the principle of equality, a principle hardly accepted by Arab society, the status of women being the most flagrant case in point. Constraint in marriage (jabr), wearing a veil and restrictions to freedom are erroneously referred to as religious prescriptions; in reality, they are cases of simple negation of the principle of equality, which does not go against Islam. In Tunisia, the equal status of women, passed into law in 1956, and coeducation at schools, institutionalised in 1968, have endured. Thanks to the Revolution, gender parity on electoral lists was introduced in September 2011, then enshrined in the Constitution (Art. 46). The dynamics of the system’s evolution constitute a genuine guarantee of progress towards gender equality. The emancipation of women is indicative of a philosophical progression.

3. **Freedom of Conscience.** Although it is inherent to the freedom of the individual, it is implicitly or explicitly rejected in Arab societies insofar as this principle offers Muslims the right to change religions or give up all religion. Apostasy, unthinkable, is sanctioned in certain countries by capital punishment. Now freedom of conscience is enshrined in the Constitution (Art. 6). This acquis is fundamental: relations with the State are based exclusively on civic rights. The State itself declares that it is “a civil State, based on civic rights, the will of the people and the rule of law” (Art. 2).

Recall a significant fact: at the United Nations General Assembly debate on 10 December 1948 regarding the definitive adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Saudi Arabian delegate expressed reservations pertaining to two articles: the one stating the right to marry with no limitations due to race, nationality or religion (Art. 16), and the one associating the freedom of conscience with the freedom to change one’s religion (Art. 18). These reservations, expressed 67 years ago, still limit the freedom of the majority of Arab subjects.

4. **Pluralism.** The category of uniqueness imbues the Arab mindset. It is rooted in the ascendancy of the father, the imam and the za’im (leader). The pater familias, the hegemonic party, the historic trade union: these authorities restrict social, political and spiritual aspects of life and ensure compliance with social codes. Doubting, breaking with or asserting other beliefs in the spheres of action, thought and faith expose one to ostracism, exile, and at times even the death sentence.

Pluralism posits the principle of freedom of choice and develops the culture of relativity. Thanks to the Revolution, it has won over the political, trade union and social arenas, breaking out with unprecedented vitality. The revolts did away with taboos, broke codes and overcame self-censorship: in Cairo,
Aliaa Magda El-Mahdy posed nude on Facebook; in Tunis, the Femen activist Amina Sboui posted a semi-nude photograph of herself, as a message regarding the appropriation of her body; in Morocco and Algeria, the ‘dé-jeûneurs’ or non-fasters proclaimed the right to eat and drink in public in the daytime in the middle of Ramadan. These rebellions defy resistance in society, where a mindset fixated on a single lifestyle subsists. The offensive has been scathing. Citizens brought up in the family religion are demanding freedom of conscience; and they are no less the citizen for it. The same is true of political, trade union and existential choices. A free society accepts plurality in political, religious and philosophical beliefs and the equal and legitimate participation of those holding such beliefs in the nation’s affairs.

5. Freedom of the Press. The freedom of expression and information, the lifting of censorship, the right to express one’s opinion with complete liberty on social and political events and to connect to information networks in the world constitute the first victory of the Tunisia of 2011. The satirical cartoon as a form of expression has entered the media. On a deeper level, the emancipated press relays the collective defence of freedom and focuses on the foundation of the rule of law, since the plurality of ideas and facts ensures transparency, provides an indication of governance and bolsters individual security.

6. The Right of Future Generations. It is accepted that the growth pattern should be inclusive, allowing all sectors of the population to participate in the growth dynamic, and it should also ensure they benefit from its effects in terms of employment and wellbeing. What all of this implies is not subsidies and aid, necessarily temporary, but the improvement of the aptitude to productively contribute to the economy. Thus perceived, the right of future generations can be summed up in three essential demands:

— A high-quality, modern education open to the future;
— A healthy environment, the basis for all socioeconomic development;
— Sustainable development guaranteeing economic, social and environmental balance.

7. The Principle of Power. In the Arab political order, indecision endures regarding the principle of the legitimacy of power: divine versus popular legitimacy. The evolution experienced in the majority of countries over the course of the 20th century has raised the people to the rank of regulators of power, the absolutism of Sharia law being increasingly limited by recourse to popular suffrage and the extension of legislation based on positive law. The 2011 Revolution dealt the decisive blow through the assertion of popular will as the source of legitimacy. Transcendence has been replaced by an immanence reflecting the aspirations of the people in their evolving historic experience. The watchword of the 2011 Revolution was, after all, “the people demand!” (Ash-shaab yurid!)

The Institutions. Three innovations distinguish the institutional balance: electoral restructuring, limitation of the executive branch and decentralisation. On the one hand, electoral legitimacy is asserted in all state organisms; and on the other hand, the spheres where citizens exercise free choice are entrusted to independent collegial institutions, free from any interference by the executive branch. The same is true of the judiciary branch, where a judge’s free determination is protected against the executive branch’s interference. The High Judicial Council and the five independent constitutional authorities dealing with elections, communication, human rights, the struggle against corruption and sustainable development, respectively, are based on the principles of election and the non-interference of the executive branch. And finally, the local judiciary is comprised of three levels of elected councils or courts: the municipal courts, the regional courts and the district courts. These innovations represent a genuine restructuring of the State.

The Second Republic entered into effect in 2015, after the promulgation of the Constitution (27 January 2014), the inauguration of the new Assembly of the Representatives of the People (4 December) and the investitures of President Beji Caid Essebsi (31 December) and Prime Minister Habib Essid and his government (5 February 2015). It must yet see to the establishment of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Judicial Council and the local authorities. Tunisia has once again demonstrated its mature, forward-looking nature as a nation. By entering democracy, it is accelerating its pace to modernisation and catching up on much of the time lost vis-à-vis the civilisation of our times.
The years since the onset of the Arab Uprisings in 2011 have witnessed what appears to be an extraordinary proliferation of non-state actors in the Middle East, matched by the consequent increase in their significance for political dynamics across the region. The category of non-state actors embraces a diversity of organisations and movements. It comprehends civil society and the flourishing non-governmental sector that has assumed great importance in the Arab world since the end of the Cold War. It includes an array of Islamist actors, including mainstream organisations, such as Al-Nahda in Tunisia, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party of Justice and Development in Morocco as well as Salafi groups which have emerged across the region from Tunisia to Yemen. It also includes violent Islamist movements, such as Ansar Bayt Maqdis which has been active in the Sinai region of Egypt, al-Murabitoun, the group led by Algerian Islamist, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, which attacked an Algerian gas installation in January 2013, leading to the deaths of 38 hostages, an array of militias that emerged in Libya following the fall of Gaddafi, and in Syria, after the outbreak of the uprising in that country, as well as the Shai Zaydi ‘Houthi’ movement which took control of the Yemeni capital, Sanaa in late 2014 plunging that country into conflict. Undoubtedly, the greatest focus of international attention in the last year has been the movement variously known as ‘Islamic State,’ ISIS and ISIL. This brief survey by no means exhausts the category of non-state actors in the Middle East. However, it does illustrate the sheer diversity that the term embraces, which, in turn, raises the question of how precisely the concept of non-state actor is to be understood.

Non-State Actors: a Definition

Posing that question is significantly easier than answering it. Josselin and Wallace (2001) propose that the concept of non-state actors should include organisations that are largely or entirely autonomous from central government funding and control, and emanate from civil society or the market economy or from ‘political impulses’ beyond the control of the State. It also includes organisations that operate as, or participate in networks that extend the boundaries of two or more states, thus engaging in transnational relations, linking political systems, economies and societies. Finally, it includes organisations that seek to affect political outcomes either within one or more states or within international institutions. Arat (2006) offers an indicative list of the sorts of organisations that may constitute non-state actors. This includes: organised opposition to government, some of which may be engaged in armed struggle; private enterprises engaged in trade, finance, manufacturing and service provision; professional, business and labour organisations; aid and development organisations; the media; religious institutions and organisations; people’s tribunals; and less formal groups such as families, ad hoc and spontaneous groups, religious, ethnic and neighbourhood communities, street gangs and underground organisations such as the mafia, mercenaries and militia groups. This clearly is a capacious list and points to a central difficulty with the concept of non-state actor, insofar as it is defined in terms of what it is not – the State – rather than what it is.
Non-State Actors in the Middle East

However the concept is understood, it is a truism that, since 2011, non-state actors have assumed increasing significance in social and political life across the Middle East. Indeed, they played a crucial role in movements that brought about the demise of autocratic governments in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. In Tunisia, the uprising against the regime of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was initiated by youth protesters. However, it gained traction when the anti-regime movement was bolstered by the support of the trade union federation, the UGTT (Tunisian General Labour Union), the Bar Association, legal as well as illegal political parties and, finally, the Islamists of Al-Nahda – the Islamic movement that had been banned by the old regime. In Egypt, the early days of the protest movement were driven by young people mobilising online, in particular, the April 6 Movement and the supporters of the ‘We are all Khaled Said’ Facebook page. But, it was when the independent youth movements were joined by non-state actors, in the form of labour activists, and the youth wings of political parties of all ideological orientations, secular as well as Islamist, that the demise of the Mubarak regime became inevitable. In Libya, the February 17 anti-Gaddafi movement was quickly joined by business interests, tribal groups, Islamists and others. This cross-ideological coalition, together with the intervention of external actors in support of the anti-regime rebels spelled the end of the Gaddafi era in Libyan political life. Similarly, the fall of the Saleh regime in Yemen became inevitable, at least in part, when the coalition of youth organisations that initiated anti-regime protests was joined by a diverse array of political parties as well as non-state actors in both the north and the south of the country, seeking greater autonomy (if not independence) from the regime in Sanaa. The period since the uprisings has seen a large increase in the numbers of civil society organisations. According to one estimate, 5,000 new civil society organisations have been established in Tunisia in the past four years while 3,000 new organisations emerged in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi.

Violent Non-State Actors in the Middle East

Within the broader category of non-state actors, the emergence of a range of armed groups across the Middle East has attracted great concern and international attention. The phenomenon of violent non-state actors is global in scope and by no means limited to the Middle East. Armed actors that are not formally linked to the State threaten security in different settings around the world. As with non-state actors, the category of violent non-state actor is also broad. Violent challengers to the State’s monopoly on the use of force can take many different forms, including tribal and ethnic groups, warlords, drug traffickers, youth gangs, terrorists, militias, insurgents and transnational terrorist organisations. Nor are their concerns always primarily political or directed towards the state level. Many are motivated less by ideology than by profit-seeking, while others are driven by local concerns. Examples include armed drug lords in Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and elsewhere, international smuggling rings, mafia-type organisations, community-based vigilantes and private security forces that have emerged in both politically stable and unstable countries. In the Arab world, the social and political conditions which followed the uprisings of 2011 have provided the setting for the emergence of an array of armed non-state actors in several states.

Libya

The fall of the Gaddafi regime in Libya saw the emergence of a host of armed militias. Initial estimates of their numbers varied from 100 to 300 such groups with some 125,000 individuals under arms. By 2014, it was believed that up to 1,600 militia groups existed. These are regionally based and comprise Islamist and non-Islamist actors. The most significant are in Zintan, Tripoli, Misrata and Benghazi. Since 2012, militias or coalitions of militias have become increasingly politicised through affiliations with the major political parties in the country. These affiliations draw on kinship, regional, tribal, as well as religious and ideological linkages. A significant number of armed groups have been incorporated into two larger coalitions – the Libya Shield Force and the Supreme Security Committee, both of which were established as transitional security forces under the authority of the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of the Interior respectively. However, the militias retain a high degree of autonomy and pursue their own agendas. They range from ideological and po-
itical to local, individualistic and sometimes criminal. The situation is exacerbated by the weakness of the national army which was deliberately neglected under the old regime. The militias have also been drawn into the ongoing conflict in Libya between the Islamist-dominated General National Congress based in Tripoli and the House of Representatives based in Tobruk, each of which in turn draw on regional and international support.

Yemen

In Yemen, for much of the past fifteen years, international attention focused on the violent Sunni radicals of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Al-Qaeda first attracted the concern of international observers when it launched an attack on the USS Cole in Aden harbour in 2000, killing 17 US servicemen. Many believe that former President Saleh stoked the jihadist threat in order to secure military and financial support from the US – he was widely suspected of complicity in the escape from prison in 2006 of a number of convicted terrorists. In 2012, a group linked with AQAP took advantage of the security vacuum that followed the fall of the Saleh regime to expand the territory under its control in the Abyan and Shabwa provinces.

It was when the independent youth movements were joined by non-state actors, in the form of labour activists, and the youth wings of political parties of all ideological orientations, secular as well as Islamist, that the demise of the Mubarak regime became inevitable.

More recently, attention has shifted from AQAP to another Yemeni non-state actor, the Houthi movement, a Shia Zaydi group which over a six month period advanced from its stronghold in the north of the country to seize control of the capital Sanaa in September 2014. This prompted a Saudi-led intervention which had as its objective the restoration of political settlement put in place by the Gulf Cooperation Council when former President Ali Abdullah Saleh finally resigned his office in November 2011.

In the intervening period, at least 2,600 people have lost their lives while, according to UN estimates, at least six million Yemenis are slipping into severe hunger.

The Houthi movement began in the Saada province in 2004 when anti-government demonstrations and disturbances by members of a group known as the Zaydi Believing Youth (Shabab al-Mumin) movement spread to Sanaa with protesters criticising the regime for its cooperation with the United States in counterterrorism. When the government tried to arrest the leader of the movement, Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, fighting broke out. Since 2004, there have been six bouts of fighting with the loss of several thousand lives (including that of al-Houthi) and very significant internal displacement of the population. Despite several ceasefires – the most recent was reached in February 2010 – the government did little to address the underlying causes of the violence which were then transformed from locally driven concerns of marginalisation and economic underdevelopment to widespread anger and dissatisfaction with the regime.

Iraq

ISIS first came to attention in December of 2013 when it seized control of Fallujah and Ramadi, two major cities in the Anbar province of Iraq in the west of the country. Nearly all of Anbar’s population is Sunni Muslim in a country whose government has been dominated by representatives of its Shia majority since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), as it was then known, had its origins in Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which in turn was a direct response to the US invasion. AQI had its stronghold in Anbar but by 2008 had alienated many because of its extreme violence. The resulting backlash and the US-supported ‘surge’ largely eliminated the influence of AQI. However, under the leadership of Abu-Bakr al-Baghdadi, the group entered the conflict in neighbouring Syria, where it established a presence in several Syrian governorates. In April of 2013, the group became the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Finally, having extended its control over a substantial area straddling Syria and Iraq, the group declared a global Islamic caliphate and renamed itself the ‘Islamic State’ (it is still commonly referred to as ISIS).
As with violent non-state actors elsewhere in the region, the emergence of IS is inextricably connected to the problem of state legitimacy in Iraq. The dramatic territorial expansion of IS is linked to the failings of the Iraqi state since the US invasion of 2003 and especially the sectarian approach pursued by Nouri al-Maliki, Prime Minister of the country from 2006 to 2014. Maliki, a leading figure in the Shia Dawa party, systematically alienated political opinion in the country, in particular the Sunni minority that had dominated public life since Iraqi independence in 1932. After taking office, Maliki oversaw a system characterised by the systematic exclusion and harassment of Sunnis, the emergence of shadowy Shia militias suspected of murder, the politicisation and corruption of the judiciary and the security services, and a military apparatus in which battle commands were reportedly for sale to the highest bidder. The inability of Maliki to transcend the mistrust of Iraq’s Sunni minority characterised his time in office, during almost all of which he enjoyed the support, however grudging it may have been, of both the US and Iran, the most significant power-brokers in the country. The alienation of Sunnis and other Iraqis has created fertile ground for the expansion of radical opposition to central government in Baghdad.

The dramatic territorial expansion of IS is linked to the failings of the Iraqi state since the US invasion of 2003 and especially the sectarian approach pursued by Nouri al-Maliki, Prime Minister of the country.

However, ISIS is not the only non-state actor that is active in Iraq. Indeed, the expansion of the group has provoked the emergence (or re-emergence) of others seeking to repel its further expansion and to expel it from territory already under its control. Non-state anti-ISIS forces include Dwekh Nawsha, an armed Assyrian Christian group established in 2014 and the Sinjar Resistance Units (SRU), a Yazidi militia which emerged in response to the takeover by ISIS of the Sinjar province, the Yazidi heartland in Iraq. The SRU, in turn, have been supported and trained by the Kurdish People’s Party (PKK). Shia militias, backed by Iran, have also been prominent in fighting against ISIS. However, some have been accused of war crimes and human rights abuses against the Sunni population. Amongst other things, this risks deepening the alienation of Iraqi Sunnis which provides increasingly fertile ground for ISIS support.

Syria

The conflict that developed in Syria after the violent suppression of the initial protests against the regime of Bashar al-Assad quickly morphed into a widespread and multi-layered insurgency. The conflict between the Syrian regime and anti-regime non-state actors has cost at least 200,000 lives to date. Three million people are estimated to have fled to neighbouring countries while a further 6.5 million are internally displaced (out of a total population of 22 million).

According to US intelligence reports, by February 2014, there were between 75,000 and 115,000 anti-regime insurgents organised in 1,500 armed groups of widely varying political orientations. Although many within the opposition to the regime share antipathy towards the brutality of the regime and of ISIS, there remain significant divisions over tactics, strategy and long-term goals. Anti-regime non-state actors in Syria, as elsewhere include Islamist and non-Islamist elements while there are significant divisions within the Islamist camp between those who oppose the violent extremism of ISIS and other militias such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.

ISIS controls large areas of the north east of the country as well as some areas on the borders with Turkey and Iraq. In 2014, it was estimated that ISIS, Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham had 26,000 members, including 12,000 foreign fighters, of whom 1,000 were Europeans and 100 were US citizens. In late 2013, a number of Islamist militias set up the Islamic Front and moved to evict ISIS from areas of Syria under its control. The Islamic Front has less clear-cut relations with Jabhat al-Nusra, with which it has cooperated on some occasions, while engaging in conflict on others.

Also ranged against the regime is the Free Syria Army (FSA), which was formed in August 2011 by army defectors who sought the removal of the Assad
regime. The FSA consists of a number of disparate armed groups – some secular and some Islamist in orientation. However, it is not a unified, cohesive fighting force although several attempts have been made for it to become as such.

**Conclusion**

The emergence of violent non-state actors in the Middle East in recent years is correlated with the growing weakness of many states in the region. States with low levels of legitimacy are unable to maintain the loyalty of many within their populations. When such states resort to repression they typically provoke opposition. Similarly, when states exclude significant elements of their populations through neglect, lack of capacity or some other form of discrimination, they can create the conditions within which violent non-state actors emerge. Where the State fails to provide security or other basic services, violent non-state actors can move in to provide alternative governance, services and collective goods thus increasing their own legitimacy in the process. The weakness of central state institutions in Libya and Yemen together with the exclusionary and repressive practices of the State in Iraq and Syria have combined with other factors to prompt the emergence of an array of violent non-state actors that pose significant threat to domestic and regional security. However, the structural context from which violent non-state actors emerge make appropriate policy responses, on both the domestic and international levels more difficult to construct. Ad hoc military strategies can address the problem of violent non-state actors in the immediate term. They cannot, however, resolve the problems of weak state legitimacy and capacity or the absence of effective state institutions, which often constitute the backdrop against which such actors emerge. The situation is further complicated by a paradoxical aspect of the nature of non-state actors in the Middle East. As is the case, elsewhere, when non-state actors take up arms against regimes in some states, quite often they do so with the support of others. To this extent, the ‘non-state’ component of those actors may be quite diluted. This has already been visible for some time in the cases of Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon. Each of these non-state actors has enjoyed the support of Syria and, especially, Iran while retaining significant autonomy over their behaviour. Likewise, the conflicts in Syria, Libya, Iraq and Yemen have drawn an array of regional actors into the fray in support of one involved group or another. The UAE and Qatar have backed conflicting sides in Libya. Saudi Arabia, several Gulf states, Turkey and Iran have all been associated with different armed groups in the Syrian conflict. Iran supports Shia militias fighting ISIS in Iraq and supports the Houthis in Yemen in the face of Saudi opposition. Thus the problem of violent non-state actors in the Middle East requires solutions that are located not merely at the local level but also at the broader geopolitical levels. Ad-hoc responses that target these groups without addressing the structural conditions that promote their emergence are unlikely to have any long-term prospects for success.

**References**


After the international intervention in 2011, Libya has hardly made it to the front pages of the European media. It came back on the radar in the winter and spring of 2015 because of the rise of the Islamic State and the migration crisis.

To be fair, Libya’s issues are complex and difficult to resolve, which keeps policy-makers at a distance. In the coming years, it will be hard for Europeans to ignore events in Libya because of its proximity to Europe and the intensity of the crisis.

Was Libya Another Failed Western Intervention?

In order to understand the current state of affairs in Libya, it is worth exploring what has happened in the country since 15 February 2011, when the Libyan version of the Arab uprisings began (although in Libya, this is remembered as the ‘17 February revolution’ because of the date the revolt was planned to start). Not all those who revolted at that time were seeking to overthrow the regime. In the previous years, Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam had given the impression of being a reformer, but slashed all hopes of incremental change when he spoke on television the night of 20 February to announce that “[the regime] will fight to the last minute, until the last bullet.” The revolt had already turned violent and was mostly conducted by local military councils, loosely coordinated by the National Transitional Council (NTC) that acted mainly as an interface with the outside world. Since the beginning, the ‘revolution’ had two souls: the local councils, largely made up of young fighters, and various Islamist groups; the regime defectors. Both actors enjoyed regional backing, particularly from Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Few Arab rulers had ever been fans of Gaddafi, a regional troublemaker and an outlier even after he appeased with the West in the early 2000s. It came as little surprise when the Arab League endorsed and cooperated with NATO’s ‘Operation Unified Protector,’ which imposed a no-fly zone on the country, ostensibly to protect the civilian population against a potential massacre by the dictator. In fact, the Arab partners of the military mission in particular made no mystery of their intention to overthrow the regime. This took a few months more than expected: Tripoli fell on 20 August and Gaddafi was eventually killed two months later.

Meanwhile, divisions among the revolutionaries had emerged on the future of the country, with the more Islamist current looking for a more decisive rupture and the defectors focusing on the continuity of state functions. This rift would ultimately grow in the wake of the regime’s collapse, when the post-Gaddafi leadership had to decide on the country’s direction. In the aftermath of ‘liberation,’ crucial decisions were taken on the issue of security, the consequences of which can still be seen today. The security apparatus of the old regime melted away. The NTC refused to ask NATO and the Arab League to offer security in its place and instead opted for the integration of the various revolutionary militias into the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence. This meant providing them with a government salary instead of disbanding them. Their ranks inevitably swelled and their brigades were included in the new hybrid security system as they were, preserving loyalties and chains of command.
Ultimately, these militias became the kingmakers of the Libyan transition, putting pressure (often physical pressure) on politicians in order to further their interests. Particularly in Benghazi and Derna, dozens of political assassinations targeted supposed or real members of the old regime. The ‘revolutionaries,’ as the militiamen defined themselves, had an uneasy relationship with what was left of the national army, which Gaddafi had always kept at a minimum in order to avoid a coup d’état. Officers from the army, who had defected to the revolution, felt marginalised by the new leadership and were physically targeted by the militias. It is from within these ranks that retired General Khalifa Haftar would emerge in 2014 to oppose all ‘Islamists’ and effectively start a new civil war.

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Before that, two major domestic developments defined the course of the Libyan transition. First, elections were held in July 2012 with a high turnout and relatively few security incidents. This was due also to a deal struck by the revolutionary government in Tripoli with the ‘federalists’ in eastern Libya, by which they would refrain from disrupting the elections in exchange for an amendment to the constitutional roadmap: the constituent assembly would no longer be appointed by the Parliament (like in Tunisia or Egypt) but instead would be elected with an equal number of representatives for each of Libya’s three main regions, despite their different populations. This agreement set a precedent: as long as a group could threaten violence and physical aggression, it could hope to force the central government into a decision.

The example would be followed with the second domestic development a year later. As in Tunisia, the Libyan post-revolutionary leadership had been struggling for some time over the lustration law that excluded members of the old regime from public office. On 5 May 2013, after being physically besieged by militias, the Libyan Parliament (the General National Congress, GNC) approved the Political Isolation Law. This bill excluded from public office and civil service all those who had served in the Libyan government even for a limited time during the 42 years of the Gaddafi regime.

Under this provision, the Parliament Speaker and acting Head of State Mohamed Magariaf was removed, along with Mahmoud Jibril, the leader of the country’s biggest party, the National Forces Alliance. Since this occurred after the GNC was physically held under sieged and threatened, those who were excluded saw the move as a de facto coup d’état, carried out by armed groups on the government payroll. It would further entrench the division between the two souls of the revolution, while giving the impression to the anti-Islamists that this was a manoeuvre by the Islamists to wrestle control from Parliament. In fact, the GNC had been elected under a mixed system: 80 of the 200 members had been selected from party lists while the remaining 120 MPs were elected as individuals. Members of the anti-Islamist National Forces Alliance had prevailed in the party-list voting but most of the individual members were of Islamist leanings. The Political Isolation Law could therefore be perceived as a move by the Islamist camp to marginalise the anti-Islamists. The coup d’état in Egypt just four months later sent shockwaves in the opposite direction. The Islamist camp, which was much more widespread in Libya than the small party expression of the Muslim Brotherhood, started to fear that what had happened next door in Cairo could well take place in Tripoli: members of the army previously loyal to the old regime would marginalise and physically eliminate the followers of the different strands of political Islam. Thus, the now Islamist-dominated GNC started to retrench while the anti-Islamist camp demanded new elections. Meanwhile, the country’s oil production came to an almost complete standstill after the summer of 2013 due to a series of blockades in oil ports and fields.

On 14 February 2014, amid a state of growing institutional and security chaos, retired army General Khalifa Haftar read a statement on TV announcing a coup d’état and the removal of the GNC. Haftar was an officer from Gaddafi’s army who had defected from the regime in 2011 like many of his colleagues. He soon learned that Libya was different from Egypt and the army could do little by itself. He came back...
a few months later, in mid-May, with a much broader coalition called ‘Operation Dignity,’ which included parts of the old army, the militias from the city of Zintan in the West of Libya and the federalists of Cyrenaica. Dignity and Haftar enjoyed the support of certain tribes, particularly in eastern Libya. This time he started from Benghazi, where the wave of political assassinations and attacks carried out by the terrorist group Ansar al-Sharia had created a consensus for his policy of eliminating all Islamists. Although initially successful, Haftar’s lumping together of all Islamists effectively created a coalition against him. By the beginning of the summer, an alternative camp had formed, which included not only more Islamist-leaning militias and Ansar al-Sharia but also the militias from the city of Misrata (a considerable part of those integrated in the government forces) and armed groups from other parts of western Libya. This coalition called itself ‘Libya Dawn.’ In the meantime, the GNC was finally dissolved and elections hastily called for 25 June, just days before the beginning of Ramadan. Registration was low both because of a lack of confidence in the political process and for security reasons. The UN Special Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) tried to broker a national unity deal before election day, but distrust between the parties had grown to intolerable levels. In the end, polls could not be held in parts of the country and turnout stood at around a fifth of eligible voters. Violence erupted soon after, with Libya Dawn attacking Tripoli and the caretaker government of Abdullah al-Thinni fleeing the capital towards Beida in the east, where the Constitutional Drafting Assembly elected in February had been working. This was the beginning of a second Libyan civil war, another step in the free fall of what was left of the Libyan State.

Libya Now, Who Is Fighting Who

Today, Libya is usually presented as a ‘Somalia on the Mediterranean,’ a failed state and a haven for terrorists just 350 km away from Italy and Malta. Yet, it is much more than that. Before 2011, oil and gas from Libya was an important resource for many European Mediterranean countries, with companies such as ENI, Total and Repsol heavily investing in the country. The Libyan sovereign wealth fund has real estate in many European cities and owns shares in some major European companies such as Unicredit bank. Another difference from Somalia is that Libya is traditionally not a country of emigration but rather a country of transit and destination. Until the fall of Gaddafi, 1.7 million migrants lived and worked there. In 2014 alone, 170,000 migrants and asylum seekers reached Europe from Libya by sea. Ultimately, Libya’s fate is far more interconnected with Europe than Somalia’s has ever been, and not just because of its geographical proximity.

This is why the current condition of the country is a source of major concern for European policy-makers and the time allocated to this nation in EU summits has significantly increased, with discussions on the deployment of a CSDP mission that would be unthinkable in other areas of the Middle East and North Africa.

In fact, the Tobruk Parliament and the Beida government are strictly associated with Operation Dignity. (Karama in Arabic) headed by the then-retired general Khalifa Haftar. For this reason, an increasing number of MPs boycotted the chamber until attendance fell to just above the absolute majority of members – and then, more recently, well below that.

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the armed forces in March 2015. This officially marked the merger between the Tobruk/Beida government and Operation Dignity, effectively demonstrating how the former was just the political branch of the latter rather than a representative of all Libyan political currents as one would expect from the internationally-recognised legislature.

Located almost a thousand kilometres from Tripoli, those in charge in Beida and Tobruk have little control over the real government structure: the ministries, the government agencies and above all the National Oil Company (NOC) and the Central Bank. These two institutions are respectively in charge of contracts with oil companies and the receipt of oil payments. The Central Bank of Libya then uses the oil revenues to pay salaries and subsidies for all civil servants, including those fighting for Haftar and most of the militias fighting against him.

The independence of Libya's economic institutions has been one of the main tenets of the work of Bernardino Leon, the UN Special envoy for Libya, who argued that Libya’s money should not have been controlled by any of the warring factions. Nevertheless, the Tobruk/Beida government has made several attempts first to fire the heads of these institutions and then, after they refused to step down, to divert oil payments into newly created parallel institutions in eastern Libya. These attempts had failed until mid-April, despite international recognition of Tobruk, because the NOC of eastern Libya does not have the minimal infrastructure to manage this business.

Despite lacking control over the government structure, the executive in Beida and the legislature in Tobruk have enjoyed most of the benefits that come with international recognition, starting with the appointment of ambassadors and representation in international bodies such as the UN or OPEC.

The second block of institutions is located in Tripoli, the capital, and has direct ties with the armed coalition Libya Dawn (Libya Fajr in Arabic). Soon after its formation, Dawn conducted an offensive on Tripoli, first destroying the international airport and then entering the capital after the militias from Zintan (allied with Haftar) had withdrawn. The political leadership of Fajr decided to resurrect the old Parliament in Tripoli, the General National Congress (GNC), arguing that there had not been a regular transfer of powers with the House of Representatives now located in Tobruk. Only a fraction of the members of the GNC took part in its meetings after September 2014. They elected a national salvation government which held even less clout with the armed factions of Dawn than the Beida government has over Dignity and Haftar's Libyan national army.

Right from the start, the Tripoli government had two goals: to acquire domestic legal legitimacy and to eventually gain international recognition instead of Tobruk. To date, it has failed on both accounts. Not a single government, not even those of Turkey and Qatar generally considered close to Dawn, has recognised the executive in Tripoli, upholding the principle of electoral legitimacy conferred to the House of Representatives in Tobruk. Moreover, Libya Dawn is in an alliance of convenience with Ansar Al-Sharia in Benghazi, though parts of Fajr actually justify this pact in ideological terms. This ambiguity has been Dawn’s major Achilles heel in terms of relations with the West. Domestically, on 6 November 2014, the constitutional court annulled the constitutional amendment that had allowed for the elections of 25 June 2014, but this verdict was recognised neither by Tobruk nor the international community.

The two armed coalitions are very loose alliances with often competing forces. What is generally referred to as the ‘Libyan National Army’ is in fact Haftar’s militia, with a high number of civilians in its ranks, ranging between 70 and 80% according to different estimates.

While there are two alternative institutional frameworks, the situation on the ground is much more fragmented with, at the time of writing, dozens of militias and at least four major front lines: the city of Benghazi; Tripoli and its surrounding area; the ‘oil crescent’ around Sirte; and the south.

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different estimates. Not all army generals agree with Haftar’s decisions which are usually taken from his war room in the eastern town of al-Marj rather than coordinated with the Tobruk/Beida government. Other elements of the Dignity coalition also pursue separate operations, such as the Zintan militias, the ‘tribal army’ around Tripoli or the Oil Facility Guards headed by Ibrahim Jadhran, which were obviously focused on oil installations.

On the other hand, Dawn is a major shareholder in the Misrata militias, although they themselves are often divided into different fiefdoms. The city of Misrata is rarely on the same page as the GNC and the militias in Tripoli and it is generally not clear if there is a chain of command in the whole Dawn coalition.

In this chaos on both sides and with state structures collapsing, a third force emerged in late 2014: the Islamic State in Libya, known locally as Tandhim ad-Dawla (Arabic for ‘the Organisation of the State’). This is the result of several converging factors. First, many Libyans had fought for ISIS in Syria as part of the Battar brigade. They started coming back to Libya in large numbers early in 2014, eventually setting up the first Tandhim cell in the eastern city of Derna, traditionally a hotbed of radicalism. After their successes in Iraq and simultaneous to the Ansar al Sharia crisis in Benghazi, they started to enjoy large-scale defections from this organisation and from other local jihadist and Islamist militias. A third component that boosted the Libyan version of IS was that it attracted many jihadists from around the region, particularly from Tunisia, Algeria and Sudan. Finally, IS benefits from mixed reactions from members of the old regime: while some are fighting in the ranks of Dignity and thus against all Islamists, other rank and file loyalists of the Gaddafi regime have shown interest in the Libyan franchise of ISIS.

In April 2015, Tandhim ad-Dawla does not enjoy the same status of its mother organisation in Syria and Iraq. It does not have control over any major town, including the city of Derna where it started in 2014. More than like an army, it acts like a criminal gang which occasionally manages to carry out murderous attacks. Nevertheless, all the components discussed above give Tandhim a relevant potential which could further develop in 2015 and 2016, particularly if Libya Dawn collapses or wanes, stirring an even higher number of defections from its Islamist elements.

**Prospects for a Political Solution**

Since early 2014, violence has continuously escalated in Libya claiming 2,825 lives last year and 656 up till 26 April 2015, according to the organisation Libya Body Count. Almost half the casualties occurred in Benghazi where the heavy fighting started in May 2014, preceded by a high number of political assassinations.

The UN has stepped up its efforts to broker a ceasefire and negotiate a national unity government, particularly after the appointment of Special Envoy Bernardino Leon, a well-known Spanish diplomat. Leon’s task became more daunting every month as a rival, unrecognised government was established in Tripoli and then a verdict by the Constitutional Chamber of the Libyan Supreme Court delegitimised the House of Representatives in Tobruk.

Usually, the challenges to reaching a negotiated settlement in Libya are ascribed to domestic factors: too many factions, too many guns and an uncompromising attitude of most of the parties. A very common explanation is also the disconnect between the politicians and the armed factions, which makes the former unable to deliver the latter.

These are all serious obstacles to a negotiated solution, which need to be taken into account together with regional dynamics: Libya is the object of the wider confrontation within the Sunni world, with different countries supporting either Tobruk or Tripoli. As for Syria, until those regional patrons start pushing for a political settlement rather than fuelling the armed confrontation, mediation efforts are unlikely to succeed.
Jihadism and Violence in the Arab World

Modalities of Jihadism in The Middle East and North Africa: Ideological and Historical Roots

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In a recent article Middle East specialist Fawaz Gerges identified three ‘waves’ of jihadist activism.1 ‘Near enemy’ jihadism, the dominant mode from the 1970s until the middle of the 1990s, consists of groups trying to topple their own governments. The second wave, ‘far enemy’ jihadism, begins with the al-Qaeda embassy bombings in 1998 and targets the United States and its allies rather than local regimes. The third wave is that of the Islamic State (ISIS), a brutally effective military organisation distinguished by effective use of propaganda, intense sectarianism, rapid acquisition of territory and the establishment of political control across state borders.

Gerges’ three waves offer a useful heuristic device for conceptualising modalities of jihadist activism. They do not follow in neat chronological order, and each wave does not fully eclipse the preceding one. But they encapsulate prevailing patterns as they have evolved over time. These patterns reflect a complex interplay between jihadist strategies, regional state policies and global political dynamics. What enables us to view these quite distinct modalities of political practice, occurring in diverse localities over a long period, as a ‘movement’ is ideology. ‘Jihadism’ as an ideological repertoire merges vocabulary and symbols of Islam as a discursive tradition with elements of the modern ideologies that shaped the 20th century politics of the Middle East.

This chapter offers some reflections on the influence of regional ideologies on modern jihadism, particularly Wahhabi and Muslim Brotherhood thought. It also demonstrates the salience of the political and socioeconomic context, as well as the role of US foreign policy, with respect to the trajectory of jihadism. The main argument of this chapter is that jihadism evolved in tandem with shifts in the political, economic and international environment in the Middle East and North Africa. As such, the ideas and strategies of jihadist groups have a contemporaneous, rather than timeless, quality.

Jihadism: Religion or Ideology?

Jihadism clearly draws on ideas familiar to Muslims and others as ‘Islamic,’ and its adherents may consider themselves to be devout Muslims. Religious conviction may motivate individuals to take extreme actions. It is possible, as some scholars have, to view jihadism in the context of an ‘Islamic’ history, to trace the evolution in the meaning and operationalisation of jihad ‘from Qur’an to bin Laden.’2 But as a way of explaining or tracing the roots of current movements, this approach diminishes the importance of modern ideologies, forged through the prism of national liberation struggles, in addition to the policies of regional states within shifting social and economic environments, and the influence of great powers, not least the United States.

Although the symbolic repertoire of Islam is clearly an important dimension of jihadism, religious language should not blind us to the influence of

regional ideologies. In the modern Middle East, in common with other populist idea systems, ideology has been distinctly ‘negativist’.\(^3\) Ba’thism, Nasserism, communism, and Islamism (not to mention Zionism) were, as they became indigenised as local nationalisms, anti- a great deal of things. They were, variously, anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, anti-monarchical, anti-Zionist, anti-communist, anti-feudalist, anti-shi’a, anti-Arab. They functioned as mechanisms of ‘othering’ in order to define external enemies and their domestic agents, and to mobilise populations against them. Most of these ideologies took shape around the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, up to the end of the Second World War, in the context of national liberation movements.

The Saudi regime has consistently sought to export its ideology in order to depoliticise Muslim populations, affirm the legitimacy of the Saudi system and maintain the stability of authoritarian regimes.

Another regional ideology that has had a pronounced impact on jihadism is Wahhabism, or Salafism, as it is manifested outside Saudi Arabia. Wahhabism was not sociologically ‘populist,’ but it served an analogous mobilisational purpose to the other modern ideologies mentioned above. Saudi Arabia was not colonised and had no meaningful ‘middle class’ driving its ideological development. This may partially explain the aversion its hegemonic ideology has toward politics. Wahhabism, the ideology of the Saudi State, refers to ideas adopted by an obscure group of Arabian religious reformists who called themselves the muwahhidun (believers in the oneness of God), and whose creed was devised by the 18th century preacher Muhammad Ibn Abdel Wahhab. It was replete with apocalyptic binaries regarding Islam’s struggle against unbelief, against perfidious Shia, Jews and Sufis.

Wahhabism underpinned the expansion of the Al Saud among the Bedouin tribes of Arabia in the 18th and early 19th centuries. It was revived at the dawn of the 20th century, with British support, to motivate tribal warriors in a renewed jihad to acquire territory controlled by the Ottoman Empire. As the movement reached the limits of its expansion and became the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism retained its mobilisational quality as an antidote to radical left-wing, and subsequently pluralist, ideologies both within the Kingdom and in the region at large. Wahhabism presents itself not as nationalism or ideology, but as ‘Islam.’ The Saudi regime has consistently sought to export its ideology in order to depolitise Muslim populations, affirm the legitimacy of the Saudi system and maintain the stability of authoritarian regimes.

If anti-political Wahhabism constitutes one important influence on contemporary jihadist ideology, another is the Islamism (or political Islam) of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB). When the MB developed its political programme in Egypt in the 1930s, Egypt occupied the intellectual centre of the Middle East. The MB borrowed from, and competed with, socialist, fascist and even liberal ideological currents, as well as Wahhabism, which the Egypt-based Islamic reformist thinker Muhammad Rashid Rida repackaged in slightly more political form as ‘Salafism.’ Whereas Wahhabism, in its statised Saudi iteration, was anti-political, the MB’s programme was oriented toward ‘inside-out’ socio-political reform: Islamise society, then the State and then the international system. For the MB ‘jihad’ was an expression of its overall mission to achieve a fully realised Islamic society in which the Muslim individual would be free to live a good and fulfilling life. Violent jihad was mandated to fight the coloniser as well as, although this divided the movement, the monarchy and social groups deemed to be agents of the coloniser.

MB ideology, although oriented toward Islamisation, had, in its scope and aspiration to universalism, strong modernist characteristics. This reflects the sensibilities of the MB’s essentially middle class support base. Its aspiration was to educate society (da’wa), reshape the nature and scope of political power (the Islamic State) and, in so doing, change the world (by restoring the Caliphate). If the ideas

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of the MB influenced later jihadist groups it was partially because they expressed the essence of modern ideology in Islamic vocabulary. In their essential meanings they were similar to those of the regimes that would come to rule the states of the Middle East.

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By the 1960s, which is when the generally acknowledged godfather of modern Jihadism, Sayyid Qutb, published his most incendiary work, MB ideology had become harder and more uncompromising. Qutb insisted that secular rulers were keeping society in a state of pre-Islamic ignorance (jahiliyya). So long as they failed to implement God’s law (shari’a) they had no right to rule. The sharpening of the Brotherhood’s message under Qutb’s leadership, particularly in relation to the regime, can be attributed to the torture that he and his comrades endured in prison. It can also be considered an expression of the dissatisfaction of excluded parts of Egyptian society. In important structural ways, Qutb’s ideas resembled Nasserist populism. As a modernist idea system that borrowed much from world ideologies on the left and right, Nasserism (as does Ba’thism) viewed society as an organic unity whose energies should be mobilised to bring about national renaissance.

Qutb’s thinking mirrored this obsession with the inherent unity of state and society. It duplicated, in Islamic vocabulary, Nasserism’s paranoia about enemies from without and agents within, its uncompromising attitude toward detractors, its hostility to pluralism, and its utopian aspirations to change the world. For Arab leftists of many stripes, revolution in Egypt would lead to Arab unity and ultimately the demise of world imperialism. Qutb’s focus beyond Egypt was, similarly, not just the ‘Muslim world’ but humanity as a whole. Jihadism is as much a creature of Gamal Abdel Nasser as it is of the MB founder Hasan al-Banna.

Near Enemy Jihadism: in the Beginning is the State

The violent Islamist groups that emerged in the Middle East and North Africa from the 1970s, Gerges’ first wave of ‘near enemy’ jihadists, incorporated Qutb’s ideas to varying degrees as their manifestos. The main preoccupation for these groups, which bound them together as part of a transnational Islamist movement, was the nature of the State. Even the Palestinian Hamas, whose priority was to fight the Israeli occupation, justified its existence as an Islamic resistance movement as an alternative to the secular PLO (a quasi-state), which was seen as being unable to harness the true energies of Palestinians as Muslims and thus doomed to fail as a liberating force.

For Islamist groups elsewhere it was the State that oppressed them; the State that facilitated the influx of corrupting ideas; the State that prevented the flourishing of Islam in society. In Qutb’s day the State had been ‘strong,’ identified with a popular ideology that resonated in society. For the jihadists that succeeded him from the 1970s until the 1990s, however, the post-populist State was ‘fierce,’ yet lacking in ideological legitimacy. As such it seemed more vulnerable to revolution from below.

The first state in the region to reveal this vulnerability was Iran. A range of revolutionary forces, including an increasingly powerful Islamist movement, harnessed widespread resentment against the pro-Western, oppressive, corrupt Shah’s regime. The ideology of the Islamic Revolution, as the revolutionary faction that was able to consolidate power after 1979 would name it, drew on indigenous Iranian sources, including a particular interpretation of Shi’i Islam. But it also reflected leftist and Third-Worldist ideas more generally, as synthesised by revolutionary Islamist intellectuals like Ali Shari’ati. Sayyid Qutb was also known among Iranian Islamist intellectuals. It was none other than Ali Khamenei, who would become supreme leader following Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in 1989, who translated his work into Persian. The Islamic Revolution was, at least in some ways, a jihadist revolution of the type Sayyid Qutb and his followers hoped to see.

In the late 1970s, and especially following the Islamist success in Iran, jihadists in the Arab world
and Iran saw themselves engaged in a common endeavour: to overthrow secular regimes and establish Islamic states. The sharp sectarian divide, as will be discussed below, came later. The revolution sparked hope for many social forces, and panic for regimes, across the Arab world. For the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliated or like-minded groups, the revolution provided an opportunity for them to redouble their efforts to build an Islamic social movement and pressure regimes into cultural and legal Islamisation. For jihadists, it sent a message that regimes were vulnerable and societies ripe for revolution.

State Policies and the First Wave of Jihadism

The jihadists that planned and carried out the assassination of Anwar Sadat believed Egyptian society to be on the brink of an explosion. The 1977 ‘bread riots’ expressed the level of social malaise Sadat’s open-door (infitah) economic policy had generated. But Egypt did not go the way of Iran. The regime survived with a new leader, who quietly allowed the Islamist opposition to regroup and expand. Members of the Gama’a Islamiyya, one of the groups involved in Sadat’s assassination, were released from prison and allowed to proselytise so long as they confined themselves to the distant backwaters of Upper Egypt (the Sa’id).

The Gama’a grew rapidly, leveraging remittances from labour migration in the Gulf (the export of people was a central element of Sadat’s deindustrialisation agenda) to build a network of mosques and charities. Gulf connections also led to the progressive ‘Salafisation’ of jihadism. This was manifested in social mores and dress, as well as a proactive approach to enforcing correct moral behaviour in society through Enjoining Good and Forbidding Evil, or hisba. The Wahhabi influence on jihadism would continue to grow, which helps explain the more nihilistic, anti-political direction in which jihadism was evolving.

In addition to seeking to confine jihadist activity to marginal, deprived or strategically unimportant areas far from metropolises (a strategy still employed today by the Egyptian, Yemeni, Syrian and other regimes) regimes were also happy to see jihadist activists leave the country altogether. The multilateral campaign against the Soviet Union, coterminous with the revolution in Iran, was a crucial chapter in the global Cold War. But for Arab regimes it was a welcome distraction from the Iranian Revolution and a diversion for home-grown jihadists. An epic confrontation with a superpower and standard-bearer of communism (part of Islamism’s axis of evil) in which rulers and people could unite in a common struggle would take the wind out of Khomeini’s sails. Islamists of all stripes embraced the great jihad. Regimes actively facilitated the travel of their citizens to Pakistan and Afghanistan to train, assist or fight. Networks created here formed the backbone of al-Qaeda.

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State policies played a significant role in the escalation of jihadist violence, but not in a vacuum. The importance of the regional political economy was revealed by the near-simultaneous eruption of civil conflicts in Egypt and Algeria in the early 1990s. During the previous decade the collapse in oil prices led to a contraction of the economy and massive youth unemployment. In Algeria, popular discontent toward the regime rose to such a peak that the government allowed the country’s main Islamist movement, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), more room for political manoeuvre. When, in a blatant example of political hubris, the regime cancelled elections FIS was set to win, some Islamist activists felt the time was right to confront the State head on. The result was the bloody civil war in which the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), which would evolve into al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), was born.

In Egypt, too, socioeconomic conditions played a key role in precipitating the State’s renewed confrontation with jihadism in the early 1990s. The curtailment of remittance revenues led more and more inhabitants of the Sa’id, the Gama’a’s stronghold, to migrate to cities, especially Cairo and Alexan-
dria. This brought the jihadist group rather too close to home from the regime’s perspective and toleration tipped over into confrontation. The result, albeit on a lesser scale than in Algeria, was a civil war that rumbled on until the Gama’a’s unilateral ceasefire in 1997.

To combat jihadism in the 1990s, as well as to suppress opposition of all kinds, and to help contain the social unrest caused by economic restructuring, regimes set about boosting their coercive capabilities. Egypt was particularly successful at this, channelling huge amounts of US military aid into the domestic security sector. Algeria, similarly, could draw on international assistance to boost its counterinsurgency capabilities during the civil war. Countries otherwise less affected by jihadist violence, such as Tunisia and Syria (which had, in 1982, brutally crushed its own Islamist uprising) built formidable police states to stymie even non-violent opposition. To attract foreign support, regimes pointed out the jihadists’ virulently anti-Western and anti-Zionist ideologies, conveniently neglecting to acknowledge that they had articulated and encouraged such sentiments themselves.

In addition to rallying troops for an apocalyptic jihad against communism (which, along with Zionism, was considered to be part of a Jewish conspiracy against Islam), Saudi and other religious figures drew on the anti-Shi'i repertoire of Wahhabism to denigrate the revolution in Iran. They were successful in rewriting the revolution as a specifically Shi'i event, one which could not be repeated in the Sunni world, and which must be vigorously contained as an existential threat to Sunni Islam. It is important to place this sectarianism, which with the rise of ISIS has become one of the most salient features of ‘third wave’ jihadism, in its correct historical context. There is nothing timeless or inevitable about it. Hostility toward the Shi’a became a part of regional political discourse largely thanks to Saudi influence. The foregrounding of sectarianism in contemporary jihadism says nothing about the intolerance of Islam and everything about the influence of Wahhabism, whose identification with the oil-rich Saudi regime elevated it from marginal cult to regional and global prominence.

The Far Enemy

The 11 September 2001 attacks confirmed the shift in jihadist strategy – from attacking regimes to targeting the United States – that had been inaugurated via the embassy bombing in Tanzania and Kenya three years earlier. The operation divided the jihadist community, with many (probably most) decrying it as a strategic miscalculation. Opponents, including those ‘near enemy’ jihadis that were trying to make peace with their regimes (as in Egypt and Libya), feared the inevitable crackdowns that, with international blessing, would ensue. They were also dismayed at the outpouring of international sympathy for the United States, including from within their own target populations (despite what tendentious Western coverage of cheering Arab crowds suggested) that the attacks aroused. This would make it yet harder to drum up support for their cause.4

The crusading West was, of course, a permanent member of the Islamist axis of evil. Intellectually the shift was rationalised as striking at the ‘head of the snake,’ to weaken backers of the near enemies, the infidel regimes. Strategically the plan was to provoke US retaliation, which would further tarnish its image, and that of its client regimes, in the region. It would lure the US into the same Afghan trap that had ensnared the USSR and exhaust public support for propping up (infidel) authoritarian regimes.

The United States took the bait, and unknowingly helped set the stage for phase three of jihadism. The US responded in three consequential ways to meet al-Qaeda’s expectations. The first was to invade Afghanistan and, two years later, Iraq, in supposed retaliation for the 9/11 attacks. The second was to launch the catch-all ‘war on terror,’ which was couched as a ‘with us or against us’ struggle against jihadism. In a kind of updated Eisenhower doctrine, support was extended to any regime trying to battle a loosely defined ‘terrorism.’ The third response was the so-called Freedom Agenda, an attempt to supplement the hard power of military invasion with the soft power of democracy promotion.

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The invasion of Iraq created a focal point for jihadist fighters, placed formerly dominant Sunni elites in a subordinate position vis-à-vis an ascendant, as well as overtly sectarian, Shi‘i elite, and weakened the central State’s ability to assert its authority over the country. This established the perfect conditions for the rise of ISIS out of the ashes of al-Qaeda in Iraq, a decade after the invasion. The War on Terror, meanwhile, further augmented the coercive resources of the region’s ‘fierce’ states. Redoubled repression, with unprecedented international blessing, combined with deepening socioeconomic problems to increase popular discontent. The Freedom Agenda, for its part, had the unintended consequences of sharpening Arab resentment against the United States for its hypocrisy. The renewed debate on the region’s democratic deficit, however, contributed to the politicisation of Arab populations in the 2000s. Pro-democracy activism dovetailed with opposition to the Iraq war, solidarity with the Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation and labour activism.

The Third Wave

The US response to 9/11, in other words, helped create the conditions that led to the Arab uprisings of 2010-2011: increasingly fierce regimes, protests and resentment against the complicity of regional states in US bellicosity. Although the uprisings seemed initially to discredit jihadism, their militarisation in Libya, Yemen and of course Syria, brought jihadism to the forefront of political life. A new generation of fighters was brought into an expanding jihadist orbit, helped or facilitated by donors and supporters in the Gulf.

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ISIS has, however, reversed the Muslim Brotherhood order of business. Whereas the MB strategy was inside-out (from individual to society, to the State and the Caliphate) ISIS is outside-in. In June 2014, ISIS announced the formation of the Caliphate, customarily the endpoint for Islamists. It was derided across the Muslim world for such a cart-before-the-horse approach. The Caliphate has survived, however, and continued to expand as ISIS takes more and more territory and secures the allegiance of more and more ‘wilayas,’ or provinces, throughout the region.

ISIS’ preoccupation is not so much with toppling regimes as it is with setting up its own state on whatever territory it can acquire. This is not, however, a completely novel orientation for non-state actors in the region. More than anything it resembles the expansion of the Wahhabi movement itself in its methods, ambitions and claims to represent all of Islam. But the scale is unprecedented in the post-inde-
dependence period. Jihadist groups have tried to formalise political authority on a smaller scale: the Gama’a Islamiyya, for example, set up a short-lived ‘emirate’ in the Cairo suburb of Imbaba, as did the GIA in Algeria. This replicated, to some extent, existing self-help practices of those living on the margins of urban society.

For ISIS the struggle against the ‘rafida,’ as Shia are derogatorily termed, exceeds in importance and urgency that against the Jews in Palestine or the crusading West.

ISIS’ strategy also resembles that of Fatah and the PLO in seeking a state in territories occupied in 1967, rather than waiting for the total liberation of Palestine. The theory was that such a state could then serve as a base of resistance and focus for Palestinians around the world. Closer still, given that many ISIS fighters and supporters lack all but a religious connection with Syria, is the example of Zionism, which established a state with ambiguous borders as a home for the world’s Jewry. And it is not even so different to current al-Qaeda practice. In order to benefit from the new opportunities afforded by the Arab uprisings, al-Qaeda has encouraged the proliferation of Ansar al-Shari’a groups, which seek through morality policing, charity and preaching to ‘prepare the ground’ and structure grassroots support for al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda is adapting to the realities of the third phase of jihadism.

**A Road not Taken?**

In 2011 a leader of the Gama’a Islamiyya quipped that if al-Qaeda were allowed to operate in Egypt they would form a political party. The uprising in Egypt, the Arab world’s most populous country and the epicentre of political Islam, had yielded a huge dividend to Islamists of all stripes, including the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafis and the post-revisionist jihadists of the Gama’a Islamiyya and Jihad organisations. Each of these trends established political parties and fielded candidates in elections. Salafis and jihadis wielded unprecedented influence on mainstream politics, hoping to hold the Muslim Brotherhood to its ostensible commitment to implement shari’a.

The militarisation of uprisings in Syria, Libya, and Yemen, as well as the harsh clampdown on all Islamist activity that has occurred in General al-Sisi’s Egypt, have precluded any such jihadist moderation in the Middle East today. The future of jihadism is uncertain, but the curtain is unlikely to come down on Islamist militancy anytime soon. What the history of jihadism has shown, however, is that the trajectory of jihadism has not been inevitable. Contemporary political and ideological dynamics affect its evolution as much, if not more, than ideas inherited from an Islamic past. Jihadism has been no aberration, but rather a central player in modern Middle Eastern history.
The years go by and the counter continues to register an increasing number of casualties, wounded, displaced people and refugees. Statements with good intentions by the so-called ‘international community’ are accumulating. Initiatives are multiplying as well. Is a pacific revolution turned armed confrontation finally giving way to the monster embodied by the Islamic State? Is this enough, as the international attitude seems to indicate, to forget the roots of the problem? To turn the page of the peoples and rally to the dictators?

A Forest of Concepts

Defining what is happening in Syria seems itself to provide an occasion for disagreement. Is it a revolution? A protest movement? A sectarian conflict? An armed crisis? Civil war? Something else? Every political analysis dealing with events in this country adopts one of these concepts in order to support an argument or a commitment. In reality, the Syrian slaughter, ‘in and of itself,’ can be associated with all of these concepts without a problem. And even more can be added. The Syrians are beginning their fifth year of insecurity, uncertainty, terror, hope, disappointment, exodus and death. Millions have embarked on the road of national and international exodus, leaving a land devastated by relentless bombing carried out with all sorts of conventional and non-conventional weapons, by a dying regime whose survival is scrupulously maintained by a few acknowledged allies and many camouflaged ones. And all the while international solidarity is missing and universal conscience lies dormant.

At the onset of the Syrian revolution in March 2011, when the regime suppressed pacific protests with machine-gun fire, generating hundreds of casualties, it was rather obvious to observe that the mere mention of a number in the hundreds sufficed to shock public opinion on any platform where debate was being held on Syria. Recognised observers claimed without a shadow of a doubt that such slaughter, relatively ‘moderate,’ could not continue. Clearly, and knowing the nature of the Syrian political system and its combination of complexity and opaqueness, serious specialists on the issue did not doubt for an instant that the atrocities would stop following an epiphany by the ‘securocratic’ leadership. Possibly somewhat naïvely, they expected the so-called ‘international community’ – which in the 2000s had devised the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (RTP), i.e. the responsibility to protect civilians – to take a stand.

Selectiveness or Fatigue?

RTP, one of many concepts that have been but a pretext – with rare exceptions – to intervene where economic and strategic interests seem seriously threatened. The death of thousands of Syrians, however, has gone unheeded in the black boxes of the political and human consciences of the world’s ‘masters.’ It is cynically amusing to count the number of times the leaders of countries of the ‘free world’ have expressed their ‘concern’ regarding the human catastrophe taking place in Syria. The disappointment of the Syrian people, verging on disgust, was palpable.

Salam Kawakibi
Deputy Director and Director of Research, Arab Reform Initiative (ARI), Paris
upon viewing dozens of conferences gathering what Syrians call the country’s ‘false friends.’

Insofar as international hypocrisy as seen by the victims, ‘Nobel Peace Laureate’ Barack Obama takes the prize for his famous statements concerning ‘red lines’ in the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government. The Syrian regime has indeed used them, and they have certainly proven their ‘efficacy’ by killing hundreds of civilians in Damascus suburbs in August 2013. The international reaction, inspired by the American position: outcry, condemnation and concern!

Two main reasons have been advanced: the first is fatigue, mainly American, from foreign intervention after the Afghanistan and Iraq adventures. The second reason / pretext was fragmentation of the Syrian opposition forces.

Numerous studies have been drawn up to justify the moral void preventing political action vis-à-vis the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria. Two main reasons have been advanced: the first is fatigue, mainly American, from foreign intervention after the Afghanistan and Iraq adventures. The second reason / pretext was fragmentation of the Syrian opposition forces. Nonetheless, humanitarian action attempts to fill the void left by the non-existence of political action and save face for world leaders. Colossal figures have been announced without details of their allocation. Efforts remain limited, the victims of numerous constraints. Insofar as UN agencies, they have no mandate to work with non-state institutions and thus prefer to work with the regime in power. Hence, their aid is distributed in government-controlled areas, which are by no means those most affected by the slaughter and its repercussions.

Inevitable Radicalism?

The growing frustration of a large part of the population in the face of international indifference has opened the doors to a massive militarisation of the protest movement. In addition to the soldiers having decided to defect from the loyalist army in order to preserve human lives and stop killing their fellow countrymen, civilians have also taken up arms for various reasons: to defend their families and their towns and avenge their loved ones who were victims of indiscriminate abuse.

This militarisation has not been accompanied by the necessary, effective political framework. Its massive expansion has permitted regional powers to influence armed groups without allowing the latter to attain their initial goal: defending civilians and establishing rule of law for all citizens.

The Real ‘Friends’ of Power

Russia and Iran’s unconditional diplomatic and military support for the Syrian regime maintains the continuity of the slaughter. With regard to Russia, this support has been above all accompanied by an ‘effective’ method that was used in Chechnya and got results: massive, indiscriminate bombing of civilian towns and rebel positions with TNT barrel bombs and ballistic missiles. The results: the capital city of Grozny was erased from the map while Moscow’s ‘jackbooted power’ was preserved. Syrian cities have been entirely or partially destroyed following this school.

The past few years have also seen direct, effective Iranian engagement. By subcontracting human military involvement to ‘mercenary’ Lebanese, Iraqi and Afghan militia, Iran has effectively aided the Syrian regime, deploying these mercenaries on the fronts to counter the shortage of manpower in the government’s loyalist army. In addition, billions have been invested by Teheran in the Syrian war machine, despite Iran’s catastrophic economic situation.

The reasons advanced for Russian involvement revolve around its general confrontation with the West since the collapse of the Soviet Union in areas of strategic influence and has nothing whatsoever to do with the imagined place Damascus occupies in the ‘hearts’ of the masters of the Kremlin. For Iran, strategic interests are combined with a (political-confessional) ambition of regional scope, together with the possibility of retaining effective instruments of negotiation with Western ‘friends / enemies’. And finally, the desire to safeguard Iranian diplomacy’s armed branch in the region – Hizb Allah (the Party of God) – until it completes its mission.
Like Russia and Iran, allies to the regime, not all the countries involved in arming the rebel groups in Syria adhere to democratic values. With the exception of Turkey, which has a democratic system, albeit questionable, democracy is missing in the Gulf States claiming to support the Syrian revolution. Support thus remains relative on all levels. Moreover, it is riddled with conditions, ranging from demands for ideological allegiance, often tending towards extremism, to political manoeuvring on the regional chessboard.

For their part, Western forces, with the relative exception of France, do not cease to produce ‘beautiful’ speeches without, however, undertaking any real action in the diplomatic sphere, let alone in the humanitarian one.

The abandonment felt by the majority of Syrians has sent a good number of them to the ranks of the most radical groups among the rebels, not to mention the terrorist organisation, Daesh. It is therefore rather regrettable, if not ignoble, to hear recognised observers say that the Syrian revolution has been dominated by Islamists from early on.

The regime realised the benefits it could reap from the rise of radicalism by stoking the fires of ignorance and obscurantism. Everything was thus done by the regime or its regional ‘enemies’ to ensure that radicalism would pervade the arena. And with international neglect, the circle is complete.

Must We Choose Between a Rock and a Hard Place?

In the West, with Daesh’s astonishing advance on the ground, the discourse according to which the Bashar al-Assad regime would be the lesser evil is on the rise today. Among entire sectors of opinion, the Damascus dictator passes as the last bastion protecting minorities in general and the endangered Christian minority in particular.

This perception arises from a strategy that gets results; that of a regime that has always known how to skilfully play the cards of the divisions between the various components of Syrian society and use religion for purposes of domination. Far from protecting minorities, the regime has chained them to its own fate. In a society where freedom of expression is lacking and civic rights do not exist, leaders began by using all the pieces to create a religious hierarchy – both Christian and Muslim – that is under their thumb. The appointment of muftis and bishops was subject to approval by the all-powerful Syrian intelligence services.

Westerners are fixed on Daesh, on the one hand, and on Christian persecution on the other. Christians are indeed in danger, but no more than the rest of the population. By lending excessive media exposure to their persecution, they are separated from the other victims, contributing to reinforcing the feeling that they are set apart and constitute a privileged caste. In Syria, that was the government’s goal: to divide communities to better control them, even if it meant setting them against one another. Westerners are thus gradually sliding towards a ‘reasonable’ rapprochement in order to eventually collaborate with the regime against terrorism. A trend that reveals a terrible ignorance of the real situation on the ground and the complexity of the regional socio-political arena. Taking advantage of this atmosphere, elected officials of the French Republic have broken the wall of shame and visited the dictator in Damascus. Some, certainly very weak in historical knowledge, have even evoked the alliance with Stalin to fight Hitler!

The ‘neither Assad nor Daesh’ advocates, extolled by French diplomacy, seem to inconvenience these elected officials and another sector of the European political class who have lucrative interests in the regime or its supporters. After thousands of victims, they advocate resuming contact with a regime whose entire body of work has been nothing but conducive to the development of numerous terrorist groups in the region since the 1970s. At the very moment when Western journalists, politicians or diplomats are meeting with Bashar al-Assad, barrel bombs continue to take the lives of Syrians just a few steps away from them.
**Daesh as ‘Saviour’!**

With the rise of the Islamic State, i.e. Daesh, we are experiencing a new phenomenon consisting of a false Western involvement embodied by a military coalition. Spectacular, ‘Hollywood-style’ air strikes have been made against positions of this terrorist group in Iraq and Syria; an intervention that appears colossal, done by a number of powerful countries with highly sophisticated military equipment. The results, however, fall short of expectations. For instance, they took four months to overcome Daesh terrorists in Kobane, a small Syrian town on the border with Turkey.

Hence the spirit of conspiracy, highly developed in the East, cannot but flourish in the face of this unsatisfying and ‘unprofitable’ military operation. Add to that the successive defeats of Iraqi forces in the face of terrorist advances in Iraq. Simple observers question the billions invested in the training and equipment of these forces.

It is thus relatively legitimate for certain observers to consider this military involvement simply as a way of clearing themselves for having attempted nothing. These strikes, above all when they cause the death of dozens of civilians, only bolster the terrorists. Their advances on several fronts attest to the failure of the operation and reveal a complete absence of any strategy whatsoever, whether military or political, on all fronts and more specifically in the Syrian arena.

Unwittingly, of course, Daesh benefits a number of actors in the Syrian arena: first of all, the regime, despite its consecutive defeats, alleges to be the lesser evil and the only one capable of handling this terrorism arising from its policies. By the same token, it is the Western champions of indifference who find in Daesh’s existence an excuse to continue doing nothing. They hide behind their perpetual hesitation, attributing their non-support of moderate Syrian rebels to the ruthless terrorist danger. The third parties benefiting from the situation are regional forces that continue to use the Syrian arena as a site for confrontation by proxy between them.

Sometimes there is a hint of colonial discourse in the analysis of the Arab Revolutions. Many imply that our mindset is incompatible with democracy. And that it is thus better to leave dictators in place to govern. What contempt for the Other!

**In the Face of Terrorism and Indifference, Civil Society**

With the media focusing on the recognised terror of terrorist groups and nearly systematically concealing the real life of Syrians and their daily suffering under the bombings and sieges by the regime, the image of the Syrian situation remains distorted after all these years.

Violence shocks consciences more and raises network’s audience ratings. On the television set, the actions of Daesh and threatened minorities are discussed, but never the struggles of the new civil society representing the ensemble of citizens without distinction.

The media also have a tendency to downplay the importance of actions by young Syrians (citizen journalists) who, on a shoestring and risking their lives for their war-torn country, continue to inform the world on the situation of the Syrian people, caught between the loyalist army assisted by the death squads, and the ISIL jihadists. Thus, local councils have been established in various towns that escape the control of the regime and operate on extremely limited resources but great willpower. These councils organise municipal services, education, the management of citizen’s everyday lives and medical services. It is no coincidence that their centres are the most targeted by loyalist air strikes.

On the television set, the actions of Daesh and threatened minorities are discussed, but never the struggles of the new civil society representing the ensemble of citizens without distinction.

These past years of suffering have seen the emergence of a ‘genuine’ civil society – a positive element that has developed over the course of this lethal wait. Four decades of dictatorship had nearly wiped out the concept of civil society. The public space was entirely taken over by the regime. The power in Damascus had replaced civil society organisations with ‘popular’ organisations in the manner of North Korea in order to supervise all segments of society.
By way of example, in March 2011, on the eve of the revolt, there were some hundred civil society organisations active, most of them controlled by the regime. Today, as we enter the fifth year of the revolution, there are nearly 5,000. Though a good many of them operate from abroad for reasons of security and feasibility, they contribute moral and material support to those who remain in the country.

Thus, for instance, the cultural scene is experiencing a significant burst of creativity. The number of artists, writers, cartoonists and creators in general placing their art at the service of this new civil society has soared. A democratic movement is certainly underway, despite its shortcomings. The Syrian people, after decades of dictatorship, are learning the art of political debate. The international community should demonstrate courage and support this movement.

Religious Dictatorship is the Legitimate Child of Political Dictatorship

Although Daesh is more frightening, with its decapitation of hostages and kidnappings of minorities, it is important to emphasise that the majority of victims in the Syrian arena are caused by the regime’s air strikes, the famine due to sieges of cities and villages, and the torture suffered by tens of thousands of political prisoners. The Daesh terrorists have indeed grasped the ‘art’ of communication and have succeeded in disseminating their images to spread terror. Paradoxically, the Syrian regime has likewise grasped the same ‘art’ from the outset of the revolt, but in the opposite sense. By preventing media coverage of the first demonstrations and then targeting the lives of citizen journalists, it has consistently tried to camouflage its repressive action.

Religious obscurantism has prospered under the control of a regime that some continue to consider secular. When protesters attacked the Danish embassy in Damascus after the publication of the cartoons depicting the Prophet in early 2006, it was clear that the incident was orchestrated by the government. At the time, gatherings of more than five people were prohibited, yet the protesters managed to scale the embassy walls and set fire to it! A solidarity orchestrated by regimes to divert the inhabitants’ attention from their suffering and the corruption and despotism of the system in which they lived. The authorities prohibited any informed intellectual debate. It was also the regime that developed jihadi networks to fight in neighbouring countries. These organisations were deprived of all national references. On the other hand, their religious references were strengthened. Today, however, religion is used by criminals of all persuasions, whether secular or religious.

Assad contributed to the creation of Daesh by releasing jihadists from prison that he had previously sent to Iraq to fight the Americans in 2000. In September 2011, he negotiated with them. Some of them, who were sentenced to death, testified that the regime had asked them to infiltrate the revolution and lend it a confessional and radical aspect. Daesh has always fought against those fighting the Syrian regime. The regime, moreover, left the organisation alone until 11 September 2014, when Daesh invaded Mosul, in Iraq. Then Syrian aviation bombed them to show the international community that the regime was fighting them too.

The period of Assad junior, since 2000, has shown a false will to modernise and develop, multiplying promises and raising hopes among young people. Years have gone by without the Syrians seeing any changes, neither in their standard of living nor their freedoms. Many initiatives by intellectuals, both collective and individual, have been curtailed by intimidation and arrests. ‘Undermining the resolve of the nation’ is an accusation frequently used by the courts to incarcerate opponents.

Syrians, in their complex diversity, never dreamed of violence or radical change. Their demands were ‘simple’ and they dreamed of the universally recognised principles of a decent life: lifting of the state of emergency, free elections, a multiparty system, a free civil society, the release of political prisoners, freedom of the press and the struggle against the prevailing endemic corruption. It would seem this is too much to ask and the cost is in human lives too high while the ‘free’ world ponders how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.
Jihadism and Violence in the Arab World

Jihadism in Northern Africa and the Sahel

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Even in Northern Africa, though thousands of kilometres from Iraq and Syria, the aftershock can be felt of the actions and discourse of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), whose military victories and the capacity to create an Islamic state from scratch has given the Maghrebi and Sahel jihadists a second wind after their decline following French intervention in Mali and the pressure of security forces in Algiers, Tunis, Cairo and Rabat. In Northern Africa as in the Sahel, jihadists are split between the two movements – al-Qaeda and the Islamic State – which, though they share the perspective of considering violent action the only tool for social change, have different or even opposing agendas and operational logic. The challenge for these two organisations struggling for leadership in the sphere of jihad is to maintain or rally structural allegiances in order to multiply the jihadi firepower in Northern Africa and the Sahel. If emissaries are sent to ensure support from a specific regional organisation for the parent organisation, allegiances are above all determined by the strategic choices made by the local jihadi leaders. Whereas some continue to proclaim their loyalty to Ayman al-Zawahiri, others prefer to join the Islamic State (IS), which has the wind in its sails despite its recent military setbacks in Syria and Iraq. In Tunisia, Abu Ayadh, the underground leader of Ansar al-Sharia (not the same group as its Libyan namesake), has made appeals to join the jihad in Syria and rally to the ranks of al-Baghdadi in Iraq. For its part, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has rejected the caliphate and renewed its allegiance to al-Qaeda and its leader, al-Zawahiri. Since then, it seems that rifts are appearing within AQIM (its leaders being primarily in Algeria), with some wishing to join ISIL. These rivalries can certainly divide and thus weaken the jihadists (who are still very weak), but they can also encourage some of them to carry out actions demonstrating their firepower over that of their rivals and attracting new members.

The Persistence of Jihadism in the Sahel

Although the intervention of France, Chad and other African countries participating in the African-led International Support Mission in Mali Mission (AFISMA, later MINUSMA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) has allowed the capacity for action of armed jihadi groups in the North Mali region to be broken, the March 2015 attack, which killed five people in Bamako, demonstrates that jihadism has not entirely disappeared from Mali. Groups such as al-Mourabitoun or the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) remain active in a region that is part of the al-Qaeda network. Combining various jihadi groups, it distinguished itself through a significant feat of arms: the In Amenas hostage crisis in Algeria in January 2013. The different operations carried out by the authorities can provide an idea of the persistence of the jihadi threat in Mali. On 10 September 2015, a truck bomb was intercepted in southern Gao and four days later, soldiers were attacked by four men south of Almoustarat, for instance. Despite French intervention, jihadists are returning to an area they know perfectly well and where they still have numerous hideouts: in the Menaka region; north of Timbuktu in the Wagadou woodlands, on the border between Mali and Mauritania; or in the
Adrar des Ifoghas massif. It is more or less from these areas that attacks have been organised against MINUSMA members for over a year. The jihadists enjoy broad support among the local population. Moreover, the High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA), a participant in the inter-Malian dialogue process, has never cut off relations with Iyad Ag Ghaly. By the same token, the boundaries between the Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) are porous.

The resilience of Malian jihadists has alarmed the authorities of Niger since the attacks on a barracks and the Areva plant in Arlit on 23 May 2013. The main element of concern for the Niger government is the presence on its territory of Niger nationals having formed part of AQIM and MOJWA and militarily trained by these organisations. Niamey’s concern is all the greater, considering that the country is practically ‘surrounded’: to the north, by the jihadists of southern Libya; to the south, by Boko Haram; and to the west, by members of AQIM and MOJWA. In any case, Niger is not the only country to grow alarmed at the jihadism in its region. Chad is likewise affected by the security imbalance in southern Libya. In the first place, the country has become a potential target since it sent a contingent of 2,000 soldiers to Mali. In the second place, N’Djamena must contend with the destabilisation risks on its eastern and southern borders due to the Darfur conflict and the security and political instability in Central Africa. In any case, the jihadi threat must not be overestimated and Mali is far from the situation prevailing in the months preceding the conflict there.

Southern Libya has become a genuine safe haven, with its vast expanses escaping the control of a Libyan state in the process of disintegration

Tunisia is certainly the country most exposed to the ‘Libyan chaos.’ Recently emerging from a democratic transition still in the process of consolidating itself, Tunis is having difficulties stemming the development of violent Islam on its territory, despite a security policy that has been stepped up as attacks increase. In any case, the security forces lack experience and though they have managed to dismantle numerous jihadi cells, have been unable to prevent attacks such as the one taking place at the Bardo National Museum in March. The security forces have not managed to dislodge the jihadists present on the Algeria-Morocco border for nearly two years now (Mount Chaambi), where the forces of order are regularly assassinated. They can, however, rely on the Algerian security forces, who are better trained and more experienced in the struggle
against jihadism, since Algiers has had to contend with a civil war opposing it to armed Islamist groups throughout the 1990s.

In this country, the authorities pride themselves on their success in stemming the jihadi threat on their territory, to the point where it has become only residual. Nonetheless, Algiers has experienced certain ‘blitz’ operations jeopardising the image of a country gradually returning to stability. For many Western diplomats, Algeria remains a country with a high jihadi risk. The Algerian desert and Kabylia are areas where jihadi groups remain active. A case in point is the assassination of Hervé Gourdel, a French hiker, in September 2014 by the Soldiers of the Caliphate in Algeria, a group claiming allegiance to the Islamic State. The Algerian situation is a matter of concern for neighbouring Morocco, which nonetheless states it is free from attacks on its territory. In any case, the terrorist alert is at maximum and Moroccan authorities established a surveillance plan (‘hadara’) in October 2014, mobilising nearly 80,000 people, demonstrating that the Kingdom has realized it could be the victim of actions such as the attacks in Casablanca in 2003 and in Marrakesh in 2011. This decision followed declarations by AQIM, which, in its project to extend throughout the Maghreb, threatened King Mohammed VI on video. This concern has increased since the Moroccan embassy in Tripoli was subject to an attack whose authorship was claimed by the Islamic State.

While General al-Sissi represses Islamists from the Muslim Brotherhood, he must also contend with the rising power of jihadi groups in Egypt. In January 2015, the Egyptian branch of ISIL, Ansar al-Bayt al-Maqdiss, committed an attack resulting in 30 casualties. Highly active in the Sinai, this group – which has claimed authorship for the vast majority of attacks perpetrated since the military coup ousted President Mohammed Morsi, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, in July 2013 – has stated that it wishes to retaliate against the regime’s political repression of pro-Morsi factions. Hundreds of security force members have been killed in a period of over a year in these attacks, which have mainly targeted the northern part of the arid peninsula, but also the Nile Delta and the Egyptian capital. Until 2012, Ansar al-Bayt al-Maqdiss operations only targeted Israeli interests in the Sinai in attacks (gas pipeline explosions) without bloodshed.

The Departure of Combatants to Syria, a New Challenge to the Region’s Security Problem

According to figures provided by the Moroccan Centre for Strategic Studies (Centre marocain d’études stratégiques), 8,000 Maghrebi (3,000 Tunisians, 2,500 Libyans, 1,200 Moroccans, less than a thousand Algerians and a handful of Mauritanians, whereas the number of Sahelians is insignificant) have joined the jihad in Syria. Never had another conflict, from Afghanistan in 2001 to Iraq in 2003, attracted as many North African jihadists. Recruitment cells are regularly dismantled in Morocco or in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. In contrast to Morocco or Algeria, which seems to be the only country to escape this wave of jihadi vocation, Tunisia continues to supply numerous combatants to ISIL. Abu Ayadh, the leader of Ansar al-Sharia, has invited Tunisians to rally to the aid of al-Baghdadi’s organisation, renewing its call to jihad in Syria. Many of them make a stop at the training camps in the Ghadames area and Cyrenaica region of Libya, where they learn to handle weapons and guerrilla warfare tactics under the guidance of Libyan Ansar al-Sharia jihadists who have been leaders of the regular army for two years now, are highly experienced and have access to the military arsenal of their country’s former leader.

In the face of the jihadi threat, the authorities are aware that a solely repressive response is not enough and that it is imperative to establish de-radicalisation programmes

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cluding between Morocco and Algeria, for once in agreement in the face of this emergency. Each country’s government is cooperating to track down jihadists and dismantle their cells. Thus, on 8 September 2014, a vehicle filled with explosives was discovered in a forest west of Anefis, a town between Gao and Kidal, by French, Senegalese and Nigerien soldiers and Malian police officers. Nonetheless, the security policy of the different countries in the region has been unable to prevent all attacks. Indeed, the Bardo attack in Tunis, confrontations with the security forces on the Algeria-Tunisia border or the Bamako attack killing five people are paroxysmal illustrations of the jihadi damage and strike capacity in the region. In response to these threats, certain countries, including Morocco, have stepped up their legal arsenal by condemning jihadi apologists with prison sentences of five to 15 years and fines of 5,000 to 50,000 euros.

The security policy of the different countries in the region has been unable to prevent all attacks

The persistence of attacks in the region is above all proof of the limitations of the security strategy undertaken by the different countries concerned. In the face of the jihadi threat, the authorities are aware that a solely repressive response is not enough and that it is imperative to establish de-radicalisation programmes. In fact, no programme has yet been undertaken in the region, in contrast to Saudi Arabia, which is a notable exception in the sphere: a royal decree established a programme for aid and reintegration for nearly 300 jihadists having returned from Syria. In Northern Africa and the Sahel, for the time being, systematic incarceration prevails. In Morocco, the majority of jihadists returning from jihad are directly apprehended at the airport and sentenced to four years of prison on the basis of an anti-terrorist law. One thing is certain, however: there is an intention to slow down or prevent jihadism through the development of a counter-discourse, a soft religious power emanating from religious figures, particularly Salafist ones. Hence the Imam of Tangiers, Omar Haddouchi, has condemned the actions of the Islamic State and other Tunisian imams railed against the perpetrators of the Bardo attack in their Friday sermons.
Changing Regional Order

Strategic Shifts in the Mediterranean after the Arab Spring: Drivers and Scenarios for the Region

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The fifth year after the Arab Spring is witnessing a cooling down of the wave of enthusiasm for what was expected to be the fourth global wave of democratisation. Not only have the voices calling for democracy, social justice and development withered away, but also there are new factors reshaping the regional landscape: deep internal changes in the roles of governments, parties, non-state actors and peoples, together with new regional competitions.

It is possible to identify four dynamic processes (or cycles) driving and shaping the current strategic landscape of the south and eastern Mediterranean.

— First, the regression of state omnipresence due to a combination of factors, including failed governance, popular demands for change and the rising role of non-state actors.

— Second, the competition between forces of chaos and order, not only internally but also regionally as people, ideas and threats seep across borders.

— Third, changes in the regional order related to system membership, the hierarchy of power, role of outside actors, etc.

— Fourth, deeper systemic forces, including population increase, urbanisation, education and media penetration.

Withering Role of the State

As they developed after World War II, the position of the State in the Arab regional system showed resilience, with a capacity to monopolise power, distribute rewards and services and resist challenges from above (claims for Arab or pan-Islamic unity, global cold war competition) and from below (non-state actors, competing ethnic identities, sectarianism, economic and social structures). Yes, the performance of the State was below par on a whole range of issues: democratisation, economic development, quality of education, resolving the Palestinian question, regional integration and more. But worst-case scenarios had been averted, at least in most countries, at least in most periods of time: prolonged internal conflicts, massive human rights violations, blatant interference in the affairs of neighbouring countries, state disintegration concomitant with the breakdown of services and access to food and water followed by mass movements of people.

And yet, the disintegration of the state project and machinery did not happen suddenly with the advent of the Arab uprisings of 2010 onwards. For the fall of the Arab State can be traced back to the challenges of Islamic and pan-Arab movements, the withering away of a generation of charismatic autocrats, the dwindling of cold-war-driven international support, the tardiness and severe limits on reform efforts, the erosive impact of the changes in regional and social media, and the expanding space of the private sector and NGOs providing services. Matar argues that globalisation was a major factor in weakening the Arab State.² When demonstrators

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shouted ‘the people want to topple the regime,’ they were bringing down the remnants of an order that had outlived its shelf life.

This weakness of the State is ominous as civil society structures remain nascent, while political processes for ensuring law and order, negotiating policies and distributing resources are far from effective. Under these circumstances, the possibilities of civil unrest, intra-regional conflict and outside intervention have the potential to increase in the future. The rise of Islamic forces further damaged the legitimacy of states, for the ideology they presented was centred on the concepts of an Islamic Umma, the return of the Caliphate and the destruction of the state structures enforced by colonialism. The Arab world, long anathema to the way it was carved up by Sykes-Picot, had settled down to the business of separate flags, multiple national anthems and border checkpoints. The ideology of Arab nationalism was reshaped to suit the needs of the State: superseding the fault lines of religions, sects and tribes that were moulded into artificial borders drawn on that spring day in Knightsbridge. Now, this order was breaking up with a return to primordial identities: Christian-Muslim, Shia-Sunni, and Kurdish-Anbari; new states and de facto states within states: South Sudan, South Lebanon, Kurdistan, and now territories occupied and administered by armed groups in Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen. Outside powers enacted policies that extended de facto recognition to these entities (arming Kurds, Iraqi Sunni tribes, receiving their leaders in Western capitals, and conducting high level visits to their territories, etc.). In a word, ‘political violence is remaking Arab societies.’

Many thought that the legitimacy of the State had been fatally damaged, and feared that ‘all the King’s men and all the King’s horses…could not put it back together again.’ Some aspects of this dynamic are ongoing, even though in some cases they have been arrested and reversed. This weakness of the State is ominous as civil society structures remain nascent, while political processes for ensuring law and order, negotiating policies and distributing resources are far from effective. Under these circumstances, the possibilities of civil unrest, intra-regional conflict and outside intervention have the potential to increase in the future.

The Returning State

The forces of chaos that arrived with the Arab uprisings were formidable. Much pent-up anger and tension was unleashed: industrial and public services strikes, demands for wage increases, religious and ethnic frictions and armed groups raising Islamic flags. With an injured state, organised and unorganised crime joined the prey: kidnappers, carjackers, petty criminals, people smugglers and rough landlords pulling down heritage in the dead of night to construct housing blocks. Hawkers rapidly multiplied, selling second-hand garments on the street corners of elegant avenues of old. Economic growth slumped and unemployment soared.

Once activated, these forces were enough to scare important segments of societies: the private sector, minorities, women, intellectuals, secular political groups, liberals and the media, but also, more importantly, the remaining representatives of the ‘old’ or ‘deep’ state: internal security structures, the police and the military. These forces of ‘order’ were far from finished. Thus, in several Arab countries that had experienced uprisings in one form or another, the State returned with a vengeance, most dramatically in

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3 Where it was secretly signed at the Hyde Park Hotel.
5 TALEB, Nassim Nicholas and TRIVERTON, Gregory F. argue that several factors influence regime fragility, “(O)r countries, fragility has five principal sources: a centralised governing system, an undiversified economy, excessive debt and leverage, a lack of political variability, and no history of surviving past shocks.” See: “The Calm Before the Storm: Why Volatility Signals Stability, and Vice Versa,” Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2015.
Egypt, but also in other cases (for example, Tunisia, Jordan, Bahrain, and Oman). The security apparatus swung back into action, taking control of the streets, lashing out at dissidents with its toughest punches saved for those carrying arms and terrorists; economic rewards were promised and, in some cases, were delivered, even as the media trumpeted the need for stability and conspiracy theories abounded. Secular politicians, including those associated with the ancien regims moved back into the limelight while Islamists were further marginalised, if not banned altogether. The forceful return of the State creates its own challenges. With what has been called the ‘militarisation of Arab politics,’ ending Arab ‘exceptionalism’ has been pushed further into the future. With democratic progress and human rights taking a back seat in most Arab countries, Western powers are facing soul-searching questions on their policies, with idealism pitted against realism, particularly as important Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) players favour stability over unpredictable change.

The Regional Chessboard

Deep changes are also underway in the regional landscape or context, to the extent that this represents a separate system of actors with its own dynamics, differentiated from both the global system and internal politics. Indeed it is possible to differentiate between two regional sub-orders: one Arab (comprising most Arab states), the other Middle Eastern (comprising Iran, Israel and Turkey). In the Arab system, changes include the more assertive role of Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries, most dramatically exemplified by the intervention in Yemen, but traceable through a series of policies and positions: interventions in Bahrain, Syria and Libya, strong support to Sisi in Egypt, differences with the US. There are also the signs of an Egyptian reassertion: engaging internationally with major powers, pushing for a joint Arab military force, undertaking military strikes in Libya, and joining ‘Operation Decisive Storm.’ There is also the activist space occupied by super rich small states, mainly Qatar and UAE. The cycles of interaction and linkage remain active in the Arab system. These were beneficial in the case of the flow of labour to the Gulf, with substantial remittances, investments and direct financial support going in the other direction. Significantly, the number of Arab satellite stations has mushroomed from around 25 in the late 1990s to 1,300 at present, owned by 776 entities, most of them private. These include specialised channels (151 broadcasters of drama, 146 of sports, 125 of religion, 124 of music and 66 of news). Yet, Gulf-owned broadcasters and Egypt-based ones seem to hold sway, as is the case with a few regional newspapers. Taken together, media has created a dynamic and politically relevant platform for inter-Arab interactions closely linked to the formation of political views, breaking the monopoly of governments and providing up-to-date information.

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These attempts to re-establish an Arab order are challenged by new forces, which are difficult to track or predict: non-state actors, like Daesh (Islamic State), striking at the heart of the Arab system, invoking Islamic unity, withdrawing recognition of borders, destroying history and culture. These efforts to strengthen the regional state system are also handicapped by the limitations of regional processes, instruments and institutions: the weakness

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of the League of Arab States (LAS), the absence of a regional security organisation, the paucity of inter-Arab trade and the vast contrast in the fortunes of Arab countries.

These developments came at a cost: thus the long-standing weights of the central causes in regional dynamics have changed with Palestine receding as a focus for debate and a cause for divisions. And yet these new issues have taken on some of the characteristics of the old ones, like tenacity and resistance to solutions. For example, the Syrian situation has turned into a low intensity, protracted conflict that may extend for many years with repercussions for neighbouring countries.

A related development is the increased interaction, indeed intervention, of the ‘Middle East order’ in the ‘Arab order’ with each of Iran, Israel and Turkey playing direct roles in one Arab conflict or the other: Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen to mention a few. This development has been coloured by the introduction of a religious-identity dimension with an emphasis on the Shia-Sunni schism, aligning Turkey with the Gulf Sunni kingdoms, resisting Iran’s expansionist role in the region.

There is also a growth in the list of ‘failed states’ together with increased instances of international intervention via the UN Security Council, the ICC, or other mechanisms (eg Somalia, Syria, Iraq, and Sudan). Yet the role of international actors is also related to the dynamics of their own relations. Thus, while at one moment it appeared as if the US and Russia were trying to co-manage the region (eg the Iran 5+1 deal, Syrian chemical weapons, Geneva II) they now seem to have moved into a more competitive relationship (post-Ukraine) with some signs of a Russian bid to re-enter the Middle East. The reactions of Arab states to the policies of international actors add complexity to these dynamics. Thus, the 5+1 deal on Iran’s nuclear capabilities has raised alarm signals concerning US policy in Arab countries. At the same time, the US’ pivot to Asia is viewed as a sign of further disengagement from the Middle East, downsizing the region’s importance and destabilising its security and power formulas.

While direct Western intervention in the region seems to have peaked, there is a search for new policies and instruments to maintain influence or control. While the US seeks to continue its withdrawal and avoid ‘boots on the ground,’ the age-old instruments of military alliances, bases and supplies have returned at the centre of US-Arab relations. Other players (Russia, France, UK and Germany) are deep into arms sales to the region without reference to wider frames of resolving conflicts, maintaining a balance of forces or indeed reducing armaments.

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The EU appears torn between the idealism of defending principles (eg human rights, democratic institutions, etc.) on the one hand, and, on the other, ensuring its self-interest (eg markets, energy supplies, protection against waves of migrants, jihadists). The question for Europe remains: how to engage and ‘ride the tiger’ of change in the Middle East.

Deeper Forces of Change

Beneath these symptoms, deeper forces are at play in the region. The huge increases in population place it on a trajectory towards doubling the current Arab population by 2050 to some 650 million, mostly urbanised and with a high percentage of young people. According to the International Labour Organisation, the Arab world already has the highest youth unemployment rate in the world and

will need to create an additional 74 million jobs in the next 15 years to absorb new entrants to its job market. This is equivalent to a 75% increase in its workforce, or equal to the total growth of its workforce between 1950 and 2000. And yet, faltering growth rates do not auger well for the future. The pressures of the youth factor will remain as a force for instability and change with demands for education, jobs and housing far beyond the capacity of the economies to deliver. These tectonic changes are reflected in the severe deterioration of the economic situation and quality of life for a large number of people in the region as a result of conflicts, climate change factors and slow economic growth: refugees, internally displaced, and slum dwellers. The ranks of the poor continue to be replenished and expanded. For the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in the region, even for lower middle-income countries, the path ahead for raising incomes is harsh and hope is far removed.

Future Scenarios

The demise of the State, its resurgence, regional and international interactions and deeper structural changes: these four sets of dynamics, or interactions, or cycles of changes will probably be central in shaping the strategic landscape of the Arab region. They reflect deep strategic shifts that followed the Arab upheavals and some of the key drivers of future scenarios.\(^{12}\)

When attempting to predict the future, there is a danger of excessive extrapolation from the present. Indeed the history of predicating the future of the Arab world is more that of partial analysis, overlooked drivers and major unpredicted events: the 1973 war, the Sadat peace initiative, the assassination of Sadat, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the Arab uprisings after 2010, the rise of Daesh, the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen and more. There are also errors of excessive pessimism or optimism (albeit this latter category is currently in short supply). Theoretically, four alternative scenarios can be delineated: (a) Continue as is; (b) Change to better (under the influence of internal and/or external factors, probably both); (c) Mixed case; (d) Black Swan scenarios.

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Scenario (a): Continuity of Chaos

The present picture of chaos in the south and eastern Mediterranean may last for another decade or two. For example, Richard Haas has argued that the region may be facing another 30-year war similar to that of Europe in the 17th century.\(^{13}\) The implications are that the West should follow conflict management strategies rather than risk being enmeshed in the region’s labyrinth: reduce dependence on oil from the region, prevent nuclear proliferation, follow counter terrorism strategies, accept the break-up of Iraq and accommodate the Assad regime in Syria. There are costs herein to Europe: waves of migrants crossing from the south, returning jihadists from Syria and Iraq, threatened energy supplies and lost opportunities of trade and growth. A policy of disengagement may carry higher costs of losing influence over events, prolonged crisis and disorder and living with unpalatable longer-term consequences.

Option (b): Best Case

In this scenario, miraculously, the transitions in the south and eastern Mediterranean result in stable, democratic and economically promising governments. Key conflicts and difficult transitions are re-

\(^{12}\) The following segment of this article is heavily dependent on my earlier article and presentation: “Some features of post Arab Spring and their implications for the Mediterranean,” International Seminar on Towards “Helsinki +40”: The OSCE, the Global Mediterranean and the Future of Cooperative Security, Instituto Affari Internazionali, Rome, 18 September 2014.

solved peacefully with solutions found for the Arab-Israeli tragedy as well as in other regional problems (Arab-Iranian relations, Syria, Libya, etc.). A nuclear-free zone is established and arrangements are in place for arms control through a regional security organisation. Fertility rates have declined as education and employment indicators have hugely improved.

One characteristic of this scenario is that it requires a participatory process of analysis and planning that involves governments and civil society, preferably from both sides of the Mediterranean, together with relevant regional organisations (LAS, GCC, EU and OSCE). It is possible to envision this scenario as part of the often-discussed ‘Marshall Plan’ for the Middle East, which would include additional roles for the US, the Gulf, the World Bank, the IMF and other international bodies. This could be based on a detailed longer-term vision that could be called ‘Med 2050.’

It may be difficult to imagine this rosy picture in the context of the present negative reality. And yet, it may be encouraged and supported through the application of a set of policies including more aggressive peace-building and problem-solving initiatives, investment in quality education, the progressive application of EU standards in the south/eastern Mediterranean, more flexible free-trade arrangements, and support to examples of good governance where they materialise (eg Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan). A central factor that will be required is more serious Arab regional cooperation if not integration.14 Optimism, as Collin Powell once said, is a force multiplier.

Option (c): Mixed

Reality is often complex, carrying some of our preferences while frustrating us with continuing problems and setbacks. Here is where realpolitik needs to absorb idealistic objectives while dealing with facts on the ground. This scenario, perhaps the most probable one, would see a continuation of a certain level of conflict and disagreement as well as difficult transitions that include quasi-democratic regimes, slow reform processes and faltering economic growth. But it would also show success through respect to human rights, empowering women and improving health and education services. A key factor would be to support an enlightened role for governments and state structures in the context of reforms and in the face of threats of disintegration and factionalism. Some sectors of the economy would show notable improvement (eg agriculture, tourism, the garment industry, small and medium enterprises). The question would be how to steer this scenario towards the more attractive Option II rather than that of Option I.

A toolkit based on practical incentives and disincentives will be needed, not only to reward success and punish failures but also to actively engage in empowering leaders and people, encouraging change and conflict management and guiding transitions, more specifically in building democracy, avoiding state failures and combating terrorism.

Option (d): Black Swan

For unexpected scenarios, the question would be what it would take to move towards dramatically better situations, or much worse scenarios. Most probably, such changes would be internally driven rather than being the result of external factors. One key element would be political leadership, whereby the emergence of one or two visionary leaders could influence the direction of change. Bad leaders would obviously take the region, or important regional powers, in the opposite direction. In terms of surprise scenarios, there is the possibility of coups in one of the oil-producing countries, in the Gulf or elsewhere in the region, or in a non-oil country with a royal regime. Herein are possibilities for the role of external powers: engaging and influencing leaders through continuous high-level dialogue and exposure to good models. This needs to expand through a wider process of engaging civil society, media and youth. But practical results will be needed to show success and combat frustrations. Probably there will be a need to increase the level of European (indeed Western) investments and time allocation, in terms of developing common policies, launching initiatives, earmarking more substantial financial resources and improving management processes.

But the question remains if this will be possible in the context of the present political and economic environment in Europe.

Dramatic changes are currently taking place in the south and eastern Mediterranean making it difficult to foresee the longer-term future of the region. New conflicts have been added while older ones continue.

There is also a need to strengthen contingency planning for worst-case scenarios stemming from unexpected events: a conflict involving nuclear capacities, acts of major human rights violations, a natural disaster in the midst of a prolonged civil war with vast ungoverned areas, or the sudden removal of a key leader from the scene, followed by chaos. It is no coincidence that the precedents and seeds for these situations are alive and well (e.g. the Israeli-Iran conflict, Sudan’s problems, Syria’s civil war, the actions of Daesh and the situation in Libya, Iraq and Yemen).

Conclusion

Dramatic changes are currently taking place in the south and eastern Mediterranean making it difficult to foresee the longer-term future of the region. New conflicts have been added while older ones continue. New challenges include the confused transition processes reflected in factionalism, instability, economic deterioration and, in many cases, the threat of failed states. Hybrid entities have taken over state functions while claiming international roles. Most worryingly, there seems to be little capacity to analyse this picture and develop strategies to respond to it on the part of regional states, relevant intergovernmental organisations or external powers.

And yet, the hopes of the Arab Spring have not died. Wider political participation has become a reality. Youth leaders are emerging through political systems with dreams of change and experience gained from exposure to politics. Women are more actively defending their rights. Here lies a challenge for external powers and organisations to engage with the forces of change rather than retreat behind the false security of protective walls.

There are several structural forces in the south and eastern Mediterranean that will probably influence the future direction of change: population growth, economic performance, urbanisation, the status of women and education. These need to be the focus of longer-term policies with substantial resources and tenacious implementation, monitoring and evaluation. Again, herein lies a key role for external powers in addressing these underlying factors in favour of positive outcomes.

But there is also a need for more aggressive strategies for conflict resolution, conflict prevention and peace-building. The experiences of Europe will be relevant provided they are presented through creative diplomacy, more generosity in the service of longer-term self-interest and a much higher level of political will and determination.

In the longer term, twenty or thirty years from now, the south and eastern Mediterranean, reflecting the dynamics of the Arab world more than those of the Middle East, may metamorphose into one of four futures: chaotic, positive, mixed or surprising. Again, the structural drivers of change will probably play a key role in determining which scenario materialises, although the mixed option appears the most realistic one. Yet, it is the current actions of leaders and institutions on both sides of the Mediterranean that can influence the direction of future change and steer the region towards more positive results. Abdicating this responsibility should not be an option.
In order to analyse the influence of the Gulf States' diplomatic initiatives in the Mediterranean and Middle East, it is necessary to look at both the six monarchies that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) – and Iran. Especially since the Arab Spring and the conflicts it triggered, primarily in Syria and Yemen, the GCC States' foreign policy cannot be understood without analysing the role and diplomatic initiatives of Iran, as well. This is particularly true given that the Arab Spring has exacerbated existing tensions, mainly between Saudi Arabia and Iran, due to their different stances on Bahrain, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Both Saudi and Iranian policies have been reactive to the challenges generated by the Arab uprisings, not only domestically but in the region at large. Both states have tried to maximise their regional influence to the detriment of their adversary’s interests in a zero-sum game that has only given rise to more violence and instability in the region.

The political developments resulting from the Arab Spring have also sparked diplomatic conflicts between the GCC States themselves. Since 2011, in light of the power vacuum left by the uprisings, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE have pursued their own agendas, based on their own interests, with a view to maximising their gains from the new and turbulent regional situation. In some cases, such as in Libya, Yemen and Iraq, these agendas have included direct military intervention. These interests have revealed internal policy differences between the GCC members, as well as the different diplomatic styles of their political elites, giving rise to the biggest diplomatic crisis in the organisation’s history between Qatar and its Saudi, Emirati and Bahraini partners.

The past several months, from November 2013 to the present, have been crucial in defining what some have called – in the view of this author, mistakenly – a new ‘strategic alliance in the region,’ due to the start of serious nuclear negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group that could lead to Iran’s reinstatement as a constructive player in the region. The stagnation of the Syrian civil war, the worsening of the confrontations in Iraq, and the new military escalation in Yemen, all of which are viewed as stages on which the fight for regional predominance is playing out, run the risk of becoming sectarian wars that threaten the rest of the Mediterranean and the Arab world.

**The Impact of the Arab Spring on the GCC’s Foreign Policy**

While the 2011 Arab Spring, including the toppling of Ben Ali, Gaddafi and Mubarak, as well as the uprisings against King Hamad in Bahrain and against al-Assad in Syria, gave rise to a power vacuum and lack of political model, it was also an opportunity for the main regional players – Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey – to struggle to fill the void and become the benchmark for the incipient models, as well as the new hegemonic player. Despite their relatively small territorial and demographic weight, far less than that of the aforementioned regional players, Qatar and the UAE also joined the fight for regional leadership, conducting public diplomacy and offering financial (as well as military, in the Emirati case) aid, two essential tools to achieve their foreign policy goals in the first months of the crisis. The GCC countries were thus the first to provide legitimacy to the inter-
national intervention in Libya to halt the advance of Gaddafi’s troops on Benghazi in March 2011. As Qatar was the GCC State to suffer the fewest anti-government demonstrations, it was able to implement the most assertive and proactive foreign policy, without the need to overcome internal impediments. It thus became actively involved in the support for the model represented by the Muslim Brotherhood, in both Egypt, through Mohamed Morsi, and Tunisia, and, later, Syria, which was clearly a much more disruptive approach to the pre-Arab Spring status quo. In contrast, due to the growing number of protests in the eastern side of the country, Saudi Arabia was forced to pursue a much more cautious policy, aimed at preserving the status quo, primarily in the Arabian Peninsula, by supporting the Bahraini and Omani regimes, which, to different degrees, faced strong civic protests at home. Although the overall objectives of the Saudi and Qatari strategies differed, they agreed on one key point: the overthrow of al-Assad’s regime in Syria. And while both countries supported King Hamad in Bahrain, only Saudi Arabia and the UAE sent security forces to the kingdom to support the government. Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood led to a direct confrontation not only with Saudi Arabia, but also with the UAE, a confrontation that ultimately culminated in a diplomatic crisis in 2014 involving all three states plus Bahrain. At the same time, the Qatari experiment of backing Morsi proved to be its greatest failure in terms of its foreign objectives. Following Morsi’s fall, the Egyptian Central Bank returned 2 billion dollars to the country in September 2013. In exchange, it received financial aid from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, who together pledged close to 15 billion dollars, underscoring the shift in loyalty and regional support away from Qatar. Simply put, Qatar’s aspirations were beyond its real possibilities to support and control its regional allies in the struggle for regional leadership. Ultimately, its position, more disruptive than supportive of the status quo, set it at odds with many of its regional partners, without yielding any benefits. Finally, the lack of coordination between the GCC members with regard to support for the opposition forces in Syria not only weakened their capability to overthrow the Assad regime, but also had repercussions for the relations with Saudi Arabia and delegitimised the rebels, who witnessed how al-Assad remained in power after four years of uprisings, having negotiated with the United States with regard to its chemical weapons and without losing its support in the region from players such as Hezbollah and Iran.

Some have cited this relative Qatari failure as the main reason why Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani decided to hand over power to his son, Tamim, in June 2013, with a view to easing tensions with his partners and lowering Qatar’s foreign profile in order to continue concentrating on strategies more closely linked to the use of soft power, such as the hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup and other cultural, sport and humanitarian initiatives. Growing domestic opposition, above all among young people, to the Qatari intervention in Syria and other scenarios was also a decisive factor in the country’s efforts to restore its image abroad.

Two other countries in the region underwent changes at the governmental level. First, Hassan Rouhani won the presidential elections in Iran in June 2013, triggering a dramatic shift in the country’s foreign policy with a variety of regional repercussions. Second, King Salman bin Abdulaziz replaced the deceased King Abdullah in Saudi Arabia in January 2015. Although in this case, major changes were not observed in the country’s foreign policy, subsequent events in Yemen and the direct intervention sponsored by Salman seem to suggest he will pursue a more interventionist foreign policy than his predecessor.

In addition to the intervention in Yemen, which began in March 2015 and involved the military participation of all the GCC States except Oman, in August 2014, the UAE, together with President el-Sisi’s Egypt, engaged in a unilateral military intervention to stop the advance of the jihadist militias in eastern Libya. Once again, the specific agendas and interests of individual GCC States gave rise to diverse foreign policy initiatives and direct interventions that were not coordinated between the six countries and which sometimes involved backing different domestic players, as was the cases in Syria and Egypt.

The GCC’s Internal Dispute

The story of the confrontation between Qatar and Saudi Arabia is not new, but rather dates back to 1995, when Emir Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani came
to power in Qatar after overthrowing his father. One year later, Saudi Arabia and the emirate Abu Dhabi allegedly supported a palace coup that sought to place Emir Hamad bin Jassim bin Hamad al-Thani, the Emir’s cousin, on the throne. The attempt culminated in the sentencing to death of 19 people, including a Saudi citizen, and the deportation of nearly 6,000 members of the Al Murrah tribe, with dual Saudi-Qatari citizenship, accused of supporting the coup. Ever since, Qatar has played the role of the maverick within the context of GCC discipline, trying to offset the omnipresent Saudi pressure on the foreign policy of all the other member states. The stance on Iran, with which Qatar has not had particularly fraught relations and with which it shares economic interests in the area of natural gas production, has been one of the main points of friction with Saudi Arabia. Then President Mahmud Ahmadinejad was even invited for the first time to a GCC summit, to be held in Doha in December 2007, something that would not have been well-received by the Saudis.

There has likewise been constant pressure on the Qatari television network Al-Jazeera whenever its broadcasts have been critical of the monarchical regimes of Saudi Arabia and other regional partners. However, in 2008, the two royal families held bilateral talks to improve the relations between the two states, with the current Emir Tamim bin Hamad playing an important role. Both states, but especially Qatar, had been crucial in the partial rehabilitation of President Bashar al-Assad in Syria, who had taken a strong hit in the regional Arab context following the forced Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. However, as noted, the Arab Spring created a power vacuum that both Saudi Arabia and Qatar tried to fill, in the Qatari case through strong support for the Muslim Brotherhood, a group that was beginning to be seen as a threat to the stability of the Saudi and Emirati regimes.

In this context, on 5 March 2014, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain issued a joint statement in which they called for the State of Qatar, and its Emir, Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, to implement and honour the security agreements signed by the GCC States and ‘to comply with the principles that ensure non-interference in the internal affairs of any of the GCC countries, either directly or indirectly, and not to support any party that threatens the security and stability of the GCC countries whether organisations or individuals, either through direct security work or by political influence, and not to support the hostile media’. The security agreement to which the statement referred is one of the cooperation framework agreements on the exchange of information and tracking down of criminals and those suspected of breaking the law proposed at the Council’s inception in 1981. As no consensus was reached regarding its content, its signing was postponed and it surfaced in 1994 and was brought to the table again, following the events of the Arab Spring, through the efforts of its main backer, Saudi Arabia.

However, despite the controversy fanned by the Gulf media, the main opponent of the agreement was not Qatar but the emirate of Kuwait. Specifically, the Kuwaiti Parliament, the most active and rebellious in the GCC, opposed nine articles, some because it considered them to undermine the sovereignty of the Council’s member states with regard to the persecution, arrest and trial of their own citizens, and others because they contravene the Kuwaiti constitution. Nevertheless, the agreement was signed by the six members in Riyadh in November 2012 and was subsequently ratified by all members except Kuwait at the Manama summit in December that same year. As for the other five members, Qatar was the first to ratify it, through Emir Tamim, on 28 August 2013. This was followed by ratification by the Saudi cabinet on 16 September, by the President of the Emirati federation, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan, on 21 October, by King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa of Bahrain, on 27 November, and by Sultan Qaboos bin Said of Oman, on 14 January 2014. The statement went on to say that, despite signing and ratifying the agreement, Qatar had failed to take ‘the necessary measures to put it into force,’ even after being repeatedly enjoined by all three of the statement’s joint issuers to do so. Alleging that this failure to implement the agreement seriously affected the security of the other member states, the statement

2 See www.mashrou3watan.com/?p=842.
ended by saying that, in light of the lack of collaboration from the ‘brotherly State of Qatar,’ the issuers had no choice but to withdraw their ambassadors from Doha, to be effective on 5 March 2014.

The explicit mention of the lack of collaboration referred to three key issues emerging from the November 2012 summits: that all GCC member states should distance themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood and its intrusive policies throughout the Arab world; that the controversial media activity of the Egyptian cleric residing in Doha, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, should be restricted; and that the movements of Iranian ‘agents’ within the GCC should be restricted. In this context, it was clear that the political and financial support that Qatar had promised to Egyptian President Morsi, of the Muslim Brotherhood, laid at the heart of the dispute.

The UAE had also lodged specific protests against Yusuf al-Qaradawi and his support for the Brotherhood, as well as against the Qatari television network Al-Jazeera. Part of this conflict between Qatar and the UAE was on display in the arrest at the Dubai airport in February 2013 of Mahmoud al-Jaidah, a Qatari physician accused of taking financial aid to the Al Islah organisation, the Brotherhood’s Emirati branch. The arrest, which was made without formal charges, led to the solitary confinement of the detainee and even torture, and was followed by Amnesty International, which called for clarification of the detainee’s whereabouts and status, as well as a fair trial.4

In March 2014, at the peak of the GCC’s internal tensions, following the withdrawal of the ambassadors from Doha, Saudi Arabia listed the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation, underscoring its priorities of security and internal stability and its position on the conflicts in Egypt and Syria. The Saudis also pressured their regional partners, who reacted in different ways. Oman and Kuwait were both reluctant to bow to the Saudi demands. The Brotherhood is allowed to participate in Kuwaiti politics as a political force, and even to have MPs; outlawing it would thus only further chip away at the already fragile legitimacy of the al-Sabah family. For its part, Oman has resisted introducing measures that might affect an opposition group that has not caused any major problems in the country, just as it has also rejected all other measures proposed by Saudi Arabia with a view to further integrating the GCC States to form a Gulf Union, at the expense of each state’s individual sovereignty. The government in Bahrain, in turn, depends on the backing of al-Minbar, the Brotherhood’s branch in the country, to remain in power, due to the lack of support from the majority of the parties representing Shiites and liberals. However, in this case, al-Khalifa gave precedence to the ties with Saudi Arabia, which would be the ultimate champion of his dynasty’s stability, rather than the domestic political legitimacy granted by his own citizens, a clear indication of the priorities of the governing houses of the Gulf.5

Reconciliation and a Common Front against Iran

The diplomatic escalation within the GCC continued for several months, until the Doha summit held on 8 December 2014. There, with the mediation of Emir al-Sabah of Kuwait, the Heads of State of the four opposed states ‘rubbed noses’ as a gesture of reconciliation. Although the summit generated considerable expectation and led to a host of preparations (the city was decorated, heavy security was positioned along the main roads, and the Sheraton hotel, where the meeting would be held, was hastily renovated), it barely lasted four hours. Other than the staging of the reconciliation, the only noteworthy thing to take place was the signing of an agreement to create a new joint naval force in order to strengthen the GCC’s defence mechanisms in the face of an Iranian threat. To this end, Saudi Arabia placed considerable pressure on its monarchical allies, warning that it was necessary to set their internal differences aside in order to concentrate on the biggest regional threat of all, which was not ISIS-ISIL-DAESH but rather the growing Iranian influence in the region, as represented in early 2015 by the occupation of Sana by Houthi rebel groups, presumably with the logistical, ideological and perhaps even financial and military support of Iran.

4 According to Doha News, al-Jaidah was pardoned by Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al-Nahyan on 24 May 2015, with a view to improving the relations between the two states. See http://dohanews.co/uae-pardons-qatari-doctor-jailed-for-supporting-banned-islamist-group/
The most recent chapter of the regional clashes, Yemen, has elicited the most direct and coordinated response of all those given by the GCC States since the Arab Spring, except for the participation of forces from all six states in the international coalition led by the United States to combat the ISIS-Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL-DAESH) forces in Iraqi territory. While the threat from this radical group has obliged all six states and Jordan to reinforce their internal security measures and tighten their borders, the prospect of an out-of-control Yemen in Saudi Arabia’s backyard, and the corresponding pressure that Iran would be able to exert on its regional adversary, was sufficiently compelling to lead to a direct military intervention without the legitimisation of the United Nations Security Council.

The announcement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, on 2 April 2015, which establishes the framework of the agreement between Iran and the P5+1 group (the United States, Russia, China, France, the United Kingdom and Germany) with regard to the nuclear negotiations, served only as another cause for concern for the GCC States. Under the agreement, Iran seriously undertook, for the first time since the start of the negotiations in 2002, to offer all the necessary guarantees required by the UN and the IAEA, as well as to reduce its stock of enriched uranium and to transform its nuclear facilities and limit its enrichment capacity, while the international community undertook to lift sanctions following verification of Iran’s compliance with the conditions. The United States recognised Iran’s right to develop a nuclear programme under international supervision, beginning with the long process of normalising Iran’s standing within the regional and international community. For the first time, a conflict in the region was beginning to be settled by diplomatic means and without the use of force, requiring all the parties to give ground in a negotiated process whereby both sides would receive guarantees in return for concessions. However, the GCC States took a diametrically opposed view of the matter. Although officially they supported the agreement, unofficially they rejected any possibility that Iran might become a nuclear power, arguing that it would be much easier for Iran to then transform its nuclear technology for military purposes. Additionally, the new stage in the relations between the United States and Iran left the GCC in a delicate position, watching as its foreign policy was delegitimised by the aggressive stance on Syria and the lack of significant cooperation on its fight against ISIS in Iraq. In this context, marked by the occupation of Sana by the Houthi forces and the support (more moral than real) of Tehran, it was perceived by many as the only alternative for Saudi Arabia other than to continue giving ground to Iran, particularly in light of the passivity of President Obama, who has been blamed in the region for his inaction against al-Assad and his naivety in the negotiations with Iran.

Conclusion

The Arab Spring both exacerbated the already tense relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran and highlighted the delicate balance between the six members of the GCC. The lack of common goals and strategies to address the power vacuum left by the fall of the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and the disastrous strategy with regard to Assad’s regime led to the largest political crisis in the GCC’s history, setting Qatar, and to a lesser extent Oman, against the rest of its members throughout 2014. The reconciliation was only possible once the states became convinced that Iran represented a much greater strategic challenge than ISIS. However, Iran has played the leading role in the only diplomatic occurrence in the region that would signify a final, long-term solution to a conflict that dates back many years, with the ensuing stability that would bring. Paradoxically, this has led to a renewed escalation of the violence in Yemen, due to the conflicting interpretations of what the control of a large swath of the country by the Houthis, presumably backed by Iran, means.

Far from stabilising, the region seems more troubled today than ever, with an escalation in the violence that encompasses Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen. In many cases, the conflicts have taken on sectarian undertones. The reactive policies of the main state players involved have only deepened these sectarian differences, making any sort of political solution even harder to attain.

6 The final agreement is slated to be signed on 30 June 2015.
The New Emerging Energy Landscape: the European Union and North Africa

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In late 2014, oil prices dropped by approximately 50%. This sharp decline is particularly significant given political instability in a number of oil producing countries such as Libya and Iraq and the sanctions on the Iranian oil sector. Several years ago these geopolitical factors would have pushed prices higher. In 2014 they had little, if any, impact due to the steady improvement in energy efficiency, which leads to lower consumption and rising production, particularly in the United States.

Energy efficiency can be defined as the delivery of more services for the same energy input or the same services for less energy input. For a long time the contribution of energy efficiency to energy security was not fully appreciated and was identified as “the hidden fuel.” In recent years, efficiency has attracted more attention and has been labelled by International Energy Agency (IEA) analysts as “the first fuel.” A recent report by the IEA stated that investment in efficiency has helped to lower energy consumption in the 18 member states by 60%. Stated differently, efficiency helped to avoid over 1.7 billion tonnes of oil equivalent from being consumed.¹ Thus, in addition to improving energy security, efficiency offers high returns on investments, increases the sustainability of energy sources and reduces pollution.

To further appreciate the significance of improving efficiency and reducing consumption, it is important to note that the 2002-2012 decade recorded the largest ever growth of energy consumption in terms of volume over any 10-year period. Both the IEA and British Petroleum (BP), among others, project a steady increase in global energy consumption. However, this rise in consumption varies by region and by fuel. Energy demand in the most developed countries (mostly member states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD) has peaked and in some countries has started a steady decline. The European Union’s energy consumption in 2013 was the same as in 1990. On the other hand, global demand for energy is led by Asian emerging markets (China, India, South Korea, and Japan) and the Middle East. Indeed, these two regions account for nearly all of the net global increase in consumption. According to the IEA, for each barrel of oil no longer used in OECD countries, two barrels more are used in non-OECD countries.² China has already surpassed the United States as the world’s largest oil importer and the Middle East is projected to overtake the US to become the largest per capita consumer of oil in 2033.

Similarly, there is a variation in the demand for different fuels. Fossil fuels maintain their dominance over the different forms of energy, while natural gas becomes the fastest growing. In addition, technological advances and lower costs regarding setting up liquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities are slowly helping to reduce the risk of supply disruptions and lower export costs. Oil consumption will grow but its share will decline and coal will grow faster than oil but slower than gas.

Growing concern about greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, particularly carbon dioxide from the com-

bustion of fossil fuels, has created renewed interest in, virtually carbon-free, nuclear power. For decades nuclear power has been seen as a non-intermittent and readily expandable source of energy. However, the industry continues to face daunting challenges and risks that need to be addressed. The list includes high construction costs, safety, waste, and the close connection between civilian nuclear power and military applications. Thus, despite the Fukushima disaster, nuclear power capacity is projected to substantially increase. This increase, however, adds little to its share of global electricity generation due to the impressive rise of renewable energy.

Despite intensive efforts, Europe is likely to remain dependent on oil and gas supplies from North Africa (and elsewhere). More work is needed to enhance political stability and economic development in the southern Mediterranean states. Like nuclear power, renewable energy sources have been the topic of continued interest in both developed and developing countries. This interest is driven mainly by concern over energy security and climate change. Renewable energy is any form of energy that is replenished by natural processes at a rate that equals or exceeds its rate of use. Some renewable energy resources such as hydropower are technically mature and are deployed on a significant scale. Others, such as wind, solar and geothermal, are in a nascent phase of technical maturity and commercial production and deployment. The strong interest in renewable energy in many countries is projected to raise its share in global power generation to one-third by 2040. Low natural gas prices (due to shale revolution), however, might reduce incentives to invest in and develop renewable energy. This variation in the current and projected consumption of fossil fuels, nuclear power and renewable energy has had a significant impact on trading relationships. Generally North America is emerging as a net exporter, rather than a net importer, while Europe and Asia’s already heavy dependency on foreign supplies will further deepen. Against this background, this essay will examine the impact the political instability in the southern Mediterranean countries has had on their energy sectors and its implications on Europe’s energy security. Despite intensive efforts, Europe is likely to remain dependent on oil and gas supplies from North Africa (and elsewhere). More work is needed to enhance political stability and economic development in the southern Mediterranean states.

Europe’s Energy Outlook

With more than half a billion people and a mostly high standard of living, the European Union has one of the largest energy markets in the world. A large population and economic prosperity lead to high energy consumption, while the EU suffers from a severe shortage of indigenous deposits. Recent statistics show a large and, potentially growing, gap between production and demand, with imported supplies making up the difference. The EU’s share of global energy production is approximately 6.1%, while its share of consumption is 12.9%. In other words, the bloc produces less than half of the energy it consumes. Accordingly, in 2012 the EU imported 53.4% of its energy needs. In 1995 the import dependency rate was 43%, meaning that despite tremendous efforts to lower vulnerability to foreign supplies, the EU is becoming more dependent on imported fuels. The EU’s external energy bill accounts for more than one billion euros per day (around 400 billion euros in 2013) and more than a fifth of total EU imports. Certainly import dependency varies across the bloc, with countries such as Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg heavily dependent on foreign supplies and Estonia, Romania and the Czech Republic less so. This dependency also varies from one fuel to another. Russia, Norway, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Libya, Algeria and Qatar are the major energy exporters to the EU. In the last few years, several emerging regional and global geopolitical trends have had a significant im-

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impact on the European energy outlook. These include the surge in unconventional oil and natural gas in Canada and the United States, the rising demand in Asian emerging markets, particularly China and India, political and security upheavals in the Middle East and North Africa, the sharp drop in oil prices and the nuclear accident in Fukushima Daiichi. It is too soon to fully assess the impact of these emerging dynamics. Still, the combination of these trends underscores the growing uncertainties in the global energy markets.

Within this context, the EU has set three targets: a 20% reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, a 20% share of renewable energy and a 20% improvement in energy efficiency, all to be attained by 2020. The European Commission has recently reported substantial progress towards these 20/20/20 targets. Building on this success, the European Council has set out new ambitious targets for the period leading up to 2030. These are: a 40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions (from 1990 levels), a 27% share of renewable energies and a 27% improvement in energy efficiency, with no specific or binding objectives for individual Member States for the last two targets.

The inadequate investment in LNG facilities, turmoil in North Africa, high Asian demand and falling indigenous production all underscore Europe’s vulnerability to interruptions in gas supplies. In addition to these broad targets and achievements it is important to highlight the EU’s efforts to curb energy consumption and diversify the energy mix. The EU has taken several initiatives to improve efficiency and reduce consumption. These include enhancing the energy performance of buildings (both private and public) and energy labelling for domestic appliances. The European Commission considers that an additional 1% in energy savings can reduce EU gas imports by 2.6%.

The Southern Mediterranean States’ Energy Outlook

The political and security upheavals that have swept the Arab world since early 2011 are unprecedented. It will take some time to fully assess the long-term implications. Still, given the crucial role oil revenues play in both providing a large share of the national income and in cementing strategic relations with European consuming countries, the energy sector has witnessed key changes.

Egypt

Egypt holds considerable oil and natural gas deposits. It is the largest oil producer in Africa outside of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-
tries (OPEC), and the second-largest gas producer in the continent, behind Algeria. Despite this huge production, Cairo is not an exporting country, due to its large population (approximately 90 million) and heavy energy consumption. Still, the country plays a significant role in energy markets as a major transit route for oil and gas shipments from the Persian Gulf to Europe and the United States through the Suez Canal and the Suez-Mediterranean (SUMED) Pipeline.

The current political situation in Egypt provides a mixture of opportunities and challenges. Following the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011 the country has suffered from political, security and economic uncertainties. The long-term implications of the toppling of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood and the ascendancy of President Al-Sisi are yet to be assessed. Since 2013, domestic security has seen relative improvement and, accordingly, the prospects for economic recovery have also improved. Still, much work is needed to accommodate political opposition, encourage foreign investment and implement comprehensive economic reform. Medium-term economic prospects hinge on both political stability and sustained reform.

Egypt’s oil production peaked in the mid-1990s and then started declining. Consumption, meanwhile, has been on the rise. This growing imbalance between rising consumption and declining production has left Egypt with little crude oil to export, most of which is sent to the European Union. Furthermore, in recent years the country’s large refinery capacity has declined and, as a result, the volume of imported petroleum products has grown.

On the positive side, political and security upheavals had little impact, if any, on oil and gas transit flows through the Suez Canal. The Canal connects the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez with the Mediterranean Sea. In 2013, nearly 3.2 million barrels of oil a day (b/d) transited the Suez Canal, according to the Egyptian authorities. This is the largest amount ever shipped through the Suez Canal, with the majority of shipments destined for Europe and North America and the remainder going to Asian markets.

Libya

Unlike Egypt which has enjoyed relative stability in the last few years, Libya has descended into an unpredictable civil war. The country has never had a strong national identity. Following the toppling of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, tribal and regional rifts have taken a central stage in shaping the country’s policies. A national government and parliament have obtained international recognition, but were forced to move to the eastern city of Tobruk and have appealed for external military intervention to restore order. Meanwhile an Islamist umbrella group known as Libya Dawn has taken charge of the capital Tripoli and another Islamist group, Ansar Al-Sharia has taken control of Benghazi. Regional powers like Egypt, Algeria and the United Arab Emirates have taken various steps, including military operations, to contain the Islamists. The United States and the European Union have been hesitant to intervene militarily and instead have called for mediation and dialogue. Several Western countries have evacuated their embassies and personnel from Libya. The ongoing political instability and lack of security have had a devastating impact on the country’s energy sector and overall economy.

Libya enjoys three major advantages. First, the country holds the largest share of proven oil reserves in Africa (after Nigeria and Algeria). Despite these massive reserves, production has failed to keep pace with consumption. In recent years production has been falling by 3% annually while consumption has been rising by 7%. As a result, the volume of exports has substantially declined, and political instability and repeated attacks on gas pipelines and facilities have made a bad situation worse. In 2012, Egypt halted gas exports to Israel, and in late 2014 it started importing liquefied natural gas (LNG). Traditionally, Europe had been the leading importer of Egypt’s LNG, but these imports have significantly dropped in the last few years.
has had a hard time fulfilling its significant hydrocarbon potential. Under the Gaddafi regime the country was subject to international sanctions for a prolonged period of time. The lack of stability and security since 2011 has dealt a heavy blow to the oil and gas industry.

In 2011, hydrocarbon exports suffered a near-total paralysis. In response, the International Energy Agency (IEA) coordinated a release of 60 million barrels of oil from the emergency stocks of its member countries – the first such release since 2005. Since then the volume of production has reflected the level of stability in the country. Oil production and exports, which had recovered in 2012, collapsed again after 2014 due to militia attacks on the main oil terminals. It is important to point out that before the recent security upheavals the authorities developed an ambitious plan to increase oil production to approximately two million b/d. However, the escalating violence has put these plans on hold. Indeed production has drastically fallen since 2012, leading to a substantial reduction in Libyan oil exports, which historically were mostly destined for Europe.

Libya’s natural gas production and exports are far less significant than its oil production and exports. In recent decades, the authorities have paid more attention to the gas sector and production more than tripled in the 2000s. The Italian oil company Eni, in partnership with the National Oil Company (NOC), led the development of the gas sector, particularly the Western Libya Gas Project. Most of this gas is exported to Italy via the Green Stream Pipeline (operated jointly by Eni and NOC). In addition, Libya exported a small amount of LNG to Spain. In 2011, the LNG plant was damaged and LNG exports have since been suspended.

**Algeria**

Unlike Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, the regime in Algiers has survived the key changes that have swept the Arab world since 2011. There were sporadic street demonstrations calling for political change, but they quickly petered out due to a lack of popular support. At least two forces have contributed to this relative stability. First, for most of the 1990s the country had experienced steady fighting between a largely Islamist opposition and the government. The relative stability in recent years has been seen as a welcome development by the majority of Algerians. Simply stated, people do not want to go back to street fighting and bloody confrontations between opposition groups and the authorities. Second, due to oil and gas revenues Algeria is wealthier than most of its neighbours and in a better position to respond to popular demands for jobs and higher standards of living. Finally, the Algerian authorities’ ability to survive the regional political and security upheavals should not be taken for granted and does not rule out popular uprisings in the future. The economy remains highly dependent on the hydrocarbon sector which, despite declining production since 2006, still accounts for a large share of its GDP. In addition, President Bouteflika’s fragile health casts a degree of uncertainty over the next few years.

Due to oil and gas revenues Algeria is wealthier than most of its neighbours and in a better position to respond to popular demands for jobs and higher standards of living

Algeria holds massive oil and natural gas deposits. It holds the fourth largest proven oil reserves in Africa (after Libya, Nigeria and Angola) and the second largest gas reserves (after Nigeria). Like other major oil and gas producers, the country is heavily dependent on hydrocarbon revenues. Furthermore, the energy sector suffers from three characteristics common to other countries. First, petroleum and gas products are heavily subsidised. These subsidies are a big burden on the state budget and encourage high consumption and waste. Second, the January 2013 militant attack on the In Amenas gas facility prompted security concerns about operating in Algeria’s remote areas. The attack resulted in several causalities and a temporary suspension of gas production at the facility. In recent years, terrorism and cyber-attacks have been a major concern for oil and gas producers. Third, traditionally the Algerian authorities have not provided attractive incentives for foreign investment. As a result, production has stalled and the infrastructure needs major updates and modernisation. In
recent years, the Algerian government has enacted new contractual and fiscal provisions, which are particularly important in exploring and developing the country’s reportedly massive shale gas and tight oil reserves. Algeria has been producing and exporting oil and petroleum products for several decades. Some of the main fields are mature, raising concerns over production and export volumes and the authorities have utilised enhanced oil recovery techniques to keep the old fields producing. This suggests that production is likely to gradually decline in the coming years. This decline has raised serious concerns in Washington and Brussels – Algeria’s main export markets. In recent years, the United States’ oil production has substantially increased and, as a result, imports from Algeria and elsewhere have declined and Europe has emerged as a major importer.

For decades, geographical proximity and historical ties have consolidated energy interdependency between North African oil and gas producers and Europe. Political instability in recent years has raised concerns about this mutual energy security. Algeria holds both large proven conventional gas reserves and vast untapped shale gas resources. However, production from mature fields has declined. Efforts to increase production have achieved modest success mostly due to bureaucratic obstacles, difficulties attracting foreign investment, old infrastructure and technical problems. However, the country is still the second largest external gas exporter to the European Union after Russia, with exports reaching Europe either by pipelines or as LNG. The country is under pressure to boost gas output to meet growing domestic demand and to fulfil long-term contractual obligations.

Europe and North Africa – the Way Forward

Europe is projected to remain dependent on foreign energy supplies. Despite serious efforts to curb production, invest in alternative energy and diversify the energy mix, the EU lacks the necessary deposits to meet consumption. For decades, geographical proximity and historical ties have consolidated energy interdependency between North African oil and gas producers and Europe. Political instability in recent years has raised concerns about this mutual energy security. Political stability and economic prosperity serve the two sides’ national interests. The experience of the last few years suggests that stability cannot be sustained without addressing popular (economic, political and social) grievances. Political and economic reforms are not silver bullets and can actually further destabilise the region in the short term. But in the long term, poor governance and dysfunctional economies breed religious extremism and violence. In order to enhance its energy security, Europe needs to maintain an active role in promoting the necessary reforms in the southern Mediterranean states.
A Fragmented Maghreb Facing a Security Challenge

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Security Threat

On 18 March 2015, authorship for the Bardo Museum attack in Tunis that caused the death of 24 people and wounded 45 was claimed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This attack constitutes the first major terrorist operation to strike in the heart of the capital of Tunisia since the January 2011 revolution.

In this country, which continues to spark hope for real political change, security is the primary challenge to the success of the political transition. Although terrorism is not new to Tunisia, terrorist violence has gained a new impetus since the revolution. This violence is partly due to regional disorganisation. The assault on the American embassy by Salafists on 14 September 2012 and the assassinations of two leftist political figures (Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi) in 2013 demonstrate that the capital is just as vulnerable as the hinterland. These acts of violence occurring in the very heart of the capital confirm the fear of Tunisian government officials regarding the jihadi threat and the chaos ravaging Libya, as well as the persistence of terrorist hotbeds in the Mount Chambi area along the Algerian border.

In any case, in contrast to other attacks, the Bardo attack occurred when Tunisia seemed to have stabilised on the political and institutional levels. Beji Caid Essebsi, the head of the coalition that had just won the legislative elections of November 2014, was elected president of the Republic.

This security issue demonstrates that the fragile Tunisian transition is feeling the effects of the new regional order and the destabilisation of Libya. After the fall of Colonel Gaddafi, the chaotic situation in Libya has affected the entire region. The porosity of its borders and the weakness of certain states in the region are the source of significant arms circulation that benefits the members of both Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State (IS), two rival organisations.

The security threat emerging from the Arab Spring combines with older factors. Well before the Arab uprisings of 2011, Maghreb and Sahel countries were already suffering from state weakness, perceptible in their inability to control their territory and protect their citizens. Hence, illegal activities developed, such as contraband (fuel, cigarettes, sugar, stolen automobiles) or criminal activities. These undertakings, which escape state control, are associated with a tradition of irredentism among certain populations, in particular the Tuaregs, who have always had difficult relations with states.

More recently, the presence of AQIM has constituted a source of insecurity in the region. To fund its activities, AQIM has not hesitated to take Europeans hostage, and states have negotiated their release by paying substantial ransoms. But the organisation

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1 On 11 April 2002, a 25-year-old French Tunisian blew himself up in a tank truck he was driving that was packed with explosives. Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for the attack, which took place in front of the Ghriba synagogue in Djerba and caused 21 casualties and 30 wounded. On 3 January 2007, a shootout took place between the police and an armed group calling itself the Asad ibn al-Furat Army in the area of Soliman, southeast of Tunis. At first the press presented the attack as a case of banditry, but the inquiry revealed it was a Salafist group. The emergence of violent Islamism marked a rupture with Tunisian political Islamism led by Ennahdha.

2 Emerging in September 2006 as a splinter group from the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), AQIM has pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda.
also controls contraband networks. Thanks to this type of funding, AQIM has managed to build up a significant arsenal. The attack on the Algerian In Amenas gas facilities in January 2013 revealed the sophistication of the weapons the al-Qaeda-allied organisation has on hand. Today, a large part of its arms cache comes from the dispersion of Libya’s weapon stock after the downfall of Colonel Gaddafi. Many of Gaddafi’s auxiliary troops returned to their countries of origin (Mali, Niger) equipped with arms they then sold or exchanged.

The terrorist organisations striving to defy states and their institutions recruit throughout the region. The terrorist attack against the In Amenas gas complex, which showed the limitations of Algerian security strategy, also revealed the transnational nature of the group of assailants. Of the 37 terrorists, 11 were Tunisian, allegedly recruited by AQIM during the Arab Spring.\(^3\)

### The Weight of Algerian-Moroccan Disputes

Maghreb countries are not organised to handle this alarming security situation. Maghreb integration has never really worked, despite the establishment of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in 1989. The disputes between Algiers and Rabat have constituted a sizable obstacle to AMU operation.

The conflict between the two major Maghreb countries initially involved border disputes. Independent Algeria did in fact renege on the agreement made by Farhat Abbas on the restitution of certain territories claimed by Morocco. Tensions continued between the two countries until 1988, when Hassan II admitted on a visit to Algiers that his country’s territorial claims on Mauritania and certain parts of Algeria were utopian and constituted an obstacle to possible cooperation with the new Algerian military government. A period of detente between the two countries followed, with Algiers at first refusing to come to the aid of the Polisario Front, which had been fighting for the independence of Western Sahara since 1973. But in 1975, after the announcement of the Green March to ‘recover’ what Rabat considered ‘its Saharan provinces amputated from Morocco,’ the Algerian government’s attitude changed radically. Indeed, the Moroccan initiative of the 350,000-strong march on Western Sahara allowed the old demons of ‘Greater Morocco’\(^4\) to resurface, a concept that Algiers thought definitively buried after Rabat’s recognition of Mauritania and the Ifrane Agreement, which recognised Algeria’s possession of Tindouf. As of 1975, the two states accused one another of wishing to destabilise the neighbouring regime. This attitude was put forth as defensive by Algiers, indicating the protection of its revolution, whereas for Morocco, the aim was to recover territories in the name of its ‘historic rights.’ But beyond the official arguments, Algiers and Rabat were clearly engaged in a struggle for regional hegemony that was to be extended through different channels, in particular the Western Sahara conflict, which regularly experiences convulsions and would become the focal point of the recurrent tension between the two countries.

These tensions are all the more difficult to dispel for the Algerian political class since Rabat has still not officially recognised the inviolability of the border between the two countries, the 1972 convention not having been definitively ratified by the Moroccan Parliament. In Rabat, on the other hand, the issue of the border is never dissociated from the issue of Western Sahara.

These reasons do not suffice to explain Algeria’s obstinacy regarding the Western Sahara issue. Algerian political players continue to accuse their Moroccan counterparts of coming to the aid of Algerian Islamists during the 1990s with the aim of destabilising the regime.\(^5\)

This rivalry between Algiers and Rabat was likewise perceptible in their handling of the Mali crisis. Algiers, which always wished to keep both France and Morocco out of the management of affairs regarding


\(^4\) The concept of Greater Morocco was developed in the mid-1950s by Allal al-Fassi, the leader of the Istiqlal party. According to this concept developed by nationalists, Morocco should legitimately recover all territories that were “amputated” before and during the French protectorate. Based on a map drawn by a party member, Moroccan nationalists believe their country, which should extend to Saint Louis in Senegal, should also include Mauritania, part of Mali, part of the Algerian Sahara and all of Western Sahara.

the Sahel area, put forth two factors it considered essential: its expertise in combating Islamist terrorism and its ability to conduct negotiations between Tuaregs and the governments of Mali and Niger. Since 2001, it is as an experienced victim that Algeria has offered its services to participate in the international struggle against Islamist terrorism established by President Bush. Washington felt that this country, which had fought against armed Islamism on its own soil during the civil war (1992-1998), could be but an invaluable ally.

Algeria also used its power of negotiation and mediation between the Tuaregs and the governments of Sahel countries. Algiers played this role in numerous conflicts, in particular between 1991 and 1995. In 2010, the government signed the Tamanrasset Accords with Niger, Mali and Mauritania, which marked the beginning of joint military cooperation that deliberately excluded Morocco. But in January 2013, when Operation Serval was launched in Mali, it signaled, to a certain extent, the failure of the Algerian strategy in the Sahel. Indeed, Algiers always attempted to lead the Sahel states to reject foreign military and security presence in the region. In 2012, after the military coup in Mali, Algeria found it very difficult to rely on its former allies, particularly the Tuaregs.6

The Malian army collapsed and a coalition of jihadists and Tuareg separatists embarked on the conquest of northern Mali.

The regional counterterrorist strategy implemented by France weakened the Algerian government’s position while putting the country’s political leaders in an awkward position with regard to the principles they had regularly been putting forth. The French army’s return to Mali thwarted Algeria’s policy, which consisted of stemming French and Western interference in the Sahel. It has thenceforth participated in the French-American strategy and the diplomatic and military alliance between France and the Sahel states. But this return of the French army to the region is likewise contrary to Algeria’s ambition of becoming the major regional power controlling all security parameters.

Excluded from Sahelian negotiations, Morocco has taken action on another front to express its concern with terrorism, particularly displaying its desire to protect itself from the threat from the south. Competition between the two major Maghreb states is also exercised through the countries’ presence in Western Africa. Taking advantage of a lesser presence of Algeria in the African arena, the King of Morocco visited a number of African countries in March 2014, namely Mali, Ivory Coast, Guinea and Gabon. Moroccan presence and investments revolve around two focal points: the economy and religion.

The parallel involvement of Algeria and Morocco in Malian affairs reveals the lack of collaboration between the two countries. Their disputes have led them to establish alliances with actors outside the region. Having become structural, this contention is detrimental in more ways than one. First of all, it prevents the countries in the area from organising into a strategic subregion whose states cooperate to block the terrorist threat. Yet these national positions and the regional division considerably complicate action by NATO, which does not recognise a strategic Maghreb but rather has to deal with states, with whom it must negotiate separately. This configuration weakens the strategic scope of the Maghreb region, which appears, by force of circumstances, piecemeal and fragmented.7

The Maghreb’s great weakness resides in its division. The countries in the area continue to appear disorganised before united partners, as, for instance, the European Union.

Today, the Maghreb’s great weakness resides in its division. The countries in the area continue to appear disorganised before united partners, as, for instance, the European Union. This division prevents it from building a collective security plan that could protect it from Islamic State or AQIM-led Islamist terrorism. The notion of collective security does not exist and each country is governed by its own security imperatives. By the same token, each country continues to follow its own logic, vying with the other at a time

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6 In April 2012, the personnel of the Algerian consulate in Gao were taken hostage by a Tuareg group that had long been friendly with Algiers.

7 Abdennour Benantar, “(Re)penser le(s) relation(s) Otan-Maghreb : perspective et limites d’un dispositif régional de sécurité limité au Maghreb,” in L’Otan et le Maghreb, FRS/ L’Harmattan p. 18-43.
when joint action is needed to neutralise the jihadi threat. It is imperative that the two major countries of the region relinquish their national approach.

**Shedding National Mindsets**

The advantages of an integrated region have been expressed more than once, whether they consist of economic synergy, the opportunity to sign agreements without uncoordinated negotiations that lend the parties less force, the importance for Maghreb societies of getting to know one another and combining efforts to handle issues common to all of these countries, such as religious fundamentalism, writing up history or arriving at full and comprehensive civic rights.

In addition to these advantages, repeatedly put forth, there are new factors introduced by the Arab Spring. Indeed, this time of rupture has marked a milestone in the history of Arab countries while radically changing regional geopolitics. The standards governing regional and international affairs have been modified. It is no longer only the imperatives of power dictating international policy, but also the social pressure contributed by public opinion. What effects can these different changes have on the organisation of regional affairs in the Maghreb, while the Algerian and Moroccan ruling classes desperately cling to a nationalism that seems obsolete?

With regard to the Western Sahara conflict, a veritable bone of contention between Algerians and Moroccans, the types of demands have radically changed. Sahrawi demands regarding human rights precede the Arab Spring, dating back to 2005. Since then, demands have gained a civic nature. In doing so, they have drawn on a new register – that of human rights, individual and political liberties and international legality.8

Such human rights demands originating pre-2011 have likewise been fuelled by the Arab Spring. The emulation effect was felt as much among the Sahrawi populations under Moroccan administration since 1975 as among the Sahrawi refugees in Tindouf. In March 2011, the appeal made in Tindouf by the Young Revolutionaries group demanded reform and change in the administration and judiciary of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), the end of corruption, reform of the electoral code and entitlement of youth to greater participation in political life. This protest was supported by the Khat al-Shahid movement, comprised by dissidents of the Polisario Front based in Spain.

The civil disobedience movements burgeoning in Western Sahara demonstrate that the measures and institutions established to represent the Sahrawis are increasingly inadequate. Neither Morocco’s nor the Polisario Front’s political offers meet Sahrawi expectations. The latter do not identify with the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS), established by Mohamed VI in 1992. They are also identifying less and less with the Polisario Front and are choosing more centrist options. As in Tunis, political action is now experienced and conceived in an entirely new manner by political activists and citizens, in a context where expression is slowly but surely growing freer. Wherever we may be, opinion now weighs upon decision-making. In the Western Sahara as everywhere, we are witnessing a new concept of politics that enshrines the emergence of the citizen. By mentioning the effects of the regional and international atmosphere, as well as the domestic evolution that would incite the parties to take ‘the people of Western Sahara’ into account, the UN Secretary-General’s 2012 report already hinted at this new order.

These are new factors we absolutely must address in order to settle the Western Sahara issue. Its outcome seems, in fact, dictated by three factors. First of all, the regional security situation calls for an end to the conflict, thus precluding the Sahrawis from swelling the ranks of the jihadists plaguing the area. Secondly, the economic climate of the countries in the region calls for Maghreb integration and greater economic synergy. And finally and perhaps above all, there is a lack of prospects for the Sahrawis, who had expressed their anger well before the Arab Spring.9

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9 See the special issue of Orient XXI: “Quarante ans de conflit au Sahara occidental,” http://orientxxi.info/documents/dossiers/quarante-ans-de-conflit-au-sahara,0880
The Euromed Dream in the New Hobbesian International Wilderness

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The Barcelona Constellation

The Euro-Mediterranean project was engendered through the Final Declaration of the First Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Barcelona on 25 November 1995, in a particularly favourable international geopolitical constellation, whose optimism thoroughly influenced the project’s content. On 25 December 1991, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the Soviet flag was raised for the last time over the Kremlin towers. It was the end of the confrontation between blocs and the end of the bipolar world in which blocs of countries and the major systems of capitalism and communism had faced off. Francis Fukuyama hailed it as the ‘end of history’ in his seminal 1989 article, later expanded into his famous book. Fukuyama foresaw ‘the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.’ Western-style democracy and the free market economy would thus signal the final stage of historic evolution, understood as a history of struggle whose end would give rise to a sort of perpetual peace like that imagined by Kant two centuries earlier, in which international cooperation would prevail over confrontation. With the end of the Cold War also came the end of confrontations by proxy in the developing world.

The failure of real socialism likewise entailed the discredit of the Third-World leftism and socialist leanings that had prevailed in the mindset of the leaders in the developing world and throughout its societies. The new philosophy of international cooperation thus left behind the manipulation it suffered during the bipolar era to culminate – after a series of preliminary conferences under a positive climate with winds of hope – in the United Nations Millennium Declaration on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), that was finally approved in 2000. Clearly, the preparation and final declaration of the Millennium Goals were one of the most obvious expressions of the atmosphere of optimism permeating the international stage after the end of the Cold War, auguring a major era of peace, progress and international cooperation. In the strictly political sphere, talk also began of a ‘third wave’ of democratisations, as announced by the title of the well-known book by Samuel Huntington. It seemed clear that the third wave of democratisations that began in southern Europe with the democratic transitions of the 1970s in Portugal and Spain would reach, and was already beginning to reach not only Latin America and certain Asian countries but, progressively, the rest of the world. Obviously, the democratic transitions already underway at the time in Central and Eastern Europe were an important part of such change.

The Middle East Peace Process, to which we will return later, seemed particularly auspicious, in the 1995 Barcelona constellation with the 1991 Madrid Conference and the Oslo Agreements pointing towards the possibility of reaching a lasting peace in the Middle East under the principle of Israel and Palestine as two States coexisting next to one another in peace.

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 had provided the great, unexpected opportunity for Germany’s reunification, which Chancellor Kohl effectively and vigorously managed to bring about. At the same time, the fall of the Iron Curtain gave all of Europe the great
opportunity of attracting to the European Union, still under construction, all Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) that had remained hidden and separated behind the Iron Curtain for decades, under Soviet domination. And this was when a major pact was made, symbolised by Chancellor Kohl and the President of the Spain, Felipe González: Europe would launch a major cooperation operation with the CEECs through the PHARE and TACIS programmes, with the end goal of bringing them closer to the European Union, while at the same time launching another major operation towards the South, a major Euro-Mediterranean policy to attract Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs) to the EU orbit. This major pact, concluded at the Cannes Summit among the leaders of EU countries, would facilitate the first Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Barcelona and the approval of its Final Declaration in November 1995. In both cases, the European Union did what it knew best: applying the experience of building the EU as an area of growing integration. First cooperation, then progressive commercial, economic and finally political integration. This involved applying what we now know as the ‘integration method’ to foreign policy. It has been occasionally said that the EU’s most successful and efficient foreign policy was precisely its enlargement process. The latter has profoundly marked EU foreign policy and its evolution. Their joint emergence in that great European Pact at the Cannes Conference demonstrates the profound, close connection between both processes, preparation for enlargement to the East and association to the South.

What would eventually become the pre-accession policy for the East European countries was clearly based on a philosophy of integration. The profound transformation aimed at and expected of the CEECs was based on their progressive approximation to the EU. These countries would have to change not only their political systems – as had occurred in the countries joining the Union in the 1970s, with Greece, Portugal and Spain going from dictatorial systems to democracies. Besides democratising their political systems, the CEEs also had to change their entire economic systems, adapting them to the market economy. The manner considered most efficient for achieving this immense transformation was their approximation and ‘regulatory’ adaptation to the European Union. Accepting the EU’s *acquis communautaire* would completely transform their institutional organisation and regulatory system to technical regulations for product manufacture, not to mention the immense, prolific body of legislation accumulated by the European Union over the course of decades. The effort required of the CEECs was immense, but so were the rewards: their complete integration into the sphere of the European Union, as well as their inclusion as full members under the protective umbrella of NATO, keeping at bay any possible blows by the fearsome Soviet bear, now a friendly country but one of formidable scale within the confines of Eastern Europe and the vast Eurasian area.

The 1995 Barcelona Declaration is not just supposed to be a charter regulating relations among countries. It goes far beyond this by proposing an immense project for change and transformation towards modernisation of the Mediterranean Partner Countries

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), traditionally also known as the Barcelona Process, was designed as a major association or partnership project whose policies also partake of the integration method. This aspect would become much more explicit through President Prodi’s later announcement of a new stage of bilateral development of the Barcelona Process via the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), in this case, the Southern Neighbourhood.

**Barcelona Process: Goals and Approach**

As is well known, what was proposed in the 1995 Barcelona Declaration was the construction of an area of peace and stability, of shared economic progress and understanding and intercultural dialogue among the peoples living along our Sea. But it is not just supposed to be a charter regulating relations among countries and between North and South. It goes far beyond this by proposing an immense project for change and transformation towards mod-
ernisation of the Mediterranean Partner Countries such that, in a manner clearly reminiscent of the integration method applied in Central and Eastern Europe, they can come into alignment with the system prevalent in the EU. It is thus an immense, ambitious, modernising project designed to upgrade the societies of those countries through the modernisation of their institutions and economies, allowing them to close the economic gap between the Northern and Southern Mediterranean Basin, a process of modernising the prevailing cultures and mindsets and a progressive coming together of countries. This immense political project fundamentally had an economic motor that consisted in creating a free trade area to revitalise countries’ economies and modernise their institutions and economic policies along with their trade. The implementation of this economic motor for the great Euro-Mediterranean political project would moreover be reinforced by financial aid, which was to contribute to upgrading both sectoral policies as well as companies and economic organisations throughout the Euro-Mediterranean countries.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was built as of 1995 based on what was actually the EU foreign policy remit or areas of competence at that time; thus fundamentally comprising foreign trade and tariffs measures, and technical and financial cooperation for development. This had been the true foundation of any presence in third countries and foreign action by the European Union, through the Commission’s, aid programmes in any sector, as part of a common EU policy, that of cooperation for development or foreign commercial policy, but not included in any common policy internal to the EU. Then, with the progressive expansion of the EU’s own remit, policies in different spheres or topics would be introduced. The entire Barcelona Process appears as a major operation of development aid that offers as well a limited integration through the use of the same methods with partner countries as those used as a pre-accession system for candidate countries to the EU. This method, the EU method, is radically different to the classic diplomacy that continues within the sphere of exclusive or nearly exclusive powers of Member States. As indicated earlier, this method, ultimately limited to ‘soft power,’ is in the very genes of both EU institutions and civil servants. As Pierre Vimont indicated, to attempt to overcome it, the Commission officers still perceive conventional diplomacy, based more on interests and Realpolitik, as contrary to the principles and the spirit of the EU’s community approach since its founding, more focused on values and the principle of legality.

The reality is that all of the Partner Countries had democracy nominally enshrined in their constitutions or legislation and in their proclamations, but with differing degrees of conviction, and practically in no case are they intended to be applied immediately or in the short term.

One of the most important applications of the method of integration to the Barcelona Process is the consideration of democracy and human rights as values commonly accepted as universal and as the foundation for the Partnership. The basis is therefore a traditional concept of modernisation understood as the convergence of different human societies towards the model developed first in Europe in the Western World, and that has, according to this view, gradually become the universal model through globalisation. It is a modernisation project considered ‘universal’ and acceptable by all. It is assumed that social and economic structures will be capable of progressively adapting and become flexible in order to advance towards each country’s own modernisation through integration in the Euro-Mediterranean normative area modelled on the EU’s acquis communautaire. More specifically, referring to Mediterranean Partner Countries, it is thus assumed that their traditional authoritarian regimes will accept and encourage their opening up and democratisation, although in a slow, progressive manner. Thenceforward, the hypothesis is followed of developmentalism as inducer of the modernisation process. That is, it is believed that economic liberalisation, both national and international, with countries opening themselves to international trade and competition and encouraging the national application of free market principles, will induce economic growth in these countries. And with this economic growth,
structural, economic and social changes will take place along with an effective development process. Finally, and this is the critical point of the developmental hypothesis, the economic and social changes will be followed by political change that will progressively accompany the process of modernisation.

The Euro-Mediterranean project today must contend with a geopolitical environment that could be qualified as a new Hobbesian jungle in which, in addition, there is no Leviathan that could impose order.

In other words, the traditional Arabic authoritarian regimes, through the growth and development brought about by partnership with Europe, would gradually modernise their political structures as well to eventually embrace the values of democracy and human rights declared as shared, according to the commitments accepted by all countries in Barcelona ‘95. The reality is that all of them had democracy nominally enshrined in their constitutions or legislation and in their proclamations, but with differing degrees of conviction, and practically in no case are they intended to be applied immediately or in the short term. The ‘langue de bois’ was a common feature to different degrees in all countries. Some, such as Syria and above all, Libya, straight out rejected such a prospect and remain on the margins of the Euro-Mediterranean process, and in the case of Libya, without accepting any agreement whatsoever.

But what is certain is that all countries, even those most inclined to accept the long-term developmentalist and democratising approach, would in fact only accept the ‘method of integration’ in its economic aspects, and even then only partially. There is not only the political reticence of the regime, but also the great pressure of the ruling classes in each country, whose ‘vested interests’ advocate resistance to liberalisation. Moreover, when liberalisation entails privatisation, in many cases these privatisations are to the benefit of those participating in power. As had occurred in Europe in the century and a half before the EU was formed, it is a social pressure with protectionist proposals, are attempting to stem any external economic liberalisation, demanding internal regulations benefiting each group and industry.

Despite this, the progress made by the Barcelona Process in this regard is undeniable, though to different degrees according to the country. With Tunisia and Morocco in the lead, there has been progress towards adapting the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s postulates by applying the respective agreements with the EU. The intention was to reach the major goal of bridging the economic gap between the North and South Mediterranean through economic modernisation and growth. And indeed, this was the case to a significant degree during the Barcelona Process’s first ten years or ‘classic period.’ Together with the application of reforms, with support from MEDA funds, European technical assistance consolidated the economic reform processes that had already begun under the auspices of international financial institutions since the late 1980s. The strengthening and advance of these policies within the Barcelona Process certainly fostered improved economic performance levels and even some approximation of per capita income levels to the EU average, despite the enormous distances still is. This was particularly the case in countries that progressed most in reforms induced by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, above all in Tunisia and Morocco, as indicated, and lagging behind in Jordan, Lebanon and above all in Egypt, a key country for its demographic and economic dimension as well as its political centrality within the Arab World.

What Went Wrong?

Paraphrasing a famous title, we could also pose the question What went wrong with the Euro-Mediterranean project? Clearly, the Euro-Mediterranean project today must contend with a geopolitical environment that could be qualified as a new Hobbesian jungle in which, in addition, there is no Leviathan that could impose order like the State did in traditional Nation-States.

To answer the question ‘What went wrong?’, we must refer to the various phenomena foreign to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, some of them of great global impact, that have developed in the Arab-Mediterranean World in recent years.
First of all, the derailment of the Middle East Peace Process. The lack of understanding between Israel and the Arab World has been growing. Suffice it to recall that on both sides, the greatest symbols of willingness to understand and negotiate – Israeli President Yitzhak Rabin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat – were assassinated by radicals of their own camp. The opportunities for peace were criminally sabotaged by extremists on both sides. The idea was to demonstrate that these were two incompatible projects, one side proposing the creation of a strictly Jewish State and the others proclaiming the desire to throw the Jews into the sea. Despite the previous groundwork – the agreements reached at Camp David as of ‘78 and then Oslo as of ‘93 – no-one ever even considered exploring the possibilities offered by the Arab Peace Initiative put forth by Saudi Arabia and all Arab States in 2003, just as there has never been a capacity to control violent anti-Israeli and by extension anti-Western extremist groups.

The Arab Mediterranean countries accepted some of the economic modernisations offered by the Barcelona Process and certain social, education or health-related modernisations, etc. Nonetheless, as has been said, it can be observed that they never seriously considered complying with the commitments made in 1995 in Barcelona to progressively democratise their political structures. This is why the ‘Arab singularity’ continues to be discussed. The majority of them dragged their feet, practicing the ‘langue de bois’ while others, particularly Syria, and even more so Libya, flat-out rejected the notion point-blank.

The societies of the Arab Mediterranean countries, however, are modernising. Their newest citizens – youth and the new professional classes – are beginning to express growing discomfort with the inherited authoritarian systems. The regimes are thus at odds with both the more or less underground, pro-leftist democracy protesters and Islamist movements. And sometimes pitting them against one another. Regarding the phenomenon of corruption pervading the traditional authoritarian regimes, even constituting the essential kleptocracy of the regime in the case of Tunisia under Ben Ali, the Islamists put themselves forth as pure. Especially for the popular classes, who have not enjoyed the advantages of a higher education, Islam-inspired movements appear as the defenders of their Palestinian brothers, as denouncing corruption from their religious stance, and as denouncing the process of Westernisation of traditions that governments are attempting to impose.

For reasons fundamentally foreign to sphere of the Mediterranean Partner Countries, the fact is that we are witnessing an upsurge of radical Islamist movements with terrorist acts that are growing in force. In 1978, the Saur Revolution, of a communist inclination, began in Afghanistan, which immediately led to Soviet intervention to defend it against Mujahideen insurgents. This would lead to a long period of war lasting from 1978 to 1992. The first part of the Afghan Civil War ended with the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 on Gorbachov’s orders and the growing involvement of the United States in the area, especially through covert operations in support of the anti-communist Mujahideen insurgents. Finally, in 1996, the Taliban took power and imposed Sharia, and Afghanistan became an incubator State for all sorts of Jihadist groups, above all al-Qaeda, which began to propagate international terrorist violence, especially against their former US and Saudi sponsors.

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Arab Mediterranean Countries never seriously considered complying with the commitments made in 1995 in Barcelona to progressively democratise their political structures

The Khomeini-led Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the United State’s great humiliation from the takeover of its embassy began a period of increasing perplexity and incomprehension by the Western World regarding what was really happening in the Muslim world. The Iran-Iraq War contained the situation in the area, which was broken by the invasion of Kuwait and the First Gulf War. In the Euro-Mediterranean region, meanwhile, there was the extremely cruel civil war in Algeria in the years following the coup in
1991, which robbed the Islamists of their electoral victory, increasing the perplexity and sensation of difficulty in comprehending the Muslim Arab World among Westerners. Finally, the 11 September 2001 attacks in New York and Washington DC definitively changed the course of history. The American response, at first supported by the international community regarding the intervention in Afghanistan and later outside international legality with the occupation and accumulation of errors committed in Iraq, has led to a new world in which violence is unleashed, preventing the normal evolution of the Arab World in general and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Partner Countries specifically.

With the arrival of the Arab Spring and Arab Revolutions in 2011, what we encountered was the crisis of the Arab authoritarian State. The progress of the new independent, secular and markedly Arab nationalist States insofar as education, construction of the basic State structures, and modernisation of society and mindsets clashed with the authoritarian patrimonialisation of the State by the groups in power. Abuse, kleptocracy and lack of freedoms only increased this contradiction and made it more obvious. The mega-attacks of 11 September 2001, moreover, strengthened authoritarian leaders in the Arab World, who presented themselves as guarantors of anti-terrorist cooperation and containment of Islamist movements, by then feared throughout the West. Revolutions broke out with the immolation of young Bouazizi in Tunisia. At that point, in the countries of the Arab World, a struggle emerged that had been concealed by the authoritarianism practised by the regimes; a struggle between on one side young people and modern-leaning citizens and on the other Islam-oriented movements that connect particularly well with the traditionalism of the popular classes, especially in rural areas, and that are aided in one way or another by external support and financing from the Gulf States.

As a consequence of the Arab Spring, we now have a Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Basin that is more differentiated than ever, as per the results of the popular movements in each country.

In the case of countries with natural gas or oil revenues available, as with Algeria, and as has been the case in the Gulf States, reforms have simply consisted of raising civil servant and general employee salaries and increasing employment in public institutions and the administration, debiting the cost to the budget, and little more. The case of Egypt is particularly significant because of its role as centre of gravity within the Arab World, from a demographic as well as historical and political standpoint. When the citizen revolution beginning in Tunisia with the self-immolation of young Bouazizi and the overthrow of Ben Ali spread to spark the popular revolts in Cairo, it became clear that the phenomenon was going to spread one way or another, with one or another result, throughout the Arab World. The Administrations of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood, which, through its political arm, succeeded in winning the elections, were an important sign of the advance of movements of Islamic tendencies throughout the Arab World. For the same reason, the Thermidorian reaction of the army and a significant section of the secular, modern-leaning population behind President al-Sisi marked a new direction to keep in mind in the Arab World, whether it be a return to the traditional authoritarian habits or the correction of past errors. Finally, we have the case in which the failure of the revolts has led to chaos and civil war, as in Syria and Libya. The emergence of the new phenomenon of terrorism on a large scale, with occupation and control of the territory and a prelude
of the Islamic State in the bloody maelstrom of Syria and Iraq has triggered alarm bells among the international community.

In this situation, Europe and the West should clearly help and exercise much greater influence, in a positive sense, on the evolution of the Arab World, particularly in the Mediterranean Partner Countries. It is obvious that the internal conflicts in the Arab World and the Muslim World must be settled internally and that any foreign intervention does nothing more than aggravate the situation. But it is also obvious that the role incumbent upon Europe especially and the West in general is of extraordinary transcendence.

And one of the key problems, from this perspective, resides in the shortcomings of the instruments and the conventional ‘European approach’ of cooperation for development and the offer of limited regional integration, as a European foreign policy towards these countries to deal with the current situation. One could say that the candid Euromed is surrounded by the Hobbesian jungle that the current international stage has become, for which it lacks the tools for reaction precisely in the most severe cases. Preaching European values is of little use in such circumstances, if not wholly counterproductive by provoking much greater rejection than acceptance.

**What Direction Now? What Should Be Done?**

It seems that the massive arrival of refugees to the EU from across the Mediterranean under dramatic conditions, with the many deaths occurring on the way and the overcrowding of refugee camps together with the aggravation of the situations of State implosion and war, in Syria in particular as well as Libya, have managed to awaken the European conscience with an awareness that something must be done. To do this, there must be a profound reflection on foreign and internal policy of the EU and its Member States towards the Mediterranean region. It seems evident that EU ‘soft power’ as a major instrument of social transformation is absolutely incapable of handling the situations of instability and violence on the short and medium terms. The European Union is also applying its instruments of Humanitarian Aid and Emergency Aid that have conventionally accompanied humanitarian cooperation policies when necessary. We should be able, in the first place, to handle the humanitarian and refugee emergencies, which we are far from achieving. It seems clear that all the EU’s soft power instruments can help to bring about change in the medium and long terms in countries with governments that are firm, stable and willing, but they cannot cope in the short term with the situations of crisis and conflict, nor address the causes that, beyond development shortcomings, are fuelling the current situation of conflict. Europe, the European Union, has not been using the instruments of Realpolitik, whether they be in the hands of EU coordination organs or fundamentally by the Member States. And when it has, as with Libya, serious errors have been committed. With the current extremely conflictive situation on the one hand and the reform process of the European Neighbourhood Policy launched by EU institutions on the other, it could be an opportune time for Europe to create the legal changes and generate the political will to enable it to rise to the occasion.

The decision-making capacity lies with the States, but this does not mean action is impossible. States must finally realise the need for a great common European foreign policy, in full synergy with the foreign policy of the individual governments.

European foreign policy consists of two parts: the EU foreign policy on the one hand, which has been called ‘exterior action’ to date, focussing on instruments of ‘soft power’ and the foreign policy of Member States on the other. Where the former was based on promoting European values and ‘soft’ attraction to Europe, doubtless of great political and economic interest to all in the long term, the latter dealt with the promotion and direct protection of national interests. After the application of the Lisbon Treaty, as indicated above, the situation has not changed greatly. The distribution of powers among the EU institutions and in Member States continues to be fundamentally the same. The creation of the European External Action Service and the strengthening of the role of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as Vice-President of the Commission at the same time does not preclude a fundamental consideration: the
power continues to be fundamentally vested in the States, which must approve all sorts of action through the Council, and anonymously at that. The decision-making capacity lies with the States, which moreover have the operative means, especially insofar as security; but this does not mean action is impossible. States must finally realise the need for a great common European foreign policy, in full synergy with the foreign policy of the individual governments. EU institutions will have to grow accustomed to protecting the interests of Member States in addition to working towards high European values, while the Member States will have to get used to having a common foreign policy and undertaking joint concrete actions in this field, coordinating amongst themselves and with the EU institutions through a Common Foreign and Security Policy worthy of the name. While the instruments of security policy, on both the police-judicial and the military levels continue in the hands of the States, close coordination within the framework of joint European action is absolutely essential, especially with the serious situation in the Mediterranean and Middle East regions. It also follows that we must go beyond this, and that ‘more Europe’ is the solution.

Currently, there is a need for coordination in the first pace among both EU institutions and Member States. And likewise between the whole of Europe and the different international institutions and actors within the framework of the United Nations, with allies as the United States and with NATO as a whole. The classic adage ‘si vis pacem, para bellum’ (‘if you want peace, prepare for war’), sadly, becomes necessary in times of crisis. The ideal of military strength is one that does not need to be used, but its availability is a prerequisite for this ideal. And in the case of the conflicts in the Arab World, as indicated, this is all the more true since any foreign intervention in their territory is and will be absolutely counterproductive. But first we must convince the powerful in the Arab World – with the political, economic or security-oriented arguments appropriate for each case according to the country – to exercise their influence to pacify the Arab world and not by funding violent movements of which they that eventually even lose control.

Insofar as coordination among institutions within the EU, it seems clear that the distribution of instruments and powers between the Commission and the European External Action Service are not the most propitious for efficient action. Foreign policy and its execution supposedly fall within the remit of the European External Action Service, whereas the main financial and cooperation instruments, beginning with the ENP, to all effects continue in the hands of the Commission. If any policy measure falls under the Common Security and Defence Policy, its control by the Council, where any Member State can veto a decision due to the rule of unanimity, makes it difficult to achieve a foreign policy and effective external action. Moreover, although much progress has been made, at least insofar as the Mediterranean Partner Countries, in decentralising from Brussels to the EC Delegations (today EU Embassies) in Partner Countries, there is still much to be done on the ground regarding coordination between the EU Delegations and Member State Embassies. It would be particularly useful if, in the process of preparing and approving the Action Plans of the European Neighbourhood Policy, these Action Plans translated into real joint action by the European Union as a whole the Commission and the European External Action Service in conjunction with the policies and cooperation carried out by Member States. Although the strictly EU Action Plans should continue to exist, there should at least be higher planning and a coordination schemes to include EU and Member State action, possibly revamping and modifying insofar as necessary the former Indicative Programmes to increase synergies and political weight through coordination of all European action in each country.

Regionalisation in Globalisation

One of the fundamental aspects of the consultation by the Commission and the High Representative regarding overhauling the European Neighbourhood Policy referred to the geographic sphere of reference. To date, the European Neighbourhood Policy, like the Barcelona Process in its classic period, has aspired to its application in the strict sphere of the Euro-Mediterranean Partner Countries, that is, the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries with a Mediterranean coastline, as well as Jordan.

What we are really discussing in the Euromed project is the role that the European Union should play on the international stage in a globalised world. Clearly,
Euro-Mediterranean policy can neither be applied the same to all Mediterranean seaboard countries. Nor can it be considered separately from the impact that other countries, the neighbours of our neighbours, have in the area. First of all, there are the Gulf States, including Iraq, the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and Iran; secondly, there are the countries of the Horn of Africa; and thirdly, the Sahel countries. Hence it would seem appropriate to distinguish between three levels of countries to which the EU should apply different political action structures.

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First and foremost, regarding the Euro-Mediterranean Partner Countries, we should distinguish between those that have a true Euro-Mediterranean vocation as such, as is fundamentally the case with Morocco and Tunisia, and the rest of countries, which participate but with limited when not decreasing enthusiasm depending on the case. There should be a clear differentiation between two levels of Mediterranean Partner Countries. The first would be the ‘Preferential Partner Countries,’ with whom the EU would aspire to build an integrated Euro-Mediterranean area. The countries of this first level should have a privileged status in their relations with the EU, clearly differentiated and favourable to them. It should be a status that countries should apply for in order to become first candidates and eventually members of a possible Euro-Mediterranean Economic Integration Community. Clearly, as in all areas of advanced integration, although the fundamental aspects may be economic, there are political aspects of enormous significance as well. Both the 1995 Barcelona Final Declaration and the European Neighbourhood Policy concept, not to mention the Morocco’s Advanced Status or the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements, move along these lines. Attaining such status should constitute a differentiated privilege not automatically extensible to the rest of the Partner Countries. The remainder of the countries should be able to see the advantages of belonging to such a Euro-Mediterranean Economic Integration Community and aspire to become members themselves, being ready to carry out the necessary changes. Only thus will the effects on the countries joining said Community be equivalent to those attained in Central and Eastern European Countries before their integration into the EU. The remaining Euro-Mediterranean Partner Countries would be on a second level, as members of the Union for the Mediterranean and the Euro-Mediterranean policy in general, with the application of the ENP on their level. In the third place, a new concentric circle of privileged relations should be established beyond our immediate neighbours in order to reach our neighbours’ neighbours as well. For this second external neighbourhood area the most appropriate scheme would probably not be a uniform approach, which would be impossible to conceive and even more so to execute, but rather a series of agreements of privileged relations with those countries, in groups or individually and at a level of formalisation and commitment greater than the current one. This is the case with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council or Iraq, as well as Iran, the countries of the Horn of Africa and the Sahel Countries. It is clear that in all cases, independently of the geographic area, the principles of differentiation and conditionality must be applied. But clearly, the greatest differentiation should consist in belonging or not to each concentric circle of this European structure for integration or international cooperation, which decreases towards the outer circles to reach areas solely of cooperation and therefore with decreasing application of conditionality.

Insofar as the thematic spheres, it seems clear under the current circumstances that, in applying the necessary coordination among Member States and EU institutions, new thematic areas of cooperation must be fostered, reaching, if need be, spheres such as reform of the security sector, in both police and judicial cooperation aspects, as well as and in particular its military security aspects. In other spheres, there should likewise be coordinated action between Member States and EU institutions, as in the case of migration and taking in both immigrants and refugees.

The case of Euro-African cooperation merits particular consideration within regional globalisation. Once
colonial ties were broken, with better or worse outcomes, Europe has tended to overlook Africa. Yet Africa is an important part of the future of Europe and the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership offers a particularly interesting angle to approach Euro-African relations. The participation of North African Mediterranean Partner Countries in Euro-African cooperation is of particular interest due to the special complementarity, synergies and capacity for action existing between the EU and its Member States, and the Mediterranean Partner Countries, which would allow them to act jointly in negotiating and implementing projects and broad cooperation agreements with Sub-Saharan countries.

At the present time, it is clear that Europa, the EU institutions and the Member States must carry out urgent action preventing the cataclysms we are all beginning to discern on the horizon.

Turkey is also a special case because it is a Mediterranean Partner Country and at the same time, a candidate for membership in the EU, as well as enjoying an agreement since 1996 now that goes beyond a free trade area to institute a customs union with the EU and its Member States. Turkey has based its progress on moving towards convergence with Europe and the Western World over the past 90 years. Over the past few decades it has increased this convergence exponentially through its economic relations with the EU, especially through the benefits of the trade agreement instituting the Euro-Turkish customs union. But there are also pulsations in Turkey moving in the other direction, of moving closer to the Turkic countries of Central Asia and the Arabic ones of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. There has been discussion of the intention of building a neo-Ottomanism lending Turkey a key role in the geographic regions formerly constituting the Ottoman Empire and beyond. It is crucial that Europe make an effort to let Turkey understand that its best future consists of playing that important role in said region as part of a broader Euro-Mediterranean project to its own benefit, to play that major role as a European country with a diverse and rich heritage.

Urgent Tasks

At the present time, when there has even been talk of the end of the Southern Neighbourhood as a reality and an economic project, and when we are witnessing a disruption of political and even social structures among Mediterranean Partner Countries, it is clear that, in addition to fostering modernisation and adapting its own instruments and political approach to the Euro-Mediterranean area, Europa, the EU institutions and the Member States must carry out urgent action preventing the cataclysms we are all beginning to discern on the horizon.

In the first place, massive assistance is absolutely necessary for countries that share values with the EU and that should be included in the first circle of economic, and to a large extent, political integration with the EU. In the case of Tunisia in particular, which is under serious and peremptory threat from those who wish to end the Tunisian democratic experience, the EU must effect a massive aid operation. The EU has gradually expanded its funds, especially for Tunisia, through new aid instruments of support to democratic transitions and civil society, beyond the conventional ENP funds. Nonetheless, we continue to work on an unrealistic scale. All told, this aid hardly reaches 200 million euros per year for Tunisia, when in the internal European crises we have experienced, the amounts handled were always in the billions. The aid packet currently being negotiated with Greece may reach 85 billion. Although in this case, it may fundamentally consist of loans, it is clear that the amounts cannot be compared with the meagre 200 million allocated to Tunisia. This amount should at least be multiplied by ten to reach 2 billion in non-returnable funds, apart from the EIB loans, which to date have more or less doubled the current amount of donation aid.

In the second place, we must act more decisively with humanitarian and emergency aid in the face of the enormous crises being experienced in Syria and its neighbouring countries. It is true that EU and its Member States have donated nearly 3,500 million euros in emergency and humanitarian aid to offset the consequences of the war in Syria. However, it seems obvious that this is not enough and that the EU must increase the calibre and efficiency, as well as the political and public communication of its aid if we do not wish to see to even greater catastrophes.
In the third place, we must undertake an exercise of convergence of soft power with Realpolitik as a joint EU policy to negotiate and offer the Thermidorian regime in Egypt economic and political support that enables it to overcome its current situation as quickly as possible and allow Egypt to advance with security and confidence towards a modernised country with a positive economic evolution, stably and in democracy. In this regard, of course, in Egypt as in other countries in the area, security aspects cannot be ignored. We cannot look the other way. Al-Sisi already has the firm political and financial support of Saudi Arabia, and it is crucial that Europe offer him other perspectives as well.

In the fourth place, Europe, with the entire weight of the EU and its Member States behind it, should participate in a determined, uninhibited manner in the pacification of Syria and Libya. As in all the current conflicts in the Arab World, the need for solutions to be internal to the Arab World must be reiterated. It is essential that the Arab countries themselves decide that none of them should support any of the forces or groups involved in the conflicts. And the same should be done to convince Iran. Negotiations with Iran constitute a good precedent in this regard, with the prominent role played by the EU and its High Representative Mogherini. But it seems clear that the efforts being carried out in both Syria and Libya by the United Nations representatives in these countries must attain significant, decisive and effective support from the EU and its Member States. Especially in order to convince the regional powers to play a pacifying and not incentivising role in the confrontations. The entire political, economic and military weight of the EU and its Member States, as well as its allies, in particular the US, must attempt to get the regional Middle East powers to stop pouring oil on the fire of conflict and foster peace.

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All in all, it can be concluded that the future will continue to be extraordinarily complicated and that we may have to get used to managing the crisis for many years to come. Nevertheless, we must bear in mind that in the long run, social transformations will prevail and will eventually bear fruit. Hence the need for urgent tasks in the face of the current episodes of crisis and the need to renew the arsenal of instruments of influence in the face of the major challenges in the region should not lead us to conclude that the conventional approach of cooperation through integration in the Euro-Mediterranean sphere is no longer appropriate. On reading the Barcelona Final Declaration today, twenty years after the fact, you will realise almost with surprise that it remains entirely valid. It is the continuation of this long-term task of helping our neighbours and partner countries in their process of modernisation, progress and development that will allow the realisation of the dream we had envisioned in 1995, that of building a Mediterranean area of peace and security, shared economic progress and intercultural understanding and dialogue among peoples and cultures throughout our seaboard.
Marc Pierini
Former EU career diplomat and a scholar at Carnegie Europe

The ministerial conference held in Barcelona on November 27-28, 1995 was then regarded as a historical landmark in the relationship between the European Union and Mediterranean countries: a vast programme of cooperation had been launched by the 27 partners based on a shared vision of the region’s destiny.

Twenty years later, most of the political concepts used at the Barcelona conference have either become obsolete or are radically challenged by the long series of events that took place in the interval: September 11, 2001; the launching and subsequent failure of the Mediterranean Union; the Arab Spring of 2011; and finally the proclamation of the Islamic State in June 2014.

Looking back at these two decades, it is important to understand what has happened and what remains of the initial political assumptions.

The Barcelona Process as a Shared Vision

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership started as an ambitious project between equals, offering shared economic and social objectives, a forum for political and security dialogue and an avenue for the development of civil societies based on shared values. This partnership – quickly known as ‘the Barcelona Process’ – was the subject of an unprecedented joint preparation over nearly one full year. It was defined as a “necessary ambition,” for both a European Union in need of stability and prosperity in its immediate neighbourhood and for the Mediterranean Partners who, beyond market access, investment and know how, expected a better cultural and social understanding.

As a result, the EU’s financial means were substantially increased, cooperation policies were diversified, and a large number of networks created in many different fields, from political science to economic research, from heritage conservation to cooperation among small and medium-size enterprises.

The Shock of September 11, 2001

The massive attack of al-Qaeda on New York and Washington, the first large-scale terrorism act inspired by a radical Islamic movement on US territory, sent shockwaves through not only the United States but also Europe and the Arab world. It was followed by major terrorist attacks in Tunisia (against the Djerba Synagogue on April 11, 2002), in Madrid (March 2004) and London (July 2007). The ‘Western model’ was directly challenged at its very heart.

Predictably, the reaction of the European Union consisted in significantly beefing up counter-terrorism policies and seeking cooperation from ‘moderate’ Arab leaders. This, in turn, was seen by a number of these leaders, particularly those then in power in Tunisia, Egypt and Syria, as an opportunity to create a new type of relationship with Western governments. The ‘selling argument’ became: ‘we will be your best buffer against Islamic terrorism.’ A typical example was the way in which the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia cooperated with France, Germany and the US in the enquiry into the Djerba bombing and in effect ‘offered’ them the means to arrest the then number four of al-Qaeda, himself the planner of the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington.
The ‘price’ exacted from Western countries was indeed a much less critical eye on human rights abuses in the countries concerned. Without saying it openly, an entire pillar of the Barcelona Process had been sacrificed to anti-terrorism policies.

An Ephemeral Union for the Mediterranean

When elected in May 2007, French President Nicolas Sarkozy promoted one of his personal projects, the Union for the Mediterranean, by which he essentially intended to shelve the Barcelona Process and promote his own vision of relations between Europe and the Mediterranean region, based on a stronger focus on private investment and a much weaker emphasis on governance. Several conceptual and protocol mistakes – such as co-opting unilaterally then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak – made this policy initiative quite unpalatable for other Arab leaders.

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Meanwhile, across Europe’s southern neighbourhood, Islamic conservatism was becoming more deeply rooted than ever before, not just within Islamist parties but throughout entire societies, including those long perceived as predominantly ‘secular’ and ‘modern’ such as Tunisia and Turkey. Their societal, scientific, and legal norms, long-inspired by Europe’s, were now regularly challenged. A different concept of society and state was being discussed or introduced in a number of countries.

In parallel, the image of Europe in the region kept being tarnished by the deep resentment toward the EU for its lack of influence on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Year after year, Arab populations felt increasingly let down by the very group of countries – the European Union – which had promoted fundamental rights and shared values in Barcelona in 1995 but kept cooperating with repressive Arab regimes.

The Arab Spring of 2011

In a matter of weeks, starting in a small town in Tunisia in December 2010 and spreading like wildfire to Egypt, Syria and Libya, a popular movement raged across the Arab world. At first sight, the message heard from the ‘Arab street’ was music to European ears: individual rights, freedom of expression, stopping corruption, accountability, free elections and dignity were the mottos of all the protests.

Very quickly, seemingly unshakable dictators fell one by one in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, while Syria was plunged into the ugliest civil war imaginable. When elections were finally held in the first three countries, they produced religiously conservative regimes that had little resemblance with the ‘shared values’ of the Barcelona Process. Conservative Islamic norms were the result of the wave of free elections, and only Jordan and Morocco managed to produce enough consensual reforms to keep their societies away from bloody developments.

The political landscape in the EU’s southern neighbourhood had changed radically and Europe realised that these countries were undergoing deeper political and societal changes than what was meeting the eye. The pre-existing EU assumptions about its southern neighbourhood had been shattered.

The Intrusion of the Islamic State

On 28 June, 2014, a self-proclaimed ‘Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant’ (ISIL) appeared on the map and started expanding its territorial grip on large swaths of Iraq and Syria, based on the failures of the respective states. It rapidly expanded its political influence through the affiliation of radical movements in the Egyptian Sinai, Libya, and Northern Nigeria. With its territorial control, military aptitude, unimaginable violence, cultural revisionism, and massive recruitment of jihadists in a number of European countries, the Maghreb, Turkey and the Gulf, the caliphate of Daesh now presents a challenge that no
Western diplomacy has had to cope with before. All the premises of the Barcelona Process are now finding their absolute opposite in the narrative and objectives of Daesh.

**Where Does the EU Stand?**

These developments render the EU’s traditional model (liberal democracy) and methodology (personal high-level talks and financial incentives towards good governance) largely ineffectual. EU leaders are now suddenly confronted with failed states (Libya, Syria), or movements they cannot even conceive to interact with (al-Baghdadi). Elsewhere, as in Tunisia, the EU is now dealing with an unprecedented governing coalition between liberals (Nidaa Tounes) and Islamists (Ennahdha) with radically diverging societal objectives.

The comfortable days of dealing with like-minded liberal interlocutors are largely over: the ‘EU model’ is becoming less sellable in today’s global environment and the EU’s brand of democracy and civilisation is being fundamentally challenged.

Yet, a large segment of the civil society in neighbouring Arab and Muslim countries is very much looking for better governance, accountability, freedom of speech and independent justice. This means that, even if the ‘shared values’ narrative is of little political relevance today, even if one should not be overly naïve about expectations from the EU, the EU should continue to support citizens who support these values. It is very telling that women organisations in Tunisia have managed to counter the Islamic party’s intention to change the definition of the role of women in society through a constitutional change. It is similarly relevant that a last-minute civic movement in Turkey manage to scrupulously invigilate the ballot counting in the 7 June legislative elections, making them more credible.

The comfortable days of dealing with like-minded liberal interlocutors are largely over: the ‘EU model’ is becoming less sellable in today’s global environment and the EU’s brand of democracy and civilisation is being fundamentally challenged.

While it is high time it adjusted to the Mediterranean region’s new realities, the EU needs to continue promoting its values with the appropriate measure of realism.
Looking back at history, those of us who have been modestly advocating a process of Euro-Mediterranean integration for more than 25 years now might be tempted to feel somewhat frustrated. Many of the dreams and goals we set for ourselves at the start – peace, prosperity and modernity for our ‘common sea’ – have yet to be realised. At the same time, however, we might feel satisfied that we had the necessary foresight to identify, even then, the risks and challenges this region could pose for Europe. We sounded the alarms and revealed that the true security risks for Europe’s future would come from the South. We decried the lack of interest in Euro-Mediterranean policy shown by our partners in the East and North, and we called for greater attention to be given to this vital area for the strategic interests of the citizens of Europe.

Today, as I write these words, on the threshold of the twentieth anniversary of the Barcelona Conference, I believe it is more legitimate than ever to demand a genuine mobilisation of the European political class. The challenges we once foretold are now erupting before our eyes in the capitals and along the borders of Europe. The terrorist attacks in Paris and Tunisia, the ongoing wars in Libya and Syria, and the widespread instability in the Middle East should be reason enough for our political leaders to establish this border region as the ‘priority of priorities.’ The Mediterranean is coming apart, economic disparities are growing, and the ‘Mare Nostrum’ is becoming a burial ground for immigrants in search of a better life. Moreover, the clash of civilisations would seem to lend credence to the theories of Samuel Huntington, and Mediterranean cultural and civilisational history is becoming compartmentalised, isolated in mutually exclusive universes. Europe must respond to this state of affairs swiftly, effectively and with the necessary political will, although not before first understanding how we got to this point, which strains all conceivable limits.

A History of the Processes of Change

The year 2010 could have been the year of the consolidation of EU Mediterranean policy and, at the same time, of the Union for the Mediterranean (UiM). However, the timing was wrong. The Spanish government, which held the rotating Presidency of the EU, had to exercise the office under a new framework: the Treaty of Lisbon. Under the new European rules, the power to conduct European foreign policy fell to the President of the European Council and the High Representative. The rotating Presidency was responsible solely for supporting their efforts and lacked the capacity and tools of the past, although it sought a more important role for those areas it considered to be of greatest interest. Logically, Spain wanted to make the Mediterranean one of the priority areas of its Presidency. The year 2010 marked the fifteenth anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration; that fact, together with the situation in the region, called for greater European political commitment to addressing the region’s challenges. However, the second UiM Summit, set to follow the first, which took place in Paris in 2008, could not be...
held. The reasons were manifold. In addition to the jealousy and prominent role played by France, which sought to retain the Presidency of the UfM and hold an extraordinary summit in Paris on the Middle East peace process, the intransigence of certain Arab states made holding the summit extremely hard. They refused to sit at the same table as Israel and, in particular, as its Foreign Minister. Moreover, things were already starting to heat up in most of the countries on the southern shore, which likewise did little to foster the atmosphere needed to hold the high-level meeting.

I remember my final, somewhat desperate attempt, when I was no longer in the government, to convince the Arab leaders to attend the event in November 2010. I visited the main capitals of the South and managed to convince most of the Heads of State. It was the last time I saw Ben Ali in his palace in Carthage. However, Brussels had the final say on whether the meeting would be held, and it preferred not to force the issue of a summit that, at the time, had no guarantee of success. Aware of that fact, or perhaps unconsciously, Europeans and Arabs alike implicitly decided that the normal course of events would lead to a ‘crisis foretold.’

**Europe and the Arab Spring: from Enthusiasm to a Gradual Distancing**

The self-immolation of the Tunisian Mohamed Bouazizi and the fall of Ben Ali in early 2011, as well as the subsequent mobilisations and changes that took place in Egypt, Libya, Syria and virtually the entire Arab world, were initially met with great enthusiasm in the European capitals. The Muslim-Arab world seemed to have clearly come to understand European values and principles once and for all. The door to modernity opened for societies that sought to embrace and establish themselves along Western lines. The slogan ‘Welcome to democracy’ echoed incessantly in the halls of many a European chancellery. At last, ‘the Arabs’ had given up and would embrace the European-Western model. Everything was unfolding just as the somewhat naïve predictions of the analysts in Brussels had said. However, the lack of serious analyses and the profound ignorance of the European pseudo-experts, who were unable to predict and understand the contradictions and situation on the ground in these countries, soon became apparent. Europe either did not understand, or did not want to understand, the depth and significance of the changes sweeping the region.

In the midst of this impasse came the ‘revolutionary tsunami,’ engulfing the entire Arab world. The events should have shaken from its stupor a European political class that had failed to react with the same energy and vision that González, Kohl and Mitterrand had shown in Europe’s enlargement to the East or in the statement regarding the fall of the Berlin Wall in late 1989 and early 1990. North Africa and the Muslim world were witnessing a stellar moment of their history. And yet, in my view, the European response was tepid and late, lacking the necessary political, economic and financial impetus and commitment.

North Africa and the Muslim world were witnessing a stellar moment of their history. And yet, in my view, the European response was tepid and late, lacking the necessary political, economic and financial impetus and commitment.

This attitude cannot be explained by the international and endogenous crises then rocking the countries of the EU. Some will argue that it was the actions of several European states that prevented another barbaric attack against the citizens of Benghazi and that the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine was first invoked to stop the bloody madness of the Libyan leader. That is all true, and the European reaction can no doubt be ‘justified’ on many other grounds, as well; however, one would be hard-pressed to explain that reaction to the Arab citizens who took to the streets of Tunis, Cairo and Benghazi, preaching principles and values that many Europeans had hitherto considered antithetical to Muslim-Arab culture and idiosyncrasy. How often have we heard, in political circles and milieus, that Arabs or Muslims do not go well with democracy and freedom, that the *umma* would not allow citizens to stand up for their rights and freedoms? Well, the Arab social movements were a model of
modernity, engagement (Twitter, Facebook, etc.) and civic-mindedness at the start. And they needed a more positive, committed reaction from their European neighbours.

The European Council took more than two months to take a position on the Arab Spring; that is, not until eight weeks after the fall of Ben Ali, in the lead-up to the military intervention in Libya. The response was ambiguous and lacking in suitable political, economic and financial proposals given the scale and urgency of the events. The EU’s initial reaction was perhaps comprehensible and even appropriate, for it took place at the start of the process, although this process increasingly picked up in terms both of speed and geographical and strategic intensity. However, between the European Council meeting of 2011 until almost 2013, not a single meeting was held that included a line or remark on the events playing out throughout the entire southern Mediterranean. Not even in October, two days after the first democratic elections were held in Tunisia, and four days after the end of the war in Libya. The Heads of State and Government neither welcomed nor supported these processes. This distancing was also the dominant note at subsequent European Council meetings. It was not until the arrival of the new set of EU leaders that a gradual awakening of interest in the region could be seen. The current High Representative, Federica Mogherini, seems willing to give the necessary attention to this situation, to which her predecessor devoted neither the effort nor the attention that should be expected of Europe.

The Role of Europe in the Crisis

Each of the economic, social and political crises on the southern shore of the Mediterranean evidenced a lack of European involvement, as well as a halt in the political and diplomatic dialogue.

Tunisia

Initially, this country was an exception due to the efforts of the EU representative, Bernardino León, who personally and proactively helped to see the internal reconciliation process, with all its ups and downs and contradictions, through to the end. In Tunisia, the democratic aspirations of society, which sought to take a decisive step forward towards modernity, were met. For the countries rocked by internal crises, the assistance and commitment received from Europe were insufficient. Following the dramatic attack at the Bardo Museum, Tunisia urgently needed the European Union to approve a series of diplomatic, economic and social measures; however, given how things stand, I am not convinced this will happen any time soon.

Egypt and Libya

In the cases of Egypt and Libya, European policy towards North Africa has probably ‘unconsciously’ mimicked American approaches and policies. For various reasons and calculations, Washington erroneously believed that the time had come for ‘political Islam’ in the countries of North Africa. Under such circumstances, it concluded, the most advisable path was to support and position itself ‘at the front of the protest’ to foster ‘regime change.’ To this end, it backed the Muslim Brotherhood, the most popular political force in the different Egyptian electoral processes and the one that irreversibly set in motion the ‘Islamist tsunami.’

In the cases of Egypt and Libya, European policy towards North Africa has probably ‘unconsciously’ mimicked American approaches and policies

The Europeans adopted this view, which can be considered legitimate, if arguable, reflexively and without rigorous debate. They believed in the virtues of President Morsí and a resolution was adopted by the UN Security Council authorising a military intervention in Libya to prevent the use of that country’s air space. No one said a word when the Western powers overstepped their authority in implementing it. The tyrannical and arbitrary ‘Colonel Gaddafi’ fell, but, other than the ‘photo opportunity’ for President Sarkozy and Prime Minister Cameron in Tripoli, no European mission was sent to the country. Neither the President of the European Council nor the High Representative travelled to Libya, and there was no
Syria

This country may well be the paradigm of the West’s analytical misguidedness and lack of a political and diplomatic strategy, resulting in one of the most serious conflicts of the century. For one thing, the Syrian political reality itself was misjudged; it was thought that, like Ben Ali and Mubarak before him, Bashar al-Assad would be the next domino to fall following peaceful civic uprisings. How many times have we heard, in European political and diplomatic circles, that al-Assad would not make it to the end of the year? It has been four years now since the conflict broke out, and the situation is catastrophic.

Syria may well be the paradigm of the West’s analytical misguidedness and lack of a political and diplomatic strategy, resulting in one of the most serious conflicts of the century

The indifference and lack of mass mobilisations of the international community and segments of global public opinion, and, in particular, of European public opinion, have made it impossible to demand more of our political leaders and call for new types of actions. However, one must never stop trying when what is at stake is human life and halting the downward spiral of violence and destruction. When observing and attempting to determine how we came to this point, we must ask how it is that the international community has been unable to prevent this tragedy, a tragedy that some seem determined to forget or not to acknowledge at all and in which more than 200,000 people have already lost their lives as the country is torn apart. Indeed, it has splintered into various communities in conflict, leading to the displacement of nearly 12,000,000 people. Perhaps the easiest thing to do is to point the finger at the primary culprits or at those who claim that the only way to resolve or transcend the bloody crisis is to let the Syrian ‘catharsis’ play itself out. I disagree. As I have said before, what has been done from the start has been to clear the way for civil war rather than seek an agreement through a political and/or diplomatic solution.

Today, we could continue as we have so far, letting the clock tick down until the conflicts and desperation ultimately leave no option but to seek a negotiated solution. Alternatively, we could accelerate the process and firmly demand an urgent end to the crisis. Or do we simply plan to grow used to living with ongoing regional conflicts in which death and destruction are merely part of everyday life? How is it possible that we have not yet been able to impose a cease-fire in Syria? What are we waiting for? A glance at the many conflicts that have plagued the world since World War II shows that peace was always achieved following a relatively short cessation in the hostilities. This is what happened in Korea, Vietnam and the various wars in the Middle East, in 1956, 1967, 1973 and 1982.

Why have we failed to achieve it in Syria? Some might argue, not without reason, that the Russian and Chinese vetoes in the Security Council are to blame. Indeed, that is probably one of the main reasons, but it is also worth noting the lack of effective diplomacy to convince those players to put an end to the fighting.

With the war in Syria, we have witnessed what I call ‘drone diplomacy,’ that is, remote diplomacy with no envoys or accredited ambassadors. Today, the international community in Damascus consists only of intelligence operatives, news media and NGOs struggling to meet humanitarian needs. No longer is anyone negotiating an end to the conflict on the ground, except for Staffan de Mistura, the special envoy of the Secretary General of the UN, whose work is always difficult.

From here on, we must avoid the errors committed in the diplomatic management at the start of the Syrian crisis. In the very first weeks of the conflict, it was proclaimed, far and wide, that the goal was regime change and that Bashar al-Assad should immediately step down. Subsequently, red lines were drawn, which, should they be crossed, would lead the United States and its allies to engage in a military intervention; when they were crossed, a negotiated solution
was sought to dismantle Syria’s chemical weapons cache instead, and the parties looked the other way so that the war could continue. The opposition militias were armed, thereby ‘facilitating,’ with the connivance of nearly all the players involved, the creation of the West’s great enemy: the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. It was armed and funded and was allowed to occupy the political and military ground of a moderate and modern opposition, despite the obvious flimsiness of such an approach. Rather than laying the groundwork for ‘diplomacy, dialogue and politics,’ a military option was chosen, in which the al-Nusra Front militias showed a greater capacity than the rationalist representatives of an opposition who felt more comfortable in the sitting rooms of Paris or Washington or the capitals of the Gulf.

The vast majority of analysts believe that Bashar al-Assad bears the brunt of the responsibility, and that may be true; however, what seems clear is that the President remains at the head of his government in Damascus. Why has he not sought, or does he not now seek, a political or diplomatic formula for a negotiated exit, one with a reasonable timeline, process and agreement the primary objective of which is to defend the Syrian people and safeguard the population from horror, chaos and violence? Just a few days ago, the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, acknowledged that they ‘will have to negotiate with Bashar al-Assad.’ Could not this decision have been made much earlier?

It has been said that the Geneva I and Geneva II conferences were failures. Perhaps. But in diplomacy, when something fails, a solution must always be sought. Why not urgently hold a Geneva III conference under a different set of parameters and with different parties? How is it possible that, although everyone agrees that Iran is a key player in its support for the Syrian regime, with influence and capacity to act, it has never been invited to the negotiating table? If we can hold talks with Iran to curb its future nuclear capabilities, can we not also talk to Tehran to end the war in Syria?

A Few Exceptions: Morocco and Algeria

In contrast to the widespread and increasingly troublesome destabilisation in the eastern Mediterranean, which affects the future of what we call the Middle East, the Maghreb, with the exception of Libya, has proven itself better able to adapt to the emerging challenges of the future. As we have already seen, Tunisia has successfully completed multiple stages of its democratic construction, and it is expected to receive urgent and unconditional support from the international community. Like Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria have also risen to the challenge of changing Arab societies and taken measures to adapt to the new winds of political and social revision and reform.

Morocco

The Alawite Kingdom is the most significant case. The vision and strategy of King Mohamed VI, who has sought amendments to the Constitution, have satisfied the legitimate aspirations of the country’s citizens by transferring some of his powers to democratically elected governments. He has proven able to effectively interpret the times and incorporate them into the country’s reform process, always through the lens of the monarchy. Today, Morocco is undeniably a country that has suitably reconciled tradition and change and that, thanks to its good relations with Europe, is making gradual but steady progress in the process of modernisation.

Algeria

For different reasons, this country, too, has successfully managed to avoid the destabilising trends found in other Arab countries in recent years. With the memories of the difficult decades of terrorist violence and internal conflict still fresh, this country has chosen instead to pursue its own, controlled and peaceful process of reform.

Many attempts have been made to encapsulate the Israeli-Palestinian crisis within Mediterranean policy. Those who think that an alternative diplomatic architecture can be built by excluding this conflict are wrong.

These two large countries, Morocco and Algeria, should become the key pillars in the region’s process of change. We would moreover be quite pleased to
see a swift, bilateral reconciliation that puts an end to the historical conflict of the Western Sahara.

A Crisis Stalled: Peace in the Middle East

The negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians have always been a destabilising factor in the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation process. Many attempts have been made to encapsulate the Israeli-Palestinian crisis within Mediterranean policy. Other European approaches have sought to emphasise the Western Mediterranean instead, and to resuscitate such undertakings as the 5+5 Initiative. Everything is just easier between the Maghreb and the countries of southern Europe, some analysts claim. And yet, inevitably, the Israeli-Palestinian question comes up and demands an urgent solution. It seems like the political leaders would rather close their eyes to an eternally thorny and intractable reality. The ‘two state’ solution of two countries living side by side in peace and security is a prerequisite for the true establishment of a framework for peace, security and prosperity in the Mediterranean. Those who think that an alternative diplomatic architecture can be built by excluding this conflict are wrong. Today more than ever, we must leverage the various Mediterranean fora to promote a definitive solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Europe and the New Mediterranean Challenges

Today, there is no more time for excuses. The problems are unfolding before our eyes; they are no longer mere predictions or hypotheses. The European Union cannot adopt an ‘ostrich policy’ and hide behind inaction. A new vision, a new strategy and a new project for the Mediterranean are needed. We must understand that this region is not a marginal one. Europe must take the lead, together with the countries of the southern shore, to endow the Mediterranean with a new centrality. In geopolitical understandings, in which security issues are interlinked, it is difficult to ignore the roots of the main risks and opportunities for Europe’s future. Sustainable economic development, global terrorism, clandestine immigration, energy dependence, food security, epidemics, climate change and the peaceful co-existence or clash of cultures all have their origin and will play out within a single vertical space: Europe, the Mediterranean and Africa.

The Mediterranean is the centre of gravity from which policies can be set and institutions created to address this new reality. Consequently, Europe must not ignore its geopolitical centre: the Mediterranean.

The Mediterranean is the nexus between the two continents and, thus, the centre of gravity from which policies can be set and institutions created to address this new reality. Consequently, Europe must not ignore its geopolitical centre: the Mediterranean.
Conflicts in the Mediterranean usually meet two criteria: they are enduring, and they have a regional dimension. Conflicts such as the Arab-Israeli conflict or those in the Western Sahara and Cyprus already seemed old twenty years ago, and yet they continue to await a negotiated solution. Likewise, the conflict that tore Algeria apart in the 1990s has lingering effects even today in the form of terrorist groups operating in the Maghreb and Sahel that can trace their origins to the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). More recently, this list has been expanded to include new sources of violence, in both North Africa and the Levant. In fact, in terms of the number of victims and complexity of the parties involved, the war that has been consuming Syria since 2011 is the new epicentre of Mediterranean violence.

Twenty years ago, in 1995, the ministers who laid the cornerstone of the Barcelona Process undertook, among other things, to create an area of peace and stability. The Mediterranean of 2014 is not only far from meeting this goal, but also experiencing one of the worst crises of violence, terrorism, refugees and internally displaced persons in its contemporary history. The sheer magnitude of the crisis makes the feebleness of the dialogue and cooperation on peace and security issues all the more palpable. This article will identify why it has been so hard to make progress in this area for the last twenty years and, on that basis, will then outline certain steps that could reverse the trend.

Regional conflicts conditioned the inception, development and subsequent transformation of the Euro-Mediterranean process. Although their existence has served as a powerful argument for the EU to pay more attention to its southern neighbours, these conflicts, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict, have also held cooperation in the region hostage. The genesis of the Barcelona Process was marked by the window for peace that opened in the second half of the 1990s. Previously, the EU had been working on the creation of a Euro-Maghreb partnership, an idea endorsed at the European Council meeting in Lisbon in 1992. It was not until after the 1993 Oslo Accords that the decision was made to expand the project to include the countries of the Western Mediterranean, culminating in the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Barcelona in 1995. What was achieved there still seems revolutionary today: the Arab countries sat at the same table as Israel, Israel participated in an international platform of which Palestine was a member in full standing, and all the parties were able to agree on a declaration and plan of action.

In 1995, the Arab-Israeli conflict was not the only source of tension in the Mediterranean. In the Maghreb, Algeria had been caught up in a wave of appalling violence for three years, and the war in the Balkans was still being waged and had even led to a NATO intervention. These two conflicts had an unequal effect on Euro-Mediterranean relations. The situation in Algeria sounded the alarms in many European capitals, especially those of the nearest European countries, which called for all Europeans to pay more attention to the Mediterranean. In contrast, the
Balkans war led to the exclusion of the countries involved from the Barcelona Process.

With regard to the impact of these conflicts on the subsequent development of Euro-Mediterranean relations, most notably they have been a millstone for both political dialogue and technical cooperation. During the first five years of the Barcelona Process, so-called ‘partnership measures’ were implemented. These measures included, among other things, support for the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo), the network of think tanks specialised in foreign policy and security issues, and a pilot plan to mitigate the effects of natural disasters. However, with the second Intifada, in 2000, the obstacles proliferated. Hence the unsuccessful attempt to adopt a charter for peace and stability that would have established the guiding principles and action protocols for addressing issues related to conflict prevention and management, disarmament and non-proliferation, and the fight against cyber terrorism and organised crime. The then French Presidency of the EU ultimately had to remove the text from the agenda in order to be able to hold the Euro-Mediterranean conference in Marseilles, and the drafts of the document have remained filed away ever since, as the necessary circumstances have not yet presented themselves to renew the discussion.

In 2005, an effort was made to take things one step further with the adoption of a Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism. However, the failure to reach a consensus on a definition of what is and is not terrorism prevented that text from becoming operational.

In order to prevent a complete paralysis, the decision was made to work on less sensitive issues, such as natural disasters and cooperation between civil protection units. The possibility for those Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) that so wished to explore cooperation measures with the EU within the framework of the former European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was also broached. Of all the MPCs, only two, Morocco and Turkey, took steps to do so, although in Turkey’s case, the country’s membership in NATO was the most relevant factor. Likewise bilaterally, beginning in 2004, work began on the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy, a framework for relations that the EU offered to new Eastern European and old Mediterranean neighbours alike. However, under the new policy, security issues were given less priority.

At the same time, terrorism had emerged as the top issue on the agenda. Ever since the brutal attacks of 11 September in New York, terrorism has not only conditioned the global agenda, but also the tepid Euro-Mediterranean security cooperation. Djerba in 2002, Casablanca and Istanbul in 2003, Madrid in 2004, and London in 2005 also suffered large attacks, and terrorism began to be perceived as a threat to all. Until then, it had been addressed as a problem limited to certain countries and with very local causes. Since 2002, the need for greater progress on counter-terrorism cooperation has been a recurring theme in political declarations, and, in 2005, an effort was made to take things one step further with the adoption of a Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism. However, the failure to reach a consensus on a definition of what is and is not terrorism prevented that text from becoming operational.

Too many setbacks in too short a time. It was this feeling of fatigue that the then French President Nicolas Sarkozy drew on to promote a new initiative to ‘reinvent’ Euro-Mediterranean relations: the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), whose philosophy included setting the thorniest issues (security, democracy, human rights) aside in order to focus on specific cooperation projects in areas of overlapping interest, such as energy, the environment, research or reactivation of the business network. Originally, Sarkozy aimed to pursue this initiative outside the EU, with the participation of only the coastal countries. However, this idea met with strong resistance, especially from Germany, and he ultimately bowed to the pressure. The result was the launch of the UfM at the Paris Summit in 2008, including full EU participation and the metamorphosis, albeit implicit and incomplete, of the original Barcelona Process.

Despite the success of the Paris Summit and of the attempt to rid the agenda of political issues, the regional conflicts soon proved able to block, or at least slow, the new initiative as well. Most obviously, it was not possible to hold a Euro-Mediterranean meeting.
of Foreign Ministers for a full seven years (from November 2008 to April 2015), and the second UfM summit, which, according to the agreed calendar, should have taken place in 2010 in Barcelona, had to be postponed indefinitely.

**Synchronised Crises**

In 2011, the Arab world was the scene of a wave of protests that began in Tunisia and Egypt and spread, with uneven force and disparate results, across North Africa and the Middle East. Although the initial protests were eminently peaceful and called for social justice, freedom and dignity, in certain contexts, such as Syria, Yemen or Libya, they soon degenerated into violence and even armed conflicts. What began as a political and social protest gradually became a regional security and refugee crisis.

The EU’s response to the first wave of protests and political change in the Arab world was to adapt the existing principles and policies to the new reality. The clearest example of this trend was the acceleration, in 2011, of a previously scheduled review of the European Neighbourhood Policy. As part of this process, additional funds were mobilised and new instruments were implemented to support both civil society and governments willing to carry out reforms. At the discursive level, the concept of partnership was revived, and a new incentive structure based on the by then famous ‘3 Ms’ (money, market and mobility) was defined.

The response to the authoritarian counter-reaction and to the emergence of new hotbeds of conflict combined sanctions against the Gaddafi regime in Libya and the Assad regime in Syria with a conspicuous silence vis-à-vis the intensification of the repression of opposition movements in much of the region. At the same time, various European states, led by France and the United Kingdom, became deeply involved in the NATO operation in Libya and later discussed the possibility of conducting a military intervention in Syria against al-Assad, something that was ruled out both because the US rejected the option and because of domestic resistance to becoming involved in a high-risk mission. London and Paris, as well as other European partners, did join the US-led coalition against the so-called Islamic State. Since July 2014, this coalition has been bombing targets in Syria and Iraq and has provided support for Iraqi government troops and Kurdish fighters.

The fact that these processes are taking place at the same time as one of the worst crises the European continent has ever experienced has conditioned the responses of both the EU and its Member States to these events. If the EU had not been immersed in such a large crisis itself, it could have reacted more generously. As it stands, its response has fallen quite short of the initial demands for the EU to offer a species of Mediterranean ‘Marshall Plan.’ It must be remembered that in 2011, the Greek debt crisis and the bailouts of the peripheral economies were the main and, in some cases, sole cause of concern for European leaders. Not only was there a lack of generosity, but also of attention at the most senior political decision-making levels. Proof of this can be seen in the scant attention paid to the situation in the Mediterranean at the European Council meetings of 2011, which almost exclusively addressed internal economic issues. Moreover, the European crisis had weakened countries such as Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal, which had traditionally promoted initiatives to strengthen the Union’s Mediterranean policy. At the same time, some countries, particularly France and the United Kingdom, had asserted their autonomy in foreign policy and defence matters, although that trend predates the crisis.

Compounding matters, in 2014, another crisis broke out: Russia annexed Crimea, triggering an armed conflict in eastern Ukraine that would become the largest challenge to the European security order of the last forty years. The crises were piling up at the EU’s borders. Therefore, even though the status of the southern countries swiftly declined over the course of 2014, especially following the collapse of the state structure in Libya and, above all, the emergence of the self-styled Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, this situation did not immediately translate to greater European attention to the South. For many European countries, these crises continued to seem too remote, both geographically and emotionally, compared to what was happening in Eastern Europe.

**2015: A Turning Point?**

In 2015, Mediterranean issues were once again included on the European agenda. Not so much be-
cause the EU had already overcome its internal problems or resolved the crisis in Ukraine, but because Europeans began to suffer the consequences of the instability in the southern Mediterranean in the form of terrorism and refugees. The attacks in Paris, Copenhagen and Tunisia (the latter including 14 European victims), as well as the shipwrecks in the Strait of Sicily, raised the alarm in Brussels and the rest of the European capitals.

In 2015, Mediterranean issues were once again included on the European agenda because Europeans began to suffer the consequences of the instability in the southern Mediterranean in the form of terrorism and refugees.

The success of the Ministerial Meeting held in Barcelona on 13 April 2015 to discuss the revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy suggested a certain Mediterranean awakening. The Ministers had not met for seven years. That they could do so now was not only the result of the quirks of the Israeli political calendar (because the country was immersed in negotiations to form a government, it was represented by a Secretary of State rather than the acting Minister, Avigdor Lieberman), but also of a shared desire to demonstrate that cooperation between Europeans and their Mediterranean partners was once again a priority.

The announcement on 16 March that the EU was willing to conduct a peace stabilisation and maintenance operation in Libya, provided there was first a national unity government, should be interpreted in the same vein. As should the growing recognition that insufficient resources had been dedicated to handling the humanitarian emergency in the Mediterranean and that the coastal countries could not bear the full responsibility for that alone. The European Council meeting of 23 April 2014 aimed to express unity and solidarity. However, the lacklustre offer of the European governments (they agreed to relocate only 5,000 refugees), as well as disagreements on the quota system and the formulas for calculating it proposed by the European Commission a few weeks later, had the opposite effect.

One point on which there was agreement was the shoring up of the Poseidon and Triton operations, the two programmes that the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders (Frontex) conducts in the Mediterranean, as well as the initiative to implement a naval mission to stop human trafficking. The mission, called EUNAVFOR MED, was inspired by the anti-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa and is expected to be conducted in three stages. The first consists of the identification of the traffickers and will focus on international waters. In the second, the European forces will search and seize suspicious vessels found in the high seas. At the end of that stage, and with a mandate from the Libyan government or the United Nations Security Council, the scope of action will be expanded to include Libyan territorial waters. The mission’s mandate also includes using all necessary means to disable the vessels.

Post-2015: Agenda, Scope and Risks for Security Cooperation

The depth and intensity of the changes that have taken place in the last five years will be reflected in the content of security cooperation in the Mediterranean. It is not so much that new issues or threats will emerge as that existing ones will be viewed in a new light. Let us take three examples. The first is counter-terrorism. A decade ago, the EU was mainly concerned with suffering attacks by groups based in neighbouring countries. Today, the EU itself has become a venue for the radicalisation and recruitment of combatants and terrorists that might launch attacks on European soil or target neighbouring countries. Consequently, the strategies and tools used to fight this shared common threat must be modified. The second is the existence of weak and collapsed States, a reality that can be found increasingly close to home. Hence, the need for the EU to take actions to prevent the consequences of such breakdowns from affecting it directly and the even greater need for it to have the necessary tools for stabilisation, the reconstruction of state structures and the promotion of national reconciliation processes. The third and final example is the massive increase in refugees and internally displaced persons now fleeing the spiral of violence and destruction in an attempt to reach European territory. The EU has thus been forced to reassess its sea rescue missions, the support it offers to
neighbouring countries that, despite their meagre resources, host most of these refugees, and its instruments for combatting criminal networks whose lists of crimes include human trafficking.

As for the scope of the cooperation, this new reality will gradually be translated into greater flexibility and broader horizons. The cooperation will become more flexible because informal cooperation mechanisms, which do not involve all countries and which tend to be lower-profile, seem like a good way to overcome the obstacles that have slowed progress on security and defence cooperation at the Mediterranean level. And the horizons will be broadened insofar as the European Union has accepted the idea that it should have a policy towards its neighbours’ neighbours. In the context of the Mediterranean security agenda, this means defining a comprehensive vision of security in the Maghreb and Sahel and continuing to explore strategic dialogue with the Arab League.

If, to date, the old regional conflicts have acted as obstacles, when not outright barriers, for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, in the coming years the opposite may prove to be true: the new conflicts may push governments on both sides of the sea to engage in dialogue and cooperate on security issues. The renewed interest in security cooperation with neighbouring countries is both an opportunity and a risk.

Another risk, which cannot be ruled out, is that the EU will remain consumed by its own crises and that this will prevent it from playing a more active role in the Mediterranean

As in the past, in a highly unstable context in which the EU requires the collaboration of its neighbours’ security forces in order to assure its own security or strengthen its borders, the Europeans may ease their demands with regard to reform and respect for fundamental freedoms. This could put political activists and civil society organisations in a difficult spot. Another especially vulnerable group is third-country immigrants and refugees, who tend to suffer abuse and mistreatment, but whose situation takes a backseat to Europe’s need for its partner countries to cooperate and, above all, to tighten their borders. The third potential victim of this situation is policy consistency. When it comes to rights and freedoms, the messages sent by Brussels and those sent by other European capitals are too often rife with contradictions.

Another risk, which cannot be ruled out, is that the EU will remain consumed by its own crises and that this will prevent it from playing a more active role in the Mediterranean. In retrospect, a Europe that had solved both its internal crises and those festering on its eastern border might arguably have responded more generously and ambitiously to the changes that have been sweeping North Africa and the Middle East since 2011. In 2015, we have seen that, even without having resolved these challenges, the EU seems to have recognised the extent to which the current spiral of violence will directly impact its security. It still has a long way to go before it re-embraces the goal of turning the Mediterranean into an area of peace and stability.

References

November 2015 marks the 20th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration. Will this date be celebrated or go unnoticed on the political and media radar screens, except possibly (if at all…) in circles limited to the initiated in Euro-Mediterranean issues?

An attentive reading of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration today is not without interest. Indeed, the text contains numerous pertinent passages and a general allure deeply imbued with optimism, conveying very well the geopolitical climate in which the Declaration was drawn up. In any case, what is certain is that the operational implementation of the text after two decades has proven disappointing. The facts have rather progressively contradicted the ambitions initially stated. In 2015, it is most certainly with other words, other actors and other scenarios that we will have to imagine the continuation of this Euro-Mediterranean saga, always exciting, although also perplexing and, in some regards, unsettling. Everything indicates that the future of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation will have to be written in different words.

**Short-Term Optimism, Emerging Pessimism**

At the onset of the 1990s, an atmosphere of euphoria and hope emerged on the international arena. Based on the will to create a pacific, stabilised Mediterranean area, the EU lent the Mediterranean Basin the full attention it deserved, producing the Barcelona Declaration. This marked a milestone in the contemporary history of relations between the European Union and the countries of the Mediterranean seaboard. A Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was established that was divided into three cooperation ‘baskets’: a political and security strand (I), an economic and financial strand (II) and a social and cultural strand (III). The text diplomatically reverberated the idea of a Mediterranean interface between Europe and Africa, with the ambition of establishing an area of integration between the EU and the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries. It also represented the hope for an affirmation of a common European foreign policy at a time when the EU, enlarged to 15 Member States in 1995, was building the next stages of its geographic expansion for the onset of the new millennium.

In this positive climate emerged the idea of building a ‘dynamic economy’ based on trade liberalism, fostering the economic globalisation process and generating an increasing interdependence. In the late 1990s, the growth shown by many economies in the region was encouraging. On the north shore, Spain, Portugal and Greece experienced an economic upturn in this period, while in France and Italy job markets were improving. On the south shore, the good economic health of several countries is particularly associated with structural reforms undertaken as of the 1980s, their growing integration into international trade and rising exogenous resources (foreign direct investment, tourism and migrant remittances). In any case, these growth models remained fragile. At the same time, Turkey began an economic takeoff that would be significant over the first decade of the

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1 The opinions expressed in this article are exclusively the authors’ and do not represent CIHEAM’s official position in any way.
21st century. Thus the EMP advanced step by step in a relatively favourable regional context. People’s standards of living improved in the majority of countries, although a certain political rigidity persisted. In the wake of the 11 September 2001 attacks, it became more obvious that the security agenda would take precedence over the dynamics of democratisation and that, to maintain economic growth and investment, the continuity of political systems was deemed preferable. It is important to recall that the dramatic events in Algeria in the mid-1990s marked people deeply. Add to that the problem of the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The failure of the Camp David II peace negotiations in 2000 unfortunately demonstrated to what point the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin on 4 November 1995, concomitant with the Barcelona Declaration or nearly, ushered in an ultimately not very auspicious Euro-Mediterranean scenario. In the same vein, it should be noted that the turn of the millennium took place with several conflicts still ongoing in the region (Western Sahara, Cyprus, etc.) and deep uncertainties in the Balkans after the Kosovo War. The Euro-Mediterranean did not become a reality. The truth is that certain spheres of cooperation were not sufficiently addressed (employment and training, agriculture and food, health, tourism) and that nothing was really achieved in terms of democratisation at a time when fear of Islamism prevailed in the region. In the post-September 11, 2001 atmosphere, authoritarian regimes were perceived as ramparts against the risks of terrorism.

Destabilising Socioeconomic Situations

The Euro-Mediterranean vision, devised in a geopolitical framework that, at the time, could justify an ambitious tone, never truly became a reality over the years. It must also be said, without playing down its importance in terms of operational and readability consequences on regional action, that multiple initiatives have been developed in parallel without necessarily being in synergy. The 5+5 Dialogue, Mediterranean Forum, European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) – a jumble of institutional frameworks accumulating and often sowing confusion, to the point where it is very difficult to say in 2015 whether the EMP still exists, or if it is now alternately the ENP, the 5+5 Dialogue and the UfM that share the regional arena in terms of cooperation between EU countries and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMC).

The Euro-Mediterranean did not become a reality. The truth is that certain spheres of cooperation were not sufficiently addressed and that nothing was really achieved in terms of democratisation at a time when fear of Islamism prevailed in the region.

In addition to this technocratic proliferation, sometimes lacking in strategic vision and rather reminiscent of the evolutions of the EU itself, there is a profound discredit regarding the means truly implemented after two decades to foster regional Euro-Mediterranean integration. There is no denying that budgets were mobilised and effective investments made that were intended to fulfil the Barcelona goals. But, as with the political-security strand, the economic and social strands seem to be much less positive in 2015 than what had been announced at the outset. A Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) by 2010? It is incomplete and differentiated. Certain sectors have been excluded, such as agricultural products, whereas increasing bilateralisation of relations between the EU and south and east shore countries has prevailed over multilateral economic integration. From 2007 to 2013, Europe disbursed 12.2 billion euros for its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), 7.5 billion of them going to Arab Mediterranean countries and 2.5 billion to Palestine alone. Only 6% of the 12 billion was designated for interregional cooperation in the Southern Neighbourhood. The new ENP for the 2014 to 2020 period was allocated a budget of 15.4 billion euros. Moreover, in the majority of cases, these countries have diversified their trade and stretched their geographical horizons. The emerging South American and Asian powers have succeeded in forging ties with North Africa and the Middle East, not to mention the relations developing between Arab countries and Sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1995 and 2015, Euro-Mediterranean trade has not intensi-
fied. Moreover, the European Union has lost its economic weight in the Southern neighbourhood countries, where foreign investment is increasingly coming from the Gulf States, Turkey or the BRIC countries (i.e. Brazil, Russia, India and China).

As a result, the stated ‘shared prosperity’ has not materialised. The standard of living gap between the North and the South of the basin is not subsiding but rather remains considerable. Thus in 2014, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per inhabitant in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) stood at USD 27,340 for the EU as compared to approximately USD 5,085 on average for the southern Mediterranean. This 1 to 5 gap is comparable to that prevailing in the mid-1990s. Although life has improved in certain territories (generally, cities and coastal areas) in some countries (in particular Turkey), there is no denying that the Euro-Mediterranean project is running up against these still glaring socioeconomic disparities between the two shores. The Southern Mediterranean Basin is, moreover, a very heterogeneous region. There are countries with a dynamic economy such as Israel, and others, such as Algeria or Libya, whose economy is particularly vulnerable and dependent on the oil cycle. Yet at the same time, this growth masks the vulnerability of economic and political systems based on rent and still far from meeting society’s expectations.

In the period from 1995 to 2005, a series of economic, social and demographic indicators showed a general improvement in standard of living, but in a context displaying many grey areas and major disparities between countries. Stalemate in the Middle East, poor economic development, precarious labour and unemployment accentuate the pressure within countries (rural to urban migration) but also between countries along the Mediterranean seaboard (South-North migrations). In this context, European countries as well as south shore countries share a common problem: migration of its youth in search of a more promising future. This is a true squandering of the human resources of all Euro-Mediterranean countries. The unemployment rate of youth in the North Africa and Middle East (MENA) region is one of the highest in the world. Approximately 40% of youth aged 15 to 30 are neither working nor studying or training. Unemployment among graduates is one of the highest in the world, a characteristic present, moreover, in the Mediterranean EU countries, where youth is finding it increasingly difficult to enter the professional workforce. Precariousness has unfortunately become commonplace for this educated youth in touch with globalisation through modern means of communication.

In the absence of inclusive growth on the social and intergenerational levels, many young people, lacking points of reference and in search of a future, respond to the ‘call of the ocean’. Although Mediterranean migration towards Northern Europe or North or South America is nothing new, lately there are more and more numerous departures. The structural trend of North African and Middle Eastern youth deciding to leave their countries for a variety of reasons (including recent conflicts) should not hide the other, economic migratory wave of Portuguese, Spanish, Italian or Greek youth particularly hard hit by the social crisis raging in their countries. The latter, translated by the ballot boxes into protest votes turning the political landscape of Southern European countries upside down, is not comparable to the plural crisis striking south shore countries. There are, however, remarkable similarities in certain regards, the first and foremost being unease amongst youth. It is as if these young people, who nevertheless represent the future of the Mediterranean region, were fleeing an area doomed to live in the past. One youth out of two under thirty is currently unemployed in Greece and Spain. The figure is only slightly lower in Italy and Portugal.

Is the Euro-Mediterranean Project a Thing of the Past?

The regional panorama of the Euro-Mediterranean in 2015 is not heartening. Development in the Mediterranean area marks the pace, and economies are stagnating, both on the north and south shores. Social demand is enormous, however. It has made authoritarian regimes in numerous Arab countries falter. States are at the end of their tether, territories are becoming autonomous and new threats are appearing. Current events in the area essentially revolve around dramatic happenings and growing trends towards concern. We needn’t paint too bleak a picture, but it would be foolish to deny the sombre reality. No conflict existing at the time of the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 has been resolved such
that it could be conjugated in the past tense, with
the exception of the arrival of peace in the Balkans.
Worse yet, new wars have arisen, in Gaza, Iraq, Lib-
ija and Syria. The collapse of states does not bode
well, neither in the short nor the medium terms.
Daesh represents a threat to the entire Medi-
terranean region. Other strategic uncertainties weigh
heavily as well, such as disturbances in the Sahel,
Yemen or Ukraine, which, combining with other
problems, form an arc of crises at the doorstep of an
EU frightened by these eastern and southern neigh-
bourhoods in turmoil. After the brief euphoria of the
Arab Revolts of 2011, the so-called ‘Spring’ in
the region was quickly eclipsed. Only Tunisia pre-
sents a truly different political-institutional counte-
nance after its revolution, whose aftermath shook
surrounding Arab countries. Other countries have
effected reforms to placate social unrest and some,
like Egypt, experimented with a dangerous demo-
cratic game that soon ended. Israel continues to wall
itself in, Turkey is pursuing its solitary course and
Iran is attempting to return to the (increasingly dis-
cordant) concert of nations.
For its part, the EU is playing it by ear. On the inter-
nal level, it is having a hard time after the rejection of
the European Constitution in 2005 and the financial
crises affecting the majority of Member States since
the end of the 2000s. Various nationalist sentiments
are being expressed, whether on the level of coun-
tries defending their interests to the detriment of the
constructive EU consensus, or on the level of territo-
ries demanding greater autonomy or even independ-
ence. Disoriented by the internal crisis of confidence
of a good number of its citizens with regard to its
political project, it is likewise destabilised by the tur-
bulence amid its neighbours. Discredited within, it
remains, paradoxically, desired at times along its
borders. It is increasingly tending, moreover, to con-
tain them rather than handle them through mecha-
nisms of strengthened cooperation. This isolation-
ism of the EU, symbolised by its essentially
security-oriented responses to migratory issues, en-
ters into contradiction with the spirit of openness
and solidarity characterising the European Commu-
nity project at the outset. The ENP, established in
2003 then revised in 2011, attempts to provide re-
sponses to a new geography. There are now 28 EU
Member States, that is, almost double the number at
the time of the Barcelona Declaration. The EU’s cen-
tre of gravity now tends more towards the East.
Though the Arab revolts concerned it, the attention
the EU has lent to Ukraine demonstrates that there is
a double standard with regard to neighbouring
countries. In order to meet the challenges of its
neighbourhood, the EU will clearly first have to over-
come its internal difficulties. What credibility will it
have in the international arena if one of its Member
States, financially floundering, finds itself excluded
from a union whose name is beginning to be mis-
treated?
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heartening. Development in the
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and economies are stagnating, both
on the north and south shores.
Social demand is enormous,
however
It is undoubtedly necessary to change the mentality
used to approach EU-South and East Mediterrane-
an relations for, although the Barcelona ambition re-
mains alluring, the actors are not quite the same and
Euro-Mediterranean ‘joint action’ is less desired.
Moreover, as in the Middle East, where the Sykes-
Picot border demarcations have been shattered,
there is still a significant problem regarding the geo-
graphic limits of the EU. How far should it (can it?)
expand? What types of borders should be proposed
to its neighbours, particularly the Mediterranean
ones, which are few to walk the path towards de-
mocracy and above all display increasingly flagrant
differences between them, to the point where the
ENP framework, renewed in 2011 (‘more for more’
and the three Ms – ‘markets, mobility and money’),
already seems obsolete. It is likely that security is-
ues will override all other dimensions in the Medi-
terranean region. It is now also certain that even co-
operation between the EU and SEMC will be
primarily designed to attenuate tensions and threats.
Twenty years after the vibrant Barcelona Declara-
tion, now more than ever, the Mediterranean region
is challenging. While international geopolitics are
becoming increasingly complex and territorial, so-
cial and economic balances in the world are resetting, Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, in the absence of impetus and enthusiasm, is slowing or stalled. And finally, the achievements accrued over the two preceding decades seem quite fragile against the emergence of new challenges and the unpredictability still marking the region. The period when trust, determination and will mutually combined seems to have passed, for turbulence, the risk of rupture, incomprehension and confusion pervades the current Euro-Mediterranean period, in a profoundly transformed geostrategic environment.

How pertinent is the Euro-Mediterranean concept to the future? Can it still be revived and relaunched when in 2015, a new institutional European Union has been established and the Barcelona Declaration will turn 20? On what geographic and financial basis? With what institutions and what actors (states, local and regional authorities, businesses, civil society organisations, etc.)? Targeting what sectors and investing in what segments of the population? Should not everything be staked on a minimum number of major strategic issues to attempt to maximise the impact of Euro-Mediterranean policy? How can a new horizon be built for the Mediterranean and how can we overcome the triple crisis – economic, cultural and social – bogging Europe down? Europe must adapt to the realities and context of the 21st century and undertake initiatives to attempt to improve the situation, not only inside its borders but also beyond them. Europe must re-think this Euro-Mediterranean vision in a reconfigured world context – this is absolutely necessary.

Putting Politics Back at the Centre of the Game

The populations on both shores of the Mediterranean have evolved greatly over the past few years, and today, institutions and political actors should do the same. Can Europe continue without reviving its citizens’ engagement with the EU? Europe should revise its priorities and return to centre field the social issues, values of solidarity and cooperation that are the pillars upon which the EU has been built in order to both renew enthusiasm among populations and implement a more farsighted strategy in its neighbourhood, to which it cannot become a spectator. Despite the frustration and complexity of the current situation in a region of structural political seismicity, must the concept of the Euro-Mediterranean be buried or, on the contrary, should we seek solutions so as not to squander it? If the Europeans and Mediterranean peoples wish to be more than just neighbours and become joint owners of a common future, they must take this opportunity and not disregard their interdependencies. The role of the UfM could be to nurture multilateral dynamics in the region, but above all to promote specific initiatives fostering human development (including on the social and geographic levels) in the long term. The Euro-Mediterranean project should not be discarded, but should certainly be revised and adapted to the new realities.

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One cannot fight geography. Europe should thus ensure its proximity with the southern and eastern Mediterranean seaboard, a proximity that is equally historic and socio-demographic. But for this Euro-Mediterranean concept to take wing, it must also be fostered by the SEMC. Moreover, although the new rules of the social and political game are still to be invented in countries throughout the region, it must be acknowledged that the growing difference between these countries hampers the dynamics of integration. The economic cost of a ‘non-Mediterranean region’ is doubtless exaggerated, but in any case, are we ready to roll with the geopolitical punches of such a ‘non-Mediterranean region’?
The Logic of Trade Integration and Its Shortcomings

Regional integration has a major role to play in expanding trading capacities and facilitating competition and innovation. With the elimination of market-access barriers, the driving force is the increase in trade within regions rather than across them. The concern, in particular in relation to the European region (or bloc), is asymmetry in comparative advantages and disparity in the economic and social size of the two regions and within each region.

How important is trade among Mediterranean countries? How important are the disparities and asymmetries? How relevant is the level of openness within and across the region?

The Barcelona Process is the central instrument for Euro-Mediterranean relations. Initially, 27 parties were involved: 15 European Members and 10 Southern and Eastern Mediterranean States (plus Cyprus and Malta before joining the EU). Launched in November 1995, the Process aimed to establish a common area of peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean. It represented an innovative alliance based on the principles of “joint ownership, dialogue and cooperation” in several areas, including economic and social integration within a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area (EMFTA) by 2010.

With the enlargement of the EU in 2004, the logic and scope of the original institutional framework became unsustainable. One could say that the Process was derailed by a series of internal and external causes. The number of EU members grew to 27, and two new members joined the Mediterranean countries (Albania and Mauritania) to make a total of 39 parties involved following the introduction of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

Other causes are more political and institutional. A parliamentary dimension was added in March 2004, while the Agadir Agreement of the same year was instrumental in reinforcing economic integration and supporting the gradual implementation of the EMFTA. In 2005, a migration chapter was added as a fourth key policy area of the partnership, which served more to raise expectations than create effective results. In July 2008, the agreements on the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) with the extension to five southeast European non-member states and the creation of the Secretariat in Barcelona tried to relaunch the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

Although the goal of EMFTA was not reached, the benefits for the SEM countries (southern and Eastern Mediterranean) were consistent, as was predicted by the economic literature: greater openness, growth in income and employment and growing expectations for a better future [Baldwin and Venables (2004), Sideri (2001); FEMISE (2010)].

The Outcomes: a Second-Best Solution

It is well known among economists that trade patterns and comparative advantages are influenced by many factors, including the endowment of resources, institutional factors related to commercial policies and incentives provided to economic agents and institutions. All these factors were part of joint and bilateral negotiations during the various stages of the Barcelona Process. As a ‘second-best’ solution, the outcomes were never going to be ideal for either

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side. Some partners retained a dominant position as oil and gas exporters, which protected them from competition. Other partners, however, have similar factor endowments and consequent comparative advantages, both for industrial and agricultural products, making the Partnership very sensitive, particularly in the short term, as it exposes the domestic producers to greater competition from each other.

Preferential Access

The Association Agreements and Action Plans covered a broad range of issues going well beyond trade, including not only commercial preferences, but more substantial and specific economic incentives and domestic reforms. The validity of this approach has been confirmed by numerous empirical studies that explore the effects of a tariff, or its non-tariff equivalent, reduction. First of all the agreements have offered more opportunities to a greater variety of products (extensive effect) and differentiation; secondly the reduction of transactional costs and tariffs allowed an increase of volume and value of products already traded among partners (intensive effect). The empirical results have confirmed both effects: a decrease in concentration of products and an increase in trading volumes, which fosters trade integration. [Cipollina, M., Pietrovito, F. (2010); Jarreau J. (2011); Femise (2011)].

The Larger Openness

The deep-integration approach was instrumental in raising trade openness. Using as an indicator the trade-to-GDP ratio of the 10 SEMs, the index shows that these countries succeeded well in opening their economies to international trade, but the geographical structure may be cause for concern. For the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership the outcome is mixed, in particular for exports from SEMs to the EU. For example, Péridy (2007) finds that EU preferences led to a 20-27% increase in exports from Mediterranean countries over the period 1995-2001, i.e. the period covering the first six years of the Barcelona Process. However, De Wulf and Maliszewska (2009) show that southern Mediterranean exports to the EU have increased by less than their

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1 Israel is not included, despite being a partner in the Barcelona Process, as it has economic, political and social features similar to those enjoyed by advanced countries.
exports to the rest of the world. Both patterns are reported in Chart 1, which shows the openness ratio during the three phases of the Barcelona Process. Taking advantage of EU preferences, SEM partners have built up a more competitive and diversified export capacity. The overall trade openness ratio rose significantly from 18% in 1995 to 28% in 2013. However, it can be observed that the significant contributions to the openness created during the first phase of the EMP have not been sustained by the incentives offered within the ENP and UfM. Since 2004, higher growth rates were achieved with extra-regional partners offering more opportunities to diversify SEM trade flows, in particular in the Gulf area or outside. As of 2013, the share of total trade in GDP for SEM countries exposed to the EU 28 was significantly lower than the previous EMP period, where trade represented only 22% of the value of their GDP compared to more than 30% for the Rest of the World (RoW). (See Chart 1.)

Links through foreign investments typically played a prominent role on this performance, but not enough to explain what happened in the second decade of the Partnership. This review provides several factors: from higher integration through other preferential agreements between Arab countries, including the Agadir Agreement, which seems to have performed reasonably well\(^2\), to narrower independent initiatives with large trading countries like India, China and also Turkey (a partner in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership).

Although an empirical literature has flourished on the technical issues of the agreements (preferences, length of negotiations) an important aspect cannot be neglected: the change of the competitive advantages of the region as a consequence of the fifth enlargement of the EU and the simultaneous accession of the former Eastern Bloc. The effects were significant, as the enlargement and the consequent set-up of the ENP gradually eroded the preferences designed to foster trade and investment integration. Still the UfM initiative has fallen short of expectations. Mostly because of the financial crises between 2008 and 2009, that shaped a significant drop in external trade, but ultimately due to the shortcomings of its scope based on bilateral incentives.

The evidence may suggest that EU preferences did have some success on the economic front, as trade and investments contributed to more openness and more diversification in their export flows. However the original design has shifted since 2004 to a more ‘shallow’ integration, due to the complexity of the problems confronting the EU and its partners and the new conflicts within the region that have hampered political and administrative reforms.

**EMFTA remains a dream, an ideal aspiration challenged by other important international players, in particular the Arab Gulf countries, which need to invest and diversify their large financial surpluses**

EMFTA remains a dream, an ideal aspiration challenged by other important international players, in particular the Arab Gulf countries, which need to invest and diversify their large financial surpluses. Ultimately, in this competitive geopolitical environment, the efficiency of the conditionality/preferential logic rests on a cost-benefit calculation of the governing elites of the SEM countries. Since there are costs associated to the structural reforms that comply with the implementation of the acquis communautaire, the elites of the region may choose to avoid them, preferring to redirect their trade flows to other more mercantilist partners. In the end, the strong export growth and FDI inflows have not been translated into similarly strong economic and social progress and the outcome has been disappointing.

**Product Concentration**

Product concentration is another aspect of the asymmetry and vulnerability of the Euro-Mediterranean integration. The concentration of SEM export flows\(^3\) is

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\(^2\) Among developing countries, the MENA countries have the highest preferential margin (RPM), which facilitates intraregional trade, at almost 5%, higher than South Asia (4% RPM) or Central Asia (about 1.8%). NICITA (2011).

\(^3\) Values of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Product Concentration Index computed by UNCTAD as a measure of dispersion of trade value across the exporters’ products.
well known, especially regarding natural resources or labour-intensive manufacturing. Particularly high values indicate the exporters’ dependency on few products or on few trading partners, but also the potentially high benefits from the reduction of trade barriers. Moreover, diversification helps to mitigate the effects of negative trade shocks especially when product varieties and foreign markets are not perfectly correlated and the negative shocks in some areas may be offset by positive shocks in others.

Measured over time, as in Chart 2 and 3, a fall in the index is an indication of greater diversification in the SEM’s export structure. Two decades of Mediterranean cooperation reveals that product differentiation based on comparative advantages increased in most countries in the region. There are, however, some differences when we compare the concentration of SEM exports to both EU and Arab countries of the MENA region. The GAFTA preference system seems to be more generous than the EMFTA, as the level of concentration, although decreasing, remains higher for Tunisian, Egyptian or Jordanian exports to the EU, compared to a more diversified structure when trading with the MENA countries.

The economic transformations have gone in the right direction, reducing disparities and creating new opportunities. Additional benefits from this process are the result of the industrial relocation of European enterprises, creating new sectors that sustained the positive relationship between export growth and diversity. In addition, the evidence confirms that greater diversification stabilises export earnings and generates positive spillovers and externalities for competition and employment. [Alessandrini S. (2014)]. (See Chart 1 and Chart 2.)

Geographical Differences

The traditional division into four sub-regional groups has not changed. One could say that the ‘hub-and-spoke’ approach has reinforced this feature with new priorities and geopolitical preferences. Excluding Turkey and Israel for their specific policy aspirations and size, the southern-eastern divide of the Mediterranean region has been strengthened. Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon have promoted comprehensive reform programmes and have achieved more progress in integration with Arab countries and some Asian economies, while Morocco and Tunisia have made important steps toward greater trade integration with the EU.

The European Union remains the main trading partner for five of the 11 countries participating in the Barcelona initiative. Europe 28 receives more than
40% of their total exports. Two of them are major oil exporters (Algeria and Libya) and three are traditional partners (Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey). Excluding the oil producers, the other partners indicate a gradual diversification to other industrial countries (benefitting from preferential treatment or FTA) or to the Gulf region. The most notable change here is the decrease in Egypt’s export share. In 2013, the European Union accounted for just 29.3% of its exports compared to 54.5% in 1995 and 36.5% in 2008. This diversification is very significant and confirms the greater attraction for the Arab partners, which accounted for 32% of Egyptian exports in 2013, reflecting the overall extra-regional orientation of this country, despite the Agadir Agreement.

On a more disaggregated level one can also observe the change of the EU’s perception and commitment to the Mediterranean Partnership. The direction of trade, in particular SEM exports to Europe, has changed over the course of the last 20 years due to new geopolitical priorities among the SEM partners, as well as changing interests among European importers. Chart 4 shows the share of MED 10 exports to the five major European partners (Italy, France, Germany, Great Britain and Spain).

From the beginning of the partnership, Italy and Germany were the two main export destinations for the region (more than 20% each), with France in an intermediate position and Spain and United Kingdom in a more secluded location (less than 10% each). The degree of concentration was thus very high, with an absorption of the other 23 European countries of only one fifth of the EU’s imports.

The evidence is certainly consistent with the idea that, during the first decade of the partnership, Germany gradually fell into an intermediate position in MED 10 exports, despite its stronger integration with Turkey, which acts as a gateway for investors and exporters to reach parts of the Middle East and Mediterranean. The second notable trend is the increased interest and orientation of Spain and the United Kingdom with growing market shares. The French position is partly aligned with German interests, before recovering positions and voice during the ENP and after proposing the creation of the UfM. Exports from SEM countries suffered after 2009 not only because of the drop in oil prices, but also due to the contraction of European domestic demand. Italy maintained its leading position as the main destination, although its market share declined almost 5 percentage points between 2009 and 2013, while the shares of Spain and the United Kingdom continued to perform more robustly.

Considering that the enlargement of the European market after 2004 did not create favourable condi-
tions for further integration between the two shores of the Mediterranean, it is worth noting the exception of Turkey: its share of total EU imports increased along with its role as a Euro-Asian and Mediterranean gateway that enjoyed growing bilateral exchanges with SEM countries.

The initial distribution of trade flows, among top importers and small niche countries, is now converging to a more diversified shape. These features underline an alternative interpretation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership; despite the poor results in encouraging greater integration between the two regions and inability to prevent contrasts and tensions in Southern Europe, the ENP has offered the legitimisation for more (un-balanced) economic relations to the central and northern countries of Europe, so that their cumulated share of MED 11 exports absorbs a quarter of European imports (up from 20% at the end of the nineties). (See Chart 4.)

Weak Interregional Integration

If the ambitions are to stimulate sustainable development in SEM countries the ‘hub-and-spoke’ integration approach revealed quite controversial difficulties for the partners on the eastern shore.

Chart 5 shows the trade links among the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean Basin. The degree of integration is measured by the share of exports, which is very low; well below its potential. The subregions are under-traded in particular for the AMU (Arab Maghreb Union) and North Africa (which includes Egypt and Libya) with an export value of less than 5% of total exports. Some positive changes can be observed after 2004, including an increase in intra-regional exports, which is particularly promising for the AMU, and the doubling of the index value from 2004 and 2013. This is very different to the expansion of trade with the MENA 19: the integration index reached 20% of total exports in 2013 from 12% in 1995. (See Chart 5.)

The evidence is clear: integration forces and trade liberalisation are supported by an extra-regional model which is less ambitious. Several features are shared by most of these countries. Tariff barriers were gradually reduced over the two decades, while non-tariff barriers and rules of origins were eased with the application of the cumulative rules of origin specifically stated within the Agadir Agreement and GAFTA. The progress has been slow and the region remains economically divided, with the lowest level of intra-regional trade and economic integration.
compared to other regional arrangements. Non-tariff barriers and rules of origin continue to distort relative prices and restrict trade within the SEM region, as emphasised by Augier et al. (2013) and Ghoneim (2012). The second impediment is the concentration of their exports and their substitutability, which restrict specialisation and further trade. Thirdly, the lack of integrative infrastructures and facilities, including poor and corrupt administrations, increases cross-border costs.

**Growing Trade Imbalances**

Among the risks introduced by the Euro-Mediterranean policies, the economic literature has reported the increased trade deficit caused by the dismantling of trade barriers. The ex-post evidence shows a quite different evolution, in part due to the dynamics of oil prices. The partner countries differ considerably: on the one hand, two countries are oil exporters that accumulated significant surpluses over the two decades; the other partners have been able to manage a bilateral deficit that has never exceeded the sustainability level, as the merchandise trade deficit has been compensated by non-trade elements of services and private transfers, specifically tourism and remittances.

Turkey is a special case, as it changed its focus from an import-substitution system to an outward-oriented growth one. The trade deficit was sustained for a long time with non-trade surplus flows. However, the multidimensional characters of the current global crises had a negative effect on its exports, so that since 2010 Turkey shows an average trade deficit with the EU of over $20 billion per year. However, it is equally interesting to observe the changes in the EU’s bilateral trade balances. The traditional trade deficit of SEM countries and the related dichotomy shaping Europe’s external relations worsened from 2004 to 2008: Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom remained net importers of energy products and generated a growing deficit due to high oil prices and the growth of their economies. Soon after their economies went into recession in 2009, trade deficit fell sharply to lower levels. The exception is the UK that continued to run consistent deficits with the region. Across the other European countries, exchanges generated a surplus that, for the large exporters, did not exceed $5 billion annually. What is interesting to observe is the growing neo-mercantilist propensity to accumulate trade surpluses from the Central European countries (over $14 billion in 2013), that led to a move away from the spirit of the initial agreement inspired by the principles of shared prosperity.

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**CHART 5**

![Intra-Regional Integration*](chart)

* MENA-19 includes the following countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, UAE and Yemen.
joint ownership (i.e. jointly-defined policy) and common development.

Not surprisingly, the outcome of the UfM was the increase of the bilateral trade surplus of Germany and 23 other countries (here aggregated in Chart 6), compensating the trade deficit of the three countries of the southern littoral. This may be justified by the export market diversification of the SEM countries underlined above, but it also reflects the diverging trends within EU countries. Of course, these patterns may not be interpreted as the sole consequence of the UfM partnership agreements, but certainly oppose the abstract concepts of integration and solidarity among countries, and contrast with the mercantilist approach of the economic agents when they enter the international markets. These recent patterns demand an explanation, since they reveal the nature of the market that has been established on the northern shore of the Euro-Mediterranean region: it strengthens the ‘hub-and-spoke’ logic and weakens the growth potential. This is a direct contrast with the original aims, namely, to use the bilateral and regional (South-South) trade to strengthen the potential for growth, differentiate production and create an integrated regional area.

Conclusions

SEM countries need to create millions of jobs in order to accommodate the rapid expansion of the labour force in the region. The problem today is the sense of frustration emerging from the results of 20 years of regional integration: low per-capita GDP growth, growing employment problems, undocumented migration and still higher tariffs that are twice those of the emerging economies. The Euro-Mediterranean project has changed its character and has become increasingly fragmented, while the South-South integration through GAFTA and the Agadir Process remains weighed down by a lack of political commitment and serious structural impediments. Despite its economic crisis, Europe should continue to open its own markets to products from the region. Europe should also realise that the initial proposal to create a free trade zone in the wider Mediterranean area has failed, but that the actual bilateral approach in negotiating with partner countries is not a win-win solution. It reinforces a core-periphery approach rather than sustaining a true and sustainable region-wide integration among the SEM countries. We may expect these initiatives to send the right signals to
encourage trade openness—the goal—and identify the measures which are needed to give these countries prospects for economic progress. The Arab springs of 2011 and today’s migration flows have made it increasingly clear that the region has a potential of young and educated citizens; they are asking for opportunities, they need policies and perspectives of social and inclusive development. The resistance to modernisation, the timid reforms, often late in their enforcement, all contribute to reducing opportunities and sustaining instability.

Bibliography


Migrations in the Mediterranean Region

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The Mediterranean Basin is one of the main migration arenas in the world. It is also, however, one of the most border-controlled areas, since it constitutes the outer border of the European Union on its southern side. Moreover, the EU has turned its back to migration from the South, because it is built on freedom of movement, residence and work within the wider Union, but closing its southern borders along the Mediterranean while opening its borders to the East. Twenty-two states border the Mediterranean Sea. These can be divided into various places of exchange and confrontation: the Maghreb and Western Europe on the one hand, the Balkans, Turkey and the Mashreq on the other. Antiquity’s ‘sea in the middle of the lands’ is today also the arena for some of the major conflicts in the world, a source of strife, insecurity and sometimes terrorism: Christians and Muslims, Israelis and Palestinians, Turks and Kurds, radical Islamists in Europe and in their own countries, not to mention the many disputes between neighbours (Macedonia, Cyprus, Western Sahara, etc). In sum, the south shore of the Mediterranean supplies the essential migration flows to the EU, which has established its border there, becoming the source of significant clandestine migration that sometimes ends in death, making this sea a vast cemetery.

The Mediterranean Migratory Area

Europe forms a migratory area with the south shore of the Mediterranean. The majority of migratory flows towards Europe are from there, considering the historic and neighbourhood ties it has with this region and the complimentary demographic and economic nature of the two areas. The gateways to Europe, i.e. Gibraltar, Melilla and Ceuta, Malta, Lampedusa, the Canary Islands and the Evros (or Maritsa) River border, where sub-Saharan Africans flock today, give the image of a Europe under siege having trouble controlling its borders while attempting to involve countries of transit, some of which have become countries of immigration, in controlling the flows by making them the border guards of Europe.

Over the course of twenty years, southern European countries and the Balkans, countries of emigration until the mid-1980s, have now become countries of immigration, a phenomenon extending to the threshold of Europe, from the Maghreb to Turkey, which have also now become regions of immigration and transit.

Today, the Mediterranean continues to be crossed by migrants. They begin along the edges of Europe: Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, the Maghreb and Albania are at once countries of departure, transit and destination. Despite the globalisation of flows, historic, geographic and cultural proximity (languages, particularly transmitted by the media) continues to explain Europe as the desired destination of choice. This is true of Spain, where Moroccan migrants are the second immigrant nationality, Italy, where Romanians, Albanians and Moroccans are the most numerous, Greece, where Albanians make up two thirds of the foreigners, and France, with Maghrebi nationals in the forefront.

Various migratory configurations exist in the distribution of migration within the Euro-Mediterranean area: Paired migration countries, often associated with a colonial past or recruitment in years of contract worker growth, where a single nationality has the majority of its emigrants in a single host country (Al-
— Quasi-diasporas, characterised by a nationality present in numerous European countries and creating strong transnational economic, cultural, religious, familial and matrimonial networks and links among its different groups (this is the case of the Turks in Europe, followed by the Moroccans),
— Scattered distribution, reflecting the globalisation of flows characterising migratory movement to Europe since the 1990s.

The southern Mediterranean Basin, despite the closed borders, constitutes a region of considerable emigration: Morocco (3.5 million emigrants), Turkey (5.3 million), Egypt (2.7 million), Algeria (one million). In Morocco, emigration has doubled in 11 years. Diasporas, formerly considered a threat to the sovereignty of the countries of origin, have today become highly solicited because they can allow those countries to exercise an influence on the host countries: acceptance of dual nationality, for instance – many European countries have opened their nationality laws to elements of jus soli over the course of the 1990s, whereas all the Muslim countries operate on the principle of jus sanguinis, with perpetual allegiance to the country of birth, as is the case in Morocco; acceptance by the country of origin of the political rights exercised by non-EU citizens on the local level in the host country and sometimes even the will to grant political rights to members of a diaspora through a consular vote or a vote in the country of origin; recognition of associations campaigning for the conditions of their compatriots, and not just friendly ones controlled by the country of origin; involvement of associations in local development programmes in the regions of origin; and organisation of religious affairs at a distance. Transnational networks of matrimonial, commercial or entrepreneurial nature cross the Mediterranean and make the border a resource for their exchanges.

But Europe only attracts half of the migrants from the south shore of the Mediterranean, since they also go to Arab countries such as Libya and the Gulf States, as well as the United States and Canada. Certain Mediterranean south shore countries are also countries of immigration. This is the case of Israel, Turkey, the Occupied Palestinian Territory and Jordan. In addition, there is an unknown number of illegal immigrants or migrants in transit, including sub-Saharan in the Maghreb and Sudanese in Egypt. Spain is the primary destination of these migrants from the South. It is the European country that has experienced the greatest migration hump in the past few years. In the mid 1980s, Southern European countries began establishing immigration policies with characteristics that distinguish them greatly from traditional countries of immigration: progressive accession to the ‘acquis communautaire,’ successive waves of legalisation, bilateral labour agreements in employment niches previously occupied by illegal migrants. On the other hand, south shore Mediterranean countries, which have emigration policies, have not established immigration policies apart from penalising illegal immigration.

Since 1985, Europe has strengthened its outer borders and opened its inner borders in the belief that immigration pressure from the southern Mediterranean was over. A visa system was established to complement the programme for non-EU citizens and suspicion increased, with the Europeanisation of border controls as of the 1990s. Walls were built, as in Ceuta, on the initiative of the European Union, with camps not only in countries of transit such as Morocco and Libya, but also in Malta or outlying EU countries. These dissuasive and repressive measures tend to increase the random settlement of those who cannot return to their countries of origin, heightening migratory pressure at the threshold of Europe. Illegal immigration continues in order to reimburse the cost of the trip, and casualties mount along the borders.

Another challenge: Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. Hopes were soon dashed due to the implementation of an EU external border surveillance and anti-terrorism system (development aid being conditional to the capacity of countries of emigration to

control illegal migration), the asymmetry of trade, instability in the region (dialogue dependence on the Middle East conflict), corruption, Islamic terrorism and the weak appropriation of the partnership by south shore countries. Agriculture and fishing, the only sectors producing at competitive levels in the South, has run up against a protectionist EU system. In the North, Euro-Mediterranean dialogue remains far from interesting all EU Member States, some of them being more interested in the eastern neighbourhood or the Nordic Union. The Barcelona Process (1995-2005) was succeeded by the Union for the Mediterranean, launched by France in 2007, which eliminated migration from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership content.

Finally, Islam is also a challenge. In the past, Europe was built where Muslim powers retreated. But the confrontation of Islam with the secularisation of European countries is often a reciprocal ordeal and outbreaks of terrorism have aggravated the divide.

Contrary to popular belief, the rise of political Islam has not had an impact on the demographic transition, as is indeed also the case in other Islamic countries such as Iran. On the north shore of the Mediterranean, countries such as Italy and Spain have entered a stage of demographic ageing, with the number of children per woman at sub-replacement levels and the entrance of a growing proportion of the population into old age, which calls for new migration sources. At the same time, emerging together with the phenomenon of "de-ageing" (whereby senior citizens are in better physical and mental condition than the preceding generation at the same age) is the phenomenon of North-South migration that is often the extension of international tourism, with people settling long-term (in France for the British, Spain and Portugal for the Germans and British, Malta for the British, and Morocco and Tunisia for the French).

The asymmetric population profiles are a first divide. Over the past sixty years, the population has grown significantly in the eastern and southern Mediterranean Basin, while it has stagnated in the North.

And finally, the rampant urbanisation of the planet also involves the south shore, marked by rural exodus, megapolisation (as in Cairo or Istanbul) and the transformation of south shore Mediterranean countries into countries of transit and immigration, with the settlement of migrants due to closed borders to the North. This is the case of Morocco and Turkey, as well as Algeria and Libya, which have become countries of transit for sub-Saharan.

The South's countries (French, Italian, Spanish), at times associated with the colonial past, is facilitated by dissemination through the media (television, internet, mobile telephones), transnational migrant networks built by migrant families that settled in European countries long ago (France, Spain, Italy, Germany, Benelux, Switzerland), remittances that, to-

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together with films, foster the image of a European Eldorado where traversing the Mediterranean is like a modern odyssey.

The Arab revolutions, though they have not changed the trend, have at times accelerated the phenomenon, as with the arrival of Syrians in Turkey, Libyans in Tunisia and Tunisians in Italy and France in the spring of 2011. Certain Mediterranean islands, destinations for tourist and also recurrent arrivals of illegal immigrants, are at the heart of the confusion between the great openness to tourism and labour and the barring of undocumented migrants: this is the case on Lampedusa, Malta, Cyprus, the Greek islands, the Canary Islands and, to a lesser degree, the Balearic Islands. New borders have likewise appeared, associated with migration and strengthened by European border surveillance systems, as at the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco, or the Evros River marking the border between Greece and Turkey. These border scenes are a control production in a world where the aspiration to move freely has never been greater while at the same time there has never been a greater need for putting up barriers to migration.

The 22 states bordering the Mediterranean total approximately 400 million inhabitants. Seven of these States belong to the EU (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal –even if it is primarily Atlantic–, Greece, Malta and Cyprus), with a revenue ten times superior on average to that of their neighbours to the South. By 2025, the population of these European States will hardly have increased, whereas that of the other states will have grown by 70%. The closing of borders often combines with the absence of a genuine alternative to migration.

Each north-shore Mediterranean country, despite its proximity to the South, has its own migratory landscape: hence France is strongly marked by its colonial past through the presence of Maghrebis, but also by the Portuguese, the leading immigrant nationality in France according to the 1982 census; Spain, which in the past few years has become the second most popular country of immigration in Europe (5.5 million foreigners), is characterised by its proximity to Morocco, as well as its South American and African tropism; Italy, the third country of immigration, which has reached a population of 5 million foreigners, is a mosaic of nationalities arriving since the 1990s; while Portugal, apart from its Eastern European workers (Romanians and Ukrainians), is dominated by its migration of colonial origin, from Portuguese-speaking countries. And finally, Greece, which had no adjoining border with the EU until 2004, is characterised by the presence of Albanians and Eastern Europeans.

New borders have likewise appeared, associated with migration and strengthened by European border surveillance systems, as at the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Morocco, or the Evros River marking the border between Greece and Turkey

In twenty years, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Malta, former countries of emigration, have become countries of immigration. This radical transition can be ascribed to a combination of factors: these countries' location along the external borders of Europe, the implementation, at times deferred, of EU border control systems, the demand for labour in sectors that cannot be delocalised (tourism, the restaurant business, fishing, agriculture, caring for the elderly, domestic services for nationals as well as for the elderly and European retirees), the existence of a 'black' labour market, and the frequent recourse to 'massive' regularisation to absorb a proportion of the illegal immigrants. Public opinion is still reticent to the idea of long-term immigrants, though they are nonetheless an integral part of these societies.

A European System of Border Control Is Characterised by Closing Off the South

The EU system to manage migratory flows is called the 'acquis communautaire,' constituted by the essential Schengen Agreements of 1985 on the elimination of internal EU borders and the strengthening of external borders. For non-EU foreign nationals, this has meant the obligation of obtaining a single-entry visa of less than three months in order to enter and travel as tourists within the Schengen Area. Re-admission agreements were signed as of 1991 with
The Mediterranean is increasingly serving as a new Rio Grande between its south and north shores. Visas are accompanied by walls, camps, radars, sensors, drones and the Frontex system.

In any case, populism rampant here and there in Europe, is gaining ground over the Communitisation of migration policies, as demonstrated by debates on the modification of the Schengen Agreement and the return to national control of borders after the arrival of Tunisians and Libyans in Lampedusa and then Ventimiglia in spring 2011.

The Mediterranean is increasingly serving as a new Rio Grande between its south and north shores. Visas are accompanied by walls, camps, radars, sensors, drones and the Frontex system. This proliferation of migration controls is based on three essential factors: the security economy, whereby private companies have become specialised in conveying the deported and military technology recycles its instruments in the civil domain; the security escalation, amalgamating the struggle against illegal immigration, anti-terrorism and the struggle against the Rom; and the use of migrants as negotiation instruments through agreements made with countries in the South (Senegal, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco).

In 2014, Romanians and Bulgarians, whose countries became EU Member States in 2007, were granted the freedom to work and settle within the EU, and this has created a certain tension. The 'disentanglement' of nationalities occurring in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall was preceded by 'disentanglements' in Mediterranean Europe: nearly half a million Bulgarians of Turkish origin returned to Turkey, some 350,000 Pontic Greeks (from the region of Pontus, along the south-eastern coast of the Black Sea) returned to Greece, Romanians of Hungarian origin returned to Hungary and Albanians of Greek origin (the Arvanites) moved to Greece, where they comprise 60% of foreigners, while the departure of Romanians for Italy continued. The struggle against illegal immigration in the Mediterranean area is a declared priority of the EU. Common regulations to combat irregular residence have been defined on an EU level since 1990. The strengthened border controls are also symbolised by SIVE (Spain’s Integrated External Surveillance System), functioning with the aid of radars between Spain and the African coast. Readmission agreements between the EU and south Mediterranean countries tend to make numerous buffer states the ‘border guards’ of the EU, other states (particularly African) already being bound by obligatory readmission clauses. Immigration and asylum liaison officers, through the Frontex programme based at a specialised agency in Warsaw, ensures reinforced control of external EU borders, and EU repatriation (that is, where various EU Member States join efforts to repatriate people) is considered a strong deterrent.

Other instruments used to control the south European borders are bilateral agreements. These consist of agreements between the countries of arrival and departure on readmission of foreign nationals in an irregular situation to their countries of origin.
Libya is an example of bargained agreements in the name of the struggle against clandestine immigration. Libya has not ratified the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees and it does not adhere to the European Neighbourhood Policy. When in 2011, 1,500 immigrants arriving on the Sicilian island of Lampedusa were deported to Libya, the migrants seeking international protection were unable to exercise their rights. Colonel Gaddafi demanded five billion euros from the EU to ‘stop’ illegal immigration and build a road from Egypt to Tunisia. By a decision on 23 February 2011, the European Commission reiterated that Member States should always respect fundamental rights and suspend agreements whenever there was violation of fundamental rights.

Bilateral agreements often have the aim of limiting the migratory flow through policies of returning undocumented migrants to the other side of the border in exchange for development policies, trade agreements or the concession of residency permits for the elite.

Countries of origin are, moreover, beginning to develop diaspora policies to use migrants as agents of influence in their host countries through the attention they garner the country: this is the case of Turkey and Morocco.

One can observe a return to regarding border management as a state affair, while the existence of European borders along the external edges of the EU is emphatically displayed. This reveals a lack of confidence of EU Member States in EU policy, which is nonetheless highly security-oriented.

Conclusion: Migrants, Bridges between Two Shores

Despite this closure, initiatives by migrants and their descendents contribute to building transnational spaces between the north and south shores of the Mediterranean: first of all through remittances, then through associations, as well as through people with dual nationality, whose elite are courted by the countries of origin, and finally through their everyday transnational practices, such as marriage, information exchange, trade, the creation of small businesses and the organisation of Islam in secularised European countries. Countries of origin are, moreover, beginning to develop diaspora policies to use migrants as agents of influence in their host countries through the attention they garner the country: this is the case of Turkey and Morocco. A number of hybrid cultural initiatives have been flourishing in music, theatre, dance and sports, and today are an integral part of popular European culture. Europe can no longer disregard this component of its diversity, in which migrants are among the main actors.

Panorama: The Mediterranean Year
### ALBANIA

**Official Name:** Republic of Albania  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Bujar Nishani  
**Head of Government:** Edi Rama

**Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)**
- Socialist Party of Albania (PSSH, social democrat) 65  
- Democratic Party of Albania (PDS, conservative) 50  
- Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI, social democrat) 16  
- Party for Justice and Integration (PDI, Albanian Chams minority) 4  
- Republican Party (PR, conservative) 3  
- Unity for Human Rights Party (PBDNJ, greek minority) 1  
- Christian Democratic Party (PKDSP) 1

**Population**
- Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Tirana (0.45)  
- Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Durrës (0.20); Vlorë (0.14)

**Area km²:** 28,750  
**Population (millions):** 2.9  
**Population density (hab/km²):** 101  
**Urban population (%):** 55

**Population age <15 (%):** 21  
**Population age >64 (%):** 11  
**Total fertility rate (births per woman):** 1.77  
**Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):** 74/80

**Economy**

**GDP & Debt**
- GDP (millions $): 13,262  
- GDP per capita ($, PPP): 11,376  
- GDP growth (%): 1.9  
- Public Debt (in % GDP): 72.6  
- Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -5.6  
- External Debt (millions $): 7,776  
- Inflation Rate (%): 1.6  
- FDI Inflows (millions $): 1,255  
- FDI Outflows (millions $): 40

**Labour market**
- Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -5.6  
- External Debt (millions $): 7,776  
- FDI Inflows (millions $): 1,255  
- FDI Outflows (millions $): 40

**FDI**
- Inflows (millions $): 1,255  
- Outflows (millions $): 40

**International tourism**
- Tourist arrivals (000): 2,857  
- Tourism receipts (million $): 1,670

**Migrant remittances**
- Receipts (millions $): 779  
- Receipts (in % GDP): 6.2

**Total trade**
- Imports: 6,787  
- Exports: 4,500  
- Balance: -2,287

**Main Trading Partners**
- Import: Italy (35%), Greece (10%), China (7%), Turkey (6%), Germany (5%)
- Export: Italy (46%), China (10%), Spain (9%), India (6%), Germany (4%)

**Society**

**Education**
- Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 98.4/96.9  
- Net enrolment rate (primary): 62  
- Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 69  
- Mean years of schooling: 9.3  
- Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): 3.3  
- R&D expenditure (% of GDP): 0.15

**Water**
- Water resources (km³): 30.2  
- Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 414  
- Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 39  
- Desalinated water production (millions m³): 0

**Security**
- Total armed forces (000): 15  
- Military expenditure (% GDP): 1.3

**Development**
- Human Development Index (Value): 0.716  
- Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 95

**Health**
- Physicians density (per 10,000): 11.5  
- Hospital beds (per 10,000): 26.0  
- Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 6.0

**Emissions**
- CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 1.2

**Protected areas**
- Terrestrial (% of total land area): 11.0

**ICT**
- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 116.2

- Households with computer (per 100): 15.8

- Internet users (per 100): 60.1
### ALGERIA

**Official Name:** People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria  
**Form of Government:** Semi-presidential republic  
**Head of State:** Abdelaziz Bouteflika  
**Head of Government:** Abdelmalek Sellal

#### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (National People’s Assembly)

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#### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Algiers (2.56)  
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Oran (0.85); Constantine (0.43)

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<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%)</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &lt;15 (%)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &gt;64 (%)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fertility rate (births per woman)</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, Men/Women (years)</td>
<td>69/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP &amp; Debt</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (millions $)</td>
<td>214,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP)</td>
<td>14,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP)</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $)</td>
<td>5,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **FDI Inflows (millions $):** 1,691  
- **FDI Outflows (millions $):** -268

#### Migrant remittances

| Receipts (millions $): | 2,000 |
| Receipts (in % GDP): | 1.0 |

#### Total trade

| In goods and services (millions $) | 69,367 |
| Exports (millions $) | 68,242 |
| Balance | -1,125 |

#### Main Trading Partners

- **Import:** China (12%), France (11%), Italy (10%), Spain (9%), Germany (5%)  
- **Export:** Spain (16%), Italy (14%), United Kingdom (11%), France (10%), United States (8%)
### BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

**Official Name:** Bosnia and Herzegovina  
**Form of Government:** Federal parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Mladen Ivanic (Serb); Bakir Izetbegovic (Bosniak); Dragan Ćović (Croat)  
**Head of Government:** Denis Zvizdic

#### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (House of Representatives)

| Party of Democratic Action (SDA, centre-right) | 10 | Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ, Croatian nationalist and conservative) | 4 |
| Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) | 6 |
| Serbian Democratic Party (SDS, Serbian nationalist) | 5 | Social Democratic Party (SDP) | 3 |
| Democratic Front (DF, social democratic) | 5 | Others | 5 |
| Union for a Better Future (SBB, centre-right) | 4 |

#### Population

| Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): | Sarajevo (0.32) |
| Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): | Banja Luka (0.20); Tuzla (0.12) |
| Area km²: | 51,210 |
| Population (millions): | 3.8 |
| Population density (hab/km²): | 75 |
| Urban population (%): | 39 |
| Average annual population growth rate (%): | -0.1 |

#### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

| GDP (millions $): | 17,977 |
| GDP per capita ($, PPP): | 9,833 |
| GDP growth (%): | 1.2 |
| Public Debt (in % GDP): | 44.9 |
| Public Deficit (in % of GDP): | -3.1 |
| External Debt (millions $): | 11,078 |
| Inflation Rate (%): | -0.9 |

| FDI |
| Inflows (millions $): | 332 |
| Outflows (millions $): | -13 |

| International tourism |
| Tourist arrivals (000): | 529 |
| Tourism receipts (million $): | 754 |

| Migrant remittances |
| Receipts (millions $): | 1,896 |
| Receipts (in % GDP): | 10.4 |

| Total trade |
| Imports | 10,746 |
| Exports | 6,973 |
| Balance | -3,773 |

**Economic Sectors**

- Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): 9
- Industry, value added (% of GDP): 27
- Services, value added (% of GDP): 64

**Labour market**

- Labour participation rate, female (%): 34.1
- Unemployment rate (%): 28.4
- Youth unemployment rate (%): 60.4

**Employment in:**

- Agriculture (% of total employment): 20.5
- Industry (% of total employment): 30.3
- Services (% of total employment): 49.0

**Energy**

- Production (millions mt oil eq): 4.6
- Consumption (millions mt oil eq): 7.1
- Consumption per capita (kg oil eq): 1,848
- Import (% energy used): 30.0

| Main Trading Partners |
| Import: Croatia (17%), Serbia (13), Germany (11%), Slovenia (9%), Italy (9%) |
| Export: Croatia (14%), Italy (13%), Slovenia (13%), Germany (12%), Austria (10%) |

#### Society

**Education**

- Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 99.6/97.5
- Net enrolment rate (primary): ..
- Gross enrolment rate (secondary): ..
- Mean years of schooling: 8.3
- Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): ..
- R&D expenditure (% of GDP): 0.02

**Water**

- Water resources (km³): 37.5
- Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 86
- Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): ..
- Desalinated water production (millions m³): 0

**Security**

- Total armed forces (000): 11
- Military expenditure (% GDP): 0.9

**Development**

- Human Development Index (Value): 0.731
- Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 86

**Health**

- Physicians density (per 10,000): 16.9
- Hospital beds (per 10,000): 35.0
- Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 9.9

**Emissions**

- CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 5.5
- Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 196

**Protected areas**

- Terrestrial (% of total land area): 1.5
- Marine (% of territorial waters): 99.2

**ICT**

- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 91.1
- Households with computer (per 100): ..
- Internet users (per 100): 67.9
## CROATIA

**Official Name:** Republic of Croatia  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary constitutional republic  
**Head of State:** Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic  
**Head of Government:** Zoran Milanović  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kukuriku coalition (KK)</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ, conservative)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Assembly of Slavonia and Baranja (HDSSB)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Labourists - Labour Party (HL SR)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Party Reformists</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Civic Party</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other national minority representatives</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Zagreb (0.69)  
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Split (0.18), Rijeka (0.13)  
- **Area km²:** 56,590  
- **Population (millions):** 4.3  
- **Population age <15 (%):** 15  
- **Population age >64 (%):** 18  
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 76  
- **Urban population (%):** 58  
- **Total fertility rate (births per woman):** 1.51  
- **Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):** 74/80  
- **Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 4

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

- **GDP (millions $):** 57,159  
- **GDP per capita ($, PPP):** 20,889  
- **GDP growth (%):** -0.4  
- **Public Debt (in % GDP):** 80.9  
- **Public Deficit (in % of GDP):** -4.9  
- **External Debt (millions $):** 580  
- **Inflation Rate (%):** -0.2  

#### FDI

- **Inflows (millions $):** 580  
- **Outflows (millions $):** -187

#### International tourism

- **Tourist arrivals (000):** 10,955  
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** 9,721

#### Migrant remittances

- **Receipts (millions $):** 1,499  
- **Receipts (in % GDP):** 2.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total trade</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>24,093</td>
<td>24,792</td>
<td>699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>20,497</td>
<td>12,199</td>
<td>-8,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>3,596</td>
<td>12,592</td>
<td>8,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>42.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Society

##### Education

- **Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):** 99.7/98.9  
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 89  
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 97  
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 62  
- **Mean years of schooling:** 11.0  
- **Public expenditure in education (as % of GDP):** 4.2  
- **R&D expenditure (as % of GDP):** 0.75

#### Water

- **Water resources (km³):** 105.5  
- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 146  
- **Water withdrawal by sector (as % of total water):** Agriculture: 1, Industry: 14  
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 0

#### Security

- **Total armed forces (000):** 20  
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 1.6

#### Development

- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.812  
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 47

#### Health

- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** 28.4  
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** 58.0  
- **Total Health Expenditure (as % of GDP):** 6.8

#### Emissions

- **CO₂ Emissions (in CO₂):** 4.0  
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** 345

#### Protected areas

- **Terrestrial (% of total land area):** 14.1  
- **Marine (% of territorial waters):** 3.5

#### ICT

- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 114.5  
- **Households with computer (per 100):** 66.3  
- **Internet users (per 100):** 66.8

### Main Trading Partners

- **Import:** Germany (14%), Italy (13%), Slovenia (11%), Austria (9%), Hungary (6%)  
- **Export:** Italy (14%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (13%), Germany (11%), Slovenia (10%), Austria (8%)
**CYPRUS**

**Official Name:** Republic of Cyprus  
**Form of Government:** Presidential constitutional republic  
**Head of State:** Nicos Anastasiades  
**Head of Government:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (House of Representatives)</th>
<th>Movement of Social Democracy (EDEK)</th>
<th>European Party (EVRO.KO, centre)</th>
<th>Ecological and Environmental Movement (ecologist)</th>
<th>Independents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Coalition (DISY, conservative)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL, socialist)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DIKO, liberal)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Population**

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Nicosia (0.25)  
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Limassol (0.23); Larnaca (0.08)  
- **Area km²:** 9,250  
- **Population (millions):** 1.1  
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 124  
- **Urban population (%):** 67  
- **Average annual population growth rate (%):** 1.1

**Economy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labor market</td>
<td>Labour participation rate, female (%): 56.0</td>
<td>Unemployment rate (%): 15.8</td>
<td>Youth unemployment rate (%): 36.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Migrant remittances**

| Receipts (millions $): 121 | Receipts in % GDP: 0.6 |

**Total trade**

| in goods and services (millions $): | 9,218 | 9,621 | 405 |
| in goods (millions $): | 5,898 | 1,994 | -3,904 |
| in services (millions $): | 3,318 | 7,626 | 4,308 |
| in goods and services (% GDP): | 42.4 | 44.2 | 1.9 |

**Society**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Adult literacy rate, Men / Women (%): 99.5/98.7</th>
<th>Net enrolment rate primary: 98</th>
<th>Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 94</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 46</td>
<td>Mean years of schooling: 11.6</td>
<td>Public expenditure in education (in % of GDP): 7.2</td>
<td>R&amp;D expenditure (in % of GDP): 0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Water resources (km³): 0.8</td>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 163</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 86</td>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desalinated water production (millions m³): 34</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Total armed forces (000): 13</td>
<td>Military expenditure (% GDP): 2.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Development**

| Human Development Index (Value): 0.845 | Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 32 |

**Health**

| Physicians density (per 10,000): 22.9 | Hospital beds (per 10,000): 35.0 |
| Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 7.4 |

**Emissions**

| CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 7.5 | Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 421 |

**Protected areas**

| Terrestrial (% of total land area): 40.9 | Marine (% of territorial waters): 1.3 |

**ICT**

| Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 96.4 | Households with computer (per 100): 70.3 |
| Internet users (per 100): 65.5 |
### Egypt

**Official Name:** Arab Republic of Egypt  
**Form of Government:** Unitary semi-presidential constitutional republic  
**Head of State:** Abdel Fattah el-Sisi  
**Head of Government:** Ibrahim Mahlab

Politcal Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (People’s Assembly) (dissolved)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):</th>
<th>Cairo (18.42)* [including the population of Giza (3.63) and Shubra El-Khema (1.10)]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):</td>
<td>Alexandria (4.69); Port Said (0.66)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Area km²:** 1,001,450  
- **Population (millions):** 82.1  
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 82  
- **Urban population (%):** 43  
- **Average annual population growth rate (%):** 1.6  
- **Population age <15 (%):** 31  
- **Population age >64 (%):** 6  
- **Total fertility rate (births per woman):** 2.77  
- **Life expectancy at birth, Men/Women (years):** 69/73  
- **Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 19

#### Economy

**GDP & Debt**

- **GDP (millions $):** 286,435  
- **GDP per capita ($, PPP):** 10,877  
- **GDP growth (%):** 2.2  
- **Public Debt (in % GDP):** 90.5  
- **Public Deficit (in % of GDP):** -13.6  
- **External Debt (millions $):** 44,430  
- **Inflation Rate (%):** 10.1

**Labour market**  
- **Labour participation rate, female (%):** 23.7  
- **Unemployment rate (%):** 12.7  
- **Youth unemployment rate (%):** 39.9

**International tourism**

- **Tourist arrivals (000):** 9,174  
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** 7,253

**Migrant remittances**

- **Receipts (millions $):** 17,469  
- **Receipts (in % GDP):** 7.0

**Energy**

- **Production (millions mt oil eq):** 88.2  
- **Consumption (millions mt oil eq):** 77.6  
- **Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):** 978  
- **Import (% energy used):** 14.0

**Total trade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services</td>
<td>65,322</td>
<td>47,317</td>
<td>-18,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods</td>
<td>48,914</td>
<td>29,059</td>
<td>-19,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services</td>
<td>16,408</td>
<td>18,258</td>
<td>1,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>-7.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Main Trading Partners**

Import: China (12%), United States (8%), Germany (5%), Italy (5%), Turkey (5%)  
Export: Italy (8%), India (7%), Saudi Arabia (6%), Turkey (5%), Libya (5%)

#### Society

**Education**

- **Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):** 82.2/65.4  
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 95  
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 90  
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 33  
- **Mean years of schooling:** 6.4  
- **Public expenditure in education (as % of GDP):** 3.8  
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** 0.43

**Water**

- **Water resources (km³):** 58.3  
- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 1,000  
- **Water withdrawal by sector (as % agriculture):** 86  
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):** 6  
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 100

**Security**

- **Total armed forces (000):** 836  
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 1.7

**Development**

- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.682  
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 110

**Health**

- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** 28.3  
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** 5.0  
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 4.9

**Emissions**

- **CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):** 2.4  
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** 34

**Protected areas**

- **Terrestrial (% of total land area):** 11.2  
- **Marine (% of territorial waters):** 13.1

**ICT**

- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 121.5  
- **Households with computer (per 100):** 43.1  
- **Internet users (per 100):** 49.6
**FRANCE**

**Official Name:** French Republic  
**Form of Government:** Semi-presidential constitutional republic  
**Head of State:** François Hollande  
**Head of Government:** Manuel Valls

**Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (National Assembly)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialist, Republican, and Citizen Group (centre-left, social democracy)</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Party of the Left (centre-left, social liberal)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic and Republican Left (left coalition)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for a Popular Movement (UMP, liberal conservative)</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non registered</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Democrats and Independents (centre-right, liberal)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecologists</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Population**

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Paris (10.76)  
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Lyon (1.60); Marseille-Aix-en-Provence (1.60); Lille (1.03); Nice-Cannes (0.96); Toulouse (0.92)

| Area km²: | 549,190 |
| Population (millions): | 65.9 |
| Population density (hab/km²): | 121 |
| Urban population (%): | 79 |
| Average annual population growth rate (%): | 0.4 |
| Population age <15 (%): | 18 |
| Population age >64 (%): | 18 |
| Total fertility rate (births per woman): | 2.01 |
| Life expectancy at birth, Men/Women (years): | 79/86 |
| Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive): | 4 |

**Economy**

**GDP & Debt**

| GDP (millions $): | 2,846,890 |
| GDP per capita ($, PPP): | 40,374 |
| GDP growth (%): | 0.2 |
| Public Debt (in % GDP): | 95.1 |
| Public Deficit (in % of GDP): | -4.2 |
| External Debt (millions $): | - |
| Inflation Rate (%): | 0.6 |

**Labour market**

- **Public Deficit (in % of GDP):** -4.2
- **Labour participation rate, female (%):** 50.7
- **Total fertility rate (births per woman):** 2.01
- **Unemployment rate (%):** 10.4
- **Youth unemployment rate (%):** 23.7

**FDI**

| Inflows (millions $): | 4,875 |
| Outflows (millions $): | -2,555 |

**International tourism**

| Tourist arrivals (000): | 84,726 |
| Tourism receipts (million $): | 66,064 |

**Migrant remittances**

| Receipts (millions $): | 22,863 |
| Receipts (in % GDP): | 0.8 |

**Total trade**

| in goods and services (millions $): | 847,218 |
| in goods (millions $): | 658,279 |
| in services (millions $): | 188,937 |
| in goods and services (% GDP): | 30.9 |
| Imports | 812,643 |
| Exports | 575,585 |
| Balance | -34,574 |
| Imports | -82,694 |
| Exports | -48,121 |
| Balance | -1.3 |

**Society**

**Education**

| Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): | ... |
| Net enrolment rate (primary): | 98 |
| Gross enrolment rate (secondary): | 198 |
| Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): | 60 |
| Mean years of schooling: | 11.1 |
| Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): | 5.7 |
| R&D expenditure (% of GDP): | 2.26 |

**Water**

| Water resources (km³): | 211.0 |
| Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): | 508 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): | 12 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): | 69 |
| Desalinated water production (millions m³): | 12 |

**Security**

| Total armed forces (000): | 326 |
| Military expenditure (% GDP): | 2.2 |

**Development**

| Human Development Index (Value): | 0.884 |
| Human Development Index (Position in ranking): | 20 |

**Health**

| Physicians density (per 10,000): | 31.8 |
| Hospital beds (per 10,000): | 64.0 |
| Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): | 11.6 |

**Emissions**

| CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): | 5.1 |
| Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): | 482 |

**Protected areas**

| Terrestrial (% of total land area): | 24.7 |
| Marine (% of territorial waters): | 58.5 |

**ICT**

| Mobile subscriptions (per 100): | 98.5 |
| Households with computer (per 100): | 81.6 |
| Internet users (per 100): | 81.9 |
GREECE

Official Name: Hellenic Republic
Form of Government: Parliamentary constitutional republic
Head of State: Prokopis Pavlopoulos
Head of Government: Alexis Tsipras

Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

- Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA): 149
- New Democracy (ND, conservative): 76
- Golden Dawn (XA, far-right xenophobic): 17
- To Potami (centre-left): 17
- Communist Party of Greece (KKE): 15
- Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK): 13
- Independent Greeks (AE, right): 13
- Independents: 6

Population

- Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Athens (3.06)
- Area km²: 131,960
- Population (millions): 11.0
- Population density (hab/km²): 86
- Urban population (%): 77
- Average annual population growth rate (%): -0.6
- Population age <15 (%): 15
- Population age >64 (%): 20
- Total fertility rate (births per woman): 1.29
- Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive): 4

Economy

- GDP (millions $): 238,023
- GDP per capita ($, PPP): 25,859
- GDP growth (%): 0.8
- Public Debt (in % GDP): 177.2
- Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -2.7
- External Debt (millions $): 91
- Inflation Rate (%): -1.4
- FDI Inflows (millions $): 2,567
- FDI Outflows (millions $): -627
- Tourist arrivals (000): 17,920
- Tourism receipts (million $): 16,188
- Receipts (millions $): 830
- Receipts (in % GDP): 0.3
- Total trade
  - in goods and services (millions $): 67,388
  - in goods ($): 52,794
  - in services ($): 14,594
  - in goods and services (% GDP): 27.8
  - Imports: 66,990
  - Exports: 66,990
  - Balance: -397

- GDP & Debt
  - Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): 4
  - Industry, value added (% of GDP): 14
  - Services, value added (% of GDP): 82
- Labour market
  - Labour participation rate, female (%): 44.2
  - Unemployment rate (%): 27.3
  - Youth unemployment rate (%): 58.4
- Employment in:
  - Agriculture (% of total employment): 13.0
  - Industry (% of total employment): 16.7
  - Services (% of total employment): 70.3
- Energy
  - Production (millions mt oil eq): 10.1
  - Consumption (millions mt oil eq): 26.0
  - Consumption per capita (kg oil eq): 2,343
  - Import (% energy used): 61.0
- Main Trading Partners
  - Import: Russian Federation (14%), Germany (10%), Iraq (8%), Italy (8%), China (5%)
  - Export: Turkey (12%), Italy (9%), Germany (7%), Bulgaria (5%), Cyprus (4%)

Society

- Education
  - Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 98.5/96.9
  - Net enrolment rate (primary): 100
  - Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 110
  - Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 117
  - Mean years of schooling: 10.2
  - Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): 4.1
  - R&D expenditure (% of GDP): 0.69

- Water
  - Water resources (km³): 68.4
  - Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 858
  - Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 89
  - Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 2
  - Desalinated water production (millions m³): 10

- Security
  - Total armed forces (000): 147
  - Military expenditure (% GDP): 2.4

Development

- Human Development Index (Value): 0.853
- Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 29

Health

- Physicians density (per 10,000): ...
- Hospital beds (per 10,000): 48.0
- Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 9.0

Emissions

- CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 7.0
- Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 460

Protected areas

- Terrestrial (% of total land area): 34.7
- Marine (% of territorial waters): 6.3

ICT

- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 116.8
- Households with computer (per 100): 59.5
- Internet users (per 100): 58.9
## Official Name: State of Israel

Form of Government: Parliamentary democracy

Head of State: Reuven Rivlin

Head of Government: Benjamin Netanyahu

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Likud (neo-conservatives)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zionist Union (centre left)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint List (arab parties)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yesh Atid (centre, laica)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kulanu (centrist)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jewish Home (religious far-right)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shas (ultraorthodox Sephardis)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Torah Judaism (ultraorthodox Ashkenazis)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yisrael Beiteinu (far-right ultranationalist)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meretz (social democrats, ecologists)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

- Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Jerusalem (0.83)
- Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Tel Aviv-Jaffa (3.58) includes Rishon LeZion (0.23) and Petah Tikva (0.20); Haifa (1.08)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area (km²):</th>
<th>22,070</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions):</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²):</td>
<td>372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &lt;15 (%):</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &gt;64 (%):</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fertility rate (births per woman):</td>
<td>3.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, Men/Women (years):</td>
<td>80/84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

| GDP (millions $):            | 303,771 |
| GDP per capita ($, PPP):     | 32,691  |
| GDP growth (%):             | 2.8     |
| Public Debt (in % GDP):      | 68.8    |
| Public Deficit (in % of GDP):| -3.6    |
| External Debt (millions $):  | 0.5     |
| Inflation Rate (%):          | 0.5     |
| FDI Inflows (millions $):    | 11,804  |
| FDI Outflows (millions $):   | 4,932   |

#### International tourism

- Tourist arrivals (000): 2,962
- Tourism receipts (million $): 6,452

#### Migrant remittances

- Receipts (millions $): 765
- Receipts (in % GDP): 0.3

#### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>91,474</td>
<td>94,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>71,198</td>
<td>62,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>20,276</td>
<td>32,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>34.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Development

- Human Development Index (Value): 0.888
- Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 19

#### Health

- Physicians density (per 10,000): 33.5
- Hospital beds (per 10,000): 33.0
- Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 7.6

#### Emissions

- CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 9.3
- Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 282

#### Protected areas

- Terrestrial (% of total land area): 17.4
- Marine (% of territorial waters): 0.4

### Main Trading Partners

Import: United States (11%), China (8%), Germany (7%), Switzerland (6%), Belgium (5%)

Export: United States (26%), Hong Kong (8%), United Kingdom (6%), Belgium (6%), China (4%)
**Italy**

**Official Name:** Italian Republic  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary constitutional republic  
**Head of State:** Sergio Mattarella  
**Head of Government:** Matteo Renzi

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (Chamber of Deputies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Five Star Movement (M5S, populist movement)</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forza Italia- The People of Freedom (PdL, conservative)</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Centre-Right (centre-right)</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic choice (centre-liberal)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Ecology Freedom (eco-socialism)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern League (LN, regionalists, populist right)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For Italy (Christian-democratic)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brothers of Italy – National Alliance (national conservative)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Rome (3.70)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Milan (3.09); Naples (2.21); Torino (1.7); Palermo (0.86); Bergamo (0.83)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area km²:</th>
<th>301,340</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions):</td>
<td>60.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²):</td>
<td>203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%):</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%):</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economy & Debt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP (millions $):</th>
<th>2,147,950</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP):</td>
<td>35,486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%):</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP):</td>
<td>132.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $):</td>
<td>-3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%):</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### FDI

- **Inflows (millions $):** 16,508
- **Outflows (millions $):** 31,663

#### International tourism

- **Tourist arrivals (000):** 47,704
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** 46,190

#### Migrant remittances

- **Receipts (millions $):** 7,536
- **Receipts (in % GDP):** 0.4

### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>in goods and services (millions $)</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>579,964</td>
<td>631,089</td>
<td>51,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>470,527</td>
<td>519,973</td>
<td>49,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economic Sectors

- **Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):** 2
- **Industry, value added (% of GDP):** 23
- **Services, value added (% of GDP):** 74

### Labour market

- **Labour participation rate, female (%):** 39.6
- **Unemployment rate (%):** 12.2
- **Youth unemployment rate (%):** 39.7

### Employment in:

- **Agriculture (% of total employment):** 3.7
- **Industry (% of total employment):** 27.8
- **Services (% of total employment):** 68.5

### Energy

- **Production (millions mt oil eq):** 32.7
- **Consumption (millions mt oil eq):** 158.6
- **Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):** 2,664
- **Import (% energy used):** 79.0

### Main Trading Partners

- **Import:** Germany (15%), France (8%), China (8%), Netherlands (6%), Russian Federation (6%)
- **Export:** Germany (13%), France (11%), United States (7%), Switzerland (6%), United Kingdom (5%)

### Society

#### Education

- **Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):** 99.4/99.0
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 96
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 100
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 62
- **Mean years of schooling:** 10.1
- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):** 4.3
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** 1.27

#### Water

- **Water resources (km³):** 191.3
- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 790
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):** 44
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):** 36
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 97

#### Security

- **Total armed forces (000):** 360
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 1.6

#### Development

- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.872
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 26

#### Health

- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** 40.9
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** 34.0
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 9.2

#### Emissions

- **CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):** 6.2
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** 605

#### Protected areas

- **Terrestrial (% of total land area):** 21.6
- **Marine (% of territorial waters):** 19.9

#### ICT

- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 158.8
- **Households with computer (per 100):** 71.1
- **Internet users (per 100):** 58.5
**JORDAN**

Official Name: Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan  
Form of Government: Parliamentary constitutional monarchy  
Head of State: King Abdullah II  
Head of Government: Abdullah Ensour  

**Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)** (Chamber of Deputies)  
- Independents: 123  
- Islamic Centrist Party (ICP, Islamists): 3  
- Homeland: 2  
- National Union Party: 2  
- Stronger Jordan: 2  
- Others: 18

**Population**  
Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Amman (1.15)  
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Zarqa (0.45), Irbid (0.60)  
Area km²: 89,320  
Population (millions): 6.5  
Population density (hab/km²): 73  
Population age <15 (%): 34  
Population age >64 (%): 4  
Average annual population growth rate (%): 2.2  
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive): 16

**Economy**  
- GDP (millions $): 35,765  
- GDP per capita ($, PPP): 11,927  
- GDP growth (%): 3.1  
- Public Debt (in % GDP): 89.3  
- Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -10.0  
- External Debt (millions $): 23,970  
- Inflation Rate (%): 2.9  
- FDI
  - Inflows (millions $): 1,798  
  - Outflows (millions $): 16  
- International tourism  
  - Tourist arrivals (000): 3,945  
  - Tourism receipts (million $): 5,145  
- Migrant remittances  
  - Receipts (millions $): 3,680  
  - Receipts (in % GDP): 11.0

**Main Trading Partners**  
Import: Saudi Arabia (19%), China (10%), United States (8%), India (5%), Italy (5%)  
Export: Iraq (16%), United States (15%), Saudi Arabia (12%), India (7%), United Arab Emirates (4%)

**Society**  
- Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 97.7/92.9  
- Net enrolment rate (primary): 97  
- Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 87  
- Mean years of schooling: 9.9  
- Public expenditure in education (in % of GDP): 9.0  
- R&D expenditure (in % of GDP): 0.43  
- Water resources (km³): 1.0  
- Water withdrawal (in m³ per capita): 166  
- Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 65  
- Desalinated water production (in millions m³): 10

**Security**  
Total armed forces (000): 116  
Military expenditure (% GDP): 3.5

**Development**  
- Human Development Index (Value): 0.745  
- Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 77  
- Physicians density (per 10,000): 25.6  
- Hospital beds (per 10,000): 18.0  
- Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 8.8  
- CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 3.4  
- Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 131  
- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 141.8  
- Households with computer (per 100): 50.8  
- Internet users (per 100): 44.2
**LEBANON**

**Official Name:** Lebanese Republic  
**Form of Government:** Confessionalist parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Tammam Salam (Acting President)  
**Head of Government:** Tammam Salam (designated)

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bloc/Stakeholder</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change and Reform bloc (Free Patriotic Movement [19]; Lebanese Democratic Party [4]; Marada [3]; Others [3])</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Government Independents (Progressive Socialist Party [7]; Glory Movement [2]; Other [1])</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 14 Alliance (Future Movement [26]; Lebanese Forces [8]; Kataeb Party [5]; Murr Bloc [2]; Others [6]; Independents [11])</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Beirut (2.18)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Tripoli (0.5); Sidon (0.2)
- **Area km²:** 10,450
- **Population (millions):** 4.5
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 437
- **Urban population (%):** 88
- **Average annual population growth rate (%):** 1.0
- **Population age <15 (%):** 21
- **Population age >64 (%):** 9
- **Total fertility rate (births per woman):** 1.50
- **Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):** 78/82
- **Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 8

### Economy

**GDP & Debt**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Value (millions $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (millions $):</td>
<td>49,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP):</td>
<td>17,986</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%):</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % of GDP):</td>
<td>134.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (millions $):</td>
<td>30,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%):</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $):</td>
<td>2,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outflows (millions $):</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflows (millions $):</td>
<td>7,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipts (in % of GDP):</td>
<td>16.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $):</td>
<td>20,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export: China (12%), Italy (8%), France (8%), United States (6%), Germany (5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import: Saudi Arabia (10%), Syria (10%), United Arab Emirates (10%, South Africa (7%), Switzerland (7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total trade Imports</td>
<td>20,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>20,983</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)*</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Sectors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry, value added (% of GDP):</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services, value added (% of GDP):</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour market</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour participation rate, female (%):</td>
<td>23.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%):</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth unemployment rate (%):</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment in:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture (% of total employment):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry (% of total employment):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services (% of total employment):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production (millions mt oil eq):</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption (millions mt oil eq):</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):</td>
<td>1,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import (% energy used):</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Trading Partners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China (12%), Italy (8%), France (8%), United States (6%), Germany (5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia (10%), Syria (10%), United Arab Emirates (10%), South Africa (7%), Switzerland (7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Society

**Education**

- **Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):** 96.0/91.9
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 93
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 75
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 48
- **Mean years of schooling:** 7.9
- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):** 2.6
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** 2.6

**Water**

- **Water resources (km³):** 4.5
- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 316
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):** 60
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):** 11
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 47

**Security**

- **Total armed forces (000):** 80
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 44

**Development**

- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.785
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 65

**Health**

- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** 32.0
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** 35.0
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 7.4

**Emissions**

- **CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):** 4.8
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** 80.6

**ICT**

- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 78.0
- **Households with computer (per 100):** 71.5
- **Internet users (per 100):** 70.5

* Data only refer to trade in goods.
LIBYA

Official Name: State of Libya
Form of Government: Provisional parliamentary republic
Head of State: Nouri Abusahmain (President of the General National Congress)
Head of Government: Abdullah al-Thani (Tobruk)

Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)
Uncertain state due to the collapse of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in 2011 and an ongoing civil war between the Council of Deputies in Tobruk and its supporters, the New General National Congress in Tripoli and its supporters, and various jihadist and tribal elements controlling parts of the country.

### Population

| Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): | Tripoli (1.13) | Benghazi (0.74); Misrata (0.64); Zawiya (0.20) |
| Area km²: | 1,759,540 |
| Population (millions): | 6.2 |
| Population density (hab/km²): | 4 |
| Urban population (%): | 78 |
| Average annual population growth rate (%): | 0.8 |

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

| GDP (millions $): | 41,148 |
| GDP per capita ($, PPP): | 15,706 |
| GDP growth (%): | -24.0 |
| Public Debt (in % GDP): | 39.3 |
| Public Deficit (in % of GDP): | -37.7 |
| External Debt (millions $): | - |
| Inflation Rate (%): | 2.8 |

#### International tourism

| Tourist arrivals (000): | - |
| Tourism receipts (million $): | - |

#### Migrant remittances

| Receipts (million $): | - |
| Receipts (in % GDP): | - |

#### Energy

| Production (millions mt oil eq): | 31.0 |
| Consumption (millions mt oil eq): | 13.3 |
| Consumption per capita (kg oil eq): | 2,186 |
| Import (% energy used): | -132.0 |

### Total trade

| in goods and services (millions $) | Imports | Exports | Balance |
| in goods (millions $) | 31,406 | 43,557 | 12,151 |
| in services (millions $) | - | - | - |
| in goods and services (% GDP)* | 32.4 | 45.0 | 12.5 |

### Society

#### Education

| Adult literacy rate, Men / Women (%): | 96.7/85.6 |
| Net enrolment rate (primary): | - |
| Gross enrolment rate (secondary): | - |
| Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): | - |
| Mean years of schooling: | 7.5 |
| Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): | - |
| R&D expenditure (% of GDP): | - |

#### Water

| Water resources (km³): | 0.7 |
| Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): | 810 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): | 83 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): | 3 |
| Desalinated water production (millions m³): | 18 |

#### Security

| Total armed forces (000): | 7 |
| Military expenditure (% GDP): | 3.3 |

### Main Trading Partners

**Import:**
- Italy (14%), China (11%), Turkey (11%), Egypt (6%), Germany (6%)

**Export:**
- Italy (25%), Germany (13%), France (11%), Spain (7%), China (6%)

### Development

| Human Development Index (Value): | 0.784 |
| Human Development Index (Position in ranking): | 55 |

### Health

| Physicians density (per 10,000): | 19.0 |
| Hospital beds (per 10,000): | 37.0 |
| Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): | 3.9 |

### Emissions

| CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): | 7.2 |

### Protected areas

| Terrestrial (% of total land area): | 0.1 |
| Marine (% of territorial waters): | 0.1 |

### ICT

| Mobile subscriptions (per 100): | 165.4 |
| Households with computer (per 100): | - |
| Internet users (per 100): | 16.5 |

* Data only refer to trade in goods.
### MALTA

**Official Name:** Republic of Malta  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Marie Louise Coleiro Preca  
**Head of Government:** Joseph Muscat

**Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malta Labour Party (MLP, social democracy)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Party (NP, centre-right)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):</th>
<th>Valletta (0.19)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):</td>
<td>Birkirkara (0.02); Qormi (0.01)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area km²:</th>
<th>320</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions):</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²):</td>
<td>1,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%):</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%):</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Population age <15 (%): | 15 |
| Population age >64 (%): | 16 |
| Total fertility rate (births per woman): | 1.43 |
| Life expectancy at birth, Men/Women (years): | 79/83 |
| Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive): | 5 |

### Economy

**GDP & Debt**  
- GDP (millions $): 10,582  
- GDP per capita ($, PPP): 32,216  
- GDP growth (%): 2.9  
- Public Debt (in % GDP): 68.1  
- Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -2.2  
- External Debt (millions $): -  
- Inflation Rate (%): 0.8

**Labour market**  
- Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -2.2  
- Labour participation rate, female (%): 37.9  
- Unemployment rate (%): 6.5  
- Youth unemployment rate (%): 14.1

**FDI**  
- Inflows (millions $): -2,100  
- Outflows (millions $): -7

**International tourism**  
- Tourist arrivals (000): 1,582  
- Tourism receipts (million $): 1,616

**Migrant remittances**  
- Receipts (millions $): 35  
- Receipts (in % GDP): 0.4

### GDP & Debt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>8,346</td>
<td>8,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>5,219</td>
<td>3,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>3,127</td>
<td>5,012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>95.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Society

**Education**  
- Adult literacy rate, Men / Women (%): 93.1/95.8  
- Net enrolment rate (primary): 95  
- Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 85  
- Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 41  
- Mean years of schooling: 9.9  
- Public expenditure in education ( % of GDP): 8.0  
- R&D expenditure ( % of GDP): 0.84

**Water**  
- Water resources (km³): 0.1  
- Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 132  
- Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 35  
- Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 1  
- Desalinated water production (millions m³): 19

**Security**  
- Total armed forces (000): 2  
- Military expenditure (% GDP): 0.6

### Development

- Human Development Index (Value): 0.829  
- Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 39

**Health**  
- Physicians density (per 10,000): 35.0  
- Hospital beds (per 10,000): 48.0  
- Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 8.7

**Emissions**  
- CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 6.0  
- Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 595

**ICT**  
- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 129.8  
- Households with computer (per 100): 80.3  
- Internet users (per 100): 68.9

### Main Trading Partners

**Import:** Russian Federation (18%), Italy (16%), China (11%), Singapore (5%), France (5%)  
**Export:** Germany (10%), Republic of Korea (7%), China (7%), Singapore (6%), France (4%)
# Montenegro

**Official Name:** Montenegro  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Filip Vujanović  
**Head of Government:** Milo Dukanović

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party represented in the current Parliament (seats)</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Socialists (centre-left)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Front (centre-right)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro (SNP, social democrat)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (social-democracy)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Montenegro (PCG, Social-democrats, ecologists)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniak Party (BS)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party of Montenegro (LPCG)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian Coalition</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Civic Initiative (HGI)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Podgorica (0.18)  
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Niksic (0.07); Pljevlja (0.03)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area (km²):</th>
<th>13,810</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions):</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²):</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%):</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%):</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Population age <15 (%):** 19  
- **Population age >64 (%):** 13  
- **Total fertility rate (births per woman):** 1.67  
- **Life expectancy at birth, Men/Women (years):** 72/77  
- **Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 5

## Economy

- **GDP & Debt**  
  - GDP (millions $): 4,462  
  - GDP per capita ($, PPP): 14,996  
  - GDP growth (%): 1.5  
  - Public Debt (in % GDP): 58.4  
  - Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -0.8  
  - External Debt (millions $): 2,056  
  - Inflation Rate (%): -0.7  
  - FDI Inflows (millions $): 447  
  - FDI Outflows (millions $): 17  
  - International tourism: 1,324  
  - Tourism receipts (million $): 929

- **Migrant remittances**  
  - Receipts (millions $): 357  
  - Receipts (in % GDP): 8.3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total trade</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>2,847</td>
<td>1,936</td>
<td>-910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>2,301</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>-1,766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>44.9</td>
<td>-21.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Economic Sectors**  
  - Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): 10  
  - Industry, value added (% of GDP): 19  
  - Services, value added (% of GDP): 71

- **Labour market**  
  - Labour participation rate, female (%): 43.0  
  - Unemployment rate (%): 19.8  
  - Youth unemployment rate (%): 41.3

- **Employment in:**  
  - Agriculture (% of total employment): 5.7  
  - Industry (% of total employment): 18.1  
  - Services (% of total employment): 76.2

- **Energy**  
  - Production (millions mt oil eq): 0.8  
  - Consumption (millions mt oil eq): 1.2  
  - Consumption per capita (kg oil eq): 1,900  
  - Import (% energy used): 33.0

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Trading Partners</th>
<th>Import (% GDP)</th>
<th>Export (% GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Import: Serbia (29%), Greece (9%), China (8%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (7%), Italy (7%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export: Serbia (36%), Croatia (16%), Slovenia (10%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (5%), Italy (4%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Society

- **Education**  
  - Adult literacy rate, Men / Women (%): 99.5/98.0  
  - Net enrolment rate (primary): 98  
  - Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 91  
  - Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 56  
  - Mean years of schooling: 10.5  
  - Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): ..  
  - R&D expenditure (% of GDP): 0.41

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Water</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water resources (km³):</td>
<td>..</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):</td>
<td>254</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Desalinated water production (millions m³): | .. |

- **Security**  
  - Total armed forces (000): 12  
  - Military expenditure (% GDP): 1.5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Water</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water resources (km³):</td>
<td>..</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):</td>
<td>254</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):</td>
<td>39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Desalinated water production (millions m³): | .. |

- **Development**  
  - Human Development Index (Value): 0.789  
  - Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 51

- **Health**  
  - Physicians density (per 10,000): 19.8  
  - Hospital beds (per 10,000): 40.0  
  - Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 7.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emissions</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):</td>
<td>272</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Protected areas**  
  - Terrestrial (% of total land area): 14.8  
  - Marine (% of territorial waters): 0.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ICT</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobile subscriptions (per 100):</td>
<td>159.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with computer (per 100):</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet users (per 100):</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**MOROCCO**

**Official Name:** Kingdom of Morocco  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary constitutional monarchy  
**Head of State:** King Mohammed VI  
**Head of Government:** Abdellah Benkirane

### Political Parties

- Justice and Development Party (PJD, Islamist) 107
- Istiqlal Party (PI, Centre-right, nationalism) 60
- National Rally of Independents (RNI, centre-right, liberal) 52
- Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM, liberal) 47
- Labour Party (PT, Centre-left) 4

**Population**

- **Capital** (urban agglomeration population in millions): Rabat (1.93)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):**  
  - Casablanca (3.49); Fez (1.15); Marrakech (1.10); Tangier (0.95); Meknes (0.70)

**Area km²:** 446,550  
**Population (millions):** 33.0  
**Population age <15 (%):** 28  
**Population age >64 (%):** 5  
**Population density (hab/km²):** 74  
**Urban population (%):** 59  
**Average annual population growth rate (%):** 1.5  
**Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 26

### Economy

**GDP & Debt**

- **GDP (millions $):** 109,201  
- **GDP per capita ($, PPP):** 7,806  
- **GDP growth (%):** 2.6  
- **Public Debt (in % GDP):** 63.9  
- **Public Deficit (in % of GDP):** -4.9  
- **External Debt (millions $):** 39,261  
- **Inflation Rate (%):** 0.4

**Labour market**

- **Public Deficit (in % of GDP):** -4.9  
- **Unemployment rate (%):** 9.2  
- **Youth unemployment rate (%):** 18.5

**International tourism**

- **Tourist arrivals (000):** 10,046  
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** 8,201

**Migrant remittances**

- **Receipts (millions $):** 6,619  
- **Receipts (in % of GDP):** 6.4

**FDI**

- **Inflows (millions $):** 3,358  
- **Outflows (millions $):** 331

**Energy**

- **Production (millions mt oil eq):** 0.8  
- **Consumption (millions mt oil eq):** 17.3  
- **Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):** 539  
- **Import (% energy used):** 96.0

**Total trade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>50,029</td>
<td>35,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>42,257</td>
<td>21,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>7,772</td>
<td>13,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Society**

### Education

- **Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):** 78.6/58.8  
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 98  
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 74  
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 16  
- **Mean years of schooling:** 4.4  
- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):** 6.6  
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** 0.73

**Water**

- **Water resources (km³):** 29.0  
- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 321  
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):** 88  
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):** 2  
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 7

**Security**

- **Total armed forces (000):** 246  
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 3.8

**Development**

- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.617  
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 129

**Health**

- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** 6.2  
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** 9.0  
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 6.0

**Emissions**

- **CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):** 1.6  
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** 65

**Protected areas**

- **Terrestrial (% of total land area):** 21.5  
- **Marine (% of territorial waters):** 2.5

**ICT**

- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 128.5  
- **Households with computer (per 100):** 47.1  
- **Internet users (per 100):** 56.0
## PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

### Name (UN use):
Occupied Palestinian Territories

### Form of Government:
De jure parliamentary democracy operating de facto as a semi-presidential system

### Head of State:
Mahmoud Abbas

### Head of Government:
Rami Hamdallah

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)
(Palestinian legislative council has been unable to meet and govern since 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamas (Islamists)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah (nationalists, socialists)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, nationalists, Marxists)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Alternative (socialist alliance)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Palestine (centre-left)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Way (centre)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Ramallah (0.08) [Administrative capital]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Gaza City (0.65); Hebron (0.26); Nablus (0.23); Jenin (0.16); Khan Yunis (0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area km²: 6,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &lt;15 (%): 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%): 75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%): 3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economy

| GDP & Debt |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| GDP (millions $): | .. |
| GDP per capita ($, PPP): | .. |
| GDP growth (%): -1.5 |
| Public Debt (in % GDP): | .. |
| Public Deficit (in % of GDP): | .. |
| External Debt (millions $): | .. |
| Inflation Rate (%): | .. |
| FDI inflows (millions $): 177 |
| FDI outflows (millions $): -9 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>International tourism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tourist arrivals (000): 545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism receipts (million $): 399</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant remittances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Receipts (millions $): 2,199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipts (in % GDP): 19.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $): 7,111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $): 5,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $): 1,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP): 65.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2,201</td>
<td>-4,910</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,324</td>
<td>-4,583</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>877</td>
<td>-327</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>-45.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economic Sectors

- Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): 5
- Industry, value added (% of GDP): 25
- Services, value added (% of GDP): 70

### Labour market

- Labour participation rate, female (%): 15.4
- Unemployment rate (%): 23.4
- Youth unemployment rate (%): 38.3

### Employment in:

- Agriculture (% of total employment): 11.5
- Industry (% of total employment): 26.3
- Services (% of total employment): 62.2

### Energy

- Production (millions mt oil eq): ..
- Consumption (millions mt oil eq): ..
- Consumption per capita (kg oil eq): ..
- Import (% of energy used): ..

### Main Trading Partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Import:</th>
<th>Export:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel (76%), Turkey (3%), China (3%), Jordan (3%), Germany (2%)</td>
<td>Israel (84%), Jordan (7%), United Arab Emirates (2%), Saudi Arabia (1%), Belgium (1%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 97.9/92.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment rate (primary): 91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling: 8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure in education (of GDP): ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D expenditure (% of GDP): ..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Water</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water resources (km³): 0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desalinated water production (million m³): 0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total armed forces (000): 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure (% GDP): ..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Development

- Human Development Index (Value): 0.686
- Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 107

### Health

- Physicians density (per 10,000): ..
- Hospital beds (per 10,000):..
- Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): ..

### Emissions

- CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): ..
- Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 28

### Protected areas

- Terrestrial (% of total land area): 0.6
- Marine (% of territorial waters): ..

### ICT

- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 73.7
- Households with computer (per 100): 50.9
- Internet users (per 100): 46.6
# Portugal

**Official Name:** Portuguese Republic  
**Form of Government:** Semi-presidential constitutional republic  
**Head of State:** Aníbal Cavaco Silva  
**Head of Government:** Pedro Passos Coelho

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party and Movement</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (PSD)</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party (PS)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic and Social Centre - People’s Party (CDS/PP)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unity Coalition (CDU, Portuguese Socialist Party (PS)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party - Ecologist Party “The Greens”</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bloc (BE, socialism / Trotskyism / communism)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

| Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): | Lisbon (2.87) |
| Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): | Porto (1.30); Braga (0.18); Guimaraes (0.16) |
| Area km²: | 92,210 |
| Population (millions): | 10.5 |
| Population density (hab/km²): | 114 |
| Urban population (%): | 62 |
| Average annual population growth rate (%): | -0.5 |
| Population age <15 (%): | 15 |
| Population age >64 (%): | 19 |
| Total fertility rate (births per woman): | 1.28 |
| Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years): | 77/84 |
| Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive): | 3 |

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

| GDP (millions $): | 230,012 |
| GDP per capita ($, PPP): | 26,975 |
| GDP growth (%): | 0.9 |
| Public Debt (in % GDP): | 130.2 |
| Public Deficit (in % of GDP): | -4.5 |
| External Debt (millions $): | - |
| Inflation Rate (%): | 0.2 |
| FDI Inflows (millions $): | 8,916 |
| FDI Outflows (millions $): | 1,915 |

#### International tourism

| Tourist arrivals (000): | 8,097 |
| Tourism receipts (million $): | 16,221 |

#### Migrant remittances

| Receipts (millions $): | 4,288 |
| Receipts (in % of GDP): | 2.0 |

#### Total trade

| in goods and services (millions $): | 86,812 | 90,552 | 3,741 |
| in goods (millions $): | 72,685 | 63,246 | -9,439 |
| in services (millions $): | 14,127 | 27,307 | 13,180 |
| in goods and services (% GDP): | 39.5 | 41.2 | 1.7 |

#### Economic Sectors

| Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): | 2 |
| Industry, value added (% of GDP): | 21 |
| Services, value added (% of GDP): | 77 |

#### Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit rate, female (%):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth unemployment rate (%):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Employment in:

| Agriculture (% of total employment): | 10.5 |
| Industry (% of total employment): | 25.6 |
| Services (% of total employment): | 63.8 |

#### Energy

| Production (millions mt oil eq): | 4.8 |
| Consumption (millions mt oil eq): | 21.9 |
| Consumption per capita (kg oil eq): | 2,087 |
| Import (% energy used): | 78.0 |

#### Main Trading Partners

| Import: Spain (32%), Germany (11%), France (7%), Italy (5%), Netherlands (6%) |
| Export: Spain (23%), Germany (11%), France (11%), Angola (7%), United Kingdom (5%) |

### Society

#### Education

| Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): | 97.1/94.4 |
| Net enrolment rate (primary): | 98 |
| Gross enrolment rate (secondary): | 123 |
| Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): | 66 |
| Mean years of schooling: | 8.2 |
| Public expenditure in education (as % of GDP): | 5.3 |
| R&D expenditure (% of GDP): | 1.50 |

#### Water

| Water resources (km³): | 77.4 |
| Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): | 514 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): | 73 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): | 19 |
| Desalinated water production (millions m³): | 2 |

#### Security

| Total armed forces (000): | 90 |
| Military expenditure (% GDP): | 2.2 |

#### Development

| Human Development Index (Value): | 0.822 |
| Human Development Index (Position in ranking): | 41 |

#### Health

| Physicians density (per 10,000): | .. |
| Hospital beds (per 10,000): | 34.0 |
| Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): | 9.3 |

#### Emissions

| CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): | 4.3 |
| Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): | 446 |

#### Protected areas

| Terrestrial (% of total land area): | 22.3 |
| Marine (% of territorial waters): | 4.1 |

#### ICT

| Mobile subscriptions (per 100): | 113.0 |
| Households with computer (per 100): | 66.7 |
| Internet users (per 100): | 62.1 |
**SERBIA**

**Official Name:** Republic of Serbia  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Tomislav Nikolic  
**Head of Government:** Aleksandar Vučić

**Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)** (National Assembly of Serbia)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbian Progressive Party (conservatism, pro-european)</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party of Serbia (socialism)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (social democracy)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic Party (social democracy)</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (regionalism, Minority rights)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak (SDAS) (Bosniak minority interests)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Action (PDD) (Albanian minority interests)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Population**

| Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): | Belgrade (1.18) |
| Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): | Novi Sad (0.34); Niš (0.26); Kragujevac (0.22); Subotica (0.14) |
| Area km²: | 88,360 |
| Population (millions): | 7.2 |
| Population density (hab/km²): | 82 |
| Population age <15 (%): | 16 |
| Population age >64 (%): | 14 |
| Urban population (%): | 55 |
| Average annual population growth rate (%): | -0.5 |
| Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive): | 6 |

**Economy**

| GDP & Debt | GDP (millions $): 43,866  
GDP per capita ($, PPP): 13,329  
GDP growth (%): -1.8  
Public Debt (in % GDP): 72.4  
Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -6.3  
External Debt (millions $): 36,937  
Inflation Rate (%): 2.1  
FDI | Inflows (millions $): 650  
Outflows (millions $): 75 |
| Economic Sectors | Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): 9  
Industry, value added (% of GDP): 30  
Services, value added (% of GDP): 61 |
| Labour market | Labour participation rate, female (%): 44.5  
Unemployment rate (%): 22.2  
Youth unemployment rate (%): 48.9 |
| Employment in: | Agriculture (% of total employment): 21.0  
Industry (% of total employment): 26.5  
Services (% of total employment): 52.6 |
| Energy | Production (millions mt oil eq): 11.2  
Consumption (millions mt oil eq): 16.2  
Consumption per capita (kg oil eq): 2,230  
Import (% energy used): 31.0 |

**Migrant remittances**

| Receipts (millions $): 4,359  
Receipts (in % GDP): 10.3 |

**Tourism**

| Tourist arrivals (000): | 922  
Tourism receipts (million $): 1,221 |

**International tourism**

| Tourism receipts (million $): | 1,221 |

**Migrant remittances**

| Remittances (millions $): 4,359  
Remittances (in % GDP): 10.3 |

**Total trade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total trade</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $): 27,357 20,355 -7,002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $): 22,800 14,975 -7,824</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $): 4,557 5,373 823</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP): 64.4 47.9 -16.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Main Trading Partners**

| Import: Italy (12%), Germany (11%), Russian Federation (9%), China (7%), Hungary (5%)  
Export: Italy (16%), Germany (12%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (8%), Russian Federation (7%), Montenegro (6%) |

**Society**

| Education | Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 99.1/97.2  
Net enrolment rate (primary): 94  
Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 93  
Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 56  
Mean years of schooling: 9.5  
Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): 4.8  
R&D expenditure (% of GDP): 0.99 |

| Health | Physicians density (per 10,000): 21.1  
Hospital beds (per 10,000):  --  
Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 10.3 |

| Water | Water resources (km²): 431  
Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 2  
Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 82  
Desalinated water production (millions m³): 0 |

| Emissions | CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 6.1  
Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 231 |

| ICT | Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 119.4  
Households with computer (per 100): 50.9  
Internet users (per 100): 51.5 |

| Development | Human Development Index (Value): 0.745  
Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 77 |

| Security | Total armed forces (000): 28  
Military expenditure (% GDP): 2.2 |

| Protected areas | Terrestrial (% of total land area): 6.3  
Marine (% of territorial waters):  |

| ICT | Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 119.4  
Households with computer (per 100): 50.9  
Internet users (per 100): 51.5 |
## SLOVENIA

| Official Name: | Republic of Slovenia |
| Form of Government: | Parliamentary constitutional republic |
| Head of State: | Borut Pahor |
| Head of Government: | Miro Cerar |

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modern Centre Party (SMC) (Social liberalism)</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS, conservative)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Pensioners' Party of Slovenia (DESUS)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats (SD)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Left (ZL) (Social democracy)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Slovenia - Christian People's Party (NSi)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance of Alenka Bratušek (ZaAB) (Liberalism)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities (Hungarian and Italian minorities' interests)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Ljubljana (0.28)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Maribor (0.14); Celje (0.06); Kranj (0.05)
- **Area km²:** 20,270
- **Population (millions):** 2.1
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 102
- **Urban population (%):** 50
- **Average annual population growth rate (%):** 0.1
- **Population age <15 (%):** 14
- **Population age >64 (%):** 17
- **Total fertility rate (births per woman):** 1.58
- **Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):** 77/83
- **Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 2

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

| GDP (millions $): | 49,506 |
| GDP per capita ($, PPP): | 29,658 |
| GDP growth (%): | 2.6 |
| Public Debt (in % GDP): | 82.9 |
| Public Deficit (in % of GDP): | -5.8 |
| External Debt (millions $): | - |
| Inflation Rate (%): | 0.2 |
| FDI | |
| Inflows (millions $): | -679 |
| Outflows (millions $): | 58 |

#### Migrant remittances

| Receipts (millions $): | 700 |
| Receipts (in % GDP): | 1.5 |

#### International tourism

| Tourist arrivals (000): | 2,259 |
| Tourism receipts (million $): | 2,976 |

#### Migrant remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total trade</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>33,044</td>
<td>36,457</td>
<td>3,503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>28,511</td>
<td>29,348</td>
<td>837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>4,534</td>
<td>7,198</td>
<td>2,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)*</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Education

| Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): | 99.7/99.7 |
| Net enrolment rate (primary): | 98 |
| Gross enrolment rate (secondary): | 110 |
| Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): | 54 |
| Mean years of schooling: | 11.9 |
| Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): | 5.7 |
| R&D expenditure (% of GDP): | 2.8 |

### Water

| Water resources (km³): | 1.9 |
| Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): | 456 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): | 0 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): | 0 |
| Desalinated water production (millions m³): | 0 |

### Security

| Total armed forces (000): | 14 |
| Military expenditure (% GDP): | 1.2 |

### Development

| Human Development Index (Value): | 0.874 |
| Human Development Index (Position in ranking): | 25 |

### Health

| Physicians density (per 10,000): | 26.2 |
| Hospital beds (per 10,000): | 66.0 |
| Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): | 9.9 |

### Emissions

| CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): | 7.1 |
| Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): | 580 |

### Protected areas

| Terrestrial (% of total land area): | 54.5 |
| Marine (% of territorial waters): | 98.4 |

### ICT

| Mobile subscriptions (per 100): | 110.2 |
| Households with computer (per 100): | 76.4 |
| Internet users (per 100): | 72.7 |
**SPAIN**

**Official Name:** Kingdom of Spain  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary constitutional monarchy  
**Head of State:** King Felipe VI  
**Head of Government:** Mariano Rajoy

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (Congress of Deputies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People’s Party (PP, conservative)</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE, social democrat)</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convergence and Union (CiU, conservative regional)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Left (IU-ICV-CHA, left wing)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amaiur (left wing independentist regional)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions)</td>
<td>Madrid (6.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main urban agglomerations (population in millions)</td>
<td>Barcelona (5.21); Valencia (0.80); Sevilla (0.70); Zaragoza (0.67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area km²</td>
<td>505,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>46.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²)</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%)</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%)</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (millions $)</td>
<td>1,406,860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP)</td>
<td>37,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP)</td>
<td>97.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $)</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%)</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### FDI

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inflows (millions $)</td>
<td>39,167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outflows (millions $)</td>
<td>26,035</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### International tourism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tourist arrivals (000)</td>
<td>60,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism receipts (million $)</td>
<td>67,608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Migrant remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Receipts (millions $)</td>
<td>10,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipts (in % GDP)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>424,981</td>
<td>463,095</td>
<td>38,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>332,385</td>
<td>316,936</td>
<td>-15,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>92,595</td>
<td>146,159</td>
<td>53,564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Main Trading Partners

Import: Germany (11%), France (11%), China (7%), Italy (6%), United States (4%)  
Export: France (16%), Germany (10%), Portugal (8%), Italy (7%), United Kingdom (7%)

### Society

#### Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%)</td>
<td>98.8/97.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment rate (primary)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (secondary)</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (tertiary)</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure in education (in % of GDP)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D expenditure (in % of GDP)</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Water

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water resources (km³)</td>
<td>111.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita)</td>
<td>694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture)</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry)</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desalinated water production (millions m³)</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total armed forces (000)</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure (% GDP)</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (Value)</td>
<td>0.869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (Position in ranking)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Health

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physicians density (per 10,000)</td>
<td>37.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital beds (per 10,000)</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Emissions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita)</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger cars (per 1,000 people)</td>
<td>482</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Protected areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territorial (% of total land area)</td>
<td>29.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine (% of territorial waters)</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### ICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobile subscriptions (per 100)</td>
<td>106.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with computer (per 100)</td>
<td>73.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet users (per 100)</td>
<td>71.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## SYRIA

### Country Profiles

**Official Name:** Syrian Arab Republic  
**Form of Government:** Dominant-party semi-presidential state  
**Head of State:** Bashar al-Assad  
**Head of Government:** Wael Nader al-Halqi

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (People’s Council of Syria)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Progressive Front (NFP, coalition led by the Baath Party)</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front for Change and Liberation (coalition of opponents of the regime)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Damascus (2.57)  
  - Aleppo (3.52); Homs (1.60); Hamah (1.19); Latakia (0.77)

- **Area km²:** 185,180

- **Population (millions):** 22.8

- **Population density (hab/km²):** 124

- **Urban population (%):** 57

- **Average annual population growth rate (%):** 2.0

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

- **GDP (millions $):** ..

- **GDP per capita ($, PPP):** ..

- **GDP growth (%):** ..

- **Public Debt (in % of GDP):** ..

- **External Debt (millions $):** 4,753

#### Labour market

- **Labour participation rate, female (%):** 13.5

- **Unemployment rate (%):** 10.8

#### Energy

- **Production (millions mt oil eq):** 23.6

- **Consumption (millions mt oil eq):** 20.0

- **Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):** 910

- **Import (% energy used):** 18.0

### Migrant remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recept (millions $):</th>
<th>1,677</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recept (in % GDP):</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>5,839</td>
<td>2,101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Main Trading Partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Import:</th>
<th>Export:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia (11%), China (10%), Turkey (8%), Italy (6%), Russian Federation (6%)</td>
<td>Iraq (52%), Saudi Arabia (13%), Kuwait (8%), United Arab Emirates (7%), Libya (5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Society

#### Education

- **Adult literacy rate, Men / Women (%):** 91.7/81.0

- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 62

- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 48

- **Mean years of schooling:** 6.6

- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):** 4.9

#### Water

- **Water resources (km³):** 16.8

- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 857

- **Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):** 88

- **Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):** 4

- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 0

#### Security

- **Total armed forces (000):** 178

- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** ..

* Data only refer to trade in goods.
**FYROM**

*Provisional reference:* the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  
*Form of Government:* Parliamentary republic  
*Head of State:* Gjorge Ivanov  
*Head of Government:* Nikola Gruevski

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (Assembly of the Republic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Notable interests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) (Conservatism)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Albanians (PDS/DPA, Albanian interests)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) (Social democracy, Third way)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>National Democratic Revival (RDK) (Albanian minority interests)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Union for Integration (BDI/DUI, Albanian minority interests)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Skopje (0.50)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Bitola (0.12); Kumanovo (0.10)
- **Area km²:** 25,710
- **Population (millions):** 2.1
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 84
- **Urban population (%):** 57
- **Average annual population growth rate (%):** 0.1

### Economy

**GDP & Debt**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (millions $):</td>
<td>11,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP):</td>
<td>13,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%):</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP):</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (in % of GDP):</td>
<td>-4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $):</td>
<td>6,934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%):</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FDI**

- **Inflows (millions $):** 334
- **Outflows (millions $):** -2

**International tourism**

- **Tourist arrivals (000):** 400
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** 270

**Migrant remittances**

- **Receipts (millions $):** 409
- **Receipts (in % GDP):** 4.0

**Total trade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $):</td>
<td>7,411</td>
<td>5,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $):</td>
<td>6,351</td>
<td>4,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $):</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>1,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP):</td>
<td>73.2</td>
<td>53.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Society

**Education**

- **Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):** 98.8/96.8
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 87
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 83
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 38
- **Mean years of schooling:** 8.2
- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):** ..
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** 0.22

**Water**

- **Water resources (km³):** 6.4
- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 490
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):** 12
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):** 67
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 0

**Security**

- **Total armed forces (000):** 8
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 1.2

**Development**

- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.732
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 84

**Health**

- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** 26.2
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** 45.0
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 6.9

**Emissions**

- **CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):** 4.1
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** 152

**Protected areas**

- **Terrestrial (% of total land area):** 7.3
- **Marine (% of territorial waters):** ..

**ICT**

- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 106.2
- **Households with computer (per 100):** 64.2
- **Internet users (per 100):** 61.2
## TUNISIA

### Official Name:
Republic of Tunisia

### Form of Government:
Semi-Presidential Republic

### Head of State:
Beji Caid Essebsi

### Head of Government:
Habib Essid

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (National Constituent Assembly)
- Call for Tunisia (NT) (Secularism, Social democracy): 86
- Ennahdha (Islamist): 69
- Free Patriotic Union (UPU) (Secularism, Liberalism): 16
- Popular Front (FP) (Secularism, Socialism): 15
- Tunisian Aspiration: 8

#### Congress for the Republic (CPR) (Secularism, Social liberalism)
- 4 seats

#### Democratic Current (Pan-Arabism)
- 3 seats

#### Republican Party (Secularism, Liberalism)
- 1 seat

#### People’s Movement (Secularism, Socialism)
- 3 seats

#### Others
- 12 seats

### Population
- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Tunis (1.98)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Sfax (0.70); Sousse (0.67); Ettadhamen (0.42); Gabès (0.34)
- **Area km²:** 163,610
- **Population (millions):** 10.9
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 69
- **Population age <15 (%):** 23
- **Population age >64 (%):** 7
- **Total fertility rate (births per woman):** 2.25
- **Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):** 73/77
- **Average annual population growth rate (%):** 1.0
- **Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 13

### Economy
- **GDP & Debt**
  - GDP (millions $): 48,553
  - GDP per capita ($, PPP): 11,300
  - GDP growth (%): 2.5
  - Public Deficit (in % GDP): -3.5
  - External Debt (millions $): 25,827
  - Inflation Rate (%): 4.9

- **FDI**
  - Inflows (millions $): 1,096
  - Outflows (millions $): 22

- **International tourism**
  - Tourist arrivals (000): 6,269
  - Tourism receipts (millions $): 2,863

- **Migrant remittances**
  - Receipts (millions $): 2,300
  - Receipts (in % GDP): 4.9

- **Total trade**
  - in goods and services (millions $): 26,274
  - Imports: 22,086
  - Exports: 22,086
  - Balance: -4,188
  - in goods (millions $): 22,988
  - Imports: 17,054
  - Exports: 17,054
  - Balance: -5,934
  - in services (millions $): 3,286
  - Imports: 5,032
  - Exports: 5,032
  - Balance: 1,476
  - in goods and services (% GDP): 55.4
  - Imports: 46.6
  - Exports: 46.6
  - Balance: -8.8

### Main Trading Partners
- **Import:** France (18%), Italy (15%), Germany (7%), China (6%), Algeria (4%)
- **Export:** France (26%), Italy (18%), Germany (9%), Libya (5%), Spain (5%)

### Education
- **Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):** 89.6/74.2
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 99
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 89
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 34
- **Mean years of schooling:** 6.5
- **Public expenditure on education (% of GDP):** 6.2
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** 1.10

### Water
- **Water resources (km³):** 4.6
- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 303
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):** 80
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):** 5
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 19

### Security
- **Total armed forces (000):** 48
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 2.0

### Development
- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.721
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 90

### Health
- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** 12.2
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** 21.0
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 7.0

### Emissions
- **CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):** 2.1
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** 91

### Protected areas
- **Terrestrial (% of total land area):** 5.4
- **Marine (% of territorial waters):** 2.5

### ICT
- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 115.6
- **Households with computer (per 100):** 23.2
- **Internet users (per 100):** 43.8
**Country Profiles TURKEY**

IE Med. Mediterranean Yearbook 2015

**Official Name:** Republic of Turkey  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Recep Tayyip Erdogan  
**Head of Government:** Ahmet Davutoglu

**Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (Grand National Assembly)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Seating</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Development Party (AKP, Islamism, Conservatism)</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican People’s Party (CHP, Social Democracy, Laicism)</td>
<td>132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Movement Party (MHP, Turkish Nationalism)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP, Democratic Socialism, Anti-capitalism)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Population**

| Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): | Ankara (4.64) |
| Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): | Istanbul (13.95); Izmir (2.99); Bursa (1.87); Adana (1.79); Gaziantep (1.49); Konya (1.16) |
| Area km²: | 783,560 |
| Population (millions): | 74.9 |
| Population density (hab/km²): | 97 |
| Urban population (%): | 72 |
| Average annual population growth rate (%): | 1.3 |
| Population age <15 (%): | 26 |
| Population age >64 (%): | 7 |
| Total fertility rate (births per woman): | 2.04 |
| Life expectancy at birth, Men/Women (years): | 72/78 |
| Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive): | 17 |

**Economy**

| GDP & Debt |  
| GDP (millions $): | 806,108 |
| GDP per capita ($, PPP): | 19,610 |
| GDP growth (%): | 2.9 |
| Public Debt (in % GDP): | 33.5 |
| Public Deficit (in % of GDP): | -1.5 |
| External Debt (millions $): | 388,243 |
| Inflation Rate (%): | 8.9 |
| FDI |  
| Inflows (millions $): | 12,866 |
| Outflows (millions $): | 3,114 |
| International tourism |  
| Tourist arrivals (000): | 37,795 |
| Tourism receipts (million $): | 34,683 |
| Migrant remittances |  
| Receipts (millions $): | 1,046 |
| Receipts (in % GDP): | 0.1 |

| Total trade | Imports | Exports | Balance |
| in goods and services (millions $): | 267,227 | 210,545 | -56,682 |
| in goods (millions $): | 243,356 | 163,404 | -79,952 |
| in services (millions $): | 23,871 | 47,141 | 23,270 |
| in goods and services (% GDP): | 32.3 | 26.4 | -6.9 |

**Society**

| Education |  
| Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): | 98.4/98.0 |
| Net enrolment rate (primary): | 94 |
| Gross enrolment rate (secondary): | 104 |
| Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): | 79 |
| Mean years of schooling: | 7.6 |
| Public expenditure in education (in % of GDP): | 2.9 |
| R&D expenditure (% of GDP): | 0.86 |
| Water |  
| Water resources (km³): | 211.6 |
| Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): | 577 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): | 74 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): | 11 |
| Desalinated water production (millions m³): | 1 |
| Security |  
| Total armed forces (000): | 613 |
| Military expenditure (% GDP): | 2.3 |

| Development |  
| Human Development Index (Value): | 0.759 |
| Human Development Index (Position in ranking): | 69 |
| Physicians density (per 10,000): | 17.1 |
| Hospital beds (per 10,000): | 25.0 |
| Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): | 6.1 |

| Emissions |  
| CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): | 4.0 |
| Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): | 110 |

| Protected areas |  
| Terrestrial (% of total land area): | 2.1 |
| Marine (% of territorial waters): | 2.7 |

| ICT |  
| Mobile subscriptions (per 100): | 93.0 |
| Households with computer (per 100): | 52.9 |
| Internet users (per 100): | 48.3 |
At the start of 2014, as the run-up to the May European Parliament elections started to gain speed, an unprecedented nervousness prevailed amongst EU political elites. The negative effects of crisis-management measures were acutely felt, recovery was not in sight in most member countries, and the Euro-crisis and its clumsy management had placed EU affairs at the centre of domestic politics like never before. Opinion polls showed a drop in support for the EU and its institutions, and Eurosceptic and Eurocritical parties were on the rise in almost all Member States. Brussels and national capitals were gripped by the fear that the quintessentially integrationist EU institution, the European Parliament, may become dominated or strongly influenced by the anti-European fringe as the result of a combination of protest votes, dismal turnouts, indifference, and disappointment in the traditionally pro-European constituencies.

Southern Europe, hard hit by five years of austerity, recession, unemployment and record emigration rates, had seen the largest drop in trust for national and European political institutions. The party systems of southern EU states arrived at the election year in very different circumstances. Following the dramatic ousting of their elected Prime Ministers, under overwhelming external pressure, Greece and Italy had, since 2012, undergone radical shake-ups of their electoral landscapes: “protest elections” (Verney & Bosco, 2013) were held twice (in 2012 in Greece, in 2013 in Italy), and resulted in technocratic cross-partisan governments. In both countries, some of the traditional main players (the Panhellenic Socialist Movement – PASOK in Greece, Forza Italia in Italy) lost their position as the largest opposition parties to emerging forces from outside the political mainstream (Syriza, Movimento Cinque Stelle – M5S). The Greek and Italian party systems were being clearly reconfigured. By contrast, the two Iberian democracies, with their deeply wounded economies and societies, had adjusted to the shock by the more traditional mechanism of substituting socialist governments, tainted by the early management of the crisis, by the other traditional mainstream party of the centre-right. The two-party system established in Portugal and Spain shortly after their transition to democracy was weakened, polls showed a growth in other parties, but the leading actors remained unchanged, despite the visible divorce between large parts of the population and the governing political elite.

In the event, the European Parliament elections were not the sea change some had feared half a year before the elections. Turnout stabilised at a record low (after falling continuously since 1979), with Western and Southern Europe largely compensating for the dismal Central and Eastern European rates. Mainstream parties still managed to retain a substantial part of the vote, providing most of the MEPs. Eurosceptic parties of the populist radical right, despite successes in countries like Britain and France, remained a marginal, and divided, force in the new Parliament.

In Greece, Syriza, the coalition of the radical left, clearly won the European election under Alexis Tsipras’ leadership with 26.5% of the vote, almost 4% more than the governing Nea Demokratia. PASOK, the junior partner in government, could do nothing to stop its decline, and with 8% of the vote, the coalition it led finished behind the xenophobic extreme right party Golden Dawn (9.4%). To Potami,
a recently-created centrist pro-European coalition, was not far behind PASOK, with 6.6% of the vote. The European elections, furthermore, were an opportunity for Alexis Tsipras, who became the candidate of the United European Left to the post of President of the European Commission, to both reaffirm his leadership in Syriza, and consolidate the party’s turn towards Europe. The European Parliament elections coincided with the second round of local elections, where Nea Democracia obtained 26.3% and a substantial part of local and regional power, whereas Syriza won just 17.7% of the vote taking two prefectures (the Ionian Islands and, crucially, Attica, the most populous) against Nea Democracia’s six. Given Syriza’s weak territorial presence, however, that was considered a good result for Tsipras’ party. The two May elections, therefore, consolidated Syriza’s popularity amongst voters, as well as its reach beyond the left and into the centre-left, previously a source of PASOK supporters.

In Italy, the elections were the first nationwide test to Matteo Renzi’s popularity as Prime Minister, and resulted in a widespread endorsement: with 40.8% of the ballots, the Democratic Party won a result better than that of any other party in an Italian nationwide election since Christian Democracy in the 1950s. The Democratic Party won the most votes of any single party anywhere in the European Parliament elections, and gained the largest number of MEPs. Renzi, the most successful Social Democratic leader in Europe, used his new prestige to increase Italy’s influence with the designation of Federica Mogherini as the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and reinforced his position as Prime Minister at home. In the same election, Forza Italia, which ran an unprecedented campaign in terms of its anti-European tone, came a distant third, with 16.8%, nearly 5 points behind Beppe Grillo’s M5S (21.1%). Comfortably consolidated as the largest opposition force, the results demonstrated that M5S’ voter base was not as volatile as mainstream parties had hoped after its strong performance in 2013. The anti-European, xenophobic position in Italy was represented by Lega Nord, who obtained 6% of the votes, a modest result compared to similar parties in other EU countries. Although it was not immediately apparent when the results emerged, the European Parliament elections were a turning point in Spain. The two main parties that had dominated Spanish democracy for decades, the People’s Party (PP) on the centre-right and Socialist Party (PSOE) on the centre-left, failed to get 50% of the vote with their combined results (26% PP, 23% PSOE); a bad result, but incomparable to the complete transformation of Italian and Greek politics since the previous election. Two parties that seemed to pose the biggest threat to the two-party system, the United Left (IU) (10.6%) and the centre reformist UPyD (6.5%), saw their prospects disappointed in relation to opinion polls during the crisis years – it turned out, in hindsight, that they were past their peak and about to enter a phase of decline. The biggest surprise was a newly created party, Podemos, which combined some of the energy of the new Spanish activism, the traditional far-left, a charismatic and media-savvy leadership and a new, progressive brand of populism. Created in January 2014, Podemos’ rise had barely registered in the polls and media; their 8% of the vote surprised even their own leaders and activists. Podemos got all the attention, but a small party, Ciudadanos, which had been in the Catalan Parliament since 2006, managed to break out of its geographical origins and win a modest 500,000 votes, two-thirds of them in other regions, a new, nearly unnoticed presence in the political centre.

In Portugal, the worst-hit country in the euro-crisis after Greece and Cyprus, the party system remained stable. The opposition Socialist Party won with 34% of the vote, followed by the governing centre-right coalition, with 30%. Although some new actors did emerge, such as Partido da Terra and Livre, the correlation of forces was not substantially altered in the elections. Just like Spain, and given the depth of its crisis, Portugal was, in contrast with most EU countries, remarkable for what did not happen: no sign of a clearly anti-European, anti-immigration party emerging.

After the May elections, opinion polls until the end of 2014 confirmed many of the trends that emerged in the results. In Italy, Renzi’s Democratic Party led the polls for the whole year, and M5S remained the second party. Forza Italia did not recover from its crisis and had to face the additional challenge of a resurgence Lega Nord. In Portugal, by the end of the year – and nine months before the general election – the Socialists enjoyed a 5-10% lead in the polls over the governing PSD, reinforced by the mayor of Lis-
bon António Costa’s landslide victory to become the party leader in its first ever open primary.

In Greece, Syriza began preparing its arrival to power, and Alexis Tsipras was busy meeting EU leaders and international investors to reassure them of the party’s commitment to preserve Greece’s membership in the eurozone. With an impending crisis looming for March 2015, coinciding with the government’s almost impossible task to elect a new President of the Republic, Prime Minister Samaras embarked on a risky course of bringing the presidential elections forward to December 2014. He failed to secure a sufficient majority and had to call a general election. So, at the year’s end, Greece was heading toward early elections in January 2015, with all polls pointing to a Syriza victory.

In Spain, the results of the May election shook the country and opened a new phase. By November, some polls started to rate Podemos first in voting intentions, and they all showed roughly comparable support for Podemos, the PP and the Socialist Party. The two-party system was weakened beyond recognition, and the two major parties were not the only victims: voting intentions for the United Left and UPyD started a rapid descent, swept aside by the purple tide of Podemos, by far the favourite for younger voters, which was preparing to “take heaven by storm” (Torreblanca, 2015). Hopes that the Socialist party would crumble like PASOK had in Greece did not materialise – the new leadership of Pedro Sanchez, in fact, stabilised PSOE’s popularity at above 20% – nor did the PP show any signs of losing its predominant position in certain core constituencies, such as those dominated by elderly voters. In this rapidly changing context, Spain was about to face a series of elections in 2015, concluding with national legislative elections in the autumn, which would confirm or disprove the depth of the change in Spain’s party system.

At the end of 2014, Southern Europe had become an uncertain but vibrant political space, holding the promise of progressive policy change. François Hollande’s troubles in France and his security-oriented, centrist move to appoint Manuel Valls as Prime Minister ensured Renzi’s position as Europe’s main progressive leader. On issues such as the treatment of irregular migrants and sea rescues, the Italian government started to adopt a differentiated stance in the European context. In other matters though, such as economic reform, it quietly followed the line defended by Berlin and Brussels, although not without this causing domestic challenges. Meanwhile, the distinct possibility that the non-Socialist left could take power in Greece and mount a head-on challenge to the austerity paradigm concentrated all European eyes on Syriza. In Spain, the electrifying energy of the 15-M movement (Indignados) of 2011 seemed to finally have found a successful political party outlet in Podemos, one that could perhaps force deeper change than either of the two mainstream parties would ever have tried.

The big question at the end of 2014 was what the net result would be of the complete realignment of the Italian, Greek and (possibly) Spanish party systems. On the one hand, the new times seemed to contain the promise of a broader spectrum of policy solutions; of better connection between civil society organisations and new activism and the centres of political power and policy-making; of a real challenge to the old, corrupted ways of conducting politics; of tangible progress in rights, liberties, participation and accountability; and of a redress of the abysmal levels of trust in politics. On the other hand, the new scenarios re-opened the fears for the stability of the eurozone, in particular in relation to the Greek situation; of populist promises that may be disappointed, feeding the spiral of cynicism and apathy; and of increasingly unstable systems, where consensus and majorities would become more and more difficult to reach, with enduring consequences on governance. The initial fears in Italy and Greece, however, that the new party configuration would result in endless instability, were not confirmed in 2014; the political systems of Southern Europe, instead, proved able to accommodate the emerging forces and aspirations in society, and to re-imagine the political game with new actors.

References


The year 2014 was hoped by many to provide a rare opportunity for the unlocking of the Cyprus negotiations. The election of Nikos Anastasiades to the Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus in 2013 and the discovery of sizeable natural gas reserves within Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) appeared to offer a new window of opportunity for a breakthrough in the long-standing Cyprus conflict. Yet initial optimism proved unfounded. Throughout 2014, energy could not prove a catalyst in conflict resolution; on the contrary, the energy issue was framed within the existing sovereignty disputes.

The Energy Factor

Claiming that Turkish Cypriot rights were infringed, Turkey disputed the right of the Republic of Cyprus to conduct exploration and drilling off its southern shore. In addition, in early October 2014 it issued a navigational telex (Navtex) blocking large areas in the Eastern Mediterranean and sent ‘Barbaros,’ a seismographic research/survey vessel owned and operated by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) in order to conduct seismic surveys within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Republic of Cyprus. The issuance of a Navtex and the subsequent exploratory activities of ‘Barbaros’ stymied the government of the Republic of Cyprus and led to the decision to withdraw from the bi-communal negotiations in protest. This decision may have strongly manifested the determination of the Republic of Cyprus to protect its sovereign rights, but it did nothing to improve the prospects for conflict resolution on the island. The interruption of bi-communal negotiations led to yet another stalemate, despite the efforts of the August 2014-appointed new UN Special Adviser to the Secretary-General Espen Barth Eide. While some hoped that the expiration of the Turkish Navtex at the end of December 2014 offered an opportunity to resume negotiations, these hopes were dashed when Turkey renewed the Navtex and once again began exploratory activities. As a result, the Republic of Cyprus, which in principle recognised that energy revenues belong to both communities on the island, took no concrete steps which would allow Turkish Cypriot participation in energy-related decisions. Thus, energy appeared – at least for the time being – not to be a catalyst, but rather another stumbling block to conflict resolution. Another opportunity to reframe the Cyprus question from a zero-sum to a positive-sum game has not been utilised.

Meanwhile, Cypriot hopes that initial energy discoveries at the Aphrodite natural gas field would be matched by new, more impressive ones were trimmed. Exploratory drillings that were held by the energy consortium ENI/KOGAS in the Onasagorras and Amathoussa fields proved somewhat disappointing. Meanwhile in January 2015, the French
energy company Total was reportedly considering pulling out from licensed exploration in the Cypriot EEZ in light of disappointing early data. While the existence of additional energy reserves was not precluded, these failures cast a doubt on the viability of the construction of an LNG plant in Cyprus, which was the declared intention of the Cypriot government. Aphrodite’s proven reserves were not sufficient for the construction of such a plant. In addition, falling international energy prices have only made it more difficult for energy companies to commit to exploration activities in the Cypriot EEZ. Sizeable investments in Cyprus’ nascent energy sector therefore became more difficult.

The Election of Mustafa Akıncı

The election of Mustafa Akıncı to the ‘Presidency’ of the internationally non-recognised ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)’ in the elections of 26 April 2015 was hailed by pro-solution activists on both sides of the ‘Green Line’ as a development of potentially historic proportions. While former President Derviş Eroğlu and the two other leading presidential candidates Sibel Siber and Kudret Özersay were not known for their steadfast commitment to conflict resolution, Akıncı’s record was different. As mayor of the Turkish Cypriot sector of Nicosia from 1976 to 1990, Akıncı spearheaded, together with his Greek Cypriot counterpart Lellos Demetriades, bi-communal projects under very adverse political circumstances. These resulted in a model integration of municipal activities and constituted an early example of successful intercommunal cooperation that won international appraisal. Throughout his political career as leader of the Communal Liberation Party (Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi-TKP) and the Communal Democracy Party (Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi-TDP), Akıncı has been among the most vocal supporters of a compromise solution which would protect the legitimate interests of both communities. His endorsement of the opening of the fenced part of Varosha to its legal residents was an example of a bold political position that distinguished him from other Turkish Cypriot politicians. This record raised expectations about overcoming the existing stalemate and paving the way for a breakthrough in bi-communal negotiations.

Building Civil Society Activities

Apart from the election of Akıncı, developments at the civil society level were another reason for optimism. Despite the stalemate at the higher political level, civil society activities have substantially increased in recent months. The Bi-communal Famagusta Initiative (BFI), for example, developed several actions calling for the return of Varosha to its residents under UN control, the opening of the Famagusta port for trade, and the declaration of the old walled city of Famagusta as a UNESCO World Heritage Monument. Holding masses in the church of Agios Georgios Exorinos within the walled city of Famagusta for the first time in decades was also an event of great symbolism.

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Meanwhile, the work of the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage aimed at the protection and restoration of cultural and religious heritage on both sides of the ‘Green Line’ has led to the rescue of important monuments and won increasing appreciation on both sides. The restoration of the Panagia Melandrina church in the village of Kalograia/Bahçeli and of the mosque in the village of Deneia/Denya were two of the successfully completed projects. Planning more projects like these was hoped to increase popular support for conflict resolution, which was critical since any agreed solution would have to be voted upon in a referendum, and developing a bottom-up solution dynamic was sine qua non for this.

Possible Steps towards a Solution – Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

Resuming the negotiation process would be the first crucial test for all sides. The termination of Turkish exploratory operations south of Cyprus and the in-
volvement of Turkish Cypriots in the Republic of Cyprus' procedures would be essential in that respect. Bundling energy together with water and other natural resources and discussing them in negotiations under the title 'natural resources' could be helpful. While Greek Cypriots would share access to information and decision-making on energy issues, Turkish Cypriots would let Greek Cypriots enjoy similar rights to water resources reaching Cyprus from Turkey. The ongoing construction of a water pipeline connecting Turkey with the 'TRNC' was expected to relieve Cyprus' chronic water shortage and boost agriculture. Extending the scope of this project so it can cover Greek and Turkish Cypriot needs alike could give a strong cooperation signal. Nonetheless, generating a strong positive momentum towards a solution would require some bolder steps. These could include the successful conclusion of negotiations on the opening of the closed city of Varosha to its Greek Cypriot inhabitants together with steps to lift the trade embargo against Turkish Cypriots.

Conclusion

Falling energy prices and the poor results of recent exploratory drillings in the Cypriot EEZ have limited aspirations concerning the pivotal role of energy in the eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus. Nevertheless, while energy discoveries may not prove a game changer for the region, they maintain their significance for the economies of the countries concerned, such as Cyprus, as well as being a valuable instrument for the development of regional cooperation. Energy can still play a strong facilitating role to conflict resolution negotiations. On the other hand, Greece’s economic and political uncertainty, as well as Turkey’s upcoming parliamentary elections of 7 June 2015 may be seen as risk factors that are not likely to contribute to a more dispassionate public debate on the Cyprus question. It is true, however, that the Cyprus question no longer generates the public interest and emotions it used to in Greece and Turkey. On the one hand, Greece is struggling with a severe economic crisis and Cyprus – or any other foreign policy issues – does not appear high on the political agenda. On the other hand, Turkey faces far greater foreign policy challenges than that of Cyprus along its eastern and southeastern border. These make it easier for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to manifest their commitment to a solution and dispel views that the prolongation of the current stalemate is actually preferable to a compromise. A Cypriot-owned negotiation process would not depend on the good intentions of Cyprus’ guarantor states to thrive.

Recommended Readings


From Maribor Spring to Tuzla Revolt: Beyond the Protest Moments in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia

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The Relation to Past Citizen Protests

There have been citizen protests in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in the past. For example, there were various forms of protest and quite advanced civic activism in Slovenia in the socialist eighties. In Croatia there were massive protests for more independence in 1971 and around the transitional cornerstone of 1989, while in 1996 around 100,000 citizens protested in Zagreb in defence of Radio 101, a local radio station that tended to be critical towards the regime. There have been workers’ protests (Maribor in 1988), nationalistic protests and even pacifist events (YUTEL concert for peace in Sarajevo in 1991). Indeed, there have been civil and uncivil protests in all three countries despite the predominantly authoritarian political culture. What is most different in the newest wave of protests, however, is that for the first time there is a questioning of the transitional promise of ‘liberal democracy and free-market capitalism.’ This questioning mostly comes from the progressive left, but neoconservative groups, nationalists and populists are also turning towards other forms of civic action, ranging from referendum initiatives to street protests.

The global economic crisis has led to a much broader crisis in Europe. Not surprisingly, the situation in the European semi-periphery and periphery continues to be even worse. There are some common features between the three countries focused on in this text and other Mediterranean countries – high unemployment rates marked with extremely high youth unemployment rates; increased social inequality and significant rises in poverty; various degrees of austerity policy that have led to a crumbling of the welfare state safety nets; and commercialisation of various public goods and services. There has also been resistance to these systemic tendencies and a significant portion of the planned privatisation plans have actually not been implemented yet. In the case of Croatia, after six years of recession, the GDP has decreased around 12.5% in terms of standard of living. These economic and other structural conditions clearly have an effect on various expressions of civic discontent. As many authors have pointed out, however, the relationship is by no means linear, and protest moments cannot be predicted, especially not solely on the basis of economic facts and figures.1 In this sense, the analysis of the Slovenian uprising provided by Gal Kirn seems to have found the strongest theoretical foundations, which can certainly be applied in the case of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina and probably beyond. Kirn follows the concept of politics developed by Jacques Rancière (“the politics of dissensus and rupture”) and underlines that the ruptures cannot be anticipated nor “simply reduced to objective conditions of the situation or explained by economic arguments.”2

While the crisis did not have a causal effect on the protests it did cause a sort of tectonic slide within the civil society sphere in all three countries, a slide

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1 As a reminder, Greece and Spain have been sites of extensive protests but so have Brasil and Turkey, rare examples of countries in which the socio-economic indicators cited above have been moving in a positive direction. On the other side, the Baltic states have experienced a serious economic recession but no protests.

The issues that are being pushed by the strongest progressive civil society actors have clearly moved in the direction of socio-economic concerns, although in Slovenia and Croatia the struggle related to LGBT rights, women’s rights and secularism has also come to the forefront which in turn manifested itself as the emergence of new forms of civic activism, including protests. The issues that are being pushed by the strongest progressive civil society actors have clearly moved in the direction of socio-economic concerns, although in Slovenia and Croatia the struggle related to LGBT rights, women’s rights and secularism has also come to the forefront. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the tectonic slide can also be observed, although it is accompanied by the highest degree of tension between new forms of activism and established organisations (accused of living comfortably under the umbrella of ‘the international community’). And it is not just about the issues at hand, but also about form and practice. Established civil society organisations (NGO’s, i.e. ‘institutionalised civic society’) have been increasingly overshadowed by ad-hoc informal initiatives, digital activism, direct and often performative activist interventions in space and wider civic coalitions that include ‘unusual actors’ (ranging from trade unions to popular artists). Rather than providing a description of this slide in the civil society sphere, let us look at the three critical protest moments in all three countries.

Three Critical Protest Moments

In Slovenia, the critical moment is rather clear. It was not the austerity measures adopted in 2012-2013 by the Slovenian government (which included the privatisation of banks, reduction of workers’ rights, drastic cuts in funding for education and culture) nor the rise in youth unemployment in 2012 or negative growth. It was a relatively minor event in the second largest city of Slovenia, in Maribor, that triggered the protests. The mayor, Franc Kangler, introduced hundreds of radar speed guns throughout the city and in two weeks there were unprecedented numbers of speeding tickets delivered to the citizens of Maribor. As Kirn described “The sense of clear social injustice grew once the information about the speed radar initiative leaked: it was a private-public partnership, which benefited the mayor and his partners.”

Thousands of people took to the streets of Maribor in the weeks that followed, eventually reaching a quarter of its total population. The protests spread both geographically (to Ljubljana as well as many other cities throughout Slovenia) and in terms of the marked political targets. This spontaneous uprising (vstaja) was a surprise even to the main trade unions and opposition parties, it included people who had never been socially engaged before and resulted in the resignation of the mayor of Maribor and and lead to the ousting of the Slovenian Prime Minister.

Established civil society organisations have been increasingly overshadowed by ad-hoc informal initiatives, digital activism, direct and often performative activist interventions in space and wider civic coalitions that include ‘unusual actors’ (ranging from trade unions to popular artists)

In the case of Croatia it is more difficult to say what the critical protest moment was. The largest-scale and most spontaneous protests were certainly those that took place in the first half of 2011. These ‘Facebook protests’ took place in Zagreb, initially as expressions of discontent towards the current government by a small group of disoriented young activists. In the weeks that followed the group expanded to ten thousand people and began to es-

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3 An important critical overview of this tectonic slide in the case of Croatia has been provided by Paul Stubbs in his article about three waves of activism. Stubb, Paul. Networks, Organisations, Movements: Narratives and Shapes of Three Waves of Activism in Croatia. POLEMOS 15: 11-32, 2012.

establish a common denominator. As Štiks and Horvat state, they started to display “more clearly the reasons for discontent, namely the disastrous social situation and a lack of confidence in institutions and a political system breeding corruption and deepening social inequalities.” Indeed, the novelty of the protests was that they brought different people to the streets who in many cases had previously not engaged in the public sphere, they contained an anti-establishment and to some degree anti-capitalist element and they were truly spontaneous. However, there were nationalist-populist elements as well.

The novelty of the protests was that they brought different people to the streets who in many cases had previously not engaged in the public sphere, they contained an anti-establishment and to some degree anti-capitalist element and they were truly spontaneous.

The other protests that took place in Croatia were different in the sense that they would not have been organised nor sustained without the existence of a core activist group. The student plenum in 2009 was a rebellion of students who were initially protesting against increased tuition fees at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Zagreb, but ended up being a much wider protest against the announced commercialisation of higher education. The student protests spread to twenty faculties across Croatia and served as a source of inspiration for other student movements in the region. The important Ne damo Varšavsku\(^6\) campaign was actually organised by two civil society groups, the Right to the City and the environmental Green Action. This was a campaign against covert deals between a private investor and the mayor of Zagreb Milan Bandić. In this case, it is interesting to note that it was not years of clientelistic and allegedly corrupt practice by the mayor, nor the idea of building yet another shopping centre and unaffordable housing that brought people out onto the streets. The trigger was a relatively minor event; the sense of extraordinary injustice when it was decided to destroy a nearby pedestrian zone at the expense of the city budget. The experience of these two protests certainly fed into the widespread protests that took place in 2011.

In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina there is no doubt about the critical protest moment. The protests that erupted in February 2014 were a radically novel development for the country. As Damir Arsenijević writes, these protests announced a change “from merely voicing dissatisfaction to inventing methods of making decisions that concern the future of all citizens.” The protests started in Tuzla, a provincial town whose heavy industry was largely devastated during the transition into capitalism (in some ways similar to Maribor). The February protests were preceded by a number of issue-oriented or site-specific protests, most notably the protests that took place in Sarajevo over an outrageous administrative failure, which lead to the death of a baby. However, the February protests brought a lot of newcomers onto the street, included violent outbreaks and rose above the ethnic divide, something best exemplified in the slogan “We are hungry in all three languages.” As Arsenijević and several other Bosnian authors suggest, they created civic engagement, enthusiasm and new forms of decision-making practice.

While some have argued for plenums to be legalised as accountability mechanisms, a group of activists coming from across the country is struggling to transform the protest moment into a sustainable movement for social justice. The trigger in this case is the continuation of the flawed dismantling of major industry in Tuzla. Again the issue of why the citizen protest started when it did cannot be explained through economic conditions alone, and the tectonic slide within the civil society sphere can be observed, albeit in quite specific conditions.

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\(^6\) In English ‘We will not give up Varšavska,’ where Varšavska is the name of the street which contained the pedestrian area in question.

\(^7\) ARSENJEVIĆ, Damir (ed.). “Unrirable Bosnia and Herzegovina: the Fight for the Commons,” Southeast European Integration Perspectives, Nomos, p. 7.
Beyond Protest: Transforming the Energy of the Moment

The protest moments have a value in and of themselves. They are an audible criticism of clientelism, corruption and injustice. They are expressions of discontent with the limitations of representative democracy as well as expressions of anger over growing inequality. Furthermore, they are a strong manifestation of new forms of activism which are much more spontaneous than the project-oriented institution building and largely elitist democracy-promotion efforts of the endless ‘transition.’ This new wave of activism nurtures a horizontal and deliberative organisational culture, while involving a much greater number of citizens. The protest moments not only carry hope, they also contain a transformative potential that should not be underestimated. The protests have fostered the development of functioning citizen assemblies (Inicijativa za mesni zbor, Maribor) and a successful new party in Slovenia (the United Left and within it the youthful political movement called the Initiative for Democratic Socialism), experiments in participatory budgeting (Pazin) and the broadest civic coalition to date in Croatia (Ne damo naše autoceste), as well as some successful plenum practices (e.g. Gračanica) and an attempt to build a nationwide movement for social justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is just a sample of some of the progressive practices largely developed on the basis of the protest energy.

Clearly the transformative potential of these citizen protests also has its limitations and undesirable consequences. In Croatia calls for direct democracy were seconded by neo-conservative groups who successfully pushed through a referendum constitutionally defining marriage as a union of man and woman. Additional space has been created for nationalistic protests by war veterans, largely contentless, populist parties have been formed and activist agenda’s hijacked. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the majority of the plenums set up during the protests have been discontinued and a coalition of nationalistic parties reconfirmed through recent elections. In some cases there are also strong, and to some extent unnecessary, tensions between protestors and established civil society organisations, and even paranoia. However, this is also a question of time. Spanish protestors reminded their Bosnian counterparts that two years after the 15M moment they thought not much had changed. They would certainly not say this today. There is transformative potential in all three countries. It may take more time for them to grow but new, homegrown seeds have definitively been planted.

8 Ne damo naše autoceste means “We will not give away our highways.” This campaign brought together five diverse civil society organisations (Croatian Youth Network, Centre for Peace Studies, Base for Workers’ Initiatives, Clubture, Green Action, Right to the City nad GONG) and two trade unions.
Back in 2003 at the Thessaloniki Summit, the Member States offered their “unequivocal support to the European perspective” of the Balkan countries and baldly stated that the future of the region lied “within the European Union.” A sense of historical duty to reunite ‘Europe,’ as well as a desire to guarantee the Union’s security and to ensure that the spectres of Srebrenica would not return – as they have done in Kosovo in 1999 and Skopje in 2001 – underpinned the solemn promise of EU membership given to the region at Thessaloniki. The June 2003 summit also marked a high point of hope for the Balkan countries, which looked at the prospect of European integration as a chance to overcome the legacy of conflict and move towards peace and prosperity.

However, over the past decade a protracted engagement and a combination of anxieties related to institutional, political and economic pressures inside the Union, as well as to daunting regional and country-specific issues in the Balkans, have damped the two sides’ commitment to ‘join their destinies’ and is now setting high hurdles for the resolution of the unfinished business of the break-up of Yugoslavia.

A Promising Engagement

To be sure, the perspective of European integration has paid important peace dividends in the region. In 2006 Serbia and Montenegro went through a ‘velvet’ split. In 2008 Kosovo declared independence from Serbia, and despite their still unresolved statehood, Pristina and Belgrade clinched a landmark deal in spring 2013 to normalise relations, under the auspices of EU facilitation. Moreover, the ‘Copenhagen Plus’ criteria set for the aspirant countries in the Balkans – including demands for the implementation of peace treaties, regional cooperation and reconciliation and full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) – have allowed real progress on certain bilateral relationships, such as between Serbia and Croatia.

By the same token, the sweeping reforms already undertaken by the Balkan countries moving from one state to many, reconstructing post-war institutions and societies, building democracies and transforming them into functioning market economies, have undoubtedly been helped by the weight of EU leverage in the region. Thanks to their herculean efforts, the EU-hopeful countries of the Balkans have managed to steadily press forward: in 2013, Croatia joined as the 28th Member State, in 2012, Montenegro began negotiations and Kosovo started to institutionalise relations with the EU,
in 2014, Serbia embarked on its accession talks and Albania became a candidate country, while the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) has had candidate status since 2005 and Bosnia-Herzegovina signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in 2008. Yet for all these vital successes, much work remains to be done in the region at a time when the passion seems to be running out of the EU-Balkan relation.

Relationship on the Rocks

On the Balkans’ Side…

Inside the Balkans, status problems were long drawn out after Thessaloniki. It took until the Brussels agreement of April 2013 – heralded as historic – for Pristina to seize effective control of the whole of Kosovo’s territory and the implementation of that deal is proving difficult. In part, the 2014 elections in Serbia, the EU and Kosovo have drained some momentum from the dialogue but it is also the case that many Serbs in Kosovo continue to oppose the compromise, and Belgrade is still formally adamant about sovereignty over Kosovo. Indeed, both Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina remain at least to a certain extent internationally administered and thus only to a certain extent autonomous.

Existing bilateral issues between the EU and Balkan countries have also complicated the process. As a result of the acrimonious name dispute between Greece and FYROM, for the past seven years the Member States have ignored the European Commission’s recommendation to start accession negotiations with Skopje. In limbo since 2005, FYROM has experienced a deterioration of inter-ethnic relations and a rise in authoritarian tendencies, to the detriment of European integration-related reforms and democratic credentials. Here, the tools deployed by the Union do not seem to have any bearing on the (mis)behaviour of Gruevski’s regime – the latest, ongoing spy scandal bears testimony in this regard – nor on the positions of Greece and FYROM in the EU-mediated talks.

Given the ethnic mosaic of the region, which does not match with its internal borders, and other lingering consequences of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the potential for relations to turn sour within the Balkans, and between countries in the region and existing or future Member States, is not negligible. Take, for instance, the recent unfortunate dynamics between Albania and Serbia or Croatia and Serbia. Moreover, the ‘regatta approach’ to the EU enlargement to the Balkans, whereby each country joins in its own time, means that any new Member State can in principle obstruct the accession of its aspiring neighbour(s). With the nationalists now making inroads into power in Croatian politics, the possibility that Zagreb might at some point decide to block Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina is no longer far-fetched.

As a result of the acrimonious name dispute between Greece and FYROM, for the past seven years the Member States have ignored the European Commission’s recommendation to start accession negotiations with Skopje

In addition, weak states and dysfunctional institutions are at the heart of the problem throughout the region. The concentration of power in a few hands has allowed political elites in countries like Montenegro (where the Democratic Party of Socialists has held office uninterruptedly since 1991, albeit occasionally in coalition with smaller allies) and increasingly also in Serbia (by virtue of the Serbian Progressive Party, under the leadership of Aleksandar Vucic) to repress any viable opposition forces, subvert the media and foster a system of corruption and clientelism. Moreover, a high degree of polarisation among uncompromising and self-interested politicians has undermined Albania’s progress and – most worrisome – has effectively brought Bosnia and Herzegovina to a standstill in its EU integration process, threatening economic development and, following the outbreak of last year’s violent protests that spread from Tuzla to Sarajevo and beyond, also social peace. A lot is hanging on the British-German initiative announced in November 2014 and aimed at getting Bosnia-Herzegovina out of its deep crisis and on the EU path. Finally, to date, none of the aspiring countries in the Balkans is yet a functioning market economy and
their economic woes have only been compounded by the cold winds blowing from the EU – the region’s main trading and investment partner. Whether the newfound focus of the Commission’s most recent enlargement strategy on economic governance will help the broken Balkan economies fix their budget deficits, create jobs, boost growth and improve competitiveness is for now an open question, but the social impact and instability generated by economic hardship – made obvious, for instance, by the protests and mass migration from Kosovo during the first months of 2015 – underscores the urgency of the situation.

Given the ethnic mosaic of the region, which does not match with its internal borders, and other lingering consequences of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the potential for relations to turn sour within the Balkans, and in the region, is not negligent.

...And on the EU’s Side

The news from the EU is not exactly heartening either: enlargement seems to be the dossier that the bloc must deliver on due to the promise made in Thessaloniki. From the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty to the cold feet following the 2007 expansion and then today’s economic crisis, political appetite and support for expansion has been fizzling out inside the Union. But waning political attention to enlargement in the EU capitals has not precluded assertiveness. The universe of detailed and strict benchmarks and conditions has become ever larger, and the frequency of incursions and opportunities for the Member States to interfere in and derail the process has increased compared to previous rounds. The upgrading of the Union’s tools, methods and approaches to enlargement on the basis of lessons learned has transformed the exercise from box ticking to results tracking. Likewise, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s decisive intervention, for instance, has persuaded Belgrade to take the normalisation of relations with Pristina seriously. Yet, this laboured enlargement strategy and haphazard commitment of the Member States – retreating from agreed standards and procedures and allowing all sorts of changeable priorities on behalf of national politicians (from the freedom of movement of people and minorities to security and good governance practices) to influence the enlargement agenda in unpredictable ways and with uncertain outcomes – has slowed down the process and dented its credibility in the region.

The Member States appear to favour now a more hands-on approach to enlargement and they almost seem to distrust the Commission when they rely, at key decision-making moments in the Council, on national evaluations, rather than on the opinion of the Brussels’ executive about progress in the Balkans. In fact, accession negotiations and neighbourhood policy have now been fused together in the same Directorate General in the new Commission, and President Juncker has already announced a break in EU widening for the next five years of his mandate. At the same time as enlargement seems to have become of dwindling importance for the new Commission, Germany and Austria voiced last year in Berlin their sustained commitment to the European future of the Balkans in a high-level summit with the leaders of the region. The Austrian government now plans to continue the ‘Berlin process’ with a similar event to be held in Vienna in August this year. While in itself the support of the Member States is a positive development, in the grander scheme of things, these initiatives give a sense that the Commission has lost its position as driver of enlargement policy, and risk a blurring of competences and a duplication of efforts between the two tiers of European politics in assisting with progress in the Balkans.

The Red Flags and the Silver Lining

The dynamics between the EU and the Balkans at present serve as a prime example of politics getting in the way of progress. Even if the accession track remains opened to the countries of the region and in spite of the avowed commitment to European integration voiced by Balkan politicians, those in power and responsible for delivering on both sides still need to match their actions to their words. Fail-
Failure to complete the Balkan enlargement is mutually harmful: for the EU’s shrinking global influence and for the Balkans’ aspiration to a brighter future.

As in many long-term relationships, after more than ten years, the EU and the Balkans resemble now an old couple, in which the two sides take each other for granted and occasionally even flirt around. The EU’s eye has been wondering eastwards after the Ukrainian crisis, diverting attention away from the Balkan enlargement and towards security concerns in the neighbourhood. This has made it easier for other actors – most notably Russia – to meddle in the Balkans and cosy up with countries like Serbia (which refused to join EU sanctions against Moscow and organised a hero-welcoming parade for Putin in Belgrade) but also Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina. While pragmatism rather than a search for alternatives has motivated these experiences, they are also a reminder that the ‘job’ is not done in the Balkans and any delaying tactics can be counterproductive.

In strategic, political and economic terms, the EU and the region share common interests and problems. This interdependence begs for joint action and makes a powerful case in favour of including the Balkans in the EU family sooner rather than later. To a large extent, in this uncertain and complex world, the two sides are in fact as strong as they are united and as weak as they are divided.

References


The Maghreb: Common Challenges and Diverging Approaches to Transition

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The Maghreb in the Face of the Terrorist Threat

Three years after the events that shook the Arab world, the Maghreb region is still experiencing an unprecedented terrorist threat. In Tunisia, this threat weighs heavily on the country’s politics and threatens to upset the fragile balance of its new political configuration. After the assassination of two emblematic figures of the Tunisian left, Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Ibrahimi, the country suffered an attack at Mount Chaambi, near the Algerian border. The outcome of this attack was judged by the Tunisian authorities as the worst to be recorded by the military since independence. After a six-month ‘ceasefire,’ the country was again the target of a terrorist attack, the bloodiest since the fall of the Ben Ali regime. The assailants, who were targeting the seat of the Tunisian Parliament, entered the Bardo National Museum and opened fire on tourists, causing no less than 23 casualties and 47 wounded.

In contrast to Tunisia, Morocco remains the most stable country in the region. No attacks have been registered since the one in Marrakech in 2011. This notwithstanding, the country remains a prime target for terrorist organisations, as indicated by the number of terrorist cells dismantled by the Moroccan authorities in 2014. Indeed, the preventive approach adopted by Morocco seems to be paying off and ensuring the country a certain immunity. According to official sources, the security services managed to foil numerous terrorist plans that, if we are to believe the official Ministry of the Interior communiqués, would have destabilised the country had they not been thwarted. The tracking of terrorism that allowed a number of terrorist cells to be dismantled in 2014 has continued in 2015. Thus, according to a Ministry of the Interior communiqué from 13 April 2015, at least six members of a terrorist cell preparing attacks on behalf of the Islamic State were arrested in Se- louane, in northern Morocco. According to the same source, the suspects are followers of jihadi thought who were planning the assassination of individuals with religious convictions contrary to those of the Islamic State organisation.

A Difficult Economic Climate

The second common denominator of the Maghreb countries in 2014 resides in the persistence of economic imbalances that weigh down their restart capabilities. This notwithstanding, although the three countries have experienced the effects of a difficult regional and international economic climate, the fact remains that how the crisis presents varies significantly from one state to another according to each of the three Maghreb countries’ structural makeup. Hence, Algeria is the country experiencing the worst effects from the international economic climate. This is particularly due to the plummeting oil prices and their repercussions on the country’s macroeconomic balance. In June, only two months after the re-election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika as President for a fourth term, the price of oil began a sharp fall, reaching its lowest level since 2009 in early January 2015, at 47.25 dollars per barrel. Following that came a fall in oil revenue, leading to a major increase in the balance of payments deficit. In fact, according to the IMF, the current account should register a deficit of 26 billion dollars in 2015. This colossal figure is un-
precedent since Bouteflika took up the presidency 16 years ago. To remedy this situation, Algeria does not seem to have any alternatives other than dipping into the country’s savings, the Revenue Regulation Fund (Fonds de régulation des recettes, FRR), to fill the gaping hole in the government’s accounts. But at this rate of expenditure, the FRR will be exhausted quite quickly.

In Morocco, 2014 was the year of the most difficult choices and the most unpopular decisions. The Bennikane Administration undertook reform of the Compensation Fund, eliminating subsidies of all liquid petroleum products, a painful and risky measure in various regards. Moreover, 2014 was one of the worst years in terms of growth in a decade, with the rate not surpassing 2.5%. In any case, the Bennikane Administration managed to reduce the budgetary deficit, which was 4.9% of the GDP in 2014. This progress was possibly primarily due to a good agricultural yield and an improvement in the economic health of the eurozone, Morocco’s main trade partner. These factors had a positive impact on Morocco’s exports, though structurally, it registered a trade deficit on the order of 20% of the GDP.

Another indicator of the economic crisis in which the three Maghreb countries are immersed is the unemployment affecting a large portion of the workforce. Tunisia, which is still suffering the after-effects of its rupture with its authoritarian past, has the highest unemployment rate in the Maghreb. The figures published by the National Statistics Institute show that the unemployment rate reached 15% during the last quarter of 2014, whereas it was only 14.8% over the course of the second quarter of that year. Morocco and Algeria experienced nearly identical unemployment rates, relatively lower than Tunisia’s. In Algeria, according to two employment surveys conducted among households by the National Statistics Office in April and September 2014, the unemployment rate stood at 10.6%, meaning an increase of 0.6% over the preceding years, remaining at 10% from 2009 to 2013. Note in this regard that unemployment affects 25% of Algerian youth, including young graduates. With regard to Morocco, despite the context of crisis, the Kingdom was the only Maghreb country where the unemployment rate returned to under 10%. According to the country’s High Commission for Planning (Commissariat au Plan, HCP), the unemployment rate is now 9.9%, having decreased by 0.3 points between the first quarter of 2014 and that of 2015.

**The Price of Maghreb Non-Integration**

Intra-Maghreb trade continues to feel the effects of the Morocco-Algeria rupture. The closing of the border between the two countries not only handicaps the two countries’ economies, but also prevents the establishment of an authentic Maghreb integration that would allow them to save over 2 billion dollars per year, according to IMF estimates.

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Trade continues to be affected by the closure of the border in 1994 and the project for regional economic integration is still blocked. “In a world where goods circulate much more freely than people, the Algerian-Moroccan standoff seems like a sacrilege, making it impossible to imagine a large-scale economic project,” states an Algerian journalist before substantiating his remarks with the example of Renault, whose Moroccan and Algerian factories cannot be connected by land.

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2 The rate went from 14.1% in 2004 to 14.8% in 2014, the Tunisian National Statistics Institute stated. According to Saiidi, the decreased unemployment rate, which stood at 14.8% over the course of the second quarter of last year, can be attributed to the hiring of over 23,000 higher education graduates to work on the population census carried out in that quarter (April and May 2014).

3 See the informative note on the state of the labour market published by the Moroccan High Commission for Planning.

The negative effects of the political tension between Algeria and Morocco are not limited to the economies of the rival countries. These tensions continued to make the Maghreb lose time, a Maghreb that, according to various observers, is today a ‘non-region’ on the economic level. Although Morocco is Algeria’s number one client thanks to Algerian exports to Morocco primarily consisting of hydrocarbons, there is no denying what some qualify as an ‘economic tragedy’ caused by the political rivalry between the two countries. In his work entitled “Algérie et Maroc : Quelles convergences économiques,” economist Camille Sari rightly notes that: “The absence of a Maghrebi economic union hinders the development of trade in goods and services and foreign exchange, as well as the circulation of human resources”; before concluding that “the Maghreb is the only region in the world without regional construction and where intra-[regional] trade is insignificant.”

**Tunisia: The Hope of Democratic Transition**

With the election of a new President of the Republic in 2014, Tunisian completed the last electoral stage of its transition process. The cradle of the so-called Arab Spring, Tunisia aspires to prove the emergence of a democracy is always possible in the Arab World. In fact, the success of the Tunisian model can not only be attributed to endogenous factors linked particularly to the Tunisian society’s dynamism, the maturity of the political class and the quality of its leadership, as well as the military’s neutral position, but also to exogenous factors associated with the country’s regional context. It is from this perspective that one can understand the Ennahda party’s difficult yet historic and decisive decision to step down in order to spare Tunisian Islamists the fate of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. There is no doubt the Tunisian transition process has great chances of making Tunisia a model of democratisation in Northern Africa. In any case, this model remains dependent on the operation of the new system, which will, among other things, have to handle two challenges associated with the current transitional context. The first challenge would be for the country’s new leaders to eliminate Ben Ali’s authoritarian legacy and attempt to forge a new democratic legitimacy for themselves beyond the polls. This challenge is all the more serious and urgent, given that a large part of Tunisian youth perceives the elites having marked the transition process (drafting of the constitution and national dialogue) as belonging to the Ben Ali regime. Indeed, newly elected President Beji Caid Essebsi, Prime Minister Habib Essid and other members of the government occupied key posts in the Bourguiba or Ben Ali regimes and do not have revolutionary legitimacy. The second challenge of the new Tunisian regime would be to find adequate solutions to the economic dysfunctions adversely affecting the country’s efforts at economic recovery. The growth estimates advanced by the IMF (3.7%) or the Tunisian government (3%) will most likely be affected by the terrorist attacks shaking the country in early 2015. In this regard, of course, tourism, one of the Tunisian economy’s mainstays, is particularly sensitive to security hazards.

**Morocco: The Year of the Vagaries of the Third Track**

The third year of cohabitation of the monarchy and the Islamists of the Justice and Development Party (PJD) seemed to confirm the hypothesis according to which change always occurs within the framework of continuity in Morocco. Some believe the new constitution has given rise to a diarchy. Now the Moroccan political system, they believe, functions with an executive branch shared by two institutions whose powers more or less balance out. In addition to the institution of the monarchy, conventionally the main actor of the Moroccan Executive Branch, the new text is considered to have raised the government to an authentic second point of impetus for policymaking in Morocco. That said, this hypothesis/aspiration based on a parliamentary reading of the Moroccan Constitution does not seem to hold up to the facts and the way the new institutional system operates. Apart

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7 By way of example, see the study by Mohamed Amine BENABDELLAH: “L’institution gouvernementale dans la constitution marocaine.” REMALD, double issue 112-113, September-December 2013.
from a few urgent, highly problematic and very politically risky issues (reform of the Compensation Fund and pension plans), the government remains nearly incapable of truly taking the political initiative, in the sense of defining the country’s general political choices and orientation. These remain the prerogative of the monarchy, whose means of action are far from being challenged by the new institutional system established by the 2011 Constitution.

The Barakat movement assembled civil society, which organised and mobilised via the Facebook and Twitter social media to call for a protest against a fourth term for Bouteflika

Three years after the establishment of the new institutional system, there is no denying that the decision-making process has remained marked by certain dysfunctions of the ‘old system.’ The disconnection between decision and responsibility that had always marked the political system continues to adversely affect the regime’s efforts at democratisation. Turning to the High Council for Education to prepare a reform project for the education system is one of the expressions of this disconnection. Another form this phenomenon takes consists in the strong presence of technocrat ministers, who controlled over 51% of the state budget in 2014. The ministers belonging to the government coalition parties controlled less than 49%, including the PJD ministers, with only 7.46% of the budget. The year 2014 was also marked by an unprecedented level of tension in relations between the Head of Government and opposition party leaders. The latter continually reproach Mr. Benkirane for having deliberately abandoned his constitutional prerogatives. For his part, the Head of Government repeatedly states that his administration is a simple collaborator of the King, who remains the true holder of power according to the provisions of the 2011 Constitution.

Algeria: The Status Quo of Bouteflika’s Fourth Term

Politics in Algeria have been marked primarily by the presidential elections leading President Abdelaziz Bouteflika to his fourth term. After having survived the so-called Arab Spring events, the Algerian regime was facing a difficult test in the presidential elections on 17 April 2014. Although it was initially assumed that incumbent President Bouteflika, suffering from health problems, would not run for office, this scenario became increasingly uncertain as the elections approached. On 22 February 2014, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal made the incumbent President’s candidacy official. After the deadline for new candidacies had passed, 10 candidacies were registered with the Constitutional Council, which validated six through its 14 March 2014 decision. These elections were marked by a wave of protests after the official announcement of the incumbent’s candidacy. Numerous protests against President Bouteflika’s fourth term were held throughout the electoral campaign as well as the day after the results were announced. The Barakat movement assembled civil society, which organised and mobilised via the Facebook and Twitter social media to call for a protest against a fourth term for Bouteflika. The movement began with protests in Algiers, which resulted in many Barakat members and other citizens participating in the protests being detained for questioning by the police. In Aurès, the B’zayed association, which is the local branch of Barakat, organised a protest on 20 March in which it attempted to bring together the greatest number of protesters. In any event, the voices raised against the fourth term and calls for boycotting the election expressed by a considerable number of Algerian civil society actors and political parties did not prevent the elections from being held on 17 April 2014. Nevertheless, the success of these elections was only possible at the price of a sharp nosedive in the participation rate, which only reached 51.7%, as compared to 74% in 2009.

8 These were, namely, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Louisa Hanoune, Ali Benflis, Ali Fawzi Rebane, Moussa Touati and Abdelaziz Belaid.
Morocco 2014: The Return of Authoritarianism

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2014 was the third year of the Benkirane administration. The cabinet led by him resulted from the early elections brought on by the 20 February Movement protests (the Moroccan version of the so-called ‘Arab’ Spring) occurring over the course of 2011. This is the first time in Moroccan history that an Islamist party independent from the monarchy is heading the government. In any case, Benkirane, a moderate conservative leader, only managed to stay at the head of the coalition government during the second half of 2013 by making significant political concessions to the pre-Arab Spring establishment, particularly insofar as sharing power with the royal palace camp. The Arab context (the military coup in Egypt, bloody civil wars bogging down Syria, Libya and Yemen, an unprecedented anti-change diplomatic offensive in the very wealthy Saudi Arabia, supported by the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait…) has profoundly shaken the fragile post-Arab Spring political balance in Morocco. The head of government’s party, which had won the 25 November 2011 election with drums beating and trumpets sounding when the Arab Spring euphoria was at its apogee, has thereafter been on the defensive. Despite several attempts during its first year in power, it has thus not managed to carry out its socioeconomic programme, perceived by its supporters as favourable to the poorest sectors, as well as to the struggle against corruption and the rentier economy.

Stability over Change

In fact, as of the cabinet reshuffle in late 2013 and throughout 2014, the Justice and Development Party (PJD) heading the coalition seems to have definitively come to terms with royal hegemony over the executive branch. It thus relinquished a democratic interpretation of the 2011 Constitution granting the executive branch substantial powers while turning various royal powers – formerly discretionary – into limited powers. After this reshuffle, control over key ministries such as those of the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Education by palace officials has made the little power held by the Prime Minister dwindle even more. This return to pre-2011 monarchical authoritarianism has been accompanied by an increase in the weight of security agencies in decision-making processes. This is implicitly justified by the real threats to the country by extremist groups, whether loyal to Daesh or al-Qaeda. Some two thousand Moroccans, a large part of them bearing European passports, are participating in the combats in Syria, Iraq and other battlefields such as the Sahel. This regression by Morocco after the democratic progress made in 2011 and 2012 is part, as stated above, of a general regression occurring in all the Arab Spring countries except Tunisia.

The PJD, which had won the early 25 November 2011 election thanks to its slogan for change “Didda Al Istibdad wal Fassad!” (Against despotism and corruption!), now tends to justify the lack of convincing results in the sphere of political and social change by insisting on Morocco’s vital need for stability. This concept was recurrent in 2014 in statements by the head of government, who is also the secretary general of the PJD. Such an orientation distances it even more from the forces comprising the backbone of the pro-democratic demonstrations leading to the elections that brought it to power. Indeed, three leftist parties – the Unified Socialist Party (PSU), the Ittihadi National Congress Party (CNI) and the Socialist Democratic Vanguard Party (PADS) – formed a federation on 23 March 2014 with a view to fight for a parliamentary regime where the King
would rule without governing. In the same dynamic aiming to bring together all those disappointed by the failure of the 2011 reform promises, some fifty political and civil society leaders met in Rabat on 6 April. Among them were important non-parliamentary leftist leaders such as Mohamed Sassi and Abdellah El Harrif, leaders of the powerful moderate Islamist association, al-Adl Wal Ihsan (AWI), such as Abdelwahed Mutawakkil, as well as activists of the 20 February Movement such as Widad Melhaf and Fouad Abdelmoumni. The aim of the meeting was to explore paths towards entente between religious and secular movements in order to continue action for political change while maintaining civil peace.

Benkirane’s popularity is intact in public opinion. The latter increasingly perceives him as someone wishing to do good for his country but foiled by the system’s elites, who fear for their interests

Austerity and Social Safety Nets

Insofar as the economy, the productive machine improved its performance but the Benkirane Administration continued to take austerity measures, such as energy subsidy cuts (a decrease of approximately 20% in public funding allocated to the Compensation Fund, whose official goal is to keep prices of essential commodities to levels affordable to the population). Such measures have had painful consequences on the social level, leading in particular to a rise in the cost of living for the poor and middle classes. The International Monetary Fund announced that Morocco has failed to protect the middle class and that the lower classes are not benefiting from economic development. By the same token, the 2014 UN Human Development Report ranked Morocco 129th out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index. The relatively low morale of Moroccan families follows the same lines, according to the 2014 report by the official High Planning Commission. Households are rather pessimistic as to the country’s capacity to find solutions to the problem of unemployment and regarding their own ability to save.

The Political Discourse in 2014 Reached an Unprecedented Level of Populism

The opposition parties in Parliament, consisting primarily of the Party for Authenticity and Modernity (PAM), the Istiqlal Party (PI) and the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), which are, we must keep in mind, close to the palace, continue their scathing criticism of the PJD and its leader. Benkirane’s regular and apparently anti-system outbursts before Parliament, in which he attacks the opposition, have gained the population’s attention and caused endless verbal sparring matches and polemics but are also a godsend for the head of government. Indeed, Benkirane’s popularity is intact in public opinion. The latter increasingly perceives him as someone wishing to do good for his country but foiled by the system’s elites, who fear for their interests. The opposition takes advantage of the government’s weak results insofar as economic and social reform to attack its head using the same populist register. Thus Hamid Chabat, the Secretary General of Istiqlal, the most important parliamentary opposition party, accused the leader of PJD of working for Daesh (the Islamic State) and Mossad.

The International Monetary Fund announced that Morocco has failed to protect the middle class and that the lower classes are not benefiting from economic development

In his traditional Throne Day Speech in late July, the King likewise mentioned social injustice and the resulting tension, while implicitly blaming the government. He stated: “I, like the Moroccan people, ask myself in astonishment: where is this fortune? Have all Moroccans enjoyed it or did it only affect certain sectors?”

1 Throne Day Speech by Mohammed VI on 30 July 2014
Slightly over a week later, the Head of Government seemed to reply to the sovereign, stating during the Afro-American Summit in Washington DC that in Morocco, it is the King who governs and not the PJD.²

Under these conditions, three trade union centres friendly with the parliamentary opposition organised a general strike on 23 September with relative success. But the government refused to accede to their demands, which were essentially of a socio-economic order and particularly included a demand for raising the lowest salaries. The government justified itself by recalling the crushing weight of debt service and the repercussions of the economic crisis that struck some of the country’s most important economic partners — namely, the European Union and the United States — several years ago, eventually reaching Morocco.

In any case, in order to limit the impact of the stated reforms on low revenue, the government proceeded to establish a minimum income for widows with minors in their charge as well as divorced women without pensions, but in practice, this only affects a minute part of the population. Measures were likewise established to assist workers having lost their jobs and to lower the price of medicine. On the social level, the education and health sectors continue to garner anger and criticism from civil society organisations, including those in favour of the government.

Their serious dysfunction is pointed out by both the official and the independent media. The Minister of Education acknowledges the “catastrophic” state, to use his own words, of the education sector. He stated on 23 September at a press conference that the majority of Moroccan students do not know how to read or write upon completing primary school.

Over the course of 2014, nearly perfect relations with Spain emerge, the latter seeming to benefit from the estrangement with Paris. By the same token, King Mohammed VI’s trip to Washington in late 2013 and his meeting with Barack Obama expressed a positive note in US-Moroccan relations that lasted throughout 2014.

The crisis with France, which began in February 2014 and did not end until early 2015, is the most serious crisis Morocco has had with the former colonial power in a quarter of a century. The cause was the summoning of Morocco’s head of counter-espionage by French courts following complaints made by people living in France who claimed to have been arrested and tortured by Moroccan secret service. As soon as the summons was presented at the residence of the Moroccan ambassador to France, Rabat unilaterally suspended judiciary cooperation between the two countries and reduced its security cooperation with Paris to a minimum.

The Moroccan press with affinities to the government gave various explanations for the tension between the two capitals but rarely openly mentioned the direct cause of the crisis, indicated above. Said press held that France was retaliating against Morocco for the Kingdom’s diplomatic and economic success in sub-Saharan Africa, a subregion that Paris considers its back yard.

Vitality and Rashness in Africa

In fact, King Mohammed VI is playing an active role in peacemaking efforts in Mali. In 2014, as he has for several years now, the King took a number of trips on the continent, particularly to Western and Equatorial Africa. His visits, which involved large delegations often including businesspeople, led to economic and cultural cooperation agreements, as well as religious ones at times. In line with Morocco’s comeback on the continent, in late January 2014, the King received Bilal Ag Cherif, the leader of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), one of the main political-military actors in northern Mali, who is perceived as favourable to Morocco.

Some two weeks later, members of the Algerian Army fired on a Moroccan surveillance post near the

² See the statements by Abdelilah Benkirane from 8 August 2014 on the Al Hurra television website.
border between the two countries, injuring several people. Morocco considered the incident an act of retaliation by Algeria against Rabat, for the MNLA is dragging its feet in joining the reconciliation process of Malian stakeholders promoted by Algiers. This incident is thus perceived as part of the diplomatic competition of the two neighbours in the subregion. Despite its African vitality, Moroccan diplomacy seems not to have a coherent sense of continuity; it sometimes falls into rashness and gets excited about successes that are at times short-lived.

**Conflicting relations with its neighbour immediately to the east and the European country closest to it (France) as well as the long cold spell with Mauritania are driving the Kingdom of Morocco to seek to strengthen its ties with other countries such as China, Russia or the Gulf oil monarchies**

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**Freedom in Check**

The international association Reporters without Borders criticises Morocco in its February 2014 report on freedom of the press in the world. The country ranks an unenviable 136th out of 180. This regression of freedom of the press and of public freedoms in general would be corroborated over the course of the year. The banning of the Freedom Now association in May 2014 followed by Minister of the Interior Mohamed Hassad’s statements against civil society organisations, which he alleged receive funding from abroad in order to serve anti-Moroccan agendas, are moving in the direction of a backlash. The Minister likewise stated that these organisations represent an obstacle to the authorities’ effective struggle against terrorism. Human rights organisations such as the Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH) and other civil society agents reacted strongly to the Minister’s attacks, which were not limited solely to statements. Indeed, numerous meetings and activities were banned every month and many organisations such as the Moroccan Association of Investigative Journalists (AMJI) and the Moroccan Digital Rights Association (ADN) are not receiving certification for registration or renewal of their executive bodies. By the same token, assaults are sometimes made on pacific protesters or isolated activists at night, as happened to Hicham Mansouri on 24 September in Rabat.

The Minister’s statement seemed to officially kick off a repressive campaign without precedents since the current administration led by the Islamist Abdelilah Benkirane came into office following the Moroccan Arab Spring protests in 2011.

In conclusion, we can say that the Moroccan economic machine continued to improve its performance in 2014 but the wealth produced remains very unequally distributed. On the political level, the PJD claims that its strategy is one of long-term reform. It prefers to make the concessions it considers necessary to gain the monarchy’s trust and the normalisation of its relations with it. This timid position, which relies on the cumulative, progressive nature of the ‘democratisation process’ has facilitated the undeniable regression of public freedoms that are making Morocco return to the pre-2011 situation.
Every political regime has its specificities and logic arising from its history. The specificity of the Algerian regime is that, at the State’s cupola is a bicephalous structure in the form of a legitimising real power belonging to the military hierarchy, and a formal power that directs the government administration and state institutions. This duality is a heritage of the War of Independence, during the course of which the military personnel of the National Liberation Army (ALN) took the upper hand over the civilians of the National Liberation Front (FLN). It has not fired a shot since the birth of the independent State in 1962, as the ALN overthrew the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA) and took power in Algiers, appointing Ahmed Ben Bella the first President. The latter was overthrown in 1965 by his Minister of defence, Colonel Houari Boumédiène. After that, the army entrusted government administration to civil elites it chose as part of a programme designed to achieve the objectives of the November 1954 Revolution. The historic legitimacy of the army is connected with these objectives, presented in official rhetoric as those of the martyrs of the war of liberation symbolically embodied by the military. Hence the military hierarchy plays the role of the source of power, insofar as national sovereignty is vested in it. This pattern was nearly broken by the electoral victory of the Islamists of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in December 1991, but the army, taking its political prerogatives, carried out a coup, making the elections null and void. The military is not ready to accept the emergence of a civilian power chosen by the electorate.¹

Nor are they ready to allow their designated President to attempt to emancipate himself from their tutelage. Whenever this occurs, there is a crisis at the State leadership level which always ends to the benefit of the military: overthrow of the GPRA in June 1962, arrest of Ahmed Ben Bella in June 1965, forced resignation of Chadli Bendjedid in January 1992, assassination of Mohamed Boudiaf in June 1992, and resignation of Liamine Zéroual in September 1998. Elected in 1999, Abdelaziz Bouteflika holds the record in longevity in the post of Head of State because he accepts the military’s primacy over politics, despite his peremptory statement of not being ¾ of a President.²

The fact that Bouteflika is kept on as Head of State despite being ill clearly demonstrates that the Algerian political system functions with a President of only formal attributes. The most important political decisions are made on his behalf and the regime requires the press to print the version according to which the President is authoritarian and has brought the army to heel after appointing senior officers loyal to him to the Ministry of Defence. Subject to the blackmail of the publicity managed by a state organisation (the National Publishing and Advertising Agency – ANEP),³ the press propagates the version according to which the President’s clan is at the origin of all corruption cases. The President’s brother, Said, officially advisor to the President, is accused by private

newsapers on a daily basis of embezzling public funds and plotting to take over the presidency from his brother. Banned from speaking to the press, Saïd Bouteflika lacks the capacity to deny the rumours reported by newspapers about him. The President and his entourage play the role of scapegoat for the dysfunctions of the State, plagued by corruption and incompetence. Bouteflika’s presidency has indeed been marked by very serious cases of corruption involving billions of dollars to the detriment of the state budget, the most significant being the Khalifa, Chakib Khelil and East-West Motorway Cases. Given the magnitude of the sums misappropriated, a rival clan is pushing for justice to be done, but the case file was “purged” beforehand by the Intelligence and Security Department (DRS) to spare its officers and other generals involved.

Regarding one of the cases to be tried in Algiers, the journalist Ihsane el Kadi, of the electronic newspaper *Maghreb Emergent*, wrote: “In facilities market management as well as in project governance, two decision-making chains are superposed in Algeria in the Bouteflika years. The first is official, formal and decides nothing of importance. The second is parallel, informal and decides everything of importance. In this informal chain, those giving orders remained hidden. Only the intermediaries emerged [...] After a 24-hour hearing at the Ruisseau Court in Algiers, the informal chain was revealed. It is military. Amar Ghoul and his Chief of Staff yielded the project governance to the DRS through Mohamed Khelladi. What happened next was a family affair. Internal to the Algerian security service. The informal Algerian chain directing the Chinese portion of the East-West Motorway construction broke in 2009. Intrusion of a DRS heavy-weight, General Hassan, and his deputy. A war of networks. Weren’t the commissions paid to prevent bottlenecks at the construction site fairly distributed? Did they forget a key link in the chain? Did the DRS truly wish to supply a slush fund abroad?”

The military hierarchy has always presented a seamlessly united front until the unprecedented crisis of January 2013 following the attack on the In Amenas gas complex, which caused divergences to appear regarding the political handling of the event. Let us recall that the assailants, arriving from Libya, entered the complex and took workers and managers hostage, among them foreigners of various nationalities. It was the first time Islamists had attacked gas infrastructures, the source of the energy income on which the entire economy is based. The country had experienced a decade of violence during which the strategic hydrocarbon sector had been spared. Refusing to negotiate with them, the Intelligence and Security Department (DRS) organised a bloody response that cost the lives of all the terrorists and a number of foreign executives, including Japanese, British and French citizens, as well as Algerians.

It seemed that the military leadership pointed the finger at the DRS, reproaching it first for shortcomings in the security of the gas complex targeted by the terrorists, and then for the violent liberation operation, during which 33 foreign hostages were killed by shots fired from the army’s helicopters. In any case, the event triggered a crisis in the top echelons of the military hierarchy, including the generals of the DRS, an institution entrusted with fighting terrorism and protecting the country’s sensitive civilian and military sites. In the most complete opacity, the military leaders reassessed the action taken by the DRS, which was probably reproached for shortcomings in the protection of sensitive sites such as the In Amenas gas complex.

The day after the attack, the military leadership took advantage of the situation to readjust in its favour relations between the military staff and the DRS, which had gained enormous influence on all state institutions, including the army, thanks to its unrelenting fight against terrorism in the 1990s. There was a before and an after In Amenas, for which the DRS paid the price: it retired Generals Bachir Tartag and M’Henna Djebbar and sidelined Colonel Fawzi, in charge of controlling the press, and the prerogatives of the DRS judicial police were ended. These measures demonstrate that the DRS has lost some of its political clout with the decrease in terrorist violence thanks to which it had taken the upper hand over other decision-making centres. Recall that the
DRS, an intelligence and counterintelligence agency under the jurisdiction of the army, plays the role of political police by infiltrating parties, labour unions, the press and other civil society organisations, and by exercising discrete surveillance of ministry personnel. It is the backbone of the regime and its mission is to neutralise political adversaries and thwart domestic and foreign threats. To do this, its officers have carte blanche to arrest and torture anyone suspected of undermining national security, in no way concerning themselves with the separation of powers or the independence of justice. The DRS is the organ by which the real power exercises its control over the State and oversees parties, labour unions, associations, the press, etc.

Recall that the DRS is the backbone of the regime and its mission is to neutralise political adversaries and thwart domestic and foreign threats.

In the sphere of policymaking, the President does not count. His role is symbolic and consists of making public opinion believe that Algeria is a state where the military obeys the President as stipulated in the constitution. The reality is quite a different story because, according to the statement by historian Mohamed Harbi, "states have armies but the Algerian army has its state." Throughout these tragic events that made international headlines, Bouteflika remained silent, leaving Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal the task of answering the telephone calls of Heads of State and Government concerned about the fate of their citizens working at the complex or killed during the army’s assault. Certain observers speculated that by his silence, the President meant to indicate that he did not have any authority over the army generals. Over a month after the attack, a spokesperson read a message from the President on television, where the latter paid tribute to the army, which he called "the nation’s shield."

En-trenched behind its silence, the army did not supply information on what really happened, and Algerian newspapers did nothing but comment on the laconic communiqués from the government and the official press agency, Algérie Presse Service (APS). Given the numerous rumours, the government organised a guided tour of the gas complex for journalists, to lend credence to the official version of events.9

Dissension in the military hierarchy had been kept secret until January 2014, when it became public knowledge through the press. Amar Saadani, head of the FLN, vehemently attacked General Tewfik Médiène, head of the DRS, accusing him of going against the directives of the Head of State and not respecting Rule of Law and suggesting he resign. In an interview in the electronic newspaper Tout sur l'Algérie (TSA), Saadani stated: "I lobby for the separation of powers. I tell you, if something happens to me, it will be the work of Tewfik Médiène. General Tewfik Médiène should have resigned..."10 Evidently, a more powerful clan than that of General Tewfik Médiène commissioned Saadani, promising him protection. Saadani’s statements had the effect of a bomb in a country where no-one dares mention the head of the political police, let alone criticise him. Especially since they were followed by the arrest of one of Tewfik Médiène’s right-hand men, General Abdelkader Aït-Ourabi, called Hassan, the head of operations for the DRS.11 Politically weakened, the DRS became the object of direct attacks in the private press, which for weeks became the sounding board for differences of opinion made in the open in statements that were certainly out of the ordinary. And then, suddenly, the attacks against the DRS in the press stopped, which was a sign that a compromise had been struck between the different opposing clans. It would seem that the issue behind these tussles was the presidential election, more precisely, the incumbent’s fourth term, to which General Tewfik Médiène was not partial. The matter was settled at a conclave of generals in which the head of the DRS went over to the majority position of his colleagues. New balances were established in the utmost opacity, behind a discourse constantly referring to the President and recalling the stipulation in the consti-
tution giving him the prerogative of being the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The reality is, however, quite different; the President remains foreign to the competition among commanders of the armed forces, over which he does not exercise any political authority. In winter 2014, tension had dropped and newspapers were busy with the matter of the candidacy of Abdelaziz Bouteflika who, a month before elections, made a laconic announcement that he would be running for a fourth term, leaving those who believed he was retiring due to his state of health perplexed. Weakened by illness, the president-candidate did not carry out a presidential campaign nor address the crowds. Election campaign meetings were led by ministers and the two parties in the administration (FLN and RND), who stated that Bouteflika’s fourth term would be that of the achievement of democratic transition. He was re-elected in an expected victory on 17 April 2014 with a comfortable rate of more than 80% of votes, defeating his adversaries, who had agreed to run as ‘extras’ to lend the elections credibility.

Algeria’s problem is that it can’t seem to manage to strip the army of its political legitimacy, which allows it to control the State, appoint civilians loyal to it to institutional posts, and keep its officers out of legal proceedings when they are involved in corruption cases. The military leaders are against the emergence of an independent civilian power, considering the State as an administration and not a sphere for the expression of society’s ideological trends. Hence they refuse to allow civil society organisations to gain their own legitimate representatives via free elections ensuring changeover. The Rule of Law, with its notions of the separation of powers, the independence of the judicial branch, public liberties and electoral legitimacy does not form part of the culture of the armed forces, which are still attached to a populist ideology incompatible with the institutionalisation of power relations via the constitution. This explains the authorities’ inaction regarding the tragic events of Ghardaïa where there have been violent clashes between two ethnic groups for four years now. There is no solution to this conflict, which has caused several dozen deaths, because the local populations have no legitimate representatives in state institutions to state their grievances. Also remarkable is the silence by which the government has responded to the protests taking place for over a year by populations in the South against shale gas operations, fearing pollution of the groundwater vital to their existence. In response to their protests, the government has used police force to violently disperse sit-ins in public spaces. On 24 February 2015, Bouteflika sent a message to the protesters, read over the radio and on television, informing them that shale gas is a gift from God and that Algeria does not have the right to reject it.

If the country has not experienced the events that have brought violence to the region since the Tunisian Spring in 2011, it is due to a policy of redistribution of the energy revenue allowed by high oil prices. From 2000 to 2013, the price per barrel went from $25 to $140, allowing the accumulation of a financial surplus of $200 billion. The government’s balanced budget was calculated for years on the basis of a $37 rate. This financial ease allowed the government to launch significant infrastructure works, with investments of several hundreds of billions of dollars: motorways, social housing, urban tramways, etc. These billions in investment fostered direct and indirect employment, as well as opportunities for speculation that lent the illusion of economic wealth. In reality, however, the market was supplied by imported products, while the foreign trade balance indicated that 98% of exports consisted of hydrocarbons. The country was financially wealthy but had become economically impoverished. This would seem the real outcome of the Bouteflika regime, with a President who rules a country he does not govern.

Since July 2014, the international prices of the oil barrel have been falling, reducing the State’s foreign currency inflow by 60%. The authorities have attempted to reassure public opinion by evoking the State’s financial surplus, which could finance the equivalent of three years of imports, but at the same time, they remind civil servants to avoid waste and make rational use of public investment. If the price of oil continues to sink for longer than three years, Algeria will have to turn to the international capital market to finance its food imports. This scenario would break the fragile balance among those holding real power, whose clans are attentive to the distribution of the energy revenue.
Although the tragic events of the Tunisian Revolution, which cost the lives of 338 Tunisians, allowed the overthrow of the head of the authoritarian regime, Ben Ali, the consequences of the latter’s policies demonstrate the limits of an artificial stability that has benefited one part of the population and marginalised another. The Tunisian Constitution was adopted on 27 January 2014 as a result of a colossal process of debate lasting three years and after reconsidering the question of identity, but the new parties emerging post-Ben Ali did not manage to prevail and offer a political alternative other than that of the Islamist party, Ennahdha, or of the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD), carried over from the former regime. After the return of the RCD in hybrid form by the name of Nidaa Tounes, joined in 2012 by leftist Tunisian personalities and ‘Destourians’ from the Bourguiba era, following the 2014 legislative and presidential elections, the major challenge announced was the struggle against terrorism and for a ‘modernist’ Tunisia, which was contrasted to the vision of the Ennahdha Islamists. Such were the slogans.

**Tunisia: “At War”**

Nonetheless, on 18 March 2015, hardly a month after the formation of the Habib Essid administration in February, Tunisia suffered one of the deadliest attacks of its history. Two young Tunisians aged 20 and 26 managed to enter the Bardo Museum in the Tunisian capital and kill 22 people. The stated target: “the infidel tourists.”

On 26 June, another attack targeted a hotel belonging to a Nidaa Tounes MP in Sousse, a coastal town and tourist centre par excellence. All in all, the toll was some sixty dead and dozens injured. The government, which advocated a return to order, promising an improved anti-terrorism policy, has a very poor safety record. In five months, Tunisia has gone from a ‘country of hope’ to a ‘danger zone’ not recommended for tourists.

On 4 July, in an address to the people, the President of the Republic, Beji Caid Essebsi, announced that “Tunisia is today at war.” The legitimate question would then be: ‘A war, but against whom?’ Whereas the President indirectly blames it on the proximity of Libya, citing the need to ensure the “protection and security of over 500 kilometres of border with Libya,” adding that “no country is safe from the threat of terrorism.” Terrorists can be found among Tunisians, often aged 18 to 35, aspiring to a certain order different from that of the preceding authoritarian regimes. In contrast to a sort of national denial whereby terrorism is purported to be an exogenous phenomenon, the attacks demonstrate that it is quite “endogenous.”

According to the latest report from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), some 5,800 Tunisian jihadists are in Syria, Libya, Iraq, Mali and Yemen, and some 625 combatants have returned from conflict zones. Also according to the OHCHR, “the current scope is unprecedented in terms of sheer scale.”

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Since the revolution and the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, the arms trade has become accessible to Tunisians, who go to Libya to earn some money but end up being indoctrinated by terrorist groups.

**The Terrorists’ Enemy Is No Longer Just the “Taghout”**

Over the past few months, Tunisian terrorists seem to have made two notorious changes, the first regarding their targets and the second the locations. Indeed, after 2011, attacks essentially targeted agents of the security forces and the army, considered the source of ‘taghout,’ which can be translated as ‘injustice.’ The fringe group carrying out these attacks claimed to be from AQIM, namely from the Oqba Ibn Nafaa Brigade entrenched in the Chaambi Mountains near Kasserine in Tunisia’s northwest. Since 18 March 2015, the attacks have moved to the capital and tourist areas, and are now against ‘non-Muslim’ foreigners. The last attack was claimed by a new enemy, the Islamic State.

Since the revolution and the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, the arms trade has become accessible to Tunisians, who go to Libya to earn some money but end up being indoctrinated by terrorist groups.

These massacres are thus eminently selective, sparing, at least for the time being, the Tunisian people and making non-Arab, non-Muslim tourists targets to be eliminated. This plunges Tunisia into what could be referred to as a sort of ‘religious war.’ Whereas Tunisians are considered ‘primarily Muslim,’ different visions of Islam are finding it increasingly difficult to coexist since, given the failing socioeconomic situation, political Islam could be a solution for some. The social divide between the ‘privileged’ and the ‘marginalised’ is growing amid an atmosphere of dissatisfaction.

Political Decisions Imperil Human Rights and Transitional Justice

Eight days after the Sousse attack, the President of the Republic declared a state of emergency, accusing social movements, first and foremost. Due to the deteriorating situation, two major political decisions were made. The first concerned the adoption last 25 July of the bill of law against terrorism and money laundering, with 174 votes in favour, 10 abstentions and none against.

Civil society did not take long to oppose it. Indeed, this new law “threatens human rights and lacks the necessary safeguards against abuse,” eight non-governmental organisations have asserted. According to Human Rights Watch: “The law grants security forces broad and vague monitoring and surveillance powers, extends incommunicado detention from 6 to up to 15 days for terrorism suspects, and permits courts to close hearings to the public [...].” Moreover, the death penalty is mentioned 17 times, although Tunisia has observed a moratorium on executions for over twenty years.

The second political decision was made by the President of the Republic himself. Two days after the Bardo attack, he announced a bill of law of “national reconciliation in the economic and financial sphere,” which he declared was “a necessity to be carried out at all costs” at the 59th anniversary of independence. It will soon be discussed and considered for adoption by the Cabinet before being brought before the Assembly of the Representatives of the People.

The bill of law specifies that it will end “prosecution and judgement, as well as the execution of sentences against civil servants and the like for acts of financial malfeasance and crimes involving public funds, except corruption and embezzlement.” Article 3 provides for the creation of an “arbitration and reconciliation commission under the government’s Executive Branch.”

The bill also allows for “an amnesty for crimes relating to foreign currency committed before the promulgation of this law, in particular the non-declaration of assets and resources abroad and the possession of foreign currency not declared according to currency regulations.”

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Sihem Ben Sedrine, Chairwoman of the Truth and Dignity Commission (IVD), in charge of justice during the transition period, vehemently criticised this bill, which, she states, contravenes the Constitution. “The Commission knew of the bill of law but never received an official copy. The bill was drafted without consultation with the IVD even though reconciliation falls within our prerogatives. It’s regrettable, all the more so since we consider this bill for national economic and financial reconciliation is anti-constitutional” she declared. Paragraph 9 of Article 148 of the Constitution provides that the State commits to respect the process of transitional justice in all its domains and timelines as per law. With this bill of law, “the State would be judge and jury,” denounced the IVD Chair. “The bill goes against the underlying principles of independence and neutrality of any body carrying out justice. It cannot be an arbitral body because it is under the Executive Branch, its members being designated by the Ministries,” she emphasised.

In the face of this bill of law put forth by the Presidency of the Republic and upheld by the party in power, the IVD announced at a press conference on 31 July that it had requested the opinion of the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission regarding the bill’s compliance with international standards for transitional justice.

Is Tunisia Moving Backwards?

The security and political situation of Tunisia, the cradle of the Arab revolutions, is rapidly deteriorating in the face of ‘religious fanatics’ who see themselves as ‘vigilantes for a better world,’ that of the Caliphate, where the poor will no longer be poor, the corrupt will be eliminated and those whose countries are plunging the ‘Arab world’ into chaos shall be ‘punished.’ In the name of their ‘utopia,’ a bloody one, these fanatics seem to be using Tunisia as a laboratory. Nidaa Tounes, for its part, thus has a heavy mission and finds itself at a revolutionary impasse between ‘violent jihadists and a dissident civil society.’ The political decisions of Nidaa Tounes, in particular the one advocating ‘national reconciliation’ with businesspeople accused of corruption, could boost the motivation of terrorists wishing to supplant a regime tending to support Ben Ali’s former policies. In the face of this ‘order’ advocated by terrorists, the Essid administration and the Nidaa Tounes party have not balked and pursue their legislative and executive programme along security and economic lines often contested by civil society and deemed to contravene the Constitution. Moreover, the unstable geopolitical context limits civil society’s latitude in defending its pro-human rights choices, given the risk of state collapse.

Certain nostalgics consider that “it would have been better to keep Ben Ali after all,” since “under him, at least there were no attacks or terrorism.” Nevertheless, it was in the womb of the ‘stable’ Tunisia that the monster was engendered: young, poor, thirsting for freedom and social justice but contaminated by a literal reading of the Koranic text.

In a Tunisia where freedom of expression and justice were absent, the number of Tunisians leaving for ‘jihad’ after the 11 September attacks remains unknown. After the revolution and above all with the rise to power of Nidaa Tounes, the country could sink into chaos.

Since 2011 and the downfall of the Gaddafi regime, basically two types of Tunisian youth have chosen dangerous destinies, risking their lives, going against the State, in search of a certain ‘dignity’; some of them in ‘jihad,’ others crossing the sea to reach so-called democratic lands. In the first quarter of this year, clandestine emigrants number some 1,600. Numerous organisations have sounded the alarm bells in April regarding the multiplication of clandestine emigration attempts. Through its choices, the Essid administration seems to be adopting the same policy as the Ben Ali regime towards this sort of ‘collective suicide’ by disappointed youth in search of utopia. To break the vicious circle, a political alternative is slow to appear and fulfil the aspirations of the new generation.

Libya’s Dangerous Divisions

Mary Fitzgerald
Journalist and analyst reporting on Libya since 2011

Four years after the ousting of Muammar Gaddafi, Libya finds itself torn between two governments, two parliaments and two army chiefs.

In the eastern town of Beida sits the internationally recognised government of Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni appointed by the House of Representatives (HoR), which was elected in a June 2014 ballot and is based further east in Tobruk. Both Thinni’s government and the HoR support the Dignity offensive launched in May 2014 by the then-retired General Khalifa Haftar and backed by Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. The HoR has since appointed Haftar commander in chief.

A last-minute decision in July to relocate the HoR, which was due to sit in Benghazi, to Tobruk triggered a boycott by some 30 members, who claimed it was a politically-motivated move which violated procedure. Some of these boycotters support a rump of the HoR’s predecessor, the General National Congress (GNC), which reconvened in Tripoli in August after a militia alliance known as Libya Dawn drove rival Dignity-aligned militias from the capital. The GNC retained its existing army chief of staff and appointed university lecturer Omar al-Hassi as Prime Minister, tasking him with forming a ‘national salvation’ government to challenge that of Thinni. Hassi was later replaced by his Defence minister Khalifa Ghwell.

In Libya, politicians and elected representatives generally wield less influence than the country’s constellation of armed groups, many of which have become entwined with criminal networks including those involved in people smuggling and other trafficking. In fact, many attribute the dramatic fall in electoral turnout – from 1.7 million in the first post-Gaddafi elections in 2012 to just over 600,000 in the HoR elections two years later – to popular disenchantment with the political process, due to the belief that real power rests with militias and not state institutions.

Dignity versus Dawn

Both Dignity and Dawn should be understood as two broad camps of loosely affiliated political and armed factions brought together more out of a sense of perceived common enemies than long-term mutual interests or goals.

The Libya Dawn militia alliance, which took control of Tripoli’s international airport in August 2014 from the militias that had held it since August 2011, is a diverse coalition. Fighters from the prosperous port city of Misrata, most of them from the Libya Shield Central Region force founded by the army chief of staff in 2012, make up the largest component of Libya Dawn. Most cannot be categorised as Islamist, yet they formed an alliance with Islamist factions from Tripoli and other western towns as well as non-Islamist armed groups, particularly Amazigh (or Berber), from across Libya’s western flank. Dawn’s opponents in the battle for Tripoli were primarily militias from or linked to the small conservative western town of Zintan. These forces are broadly allied with Haftar’s Operation Dignity. The Zintan-linked camp also includes former Gaddafi fighters and tribal forces from the Warshefana region on Tripoli’s outskirts.

All were united by the goal of removing Zintani influence from the capital, where Zintani factions – just like their rivals - had long used force or threat or force for political leverage. Apart from controlling
the airport since 2011, Zintani militias had also attacked or occupied a number of state institutions including the GNC, the Interior Ministry and the army chief of staff’s headquarters.

A pertinent question is whether Dawn would exist if not for Dignity. Haftar launched Dignity – which he billed as a “war on terrorism” – after he was accused by then Prime Minister Ali Zeiden of attempting a coup in February 2014. Haftar had publicly called for the suspension of the government and its replacement by a military council. He later surfaced in eastern Libya where he drummed up support from disgruntled former army and police officers and militias linked either to influential tribes or federalists seeking greater autonomy for the east. Haftar gave the name Karama or Dignity to the motley alliance of army units, including Benghazi’s Saiqa special forces and anti-Islamist militias that resulted. According to Faraj Barassi, a key commander in Dignity, only 20% of its forces are uniformed; the rest are militiamen.

With the central bank and national oil company headquartered in Tripoli and therefore out of reach, Thinni’s recognised government has attempted to set up parallel institutions in eastern Libya.

Haftar’s wide-ranging offensive – which targeted groups and individuals beyond those considered extremist – prompted a number of Benghazi’s militias to unite against him and coalesce into what is known as the Revolutionary Shura Council. Among them are the February 17 Martyrs’ Brigade – the largest rebel group formed in eastern Libya during the 2011 uprising – along with a regional branch of the state-sponsored Libya Shield force. Another key part of the Shura Council is Ansar al-Sharia, a hardline group formed after the revolution, whose members were accused of involvement in the 2012 attack on a US diplomatic mission in Benghazi which claimed the lives of the ambassador and three compatriots. The Shura Council is connected with the Dawn camp in western Libya in so far as they share a common enemy in Haftar and his Zintan allies. The UN designation of Ansar al-Sharia as a terrorist organisation in November 2014 has strained Dawn’s tactical alliance with the Shura Council, with backers in Misrata pushing for the others to distance themselves from the group.

**Whither Haftar?**

Haftar draws on a substantial well of public support in Benghazi, where residents, frustrated with poor security and a series of assassinations, rallied to his Operation Dignity. The HoR’s decision to officially return Haftar from retirement also boosted his credentials, but even elements broadly sympathetic to the operation to root out Islamists are wary of his political ambitions. His efforts to establish and lead a supreme military council have met resistance from several quarters within the broader Dignity camp, including some eastern army units, who fear he may use it to seize power. Once supportive federalists in eastern Libya are now doubting Haftar’s commitment to their cause. The Dignity alliance is increasingly beset by internal tensions and fractures. Within the opposing Dawn camp, the primary motivation remains countering what its various elements believe is Haftar’s plan to install himself as military ruler of Libya. For this reason, the question of what to do about Haftar has proved a major stumbling block in UN efforts to mediate a solution to the crisis.

**Economy in Freefall**

With Libya split between rival political and armed factions propping up two governments vying for power, the country’s economy is increasingly feeling the strain. With the central bank and national oil company headquartered in Tripoli and therefore out of reach, Thinni’s recognised government has attempted to set up parallel institutions in eastern Libya. These moves have drawn criticism from the UN and key Western powers, who see it as a charade at best and a step towards de facto partition at worst.

The price of not resolving the political crisis is high, given oil output (hovering between 500,000 and 600,000 bpd, but it has dipped much lower at
times due to continued fighting). That, combined with plummeting oil prices, has forced the central bank to dip into its reserves in order to pay salaries and subsidies. Reserves reached $100 billion in August 2014, representing a 20% drop from the start of the year. The World Bank has warned reserves could be depleted in four years under the current situation. Diplomats say it could happen within 18 months.

Since 2011, Libya has been running a budget deficit, except in 2012 when oil exports increased substantially. The World Bank has estimated that with current oil prices and Libya’s level of oil exports, the 2015 budget deficit is likely to increase to 31% of GDP in 2015, from 11% in 2014.

Libya’s unravelling over the past year has led to deep and dangerous divisions that pose a threat not just to its failing transition but also the security of the surrounding region and Europe

Addressing the fiscal gap poses a major challenge as oil exports are not expected to recover significantly any time soon. Most of Libya’s budget is allocated to public sector salaries (a quarter of Libyans – most adults – receive a state salary) and energy subsidies. Foreign reserves will continue to be under severe pressure unless there are major policy shifts in terms of lowering the wage bill and slashing subsidies. Cutting the budget presents difficulties, however, as two-thirds of the funds are reserved for salaries and subsidies. Complicating the issue is the fact that fighters on both sides of the current crisis are on the state pay roll.

Enter ISIS

Given the number of Libyans who have joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq, it was always a question of not if but when an affiliate would emerge in Libya. A group in the eastern town of Derna, known as the Majlis Shura Shabab al-Islam, declared allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in late 2014. The group comprises local returnees from Syria, as well as a small number of foreigners, and remains the only entity in Libya that Baghdadi has publicly acknowledged. ISIS sympathisers are also present in Benghazi and Sirte. Members of other militant groups have defected to join ISIS as they become more assertive. ISIS has claimed responsibility for a number of attacks in 2015, including one on the Corinthia Hotel in Tripoli and several on oil facilities south of Sirte. They also abducted and later beheaded 21 Egyptian Copts near Sirte and took over a number of state institutions in the town. ISIS has denounced key figures in both the Dawn and Dignity camps as apostates and its presence has turned Libya’s crisis into a three-way war. In March, the Misrata-led 166 Battalion took on ISIS in Sirte for the first time. The UN insists that only a unity government can tackle the threat posed by ISIS.

Can a Constitution Save Libya?

As Libya slips further into chaos, many are pinning their hopes on the continuing work of its Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA). The assembly is tasked with writing Libya’s first post-Gaddafi constitution and the country’s first since 1951. Libya had no formal constitution throughout Gaddafi’s four decades in power. That legacy, along with present challenges, including how to manage oil wealth, decentralise governance and determine the role of religion, means the CDA’s work will not be easy. Just under 500,000 of Libya’s 3.4 million eligible voters took part in elections to the assembly in February 2014, raising questions from the start about its own legitimacy and that of the document it will produce. The CDA is now long past the 120-day timeframe it was given to present a draft of the constitution to Parliament and then have it put up for a public referendum. The two prickliest issues faced by the assembly relate to the place of sharia (Islamic) law and decentralisation. A broad consensus exists that sharia should be a reference point but there is fierce debate over whether it should be the only source, the principal source or a source among many for legislation. The question of decentralisation is linked with the question of how to distribute oil revenues and it has become more fraught as federalists in eastern Libya, some of them armed,
become more assertive. In addition, more separatist-minded elements have gained ground over the past year. All this plus the burden of expectation means the CDA is under considerable pressure.

Conclusion

Libya’s unravelling over the past year has led to deep and dangerous divisions that pose a threat not just to its failing transition but also the security of the surrounding region and Europe. With the country split between two governments east and west, entire regions, communities and even families are divided over the nature of the crisis and how to resolve it. A profound polarisation has taken root, feeding off fresh grievances and driven by revenge, which adds a whole new layer of reconciliation challenges to the numerous legacy issues of the Gaddafi era. A range of actors see opportunity in Libya’s chaos, from ISIS to separatists bent on establishing their own state in the east. Without a unity government, the country will remain caught in paralysing zero-sum politics and unable to tackle the myriad of security and economic challenges that threaten its very existence.

Bibliography

Eluding Normalcy: Egypt’s Political Situation

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During the 18-day revolution in 2011, an Egyptian actress became the focus of social-media mockery as she ardently complained of her suffering from the interruption of restaurant delivery services. Four years later, the incident seems less caricature.

Alongside the massive revolutionary upheavals, a significant trend among public attitudes in Egypt has arguably reflected a growing need to restore ‘normalcy’ and ‘order,’ not only related to the day-to-day functioning of people’s lives, but regarding economic welfare and a lost sense of security. In pragmatic terms, this drive has translated into a growing primacy of conservative political trends among the population, whose political choices account for major developments and political milestones over the past four years.

This was the context for the close contest of the 2012 presidential elections (just a year after the revolutionary upheaval) between the ‘statesman’ of the time, General Ahmed Shafiq, and the narrowly elected Muslim Brotherhood figure Mohamed Morsi (whose victory was made possible by the support of revolutionary forces antagonistic to the Mubarak regime, and hence to General Shafiq).

One year later, in the run up and, more specifically, aftermath of 30 June 2013, this conservative tilt has been accentuated under the influence of several factors: disillusionment over the possibilities for change; the ‘negative’ experience of the short-lived Brotherhood rule; the rise in violence and terrorist incidents after Morsi’s ousting; dire economic conditions; and a highly turbulent regional context with decidedly negative demonstration effects. As a consequence, the quest for order and the consolidation of the ‘State’ is almost a greater priority in Egyptian politics today than democracy.

In terms of political process, the current situation tends to be categorised as a ‘failed transition,’ a phase of ‘autocratic restoration,’ an attempt to try to make sense of the post-3 July political developments in Egypt that overthrew the Brotherhood’s rule through mass popular protest and with the aid of the military. Incidents and indicators of current democratic regression and retreating hopes are not wanting.

There are plethoric explanations as to the reasons that brought about this state of affairs; some attribute it to the domineering power of the military, their strategic or corporate interests and organisational creed. Others put more emphasis on the choices and alliances of a fragmented and satellite political elite, the weakness of a viable political alternative other than the Islamists, while the rise of Islamist violence in the aftermath of the Brotherhood rule has certainly not been conducive to a smooth transition.

In the same vein, Aly El Raggal argues that, whether regarding the armed forces (the dominant political power) or the Muslim Brotherhood (the most viable political force), hierarchical structures and a process of socialisation focused on loyalty and obedience and a mistrust of ‘others’ have led to a stifled public do-

2 Ahmed Abd Rabou lists 13 indicators of democratic regression in his critical article: What Has the President Done in One Year? (in Arabic). These include an overemphasis on the role of the presidency, patrimonial politics, prevalence of conspiracy theory, over-securitisation, disregard for the Constitution, among others. www.shorouknews.com/columns/view.aspx?cdate=24052015&d=6fe3d13f-d64c-4f3f-be9b-4694c9456110
main, and the new values of plurality advocated in the ‘squares’ had no solid social ‘carriers’ or means of support to survive and thrive. This explanation touches on the social basis of the political situation, which, despite having an indirect impact, is nevertheless significant.

The Quest for Order

Underlying and fuelling the current political situation is a conservative ‘moment’ that seeks to reclaim the ‘State’ and a clear preference for order and economic recovery. Public opinion surveys have shown a growth in this trend over the past four years. In the beginning, directly after the 25 January revolution, the Arab Barometer surveys showed considerable concern over economic welfare and regarding security matters among the Egyptian population. A look at the more recent World Values Surveys on Egypt reflects the consistency and, arguably, escalation of these concerns and sheds light on their political repercussions. General trends show a fatigue and mistrust of revolutionary change, as people cling to the State as a guarantor against chaos, especially in a region of fragile and failing states, and prioritisation of economic and security issues.

The data on Egypt show that more than 70% of people surveyed considered politics either important or rather important, while close to 100% considered religion important (94%) or rather important (5.7%). Almost equal to the percentage of interest in politics was the prevalence of unhappiness among Egyptians, with 44% feeling not at all happy and 30% feeling not very happy. A telling development is the dwindling of social capital and trust with almost 80% of surveyed Egyptians believing that people could not be trusted, and that you need to be very careful. Moreover, active membership in intermediary institutions, whether political, religious, philanthropic, professional or labour unions, is very weak and does not exceed 0.3%, while membership in political parties hovers around 1.5%. In this sense, not only are actual threats of a lack of order, or chaos, perceived, but these ‘fears’ and threats are accentuated by mistrust, and a lack of intermediary associations and bonds around which positions could be articulated or clustered. This is a typical situation where the State is resorted to and held onto as a guarantor or shield against chaos.

Underlying and fuelling the current political situation is a conservative ‘moment’ that seeks to reclaim the ‘State’ and a clear preference for order and economic recovery

Questions regarding personal and collective objectives in the same survey also reflect a prioritisation of economic concerns. In a question on what the aims of the country should be for the next ten years, the first priority was a high level of economic growth for more than three quarters of respondents, while making sure the country has strong defence forces was the first choice of 14.3% of respondents. An outright preference for order that requires no further interpretation is evident as almost 58% of respondents chose restoration of order in the country as their first and foremost aim (if they had to choose according to the question’s wording), while giving people more say in important government issues claimed a meagre 5.6%, protecting freedom of speech 6.4%, and 30% opted for bread and butter issues, proclaiming their personal aim to be checking rising prices. The same trend is seen in an opinion survey by the Baseera Center on the most significant events of 2014, in which the Suez Canal mega project was the first choice for respondents with 32%, followed by the Presidential elections and Sisi’s victory with 21%, and in third place was the change in the ‘bread distribution system’ which 5% of respondents rated as a major development of the year.

The source of legitimacy of the regime thus lies mainly in restoring the grip of the State, prospects for economic welfare and growth within, renewed prestige and a niche for Egypt’s regional role amidst rising nationalism.

7 Ibid.
8 www.baseera.com.eg
Anomaly Prolonged

The dilemma of the current ‘moment’ is that, despite the fervent pursuit of normalcy and order ‘at all costs,’ which seems to shape the political performance of the regime and a wide social support base, forms of anomaly persist and order still seems elusive. According to a new composite index surveying and measuring incidents of violence and social disruption since 30 June 2013, violence has persisted. Foremost amongst forms of violence measured by the report are incidents targeting the security apparatus, especially in the 18 months following 30 June, which totalled 204 and claimed the lives of 522, 60% of whom were police officers and 40% members of the armed forces. Although incidents of army and police targeting remain to date, these peaked in the months that followed 30 June.9 It is noteworthy that 50% of these incidents/casualties took place in Sinai; the main seat of violence against the army, while 11% took place in Cairo.10 Another indicator is the rise in sabotage of police possessions and public facilities (especially electricity), explosions, which accelerated since mid-2014 according to the report, and, to a lesser degree, violence targeting Copts, their homes, churches or possessions. Other indicators of the index refer to acts of protest, especially by the Muslim Brotherhood and their proponents or sympathisers in general and among youth and students, which have shown a tendency to decline over the period.11

Protests or violent and terrorist incidents could have been viewed as outlying incidents had the political situation been normalised on other fronts. However, viewed through the prism of ‘political process,’ major institutional blocs are still lacking, further manifesting a lack of ‘normalcy’ in Egyptian politics, even on such a formal level. The delay in undertaking the final aspect of the road map envisioned a few years ago, namely the continued absence of a legitimate legislative entity, or in other words, a Parliament, is testament to this situation. Although the post 6/30 regime stressed its willingness to democratise and, to this effect, put forward a road map of political processes that included a constitutional referendum, presidential elections and parliamentary elections, two years on and Egypt remains without a legislative or representative authority since the dissolution of the Shura Council in July 2013. Yet even prior to this, Egypt had not had a ‘proper’ legislative authority since the Supreme Court dissolved the People’s Assembly a few days before Morsi’s election. The Shura Council (the higher parliamentary chamber), which assumed a legislative role under the transitional provisions of the 2012 constitution, drafted under Brotherhood rule, was discredited because of its extreme structural weakness and low electoral turnout, which undermined its legitimacy. For the first time since the 1950s, Egypt has had no legislative body for an entire year (2014), and in the 52 months since January 2011 the country has had a representative legislature for only six months.12

Parliamentary elections, which were scheduled to be held in two rounds between 21-22 March and 6-7 May 2015, were delayed after the Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), in March, ruled the electoral constituencies law to be unconstitutional.13 Prospects for upcoming elections or their implications for the political transition in Egypt are not very promising in light of the apparent weakness of political parties and their vulnerable and ever-changing electoral coalitions.

Conclusion

To sum up, the current political situation in Egypt, which favours order, economic recovery and enhancing the prestige and grip of the State, depends largely on ‘delivering’ on all fronts as a basis for legitimacy and consolidation. Delivering on economic goals seems to be the most promising aspect of the current formula and its main reason for remaining in place in the near future. However, scenarios regarding long-term political trends or prospects for democratic transition remain very fluid.

10 Ibid, p. 17.
11 Ibid.
13 The court found the law violated Article 102 of the constitution which stipulates that equal representation among voters in all constituencies must be guaranteed. http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/124469/Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-parliamentary-elections-back-to-square-one.aspx
Amid myriad threats and regional security dilemmas currently affecting the socio-economic and political situation in Jordan, the monarchy has successfully managed to maintain its stability throughout 2014. While the entire region has been mired in crises and conflicts – with Syria torn apart by a deadly civil war, with the Islamic State slowly encroaching on Iraq and Syria and with Gaza being almost completely decimated – the Jordanians have shown a remarkable resilience, proving yet again the strategic significance of Jordan to its Western allies.

Syrian Inferno

The war in Syria has continued to exacerbate the already quite delicate economic and security environment in Jordan. The intensification of military activity on the ground, along with the deteriorating humanitarian situation and the massive influx of civilian refugees into Jordan, has been a major headache for policymakers in Amman. The current circumstances in particular pose both a direct military threat to the Kingdom and the potential exhaustion of the Jordanian socio-economic system as a result of the dangers arising from the uncertain future of the Syrian regime. Last year (2014) witnessed frequent border clashes between the Jordanian army and armed rebel groups from Syria attempting to enter the country. Nevertheless, the monarchy maintained its open-border policy, which resulted in the arrival of an additional 50,000 Syrian refugees, bringing their total number in Jordan to over 620,000 (equal to roughly 10% of the Jordanian population). Some of these refugees took shelter in the newly established Azraq camp (opened in April 2014) located in the heart of the Eastern Desert. However, there were also numerous cases of forced returns at the border and deportations from Jordan, thus extending the long list of instances of *refoulement* practices carried out by the authorities.

The government’s increasingly hard line on refugees falls in line with the growing discontent of Jordanians themselves. In late 2014, 79% of Jordanians opposed the open-border policy and further influx of the refugee population, a steady increase from 64% in September 2011. Jordanians are frustrated by the fact that the Syrian crisis is currently constraining the State’s resources (water and energy in particular), infrastructure and job market, too often at the expense of the host communities. Such curtailments cannot pass unnoticed and thus generate many social tensions.

Meanwhile, Jordan is forced to continue its balanced and cautious policy towards Syria. Despite alleged support for moderate Syrian rebels and the expulsion of the Syrian envoy in May 2014, the Hashemite Kingdom maintains diplomatic relations with Damascus. In other words, it keeps all options open. Ideally, one might think that a quick end to the civil war in Syria would bring a solution to Jordanian security dilemmas. With recent developments on the ground, however, there is no scenario that could possibly work in Jordan’s interests.

ISIS – The Challenge of Radicalism

Whereas the Syrian problem has been looming over Jordan for quite some time now, the new threat posed by the appearance of the so-called
Islamic State (ISIS, or ‘Da’esh’ in Arabic) on Jordan’s doorstep came as a surprise to many. Far from being a pleasant surprise, the appearance of ISIS has created a security threat that no one in Amman is able to ignore. Having been previously involved in quashing the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda under the leadership of Jordanian national Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian monarchy has quickly turned into a primary regional enemy for the militias led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. The Hashemite family itself has become an object of relentless calumnies and threats, the central theme being their political and military cooperation with Israel and the West.

Even more concerning to the Jordanian regime than the border clashes with jihadists and the territorial expansion of ISIS (the latter being especially exaggerated), was the alarming rise in support for extremist Islamism within the Kingdom itself. Sympathy for radical Islam has been most prevalent in the southern city of Ma’an, a locus of frequent anti-government riots in the 1990s and 2000s and, at the same time, a traditional support base of the monarchy. Being far away from cosmopolitan Amman, feeling neglected by consecutive governments and possessing an awareness of socio-economic disparities, the Ma’anis have resorted to trafficking drugs and weapons between the war zones in Iraq. Simultaneously, conservative-minded youth, largely unemployed and with poor economic prospects, have fallen into the trap of polished and well-orchestrated ISIS propaganda. The anti-Israeli and anti-Western slogans have been a particularly successful recruiting device here, as the two entities have often been blamed for Jordan’s recent liberal economic reforms that have deprived the local populace of their hitherto share in state resources.

In these circumstances of rising radicalism and distrust towards public authorities, several large-scale demonstrations erupted in Ma’an in 2014, the biggest of which took place in late June. When security forces raided the city in search of criminal gangs, their alleged excessive use of force triggered anger and led to violent clashes. This time, however, next to traditional anti-government slogans, signs of support for the jihadists were also publicly raised, including flags of the Caliphate and banners with the controversial words “Ma’an the Fallujah of Jordan.” The June protest coincided with ISIS advancements in Iraq and was understandably not well received by the Hashemite regime. In response, the authorities launched a crackdown on supporters of the Islamic State by arresting a few hundred citizens (the majority of them Salafis) and referring them to the State Security Court on suspicion of intent to support terrorism. Such a legal possibility was facilitated by the amended anti-terrorism law (changed at the beginning of June 2014), which also controversially broadened the definition of “terrorism” to include such acts as “disturbing [Jordan’s] relations with a foreign state.” The crackdown was widely seen as a move against freedom of speech.

In order to counter the expansion of the Islamic State, Jordan joined the international coalition, both as an operational base and an active member. Since September 2014, the Jordanian Air Force has conducted numerous strikes against the positions of ISIS militants in Syria. Moreover, the monarchy became actively engaged in mobilising Muslim countries against the radical ideology of the Caliphate. The campaign has failed, however, to quell public disapproval of Jordan’s military involvement in the anti-ISIS coalition, which only intensified following the capture and murder of Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh after his plane crashed in Syria on 24 December. The video showing his immolation – released only in the first days of February 2015 – infuriated Jordanians and eventually united them against the extremist enemy. However, this new-found anti-ISIS consensus does not mean that the problem of native jihadists in Jordan has already been solved.

The government’s increasingly hard line on refugees falls in line with the growing discontent of Jordanians themselves. In late 2014, 79% of Jordanians opposed the open-border policy and further influx of the refugee population.
**All Quiet on the Domestic Front?**

Three years into the uprisings of the Arab Spring, which King Abdullah II notoriously described more as an “opportunity” than a threat, the essence of the Jordanian socio-political system has remained intact. The regime’s discourse of democratisation as being more about procedures and capacity-building rather than the redistribution of power has succeeded to capture the minds of both Jordanian society and the international community. It was in this vein that the procedural reforms, deprived of depth and breadth, continued to take place in 2014. At the same time, freedom of expression and freedom of the media in Jordan both experienced a serious setback. As a result of controversial 2013 regulations, many independent electronic media outlets were shut down, several journalists were arrested and many other imposed self-censorship. In the 2014 Freedom House Freedom of Press Index Jordan ranked 155th out of 197 countries, a significant drop of 10 spots in comparison with 2013 and the worst result in Jordan’s history. The situation was worsened further by the revision of counter-terrorism laws in June 2014.

In August 2014, the Jordanians saw their constitution amended for the second time since the beginning of the Arab Spring, with the almost unanimous support of the Parliament. The amendment to Article 67 – welcomed by all stakeholders – expanded the jurisdiction of the Independent Election Commission to organise and supervise, not only parliamentary, but also local and municipal elections. Far more startling, however, was the amendment to Article 127, which granted the King sole authority to appoint key security positions in Jordan, namely the Director of the General Intelligence Department and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While it may be true that the King has been nominating these positions for many years, he has done so in practice only and not by law, which technically left this prerogative to the Prime Minister. Nonetheless, the government presented the measure as a move towards professional, independent and apolitical military and intelligence services, whereas for reform activists it was a clear sign of concentrating more power in the hands of the monarch vis-à-vis a weakened parliament (which previously oversaw the nomination process). The lack of public debate on the issue and the surprisingly quick legislative procedure – finalised within a few weeks – have only confirmed these concerns.

Before the end of the year, the regime once again surprised the Jordanian public, and perhaps the international community even more, – by lifting the de facto moratorium on the death penalty, which had been in place since 2006. In the aftermath of this decision, eleven people were executed by hanging, having been sitting on death row for over eight years. This development undoubtedly jeopardised international efforts to eradicate the death penalty from the Jordanian penal code, but also opened the way for the executions of jihadists Sajida al-Rishawi and Ziad al-Karbouli in February 2015.

**Western Friends Are Never Enough**

The security concerns of a volatile neighbourhood have pushed Jordan to bid for a non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council, after the unprecedented resignation of Saudi Arabia in late 2013. Its two-year term, which began in January 2014, is helping the Hashemite monarchy strengthen its position worldwide, as well as push its own agenda at the UN, entirely aimed at securing the international assistance necessary to manage Jordan’s safe transit through regional crises. Above all, the monarchy presents itself as a moderate and rational partner of the international community, ready to facilitate support in a number of significant issues, such as the Middle East peace process or global response to the ISIS threat. This rhetoric works well enough with the traditional allies of the Hashemites, the United States and the European Union, both of which have their own stake in the regime’s stability, which is possibly higher now than ever. The latter offered Jordan generous support.
in both humanitarian and development fields, and established a Mobility Partnership in October 2014 (meant as a platform of cooperation in the area of migration and mobility). Advanced preparatory work was also done towards the negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) between the EU and Jordan. The US, on the other hand, has focused on military and intelligence cooperation, e.g. by sending 1,700 US soldiers to Jordan. It also offered a total of $1 billion of financial and military assistance to the Kingdom in 2014. In both cases, support is meant to mitigate the negative impact of regional turmoil and ensure Jordan’s security.

**The Way Forward**

Against all odds, in the midst of a plethora of security threats from both inside and out, the Hashemite monarchy continues to thrive, which only boosts its strategic significance in the eyes of the international community. This does not mean, however, that the decision-makers in Amman can forever distance themselves from regional and domestic problems. While the challenges of the Syrian war and the Islamic State are of global interest, meaning Jordan does not have to deal with them alone, the pressing need to address socio-economic grievances of Jordanian society, especially those communities residing outside of Amman, cannot be ignored. For the time being, however, a convenient distraction from such pressing domestic issues in the form of external threats continues to monopolise the agenda to the detriment of ordinary Jordanians.

**Bibliography**


In its 67th year since independence, Israel has many reasons to look back with great satisfaction on major achievements at home and abroad. Yet the country has not reached a stage of stability either in ensuring long-term external border security or achieving internal harmony among its population. One of the comforting realities for Israel over the last few decades was that for better or worse the region had experienced very few changes. As it turns out, however, revolution and civil war were simmering under the surface. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring almost everything has been in a state of flux, posing new challenges to Israel, while some of the old challenges remain unresolved. Israel achieved a wide range of impressive political, economic and social accomplishments. However, its failure to ensure peaceful coexistence with its neighbours, a growing rift with the international community, especially its closest allies the United States and the EU, the country’s fragile democratic character and social coherence, growing economic disparity and prevailing corruption, pose enormous challenges ahead and threaten Israel's long-term well-being. Long before its inception, the country’s founding fathers harboured seemingly impossible aspirations, especially in a region which rejected the very Zionist idea of a Jewish state in the Middle East. They envisaged the formation of a Jewish, democratic, Western-style, prosperous welfare society within secure borders; a vision which seems under more scrutiny than ever.

The Domestic Scene

Israeli elections in March saw the return of Benjamin Netanyahu to the Prime Minister’s office for a fourth time. The March elections might not have produced decisive results – Israeli elections rarely do – but they positioned the Likud party in the best place to form a coalition. Gaining 30 seats, only a quarter of the total in the Israeli Knesset, the Likud party and its leader shoulder the excruciating task of forming a coalition with some incompatible partners. To shape such a coalition as both a functioning government and a reflection of the political agenda of the leading partner is an almost impossible task. Netanyahu’s relative success at the ballot box, despite very few achievements during his time as Prime Minister, was a result of his ‘never say die’ approach, politics of fear, which Netanyahu exploits to the maximum, and a not sufficiently appealing political alternative for Israeli voters.

The results of the elections represent a continuous fragmentation in Israeli society on a range of issues, including the peace process with the Palestinians, the Iranian nuclear programme, economic and social priorities, relations with minorities and the relationship between the State and religion, among others. Overall, these divisions created the perfect electoral environment for Netanyahu, which is high on rhetoric, inertia and political party manoeuvring, but low on the daring required to make strategic decisions. It also points to a fundamental weakness of the Israeli electoral system, which is unable to produce decisive results. Consequently, this results in dysfunctional coalition governments which are incapable of making far-reaching policies on the most critical of issues. It is a system which produces politicians rather than statesmen. While many blame the electoral system, one should not underestimate the divi-
sions and fragmentation that these election results epitomise in Israeli society.

**CHART 7** 2015 Israeli Election Results (Seats)

The Peace Process

US Secretary of State John Kerry led nine months of intensive diplomatic efforts to bring peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, which ended in a stalemate at the end of April 2014. For all intents and purposes, no peace negotiations have resumed since then and the probability of a peaceful settlement of the conflict seems as remote as ever. There are basic disagreements on most core issues, including Jerusalem, resolving the plight of the Palestinian refugees, security arrangements, Jerusalem and the Israeli settlements. The Israeli government’s single most provocative policy, which casts severe doubts as to whether Israel is negotiate in good faith, is that of the constantly expanding settlements. 48 years after the occupation of the West Bank, more than 500,000 Jewish settlers are living in settlements across the West Bank; a fact which renders the prospect of a viable Palestinian state almost non-existent. A right-wing coalition in Israel will only exacerbate this situation beyond repair. Prime Minister Netanyahu argues that there is no Palestinian partner for peace, but few would doubt that the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is keen to sign a peace agreement. He might not be the most powerful of leaders, or easiest of partners, but he is a partner nevertheless. Last summer’s war in Gaza, demonstrated the consequences of a lack of peace, not to mention holding nearly two million people under siege. The division between the West Bank and Gaza makes the situation even more complex and difficult to resolve. Moreover, the Hamas government in Gaza is oppressive and thrives on the conflict with Israel. It also serves as an excuse for the Israeli government to avoid negotiating peace with the Palestinians. In the absence of peace and hope for the Palestinians, a third Palestinian intifada (uprising), is a realistic possibility. The preferred course of action for the Palestinians is to put Israel under international scrutiny and pressure. Returning to the Security Council and requesting recognition for a Palestinian state, referring Israeli politicians and military commanders to the ICC for war crimes and crimes against humanity, encouraging the BDS (Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions) and civil disobedience are all non-violent options for the Palestinians in order for the dream of an independent Palestinian state to remain a possibility. This might leave Israel internationally isolated and exposed.

The Iranian Nuclear Programme

Few can doubt that Israel’s foreign policy in 2015 is to a large extent dominated by its opposition to the Iranian nuclear programme and to any agreement negotiated and signed between the P5+1 and Iran. Since the late 1990s Israeli leaders have perceived and portrayed Iran, especially one with nuclear military capabilities, as an existential threat. The aim was to mobilise the international community to take tough measures against Iran in order to stop it from developing nuclear weapons. However, negotiations over the last 18 months have yielded an interim agreement and a framework for a long-term agreement which leaves Israel somewhat isolated internationally. It is hard to imagine any agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme that Israel and its Prime Minister would find acceptable. The Israeli elections are behind him, leaving him in a comfortable position to form a new coalition government with an even more hawkish outlook of international affairs than his previous one. Unlike his U-turns regarding some of his behaviour during the election campaign, he is not apologetic about his
stance on Iran and hardly seems bothered as to whether this stance will deepen his rift with the US administration and President Obama. The interim agreement and the framework for a final agreement include Iranian guarantees not to pursue nuclear military capability. However, Israel will continue to voice its opposition to the agreement insisting that the Iranians cannot be trusted and that the circumscribed 15-year commitment is too short. Netanyahu and his political allies in Israel perceive the agreement as a great victory for Iran, which will strengthen its position in the region, and hence threatens Israel’s existence. One would expect Netanyahu to continue his efforts to avert this agreement through the US Congress, where his main allies are calling for tightening sanctions against Iran instead of rapprochement with Tehran. The military option against Iranian nuclear installations has never been a realistic one, but if a final agreement is signed with Iran, a military attack on the country would be in bold defiance of the UN Security Council itself.

Economy and Society

Netanyahu’s governments since 2009 were able to shelve decisions on some of the most important and urgent matters, thanks to a growing economy, which rode the world’s economic storm almost unscathed. Nevertheless, Israel is a country of contradictions and its economy is no exception. What seemed, until quite recently, a very successful strategy to avoid the world recession has started to wobble. For a decade or more Israel managed to perform an economic miracle, but not without a social price. Israel became a member of the OECD in September 2010 on the basis “…that Israel’s scientific and technological policies have produced outstanding outcomes on a world scale.” The country has 4,000 active high-tech companies. More than 90 of these trade on the NASDAQ Stock Market and are valued at $40 billion, second only to China outside North America. Last year it ranked number one among OECD countries in expenditure on Research and Development as a percentage of GDP – at 4.2% – and ranked in the top 15 countries in the world in innovation. According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, the total exports of the ICT industry are estimated to be worth $16.1 billion a year, almost 21% of the country’s total value of exports in 2013. Experts argue that the Israeli society and economy are almost geared towards innovation and enterprise, as it had to respond quickly to waves of immigration in terms of job creation and the building of infrastructure.

Nevertheless, Israel’s strengths in economic growth are, alas, also its vulnerability. It is vulnerable to any change in international conditions, let alone its own domestic fragility. Nearly 60% of Israel’s exports go directly to Europe and the United States. Exports at 40% of the GDP, with a high proportion of high-tech goods such as electronics, pharmaceuticals, and military equipment, created a dependency on the recovery of world markets from the longest global recession in living memory, not to mention an almost complete dependency on being a major energy importer. These factors have political-diplomatic implications beyond the obvious economic ones, and also expose the country to external pressures on other issues.

Furthermore, despite the impressive macro figures, including a high level of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), many segments of Israeli society failed to enjoy the fruits of economic prosperity because this prosperity relied on a relatively narrow sector of the economy. In addition, very little policy and budgetary attention was paid to growing disparities and injustices coupled with low social mobility. Moreover,

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1 Accession: Estonia, Israel and Slovenia invited to join OECD, www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/accessionestoniaisraelslovenianvtedtojoinedoc.htm


6 The discovery of two major gas fields, first Tamar 50 miles off the Israeli coast with an estimated 8.3 trillion cubic feet of gas, and then a year later the discovery of Leviathan next to Tamar with an estimated 16 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, has the potential of transforming Israel into a net energy exporter.
constant neglect of the lower-middle and middle classes, which carry most of the social economic burden in terms of generating wealth, taxation and military service, bred malaise. Recent figures show that a fifth of Israelis live below the poverty line, more than double the figure for OECD countries (11.1%). Israel’s poverty levels are only surpassed by Chile, Mexico, the United States and Turkey. Those most affected by poverty are the ultra-Orthodox Jews and the Arabs. In 2013, one in three children lived in poverty, and the inequality in income distribution was the fifth worst in the Western world. The Gini index for Israel, which measures income inequality, stands at 39.2 (compared to an average among OECD countries of 31.0). For a country mired by so many external and domestic challenges and consequently in particular need of a cohesive society, these figures are alarming.

In Conclusion

The March election results spelled continuity rather than change for the foreseeable future. Though the makeup of the new Israeli Knesset does not suggest that it is veering to the right, the power configuration in the Parliament leaves most of the power in the hands of Prime Minister Netanyahu and those who hold a more hawkish worldview. This could only lead to further stalemate in peace negotiations with the Palestinians, the expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank, the continuation of the Gaza blockade, and, as a consequence, the risk of a third intifada and international isolation. In the same vein, Israel’s outright rejection of any agreement with Iran on the latter’s nuclear programme, leaves the country in direct confrontation with the P5+1 and most of the international community. This might have a great impact on the country, considering the increase in voices calling for BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) against Israel and for the indictment of a number of politicians and military commanders for crimes against humanity and war crimes. The challenges at home are by no means any easier, especially in the wake of a highly divisive election campaign. Addressing social and economic injustices is paramount, not to mention the related issue of relations between state and religion, particularly with regard to taking urgent steps to ensure equality for Israel’s Arab minority. These international and domestic challenges require a stable, competent and inspirational government, which the elections seem not to have produced.

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8 Ibid.
Lebanon: a General Assessment of the Situation in the Country

Lebanon, as ever, lives a double existence. On the one hand it comprises a vibrant and liberal atmosphere, particularly in Beirut and some of the areas along the coast and in the mountains. The UN puts Lebanon comfortably in the ‘high development’ category; while Freedom House applauds Lebanon’s media environment for being among the ‘freest’ in the region. Lebanon’s plethora of festivals, book fairs and other cultural activities grow amidst hedonistic scenes in the fashionable neighbourhoods of Beirut.

On the other hand, parts of Lebanon teeter on the brink of a serious breakdown of order brought on by governmental negligence and the involvement of both major Lebanese political blocs in the Syrian war. Parliamentary elections were suspended two years ago and the country has no President. The number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has reached drastic levels, with little prospect of their return or their basic needs being met. The security situation in Lebanon has worsened especially along the Syrian border where jihadi groups have strengthened, but also in and around the Syrian-occupied Golan Heights, provoked by Israel. All this has had an extremely negative economic impact on most Lebanese families, with poverty and inequality growing: the ‘hedonistic scenes’ in Beirut’s fashionable districts are certainly not replicated elsewhere in Lebanon. Meanwhile, whether in times of conflict or stability, the financial elite in Lebanon continues to prosper while ensuring the failure of any meaningful reform that advances the public interest.

The Syrian War Consumes Lebanon

The war in Syria casts a shadow on nearly all sectors, social strata and regions of Lebanon. It is also the main source of national political conflict between the two main political blocs, ‘March 14’ (led by the Saudi-backed Future Party) and ‘March 8’ (primarily comprising the Iranian-backed Hezbollah and Michel Aoun, the leading Christian politician and head of the largest parliamentary bloc, the FPM). These blocs were formed following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri during the heyday of the ‘war on terror’ and the disastrous 2003 invasion of Iraq, the consequences of which continue to devastate the region. Syria withdrew its army (though not all of its influence) from Lebanon under pressure from the UN Security Council, which then passed a series of unprecedented activist resolutions before and after Israel’s brutal 2006 invasion of Lebanon. These resolutions stoked – and internationalised – internal divisions largely over the role of Hezbollah as a legitimate resistance movement that could retain its military structure in its struggle against Israeli aggression (Makdisi, 2011).

The relatively stable period – following Israel’s defeat in 2006 and subsequent international-sponsored Doha agreement in 2008 – ended when initial demonstrations for reform in Syria turned violent sparking civil and then regional war. March 14 leaders politically and materially supported Syrian rebels, and called for an intervention to overthrow the regime; while March 8 leaders called for a political resolution that would preserve stability and the status quo that favoured them in Syria. Hezbollah’s direct military intervention in key border battles helped turn the tide of war in favour of the Syrian regime, but exacerbated political and bitter sectarian conflict between March 14 and March 8.
supporters. This cleavage consumed all areas of Lebanese politics and society, including attitudes towards the refugees who settled in locations depending on their political and sectarian identities. As Syrian rebels radicalised religiously, even before the domination of ISIS and al-Nusra, moderate elements within March 14 (including most of the Christians) feared for minority groups. Many acknowledge that Hezbollah’s support of the Lebanese army during battles with jihadis explains how ISIS has not yet secured a foothold in northeastern Lebanon and perhaps beyond. In the south, Hezbollah has advanced plans to confront the increasing presence of jihadis who have tried to infiltrate from the Golan Heights with alleged Israeli support. Israel’s assassination of Hezbollah officers in the occupied Golan Heights was intended to stoke tensions and test Hezbollah’s capacity to fight two wars. Hezbollah’s response was swift and deadly as it executed an attack on an Israeli convoy in occupied Sheba’a farms. Hezbollah views the conflict with ISIS and al-Nusra as an existential one; a zero-sum game in both military and sectarian terms. It has linked them with Israel as part of a broader Western and Saudi-backed coalition bent on destroying the resistance axis that includes Iran. March 14, for its part, sees the defeat of the Syrian regime as crucial to the weakening of Hezbollah (and Iran) and spread of Saudi influence in the region. All eyes are now focused on what appears to be a seminal battle in the border areas of Qalamoun.

The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: Despair and Increasing Intolerance amidst the Failure of the International Community

There are now about 1.5 million Syrian refugees – mostly women and children – registered with the UN in Lebanon (and many more reside informally), a quarter to a third of the population. This is in addition to the 300,000 Palestinian refugees who have been awaiting the fulfilment of their right of return to Palestine since their forced expulsion in 1948. Indeed, Lebanon now has the highest per capita concentration of refugees in the world, with the UN describing the country’s hosting of these refugees as a display of “extraordinary generosity” (UNHCR, 2015, p.2). However, given that these refugees are scattered across nearly 2,000 Lebanese localities, putting the already poor infrastructure and public services under severe strain, it is unsurprising that tensions in the largely poor host communities have steadily grown, consequently raising security concerns. From the start, Lebanon rejected international requests to set up refugee camps, but more generally there was no coherent government strategy until 2014 when it moved to restrict the entry of refugees to “exceptional humanitarian cases” as their condition worsened – some 70% cannot meet their daily minimum daily food requirement – and Lebanese intolerance grew (UNHCR, 2015, p. 3).

Hezbollah’s direct military intervention in key border battles helped turn the tide of war in favour of the Syrian regime, but exacerbated political and bitter sectarian conflict between March 14 and March 8 supporters

The international community has predictably failed to support these refugees over the past three years with the requisite funding demanded by the UN (so far contributing only 18% of the $1.5 billion requested for 2015). UNRWA, the agency that provides services and social support for the Palestinian refugees, has suffered perennially in terms of donor support.

Lebanon’s Failing State Institutions and Economy

This combination of internal deadlock and external threats has led to official political paralysis. There has been no President since Michel Suleiman’s term ended on May 25, 2014. The Parliament first failed to secure the required two-thirds majority for any candidate, and subsequently MPs from key political parties deliberately denied quorum. The President is the most senior symbol of (Maronite) Christian power, which has dwindled considerably since the end of the Lebanese civil war in 1991. Backed by his ‘March 8’ allies, General Michel Aoun is the most prominent, and controversial, candidate, whose election would represent a shift towards a more as-
assertive ‘Christian’ voice that, he asserts, would re-store a sectarian power balance and national reform. ‘March 14’ and ‘March 8’ parties remain in dialogue to resolve this standoff, but they await regional patrons’ blessings.

Meanwhile, citing “extraordinary security circumstances” the Lebanese Parliament has, since June 2013, extended its term twice through dubious constitutional mechanisms. During the first extension, the Constitutional Council, Lebanon’s highest legal authority, failed to achieve quorum as three judges deliberately stayed at home. During the second extension, the Council rejected a challenge filed by Aoun’s FPM, arguing that its priority was to prevent further power vacuums in state institutions. A wide range of civil society groups vociferously protested this ruling claiming the Parliament as ‘ours,’ and some calling the MPs ‘occupiers.’ It goes without saying that during such official state paralysis most policy issues have been neglected or shelved despite deteriorating socio-economic and environmental conditions.

The common census among the Lebanese is that this political vacuum is the result of the regional wars and rivalry between Lebanon’s main patrons – Saudi Arabia/USA/France and Iran/Syria – and the endemic dysfunction and corruption of the Lebanese political system. Cynicism is rife, and disdain for public officials is higher than ever.

**Lebanon’s Economy Is also Failing as Inequality Grows**

Lebanon’s economy has been in a ‘downturn’ since 2011, while public debt has been on an ‘upward trajectory’ since 2012 and remains one of the highest in the world as a share of GDP (an incredible 134%). All this while the Central Bank’s gross reserves are quite ‘comfortable’ and credit provided to the private sector relatively high (IMF, 2014, p. 4-5 and 8-10). Poverty and unemployment in Lebanon is increasing, with a third of the population near or below the national poverty line. The World Bank estimates that only one job was generated for every six new entrants into the labour market (even before the Syrian war), with conservative official unemployment figures now at 11% in total, over 33% for youth aged 15-24, and around 50% employed in the low-wage informal sector (IMF, 2014, p. 6).

Meanwhile, the provision of basic state services such as the regular electricity, clean water, telecommunications and the internet, have worsened considerably; environmental degradation and theft of public resources continue unchecked. Income and wealth disparities continue to grow under regressive tax systems that favour the rich. Despite a huge public debt, Lebanon’s revenue from tax from GDP remains around 15%. With an estimated tax evasion rate of 70% (particularly among the wealthy) the majority of taxation (that contributes 72% of total state revenues) comes in the form of indirect taxes that burden the poor, while citizens feel no return on these taxes in terms of services (Jaber and Rihani, p. 17-20).

**Energy Crisis as the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Promise Recedes**

Like other public services, the crisis in Lebanon’s energy sector – a main source of income for the State – has become worse as political deadlock has resulted in the shelving of reform policies and the influx of Syrian refugees has increased overall energy needs. Lebanon remains almost entirely dependent (97%) on oil imports to fulfil its energy needs, costing the Lebanese taxpayers around $4 billion annually. Plans to invest in a very old power infrastructure and power plants so as to carry out the transition to natural gas imports via the Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP) have failed to materialise. Meanwhile the huge surge in energy demand far outstrips supply, resulting in daily power blackouts ranging from three hours (in affluent parts of Beirut) to over 13 hours (in the poorer areas of the south, Beqa’a, and north), with a powerful, politically-backed local ‘mafia’ of private generators filling this gap and profiting to the tune of billions of dollars.

In 2010, Lebanon discovered it had around 850 billion cubic metres of offshore recoverable natural gas in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) – comprising about 25% of the entire Levant Basin – as well as 660 million barrels of oil. Given Lebanon’s geographic comparative advantage, there was an initial enthusiasm and surge in policy debates over this potentially seminal discovery that could fundamentally change Lebanon’s economy. Lebanon quickly adopted the Offshore Petroleum Resources Law in
2010 to regulate the offshore gas and oil sector; and established the Lebanese Petroleum Administration (LPA) in 2012 to manage and supervise petroleum activities. Despite its politicisation, the LPA in 2013 passed a decree with guidelines including licensing applications that paved the path for a pre-qualification round that was considered highly successful as 50 international companies qualified.

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However, since then the domestic and regional political turmoil has stifled progress as two key decrees remain in limbo, one that delimits Lebanon’s territorial sea and EEZ and another that stipulates provisions of future Exploration and Production Agreements (Fattouh and El-Katiri). Civil society actors have consistently expressed serious concerns regarding the environmental impact and socioeconomic distribution of this public wealth. They were unhappy that the mandatory strategic environmental assessment conducted in 2012 was finalised in a hurried and hushed manner, using unreliable data and outside of a larger national sustainable development framework (Maalouf, 2014). There was further concern that the 2010 law, which places all earnings in a sovereign wealth fund to advance the public interest, was intentionally vague on specifics that would lead to this public wealth being mismanaged and distributed unequally.

Conclusion

Overall, the period from 2014 to the first part of 2015 has been tough for the majority of Lebanese in socioeconomic and security terms, though the latter thankfully remains relatively stable. With the war in Syria raging, corruption high and the public interest ignored, the prospect of reaching political consensus on social, economic or energy policy to alleviate the plight of the poor and even middle classes is slim. The Syrian war and the presence of Syrian refugees on such a large scale have dramatically altered Lebanon in ways that have not yet been fully understood. This, however, does not fully explain the increasingly dire socioeconomic situation that most Lebanese face. While some key sectors such as tourism are clearly directly affected by the Syrian war, other policies such as the unfair tax system and corruption at the very highest levels, which have resulted in the unprecedented squandering of public resources and property, considerably pre-date the Syrian war. In truth, no political party or bloc appears to have any answers to Lebanon’s social problems let alone its political ones. Meanwhile, as ever in Lebanon, life goes on and even improves in the more prosperous areas.

Bibliography


Israel should stop its policy of lockdown, which cuts the Gaza Strip off from the rest of the world, and acknowledge that the inhabitants of Gaza are part of the Palestinian peoples, whose official leadership is attempting to establish a state next to Israel.

Editorial in the daily newspaper Haaretz, 26 December 2014.

From 8 July to 26 August 2014, Israel’s Protective Edge offensive literally devastated the Gaza Strip. Entire neighbourhoods of this Palestinian territory, inhabited by at least 1.8 million people, were reduced to rubble. The mediation of Cairo, which had proven effective in the preceding crisis in November 2012, was neutralised by the pro-Israeli stance taken by Field Marshal Abdul Fattah Al-Sisi. The new ruler of Egypt, appointed after an electoral farce in May 2014, effectively overthrew Mohammed Morsi, the first elected President in Egyptian history, with a background in the Muslim Brotherhood, in July 2013. Having ruled Hamas a terrorist movement, Al-Sisi then unleashed his hostility against Palestinian Islamists. Since then, the absence of an external moderator has granted free rein to the devastating logic of arms, above all during the twenty-day ground invasion of Gaza by Israeli tanks and commandos.

When the cease-fire finally arrived, the death toll was catastrophic: over 2,100 people killed in Gaza (among them nearly 500 children), the final number of victims being most certainly impossible to determine due to the quantity of human remains buried under the rubble of the bombings; over one hundred thousand Palestinians are homeless due to the total or partial destruction of some 18,000 houses. According to the UN, only 10% of the inhabitants of Gaza have guaranteed access to water 6 to 8 hours a day, while 75% only have access to water once every four days or less.

Israel cannot, however, claim more than a very relative ‘victory.’ Sixty-six soldiers died during this offensive, while Palestinian fire killed six Israeli civilians (and one Thai national). The Iron Dome system for intercepting Palestinian rockets thus demonstrated its vulnerability, even leading to the temporary suspension of flights to Tel-Aviv by several Western airlines. Hamas’ fire continued to strike deep into Israeli territory uninterruptedly until the cease-fire, and they continued throughout the conflict.

Israel can state that dozens of tunnels were destroyed, thus complicating possible Hamas infiltrations on their territory. But the very discovery of these complex infrastructures has disconcerted Israeli settlements bordering the Gaza Strip. Indeed, it only confirms the inanity of an exclusively military response to what is above all a political problem for Israel: Is the Israeli State ready to negotiate with Palestinian partners on equal footing and not in a relation of direct (before 2005 in Gaza) or indirect (since the 2005 ‘disengagement,’ itself the prelude to a series of devastating wars) occupation?

For a time, Israel believed it had found the optimal formula, from the viewpoint of security, for controlling the Gaza Strip from a distance after withdrawing both its soldiers and colonies in 2005. The occupation had but changed form, but the Tsahal (Israeli Military) was freed of the constraints of constant ground presence, although frequent incursions were necessary to deteriorate Palestinian networks.
These offensives could expand into major operations, such as **Operation Cast Lead** in December 2008 (with ground intervention), or **Operation Pillar of Defence** in November 2012. Yet Israeli strategists were forced to admit their inability to stop the Palestinian rocket fire other than through a cease-fire, negotiated via the mediation of Egyptian military intelligence. And each round of hostilities saw Hamas launching even longer-range missiles, now capable of hitting Tel Aviv or Jerusalem.

The land blockade thus directly fosters an economy of tunnels oriented towards meeting the needs of the Gaza market.

Israel had committed the error of underestimating the adverse dynamic of the blockade, which has played into the hands of armed groups and their financial sponsors. The demand for consumer goods and construction material in the Gaza Strip cannot in fact be met by the paltry quantities admitted through Israeli checkpoints. The land blockade thus directly fosters an economy of tunnels oriented towards meeting the needs of the Gaza market.

In any case, these tunnels represent an investment too significant in digging and maintenance not to involve high value-added contraband. Hence arms and explosives trafficking has become the key to this underground economy. Moreover, the anaemia of Gaza’s trade, handicrafts and industry, the direct consequence of the blockade, inevitably steers unqualified youth towards militias, the leading ones being those of Hamas.

The blockade, far from undermining the Islamist movement, has consolidated its military wing, the al-Qassam Brigades, who have managed to expand their ranks and arsenal. With regard to the EU, it came to cover the salaries of thousands of Palestinian Authority civil servants in Gaza… on the express condition that they refuse to work for the Hamas administration.

By financing this mass technical unemployment, the EU has allowed the Islamist party to purge the Gaza civil service and only employ loyal agents.

It is thus imperative, in light of the calamitous outcome of **Protective Edge**, to learn from these seven years of blockade and war. Not only has this ruinous status quo not improved Israel’s security in the long term, but it has also plunged the population of Gaza into permanent insecurity, without weakening Hamas’ stranglehold on the territory.

The Israeli-Palestinian cease-fire of 26 August 2014 is based on reciprocal concessions: Israel has committed to easing up its pressure on the Gaza Strip, in particular by extending the fishing zone to 6 nautical miles and reducing the width of its buffer zone along the border, where it prohibits all movement inside the Gaza Strip, from 300 to 100 metres; Hamas has agreed to transfer Gaza's border crossing points with Israel and Egypt to the Palestinian Authority. After fifty days of conflict, Israel had not attained any of the ambitious goals established for **Protective Edge**. It is therefore time to accept that the Gaza Strip is an integral part of a Palestine committed to achieving a sovereign and independent state. Only such a state will be able to ensure the peace that Israel legitimately demands.

Egypt is incapable of assuming such a mission to the benefit of Israel in Gaza; one could even fear that Field Marshal Sisi would like to leave this conflict open to ensure his own strategic revenue from the United States.

The Palestinian Authority aims to resettle in the Gaza Strip, based on the agreement concluded between the PLO and Hamas in April 2014. Hamas mandated its Palestinian partners to negotiate on their behalf with Israel, a delegation process that is also valid for other third parties. Such a system has inevitably led to great tension, including anti-Fatah attacks in Gaza, but there is no other alternative to direct dialogue with Hamas, an unavoidable actor in Gaza.

This mediation is essential for allowing the EU to resume its control task at the Gaza borders as established in the Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA), concluded on the day after Israel withdrew its forces in 2005. Israel will never agree to loosen its grip on the Palestinian Territory without reliable international guarantees.

This is an incomparably more exhilarating mission for the EU than the depressing reconstruction of the area left in ruins by the most recent Israeli offensive. This is where the EU-28 will find the substance for authentic contribution towards peace in the Middle East. The establishment of a sea route between Cyprus and the Palestinian Territory under EU surveillance is even conceivable.
President Sisi, who demonstrated his reluctance to negotiate a cease-fire in the summer of 2014, returned to the forefront through the donor conference for the reconstruction of Gaza held in Cairo the following October. Egypt has accepted the official co-presidency of Norway, more favourable than the former towards Hamas, but it directs the work with an iron fist. Al-Sisi even presented the non-invitation of Israel as a demonstration of nationalist ‘firmness,’ whereas the aim was to spare the Hebrew State’s having to pay compensation, at least symbolically, for the destruction for which it bears direct responsibility.

The anaemia of Gaza’s trade, handicrafts and industry, the direct consequence of the blockade, inevitably steers unqualified youth towards militias, the leading ones being those of Hamas

The devastation inflicted on the Gaza Strip by Protective Edge is estimated at three to four times the damage of Operation Cast Lead five and a half years earlier. Donors have committed to paying 5.4 billion dollars (half of which allocated to the reconstruction of Gaza and the other to the Palestinian Authority’s budget). Qatar by far takes the prize for generosity, pledging a billion-dollar donation (the EU follows, with 570 million). But these funds will be wasted if a political process including Gaza is not relaunched. This is, moreover, what both Americans and Europeans are calling for in unison, pressing Israel and the Palestinian Authority to renew the dialogue interrupted in April 2014.

Today, the Gaza Strip remains subject to double isolation, cut off by Israel from the rest of Palestine, and cut off by Egypt from the rest of the Arab world. The vicious circle of wars of the past few years demonstrates that the blockade imposed on the 1.8 million women and men of the Gaza Strip is not only morally unjustifiable, it is also strategically inept. This potential for recurrent crises must be defused by lifting the siege of Gaza. Resolute European intervention is all the more urgent since Egypt has engaged in a new escalation on its side of the border to render the siege of the Palestinian Territory even more airtight. Launched in November 2014, what the al-Sisi regime is doing is in fact an operation to genuinely, physically eliminate the Egyptian part of the border city of Rafah. The fate of dozens of thousands of Egyptian civilians is beyond the scope of this article, but it does sadly illustrate to what point the refusal to deal with the roots of the Gaza crisis cannot but weigh heavily upon the future of the border populations in both Egypt and Israel.

It was in 1906 that the Ottoman and British Empires deliberately established the border separating Palestine and Egypt, then under their respective authorities, right through the middle of the city of Rafah. The aim then was to control the fluidity of contacts between Arab populations that were often related. The adverse effects of the Camp David Israeli-Egyptian peace accords, concluded in 1979 at the expense of Palestinian rights, were symbolised three years later by the establishment of a fortified border through the heart of the Rafah urban area, thereafter separating the Egyptian Sinai from the Palestinian Gaza Strip.

The West’s mantra for the renewal of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process seems ludicrous after the electoral success of Benjamin Netanyahu, who won the legislative elections of 17 March 2015 after basing his campaign on the rejection of the very principle of a Palestinian state. The European Union must necessarily move to have the siege of the Gaza Strip lifted, if only to finally allow a reconstruction worthy of the name. Otherwise, the next war that will sooner or later be waged against Gaza due to the militaristic blindness of both Netanyahu and al-Sisi will have repercussions well beyond the unfortunate Palestinian Territory.

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All Eyes on the Islamic State?
Repercussions of the Fight against Jihadists on War-Torn Syria

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Since autumn 2014 the United States has largely focused on building an international coalition with the aim of degrading and destroying the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, after the group’s well-mediated advance in Iraq and the declaration of a caliphate in June 2014. Yet, this coalition of some 60 states has not had a shared approach when it comes to addressing the civil war, ending the bloodshed and achieving sustainable stabilisation in Syria. At the same time, in the spring of 2015, the efforts of the UN Syrian envoy Staffan de Mistura at achieving a ‘freeze’ (or limited) ceasefire in Aleppo – and thus the attempt at launching a stabilisation process from the local level – have run aground. Regional powers have kept fanning the military confrontations between the Syrian regime and different rebel formations. In sum, the international shift of attention away from Syria to Iraq, the tacit cooperation with Iran in the anti-IS campaign in northern Iraq, as well as the weakening efforts to support the emergence of a credible alternative to the Assad regime have meant that a political solution to, or even a containment of, Syria’s civil war has become ever more elusive.

The International Coalition against the So-Called Islamic State

Already the coalition’s definition of the main threat is problematic in view of understanding current dynamics as well as with regards to achieving sustainable stabilisation in Syria. While the coalition has depicted the Islamic State (IS, or ISIL in UN parlance) as a threat to the national security of coalition partners as well as to regional stability and international security,1 IS should rather be seen as a product of the civil wars and the degradation of state structures in the region. It is thus just one of the many symptoms of the region’s conflicts rather than their source. And it is these conflicts that constitute a threat to regional stability and international security as they continue to attract foreign fighters, generate refugees, lead to the spilling over of fighting across borders and foster a sectarian reading of conflicts and geopolitical struggles. This implies that reducing the international approach to fighting one of the symptoms as manifested in IS will hardly reduce the threat to regional and international security either significantly or sustainably.

This problem has been compounded as, beyond the fight against the IS, there has not been a common approach among coalition partners to dealing with the conflict in Syria. While the US has made Iraq a priority, Turkey and important Arab partners in the coalition prefer to focus on Syria. And while for Western governments, regime change in Syria is no longer (if it ever was) a priority, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have maintained their goal of regime change and supported radical rebels’ military advances in northern Syria. A further complication has arisen from Iran’s becoming an important, albeit tacit partner in the coalition’s efforts in Iraq. While indirect cooperation with Iran, which has trained, advised and led Shiite militias in the fight against IS, has been important in pushing back the jihadists there,

the Iranian presence on the ground is seen as a potential threat to US troops and has limited the US’ room for manoeuvre, not only in Iraq but also in Syria. The fight against IS in Syria has also been hampered because the coalition has not been able to rely on local ground forces, as it has done in Iraq. Though the US has started a programme to train, assist, and equip some 15,000 so-called moderate rebels over a period of three years, that approach might well be too little too late to make a decisive difference. Already, over the last few months, moderate rebel formations have been crumbling under the force of jihadists.

While indirect cooperation with Iran, which has trained, advised and led Shiite militias in the fight against IS, has been important in pushing back the jihadists there, the Iranian presence on the ground has limited the US’ room for manoeuvre, not only in Iraq but also in Syria.

Moreover, the coalition has been sharing Syria’s air space with the Assad regime and coordinated its air strikes with it. This tacit collaboration has had the side-effect of delegitimising the coalition’s aerial attacks in the eyes of many Syrians who have been suffering under the regime’s shelling. It has also weakened the moderate rebels allied with the US, and indirectly helped the Assad regime by allowing it to concentrate its forces on strategic locations and to target the moderate rebels. As another unintended consequence, the Assad regime is slowly being rehabilitated internationally as an unavoidable partner in the fight against IS – with the regime’s narrative ‘either us or terrorism’ making headway as the paradigm through which the conflict in Syria is perceived.

On the ground, while IS has clearly been put on the defensive in Iraq, that has not been the case in Syria, although it is true that there too IS resources have been diminished considerably through coalition attacks on oil fields and infrastructure. Also, IS supply lines between Syria and Iraq have been partly destroyed and command and control capacities have been decimated, as have some of the training bases. A major success has been to push IS out of the Kurdish town of Kobane – though in a lengthy campaign, partially undermined by Turkey, and at the cost of the town being completely flattened. At the same time, IS advances in other parts of the country have not been stopped, and the group has proven very swift and able in adapting its tactics and methods under pressure. And even though there seems to be a degree of infighting as a consequence, IS has continued to successfully recruit personnel, internationally and from other rebel groups.

A Divided Country with Dynamic Front Lines

As a result of the continued fighting, Syria has become ever more fragmented. In the spring of 2015, the country is divided into at least four areas under the control of different forces. The regime and its allies (mainly in the form of Hezbollah and local sectarian militias) control around a third of Syrian territory, including central Damascus, the larger parts of all provincial cities (except for Raqqa and Idlib), the centre of the country, as well as what is usually called the Alawite heartland, i.e. the coastal towns of Tartous and Latakia and their mountainous hinterland. IS controls the east and parts of the north of the country, mainly along the Euphrates valley and the border with Turkey. Since the liberation of Kobane from an IS onslaught with international air and Kurdish Peshmerga ground support in January 2015, the Syrian PKK affiliate Democratic Union Party (PYD) (again) controls the three main Kurdish towns in Syria’s north. But it does not have full control over the whole of the three cantons in which at the beginning of 2014 it had declared the Kurdish self-administration of Rojava (West Kurdistan). A broad array of armed groups, including Free Syrian Army (FSA) affiliated rebels, IS and the Nusra Front is present in the north and the south of the country, with little coordination between FSA-affiliated rebels in the two regions.

None of these areas is contiguous and, except for those zones controlled by the PYD and IS, there is little central control and command. That is also true in the areas dominated by the regime, as the latter has had to rely on Hezbollah and the militias of the so-called Syrian resistance. The rebel-held areas, in particular, resemble a dynamic assemblage of warlords’ fiefdoms with constantly shifting alliances and mergers between different rebel groups, mainly motivated by local priorities and the availability of resources, much less by ideological affinities.

The rebel-held areas, in particular, resemble a dynamic assemblage of warlords’ fiefdoms with constantly shifting alliances and mergers between different rebel groups, mainly motivated by local priorities and the availability of resources, much less by ideological affinities.

Also, while the general division between the areas under control of the regime, the rebels and the PYD has stabilised over the last year, the frontlines and major cities have been strongly contested and embattled, not only between rebels and the regime but also between different rebel formations. In the spring of 2015, two trends are noteworthy. Firstly, regime forces have been weakening, and the regime has had to rely ever more on Hezbollah and sectarian militias rather than the regular army. As a result, fighting led to the regime losing control over Idlib, the second of the provincial towns after Raqqa, to an alliance of radical fighters including the Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham in March 2015. At the same time, regime forces and their allies (unsuccessfully) attempted to reconquer territory previously lost to rebels in the southwest – close to the Golan Heights and the Jordanian border – and to tighten the siege around Aleppo. Second, infighting between different rebel groups was decided by jihadist forces and led to a further weakening of moderate rebels. In early April 2015, IS moved into the Palestinian refugee camp of Yarmouk less than 10 kilometres from the centre of Damascus. Moderate rebels connected to the FSA had already been squeezed out of Idlib province by an advance of the Nusra Front, resulting in, among other things, the dissolution of one of the groups that the US had trained and equipped, i.e. the Hazm Movement. Indeed, increased fragmentation and loss (or absence) of political control over parts of the regime and opposition forces will make negotiations over a political settlement ever more difficult, and implementation of agreements next to impossible.

**Humanitarian Implications**

It has, above all, been the Syrian civilian population that has suffered the consequences of the continued armed fighting. Syrians have been affected by air and ground attacks, first and foremost by regime forces in the form of rather primitive ‘barrel bombs’ and chemical substances and by sieges on rebel-held areas that have led to the resurgence of malnutrition, starvation, and maladies thought to be eradicated. They have also suffered detentions, torture and killings by the regime as well as changing warlords imposing their rules, taxes and morals – with IS, albeit a particularly brutal force, only one of many such rulers. And they have been forced into displacement and flight.

As a consequence, at the beginning of April 2015, some 220,000 Syrians are estimated by the UN to have been killed in the violence. Some 3.9 million Syrians are registered as refugees, with most of them residing in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq. More than 7.6 million Syrians are internally displaced. Some 12.2 million, i.e. around 67% of the Syrian population of 18.2 million, are in need of humanitarian assistance. Yet, around 4.8 million reside in hard-to-reach areas, i.e. localities under siege by regime or rebel forces or difficult to access due to restrictions or fighting, so that they cannot receive

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3 For a detailed account of recent developments on the ground see also Oweis, Khaled Yacoub. “Sieges and Ceasefires in Syria’s civil war.” SWP Comments, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2015.

the help they need.\(^5\) In this regard, while some progress has been achieved with regards to the delivery of humanitarian aid across borders since Security Council resolution 2139 in February 2014 and 2165 in July 2014, there has been very little improvement with regards to aid across front lines.\(^6\)

**Where to Go from Here?**

The fight against IS cannot be successful in Syria as long as the terror exercised by the regime and its allies – they have been responsible for some 95% of civilian deaths in Syria\(^7\) – is not tackled at the same time, and as long as there is no credible and effective alternative to the regime on the one hand and jihadists forces on the other. Only when these conditions are fulfilled is there a chance for the struggle against IS to be embraced by the mainstream rebels as well as the larger population.

Therefore, four elements seem to be key not only to fight IS effectively but also to work towards achieving a sustained stabilisation of Syria: 1) **Supporting a credible and viable alternative to the regime and the jihadists.** Indeed, in early 2014 an opposition government, the Syrian Interim Government (SIG), started to work from the Turkish city of Gaziantep with the task of providing services in areas outside Assad’s control. Yet, while the SIG, with the help of an array of international partners, has evolved into quite an effective service provider over the year 2014, it is now about to collapse as it no longer receives any core funding. Such a collapse would spell the end of a tangible alternative to regime and jihadist rule in Syria. 2) **Protecting the population by imposing a no-fly zone over Syria (except for fighting against IS)** so as to shield civilians at least from air attacks. 3) **Considerably increasing humanitarian aid** with a special view to hard-to-reach areas as well as long-term development support for refugees to provide livelihoods and prospects for Syrians who have had to flee the country and prevent radicalisation. 4) **Exploring anew regional and international opportunities for a political settlement based on the 2012 Geneva principles,** in particular in light of a new Saudi leadership and a possible nuclear deal with Iran.


The Linkages between Domestic and Foreign Policy

The year 2014 was dominated by domestic political concerns and presented yet another example of the linkages between domestic and foreign policy in Turkey. On the one hand, the evolution of Turkey’s political scene had a bearing on its foreign policy, while on the other, foreign policy issues were used in the country’s domestic politics.

The year was marked by two elections. Local elections were held on 30 March and presidential elections followed on 28 August. Particularly after the election of former Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as President, the domestic political debate began to focus on a shift from the parliamentary system to a presidential one and thus on the upcoming general elections to be held in June 2015, as the AKP needs a three-fifths majority of the 330 seats in the Parliament to pass a draft proposal on constitutional change. These developments meant that Turkey’s policy makers directed their attention mainly to domestic politics and the elections and the debate over the system sharpened the existing polarisation. In 2014, the accusations of increasing authoritarianism and personalisation under AKP rule, in power since 2002, continued unabated in the country and abroad. The direct impact of the personalisation of rule was particularly evident with respect to two foreign policy issues, namely the normalisation of relations with Egypt and Israel, where any efforts to progress in that direction were halted by Erdogan’s vocal opposition.

At the end of 2013 the country was shaken by corruption allegations against government officials, including three ministers, which led to a criminal investigation. The response of the government was widespread reassignments and dismissals of police officers, judges and prosecutors, which increased concerns over judiciary independence and the separation of powers. All this brought the tug of war between AKP and the Gülen movement, which had been ongoing for some time, to a head, as Er-
dogan and the AKP accused the movement and its followers of being behind what they termed as an “attempted coup” against the government. An extensive bureaucratic purge was initiated against what the AKP government called “the parallel state.” The extent and the intensity of the all-out war between the two former allies had several repercussions for foreign policy such as losing the support of the Gülen movement abroad which has an extensive global network. Yet the most enduring consequence of this crisis has been the strengthening of the belief held by Prime Minister Erdogan and some of his supporters that a coalition of internal and external actors is conspiring to topple him; a belief he also expressed during the Gezi protests in the summer of 2013. This conspiracy perspective was reflected in Turkey’s foreign policy as it made the government more inward-looking and suspicious of Turkey’s allies, including the US and some EU governments, which were at times openly accused of being part of the “plot against the government” in cooperation with their domestic allies. It can be claimed that this mindset was quite influential in the way the AKP government framed the coup in Egypt. Clearly upset by losing in Egypt a strategic ally with Morsi’s ousting, the AKP also used the coup as a metaphor at home to once again discredit Gezi park protests and other government opposition by invoking themes of victimisation through the claim of a plot to topple the government in Turkey. Thus, Erdogan in all his public speeches and rallies made extensive references to the Egyptian coup and clearly used it for domestic purposes.

The Kurdish Issue at the Nexus of Domestic and Foreign Policy

Yet the quintessential issue that epitomised the domestic and foreign policy linkages continued to be the Kurdish problem. The issue had always had a regional dimension, which was kept in check by the Cold War. In the post-Cold War and Gulf War period, however, it was further complicated by rapid regionalisation. There have been several attempts since then to acknowledge the issue and propose solutions, but these have been half-hearted. The AKP government went farthest in this regard, despite the fact that it too did not completely depart from the on-and-off approach. The AKP initiated what was called the “Kurdish opening” in 2009 to find a solution to the ongoing Kurdish conflict. The process went through several stages, characterised by several achievements and reached new levels when, in 2012, Erdogan allowed state officials to negotiate with the jailed leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan. In March 2013, Ocalan’s letter to the people, which called for an end to the armed struggle, was read both in Turkish and Kurdish during the Nowruz celebrations in Diyarbakir.

Erdogan in all his public speeches and rallies made extensive references to the Egyptian coup and clearly used it for domestic purposes

However, in 2014 the peace process was made more complicated by the developments in Syria. On the one hand, the PYD, a close associate of the PKK, increased its control over the Kurdish-populated areas of Syria, where central government had withdrawn, creating uneasiness on the part of the AKP government and bringing fresh urgency to the issue. On the other hand, the new opportunities presented by the post-Arab uprising developments in Syria triggered an eagerness in the PKK to exploit those opportunities and strengthen its hand vis-a-vis the AKP government in its negotiations. Towards the end of the year, the crisis over Kobane, a Syrian Kurdish town on the border with Turkey, best represented the ambiguous attitude of the AKP government, as well as the PKK’s opportunistic moves. The government’s reluctance to help Kobane, especially by allowing fighters to cross the border, led to a two-day rampage by supporters of the Kurdish parties in Turkey, the HDP and PKK, in several cities, thereby endangering the peace process. In the meantime, the PYD effectively became the most prominent force fighting ISIL on the ground. The US started to drop arms, ammunition and medical supplies on Kobane and, together with its allies, began to bomb ISIL positions. These developments, together with mounting international pressures, led Turkey to allow Kurdish peshmerga from
Iraq to cross through Turkey to Kobane. Thus, the AKP government had to accept what it had refused at the beginning, although the damage had already been done.

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The Middle East Impasse: Old and New Challenges

In 2014, the developments in the Middle East took over foreign policy agenda, which, however, was unable to abate the erosion of Turkey’s influence in the region. The AKP government’s conflict with Israel, Syria and Egypt remained in place. As an International Crisis Report put it in 2014 “the humanitarian, policy and security costs” of the Syrian crisis continued to rise. With the number of Syrians living in Turkey reaching approximately two million, Turkey was facing a major challenge. More importantly, it remained unable to change the situation on the ground in Syria and became increasingly disillusioned about decisive action being taken by anybody else. The only positive sign in terms of Turkey’s relations with its Middle Eastern neighbours, which emerged towards the end of the year, was the improvement in relations with Iraq’s central government after Haidar al-Abadi took office in September, and the signing of the agreement between the KRG (Kurdish regional Government) and the central government over oil exports.

Recent developments in Iraq and Syria with the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the establishment of the so-called Islamic State (IS) have opened up another set of new challenges for Turkey. The rapid advances of ISIL threatened the territorial integrity of Turkey’s two southern neighbours and thus challenged Turkey’s long-standing policy. These developments also increased pressures on Turkey to join the US-led anti-ISIL coalition. In the meantime, ISIL seized many parts of northern Syria and became Turkey’s neighbour. Moreover, ISIL seized the Turkish consulate in Mosul upon entering, kidnapping the consul along with 49 staff members and holding them hostage for 102 days. This new instability in Iraq has almost completely undermined Turkey’s trade with central and southern Iraq. Only after the release of the hostages in October 2014, did the Turkish Parliament adopt a resolution to authorise the military to carry out operations in Syria and Iraq and allow foreign troops to operate out of Turkish bases. Similarly, Turkey seemed to at least intensify its crackdown on cross-border oil trade or human trespassing. However, Turkey has been continually criticised for not doing enough against ISIL as the AKP government has maintained its reluctance to join the anti-ISIL coalition and get involved directly.

Finally, Turkey’s relations with Iran began to deteriorate due to the developments in Syria and Iraq. This was a complete turnaround from the beginning of the year when Erdogan visited Iran and the two countries signed a strategic cooperation treaty. Despite their divergent positions on Syria the two countries had decided to isolate their bilateral relations from the negative effects of the Syrian crisis. Yet the rise of ISIL and the formation of the US-led coalition against it altered the balances once again. Iran’s active collaboration in the fight against ISIL and Turkey’s reluctance led to a deterioration in bilateral relations between the two countries.

Uneasy Relations with Global Powers

In 2014, Turkey’s relations with the US also faced challenges. The AKP government first perceived US involvement in the region against ISIL as an opportunity to negotiate with the US to extend its fight to topple the Assad regime. A central demand of the Turkish government in this regard has been to ask the US to establish a no-fly-zone over Syria in return for allowing the US and the coalition to use the Incirlik air base for manned flights and for Turkey to join the coalition directly. Yet, the Obama administration clearly did not want to expand its war in Syria to include the regime, but
rather limit it to fighting against ISIL. The only US cooperation with Turkey was the signing of an agreement to train what was called “moderate opposition” in Syria. The two countries, however, had difficulties in developing a common strategy against ISIL.

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Relations with Russia, already strained to some extent due to the Syrian crisis, faced a new challenge with the crisis over the Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea. Yet, the two countries did not allow these divergences to poison their otherwise beneficial relations. During his visit to Turkey in December, Putin announced a new gas pipeline, Turkish Stream, instead of the South Stream, citing EU objections as the reason for the move. Furthermore, despite calls by the EU to support the sanctions against Russia, Ankara and Moscow pledged to increase economic ties. These developments further widened the gap between Turkey and the EU at a time when not much was happening in their relations.

Conclusion

2014 was a year of increasing challenges for Turkey’s foreign policy. Mostly consumed by domestic issues, the AKP government responded to some of these challenges pragmatically, whereas adopted non-flexible positions on others. The decisions seem to be based on cost-benefit calculation, taking into consideration not only Turkey’s regional and international interests but also the government’s domestic goals.

Reference

The old adage that a single death is a tragedy, multiple deaths merely a statistic has never rung more true than in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region today. Faced with mounting human rights abuses of all kinds, keeping track of the death toll in the conflicts in Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen has become a fleeting preoccupation of Western media and public policy debates where only four years ago the twists and turns of the ‘Arab Spring’ were charted in detail. The Arab world’s past and ongoing abuses were then highlighted in detail in Western, above all European, policy formulations seeking to engender a new politics of inclusion and participation for the region. Now, the focus of Western policy establishments has fragmented between a number of competing crises. At the time of writing, these included UN-sponsored negotiating processes among competing political actors with limited impact on the ground (Libya), maintaining a broad international coalition to combat ISIS (Iraq and Syria) and political support for a regional military mission led by Saudi Arabia and the GCC in Yemen.

In none of these situations is countering the overall death toll in the region or strengthening human security directly addressed or even close to the centre of the policy debate. Syria, still under the rule of Bashar al-Assad, is in the ‘too difficult to fix’ box because of the regionalised conflict that many foresaw the transnational violence in Syria would become: ISIS effectively now controls the whole of the Iraqi-Syrian border linking its territorial conquests, thus merging its putative state across northern Syria and Iraq; the Iraqi government, heavily reliant on Iranian rather than Western military assistance, is now less susceptible to US and EU pressures over safeguarding all of its citizens in the fight-back against ISIS; and Yemen, whose incipient steps towards political inclusion were cut short in 2014 by the takeover of key strategic areas by the northern Houthis, is likewise beyond any direct Western political influence. By relying on airpower alone, the GCC-Arab military mission to displace the Houthis now risks falling into exactly the same trap as Western powers lined up against ISIS.

The consequences of continuing to allow this situation to escape their collective control should be at the heart of policy reviews in Western capitals, above all in the European Union. The recent downplaying of the West’s ability to influence outcomes in the Middle East has attracted others, not just ISIS, to fill a policy void that stretches straight back into Europe. Europe itself spent the first half of 2015 agonising over the fate of Greece, within or beyond the eurozone.

Another old adage is that military campaigns never conclusively win anything without political processes to end them. For this, Europe and the US still have an armory of ‘soft power’ tools which it could, and should, be deploying more strategically and tactically. Instead of responding with blanket financial donations and propping up regional reform programmes that meet with internal elite resistance, the West needs to target its assistance in ways which explicitly address its own economic and political interests, as an internal, as well as external, policy response to the threat of mounting chaos in the Middle East.

In place of the currently defeatist attempts to mitigate and manage overspill effects, the key to European efforts lies in building up the capacities of local populations to resolve, manage and combat the conflicts in their midst, including on the front lines of...
the overspill effects of migration into Southern Europe. This means resetting the ‘prevent and deplore’ button of regional policy back towards the ‘enable and cure’ policy approaches side-lined since the rise of ISIS in 2014.

Most European governments, along with the US, will argue that they are already responding to regional demands for institution-building and the creation of economic resilience, including in states such as Tunisia which, until the major terrorist incidents of 2015, had successfully navigated the choppy waters of the ‘Arab Spring’ aftermath. But as an open letter addressed to President Obama by 60 close observers of Tunisia in May 2015 pointed out, the sums of money committed are paltry in comparison with the US’s hard security expenditure, and the balance between the two needs urgent re-evaluation. The US$134 million pledged by President Obama during the visit of Tunisian President Caid Essebsi to Washington is just 14% of what the US provides in assistance to Jordan, and a sixth of the annual US$800 million, the letter-writers argued, that the Tunisian reconstruction process actually needs1.

More directly than for the US, which will shortly be in the full throes of its next lengthy presidential campaign, the Middle East’s conflicts have already had profound consequences within European societies as well as beyond the EU’s southern borders. The overspill of violent extremism, migrant flows and asylum-seekers is already headline news, overwhelmingly addressed in terms of prevention rather than prompting a radical rethink of Europe’s collective approach to migration flows. Exploring the economic benefits of creating trans-regional employment opportunities on both sides of the Mediterranean is currently absent from this debate, where youth unemployment levels in southern Spain and Greece are officially higher than their North African equivalents. At the heart of the Mediterranean Basin, external EU policy cannot be excluded from domestic European social and economic policy needs. In early 2015, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, set out both long and short-term proposals for resettling Mediterranean refugees across a wider number of European states, but many EU members lag behind. The UK’s Prime Minister David Cameron, newly re-elected in May 2015, made restricting net migration to 100,000 entrants a year a central plank of his new mandate. His government also planned to cut funds to police forces tasked, along with other agencies, with tracking down an estimated 300,000 illegal migrants already in the UK, as well as refusing to accept new migrant allocations proposed by the EU.

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This sits uneasily with the essence of the European project, based, as is oft-repeated, on its core liberal values subject to the rule of law. In the face of immediate crises, short-term political expediency and catering to popular domestic concerns over uncontrolled migration is understandable. Yet, it also encourages others to take what ought to be promoted as universal values as a disposable and optional extra, as well as undermining them in Europe’s own multicultural societies. Even the West’s most solid allies in the Middle East, Israel and Egypt among them, have veered towards illiberal interpretations of their own political mandates in respect of the legal oversight of their actions and the status of minorities; amidst the mildest of international protests, Egyptian courts continue to pass death sentences, including on former President Morsi, after perfunctory trials.

This downgrading of universal values in Europe’s external relations is dangerous for any prospect of building the necessary apparatus for inclusion and consensus in Europe’s own backyard. It also does little to offer compelling alternatives with which to combat the rise of racism and ethno-religious divisions within Europe itself. The spread of liberal values is also now under the direct attack of those, like China and Russia, who are not in the business of promoting human rights and democracy. In the wake

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of the ‘Arab Spring,’ the aspiration to acquire both has not declined so much as the conditions to meet even minimal standards for the rule of law, where social and economic survival has become the overriding priority for many in the Middle East.

In this respect, the credibility of Western governments to enforce universal norms sanctioned 60 years ago at the United Nations is not just being undermined by the vetoes imposed by Russia and China as permanent members of the UN Security Council, but through the failure of European and North American leaders to find any traction for their defence in the fragmented Middle East policies their governments are pursuing.

It is now nearly 20 years since the European Commission and British government both sought to promote variants on a ‘human-rights-led’ foreign policy. Then, as now, this aspiration was dismissed as naïve and impractical when confronted by the realpolitik, hard security challenges and commercial realities of an increasingly volatile world. Yet, the alternatives have just as naïvely failed to promote and sustain the necessary conditions for the economies and values of the West to flourish. The West’s ‘soft power’ policy add-ons have been too reliant on the active cooperation of regional governments to meet the needs of the majority populations they ostensibly serve. As a result, the citizens of the Middle East continue to be seen as the passive victims of the chaos to have befallen them, rather than as critical players in re-dressing the failings of their own states.

By funding the direct needs of the Middle East’s growing refugee population, Western aid has clearly saved lives and staved off greater humanitarian crises. By failing to engage the largest of these populations, the Syrians, as actors in their own destiny, the West is also storing up the kind of intractable problems that generations of similarly assisted Palestinian refugees now represent. The majority of displaced people wish to live and work unencumbered by an open-ended reliance on external aid and hand-outs. Yet, unless Western governments perceive this ambition to be consonant with their own best interests, the ranks of illegal migrants penetrating Europe’s borders combined with violent acts fuelled by marginalisation and exclusion will, through contamination, ineluctably increase in the West itself.

Over the short-term, there may be nothing even the frontline states of Europe can constructively do to stem the immediate sources of violence in the Middle East. The promotion of democracy and the defence of human rights may well seem forlorn endeavours when millions of refugees need shelter and food, the onward march of ISIS has infiltrated to the core of European societies, and the precarious existence of peoples in the hinterland of the MENA region has added West and East Africans to the tide of Syrian refugees seeking an escape in Europe. Realpolitik suggests that the West’s best interests now lie in supporting and maintaining regional stability where it still exists.

The violence will eventually cease, as it did after civil wars lasting 15 years in Lebanon and 10 in Algeria from the mid-1970s to late 1990s. The West’s beleaguered defence of its values needs to prepare for this day by adjusting its realpolitik lenses to look at where the Middle East can be helped now, and in much more detailed and interlinked ways than hitherto. The money that few Western taxpayers want to see their governments spending on ill-fated military or migration-prevention ventures could be put to much better use in the hands of regional actors already seeking to prepare for their own future, often below the radar of current conflicts. This includes Syrians providing their own healthcare and educational facilities in war-torn Syria, beyond the reach of UN agencies, but accessible to Western funding via local NGOs; start-up businesses and professional networks seeking know-how and sector-specific assistance to overcome local blockages to funding and trade; students of all ages needing more creative solutions to their disrupted education; and refugees and vulnerable communities seeking alternatives to the encroachments of predatory traffickers, armed groups and ideologies.

The opportunities are well-documented within social and mainstream media, and outlined in the conclusions to the many conferences convened to address the region’s challenges. What needs fine-tuning is the match between Western assistance and the specific needs of its regional targets. ‘Soft power,’ in other words, needs another look; not as the charitable or palliative alternative it is often taken to be in face of the harsher and more destructive forces of conflict, but as a necessary and proactive corollary to the reactive logic of the currently failing policies of Europe and the US towards the Arab world.

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The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) entered into force in March 2014 but, as stated in its Article 19 “shall apply from 1 January 2014 until 31 December 2020.” It is therefore now possible to see how the rhetoric of the so-called ‘more for more’ and ‘less for less,’ an incentive-based approach emphasised by the May 2011 joint communication on “A new response to a changing Neighbourhood” and then transposed into the legally binding provisions in the ENI, was implemented in 2014, compared to previous years. It is worth remembering that this ‘positive conditionality’ approach was implemented after the launching of the ENP but reinforced in 2011, during the first revision of the ENP. The main paragraph of the May 2011 joint communication related to this issue stated that:

“Increased EU support to its neighbours is conditional. It will depend on progress in building and consolidating democracy and respect for the rule of law. The more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will get from the EU. This enhanced support will come in various forms, including increased funding for social and economic development, larger programmes for comprehensive institution-building (CIB), greater market access, increased EIB financing in support of investments; and greater facilitation of mobility. These preferential commitments (…) will recognise that meaningful reform comes with significant upfront costs. It will take the reform track record of partners during the 2010-12 period (…) into account when deciding on a country’s financial allocations for 2014 and beyond. For countries where reform has not taken place, the EU will reduce or even reconsider funding.”

2015 is of particular interest as a consultation for the ENP review was launched in March, but also as it is still the first year of the mandate of the new Commission appointed in November 2014. This is of importance as the new President of the European Commission “decided that the ENP will be reviewed within the first year of the new Commission’s mandate.” Therefore, there is a paradox in having a second review of the ENP in 2015, while the legally binding provisions for the financial cooperation (ENI Regulation) were adopted in 2014, on the basis of the 2011 revision, and will last until 2020 under the current Multiannual Financial Framework. It is therefore doubtful that such a financial regulation will be rene-

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4 Including a new HR/VP and a new Commissioner and Directorate-General for a portfolio renamed “Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations” (and a new DG NEAR).
negotiated between the EU Council and the European Parliament before 2020. So the margin of manoeuvre remains very limited. Only a mid-term review, with potential reallocations of financial envelopes, is scheduled at the level of the programming instruments, not the ENI per se.

There is a paradox in having a second review of the ENP in 2015, while the legally binding provisions for the financial cooperation were adopted in 2014, on the basis of the 2011 revision, and will last until 2020 under the current Multiannual Financial Framework.

The key words in 2011 were: ‘reinforcement of conditionality’ (Deep Democracy Criteria) and ‘differentiation’ to promote the ‘democratisation wave’ of 2010-11. In 2015, it seems that ‘flexibility’ (and more pragmatism) will be used to first promote ‘stability.’ Flexibility will also be used to address the emergence of migratory and security issues more rapidly.6

The First Year of the Implementation of the New European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)

The ENI total budget for the period 2014-2020 is €15.4 billion. According to the European Commission, it provides the “bulk of funding for cooperation with the 10 Mediterranean countries and the six Eastern Partnership countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy.”7 It is important to recall that this global financial envelope includes bilateral (or country) financial envelopes as well as multilateral (multi-country) financial envelopes allocations (two South and East regional programmes, one Cross Border and one Wider Neighbourhood programme). According to the European Commission and High Representative, for the first year of its implementation (2014), “€2.3 billion were committed under the ENI” and “€1.6 billion were disbursed (…) this figure includes both ongoing and new programmes.” It is therefore important to stress that for 2014, some programmes that were launched under the ENPI are still being implemented but are, since January 2014, governed, on the legal level, by the rules, criteria and procedures of the ENI (and by a new horizontal regulation) as the latter replaced the ENPI. This is clearly emphasised in the preamble of the ENI, first indent, that states that the ENI “replaces Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 (…), which expired on 31 December 2013.” Indent 29 refers to the new horizontal regulation stressing that: “common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union’s instruments for financing external action are laid down in Regulation (EU) No 236/2014.”8

As referred to above, in 2011 the Commission and HR/VP emphasised that the share of the bilateral financial envelope should be based on the evaluations of the years 2010-12 “when deciding on country financial allocations for 2014.” The problem is that if one considers Tunisia or Egypt, it is difficult by definition for the EEAS/Commission to end with an overall positive evaluation if the so-called ‘deep-democracy criteria’9 are strictly applied. The example of the evaluation of the SPRING programme made by the Commission in 2013 is that “the lack of political and administrative stability in those partner countries

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6 However, for issues linked to illegal migration or security one should note that instruments and programmes, other than the ENI, can also be used (e.g. the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP), humanitarian aid etc.).
9 Article 4 § 1 of the ENI: 1. Union support under this Regulation provided to each partner country in accordance with point (a) of Article 6(1) shall be incentive-based and differentiated in form and amount, taking into account all the elements listed below, reflecting the partner country’s:
(a) needs, using indicators such as population and level of development;
(b) commitment to and progress in implementing mutually-agreed political, economic and social reform objectives;
(c) commitment to and progress in building deep and sustainable democracy;
(d) partnership with the Union, including the level of ambition for that partnership;
(e) absorption capacity and the potential impact of Union support under this Regulation.
undergoing a process of democratic transition may lead to difficulties in designing initiatives, delays in disbursing funds and a loss of effectiveness. A flexible approach is required."\(^{10}\)

The table above illustrates the evolution of the country and multi-country financial envelopes from 2010 until 2014. What are not taken into account in the table are the financial envelopes devoted to two multi-country programmes for the period 2010-13: the ENPI ‘Interregional’ and ‘Cross Border’ programmes. For 2014, the Commission provided figures for “Regional and other multi-country programmes.” The possibility of participating in EU programmes and agencies is also to be taken into account, but the transfer of know-how, for example, is difficult to evaluate in financial terms. Also other EU thematic programmes and specific financial and technical resources can be used as well. On top of this, and outside the proper EU budget framework, the European Investment Bank (EIB) loans and technical assistance programmes have increased since 2010 as it was easier to quickly provide more loans to the MPCs. They are not taken into account here, as they are financed on EIB’s own budget and because they are not subsidies but mainly preferential loans.

The selected time period is 2010-2014. It therefore ranges from the year of the first uprising in Tunisia to the most recent programming. It includes, at the technical level, the last year of the 2007-

\(^{10}\) Commission implementing Decision of 18.7.2013 on the special measure, support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) 2013 in favour of the southern Neighbourhood region to be financed from the general budget of the European Union, Brussels, 18.7.2013 C(2013) 4452 final, point 3.3.
2010 National Indicative Programmes (NIPs), the entire 2011-2013 NIPs (both were framed under the ENPI) and the first year (2014) of the ENI programming. Under the ENI, if the partner country has concluded an ENP Action Plan, a ‘Single Support Framework’ has replaced the former NIPs and Country Strategy Paper (CSP).

What is not mentioned in this overall table is that the ENI includes a new feature (although a similar ‘Governance facility’ was introduced in 2006\(^1\)). According to the ENI Regulation, in order to “facilitate the implementation of the incentive-based approach (...) an amount in the range of 10% of the financial envelope (...) shall be allocated to multi-country umbrella programmes that will supplement the country financial allocations.”\(^{12}\) In 2014, the umbrella programme “channelled €200 million of additional allocations to: Ukraine (€40 million), Georgia (€30 million) and Moldova (€30 million) in the East; and to Tunisia (€50 million), Morocco (€20 million), Jordan (€15 million) and Lebanon (€15 million) in the South. Additional funding was used to launch new programmes or expand the scope and duration of existing programmes, in line with the key priorities for bilateral assistance.”\(^{13}\)

What is striking is that without this information it is difficult to draw very clear conclusions about the evolution of the global yearly financial envelopes on the basis of this table, except that three Eastern Partners namely Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine benefitted from a clear regular increase of their bilateral financial envelopes (there is however one exception: a slight decrease for Moldova in 2014). Also overall, in 2014, half of the commitments (bilateral and regional) were made for the six Eastern partners, compared to a third in 2010. Last but not least the additional allocations of the umbrella programmes for the six Eastern and 10 Southern partners in 2014 are the same (€100 million for each region).

For the Mediterranean partners there is, first of all, a series of specific cases to be taken into consideration. Syria\(^ {14}\) and Libya (like Belarus) have never been integrated into the ENP. For Algeria, which is also not fully involved in the ENP as it is still negotiating its first ENP Action plan, it is worth mentioning that 2014 represented the lowest level of commitment since 2010. Palestine is another specific case and cannot be compared to other MPCs for obvious reasons, which we are not going to address here given their peculiarities. Israel is also a special case as it is not considered to be a ‘developing country’ that can benefit from traditional development cooperation, although this country is, at the same time, very much involved in cooperation at the level of EU scientific cooperation programmes.

Thus the most interesting cases linked to the so-called ‘Arab Spring’ are Egypt and Tunisia. Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco are also to be taken into consideration. For Egypt it is difficult to link the evolution of the financial envelope to the evolution of the political-economic situation. It is true that this partner went through a revolution and a counter-revolutionary process during the period of time considered. What is obvious is that Egypt is not one of the beneficiaries of the umbrella programmes (UP). Unlike Egypt, Tunisia benefited from an extra €50 million from the UP, representing a little less than a third of the overall 2014 commitment (€169 million). The evolution of the Tunisian bilateral financial envelope indicates a regular increase during the last three years and the highest commitment (€180 million) was made in 2011, the year following the Jasmine Revolution. The figures for Morocco show a steady increase from 2010 until 2013 and then a drop in 2014, although Morocco benefited from an extra €20 million from the UP that year. Jordan and Lebanon do benefit from an increase in their financial envelopes for 2014 (which doubled compared to 2013 and are the highest commitment rates since 2010). The two supplementary umbrella programme envelopes contributed to this situation even if their amounts remained limited (€15 million each). But as both countries are strongly affected by the Syrian crisis they do benefit from other EU budget lines.


\(^{12}\) Art. 7 § 6 of the ENI

\(^{13}\) SWD(2015) 77 final, op. cit.,

\(^{14}\) “Due to the ongoing crisis, bilateral cooperation with Syria was suspended in May 2011. Consequently, there is no programming document for this country. Commitments take the form of annual ‘special measures’ in favour of the Syrian population; they are complemented with additional support to Jordan and Lebanon to help these countries cope with the influx of Syrian refugees. The 2014 special measure budgeted €41.25 million for actions to support the Syrian population still inside Syria.” SWD(2015) 77 final, op cit., p. 3.
One must therefore analyse each single bilateral evaluation report to understand the reasons for the evolution of the commitments. Also pure programmatic, technical and administrative issues have to be taken into consideration. Furthermore, it is important to underline that a calculation per capita would highlight a larger decrease for Egypt and larger increase for Tunisia for the year 2014. Finally the supplementary umbrella programme envelopes and their share in the total 2014 commitments per country are the clearest indicators for evaluating the implementation, in 2014, of the ‘more for more’ and ‘less for less’ approach at the level of financial cooperation.

The Review of the ENP: More Flexibility and a Focus on Security & Stability

The 4 March 2015 Joint Consultation Paper entitled “Towards a new European Neighbourhood Policy,”15 stated: “There is now a clear need to review the assumptions on which the policy is based, as well as its scope, and how instruments should be used, including how different policy sectors can better contribute to cooperation, ensuring linkages between internal and external priorities.”16

The Council conclusions ‘on the Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy,’ adopted on 20 April 201517 what at the time was an ongoing review. The EU ministers affirmed “the four priority areas that the current ENP review seeks to address: ‘Differentiation,’ ‘Focus,’ (including inter alia security, economic development and trade, good governance, migration, energy and human rights) ‘Flexibility,’ and ‘Ownership and Visibility’” (Point 6) and stressed that a “revised ENP should take into account interests and needs of the EU and its neighbours, neighbours’ commitment to reforms, the level of ambition of the partnership as well as different challenges and the geopolitical environment” (point 7).

Other priorities include:

i) “Stability and prosperity based on principles of political inclusion, rule of law, the respect of human rights and inclusive economic development;”

ii) The contribution to “promoting stability in the neighbourhood in line with (…) other relevant EU policies such as the area of Freedom, Security and Justice;”

iii) The wider use of ENP instruments to “strengthen partners’ capacity to address security threats, notably through security sector reforms;”

iv) Ensuring a “closer coordination between ENP and wider CFSP/CSDP activities” (point 8).

The proposed shift, compared to 2011, is quite noticeable.

The Challenge of Consistency: the EU’s Credibility at Stake

If it is confirmed, in autumn 2015, that the reviewed ENP will be characterised by more ‘flexibility,’ it should remain clear that the concept of flexibility means that the EU “should be capable of responding flexibly to the changing situations in the region, challenges and crises while preserving its continuity and predictability.”18 It is obvious that it will be crucial for the EU and its Member States to remain consistent in the implementation of the ENI and avoid disregarding the Deep Democracy Criteria.

Inconsistencies can lead to the MPCs perceiving a ‘double standard approach.’ The supplementary umbrella programme envelopes have the merit of giving clear signals to the partners. They are, however, not very ‘visible’ for the general public as their amounts have to be found in the detailed reports. This, for instance, could be taken into consideration in the current ENP review.

There is also a feeling, with the emphasis put on the EU’s ‘interest and needs’ and ‘stability,’ that the EU is coming back to the old model of Euromed relations. This should be clarified, otherwise the EU’s discourse on values could be perceived as hypocritical. Therefore, for the abovementioned ‘Focus’ one should start, and not end, with ‘human rights.’

19 Ibid., p. 3
18 Ibid., Point 7.
Implications of the Russia-Ukraine Crisis for the Middle East and North Africa

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International Context

The Ukrainian crisis, currently the most serious crisis in Russia-West relations, which became openly antagonistic over the last year, has emerged as just another piece of evidence that the post-bipolar polycentric world is strongly influenced by the evolving balance between two opposite trends – the trend towards multilateral cooperation on global challenges and the trend towards a new bipolarity that will be totally different from the East-West bipolarity. Unlike the East-West confrontation, it will be a bipolarity within the same economic system – a confrontation between liberal capitalism and authoritarian (or sovereign) capitalism, which will be ‘dissolved’ within the multipolar world.

The Ukrainian conflict has three interrelated dimensions – global, regional and local – with deep implications for international security, including for the Black Sea/Mediterranean region. This is all the more so, since outside Europe the situation is not getting better. The Arab Awakening has triggered deep changes and added instability to an already troubled area. In a region in turmoil, political transitions in North African countries are proving to be complex and long-term processes, while relations between states are evolving and new geopolitical dynamics are shaking up old patterns, above all in the Middle East (Ottaway, Al-Qarawee, Merone and Achy, 2013). Aside from the conflicts and instability, the international community is faced with new challenges, such as the ISIS threat, the proliferation of WMD, international terrorism, piracy, organised crime, etc.

Recasting a New Balance of Power

The Ukrainian divide has emerged as a key issue for recasting a new balance of power between Russia and the West with a strong impact on their regional relations (Csernatoi, 2014). Before the Ukrainian conflict, Russia’s foreign policy had been guided by three factors – the predominance of pragmatic economic interests over political or ideological differences, an emphasis on bilateral relations, and status-(re)building. Since the Ukrainian conflict, it has acquired a new dimension – geopolitical rivalry with the West, not only in the Euro-Atlantic space but also elsewhere.

The geostrategic importance of the conflict in Ukraine goes beyond Europe because the Black Sea region connects Europe with Asia, and the Eurasian land mass is linked to the Middle East through the Balkans, where Turkey borders with Syria, Iraq and Iran in the south.

Since incorporating the Crimea, Moscow has been sidelined in the international arena and excluded

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from important international formats and forums. Russia’s alienation has encouraged the Kremlin to look for its own allies to mitigate its isolation by the West. The CIS region will become the main arena in the battle for spheres of influence between Russia, on the one hand, and the EU and NATO/US, on the other. Russia still has the potential to oppose those projects in the CIS that it perceives as threats to its national interests.

Beyond the CIS, Moscow might view the so-called Eurosceptic countries – in particular, Greece and Cyprus, in the EU, and Turkey, in NATO – which are unhappy with Brussels’ policy, as potential Russian allies. Beyond the CIS, Moscow might view the so-called Eurosceptic countries – in particular, Greece and Cyprus, in the EU, and Turkey, in NATO – which are unhappy with Brussels’ policy, as potential Russian allies. However, this would only go as far as an ‘à la carte’ partnership on particular issues not of fundamental importance. As long as the Eurosceptic countries remain in the EU, and Turkey in NATO, there will not be any fundamental change in their policy towards Russia. Turkey’s theoretical departure from NATO, were it to happen, would in any case be the result of internal cataclysms linked to a rise of radical Islam in Turkish society, rendering the whole question of a potential strategic partnership irrelevant.

On 1 December 2014, during a visit to Ankara, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia was abandoning the South Stream project and would instead build a new subsea link to Turkey. He declared that South Stream had reached a dead end because of opposition from the EU, which has said that the Russian-backed scheme may violate provisions of the Third Energy Package (Badykov, 2014).

At the same time, Russia has turned to Turkey’s old opponent – Cyprus. Under an agreement signed by President Putin and Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades in February 2015, Russian navy ships can now stop at ports in Cyprus, and Moscow will continue to provide the Mediterranean country with debt relief. This will lead to the extraordinary situation of Cyprus becoming a military hub for both Britain, an EU and NATO member, and Russia. This access to the port, as an alternative to Tartus, is especially important in view of Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu’s statement that, “It has been decided to set up a navy department task force in the Mediterranean zone where naval forces will stay on a permanent basis.” This ‘permanent’ presence would allow Russia to “secure shipping access to the Suez Canal and extend its influence in the Middle East” (Saunders, 2015).

Russia has opportunities to strengthen its political and economic influence in the Western Balkans, which remain Europe’s soft underbelly. In addition to their internal problems, Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania are the main recruiting grounds in the Balkans for radical Islamists seeking fighters for the wars in Syria and Iraq (Tomovic, 2014). The primary example here is Moscow’s efforts to establish special relations with Serbia and Macedonia. “Those in the EU who are skeptical towards further enlargement – and there are many – might even silently welcome the new power of Russia” (Jović, 2014). Bosnia’s survival as a unified state cannot be taken for granted. Moscow’s decision to abstain in a UN
vote authorising a prolonged EU mission to the country leads many to believe that the Kremlin is seriously considering such a move (Krastev, 2015). That is a very new development, because until recently the Balkans were one of the very few areas where cooperation between Russia and the West in the 90s was quite productive.

The ‘Foot in the Door’ Middle East Strategy versus Cooperation

The emerging bipolarity of Russia-West relations at the macro level has already been projected to the Mediterranean region. This trend’s continued development would inevitably create a new fault line in the southern Mediterranean region and push the competing sides into foot-in-the-door policies of the type practiced during the Cold War. Generally speaking, Russia’s relations with the countries of North Africa (Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria) aim to take advantage of the new opportunities, but are not really guided by a well-thought-out strategy for the region. As with the Balkans, Russia seems to be increasingly keen to position itself in the region as an alternative to the EU or the US. In February 2015, President Putin visited Egypt, where he was warmly welcomed by his Egyptian counterpart, Abdul Fattah al-Sisi. The visit came at a time when Cairo-Washington ties remained frayed. The two leaders agreed to boost trade and military cooperation, and, in March 2015, Russia began supplying weapons to Egypt after signing a memorandum.

Russian navy ships can now stop at ports in Cyprus, and Moscow will continue to provide the Mediterranean country with debt relief

As for Russia’s engagement with the problems of the Middle East, it is aimed at exacting leverage over the West, as Moscow’s assistance could play a crucial role in the settlement of major issues such as the Iranian nuclear problem, the Syrian conflict, the stabilisation of Afghanistan and violent jihadist groups (Kozhanov, 2015). It can also be viewed as part of a strategy aimed at avoiding international isolation in the wake of sanctions over the Ukraine conflict and persuading the West of Russia’s indispensability in handling major Middle Eastern issues.

The collapse of the P5+1 talks on the Iranian nuclear programme would increase the risk of an Israeli military strike, the spread of hostilities and violence throughout the Middle East, and the unravelling of the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime. The Ukraine conflict has deeply divided the P5+1 group, which previously spoke with a single voice on the Iranian nuclear issue, making it difficult for Russia and the West to cooperate on it (Arbatov, 2015). Russia can be helpful in the dialogue with Bashar al-Assad and in the Middle East Quartet on Palestine.6 However, many experts say that Russia is more interested in the process of the negotiations than their outcome. This can be explained not only by the deteriorating relations between Russia and the West but also by Moscow’s economic interests.

Any intensification of Russian efforts towards Palestinian independence may make the Israelis reconsider their ties with Moscow. Meanwhile, Russia is interested in certain technologies that Israel could provide, as well as in bilateral trade with that country, which reached $4.6 billion in 2014 (Kozhanov, 2015). Economic cooperation with Middle Eastern and North African countries also weakens the anti-Russian camp in the region. The Near and Middle East, together with North Africa, is the second largest market for Russian military exports, accounting for 23% of all such exports (Wezeman and Wezeman, 2015). For security and political reasons, Russia clearly does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons. However, unlike the United States, Russia has huge political and economic interests with Iran. Iran is one of the main recipients of Russian peaceful nuclear technology and arms sales. Also, Iran is seen as a geopolitical counterbalance to the expanding influence of Turkey, the United States, and Islamic Wahhabism in the South.

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6 In March, the UN special envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, argued that Russia can be helpful because only Moscow (and Tehran) speak directly to Bashar al-Assad.
and North Caucasus and Central Asia. Finally, Iranian oil and gas resources (the fourth and second largest in the world, respectively) are a lucrative target for future Russian investment.

There is one issue that still unites Russia and the West in the region despite their differences – the ISIS challenge. The sharp deterioration in political relations between Russia and the United States in the last two years has seriously undermined both the level of and potential for counterterrorism cooperation, since intelligence in this highly sensitive area of security cannot be shared without a high degree of trust between the two sides. Who stands to lose more – Russia or the West – is a matter of debate. But one thing is clear: the winner in the rapidly deepening disengagement between the two sides, which is undermining cooperation on fundamental security issues, is radical Islamism. That is why both Russia and the US must realise the folly of sacrificing strategic interests for short-term geopolitical gains and show that the civilised world is capable of drawing lessons – however bitter they may be to swallow – so that new and perhaps even more terrible catastrophes can be averted.

The scenario of limited bipolarity is not irreversible. A great deal will depend on how Russia and the West come out of the Ukrainian crisis. The relationship will probably never be the same unless Russia re-embraces its European vocation. But Russia and the West could return to a more balanced and non-confrontational model of relations based on an agreed set of rules and common interests along the lines of the Gorbachev USSR-West relations.

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In Search of Green Shoots: Assessing the EU’s SPRING Programme

From the viewpoint of policymakers, the mood of change sweeping the Middle East and Northern Africa (MENA), almost five years ago, was based on a narrative of human rights and personal freedoms, democracy and the rule of law. For those participating in civil protests against uncompromising and authoritarian regimes, however, it was just as much about finding dignity in everyday life, bringing about more socio-economic equality and opportunities and job creation. In an attempt to help consolidate such changes, European Union (‘EU’ or ‘Union’) actors were vocal in expressing political commitment to the democratic aspirations of the people of the MENA. In practice, the commitment was translated as financial, but by no means unconditional. To have old and new leaders move in the direction of political reforms, a carrot was dangled in front of partner countries. This bait took the form of allocations for a wide variety of projects stimulating institution-building and economic recovery.

In September 2011, the European Commission – with a sense of optimism and hope that characterised the mindset at the time – presented its SPRING programme (Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) as a cross-cutting financial instrument under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In line with the ENP, SPRING reflected an incentive-based (‘more for more’) and differentiated approach. This gave the EU the necessary flexibility for modulating assistance on the basis of progress made by individual MENA countries. In retrospect, the programme, which ultimately only ran under that name until the end of 2013, showed the limits of an external actor in reforming governance models in the Arab region. This contribution reflects on some of the lessons learned. First, it looks back at the fairly short history of the SPRING Programme. Second, it discusses some of SPRING’s results in light of its most important features. Third, it examines SPRING’s integration in the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) as an umbrella programme.

SPRING (2011-2013): a Brief Overview

Civil unrest and regime changes in the early months of 2011 triggered a re-thinking of the EU’s relations with the MENA region. The spring that followed saw a materialisation of the (financial) commitment on behalf of the EU to those pursuing a political awakening. In this sense, the March 2011 Joint Communication of the High Representative and the Commission on “a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Pros-

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perity with the southern Mediterranean” announced
the EU’s readiness “to support all its southern neigh-
bours who are able and willing to embark on […] re-
forms.” To do so, the EU turned to familiar budget
lines, such as those comprised in the Euro-Medit-
erranean Partnership (EMP), the Union for the Mediter-
ranean (UfM) and ENP programmes, and converted
these into ‘Arab Spring assistance.’ None of the ex-
isting mechanisms, however, were significantly
adapted in order to meet the requirements of new
political realities. Within those existing frameworks,
instruments were also created, including the SPRING Programme. Although announced as a flag-
ship initiative, the Programme did not integrate the
other previously mentioned budget lines.

SPRING was not the revolutionary
break with the EU's foreign policy
past in Europe’s southern
neighbourhood that it has
sometimes been portrayed to be

The main aim of SPRING was to support selected partner countries in their transition to democracy. To
receive European funding under the SPRING Pro-
gramme, countries had to commit to establishing
deep and sustainable democracies. SPRING was
not the revolutionary break with the EU’s foreign pol-
icy past in Europe's southern neighbourhood that it
has sometimes been portrayed to be. The design of
the Programme built on and enforced an incentive-
based and tailor-made approach that had already
been introduced pre-Arab Spring in the ENP. Ap-
plying a ‘more for more’ principle, the EU promised fi-
nancial and technical support to help transitions. The
more a country progressed in its democratic reforms,
the more support it could expect from the EU. Ulti-
mately, SPRING would run a budget of €390 million
for 2011-2012 and €150 million for 2013, benefit-
ing seven MENA countries in total.

Spring Forward, Fall Back?

Initially, support went primarily to Tunisia, soon to be
followed by Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco (2011). It
does not come as a surprise that Tunisia, the first
country where protesters had marched, was the first,
and remained the largest, beneficiary of SPRING funding. For many years, the country has been the
EU's blue-eyed boy in the MENA. Together with
Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco (the so-called Agadir
Agreement countries), it had already concluded bi-
lateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the EU
prior to the Arab uprisings. Two other Arab partners
in the southern neighbourhood, Algeria and Leba-
non, joined SPRING at a later stage (2012), when it
was deemed that the right conditions were in place.
In 2013, SPRING continued to support projects by
the Agadir Agreement partners minus Egypt. In
Egypt, which had been the second biggest benefi-
ciary (after Tunisia) in SPRING’s first phase, Presi-
dent Morsi’s government was ousted later that year.
Of the non-Agadir countries, funding dried up for the
(already small-scale) ‘Programme in support of gov-
ernance’ in Algeria. Libya was welcomed as a new
SPRING partner in 2013, receiving the smallest pro-
portion of all countries (€5 million) for projects sup-
porting the media and the constitutional process
that year.

The main aim of SPRING was to support selected partner countries in their transition to democracy.
To receive European funding under the SPRING Programme, countries had to commit to establishing deep
and sustainable democracies.

These data clearly reflect a differentiated approach,
both in terms of funding received by countries (rang-
ing from €5 to €155 million) and the type of projects funded. EU actions included electoral reforms, civil society support, good governance and social justice projects, as well as waste water treatment and the renovation of neighbourhoods. In Morocco, a country that did not have a regime change, it is interesting to see how European allocations went to vocational trainings, rural health and literacy projects, rather than to institution-building. The case of Lebanon stands out among the others, since SPRING mainly financed infrastructure for Palestinian (in 2012) and Syrian refugees (2013) in the country. Again, those projects are not completely in line with the original SPRING rationale and have a very different finality from, for example, the 'justice preparatory' project in Jordan or the support for the 'association agreement and democratic transition' project in Tunisia.

EU Reports assessing the progress made lack the level of detail to distinguish the contribution of SPRING amidst other initiatives. By not sharing performance measurement and evaluation plans, it has been impossible to track progress of initiatives and to allow for external control on appropriate budgeting.

The fluctuation in partners and in funds allocated was a result of the conditionality approach adopted. Firstly, not all MENA countries that received SPRING allocations managed to keep promises to the EU.7 One of the reasons may be that SPRING did not seize the opportunity to present MENA partners with incentives that were appealing to political leaders in the long run,8 such as the long-promised realisation of the 'stake in the market' for Arab countries and the conclusion of mobility agreements striving for broader labour-related mobility.9 Moreover, SPRING’s budget remained relatively small, and, simultaneously, included very diverse projects, making an overall assessment tricky.

From a historical perspective, the Arab uprisings remain very young and fragile. Each MENA country will have to go through complex processes in order for a sustainable democratic climate to take root. The EU’s provision of technical assistance to help the authorities organise elections in line with democratic standards is a case in point. Despite good intentions, the outcome fell short of expectations: in Egypt, an elected government was overthrown and in 2014, Libya’s highest court ruled the general elections unconstitutional, leaving the country without an official government.

While SPRING’s trial and error approach can be condoned for the above reasons, the EU’s approach in measuring and communicating SPRING’s results cannot. EU actors reported that results of the SPRING Programme in the southern region were generally positive, although quite diverse. Tunisia and Morocco (where no regime change took place) did significantly better than Libya and Egypt.10 Yet, a more detailed self-assessment of SPRING is not publicly available. From the International Monetary Fund, we learn that modest economic recovery in most countries (with the notable exceptions of Libya and Egypt) is still overshadowed by high unemployment across the region.11 EU Reports assessing the progress made lack the level of detail to distinguish the contribution of SPRING amidst other initiatives. By not sharing performance measurement and evaluation plans, it has been impossible to track progress of initiatives and to allow for external control on appropriate budgeting.12 EU actors have always been

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12 See, for example, the criticism of the European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons in its 30th report, 15 January 2014, considering the European Court of Auditors Special Report No. 4 2013 on EU Cooperation with Egypt in the Field of Governance.
vague about the long-term viability of SPRING initiatives, providing little information that details how SPRING initiatives would continue without EU assistance. Remarkably, throughout its lifespan, SPRING has also been bypassed by the European Parliament, Court of Auditors as well as civil society. This allowed for SPRING’s silent disappearance, contrasting the bravura with which it was once announced.

**A New Spring for the EU and MENA**

Under the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework, SPRING funds were replaced by the so-called Umbrella Programme funds. These funds are now laid down in the regulation of the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). Effective from 2014 to 2020, the ENI seeks to streamline financial support. It partially remedies the fact that funds were incoherently distributed through a variety of instruments, of which SPRING was just one example. ENI aims to concentrate on a more limited set of agreed policy objectives than SPRING and to make programming shorter and better focused, so that it is more effective. However, SPRING’s full integration in the ENP did not change its key principles or its partner selection practices. In 2014, Tunisia was the first recipient of Umbrella funds with an amount of €50 million. SPRING also inspired the creation of a twin programme in the eastern neighbourhood, called the Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation (‘EaPIC’) ‘umbrella’ Programme. Much like the original, EaPIC draws on the same incentive-based and differentiation principles of the revised ENP.

ENI aims to concentrate on a more limited set of agreed policy objectives than SPRING and to make programming shorter and better focused, so that it is more effective.

In sum, as has been the case with previous experiences with conditionality in the framework of the ENP, the use of financial assistance as a ‘carrot’ did not automatically generate sustainable human rights and democracy. However, despite difficulties and setbacks, the EU has financed important initiatives, which in the short term have led to small democratic gains. As regards the long term, however, MENA countries still have a long way to go before they will be able to reap the fruits from deep democracy.


14 MENA Countries were eligible to receive funding under several thematic instruments and programmes, for instance: the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument for Stability (IIS), the SUdep Sustainable Urban Demonstration Project, the Mediterranean Sea Programme and various other ENP/ENI instruments, such as the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF).

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Kurdistan has faced numerous tragedies in its time. Divided between four countries by Imperial powers, the Kurds have suffered political alienation, discrimination and genocide at the hands of various Turkish, Arab and Persian rulers. Despite a long and bloody history, the Kurds have never faced quite as virulent and destructive a threat as the Islamic State (ISIS), which has sought to utterly destroy Kurdish political and cultural life in Iraq and Syria. The Kurds presented little in the way of a strategic threat to the Caliphate. Kurdish territorial designs stretched into only small portions of Arab-held territory in Iraq and Syria, and certainly not into the heartlands of ISIS control. ISIS’ militant dislike of separatist nationalism in the Islamic world, especially when mixed with secular values, may have been a trigger. But ultimately it may prove to be a combination of hubris and a misguided sense of military capability that drove ISIS into battles against the Kurds that have been hugely costly in terms of weapons and manpower and deleterious to the group’s perceived invincibility.

ISIS: a Blessing or a Curse for Kurdistan?

Despite ISIS’ appetite for wanton destruction, a debate exists as to whether Iraqi Kurdistan has benefitted from the insurgents’ repeated intrusions into their land. Kurds rejoiced in June 2014 when Iraq’s army melted away from disputed Kurdish lands in the face of an ISIS attack. The long held desire for Kurdish control over Kirkuk was finally realised as the Peshmerga moved to secure areas long disputed between themselves and the central Iraqi authorities in Baghdad. As such, the ISIS advances in Iraq have provided territorial benefits for Iraqi Kurdistan, as well as bringing the Kurds into close security cooperation with a number of important international actors, most notably the United States, France, the UK and Germany. With such international backing the security of Kurdistan is virtually all but guaranteed, be it from ISIS or from any potential conflict with the Iraqi State, and this despite the preference in the West for a unified Iraq under Baghdad’s control.

But the raucous optimism of that time has been replaced with unease about the future of the proto-State that is coming into being in Iraq. Kurdistan may well have gained the land it dreamed of, but the price it is paying is high. The Peshmerga have lost 1,200 men and women, and over 5,900 have been injured defending their lines from repeated ISIS attacks. The region has taken in some 1.6 million refugees from Syria and the rest of Iraq, straining the regional government’s resources to breaking point. Additionally, numerous towns and villages along the front lines of Kurdish and ISIS fighters have been rendered uninhabitable by the destruction of war and by retreating ISIS forces.

Similarly, ISIS attacks against Syria’s Kurdish region (known as Rojava) have proven a defining moment not just for Syria itself, but also for the future of Kurdistan. The siege of the Syrian border town of Kobani in particular focused minds on the Kurdish struggle, for the first time bringing Western air power, under the guise of Operation Inherent Resolve, to back Syrian Kurds in their armed struggle. Less economically developed than their Iraqi brethren, and only having achieved relative autonomous power since
2012, Syrian Kurdistan’s mere emergence on the world stage as a political actor is almost entirely as a result of ISIS attacks. Although not assured of the same level of Western support as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), Syrian Kurds have been effectively given assurances by the international coalition that they will not be left alone in their struggle for survival.

The ISIS advances in Iraq have provided territorial benefits for Iraqi Kurdistan, as well as bringing the Kurds into close security cooperation with a number of important international actors, most notably the United States, France, the UK and Germany.  

As Rojava comes to life as a socio-political entity it faces numerous challenges, not least the devastation caused by ISIS. 80% of Kobani lies in ruins; the majority of its people have fled to Turkey and are unsure as to whether they will be allowed to return to a town ridden with hidden bombs and little working infrastructure. Rojava’s three cantons of Afrin, Kobani and Jazeera remain separate entities lacking contiguity and a defined political future, especially as the war in Syria still looks far from being over. As ISIS weakens militarily, retreating from territories it once held, and factions such as the al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat al Nusra and Syrian regime look to capitalise, Syria’s Kurds undoubtedly have to continue fighting as the war drags on indefinitely.

Salaries of civil servants and Peshmergas have gone unpaid, sometimes for as much as six months, and the three incomplete payments made by Baghdad this year have only made up for salaries missed some four months ago. This while Baghdad has continually ensured the payment of salaries to Iraqi government workers in Mosul, working under ISIS. Given that 70% of the KRG’s working population is in the public sector, this has proven devastating to the area’s economy, the lack of money in the system leading to a cascade effect causing what little private sector that exists to shrink rapidly.

The solution to the problem is complex; corruption, bad fiscal management and tumbling oil prices all play their part in preventing a quick fix for Iraq’s Kurds, and restarting regular payments from Baghdad will not cover the region’s $1.2-billion monthly expense bill. It will be a slow rebuilding process that may take many years, and the damage to Kurdistan’s drive to one day become an independent state will be long lasting. The war has exposed the fragility of the KRG, and while Iraq’s Kurds have pulled together during this time of crisis, there is deep anger about the inefficiency and incompetence of political leadership, and the inability of Iraqi Kurdistan to put into place structures which afford them greater fiscal autonomy from Baghdad.

In Rojava, Syria’s Kurds have also begun to grumble. The existential nature of the threat posed by ISIS has exposed cracks in the nascent autonomous project. Burdened by refugees from other areas of Syria, effectively blockaded by Turkey and by ISIS regions to the south, and with a limited border crossing into the KRG, Rojava has struggled to form any sort of functioning economic system or export goods in any substantial quantity. This despite its plentiful oil reserves and abundant cereal crop production, which has the potential to provide up to 30% of Syria’s total need if it is not exported. The highly centralised system being put into place by the canton administration is, like Iraqi Kurdistan, highly dependent on the capital city for inflows of cash, and, consequently, the fate of Rojava is tied to the ability of Damascus to print money, which hugely affects Syrian Kurds’ ability to push for complete autonomy in the near future.

Economic Challenges  
The fight against ISIS has deeply affected the daily lives of Iraq’s Kurds, in particular through its effects on the KRG economy. Iraqi Kurdistan has suffered dramatically as a result of instability in the rest of Iraq. Failures by the central authorities in Baghdad to pay the KRG its allotted 17% monthly share of the national budget have led to a cash crisis in Kurdish-controlled territory.
Intra-Kurdish Politics and the Growth of a Pan-Kurdish Identity

The Kurds are infamous for their plethora of political divisions, and relations between the main party in Syrian Kurdistan the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and the most powerful party in Iraqi Kurdistan the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) are notably poor. But the problems of intra-Kurdish rivalry have undergone a strange metamorphosis as a result of ISIS attacking Kurds on both sides of the international border. Indeed the ferocity of the ISIS attack against Syrian and Iraqi Kurds represents the first time in Kurdish history that Kurds have faced a threat from the same entity, unbound by state or geographical borders.

This has translated into a deepening sense of pan-Kurdish identity. Iraq’s Kurds watched anxiously as their Syrian brothers fought desperate battles in Kobani to repel repeated ISIS offensives, eventually leading to calls from among Iraqi Kurds to support Kobani with Peshmerga fighters. Indeed Kurds across Turkey, Iraq and Syria cheered when 150 Peshmerga, with Turkey’s permission, crossed into Kobani to help defend the town from ISIS. Additionally, hundreds of Turkish, Iraqi and Iranian Kurds have been identified fighting among the ranks of the People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria, and Iranians, Turks and Syrians have also been seen fighting in Iraq alongside Peshmerga forces, a sign if ever there was one of increasing unity among Kurdistan’s four constituent parts.

The problems of intra-Kurdish rivalry have undergone a strange metamorphosis as a result of ISIS attacking Kurds on both sides of the international border

This unity was also displayed by diaspora Kurds in Europe and the US who collected aid packages for each other’s armed forces and joined together to demonstrate against ISIS with scant thought as to whose faction they stood alongside. This is perhaps the first time such unity has been observed in the diaspora, where political divides in the homeland are often starkly reflected.

But despite the closer emotional links and the security cooperation in Kobani the problems between the PKK-affiliated PYD, and the pro-Turkish KDP still run deep. This is most demonstrably shown in Sinjar, where the Yazidi population faced slaughter at the hands of the Islamic State in August 2014 following a withdrawal by Peshmerga forces. Locals in the area largely view the Syrian Kurdish forces as their saviours, and the YPG and PKK were able to secure areas of Sinjar in the absence of KDP Peshmerga forces. At the time of writing, YPG, PKK and Peshmerga forces all patrol the area without clear jurisdiction as to who is in charge of security.

As such the rise of the Syrian Kurds in the international consciousness presents a challenge for the KDP, not only because they are a rival Kurdish faction with a lot of guns and an organised army, but also because the loyalties of some populations in Iraqi Kurdistan are decidedly mixed, and it is unclear as to whether the KDP can fully reassert itself as the dominant player in its own region of Kurdistan. This is particularly significant given that Iraqi Kurdistan houses some 600,000 Syrian Kurdish refugees from Rojava, most of whom are loyal to the PYD. Although it is unlikely that Syrian and Iraqi Kurds would go to war over their differences, especially when ISIS still threatens, it does present a problem in the future. Given that the PYD maintains working relations with Iraqi Kurdistan’s other main party the PUK, the KDP has adopted something of a siege mentality, feeling surrounded on all sides by parties aligned against it.

How the problems of contested space between rival Kurdish factions will be resolved is unclear at present. The power struggles between the PYD and KDP will no doubt continue, and inside both Iraq and Syria there is competition for influence. The question will be whether the politicians can both understand and reflect the growing desire of their own populations for closer integration and cooperation.

The Future

The future for the Kurds looks brighter than it did six months ago, the autonomous projects in both Rojava and Iraq have survived the worst of the ISIS on-
slaughter, although they have been severely weakened. The blitzkrieg that saw ISIS sweep across Syria and Iraq has finished, and the edges of the Caliphate are fraying. ISIS losses in Kobani, Sinjar and Tikrit have shown that with Western backing, local forces on the ground can secure victory, albeit at a cost.

The biggest threat the weakening of ISIS poses to the Kurds, (quite apart from potential terrorist infiltration into Kurdish-controlled areas as revenge), is that it removes the glue that held the Kurds together. But cities can be rebuilt, refugees rehoused and the price of oil will rise again in time, offering more stable income and resources to tackle the devastation ISIS has left behind. However Kurdistan has changed and the once confident KRG is no longer on the definite pathway to statehood that it was in 2013. The demographics of the region have been altered by the movement of millions, political control and territory have changed hands and the balances of power inside Kurdistan have changed in ways that counter KDP influence and dominance. The biggest threat the weakening of ISIS poses to the Kurds, (quite apart from potential terrorist infiltration into Kurdish-controlled areas as revenge), is that it removes the glue that held the Kurds together. Only after the dust has settled will it be possible to know whether Kurds really can work together to build their future cooperatively, or whether the bickering and infighting will begin again.

It is most likely that problems with their respective capital cities will keep the Kurds busy engaged for some time. Syrian Kurds must negotiate a fraying relationship with Assad’s regime as it battles back against the myriad of forces determined to remove it from power, all the while not becoming the target of either militia or regime retribution. Iraqi Kurds on the other hand face a long struggle ahead with Baghdad over the status of territories held by the Peshmerga, the distribution of oil revenues and the level of political participation for Kurds in what remains of the Iraqi political consensus.

The future of both Syria and Iraq is still unknown, and it is likely that the Kurds will focus on quietly building up their own structures of government in preparation for the day in which neither Damascus nor Baghdad can effectively extend any fiscal or political control inside their borders. At such a time, with ISIS gone and no rivals to match them, the Kurds will find they have become independent not through choice, but because there is no other option available but the full declaration of self-rule.
In the devastated landscape of what has rather hastily been called the Arab Spring, Tunisia is an exception. This country, which in January 2011 triggered the movement of Arab revolts against dictatorship and for freedom, has certainly undergone a long and fragile political transition, but it has managed – four years, three political assassinations and six administrations later – to retain its republican institutions, enact a new constitution hailed by numerous observers as the most progressive in the Muslim world, and pass the test of two legislative elections (October 2011 and November 2014) and as many political changeovers (the seculars handed the reins of power over to the Islamists in 2011, then vice-versa in 2014) to arrive today at a parliament, a government and a President elected through universal suffrage for a five-year term.

The Tunisian Exception

In the other Arab countries that followed Tunisia in rising up against dictatorship, the situation is less rosy. In Libya, Yemen and Syria, the ‘revolution’ led to anarchy and civil war, reinvigorating jihadi groups and reawakening the old demons of tribalism and ethnic and confessional conflicts. In Egypt, after the fall of the Hosni Mubarak regime, the State did in fact remain intact, but at the price of a military putsch and the army’s taking power again. The democracy charted by the crowds of revolutionaries at Tahrir Square in Cairo was thus postponed indefinitely. Which has led Brian Garrett-Glaser, a researcher at the Center for Preventive Action of the Council on Foreign Relations (USA), to say that “Tunisia is a relative island of stability in a chaotic region, and the outcome of its democratic transition – as well as the role played by the United States throughout – will have a significant impact on regional and global security, US-led efforts to counter violent extremism, and perceived credibility of US actions in the Middle East.”

As many other American researchers regarding the nascent democracy in Tunisia, Brian Garrett-Glaser believes “Tunisian attitudes toward democracy and Islam prove that the two are not incompatible” and can help dissipate the general scepticism regarding the role of political Islam in a democratic regime based on political change through elections. “It is in the United States’ strategic interest for this realisation to spread throughout the region,” he concludes.

The Spaniard Lluís Bassets arrives at the same conclusion: “Tunisia is an exception, a sort of solitary democracy lost in an ocean of autocratic regimes and failed states. Nonetheless, it has become the solution, the model that the Islamic State struggles against, the exact opposite of the Caliphate,” he writes, alluding to the terrorist attack at the Bardo.

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1 Lotfi Nagdh (of the liberal Nidaa Tounes party), and Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi (of the left-wing Popular Front coalition) were assassinated by religious extremists.
Museum in Tunis on 18 March 2015, which killed 22 people, primarily foreign tourists. The Spanish editorialist also advocates greater support from European countries for the Tunisian democratic experience: “Tunisia is the solution, but this solution cannot come solely from Tunisia. Tunisia is also the last bastion against the ominous alternatives of dictatorship or chaos […]. Will we abandon the Tunisians to their fate now?”

The Only Arab Democracy

Tunisia’s status as the only Arab democracy was not won overnight. The country has earned it through a long process of negotiations, at times heated, between political actors, which have allowed the State’s institutions to endure, the population’s democratic aspirations to be realised and a parliamentary regime to be instated that accords a significant role to citizen participation. This has, as we know, come at a price in sweat and blood, but one that can be considered reasonable in comparison with what is occurring in other Arab Spring countries.

Various grounds can be advanced to explain this relative success. We will discuss here those that seem the most pertinent, historically and politically:

1. First of all, Tunisia has a very old tradition of state organisation, instated by the Husaynid Beys more than three centuries ago. This has allowed it to weather the storms (of colonialism, dictatorship and then democratic transition) without crumbling, backed by an administration that, though all-powerful and bureaucratic, was relatively well-organised and efficient.

2. This state tradition was strengthened by a reformist process born in the first half of the 19th century, with the abolition of slavery in 1846, the promulgation of the first constitution in the Arab world in 1861, the adoption of a national currency and, last but not least, the establishment of an army that has managed to maintain its role as protector of state institutions and national borders while refraining from interfering in political affairs throughout its existence, even at times of crisis and major uncertainty.

3. The emergence as of the 1920s, under the French protectorate, of political parties, unions and associations that would lead to the movement for national independence, gained in 1956 more through negotiation than war and that, after the instatement of the republic in 1957, would continue their work of political management and citizen mobilisation. In addition, and despite the dictatorships imposed by Habib Bourguiba (1956-1987) and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011), which attempted to muzzle these parties, unions and associations and place them at the service of their respective authoritarian regimes, Tunisian civil society has never lost its vitality, strength and openness to the world. It even played a decisive role in the popular mobilisation leading to the overthrow of Ben Ali and in channelling popular forces to make the democratic transition advance while preventing excesses that could lead to anarchy.

Civil Society, the Metronome of the Transition

The day after the revolution of January 2011, the State tottered but did not fall. The Parliament, consisting of two chambers, was dissolved, as was the constitution in effect since 1959. A provisional government was instated with the mission of administering daily affairs and preparing the election of a constituent assembly.

At this dangerous stage, civil society was in the forefront, namely through the High Commission for the Realisation of Revolution Objectives, Political Reform and Democratic Transition (HIROR), which established the bodies and legal mechanisms necessary for the transition to run smoothly. Directed by Yadh Ben Achour, an eminent law professor specialising in Islamic political theory and public law, the High Commission brought together representatives of political parties, national organisations (trade union centre, employer’s association), professional associations (bar association, magistrates, journalists, university faculty, engineers, etc.) and independent national figures. This Commission, which filled the institutional void left by the dissolved Parliament, in adopting the statutory instruments necessary for the State to operate, created the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE), entrusted with organising the October 2011 elections,
the first truly free and transparent elections in the country’s history. At the same time, numerous other commissions ensured other aspects of the transition operated properly, in particular the National Commission for Media and Communications Reform (INRIC), the National Commission to Investigate Cases of Corruption and Embezzlement (CNI-ACM) and the National Commission to Investigate Excesses and abuses (CNIDV). These provisional commissions, whose members were co-opted from among civil society’s most prominent experts and actors, conceived the wise engineering of the political transition (general amnesty, law on political parties, a new electoral code, etc.), prepared the necessary sector reforms (media, magistracy...) and laid the groundwork of a transitional justice designed to definitively settle the dictatorship period.

These commissions, which operated on a volunteer basis but with logistic support from the State, dissolved themselves after the election and establishment of permanent legal institutions, namely the National Constituent Assembly (NCA), the Independent High Authority on Audiovisual Communication (HAI-CA), the Truth and Dignity Commission, etc.

The Origins of National Dialogue

By the same token, the new-found freedom allowed civil society to break free of the shackles of state control that had long suppressed it under the dictatorship and to regain a momentum, vivacity and creativity that would grow over the months. Thousands of associations were thus established, taking advantage of the easing of the conditions and procedures required for their creation. Some of them played a key role in the transition phase, as for instance, Mourakiboun (Observers), the Association tunisienne pour l’intégrité et la démocratie des élections (ATIDE, the Tunisian Association for the Integrity and Democracy of Elections) or I Watch, which have contributed, together with the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE), to ensuring that electoral operations take place properly. The Al-Bawsala (Barometer) association specialises in observing the work of the Assembly. It also monitors the proper execution of the state budget and lately also ensures citizen oversight of municipal activities in all domains: infrastructure, health, culture, sports, etc. Dozens of other associations can also be cited, active in domains as diverse as police reform (Islah), financial transparency (ATTF), observation of the judiciary (OTIM), etc.

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To measure the importance of the role played by the civil society in Tunisia in preventing the chaos currently reigning in the other Arab Spring countries, one must recall the action civil society organisations took during the crisis arising after the political assassinations of the two left-wing leaders Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi. It was in the summer of 2013: tens of thousands of Tunisians were protesting daily in cities across the country to demand the dissolution of the government led by the Islamist Ali Laarayedh. And the cause: the aggravation of the economic crisis, the rise in religious extremism and its corollary, terrorism, and social malaise (unemployment, insecurity, inflation...) revealed the incompetence of the government and its inability to rise to the situation.

The country, divided into two irreconcilable blocs – the Islamists and the seculars – was on the verge of civil war. The work of the National Constituent Assembly was suspended, the government paralysed and international partners and lending institutions won over by misgivings. And this was when the civil society once again intervened to save the day by launching the National Dialogue under the auspices of four national organisations: the Tunisian General Trade Union (UGTT, the historic labour union confederation), the Tunisian Union for Industry, Commerce and Handicrafts (UTICA, the national employers’ union confederation), the National Bar Association (ONAT) and the Tunisian Human Rights League (LTDH). The heads of these organisations succeeded in reconciling the positions of party leaders and bringing them to the negotiation table. A marathon of
meetings from September to December 2013 allowed them to reach a solution acceptable to all parties, which consisted in dissolving of the government, establishing a technocratic government entrusted with managing daily affairs and creating the conditions for holding legislative and presidential elections by the end of 2014, and accelerating the adoption of the new constitution. This was the scenario, scrupulously followed by all parties involved, that allowed the Tunisians to overcome the crisis, save the democratic transition they believed compromised and regain hope.

The Conundrum of Secret Funding

When considering the vitality of Tunisian civil society today, one mustn’t lose sight of the darker side of the coin, namely, the secret ties held by many associations with certain major political parties. Taking advantage of the weakened State and the absence of effective methods to control political funds, which flow at times via informal circuits escaping the banking system, these parties use associations, whose number has practically doubled since the revolution, going from 9,000 to over 16,000, as funding pumps. The resources thus collected allow them to display an insolent degree of wealth while organising American-style electoral meetings, deepening their networks in popular districts and offering needy families gifts (sheep for Eid al-Adha, school supplies for children, funds for marriages and circumcision ceremonies, baskets with food or household goods...). These facts are not only commonplace but widely discussed by the media, yet the authorities seem helpless in addressing the practices of political parties that, upon taking control of the legislative institution, seem to have also taken hold of the state apparatus and neutralised public control mechanisms.

In any case, parties and organisations are required by law, if not to reveal their funding sources, at least to submit a detailed annual report on their revenue and expenditure to the Court of Auditors, as stipulated by Decree-Laws 87 and 88 of 2011 regulating the organisation of political parties and associations, respectively. The problem is that the majority of parties and associations do not comply or only partially comply with this legal requirement. The Court of Auditors is handicapped by a lack of material means and expertise in the control of political fund flows. To gain an awareness of the enormity of the task, suffice it to imagine the number of accounting experts needed to audit the accounts of some 150 political parties and 16,000 associations.

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Officially, parties are funded by membership dues and public subsidies allocated in proportion to their representation in Parliament. It is a known fact, however, that the amounts collected through these two legal sources are not even enough to cover the rental fees and operating expenses of the hundreds of offices these parties, particularly the larger ones, maintain throughout the republic, not to mention the salaries of the hundreds of civil servants they employ full time. The other sources, less transparent and harder to trace, are contributions in cash and in kind made by certain local businessmen wishing to have ‘clients’ among the policymakers, and ‘shell’ associations often financed by foreign donors. And this is where we will find one of the significant challenges to the success of the democratic transition in Tunisia: gaining greater control over foreign funding, particularly that from certain Gulf States using hundreds of so-called Koranic, charitable, social or cultural associations as ‘slush funds’ for Islamist parties – including Ennahdha – and, according to certain media investigations, even terrorist groups.
Jihadism in Europe

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The year 2015 opened with dramatic reminders that jihadism still poses a significant threat to the security of most European countries. The attacks that bloodied the streets of Paris (January attack against the offices of the Charlie Hebdo magazine and a kosher market) and Copenhagen (February attack against a freedom of speech event and a synagogue hosting a religious ceremony) confirmed the fears that had long been expressed by authorities throughout the Continent. The death of Osama bin Laden and the enthusiasm generated by the Arab Spring had initially triggered hopes that the War on Terror and its toxic legacy had become a thing of the past. Yet, over the last couple of years, there has been a chilling realisation that the global jihadist movement is anything but vanished. Rather, it has been experiencing a resurgence worldwide, including in Europe. No indicator is more telling of this dynamic than the mobilisation of European foreign fighters for the conflict in Syria and, subsequently, Iraq. The mobilisation of European jihadists for foreign battlefields is not a new phenomenon. It dates back to the 1980s (Afghanistan), continued throughout the 1990s (Bosnia and Chechnya) and surged in the 2000s (Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia). Even so, the number of European-based fighters who have reached Syria and Iraq since 2011 is unprecedented in size. One of the latest estimates, provided in January 2015 by Europol, puts that number at up to 5,000. Larger countries like France and the United Kingdom have contributed the lion’s share of the fighters (some 1,000 and 800, respectively), but even smaller ones have seen large numbers of their residents (and, in most cases, citizens) travel to Syria to fight. Worrying is, for example, the case of small Belgium, which has provided a disproportionate 400 fighters.

Even though not all do, the vast majority of these European volunteers join jihadist groups, in particular the Islamic State. European authorities are understandably concerned about the implications. British authorities have described this phenomenon as “a game-changer” and “the most profound shift in the threat we have seen since 2003.” In January 2014, the then French Interior Minister Manuel Valls called the possibility of these individuals returning to France as hardened jihadists as “the biggest threat that the country faces in the coming years.” Hans-Peter Friedrich, Germany’s former Interior Minister, has stated that returnees from Syria trained in “deadly handwork” will be “ticking time bombs.”

To be clear, not all foreign fighters will pose a threat upon returning to Europe (and some will never return at all, either because they will die on the battlefield or because they will continue their militancy in Syria/Iraq or elsewhere). But it seems inevitable that at least some of those who do will attempt to carry out attacks against targets in their own or other European countries. So far the only successful attack carried out by a returning foreign fighter is the May 2014 shooting of four visitors at Brussels Jewish

3 Ibid.
Museum by Mehdi Nemmouche, a Frenchman who had just returned to Europe after fighting with ISIS. But attacks tracing their roots in the Syrian/Iraqi conflict have been thwarted in Britain, Sweden, Belgium, France, and Switzerland. Many of these were just in the planning stages, and it is unclear whether the planners were acting independently or under some form of command from various groups operating in Syria and Iraq.

Mirroring dynamics seen in European jihadist networks over the last decade, the European ‘contingent’ in Syria is characterised by the extreme diversity in origin, age, background, and socio-economic conditions of the individuals fighting there. Some of them are seasoned jihadists, individuals with a long track record of militancy and fighting experience. Yet most appear to be young aspiring jihadists with no previous battlefield experience. Many of them were known to belong to militant networks or be active in the Salafist scene in their countries of origin but had not been previously involved in any direct violent action, whether domestically or abroad. Others were individuals who had previously not given any sign of sympathy with jihadist ideology or even of any interest in politics or religion. Cases of individuals that, in a matter of weeks, go from no interest in jihadism to fighting in Syria are frequently reported throughout the continent.

One characteristic that has been noticed in most European countries is that many of the foreign fighters are extremely young, in some cases as young as 13. And another development that has been witnessed Europe-wide is the growing number of females who decide to travel to Syria with their husbands or to get married to mujaheddin they meet online. There are indications that some of these women are also involved in actual fighting, a relatively new development in the world of jihadism.

At the same time religious motivations play a crucial role. Most foreign fighters who join jihadist groups are driven by a deep hatred for Alawites and Shias in general and see fighting what they consider deviant Islamic sects a religious duty. Similarly, many of them are enthusiastic about the idea of establishing an Islamic state governed by a strict interpretation of the sharia in Syria, a country in the heart of the Arab world. This prospect arouses particular emotions among those espousing jihadist ideology also due to Syria’s particular importance in Islamic history and eschatology. Finally, personal issues and circumstances cannot be ignored as important drivers behind the radicalisation process and the decision to travel to Syria of many European foreign fighters. These intertwined factors are visible in the personal recollections of some of the first European jihadists who have publicly spoken about their experiences in Syria. One of them is a slightly atypical militant, 38-year-old Abderroazak Benarabe. Benarabe is widely known in Denmark as Store A (Big A) and is the former leader of one of the coun-

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5 “Brussels Jewish Museum killings: Suspect ‘admitted attack’,” BBC, June 1, 2014.
try’s most notorious criminal gangs, the Blågårds Plads Gruppe. Benarabe was profiled in a 2013 documentary broadcasted by Danish public television that followed the gangbanger’s journey from Copenhagen to Syria, where he spent time with the Sunni militant group Ahrar al Sham.7

In the documentary Benarabe explained that he had spent most of his life engaging in criminal activities and without being religious. But when his younger brother, who was also a gang member, found two nodes in his neck, Benarabe reconsidered his approach to life. “I made a covenant with God that if he let my little brother survive,” he recounted “I would pull myself together and stay away from crime.”8 Big A interpreted the fact that the nodes were found to be harmless as a sign: “I began to relate to Islam, stopped smoking marijuana, tried to stay away from crime and had started frequenting the local mosque.” After a few months he decided to travel to Syria. “With all the crap I’ve done in my life, I want to do something good again, and if it costs me my life, at least it’s in a good cause,” he explained. “I will fight against the injustice that is happening down there, while the whole world is looking on.”

These factors are unquestionably crucial for some of the Europeans who travel to Syria. Yet, in other cases, more superficial factors are equally important. In many cases, in fact, the search for a life time adventure, the attraction to violence and the sheer ‘cool’ appeal of being involved in militancy are extremely important factors.

The European Response

European authorities have reacted in a variety of ways. Many initiatives have focused on preventing European Muslims from traveling to Syria in the first place. While the approaches vary from country to country, most employ a mix of hard and soft measures. When possible, authorities seek to arrest and criminally prosecute individuals seeking to leave. And while no country criminalises traveling to Syria or any other conflict area per se (although proposals to do so are currently being discussed), many have statutes under which individuals seeking to make the journey can be charged with training for terrorist purposes, providing support to a terrorist organisation or similar offenses.

Obviously, in order to do so, authorities need to be in possession of solid evidence that can be produced in court, something that is not easy to obtain when seeking to prosecute individuals who are simply planning terrorism-related activities. This often leads to frustrating situations in which authorities have to watch individuals leave for Syria with what can be quite reasonably assumed to be the intention of joining jihadist groups but are unable to arrest them for lack of adequate evidence. In many instances European authorities resort to alternative, but arguably not very effective, measures such as the confiscation of travel documents or, in the case of minors, judicial custody.

Authorities face similarly significant challenges when dealing with individuals who have returned from Syria. Those seeking to prosecute returnees are faced with the challenge of proving through evidence admissible in court that a given individual committed specific crimes — a daunting task given the difficulty in obtaining reliable evidence from the Syrian and Iraqi battlefields.

Many European countries have also been employing various measures to reintegrate returnees. Countries such as Denmark and the Netherlands have had a counter-radicalisation structure in place for almost ten years, and are now using many of their resources to diffuse the potential threat posed by returnees. In many countries, such efforts take the form of psychological counselling and coaching from trusted mentors. At the same time, authorities seek to monitor the returnees’ activities and assess the dangerousness of each.

Overall, however, these measures seem inadequate to stem the steady flow of foreign fighters now migrating to the Levant — or prevent the return of at least some of them home, with the intention of carrying out attacks. Europe’s struggle in confronting this emerging threat demonstrates all too clearly that liberal democracies face significant, and perhaps ultimately insurmountable, barriers to their ability to defend against this current trend in transnational terrorism.

7 The documentary can be seen at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7wKG82b9iw
Arab societies are experiencing deep divisions between ethnic, religious and sectarian components, which have coexisted throughout their long history, and today are looking increasingly disintegrated. This is not due to the nature of these components or their structure, but rather these divisions were made more evident as far back as the collapse of the foundation of the modern Arab states and the failed transition during the Arab Spring.

Arab Transition

The ‘Arab revolutions’ as the young Arab activists liked to call them, started in Tunisia then continued in Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria succeeding in overthrowing the Arab dictators who had been in power for decades. These uprisings also destroyed the ‘traditional hypothesis’ repeated in Western studies regarding Arabic exceptionalism when it comes to democracy, or the so-called cultural factor that many researchers relied on when analysing the absence of democracy or its development within many non-Western societies, especially Arab ones (Laffin, 1975). One of the components of this direction in Western literature focused on the characteristics of the Arab people, such as: hypocrisy, irrationality and honour-related social norms which directly contradict the concept of democracy (Puyce-Jones, 1989). Some might blame this on ‘Islam,’ its lack of distinction between the spiritual and temporal worlds making it incompatible with democracy (Cesari, 2014).

The Tunisian revolution has completely upended this prior hypothesis, and reaffirmed what we have always said: that we should not look at culture or values statically. It is closely associated with the present political climate, which may promote the creation of some kind of rule of law or indulge corruption and nepotism, it might support accountability and what comes with it such as honesty and responsibility or become a fertile environment for stagnation, waste, and an irresponsible use of public money.

The Failure of Arab Transitions and the Rise of Sectarianism

With Yemen’s following the same fate to Libya and Syria, after the Houthis took control of the capital, Sanaa, has turned the Arab Spring into a fully-fledged autumn exactly five years after its beginning.

Why have most Arab Spring countries, such as Egypt, Syria, Libya and Yemen, failed to accomplish the political transition towards building a democratic and liberal system and thus achieve the dream of the youth at the forefront of the demonstrations and the millions that filled the streets of Arab capitals? Why did democratisation in these countries fail, despite the success of the transformation process in other parts of the world like in countries of Eastern Europe in the nineties and Latin America in the eighties?

Why have Arab Spring countries failed to shift from military or authoritarian regimes to democratic ones and instead are almost all on the brink of or already plunged into civil war? It is difficult to predict when or how it will end, whether these countries will return to the traps of military rule as in Egypt, or become like Yemen, Syria and Libya; failed states in chaos and with a complete absence of state institutions.
In fact, there are several reasons for this failure, none of which stems from the isolated nature of the Arab region and lack of similarity to other parts of the world, but are rather entirely built on the elements of the modern Arab states that ruled in those countries. And since these countries never addressed the issue of sectarianism, it was easy for this element to explode during the transition.

It is true that the Arab countries have different types of authoritarianism. There are authoritarian regimes which allow a minimum level of competitiveness in the elections and the media and have a multi-party system. They may be rigging the election results and constantly arresting political dissidents, but there is a degree of liberalism in dealing with the opposition (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Egypt under Mubarak and Yemen under Saleh would be examples of this. Then there are authoritarian systems that are hegemonic, which means that election results are known in advance, that there is no pluralism in the political system or in the media, like Syria under Assad or Libya under Gaddafi. In the first model of authoritarianism, regimes are competitive and there is a high probability of transition towards a democratic system, while the probability of transition in hegemonic authoritarian regimes is very low. Even if the transition occurs, it could lead to instability in the political system, or back to military rule.

If we look at the countries involved in the Arab Spring, like Syria and Libya, both are the most closed of the Arab region (perhaps in the whole world with the exception of North Korea). Both Yemen and Egypt are certainly competitive compared to Syria and Libya, although both attempted to follow the same path in recent years, through their leaders' personalisation of state institutions to enable power to be transferred to their sons, Jamal in the case of Egypt and Ahmad in the case of Yemen. In this way they became increasingly described as family regimes and this of course opened the door towards the weakening of state institutions and strengthening of special interest networks inside and outside the country at the expense of national interests, which often vanish or take a back seat to the interests of the ruling family.

The Arab revolutions collided with the harsh tyrannical structures of the ruling regimes, which proved unwilling to initiate a smooth democratisation or transition process. These structures played a destructive role not only by blocking the transformation process, but by destroying it, helping to create non-state military organisations, like ISIS in Syria and Iraq, Hezbollah in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen. All these military structures have been formed either directly or indirectly by the previous regimes’ structures in order to obstruct the process of transition, and, in so doing, have led these countries into political or military chaos. Unable to withstand the pressure, the already weakened social structures were thus broken down, opening the door to civil war and giving way to rising sectarianism.

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Another key factor in the failure to undergo transition, which has ultimately led to the rise of sectarian politics in the Arab Spring countries, was the lack of regional institutions, or at least some kind of mediator or promoter of the transition process, like the role played by the European Union in Eastern Europe. The only regional institution is the Arab League, which is highly traditional, not governed by democratic principles or a legal mandate and uninterested in pushing for democratisation in the Arab world. This has left the Arab nations to carry out their transitions alone, with neither the experience nor the capacity to do so effectively. With the exception of Tunisia, Arab Spring countries, such as Syria, Libya, Yemen and Egypt, are finding out through their transformation processes how the ruling political elites and oppositions have conflicting agendas that
are difficult to reconcile. Added to this was the absence of support for political transition from the international community, which allowed the process to slip into armed conflict and, in some cases, civil war. Unfortunately, the bitter truth seems to be that civil war is the natural successor to the authoritarian regimes that ruled Arab countries for decades, which leads us to the final and most important factor: the foundation of the modern Arab states. This foundation is not only the framework of the modern Arab State, which suffered a period of disintegration and dissolution because of its inability to govern with democratic principles. Sectarianism may arise from minority or majority groups too as we have seen in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. In this case there are two possibilities: either the recognition of a semi-sectarian balance with guaranteed pluralism but without the abolition of sectarianism or the prevention of any party from controlling any other party, leaving these countries open to the dangers of the coexistence of opposing communities. But the latter does not eliminate the possibility of resorting to sectarian war to resolve controversies caused by imbalances arising from internal or external changes.

Democratic systems are enriched by the consistent and clear devolution of power in a peaceful manner, which allows sectarianism to be bypassed and reduces the need to fuel sectarian feuds, as well as leading to the abolition of religious distinctions or denominational and sectarian discrimination between groups. Democracy does not just mean holding elections but also requires the State and civil society to commit to working hard to develop an awareness of individuals’ needs and upgrade civic awareness at the expense of communal awareness, teaching people the meaning of freedom, equality, justice and public responsibility. Cooperation, solidarity and participation must be brought into the arena of rampant conflict to improve living conditions for everyone. If the concept of citizenship has not been ingrained in our societies today, it is not due to the presence of religious distinctions but moreover a lack of civic education resulting from the desire of the ruling elites to maintain the political control mechanisms by force and dashing hopes for a modern political culture and its accompanying sense of responsibility. The main concern is that by completely erasing the idea of equality and citizenship awareness among individuals, these people can easily become henchmen and supporters of sectarianism.

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Towards a Resurgence of Government Concern Regarding the Informal Economy in South Shore Mediterranean Countries

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The Arab Spring marked the reminiscence of a certain interest of the authorities in South Shore Mediterranean countries and especially the Maghreb regarding the informal economy, an interest coinciding with the return of this issue to the International Labour Conference agenda in 2014.

Labour Market Tension

In recent times, the countries in the region have continued to experience high unemployment rates (approaching 10% or more, and even reaching 13% in the case of Egypt and 15% in Tunisia) particularly affecting the labour force with a higher education or specialised training (with rates at nearly 20% or more in Egypt and Morocco and over 30% in Tunisia). The situation is especially acute among youth aged 15 to 24, whose unemployment rate in 2014 was between 17.9% in Turkey and 31.4% in Tunisia, whereas the proportion of this age group that is not in employment, education or training (the NEET rate) is nearly one out of four (see Table 5).

The majority of countries are pursuing even more vigorous active employment policies particularly aimed at youth. In Algeria, thanks to the revenue from hydrocarbon rent, a great number of youth have benefited from workforce integration contracts and support for job creation, the country managing to stave off the rise in unemployment rates, whereas in Tunisia, the same type of programmes could not absorb the masses of youth impelled to declare themselves unemployed rather than informally employed, due to selection criteria inappropriate for gaining employment in the public sector (whether subsidised or not). Hence nearly one youth out of two declared they were seeking work in 2011 (42.3%), the proportion being around one out of three today (31.4%). (See Table 5)

Resilient Informal Economies in Which Micro-Enterprise Predominates but Where Informal Employment within the Formal Sector is Much More Widespread than in Other Regions

It is in such a context, and while in the majority of the developing regions in the world, employment in the informal economy has increased continually over a long period, that the South Mediterranean Countries have experienced fluctuations, illustrating the global counter-cyclical nature of a phenomenon whose definition and measure have been progressively refined over the course of the past four decades.

The informal economy is not the equivalent of the shadow economy, even if ties to the latter do exist and it can at times prevail over the former. Consisting of micro-enterprises on the one hand and unprotected workers in the formal sector on the other, the informal economy involves economic activities that are perfectly visible but poorly understood.1

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1 Without going into detail here on the definitions, recall that the informal sector was defined at the 15th International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ICLS, 1993) based on the characteristics of the enterprises (legal status, size, non-registration of the company or its workers), whereas informal employment was defined at the 17th ICLS in 2003 based on the characteristics of the employment exercised (mainly the absence of social security). The informal economy to which the 2002 International Work Conference referred, as well as the following Conferences, was a combination of the two preceding concepts.
Table 6 (and Chart 8 below) shows the evolution of employment in the informal economy as a percentage of non-agricultural employment – a much more sensitive indicator and thus more pertinent than an indicator taking into account agricultural activities and thus subject to evolutions that have a tendency to balance out. Note the sharp rise in informality across the region in 2000-2004 and 2005-2009, followed by a decrease in the 2010-14 period. This decrease (occurring in all the countries in the region except Tunisia, which is experiencing the after-effects of the 2011 revolution) also reveals the results of a certain interventionism by states concerned at the sharp rise in unemployment among youth in general and young graduates in particular.

Over the recent 2010-14 period, employment in the informal economy thus represented an average of some 50% of overall non-agricultural employment in Northern Africa, with a maximum in Morocco (70%, in a downtrend) and a minimum of 40% in Algeria and Tunisia. The latter, which until the end of said period had the lowest informal economy employment rate, has now surpassed 40%.

Moreover, one of the characteristics of the informal economy in Northern Africa is that informal employ-
ment outside of the formal sector (that is, essentially precarious employment in the formal sector) represents over 41% of total employment in the informal economy (the remaining 59% consisting of employment in informal micro-enterprises), which is the highest proportion observed in the world. Another defining feature, revealed by the Tunisian School to Work Transition Survey (SWTS) effected in 2013 by the Tunisian National Observatory of Employment and Training (ONEQ) in partnership with the International Labour Organization (ILO-ONEQ, 2014), is that over ¾ of employed youth are working in the informal economy. And this is most likely the case in the other countries in the region as well. Taken together, youth unemployment rates (between 1 out of 5 and 1 out of 4 unemployed), NEET rates (1 out of 4 youths neither employed nor in education or training) and the informal economy employment rates (3 youths out of 4) explain the sudden resurgence of government concern with the informal economy.

**Origins of the Informal Economy: Its Recent Ties with the Contraband Economy and Islamism**

The origins of the informal economy and its dynamics in Northern Africa are diverse. Although they draw their origins from formerly powerful trade guilds in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, informal manufacturing activities would experience a certain decline around 1980, with strong competition, first domestic (with the pressure of apprentices completing their training), then foreign (with the competition from Chinese products). Two phenomena, however, emerged to boost the growing orientation of informal activities towards distribution.

From the failed advent of an Islamic State over the course of the 1990s, the Algerian economy inherited established distribution channels that continue to function today while remaining impermeable to any form of tax payments, refusing to contribute to state funds. There is a connection between import and retail
distribution, thanks to complicities and large-scale operations with Middle Eastern and Far Eastern countries, with which it is easier to practice under-invoicing, as well as counterfeit products. Hence the transition from Marseilles tote bags to containers from Shanghai (Peraldi, 2001). This bazaar economy is one of the historic roots of the informal economy based on the absence of invoicing and payment in cash.

Another source, in the case of Algeria, is excess bureaucracy, above all for youth who are just starting off: access to a business space and credit is at times difficult, lengthy, expensive, complicated and marked by favouritism. This obliges them to adopt survival strategies that explain the lack of competitiveness of SMEs.

Against this historic backdrop of going against the rules and bureaucracy inherited from previous periods, the 1994 Structural Adjustment Programme greatly curtailed the population’s purchasing power. The informal economy then adapted: by underestimating the value of imported products through under-invoicing and thus eliminating the tax burden, it has managed to keep consumer products affordable to the middle class.

This is a system difficult to eliminate because it has taken on a large scale and infected all the cogwheels necessary for its further development. However, it is this import system that hinders the development of national enterprise, for it follows its own dynamic, namely, if a certain product pleases consumers, that article is immediately sent to China, where it is counterfeited and returns to the Algerian market at a much lower price. Under such conditions, no manufacturing activity or even any legal import activities can survive.

To gain an idea of the strength of this informal sector and the lobby it represents, suffice it to recall that the obligation to settle any transactions over 50,000 Algerian dinars by cheque fizzled out in 2010, and it was not until June 2015 that it was reinstated by decree, but now for amounts of over 1,000,000 dinars.

The surveillance of accounts with over 50 million dinars has had the perverse effect of deflecting people from their banks, with over 50% of funds remaining outside the banking system.

But although social partners seem to coincide in this analysis and although the Algerian National Economic and Social Pact seems to demonstrate the authorities’ predisposition to endorse it and drawing the appropriate conclusions, there is no apparent unanimity on the solutions to implement. Shortly after the colloquium on “The Informal Economy in Algeria: Traces of a Transition towards Formalisation” (March 2013), organised under the patronage of the Algerian Ministry of Commerce, the commitment to draw up a White Paper seems to be at a standstill, and though the main institutional actors were parties to the Declaration of Tunis on 2 July 2013 (see below), there has not been any significant progress in this regard since then. Moreover, these actors witnessed a change in discourse on the informal economy, insisting on its job creation aspect and the consequent need to leave it in peace. And though the Pact discusses the ‘struggle’ against the informal economy, the social partners are more circumspect regarding the need for ‘repression.’

Access to a business space and credit is at times difficult, lengthy, expensive, complicated and marked by favouritism. This obliges them to adopt survival strategies.

In Tunisia, the development of contraband is a central phenomenon dating back to the mid-1990s, when the free trade regime with Europe and the prosperity of the Trabelsi Clan resulting therefrom were offset by a laissez-faire tolerance towards ordinary people, leading to the emergence of Libyan souks in nearly all cities. This recognised and tolerated social release valve entailed the mass destruction of the organised economy. Thus, for instance, and with the help of the tax rise, the home appliances sector became informal through contraband. A whole series of distribution chains were then established on an informal level with the lowest link in the chain (the retailers) perfectly visible and obtaining greater profit than those gained in the formal sector, whereas the top of the chain remained invisible. Ayadi et al. (2013), in their study for the World Bank, measured the magnitude and the tax gap along both Tunisian borders – the one with Libya and the one with Algeria. They found that the labour market was in crisis in all the governorates where contraband prevailed, for salaries had to be aligned with the contraband revenue, further reducing hiring. The risk is then that the entire organised economy become infected.
Contraband is a phenomenon that sustains arms trafficking and religious extremism. A symptomatic factor, moreover, is that it was during the same period in the 1990s that the contraband and distribution networks sustaining Islamism were established in Algeria. Hence, besides a small private entrepreneurial sector seeking access to markets and sources of funding and which deserves support, the informal sector consists primarily of activities infected by contraband, themselves infected by the criminal economy involved in arms trafficking and terrorism.

The Influence of Peruvian Economist Hernando de Soto’s Ideas

Tunisian and Algerian employers and their associations have adopted Hernando de Soto’s analyses. This author has come to their defence in Tunisia and in the whole of the Maghreb within the framework of his Institute for Liberty and Democracy (ILD), dedicated to studying and comprehending the legal causes of economic exclusion and advocating an inclusive State of Law: the informal economy arises from the difficulties encountered by the formal sector and the barriers to entering it, which should thus be removed. De Soto’s theories have been known since 1986: in many countries, it takes months if not years to complete all the procedures required to set up a business – if indeed it is possible to achieve at all – while in other countries, it only takes a few minutes, several hours or several days. Reducing the number of procedures required and their length would thus be the first element of a policy of economic formalisation. But the main problem lies in the absence of recognition of the extralegal capital small, informal entrepreneurs have available. It is access to legality that is limited and that should be expanded, a much vaster and more complex problem than that of simple procedures for registering a business.

In his analysis of the situation in the MENA region and in Tunisia in particular during the post-Arab Spring period, De Soto (2013) poses the question: “Why are Arab entrepreneurs not meeting their potential for producing prosperity?” According to him, over 90% of the Tunisian population has extralegal real estate, with extralegal real estate and business assets in 2012 to the value of 115 billion US dollars (that is, four times the amount of cumulative Foreign Direct Investment since 1976), and 85% of Tunisian entrepreneurs operate extralegally, whereas it takes 62 procedures and 499 days to legalise property rights and 54 procedures and 142 days to set up a small business. He thus proposes a programme for economic inclusion based on hearing people’s needs, reaching a consensus on acceptance of extralegal practices and documents, improving accessibility to property and business rights and evaluating public policies by their results insofar as inclusion.

An analysis of the forgotten origins of the Arab Spring and its economic solution was broadly disseminated in a brochure (ILD, 2012). The event triggering the Tunisian Revolution, 26-year-old Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in Sidi Bouzid, was a protest by a small-time street vendor of fruit and vegetables whose little capital he possessed was confiscated by the authorities. Numerous other cases of self-immolation took place in the following weeks throughout the entire subregion for similar reasons. Interviewing the families of those immolated and survivors, De Soto saw in these actions the emergence of a social class of entrepreneurs wishing to accumulate capital, aware of being repressed and subject to the authorities’ ‘hogra’ (contempt), and rebelling against being deprived of their real estate and business rights. In losing his tangible assets, Bouazizi was also losing his extralegal rights and, naturally, his legal rights, to which all sorts of obstacles had prevented him access.

The recent evolution of the informal economy is threatening the wage- and-social-security model

At present, a number of political parties, among them Afek Tounes, have adopted these ideas as part of their agenda.

Relative Consensus among Social Partners on the Diagnosis and Solutions for Transition from the Informal to the Formal Economy

Subsequently, these thoughts were discussed in Algeria, then were the subject of an official declaration in Tunis adopting recommendations on a Maghreb-wide scale. The Declaration of Tunis, made on 2 July
2013, expressed the wish of an inclusive Maghrebi Council for Entrepreneurship. Considering that “over half of the entrepreneurs in the Maghreb are now, to some degree, outside of the formal sphere and therefore do not enjoy the advantages and protection of the law, nor the advantages of globalisation” and that it is “imperative to take action for economic and social inclusion and for Maghrebi economic integration by rendering normative and legal regulatory systems coherent and feasible, thus rendering recourse to informality needless,” Maghrebi employers’ organisations decided to combine efforts to achieve “inclusive and sustainable solutions to the problem of the informal economy, which affects economic growth, social and regional integration, and peace and stability in the Maghreb.”

Symptomatically, labour unions are of the same opinion, for they find that the recent evolution of the informal economy is threatening the wage-and-social-security model (the welfare State) and we are thus witnessing a certain convergence between employers, employees and governments, perhaps partially brought on by discussions at the 103rd session of the International Labour Conference in 2014 (ILO, 2014) that resulted in recommendations for a transition from an informal to a formal economy, exceptionally adopted nearly unanimously at the 104th session in June 2015 (ILO, 2015).

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Struggling against Food Waste in the Mediterranean Region to Strengthen Food Security

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In the vast debate on food security, the issues of food loss and food waste have become central. Whereas many concerns exist regarding the evolution of the supply and demand for agricultural products in the coming years, the struggle against losses and waste is turning out to be one of the main levers to pull in attempting to reduce food insecurity in the world. Such an issue also affects the Mediterranean Basin. All the countries in this region are facing the following difficulty: they need to produce more with fewer resources and thus use resources more sparingly.

The problem of food loss and food waste has various dimensions (social, economic and environmental) and should be approached from three different yet complementary angles. Indeed, combining the analysis of natural resources, production and knowledge allows the matter to be situated more globally within the perspective of sustainable development, where humans become the priority again.

Conserving Natural Resources

Food waste does not just mean the loss of a substance that is vital to humans, but also the squandering of precious natural resources (land, water, energy, forests, biodiversity) indispensable for a sustainable food supply. Not maintaining an efficient land base, the water necessary for agricultural activity, forest areas that contribute to attenuating climate change, energy supplies in the field of food production and transport, and Mediterranean biodiversity means undermining major elements of food security. Managing these issues well is thus decisive on the road towards a global strategy of struggle against waste.

The depletion of natural resources is a factor contributing to tension and destabilisation in the Mediterranean Region. The water problem is well known: unequally distributed among countries and territories, water is increasingly coveted. Its role remains important for agriculture, since 80% of this ‘blue gold’ is used for irrigation in Middle East and North African (MENA) countries. To mobilise greater amounts of water in the Mediterranean Basin, the solution is not to hope to find more, but on the contrary, to limit waste in order to increase the available volume. In fact, large amounts of water are lost due to lack of appropriate techniques or modern infrastructure. Greater human engineering and technology are thus necessary to develop more efficient irrigation systems. In the process of food production, water is a key element throughout the food chain. The total volume of water used every year to produce lost or wasted food (250 km³) is equivalent to the annual flow of the Volga River (Russia), or three times the volume of Lake Geneva. To obtain one kilogramme of cereals, a staple of human consumption, some 13,000 litres of water are required. To measure the ensemble of water supply necessary for food production or industry and evaluate the environmental footprint of a product, the concept of ‘virtual water’ has been proposed. It certainly reflects the search to decrease waste with relation to the resources available to a country or operation.

The issue of soils is also frequently discussed. The land resource, like water, is, of course, strategic for agriculture. The United Nations, moreover, declared 2015 the International Year of Soils, following the Year of Family Farming in 2014, indicating to what point the land constitutes a major pillar of develop-
ment for rural communities. Nearly 1.4 billion hectares of land, in other words, 28% of the agricultural surface area of the world, currently produces food that is later lost or wasted. This ‘land’ waste, together with the encroachment of urbanisation upon arable land occurring throughout the Mediterranean Basin, should thus be taken seriously. Again, it seems surprising to be so concerned about new agricultural areas to be farmed (the famous land reserves of the planet!) and so little about all of those areas already under cultivation but whose production is being lost along the chain...

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Similar issues or ones related to those of water and soils exist with regard to forests, biodiversity and energy. In the case of energy, we mustn’t forget that its contribution is essential for agricultural activity. Otherwise, food produced then transported thousands of kilometres would not be consumed, causing by extension a considerable waste of energy. Moreover, the production and distribution of crops are stages in which greenhouse gas emissions are not negligible. In the geopolitics of resources, one must thus consider the issue of their waste and poor use. Managing these resources better would mean contributing to rendering development more sustainable and responsible. It would also and above all mean increasing the means of attaining greater food security. The definition of the new Post-2015 Development Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will probably reflect these growing concerns.

Reducing Food Waste

According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), approximately a third of world production is lost or wasted every year. This represents nearly 1.3 billion tonnes of food intended for human consumption which goes to waste at all stages of the food system. These losses and waste are different and occur in different proportions according to the stage of the food chain and the geographic, social and economic context involved. Developing countries are more affected by food loss during agricultural production (harvesting, transport and storage of the foodstuffs produced), whereas higher-income regions are essentially concerned by food waste at the retail and consumption stages (in the home and at restaurants).

Due to demographic growth and socioeconomic change, the world food demand could increase from 40 to 70% by 2050. In this scenario, we will have to be capable of increasing world agricultural production by approximately 60%. This is an immense challenge calling for a plurality of responses, not only agronomic and technological, but also logistic, social and political. The reduction of food loss and waste constitutes a real means to improve the efficiency and sustainability of agriculture and food production systems that should be implemented on different territorial levels. Indeed, problems vary greatly between countries and sectors. There will always be a certain amount of fruit and vegetables that spoil during the transport stage, for they are fragile. However, it is more difficult to accept such losses for wheat, which is easier to handle. In Egypt, some 10 to 20% of the harvest is lost due to lack of efficient storage space and appropriate infrastructure. This country is the world’s leading wheat importer. Reducing domestic losses would allow it to stem the rise in imports and adapt its local offer to domestic needs. In European societies, the struggle against food waste has become a highly significant matter of public and citizen action over the past few years. In France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece, populations are realising that greater attention in this regard provides not only a means of reducing personal expenses but also an indirect contribution to the health of the planet. There are new reflexes being created, above all in times of economic crisis, that can contribute to building greater food security as they spread. Distribution is likewise working to change its rules on unsold items and sell-by dates for products on the shelf, distinguishing more clearly between the expiration date and the best-before date on labels. This increased
Developing countries are more affected by food loss during agricultural production whereas higher-income regions are essentially concerned by food waste at the retail and consumption stages. Whereas an increase in agricultural production is a goal in and of itself, there is no doubt that a drastic reduction of food waste, both after harvesting and in the consumption stage, certainly represents a more operational and sustainable enabler of world development. This represents, moreover, an essential line of action for farmers. Post-harvest losses automatically mean a loss of income for them, since quantities sold diminish. This dimension has long been neglected. Its rise on the international agenda and the strategies implemented by many states and local governments are gratifying. At the Ministerial Conference on Agriculture held on 8 May 2015 in Istanbul, the G20 reiterated the great importance of this matter in its communiqué. The Turkish authorities naturally spearheaded the issue with the experience gained through their current project to reduce bread waste in the country, whose early results are highly encouraging.

Feeding Knowledge

In addition to waste of natural resources and food, there is also a waste of savoir-faire and knowledge. The intergenerational transmission of good farming practices adapted to the geographic milieu proves as strategic in the 21st century as it was in the past. Yet this transmission cannot only be ‘vertical.’ It should be shared on a territorial level, in a country or region. In the Mediterranean, the challenges in agriculture are such that good practices must be fostered, experiences exchanged, and different techniques made known. Savoir-faire is effective over time if it is transmitted to new generations, but will be even more precious if shared collectively. In the face of climate change, each solution counts and can offer action tips for people at the other end of the Mediterranean Region, for farmers open to the practices of others and agro-ecological progress. The accumulation of research without its being shared, the duplication of ideas without coordination or the lack of synergy among actors are other facets of the same problem, i.e. the waste of knowledge. Scientific diplomacy was never as necessary as it is today in the field of agronomic research. To feed the planet, people must be fed ideas and knowledge. Training is thus a crucial point to consider throughout a professional agricultural career. If we wish to establish sustainable food security, we must also combat this type of waste! In agriculture, this is of the essence. Traditional savoir-faire deserves greater attention and local solutions call for greater regional dissemination, which modern communication technologies amply allow. Hence, we must feed knowledge by sharing ever more experiences, knowledge and ideas. The circular economy of knowledge has incredible strength.

Beyond the struggle against the waste of knowledge, it is human action that should be put in perspective. People come up with responses when faced with problems that crop up, thereby accumulating knowledge that sediments over time and spreads. Humans are the creators of solutions that can surmount underdevelopment. This positive reading of human action on the state of the planet is resolutely oriented towards human ingenuity, capable of inverting trends, creating and finding local solutions adapted to meeting global challenges. This assertion is a plea for a Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda that...
could be structured according to four pillars: economic, environmental and social, naturally, but also innovation. By innovation, two things can be understood: first of all, humanity’s capacity to create change, advance science, feed knowledge and bring about the sort of historic ruptures that sometimes make humanity take a giant leap forward; and secondly, the implementation of SDGs on the local level that take into account societies’ cultural, social, economic and geographic specificities. Innovation for development is perforce local and distinctive. There is no magic recipe. Solutions will be adaptations to the situations in different territories to effectively implement knowledge in combination with the practices, needs and constraints of the context in which an action is intended to be translated into tangible results for people. Each territory can then invent its own model (or models!), at its own pace, with its own actors, difficulties and history.

**Conclusion**

The issue of waste and its different forms, schematically presented here, constitutes a significant challenge for the Mediterranean Region. In order to improve food security for people in the region, better managing natural resources, reducing agricultural loss and adapting knowledge to primary needs are strategic levers for concrete, pragmatic action. This is why CIHEAM is currently working with FAO to jointly conduct a cross-cutting analysis of this waste that will be the focal point of the 2016 edition of the Mediterra Regional Report. In any case, we are convinced that we must go further in this direction by working together with all Euro-Mediterranean multilateral cooperation actors wishing to commit to a Post-2015 Development Agenda whose implementation in the region rests largely on agriculture and food.

**FEEDING KNOWLEDGE, A CONCRETE CIHEAM PROGRAMME**

In the struggle against the waste of knowledge, CIHEAM’s most emblematic contribution is the development and implementation of the Feeding Knowledge project, in collaboration with Milan Polytechnic, a project that fosters the transfer and sharing of knowledge and innovation in the Mediterranean Region. This initiative has been part of the preparations for the Milan Universal Exposition, to be held from May to October 2015. Making the Mediterranean Basin a laboratory of this innovative concept, Feeding Knowledge is a programme aiming to promote cooperation in research and innovation for food security through knowledge sharing and the joint creation of concrete solutions that could meet the needs of developing countries. Since 2012, the programme has established a Mediterranean network of over 2000 experts focusing on research, innovation and knowledge transfer for food security. The programme’s five thematic spheres are sustainable management of natural resources, quantitative and qualitative enhancement of crops, socioeconomic dynamics and global markets, the sustainable development of small rural communities in marginal areas, and food consumption habits (food, environment, society, economy and health). Feeding Knowledge is expected to become one of the legacies of the Milan Universal Exposition and to be deployed more widely in the years to come.
The Effects of European Austerity Measures on the South and East Mediterranean Countries

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Following the 2008 United States (US) financial crisis and the European Union (EU) debt crisis, European countries have been experiencing a deep recession, and consequently a dramatic and fundamental shift in their expenditure and taxation policies. Accumulated public European debts have soared, balanced budgets have virtually disappeared, and government deficit financing through the issue of treasury bonds has prevailed. This resulted in the Greek debt crises of 2011 with potential fiscal insolvency in the remaining countries of Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Subsequently, all EU countries started implementing fiscal austerity measures in order to address their fiscal imbalances, curb their budget deficits and contain their accumulated public debts.¹

Despite genuine fears that the newly introduced austerity measures in several EU countries could prolong the recession in the EU, collapse aggregate demand, worsen already high unemployment rates, and further lower prices, European countries had no choice but to introduce swift austerity measures to address their fiscal imbalances in order to avoid a debt default and a fully-fledged banking and debt crisis. While these fiscal policy measures may improve the external deficits of Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, they are expected to lead to painful domestic adjustment measures, as a significant number of domestic firms will likely shut down further worsening the EU’s unemployment rates. Furthermore, deflation would also worsen the real burden of the EU’s national debt (Neaime 2015a).

The timing of the introduction of the various austerity measures in most European countries remains a concern for the Mediterranean Partner Countries² (MPCs), given the recessionary environment that the EU has been experiencing since the 2008 US financial crisis. It is believed that the newly introduced fiscal adjustment measures would keep EU countries in recession thereby worsening the existing debt burden and hampering any future effort to grow out of the accumulated public debt through higher real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rates. Moreover, these austerity measures are expected to lower the EU’s demand for Mediterranean imports, lower capital outflows to the region and adversely affect remittances and tourism from the EU to the South and East Mediterranean countries.

In the wake of the signing of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Agreements, the recent debt and financial crises and their respective negative spillover effects on several emerging economies including the South and East Mediterranean countries, have brought forward the potential damage to the Mediterranean Economies emanating from the EU’s weak financial sector and poor public sector finances. Moreover, there are recent fears that the EU’s fiscal and monetary imbalances and the newly introduced austerity measures could even endanger the recent trade and economic integration efforts between Europe and its Mediterranean partners.³

With the above in mind, and in light of the various austerity programmes that have been recently intro-

¹ For a more detailed discussion of the European Union’s debt crisis, see Neaime 2015.
² In this study the eight MPCs are: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.
duced in the EU, this paper will attempt to assess the macroeconomic and financial implications of those measures on the Mediterranean Partner Countries.

**Impact of the European Union’s Austerity Measures on MPCs**

The recent European debt and financial crises and the newly introduced austerity measures have put pressure on the MPCs’ economies, contributing to declines in their real GDP growth rates, commodity exports, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows, tourism revenues, workers’ remittances, and stock market performance. The EU’s adverse macroeconomic implications on the MPCs have not yet fully unfolded. It is possible that the negative economic and social consequences of the EU crisis, for example on Mediterranean employment, will be felt for some time to come – especially given the ongoing double-dip recession in the EU’s economies. Weaknesses in the public sector finances of some MPCs made the transmission of the EU’s recession into the region a source of concern, and have undermined the recent integration efforts of those countries with the EU. Moreover, lower growth prospects in the EU as a result of the various austerity measures introduced are leading to soaring current account and budget deficits, and are a source of concern for the sustainability of the current exchange rate regimes in several MPCs.\(^4\) Although trade and globalisation issues and the financial and economic integration of the MPCs with the EU’s financial and goods markets were among the main reasons why the EU’s austerity measures are affecting the Mediterranean region, it was accentuated by domestic macroeconomic, political, fiscal, monetary and financial issues, notably the existence of fixed exchange rates, weak domestic

\(^4\) See also Colton and Neaime 2002.
stock and bond markets, high real interest rates and limited fiscal space in some of those partner countries. The EU’s austerity measures coupled with the recent political and military turmoil in the Mediterranean region have lowered the MPCs’ real GDP growth prospects, through the trade and exchange rate channels, and through declines in GDP growth rates of the region’s main trading partners (Chart 9). Even during the financial crisis of 2008, the MPCs’ real GDP growth rates were much higher than the growth rates observed since 2011.

Chart 10 indicates that the MPCs’ real GDP growth prospects for 2014 were negatively affected because of weak growth prospects (1.4% in the EU, and 2.4% in the US) in their major trading partners, mainly the EU which accounts for about 40% of the MPCs’ total trade, followed by the US, accounting for about 10% of the region’s total trade. Chart 11 shows the specific MPCs’ total export destinations in millions of dollars between 2009 and 2014. It is clear that the South Mediterranean countries’ major trading partners are the EU-28 countries. It is through this trade channel that Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt have been affected by the recent austerity measures in the EU.

Weak growth prospects are affecting the EU’s demand for MPC exports. The most affected MPCs are the South Mediterranean countries of Israel, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and to a lesser extent Egypt. The ensuing EU recession has not only dried up liquidity but also reduced financial inflows and export revenues, threatening the fiscal and current account balances and, subsequently, the macroeconomic stability of several MPCs. Some partner countries have been facing liquidity challenges since the beginning of the Arab uprisings, which may evolve into solvency problems for a number of them. For MPCs with weak financial linkages with the EU, the multiple external shocks have started to reveal gaps between revenues and spending, and capital outflows have put downward pressure
on their exchange rates coupled with a decline in foreign exchange reserves. Lower export earnings and an inability to impose counter-cyclical taxation measures will worsen their budget deficits and further widen their gap of foreign exchange needs.

Similar to the export of commodities, tourism and remittance revenues constitute an important source of foreign exchange and contribute to economic growth for the MPCs of Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan and Lebanon. However, the European austerity measures have had a profound knock-on effect on remittances in all MPCs with the exception of perhaps, Egypt and Lebanon. Remittances provide valuable foreign exchange for the MPCs that are used to financing current account deficits and foreign debt service payments, not to mention meeting consumption demands of the domestic market. In Egypt for instance, remittances have averaged $18 billion since 2012, followed by Morocco where they have averaged $6 billion. Therefore, any further decrease in remittances, resulting from the EU’s austerity measures, is expected to have a detrimental effect on the above two countries’ growth rate of real GDP (Chart 12), and on their ability to service their foreign public debt.

The spillover effects of the recent recession and the EU’s austerity measures on MPCs and their effects on the MPCs’ financial markets varied according to their degree of financial integration with the EU’s capital markets (Neaime 2012). Jordan, Israel, Egypt and Morocco with large exposure to EU banks, bonds and equity markets, were the first to suffer (Chart 13). These countries are facing a four-edged sword, i.e. plunging asset prices, higher borrowing costs, capital outflows and a decrease in exports. Other MPCs, namely Tunisia and Lebanon have become more resilient with respect to past crises, owing to the build-up of adequate foreign exchange reserves and a robust fiscal stance. The current financial crisis has also reversed the gains made in the past decade in reducing the debt burdens of some MPCs, and might also carry the risk of new debt/exchange rate crises because of a dangerous combination of fixed exchange rates, internal and external shocks, the higher cost of debt servicing, and the pressing need for increasing new external and domestic borrowing.

Conclusion

Given the current recessionary environment in the EU, it is difficult to design a credible fiscal consolidation scheme for growth and development on the one hand,

See also Neaime (2015b) for a more detailed discussion of the implications of the financial crisis on Lebanon’s macroeconomic fundamentals.
and for debt and deficit reduction on the other, that could be implemented swiftly and effectively without harming the EU’s Mediterranean Partners, and perhaps endangering the EU-Mediterranean Partnership agreements across the board. No doubt, the various stabilisation programmes will help EU countries over time to grow out of debt and modernise; with an efficient and fiscally responsible public sector, a credible tax system, more competitive labour markets and an internationally competitive economy.

Some MPCs have been hit by the worst exogenous financial/economic/political shock in decades, while others were ill-equipped to fight the economic and social consequences of the crisis given their poor macroeconomic and fiscal policies. Therefore, alleviating the macroeconomic imbalances of those countries, and providing them with the fiscal space needed to combat the economic and macroeconomic implications of the European debt and fiscal crisis would also help stabilise European demand, and should thus be regarded as an integral component of EU countries' stimulus packages.

**Bibliography**


Gulf Assistance Funds Post-2011: Allocation, Motivation and Influence

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The high volumes of Arab Gulf assistance funds post-2011 to several Arab MENA countries have intensified scholarly interest in understanding the Gulf States’ motives and in detecting continuities and changes in their allocation trends. Gulf assistance funds have also attracted much attention following the outbreak of several public uprisings in the region, as the promptness in offering them in massive amounts and through a variety of instruments (i.e. grants, hard-currency deposits, fuel products, loans and investments) worked to dwarf economic aid from other external actors. Accordingly, the comparative ability of the Arab Gulf States to influence transformation processes in transitional countries has been, and remains, significantly boosted.

General Trends in Gulf Aid before and after 2011

Key characteristics of Gulf aid prior to 2011 include, first, its comparative generosity, as Gulf aid worldwide ranged from 4.7% of collective gross national income during the 1970s to approximately 1% during the first years of the 2000s. Second, Gulf aid was mostly (around 60%) allocated to Arab and Muslim countries. Third, Gulf aid was mostly granted bilaterally rather than multilaterally channelled through Gulf institutions, as the share of bilateral aid stood at 86% from 1995 to 2004. Fourth, motives for granting aid or loans varied over time, ranging from investing in regional stability or enhancing Gulf commercial interests to promoting Islam through large flows of unofficial aid to state and non-state actors. Finally, fifth, eight Arab countries in specific topped, and largely continue to top, the list of Gulf aid recipients. These are, in order of their aid share since the mid-1970s, Morocco, Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Tunisia, Jordan, Yemen and Sudan.1

Following the outbreak of Arab uprisings in late 2010 and early 2011, the Arab Gulf States were generally rapid and generous in using their petrodollar investments to confront the various security and stability ramifications of these mass events. In this respect, the trends in post-2011 Gulf assistance funds indicate a general continuity in terms of generosity, motivations, and destination. Nonetheless, the post-2011 trends also indicate a notably increased Gulf tendency, especially by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait, to finance economic projects instead of the previously prevailing tendency of transferring cash. In addition, a notable sign of change has appeared in the form of an interest in growing Gulf companies, especially Emirati and Saudi ones, to achieve high profits on investments in infrastructure projects. The most recent increase in Gulf companies’ contracts to invest in sub-Saharan Africa, especially in profitable energy and infrastructure projects in some West African countries, such as Guinea and Ghana, is a case in point.2 As announced in August 2014 by the Director General of the Dubai Chamber, Hamad Buamim, the Gulf States intend to increase their investments in Africa by $61 billion annually.

Continuity in Gulf Aid Generosity and Destinations

Showing remarkable consistency with previous decades, and regardless of the huge economic needs of Arab countries in transition, Gulf assistance funds continued to flow generously into the economies of politically and strategically important countries. As an example, it is quite intriguing to contrast the modest Gulf assistance funds for Tunisia with those allocated to Jordan, Morocco or Oman. These three countries, which are not traditionally included in the category of “Arab Spring countries,” were promised $20 billion early in 2011 by the GCC alone, to be delivered over 10 years for Oman and over 5 years (from 2012 to 2017) for Jordan and Morocco. Another example is the case of Egypt, especially when comparing Gulf assistance funds to this country before and after the fall of President Mohamed Morsi, of the Muslim Brotherhood, in June/July 2013. From just July 2013 to February 2015, Egyptian officials declared they had received over $23 billion in assistance funds from friendly Gulf States. An additional aid package, estimated at approximately $12.5 billion, followed during Egypt’s Economic Development Conference in March 2015, provided by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Oman. This sum does not include the numerous investment contracts, likewise signed during the conference, between the Egyptian government and Saudi, Emirati and Kuwaiti companies for the implementation of huge energy and infrastructure projects. These two examples indicate that the process of Gulf investments and aid allocation post-2011 is not determined merely by the economic conditions of countries in transition or the need to seek profits. Rather, Gulf investments and aid allocation are more politically driven and are meant to invest in the political stability of key Arab actors and friendly regimes.

Motivation: Gulf Assistance Funds Broadly Address Stabilisation

Gulf States’ resistance to radical change and their eagerness to seek stabilisation appear to be prominent motivations that determine the destination of their assistance funds post-2011. This was the case in all three sub-regions of the Arab area: the Arab Gulf, the Levant and North Africa. In the Gulf region itself, leading GCC monarachies rapidly employed their assistance funds with the core objectives of maintaining the political stability of the Gulf monarchical regimes and fending off the perceived Iranian and Shiite influence in the predominantly Sunni area. Repressing public revolts in Bahrain and then allocating $10 billion in assistance funds to invest in the political stability of this tiny country is one example. But also, a key relevant example can be seen in the immediate response of the late King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who released massive financial packages, estimated at around $130 billion, as a royal gift in the form of social, unemployment and housing benefits to fend off possible political demands by the Saudi people. Related to the objective of maintaining the political stability of the Gulf monarchies is the objective of maintaining the stability of neighbouring Yemen. Early in 2011, the GCC took the lead as the most credible mediator to end the violent confrontations between the Yemeni regime and the opposition. Key GCC States, led by Saudi Arabia, were alarmed at how southern Yemen emerged over the course of 2011 as a hub for al-Qaeda terrorists, and of how the violent confrontations between the Yemeni regime and the protestors signalled a potential civil war. By introducing and monitoring the implementation of the “Gulf Initiative” for a smooth transfer of power, the GCC States coordinated the deposition of Ali Abdullah Saleh and the advent of Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi. Following political mediation efforts, in 2012, the GCC promised Yemen a package of $7.9 billion, to be delivered gradually, for the implementation of developmental projects and delivery of fuel products. The current Saudi-led military operation in Yemen is accordingly explained by the mounting Gulf fear of the alarming ramifications of turmoil, both inside Yemen and on the Saudi-Yemeni border, caused by the takeover of power by the Iranian-supported Houthi rebels.

Gulf investments and aid allocation are more politically driven and are meant to invest in the political stability of key Arab actors and friendly regimes.
Addressing Stabilisation in the Levant: Syria, Jordan and Lebanon

In the nearby Levant, key Gulf States were notably active in supporting the Syrian opposition, particularly during the early stages of the conflict, and in regularly extending humanitarian assistance funds to the displaced Syrian people. This aid was also generously extended to Jordan and Lebanon, especially in the aftermath of the establishment of the Islamic State (IS) organisation in Syria and Iraq, again underscoring the core objective of stabilisation.

In Syria, the Gulf States were eager to put an end to the Alawite al-Assad regime, which had long been condemned in the Gulf for facilitating Iranian penetration in the region. In the early stages of the Syrian crisis, many Gulf States had voted to expel the country from the League of Arab States and had demonstrated a strong willingness to aid various factions of the Syrian opposition. Frustrated by the lack of international or regional intervention to topple al-Assad, Saudi Arabia and Qatar were repeatedly reported to be generously arming and funding the increasingly fragmented opposition factions in Syria.

As for Lebanon, in December 2013, Saudi Arabia alone pledged $3 billion for the purchase of French weapons, which were delivered in November 2014, to enhance the Lebanese military’s capabilities to confront the IS threat. In August 2014, following the Arsal battles, Saudi Arabia pledged a further $1 billion to strengthen the Lebanese army, which brought total Saudi military aid to Lebanon in just 2014 to $4 billion. Indeed, it is striking to compare this Saudi military aid with Lebanon’s total defence budget, which stood at only $1.7 billion in 2012. In a further effort to address stabilisation in Lebanon, the Saudi National Campaign to Support Brothers in Syria promised an $11 million package of humanitarian, educational, vocational and health aid for the year 2015 to meet the needs of Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

In Jordan, Saudi Arabia took the lead in May 2011, in a further step to prop up the legitimacy of Arab monarchial systems, with a proposal to enlarge the GCC in order to include the two monarchies of Jordan and Morocco. However, given the delay in admitting Jordan and Morocco to the GCC, the organisation decided in December 2011 to create a $5 billion fund, later increased to $10 billion, for the two countries in support of development projects. In addition, in January 2013, Saudi Arabia promised to allocate another $10 billion to Jordan in order to help the country deal with the increasing influx of Syrian refugees. It is worth mentioning in this respect that the largely marginalised and poorly managed refugee camps in both Lebanon and Jordan have increasingly come to be viewed as fertile soil for the proliferation and recruitment of jihadists in the region.

Addressing Stabilisation in Egypt, Libya and Morocco: Different Means for Different Contexts

Gulf assistance funds first addressed stabilisation in North Africa in the case of Morocco, as a fellow monarchial regime, through a $5 billion allocation in 2011 to developmental projects and the consideration, notwithstanding the vast geographical distance, of the country’s inclusion in the GCC. The Gulf stance towards Morocco, which witnessed public protests even if these protests did not develop into mass uprisings as they did in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, emphasises the GCC’s determination and outreach efforts to take on the potentially destabilising effects of uprisings in the Arab region at large.

The Gulf stance towards Morocco, emphasises the GCC’s determination and outreach efforts to take on the potentially destabilising effects of uprisings in the Arab region at large

In the more controversial case of Egypt, key Gulf States perceived investment in Egypt’s political stability and security as crucial for the Gulf’s own security. Indeed, Egypt’s internal political developments and leadership orientation have long had repercussions on Arab and regional politics. However, comparing the trends of Gulf aid before and after the fall of Morsi highlights a divergence in the type of political stability that different Gulf States were eager to promote in this pivotal Arab country. While immediately after the fall of Mubarak in February 2011, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE all promised assistance funds to the interim military regime (esti-
mated altogether at around $17 billion). It was mainly Qatar that effectively delivered extensive financial support to the Muslim Brotherhood government, which assumed power in mid-2012 amid wide Gulf apprehension. Generally, this reinvigorated role of Qatar is stimulated by the structural opportunities offered by the new context of Arab transformations, in which the more ambitious Qatari rulers sought to achieve not only political stability, but also an outsized regional outreach and prestige. In sharp contrast with this trend, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait emerged as the main supporters of the new political order in Egypt arising after the June 2013 uprising and the fall of Morsi the following July. Specifically, these three Gulf monarchies had previously perceived the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as well as elsewhere in the Arab region, as a threat to regional political stability and to the political stability of the Gulf’s own monarchies. It is important to highlight that a relative change in Gulf aid allocation to Arab MENA post-2011 was quite evident by mid-2013, following the regime change in Egypt. This can be seen in an increasing tendency, especially by Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait, to finance economic projects and increase investments. The continuous economic downturn that Egypt has been experiencing since 2011 and the objectives of political order and stability, which the new Egyptian leadership under al-Sisi has prioritised, necessitated a bold push for big economic projects and a steady inflow of foreign investments. These objectives were largely possible because of Gulf political support and economic assistance over the past two years.

Even in Libya, where animosity towards the former Gaddafi regime mainly stimulated broad Gulf support for regime change and participation in the NATO operation in 2011, today key Gulf States are eagerly extending various forms of political and military support for the country’s stabilisation. This is most evident in the continuing Saudi, Emirati and Egyptian support for the Libyan army under the leadership of General Khalifa Haftar in fighting irregular militias and stabilising the country. The current close coordination between Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the stabilisation of Libya, like the close coordination between Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE on fighting the Houthi rebels in Yemen, is ongoing, indicating a practical reinvigoration of Arab solidarity in facing some of the security ramifications of the Arab uprisings. Apart from the fact that there is indeed a growing perception of common security threats among most Arab countries, it remains true that the far-reaching and influential role that key Gulf States were able to advance post-2011 thanks to their petrodollar investments is one of the crucial factors in ensuring favourable conditions for the current state of pan-Arab revival.

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Fifty Years of Trade Agreements between the EU and Mediterranean Countries

The first Association Agreements with Mediterranean Non-Member Countries (MNCs) were signed nearly 50 years ago. These agreements have evolved greatly over time but continue to be the object of much criticism, particularly regarding insufficient market access in trade between the two shores of the Mediterranean (in particular for agricultural products from the South), the presence of too many non-tariff barriers (NTBs), the significant differences in the sphere of standards and norms (particularly technical ones) and the insufficient financial aid granted by the EU. This article reviews the past 50 years of EU-MNC cooperation: Outcome? Bottlenecks? Prospects for Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs)?

From the First Association Agreements…

The first Association Agreements consisted essentially of customs duty reductions applicable to exports to the European Economic Community (EEC) from these countries. In any case, the tariff reductions were quite limited, in particular for agricultural products. Moreover, these preferential tariffs were not harmonised, such that for a single product the MNCs enjoyed different reductions. Hence, as of 1972, the EEC established a Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) in order to extend preferences and harmonise all the MNCs. This gave rise to cooperation agreements, which included bolstering trade preferences for agricultural products and implementing a financial aid policy consisting of preferential loans from the European Investment Bank (EIB) through instruments called MEDA.

The next stage followed the enlargement of the EEC to Spain and Portugal in 1986. This led the EEC countries to extend the preferences initially granted to the MNCs to take said enlargement into account. The new agreements (Additional Protocols to the Agreements) were signed in 1988 to eliminate customs duties for MNC exports alongside those for exports from Spain and Portugal, particularly for agricultural products.

… to the Barcelona Agreements…

But the most important stage of these past 50 years was certainly the conclusion of the Barcelona Agreements in 1995, which allowed the progressive establishment of a Free Trade Area (FTA) between EU countries and the MNCs. Thus the preferences that had remained unilateral until then progressively became bilateral until full establishment of the FTA in 2010. This stage was also concomitant with accession by a non-negligible number of MNCs to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) / World Trade Organization (WTO) since the 1980s. The Barcelona Agreements likewise allowed a deepening of financial instruments, thenceforth called FEMIP.

1 The MNCs include all EU non-member countries in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean region, namely North African countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt), as well as Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Israel and the Palestinian Territories.
… to Attempts at Deepening Trade Liberalisation

In 2004, the EU enlarged to include certain Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), likewise allowing an enhancement of the Barcelona Agreements via the newly-established European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The main goal of this policy was to strengthen the regional integration process between the expanded EU and its new eastern and Southern neighbours, providing for the progressive application of the Community Acquis and the four freedoms (free movement of goods, services, capital and people) in this new area. The reality has, however, proved somewhat different, insofar as the objectives of deeper regional integration have generally not been attained, for various economic and political reasons. The same is true of the 2008 launching of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), which was to create new opportunities in terms of regional integration and new projects (energy, de-pollution of the Mediterranean, infrastructures, universities, etc.) as well as a new governance in the Euro-Mediterranean area, with its co-presidency and Secretariat. In fact, the UfM has never truly come into its own.

The Euro-Mediterranean agreements, and in particular the Barcelona Agreements, have had but a limited effect on trade and little or no effect on reducing the economic gap between MNC and European income levels

Hence, this first assessment of EU-MNC agreements makes it clear that the most successful accords are the Barcelona Agreements, which allowed the creation of an FTA. However, there is no denying that, since these agreements, efforts at deepening trade liberalisation have remained limited.

Mixed Results…

The main objective of all these agreements was to boost trade relations between the EU and the MNCs in order to provide support for their economic growth. Though the majority of impact studies conclude that there is a positive effect on trade, this effect remains limited. Péridy and Roux (2012), for instance, indicate in a survey that the effects on trade are estimated at an increase of roughly 25%, but slowing towards the end of the period, primarily due to restricted access to the European market for agricultural products from the MNCs. Effects vary, moreover, from one MNC to another, with highly positive effects for Tunisia but negative ones for such countries as Algeria. There are very few studies available on the impact of the Euro-Mediterranean agreements on MNC growth and their convergence towards the EU in terms of wealth. In any case, Péridy and Bagoulla (2012) conclude that there is an absence of significant effects. All of these results thus indicate that the Euro-Mediterranean agreements, and in particular the Barcelona Agreements, have had but a limited effect on trade and little or no effect on reducing the economic gap between MNC and European income levels.

…and Many Obstacles

The minor impact of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership can be attributed to numerous economic and political obstacles. First of all, it is important to emphasise that, despite the establishment of an FTA in 2010, the MNCs have not fully eliminated their customs duties on European imports. Moreover, non-tariff barriers (NTBs), in particular technical and sanitary barriers, remain at very high levels. Calculated in tariff equivalents based on Kee et al. (2009), Chart 14 shows that the majority of MNCs apply NTBs representing over 20% in tariff equivalents, which is much more than the majority of OECD countries or other emerging countries. Algeria, Egypt and Morocco display the same rates of nearly 40% or over, indicating significant protection against imports. If we combine customs duties with NTBs, it is clear that the MNCs are far from reaching a sufficient level of trade liberalisation, with the exception of Turkey. This clearly explains why the effects of the Barcelona Agreements on trade are limited. There is a similar impasse concerning the absence of real liberalisation of trade in services, which likewise remain subject to significant protection in the majority of MNCs (Turkey ex-
cluded), although certain countries are beginning to institute reforms in this regard (Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt).

Among other economic obstacles, let us note the existence of other trade costs, such as logistics costs that continue to be excessive. Table 7 shows that, when the Logistics Performance Index developed by the World Bank (2014 edition) is broken down, the MNCs are generally very poorly ranked, particularly Syria, Tunisia, Algeria and Lebanon, with many indicators with a value above one hundred, such as the efficiency of customs procedures, the quality of organisation of international shipments, the logistics competence (i.e. quality of service), tracking and tracing of shipments, and timeliness. Certain countries, however, are not so badly ranked, as for instance, Turkey, Israel and even Morocco, which has made great efforts over the past few years to

### TABLE 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Customs</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>International Shipments</th>
<th>Logistics Competence</th>
<th>Tracking &amp; Tracing</th>
<th>Timeliness</th>
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<td>27</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>96</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
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<td>89</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>67</td>
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<td>108</td>
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<td>117</td>
<td>102</td>
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<tr>
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<td>120</td>
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<td>Syria</td>
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<td>144</td>
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<td>158</td>
<td>145</td>
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<td>MENA Average</td>
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<td>76</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations based on 2014 World Bank data.
improve the quality of its infrastructures (road network, railways, Port Tanger-Med, etc.).

Another significant impediment concerns the type of exports by MNCs, too often oriented towards products of low added value, as indicated in Chart 15. Hence, less than 25% of MNC exports involve high-quality products, which naturally dampens the impact of trade liberalisation with Europe.

A last factor of economic impediment relates to the segmentation of MNC markets. In fact, the absence of South-South integration does not allow opportunities for economies of scale in production processes and curbs the effectiveness of trade with Europe. Despite attempts to create a major Arab Free Trade Area, intra-MNC trade remains low, on the order of 12%, as compared to 66% for intra-EU trade.

If we add to these economic obstacles the numerous political constraints associated with governance, not to mention the effects of the Arab revolutions, it is, after all, not very surprising that the overall effects of the Euro-Mediterranean Agreements have been limited.

**New Perspectives through Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs)**

Aware of the obstacles indicated above, EU and MNC leaders have launched a process to deepen the FTA through DCFTA initiatives. Thus the European Commission was given the green light to initiate negotiations on DCFTAs with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia in December 2011, as part of the EU’s response to the political developments in the Arab world. Morocco and Tunisia were the first of four countries to take a seat at the negotiation table, with official negotiations starting in 2012 and 2013.

The aim of the DCFTAs is to go beyond liberalisation of trade and elimination of customs duties by focusing on greater economic integration. The DCFTAs cover various spheres, including public markets, technical regulations for industrial products, customs procedures, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, intellectual property rights, competition, energy trading, commercial aspects, sustainable development, etc. This in turn should improve market access opportunities, the investment climate, support for economic reform and consumer choice. Particular priority is granted measures designed to foster European investment, improve economic governance and step up regional economic integration. There is also an environment facet to these agreements. EU financial support should also be increased. Note that this DCFTA agreement follows other recent trade agreements, namely those between the EU and Morocco in 2012 on improved access to the European market for Moroccan agricultural products.

Impact Studies Forecast Positive Effects for Morocco and Tunisia

The two main impact studies point towards overall positive effects for Morocco and Tunisia, but negligible ones for the EU. With regard to Morocco, ECORYS (2014a) predicts an effect on the Moroccan GDP of approximately 1.6% in the long term, as well as a 15% increase in exports and an 8% rise in imports. There are, however, sector differences, with positive effects for Morocco in produce and machinery due to lower European NTBs. On the other hand, the cereals sector will likely shrink because of the alignment of Moroccan NTBs with those of the EU. The consequences on salaries should be generally positive (+1.5%). And finally, the impact on the Decent Work Agenda will be limited and environmental effects will vary according to type of pollution, with an uncertain overall effect.

The aim of the DCFTAs is to go beyond liberalisation of trade and elimination of customs duties by focusing on greater economic integration

Tunisia should enjoy more significant effects (ECORYS, 2014b), with a 7% rise in GDP. This sharp increase is essentially tied to the reduction of NTBs and customs duties on agriculture. The predicted effects on trade are likewise significant, with a rise of 17% in imports and 20% in exports. Moreover, with effects on prices limited to +2% and salaries increasing by 10%, the effect on Tunisian purchasing power is expected to be largely positive. Effects on poverty and employment should likewise be positive, while, as with Morocco, the overall environmental effects will be difficult to predict. The most positive sectoral effects will be in vegetable oil and produce, due to the reduced EU protection. Machinery and transport equipment should also experience a production increase, as will activity in certain service sectors. The textile, leather and petrochemical industries, on the other hand, are expected to shrink.

In conclusion, DCFTAs will allow further gains, but improvements are desirable. These would particularly involve moving towards EU-MNC sectoral regulatory convergence, increasing the added value of exports, boosting support for the internationalisation of SMEs and the business climate (namely through FDI, improved education, and investment in human capital), pursuing targeted reduction of NTBs and accelerating trade facilitation, accelerating reform relating to governance and the role of the State, improving the quality of logistics infrastructure, pursuing social dialogue and taking into account the coming environmental challenges.

References


Assessment of Pollution Reduction Programmes in the Mediterranean Region

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An institutional cooperation framework to deal with common problems of environmental pollution, the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) is celebrating its 40th anniversary this year. This provides the ideal opportunity to assess Mediterranean pollution reduction programmes and calls for a historic perspective. After reviewing the establishment of the MAP system, we can move on to the birthday of the Horizon 2020 initiative, aiming to reduce pollution in the Mediterranean 10 years on, and take stock of the programmes implemented as of 2005.

The Mediterranean: a Sea under Great Pressure

The Mediterranean Sea represents well over 1% of the surface area of the seas on the planet. The cradle of humanity, it has experienced accelerated degradation in the 20th century due to uncontrolled urban development associated with unsustainable development of coastal activities. The population of Mediterranean countries has experienced constant growth over the past 50 years (see Chart 16); it has doubled, going from 240 million in 1960 to 480 million in 2010.

During this same period, the urban population in the region experienced significant growth: in 1960, it represented 48% of the total population of Mediterranean countries, whereas in 2010 approximately 67% of the total population was living in urban areas. The majority of this urbanisation took place along the coast (Map 1). The growth of coastal cities of southern countries was very high in this period. For instance, Shubra el-Kheima (Egypt) saw its population multiplied by 28 to reach a million inhabitants, the populations of Amman, Rabat and Istanbul grew 10 to 15 times their size, those of Damascus, Beirut, Ankara, Casablanca, Tel Aviv and Algiers five to 10 times, and those of Cairo, Tunis and Alexandria three to five times.

The increase in maritime traffic and generalised overfishing have raised the pressure on natural resources and the environment. The modification of the consumption model has entailed a spectacular increase in the quantity of waste produced as well as the volume of water used then discharged. This depredation in general, and pollution in particular, seriously jeopardise the economic development of countries in the region and the quality of life of the people living along the seaboard.

Implementation of the Mediterranean Action Plan and its Components

To meet these challenges, the Mediterranean countries and the European Community established the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) in 1975, the first regional sea conservation programme placed under the auspices of the brand new United Nations Envi-

1 The opinions expressed in this article pertain to its author and do not necessarily reflect UNEP/MAP’s or Plan Bleu’s points of view.
A year later, the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, known as the Barcelona Convention, was adopted, its two first protocols pertaining to pollution prevention. Other protocols would follow, from 1976 to 2002 (i.e. the Dumping, Pollution from Land-Based Sources, Offshore, Hazardous Wastes, and Prevention and Emergency Protocols), some of which were subsequently revised. Two more protocols – Specially Protected Marine Areas and Integrated Coastal Zone Management – were adopted in 1999 and 2008, respectively.

To implement its pollution reduction programme, the MAP first set up a network of resources (Programmes and Regional Activity Centres) and stakeholders through national focal points in order to foster technical cooperation between the Parties to the Barcelona Convention. The Programme for the Assessment and Control of Marine Pollution in the Mediterranean, i.e. MED POL, was established as MAP’s first operational programme. Its mission has been progressively expanded so as to help Mediterranean countries formulate and implement programmes to monitor and control pollution and devise action plans designed to reduce pollution from land-based sources.

In order to prevent pollution generation at its source and ensure efficient use of resources, a Regional Activity Centre for Cleaner Production (now known as the Regional Activity Centre for Sustainable Consumption and Production – SCP/RAC) was created in Barcelona in 1996 to assist the Parties in applying the best technology and sustainable environmental practices available.

### Action Programmes for Reducing Pollution in the Mediterranean

It is important to return to 1997, year in which the Contracting Parties to the Barcelona Convention adopted a Strategic Action Programme that is still in effect, the SAP MED. It comprises regional and national activities to combat pollution from land-based sources. A MED POL initiative, the SAP MED has identified priority target categories of polluting substances and activities that Mediterranean countries should eliminate or control according to a timetable.
with a 2025 horizon. With its pollution hot spots, the SAP MED essentially targets urban and industrial activities responsible for releasing persistent, bioaccumulative, toxic substances (PBTs) into the marine environment, more specifically, persistent organic pollutants (POPs).

With the support of the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the SAP MED succeeded in 2005 in having countries commit to establishing a National Baseline Budget of Coastal Emissions and Releases and devising a National Action Plan (NAP) to combat marine pollution from land-based sources through concrete projects. The NAPs presented an investment portfolio structured according to the spheres of the main pollution sources.

Also in 2005, the Euro-Mediterranean Partners and major financial institutions committed to the Horizon 2020 Initiative, also known as H2020, designed to reduce pollution in the Mediterranean Sea by the 2020 horizon by struggling against land-based sources of pollution, which are responsible for 80% of the general pollution in the Mediterranean Sea: urban wastewater, municipal waste and industrial pollution. H2020 has been integrated into the work done by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Activities are organised into three subgroups: Pollution Reduction Investment, coordinated by the European Investment Bank (EIB); Capacity Building, coordinated by a federation of Mediterranean NGOs (MIO-ECSDE); and Review, Monitoring and Research, coordinated by the European Environment Agency (EEA).

In 2008, the Contracting Parties used the MAP to implement the ecosystem approach (EcAp) for managing human activities having an impact on marine and coastal ecosystems in the Mediterranean in order to achieve their "good environmental status." The MAP ecosystem approach has seven stages: 1) establishing a vision for the Mediterranean; 2) drawing up strategic objectives to attain that vision; 3) assessing priority issues; 4) establishing ecological objectives; 5) determining the associated operational objectives, indicators and targets; 6) developing a monitoring strategy; and 7) devising measures designed to attain the strategic objectives.

EcAp represented both a profound change vis-à-vis previous sectoral approaches, and synergy with the Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD) apply-
External Financing Indispensable for the Implementation of the National Action Plans

In 2008, under the aegis of the MAP, the MedPartnership project was launched to ensure the financial viability of the National Action Plans (NAPs) through financing via the Global Environment Facility (GEF), the MAP’s Mediterranean Trust Fund (MTF) and such financial institutions as the EIB and the World Bank, as well as a number of regional and international organisations. The NAPs project portfolios were extensively used by Horizon 2020 to guide priority de-pollution investment choices.

The Mediterranean Hot Spot Investment Programme (MeHSIP) was created in 2009 by the EIB to provide support for the investment component of the H2020 Initiative. It has contributed to the creation and implementation of infrastructure projects, particularly for the reduction of the hot spots identified in the NAPs.

Taking Stock

Recent evaluations, namely the evaluation of the first phase of H2020 and that of SAP MED and NAPs implementation, have allowed an assessment of Mediterranean de-pollution programmes since 2005.

Pollution Reduction

Progress in the sphere of wastewater treatment is uneven in the Mediterranean area. There is improved access to sewage systems, but the functioning of treatment plants remains poorly known and the elimination of sludge by-products from these plants is not yet satisfactory.

Industrial pollution remains high and is even increasing in certain sectors: energy production, refinery and chemical industries, the agrifood industry, cement production and metalworking. Excess nutrients have detrimental effects (eutrophication) in certain areas with a significant inflow (Gulf of Lion, Nile Delta) or in relatively landlocked waters (lagoons, northern Adriatic).

The quantity of municipal solid waste produced is continually on the rise due to the increase in populations and standards of living. Changes in consumption patterns make waste less biodegradable, with a growing proportion of plastic. The collection, particularly in rural areas, and treatment of municipal solid waste is still insufficient in the southern Mediterranean. Significant efforts have been made to close uncontrolled dump sites and open controlled landfills. However, landfills are often open air in southern countries. The proportion of recycled or composted material is still low, hardly surpassing 10% of the volume collected. Part of this waste enters the sea and accumulates on the surface, on the seafloor and on beaches via marine currents. A Regional Plan for Marine Litter Management was adopted in 2013 through MED POL.

In sum, assessments show that progress has been made in wastewater treatment and, to a lesser degree, also in solid waste treatment, but a great deal remains to be done to reduce industrial pollution. In certain cases, the pressure from population growth and industrialisation combined with the emerging effects of climate change is growing more quickly than the effects of the measures taken.

Monitoring the State of the Environment

Based on regular monitoring undertaken within the MAP framework, the project for a Shared Environmental Information System (SEIS) implemented by the EEA and supported by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) has helped establish the first elements of a joint mechanism for information production. Establishing a sustainable, lasting and pertinent system will require even more efforts on the regional and country levels, namely to handle implementation of the Ecosystem Approach (EcAp).

Investment Efficiency

Concerning investment, recent assessments have shown MED POL pollution hot spot identification to be an effective targeting tool. The review underway of the NAPs and hot spots by MED POL should furnish a new basis for identifying future priority projects. In terms of methodology, assessments have confirmed the importance of ensuring constant sup-
port at all stages of project development, fostering investment and ensuring the financial sustainability of the economic sectors concerned.

**Capacity Building**

The legislative framework required to meet the commitments of the Barcelona Convention and its Land-Based Protocol has been widely established in the countries concerned, but its implementation remains a challenge. The Capacity-Building Programme, supported by H2020, was appreciated for the broad spectrum of training it offered. The European programme to prepare Eastern European countries for accession has helped them integrate H2020 goals.

**Stakeholder Involvement**

H2020 has enhanced the cooperation dynamics between regional structures and programmes, between the Barcelona Convention and the MAP, and other more recent ones such as the UfM Secretariat. Nonetheless, coordination and cooperation must be stepped up among H2020 subgroups, financial institutions and funding agencies, as well as on the national level among the different agencies involved. One point of concern is the growing number of national focal points chosen for the different initiatives, which could be a factor of dispersion. And finally, civil society and private sector participation needs to be reaffirmed and boosted.

**A Race between Growing Pressure and Implementation of Measures**

The complexity of the range of pollution reduction programmes should not obscure the fact that the Contracting Parties to the Barcelona Convention have maintained the capacity of the MAP to federate efforts and focalise significant resources on pollution reduction in the Mediterranean over time. These resources are primarily supplied by the European Union, especially through H2020, but third countries are effectively associated and contribute to the collective effort. Numerous results can be highlighted, such as: the significance of investment made to reduce pollution at hot spots, the significant increase in the number of coastal cities equipped with wastewater treatment facilities and the implementation of both the EcAp initiative and the Regional Plan for Marine Litter Management. Several avenues for progress have been identified in the H2020 2015-2020 work programme, in particular: strengthening national environmental legislation and its application; updating priority investment projects to secure their funding and ensure their implementation; the need to collect data in application of SEIS principles, namely to implement the EcAp and gain a precise overview of the state of the Mediterranean Sea; and the need to improve the interface between science and policies with regard to environmental issues, particularly in order to identify new priorities. In any case, it was acknowledged at the May 2014 UfM Ministerial Meeting on Environment and Climate Change in Athens that “unless the efforts to de-pollute the Mediterranean Sea by 2020 are considerably intensified, the [H2020] goal will not be fully met.”

**References**


Mediterranean Fisheries. Stocks, Assessments and Exploitation Status

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The state of Mediterranean fisheries follows the same trends and faces similar problems as most of the world’s fisheries, i.e., a generalised overexploitation and broad habitat degradation (Clover 2005, Roberts 2007, Cury 2008). Moreover, Mediterranean fisheries are particularly complex due to the high diversity of cases and the many countries of very different cultures involved. Oliver (2002) estimated the number of boats at around 100,000 and fishermen at around 300,000; Farrugio (2013) gives the figure of 250,000 fishermen, including the Black Sea, for 2008. Fisheries are also diverse, constituted by multispecies resources caught using different fishing gears. Furthermore, their long history makes it very difficult to envisage what the state of the ecosystem would have been without them.

Much work has been done in recent years to assess Mediterranean fishery stocks, led by the Regional Fishery Bodies. Fifteen years ago, few international, standardised and peer-reviewed assessments could be found (Oliver 2002, Lleonart & Maynou 2003). In the last five years 300 assessments have been carried out on 130 stocks involving 27 species, although this only covers 26% of landings. However, the assessments by area are unbalanced, since the central and western basins are much better covered than the eastern one. The results show that most of the stocks analysed are overexploited and resolute actions to redress this trend are needed to make fisheries sustainable, nature-respecting and economically and socially efficient.

Mediterranean Areas

The Mediterranean Sea constitutes a Large Marine Ecosystem (LME), number 26 as defined by UNEP (United Nations Environmental Programme), limited by the straits of Gibraltar and Bosphorus, and including the Marmara Sea, although it is considered separate to the Black Sea (LME number 62). The FAO defined Major Fishing Areas for statistical and fishery management purposes. The Mediterranean and Black Sea is number 37. This area has four subareas split into ten statistical divisions. On the other hand, the GFCM (General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean) (2009) defined 30 Geographical Subareas (GSA) for assessment and management purposes (Map 2). The large pelagic migratory species are allocated to the whole Mediterranean.

In this paper, it is considered the Mediterranean LME (including the Marmara Sea) with 28 GSAs, but not the Black Sea.

Fishery Resources and Global Catch

Mediterranean fisheries have been described in several instances from different viewpoints (i.e. Farrugio et al. 1992, Oliver 2002, Bas 2005, Caddy 2009, Leonart 2011, Barros 2011). The Mediterranean landings, disaggregated by taxon, country and statistical division, from 1970 to 2011, were reported by FAO-GFCM (2014). The data base includes 285 taxa (species or groups of species) for the triennium 2009-2011, which is the period analysed in this paper. Of these taxa eight are small pelagics, 54 medium and large pelagics, 200 demersals, 15 bivalves and eight groups of species (such as ‘osteichthyes’ or ‘mollusca’).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FAO subarea</th>
<th>FAO statistical division</th>
<th>GFCM Geographical Sub Area (GSA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western</td>
<td>1.1 Baelaric</td>
<td>01 - Northern Alboran Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>02 - Alboran Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>03 - Southern Alboran Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>04 - Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>05 - Balearic Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>06 - Northern Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.1 - Sardinia (west)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 Gulf of Lions</td>
<td>07 - Gulf of Lions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3 Sardinia</td>
<td>08 - Corsica Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>09 - Ligurian and North Tyrrenian Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10 - South and Central Tyrrenian Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.2 - Sardinia (east)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12 - Northern Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central</td>
<td>2.1 Adriatic</td>
<td>17 - Northern Adriatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2 Ionian</td>
<td>18 - Southern Adriatic Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>13 - Gulf of Hammamet</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>14 - Gulf of Gabes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>15 - Malta Island</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16 - South of Sicily</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19 - Western Ionian Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>20 - Eastern Ionian Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21 - Southern Ionian Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>3.1 Aegean</td>
<td>22 - Aegean Sea</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>23 - Crete Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2 Levant</td>
<td>24 - North Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>25 - Cyprus Island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>26 - South Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27 - Levant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black Sea</td>
<td>4.1 Marmara</td>
<td>28 - Marmara Sea</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.2 Black Sea</td>
<td>29 - Black Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.3 Azov Sea</td>
<td>30 - Azov Sea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GFCM.
During the period 1981-2009 the historical reported landings exceeded one million tonnes, reaching a maximum of 1.2 million in 1994. The average of the three years 2009-2011 is 0.918 million tons. According to these data 54% of landings are pelagic fish, 37% benthic and demersal and 9% of the groups are not identified at species level. 17 taxa, out of the 285, account for more than 1% of total catch, and only two represent more than 10%: sardines and anchovies (see table 8). The third most landed taxon is a set of undetermined species under the general name of ‘bony fish,’ incidentally stressing the importance of effective species identification for reporting catches. Pauly et al. (2014) consider these landings to be underestimated.

Assessments

There are three international organisations with the mandate of assessing Mediterranean stocks: GFCM, the STECF (Mediterranean EWG) and ICCAT. The former, the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean” (www.gfcm.org) comprises 23 Member States and includes the Black Sea. The Expert Working Group on Assessment of Mediterranean Sea stocks (MedEWG), is a group created by the STECF (Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries) of the European Commission (http://stecf.jrc.eueuropa.eu/). Its mandate includes the stocks exploited by the EU Member Countries in the Mediterranean Sea. Both GFCM and STECF-Med EWG assess stocks. A stock is usually defined as one species in one GSA. The ICCAT (International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas) (www.iccat.int) is an organisation responsible for the conservation of tunas and tuna-like species in the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent seas. There are 50 contracting parties, nine of them riparian areas of the Mediterranean. The European Union acts as a single member but includes all European countries. The stocks of large pelagics assessed by ICCAT embraces the whole Mediterranean.

Other assessments, usually restricted to national frameworks, can be found in grey literature or scientific journals, but since they have not been peer-reviewed or presented in formats standard to international assessment fora, they are not considered here.

During the last five years around 300 assessments involving 130 stocks (species by GSA) and 27 species have been conducted. Reports are available on the organisations’ websites. In some cases the same stock has been assessed several times in the last five years. Of the 27 species assessed, nine belong to the group with more than 1% of Mediterranean landings. The other 18 have particular economic importance or local interest or both. These 27 species include 20 bony fish (13 demersal, three small pelagics, one medium pelagic, three large pelagics), one elasmobranch, five crustaceans and one mollusc (see Table 8). The 130 stocks assessed are not evenly distributed. The western and central basins are far more studied than the eastern (see table 9). Around 75% of assessments have been carried out in European waters. Although major efforts are currently being made to assess stocks, only 26% of catches have a known status. This knowledge is higher in the central region (37%), followed by the western (26%) and the eastern (11%). The assessed large pelagics represent around 40% of their total catch. Not a single stock has been assessed in six GSAs (two European, four non-European).

Red mullet, hake, deep-water rose shrimp and sardine are the species that have been analysed most frequently, with more than 10 stocks assessed several times.

Assessment Procedures

A fish stock assessment is a complex operation involving several steps: 1) collecting data and estimating parameters; 2) choosing an assessment method, usually based on mathematical models; 3) determining the reference points, i.e. MSY (Maximum Sustainable Yield), and associated biomass and fishing mortality; 4) estimating indicators, i.e. current catch, catch per unit effort, biomass and fishing mortality; 5) diagnosing the status of the stock in terms of indicators, trends and their distances to the reference points; and 6) providing management advice to the decision makers.

The results of an assessment can be expressed in a bivariate context (biomass vs. fishing mortality), or more simply associating the stock status to a single
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Species</th>
<th>Total landings</th>
<th>% in the landings</th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Taxonomic group</th>
<th>Ecological habitat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sardina pilchardus</td>
<td>178,860</td>
<td>19.47%</td>
<td>60.19%</td>
<td>77.23%</td>
<td>26.31%</td>
<td>58.70%</td>
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<td>small pelagic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engraulis encrasicolus</td>
<td>124,293</td>
<td>13.53%</td>
<td>34.50%</td>
<td>76.54%</td>
<td>26.80%</td>
<td>51.95%</td>
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<td>Osteichthyes</td>
<td>60,902</td>
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<td>NA</td>
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<td>NA</td>
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<td>NA</td>
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<td>Sardinella aurita</td>
<td>52,756</td>
<td>5.74%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
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<td>small pelagic</td>
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<td>Trachurus spp</td>
<td>42,348</td>
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<td>NA</td>
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<td>73.32%</td>
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<td>medium pelagic</td>
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<td>Boops boops</td>
<td>28,800</td>
<td>3.14%</td>
<td>16.36%</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<td>14.70%</td>
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<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullus barbatus + Mullus spp</td>
<td>26,213</td>
<td>2.85%</td>
<td>65.22%</td>
<td>55.64%</td>
<td>34.45%</td>
<td>51.25%</td>
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<td>small pelagic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Merluccius merluccius</td>
<td>26,105</td>
<td>2.84%</td>
<td>92.88%</td>
<td>77.23%</td>
<td>3.40%</td>
<td>51.25%</td>
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<td>demersal</td>
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<td>Chamelea gallina</td>
<td>19,426</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>molusc</td>
<td>demersal</td>
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<td>Parapenaeus longirostris</td>
<td>15,227</td>
<td>1.66%</td>
<td>75.36%</td>
<td>70.95%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>64.29%</td>
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<td>demersal</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>bony fish</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pagellus erythrinus</td>
<td>11,777</td>
<td>1.28%</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
<td>28.16%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>22.82%</td>
<td>bony fish</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sepiidae, Sepiolidae</td>
<td>11,728</td>
<td>1.28%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>molusc</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scomber colias</td>
<td>11,323</td>
<td>1.23%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>bony fish</td>
<td>medium pelagic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Octopus vulgaris</td>
<td>10,468</td>
<td>1.14%</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.004%</td>
<td>molusc</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sepia officinalis</td>
<td>10,439</td>
<td>1.14%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>molusc</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Squilla mantis</td>
<td>7,195</td>
<td>0.78%</td>
<td>8.67%</td>
<td>62.55%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>64.74%</td>
<td>crustacean</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mullus surmuletus</td>
<td>5,929</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
<td>43.60%</td>
<td>19.48%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>27.68%</td>
<td>bony fish</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solea solea</td>
<td>4,884</td>
<td>0.53%</td>
<td>40.21%</td>
<td>61.91%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>50.96%</td>
<td>crustacean</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spicara spp (Spicara smaris)</td>
<td>3,114</td>
<td>0.34%</td>
<td>77.50%</td>
<td>57.01%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>61.50%</td>
<td>crustacean</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lophius spp (L. budegassa)</td>
<td>5,929</td>
<td>0.65%</td>
<td>43.60%</td>
<td>19.48%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>27.68%</td>
<td>bony fish</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micromesistius oulaiou</td>
<td>5,422</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
<td>31.41%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>16.64%</td>
<td>bony fish</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nephrops norvegicus</td>
<td>4,884</td>
<td>0.53%</td>
<td>40.21%</td>
<td>61.91%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>50.96%</td>
<td>crustacean</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristaeomorpha foliacea + Aristidae</td>
<td>3,114</td>
<td>0.34%</td>
<td>77.50%</td>
<td>57.01%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>61.50%</td>
<td>crustacean</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sphyraena sphyraena</td>
<td>2,682</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
<td>7.60%</td>
<td>14.25%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>5.29%</td>
<td>bony fish</td>
<td>medium pelagic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aristeus antennatus</td>
<td>2,154</td>
<td>0.23%</td>
<td>48.45%</td>
<td>28.57%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>48.30%</td>
<td>crustacean</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trisopterus minutus</td>
<td>1,736</td>
<td>0.19%</td>
<td>1.67%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NNL</td>
<td>1.36%</td>
<td>bony fish</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physic blennoides</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>1.77%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NNL</td>
<td>1.73%</td>
<td>bony fish</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xiphias gladius</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>0.04%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>3.81%</td>
<td>bony fish</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thunnus thynnus</td>
<td>2,682</td>
<td>0.29%</td>
<td>7.60%</td>
<td>14.25%</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>5.29%</td>
<td>bony fish</td>
<td>medium pelagic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saurida undosquamis</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>NNL</td>
<td>NNL</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>bony fish</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galeus melastomus</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>A-NRL</td>
<td>NNL</td>
<td>NNL</td>
<td>A-NRL</td>
<td>bony fish</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pagellus bogaraveo</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>A-NRL</td>
<td>NNL</td>
<td>NNL</td>
<td>A-NRL</td>
<td>bony fish</td>
<td>demersal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thunnus alalunga</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.001%</td>
<td>NNL</td>
<td>NNL</td>
<td>NNL</td>
<td>NNL</td>
<td>bony fish</td>
<td>large pelagic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Average 2009-2010-2011; (FAO-GFCM 2014). ** Total landings expressed in weight (tonnes) and percentage, and fraction of assessed landings by basin and total (NA: not assessed, NRL: no reported landings, A-NRL: assessed but no reported landings). The taxonomic group as well as the habitat of the taxa are indicated.
descriptor such as: ‘underexploited,’ ‘fully exploited,’ ‘overexploited,’ ‘depleted,’ ‘recovering,’ etc. The term ‘overexploitation’, or its synonym ‘overfishing’, can also be detailed as growth overfishing (the fish caught are too small, so the yield is under the potential productivity) or recruitment overfishing (the spawning stock biomass is too little, thereby threatening the future recruitment). Sometimes other descriptors are used like ‘uncertain,’ ‘sustainable,’ ‘unbalanced’ or ‘risk of overexploitation.’

**Assessments Results**

We know about the status of 26% of Mediterranean landings, but what is the status of these stocks? For most of the stocks assessed, 80%, appear to be overexploited. All assessed species present overexploited stocks.

In a few cases (6%) the stocks appear to be underexploited. This happens particularly with sardine and anchovy, but also occasionally in some stocks of demersals, like picarel, Norway lobster, common pandora and deep-water rose shrimp. The ‘fully exploited’ cases represent 11% of assessed stocks including the same species as before plus red mullets. The status of the remaining 3% is unknown.

Anchovy in the Gulf of Lion was diagnosed as depleted: in 2007, landings of 13,340 tonnes were reported, and five years later, in 2012, only 5%, 635 tonnes, were landed. Bluefin tuna seems to be on its way to recovery after suffering from overfishing in the recent past.

**Conclusions**

The knowledge of the status of Mediterranean fish stocks is quite limited since assessments cover only 26% of catches and 80% of the assessed stocks are overexploited. The impact on fisheries in certain sensitive habitats, especially benthonic ones in shallow waters, although difficult to quantify, has been fully demonstrated.

Great efforts have been made to assess Mediterranean stocks; 300 assessments and 130 stocks assessed in the last few years is no small task. But despite such efforts, the status of only a quarter of the landed fish is known. This is due to the diversity of commercial species and stocks in the Mediterranean. Its fishery is a complex multispecies and multi-gear system and our knowledge of the interactions, both technical and biological, is poor. Many elements must be added to understand the exploited system, such as: (a) the high levels of discards would probably provide a worse picture of the status of the exploited ecosystem, (b) the invasion of new species through the Suez canal or the Strait of Gibraltar, or by means of other sources like ballast water or recreational activities, strengthened by climate change are modifying the marine ecosystem with unknown consequences for fishing, (c) technological advances which make fishing effort (i.e. time at sea) more efficient.

Is there any chance of correcting the trend of overfishing and redressing the fishery to make it more sustainable and productive? Probably, but strong and resolute management measures must be agreed and implemented. Here are some suggestions: (i) the creation of no-take zones to protect productive ecosystems (not necessarily coastal) which host essential fish habitats, i.e. both spawning and nursery grounds. These protected fishing areas must be of a good size (currently they are confined to a few micro coastal areas) and must be subject to an efficient monitoring, control and surveillance system; (ii) trawling has a major impact on the overexploitation due to its poor selectivity and, although it is not the only gear

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**TABLE 9**

Global Numbers of Stock Assessments by Basin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Western</th>
<th>Central</th>
<th>Eastern</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landings (tonnes)</td>
<td>322,501</td>
<td>344,761</td>
<td>251,165</td>
<td>918,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% landings</td>
<td>35.11%</td>
<td>37.54%</td>
<td>27.35%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. assessments</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. GSAs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. stocks assessed</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. species assessed</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landings assessed (tonnes)</td>
<td>83,733</td>
<td>125,910</td>
<td>27,963</td>
<td>237,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% landings assessed</td>
<td>25.96%</td>
<td>36.52%</td>
<td>11.13%</td>
<td>25.87%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
responsible for overexploitation, there is no doubt that it plays a fundamental role, so its activity should be placed under very strict and restrictive management; (iii) the Mediterranean fisheries are multispecies and multi-gear, so the traditional assessment methods based on one stock (one species) and one fleet do not always explain the current situation and trends, thus there is a need for moving beyond traditional age-structured population dynamics assessment models towards approaches that encompass the multi-species and data-poor nature of Mediterranean fisheries. A global approach is needed.

References


Decentralisation in the Arab World Must Be Strengthened to Provide Better Services

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Director
Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS), Beirut

Decentralisation on the Agenda\(^1\)

One of the major features of democracies is the extent to which the State is decentralised. With the advent of democratic transformations in the Arab world, decentralisation already is or will soon be on the reform agenda. Decentralisation is desired for two reasons. One, it enhances democracy and participation in managing local affairs. Two, it consequently leads to better developmental outcomes. The assumption is that delegating authority to lower level authorities will make service provision more effective, as it will be more responsive to the actual needs of beneficiaries, while political representation will also be enhanced through better participatory practices. Moreover, decentralisation is believed to increase representation for religious and ethnic minorities and empower local communities. Many also claim that it encourages flexibility, creativeness, and innovation, in addition to holding local politicians directly accountable.

In the context of the Arab world, decentralisation was partially established by colonial authorities to control the power of strong local leaderships. After the founding of independent nation-states, governments favoured social welfare policies to gain support and legitimacy, often privileging authoritarian rule. Progressively, structural adjustment policies and neoliberal reforms drastically altered the socio-political system in favour of the governing authorities and their associated elites, leading to a drastic increase in poverty levels. Governments in the Arab region continued to advocate decentralisation, often under the auspices of foreign donors, but very little effective decentralisation of authority was being implemented. Deconcentration was the actual dominant practice, which namely served to strengthen the central government’s domination. This led to a major crisis of accountability between different levels of governments as well as vis-à-vis citizens.

In 2013, the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) led a research project funded by the Open Society Foundation on decentralisation, democratisation, and the role of regional administrations for better service delivery in the Arab world. The framework used to study decentralisation and service delivery in the Arab world is structured along three components: i) the making and the politics of decentralisation; ii) the legislation and practice of service delivery; and iii) the fiscal structures of decentralisation. In all three components, we seek to understand the legal framework guiding the studied issue, its evolution over time and its actual practice. One of the objectives is to identify and qualify the gaps and hurdles that impede the implementation of a more decentralised and democratic system of governance, but also to study carefully how these gaps are being navigated, circumvented, and regulated. The project aimed to lay the groundwork for sharing decentralisation and service delivery experiences in five Arab countries: Lebanon, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen. Five cross-cutting themes emerged from the case studies, which are presented below.

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\(^1\) This article is based on a policy brief and book published by LCPS titled “Decentralisation, Urban Management and Service Delivery in the Arab World.”
Colonial Legacies Determine Decentralisation Policies

The first theme focuses on how colonial legacies and regional histories determine contemporary decentralisation policies and discourses. The analysis of the political history of country cases reveals that interactions and hierarchies between groups living in regions of the Arab world prior to colonial rule were very much regulated according to a decentralised architecture of power. Colonial regimes deeply reconfigured these relationships via the drawing of new territorial and administrative boundaries that cut across regions and hinterlands. They used the technical and administrative dimensions of decentralisation to justify their reforms and to control territories and opposition groups. The aim was to have a firm grip on the newly formed nation-states' territories, applying the classic ‘divide and rule’ adage. With the establishment of independent nation-states, this approach was further consolidated, using the narrative of the need to build a strong modern state. Decentralisation reforms continued with the same objective of extending the eyes and ears of the central State to localities. However, municipal elections started to be held, and democratic representation began to emerge at the local level.

Interactions and hierarchies between groups living in regions of the Arab world prior to colonial rule were very much regulated according to a decentralised architecture of power

This colonial legacy of decentralisation is not the same across Arab states. While in Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and Jordan, the building of post-colonial nation-states used centralisation to consolidate state power, in Yemen, decentralisation was preferred as a tool to balance regional powers. In either case, centralisation and decentralisation narratives were used to consolidate the interests of the ruling elites and their networks. These narratives were often accompanied by a modernisation rhetoric that praises the values of a strong state needing to control service delivery and secure its authority over national territory. In Jordan, the King advocates decentralisation to further secure the power of original Jordanian families, create jobs and maintain social peace, while controlling the emergence of Islamist groups within municipalities. In Lebanon, municipalities are also taken up by sectarian ruling powers to further their control over territories and access economic development rents, as well as distribute services to their clientele.

The social and territorial organisational system of Tunisian tribes provided services to constituencies according to a decentralisation hierarchy that was replaced under colonial rule with a new administrative geography aiming to control their power. The independent Tunisian nation-state further consolidated this territorial subdivision and positioned its representatives to supervise regions and localities and administer service delivery. In Morocco, the deconcentration of state services similarly serves to place ‘eyes on the street’ of the most remote tribal regions, via an extensive administrative system. This ambivalent system that both centralises and decentralises authority well illustrates the policy tensions and contradictions that characterise decentralisation issues in Morocco.

Central Governments Support and Subvert Decentralisation Policies

The second theme investigates how the State advocates but also subverts decentralisation reforms. National actors in Arab countries understood the importance of promoting decentralisation as a reform tool, because this was what international donors desired. Many public officials were wary of relinquishing power and resources and paid lip service to decentralisation. This meant both a push toward adopting decentralisation policies and simultaneously finding ways to circumvent their full implementation. Such dual positioning often leads to paradoxical situations where governments issue decentralisation policies that are halted by other policies, often fiscal, that restrict their applicability. The findings show that international donors are indirectly contributing to the increased centralisation of state power and services, not to mention furthering corruption and inefficiency.

Yemen is a case in point where decentralisation is strongly encouraged by the central State in terms of policy-making, and thanks to extensive aid from donors, leading to relatively effective deconcentration of
technical and administrative services. However, when it comes to political decentralisation, legal, fiscal, and territorial tools are used to restrict the effective empowerment of local authorities. In Morocco, the monarchy exercises stringent controls over elected local authorities via fiscal and administrative mechanisms. In addition, it uses international aid dedicated to decentralisation to strengthen central state services and appoints regional authorities that supervise locally elected governments, at the expense of their empowerment. The Lebanese Ministry of Interior is another example, as it uses multiple sources of funds to study decentralisation reforms, train its employees, and establish in-house service structures -ultimately consolidating its own constituencies and networks at the expense of enhancing local and regional governance.

While in Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and Jordan, the building of post-colonial nation-states used centralisation to consolidate state power, in Yemen, decentralisation was preferred as a tool to balance regional powers.

A major tool the central State uses to backstop the works of local and regional governments is fiscal control. Indeed, it can provide municipalities with many prerogatives on paper, but can impede their ability to operate and execute by withholding payments, like in Lebanon, or requesting additional fiscal contributions for unexpected expenses, like in Tunisia. It can also, illegally, operate unequal payments, favouring its partners and challenging its enemies.

Decentralised Services Need More Resources and Partnerships with Public-Private and Civil Society Actors

The third theme examines urban management and service delivery, public-private partnerships, and the role of civil society groups. Urban management and service delivery are in most cases relatively centralised services led by national-scale public agencies. Increasingly, infrastructural and technical services are being decentralised to local scales, often without sufficient human and fiscal resources to manage and maintain them. These are usually coordinated via public-private partnerships according to complicated legal and institutional setups. Such opaque setups lead to management and provision problems, which local governments are directly bearing because issues of accountability have not been clearly defined.

In Morocco, local governments constantly need to negotiate with the central State to access urban services and fiscal resources, generating tensions, especially when conflicts within local governments prevent bargaining strategies. This is comparable to the case of a regional administration in Lebanon (Suwayjani), which managed to get funding to build a waste management plant in its district but failed at insuring a steady flow of resources to maintain the plant, and hence ended up relinquishing its operation to a central state agency. In Tunisia, local governments are unable to control urban management and planning because of their limited resources, lack of legal tools and the pressure of private economic interests. In Jordan, the amalgamation reform of municipalities in 2001 did not improve service delivery as planned; on the contrary, it increased clientelism and inequality in accessing services. Jordanian municipalities are thus mostly unable to effectively provide services to their dwellers and are quite dependent on the central government, mainly due to a lack of technical and fiscal resources. In Tunisia, a dynamic mayor worked closely with NGOs concerned with public transportation, and coordinated a free school transportation system. In Lebanon, a charismatic mayor helped civil society groups establish a successful ecotourism project.

Municipalities Are Reluctant to Collect Local Taxes to Secure Political Loyalty

The fourth theme relates to the reluctance of municipalities to collect local taxes. In all countries, municipalities suffer from low revenues. This is largely attributed to the fact that central governments have given local administrations little tax authority. Central governments have also stalled in distributing funds to local authorities from the intergovernmental grant system. In some instances, like in Jordan and Yemen,
fiscal allocations to local governments followed a political logic, favouring the hometowns of ministers and parliamentarians.

A major tool the central State uses to backstop the works of local and regional governments is fiscal control. Indeed, it can provide municipalities with many prerogatives on paper, but can impede their ability to operate and execute by withholding payments. However, some local governments have failed to optimise on the tax authority granted to them. For some, this is a matter of weak human resources and a poor system of identifying taxpayers. In other cases, municipal councils have chosen not to collect taxes or fees from their constituencies. They unofficially exempted some taxpayers from paying local taxes to gain political loyalty. In Jordan, up to 40% of municipal revenues were not collected in 2003. Jordanian mayors seemed to prefer negotiating grant transfers from the central State rather than antagonise their immediate constituency. In Morocco, too, fear of losing their electoral base, clientelism, and mistrust of public finance make mayors reluctant to collect taxes. Similarly in Yemen, local councils did not want to upset the popular base they needed to appease.

**Leadership and Networks of Local Officials Make Municipalities Perform Better**

The fifth theme investigates innovations undertaken by local and regional governments. In particular it explores the features that explain the noteworthy performance of some local and regional governments, their abilities to negotiate their ways through hurdles to delivering better services, think holistically about development projects and establish various partnerships for spatial planning. Such features include leadership, networks, civil society dynamics, political competition, governance, and territoriality. Innovative experiences demonstrate that decentralisation policies can open up avenues for improved service delivery and urban management, and for social and political change, albeit timid and contained.

In Yemen, some local leaders have strong abilities to negotiate with national authorities while advancing solutions that meet their constituencies' needs, often using both legal and extra-judicial networks. For instance, one local council managed to bypass the constraints of limited resources and established cultural activities in its town while another brought water and sanitation services to its constituency despite technical and geographic hurdles. Some regional governments in Lebanon succeeded in negotiating grant packages and mobilising local partnerships to promote strategic planning for their region and initiate economic development through ecotourism strategies (e.g. Jezzine, Sour, Dinniye). Service delivery on the regional level seems to also be more successful in Tunisia where experiences of public transportation in the district of Sidi Bouzid led to positive outcomes. In Morocco, some municipalities led by charismatic figures are succeeding in using institutional setups and international grants to direct them to their locality's needs. Matters were more complex in Jordan, where strong centralisation and direct interventionism by the King prevents opportunities for manoeuvring autonomously at the local level.
According to various reports and prospective studies published by the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the US government (see references), the main geopolitical effects derived from unconventional oil and gas exploitation and trade can be summarised in the following points:

**Unconventional Oil**

At the end of 2011, excluding liquid fuels derived from coal and natural gas (CTL and GTL respectively), the estimates of recoverable unconventional oil resources and reserves worldwide, slightly exceed the volume of conventional oil reserves and resources.

Not counting CTL and GTL resources, the industrialised OECD countries, which only hoard 15.6% of the total resources of technically recoverable global crude oil and natural gas liquids, contain 62% of unconventional oil resources. In late 2011, these were located primarily in North America, Eastern Europe-Eurasia and Latin America, counteracting the geopolitical importance of the Middle East, a region that accounts for 42% of conventional oil reserves and resources. However, it is worth noting that the potential conventional resources in the Middle East region remain unexplored.

The forecasts for the period 2012-2035 indicate that the share of conventional crude oil in overall oil production will fall from 80 to 65%. The growth in production needed to cover demand must therefore come from other sources. Among these, together with natural gas liquids, are the unconventional oil supplies, whose contribution could multiply by three in the aforementioned period. These unconventional supplies would come mainly from US light tight oil (LTO) from the Canadian oil sands and Venezuelan extra-heavy oil.

Up to 2020, oil production in non-OPEC countries will maintain its upward trend. Both conventional and unconventional oil production will increase, but the former will reach its peak shortly before 2020 and then decline a few years later to the extent that even an increase in unconventional oil production will not be enough to turn this downward trend around. Total oil production between 2012 and 2035 will fall in most non-OPEC countries, with the exception of Brazil, Canada, Kazakhstan and the US, although production in the latter will go into decline before 2035. From then until 2035, production in the ultra-deep waters of Brazil and of LTO in the United States will lose steam, the Middle East will stand as the sole source of relatively cheap oil in the world and Iraq will become the largest contributor to overall output growth.

With regard to both conventional and unconventional oil, the balance of production during the 2012-2035 period, clearly favours Iraq, Brazil, Canada, Kazakhstan and the United States, while at the opposite end are Russia, China, Norway, the United Kingdom, Oman and Azerbaijan, with Kuwait and Argentina lagging quite behind. Moreover, Venezuela, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will remain in a balanced position.

In 2035, the percentage share of OECD countries in terms of global oil demand will fall to approximately 32% as compared to 46.6% in 2012. In China, however, the oil use has significantly increased, so that in
2030, this country will overtake the US as the largest global consumer. Likewise, India emerges as a key centre for oil consumption, especially between 2020 and 2035, a period during which this country will experience the largest growth in global demand. Another relevant issue is that the Middle East will become the world’s third largest centre in terms of oil demand.

In the next two decades, the changing geography in oil production and consumption will lead to a major reorganisation of global trade. Oil flow destinations will move from the OECD, where Europe remains the sole importing market, to Asia. In 2035, the two largest global oil importers will be China and India, while the percentage of US involvement in inter-regional trade in crude oil will decline from 27% today to 15%. This reorganisation of trade flows will require a reassessment of security policies for the oil supply. The big Asian countries will have to engage more in preventing and managing the effects of possible disruptions in the global supply of crude oil.

**Unconventional Gas**

Without accounting for gas hydrates, it is estimated that the reserves and recoverable resources of unconventional gas are equivalent to about three-quarters of that of conventional gas. At the end of 2012, shale gas represented approximately 61.8% of the total technically recoverable unconventional resources, pending extraction, compared with 23.6% for tight gas and 14.6% for coal-bed methane or CBM.

Approximately 27.7% of unconventional gas resources are located in the Asia-Pacific region, 19.2% in the US and Canada, 16% in Latin America, 13.4% in Eastern Europe-Eurasia, 14.2% in Africa, 5.5% in European OECD countries, and just 3.8% in the Middle East. This distribution will contribute to balancing the excessive concentration of conventional reserves and resources in Eastern Europe-Eurasia (mainly in Russia) and the Middle East, which account for around 30.6% and 26.5%, respectively, of the world’s reserves and technically recoverable resources of conventional natural gas. However, it must be noted that the volume of unconventional gas resources in the Middle East is yet to be evaluated.

Between 2011 and 2035 natural gas production will grow in all regions around the world, with the only exception of Europe, where the increase in production in Norway will not be enough to offset the decline in other mature fields. China, the US, Russia and Australia (in that order), followed by Qatar, Iraq, Brazil, Turkmenistan, Iran and Algeria will experience the greatest increase in production. Although the US and Australia will register large increases in their production thanks to unconventional gas resources, both countries becoming net exporters, the countries outside the OECD will be responsible for around 81.75% of the growth in production.

52% of the total increase in natural gas production forecast worldwide between 2011 and 2035 will come from conventional gas, while the remaining 48% will come from unconventional sources. The forecasts are that, as of 2020, the development of unconventional gas production will spread beyond North America (the US and Canada), turning China and Australia into the largest contributors to global output growth, followed by other countries like Argentina, India, Algeria, Mexico and Indonesia; the European Union with a position slightly above the latter three countries. Unconventional gas, which in 2011 represented around 17% of the world’s total natural gas production, could reach 27% in 2035. The natural gas markets that will experience the fastest growth between 2011 and 2035 are those located outside the OECD. Countries outside this organisation will be responsible for more than three-quarters of the growth in demand during the aforementioned period, with the maximum growth in absolute terms being concentrated in China and the Middle East. In the OECD countries, although consumption will increase, the growth rates will be less due to market saturation and the effects of the penetration of renewable energies in the energy sector in Europe. Despite this, the OECD markets will continue to be comparatively large, so that, for example, in 2035, demand in the US, still the largest consumer worldwide, will be 50% higher than in China.

Inter-regional natural gas trade will continue to grow throughout the period 2011-2035, during which, based on the exploitation of their unconventional resources, certain new exporters will become increasingly relevant, such as Australia, the US and Canada, thereby posing a competitive challenge to the classic exporters, like Russia and Qatar. During the course of
the period 2011-2035, we will also be witness to a continual change in the direction of the international trade in natural gas, whose import focus will move from the Atlantic basin (with the notable exception of Europe that will continue to be the world's biggest importing region) towards the Asia-Pacific region.

Just under half the increased international trade in natural gas expected for the period 2011-2035 will be carried out via gas pipelines. This flow will hardly be affected by the advances in unconventional gas production and its main developments will be seen in Eurasia.

While natural gas trade via gas pipelines will continue to be dominated by just a few producers, basically located in Eurasia (Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan), the group of exporting countries of liquefied natural gas (LNG) will undergo a major reorganisation. Some of today’s LNG exporters are already experiencing a rapid growth in internal demand, thereby limiting the volume available for exports. This trend is particularly evident in the Middle East, so that in 2020 only Qatar and Yemen will remain as exporters (to which perhaps Iraq could also be added). Other countries that for the same reason could cease to be exporters are Egypt and Trinidad & Tobago. Moreover, the market will see the appearance of new actors, notably including Australia, the US and Canada, major producers of unconventional gas. Furthermore, Russia could expand its share in the LNG market directing its exports towards Asia.

Unlike the United States, the European Union shows a particularly negative development, as its dependence on gas will rise from 60% in 2011, to 80% in 2035, while dependence on oil imports will rise during the same period from 80% to close to 90%. Beyond the implications for supply security, these data imply much higher energy prices in the European Union, which will undoubtedly represent a heavy burden for the competitiveness of its industry and a significant fall in its citizens’ purchasing power.

China and India, like other Asian countries and regions show a similar trend to that of the European Union in their degree of dependency on hydrocarbon imports, although theirs is less dramatic, while the major conventional hydrocarbon producing countries in the Middle East, Russia, Africa and the Caspian region will see hardly any variations in their positions.

**Bibliography**


Energy Infrastructure Targeting in the Mediterranean: a Shifting Threat

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In January 2013 the largest ever terrorist attack on an oil facility took place at the Tigantourine gas complex, operated by Statoil, BP and the state-owned Sonatrach, at In Amenas in eastern Algeria. The attack was carried out by the Al Mulathameen Battalion, a terrorist group led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar (and linked to al-Qaeda), who targeted the main facility and accommodation camp – taking hundreds of workers hostage, including more than 130 foreign nationals, who were deliberately sought out. After making a series of demands and threats, the Algerian military assaulted the complex. Consequently, 39 foreign nationals and most of the attackers were killed, prompting Statoil and BP to suspend operations while they performed security risk assessments. While Belmokhtar claimed that the attack was in retaliation for Algeria allowing France to use its airspace during military operations against Islamist groups in northern Mali, the evidence suggests that the likely motive was hostage-taking – a tactic widely used throughout the region.

This attack, though extraordinary, did not happen in isolation. On the one hand, while Algeria has long been a rather risky operating environment for oil and gas ventures, regional security in North Africa has been deteriorating since the Arab Spring began in 2011. In fact, risk assessment firms predicted that energy assets and foreign personnel operating in southern Algeria were a potential target due to the growth of militant and illicit/criminal activity in North Africa and across the Sahara. More broadly, in large parts of the Mediterranean region – namely Egypt, Yemen, Tunisia, Libya, Syria and Turkey – oil and gas pipelines as well as energy facilities and personnel have come under threat. Indeed, as much of this region has become the epicentre of instability, energy infrastructures (EI) – that is physical assets, such as pipelines and facilities, human capital (i.e. energy sector employees) and, to a lesser extent, information infrastructure that support the functions of energy systems and operations – have been increasingly targeted.

On the other hand, the In Amenas case, and the growing vulnerability of EI in the Mediterranean region, must also be understood within a global context where EI is more frequently targeted. Since 1980, there have been over 10,000 EI attacks, across the globe (see the Energy Infrastructure Attack Database), however many of those attacks have been within the last 14 years – with over 400 EI attacks occurring, on average, per year since 2000 (which is at least a 100% increase). Not only is the rate of increase in such attacks concerning but it is also the propensity of attacks to cluster in hotspots of instability or conflict where non-state actors target EI and use it as a channel or platform to air grievances, communicate to governments, affect state economic interests; and as a source of access and power and of income and status. It is worth noting that the Tigantourine gas complex attack was one of many that occurred during 2013. Beyond North Africa, EI was targeted in various parts of the Middle East, South Asia, West Africa and South America. For instance, in that same year Colombia leftist guerrillas carried out 163 oil pipeline bombings, in addition to other EI attacks, that created considerable economic and environmental costs, while in Nigeria former militants and criminal entrepreneurs repeatedly sabotaged oil pipelines, stealing anywhere from 100,000 barrels per day (bpd) to 150,000 bpd. While these other attacks captured some attention, it was because of their small, diffuse – though fre-
quent – nature that they were unable to command the international shock and attention that In Amenas received.

Given that large parts of the Mediterranean region have become hotspots of instability, it is worth examining the threat to energy infrastructures in this area. What types of assets are most commonly targeted, how are they targeted and what types of groups are carrying out such attacks? What are the different goals or motivations? And what are the EI protection strategies that are needed to enhance security? This analysis comes at a time when the excitement around the gas findings in the Eastern Mediterranean Levant Basin, which holds an estimated 3.45 trillion cubic metres of natural gas and 1.7 billion barrels of oil, is moderated by the heightened political tensions in the region. Ongoing fallout from the Arab Spring aside, natural gas findings off the coast of Cyprus have exacerbated relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots while Israel and Lebanon are in a maritime border dispute in which both countries have declared overlapping boundaries in the Mediterranean Sea.

**EI Targeting in the Mediterranean**

Energy assets are symbolic, strategically important and comprised of distributed infrastructures, many in remote locations that make them difficult to protect and thus attractive targets (See the box for a snapshot of different types of EI targeting). While in the 1980s EI attacks were a common feature throughout Central and South America where leftist groups targeted electrical infrastructure and to some degree oil and gas pipelines, more recently oil and gas infrastructures (including those both on and offshore) have become the target of choice. A spotlight on the Mediterranean region reveals that threats to EI not only cut across the region – impacting states in varying ways – but have also followed a similar trajectory.

In the 1980s and 1990s, terrorist groups in France and Spain carried out a number of violent campaigns. In France, Corsican nationalists who advocated for an independent Corsica often targeted public buildings and infrastructures, particularly electrical lines and substations, as a way to communicate their opposition to French control. Similarly, in Spain, Basque nationalists also targeted electrical infrastructures during its violent campaign that spanned over 30 years.

But, since 2000, the war in Iraq set in motion regular clashes within communities as well as proxy wars between the Shiite and Sunni Muslim communities. This coupled with the contagion of instability throughout North Africa and the Middle East has elevated energy infrastructure vulnerability – particularly in the oil and gas sector – throughout the Mediterranean region. This comes at a time when, in 2014, the International Energy Agency warned that political risks in North Africa and the Middle East may prevent it from reaching future production goals.

**SNAPSHOT OF EI TARGETS**

- Electrical infrastructures: Due to their extent and remoteness electricity lines and substations are often attractive targets. Most attacks aimed at electrical infrastructure involve some type of explosive device.
- Pipelines: Pipelines (whether gas or oil) are often the target of sabotage or bombing, which result in down time and repairs that can take weeks. Like electricity assets, they are hard to protect due to their extent and remoteness.
- Oil and LNG tankers: Transit areas such as the South China Sea, Malacca straits, Gulf of Aden, Indian Ocean, and Gulf of Guinea have all been the home to armed banditry and hijacking of oil and LNG tankers. While armed banditry can incur financial costs, hijackings of tankers have resulted in multi-million dollar ransom payments.
- Energy sector employees: Energy sector employees, particularly foreign nationals are often targeted for significant ransom payments as well as for leverage for other interests.
- Rigs: Largely non-violent, occupying drilling rigs and drilling vessels is largely the work of environmental activists.
- Facilities: Local community opposition to extractive projects often sit along a spectrum of conflict that include demonstrations, protests and blockades that are aimed at facilities.
- Energy Information Infrastructure: Cyber-attacks largely include intellectual property theft and espionage but can also threaten supervisory control and data acquisition systems which monitor and control infrastructure in the energy sector.
Turkey

Turkey’s strategic importance in the energy world has grown through its becoming a key transit country for oil and gas resources headed towards the EU. However, it sits on the edge of an unstable neighbourhood and has its own history of domestic terrorism. Over the years the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has sought autonomy in southern Turkey, has targeted EI in an effort to communicate its grievances and, in doing so, leverage a national, if not international, platform. While in the mid-1980s it carried out its first attack aimed at the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline, since then such attacks have been infrequent and often used as a last resort, though one that is sure to provide the group with maximum attention. The August 2008 attack aimed at the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, which pumps one million barrels per day (bpd) and is regarded as one of the most important alternative oil transit pipelines, garnered global attention and concern that more similar attacks would follow. However, it was not until 2010 that the group increased EI attacks, thereby confirming its intent to undermine Turkey’s strategic assets, which are integrally tied to its energy infrastructure and role as a transit country. In one 2012 attack it bombed part of the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum (BTE or Shah Deniz) gas pipeline, halting 16% of Turkey’s daily gas intake for about a week. More recently, hostilities between Turkey and the PKK have subsided as a peace process has been underway, although peace is tenuous at best.

Algeria

Algeria possesses up to 2.4% of the world’s oil and gas reserves, while contributing 1.8% and 2.4% of oil and gas production as well as up to 5% of LNG. Up until the attack on the Tigantourine gas complex, it seemed to be largely immune from the contagion of violence and unrest unleashed by the Arab Spring. But the 2013 attack reminded the energy sector that Algeria is not immune to dynamics in the region. In fact, while EI attacks have been more common in other countries in the region it should be kept in mind that when Belmokhtar and his group decided to launch the world’s most dramatic and devastating attack on an oil facility, they chose to do so in Algeria.

Egypt

Within Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula has been home to a number of attacks aimed at its energy infrastructure. For instance, the gas pipeline connecting Egypt to Israel and Jordan was attacked at least once a month from mid-2011 to July 2012. Since then there have been at least another 15 reported EI attacks. The repeated nature of these attacks result in repeated disruptions and, at times, lengthy repairs. More recently, in January 2015, Egyptian jihadists claimed responsibility for bombing the pipeline yet again, noting that it was due to Amman’s role in targeting the Islamic State group.

Since 2011, civil war and the death of Muammar Gaddafi has created a space for violent groups and rebels to flourish and keep Libya in a state of violent paralysis. Consequently its oil and gas sector has been continuously disrupted as violent groups, such as those affiliated with ISIS as well as ethnic minorities

Libya

Since 2011, civil war and the death of Muammar Gaddafi has created a space for violent groups and rebels to flourish and keep Libya in a state of violent paralysis. Consequently its oil and gas sector has been continuously disrupted as violent groups, such as those affiliated with ISIS as well as ethnic minori-
ties like Berbers and Toubous, have carried out a number of attacks on energy facilities, including Ras Lanuf, Es Sider, and Zuettina (oil and gas terminals). Attacks have ranged from minor to major events such as those aimed at oil fields in the Sirte region which caused considerable damage. For some, the goal is to undermine the government, advance political objectives, or demand the recognition of their rights. For others it is simply about using the energy assets as a platform for garnering funds. In any event, for a country that relies on oil for most of its revenue, the targeting of energy infrastructure will only expedite the further deterioration of the country.

Syria

Like Libya, as Syria has become engulfed in political turmoil and war, attacks aimed at its natural gas facilities have increased and thus caused substantial losses in daily energy supplies. Illustrative of this, during 2012, one attack aimed at a natural gas pipeline cut off the supply of 194 million cubic feet of natural gas per day while another attack on a natural gas field led to the loss of 70 million cubic feet of natural gas per day. Such attacks have continued and in many cases intensified. As recently as June and July 2015, Islamic State (IS) militants bombed a natural gas pipeline that serves Damascus and Homs as well as a power plant that provides energy to Hasaka. On the one hand IS has used its access to oil fields to generate income while, on the other it has bombed electrical and natural gas infrastructure to deny resources to the government and weaken its position.

Protecting EI amidst Ongoing Volatility

This cursory overview of threats to EI in the Mediterranean region reveals a concerning trend. Despite this, EI protection strategies have yet to adapt to the shifting and volatile conditions. While in some cases energy operations need to be temporarily suspend due to particularly hostile conditions, in the longer term a more holistic, cross-sectoral approach to securing energy infrastructure is needed in such volatile regions. This includes coordinating security strategies that stretch from onshore to offshore and leveraging an increase in naval activity in the region to enhance the protection of EI.

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Returning to the In Amenas case, though measures have been taken to enhance security it seems that they sit within the reactionary ‘business-as-usual’ approach which tends to lean more towards ‘guns, gates and guards,’ rather than a more holistic and tailored approach that will improve risk management. Not only are better diagnoses of operating contexts vital, but sustained analysis and engagement are also key. This includes adopting an evidence-based approach to understanding the power of contagion that creates clusters and the motivations and characteristics of violent non-state actors. Today’s violent militia groups have a complex mix of shifting economic, social, political, cultural, and ideological grievances. They are also transnational and often have different, if not competing, agendas. Consequently, multi-pronged strategies must seek to isolate extremists by using a socio-anthropological lens to develop a deeper understanding of them, support host communities through tailored community engagement activities and enhance cross-border collaboration that could diminish the capacity of such groups to carry out attacks.
What it truly means to be a journalist is one of the most pressing questions that countries affected by the Arab Spring have had to face. When the squares lit up, thousands of youths took to the streets in the double guise of protesters and citizen-journalists. They voluntarily and freely reported a chapter of history, which they actively contributed to creating, while state television channels continued to ignore it. When censorship and self-censorship barriers were torn down, both professional and amateur journalists found themselves immersed in a completely new media-communication sphere. Debuting within this new and unregulated context, these new journalists tasted the emotion that accompanies exercising rights, which they had regained during the protests. These journalists were now able to grasp the influence they could have on the public – from whom they had had to partially veil the truth, and their own interpretation of events, for years. In a short period of time, the role of the journalist rapidly evolved (and, at least in the case of Egypt, subsequently devolved) into one that was increasingly militant. Neutrality and credibility struggled to assert themselves. In fact, today, programming is gradually being replaced by a staunchly politicised agenda.

With this in mind, this analysis self-critically questions the roles played by the media as they acquired greater authority during and after the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions. How did they act and what mechanisms did they set into motion during the transitions, especially in the highly polarised phases? Did they accentuate or reduce that polarity? In order to answer these questions, this analysis has closely followed the evolution of the complex – and still ongoing – media reform processes.

**Between Polarisation and Compromise: Tunisian Media during the Transition**

With the opening of the private broadcast sector for political reporting, the Tunisian audiovisual landscape changed dramatically. No fewer than twelve radio stations and numerous television channels began to broadcast without authorisation between 2012 and 2013. Indeed, widespread liberalisation animated the local television scene. As explained by Fatima El-Issawi, the excessive polarisation seriously threatened the new pluralism. National TV stations quickly became the main spearheads of politi-
While considering the polarisation of the Tunisian media on the basis of an Islamist/secularist dichotomy is quite tempting, audience data show that channels existing before the revolution still dominate the Tunisian television scene, and Islamist and religious channels are not faced with a receptive audience. Thus, the political polarisation between an Islamic and a secular pole is not reflected in the media context, which more closely resembles a battlefield thick with different factors and competing interests.

At the same time, the approach advanced by partisan journalism has become one of the fundamental features of the Tunisian post-revolutionary media system. Even if the latter has failed to lobby for rights and freedoms, instead choosing to sweeten the images of political and ideological allies, the media sector has still undertaken an important reform process that deserves to be closely followed. The positive approach to reform undertaken by the Tunisian media has still to show important results and Tunisian media have to achieve their own autonomous maturity vis-à-vis the political opposition.

Lined Up and Defeated: Egyptian Media during the Transition

Post-revolutionary Egypt was not immune to the explosion of new media outlets. In addition to new media linked to political parties, some wealthy businessmen with ties to the Mubarak regime decided to create new outlets to promote their own interests, rather than the public one. As a result, there was a rise in both ethical and financial corruption. Even if the 2013 Constitution provided real progress in the protection of freedom of information, this remained only on paper due to repressive campaigns implemented by the military-backed government. Successive regimes have taken steps to limit freedom of expression and control the narrative in Egyptian media coverage. Hopes for a more professional sector have been dashed by a state media apparatus that has, for all intents and purposes, supported whatever regime has been in power. In addition, the deep polarisation between pro-Islamists and pro-liberals – above all at the end of the Muslim Brotherhood era – transformed the media into the favourite political spin.

If Brotherhood control of the media was one of the most evident authoritarian aspects of the Islamist era – as well as a clear replication of the previous regime’s behaviour – the wave of populist propaganda associated with the 2013 military intervention was a

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4 This can be partly explained by the role played by all agents involved in the political and journalistic spheres. In a relationship of permanent competition and tension, they fall both strictly and directly under the influence of market approval and public consensus. Thus, economics dominates the organisation of the Tunisian media sector, which is characterised by the cohabitation of religion, politics, capital and entertainment.

5 Fifteen new TV channels have been licensed.
replication of the old regime's tactics of mobilising public opinion and muzzling the media for its own benefit. Instead of mitigating the struggle between liberal and Islamist forces, the media magnified it, fuelling popular anger against the Brotherhood’s rule and supporting — or, rather, embellishing — the military intervention.

To date, journalists working both in private and state media have continued to share a propagandistic attitude, serving as the guardians of the regime, always ready to orchestrate media campaigns to glorify it whenever it is in danger. Many newspapers and television networks are able to transmit and report exaggerations, fabricate news and reports, and commit other infringements as part of their daily practice without being held accountable. They are also used to celebrating the government’s achievements, while ignoring its failures. The lack of a code of ethics and a proper media framework transforms journalists into nothing but spokespersons for their corporate heads, who themselves are often reiterating government rhetoric.

Hopes for a more professional sector have been dashed by a state media apparatus that has, for all intents and purposes, supported whatever regime has been in power within this scenario, there were immediate calls by civil society for significant reform of the legal framework governing the media. The day after Mubarak’s resignation, a statement issued by the Forum of Independent Human Rights Organisations included a significant section on media law reform. The National Coalition for Media Freedom was then established and, on 3 May 2011, issued a Media Freedom Declaration in Cairo setting out the ten main principles of media freedom and calling for the abolishment of the Ministry of Information and Supreme Press Council and their replacement with independent bodies. The Ministry was put into abeyance and many rules limiting media freedom were suspended. But this new trend did not last long. An early setback occurred when, on 9 July 2011, a new Minister of Information, Osama Heikal, was appointed — to the great disappointment of Egyptian human rights groups, which had hoped that this Ministry had been permanently abolished. This was followed by a series of new appointments to state newspapers made by the Shura Council, which is dominated by Islamist forces.

The lack of a code of ethics and a proper media framework transforms journalists into nothing but spokespersons for their corporate heads, who themselves are often reiterating government rhetoric.

It can be concluded that the legal framework, which formally remains almost entirely in place, has established a strict regulatory regime for the media that allocates a broad measure of control to the government. Today, state media reform is needed more than ever before, but the political will is lacking. Like its predecessors, the Al-Sisi regime has shown little interest in making the media more open and democratic.

Conclusion

This analysis has focused on the evolution of the Tunisian and Egyptian media sectors during the turbulent post-revolutionary transitions. Underlining that the reform of the media sector itself remains a challenge, this paper has shown the role played by the media in two different democratisation processes. While in the Tunisian evolution,

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7 Mendel, Toby; Abdel Azz, Yasser; Alem, Rasha Nabil; Al-Zahra Abdel Fattah, Fatima; Mahmoud, Hany Ibrahim. Assessment of media development in Egypt based on UNESCO’s Media Development Indicators. Cairo: UNESCO Office Cairo and Regional Bureau for Science in the Arab States, 2013, p. 6-8 (available at: www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/resources/publications-and-communication-materials/publications/full-list/assessment-of-media-development-in-egypt/). For a list of the new reform initiatives that have been undertaken since the revolution, see p. 78.
compromise and reconciliation have prevailed, the Egyptian involution has been dominated by polarisation and sectarianism. When the latter was reaching its peak, Egyptian media became the best platform for political lobbying. Transformed into a political battlefield instead of helping to moderate the heated social climate by focusing on fundamental challenges to national development, the media have exacerbated internal division and pushed the country closer to the brink of a civil war. The same cannot be said for the Tunisian landscape, where media played a more positive role. The turbulent but ‘sensible’ management of the constitutional transition by the Troika (Ennahdha, CPR and Ettakatol) avoided this danger, and the absence of this media polarisation did not exacerbate the political debate that could derail the country into a sectarian abyss.

Supporting professional – rather than partisan – journalism, Egyptian media could play a more positive role, abandoning their propagandistic attitude and reducing – rather than exacerbating – the heat of the political debate. Nevertheless, in both countries, the approach advanced by partisan journalism has become one of the fundamental features of their post-revolutionary media systems. While it is important to insist on institutional reform, in both countries civil society organisations should launch a comprehensive internal reform process. Focusing on the institutional path, this paper has shown that, once again, the Tunisian reform process has proved itself to be more successful than the Egyptian one. Even if it is still an ongoing process, it has achieved important goals. The opposite can be said looking to the Egyptian landscape. Not only has the debate around media reform been poor, but the formal reform process has not achieved anything of importance. Here, the only possible reform path seems to be via dissident voices inside the media backed by civil society and popular support. While legal reforms – like Tunisia’s – are necessary, they risk laying the foundations for change without actually creating any real change. It is now time for civil society organisations to launch a comprehensive internal reform process. Taking a bottom-up approach to reform, this process should focus on the eradication of self-censorship habits, the value of data, and the importance of a code of conduct. Supporting professional – rather than partisan – journalism, Egyptian media could play a more positive role, abandoning their propagandistic attitude and reducing – rather than exacerbating – the heat of the political debate.
Research generally highlights three factors that led 29 European countries to embark on the Bologna Process in 1999 with the aim of creating a European Higher Education Area (EHEA) by 2010. These were perceived global pressures on higher education systems in Europe (Charlier & Croché 2008; Hartmann 2008); perceived deficits of national higher education systems (Peciar & Pellert 2004; Charlier & Croché 2008); and tensions between national governments and European interests regarding the competence for policy development in higher education (Tomusk 2004; Corbett 2006; Peciar 2007; Charlier & Croché 2008).

The ‘External Dimension’ – Cooperation or Competition?

Particularly the first factor has received increasing importance in recent years through the development of the so-called ‘external dimension’ of the Bologna Process (Zgaga 2006; Vögtle 2010). This was linked to perceived global pressures brought about by declining numbers of foreign students choosing to study in Europe compared to Europeans studying in the US. Particularly the decrease in enrolments of foreign students from regions such as Asia, Latin America as well as Eastern Europe, which were considered by various European countries to be of geopolitically strategic importance, raised concerns (Charlier & Croché 2008). In view of that, European cooperation in higher education through the Bologna Process was considered an effective strategy to increase the attractiveness and competitiveness of higher education systems in Europe. In particular, the size of the European Higher Education Area and European labour market as well as the connection between the two were considered as determining factors for its attractiveness for skilled individuals and its competitiveness with other world regions (Hartmann 2008). Multilateral cooperation appeared to be, therefore, more effective than individual strategies undertaken by each country.

Despite the joint declarations for multilateral cooperation, various countries of the EHEA stepped up their individual promotion activities in the hope of maximising their own national benefits from this cooperation vis-à-vis their cooperating partners (Charlier & Croché 2008). Others appear to have seen it as an opportunity for a rapprochement with the European Union, particularly in view of its enlargement in 2004, for which negotiations had commenced in 1995 (Tomusk 2004).

These diverging motives for engaging in the Bologna Process stress the need to analyse more closely the relationship of the EHEA with countries in the eastern and southern Mediterranean. Is the engagement of countries from the eastern and southern Mediterranean in seminars and conferences linked to the Bologna Process (Zgaga 2006: 39-45) evidence of their intention to seek rapprochement with Europe, much in the same way as Tomusk (2004) suggested for the ‘new’ EU Member States in the early stages of the Bologna Process? Or is it evidence of centre-periphery dependencies as suggested by the World Systems Analysis advanced by Wallerstein (1998; 1990); Amin (1976-77) and Amin & Luckin (1996), namely...
as “a disguised transfer of value from the periphery to the centre” (Amin 1976-77: 47) by attracting skilled individuals from South to North, “since the periphery has borne the cost of training this labour force.” (Amin 1976-77: 47) Or is it evidence of a combination of both?

Quality Assurance, Comparability and Compatibility and their Link to Mobility

In the Bologna Process the discourse on quality assurance has gained importance in bringing about a systemic change in higher education, alongside structural reforms to ensure the accountability of higher education institutions to external expectations at national level and increase comparability, compatibility and mutual trust between national quality assurance systems.

European cooperation in higher education through the Bologna Process was considered an effective strategy to increase the attractiveness and competitiveness of higher education systems in Europe

Facilitating the comparability of and mutual trust in national quality assurance systems is of particular importance from an international perspective, since it eases the recognition of qualifications and study periods between one country and another. This in turn supports the mobility of students and graduates within and towards the EHEA – a central element of the ‘external dimension’ of the Bologna Process as suggested above. Apart from that, it projects the quality of higher education in the EHEA internationally – thus, aiming to create a pull-factor towards the EHEA. However, facilitating student and graduate mobility is not uncontroversial in view of the difference in socio-economic development among the countries, resulting in some countries being more ‘attractive’ for the best talent than others. The effects of such push and pull factors are noticeable both within the EHEA (Kwiek 2004) and between countries from outside it towards the EHEA (Shawa 2008). Therefore, embarking on higher education reforms that improve the recognition of qualifications of foreign graduates may further facilitate the mobility of the best talent towards the EHEA.

Besides that, quality assurance also seeks to ensure the accountability of higher education institutions to external expectations at national level. This is important in view of increasing cross-border provision of higher education and the need for regulation at national level that arises from such developments. Kwiek (2004) argues that such developments within and outside the EHEA may affect the spirit of ‘cooperation’ and ‘competition’ since: some countries are already global players in higher education; and some are already exporters of higher education to Central and Eastern Europe in various, but mostly highly lucrative, disciplines. It may be hard to combine the ‘competitive’ spirit presented to the non-European global competitors with the ‘solidarity’ spirit presented at the same time to the (central) European partners. Can we imagine sheer cooperation and solidarity as driving motives in contacts with the countries of the region on the part of institutions from the countries with strong market traditions and a good share in the global education market (like for example, the UK or the Netherlands)? (Kwiek 2004: 770).

Facilitating the comparability of and mutual trust in national quality assurance systems is of particular importance from an international perspective, since it eases the recognition of qualifications and study periods between one country and another

If countries forming part of the EHEA voice such concerns regarding the consequences of implementing the higher education reforms arising from the Bologna Process, who may influence its discourse? And, why should other countries and regions of the world be interested in implementing such reforms and seeking comparability and compatibility with higher education systems in the EHEA?
Quality Assurance in Higher Education in the Mediterranean

Indeed similarities in reforms on quality assurance between countries of the EHEA and the eastern and southern Mediterranean are noticeable. However, it is questionable to what extent these reforms are the result of cooperation with the EHEA or a response to it. Instead, reforms may have been influenced by the aim of strengthening ties with the US or with former colonial economic powers rather than the EHEA per se.

The Example of Israel

Research on the process of quality assurance in Israel suggests a focus on quality assurance by subject area across higher education institutions, in contrast to the focus on external quality assurance of higher education institutions in the EHEA. Bearing in mind the strong influence of research intensive universities in the governance structures of the Council for Higher Education, which is responsible for quality assurance of higher education in Israel (Bernstein 2002; Lieven & Graeme 2006; Geva-May 2001) this comparative approach to quality assurance across a diverse set of higher education institutions appears to serve particularly their interests in sustaining the stratification of Israel’s higher education system (Bernstein 2002; Davidovitch & Iram 2009; Davidovitch & Soen 2010).

Reforms may have been influenced by the aim of strengthening ties with the US or with former colonial economic powers rather than the EHEA per se

Another notable difference in the discourse on quality in higher education in Israel is the progressive de-nationalisation of higher education. Quality assurance regulations in Israel stress that the members of the quality evaluation committees must be in the majority foreigners (CHE 2013), while the recommendations and guidelines issued by the Council for Higher Education in 2006 had no such requirement (CHE 2006). Indeed, only two out of seven evaluations of academic disciplines, carried out during the academic year 2005/2006, were carried out by a majority of foreign evaluators. In comparison, out of 32 evaluations of academic disciplines carried out between the academic year 2005/2006 and 2011/2012 foreign evaluators made up the majority of the evaluation committees in 27 cases. This clearly indicates a major effort by the Council for Higher Education to seek foreign influences on Israel’s higher education system. In view of that, it is interesting to note that in 28 out of 32 cases the majority of foreign experts were from the US. Indeed, in 17 out of 32 instances all foreign experts were from the US. Thus, Israel’s higher education system appears to be more in line with higher education and research institutions in the United States, rather than with the EHEA.

The Example of Egypt

Developments on quality assurance in Egypt seem to mirror more closely the tiered structure of programme accreditation and external quality assurance of higher education institutions (Arab Republic of Egypt 2004; 2006; 2009). However, these developments appear influenced by external consultancy from the Quality Assurance Agency of the UK and conditions of funding from World Bank loans rather than by the policy discourse from the Bologna Process. Thus, they appear to be more aimed at strengthening economic ties with the former colonial power or between centre and periphery rather than being inspired by a policy dialogue with the EHEA.

Besides that, the final project report of the Arab Republic of Egypt (2009) on the higher education enhancement project, of which the development of the national quality assurance framework on higher education formed part, also noted the resistance of universities to the reforms pursued through this World Bank project. Nevertheless, it expressly stated its resolve to overcome this resistance by pursuing the reforms in a top-down fashion (Arab Republic of Egypt 2009: 41, 47). It appears, therefore, that such reference to funding conditionalities or the discourse on quality assurance, which seeks to increase the accountability of higher education institutions to external expectations, may have been used to strengthen control over higher education institutions.
The Example of Lebanon

In Lebanon, the Directorate General of Higher Education has been responsible for the licensing of new higher education institutions through exercising a simple process of auditing. Beyond this initial licensing by the Ministry, quality assurance was being ensured through institutional competitiveness and, for some selected universities, through foreign quality assurance agencies. However, the recent rapid increase in the number of higher education institutions locally calls for the establishment of a national QA agency. This need comes as a response to the growing regional competition where the weak quality of some higher education institutions affects the reputation of the whole national system (Towards the Lebanese Quality Assurance Agency - TLOQAA Project, 2013). In addition to the national need (DGHE, 2007/2008), there is a growing international pressure to establish a national quality assurance agency as mentioned in the EU country strategy paper (ENP, 2007-2013) and the recommendations of the conference of Arab ministers of HE in Dubai 2007.

With the absence of a national regulative framework to regulate and monitor institutional quality, the individual institutions’ endeavours to maintain their quality have been the sole quality assurance measures available. As the institutions have a high degree of autonomy and freedom, the higher education arena in Lebanon has traditionally been a very diverse one and much influenced by foreign forces where each institution follows the education system of the country it is affiliated to and gets evaluated by QA agencies from the corresponding country as well. In other words, French, American, Arab, and Canadian universities follow the European, American, Arab and Canadian system respectively.

In Lebanon, there is no specific mechanism for supporting the implementation of the Bologna Process apart from the Tempus Higher Education Reform Experts, who disseminate information on Bologna to both institutions and Ministries. (Tempus, 2012) In fact, it is through European funded Tempus projects and one AMIDEAST project that a Lebanese QA agency was initiated in the form of a draft law prepared and completed on 14/12/2010 and submitted to the government (MEHE, 2011). Political and sectarian interference, limited monetary resources and human expertise, in addition to the current regional unrest, dramatically impede the ratification of such a law. In the meantime, another recent Tempus project, TLOQAA, has been developing a Lebanese QA model by emulating the functioning of external QA through a pilot evaluation of several higher education institutions.

Just because similarities may be drawn between strategies for higher education reform in the EHEA and countries in the eastern and southern Mediterranean this does not imply the existence of sound and reciprocal cooperation.

In addition to the old French universities who initially adopted the Bologna reforms, an NQA inspired by European standards, can influence the only public university, the Lebanese University, which has around 40% of the total students’ enrolments, as well as a number of the new universities, who have not opted for a foreign quality assurance agency. Furthermore, even though the Bologna process has no direct influence on the few old well-established universities that initially followed a non European system of education; those same universities have been involved in the TLOQAA Tempus project and have agreed to perform the pilot evaluation. This means that the Bologna process has influenced the Lebanese higher education through its work on paving the way to establishing a national quality assurance agency based on EU funds and consultancy which ensures that the main Lebanese education ambiance is in phase with the EHEA.

Conclusions

Overall these findings suggest that countries in the eastern and southern Mediterranean pursue their own national interests for higher education reform and to this end may draw to different extents on the Bologna Process discourse as well as on funding and consultancy from individual countries within the EHEA. However, just because similarities may be
drawn between strategies for higher education reform in the EHEA and countries in the eastern and southern Mediterranean this does not imply the existence of sound and reciprocal cooperation. A more comprehensive and sustained dialogue would be needed to ensure such cooperation. However, bearing in mind the present regional unrest, such dialogue may be difficult.

References


The Arab Spring/Uprising/Revolution will go down in contemporary history as the season of short-lived hopes and aspirations of a people, both men and women, who wanted dignity and change. They sought freedom, respect for human rights, the rule of law and accountability. Women in the region were advocates for such reform, but more than four years after the Arab uprisings began, many of their desires have yet to be achieved. Despite escalating turmoil and the rise of extremist groups in the region, women have maintained their focus and continue to fight for greater rights.

Women's Participation in the Arab Uprisings

From the start of the Arab uprisings in early 2011, women across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region actively participated in demonstrations alongside men. In Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and elsewhere in the region, women were on the frontlines in demonstrations that expressed dissatisfaction with the status quo. Women activists played influential roles in these uprisings, and anticipating their involvement would help stimulate reforms in a region dominated by autocrats and, in turn, improve the status of women. These women initially did not ask for women’s rights, as their wishes and desires for regime change were the same as those of the rest of the population. Although women were detained, beaten, and raped in squares and streets across the region, they remained in the vanguard of the struggle over the future of their countries. Women’s participation in these uprisings did not, for the most part, translate into their participation in the transitions that took place in a number of countries. Once dictators had been overthrown and protests had subsided, women who took part in the Arab uprisings and women activists were sidelined. As countries transitioned after their revolutions, women were largely excluded from the negotiating table and decision-making positions, and their rights and political participation diminished. Most transitional bodies, including the Syrian National Council, had no women representatives. The number of women participating in drafting the new Egyptian constitution was minimal (women and youth shared 10% of the drafting committee’s representation). Egypt also, for example, abolished its quota for women’s parliamentary seats, which reduced women’s representation from 12% in the 2010 parliament to less than 2% of seats before the 2012 parliament was dissolved. Despite standing side-by-side with their male counterparts in public squares during the protests, women were once again relegated out of the public space and subjected to the regression of many of their rights. Moreover, women suffered (and continue to suffer) from an increase in sexual harassment, violence, and other security challenges. Four years later, we are seeing that although women supported the Arab uprisings, it appears the Arab uprisings did not support women.

While many countries witnessed a regression in women’s status, some managed to prevent the rolling back of the clock on women’s rights. Tunisia, for
example, provided a model for other countries in the region of a seemingly successful transition. Prior to the revolution, the country already had a progressive constitution and a personal status law that was the envy of the region. Women's involvement in society and public affairs was well established. Following the overthrow of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, in 2011, Tunisia elected the National Constituent Assembly and more than 20% of the deputies were women. Since the uprisings, Tunisia and Morocco have implemented gender parity in nominations. Algeria also has a parliamentary quota and ranking on nomination lists for women's seats, which means that women now hold 146 parliamentary seats (more than 31%). After Libya's 2012 elections, 33 women held seats in its 200-member parliament. Libyan women also held six of 60 seats on the constitutional drafting committee. In Yemen, during the period of constitutional drafting and before the country descended into civil war, women secured four of 17 seats in the country's constitutional drafting committee. In Egypt, women made sure that the second draft of the constitution had a strong component on women's and human rights.

Regional Chaos and the Rise of Extremism

Today, four years after the Arab uprising, we are witnessing a region in chaos. Syria is in a civil war, with more than three million refugees fleeing to Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey. Yemen is also engaged in civil war. Libya has two governments that are fighting one another. Egypt is run by a military government. Tunisia's peace was shattered after a bomb at the National Bardo Museum in the capital killed 20 tourists in March 2015.

The falling apart of the Arab Spring resulted in the rise of the militant group ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham), also known locally as Daesh. ISIS is in control of territory in Iraq and Syria and is active in a span of countries stretching from the Middle East to Africa. The region is in turmoil and, as usual, women and children are the first victims, experiencing the deterioration of their rights in a time of upheaval and the rise of extremist movements. ISIS – the most notorious and barbaric of these groups – has carried out particularly heinous acts against women in Iraq and Syria, including their kid-napping, raping, trafficking, selling and sexual enslavement. For ISIS fighters, women are the spoils of war. ISIS members have 'married' or raped girls as young as nine years old. In ISIS-controlled territories, women are subjected to such inhuman treatment and forced to abide by ISIS-imposed restrictions based on the group's narrow interpretation of the sharia. The group has in particular targeted Yazidi women and girls among other religious and ethnic minorities. A recent UN report indicates ISIS may have committed genocide against the Yazidis, as well as war crimes and crimes against humanity. Those who have managed to escape ISIS-controlled areas and the Syrian conflict have often ended up in refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, and Iraqi Kurdistan, where insecurity and violence are common. The majority of refugees are women and children; the UN Population Fund reports that approximately 7.5 million Syrian women and girls have been displaced. Women in refugee camps in the camps are particularly vulnerable and report frequent instances of domestic, gender-based and sexual violence. However, accurate statistics are difficult to obtain, and women face significant obstacles in their ability to report such violence. In addition, families in refugee camps are sometimes forced to marry off their young daughters in order to survive. The vulnerability of this population is intensified by the lack of adequate healthcare and social services. Moreover, the refugee camps could result in a lost generation of children, especially girls, who have no access to education. ISIS remains, of course, a significant threat in the region. Surprisingly, there are not only women who fight the movement but also women who have joined it. Some of these 'joiners' have been organised in the all-female al-Khansaa and Umm al-Rayan brigades that are responsible for enforcing sharia law, carrying out punishments and monitoring checkpoints for women in ISIS-controlled territory. A number of women from the region and elsewhere in the world, including Western countries, travel to Syria to marry ISIS fighters. In striking contrast to these obedient and domestic jihadist brides are the women fighting against ISIS: the female members of the Kurdish peshmerga. These women are anything but symbolic. They have been serving alongside their male counterparts for decades; and now they serve on the frontlines in the battle against ISIS.
Women’s Progress since the Arab Uprisings

Women, as noted, have been victimised across the region as a result of the advance of ISIS, by turmoil and civil war, or by forced displacement and refugee camp conditions. But women are pushing back. In Iraq, women’s civil society groups help women rescued from ISIS territories to return to normal life. Women activists are also instrumental in providing care for those in refugee camps, especially women and children. All over the region, women actively work to claim their rightful place in society. In some countries, progress has come in leaps and bounds, while in others through incremental steps.

On the whole, the regional average for women’s representation in parliament has increased since the beginning of the Arab uprisings. The good news is that the region has done well in providing women with access to education. Statistics on the condition of women in the region are both disheartening and encouraging. On the down side, the Global Gender Gap Index (in which higher numbers indicate a worsening of women’s conditions) ranked the UAE at 115 in 2014, down from 103 in 2010; Tunisia at 123, down from 107; and Yemen at 142, down from 134.1 The figures for women’s employment, on the other hand, are mixed. According to World Bank statistics, Syria and Algeria – at 13% and 15% respectively – have the lowest rate of female employment; the figures are much better for the smaller Persian Gulf states, with Qatar at 51%, the UAE at 47%, and Kuwait at 44%.2 Algeria has one of the lowest rates for employment of women but the highest percentage of women in Parliament in 2015 (31.6%), followed by Tunisia with 68 women Members of Parliament (31.3%).3 Yemen and Oman, with one woman in Parliament each, are at the bottom of the list. On the whole, the regional average for women’s representation in Parliament has increased since the beginning of the Arab uprisings. The good news is that the region has done well in providing women with access to education. In Iran the ratio of female to male enrolment in higher education is 100, in Lebanon 107, and in Bahrain 198.4 Does female education automatically lead to female employment? Not necessarily. In most of these countries the rate of unemployment for young men and women is high; when it comes to hiring, men are preferred to women. The cultural taboo against working women continues to be the main obstacle to higher rates of women’s employment.

Women’s Constitutional Rights in the Region

The Islamist governments that came to power after the Arab uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia did not exactly open up the gates to women. The influence of the sharia on the first Egyptian constitution led to their marginalisation. In Tunisia, however, the Islamist Ennahdha party quickly discovered that women activists and society as a whole would resist such new impositions on women. The eventual fall of the Islamist governments in these two countries vindicated the women who had fought against a contraction of their rights – even if in the name of religion. In Libya, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and other countries in the MENA region, the sharia remains the dominant source of law where women’s rights are concerned.

In Saudi Arabia, 30 women now hold seats on the consultative Shura Council, Saudi women will finally participate in the upcoming local council elections and restrictions on women’s employment have been eased. These are welcome developments, but Saudi women still have a long way to go before they achieve equality under the law. In Iran, 36 years after the Islamic revolution, women continue to fight to reinstate the rights they had under the monarchy, including the right to sue for divorce, a ban on polygamy, child custody in case of divorce and the res-

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2 World Bank data on labour force participation rate, female (% of female population aged 15+), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS
3 World Bank data on unemployment, female (% of female labour force), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.FE.ZS/countries
4 World Bank data on ratio of female to male tertiary enrollment (%), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ENR.TERT.FM.ZS/countries
toration of marriage age for girls from 13 back to 18. Women in Iran today also face the danger of an abolishment of the very successful family planning programme that lowered Iran’s growth rate to 1.3% (as of 2013).

Promoting women’s rights in some Gulf countries may be considered somewhat symbolic and perceived as a means to demonstrate a country’s wealth and modernity rather than its commitment to women’s progress

In Iraq, women hold more than 25% of parliamentary seats, as required by a constitutional quota, but Iraqi women are still excluded from most decision-making positions both inside and outside Parliament (there are currently two women ministers). The country’s personal status law was among the most progressive in the region when it was implemented in 1959, but in 2014 Parliament attempted to roll back a series of women’s rights related to the age of marriage, women’s mobility and child custody, among other issues. Although a number of Gulf states have taken gradual steps to improve women’s legal rights following the Arab uprisings, the number of women in political decision-making positions remains low. Promoting women’s rights in some Gulf countries may be considered somewhat symbolic and perceived as a means to demonstrate a country’s wealth and modernity rather than its commitment to women’s progress.

In addition to countries’ constitutions, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is another important tool that, when implemented properly, can provide expanded rights for women. Although most countries in the region have ratified CEDAW, the majority have existing reservations to a number of articles in the document. Morocco has declared its intention to withdraw its reservations to CEDAW but has not yet deposited the instruments of ratification. Tunisia is the only country that has withdrawn all its reservations; it issued a decree in 2011 under the interim government, though the reservations were not formally withdrawn until 2014. Iran is the only country in the MENA region that has not ratified CEDAW.

As 2015 marks the 20th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, women in the MENA region had hoped that the last two decades would have yielded more progress for women. Advances in women’s rights, however, have been more or less disappointing. Women in the region need peace, security, justice, and stability to make any headway. They need to live in societies that believe in gender equality. They need governments that are willing and able to give women protection and equality under the law out of conviction – and not as a form of window dressing.

Bibliography


The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Conflicts in the Making

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The attention and resources given to the Syrian crisis by the international community are currently focused on either the vast humanitarian needs of millions of displaced Syrians or the threat that a weak state with radical elements poses to international security. Yet, the humanitarian situation also implies political aspects; the immediate needs of refugees are only the tip of the iceberg in terms of the implications of their displacement. As the Syrian crisis enters its fifth year, social tensions are growing rapidly in host countries due to the interaction of a protracted refugee crisis with already weakened economies and strained infrastructure, as well as volatile domestic politics, resulting in a gridlock that hinders the creation of a unified long-term vision that could guide policy initiatives to face these historic challenges. Conflict prevention is therefore increasingly necessary in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey, to address the strain of hosting four million refugees in countries that are already politically, socially and economically fragile. Ultimately, the Syrian refugee crisis poses severe problems for regional and international stability. This should motivate international heavyweights, regional powers and influential donors to put diplomatic, political and economic pressure on host governments to take action to defuse tensions by changing political rhetoric geared toward a domestic audience, and by producing comprehensive refugee policies to manage the situation sustainably until repatriation is possible.

Introduction

With the Syrian civil war now in its fifth year, the Middle East is in the midst of one of the most serious political and humanitarian crises in modern memory. According to Antonio Guterres, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the Syria refugee crisis is reaching a “dangerous turning point.”² In addition to having reached heights of unacceptable suffering for many refugees, the scale of the situation is producing unbearable political, economic and social strains that threaten the stability of refugee host countries. As of May 2015, there are more than 1.7 million Syrian refugees in Turkey, 1.2 million in Lebanon, 628,000 in Jordan and 248,000 in Iraq (See Map 3 and Table 10). Another 9 million people are displaced inside Syria, representing a pipeline of potential refugees.³ The refugee-to-citizen population ratio, especially in Lebanon, is a particular cause for concern, unprecedented even compared to previous waves of Palestinians, Iraqis and other refugees. Lowball estimates approximate that one in four people in Lebanon are Syrian refugees; the equivalent of 125 million additional people entering the European Union within four years.

¹ With significant contributions from Jennifer Quigley-Jones, Tori Stephens and Jeff Howry from the Study Group on the Syrian Refugee Crisis. Special thanks also to Claude Bruderlein and Sofia Quesada who participated in the editing process.
Deteriorating Social Relations

With the growing numbers of refugees and their actual and perceived negative impacts on the host countries, the initial warmth and generosity that locals had extended to refugees is declining. **Public sympathy has fallen sharply.** In August 2014, 79% of Jordanians were opposed to receiving further Syrian refugees.4 In Turkey, 65% thought the country should stop taking in Syrian refugees, and 30% of this group thought that Syrian refugees already present should be sent back to Syria.5

The level of distrust among communities is particularly troubling. In the American University of Beirut-Save the Children’s study of intergroup tensions between Syrian refugees and Lebanese host communities, over 90% of Lebanese nationals surveyed perceived refugees as threats to their economic livelihood and value system, and over two-thirds perceived them as existential threats.6 A majority of refugees also perceived the Lebanese as a symbolic and economic threat.7 The view of the ‘other’ as a threat not only to social and economic well-being, but also to the physical self should sound

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5 "Reaction mounting against Syrian refugees in Turkey," Centre for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (EDAM), 2014/1.


7 Ibid.
alarm bells for those concerned about peace and stability in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and Iraq.

The resentment has manifested in violent episodes at the border regions of Lebanon and Turkey with Syria. The tensions and distrust are exacerbated by fears of the rise of militants among refugees, particularly as Syrian opposition groups are known to operate out of southern Turkey. Refugees and locals also supported clashes in Arsal in August 2014 between the Lebanese Armed Forces, Nusra Front and ISIS. While incidences are still isolated, they are increasing in frequency.

Social tensions are also creating lasting, long-term negative impacts that drive future vulnerability. For example, in Turkey and Lebanon discrimination against Syrian refugees from local students and teachers creates hostile environments for refugee children who become discouraged from attending public schools. Tensions also increase the stress experienced by an already traumatised population. The ‘lost generation’ is therefore losing opportunities to maintain their economic, social and physical health to rebuild Syria one day, if peace is achieved; they are also particularly vulnerable to radicalisation.

Drivers of Social Tensions

85% of Syrian refugees currently reside in urban, peri-urban and rural settings, often among the poorest host communities, and tensions are growing quickly. Refugees live closely with host populations, thereby highlighting natural, social and cultural differences. In addition, host citizens tend to perceive the refugees not only as economic competition but also as an existential threat, because the largely Sunni Syrian presence intersects with underlying political cleavages.

There are social and cultural differences between the communities. In interviews conducted by the International Crisis Group, Turks claim that the social fabric has altered fundamentally. The differences range from noticing different dress styles on the street to more serious issues like complaints about Turkish men taking young Syrian wives through unofficial, religious marriages that affect marriage prospects for Turkish women; alleged child-marriages among Syrians also cause resentment and concern. Perceptions of refugees are prejudicial; it is widely believed that Syrians jeopardise neighbourhood security. While Turkish NGOs have disputed these claims, finding crime rates among Syrians to actually be lower than among Turks, the impression persists. To complicate things, the concept of neutral humanitarianism is not widely understood in Turkey; widespread disdain is professed for Syrian men who are seen as having abandoned the fight in Syria.

The refugees have also economically impacted host communities. Even though economic slowdown is an effect of the Syrian crisis, host citizens disproportionately blame refugees for the deterioration. The largest cause of discontent is competition for jobs (perceived or actual), although this affects different segments of the job market unequally. The World Bank estimated that the labour supply in Lebanon would increase by 30-50% in 2014, with the largest impact on women, youth and unskilled work-


9 HARE & SAAB, 2014.


11 Interviews conducted in January 2015 with Turkish NGOs serving Syrian, other refugees and host communities.

12 Ibid.
Refugees have also increased demand and prices for essential goods and services. Housing rents in northern Jordan increased from $55-70 per month before the crisis to an average of $420 in early 2014. The dramatic increase has severely reduced the availability of affordable housing for poor Jordanians. Syrian refugees are thus viewed as sources of economic competition.

Most importantly, the presence of Syrian refugees is construed as an existential threat, jeopardising previously delicate balances in host countries. In Turkey, support for refugees depends primarily on whether one is for or against the AKP government, whose Sunni-oriented foreign policy toward Syria is not only highly unpopular, but also complicates relations between the Turkish government and the resident Alevi and Kurdish populations. In Lebanon, historical sectarian rifts are exacerbated by the influx of Sunni Syrians into a country with a confessional political system. This triggers fears of Palestinian integration and memories associated with their alleged role in Lebanon’s civil war. In Jordan, any indication of a long-term Syrian stay threatens tribal Jordanians who are already outnumbered by the Palestinians. In Iraq, the influx of Kurdish Syrian refugees into Kurdish areas is occasionally perceived as bolstering sectarianism. To the elites and their constituents, the refugees upset a hard-won stability.

Short-Term Humanitarian Response Contributes to Deteriorating Community Relations

The polarisation of the Syrian crisis has impeded the development of longer-term domestic and foreign policies on the Syrian refugee crisis. As a result, humanitarian organisations and local authorities can only provide short-term assistance. Many locals experience similar levels of vulnerability as the Syrian refugees, yet they benefit little from domestic or international aid; the disparity between assistance provided to equally vulnerable populations is a particular source of discontent. For example, the daily trucking of water to Jordan’s Za’atari camp is expensive and wasteful (costing around $12,000 per day), while Jordanians in surrounding communities, who experience water shortages, get piped water as little as once every 10 days during the height of summer. While there are growing efforts to counter this problem, like rehabilitating the existing water infrastructure, programmes have often addressed immediate humanitarian needs at the expense of community relations. There are a growing number of programmes aimed at building social cohesion, particularly through inclusive development. However, more needs to be done to target the drivers of social tensions.

The refugee crisis, combined with the policy stalemate, has resulted in stressed services, overburdened communities, and rising disparities between and within populations. The problems are exacerbated by the tight international funding situation. Only $3.8 billion was pledged for the $8.4-billion regional appeal at the Kuwait III conference on 31 March 2015 for the Syria crisis. In light of the vast humanitarian need and political sensitivities, medium to long-term responses are receiving little attention and resources, endangering even the short-term stability of the host country.

Challenges to Addressing Social Tensions

Despite the growing urgency, there are significant obstacles to addressing social tensions between refugees and host communities. Host authorities have been reluctant to engage in longer-term plans for water, sanitation, education, health, livelihoods etc. for many reasons; two are highlighted below.

Challenge 1: Weak International Obligations

Protection is weak for refugees in the host countries. Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq are non-signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol.

References:


that spell out the obligations of states.\textsuperscript{17} Turkey, although a signatory, has a geographical limitation that excludes any non-European refugees from its treaty obligations. While host countries have shown exceptional generosity to Syrian refugees, the states have also used their non-signatory status to limit the scope of provision. UNHCR has signed Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with Jordan and Lebanon to provide some contractual basis for their interactions; yet these MOUs only cover the bare basics. Given the inherent reluctance to act, the lack of binding international law has offered a legal basis for limited assistance.

\textit{Challenge 2: Delicate Political Balance Struck for the Short Term}

Ruling elites in the host countries fear programmes that could result in permanent national changes in demographics and in the political landscape. The status quo poses the greatest challenge to addressing social tensions; at present, an uneasy balance has been struck that schizophrenically appeases citizens’ fears of refugee integration and provides just enough social support to silence refugees. Fears of integration paralyse the State’s ability to make comprehensive crisis management policies, yet this is unsustainable as the crisis lengthens and the population grows. In addition to compromising the welfare of Syrian refugees and vulnerable host citizens, this balancing act ironically erodes the stability that leaders are so desperate to preserve.

\textit{Conflict Prevention Measures Necessary}

The humanitarian system is unable to sustain a long-term response to a protracted refugee situation at the scale of the Syrian crisis. Greater long-term planning is necessary; Jordan’s April 2015 announcement of a water distribution system at Za’atari by the Water Network Task Force is an example of steps in the right direction because it reduces water drawn from surrounding communities. However, humanitarian spending for the Syrian refugee crisis is unsustainable in the context of the sheer number of major emergencies occurring worldwide. Host countries have largely borne the costs associated with higher demand for services; optimistic projections show that international donors funded only 63% of the annual appeal for refugees at the end of 2014; the percentage has declined yearly since the beginning of the crisis.\textsuperscript{18} Instead, bureaucratic hurdles for the reallocation of development funding to middle-income countries must be overcome to finance conflict prevention and inclusive development efforts.\textsuperscript{19} The sectarian fighting in Syria as well as the protracted refugee presence has not only impacted host communities but also inflamed pre-existing political cleavages in host countries. The stability of the Middle East depends on the timely prevention of tensions escalating between refugees and host communities. Therefore, while there must be a parallel push to resolve the conflict in Syria to prevent spillover effects, immediate attention must also be paid to conflict de-escalation in fragile host communities. Community and national leaders should assert a calming, rather than polarising, influence to prevent the widespread outbreak of violence. Concurrently, systematic efforts toward addressing the drivers of social tensions, particularly regarding underlying developmental and political problems that worsen the refugee situation, are needed. Political stakeholders need to develop a long-term view of the situation and work together to produce comprehensive policies in order to jointly address the needs of vulnerable refugee and host communities.

\textsuperscript{17} Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights declares the right of everyone “to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” The Refugee Convention of 1951 and its accompanying 1967 protocol are treaties signed by 148 countries (to one or both of these instruments as of April 2015) that spell out the obligations of different parties. Refugee and subsidiary protection regimes in several regions, as well as with the progressive development of international human rights law, supplement the Refugee Convention and the additional protocol.


\textsuperscript{19} UNSC Resolution 2191 (2014) urges “all Member States, based on burden-sharing principles, to support the United Nations and the countries of the region, including by adopting medium and long-term responses to alleviate the impact on communities, providing increased, flexible and predictable funding as well as increasing resettlement efforts, and taking note in this regard of the Berlin Communiqué of 28 October 2014.”
A Record Year for Migration across the Mediterranean

2014 represented a record year for Europe as a whole, and more intensely for the Mediterranean area, both in terms of the number of migrant and refugee arrivals by sea to Southern European Member States (primarily Italy, but also Greece and Malta) and in terms of asylum applications submitted overall in the European Union (EU). Maritime migration flows in the Mediterranean were characterised by an acute intensification, but the reason these flows are of particular concern is only partially related to numbers and has much to do with their mixed nature. This article will try to consider more analytically the concept of mixed migration, which is increasingly used to describe Mediterranean flows and which permeates the debate on fairness and effectiveness of policy responses to migratory pressures in the Mediterranean.

According to the UNHCR, in 2014 maritime arrivals to Europe across the Mediterranean stood at over 218,000 – three times the number of arrivals registered in 2011, at the height of the Arab Spring. In 2014, Italy alone witnessed more than 170,000 arrivals on its southern shores, a four-fold increase compared to the previous year (43,000 arrivals in 2013) and an almost three-fold increase compared to 2011 (63,000 arrivals). These figures confirm that the central Mediterranean route is by far the corridor most used by migrants and asylum seekers to cross the Mediterranean and reach the EU. In the midst of a prolonged situation of anarchy, violence and lack of state authority, Libya has become a sort of Mediterranean ‘hub’ or ‘funnel,’ which migrants and refugees from Eastern and Western Africa (as well as from Syria) transit through, gather at and depart from. On the other side of the Mediterranean Sea, Italy is the main destination country (or transit country for those heading towards Central or Northern Europe).

Maritime arrivals to Greece have also significantly increased in 2014 (about 43,500 arrivals – a 280% increase compared to the previous year). This migration flow is of particular concern because it is mainly composed of people who flee situations of conflict, persecution and severe violence: about 60% of those who arrived by sea in 2014 came from Syria and many others came from Afghanistan, Somalia and Eritrea.

The situation is expected to get even more serious and complex in 2015. Figures referring to the first two months of 2015 reveal a sharper increase in maritime arrivals compared to the same period of the previous year. Italy witnessed an increase in sea arrivals of 43% – from 5,500 to almost 7,900 arrivals, according to Interior Ministry statistics. Moreover, as reported by Gil Arias Fernández, deputy executive director of Frontex, in January-February 2015 the agency re-
recorded almost 5,300 arrivals in the eastern Mediterranean, witnessing a 107% increase compared to the same period in 2014. Moreover, the Greek coast guard counted almost 6,500 arrivals in March alone, meaning that the number of arrivals in the first three months of 2015 has tripled compared to the previous year. Even more worryingly, the Italian coast guard authorities are reporting that about 10,000 people have been rescued from the sea in just five days between 10-14 April, whilst about 400 people are feared dead after their boat capsized close to the Libyan coast.

Asylum seekers, as already suggested, are a relevant part of Mediterranean migration flows. According to the UNHCR, 50% of arrivals in the Mediterranean consist of Syrian and Eritrean people, who are broadly recognised as people in need of protection (the former fleeing a longstanding conflict, the latter escaping a militarised dictatorial regime). As a consequence, along with the intensification of migration across the Mediterranean, in 2014 asylum applications in the EU increased by 44% as a whole. Germany alone recorded a 58% increase in applications, confirming for the second year its role as the largest recipient of asylum seekers in the industrialised world. Nonetheless, Southern Europe witnessed a 95% increase, which particularly affected Turkey and Italy: among the top five receiving countries in the industrialised world, Turkey ranked third (after the USA) and Italy fifth (after Sweden). Asylum applications in Italy doubled and, among the EU Member States, Italy ranked third for the first time ever (with 65,000 applications), behind Germany (203,000) and Sweden (81,000).11

**Refugees or Migrants? An Analysis of Mixed Migration Flows in the Mediterranean**

The concept of mixed migration generally refers to flows consisting of various categories of migrants with different motivations and different protection needs who travel together along the same migration routes, using the same means of transport and relying on the same smuggling networks.

This concept has developed over the past two decades and has become increasingly important in the policy field as of 2000, when the UNHCR launched the Global Consultations on International Protection in response to what the organisation considered as a crisis in international protection.12 In order to tackle this issue, the UNHCR encouraged reflections and led debates at multilateral level on the so-called ‘migration-asylum nexus’ and the phenomenon of mixed migration. The outcome was a number of policy papers, the most relevant of which is *Refugee Protection and Mixed Migration: A 10-Point Plan of Action*, published in January 2007.13 This series of documents offers clear practical recommendations to

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12 Fifty years after the 1951 Geneva Convention, the UNHCR had observed in Western countries a growing prejudice against asylum seekers, who were largely perceived both by governments and public opinion as “economic migrants in disguise.”

states and other international actors on the provision of protection in the context of mixed flows and represents a valuable contribution in the current elaboration of policy responses to such phenomenon. However, if on the one hand, valuable steps have been done in the policy field to identify concrete ways to manage mixed flows while seeking a balance between protection and migration control, on the other hand, analytical reflection on the concept of mixed migration has been very limited. What do we mean exactly when we talk about mixed migration flows? The heterogeneity and complexity of mixed flows may be tentatively connected to four elements.

1. **Contexts of origin**

According to a traditional dichotomous analysis of migration, migrants are identified as ‘forced migrants’ when they are compelled to leave their country of origin due to situations of conflict, generalised violence or persecution (asylum seekers and refugees); conversely, they are considered ‘voluntary migrants’ when they choose to migrate with the aim of improving their economic and living conditions (economic migrants). But in reality the borders between forced and voluntary migration are not so clear-cut. For instance, so-called ‘voluntary migrants’ may have faced situations of extreme poverty or serious humanitarian crises in countries of origin and/or transit, so that their ability to actually choose to migrate may be considered very limited, if not completely absent.

2. **Individual profiles**

Within mixed flows, one may further distinguish vulnerable people (minors and unaccompanied minors, trafficked people, pregnant women, people with seriously illnesses) from non-vulnerable people (to simplify, healthy non-trafficked adults). Both vulnerable and non-vulnerable people may be found among forced and non-forced migrants, thus creating a complexity of situations and protection needs.

3. **Individual motivations**

A migrant may be driven by different kinds of motivations, so that he or she may be escaping from a conflict while simultaneously looking for social and economic betterment. Motivations related to the political situation in one’s country of origin may, thus, mingle with motivations related to future life opportunities in another country. It must be noted that in certain countries of origin, situations of conflict, violence, poverty and inequality actually coexist and all together represent migration determinants.

4. **Diachronic stratification**

Migration paths may be very long and the time variable may impact on both the objective profile of migrants (points 1 and 2) and the subjective profile (point 3), producing a shift from the ‘migration pole’ to the ‘asylum pole’ and vice versa. For instance, migrants may leave their country of origin for economic reasons and settle as migrant workers in another country, from where they may be forced to flee years later due to conflict (this is the case of sub-Saharan migrants escaping Libya in 2011) or they may be unable to return to their country of origin due to a changed political situation and thus become refugees sur place.

Although mixed flows exist all over the world, in the Mediterranean area their level of complexity and heterogeneity seems to be increasing, due to various interconnected geopolitical, institutional and socio-economic factors that make Mediterranean mixed flows a very specific phenomenon. Prolonged conflicts, dissolution or instability of states, porosity of borders, widespread violence and persecution (by both state, non-state and pseudo-state – i.e. the IS – actors), as well as economic, environmental and public health issues are among the factors that characterise in different ways Eastern, Western and Northern Africa (Sahel, Horn of Africa, Libya), the Middle East (Syria, Iraq) and the Arabian Peninsula (Yemen).

**Policy Responses to Mixed Migration in the European Union: an Open Issue**

Mediterranean flows are, thus, more and more populated by diverse groups of migrants, among which

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14 On the continuum between forced and voluntary migration, see Van Hear 2011.
the presence of asylum seekers, refugees and vulnerable people has been constantly growing. This has produced new challenges for receiving countries on the northern shores of the Mediterranean, in particular for Italy and Greece.\textsuperscript{15}

Consistent with the UNHCR guidelines, these countries are asked to improve their capacity to produce and implement policy responses that consider the mixed nature of migration flows (i.e. the heterogeneity of the contexts of origin, profiles and motivations of migrants) as well as their differentiated protection needs, offering different treatments to different categories of migrants. These countries are also required to balance their protection responsibilities and their duty to respect migrants’ fundamental rights with their (legitimate) border control priorities.

However, this is easier said than done, since the whole European legal and policy framework on migration is based on the fundamental distinction between voluntary migration and forced migration. This normative framework is evidently grounded on the assumption that migration is not mixed and that people migrate for a single reason (labour, study, international protection, family reunification). This normative architecture has produced a series of antinomies (voluntary vs forced, migration vs asylum, control vs protection) and a number of mutually exclusive categories of migrants, each category being entitled to a different set of rights and limits to such rights. But, as mentioned above, in reality, migration may be driven by a combination of motivations and factors (to live in a safe place, to improve one’s living conditions, to join family, to study) which would need to be addressed by a correspondingly differentiated policy approach.

Therefore, the reality of migration, and in particular the increasingly complex and mixed nature of Mediterranean flows, calls into question the consistency and effectiveness of the European normative and policy framework on migration. On the one hand, mixed flows challenge the conceptual distinction between forced and voluntary migration and call for a revision of such a framework based on different grounds. On the other hand, maritime mixed flows pose new challenges in terms of their practical management, and countries located at the southern borders of the EU should not be left alone to face these challenges. A common European effort is required in order to overcome the current normative crisis and to pursue a sound, fair and protection-sensitive management of mixed migration in the Mediterranean.

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\textsuperscript{15} For a detailed analysis of the implementation of asylum policies in the context of maritime mixed flows in Italy and Greece, see Pastore Roman 2014.
Today, over five years since the beginning of the so-called Arab Spring, the outlook for women across the region is mixed. The optimism and idealism have long since faded, and these movements have revealed themselves not to be a series of discrete events, but rather a long process likely to span decades. The Arab woman’s body, moreover, continues to be a contested space upon which Islamists and progressive secularists alike inscribe nationalist and religious identity, potentially denying Arab women the right to self-determination or self-actualisation. Like the nationalisms that preceded them, the post-Arab Spring movements threaten to assign Arab women a fixed role as an historical metaphor, as a reservoir of communal identity out of which the ‘nation’ can be constructed.

Mervat Hatem (2013) recently urged the need for a critical retrospective assessment of the history of “the feminist projects in the [MENA] region that reflects and privileges the voices of women instead of the dominant views of men, especially ‘the grand old men of Arab modernity’.” As part of this critique, one must evaluate Arab women’s cultural production in the context of nationalist and official state discourses, which produced new forms of governmentalities that emphasised domesticity and mothering as the critical roles of women – limited roles that placed women in service of the nation. The process of modernisation in Arab societies privileged the role of the State in resolving gender disparities; the result was what Hatem describes as a takeover of gender agendas – a takeover that would, ironically, offer legitimacy to the authoritarian State.

Arab feminism became a convenient tool for official state discourse and political opposition movements, both of which see Arab women, particularly the Arab woman’s body, as a symbolic marker of Arab selfhood. As Salam Al-Mahadin (2011) has noted, the Arab woman inhabits a contested and discursive space that governs (and is governed by) “various aspects of social, political, religious and economic life.” The exigencies of nationalist identification situate Arab women at the intersection of cultural authenticity and political struggle, thus granting them symbolic capital that offers only temporary gains. Recognising that official state narratives, the rhetoric of political opposition, and religious, traditionalist movements mediate their respective messages through women’s bodies, Arab women writers rearticulate nationalist discourse and reject the monolithic image of women as a signifier of tradition and nation. They construct and inhabit a rhetorical position that allows them to participate in and engage with the production of knowledge; they stress the need for agency in cultural production. It is as cultural production that writings by Arab women participate in revolutionary and post-revolutionary discourse.

**Narrative Revision: Arab Women’s Literary Resistance**

Having been largely excluded from active participation in the historical and cultural narratives of the Arab world, except in symbolic capacities, Arab women writers and activists have long sought visibility in regional, national and global conversations. Arab women authors are frequently discredited and overlooked both at home and abroad; sometimes branded as agents of Western colonialism and culture, sometimes judged for nationalist discourse that...
classical Western feminism defines as incompatible with women’s rights. The postcolonial impulse to guard against the perceived encroachment of Western cultural imperialism and the misguided Western disdain for alternate forms of feminist discourse thus manifests in a resistance to Arab women’s calls for agency and inclusion and often results in a general disregard for their work.

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Oscillating between these two evaluative positions, critical approaches to women’s writing reveal the complex relationship women’s cultural production has with Arab tradition – literary, political, and religious. Rather than focusing on what Fedwa Malti-Douglas (1991. p. 3) identifies as “the futile dialogue on gender and women [that has long attracted] the West” and that titillates the Western observer with the “image of women languishing under the yoke of Islam,” contemporary Arab women writers, especially since the 1950s, have engaged in multi-faceted revisions of tradition, subverting existing literary, social, and political authorities. Fadia Suyoufie (2008. p. 217) has recently argued that contemporary Arab women writers have, through these revisionist tactics, circumvented the gendered anxiety that relates to tradition. Indeed, Suyoufie claims, “these writers appear relatively free from the constrictions of tradition since they have perennially stood on its periphery.” The feminist revision of tradition is not merely an oppositional, anti-patriarchal movement. Rather, the appropriation Suyoufie describes ironically liberates the woman writer from the restraints of tradition. Appearing largely in the novel, a young genre with a short history in the Arab world, women’s revisionist discourse is not merely a counterpoint to masculine tradition. These women writers experiment openly with their narratives, free from formal restrictions. Writers such as Assia Djebar, Sahar Khalifeh, Fadia Faqir, and Leila Abouzeid, for example, have complicated the discussion of national and pan-Arab identity, noting as they do the gaps in historical, literary and linguistic traditions. These writers extend the parameters of feminist categorisation in their novels, expanding women’s identities beyond anti-colonial nationalist imperatives. The identity of the women they present is not collective and, as such, is not restricted to postcolonial nationalist identification. As a result, the women in their novels attain a kind of subjectivity culled from both collectivist Islamic tradition and Western secular individualism, an individuality that they are stripped of in both the colonial and postcolonial narrative. The women in these novels, of different backgrounds and with different approaches to identity and resistance, reveal the interconnectedness of what is both traditional and revisionist. These women’s lives, far from irrelevant stories of women’s affairs, present a revised nationalism that is in a constant state of re-definition. The novels themselves are acts of defiance; recording the stories of women who many presume should neither be seen nor heard is the Arab woman author’s most effective cultural and political resistance.

**Narrating the Arab Spring: Rewriting Collectivity, Creativity and Defiance**

While the novel had allowed the Arab woman writer a freer space within which to appropriate and revise traditional discourse, the recent wave of popular revolutions across the Arab world has ushered in what Courtney Radsch and Sahar Khamis (2013. p. 881) have termed a “communicative revolution,” wherein Arab women writers and activists have begun to leverage social media and online platforms to “enact new forms of leadership, agency and empowerment.” These uprisings highlighted the notable roles of Arab women and youth, groups traditionally invisible or excluded from the public sphere. And while analyses of these groups’ roles have rightly moved away from the misdirected discussion of whether or not social media caused the Arab uprisings, the fact remains that women cyberactivists are redefining both the virtual and physical private and
public spheres. Much like the redefinitions of literary tradition, these new media of expression have presented women activists and writers with opportunities for innovative forms of cultural production and for a transnational expansion of the discussion of Arab women’s lives.

While the novel had allowed the Arab woman writer a freer space within which to appropriate and revise traditional discourse, the recent wave of popular revolutions across the Arab world has ushered in a “communicative revolution,” wherein Arab women writers and activists have begun to leverage social media and online platforms to “enact new forms of leadership, agency and empowerment.”

There has been a widespread tendency to overstate the prevalence or significance of social media in the Arab uprisings as well as the levels of women’s participation in these media; however, the fact that Arab women, numerically underrepresented in the virtual public sphere, constituting only about a third of users is, as Radsch and Khamis (2013. p. 882) contend, “even more remarkable.” Much like women writers and activists in the formative nation-building years between the 1920s and 1960s who, while not necessarily representative of all women in the region, founded women’s associations, educational and cultural organisations, and independent presses that advocated for women’s right to work, to vote and to participate in the political sphere, today’s cyberactivists are shifting the boundaries of the private and public, redefining women’s potential and actual roles.

Arab women’s activism has never been an exclusively public and explicit phenomenon, nor have the seemingly missing women’s voices from public discourse indicated women’s lack of cultural production or suggested their limited social and political awareness. Rather, their missing voices indicate social realities as disparate as authoritarian govern-

ments that actively suppress public women’s movements to individual families that enforce compliance or silence. The online performance of the past decade or so – blogs, social media, etc. – has allowed these seemingly invisible women activists to circumvent the authoritarian realities of their lives. Even before the most recent rise in cyberactivism, Arab women had begun to subvert structural and cultural constraints by creating a virtual public sphere that, due to the option of anonymity, seemingly protected these women from censure or punishment. Arab women cyberactivists today, though, working as they are within popular revolutionary movements that challenge and, in some cases, have already toppled authoritarian regimes, recognise the tension between anonymity and publicity. Indeed, according to Radsch and Khamis (2013. p. 884), the “emancipatory, expressive potentials of social media platforms were only partially experienced by those who chose anonymity over publicity.” Today’s women cyberactivists rarely choose anonymity, as that puts them at a disadvantage with a global media searching for reliable citizen journalists.

Women’s ability to establish virtual public relationships with global media shapes not only the international narratives about the region and the popular uprisings, but also actively guides public opinion and public agendas both at home and abroad.

The significance of the Arab woman as citizen journalist is hard to overstate. Writing within countries lacking independent media outlets, these women cyberactivists participate in regional and transnational conversations about human rights, government corruption and women’s lived experiences. Indeed, women’s ability to establish virtual public relationships with global media shapes not only the international narratives about the region and the popular uprisings, but also actively guides public opinion and public agendas both at home and abroad. Rather than simply expressing women’s stories, this cyberactivism is transnational and subver-
sive. It simultaneously criticises and challenges the authoritarian regimes at home while revising and recasting the Arab woman’s narrative in a transnational context. The Arab woman cyberactivist is more than an active participant in this national and global conversation; she is, rather, shaping and revising that conversation. Unlike forms of cultural production that are too narrowly construed, the work of Arab women cyberactivists merges the individual and the political and blurs the boundaries between public and private.

Innovative cultural production remains the most effective means of bringing women out of their perceived seclusion and into wider circles. Arab women, as Miriam Cooke (2000. p.181) argues, “are not victims, but rather strong individuals who are balancing national, transnational, religious and feminist agendas in an attempt to construct a society hospitable to them.” Their work sometimes reinforces, sometimes questions discourses of modernity, nationalism, and feminism. This work derives legitimacy from women’s experiences, affirming them as subjects of their own histories, producing their own body of knowledge and identity and challenging simplistic discussions of Arab women’s lives. There remains, of course, the significant challenge of translating women’s “personal empowerment and agency into institutional change.”(RADSCH and KHAMIS, 2013. p. 887) It is a challenge, though, that these women are facing publicly – both in the virtual and the real world.

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‘Artivism’ in the Arab World: a Major Driving Force towards Democracy

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Long before the Arab Spring, it had already been repeatedly pointed out that youth constitute the largest part of the population in the Arab world, and that this established fact should be seriously taken into account as a key political feature of the region. However, if the economic consequences of this factor have been broadly analysed, it is surprisingly much less the case when it comes to its cultural impacts, which are of equally great importance. Young people have specific interests and behaviours, making up what is commonly called ‘youth culture,’ which is in turn directly related to a number of crucial economic and political issues in the region. To have a grasp of what contemporary youth culture means in the Arab world, we must consequently take a closer look at what today’s youth generally like and like doing – namely the music, films, literature, and art they prefer, places they like to go to, events they celebrate, topics they discuss most often, etc.1

As such, with young people representing the greatest share of the population in this part of the world, youth culture is at the same time also about popular culture. In other words, knowing the tastes and preferences of the youth provides an understanding of the majority, thus allowing decision-makers to better choose and implement the most appropriate economic and political measures.

Youth Culture Equals Popular Culture

Above all, this ‘popular youth culture’ illustrates everyday life and contemporary cultural trends in the region, which are actually and luckily mostly far away from those pictured by the international mainstream media, which inevitably focus on the ‘bad’ news. Popular youth culture sheds light on how ordinary people think and act, and, in this way, on the major cultural transformations the region is undertaking. Ultimately, it explains how these led to the profoundly democratic phenomenon of the Arab Spring, although uncertain times have followed in its wake.

Like everywhere else in the world, most people in the Arab world are ordinary ‘everyday life-heroes.’ In addition, a significant number engage in creative artistic paths, which are particularly representative of the cultural trends and changing mentalities occurring there. In a region where democracy is still an exception, any kind of artistic expression enables not only a certain personal self-fulfilment, but also, as soon as it is shared with others, a form of collective action. The strength of artistic expressions in more or less authoritarian contexts lies precisely within the inherent ‘ambiguity of art.’ It is not by chance that the Arab world is increasingly becoming ‘the place to be’ when it comes to artistic creativity. Of course, in this respect the media primarily focuses on big museums or costly artistic projects, and, in doing so, fosters the idea of an emerging Arab arts market.

Yet, far from this successful mercantile approach to arts in the region, a number of artists engage more or less consciously in art as a form of cultural resist-

ance; in short, in socially and politically committed art, in ‘activism.’ The question therefore is: cultural resistance against what? Or: why activism? There are plenty of socially and politically engaged artists carrying a message of hope and change throughout the region, be it before, during or since the Arab Spring. Many of them produce artistic work against arbitrariness and opposition to change, placing their creativity at the service of freedom and democracy. Some artists go even further, actively supporting activists and demonstrators, thus becoming renowned ‘activists.’

In this respect, the contemporary Arab music scene provides a striking and remarkable example. Not only was its development one of the very first indicators of the coming Arab Spring, but it has also actively escorted if not boosted the democratic uprisings. However, prior to the Arab Spring, few researchers had drawn attention to the new urban music emerging across the region since the mid-90s, though in different proportions depending on each country. Mark LeVine’s *Heavy Metal Islam* can be considered an ‘avant-garde’ work on this topic, exploring the developing rock and hip-hop scenes across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), spanning countries from Morocco to Pakistan.\(^2\) The book opens with a chapter on Morocco, which had the most lively music scene in the region during the first decade of the 21st century.

### The Moroccan Nayda, a Precursor to the Arab Spring

Morocco, at the turn of the new millennium, experienced the development of an extraordinary cultural phenomenon: the Nayda. In Moroccan Arabic, in Darija, ‘nayda’ means ‘something is going on,’ ‘something is arising,’ and at the same time ‘cool,’ ‘everything is fine,’ ‘we are having fun.’ It must also be noted that the word has the same etymology as the ‘Nahda,’ the well-known 19th century Arab Renaissance movement. Similar to the creativity that distinguished the Nahda, the Moroccan Nayda refers to an unusual productivity in all artistic sectors between 2000-2010.

At the origin of the profoundly modern and secular Nayda was an underground music scene called ‘la nouvelle scène’ (the new scene). This music scene adopted new music forms, namely rock (including metal), rap and a genre named ‘fusion,’ merging traditional Moroccan music elements with rock, rap and reggae elements. Highly subversive during its first underground period, the music scene progressively developed to become a more ‘overground’ and mainstream phenomenon, especially thanks to a number of successful and innovative music festivals, such as the pioneer urban music festival ‘L’Boulevard’ in Casablanca and the ‘Gnaoua Festival’ in Essaouira.\(^3\) This is how rock and rap have been acclaimed by the Moroccan youth, thus becoming part of Moroccan popular culture.\(^4\) This creativity in the music field subsequently reached every form of artistic expression, be it in theatre, cinema, literature, fashion or art, so that by 2005 this whole dynamic was identified and recognised as the Nayda.

Benefiting from a certain ‘liberalisation’ of the media, which allowed the rapid development of private radio channels, and from the support of influential economic and political actors, among whom King Mohammed VI himself figures, the Nayda expanded very quickly. However, its drawback was its simultaneous co-optation by a variety of stakeholders. By the end of 2010, when the Arab Spring started in Tunisia, the Nayda was already in decline. In the meantime, Tunisia’s civil society suffered from excessive censorship under the Ben Ali regime, and musicians were hard-pushed to pursue committed creative work. In fact, as Mark LeVine points out, “governments in the MENA are naturally wary of such hybrid ‘cultural’ spaces and projects. They understand as well as the region’s metal-heads and hip-hoppers how the presence of heavy metal, other supposedly Western forms of hard music and alternative cultures more broadly threaten the established order, and through it their political power.”\(^5\)

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\(^{5}\) LeVine, Mark. *Heavy Metal Islam*, op. cit., p. 5.
That said, both the Moroccan and Tunisian situation before the Arab Spring show how authoritarian governments react differently to such artistic scenes, adopting various approaches to control them, either by tolerating them to a certain extent and co-opting them, or by censoring and repressing them more or less violently. In Morocco, the monarchy reacted in quite a permissive manner, progressively regulating and neutralising the Nayda. This is probably one of the reasons why the impact of the Arab Spring in Morocco was relatively low in comparison to what happened elsewhere. In contrast, in Tunisia, the Ben Ali regime’s almost complete lack of toleration of any kind of contentious expression contributed to the revolution that led to its collapse, and finally to a democratic transition. Overall, what is important to bear in mind is the fact that the secular spirit of the Nayda is exactly the same post-Islamist trend that has driven the Arab Spring, first in Tunisia, then across the whole region.

**Artivists and Raptivists of the Arab Spring**

With the outbreak of the Arab Spring, artists from the contemporary music scene have often supported the contentious and revolutionary movements that emerged in several countries. Rappers in particular became important symbolic ‘freedom fighters,’ using the emotional power generated by their music and lyrics to galvanise protesters.6 In Tunisia, the rapper El General encouraged protests with his famous contentious song ‘Rayyes lebled’ (‘President of the country’), in which he addressed Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, before being arrested by the police. Released shortly before the President’s escape to Saudi Arabia, he was immediately considered as a revolutionary hero, and Time magazine included him among the 100 most influential people in the world in 2011. Since then, other ‘raptivists’7 have followed, and, as part of civil society, watched over the democratic constitutional transition process until its successful completion in 2014. For example, the rapper Volcanis le roi produced the song ‘Chay ma tbedel’ (‘Nothing has changed’) in 2012, despite the increased tensions between followers of the collapsed regime, Islamists and secularists. In 2013, the rapper Weld El 15 produced the song ‘Boulidia kleb’ (‘Policemen are dogs’) in which he sharply criticises the police. He was sentenced to prison and arrested before later being discharged. Such cases show that, since the Arab Spring, Tunisia’s civil society is progressively discovering the joys and challenges of the freedom of speech for which they have fought so relentlessly. Egypt and Libya, two countries which have witnessed an impressive secular revolutionary movement in the wake of the Tunisian one, are also home to many raptivists who have supported the people’s aspirations for democratic change. In Egypt, El Deeb participated in the demonstrations in Tahrir square, while MC Amin and the Arabian Knightz also produced engaged songs. In Libya, the anonymous Ibn Thabit continuously produced songs in support of the revolutionary movement while actually fighting in its ranks until the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, after which he revealed his real identity and stopped rapping.

Both the Moroccan and Tunisian situation before the Arab Spring show how authoritarian governments react differently to such artistic scenes, adopting various approaches to control them, either by tolerating them or by censoring them.

In Syria, the situation is quite different due to the cycle of violence that has developed from the initially democratic and peaceful revolutionary movement against the Assad regime. The violence of the repression made it much more difficult from the start for artivists to express themselves. Nevertheless, the rapper Omar Crow managed to produce some politically engaged songs, before street-art battles took over between opponents and supporters of the Assad regime.

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7 On ‘raptivism’ see the hip-hop project of Aisha Fukushima, http://raptivism.org/
Splits, Radicalisation and Revival

In Morocco, however, the contentious 20 February Movement that emerged in the wake of the Arab Spring neither became a revolutionary movement nor produced a cycle of violence. Nonetheless, it had a major impact on the music scene that had led to the Nayda during the previous decade. A split appeared between the main Nayda artists, some of whom were opposing change and others supporting the 20 February Movement. Even a so-called “battle” took place between the famous rapper Don Bigg defending the established order in his song ‘Mabghitch’ (‘I don’t want’), and the rapper Koman responding to him in his song ‘Achaâb yourid al hayat foug Figuig’ (‘People want to live beyond Figuig’), thus supporting the movement alongside other artists, just as the popular rock and fusion band Hoba Hoba Spirit did with its song ‘Iradat al hayat’ (‘The will to live’).

In addition, a second generation of artists, which is more explicit in criticising the established order, has emerged in this context. The rappers of the group L’Bassline (The insolents) perfectly illustrate this radicalisation of the Moroccan music scene: their successful song ‘Chayllah système’ (‘Long live the system’) contains a highly ironic message regarding the omnipresence of the ‘makhzen,’ the Moroccan governing institution centred on the King. The most stunning ‘artistivist’ example, however, is that of rapper Lhaqed (‘The Resentful’) who engaged actively in the 20 February Movement, elaborating slogans prior to demonstrations, and whose lyrics sharply denounce the ‘makhzen’ and the monarchy. Owing to the video clip to his song ‘Klab dawla’ (‘Dogs of the State’), which reports on the arbitrariness of the police, he was charged and arrested. Meanwhile Lhaqed is known as “the voice of the people” and has become the main symbolic figure of the 20 February Movement. Having maintained his position and his commitment to democratic change in Morocco, he has been arrested several times since his release.

Ultimately, when his Tunisian ‘comrade’ Weld El 15 was sentenced to prison because of a song in which he criticised the police as he had done, Lhaqed showed solidarity by producing the song ‘Free Weld El 15.’ Both then had the opportunity to meet and participate in a televised debate on “Rap as a form of political expression,” perhaps constituting the first step towards a network of artists and artistivists for democracy in the Arab world.

In summary, the case of the contemporary Arab music scene clearly shows how analysing artistic trends and popular youth culture provides a better understanding of the political issues on the agenda. Not only was the development of a new music scene across the region, and more specifically the Nayda in Morocco, a first sign of the Arab Spring, but artistivists and raptivists were also at the forefront of the secular democratic dynamics once the changes had begun.

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8 Figuig is a small town in the East of Morocco.
9 “Rap as a form of political expression” (in Arabic), televised debate on France 24, 4 March 2014.
Telling Graphic Stories of the Region: Arabic Comics after the Revolution

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Comics: a Rich Heritage in the Region

Comics, especially those for children, have been around in the Arab world for over 70 years. But recent years have witnessed a sudden rise in the number of comics that target adult audiences, particularly since the uprisings, and with it an unprecedented growing interest and avid following.

The comic genre in the Arab world has not grown from nothing; its seeds stem from the region’s wealth of local heritage and experiences. Magazines of today, such as TokTok, like to remind their audiences of this history, regularly featuring comic figures from local heritage in its pages, in order to emphasise that the art is rooted in a rich past, and not a mere replication of the West (Bank).

“As far as the general public in the Arab world was concerned, comics and animation films were for a long time nothing more than children’s entertainment,” notes art historian Charlotte Bank (Bank). Although the adult graphic novel appeared in the Arab world as far back as the early 80s in Lebanon, it was localised and did not spread or spill over to other Arab nations. In Egypt, as in most Arab countries, most of the earlier comics targeted children and it was not until the arrival of Shafei’s Metro in 2008, with its controversial content widely covered in the media, and the long history preceding it, that the adult graphic novel genre publicly emerged and comics targeting adults became more widespread in Egypt and the region.

A Decade of Growth: Paving the Way

The foundations were laid for the spread of comics with the cautious revival of the genre in the mid-2000s through a series of independent adult-focused comics. The unveiling of the personal narrative Le Jeu des Hirondelles by Zeina Abi Rashed, depicting her childhood during the Lebanese civil war, the rise of the local superhero Malak from the cedar trees of Lebanon in the form of a comics series, the formation of The 99, from Kuwait, depicting a more moderate face of Islam in the wake of 9/11, and the launch of the alternative and experimental Lebanese comic periodical Samandal, which gained a following locally and throughout the region, all paved the way for a larger following of adult comics.

With the culmination of Egypt’s first graphic novel Shafei’s Metro in 2008, an “autopsy of a fragmented society waiting for a revolutionary moment to shake off the endemic corruption infesting its parts” (Gameel), the stage was set for the genre to play a sig-

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1 This article studies adult comics and does not cover children’s comics. Although they have a strong presence today, they were not greatly affected by the uprisings. These magazines were the training ground for many artists contributing to the adult genre today, and are far more professional and skilfully produced than their predecessors.

2 Starting as early as the 1920s, its true emergence began in the 50s with children’s comics, which became very popular, such as Egypt’s Sindbad, and the long standing Samir. In the 60s and 70s imported and translated comics took over the market, with American superheroes, Disney and French and Belgian comics. The late 70s and early 80s responded with a number of locally made comics for children, such as the pan-Arab Majed from UAE, the popular Bisat el Rih and Ahmad from Lebanon, and Majalati in Iraq, and a shy but persistent number of adult comics first appearing in Lebanon with Carnaval and Freud by JAD, and the comics collective JADWorkshop with their publication Min Beirut in 1989.

3 Georges Khoury’s comics Carnaval, and Sigmund Freud, and numerous editorial comic strips
nificant role and present itself as a form of expression to be taken seriously. The art’s newfound emergence and initial recognition was reinforced by the launch of the 2008 comic festival in Algeria, FIBDA, as well as by other successful initiatives since.

Expressing a Revolution: the Rise and Spread during the Uprisings

The Arab uprisings, and the fall of the centralised states and governments, greatly affected the spread of comics, accelerating it through their use as a medium for commentary, criticism and dissent. The Internet and social media ensured a widespread dissemination, while the reduced control over the press and media allowed for more private publishing, and the international attention the art form attracted substantially elevated the place of comics in the region. Early on, the sudden onslaught of the ‘revolutions’ brought with them a sense of euphoria, as people realised their ability to generate change. Individuals took to the streets visually expressing their rebellion against the archaic systems in place, using street art, banners and cartoons, which reached the public through the Internet. Young artists challenged the old mediums of expression and brought the fresh artistic language of the street and popular culture to the fore. The uprisings gave “fresh impetus and new, immediate social relevance to this young art form” as noted by art historian Charlotte Bank, where the work of young comic artists now came into focus (Bank). Previously, magazines and publications were the only platform for viewing comics, and in most Arab nations these were issued and controlled by the State, which limited the selection, content and, as a result, the choice. The genre was further restricted by the limited opportunity for publication due to a lack of support; apart from the state-run periodicals, adult comic albums were self-produced, and independently funded (Khoury).

As most comic magazines in the Arab nations were issued by the State, the fall of the centralised governments opened the door to privately published magazines. Magazines tackling adult issues emerged in the region and proved highly popular, particularly among the youth. The well-designed and skillfully illustrated TokTok magazine, founded by five young artists, was launched in Cairo in early 2011, bringing hundreds of enthusiasts together for its opening. After his novel Metro, Shafei launched the more political Al Doshma, while The 9th Art magazine produced by Shennawy and dedicated to the promotion of this art followed soon after. Tunisian comic artist Othman Selmi documented the trigger of the revolution in Spark. In Morocco, Mohamed Amine Bellaoui, AKA Rebel Spirit, published Le guide Casablancaies 2014, about his hometown Casablanca, and produced the magazine Skef Kef, which brought up issues from the street. Various comic collectives emerged during this time, such as the Syrian collective Comic4Syria, whose work appeared solely online through social media thus ensuring anonymity and, therefore, their protection, and who posted reactions to their predicament, and the Tunisian collective Bande de BD, which published the comic BD Koumik.

Contesting Censorship

Artistic expression in all its forms has, for a long time, been dominated by heavy censorship in most Arab countries, and the call for freedom from oppression and from the stifling censorship plaguing the Arab...
nations was among the main aims of the uprisings. The revolutions helped to widen the scope of freedom of expression and broaden the margins of censorship, particularly in Tunisia and Egypt, allowing the comic medium to expand (Villa). Young comic artists, aided by the recent rebellions, are now “experimenting with new and more subversive styles to look at Egypt’s realities” (El Deeb). The visual language of comics offered a powerful alternative to the written word, enabling comics and cartoons to reach a wider audience. Moreover, living in a world with a prevailing image culture made the medium far more influential (Gameel). Comics and cartoons in particular have become a significant medium to express dissent in places such as Syria, where political repression is strong (Mawad). Previously unable to show their controversial work, comic artists were now not only able to share it, but gained large followings.

Unfortunately the practice of artistic censorship continued to dog artists even after the old regimes fell and new leaders were appointed. In Tunisia it took on a new form, shifting from state to religious censorship (Bousquet). This applied to other nations as well, as was evident in Egypt’s post-Mubarak era, and Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood’s harsh crackdown on the media and all forms of expression. Although comics have not endured the same fate as political cartoons,9 being a relatively new medium and less known for targeting adult issues, artists making comics critical of their oppressors have already resorted to posting anonymously on the Internet, in fear of brutal reprisals.

With little support and insufficient opportunities for publication, many turned to the Internet to showcase and share their work. Comic art and comic artists, previously limited to local enthusiasts and a very marginal readership, were now available to a wider audience. The democratisation of the uprisings led to an increased openness to the West, but also to other Arabic experiences; comic artists were introduced to the works of their lesser-known counterparts in the region, discovering and networking with each other.

An Online Presence of Defiance: the Role of the Internet

Accessibility through the Internet, social media and mobile phones played a major role in the advance of this medium, greatly increasing readerships and its dissemination, but also acting as a means of evading censorship, pushing boundaries and, most importantly, attaining anonymity from aggressors.

The uprisings pushed the use of this medium, both that of comics and the Internet, to another level. “Cartoons and comic strips can convey ‘subversive narratives’ and, like mobile-phone images, are easily uploaded to social media sites,” noted cultural writer Malu Halasa in *Syria Speaks* (M. O. Halasa). The activists took advantage of the ease with which they could upload their work and spread it through social media, enjoying the anonymity it allowed them.10 Notably, in 2013, an anonymous comic collective from Syria created the social media page Comic4Syria, posting comics expressing the turmoil in their country. In her introduction to the book *Syria Speaks* on art during the uprisings, Halasa compares their work: “As opposed to the essentially monolithic propaganda of the regime, the anonymous [online] group Comic4Syria has spearheaded a growing movement of multidimen-

9 The crackdown on cartoons and cartoonists was inevitable and was widely practiced during the uprisings. And while cartoons have an inherent ambiguity that is difficult to pinpoint, this did not stop oppressive regimes from resorting to violence in order to silence cartoonists’ voices, as was evident in the attack on cartoonist Ali Farzat, who had his hands broken and was left in hospital (Mawad).

10 In Tunisia, Nadia Khiari regularly posted the popular character Willis from Tunis, a cat that criticised the post-revolution state of affairs.
sional revolutionary symbolism that has encouraged dialogue, debate, free expression and contestation” (M. O. Halasa).

**Locality: Language and the Status Quo**

With the uprisings came the collapse of state propaganda and pan-Arab nationalism, and the emergence of a focus on local issues and problems. Although the revolutions played a role in the spread of comics, not all the comics produced during this time were directly concerned with the uprisings. Egyptian comic artist Hicham Rahma declared, “We want to make a revolution within comics… We don’t want to make all our comics about the revolution, we want to bring a new wave of comics into Egypt” (Marasligil).

The status quo, social issues and life in the streets, feature prominently in the comics, with a noticeable sense of locality dominating in both content and form.

The status quo, social issues and life in the streets, feature prominently in the comics, with a noticeable sense of locality dominating in both content and form. Previously unheard of, personal narratives came to the fore, as did criticism and humour. Backgrounds of Arab cities, most often obscured in most of the older comic strips, were now depicted in their crowded, dusty and grim detail. Women featured with the hijab or traditional dress appear in the frames, speaking local dialects. Unlike street characters and local stereotypes feature, such as Shenawy’s humorous parking attendant in TokTok and the brutal policeman in Skelek.

The local Egyptian, Syrian, Lebanese and Tunisian dialects made a comeback during the uprisings, evident in all the comics produced, when the majority of older comics were written in classical or literary Arabic, evoking the pan-Arab nationalism of the era they were created in. This brought comics closer to their public ensuring their place as a popular medium.

**Joining the Milieu: the Role of Women as Authors and Characters**

Although the uprisings brought about a newfound sense of freedom and challenged the state of political affairs, they also highlighted the social problems plaguing the countries they started in. The comic platform offered a stage from which to criticise the status quo, forcing many previously unspoken issues to the surface. Women’s issues came to the foreground and were featured prominently as a major concern. These concerns were addressed as the main themes in some magazines, with entire editorials dedicated to the subject or through the introduction of powerful female characters. Additionally, while cartoons tend to be a male-dominated field in the Arab world, from their onset as an adult medium, comics in this region seemed to gather a reasonable number of female authors and artists, evident in the contributors to the contemporary comic publications.

Magazines tackling the marginalisation of women and their continuous harassment surfaced among the regional comics being produced. TokTok addressed women’s issues in various episodes, and dedicated an entire editorial to the subject of harassment. Strong female characters have also come to the rescue of women, such as the formidable Qahera a superhero, cleverly playing on the word ‘Qahera’ which is the Arabic word for Cairo and translates as ‘the defeater.’ Qahera features a female Muslim superhero who “combats misogyny and islamophobia amongst other things” according to her creator Deena Mohamad, as posted on the website where the comic appears (Mohamad). 2014 saw the comic series Diaries of an Arab girl on the web, talking about the daily struggles of women in the Middle East through its main character Majida and her two friends (Ahmad).

---

11 The comics of this collective however brutal, do not exclude humour, with a series about a very unfortunate opposition fighter Abou Mouss el Madsouss who is snitched on and continuously gets caught or beaten up by the Shabiha.

12 Although many Egyptian comics from before nationalism were in the colloquial dialect, this slowly diminished in favour of the classical language.

13 Notably, earlier comic artists such as Loujaina al Asil, Miriam Jabal Amel, Zeina Abi Rashed, Newal Louride, Joumana Medlej, Lena Merhej and Michele Standjofsky paved the way for an increasing female contribution to comics in the region.
However, the appearance of *Shakmagia* (Jewellery box) in Egypt, at the end of 2014, as the first feminist comic magazine especially dedicated to promoting their plight and “looking to address issues facing women and men from a feminist and human rights perspective” as claimed by the magazine, was a clear sign of the importance of this issue and the urgent need to present it.

It could be said that with the revolutions many taboos have been dropped; in this case, the woman has been brought down from her pedestal and iconic status of either mother or sister upholding all morals in society, and now appears as a character like all others, who is not perfect and can be made fun of. She is in bed with her lover in *Metro*, harassed on the streets in *Shakmagia* and defies the male population in *Qahera*.

### Regional and International Initiatives on Arab Comics

The already bubbling scene and clear interest prepared the platform for a cascading number of important pioneering initiatives and relevant events significant to Arabic comics as a cultural form both locally and internationally. The launch of the *Mu’taz and Rada Sawwaf Arabic Comics Initiative*, at the American University of Beirut in Lebanon 2014, aimed at archiving comics from the region, as well as the scholarship, promotion and teaching of this art form as a regional practice, marked a significant moment for comics in the region. *Between Cadres* (BECA), *Egypt Comix Week* that opened in September in Cairo and Alexandria, was the first large-scale event in Egypt dedicated to comics. The successful and well-attended *Arabic Comics Symposium*, held at the Lebanese American University in Beirut this spring, reinforced the importance of comics and brought forward various issues. Egypt also awaits an upcoming comic festival in the fall of 2015, and the *Mahmoud Kahil Award*, which honours the region’s comic and cartoon illustrators, is expected to be announced for November of this year.

The international response to this medium played a role in the attention it attracted, but also in recognising its place in the arts locally. In 2012, the *Erlangen Comic Salon XV* in Germany dedicated a large exhibition to comics in the Arab world, a first of its kind gathering artists from all over the region and exhibiting and presenting their work while initiating discussions on the form. The Arab American National Museum in Dearborn Michigan, hosted *Creative Dissent: Arts of the Arab World Uprisings* in early 2014, an exhibition on art and protest in the Arab world including comics. Rhode Island’s Brown University held the symposium and exhibition *Arab Comics: 90 Years of Popular Visual Culture* in March 2014, said to be the first of its kind in the United States specifically directed to this genre. The prolific book *Syria Speaks: Arts and culture from the frontline* (M. O. Halasa) presented these popular art forms to the world through their documentation.\(^\text{14}\)

### Conclusion

Growing from a long and rich history, comic art in the Arab world rapidly spread after the uprisings of recent years. Adult comics previously limited to local enthusiasts and a marginal readership, with the aid of the Internet, developed as a medium of expression, criticism, satire and dissent. Comics’ localities were brought into the foreground in the works, through the use of colloquial dialects and by depicting their contextual realities, as was the case for social and women’s issues and concerns.

**Adult comics previously limited to local enthusiasts and a marginal readership, with the aid of the Internet, developed as a medium of expression, criticism, satire and dissent**

Emerging from the child-oriented constraints of the past, the language of propaganda enforced by the State and the lack of recognition and support, adult Arab comics have emerged and are developing, anchoring their newfound fame in lasting success and respect for the genre.

\(^{14}\) The Spanish based NGO, *Fondacion Al Fanar* aims to promote cultural relations in various spheres with the Arab world, by showing facets of the Arab reality and disseminating and translating different cultural expressions from Arabic, including comics.
For the people who participated in the revolutions, there is no way back. Regardless of whether democracy is imposed or if totalitarian regimes return, comics for adults are now an established genre in the Arab world, and there is no return. Comics may be censored, their authors prosecuted... but the genre is here to stay.

Bibliography


References


The Mu’taz and Rada Sawwaf Arabic Comics Initiative at the American University of Beirut, www.aub.edu.lb/provost/Academic-initiatives/saci/Pages/index.aspx


Egypt Comix Week: Between Cadres (BECA) – Egypt Comix Week –22 and 27 September, Cairo and Alexandria, Egypt

Mahmoud Kahil Award in comics and cartoons in the Arab world, November 2015, www.Mahmoudkahil.com

List of Arabic Adult comics magazines:

Autostrade (Egypt)
EL Doshma (Egypt)
BD Koumik (Tunisia)
La Furie des Glandeur
Makhbar 619 (Tunisia)
Samandal (Lebanon)
Shakmagia (Egypt)
Skefkef (Morocco)
TokTok (Egypt)

Appendices
MAP A.1 | Civil War in Syria. Developments over the Last Year

- **Controlled by the Syrian Armed Forces**
- **Controlled by the People’s Protection Forces (Kurdish Forces)**
- **Controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant**
- **Controlled by the Syrian National Coalition (Opposition Forces)**
- **Controlled by the al-Nusra Front**

MAP A.2 | The Fragile States Index in the Mediterranean

The Fragile State Index is based on twelve indicators covering a wide range of state failure elements. Aggregated data are scaled from 0-10 (the lower the score, the better) to obtain final scores for 12 social, economic and political/military indicators. The total score is the sum of the 12 indicators and is on a scale of 0-120.

Decade Trend 2006-2015 Fragile State Index Calculated according to the difference between the total average of all the indicators in 2006 and 2015

Critical Worsening
Significant Worsening
Worsening
Some Worsening
Marginal Worsening
Insignificant Change
Marginal Improvement
Some Improvement
Strong Improvement
Significant Improvement

Fragile State Index 2015 Indicators
Demographic Pressure: Pressures on the population, such as food scarcity, population growth, and mortality rates. Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: Concerns associated with population displacement and refugees. Group Grievance: Tensions and violence among groups within the State including sectarian and religious violence. Human Flight and Brain Drain: Migration per capita and emigration of educated people. Uneven Economic Development: Disparities in development among different ethnic and religious groups and among regions within the State. Poverty and Economic Decline: Poverty rates and economic performance. State Legitimacy: Corruption and other topics undermining the social contract such as government performance, political participation. Public Services: Provision of education, healthcare, sanitation, and other services. Human Rights and Rule of Law: The protection and promotion of human rights. Security Apparatus: Internal conflict and proliferation of non-state armed groups. Factionalised Elites: Conflict and competition among local and national leaders. External Intervention: External actors intervene to help the State meet its obligations to provide services or manipulated domestic affairs.

Own Production. Source: The Fragile States Index – The Fund for Peace: http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/
MAP A.3a | Evolution of Selected Indicators over the Last 20 Years

1995 | 2013
---|---

**Median Age of the Total Population (years)**
- Data unavailable
- Less than 22
- From 22 to 26
- From 26 to 30
- From 30 to 34
- From 34 to 38
- From 38 to 42
- More than 42

**Labour Force Participation Rate, Female (% of female population aged 15-64)**
- Data unavailable
- Less than 20%
- From 20% to 30%
- From 30% to 40%
- From 40% to 50%
- From 50% to 60%
- From 60% to 70%
- More than 70%

**CO₂ Emissions per capita (t CO₂/capita)**
- Data unavailable
- Less than 1
- From 1 to 2
- From 2 to 3
- From 3 to 4
- From 4 to 5
- From 7 to 8
- More than 8

**Mortality Rate, Under 5 (per 1,000 live births)**
- Data unavailable
- From 12 to 16
- From 8 to 12
- From 4 to 8
- Less than 4
- From 40 to 50
- From 30 to 40
- From 20 to 30
- From 16 to 20
- From 12 to 16
- From 8 to 12
- Less than 4

Own Production. Source: WB, IMF, UNCTAD, UN Population Division and IEA.
MAP A.3b | Evolution of Selected Indicators over the Last 20 Years

1995 2013

GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $)

Data unavailable
From 5,000 to 10,000
From 10,000 to 15,000
From 15,000 to 20,000
From 20,000 to 25,000
More than 30,000

Services, Value Added (% of GDP)

Data unavailable
From 50% to 55%
From 55% to 60%

Migrants' Remittances, 1995-2013 (% of GDP)

Data unavailable
From 1% to 2.5%
From 2.5% to 5%

Goods and Services Trade Balance (% of GDP)

Data unavailable
From -30% to -20%
From -10% to -5%
From -5% to -1%
From -1% to 0%
From 0% to 1%
From 2% to 3%
More than 5%

Own Production. Source: WB, IMF, UNCTAD, UN Population Division and IEA.
MAP A.4 | Elections in Greece

**Political Party with Most Votes in Each Region**

**January 2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Democracy (ND)</td>
<td>More than 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)</td>
<td>From 35% to 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)</td>
<td>From 35% to 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of Greece (KKE)</td>
<td>Less than 20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**May 2012**

<table>
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<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New Democracy (ND)</td>
<td>More than 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)</td>
<td>From 35% to 40%</td>
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<td>From 35% to 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of Greece (KKE)</td>
<td>Less than 20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**June 2012**

<table>
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<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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</thead>
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<td>New Democracy (ND)</td>
<td>More than 40%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)</td>
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<td>From 35% to 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of Greece (KKE)</td>
<td>Less than 20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MAP A.5a Consumption and Production of Electricity

Own Production. Source: IEA.

Electricity Production by Source
- Nuclear
- Coal
- Oil
- Gas
- Biofuels and Waste
- Hydro
- Wind
- Solar
- Other

Electricity Production (GWh)
- More than 500,000
- From 200,000 to 500,000
- From 100,000 to 200,000
- From 50,000 to 100,000
- From 25,000 to 50,000
- From 15,000 to 25,000
- From 5,000 to 15,000
- Less than 5,000
- Data not available

Imports* of Electricity (in %) (Net Importer Countries)
- Croatia
- Albania
- FYROM
- Montenegro
- Morocco
- Portugal
- Italy
- Jordan

Exports* of Electricity (in %) (Net Exporter Countries)
- France
- Israel
- Slovenia
- Spain

Data not available:
- Imports-Exports) / (Production+Imports-Exports)
- (Imports-Exports) / (Production+Imports)
MAP A.5b | Consumption and Production of Electricity

Electricity Consumption by Source
- Other
- Commercial and public services
- Industry
- Transport
- Residential

Electricity Consumption / Production (kWh per capita)
- More than 35
- From 6,000 to 7,000
- From 5,000 to 6,000
- From 4,000 to 5,000
- From 3,000 to 4,000
- From 2,000 to 3,000
- From 1,000 to 2,000
- Less than 1,000
- Data not available

Losses in Electricity Transmission (Losses over Electricity Supply in %)

Mediterranean Countries

World

Own Production. Source: IEA.
MAP A.6 | Population Policies

**Average Annual Population Growth Rate (%)**

- Less than 0%
- From 0% to 0.5%
- From 0.5% to 1%
- From 1% to 1.5%
- More than 2%

**Population Policies**

1. **Policy on growth**
2. **Population age structure**
3. **Level of concern about ageing of the population**
4. **Measures to address population ageing**
5. **Fertility**
6. **Policy on fertility level**
7. **Level of concern about adolescent fertility**
8. **Policies to reduce adolescent fertility**

**Reproductive health and family planning**

9. **Government support for family planning**
10. **Policies to prevent domestic violence**

**Health and mortality**

11. **View on the level of under-five mortality**
12. **Level of concern about HIV/AIDS**

**Spatial distribution and internal migration**

13. **Policy on migration from rural to urban areas**

**International migration**

14. **Policy on immigration**
15. **Policy on highly-skilled workers**
16. **Policy on integration of non-nationals**
17. **Policy on naturalisation**
18. **Policy on emigration**
19. **Acceptance of dual citizenship**

**Government Views and Policies**

| AL | DZ | BA | HR | CY | EG | FR | GR | IL | IT | JO | LB | LY | ME | MA | PT | RS | SI | ES | PS | SY | MK | TN | TR |
|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
|    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |

### Agricultural Area over Country Area (in %)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Country Area (%)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More than 70%</td>
<td>Cereals 100.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60% to 70%</td>
<td>Forage 83.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50% to 60%</td>
<td>Cereals 58.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40% to 50%</td>
<td>Cereals 30.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30% to 40%</td>
<td>Fruits 18.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 30%</td>
<td>Fruits 14.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data unavailable</td>
<td>Cereals 19.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Products with Biggest Area Harvested

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product</th>
<th>1,000 Ha</th>
<th>% of total area harvested</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cereals</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forage</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Country Area by Type

- Inland Waters
- Temporary crops
- Other land
- Fallow land (temporary)
- Permanent crops
- Forest area
- Temporary meadows and pastures
- Arable land
- Oilcrops
- Cereals
- Vegetables

Own Production. Source: FAO.
Threatened* Species (Animals) 2014

Extinct” / “Extinct in the wild” Species (Animals)

Mammals, Birds & Amphibians

Other animals**

Threatened* Species (Animals) 2014

Extinct” / “Extinct in the wild” Species (Animals)

Mammals, Birds & Amphibians

Other animals**

Number of “Critically Endangered” Species in Mediterranean Countries by Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mammals</td>
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<tr>
<td>Birds</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reptiles**</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amphibians</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fishes**</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Molluscs**</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other invertebrates**</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>302</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Includes “Critically Endangered,” “Endangered” and “Vulnerable” categories of the Red List of IUCN

**Reptiles, fishes, molluscs and other invertebrates. For these groups, there are still many species that have not yet been assessed for the IUCN Red List and therefore their status is not known. The figures presented for these groups should therefore be interpreted as the number of species known to be threatened within those species that have been assessed to date, and not as the overall total number of threatened species for each.
### International Mobility of Tertiary Level Students

#### Gross Outbound Enrolment Ratio (%)

- **More than 20%**
- **From 15% to 20%**
- **From 10% to 15%**
- **From 7.5% to 10%**
- **From 5% to 7.5%**
- **From 4% to 5%**
- **From 3% to 4%**
- **From 2% to 3%**
- **Less than 2%**

#### Top Five Destination Countries of Tertiary-Level Students from Mediterranean Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>24,751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; H.</td>
<td>11,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>6,096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>27,411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>16,217</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>62,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>32,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>51,236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>13,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>4,350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>STUDENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>44,161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>12,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>10,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>2,433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>30,135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Outbound Mobility Ratio

- **From 7.5% to 10%**
- **From 5% to 7.5%**
- **From 2% to 3%**
- **Less than 2%**

---

Own Production. Source: UNESCO.
Appendices Maps

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2015

MAP A.9b | International Mobility of Tertiary Level Students

Inbound Mobility Rate by Genre

- More than 20%
- From 10% to 20%
- From 5% to 10%
- From 3% to 5%
- From 2% to 3%
- From 1% to 2%
- Less than 1%
- Less than 2%

Inbound Mobility Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>7,300</td>
<td>3,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>842</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>7,454</td>
<td>2,316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>271,399</td>
<td>97,540</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Top Five Origin Countries of Tertiary-Level Students hosted in Mediterranean Countries

- Greece: 29,012
- Italy: 77,732
- Jordan: 27,931
- Malta: 591
- Morocco: 8,604

Net Flow of Internationally Mobile Students (inbound - outbound)

- France: 208,883
- Egypt: 34,716
- Italy: 26,496
- Spain: 25,624
- Lebanon: 14,141

Own Production. Source: UNESCO.
MAP A.10 | Transport. Merchant Fleet of Mediterranean Countries

The figures cover seagoing propelled merchant ships of 100 gross tons and above, excluding Inland Waterway Vessels, Fishing Vessels, Military Vessels, Yachts, and Offshore Fixed and Mobile Platforms and Barges.

Own Production. Source: UNCTAD.
**MAP A.11 | Road Traffic Deaths in Mediterranean Countries**

Estimated Number of Road Traffic Deaths 2010

- Each dot represents 100 deaths
- Less than 100 deaths

Estimated Road Traffic Death Rate (per 100,000 population) (2010)

- More than 20
- From 5 to 10
- Less than 5
- From 10 to 15
- No data

Own Production. Source: WHO.

**MAP A.12 | Broadband Subscriptions and Internet Users**

Percentage of Individuals Using the Internet (2005-2013)

Fixed (Wired)-broadband Subscriptions per 100 Inhabitants (2013)

- More than 35
- From 30 to 35
- From 15 to 20
- From 5 to 10
- From 2.5 to 5
- From 25 to 30
- From 10 to 15
- Less than 2.5

Own Production. Source: ITU.
MAP A.13 | Syrian Refugees in Neighbouring Countries and Internal Displaced People (IDPs) in Syria

**IDPs in Syria (7.6 million) by Governorate**

- More than 1,500,000
- From 750,000 to 1,500,000
- From 400,000 to 750,000
- From 200,000 to 400,000
- Less than 200,000

**Percentage of Syrian Refugees in the Country**

- Less than 10%
- From 10% to 20%
- From 20% to 30%
- From 30% to 40%
- More than 40%

**Current Situation of Syrian Citizens**

- Refugees*: 19%
- IDPs*: 35%
- Rest: 47%

* at the end of 2014

MAP A.14 | Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Trade in the Mediterranean Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ICT Goods Trade, Share of Total Merchandise Trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More than 15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 1.5% to 2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Exports/Imports |
| ICT Goods (in million $) |
| Less than 100 Million $ | 5,000 Million $ | 15,000 Million $ |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediterranean Countries ICT Imports: Main Countries of Origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UE Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashreq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Mediterranean Countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own Production. Source: UNCTAD.
MAP A. 15 | Exports of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Countries to EU

Trade Exports to EU-28 Share from ENP Countries

ENP Countries According to the Agreement Signed with the EU
- Association Agreements (AA)
- Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA)
- Interim Association Agreement
- No Agreement

*Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine signed and provisionally applied AAs that will replace PCAs as soon as they are ratified by all EU Member States.

Own Production. Source: European Commission Services (DG TRADE).
MAP A.16 | Gender Gap Index in Mediterranean Countries (2014)

Global Gender Gap Index
(from 0=inequality to 1=equality)

- More than 0.750
- From 0.725 to 0.750
- From 0.700 to 0.725
- From 0.675 to 0.700
- From 0.650 to 0.675
- From 0.625 to 0.650
- Not available

Categories
1. Economic Participation and Opportunity
2. Educational Attainment
3. Health and Survival
4. Political Empowerment

Gender Gap categories
(Subindexes) (2006-2014)

Less than 0.600
From 0.600 to 0.625
From 0.625 to 0.650
From 0.650 to 0.675
From 0.675 to 0.700
From 0.700 to 0.725
More than 0.750

MAP A.17 | Detections of Illegal Border-Crossings between Border Crossing Points (2014)

Evolution of Detections (2009–2014) (All routes)

Sea Rescued Operations in Central Mediterranean
- Mare Nostrum (Oct. 2013–Oct. 2014) 150,000 3,000
- Triton (Oct. 2014–Jan. 2015) 23,000 1,750

Rescued People (Frontex)
Deaths (IOM)

Detections of Illegal Border-crossing (percentage change on 2013) (by routes)

Sea Border
- Central Mediterranean: 277%
- Black Sea: 193%
- Eastern Mediterranean: 105%
- Western Mediterranean: 15%
- Western Africa: -2%

Land Border
- Western Balkans: 117%
- Circular route from Albania to Greece: 1%
- Eastern Borders: -3%
- Western Mediterranean: -27%

Western Mediterranean (sea): 4,755
- Cameroon: 845
- Algeria: 734
- Morocco: 468

Western Mediterranean (land): 3,087
- Mali: 669
- Cameroon: 652
- Syria: 405

Western Balkans (land): 43,357
- Kosovo UNSCR 1244: 22,059
- Afghanistan: 8,342
- Syria: 7,320

Circular Route from Albania to Greece (land): 8,841
- Albania: 8,757
- FYROM: 31
- Georgia: 14

Central Mediterranean (sea): 170,664
- Syria: 39,651
- Eritrea: 33,559
- Sub-saharan nationals: 26,340

Western Africa (sea): 276
- Morocco: 52
- Guinea: 50
- Senegal: 26

Western Balkans (land): 43,357
- Kosovo UNSCR 1244: 22,059
- Afghanistan: 8,342
- Syria: 7,320

Eastern Borders (land): 1,275
- Vietnam: 257
- Afghanistan: 209
- Georgia: 171

Black Sea (sea): 433
- Afghanistan: 261
- Iraq: 90
- Iran: 45

Eastern Mediterranean (sea): 44,057
- Syria: 27,025
- Afghanistan: 11,582
- Somalia: 1,621

Eastern Mediterranean (land): 6,777
- Syria: 4,684
- Afghanistan: 893
- Iraq: 483

January 2014

In Spain, the implementation of the new education bill finds opposition from five autonomous regions. In France, thousands demonstrate against the President François Hollande the same month that the government approves fresh cuts. Monaco experiences the longest strike in its history. In Italy, the Agriculture Minister resigns. Malta and the European Commission reach an agreement on the Maltese Nationality Law. Croatia extradites Josip Perkovic. Serbia begins EU accession negotiations. The crisis in the government coalitions of Montenegro, Serbia and FYROM forces the governments to consider early elections. In Kosovo, the former Serbian Minister for Kosovo is arrested accused of war crimes. Greece imprisons three members of the Golden Dawn party for belonging to a criminal organisation. In Turkey, the crisis between the government and the courts continues over a corruption case involving the leadership of the governing AKP. In Syria, the regime continues its advance to recover control of areas in rebel hands, while the Geneva II talks are in progress. In The Hague, the trial begins for the murder of the Lebanese President Rafiq Hariri. Egypt approves the new constitution and names the interim government.

Spain

- On 8 January the Civil Guard arrests eight people accused of coordinating and carrying out orders from outside the country from the Euskadi ta Askatasuna terrorist group (ETA) for their imprisoned members.
- On 15 January the Spanish Wind Energy Association announces that, during 2013, Spain became the first and only country to have wind as its main source of energy.
- On 29 January five autonomous regions express their opposition to the application of the Education Reform Bill approved in November 2013 by the parliamentary majority of the ruling People’s Party (PP, centre-right).

France

- On 1 January Mayotte officially becomes the ninth ultra-peripheral region of the EU.
- On 9 January, at the request of the Interior Minister Manuel Valls, the Council of State cancels a performance in Nantes by Dieudonné, an anti-Semitic singer of Cameroon origin, saying that it would incite racial hatred. In Libya, there are fresh outbreaks of violence in Sebha. Tunisia approves the new constitution and names the interim government.

Portugal

- On 9 January Portugal issues long-term debt for the first time in eight months. On 21 January the Portuguese debt drops from 5% for the first time since August 2010.

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of the Yugoslav secret service Zdravko Mustac to Germany for the 1983 murder in Munich of dissent Stjepan Djurekovic. The decision contrasts with that taken the previous day by a court in Zagreb, and confirmed on 21 January by the Supreme Court, which approves the extradition of former Yugoslavian intelligence chief Josip Perkovic, in the same case.

Montenegro

- On 25 January the Social Democratic Party (SDP) traditional ally of the governing Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) agrees to collaborate with the opposition Positive Montenegro Party, also social democratic, accelerating the possibility of a split in the coalition government.

Serbia

- On 21 January Serbia initiates EU accession negotiations.
- On 25 January the Economy Minister Sasa Radulovic (Serbian Progressive Party, SNS, conservative) resigns over his failure to reach an agreement with trade unions to liberalise the labour market. His departure intensifies the crisis in the coalition government and increases the chances of early elections.
- On 29 January the former President Boris Tadic leaves the Democratic Party (DS, social democratic) because of disagreements with the leadership.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 11 January Albania and Kosovo hold their first bilateral summit in Prizren to advance together on their respective European accession processes.
- On 15 January radical Kosovo Serbs, opposed to the agreement between Belgrade and Kosovo to normalise bilateral relations, murder Dimitrije Janicijevic, the Kosovo Serb municipal councillor in Mitrovica and member of the Kosovo coalition government.
- On 27 January the Parliament fails to agree on a constitutional modification proposed by the ruling Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK, centre-right) to reserve 20 seats for Montenegrin and Croatian minorities.
- On 28 January the former Serbian Minister for Kosovo Affairs Oliver Ivanovic is arrested in Kosovo suspected of committing war crimes between 1999 and 2000. His arrest sparks protests in Belgrade and Mitrovica, where Ivanovic is emerging as a favourite in the city’s mayoral elections scheduled for 23 February, after, on 11 January, the winner of the November 2013 elections, Kristimir Pantic, turns down the post, in a tacit refusal to recognise Kosovo’s sovereignty.

FYROM

- On 30 January the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE, conservative) and its coalition partner the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI, Albanian nationalist) agree to hold early presidential elections.

Greece

- On 6 January Greece files a complaint against the Troika to the European Parliament for making incorrect calculations on the implementation of the required austerity measures and the effects they would have on the Greek economy. The country urges the EU to extend the repayment deadlines and lower the interests of the economic bailout.
- On 11 January three Golden Dawn members are jailed pending trial for belonging to a criminal organisation. With this ruling from the Greek judiciary, five of the 19 MPs from the neo-Nazi party are behind bars.

Turkey

- On 7 January the government sacks the police chiefs of 15 provinces. The dismissals add to those carried out since December 2013 and affect around a thousand police officers investigating a possible corruption case that involves the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP, Islamist).
- On 9 January the government presents a draft bill to limit access to the Internet and monitor what pages users are visiting, as part of a new block of conservative regulations presented by the Ministry of Family and Social Policy.

Cyprus

- On 22 January the government approves the draft bill to create a dispute tribunal.
- On 28 January Northern Cyprus abolishes the law that criminalises homosexuality.

Syria

- On 3 January a major offensive begins, which continues throughout the month, led by the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Islamic Front against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS).
- On 9 January the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROF) announces its decision to re-elect Ahmad Jarba as its president.
- On 22 January the Geneva II Peace Conference begins, marked by the controversial absence of Iran and aimed at deciding on a transitional government. On 30 January the talks end without reaching an agreement.

Lebanon

- On 16 January the trial in absentia begins at the Special Tribunal for Lebanon against four members of Hezbollah for the murder in 2005 of the Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and another 21 people.
- On 16 January five people are killed in an attack in Hermel, a Hezbollah stronghold. On 21 January another four people are killed in a fresh attack in Haret Hreik. This brings the number of attacks against Hezbollah to five since the group announced its participation in the Syrian conflict in June 2013.
- On 17 January seven people are killed by mortar shells fired from Syria into Arsal. With a majority Sunni population in favour of the Syrian revolution, Arsal has virtually been shelled on a daily basis.

Egypt

- On 9 January 113 Muslim Brotherhood members are handed down sentences of up to three years’ imprisonment.
- On 14-15 January Egypt holds the referendum for the new constitution.
Confrontations and clashes break out between Muslim Brotherhood supporters and security forces leaving at least nine dead and 444 arrested. On 18 January the Electoral Commission announces that 98.1% of voters have approved the new constitution with a 38.6% turnout.

- On 22 January the Muslim Brotherhood and the Alliance to Support Legitimacy, call for 19 days of protest against the government sparking unrest throughout the month.
- On 27 January the social democrat deputy Prime Minister and International Cooperation Minister Ziad Baha el-Din announces his resignation, saying that his decision is coherent with the transitional process.
- On 27 January the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces authorises the vice President and Defence Minister Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi to run in the next presidential elections.
- On 28 January Mohammad Saeed, head of the Technical Office of the Interior Minister is assassinated in Giza.
- On 31 January Saudi Arabia announces a new 4-billion-dollar aid package for Egypt.

Libya

- On 8 January the self-declared autonomous government of Cyrenaica announces that it will resume oil exports outside of state control.
- On 12 January Abd-Rabbo al-Barassi, Prime Minister of the self-declared autonomous region of Cyrenaica, survives an assassination attempt in Bayda.
- On 12 January the deputy Minister of Industry Hasan al-Droui is assassinated in Sirte.
- On 21 January the Interior Minister submits a report to the GNC that documents 643 political assassinations during 2013 and reveals serious breaches in domestic security.
- On 29 January the deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister Seddik Abdelkarim survives an assassination attempt in Tripoli.

Tunisia

- On 9 January the Prime Minister Ali Larayedh resigns to make way for the new interim government of Mehdli Joma, who was elected the new Prime Minister in December 2013. Larayedh also cancels the new taxation on agricultural vehicles from the 2014 Finance Law, which has sparked protests since December.
- On 10 January the US adds Ansar al-Sharia to its list of terrorist organisations.
- On 15 January the members of the High Electoral Commission take their posts after being elected on 8 January.
- On 26 January the National Assembly approves the new constitution with 200 votes in favour, 12 against and four abstentions.
- On 29 January the new government is approved by the National Assembly.

Algeria

- On 7 January an agreement between Algeria, Statoil and British Petroleum is announced to resume gas production in Tiguentourine, a year after the terrorist attack and kidnapping carried out by the el-Moulathamine Brigade.
- On 17 January Algeria calls presidential elections for 17 April.
- On 13 January the government deploys 3,000 soldiers and police officers to control unrest between Malikis and Ibadis in Ghardaia.

Morocco

- On 17 January the government announces the suspension of gasoline and fuel oil subsidies.
- On 22 January the Parliament approves the deletion of a paragraph from the Penal Code that absolves the rapist of a minor if he marries his victim.

Mauritania

- On 2 January the journalist Mohamed Cheikh Ould Mohamed is arrested in Nouadhibou accused of apostasy.

EU

- On 1 January Greece takes over the EU Presidency with priorities of fighting against youth unemployment, reducing illegal immigration, strengthening the monetary and banking union and promoting a safety-focused European maritime policy.
- On 1 January Latvia officially adopts the euro as its currency.
- On 16 January the European Parliament approves the requirement for all members to respect the right to free movement, including for Romanians and Bulgarians, for whom restrictions were lifted on 1 January.

February 2014

Spain faces an immigration crisis at the Melilla border. In France a new demonstration is held in protest against the policies of François Hollande. In Italy, Matteo Renzi becomes the new Prime Minister. Switzerland caps the number of Croatian citizens allowed entry into the country. In Bosnia a wave of protests erupts against government mismanagement and corruption. The second round of international negotiations on Syria ends without an agreement. Lebanon forms a new government. In Egypt, the government resigns and Ibrahim Mahlab is appointed the new Prime Minister. In Libya, new protests denounce the extension of the General Nation Congress’ mandate in the same month that the country elects the Constituent Assembly. In Algeria, the Islamist parties announce that they will boycott the presidential elections. In Mauritania, a new government is formed. Tension mounts in Ukraine over whether the country should align with the European expansion process or remain in the Russian orbit.
Portugal

- On 7 February the Parliament amends the 2014 budget with cuts on pensions, amounting to over 1,000 euros per month, and an increase in health insurance contributions for civil servants to mitigate the effects of miscalculations made by the Constitutional Court in December 2013 regarding the reduction in civil servant pensions.
- On 12 February the IMF authorises a new aid tranche for Portugal of 910 million euros.

Spain

- On 6 February nine sub-Saharan die trying to swim across the Spanish-Moroccan border into Ceuta in the area of Tarajal, on a day on which a further 300 illegal immigrants try unsuccessfully to enter Spanish territory. On 28 February 214 sub-Saharan successfully enter Melilla in a mass assault on the border fence, the fifth since the year began.

France

- On 2 February a large conservative demonstration in Paris protests against the government’s policies, particularly the same-sex marriage and adoption law.

Monaco

- On 12 February the company Borg-Warner announces the closure of its Monaco factory, which will lead to the dismissal of 153 workers. This adds to the closure of the Mercaplast factory, which resulted in 85 dismissals in 2013.

Italy

- On 4 February Mariano Riccio is arrested in Naples, head of the Amato-Pagano Camorra clan.
- On 5 February the Italian navy rescues 1,123 sub-Saharan in waters around Lampedusa.
- On 14 February Enrico Letta resigns after losing the support of his party and other groups that supported his government. The move leads the secretary general of the Democratic Party (PD social democrat), Matteo Renzi, to form a new reformist government, which he presents to the President Giorgio Napolitano on 17 February.
- On 20 February the Parliament approves the new party financing law which will end public financing of parties between now and 2017.
- On 25 February Matteo Renzi consolidates his position in the government after winning a parliamentary confidence vote.

Slovenia

- On 24 February the Parliament approves the appointment of Metod Dragonja as Minister of the Economy, Alenka Trop Skaza as Health Minister and Gorazd Zmavc as Minister for the Diaspora.

Croatia

- On 16 February Switzerland announces that it will not grant freedom of residence to Croatian nationals. On 18 February Switzerland reaches an agreement with the EU under German mediation to establish a cap, after the EU suspends Switzerland’s involvement in the Erasmus and Horizon 2020 programmes on 17 February.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 5-6 February unrest erupts in Tuzla between police and demonstrators protesting against job losses after the privatisation of several public companies. As of 8 February the protests and unrest, the worst in 20 years, spread to several areas of Bosnia demanding political reform and measures to be taken against corruption, to create jobs and improve the governability of this fragmented country.

Montenegro

- On 15 February clashes break out in Podgorica between the police and antigovernment protesters.
- On 19 February the opposition Democratic Front announces a parliamentary boycott against the decision taken by the ruling DPS to vote against the electoral law reform required to advance in the EU accession process.

Serbia

- On 13 February Dragan Tomic, MP in the ruling Serbian Progressive Party, is arrested for financial wrongdoings related to affairs of Univerzal Banka.
- On 15 February thousands gather in Niš and Novi Sad to demand that measures be taken against the increase in violence in the country.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 5 February the Transport Minister and vice-President of the ruling PDK Fatmir Limaj and the Parliament Speaker Jakup Krasniqi leave their party to join the opposition over disagreements with the leadership.
- On 5 February Uke Rugova, son of the former President Ibrahim Rugova is arrested at the request of the EU rule-of-law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) for his involvement in organised crime.
- On 11 February Serbia’s war crimes court sentences nine members of the paramilitary group The Jackals to between two and 20 years in prison for the murder of more than 120 ethnic Albanians during the Kosovo conflict.
- On 20 February EULEX presses fresh charges against Fatmir Limaj for corruption and involvement in organised crime.
- On 23 February the pro-Serbian candidate Goran Rakic wins Mitrovica’s municipal elections.

FYROM

- On 1 February Albania and FYROM fail to reach an agreement in the negotiations over Skopje’s plans to build a dam in Radika River, cause for concern in Tirana due to the project’s possible repercussions on water levels of the Drin River that generates Albania’s electricity.
- On 18 February unrest erupts in Skopje between police and demonstrators protesting against the cuts and privatisations.

Albania

- On 20 February the Democratic Party (DP, centre-right) leads a dem-
onstration against the ruling Socialist Party, which it accuses of failing to keep electoral promises and authoritarianism.

**Greece**

- On 5 February the former President of the defunct Hellenic Postbank Angelos Filippidis is arrested for tax fraud.
- On 17 February the government announces that, without taking into account the interest on its debt, Greece registered a financial surplus in 2013 of over 1.5 billion euros, although the unemployment rate continued to grow, reaching 28% in November 2013.
- On 26 February dock workers go on strike and demonstrate in Athens against the partial privatisation of the Port of Piraeus. On the same day, farmers also protest against the increase in taxes on agricultural production.

**Turkey**

- On 6 February the mayor of Istanbul Kadir Topbas presents the redevelopment project for Taksim Square which preserves Gezi Park in its entirety. The previous project included the removal of the latter triggering the largest wave of protests seen against the government in ten years.
- On 8 February protests and unrest erupt in Istanbul over laws that would tighten control of the Internet, approved on 5 February by the Parliament.
- On 15 February the AKP obtains parliamentary approval of a law giving the government greater power over prosecutors and judges, in a session that ends in a brawl.

**Cyprus**

- On 11 February reunification negotiations resume after an 18-month break, provoking the Democratic Party’s (DIKO, centre-right) departure from the government coalition on 26 February.
- On 27 February the Parliament rejects the law to privatise state companies, set as a prerequisite by the Troika for the fourth tranche of the financial bail-out.

**Syria**

- On 3 February at least 36 people are killed in Syrian air strikes on Aleppo, adding to the 120 people killed on the previous two days.
- On 3 February Nasser al-Qudwa, vice-President of the international team leading the Syria peace talks is dismissed, in accordance with demands made by Damascus.
- On 10 February a second round of Geneva II peace talks begins in Montreux, which ends without an agreement.
- On 12 February the Syrian army and Hezbollah force the FSA to withdraw from Yabroud.
- On 16 February the FSA replaces its current army chief Selim Idriss with Abdeilah al-Bashir.
- On 26 February an ambush by the Syrian army and Hezbollah leaves 175 rebels dead from the al-Nusra Front in Damascus.
- On 28 February the FSA force ISIS to pull out of Azaz five months after the group took control there.

**Lebanon**

- On 15 February after a 10-month power vacuum, the Prime Minister Tammam Salam succeeds in forming a national unity government.
- On 19 February the jihadist group the Abdullah Azzam Brigades claims responsibility for the double suicide bombing in an Iranian cultural centre in Beirut, which leaves at least five dead.

**Egypt**

- On 6 February the Court of Cassation in Cairo overrules the decision made by the Port Said Criminal Court, which sentenced 21 people to death for the massacre at the Port Said football stadium in February 2012.
- On 7 February at least three are killed in al-Fayum, Minia and Giza in protests called by the Muslim Brotherhood.
- On 24 February the Prime Minister Hazem el-Beblawi and his government resign. On 25 February the President Adly Mansour names the Housing Minister Ibrahim Mahlab, from the banned Democratic National Party (PND) as the new Prime Minister.

**Libya**

- On 3 February the Prime Minister Ali Zeidan urges pro-autonomy demonstrators who have been blocking ports in Cyrenaica to put an end to their actions, threatening them with military intervention.
- On 3 February the GNC extends its mandate, which was due to end on 7 February, to be able to finish drafting the constitution before August and hold elections at the end of 2014.
- On 5 February the GNC approves an amendment to the penal code under which anyone publicly undermining the power of the State can be sentenced to up to 15 years in prison.
- On 7 February a demonstration in Tripoli protests against the decision to extend the current GNC mandate.
- On 14 February general Khalifa Haf-tar, one of the revolution leaders, issues a statement in which he calls the army to take control of the country and dissolve the GNC.
- On 20 February Libya holds elections to choose the 60 members of the Constituent Assembly that will draft the new constitution.
- On 26 February the murder of two security agents in Benghazi sparks new protests that end in clashes.

**Tunisia**

- On 4 February the Interior Minister Lotfi Ben Jeddou announces the death, the previous day, of Kamel Gadhgadh, one of the top leaders of Ansar al-Sharia and prime suspect in the murder of Chokri Belaïd in February 2013.
- On 8 February security forces capture Ahmed Melki in Béja, suspected of murdering Mohamed Brahmi in July 2013.
- On 10 February the Religious Affairs Minister Mourir Tili announces the government’s plans to stop imams interfering in the nation’s political affairs.
- On 14 February the Interior Minister announces stricter controls on people wearing the full veil (niqāb).
- On 17 February a demonstration in Jendouba condemns the murder of four people at the hands of Islamist militants on 15 February.
**Algeria**

- On 15 February the Islamist Front of Justice and Development, Ennahdha and the Movement of Society for Peace announce that they will boycott the presidential elections in April.

**Morocco**

- On 19 February a court in Casablanca orders the Takfiri imam Abdelhamid Abouaïm to pay 45 euros and gives him a month’s suspended prison sentence for defamation against Driss Lachgar, member of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), who he accused of apostasy in December 2013 for calling for a ban on polygamy.

**Mauritania**

- On 12 February the Prime Minister Moulaye Ould Mohamed Laghdaf announces the composition of the new government, following the victory of the Union of Democratic Forces (UFD, socialist) in the November and December elections. The Defence, Interior, Foreign, Finance and Justice Ministers retain their posts.

**EU**

- On 11 February the EU warns Switzerland that bilateral relations will suffer if Berne sets quotas for EU workers or limits the free movement of people, measures called for by the ultra-conservative Democratic Union of the Centre and approved in a referendum.
- On 21 February the EU agrees to impose sanctions on the government of Ukraine for the use of violence against demonstrators who, since November 2014, have been calling for Kiev to leave Russia’s orbit and move towards the EU. On the same day, the Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych announces his resignation and calls early elections for 2014 after reaching an agreement with the opposition, and the Verkhovna Rada votes to release the former Prime Minister and opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko. On 24 February the Rada appoints Tymoshenko’s right hand Oleksandr Turchynov the acting President. Turchynov announces a change in direction in EU relations towards signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreement. The new government issues an arrest warrant for Yanukovych, who flees first to secessionist and pro-Russian Crimea and then Russia. Moscow recalls its ambassador to Ukraine and says the new government is not legitimate. NATO promises to defend Ukraine if tensions heighten in Crimea, where pro-Russian militants take over the regional government on 27 February and the main airports the following day.

**March 2014**

**Police in Portugal go on strike. In Spain, the former Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez dies. France holds municipal elections. In Italy, the government approves new anti-crisis measures and the high court confirms Silvio Berlusconi’s ban from public office. In Bosnia, the Interior Minister is sacked by the Parliament. In Serbia, the Progressive Party wins in the parliamentary elections. Kosovo announces plans to create its own army. In Turkey, the AKP wins the municipal elections, the same month that the government tries to block the social network Twitter and closes down a network of Hizmet schools, which is critical of government policies. In Cyprus there are changes in the cabinet and the management of the Central Bank. In Syria, the army makes fresh advances. In Egypt, the new government takes over and Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi announces his candidacy in the presidential elections in May, while an Egyptian court hands down death sentences to 529 members of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Libya, the Prime Minister Ali Zeidan is dismissed. In Tunisia, the government lifts the nationwide state of emergency. Algeria prepares for presidential elections in April, in which Abdelaziz Bouteflika will run for reelection, who also approves changes in his cabinet. The EU is largely focused on Crimea’s secession from Ukraine.

**Spain**

- On 22 March the so-called Dignity Marches arrive in Madrid which set off from different parts of the country in February to protest against the austerity policies. The protests end in violent clashes with police.
- On 23 March Adolfo Suarez, the first Prime Minister of Spain’s current democracy and a key figure in the transition, dies.
- On 25 March the Constitutional Court confirms that the Catalan government’s decision to hold a referendum on self-determination is unconstitutional.

**France**

- On 11 March the Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault admits that both he and the Justice Minister Christiane Taubira knew that telephone conversations between the former President Nicolas Sarkozy and his lawyer Thierry Herzog were being tapped in February 2013 on the orders of judges 6 months earlier, in the investigation into the Karachi corruption case.
- On 23 and 30 March France holds municipal elections with a record abstention rate of 38.5%. The Socialist Party (PS), with 40.5% of the votes, is defeated by the centre-right parties who obtain 45.1%. The PS retains control in Paris but loses 151 towns while the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP, centre-right) wins 142 and the National Front (FN, far-right) finishes in third position with 6.85% and winning 11 towns.

**Monaco**

- On 18 March public city maintenance workers go on strike against the reduction of their weekly working hours from 40 to 37.5 hours and to demand that retirement age be raised from 60 to 65.

**Italy**

- On 4 March the Undersecretary for Infrastructure Antonio Gentile resigns accused of pressuring the newspaper L’Ora della Calabria not to publish in-
formation implicating his son in a corruption scandal.

- On 12 March the Chamber of Deputies approves the election reform law presented by the government aimed at ending Italy’s history of political instability.

- On 18 March the Supreme Court confirms the former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi’s two-year ban from public office over the Mediaset corruption case.

- On 21 March over 4,000 illegal migrants are rescued in the Strait of Sicily after four days of operations.

**Slovenia**

- On 12 March the European Court of Human Rights orders Slovenia to pay compensation of between 29,400 and 72,770 euros to six Yugoslavs whose residency rights were illegally removed after failing to apply for Slovenian citizenship in 1991.

**Croatia**

- On 3 March Croatia asks the United Nations International Court of Justice to come to a decision on whether Serbia committed Genocide in Vukovar, Slavonia, during the Balkans War. Serbia, for its part, accuses Croatia of the same acts in Vukovar when it launched Operation Storm.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

- On 12 March the European Commission urges Bosnia to pass the law on money laundering and financing terrorism, blocked until now by Bosnian Serb MPs who demand that these matters be dealt with by the entities and not the Federal Parliament.

- On 14 March the Federal Parliament dismisses the Interior Minister Fahrudin Radonic for failing to prevent the violence triggered by anti-government protests in February.

**Serbia**

- On 16 March Serbia holds a general election. The conservative SNS of deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic wins with 48.8% of the votes. On 19 March Vojislav Kostunica and Mladjan Dinkic step down as leaders of the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS, conservative) and United Regions of Serbia (URS, liberal) respectively.

**Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244**

- On 4 March the Prime Minister Hashim Thaci announces plans to transform the current security forces into a full-fledged army. He also announces that the Ministry of Security will become the Ministry of Defence.

- On 10 March the OSCE confirms that Serb residents in Kosovo will be able to vote in the Serbian elections on 16 March.

- On 20 March a demonstration in Prizren calls for the resignation of its mayor Ramadam Muja after being found guilty by a EULEX court for abuse of office.

**FYROM**

- On 5 March the Parliament is dissolved after the main parties agree to hold early parliamentary elections in April.

**Greece**

- On 31 March the Parliament approves new cuts to guarantee the continuation of the EU and IMF bailout. The reform also includes, however, 527 million euros to be spent on the country’s poorest, funded by 2013’s budget surplus.

**Turkey**

- On 12 March the President Abdullah Gul passes a bill to close down the Hizmet school network, which follows the doctrine of Fethullah Gulen, Islamist cleric and former ally of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and which has great influence over wide sectors of the State. The decision comes after an alleged corruption scandal involving the AKP instigated by supporters of Gulen.

- On 13 March two people are killed in clashes that erupt in several cities between police and opposing demonstrators, Islamists and leftists, sparked by the funeral of Berkin Elvan, who has died nine months after falling into a coma after being hit by a tear-gas canister during anti-government protests in June 2013.

- On 20 March the government blocks access to Twitter alleging that the social network has been used by its political enemies, after recordings are posted pointing to the Prime Minister’s possible involvement in a corruption scandal.

- On 30 March the AKP wins in the municipal elections with 45.6% of the votes. The Republican People’s Party (CHP, Kemalist) obtains 28%, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP, far-right) 15.3% and the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP, social democrat, Kurdish nationalist 6%.

**Cyprus**

- On 11 March Chrystalla Georghadjii is appointed Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus.

- On 4 March the Parliament passes a bill to privatise the main public services, set as a condition by the EU and IMF for the disbursement of fresh aid.

- On 12 March the President Nicos Anastasiades appoints Costas Kadis, Philippou Patsalis and Tasos Mitsopoulos the Ministers of Education, Health and Defence respectively to replace three ministers from the DIKO party, which abandoned the government coalition in February.

**Syria**

- On 13 March the Parliament passes a new election law which, in practice, excludes practically all opposition candidates from running for the presidency.

- On 14 March the besieged rebels in Barzeh reach a ceasefire agreement with the government.

- On 16 March the army takes back Yabroud, the last rebel stronghold on the Lebanese border.

- On 20 March the army takes back control of the Krac des Chevaliers Castle.

- On 22 March the Turkish air force shoots down a Syrian fighter-bomber allegedly violating Turkish airspace.

- On 25 March the Ansar al-Sham Brigade take Samra, Latakia.
Libyan transition.

Meeting held in Rome to monitor the security, a day after the international to demand improvements in internalhazi residents take to the streets again

The extension of the current Parliament’s mandate.

On 11 March the GNC dismisses the Prime Minister Ali Zeidan replacing him with the Defence Minister Abdullah al-Thani. The move comes after the Libyan navy’s failure to stop a North Korean tanker loaded with oil supplied by Cyrenaica’s federalists from breaking the naval blockade imposed by Tripoli, and in response to the rejection of the extension of the Parliament’s mandate, which expired on 7 February.

On 17 March a bomb attack on an army academy in Benghazi kills eight people.

On 19 March Libya asks the United Nations for international aid to re-establish internal security.

On 1 March the new caretaker government is sworn into office, with 20 of the 31 ministers remaining in office.

On 4 March the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters outlaws Hamas’ activities in Egypt.

On 8 March the President Adly Mansour passes the law that will regulate the upcoming presidential elections thus protecting the Electoral Commission’s decisions.

On 19 March a demonstrator is killed in clashes during a protest in Beni Suef in support of Mohamed Morsi, on the third anniversary of the first constitutional referendum. Protests also take place in the universities of Cairo and al-Azhar.

On 24 March 529 Muslim Brotherhood members are sentenced to death for the clashes following the dispersal of the Islamist protest camps in August 2013. On 25 March two new mass trials are opened against 919 people on the same charges, among them the Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide Mohammed Badie.

On 25 March Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi steps down from his post to present his candidacy for the presidential elections.

On 2 March two GNC members are injured by demonstrators opposed to the extension of the current Parliament’s mandate.

On 7 March several hundred Benghazi residents take to the streets again to demand improvements in internal security, a day after the international meeting held in Rome to monitor the Libyan transition.

On 2 March NATO, the US and the EU urge Russia to halt its military mobilisation in Crimea. Ukraine calls up its military reserves. The G7 cancels its July G8 summit in Sochi. On 3 March Russia accepts Germany’s proposal to create a contact group to initiate political dialogue on Ukraine. On 4 March in response to Russia’s military deployment, the US suspends its military and trade cooperation with the country. On 6 March the Tartar population in the region is mobilised to keep Crimea in Ukraine. In Donetsk, the Ukrainian police recover control of the town hall from the pro-Russian militants that had taken over the building. The EU approves 11 billion euros in aid to Ukraine and accelerates the association process with Kiev, and NATO suspends its relations with Russia. On 13 March the European Council, Parliament and Commission agree on a mechanism to manage bankruptcies in financial institutions, ahead of the definitive Banking Union.

On 2 March Kuwait hosts the 25th Arab League Summit overshadowed by political tensions between the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council and the death sentences given to 529 Islamists in Egypt, a country that is requesting the help of the pan-Arab organisation in the fight against terrorism. The meeting
ends without reaching any decisive resolutions on Syria despite the urgent call for help from Bashar al-Assad’s political opposition.

April 2014

Portugal receives a new financial aid package after announcing fresh cuts. Italy and Croatia also approve new austerity measures. Spain appoints a new Agriculture Minister. France shuffles its cabinet and Manuel Valls is named Prime Minister. Malta elects its President. In Slovenia, the change in the leadership of Positive Slovenia endangers the government coalition. Kosovo approves the War Veterans law and a special court for war crimes committed during the Kosovo conflict. In FYROM, the conservatives win both the parliamentary and presidential elections. In Syria, the army launches new offensives in Dara, Aleppo and Homs forcing more withdrawals from the armed opposition and Bashar al-Assad announces that he will run in the presidential elections of 3 June. In Lebanon, the negotiations between the political forces are yet to find a candidate with the necessary consensus to assume the presidency. Jordan opens a new camp for Syrian refugees. In Egypt, protests led by the Muslim Brotherhood continue amid further arrests of the organisation’s members, in the same month that the judiciary confirms death or life sentences for hundreds of Islamists. In Libya, the recently appointed caretaker Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani submits his resignation. Algeria holds presidential elections which are won again by Abdelaziz Bouteflika. The EU approves new sanctions against Russia for its responsibility in Ukraine’s internal crisis.

Spain

• On 28 April Isabel Garcia Tejerina is named Agriculture Minister to replace Miguel Arias Cañete, who will head the People’s Party list in the European elections.

France

• On 1 April after the disastrous municipal elections the government resigns and the President François Hollande appoints the Interior Minister Manuel Valls as the new Prime Minister, who presents his cabinet on 2 April, which includes Segolene Royal in charge of Ecology, Arnaud Montebourg in Economy, Michel Sapin in Finances, Bernard Cazeneuve in the Interior and Benoît Hamon in Education. Laurent Fabius, Jean-Yves Le Drian and Christiane Taubira retain their positions as the Foreign, Defence and Justice Ministers respectively.

• On 8 April Manuel Valls announces an austerity plan that includes simplifying administrative procedures and cuts of 50 billion euros, which, despite internal disagreements in the Socialist Party, are approved by the National Assembly on 29 April.

Monaco

• On 11 April France released a decree that reinterprets the 1963 Franco-Monegasque Fiscal Convention and exempts French citizens born and residing in Monaco from paying taxes on income earned in the principality.

• On 25 April the owner of the French telecommunications company Free Xavier Niel acquires 55% of Monaco Telecom.

Italy

• On 8 April the government expands measures to reactivate economic growth, which include reducing tax deductions on low incomes, increasing taxes on bank deposits to 26%, selling 1,500 official cars, reducing salaries of public sector managers, abolishing superfluous public entities, privatising goods and public companies, simplifying administration procedures, abolishing the provinces and reforming the Senate.

• On 9 April over 4,000 immigrants are intercepted by Italy in just 48 hours in the Strait of Sicily. The Interior Minister Angelino Alfano declares that the situation is critical.

• On 15 April a Court in Milan orders Silvio Berlusconi to perform at least four hours of community service a week in a residence for the elderly during the course of one year, in the Mediaset case.

Malta

• On 4 April Marie-Louise Coleiro Preca, from the Labour Party, is elected President of Malta by the Parliament.

Slovenia

• On 25 April the Prime Minister Alenka Bratusek loses the presidency of Positive Slovenia, the main party of the government coalition, to the mayor of Ljubljana Zoran Jankovic. The return of Jankovic, who had to hand the presidency of the party over to Bratusek after being accused of corruption, endangers the government coalition.

Croatia

• On 17 April the government adopts new measures to reduce the budget deficit from 4.5% to 0.4% of the GDP and which include new taxes on petrol and telecommunications.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

• On 15 April the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia rejects a move to drop some of the most serious genocide charges against the former Bosnian Serb military leader Ratko Mladic.

• On 21 April four former Bosnian Croatian paramilitary fighters are arrested by the Bosnian authorities accused of war crimes against the Serbian population of Odzak in 1992.

Serbia

• On 14 April a court in Belgrade rehabilitates the deceased Queen Maria of Yugoslavia ruling that she was ille-
gally stripped her of her citizenship and all her assets in 1947.

- On 24 April Sinisa Mali, from the Progressive Party, is elected mayor of Belgrade by the city assembly.

- On 27 April the Parliament voted in the new government of Aleksandar Vucic whose main goal will be economic recovery. The 18-member cabinet, will include three deputy Prime Ministers, Zorana Mihajlovic, also Public Works and Transport Minister; Rasim Ljajic, also Trade, Telecommunications and Tourism Minister; and Kori Udovicki, also Public Administration and Local Self-government Minister. Ivica Dacic, will be the new Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 3 April the Parliament passes the War Veterans Law which is boycotted by the Democratic League of Kosovo, in protest against the former guerrilla group the Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK) not benefitting from the law.

- On 23 April the Parliament approves the constitution of a special tribunal for war crimes set up to investigate allegations against the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) during the 1998-1999 Kosovo conflict.

FYROM

- On 9 April the Constitutional Court rules that the Lustration Law, under which the State can investigate people suspected of spying or collaborating with Yugoslavia’s socialist regime, is legal.

- On 13 and 26 April the first and second rounds of presidential elections are held, the latter coinciding with the parliamentary elections. In both elections the ruling conservative VMRO-DPMNE wins, with 43.29% of the votes in the parliamentary elections ahead of the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia’s (SDSM) 24.78%, and with 55.93% in the presidential elections for the current President Gjorge Ivanov, ahead of Stevo Pendarovski’s 40.4%.

Albania

- On 24 April the dissident anti-communist Kujtim Gaziu sets himself alight outside the Parliament to denounce his precarious economic situation, after 20 years waiting for compensation for the abuses he suffered under the communist dictatorship.

Greece

- On 9 April the year’s first general strike is staged against the austerity measures demanded by the EU and IMF.

- On 10 April a car bomb explodes outside the Central Bank of Greece in Athens, on the same day that Greece returns to the bond markets, following a four-year absence, with a four-year bond valued at 2.5 billion euros.

Turkey

- On 3 April the Constitutional Court lifts the ban on Twitter in force since 20 March under a government decree. Despite the ruling, the government upholds the ban.

- On 15 April at least three people are killed in Istanbul when a car carrying the former MP Adnan Yildiz from the Anatolian party (centre-right, Turkish nationalist) comes under fire.

- On 23 April the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan offers his condolences to the descendants of the thousands of Armenians massacred in 1915 by the Ottoman Empire. Although not an apology, this is the first time that the Turkish State has expressed its condolences.

Cyprus

- On 3 April Christoforos Fokaides is appointed Defence Minister to replace Tasos Mitsopoulos, who died on 22 March.

- On 15 April dock workers in Limassol accept the Labour Ministry’s offer in the negotiations, ending their strike over salary cuts and working hours.

Syria

- On 13 April the army launches an offensive to take back control of several rebel positions in Rif Dimashq, Duma and Hama. In the latter, the town of Kafr Zita is victim to a poisonous gas attack.

- On 16 April the Syrian army steps up its offensive on the main rebel stronghold, the city of Homs.

- On 22 April the MP Maher Abd al-Hafiz Hajjar, member of the opposition party tolerated by the Syrian regime, has presented the first candidacy to the presidential elections, scheduled for 3 June.

- On 27 April the joint mission of the United Nations and Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) reports that the Syrian regime still holds 7.8% of their chemical arsenal, on the same day that the deadline expires for its complete removal.

- On 28 April Bashar al-Assad announces that he will run in the upcoming presidential elections.

Lebanon

- On 23 and 30 April the Parliament fails to elect a new President after none of the candidates obtain the minimum of 86 votes – two-thirds of the house – in the first round.

Jordan

- On 30 April the Azraq refugee camp opens, with a capacity for 130,000 people. The camp will have to absorb the excess of Syrian refugees from the Zaatari camp, which is already housing 93,000 people and is stretched to the limit of its capacity.

Egypt

- On 4 April the government amends the Penal Code to toughen sentences for terrorism and expand its reach.

- On 15 April the Alexandria Court for Urgent Matters bans the Muslim Brotherhood from running in elections.

- On 20 April Egypt’s Central Election Commission announces the only two candidates to the presidency, field-marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, and Hamdeen Sabahi, the leader of the Egyptian left.

- On 25 April Muslim Brotherhood spokesman Yasser Mehrez is arrested amid large-scale Islamist protests, mainly in Fayum and Cairo.
• On 28 April the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy, the Muslim Brotherhood-led coalition, calls for a boycott of the presidential elections, scheduled for 26 and 27 May.
• On 28 April the judge Said Youssef confirms death sentences for 37 of the 529 Muslim Brotherhood supporters handed down on 24 March. The other 492 receive life sentences. On the same day a further 683 of the 919 Islamists are sentenced to death under the same charges in a second trial initiated on 25 March, including Mohammed Badie, the spiritual leader of the Muslim Brotherhood.

**Libya**

• On 7 April the government and the Cyrenaican federalists agree to immediately reopen two oil facilities, and hand over the other oil-exporting ports to the Tripoli authorities. The Justice Minister, however, will investigate the sales of hydrocarbons since the fall of Gaddafi, study the removal of decree 42, according to which a special security force was formed to lift the blockade imposed by the rebels on oil wells, and all arrest warrants will be lifted against leaders or members of the militias that took control of the oil docks in the summer of 2013.
• On 13 April the caretaker Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani, resigns a day after a failed terrorist attack on his life.
• On 29 April two gunmen burst into the GNC causing the MPs to flee, interrupting attempts to elect a new Prime Minister to replace Abdullah al-Thani.

**Tunisia**

• On 9 April the President Moncef Marzouki pardons 467 prisoners and commutes death sentences given to two others to mark Martyrs’ Day.
• On 18 April Moncef Marzouki announces that he will reduce his own salary by two-thirds in line with the austerity programme being carried out by the current government to reduce the country’s severe budget deficit, estimated at around 2.25 billion euros. One of the most controversial measures is the removal of subsidies on fuel and certain basic food products.

**Algeria**

• On 17 April Algeria holds presidential elections in which Abdelaziz Bouteflika achieves his fifth consecutive victory obtaining 81.53% of the votes.

**Morocco**

• On 11 April the candidate of the parliamentary majority Rachid Talbi Alami is elected President of the House of Representatives (lower house).
• On 29 April the government, employers’ associations and trade unions agree to raise the minimum wage, increase pensions and scholarships and expand state medical coverage.

**EU**

• On 3 April Brussels hosts the 4th EU-Africa Summit, in which an Action Plan is agreed to combat irregular migration and favour legal mobility between 2014 and 2017. The EU also commits to spending 28 billion euros in aid between 2014 and 2020 throughout Africa.
• On 14 April Ukraine’s ultimatum expires for the pro-Russian mutineers and the Ukrainian army advances to take back control of various secessionist positions. Ukraine again accuses Russia of being behind the destabilisation by taking control of the east and south of the country. Russia warns that Ukraine’s military movements are leading the country to civil war. On 17 April Ukraine, Russia, the EU and US agree in Geneva on the disarmament of the illegal armed groups and the evacuation of buildings occupied by pro-Russians. NATO strengthens its defences in Eastern Europe. On 22 April the Ukrainian President Oleksandr Turchynov announces an anti-terrorist campaign against the pro-Russian uprising. On 29 April the US and EU extend sanctions on Russia faced with the country’s failure to comply with agreements reached in Geneva.
• On 30 April Switzerland lifts restrictions on the entry of Croatian workers into Swiss territory to reactivate relations with the EU, which have been frozen as a consequence of Berna’s approval of the aforementioned veto, approved in a public referendum.

**Portugal**

- On 17 May Portugal ends it Troika surveillance after successfully concluding the last inspection of its public accounts.
- On 25 May the Socialist Party wins in the European elections (31.46%) ahead of the Portugal Alliance formed by the two major centre-right parties (27.71%). The communist-green alliance comes third (12.68%).

**Spain**

• On 12 May the President of Leon’s provincial government, Isabel Carrasco, is shot dead by two members of her party, the PP, in a personal revenge attack.
• On 25 May the PP wins in the European elections (26.1%), followed by the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE, 23%), United Left (IU, 10%) and the new far-left party, Podemos (8%).
• On 26 May the eviction of a squat in Barcelona triggers a week of unrest in the streets.
• On 28 May some 1,000 illegal immigrants storm the Melilla border, half of them succeeding in entering Spain.
in the biggest coordinated assault to date, amid mounting tension in the city.
- On 28 May the former Councillor of the Valencian government’s department of Solidarity and Citizenship Rafael Blasco is sentenced to eight years in prison for embezzling 1.8 million euros, earmarked for aid projects in Nicaragua.
- On 30 May the police dismantle a jihadist cell in Melilla, which was planning attacks in Morocco using fighters returned from Syria.

France
- On 19 May Jerome Kerviel is handed over at the French-Italian border, the rogue trader sentenced to three years’ imprisonment for causing losses of 4.9 billion euros for Societe Generale in 2008, in the biggest fraud in history.
- On 25 May the FN wins the European elections (25%) ahead of the conservative UMP (20.8%) and the ruling PS (14%).
- On 27 May Jean-François Cope resigns as President of the UMP owing to the poor results in the European elections and over fresh evidence of corruption in the Bygmalion case, on the financing of Nicolas Sarkozy’s 2012 election campaign.
- On 28 May the police dismantle two camps holding 650 irregular migrants in Calais.

Monaco
- On 21 May Helene Pastor, a member of Monaco’s second dynasty after the Grimaldis, dies from injuries suffered on 6 May after being shot in Nice.

Italy
- On 8 May the former Industry Minister Claudio Scajola is arrested as part of a court investigation into the mafia association of a former colleague from his party, the People of Freedom (PDL, centre-right).
- On 25 May the PD wins in the European elections with a historic 40.9% of the vote, followed by the Five Star Movement (populist, 21.15%) and Forza Italia (centre-right, 16.81%).
- On 31 May more than 3,600 immigrants are intercepted in Sicilian waters ending a month of mass arrivals. Since the beginning of 2014, more than 43,000 immigrants have arrived in Italy.

Malta
- On 25 May the Labour Party wins in the European elections (PL, 53%) against the conservative Nationalist Party (PN, Christian democracy, 40%).

Slovenia
- On 5 May the Prime Minister Alenka Bratusek resigns due to a lack of support from her party Positive Slovenia.
- On 25 May the Democratic Party (SDS, centre-right) wins in the European elections (24.86%) followed by the New Slovenia-People’s Party coalition (16.46%) and the new reformist party Verjame (centre-left, green 10.5%).

Croatia
- On 25 May the centre-right coalition led by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ, conservative) wins in the European elections (41.42%) ahead of Kukuriku, a social democratic-liberal coalition (29.93%) and the new left-wing green party, ORAH (9.42%).

Bosnia and Herzegovina
- On 19 May a million Bosnians are left without drinking water after the largest floods in 120 years, which leave more than 100,000 houses destroyed, 70,000 people evacuated and at least 24 dead.

Montenegro
- On 25 May the ruling Democratic Party of Socialists wins in 11 out of 12 municipalities in local elections described by the opposition and observers as highly irregular, leading the State Prosecutor to open an investigation.

Serbia
- On 9 May the chief editor of the state-owned newspaper Vecernje Novosti, Srđjan Skoro, is sacked for criticizing the government.
- On 29 May the death toll in Serbia reaches 51 as a result of severe floods that have also affected Bosnia, Croatia and Romania this month.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244
- On 2 May the EU and Kosovo conclude negotiations on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, considered a prelude to accession negotiations, which will begin in July.
- On 7 May the Parliament is dissolved to allow early elections to be held on 8 June, due to the block by the Serbian minority on the law to create a Kosovo army.
- On 23 May three former Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) fighters surrender to the police after escaping from a hospital in Pristina two days earlier to avoid being transferred to Mitrovica and tried by EULEX.

FYROM
- On 1 May the Social Democratic Party refuses to take up the 34 seats won in the April elections in protest against the victory of VMRO-DPMNE, which it considers to be fraudulent.
- On 19 May the death of a young Macedonian at the hands of an Albanian in Gjorce Petrov, Skopje, sparks two days of unrest in the capital.

Greece
- On 4 May NERIT begins broadcasting, the new public television channel that succeeds ERT.
- On 7 May the Parliament lifts immunity from Golden Dawn members Giorgos Germenis and Nikos Michos, and a further two lawmakers who abandoned the neo-Nazi party.
- On 12 May the Supreme Court allows Golden Dawn to run in the European elections.
- On 18 and 25 May Greece holds the first and second round of its municipal and regional elections. On the national level, New Democracy (ND, centre-right) wins most votes and takes control in all regions except Attica and Central Macedonia, where Syriza (far-left) wins, the second most voted party on a national level and also the victor in the European elections.
Turkey

- On 1 May rallies held on International Workers’ Day in Istanbul end in clashes between police and anti-government protestors.
- On 13 May more than 300 miners are killed in an explosion in a coal mine in Soma, in the biggest mining accident in Turkish history. The incident sparks unrest and widespread protests against the government. 24 Soma Holding executives are arrested for their responsibility in the disaster.
- On 16 May, despite the ceasefire between the government and the terrorist organisation the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), members of the latter attack a military checkpoint in Tunceli.
- On 22 May two people are killed in Istanbul when police shoot at Alevi demonstrators denouncing the persecution and discrimination they suffer.
- On 29 May the Constitutional Court orders that the government lift the ban on YouTube, issued in March.

Cyprus

- On 2 May Cyprus removes the restrictions on cashing bank cheques, enforced to avoid capital flight during the international financial bailout.
- On 12 May the European Court of Human Rights rules that Turkey should pay 30 million euros in compensation to the families of the 1,456 people that went missing in Turkey’s 1974 military intervention and 60 million to the residents of the Karpas peninsula for moral damages.
- On 21 May the US vice-President Joe Biden arrives in Cyprus to relaunch reunification talks.
- On 25 May the coalition formed by the Democratic Rally (DYSY, centrist) wins in the European elections (37.7%) followed by the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL, Marxist-Leninist, 26.9%) and the social democratic DIKO (10.8%).

Syria

- On 7 May the rebels begin their withdrawal from Homs, which was agreed with the regime on 2 May. Meanwhile, the regime’s bombing raids continue throughout the month in several provinces, as well as its fighting with the FSA and Islamist militias, leaving hundreds dead.
- On 13 May the United Nations and Arab League envoy to Syria Lakhdar Brahimi resigns over the lack of international commitment to stop the Syrian conflict.
- On 17 May the Air Defence Chief Hussein Ishaq is killed in Damascus in an FSA attack.
- On 22 May Russia vetoes a French proposal in the Security Council for the International Criminal Court to investigate those responsible for war crimes committed in Syria.
- On 25 May Fauzi Ayub, one of Hezbollah’s head strategists, is shot dead in Aleppo.

Lebanon

- On 25 May after five unsuccessful attempts in April and May to elect a successor to the President Michel Suleiman due to a lack of a quorum, the cabinet assumes provisional control of presidential duties.

Egypt

- On 2 May new Muslim Brotherhood protests in Alexandria end in clashes with the security forces and anti-Islamist militias.
- On 3 May the Cairo Criminal Court hands down ten-year prison sentences to 102 Muslim Brotherhood members for violent acts committed after the coup on 3 July.
- On 6 May the Egyptian judiciary bans the leaders of the Democratic National Party from running in the elections.
- On 18 May 163 Islamists are given 10 to 15-year prison sentences for acts of violence.
- On 23 May Hosni Mubarak and his two sons are sentenced to three and four years’ imprisonment for corruption in the Presidential Palaces case.
- On 22 May Shadi al-Menei, head of Ansar Beir al-Maqdis, is killed in fighting with the army in Sinai.
- On 26-27 May Egypt holds presidential elections. With a 44.4% turnout, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi wins 96.91% of the votes. His only rival Hamdeen Sabahi obtains 3.09%.

Libya

- On 1 May violent clashes break out in Benghazi between the army, Islamist militias and troops of general Khalifa Haftar which spread to Tripoli and continue throughout May leaving hundreds dead.
- On 6 May Ahmed al-Maiteeq is confirmed as Prime Minister by the Parliament Speaker.
- On 8 May Ibrahim Sennussi, head of Intelligence Services in Cyrenaica, is murdered in Benghazi by Ansar al-Sharia.
- On 13 May the Jordanian ambassador Fawaz al-Ait, who was abduced in April in Tripoli, is freed in exchange for the release of the terrorist Mohamed Dersi.
- On 18 May the al-Qaqa and al-Sawaqi brigades, allied with general Khalifa Haftar, attack the National Congress. Their main aim is to oust the Islamist militias from Libya and the Islamist camp that dominates the Parliament and which supported the appointment of Ahmed al-Maiteeq.
- On 20 May the National Congress agrees to hold early elections on 25 June.
- On 27 May the new Prime Minister Ahmed al-Maiteeq survives an attempt on his life in Tripoli.
- On 28 May the outgoing government of Abdullah al-Thani refuses to hand power over to Ahmed al-Maiteeq until the judiciary issues a ruling on the legitimacy of his election, which failed to attain the minimum quorum of 120 votes.

Tunisia

- On 2 May the National Assembly approves the new electoral law with an absolute majority.
- On 26 May the Tunisian Court of First Instance orders the dissolution of the Islamist National League for the Protection of the Revolution.
- On 27 May four police officers are killed in an attack against the Interior Minister Lotfi Ben Jeddou believed to have been carried out by Ansar al-Sh-
aria in response to an anti-terrorist operation underway in the Chaambi Mountains.

Algeria

- On 5 May the 30 ministries of Abdlmalek Sellal’s new cabinet are revealed, which include just 13 new faces and no major ministerial changes.
- On 16 May the government unveils the details of the constitutional reform package, which includes delegating some of the presidential powers to the Prime Minister, increased rights for the opposition, the separation of powers and social freedoms. On 19 May the Forces for Change coalition, formed by 13 opposition parties, announces that it will not participate in a reform that it believes is a farce.

Morocco

- On 6 May the government gives the security forces authorisation to enter university campuses if public order is under threat following the death of a student on 24 April during clashes between Islamists and leftists at the University of Fez.

Mauritania

- On 3 May the parties of the National Forum for Democracy and Unity (FNDU) decide to boycott the presidential elections in June and accuse the government of blocking the electoral reform law.

EU

- On 1 May the European Stability Mechanism reaches its target level of paid-in capital: 80 billion euros, the highest among all international financial institutions worldwide.
- On 12 May independence referendums are held in Donetsk and Lugansk with both provinces declaring independence from Ukraine and intentions to join Russia. Meanwhile, the anti-terrorist operation launched by Kiev to recover control of pro-Russian areas, on 25 May Ukraine holds early presidential elections in which the magnate Petro Poroshenko (55%) wins with promises to restore peace in Ukraine and keep the country together, as well as continue the rapprochement process with the EU.
- On 27 May the EU holds parliamentary elections. The European People’s Party (centre-right) wins with 212 seats, followed by the Socialist Party (186) and the Liberals and Democrats (70). The three parliamentary groups lose their weight in the European Parliament because of the widespread discontent over the economic crisis. The sharp rise in Eurosceptic, populist and extremist parties is cause for concern.

June 2014

In Spain, Felipe VI succeeds Juan Carlos I to the throne. Italy continues to struggle with mass immigrant arrivals. Serbia and Montenegro are unable to reach an agreement on dual nationality. Kosovo holds early elections. In FYROM the new government assumes office. Albania becomes a candidate for EU accession. Greece reshuffles its cabinet. In Turkey clashes break out between the police and PKK demonstrators, parallel to the development of the negotiating process. In Syria, after taking back Homs, the army focuses onousting the rebels from Aleppo, faced with the rapid advance of ISIS, which already has control of large areas of Syria and Iraq. Jordan reaches a defence agreement with Israel. In Egypt, the results of the presidential elections see Abdal Fattah Al-Sisi take victory with 96.91% of the vote. In Libya, the Supreme Court rejects the appointment of Ahmed al-Maiteq and an early general election is held. Mauritania holds presidential elections.

Portugal

- On 5 June the government adopts a draft law to reform pensions, which raises social security payments as of 2015 to guarantee the continuity of pensions and reduce the public deficit.

Spain

- On 2 June Juan Carlos I abdicates. On 11 June the Parliament approves the abdication law. On 19 June the Prince of Asturias is proclaimed King Felipe VI.
- On 16 June nine people are arrested in Madrid in a police operation that dismantles an international recruitment network sending jihadists to Syria.
- On 20 June the government approves income and corporate tax cuts as of 2015, resisting EU pressure to raise VAT.
- On 25 June the Supreme Court authorises oil prospecting in the Canary Islands.
- On 26 June the reform bill on Judicial Power is approved, which gives immunity to emeritus and reigning kings and queens, the Prince and Princess of Asturias and their respective consorts and allows them to be tried only by the Supreme Court.
- On 26 June the judge overseeing the Noos corruption case upholds charges against Princess Cristina de Borbon.
- On 26 June the PSOE Secretary General, former minister and opposition leader Alfredo Perez-Rubalcaba announces that he is retiring from active politics.

France

- On 2 June the police arrest four people in the Paris area and in Provence in an anti-jihadist operation, a day after the arrest in Marseille of a French Arab jihadist accused of killing four people in the Jewish Museum in Brussels on 24 May.
- On 3 June over a thousand pensioners protest in Paris to demand their pensions be increased.
- On 10 June French railway workers stage a strike, which, after eight consecutive days of protest against the sector’s liberalisation, becomes indefinite.
- On 11 June the UMP announces that the former Minister of Education Luc Chatel will become the party’s new acting Secretary General and the former Prime Ministers Alain Juppé, François Fillon and Jean-Pierre Raffarin will jointly lead the government until a general congress is held in November.
- On 26 June the National Liberation Front of Corsica gives up its armed struggle.

Italy

- On 4 June the mayor of Venice Giorgio Orsoni and a further 34 people are
arrested for corruption in the Moses Dam construction project, designed to protect the city from the Adriatic Sea.
• On 5 June 31 members of Cosa Nostra are arrested in the Bagheria district.
• On 13 June the former Senator Marcello Dell’Utri is sent to prison for his links with the mafia.
• On 13 June the government adopts a law-decree that gives the National Anti-Corruption Agency the power to approve and oversee public contracts and services.

Slovenia
• On 24 June the EU gives Ljubljana the 2016 Green Capital award.

Croatia
• On 2 June after negotiations between Croatia and Montenegro fail over the sovereignty of the Prevlaka Peninsula, both countries agree to resolve the issue through international arbitration.

Bosnia and Herzegovina
• On 18 June the Serbian Democratic Party announces that Sonja Karadzic-Jovicevic, the daughter of the former Bosnian Serb President Radovan Karadzic, will run as a candidate for Pale in the upcoming parliamentary elections.
• On 18 June the police arrest 30 officials of the taxation authority suspected of organised crime in the biggest anti-fraud operation since Bosnian independence.

Montenegro
• On 17 June six years of negotiations between Serbia and Montenegro over their respective citizens’ rights to dual nationality end without an agreement.
• On 24 June the EU and Montenegro open three accession negotiation chapters.
• On 25 June NATO refuses to offer Montenegro membership at the Newport Summit.

Serbia
• On 6 June a demonstration in Belgrade calls for the resignation of the Interior Minister Nebojsa Stefanovic, accused of plagiarising parts of his PhD thesis.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244
• On 8 June Kosovo holds early elections. The ruling PDK wins with 30.38% of the votes ahead of the Democratic League (LDK, conservative, 25.24%) and pro-independence Vetëvendosje party (13.59%).
• On 15 June Elvis Pista, the Democratic Party candidate in the recent elections, is murdered in Pristina.
• On 18 June Kosovo Serbs remove the concrete barricade from the Mitrovica bridge, which had been in place since 2011 to stop Kosovo Albanians from crossing. It is replaced hours later by another consisting of large plant pots containing bushes. On 22 June there are clashes on the bridge between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians.

FYROM
• On 8 June the new government is announced in which most ministries remain unchanged. Abdllaqim Ademi from the coalition DUI party, moves from Environment to Education, Zoran Jolevski (VMRO-DPMNE) takes over in Defence, Nurhan Izairi and Adnan Jashari, both from DUI, become the Environment and Justice ministers respectively and Mihail Cvetkov (Socialist Party) becomes Agriculture Minister. The opposition Social Democratic Party continues to consider the electoral results as fraudulent and maintains its parliamentary boycott.
• On 30 June six ethnic Albanians are imprisoned for the murder of five Macedonians in 2012, which triggered an escalation in ethnic tensions.

Albania
• On 16 June the police launch an operation to enter Lazarat, a village controlled by organised crime and one of Europe’s largest cannabis producers. Three days of fighting ensue.
• On 24 June Albania is granted official candidate status for EU accession.
• On 26 June Artan Santo, CEO of Credins Bank, is murdered in Tirana.

Greece
• On 9 June the Prime Minister Antonis Samaras announces a cabinet reshuffle following New Democracy’s poor results in the European elections. Gikas Hardouvelis replaces Yannis Stournaras as Finance Minister. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) increases its presence in the coalition government.

Turkey
• On 4 June security forces disperse Kurdish demonstrators blocking several roads in Diyarbakir and Mus to put an end to protests that have spread throughout the southeast of the country since May against the government’s plans to construct military outposts in the area.
• On 18 June a court in Ankara gives life sentences to the two surviving leaders of the 1980 coup, general Tahsin Sahinkaya and general Kenan Evren.
• On 26 June the government submits a draft law to the Parliament that would provide a legal framework for the peace negotiations with the PKK terrorist organisation, which are currently at an impasse. The document maintains that measures will be adopted to reintegrate PKK members who lay down their arms.

Cyprus
• On 6 June the Securities and Exchange Commission imposes huge fines on the Bank of Cyprus, the People’s Bank of Cyprus and several former board members and executives for giving misleading information over investments in Greek bonds during the contagion of the Greek crisis in Cyprus.

Syria
• On 3 June Syria holds its first presidential elections in more than 50 years. The official results give victory to Bashar al-Assad with 88.7% of the votes.
• On 16 June the Syrian and Iraqi governments join forces to fight against the ISIS militias, whose lightning offensive carried out throughout June from its strongholds on Syria’s eastern border has already given it control of Mosul, and other towns.
• On 22 June a missile launched from the Syrian border leaves one dead in the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights. In response, the Israeli army attacks rebel positions in Syria and strengthens its presence in the area.
• On 25 June a faction of the al-Nusra Front, a wing of al-Qaeda, pledges allegiance to ISIS in Albu Kamal, on the Iraqi border.
• On 27 June the interim Prime Minister of NCSROF Ahmad Tumah orders the dissolution of the FSA high command and dismissal of its leader Abdelilah al-Bashir for corruption.
• On 29 June to mark the beginning of Ramadan, the ISIS spokesman Abu Mohamed al-Adnani declares the group’s intention to create a caliphate that will spread throughout the Muslim world, with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its leader. The group thereby changes its name to Islamic State (IS).

Egypt

• On 3 June the Election Commission reveals the definitive results of the presidential elections on 26, 27 and 28 June, which confirms victory for Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi with 96.91% of the votes.
• On 6 June the acting President Adly Mansour enacts the law approved by the Council of Ministers on 4 June, which criminalises sexual harassment for the first time.
• On 11 June the activist Alaa Abdel Fattah and 24 others are sentenced to 15 years in prison for disrupting public order.
• On 17 June the 34 members of the new cabinet, headed by Ibrahim Mehleb, are sworn into their posts. Just 13 of the 34 members are new, including Foreign Minister Sameh Shukri; Investments Minister Ashraf Salman; and Antiquities Minister Mamdouh al-Damat.
• On 19 June the Muslim Brotherhood’s spiritual leader Mohammed Badie is sentenced to death, together with another 13 Islamist leaders, including Mohammed Beltagy and Essam el-Erian, Safwat el-Hegazy, Bassem Ouda and Assem Abdel Maged.
• On 24 June Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi announces the start of a period of austerity to balance the national economy.

Libya

• On 2 June eight people are killed in fighting between the army and forces of general Khalifa Haftar and Ansar al-Sharia Islamist militias in Benghazi.
• On 4 June four soldiers are killed in a suicide bomb attack at a military base controlled by Khalifa Haftar.
• On 5 June the intelligence chief Salem al-Hassi resigns.
• On 9 June in virtue of its ruling on 5 June the Supreme Court rejects the appointment of the Prime Minister Ahmed Maiteeq as unconstitutional.
• On 15 June the US captures Ahmed Abu Kattalah, a prominent leader of Ansar al-Sharia and main suspect for the attack on the US embassy in Benghazi on 11 September 2012.
• On 22 June the GNC approves the state budget for 2014, issued by the government in January. The budget is worth 47 billion dollars, a figure that continues the trend to lower the national budget since the revolution, owing to the constant strikes and protests that have systematically paralysed production and exports of crude oil.
• On 25 June Libya holds early parliamentary elections to elect the 200 deputies of the new legislative power, which will be known as the House of Representatives and will be based in Benghazi as of 1 August.
• On 26 June the lawyer and activist Salwa Bughaisig is murdered in Benghazi.
July 2014

In Portugal, Banco Espirito Santo is declared bankrupt. In Spain, a major corruption scandal is uncovered involving the former Catalan President Jordi Pujol. France approves a far-reaching territorial reform plan and new measures to reduce the public deficit. Italy assumes the EU Presidency. Slovenia holds early parliamentary elections. In Serbia, the Finance Minister resigns. Cyprus receives a new tranche of its economic rescue package. In Syria, IS continues to advance and the army prepares to launch an offensive on Aleppo. Lebanon continues its struggle to elect a new President, and the country warns of its incapacity to cope with the continuing inflow of Syrian refugees. In Egypt, the violence in Sinai intensifies in connection with the conflict between Gaza and Israel. In Libya, there is a surge in the violence between Islamist militias, government forces and paramilitary groups loyal to Khalifa Haftar. Tunisia launches a large-scale anti-jihadist operation and suffers its worst attack since independence. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia tighten security measures faced with increasing jihadist activity in the Maghreb.

Portugal

• On 18 July Banco Espirito Santo requests to be placed under controlled management, unable to make debt repayments which expire at the end of the month. On 24 July Ricardo Salgado, former President of Banco Espirito Santo bank, is arrested on charges of money laundering.

Spain

• On 23 July around a thousand sub-Saharan migrants unsuccessfully attempt to jump the Melilla border fence.

• On 23 July the former President of Castellon Carlos Fabra is sentenced by the Supreme Court to four years in prison on four separate corruption charges.

• On 25 July the former President and historic figure of Catalanian nationalism Jordi Pujol issues a statement in which he admits to possessing millions of euros worth of undeclared funds in different tax havens.

• On 27 July Pedro Sanchez is elected Secretary General of PSOE.

France

• On 1 July the European Court of Human Rights upholds the French ban on wearing the full Islamic veil in public spaces in force since 2011, ruling that it does not violate any human rights.

• On 2 July the former President Nicolas Sarkozy, his lawyer Thierry Herzog and the Supreme Court magistrate Gilbert Azibert are charged with corruption, influence peddling and violation of professional secrecy in a court investigation into the irregular financing of the 2007 election campaign.

• On 8 July the National Assembly approves the government’s proposal to save 50 billion euros in three years through widespread cuts on social security payments and taxes for companies and a pension freeze. Trade unions announce a boycott on a labour forum launched by the government and 33 socialist MPs abstain from the parliamentary vote.

• On 19 and 23 July two large demonstrations in Paris protest against the Israeli offensive in Gaza. The protests end in several days of clashes between pro-Palestinians and pro-Israelis in Paris and Sarcelles.

• On 23 July the National Assembly approves the government proposal to reduce the number of French regions from 22 to 13. The territorial reform is part of a move to simplify administrative layers and reduce public spending. It maintains the departments but removes their general councils, joining municipalities so that they have a minimum of 20,000 inhabitants.

Italy

• On 1 July Italy assumes the six-month EU Presidency with the priorities of generating economic growth and employment, reinforcing citizens’ rights and strengthening Europe’s international role.

• On 7 July the number of immigrants intercepted in Italian waters in the last two days exceeds 2,600.

• On 18 July the Milan Court of Appeal overturned the seven-year prison sentence for abuse of power and soliciting minors for sex given to the former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in June 2013 in the Ruby case.

• On 22 July the police arrest five men accused of murdering and throwing overboard dozens of immigrants on their way from Libya.

Slovenia

• On 13 July Miro Cerar, the head of his self-named party formed six weeks earlier, wins the early legislative elections.

Croatia

• On 16 July the Parliament approves the civil union law, which could benefit same-sex couples.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

• On 16 July a Dutch court rules that the Netherlands is partly liable for their blue helmets failing to prevent the murder of some 300 Bosnians at the hands of Bosnian Serbs in Srebrenica in July 1995.

• On 20 July 284 people murdered by Bosnian Serb forces in July 1992 in Prijedor are buried in Kozarac. Their bodies were found in the war’s biggest mass grave in Tomasica.

Serbia

• On 12 July the Finance Minister Lazar Krstic resigns due to disagreements with the Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic over the economic reforms. Krstic is replaced by Dusan Vujovic.
Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 28 July the EU Special Investigative Task Force for Kosovo accuses UÇK high command of war crimes against humanity after the war ended in 1999, against Serbs, Roma and other ethnic minorities and rival ethnic Albanians.

Turkey

- On 22 July at least 67 police officers participating in an investigation into alleged government corruption are arrested under suspicion of espionage.
- On 23 July at least two Turkish soldiers and six militants from the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union party (PYD) and the PKK are killed in clashes in Ceylanpınar.

Cyprus

- On 25 July the EU and IMF recommend the disbursement of a 436-million-euro tranche of Cyprus’ 10-billion-euro rescue package after confirming that Nicosia has undertaken the required adjustments.

Syria

- On 3 July the al-Nusra Front withdraws from two towns in Deir al-Zour leaving most of the province under IS control.
- On 6 July the Syrian army takes Kfr Saghir in Aleppo.
- On 7 July the US ship Cape Ryan begins its task of neutralising 600 tonnes of chemical materials from the Syrian arsenal.
- On 8 July NCSROF elects its chief negotiator at the Geneva Summit Hadi al-Bahra as its President.
- On 9 July the armed forces secures positions around Aleppo before launching its final offensive on the city. Fighting in the city intensifies throughout the month.
- On 9 July at least 20 IS militants are killed in an air strike by the Syrian army on al-Talae, Raqqa.
- On 10 July the UN Secretary General Ban ki-Moon names Staffan de Mistura to succeed Lakhdar Brahimi as mediator for Syria.
- On 12 July a Syrian rebel commander is murdered in Amman, in the first incident of this kind on Jordanian soil.
- On 23 July the youth wing of the Jordanian Salafi Jihadist Movement describes al-Qaeda as illegitimate and swears allegiance to IS.

Lebanon

- On 2 and 29 July the eighth and mid-month.
- On 29 July the EU approves additional aid of 175 million euros for Syria, faced with the deterioration of the situation there.

Egypt

- On 1 July the armed group Ajnad Misr claims responsibility for the bomb blasts near the presidential palace, which left two police officers dead.
- On 3 July at least five demonstrators are killed in Cairo during the first anniversary of the fall of President Mohamed Morsi.
- On 3 July at least 17 Islamist militants are killed in an army operation in the north of the Sinai Peninsula. A further 12 people are arrested.
- On 4 July fuel prices rise by up to 78% to lower the State’s budget deficit.
- On 13 July a court in Cairo overturns the one-year prison sentence given to former Prime Minister Hesham Qandil for refusing to implement a court order to renationalise the Tanta Flax and Oil Company.
- On 21 July an Egyptian court sentences three Mohamed Morsi supporters to 25 years’ imprisonment for rioting after Morsi’s ousting.
- On 23 July the army announces the death of two militants and the arrest of a further 15 during an operation in Sinai, a day after Ansar Bait al-Maqdis claims responsibility for an attack on 19 July on a border checkpoint in al-Wadi al-Gedid, in which 22 police officers were killed.
- On 29 July the army announces the death of seven militants and arrest of four others during an operation in Sinai after the murder, on 25 July, of two brigadier generals in Sheikh Zuwaied.

Libya

- On 13 July security forces carry out a raid in Bab al-Tabaneh, Tripoli, to capture Hussam al-Sabbagh, accused of planning attacks on the Alawite neighbourhood of Jabal Mohsen. The raid ends in clashes with Sunni militias.

Jordan

- On 12 July a Syrian rebel commander is murdered in Amman, in the first incident of this kind on Jordanian soil.
- On 23 July the youth wing of the Jordanian Salafi Jihadist Movement describes al-Qaeda as illegitimate and swears allegiance to IS.
civilian airports, warning that the country could become a failed state.

- On 21 July army special forces and fighters loyal to general Khalifa Haftar repel an attack by militias connected with Ansar al-Sharia to take control of an air base in Benghazi. On 22 July Ansar al-Sharia launches a counter-offensive, which on 28 July retakes the air base.
- On 23 July a day after the results of the parliamentary elections are announced, the GNC declares that it will transfer power over to the House of Representatives on 4 August.
- On 28 July the Libyan government is revealed to be the legal defence of the alleged al-Qaeda member Abu Anas al-Libi, accused of terrorism by the US.
- On 30 July the former Prime Minister Mustafa Abushagur, abducted the previous day in Tripoli, is released unharmed and seemingly without payment of a ransom.

Morocco

- On 26 July Mohammed VI signs a decree approved by the Parliament in June banning imams and preachers from participating in any form of political activity.
- On 30 July Mohammed VI pardons 13,218 people to mark Throne Day.

EU

- On 15 July the Luxembourger Jean-Claude Juncker is elected by the European Parliament as President of the European Commission with 422 votes in favour, 250 against and 47 abstentions.

August 2014

Portugal bails out one of its biggest banks. France carries out far-reaching government reforms. Spain and Italy deal with new immigrant arrivals. In Slovenia a new coalition government is formed. Croatia announces fresh cuts and tax hikes. The Constitutional Court of Kosovo suspends the election of Isa Mustafa as Parliamentary Speaker. FYROM approves constitutional amendments. Greece receives a new tranche of its bailout package. Turkey holds presidential elections. In Cyprus, protests are staged against the foreclosures bill. In Syria, IS continues its advance. In Egypt, new sentences are handed down to Muslim Brotherhood supporters. In Libya, fighting continues between rival militias and government forces and two parallel governments and parliaments are formed.

Portugal

- On 4 August the government bails out Banco Espiritu Santo with 4.5 billion euros from EU and IMF funds. The rescue means that shareholders have to cover the debt, thereby losing all their invested capital.

Spain

- On 5 August Angel Ojeda, former Head of the Andalusian Tax Office, is arrested for his alleged involvement in the embezzlement of millions in funds earmarked for training courses for the unemployed.
- On 12 August 836 immigrants are intercepted in waters of the Bay of Gibraltar on the same day that 700 immigrants attempt a coordinated assault on the Melilla border fence. Throughout the month, hundreds of immigrants attempt to enter the Spanish city.

France

- On 25 August the Prime Minister Manuel Valls and his cabinet resign to form a new government which is more consistent with the direction chosen for economic recovery and following resignations from the Economy, Education and Culture ministers. On 27 August the changes are announced: Emmanuel Macron replaces Arnaud Montebourg at the helm of the Economy, Najat Vallaud-Belkacem replaces Benoit Hamon in Education and Fleur Pellerin replaces Aurelie Filippetti as Culture Minister. Laurent Fabius retains his position as Foreign Minister and Segolene Royal and Christiane Taubira retain their posts in the Environment and Justice ministries respectively.

Italy

- On 20 August the EU turns its back on Italy, declaring that Frontex will not assume control of Operation Mare Nostrum, which costs the country 9 million euros each month and has already rescued 103,659 people since January. It considers the waves of immigration that Italy experiences on a daily basis to be Rome’s problem.

Malta

- On 25 August the first private migrant rescue mission begins operating from Vittoriosa.
- On 27 August the government announces that it will hold a public referendum on whether to postpone the municipal elections until 2019, so that
they coincide with the European elections.

Slovenia

- On 21 August the new Prime Minister Milo Cerar announces that his party will form a coalition government with the Pensioners’ Party (DeSUS) and the Social Democrats.

Croatia

- On 7 August the new labour act enters into effect under which companies can renew temporary contracts indefinitely and transfer workers to other companies with the same owner. The law also facilitates dismissals and increases flexibility for going on strike over unpaid wages.
- On 14 August the Constitutional Court rejects a request to hold a referendum to tighten restrictions on language use for minorities, faced with the refusal of the people of Vukovar to accept bilingual signs in Croatian and Serbian.
- On 28 August the government announces tax increases on bank savings and cuts to public sector bonuses in 2016 to reduce the public deficit.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 5 August the War Crimes Prosecutor opens an investigation into the former Yugoslav general Dragam Zivanovic over the murder of 118 ethnic Albanians in Kosovo in 1999.
- On 13 August Oliver Ivanovic, leader of the Citizens Initiative Freedom, Democracy, Justice is accused of war crimes against ethnic Albanians during the Kosovo conflict by the EU-LEX prosecutor.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 22 August the Constitutional Court overturns the appointment of Isa Mustafa as Parliament Spokesman on 17 July, since it was not proposed by the largest parliamentary group, the PDK, but rather an alliance of another three parties.

FYROM

- On 19 August the government announces a plan to cancel the bank debts of the population’s poorest segments.
- On 26 August the parliamentary debate on the State’s general budget ends in fighting between the MPs of the two biggest parties of the Albanian minority, the opposition DPA, which is against the cuts proposed by the cabinet, and DUI, a member of the government coalition.
- On 27 August the Parliament approves, with an opposition boycott, seven amendments to the constitution, which include the definition of marriage as the exclusive union between a man and woman; the opening of an international financial zone with fiscal advantages to attract foreign investment; the removal of the Justice Minister from the Court Council, a limit on the rate of public debt to 60% of GDP and on the budget deficit to 3% of GDP; and the so-called “constitutional complaint” mechanism, whereby people and institutions can file complaints against the authorities.

Albania

- On 1 August seven employees of the central Bank of Albania are arrested for stealing 7 million dollars. The news triggers calls for the bank’s governor Adri Fullani to resign.
- On 6 August the government orders the closure of 18 higher education institutions that were issuing dubious qualifications.
- On 22 August a police operation destroys more than 86,000 cannabis plants in Dukagjin.
- On 28 August a businessman from Vlora is killed by a car bomb attributed to organised crime.

Greece

- On 13 August the eurozone approves the disbursement of a 1-billion-euro aid tranche for Greece after Athens legislates in favour of unifying the public sector pension funds and allows more construction and business activities to be carried out along its coastline.
- On 29 August Ilias Kasidiaris, a prominent member of Golden Dawn, is sworn in as a member of Athens’ City Council from prison, where he is being held in custody, accused of illegally possessing arms.

Turkey

- On 10 August Turkey holds the first direct presidential elections in its history. The current Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (AKP) wins with an absolute majority, 51.79% of the votes. One of the main pillars of Erdogan’s campaign is the modification of the constitution to expand presidential powers. Secularists fear the Republic’s Islamisation. On 28 August Erdogan is sworn in as the nation’s 12th President.

Cyprus

- On 27 August the government names Makis Constantinides, former Secretary General of Communications and Public Works, the new chairman of Cyprus Airways, to replace Tony Antoniou, who resigned following accusations that he charged personal expenses to the airline.
• On 27 August a demonstration outside the Parliament protests against the government’s plans to pass a law on foreclosures, required by the Troika to disburse the next tranche of the Cypriot rescue package.

Syria
• On 7 August IS takes control of the Brigade 93 base in Ain Isa, al-Raqqa.
• On 10 August Bashar al-Assad reappoints Wael al-Halaqi as Prime Minister, who had replaced Riad Hijab in the position in 2012, after the latter fled Syria to join the political opposition in exile.
• On 13 August IS expands its control in the north and east of Syria taking Turkmen Bareh and Akhtarin, in Aleppo.
• On 14 August government troops, supported by Hezbollah, take back control of the town of Mleiha, which had been in rebel hands for over a year.
• On 24 August IS takes over the Tabqa airport, the government’s only stronghold in the province of Raqqa.

Lebanon
• On 5 August the army and Syrian Islamist militants agree to a 24-hour ceasefire after four days of fighting for control of Arsal. On 7 August the jihadists withdraw from Arsal taking a group of soldiers hostage, some of who are freed on 17 August.

Egypt
• On 5 August Egypt announces plans to construct a new Suez canal, which will run parallel to the current one and is predicted to generate 10.1 billion euros a year for the Egyptian economy.
• On 6 August 12 supporters of the defeated President Mohammed Morsi are sentenced to death and a further ten given life sentences for the assassination of Giza’s security chief in Kerdasa during the Islamist protests before the coup on 3 July 2013.
• On 7 August the Cairo Criminal Court sentences two Egyptian citizens to life imprisonment and a third to 20 years in prison for sexually assaulting, raping and stealing from women in Tahrir Square during the swearing in of President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi.
• On 20 August the decapitated bodies are found of four civilians abducted and accused by Ansar Bait al-Maqdis of collaborating with Israel.
• On 30 August the Giza Criminal Court sentences the leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Mohamed Badie to life imprisonment. The ruling modifies the provisional death sentence given to Badie and six other defendants.

Libya
• On 4 August the new House of Representatives elects Aguila Saleh Issa as President of the council in a vote boycotted by the Islamists.
• On 6 August Ansar al-Sharia and its allies from the Central Shield Brigade and the 17 February Brigade launch an attack on Benghazi Airport.
• On 13 August the House of Representatives orders the dismantling in Tobruk of all militias operating outside of the State’s control.
• On 14 August the EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean, Spanish diplomat Bernardino Leon, is appointed the new UN Special Representative in Libya.
• On 16 August new fighting erupts in Tripoli between rival militias from Misrata and Zintan. In Benghazi, the offensive launched on 6 August by the alliance between Ansar al-Sharia and other Islamist militias succeeds in ousting the government forces from the city.
• On 24 August the House of Representatives elects Abdel Razzak Madhuri as new army chief-of-staff to replace the dismissed Abdessalam Jadallah al-Obedi.
• On 25 August the US press reveals that Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have repeatedly bombed several Islamist militia positions fighting for control of Tripoli.
• On 25 August the Islamist majority of the outgoing National Congress meets in Tripoli saying it will not dissolve and calling Omar al-Hasi to form a national salvation government.
• On 27 August the UN Security Council approves a resolution that calls for an immediate ceasefire in Libya.
• On 28 August the acting Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani and his cabinet resign so that the House of Representatives in Tobruk can elect a new government.

Tunisia
• On 21 August the Constituent Assembly votes against the approval of the new law against terrorism and money laundering, which consists of 163 articles, most of which are yet to be ratified, and which is to replace the 2003 law, established during the Ben Ali regime.

Morocco
• On 7 August the government approves a Pensions Law reform which increases the retirement age to 62 for 2015 and 65 for 2021.
• On 14 August Morocco steps up security faced with the destabilisation in Libya.
• On 14 August nine jihadists linked with IS are arrested in Morocco in a joint operation between the Moroccan and Spanish security forces.

Mauritania
• On 2 August the President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz is sworn into his post for a second mandate after winning the early elections held on 21 July.

EU
• On 7 August Russia imposes a one-year ban on imports of fresh food products from the EU, Norway, the US, Australia and Canada, in response to sanctions imposed by the West over Russia’s support of the pro-Russian insurgents in Ukraine. During August, the situation in Ukraine worsens with clashes between the Ukrainian army and pro-Russian militias trying to advance from the east of the country. The US and EU accuse Russia of intervening militarily in the conflict.
• On 28 August Berlin hosts an EU Summit with the Western Balkan countries to relaunch their European accession processes.
• On 30 August the Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk is elected President of the European Council and the Italian Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini, head of Foreign Affairs.
September 2014

In Spain the Justice Minister resigns and the Constitutional Court suspends the application of the decree approved by the Catalonian President to hold a referendum on Catalonian self-determination. In France, the socialist government wins a confidence vote but its party suffers defeat in the elections for the senate at the hands of the centre-right. In Bosnia, several senior figures of the Bosnian Croat entity are arrested for tax fraud. Greece agrees to outsource the management of its public hospitals. In Turkey, more police officers linked with Fetullah Gülen are arrested and a controversial law tightening control of the Internet is passed. Cyprus passes its controversial foreclosures bill. The US-led international coalition begins its military intervention in Syria and Iraq against IS and the al-Qaeda-linked Khorasan cell. In Jordan, the Salafi preacher Abu Qatada is cleared of terrorism charges in a second trial. In Egypt, Alaa Abdel Fattah, one of the secular protest movement leaders from the 2011 Revolution, is released on bail. In Libya, the Islamist-dominated outgoing Parliament’s refusal to dissolve and give way to the new Parliament’s mandate elected in June leaves the country with two parallel parliaments and governments. In Tunisia, Ennahdha announces that it will not run in the November presidential elections. In Algeria, a new IS-linked terrorist group emerges known as the Soldiers of the Caliphate. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia step up their anti-terrorist operations.

Portugal

- On 4 September the Parliament approves an amending budget for 2014 that respects the budget deficit cap of 4% of GDP, but which does not include new austerity measures thanks to the 1.6-billion-euro revenue surplus obtained from those already adopted.
- On 28 September the mayor of Lisbon Antonio Costa wins the Socialist Party’s primary elections.

Spain

- On 23 September the Justice Minister Alberto Ruiz-Gallardon resigns after the Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy scraps plans to make the abortion law stricter, due to a lack of consensus. On 29 September Rafael Catala succeeds Ruiz-Gallardon.
- On 27 September the Catalonian President Artur Mas signs the decree approved by the regional parliament allowing a referendum to be held on Catalonia’s self-determination. On 28 September the Constitutional Court provisionally suspends the application of the decree, accepting two appeals filed by the Spanish government claiming it is unconstitutional.

France

- On 1 September the Paris Correctional Court hands down prison sentences of eight years to Jon Etxeb erria, seven to Ruben Rivero and six to Iñigo Sancho, members of ETA’s logistical apparatus who were arrested in January 2012 in Auxerre.
- On 9 September the Secretary of State for Foreign Trade Thomas Thvenoud, who resigned on 4 September over his failure to pay his taxes properly over several years, leaves the Socialist Party but remains an MP.
- On 16 September the government wins a parliamentary confidence vote on its programme of cuts, but loses its absolute majority.
- On 18 September Air France pilots extend their strike that began on 15 August against the conditions offered for working for Transavia, a low-cost subsidiary of the airline, to 28 August.
- On 19 September the former President Nicolas Sarkozy announces his return to politics.
- On 28 September the centre-right parties win the elections to the senate, in a new election defeat for the PS. The extreme-right FN party gains two seats.

Italy

- On 3 September the Public Administration Minister Marianna Madia announces that the public sector salary freeze will continue in 2015.
- On 9 September Adamo Pisapia, member of the D’Agostino-Panella clan of the Camorra is arrested in Ibiza, Spain.

Malta

- On 29 September the Prime Minister Matteo Renzi receives the Democratic Party’s backing for his labour market reforms.

Moldova

- On 28 September the centre-right parties win the elections to the senate, in a new election defeat for the PS. The extreme-right FN party gains two seats.

Montenegrin

- On 2 September after negotiations with the Education Minister break down, teachers stage a strike to demand pay rises and better contracts.

Slovenia

- On 15 September the journalist from the newspaper Delo, Anuska Delic, stands trial for publishing classified documents that link the opposition SDS with the neo-Nazi movement Blood and Honour.
- On 18 September the coalition government announces cuts in public spending and tax hikes.

Slovenia

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Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 3 September the police arrest 16 people in separate raids throughout the country for recruiting jihadists for Syria and Iraq.
- On 4 September the former police officers Miodrag Josipovic and Branimir Tesic are arrested, accused of committing genocide against Bosnian civilians in Bratunac in 1995.
- On 10 September 14 people are arrested for tax fraud amounting to over 6 million euros, including the vice-President and Agriculture Minister Jerko Lijanovic, Trade Minister Milorad Bahij and the MP Mladen Lijanovic, all officials of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Serbia

- On 17 September the Public Prosecutor orders a police investigation into the creators and members of different...
social network pages known as the Army of Sandzak, which call for action to be taken against Serbia’s control over the Bosniak-majority region.
• On 19 September the government presents new austerity measures that foresee cuts to pension and public sector wages exceeding 211 euros per month.
• On 28 September clashes erupt between police and demonstrators protesting against the Gay Pride march in Belgrade.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

• On 1 September EULEX issues arrest warrants for the mayor of Zubin Potok, Stevan Vulovic, suspected of organising the escape of Kosovo Serb prisoners; and for his predecessor Slavisa Ristic, suspected for murder and endangering the security of UN staff in Kosovo, after both men fail to show up for questioning. The decision sparks Kosovo Serb protest marches.
• On 17 September 15 influential Muslim clerics are arrested accused of recruiting jihadists for the al-Nusra Front.

FYROM

• On 18 September a symbolic ceremony in Skopje declares the Republic of Ilirida, the Albanian-majority western part of the country, independent.

Greece

• On 4 September Greece requests urgent European funds faced with the significant rise in Syrian and Iraqi migrants.
• On 11 September the Parliament approves the outsourcing of hospitals management. Doctors, who have staged repeated strikes throughout the year, condemn the measure as the first step towards complete privatisation of the health service.

Turkey

• On 1 September 33 police officers are arrested for their links with the network founded by the preacher Fethullah Gülen, accused of plotting to overthrow the AKP government.
• On 2 September the Public Prosecutor drops charges against Bilal Erdogan, the President’s son, and around a hundred others accused of corruption following police operations in December 2013.
• On 7 September thousands protest in Istanbul against poor safety conditions for workers in Turkey after ten workmen die on the construction site of a skyscraper.
• On 17 September the Parliament passes a law allowing web pages to be blocked without a prior court order and under which Internet providers are obliged to keep a record of user activity for two years, which must be made available to the authorities on request.
• On 22 September the government lifts the ban on wearing the Islamic veil in public institutes.

Cyprus

• On 6 September the Parliament approves the foreclosures bill proposed by the government and required by the EU and IMF for the release of the next tranche of the financial rescue package. The Troika, nevertheless, withholds the next payment, describing the law as too permissive.
• On 17 September Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders announce their willingness to accelerate reunification negotiations.

Syria

• On 2 September the army launches its biggest offensive since the beginning of the war on Jobar, on the outskirts of Damascus, which has been under rebel control for the past year.
• On 4 September 10 NATO states agree at the Newport Summit to form an alliance to defeat IS in Syria and Iraq. On 11 September nine Arab countries join the alliance.
• On 11 September the al-Nusra Front releases 45 Fijian UN peacekeepers captured in the Golan Heights in August.
• On 18 September IS takes 16 villages on the Turkish border, in its advance to control the town of Kobane.
• On 19 September Russia presents a proposal before the United Nations to remove the issue of Syria’s chemical weapons’ arsenal from the meetings’ agenda. The proposal, backed by China, is rejected.
• On 22 September around 130,000 Syrian Kurds have crossed the border into Turkey in just three days, fleeing from IS.
• On 23 September at least 50 people, mostly IS and al-Nusra jihadists are killed in Raqqa, Deir al-Zour, Hasaka and Aleppo, in the first air strike by the US-led international coalition.
• On 25 September the US describes the threat to its security, alongside IS.

Lebanon

• On 30 September Iran announces that it will lend military support to Lebanon in its fight against IS, which has been ongoing for the last three months on the Syrian border. This is the first time that Beirut has accepted Iranian help, which it has always rejected due to the non-Shiite sector’s distrust of Teheran.

Jordan

• On 8 September a US jury finds the largest banking entity in Jordan, Arab Bank, guilty of financing Hamas terrorist attacks.
• On 24 September the Salafi preacher Abu Qatada is cleared by the State Security Court in the second of two trials for terrorism.

Egypt

• On 15 September Alaa Abd el-Fattah, leader of the secular protest movements against Mubarak in 2011, is released on bail by the Cairo Criminal Court, which in June sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment for organising an unauthorised demonstration.
• On 17 September Karim Taha, member of the April 6 Movement, which fought against the Mubarak regime and
was banned by the courts in April 2014, joins the hunger strike started in January by the reporter Abdullah al-Shami, jailed in June, and the journalist Mohamed Soltan, the son of a Muslim Brotherhood leader. Some 80 prisoners in Egyptian jails and around 200 families and sympathisers have been supporting the so-called “Battle of empty stomachs,” which demands the release of political prisoners and that the law regulating the right to gatherings and demonstration be repealed.

- On 21 September at least four police officers are killed by a bomb blast in Cairo.
- On 22 September IS calls on its supporters in Sinai to continue their attacks on the security forces.
- On 25 September a court sentences six men to two years in prison for being “debauchery,” in yet another case of homosexual persecution in Egypt.

**Libya**

- On 17 September Madrid hosts an international conference on Libya, where a road map is drawn up for a process of national dialogue. Meanwhile, fighting continues on a daily basis between government forces and para-military groups and Ansar al-Sharia and different Islamist brigades for control of Tripoli and Benghazi.
- On 17 September Omar al-Hasi – the Prime Minister elected by the GNC, the outgoing Islamist Parliament refusing to hand power over to the new Parliament in Tobruk – forms a parallel government.
- On 28 September Abdullah al-Thani’s new government is sworn in after the Tobruk Parliament approves its 12 ministers with 110 of the 112 votes of the house. The new cabinet lacks a Defence Minister.

**Tunisia**

- On 7 September the main Islamist party Ennahdha announces that it will not run in the November presidential elections.
- On 17 September the police shoot down two Islamist militants in the Chaambi Mountains, close to the Algerian border, after the authorities raise the level of national alert in view of the parliamentary elections.
- On 17 September the interim Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa announces that he will not run in the November elections.
- On 29 September the Okba Ibn Nafa terrorist cell, until now affiliated with al-Qaeda, declares allegiance with IS from the Chaambi Mountains.

**Algeria**

- On 15 September reports are released on a new terrorist group founded in Algeria, the Soldiers of the Caliphate. A splinter group of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) led by AQIM’s hitherto regional head Abdelmalek Gouri, and which has sworn allegiance with IS.

**Morocco**

- On 12 September the Interior Minister reports that a recruitment cell sending jihadists to Syria and Iraq has been dismantled in Fez, Nador and Ouatt el-Haj.
- On 13 September a new party is created in Bouznika, the Neo Democrats, led by Mohamed Darif under the slogan “less ideology, more action and impact.”

**EU**

- On 5 September the EU approves new economic sanctions against Russia for threatening Ukraine’s sovereignty, despite the ceasefire agreement reached between the Ukrainian and pro-Russian forces.
- On 17 September the European and Ukrainian parliaments ratify the Association Agreement with a view to Ukraine’s EU accession.
- On 18 September Scotland holds an historic referendum on its independence, with an 84.59% turnout. The result is for the country to continue as part of the United Kingdom with 55.3% of the votes in favour of this direction.

**Arab League**

- On 8 September the Arab Foreign Ministers agree on joint defensive measures to fight against IS and other jihadist groups.

**October 2014**

In Spain, major corruption scandals are uncovered. In France and Italy, economic reforms proposed by their governments are met with criticism in their respective parties. Bosnia holds a general election. In Kosovo, EULEX comes under scrutiny after reports of bribery. The Greek government survives a confidence vote. Tensions between Turkey, Cyprus and Greece mount over gas reserves. Turkey allows Kurdish-Iraqi militants to cross its borders to help defend Kobane. Lebanon announces that it is closing its borders to more Syrian refugees. Egypt declares a state of emergency, heightens security in Sinai and approves new anti-Islamist and anti-terrorist legislation. In Libya, IS takes control of Derna. Tunisia holds parliamentary elections. In Algeria, the police stage a one-day strike. In Morocco there is a national strike.

**Portugal**

- On 15 October the government submits the budget for 2015 which foresees a reduction in the public deficit to 2.7% of GDP, with no tax adjustments and including a rise in the minimum wage.

**Spain**

- On 11 October the National Court reports that the former deputy Prime Minister, former World Bank chairman and former chairman of Bankia, Rodrigo Rato and another 82 senior figures in Caja Madrid and Bankia – which was rescued with 22.424 billion euros of European funds in 2012 – diverted 15.5 million euros in undeclared funds for private use between 2003 and 2012.
- On 16 October Spain is elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2015-2016.
- On 20 October 200 sub-Saharan storm the Meilla border fence.
- On 21 October the former People’s Party Secretary General and Minister Angel Acebes is charged in the Barcenas corruption scandal.
• On 27 October 51 politicians, civil servants and businessmen are arrested in the Civil Guard’s so-called Operation Punic, for their involvement in a corruption plot affecting Madrid, Murcia, Leon and Valencia. Among the accused is Francisco Granados, former People’s Party Secretary General in Madrid, former member of the Madrid regional government and former senator.

• On 29 October the former Minister of Territorial Policy of the Catalan regional government Joaquim Nadal is charged with fraud.

France

• On 1 October the government presents the budget for 2015 which includes public spending cuts 50 billion euros below what is required by Brussels to reduce the budget deficit to 3% of GDP.

• On 5 October the group La Manif pour Tous gathers thousands in Paris again in protest against the law on same-sex marriage.

• On 14 October the National Assembly adopts the draft law that foresees a 50% reduction in nuclear energy over the next ten years.

• On 16 October France and Germany reach an historic agreement to fuse their embassies.

• On 20 October the former Socialist Party Secretary General Martine Aubry joins other party members opposed to the economic policy of François Hollande and Manuel Valls.

• On 22 October the satirical weekly Le Canard Enchaîné publishes confidential documents from the Economy Ministry according to which more than 60 deputies and senators are guilty of tax fraud.

• On 24 October the Senate approves in line with 13.3/1,000 residents. – 24.1/1,000 residents –. Cyprus is next – 10,187 – is by far the highest in the EU in relation to the country’s population – 24.1/1,000 residents. –. Cyprus is next in line with 13.3/1,000 residents.

Malta

• On 12 October Air Malta forecasts 16-million-euro losses for March 2015, and will therefore have to renegotiate its restructuring plan, which was agreed with the EU in 2011.

• On 18 October following Greece’s example in 2012, Malta reforms the Animal Welfare Act, banning circuses that use animals and imposing prison sentences for animal cruelty.

• On 22 October Eurostat announces that the number of first residence permits issued by Malta to foreigners in 2013 – 10,187 – is by far the highest in the EU in relation to the country’s population – 24.1/1,000 residents. –. Cyprus is next in line with 13.3/1,000 residents.

Italy

• On 8 October the government is given the Senate’s backing for major labour market reforms, despite opposition from the trade unions and part of the ruling Democratic Party.

• On 9 October the Interior Minister announces that he will annul all marriages between same-sex couples registered and performed outside of the country, as Italian law does not allow such a union.

• On 15 October the government presents the budget for 2015, which foresees 18-billion-euro tax cuts and a deficit of 2.9% of GDP for 2015.

• On 16 October Silvio Berlusconi’s acquittal in the Ruby case is confirmed. The judge presiding over the case re-signs over his disagreement with the sentence.

• On 28 October Giorgio Napolitano becomes the first Italian President to appear as a witness before the courts by testifying in the trial of the State-Mafia negotiations in the nineties.

Slovenia

• On 15 October the Parliament expels the former Prime Minister Janez Jansa deeming it incompatible for him to retain his seat while serving his two-year prison sentence for corruption.

• On 19 October the hitherto vice-President Violeta Bulc becomes the new Slovenian commissioner, at the helm of Transport.

Croatia

• On 19 October the mayor of Zagreb Milan Bandić is arrested for corruption and abuse of power.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

• On 12 October Bosnia holds elections. The election for the federal tripartite presidency is won by Bakir Izetbegovic (Party of Democratic Action, SDA, Bosnian nationalist conservative), Drag Anovic (Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina, HDZ, Bosnian Croat nationalist conservative) and Zeljka Cvijanovic (Alliance of Independent Social Democrats, SNSD, Bosnian Serb nationalist social democrat). SDA gains most votes in the elections to the House of Representatives (lower house) of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the elections to the House of Representatives (lower house) of the entity of the federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina SDA wins. In the elections to the National Assembly of the Srpska Republic SNSD wins and its President Milorad Dodik renews his term in the entity’s presidential election. The canton assemblies of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina are also elected. The results and high rate of abstention reveal people’s fatigue with respect to the complex power balance established in the Dayton Agreement.

• On 22 October workers from public companies in the process of bankruptcy or privatisation demonstrate again in Tuzla.

Montenegro

• On 7 October, after 18 months of parliamentary negotiations, Ivica Stankovic, magistrate at the Supreme Court, is named Chief Public Prosecutor.

• On 13 October at least 20 people are arrested following clashes between Bosnians and Kosovans in the Konic refugee camp in Podgorica.
Serbia

- On 14 October the football match between Serbia and Albania in Belgrade to classify for the 2016 European Cup is suspended after fights break out between players and fans from both sides. Among the arrested is Olsi Rama, the brother of the Albanian Prime Minister. The clashes at the stadium are followed by attacks on Albanian businesses in Belgrade.
- On 15 October the former Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica leaves the DS after accusing the new leadership of abandoning its policy not to join the EU.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 21 October Kosovo, Albania and FYROM announce the definitive demarcation of their borders.
- On 28 October Maria Bamieh, the EULEX prosecutor recently dismissed for controversial declarations about the integrity of the mission heads, reveals that certain judges of the body accepted bribes to drop problematic trials. The European Parliament announces the opening of an investigation.

FYROM

- On 6 October 17 police officers and intelligence agents are sentenced to up to 15 years’ imprisonment in the country’s first espionage trial.

Greece

- On 11 October the government avoids early elections winning a confidence vote called for by the Syriza-led opposition, whose voting intention is almost an absolute majority.

Turkey

- On 14 October Turkish fighter jets attack enclaves of the PKK terrorist organisation in Daglica after several days of siege imposed by the PKK on a military barracks. This is the first serious incident since the ceasefire in March 2013 and a symptom of the faltering peace negotiations.
- On 20 October Turkey gives in to pressure at home and abroad and confirms that it will allow the Kurdish-Iraqi Peshmerga to enter Turkey in order to reach the Kurdish-Syrian border town of Kobane and join the fight against IS.
- On 29 October the official reception for Republic Day, which was going to be held in the recently finished White Palace, the world’s biggest presidential palace, is cancelled as a mark of respect for the miners trapped in a mine in Ermenek since 27 October.

Cyprus

- On 3 October the opposition parties come together to demand the renegotiation of the terms of the Cypriot rescue package.
- On 8 October Kudret Ozersay, the Turkish Cypriot in charge of reunification negotiations, resigns in order to run in the 2015 Turkish-Cypriot presidential elections.
- On 20 October Cyprus threatens to veto Turkey’s accession process after a Turkish survey vessel enters its Exclusive Economic Zone. On 24 October, the European Council issues Turkey a warning and adds that its recognition by all Member States is a “necessary component” for the accession process.
- On 27 October Christodoulos Christodoulou, the former governor of the Central Bank, is sentenced to five years in prison for tax evasion.
- On 31 October the Supreme Court rules that the foreclosures law, adopted by the Parliament in September, is unconstitutional, as it does not respect the conditions agreed with the Troika to receive the economic rescue package. The court’s decision should allow Cyprus to receive the next tranche of its bailout.

Syria

- On 3 October the Syrian army takes back control of al-Mudafah, Handarat and Sifat, in Aleppo.
- On 5 October the British Royal Air Force locates Abdel Majed Abdel Bary in Raqqa, the British-Egyptian terrorist responsible for the executions of James Foley, Steven Sotloff, David Haines and Alan Henning posted by IS.
- On 19 October US planes drop arms and medicine provided by Iraqi Kurdistan for the Syrian-Kurdish fighters.
- On 30 October IS takes control of the Shaar gas field in Homs.

Lebanon

- On 18 October Lebanon declares that it will not accept any more Syrian refugees. Meanwhile the border fighting against al-Nusra and IS continues.
- On 27 October the army takes Tripoli after four days of fighting with Sunni groups from Bab el-Tabaneh.

Egypt

- On 2 October the army kills Mohamed Abu Shatiya, commander of Ansar Beit al-Maqdis.
- On 24 October Egypt declares a state of emergency in Sinai after 28 soldiers are killed in attacks carried out by Ansar Beit al-Maqdis. On 29 October, Egypt creates a militarised zone on the border between Sinai and Gaza.
- On 27 October Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi undersigns a law allowing the army to take control of vital state facilities in case of threat and under which anyone carrying out an attack on these sites can be tried before a military court.
- On 30 October the government orders the dissolution of the National Alliance Supporting Legitimacy, which calls for the reinstatement of Mohamed Morsi.

Libya

- On 4 October IS takes control of Derna through the Islamic Youth Council.
- On 8 October the Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thani, accepts Egypt’s help in the reconstruction of the Libyan armed forces.
- On 20 October the Tobruk Parliament announces a formal alliance with the former general Khalifa Haftar. Meanwhile, throughout the month, Operation Dignity continues against Islamist positions.

Tunisia

- On 26 October Tunisia holds parliamentary elections. The secularist party
Nidaa Tounes wins with 85 of the 217 seats. Ennahda (Islamist) wins 69 seats. The Free Patriotic Union (liberal), the Popular Front (far-left) and Afek Tounes (liberal), obtain 16, 15 and 8 seats respectively.

Algeria
- On 14 October the police stage a large-scale, peaceful protest march for the first time in Algiers to call for better wages and a trade union.
- On 15 October the Mauritanian Saifedine al-Mauritani and another member of Okba Bin Nafiaa, affiliated with IS, are arrested on their way to Mali.

Morocco
- On 28 October Morocco announces that it will support the United Arab Emirates in its fight against terrorism, but will not join the US-led coalition in Syria and Iraq.
- On 29 October the country’s four main trade unions stage a 24-hour national strike against the pension reform, increases in the price of fuel, electricity and water and the resulting deterioration of Moroccans’ purchasing power. The demonstration also calls for a rise in the minimum wage.

Mauritania
- On 12 October four IS members are arrested in Zouerate.

EU
- On 7 October the Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt announces that Denmark will hold a referendum on whether or not to opt out of the EU's justice and interior policies.
- On 17 October British MPs approve a referendum to be held between now and 2017 on the United Kingdom’s continued membership of the EU.
- On 20 October the European Council approves Germany’s proposal to appoint a coordinator to head a joint mission to combat Ebola. It also approves Britain’s proposal to donate 1 billion euros to the fight against the epidemic that, since December 2013, has already caused more than 4,500 deaths and 9,000 cases, mostly in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Conakry and Nigeria and isolated cases in Senegal, Mali, the US, Spain, the United Kingdom, Norway, Germany and France.
- On 22 October the Juncker Commission is given the green light by the Parliament.
- On 30 October Russia and Ukraine, under European mediation, sign a 3.65-billion-euro deal guaranteeing the supply of Russian gas through Ukraine, amid tension between Moscow and Kiev over the secessionist war in eastern Ukraine and after the pro-Europeans win a landslide victory in the Ukrainian elections on 26 November.

November 2014

In Portugal, the Internal Administration Minister resigns, the former Prime Minister Jose Socrates is arrested and a 24-hour national strike is staged. In Spain, the Public Prosecutor files a complaint against the President of the Catalan government. In France, the UMP and FN elect their respective presidents. The two main Italian parties agree on the election reform law. The two main Italian parties agree on the election reform law. The ICTY releases the Serbian war criminal Vojislav Seselj. In Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo the coalition governments are announced. In Greece there is another general strike. The FSA withdraws from Aleppo. The Lebanese Parliament extends its mandate. In Egypt, the former President Hosni Mubarak is found not guilty for the deaths in the 2011 revolution and Ansar Beit al-Maqdis pledges allegiance to IS. In Libya, the Supreme Court declares the Parliament formed after the June elections unconstitutional. Tunisia holds the first round of its presidential elections.

Spain
- On 7 November Cristina de Borbon is charged in the Noos corruption case.
- On 11 November 32 high-ranking civil servants and members of the People’s Party, Canarian Coalition and United Left are arrested in Operation Madeja, accused of accepting bribes.
- On 17 November some 400 immigrants attempt to storm the Melilla border fence.
- On 21 November the Public Prosecutor files a complaint against Catalonia’s regional President Artur Mas, his vice-President and Education Minister for disobedience, prevarication, embezzlement and usurpation of power for organising a region-wide referendum on 9 November on Catalanonian secession, contravening a Constitutional Court ruling.

France
- On 18 November the National Assembly adopts the austerity budget for 2015.
- On 29 November Nicolas Sarkozy is elected President of the UMP with 64.5% of the votes.
- On 30 November Marine Le Pen is re-elected President of the FN with 100% of the votes and presents her candidacy to the Elysee with the economic and political support of the Russian President, Vladimir Putin.
Italy

- On 11 November a court of appeal overturns the six-year prison sentence handed down to seven members of the High Risk Commission for failing to predict the 2009 earthquake in L’Aquila.
- On 12 November the Prime Minister Matteo Renzi and the leader of Forza Italia Silvio Berlusconi reach an electoral reform agreement under which 40% of the votes in the first round will represent a majority.

Malta

- On 12 November Lawrence Fenech and Ian Falzon, former officials of Malta Air Traffic Services are each given a two-year suspended prison sentence for corruption.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 9 November the Bosnian Party of Democratic Action agrees to form a coalition with the Democratic Front and the Alliance for Changes.
- On 12 November farmers block border crossings after failing to reach an agreement with the government to increase taxes on dairy imports.
- On 13 November the Bosnian Air Navigation Services Agency assumes control of its national airspace for the first time since Bosnian Independence, which until now has been managed by Croatia and Serbia.
- On 13 November the Chief Prosecutor Goran Salihovic says that around a hundred people will have been charged for war crimes committed during the Bosnian War by the end of 2014, compared to 56 in 2013.

Montenegro

- On 17 November the Democratic Party of Socialists and Social Democratic Party reach an agreement in principle over economic policy, European integration and the fight against corruption and organised crime after months of disagreements within the ruling coalition.
- On 18 November the Health Minister Miodrag Radunovic resigns faced with growing protests against the poor state of the health system following the death of a baby in a hospital in Bijelo Polje.

Serbia

- On 2 November Vojko Kadijevic, last Defence Minister of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, who stood accused of war crimes during the Croatian War, dies in Moscow.
- On 3 November the Parliament in Vojvodina approves the reshuffle of the government led by the Democratic Party, in a vote boycotted by the coalition member Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians, which disagrees with the change.
- On 9 November Balkan drug lord Dragoslav Kosmajac is arrested.
- On 15 November the leader of the ultra-nationalist Radical Party Vojislav Seselj is welcomed in Belgrade by more than 3,000 people following his release by the ICTY on 6 November after receiving treatment for cancer and serving 11 years in prison for war crimes. In response, on 28 November the Croatian Prime Minister Zoran Milanovic cancels an official visit to Serbia, scheduled for December.
- On 24 November the former Serb fighter Petar Ciric is sentenced to 15 years in prison for the massacre of 200 Croats in Ovcara in 1991.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 10 November the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini appoints the French legal expert Jean-Paul Jacque to investigate reports made in October of alleged corruption in EULEX.
- On 19 November the President Atifete Jahjaga announces that Isa Mustafa’s Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) will form a coalition government with Hashim Thaci’s Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK). The agreement puts an end to a period of political stalemate ongoing since the June elections.

FYROM

- On 10 November the Parliament revokes the seats of 31 SDSM MPs, six months after their refusal to assume their posts in protest against the April election results, which the party believes to be fraudulent.
- On 12 November Greece and FYROM resume talks in New York to resolve the Name Dispute, ongoing now for 23 years.
- On 21 November the former mayor of Ohrid Aleksandar Petreski is arrested for organised crime and bribery.

Albania

- On 6 November the socialist MP Luiza Xhuvani gives up her seat following the arrest of her son in connection with the death of four people in a nightclub in Tirana.

Greece

- On 12 November Konstandinos Kioussis, a civil servant given three life sentences in absentia in 2004 for stealing 9 million euros of public funds, is arrested in Karyes after eight years hiding in different monasteries on Mount Athos, where he pretended to be a novice monk.
- On 27 November the Greek authorities rescue more than 700 immigrants adrift off the shores of Crete.
- On 27 November Greece is paralysed by a national strike called by the main trade unions against the cuts negotiated with the Troika to avoid a third bailout.

Turkey

- On 3 November a boat carrying around 40 illegal migrants sinks in Bosporous killing at least 24.
- On 27 November seven Galatasaray supporters are arrested for stabbing a Red Star Belgrade fan to death during violence before the Euroleague basketball match between both teams in Istanbul. The tension between Serbs and Turks also forces the cancellation of a waterpolo match in Belgrade between Galatasaray and Partizan.

Syria

- On 3 November IS takes control of its second gas field, the Jahar gas field in Homs, after taking over the Shaar gas field on 30 October.
• On 4 November IS releases 93 Kurds abducted in February in Kobane.
• On 12 November the Israeli edition of Forbes reports that, with revenues of around 2 billion dollars, IS is the world’s wealthiest terrorist group.
• On 16 November IS posts a video in which it claims responsibility for the decapitation of 18 Syrian soldiers and that of the US aid worker Peter Kassig.
• On 18 November Hurriyet reports that the FSA has given up fighting in Aleppo and withdrawn more than 14,000 militias.

Lebanon

• On 5 November the Parliament extends its mandate to 2017 in view of its inability to hold elections without being able to elect a new President and the dangers posed by the situation in Syria and Iraq. Protests in Beirut denounce the decision as unconstitutional.

Egypt

• On 4 November Ansar Beit al-Maqdis pledges allegiance to IS.
• On 5 November the President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi appoints the former Mubarak minister Fayza AbulNaga, national security adviser.
• On 28 November there are serious clashes between Islamist demonstrators and security forces in Cairo, in a day of protests throughout Egypt, called by the Salaf Front and supported by the Muslim Brotherhood.
• On 29 November the former President Hosni Mubarak and his Interior Minister Habib el-Adly are cleared of conspiring to kill protesters during the 2011 Revolution.

Libya

• On 6 November the Supreme Court declares the Parliament formed after the elections on 25 June and recognised by the international community as unconstitutional, along with the government of Abdullah al-Thani.
• On 10 November clashes erupt in Ain Mara, Derna, between the army and the militias of Khalifa Haftar and IS and Ansar al-Sharia. This government offensive runs parallel with another launched on Benghazi.
• On 24 November two attacks on the Mitiga airport in Tripoli, for which the Tobruk government claims responsibility, forces its closure. The attack comes after the Tobruk government’s announcement on the previous day of an imminent offensive on Tripoli.

Tunisia

• On 18 November Slim Chiboub, the son-in-law of the former President Ben Ali, is jailed on his arrival in Tunisia from his exile in Abu Dabi for possession of illegal arms, a crime for which he was sentenced in absentia to six years in prison.
• On 23 November Beji Caid Essebsi wins in the first round of presidential elections with 39.46% of the votes, beating the current President Moncef Marzuki.

Algeria

• On 2 November the Prime Ministers of the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, Alexander Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky, win their regional elections with 70% and 63.8% of the votes respectively. Ukraine and the EU do not recognise these elections, whose results would imply each region’s leaving Ukraine to join Russia. After the elections, fighting resumes in Donbass.

Mauritania

• On 4 November the Education Ministry passes a law making Islamic and religious education in secondary schools compulsory, to “initiate young people into a moderate middle-ground form of Islam to prevent extremism.”
• On 18 November two AQIM-linked Mauritanians are sentenced to death for the murder in Aleg of four French tourists in 2007.
• On 19 November two members of the Initiative for the Resurgence of the Abolitionist Movement (IRA) are found guilty by a court in Nouakchott for belonging to a non-authorised organisation, after, on 14 November, 14 of their fellow members are jailed in Rosso.

EU

• On 2 November the Prime Ministers of the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, Alexander Zakharchenko and Igor Plotnitsky, win their regional elections with 70% and 63.8% of the votes respectively. Ukraine and the EU do not recognise these elections, whose results would imply each region’s leaving Ukraine to join Russia. After the elections, fighting resumes in Donbass.
• On 4 November the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, an advocate of shared legislation throughout the EU on immigration and internal migration, warns her British counterpart David Cameron that London’s proposal to limit the entry of citizens from the rest of the Union into the UK represents a point of no return and would virtually mean the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU.
• On 6 November the LuxLeaks scandal is made public, an investigation into secret agreements signed between around 340 multinationals and the government of Luxembourg under the current President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, for the purposes of tax evasion.
• On 9 November Europe commemorates the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, which precipitated the fall of the Iron Curtain.
• On 10 November the Philae spacecraft of the European Space Agency’s Rosetta Mission performs the first-ever
soft landing on the nucleus of a comet, the 67P/Churyumov-Gerasimenko.
• On 13 November the European Parliament adopts the EU-Moldava Association Agreement.
• On 27 November for the first time in EU history, a group of MEPs brings a motion of censure against the Commission’s President Jean-Claude Juncker, which is defeated.

December 2014

Spain passes the controversial Citizen Security Law. France raises its anti-terrorist alert. In Italy, there is a national strike, the government approves the criminal code reform, toughening sentences for corruption, and there are further mass migrant arrivals. Croatia holds the first round of presidential elections. In Montenegro a new political party emerges. Kosovo forms a coalition government and is recognised by the International Olympic Committee. The political crisis in Greece leads to early elections scheduled for January 2015. In Egypt, further death sentences are handed down to members of the Muslim Brotherhood. The internal split in Libya continues, where the two parallel power centres lead the EU and UN to threaten to impose fresh sanctions. In Tunisia, Beji Caid Essebsi wins the presidential elections.

Spain
• On 3 December the People’s Party parliamentary spokesman Alfonso Alonso is appointed Health Minister to replace Ana Mato, who resigned on 27 November after being cited by a judge in the Gürtel corruption trial.
• On 11 December the PP’s parliamentary majority approves the Citizen Security Law, which has been criticised by the other political parties.
• On 18 December the Public Prosecutor Eduardo Torres-Dulce resigns “for personal reasons.” The next day Consuelo Madrigal is appointed the new Chief Public Prosecutor.
• On 30-31 December 156 illegal immigrants succeed in jumping the Melilla border fence. In 2014, some 2,254 people have entered the Spanish city this way.

France
• On 4 December Faouzi Lamdaoui, personal adviser to François Hollande, resigns accused by the court of “misusing corporate assets.”
• On 23 December France steps up its military deployment throughout the country under the anti-terrorist Vigipirate plan, following three separate attacks over the past three days, which leave one dead and almost 30 injured.

Monaco
• On 11 December Alberto II’s wife Charlene of Monaco gives birth to twins, Gabriela and Jacobo. The latter is heir to the throne.

Italy
• On 2 December a mafia network is dismantled in Rome with the arrest of 37 people, some of them members of different political parties. Another hundred or so people are under investigation, including the former mayor of Rome and former Berlusconi minister Gianni Alemanno, who on 3 December leaves the Brothers of Italy party (centre-right).
• On 11 December the government approves a reform of the criminal code that imposes tougher laws against corruption. It includes raising the minimum prison sentence for corruption from 4 to 6 years, simplifying the process for confiscating assets, ensuring that those found guilty return everything they have stolen, right down to the last cent, and extending the statute of limitations for such a crime.
• On 12 December Italy is paralysed by a general strike against the government’s economic policy, labour and public administration reform and budget cuts.
• On 18 December the police arrest 52 people in Reggio Calabria for their links with the ‘Ndrangheta.
• On 30 December 970 illegal migrants aboard a Moldovan-flagged ship, abandoned by its crew near Corfu, disembark in Gallipoli after being rescued by the coast guard. This is yet another mass arrival after, on 25 and 26 December, around 1,300 migrants were rescued in the Strait of Sicily. In 2014, 167,462 migrants have reached Italy by sea.
• On 31 December Giorgio Napolitano confirms his resignation as President in his end-of-year speech citing his age.

Malta
• On 9 December Carmelo Abela is appointed Interior Minister to replace Manuel Mallia, who was forced to resign by the Prime Minister Joseph Muscat after being implicated in an investigation into his driver in connection with a shooting incident on 19 November.

Croatia
• On 28 December Croatia holds the first round of its presidential elections. The incumbent President, the independent Ivo Josipovic, and the HDZ candidate Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, pass through to the second round, which will be held on 11 January 2015.

Bosnia and Herzegovina
• On 6 December the SDP elects Nermin Niksic as party leader to replace Zlatko Lagumdzija, who resigned following the poor election results in October.
• On 9 December Sefik Dzaferovic (SDA) is elected Chairman of the House of Representatives (federal lower house) and Borjana Kristo (HDZ) and Mladen Bosic, (SDS) are appointed first and second deputy Chairs.
• On 12 December 15 former Bosnian Serb fighters and officers are sentenced to prison for the massacre of 150 Bosnians in Zecovi in 1992.
• On 17 December the social democrat leader Hamdija Lipovaca, the Prime Minister of the Una-Sana canton, is arrested over irregularities in the construction of sports facilities in Bihac, while he served as the mayor there.
• On 18 December the SDS elects Bosnian Denis Zvizdic to head the tripartite presidency of the federal Council of Ministers.
Montenegro

- On 9 December the secret service chief Boro Vucinic resigns.
- On 22 December the new Civic Movement party presents its leadership, headed by former vice-President Zarko Rakcevic, and programme, based on Euro-Atlantic values and democratic regeneration.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 9 December the meeting of the International Olympic Committee in Monaco recognises the Kosovan Olympic Committee, whose team will participate for the first time in the Rio 2016 Olympic Games.
- On 9 December Isa Mustafa, leader of the Democratic League (LDK) is sworn in as Prime Minister, in accordance with the agreement signed on 8 December between Kosovo’s two main parties (LDK and PDK). The outgoing Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi (PDK) will be deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister.

FYROM

- On 9 December there are bomb attacks in the Tetovo and Kumanovo police stations, in an attack the likes of which have not been seen since the ethnic conflict in 2001.
- On 10 December 12,000 students protest in Skopje, in the country’s biggest student demonstration since independence, against the higher education reform bill which foresees the introduction of exams written by the government in addition to the university exams.
- On 7 December the government presents the country’s new coat of arms to the Parliament – a rampant lion on a yellow shield, topped with a crown – which will replace the current coat of arms, which dates back to the communist era.
- On 22 December thousands of temporary, construction and service workers demonstrate in Skopje against the government’s plans to increase their taxes in 2015.

Albania

- On 8 December the head of the Societe Generale bank Gent Sejko is named the new governor of the Central Bank to replace Ardian Fullani, sacked in July for failing to prevent the theft of five million euros.
- On 17 December the deputy Environment Minister Diana Bejko is sacked over her failure to pay the electricity bills for her summer home.

Greece

- On 6 December a demonstration organised in Athens in memory of the protester Alexis Grigoropoulos who was killed by the police six years ago ends in clashes with the police and dozens of arrests.
- On 8 December the government announces that the first round of the presidential elections scheduled for 2015 are being moved forward to 17 December. The announcement comes a day after the Eurogroup gives Greece a two-month extension on its economic rescue and amid a crisis in the government coalition and economic uncertainty in the international markets over the government’s difficulties to continue applying the reforms agreed with the Troika. On the same day, the Parliament narrowly succeeds in passing the general budget for 2015, widely rejected by the Greek people, despite its exclusion of the new measures required by the Troika.
- On 17 December Antonis Samaras’ cabinet fails to gain the parliamentary support needed to ensure the election of his candidate Stavros Dimas to the Presidency of the Republic. On 21 December Samaras proposes a national coalition government in order to get Dimas elected and thereby avoid early legislative elections being held, in which Syriza is a clear favourite to win. On 29 December the presidential elections fail and early legislative elections are therefore called for 25 January 2015.

Turkey

- On 1 December the Russian President Vladimir Putin announces the suspension of the South Stream gas pipeline project and instead named Turkey as an alternative for a Russian gas pipeline into southern Europe, after the sanctions imposed by Brussels on Moscow over the conflict in Ukraine.
- On 6 December the government announces the introduction of religion as a compulsory subject in public primary school education.
- On 15 December the President Recep Tayyip Erdogan rejects the EU’s criticism of the previous day’s arrest of 27 journalists connected with the Islamist preacher Fethullah Gülen and accused of threatening state security.
- On 20 December over a hundred members of the Turkish teaching union (Egitim-Is) are arrested in Ankara during a demonstration calling for secular education and improved working conditions and salaries.

Cyprus

- On 22 December the Larnaca District Court sentences five public figures, including a politician, trade unionist and businessmen, for the purchase of property in Dromolaxia at above-market prices using the pension fund of the CyTA telecommunications company.

Syria

- On 1 December the World Food Programme (WFP) announces that it has run out of funds and has to cancel the delivery of 1.7 million euros in aid to Syrian refugees. By 9 December the WFP’s appeal raises 6 million euros and it reactivates its aid plan.
- On 2 December the NATO headquarters hosts the first major meeting of the international coalition against IS. The 60 countries at the meeting agree to support the coalition’s military operations; halt the flow of foreign terrorists to Syria and Iraq; cut access to the financing and funds of IS; help the civilian population with humanitarian aid and spread information about the true nature of IS in order to delegitimise it. During the meeting a group of Arab countries forwards a request, dis-
missed by the other members, to begin talks with the part of the Syrian army that, although loyal to the Bashar el-Assad regime, has not committed any kind of war crime.

- On 14 December at least 100 Syrian soldiers and 80 Islamist rebels are killed in fighting for control of the strategic military bases of Wadi al-Dif and al-Hamadiya, Idlib, constituting a victory for the al-Nusra Front.
- On 15 December the Syrian army takes back control of a strategic area of the north of Aleppo city from the al-Nusra Front.
- On 17 December the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights announces the discovery of a mass grave in Kashkiya, Deir al-Zour, in which 230 members of the Sheitat tribe are buried, killed by IS.
- On 25 December army shelling leaves more than 45 dead in al-Bab and Qabaseen, in Aleppo. In the last three days, the Bashir al-Assad regime has stepped up its offensive against the insurgents in Rif Dimashq, Homs, Hama, Hasakah, Idlib, Raqqa and Deir az-Zour.

Jordan

- On 21 December, following a ruling confirmed by the Supreme Court, 11 people found guilty of murder are executed at Swaqa prison. The death penalty has not been used in Jordan since March 2006.
- On 24 December the army announces that one of its planes has crashed in the north of Syria and its pilot captured by IS.

Egypt

- On 2 December the Public Prosecutor appeals the court’s decision to clear the former President Hosni Mubarak, former Interior Minister Habib el-Adly and six collaborators of the murder of demonstrators during the 2011 revolution.
- On 2 December the criminal court of Giza sentences 186 people to death for the murder of 11 police officers in the attack on the Kirdasa police station, on the outskirts of Cairo on 14 August 2013.

Libya

- On 3 December the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the US, Spain, France, Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom and EU and UN representatives meet at the NATO headquarters to draw up a road map to end the political dispute dividing Libya. On 16 December the EU and UN threatens Libya with economic sanctions if the country does not take effective steps towards political dialogue.

Tunisia

- On 2 December the inaugural ceremony for the new Tunisian Parliament takes place. Mohamed Ennaceur (Nidaa Tounes) is elected Speaker of the house.
- On 11 December the former Prime Minister and founder of Ennada Hammadi Jebali leaves the party over differences with the current leadership.
- On 17 December the IS-linked jihadi Abou Bakr al-Hakim claims responsibility for the murders in 2013 of the politicians Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi.
- On 21 December the second round of presidential elections is held with a turnout of 59.04%. Beji Caïd Essebsi wins with 55.68% of the votes.

Algeria

- On 23 December the army kills Abdelmalek al-Gouri, in Boumerdes, the leader of the terrorist group Soldiers of the Caliphate, an IS-affiliated group in Algeria.

Morocco

- On 8 December Abdellah Baha, Morocco’s Minister of State, is hit by a train and killed in Bouznika, in the same place where the socialist MP Ahmed Zaidi died in November, from the Socialist Union of Popular Forces party (USFP).
- On 15–16 December Marrakech hosts the Global Counterterrorism Forum.

EU

- On 1 December Poland’s former Prime Minister Donald Tusk is sworn in as President of the European Council, to replace the Belgian Herman Van Rompuy.

Gibraltar

- On 7 January the ‘Alejandra’ is the first Spanish fishing boat of 2014 to be expelled from Spanish waters in the Bay of Gibraltar, by Gibraltar patrol boats. On 19 February the United Kingdom announces a “high-level formal protest” over the incursion of a Spanish naval ship in Spanish-controlled waters close to Gibraltar, during a British navy training exercise. On 2 April the Spanish ambassador in London and British ambassador in Madrid, Federico Trillo and Simon Manley, are summoned respectively by the Foreign Ministries of the United Kingdom and Spain over Gibraltar’s report of an alleged violation of its sovereignty by the incursion of a Spanish research vessel in the Bay of Gibraltar. Throughout the year there are repeated incidences, hostilities and confrontations in Spanish-controlled waters in the Bay of Gibraltar, involving patrols from the Spanish and Gibraltar authorities, the Spanish and British navies, fishing boats, Spanish research vessels and smuggling vessels. As a result of these incidents, Spanish and British diplomats are regularly summoned in London and Madrid by the respective Foreign Ministries and formal protests are issued before the EU.
- On 2 January the Spanish Supreme Court confirms the 1.7-million-euro fine imposed by the government on Jyske Bank Gibraltar Limited for refusing to reveal the identity of its clients to Spain, protecting them under the banking secrecy law in force on the Rock.
- On 2 July the European Commission sends a fact-finding mission to the Spanish-Gibraltar border to monitor whether or not the recommendations made by Brussels in 2013 to resolve the issue of vehicles and people being held up by Spanish anti-smuggling checks have been applied.
- On 25 July the European Commission considers that Gibraltar has not breached environmental regulations, as
alleged by Spain, with its bunkering activities, land reclaimed from the sea by the Rock and its construction of artificial reefs.

- On 29 July the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) concludes, after a year of investigations, that there are sufficient motives to investigate the Rock’s alleged role as a base for smuggling and tax evasion and recommends that both Spain and the United Kingdom initiate judicial proceedings.

- On 13 August OLAF reports that tobacco smuggling in Gibraltar cost EU tax authorities around 700 million euros between 2010 and 2013.

- On 22 October Spain, the United Kingdom and Gibraltar agree to set up a new forum with its headquarters in Brussels to replace the Tripartite Forum, which will include the participation of the Council Association of Campo de Gibraltar and the Andalusian regional government.

- On 2 December the Spanish Public Works Minister Ana Pastor forces the exclusion of Gibraltar’s airport, built on the isthmus illegally occupied by the United Kingdom, from the Single European Sky regulations.

Western Sahara

- On 8 January the Moroccan security forces disperse an unauthorised gathering organised by the Coordination Committee for the Refusal of Moroccan Nationality in El Aaiun.

- On 29 July the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) concludes, after a year of investigations, that there are sufficient motives to investigate the Rock’s alleged role as a base for smuggling and tax evasion and recommends that both Spain and the United Kingdom initiate judicial proceedings.

- On 26 February Morocco suspends its judicial cooperation with France in reaction to declarations allegedly made by the French Representative to the UN Gerard Araud about France’s deliberate disengagement from the Sahara issue, attributed to the diplomat by the actor Javier Bardem during the presentation of his pro-Saharawi independence film: Sons of the Clouds. Paris flatly denies the allegation. The incident comes three days after the French ambassador in Morocco Charles Fries is summoned to the Moroccan Foreign Ministry in protest over a lawsuit filed in France accusing the Moroccan spy chief Abdelatif Hammouchi of torture.

- On 29 April the United Nations Security Council extends the mandate for the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), but once again excluding human rights monitoring from its competences.

- On 13 May the Canadian diplomat Kim Bolduc is appointed the new head of MINURSO to replace Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber.

- On 15 October Human Rights Watch reports serious restrictions on fundamental rights in the Polisario-managed Tindouf camps.

- On 6 November, in a speech to mark the 39th anniversary of the Green March, Mohammed VI announces the need to review the subsidised economic system of the Western Sahara to promote the region’s socio-economic growth.

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- RTVE
- The New York Times
- The Washington Post
- United Nations News Centre
March sees a resurgence of violence between Israel and the Islamic Jihad endangering the fragile truce agreement reached in November 2012 between Israel and Hamas, the ruling group in the Gaza Strip. Notwithstanding, in the first half of 2014, the US Secretary of State John Kerry’s initiative to relaunch the peace talks continues to advance. Part of this process of rapprochement, also supported by Jordan, includes the release of thousands of Palestinian prisoners held in Israel since late 2013, a decision that is put on hold in April following the PNA President Mahmoud Abbas’ decision to apply to join 15 international UN treaties and conventions. This, together with April’s announcement to form a Palestinian unity government between Fatah and Hamas, which comes to fruition in June, leads to the suspension of the rapprochement process. For Israel’s part, the authorisation of new constructions in the Jewish settlements in Palestine-claimed territory and pressure from the ultra-nationalist members of the Israeli coalition government also contribute to hindering efforts to resume negotiations. The subsequent discovery on 30 June of the bodies of three young Israelis kidnapped days before near Hebron, followed by the murder of a young Palestinian in Jerusalem turns the stalemate into full-blown hostility with the breakout of armed fighting between Israel and the Gaza Strip. Thus, throughout July, Israel responds to the rocket launches from Gaza with the activation of Operation Protective Edge which includes a land offensive to neutralise Hamas and Islamic Jihad positions and destroy the network of secret tunnels along the border. The offensive continues until the end of August, when Egyptian mediation achieves a ceasefire declaration after 50 days of conflict which leaves more than 2,100 Palestinians and almost a hundred Israelis dead. The final quarter of the year is marked by new recognitions by Western parliaments and governments of Palestine as a state, an increase in violence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and the PNA’s announcement in December of Palestine’s formal request for full membership of the International Court of Justice. In Israel, the unstable coalition government breaks apart in December and early elections are called for March 2015 due to differences among members on practically all fronts, particularly with respect to relations with the PNA and November’s approval of the Israeli Nationality Law.

January 2014

Israel

- On 5 January thousands of irregular immigrants, mostly Sudanese and Eritrean arriving in Israel through Egypt, call a strike and hold a mass protest on 8 January outside the Knesset building in Jerusalem to demand an end to the detentions and ask for their regularisation as political refugees.

- On 10 January four days after the US Secretary of State John Kerry leaves Israel following his tenth trip to Jerusalem to demand an end to the detentions and ask for their regularisation as political refugees.

- On 11 January Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister of Israel between 2001 and 2006, passes away.

Palestine

- On 8 January the media reports new negotiations between Fatah and Hamas which have been in process since the end of 2013 to achieve a Palestinian unity government.

- On 9 January several residents of Palestinian refugee camps in the West Bank set fire to tyres and set up roadblocks in protest over the consequences of the United Nations workers’ strike in the area, which began in early December 2013 to demand a pay rise.

Peace Negotiations

- On 1 January the US State Secretary John Kerry arrives in Tel Aviv to begin his tenth visit to the region to reactivate the peace talks since he assumed the post on 1 February 2013. The visit comes to an end on 6 January without approval on a framework agreement.

- On 16 January the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu made an unexpected visit to Jordan to talk with King Abdullah II in an attempt to relaunch the US-brokered peace process. The visit comes a week after the PNA President Mahmoud Abbas’s visit to Jordan to the same end.

- On 29 January Benjamin Netanyahu demands that the Economy Minister and
leader of the ultra-orthodox party Jewish Home, Naftali Bennet, publicly apologise for his criticism of the Prime Minister’s declarations at the Davos Forum. Netanyahu had stated that if a peace agreement were reached between the PNA and Israel, the possibility may exist to consider Jewish settlers remaining but living under Palestinian sovereignty. Hours later, under the threat of Jewish Home’s expulsion from the coalition government, Bennett retracts his criticism. For his part, the Palestinian Chief Negotiator Saeb Erekat assures that the PNA would never agree to Israeli settlers remaining in Palestinian territory.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 13 January two rockets are fired from the Gaza Strip into southern Israel, hours before the funeral of former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, for which Israel employs full security measures.
- On 15 January a group of Israeli settlers try to burn down a mosque in Dir Istia, the West Bank, in response to the beating of two settlers who entered Kusra where, according to local residents, they attacked a teenage boy. This is the last case of so-called price-tag attacks carried out by Israeli settlers on Palestinians and even on the Israeli army itself. According to a UN report, this kind of attacks has multiplied fourfold in the last eight years.
- On 22 January two members of the Islamic Jihad accused of launching missiles into Israeli territory during the funeral of former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, are killed in an Israeli airstrike on Beit Hanoun, Gaza.
- On 29 January a Palestinian from the Jalazone refugee camp in Ramallah is shot dead in the vicinity of the Israeli settlement of Ofra, in the West Bank, by Israeli soldiers.

February 2014

Israel

- On 17 February Benjamin Netanyahu opposes the proposal of PNA President Mahmoud Abbas for the deployment of NATO forces in the territory of the future State of Palestine.

March 2014

Israel

- On 2 March around 400,000 people demonstrate in Jerusalem against the law that, as of 2017, will eliminate most exemptions of rabbinical students from compulsory military service, a move driven by Yair Lapid, Finance Minister and leader of the centrist party Yesh Atid.
- On 5 March the Israeli navy announces it has intercepted the Panamanian-flagged ship Klos C in international waters in the Red Sea, travelling from Iran and carrying Syrian-manufactured M-302 rockets to the Gaza Strip.
- On 12 March, despite a boycott from the opposition, the Knesset approves the electoral reform that raises the threshold for obtaining parliamentary representation from 2% to 3.25% and sets the maximum number of ministers at 18.

Peace Negotiations

- On 19 February John Kerry and Mahmoud Abbas meet in Paris as part of Kerry’s initiative for the peace negotiations to resume between Israel and Palestine with the aim of establishing a new negotiating framework before the end of April 2014.

April 2013

Israel

- On 9 April Benjamin Netanyahu orders legal action to be taken against a
group of pro-settlement activists accused of injuring several Israeli soldiers in the Yitzhar settlement, close to Nablus, after the army demolishes a series of unauthorized homes.

- On 10 April Israel launches its most sophisticated spy satellite into orbit, the Ofek-10.
- On 11 April Naftali Bennett, Economic Minister and leader of the ultra-nationalist party Jewish Home, warns Benjamin Netanyahu that the party will abandon the coalition if the government authorises fresh releases of Palestinian prisoners.

**Palestine**

- On 1 April the Czech police force announces that the death of the Palestinian ambassador in Prague Jamel al-Jamal on 1 January was not caused by the explosion of a security device installed in a safe located in the embassy, but rather the incorrect handling of explosives.
- On 1 April Mahmoud Abbas signs documents to request membership of 15 international UN treaties and conventions.
- On 23 April Fatah and Hamas announce a reconciliation agreement that includes calling elections in January 2015 and the formation, before July, of a unity government, in theory under the leadership of Mahmoud Abbas. Israel warns the Fatah-led PNA that any agreement with Hamas would be incompatible with the peace negotiations.

**Conflicts between the Parties**

- On 23 April the Israeli air force bombs the north of the Gaza Strip, following the announcement of the formation of a Palestinian unity government. Six Palestinian civilians are injured.

**Peace Negotiations**

- On 1 April John Kerry tells Israel that the US will release the US-Israeli spy Jonathan Pollard imprisoned in the US since the eighties, in exchange for Israel releasing 400 Palestinian prisoners held in Israeli prisons and freezing construction work in settlements in the occupied territories.
- On 3 April efforts to resume peace talks are on the verge of collapse after Mahmoud Abbas signs the applications to join 15 international UN treaties and conventions on 1 April. In response, the Israeli Justice Minister Tzvi Livni announces that Israel will suspend the release of 26 members of the fourth batch of Palestinian prisoners out of a total 104 that Israel had promised to release in the summer of 2013. In addition, Jerusalem announces new economic sanctions against Ramallah.
- On 21 April Mahmoud Abbas threatens to dissolve the PNA and giving Israel a legal commitment as an “occupying power” if the peace talks fail again.
- On 23 April after the announcement of the formation of a Fatah and Hamas unity government, Israel cancels a negotiating session scheduled for the same day, although the Palestinian Negotiator Saeb Erekat assures that there was no such meeting scheduled.
- On 27 April in unprecedented declarations given on the eve of Yom HaShoa (Holocaust Day), Mahmoud Abbas, describes the Holocaust against the Jewish people as the most horrific crime against humanity in modern times. Benjamin Netanyahu criticises Abbas for making a pact with Hamas reminding him that the terrorist group controlling Gaza continues to deny the holocaust and is committed to the destruction of Israel.
- On 29 April the nine months that the parties had set to reach a US-brokered framework agreement to reactivate the peace negotiations come to an end without results.
- On 11 May stating that it violates municipal legislation, the Jerusalem City Council demands that the Catholic Church remove the poster located in the old city welcoming Pope Francis, who is visiting the Middle East at the end of the month. On 12 May the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem Fouad Twal expresses his concern at the mounting acts of vandalism against the Christian community in Israel. The statement comes hours after ultra-Orthodox Jews call for holy war against an eventual agreement between Israel and the Vatican to share sovereignty of the Cenacle on Mount Zion in Jerusalem, whose ownership has remained unresolved since both states established diplomatic ties in 1993.

**Conflicts between the Parties**

- On 15 May Israeli soldiers kill two teenagers in Beitunia, the West Bank, who were participating in a solidarity protest for the Palestinian protesters arrested without charges and on hunger strike in the Ofer military prison.
- On 30 May Israeli military sources claim to have prevented a suicide bomb attack at a military checkpoint in Tapuah, the West Bank, with the arrest of a young Palestinian man from Nablus.

**Peace Negotiations**

- On 25 May Pope Francis visits Israel and Palestine during his short tour of the Middle East. The Israeli and Palestinian presidents Mahmoud Abbas and Shimon Peres commit to going to the Vatican in the coming weeks to pray together for peace in the Middle East.

**May 2014**

**Israel**

- On 1 May the media reports the unprecedented mass protest on Facebook of tens of thousands of Israelis – many of them members of the army or undertaking compulsory military service – against the vulnerability of soldiers facing constant clashes with the Palestinian population and the lack of support from the Israeli authorities.

**June 2014**

**Israel**

- On 4 June the Israeli government announces the tender for the construction
of some 1,500 new homes in the settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, a decision that coincides with the announcement of Palestine’s new unity government, which Israel opposes due to Hamas’ classification as a terrorist organisation.

- On 10 June the Parliament elects Reuven Rivlin as successor to Shimon Peres as President of Israel. Rivlin, from Likud’s more conservative wing, becomes the country’s tenth President after defeating Meir Scheetrit in the second round, from Justice Minister Tzipi Livni’s centrist Hatnuah party.

- On 22 June a missile launched from Syrian territory leaves one dead in the Golan Heights. This is the first fatality in the area since the outbreak of war in Syria. In response, the Israeli army attacks several rebel positions in Syria and strengthens its positions in the area.

- On 28 June Jordan and Israel reach a defence agreement against the Jihadist threat spreading through neighbouring Syria and Iraq.

- On 1 June a Fatah representative Azzam el-Ahmed announces on Hamas’ official website Al-Rai that the new unity government agreed with Hamas will come into being on 2 June in Ramallah as an interim cabinet pending the holding of elections in 2015, in accordance with the reconciliation agreement reached in April.

- On 2 June despite opposition and warnings from Israel, Fatah and Hamas announce the composition of the new interim national unity government and its 17 ministers are sworn into their posts in Ramallah’s Mukataa, before Mahmoud Abbas. The technocratic government is headed by the current Prime Minister in the West Bank Rami Hamdallah, who also assumes the position of Interior Minister. Riyad Maliki will continue as Foreign Minister despite Hamas’ opposition. The Minister of Prisoners’ Affairs will continue to answer to the PNA and not the PLO, at Mahmoud Abbas’ request, to avoid possible criticism from certain donor countries.

- On 9 June Hamas blames Rami Hamdallah’s new Palestinian reconciliation government for the salary crisis in Gaza where Hamas civil servants are yet to receive salaries from May.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 3 June a Palestinian militant is killed and an Israeli soldier injured in Nablus during a shootout in the West Bank, which began when the Palestinian opened fire on a border patrol.

- On 12 June three young Israelis hitchhiking near the Gush Etzion settlement in Hebron are kidnapped. Benjamin Netanyahu blames Hamas and the security forces carry out widespread raids in the ensuing days in the Hebron area, making hundreds of arrests. On 17 June during the sixth day of Operation Return Brothers in search of the three kidnapped Israelis, Israel arrests a further 51 Palestinians, who were released in 2011 under the agreement reached between Israel and the PNA. On 18 June an intense firefight erupts in Jenin during the searches carried out by the Israeli army to locate the missing people. On 20 June another Palestinian is killed in fresh clashes during the search and arrest operation. On 22 June a further two Palestinians are killed in clashes during the raids.

- On 25 June a missile launched from Gaza to Ashkelon, misfires and hits a house in Beit Lahia, in north Gaza, killing a Palestinian girl. This is one of five missiles launched at southern Israel, two of which are neutralised by Israel’s Iron Dome defence system, another two landing in Palestinian territory and a fifth in Sedot Negev causing material damages. Israel responds with an air strike on five underground launchers in north Gaza and an arms deposit in the south of the Strip.

- On 25 June dozens of Palestinians end a two-month hunger strike in protest against their administrative arrests after reaching an agreement with the Israeli government.

- On 31 June the three young Israelis who went missing in East Jerusalem are found dead in the village of Halhul by Israeli soldiers. The ensuing military deployment ends in fighting with Palestinian protestors.

Peace Negotiations

- On 27 June the EU Special Envoy for Peace Negotiations Martin Indyk resigns a year after his appointment due to the collapse in negotiations.

July 2014

Israel

- On 24 July Reuven Rivlin takes over as President of Israel.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 1 July the Israeli Air Force bombs Hamas and Islamic Jihad positions in Gaza, hours after the discovery of the bodies of three young Israelis murdered in the West Bank. The same day the charred remains of a young Palestinian who went missing in East Jerusalem are found west of the capital. The news triggers major unrest in East Jerusalem, which continues the following day while the Israeli army bombs Hamas positions in Gaza.

- On 8 July Israel begins Operation Protective Edge against the rocket launches from Gaza.

- On 9 July Hamas announces rocket launches aimed at Haifa which are intercepted by the Iron Dome system. Other missiles do reach parts of Jerusalem and areas near Tel Aviv and the Dimona nuclear plant.

- On 14 July 10,000 Palestinians evacuate their homes in Gaza at the close of the ultimatum given by Israel for Hamas to cease the rocket launches into Israeli territory. The Arab League asks the international community to protect the people of Gaza. The same day, 130 rockets are launched at Israel. Just 22 are intercepted by the Iron Dome system.

- On 15 July Israel halts its attacks on Gaza after accepting an Egyptian proposal for a ceasefire. For their part, Hamas rejects any truce prior to a complete agreement with Israel. Around a hundred rockets are fired from Gaza and Israel resumes Operation Protective Edge.

- On 16 July Israel unilaterally declares an end to the hostilities for five hours, a
measure requested by the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process Robert Serry to allow humanitarian aid to be delivered to civilians in Gaza. Hamas accepts the ceasefire.

- On 17 July the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) finds 20 rockets in one of their refugee schools and reports that its facilities are being used by militias from the Strip for military ends, endangering the safety of the civilian population.

- On 17 July Benjamin Netanyahu orders the start of an immediate land offensive on Gaza in a new phase of Operation Protective Edge, after fresh plans are discovered for Hamas to attack the Sufa kibbutz through a secret tunnel. The aim of the land invasion would be to destroy the entire network of secret tunnels and bunkers.

- On 20 July 13 Israeli soldiers are killed during the land offensive. A further seven are killed by an anti-tank missile. On the same day, in Shujaiya, the Israeli offensive leaves at least 100 Palestinians and 13 Israeli officers and soldiers dead.

- On 21 July an attack by Israeli forces on a hospital in Gaza leaves four dead and fifty wounded.

- On 22 July Hamas launches four M75 rockets at Tel Aviv, one of which lands in the vicinity of the Ben Gurion International airport and leads to the cancellation of the majority of international flights to Israel.

- On 24 July 16 people are killed and another 200 are injured in an attack by the Israeli Air Force on a school of the UNRWA in Beit Hanoun, Gaza.

- On 26 July Benjamin Netanyahu orders a second 12-hour humanitarian ceasefire, which is accepted by Hamas. After the 12 hours, shooting resumes despite a request from the international community in Paris to prolong the ceasefire. Hamas refuses to extend the truce if Israel does not first withdraw its units from the Strip.

- On 26 July a peaceful demonstration in Tel Aviv calls for an end to the land offensive on Gaza. In parallel, the nationalist right organises a separate march in favour of continuing the war and putting an end to the Hamas government in the Strip, forcing the local police force to deploy officers in the surrounding areas to quell the unrest.

- On 28 July the day of Eid al-Fitr which marks the end of Ramadan, seven Palestinian children are killed by an Israeli missile that lands in a refugee camp in Gaza. On the same day, Israel bombs the Strip’s main hospital, al-Shifa. In addition, at least four Israeli civilians are killed and eight injured in Eahkol by a Palestinian howitzer.

- On 30 July another UN school in Jabalia is bombed. At least 15 people are killed and a further 90 are injured.

- On 30 July the Israeli army unilaterally announces the opening of a “humanitarian window” between 15:00 and 19:00. The offer is rejected by Hamas, which continues with the rocket launches into southern Israel. The Israeli army attacks Shujajyeh and Khan Yunis.

- On 31 July Mahmoud Abbas declares the Strip to be a “humanitarian disaster zone” in a letter of protest to the UN. Israel announces that it will not accept a truce that prevents its soldiers from completing their mission to destroy all tunnels built by Hamas.

### August 2014

**Israel**

- On 5 August Barack Obama ratifies a law that allows the US to give an additional 168 million euros in emergency aid for the Israeli Iron Dome anti-missile system.

- On 26 August the ceasefire agreement reached between Israel and Hamas after 50 days of conflict in Gaza endangers the survival of the Israeli coalition government, whose more conservative members, headed by the Ministers of the Economy, Naftali Bennett; Foreign Affairs, Avigdor Lieberman; and Interior, Yitzhak Aharonovich, refuse to sign the agreement and demand greater force be used against the Palestinian militants in the Strip.

- On 27 August an Israeli civilian is injured by a missile fired from Syrian territory that lands in a kibbutz located in the north of the Golan Heights, just hours after an Israeli soldier is injured by a stray bullet from the fighting on the Syrian-Israeli border. Israel responds with artillery fire into Quneita in Syria, which is taken during the day by the al-Nusra Front after intense fighting with forces loyal to Bashar al-Assad, in which at least 20 soldiers and four jihadists are killed.

- On 29 August the Office of Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu denies agreeing to create a Palestinian state on the 1967 borders, contradicting the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.

- On 31 August Israel declares 400 hectares in the Gvaot settlement in Gush Etzion, Judea as state land, bringing into force a government decision taken in June in response to the kidnapping and murder by Hamas of three teenage Israelis who were hitchhiking in the West Bank.

**Palestine**

- On 7 August Hamas admits to having executed Palestinian militants in recent weeks accused of collaborating with the enemy after the body is found of Ayman Taha, Hamas’ spokesman in the Gaza Strip, who was murdered for allegedly spying for Egypt.

### Conflicts between the Parties

- On 1 August a ceasefire enters into force agreed the night before by Israel and Hamas at the proposal of the US and UN, which is broken 90 minutes later. Fighting resumes after Israel accuses Hamas of new rocket launches and the kidnapping of Lieutenant Hadar Goldin during a screening operation in Rafah.

- On 2 August UNICEF states that since the beginning of Operation Protective Edge, 296 Palestinian children and teenagers have died, representing 30% of the civilian casualties. According to the Health Ministry in Gaza, the total death toll exceeds 1,650 in the Strip. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay asks Israel to assume responsibility for the “growing evidence of war crimes” perpetrated by the Israeli army in Gaza.

- On 3 August at least 10 people are killed in an attack by the Israeli army in Rafah that affects a United Nations school-shelter.
On 4 August the Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman proposes that the UN take control of the Gaza Strip once Israel has "defeated" Hamas.

On 4 August Israel and Hamas accept a 72-hour ceasefire proposed by Egypt that will begin at 8:00 on 5 August. Israel announces that it will withdraw all its troops from Gaza once the truce begins.

On 5 August the Israeli army withdraws from Gaza claiming to have completed its operations to locate and destroy all of Hamas' tunnels between Gaza and Israel. At least 32 tunnels and dozens of access points have been destroyed.

On 5 August Hamas is accused of firing several rockets minutes before the entry into force at 8:00 on 5 August of the 72-hour humanitarian ceasefire proposed by Egypt and accepted by the Israeli government and Palestinian factions.

On 5 August the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' armed wing, assure that the "chapters of the battle against the Israeli entity" will continue "until Israel accepts the rights of the Palestinian people and their just demands."

On 5 August an Israeli delegation composed of Yitzhak Molcho, adviser to Benjamin Netanyahu, Yoram Cohen, head of the Shin Bet security agency and Amos Gilad, head of the political office of the Defence Ministry, arrives in Cairo to negotiate a definitive ceasefire with the Palestinian leaders of Hamas, Fatah and Islamic Jihad taking advantage of the 72-hour ceasefire currently in force.

On 8 August at the end of the 72-hour ceasefire brokered by Egypt and with the parties unable to reach an agreement in Cairo for a definitive truce, the hostilities resume. Israel, which had agreed to extend the truce, attacks several positions in the Gaza Strip in response to rocket launches into Israeli territory. The same day, the Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman asks the EU to send inspectors to the Gaza borders to control Palestinian trade with the neighbouring territories. One of Hamas' demands for extending the truce is the immediate lifting of the land and sea blockade on the Strip, an unacceptable request for Israel, which, for its part, demands Hamas' demilitarisation.

On 10 August the attacks between both sides intensify.

On 11 August at 00:00 a new 72-hour ceasefire is agreed between Israel and Hamas while both sides continue to look for a definitive agreement in Cairo under Egyptian mediation and assisted by the US.

On 13 August, faced with the lack of advances in the negotiations, Israel and Hamas agree to extend the 72-hour ceasefire, which began in the early hours of 11 August, for five more days -taking it to 18 August.

On 14 August Israel and Hamas mutually accuse one another of having violated the latest ceasefire after Benjamin Netanyahu orders the Israeli army to respond to an alleged rocket fired from Gaza at Eshkol, Netivot, Sedot Negev and Ashkelon. Such an attack would have meant a violation by the Gaza Strip government of their agreement to extend the truce just moments after it entered into force.

On 18 August Israeli soldiers demolish the homes of two Palestinians suspected of kidnapping and murdering the three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank in June.

On 18 August Israel and the Palestinian factions in Cairo agree to extend the truce in Gaza for another 24 hours while negotiations for a definitive ceasefire continue.

On 19 August the Turkish shipping company Karadeniz announces that it is sending a floating power station to Gaza in the next 120 days to ease the power shortages in the Strip caused by the current conflict with Israel.

On 20 August several rockets launched from Gaza, responded to with bombs fired at the Strip by the Israeli army, put an end to the 24-hour extension of the ceasefire leaving the indirect negotiations in Cairo on the brink of collapse.

On 20 August Hamas confirms that the wife and daughter of Mohammed Deif, commander of the armed wing of the al-Qassam Brigades, have been killed in the previous day's air strike on the Gaza Strip.

On 21 August three commanders of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades – Mohammed Abu Shamalla, Raed al-Atar and Mohammed Barhoum – are killed in an Israeli air strike on Rafah. Hours later, Hamas announces that it has executed three Palestinians and arrested a further seven for collaborating with Israel.

On 23 August an Israeli air strike destroys a 13-story residential building in the centre of Gaza city leaving 17 people injured. The Israeli army claims that the building was being used as the command centre for Hamas militias. According to Ashraf al-Qedra, emergency spokesman in the Strip, nine people have been killed and 20 others injured during a day of Israeli attacks. Israel warns that it will step up its offensive against Hamas and whoever provides its militants with protection, which includes planning air strikes on densely populated areas in Gaza. Israel warns the people of Gaza to evacuate areas close to launch sites used by Hamas and other Islamist militias.

On 23 August Hamas kills another four people accused of collaborating with Israel, bringing the number of extrajudicial executions in Gaza in the last 72 hours to 25. In Ramallah, the PNA describes the executions as illegal.

On 26 August the United States unveils a draft resolution to be presented before the United Nations in an attempt to reach a ceasefire agreement between Israel and the Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip. This is a version in parallel to those presented by Germany, France and the United Kingdom and by Jordan that include the need to create an international mission to monitor the situation.

On 26 August the Israeli army reports the bombing of at least 30 targets in Gaza and 71 rockets fired from the Strip land in Israeli territory without causing any damages.

On 26 August at 19:00 the new ceasefire enters into force agreed by Israel and Hamas under Egyptian mediation and which puts an end to 50 days of conflict that has left more than 2,100 Palestinians and 70 Israelis dead. The key points of the agreement, as disclosed by Israeli and Palestinian leaders, are: the immediate halt of attacks by either side without exception; Israel's opening of the border crossings with Gaza, the control of whose border with Israel will be passed over...
to the PNA, which will also lead the coordination of reconstruction activities in Gaza with international donors; and the reduction of the buffer zone around Gaza from 300 to 100 metres and the extension from three to six miles of the fishing zone off the coast of Gaza for Palestinians. In addition, in a separate and bilateral agreement, Egypt agrees to reopening its border with Gaza and Rafah.

September 2014

Israel

- On 14 September the military leadership and a wide range of political forces in Israel criticise 43 reservists that signed a letter refusing to serve in Israel’s largest military intelligence unit, the 8200, alleging that it “spies on innocent Palestinians” and “serves to deepen the occupation of the West Bank.”
- On 23 September the Israeli Air Force shoots down a MiG-21 fighter jet from the Syrian air force in the province of Quneitra, in the Golan Heights, after the plane enters Israeli airspace. According to Haaretz, this is the first time since 1989 that the Israeli Air Force has intercepted an aircraft from the Syrian regime. The Syrian regime confirms Israel’s downing of one of its fighter jets, described by Damascus as “an act of aggression.”

Palestine

- On 7 September Mahmoud Abbas threatens to stop collaborating with Hamas, if the latter does not allow the Palestinian unity government created in June to exercise its authority in the Gaza Strip.
- On 25 September Fatah and Hamas reach an agreement enabling the Palestinian unity government to also assume control of the Gaza Strip, one of the requirements of the August agreement with Israel to end Operation Protective Edge.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 4 September Israel arrests eight Palestinian citizens connected with the murder of three young Israelis close to Hebron in June.
- On 4 September the Palestinian government and the UN believe it will cost 9 billion euros to reconstruct the Gaza Strip in the wake of the conflict with Israel during July and August.
- On 7 September groups of Palestinian demonstrators clash with Israeli soldiers in East Jerusalem after it is revealed that a young Palestinian from Wadi al-Joz has died from wounds suffered in a clash with Israeli police at the beginning of the month.
- On 10 September a Palestinian is shot dead by Israeli soldiers carrying out a raid in the al-Amari refugee camp, close to Ramallah, in search of a Hamas militant. The soldiers are met with some 50 Palestinians throwing stones and firebombs.
- On 17 September a missile is fired from the Gaza Strip and lands in the Eshkol Regional Council without causing any damages. Although Hamas denies being behind the missile launch, the attack raises fears of an Israeli reprisal, thus ending the ceasefire and breaking the agreement reached between the PNA and Israel hours earlier in Cairo for the creation of a mechanism to allow the reconstruction of Gaza to begin.
- On 23 September Israeli soldiers kill Marwan Qawasmeh and Amer Abu Aisha in Hebron, both Hamas members and the prime suspects in the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli students on 12 July near to Gush Etzion, the West Bank.

Peace Negotiations

- On 2 September, speaking at a UN press conference, Mahmoud Abbas’ adviser Hanan Ashrawi announces the PNA and PLO’s intention for Israel to abandon the Palestinian occupied territories in the next three years. The declaration explains efforts to raise international support, including in the United States, in the hope that the UN Security Council – or failing that, the General Assembly – approves a resolution that supports this timetable for the end of occupation.
- On 3 September a Palestinian delegation formed by the negotiators of the ceasefire with Israel holds a meeting with John Kerry in search of the latter’s “clear commitment for the 1967 borders to be respected and for the end of the Israeli occupation in a specified timeframe.”

October 2014

Israel

- On 5 October the Israeli Foreign Ministry summons the Swedish ambassador, Carl Magnus Nesser, after Sweden’s new Prime Minister Stefan Löfven announces that his country will recognise the Palestinian State.
- On 22 October Israeli soldiers are shot at on the Egyptian border.
- On 26 October a new directive is sued by the Defence Minister Moshe Yaalon will ban Palestinians from traveling on Israeli buses in the West Bank as of November.
- On 27 October Benjamin Netanyahu orders the planning of 400 homes in Har Joma and 600 in Ramat Shlomo, both in East Jerusalem, as well as new infrastructure to be built in the West Bank.

Palestine

- On 9 October the first meeting of the Palestinian unity government takes place since the 2007 conflict between Hamas and Fatah, amid tight security measures. The Palestinian factions agreed in September that the unity government would assume immediate authority in Gaza before the International Donor Conference is held in Cairo on 12 October.
- On 13 October the British Parliament approves a non-binding, symbolic resolution with 274 votes in favour and 12 against in support of the United Kingdom’s recognition of the Palestinian State.
- On 22 October the Irish Parliament approves a non-binding resolution asking the government to recognise Palestine as an independent state.
- On 30 October Sweden recognises Palestine as an independent state as a necessary measure to relaunch the peace process, according to the Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström.
Conflicts between the Parties

- On 12 October the International Donor Conference in Cairo, co-hosted by Egypt and Norway, raises 5.4 billion dollars for the Palestinian government towards the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip in the wake of Israel’s Operation Protective Edge. The countries gathered in the Egyptian capital say the efficiency of the aid money relies on Israel lifting its embargo on Gaza and the resumption of peace talks between Israel and Palestine, culminating in an agreement to end the Israeli occupation and the creation of two states in the region. Egypt asks Israel to reconsider the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative by which the grounds for an Arab recognition of Israel would be the Jewish State returning to the 1967 borders. The United States announces the immediate delivery of 212 million dollars in addition to the 190 million already pledged. Both the US Secretary of State John Kerry and the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon reiterate the importance of reaching a definitive peace agreement beyond the current temporary ceasefire. Qatar announces a billion dollars in aid and the United Emirates 200 million. The UN, Israel, and the PNA agree on a mechanism to give shelter to the thousands of displaced persons, which guarantees that reconstruction material is not used by Hamas to rebuild the tunnels. In addition, the PNA offers the reconciliation of Hamas and Fatah as a guarantee for the international donors. The PNA will assume immediate control over the Erez and Kerem Shalom border crossings.

- On 16 October the unrest on the streets intensifies, ongoing since the beginning of the month in Jerusalem and Ramallah, with the death of a Palestinian child who was shot by Israeli security forces in Beit Liqya, a town close to Ramallah. According to Israeli army spokesmen, the soldiers responded with gunfire to a Molotov cocktail attack launched at a distance of 20 metres by a group of young Palestinians. The clashes in Jerusalem, which are becoming increasingly frequent, come after a violent summer marked by the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers, the subsequent raids, the revenge killing of a young Palestinian from Shuafat and the 50-day war between Israel and Hamas; as well as the tension around the Temple Mount, which Israel and Palestine both claim as their own. These clashes are being reproduced on the diplomatic level between Israel and Palestine before the UN General Assembly over Palestine’s request for the UN to approve a resolution that sets the deadline for ending the Israeli occupation and allowing the creation of its State.

- On 22 October the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon announces that he will establish a commission to investigate the Israeli attacks on the UN facilities in the Gaza Strip during the Protective Edge offensive.

- On 23 October an Israeli baby is killed and another eight people are injured in an attack carried out by a Palestinian driver from Silwan, East Jerusalem, who intentionally ran over the pedestrians while they were waiting for a tram in Givat HaTachmoshet, in north Jerusalem. Hamas assumes responsibility for the attack as a response to the Israeli occupation of territories claimed by Palestine. Benjamin Netanyahu issues a statement blaming Mahmoud Abbas for the attack citing his alliance with Hamas in the unity government. This serious incident ignites tensions, provoking clashes between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli security forces in the West Bank, which raise fresh fears of a third intifada.

- On 30 October Israeli police shoot dead a Palestinian wanted for his alleged involvement in the assassination attempt of Yehuda Glick, a prominent ultra-nationalist Rabbi. Glick, who demands greater Jewish presence at the Temple Mount, was seriously wounded when leaving a conference the previous night by shots fired by a man who fled on a motorbike toward West Jerusalem. The clashes intensify in Jerusalem between Palestinian demonstrators and the police, who proceed to close the Temple Mount for the first time in 40 years to prevent a major outbreak of violence. Hours later, Israel reopens access to the Temple Mount, but only to those over 50 years old.

November 2014

Israel

- On 2 November the Council of Ministers approves a reform of the Penal Code under which anyone throwing stones or other objects at cars is punishable with up to 20 years in prison, a measure that aims to put a stop to the unrest in recent days in Jerusalem between the police and Palestinian demonstrators. On the same day, the Israeli government reopens access for Jewish visitors to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem.

- On 3 November Benjamin Netanyahu orders plans to go ahead for the construction of 600 homes in the Ramat Shlomo settlement north of Jerusalem, and a further 400 in the Har Joma settlement in the district of Bethlehem.

- On 4 November Israel reopens the Erez crossing, which borders Gaza, after a four-day closure for security reasons due to rising tensions in the area.

- On 12 November the Israeli authorities give preliminary approval to the construction of 200 new homes in a Jewish neighbourhood in Ramot, East Jerusalem, amid rising tensions in the city. To these 200 homes are added a further 174 in unspecified Arab neighbourhoods in the city.

- On 14 November Israel lifts the age restriction for entering the Temple Mount for prayer, stepping up security measures throughout Jerusalem and other sensitive areas.

- On 20 November the Mayor of Ashkelon, Itamar Shimon, imposes a partial ban on hiring Arab workers, faced with mounting tension in the area.

- On 20 November the Israeli government agrees to cooperate with the United Nations investigation into the war crimes allegedly committed during Operation Protective Edge, headed by the Canadian judge William Schabas, with Senegalese lawyer Doudou Diene and US judge Mary McGowan Davis.

- On 21 November Israel reveals the results of a joint operation of the army, police and Israeli security agency Shin Bet, which succeeded in bringing down a Hamas commando unit accused of plotting to assassinate the Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman during
the summer of 2014, during Operation Protective Edge. The four members of the cell and residents of Harmala, a town close to the Israeli settlement of Nokdim, where Lieberman’s family lives, remain under arrest.

On 23 November the Israeli Council of Ministers approves with a majority of 14 votes to seven the so-called Israeli Nationality Law, an initiative that declares Israel as “the home of the Jewish people,” despite the vote against by two centrist parties in the coalition.

On 29 November General Gadi Eisenkot is appointed Israel’s new Chief of-Staff, considered a moderate regarding Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as the Iranian nuclear plan, but also known for his tough measures in the face of serious threat.

**Palestine**

On 9 November Mahmoud Abbas announces that the acts of commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the death of Yasser Arafat scheduled for 11 November are suspended in Gaza after Hamas states it is “not in a position to be able to ensure security.”

On 18 November the Spanish Parliament gives almost unanimous approval to a bill urging the government to recognise Palestine as a state, reaffirming its conviction that the “only possible solution” to the conflict is the coexistence of two states.

On 26 November Egypt orders the opening of the Rafah border crossing with Gaza, which had been closed for a month due to instability in Sinai, allowing thousands of Palestinians stranded outside the Strip to return to their homes.

**Conflicts between the Parties**

On 5 November intense clashes break out between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli security forces in the vicinity of the Temple Mount, which spread throughout the Old City and East Jerusalem.

On 8 November the Israeli police shoot dead a young man of Israeli-Arab origin who had allegedly been trying to attack police officers in the town of Kafr Kanna, Galilee. The death sparks new clashes in the West Bank. On 9 November Israel goes on heightened alert shortly after an Israeli driver survives a lynching attempt in Taipe.

On 10 November a Palestinian man from Hebron armed with a knife murders a young Israeli woman and injures three others close to the Alon Shvut settlement, in the south of the West Bank. Hamas and Islamic Jihad describe the attacks as “legitimate action.” Hours earlier, a Palestinian Hamas supporter from Nablus stabs an Israeli soldier in southern Tel Aviv.

On 11 November a young Palestinian is shot dead by Israeli soldiers in clashes in the Al-Arroub refugee camp, north of Hebron. New clashes also break out close to Ramallah and in the south of the West Bank.

On 12 November a mosque in al-Maghir, close to Ramallah, and a synagogue in Shfaram, northern Israel are set on fire amid rising tensions between Palestinians and Israelis.

On 17 November a Palestinian bus driver found hanged in his vehicle in Jerusalem sparks fighting between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli security forces, despite an autopsy describing the death as a suicide.

On 18 November two Palestinian attackers from East Jerusalem linked with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine murder four people in a synagogue in the orthodox Jewish neighbourhood of Har Nof, West Jerusalem, before being shot dead by police. On 19 November an Israeli police officer dies from injuries suffered in the attack.

On 18 November Israeli forces demolish the home of the Palestinian citizen who on 22 October ran over several people in Jerusalem leaving two dead and five injured.

On 18 November a young Palestinian is injured after being shot by an Israeli following a demonstration held by Jewish settlers on the outskirts of Beitan, close to Ramallah. The incident comes hours after a Palestinian is stabbed by a group of Israelis in the north of East Jerusalem.

On 20 November a young Palestinian is shot dead by Israeli soldiers in Jabalia, on the border between Israel and the north of the Gaza Strip. According to the Israeli army, the young man and another person ignored warnings from the soldiers to leave the security area and move away from the border fence.

On 24 November the Israeli police arrest three Palestinians suspected of stabbing several Israeli students as they were leaving a religious academy in Jerusalem’s Old City. In recent days, both Palestinians and Israelis report attacks on the city’s streets.

**December 2014**

**Israel**

On 2 December Benjamin Netanyahu dismisses two of his main centrist members, the Finance Minister and leader of Yesh Atid (There is a Future) Yair Lapid and the Justice Minister and leader of Hatnuah party Tzipi Livni, making the coalition government crisis official and forcing early elections to be scheduled. The dismissals are followed by the resignation of the four remaining Yesh Atid ministers.

On 3 December the Israeli political parties agree to hold early parliamentary elections on 17 March 2015.

On 10 December the leader of the opposition and labour party Yitzhak Herzog and the leader of the centrist Hatnua party Tzipi Livni agree to form an alliance for the elections on 17 March 2015 to defeat Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud. If the labour-centrist coalition wins in the elections, Herzog would be the Head of Government for the first two years, after which Livni would take over.

**Palestine**

On 2 December the French National Assembly supports the recognition of the Palestinian State with 339 votes in favour and 151 against; a decision that is non-binding for the French government.

On 17 December the EU Court of Justice orders the European Council to revert its decision on 27 December 2001 to include Hamas in the list of terrorist organisations, which was drawn up on the same date. The court establishes that the inclusion of Hamas in the list “is not based on acts examined and confirmed in decisions of
competent authorities, but on factual imputations derived from the media and Internet."

- On 17 December the European Parliament votes in favour of adopting a symbolic recognition of the Palestinian State within a two-state (Israel and Palestine) solution and linked to the peace process.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 1 December Israeli soldiers shoot a Palestinian linked with Fatah who, according to witnesses and the army, had stabbed and slightly injured a civilian close to the Gush Etzion settlement bloc in the West Bank. The attacker remains in critical condition in Hadassah Ein Kerem Hospital in Jerusalem.
- On 3 December the Israeli security forces arrest three Palestinians following an attack in the West Bank in which one of the men stabbed two Israelis in a supermarket close to the Maale Adumim settlement, on the outskirts of Jerusalem.
- On 10 December Ziad Abu Ein, a Palestinian minister without portfolio who headed a department dealing with the settlements and East Jerusalem and West Bank separation fence, dies in Turmus Aya after clashes with Israeli soldiers and border police.
- On 16 December Israeli soldiers shoot dead a Palestinian during a raid on the Qalandia refugee camp in the West Bank, in which various explosive devices are captured and another Palestinian is arrested.
- On 19 December Israel responds to a rocket launched into southern Israel by bombing a cement factory suspected of producing material for reconstructing the smuggling tunnels destroyed during Operation Protective Edge.
- On 20 December in response to a missile fired from Gaza at Eshkol, the Israeli Air Force attacks a training camp of Hamas’s armed wing in the south of the Strip. Neither attack causes any personal injury.
- On 24 December Tayseer Asmairi, leader of Hamas’ armed wing in the south of Gaza and in charge of border observation points, is killed in the most serious fighting on the Israeli-Gaza Strip border seen since the end of the Protective Edge offensive in August. The incident, in which an Israeli soldier is injured, comes after an Israeli army patrol responds with artillery to an attack by an unidentified sniper in the area of Khan Yunis.

Peace Negotiations

- On 17 December Jordan, a non-permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, submits a draft resolution on behalf of Palestine and the Arab countries that establishes a one-year period to conclude the peace negotiations, aimed at establishing two democratic and prosperous states based on the 1967 borders and with Jerusalem as the capital for both, and sets 2017 as the deadline for completing the Israeli withdrawal from the Palestinian territories. On 30 December the resolution is rejected with votes against from the United States and Australia and abstentions from the United Kingdom, Lithuania, Nigeria, Rwanda and South Korea.

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Appendices

Chronologies

Euromed Chronology

January

Greek Presidency
1 – Athens: Greece starts its 5th Presidency of the Council of the EU underlining a major turning point for the future of the EU, ahead of the May 2014 European elections. The main priorities can be summarised as follows: growth and jobs, with a focus on alleviating unemployment – particularly among the young – and boosting job-creating investments in the real economy; deepening European and eurozone economic governance, which means working towards implementation of the agreement on the banking union and pursuing the European deposit guarantee scheme; and security of the common borders, including policies and initiatives for confronting illegal migration, as well as for promoting growth-oriented mobility within an area of freedom, security and justice.

http://gr2014.eu/

Humanitarian Aid
15 – Kuwait: The European Commission pledges an extra €165 million for vital humanitarian assistance and for areas such as education and support to host communities and local societies for 2014 at the International Pledging Conference for Syria. This brings the total funding to over €1.1 billion since the start of the crisis, including €615 million in life-saving humanitarian aid alone.

Socio-Economic Development
20 – Brussels: The EU adopts an assistance package worth €45 million to address socio-economic priorities expressed by the people, through concrete bilateral actions in Jordan, Libya and Tunisia. These actions directly benefit citizens in these countries and bring tangible results in the fields of agriculture, environment, migration and education. In Jordan, this support also aims to mitigate the consequences of the Syrian refugee crisis in the country.

Rural Development
20 – Brussels: A project of €10 million for agricultural and rural development is approved by the EU in Tunisia as part of the Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (ENPARD) with the aim of sharing EU best practices and providing farmers and producers with the necessary skills to actively participate in reducing the vulnerability of poor and marginalised households. Reducing the socio-economic divide is a key priority in Tunisia’s political transition process, with a focus on promoting inclusive agricultural policies that promote job creation and food production by small and medium-sized agricultural enterprises.

Anna Lindh Foundation
29-31 – Tunis: ALF holds a meeting on “The role of citizens in building open and plural societies” gathering 80 civil society leaders and experts, representatives of ALF National Networks, and key partner institutions such as the League of Arab States (LAS). They tackle fields like education, intercultural citizenship, youth participation, social changes and media narratives.

February

Audiovisual
4 – Amman: A workshop for narrative film projects takes place under an initiative supported by the Med Film Factory project within the framework of the Euromed Audiovisual programme. The workshop is attended by the producers of several feature film projects from the Arab world. It includes one-to-one sessions with mentors, as well as the presentation of production case studies.

www.medfilmfactory.com/

IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook
7 – Brussels: The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) presents the new edition of the IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2013 at the European Parliament. The presentation is presided over by the European ENP Commissioner Füle. This is the occasion for the commissioner to give an overview of the changing situation in the southern Mediterranean, express the willingness of the EU to support partners in the region who embark on political transitions and recall the pivotal role civil societies play in these processes.

www.iemed.org/

Horizon 2020
9 – Cairo: The EC organises a regional conference to launch Horizon 2020 in the Euromed region. The conference, “Meeting Euromed Common Challenges,” brings together around 400 policymakers, researchers, representatives from academia and industry and research institutes, technology transfer centres, incubators, and technology platforms. Different parallel sessions at
the conference enable participants to share know-how, explore gaps and links between research and innovation, as well as develop an understanding of how research and innovation initiatives could create complementarities and synergies that allow leveraging potentials and addressing societal challenges in the region.


Industrial Cooperation
19 – Brussels: Representatives from more than 30 EuroMed countries and partners gather at the UfM’s 9th Ministerial Meeting on Euro-Mediterranean industrial cooperation. The aim is to enhance support for SMEs and further develop its ultimate ambition to create a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area. International and national business associations as well as international organisations are also present to contribute to the debate. Ministers adopt the new Euro-Mediterranean Industrial Cooperation Work Programme for the period 2014-2015.

Anna Lindh
20 – Beirut: ALF organises a forum on the participation of young people in local public life. In the framework of the Dawrak-Citizens for Dialogue Programme, the initiative is in cooperation with the Bureau of United Cities and Local Governments, and the Lebanese National Commission for UNESCO. The Forum brings together 70 participants from Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, as well as experts from other countries. It is intended to share different experiences in the field of cooperation between local authorities, civil society and institutions, and to develop the capacity of civil society in the field of dialogue management at the local level.

ARLEM
23 – 24 Tangier: ARLEM (Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly) holds its 5th plenary session. On the agenda, besides the discussion and adoption of ARLEM’s annual report on “The Territorial Dimension of the Union for the Mediterranean” and ARLEM’s work programme, is the adoption of the report of the Commission for Economic, Social and Territorial Affairs (ECOTER) on a cohesion strategy for the Mediterranean, and of the Commission for Sustainable Development (SUDEV), on urban mobility on the Mediterranean, as well as the new priorities for the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).

ALF
24 – 1 March, Tunis: 60 participants from across the Arab world gather for the Arab Forum for Education for Intercultural Citizenship in the framework of the Dawrak Programme, organised by the ALF in cooperation with the UNESCO club Bardo, and addressed by Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki. They stress the idea that education for intercultural citizenship is key to achieving social cohesion, as important as the culture of co-existence and is most crucial in the times of transition that many Arab countries are going through at present.

www.annalindhfoundation.org/news/

March

ENP
15 – Brussels: The new European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) comes into force with a budget of €15.4 billion for the period 2014-2020. The ENI replaces the ENPI (the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument) in supporting the implementation of the political initiatives that have shaped the ENP. “This Regulation establishes an ENI with a view to advancing further towards an area of shared prosperity and good neighbourliness involving the Union and […] the partner countries by developing a special relationship founded on cooperation, peace and security, mutual accountability and a shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights in accordance with the TEU” (Treaty on European Union).


Education
15-17 – Amman: The Arab Education Forum and the Istikshaf coalition organises a conference on “Advocating Mobility around the Mediterranean.” The conference gathers more than 50 participants and aims to be a venue for sharing experiences in the Euro-Arab region on the impact of mobility for learning, allowing artists, social entrepreneurs, and young people to discuss their experiences of mobility and the impact it has had on their professional and personal trajectory.

http://almoutaqa.com/defaulten.aspx

Industry
24-25 – Florence: To mark the 10th anniversary of the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue on the textile industry, the European Commission’s DG Enterprise and Industry organises the Euro-Mediterranean Conference on Creativity, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) in Textile and Clothing Industry in the Euro-Mediterranean Area. The main objective of the conference, organised with the support of the TAEX instrument and the European University Institute, is to exchange experiences regarding policies, practices and programmes about creativity, design, innovation and IPR as a substantial economic lever to improve brand image, sales and profitability of companies in the textile and clothing sector.


Women
26-27 – Barcelona: The Secretariat of the UfM holds an international project-oriented conference under the title “Women’s Socio-Economic Empowerment: Projects for Progress.” As an operational result from the Third Union for the Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Strengthening the Role of Women in Society (Paris, 11 September 2013), the objective of the conference is to create a strong momentum for women’s socio-economic empowerment in the region, and encourage the implementation of projects and initiatives in the field of gender affairs. This conference gathers more than 200 professionals dealing with gender equality from 35 countries.

http://ufmsecretariat.org/
April

Economic Cooperation
1 – Athens: Finance Ministers of the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries gather for the 13th ECOFIN/FEMIP Ministerial Meeting, during which they confirm their support to the European Investment Bank’s new 2014-2020 roadmap for the Mediterranean region. The key areas tackled include maintained support for private sector development, individual country strategies adapted to the needs of each partner country and facilitating Foreign Direct Investment of EU companies, potentially through awareness campaigns and new products.

Culture
7 – Brussels: Professionals from the 16 Neighbourhood partner countries join colleagues from EU Member States and 10 strategic partners to discuss the impact of culture in foreign policy. They discuss proposed recommendations by experts, which could form the basis of a new EU strategy on the role of culture in the EU’s external relations. The proposals follow a pilot initiative, launched by the European Parliament and led by the European Commission.

Education and Training
8-9 – Brussels: The European Training Foundation (ETF) organises an international conference on qualification systems to discuss the findings of a recent ETF study on the subject and help partner countries reform their education and training systems to better meet labour market needs. The conference tackles three broad topics: making better qualifications, ensuring trust in qualifications and bringing qualifications closer to citizens.
www.etf.europa.eu/

Elections
26-27 – Egypt: The EU deploys an Election Observation Mission (EOM) to Egypt for the Presidential Elections in response to an invitation by the authorities. The EU has been calling for credible and transparent elections, which allow universal participation, according to international standards. The EOM is independent and will conduct an impartial assessment of the electoral process on the basis of all relevant election standards. A Core Team of 10 EU election analysts arrived in Cairo on 18 April; they are joined by 30 long-term observers on 25 April. 60 short-term observers are deployed on 21 May. A number of local short-term observers and a delegation from the European Parliament will be embedded in the EOM.
www.eueom.eu/files/pressreleases/english

Higher Education
27-28 – Brussels: The European Commission’s DG Education and Culture organises the “Seminar on Quality assurance in Higher Education in Southern Mediterranean countries.” This event gathers 91 participants – including 77 from Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, and Tunisia – representing ministries of education, universities, quality assurance institutions, student organisations and national and regional organisations active in the higher education field. The seminar gives participants the chance to discuss the topic of quality assurance in depth and provides excellent networking opportunities.

Civil Society
29-30 – Brussels: More than 150 civil society organisations from the Southern Neighbourhood and Europe gather for the first EU-Southern Neighbourhood Civil Society Forum. Participants from EU institutions, civil society, academia and the media discuss joint approaches for more inclusive, participatory and action-oriented dialogues between governments, EU institutions and civil society organisations.

May

Libya
8 – Brussels: EU Foreign Affairs Chief Ashton appoints Bernardino Leon as her personal Special Envoy for Libya. Mr Leon will facilitate, coordinate and enhance the EU’s actions in support of the Libyan people at a critical juncture for the country. The EU is deeply concerned by the significant deterioration of the political and security situation in Libya and has repeatedly condemned the continued violence across the country. Mr Leon reiterates the importance of an inclusive Libyan political dialogue and urges all parties to actively cooperate with UNSMIL to facilitate a ceasefire and the re-launch of the political process.

Environment
13 – Athens: 43 UfM member countries gather for the Ministerial Meeting on Environment and Climate Change. As agreed by at their Senior Officials Meeting in October 2013, the main topics of this Ministerial Meeting are the Horizon 2020 Initiative to de-pollute the Mediterranean, climate change and Sustainable Consumption and Production (SCP). The Ministers highlight the cross-sectorial nature of environment and climate change challenges and the importance of fostering growth and job creation, while ensuring better quality of life and a sustainable future.

Trade
12-14 Barcelona: The UfM Secretariat hosts the 2nd technical meeting of the “Euro-Mediterranean Trade and Investment Facilitation Mechanism (TIFM): Training Workshop for Technical Focal Points.” The project is implemented by the International Trade Centre (ITC), a joint agency of UN and WTO, and it delivers the online information portal – Euromed Trade Helpdesk – as well as coordinating a TIFM problem resolving the network of national institutions, responsible for responding to enquiries posted on the online portal, so as to facilitate trade and investment.

Media
30 – Hammamet: The 2nd Maghreb Press Forum takes place in the presence of key media players from Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania and Tunisia, as well as media trade unions and representatives of the European press. The Forum is organised at the initiative of the EU Delegation to Tunisia, in partnership with the Tunisian Federation of Media Editors, to discuss the...
threats looming over the press in the Maghreb. The participants agree that the major obstacles that undermine the journalists’ profession in the Maghreb region are mainly: the lack of economic viability of press companies, the precarious socio-economic conditions of journalists themselves, the attacks on journalists in sometimes uncertain political contexts and an inadequate legal and judicial framework that prevents the practice of independent journalism.

**June**

**Energy**

4 – Amman: The Association of Mediterranean Energy Regulators (MEDREG) holds its 17th General Assembly, where it presents and discusses the strategy it is developing for 2020-2030, defining the role of regulators in establishing a Mediterranean Energy Community and the Mediterranean Forum on Energy Regulation to be held in November.
www.medreg-regulators.org/

8-10 – Alexandria: 25 participants from European and southern Mediterranean countries, representing both the formal and non-formal education sectors take part in the 3rd Alexandria Education Convention organised by ALF and the Swedish Institute in Alexandria. The aim of the Convention is to gather the feedback of educators from the Euro-Mediterranean region on the draft contents of the “Education Handbook on Intercultural Citizenship in the Euro-Mediterranean Region,” to be published by the end of 2014, and their suggestions for the development of a training scheme around this resource. Participants will act as multipliers of the programme for Intercultural Citizenship Education within their communities.
www.annalindhfoundation.org/

**PA-UIM**

12 - Barcelona: Parliamentarians representing various member states of the UIM gather at the Secretariat for a meeting of the Committee on Energy, Environment and Water of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean (PA-UIM). Discussions focus on the developments of important UIM activities and projects in the fields of Energy and Climate change. The committee pays special attention to the Marine Protected Areas (MedPAN), “Let’s Do It!” and “Eco-towns” campaigns, as top items on the meeting’s agenda. The meeting provides an opportunity for a fruitful exchange of views between the UIM Secretariat and the members of the PA-UIM on the latest relevant developments, such as the UIM Ministerial Meeting on Environment and Climate change, which took place in Athens on the 13 May.

**Fishery**

15 – Brussels: European vessels are able to resume fishing in Moroccan waters after a suspension of more than two years, in return for financial assistance from the EU to the Moroccan fishery sector, as the EU-Morocco Fisheries Partnership Agreement enters into force. EU and Morocco conclude the four-year fisheries deal in December 2013, but its entry into force was pending ratification by Morocco. Now that both sides have concluded their ratification procedure, EU vessels receive certain fishing rights in Moroccan waters in return for financial assistance from the EU to develop the Moroccan fishery sector.

**August**

**Employment**

20 – Cairo: In the framework of the EU-funded project “Stabilising at-risk communities and enhancing migration management to enable smooth transitions in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya” (START), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) delivers an introductory workshop on Information, Counseling, and Referral Services. The main objectives of the meeting are to discuss and assess current structures of the Public Employment Services Offices and propose potential reforms. The main objective of START is to support the Governments of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya to stabilise at-risk communities and enhance migration management – helping to establish preconditions to smooth transition processes and sustainable recoveries in the three target countries.
www.egypt.iom.int/
Politics and Security
30 – Brussels: Italy’s Foreign Minister Federica Mogherini is appointed as the next EU High Representative at a meeting of EU leaders in Brussels, succeeding Catherine Ashton, who is due to step down when the term of the current Commission ends on 31 October 2014. At a press conference following her nomination Minister Mogherini spoke about the international situation and the “huge challenges all around Europe, in Ukraine and Iraq, Syria, and Libya.”

September

ENP
10 – Brussels: In the newly elected President Jean-Claude Juncker’s European Commission, the Austrian Johannes Hahn is appointed European Commissioner for ENP and Enlargement Negotiations, succeeding Štefan Füle, who is due to step down when the term of the current Commission ends on 31 October 2014. EC Hahn expresses his will to build connections, help regions to stand on their own feet, and through concrete action deliver to promote security and prosperity and communicate European values.

EU – Libya
17 – Madrid: The Spanish Foreign Minister, García Margallo, organises a Ministerial conference on stability and development in Libya. The meeting gathers Secretariat of the UfM, Foreign Ministers from North Africa and high representatives of the EU, LAS and the African Union. The meeting aims to address the deteriorating security situation in Libya and its impact and consequences on its neighbouring countries and the Mediterranean region as a whole. The conference gives the Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mohamed Abdelaziz, as well as the new special envoy of the UN, Bernardino Leon, the opportunity to give a detailed overview of the situation in Libya as well as their views on the way forward.

Civil Protection
22-25 – Rabat: The EU-funded Civil Protection PPRD South II project (Prevention, Preparedness, and Response to Natural and Human Disasters) organises the first regional workshop on the Host Nation Support mechanism (HNS). Several representatives of Civil Protection Services and Institutions involved in the crisis management of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia take part in the workshop.

Education & Training
22-23 – Beirut: The French Agency for Development (AFD), European Training Foundation (ETF) and the Centre of Mediterranean Integration (CMI), in partnership with the EU delegation in Lebanon, hold a seminar entitled “Youth employability in Lebanon: the role of vocational education and training and entrepreneurship.” The event is hosted by the Social and Economic Council. In attendance are 60 participants from the Lebanese ministries of education and labour, private businesses, international agencies, academia, young entrepreneurs and civil society organisations. The seminar develops actionable recommendations for reform of the vocational and technical education system and promotion of entrepreneurship as a strategy for job creation.
www.etf.europa.eu/

Crisis Management
29-1 October – Hazmieh: A crisis management workshop supported by the EU takes place, gathering municipal council members, representatives of local NGOs, of municipal police departments, social workers, heads and members of several social development centres. The training is focused on negotiation techniques, problem solving mechanisms, the mediator’s role and the causes and dynamics of conflict. This workshop is organised in the framework of the EU-funded “Second Cycle of Capacity Building Programme for Local Leaders from Beirut Southern Suburbs on Crisis Management & Mediation.”

Telecommunication
30 – Brussels: Digital Economy Ministers and representatives of ministries, the UfM Secretariat, telecoms regulators, development banks and EU institutions gather for a UfM Ministerial meeting and pledge closer cooperation to reap the benefits of the digital economy for Euro-Mediterranean citizens, consumers and businesses. Participants agree to forge closer ties on the use of open data and e-government, and to step-up dialogue between national telecom regulators around the Mediterranean. They also agree to improve connectivity between scientific and research communities and to work on a long-term eHealth cooperation strategy.

Higher Education
30-1 October – Rome: A Conference on “The EU Neighbourhood Policy and Mediterranean Youth: The Key Role of Training and Mobility” is organised by the Union of Mediterranean Universities (UNIMED) in collaboration with the French Embassy in Italy/Institut Français d’Italie and Sapienza University of Rome. The conference brings together EU and Euro-Mediterranean decision-makers, education stakeholders and university representatives from both shores of the Mediterranean to discuss the establishment and implementation of mobility and capacity building tools in the Mediterranean, to make proposals in view of strengthening the integration of Mediterranean universities in the European Higher Education Area and to propose initiatives for cooperation with universities from the countries in crisis to promote solidarity and mutual support within the academic community.

October

Civil Society
13 – Amman: A regional civil society seminar, as part of an initiative to create mechanisms for a structured regional dialogue between civil society, authorities and the EU, brings together 55 participants, including mainly civil society representatives from Jordan and the Southern Neighbourhood, a few European CSOs and experts, as well as members of the EU diplomatic corps in Jordan.

Employment
15 – Barcelona: With the broader goal of fostering regional employment op-
opportunities, and under the framework of the Mediterranean Initiative for Jobs (Med4Jobs), the UfM Secretariat hosts a workshop on job intermediation and placement services in North Africa and the Levant at its headquarters. The UfM Secretariat holds this dialogue platform to foster the exchange of best practices on job intermediation, facilitate cooperation between local and regional actors, identify successful practices for potential replication and up-scaling, as well as to explore areas for possible UfM intervention and support under Med4Jobs.

EU – Palestinian Authority
20 – Ramallah: EU and Palestinian Authority officials meet as part of an annual policy dialogue. Two separate subcommittees participate in the meeting: one on economic and financial matters, and one on energy, transport, climate change, environment and water. Officials from the EU and their counterparts at the relevant Palestinian Authority Ministries (including Ministries of Finance, National Economy, and Transportation), Palestinian Water Authority, Environment Quality Authority, and Palestinian Energy and National resources Authority engage in detailed exchanges on the latest developments in these important areas of cooperation between the EU and Palestine.

Tourism
24 – Tunis: A TAIEX seminar opens on the implementation of a “Tunisia Tourism Quality Label.” Tourism professionals coming from European administrations and Tunisian tourism stakeholders can exchange good practices in order to promote capacities reinforcement linked to quality service to tourists in line with the European and international standards. The TAIEX seminar aims at supporting the creation of such a label in the interest of participation, transparency and public/private partnership. In the framework of the implementation of the Tunisian tourism strategy “VISION 3t+1,” the quality/training approach is one of the three key pillars of the reform, together with offer diversification/regionalisation and branding.

Racism
27-28 – Jerusalem: The 8th seminar on the fight against racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism gathers officials, diplomats and experts from Israel, the European Commission, the EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency, the European External Action Service and several EU Member States. Over the two days, the participants discuss policies and tools aimed at combating racism and xenophobia, with a particular focus on anti-Semitism. In this context, data, trends and EU measures to combat racism and anti-Semitism figured prominently on the agenda. A specific session is devoted to cyber-hate – a growing and worrying phenomenon for both the EU and Israel.

ALF
27-30 – Naples: On the occasion of its 10th Anniversary, the ALF holds a conference in Naples, under the Italian Presidency of the EU, to address the role of civil society in facing social crises and unprecedented violence in the region. EU Commissioner Füle, addresses participants opening the high-level debate. The Naples conference on “The Next Chapter of Mediterranean Dialogue” brings together 250 delegates from the 42 countries of the UfM, including civil society networks, regional institutions, media and political leaders. Their purpose is to exchange proposals, coordinate international efforts and define the next chapter of intercultural dialogue for the Mediterranean in the face of social crises, cultural regression and unprecedented violence in the region.

Water
28-30 – Athens: Some 100 water specialists and stakeholders from the Mediterranean region, both from within and outside the water sector, including public authorities and civil society and private sector representatives, attend the first Regional Conference of the UfM-labelled project on “Governance & Financing for the Mediterranean Water Sector.” The three-day conference aims to present the outcomes of the National Water Policy Dialogues conducted in Jordan and Tunisia during the project’s first year of implementation (2013-2014) and discuss the way forward for the second year and the project’s imminent implementation in Palestine, set to start in November. It also aims to build on the regional dialogue initiated at the project’s launch in May 2014. Furthermore, it provides an opportunity to share national experiences on sustainable water governance and financing and call for further South-South as well as North-South cooperation.

Elections
October-November: In response to an invitation by the Tunisian authorities, the European Union has deployed its Election Observation Mission (EU EOM) to observe the upcoming elections in Tunisia. The EU EOM arrived with a Core Team of eight experts on 17 September in Tunis. A second group of 28 long-term observers join the EU EOM on 29 September and another 28 short-term observers will be deployed on 21 October throughout the country, together with a delegation of the European Parliament for the election days. Additionally, a significant number of locally recruited short-term observers from diplomatic representations of EU Member States in Tunisia will also take part in the observation. The EU EOM will conduct a comprehensive analysis of the entire electoral process based on a long-term observation in line with domestic law as well as regional and international standards.

November

Water
3-4 – Naples: Under the Italian Presidency of the Council of the EU and with the support of the European Commission, the National Research Council of Italy organises the conference “EuroMED Cooperation - Inland and
Marine Water Challenges,” aimed at enhancing international cooperation on research and innovation in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The conference is designed as a two-day conference – four parallel thematic workshops and a plenary session – embracing present scientific and political debate for the identification of urgent challenges related to the proper management of inland and marine waters, with special emphasis on their links, and the impacts on society and sustainable economic growth.

www.euromed-imwc.eu/index.html

Women
5-6 – Brussels: The European Commission, the European Parliament and UN Women kick off the two-day Spring Forward for Women conference at the European Parliament headquarters. The conference brings together women lawmakers from the Arab States and members of the EP. Participants share their experience in advancing gender equality and women’s empowerment in both the EU and the Arab States. The delegation of women parliamentarians from the Arab States region includes representatives from Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, United Arab Emirates, Yemen and the Arab Parliament. Arab States’ parliamentarians participate in the meetings of the European Parliament Delegations working on the Arab States and exchange experiences and perspectives with fellow parliamentarians on the situation in their respective regions and countries.

ARLEM
10 – Cairo: Representatives of local and regional authorities from the Mediterranean partner countries as well as members of the Committee of the Regions meet to discuss the work programme of the UfM and the implementation of the ENP at the local and regional level. The meeting is chaired by ARLEM co-Presidents. Participants also discuss the priorities for the next ARLEM mandate 2015-2017, which is strategically placed within the work programme of the UfM.


Private Sector
14 – Barcelona: Over 25 private sector representatives from more than 10 countries together with the Heads of Cooperation from EU Delegations in Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine and Tunisia take part in a seminar organised by the UfM and the European Commission to discuss the main challenges for private sector development in the region, as well as identify possible joint initiatives and innovative projects (including public-private partnerships – PPPs) to facilitate private sector growth. With a particular focus on job creation, participants discuss specific examples on how private sector growth can reduce unemployment, and discuss ways to disseminate success stories.

Energy
18-19 – Rome: Energy Ministers of Euro-Mediterranean countries as well as representatives of financial institutions, associations of regulators, transmission system operators and industry gather at the Italian Foreign Ministry for a conference on “Building a Euro-Mediterranean energy bridge.” The conference aims at strengthening cooperation among Euro-Mediterranean partners in order to deal with emerging energy challenges and concerns for energy security.


Water
25-27 – Murcia: The 2nd Mediterranean Water Forum takes the current geopolitical situation in the Mediterranean region into consideration to become an important step for exchange and consolidation of know-how and experiences in the field of water in the Mediterranean. The event is structured around the preparatory process for the 7th World Water Forum, set to take place from 12 to 17 April 2015 in Daegu, South Korea.


Energy
26 – Barcelona: The EU-supported Association of Mediterranean Energy Regulators (MEDREG) holds the 1st edition of the Mediterranean Forum on Energy Regulation, supported by the European Commission with the objective of creating a Mediterranean Energy Community. Dedicated to “Regulation & Investments: Solutions for the Mediterranean Region,” the forum represents a unique opportunity to review the current state of thinking on the relationship between energy regulation and investments, identify the main challenges and risks and assess how they can be addressed both at regional and sub-regional level. Three key issues are addressed: the roadmap for a Mediterranean energy community, how to face the challenge of market-based regulation and where to find the money to build grids and support generation projects.

www.medreg-regulators.org/Portals/45/forum/home/Press_release.zip

December

ALF
1-2 – Alexandria: The ALF holds a major conference focused on “civil society building open and pluralistic societies.” The conference “Moltaqa” (‘Gathering’ in Arabic) brings together more than 200 civil society leaders from across the Arab region, in addition to representatives of CSOs from Europe and international institutions. There are more than 300 civil society leaders from nine Arab ‘Mediterranean’ countries – Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine and Tunisia – in addition to representatives from 20 European countries. The conference is built on a series of working sessions including themes such as “How to use Arts to reach the wider society,” “Learning Tools on Intercultural Citizenship,” “Debating Skills and Young Arab Voices,” and “Youth Participation in Local Governance.”

Audiovisual
2-3 – Tunis: The EU’s Euromed Audiovisual III programme hosts the “Mediterranean Film Forum.” Almost 100 film and audiovisual professionals from Europe and the southern Mediterranean region participate in the event held on the sidelines of the Carthage Film Festival. As the programme’s activities draw to a close after four years of supporting the development of southern Mediterranean film
Transport
9-10 – Civitavecchia Port: The UfM High-Level Conference on the Financing of the Future Trans-Mediterranean Transport Network (TMN-T) gathers over 120 participants in an event attended by Jordanian Transport Minister Lina Shbeeb, in her capacity as Co-Chair of the UfM, as well as by the main European and international financial institutions, donors and private companies. The event provides an opportunity for dialogue among project promoters, donors and beneficiaries to discuss how to mobilise and coordinate all potential partners towards the effective implementation of the TMN-T Network and its priority projects within the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T). Moreover, about 30 speakers participating in the conference propose innovative instruments and alternative ways of funding with an emphasis on the role of the private sector. UfM Secretary General Sijilmassi announces the launch of a consultative platform to coordinate the European and international financial institutions building the construction of the financial framework of the flagship regional transport projects. This support would reinforce efforts by the Secretariat to improve the instruments for project assessment and implementation. http://ufmsecretariat.org/conference-financing-tmnt/

Cooperation
12 – Rome: The NextMed Conference brings together over 500 people from the whole Mediterranean area to assess the achievements and new challenges facing cross-border cooperation in the Mediterranean. Enhanced cooperation among countries of the region under the new European Neighbourhood Instrument is highlighted as a contribution to a more integrated Mediterranean region, from the economic, political, social and cultural points of view. Participants also focus on the strategy of the ENI CBC Med Programme for 2014-2020. The discussions offer an overview of the four thematic objectives and 11 priorities tackled by the new Programme: Business and SMEs development; Education, research, technological development and innovation; Social inclusion and fight against poverty; Environmental protection, climate change adaptation and mitigation.

http://www.enpicbcmed.eu/communication/nextmed-conference-over-500-participants-attend-launch-new-phase-cross-border-cooperation

ARLEM
14-15 – Antalya: ARLEM organises its 6th Plenary Session. Local and regional representatives from EU Member States and Euro-Mediterranean countries discuss various important topics, ranging from migration to waste management and urban governance. The plenary session begins with the presentation and the adoption of the annual report on “The state of the territorial dimension of the Union for the Mediterranean,” which also sets political recommendations for the coming years. ARLEM insists that the EU must continue to be the primary strategic partner for the countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean, helping them towards a prosperous and peaceful future. This is followed by a debate on the state of decentralisation in the Euromed region.


EU-Morocco
16 – Brussels: The EU and Morocco hold their 12th Association Council meeting. Both parties take stock of the achievements and progress made since the previous session, in December 2013, and review the process of reforms in Morocco, as well as the next steps to be taken. The meeting was co-chaired by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini and Morocco’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Salaheddine Mezouar. The EU reiterates its readiness to support Morocco in implementing its reform process, particularly through the Action Plan 2013-2017 within the framework of the ENP and through substantial resources being made available.


Environment
17 – Barcelona: National representatives in charge of Environmental Policy from more than 20 Mediterranean countries join participants from international financial institutions, regional organisations and other key stakeholders in adopting a strategic document outlining the key objectives over the next five years for the H2020 Initiative for a cleaner Mediterranean as regards investments in pollution reduction, review and monitoring, capacity building and research. With a clear indication from the ministers to step up efforts, the unanimously-adopted document recognises the need to reinforce investment activities in pollution reduction, with a wider thematic scope, information sharing and closer cooperation and synergies. During discussions, participants validate the work of ongoing efforts and the initiative’s first phase. In particular, they call for more integration among the programme’s different components as well as with other regional initiatives and processes for more efficiency and complementarity, especially as regards capacity building.

Humanitarian Assistance
22 – Brussels: The EC is releasing €2 million in emergency funding to assist scores of Libyans who have been forced to flee their homes because of worsening violence in the country. The funding will provide essential humanitarian assistance and protection to the most vulnerable people affected by the conflict. It will be used to provide food, shelter, medical assistance and psychosocial support. The approaching winter will also increase the need for warm clothing, heaters and insulated shelter. It is estimated that nearly 400,000 people have been displaced due to fighting in Libya since May 2014.

1. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

2014 marks two important anniversaries for NATO and its partners in the Mediterranean and Broader Middle East region: the 20th anniversary of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the 10th anniversary of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). The Mediterranean region faces huge security challenges with wide-ranging implications for Euro-Atlantic security, so it is important to underscore how the security and stability of these regions are interlinked. The Dialogue was conceived to mark this shift in the Alliance’s priorities and the beginning of a greater cooperation between the Alliance and its neighbours. Since its inception it has evolved to become a partnership of seven nations: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Under the NATO partnership framework, they engaged in political dialogue and practical cooperation. As for the political dimension, bilateral consultations (NATO+1) are regularly held and provide a forum for sharing views on a wide range of issues. Multilateral meetings (NATO+7) are held after NATO Summits or for special NATO events. The practical dimension includes seminars, workshops and practical activities in the field of modernising armed forces, border security, scientific and environmental cooperation, emergency planning, terrorism, weapons proliferation issues, civil management and border security control. MD nations have also contributed to NATO operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya.

In June 2004, NATO launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to contribute to regional security by offering the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council practical bilateral security cooperation. Four of these countries have joined the Initiative: Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates, however the initiative is open to all interested countries in the Broader Middle East region. Bilateral activities comprise a range of cooperation areas: tailored advice on defence transformation, military-to-military cooperation to achieve interoperability and cooperation in the fight against terrorism. In 2014, Kuwait becomes the first Gulf partner to conclude an Individual Partnership Cooperation Programme with NATO to plan their practical cooperation in a more tailored way. The political dimension has developed (both bilaterally and multilaterally) and evolved to include high-level meetings. ICI partners actively contribute to NATO ISAF operations in Afghanistan and provide assets for air operations in Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya.

In the framework of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, a forum for MPs from across the Atlantic Alliance to discuss and influence decisions on Alliance security, a Mediterranean and Middle East special Group (GSM) was launched in 1996. The GSM was conceived as a formal mechanism to address regional challenges, and a forum for cooperation and discussion with parliamentarians from the MENA region. The GSM conducts two annual seminars, which bring together parliamentarians from NATO countries with their counterparts in the region to explore specific topics. GSM seminars and reports cover a broad range of issues, including: security-related matters in the Mediterranean area and Broader Middle East, developments in NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, with a particular focus on those matters that directly concern national parliamentarians, and religious and cultural forces shaping developments in the region and in the region’s relations with allied countries. Recognising the profound changes that the ‘Arab Spring’ continues to bring to the region, the Assembly has stepped up its outreach to the region with two main priorities: strengthening political engagement with the region, and exploring avenues of assistance for democratic transition and parliamentary oversight of security and defence.

**Main Events in 2014**

- 15 January, Tel Aviv, Israel: NATO deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow delivers a keynote speech at the Institute of National Security Studies conference on missile defence, stressing that the Alliance’s Ballistic Missile Defence system poses no threat to Russia, adding that cooperation with Russia on missile defence would improve security for both NATO and Russia. The deputy Secretary General’s visit to Israel includes talks with Israeli Defence Minister and senior officials to review areas of NATO-Israel cooperation. Israel has an Individual Cooperation Programme (ICP) dating back to 2008.
- 20-21 January, NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium: Visit of Diplomats from the State of Qatar to NATO under the ICI. Topics discussed include NATO’s ICI and Military Cooperation; NATO’s Current Political Agenda; NATO’s Transfor-
In the final Declaration the Alliance’s International Staff and International Military Staff. In the context of the 20th anniversary of the Mediterranean Dialogue, topics discussed include NATO’s relations with Mauritania; the political and military cooperation under the MD; NATO’s operations; and NATO’s policies in the areas of emerging security challenges.

- 27 May, NATO HQ, Brussels, Belgium: A group of high-level opinion leaders from Morocco visits the NATO HQ in the context of the MD’s 20th Anniversary. The Moroccan civil society representatives are also briefed on the Alliance’s transformation and its outreach to the Mediterranean and to the Middle East by Mr. Nicola de Santis, Head of the Middle East and North Africa Section.

- 2-4 June, Malta: The NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme supports the US German Marshall Fund and Malta MEDAC in organising the International Border Security Forum. The forum gathers more than 50 participants to discuss border security challenges in the Mediterranean Basin (eastern Libya, northern Mali, the Sinai Peninsula and Syria, provide safe havens for terrorist groups and other illicit actors). The event provides the occasion to discuss a wide range of issues, bringing together major stakeholders in border security from think tanks, academia, and public administration from the Mediterranean region, Europe and the US. It is also a platform for senior experts and government officials to debate and network in the spirit of building the international border security community.

www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_110614.htm

- 4-5 September, Newport, Wales: More than 60 world leaders attend the 2014 NATO summit, the first after the 2012 Chicago summit. NATO leaders have to cope with the greatest challenges to security since the end of the Cold War – not only Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, but multiple threats in the Broader Middle East and Gulf regions. NATO Defence Ministers meet with 24 interoperable partners to discuss ways to improve practical cooperation. In the final Declaration the Heads of State and Government affirm
their concern on the deteriorating situation in Libya, calling all the parties to start an inclusive political dialogue and reaffirm their readiness to support the country with advice on defence and security institution building for Libya to adhere to the Mediterranean Dialogue framework. They underline the efforts made through Operation Unified Protector together with regional Arab partners. They reiterate their commitment to the MD and ICI and the principles that underpin them. The MD and ICI remain two complementary yet distinct partnership frameworks, looking to deepen political dialogue and practical cooperation in both fora, building on many years of steady progress. They remain open to welcoming new members from the Mediterranean and the Broader Middle East region to these frameworks. 2014 marks the 20th anniversary of the MD and 10th anniversary of the ICI. The summit is the occasion to encourage MD and ICI partner countries to be proactive in taking full advantage of the opportunities offered by their partnership with NATO, as well as individual partnership and cooperation programmes.

Wales Summit Declaration: www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?selectedLocale=en • 1 October, Amman, Jordan: Launching of National Cyber Defence Strategy in the framework of the NATO Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme. It is the first of this kind in a partner country. It involves a joint team of cyber experts setting up cyber defence in Jordan to include the protection of key infrastructure such as electricity grids, dams, energy networks and more.
• 2-4 October, Catania, Italy: The NATO PA’s annual GSM seminar is dedicated to assessing the security situation in Europe’s southern neighbourhood. The seminar engages NATO members, partners, Middle East and North Africa (MENA) legislators as well as a range of observers and members of the press. The seminar focuses on several of the security challenges currently facing the region, including the conflict in Syria and Iraq, the threat posed by foreign fighters participating in those conflicts, the refugee crisis and its implications for the immediate neighbourhood and the broader Mediterranean, the consequences of the recent war in Gaza and ongoing instability in Libya. The role Italy has played in coping with the growing refugee crisis in the Mediterranean, including its humanitarian naval operation, Mare Nostrum, constitutes another central theme for the deliberations.

www.nato-pa.int/Default.asp?SHORTCUT=3658 • 19 October, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates: NATO deputy Secretary General Vershbow takes part in the Abu Dhabi Strategic Debate, speaking in favour of deepening NATO’s partnership with countries in the Gulf. He also stresses that NATO and regional partners of the Gulf should intensify political dialogue and practical cooperation, working together to strengthen maritime security and further strengthen interoperability. He also addresses the danger that the terrorist organisation ISIL poses to the Middle East and beyond, including to NATO and EU Member States. Dealing with it requires a broad, multinational effort covering a range of different measures. On the occasion, NATO deputy SG expresses the need to intensify practical cooperation and political dialogue, and closer relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council are envisaged, as well as strengthening maritime security, considering that Gulf countries depend on the secure transport of their energy export and European NATO allies on Gulf energy supply.
• 17 November, La Hulpe, Belgium: NATO deputy SG Vershbow speaks at a conference on NATO-Israel Cooperation. He recalls the adoption of the Readiness Action Plan at the last Wales Summit and the need to improve interoperability. Considering the huge security challenge the region is facing, the MD is becoming more valuable than ever. It is in fact a unique multilateral forum where 28 NATO allies, Israel and key Arab countries sit together on a regular basis for ministerial, ambassadorial and also informal consultation.

www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_114789.htm?selectedLocale=en • 8-10 December, Amman, Jordan: Jordan hosts a seminar marking the 20th anniversary of the Mediterranean Dialogue and gathering 28 Permanent Representatives to the North Atlantic Council and the Brussels-based ambassadors of the seven countries participating in the Partnership. The relationship has deepened over the last 20 years but the spread of ISIL in the Middle East region is presenting new security challenges requiring closer cooperation. There are three potential areas where this cooperation can grow stronger: NATO should improve its assistance in developing partner countries’ own defence capacity and increasing the ability of Armed Forces to work together and deepen political consultations (both bilaterally and multilaterally).

www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_115773.htm?selectedLocale=en • 11 December, Doha, Qatar: A conference to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the ICI gathers 20 members of the Alliance and the ambassadors of the four partner countries. NATO SG Stoltenberg sets out three priorities for better cooperation: increasing cooperation between military forces; enhancing cooperation on maritime security, inviting Gulf Partners to join NATO’s “Ocean Shield” mission against piracy; and deepening political consultation both bilaterally and with the Gulf Cooperation Council. On the occasion, the SG mentions the suggestion received to broaden joint public diplomacy activities and include civil society representatives, academics, opinion makers and parliamentarians. The conference is also the occasion to discuss security challenges such as terrorism, maritime security and cyber security.

www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_115900.htm • 15 December, Nouakchott, Mauritania: NATO Assistant SG Stamatopoulous meets with the Prime Minister of Mauritania to discuss the partnership between NATO and Mauritania. She also delivers a keynote speech at the NATO-Mauritania Conference to celebrate the MD’s 20th Anniversary.

For further information:
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52956.htm
The relationship between the OSCE and its non-participating states was invited to a specific meeting on Mediterranean issues related to economic, social, environmental, scientific and cultural topics. It was at the 1993 Rome Ministerial Council meeting when Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia, requested a closer cooperation and finally became partners for cooperation in 1995 (Jordan joined in 1998). In 1994 an informal contact group of experts met to conduct a dialogue with MPCs to facilitate the exchange of information of mutual interest and generate ideas: the Mediterranean Contact Group (MCG). Within the political framework of this relationship, besides the MCG, the main elements are: the annual OSCE Mediterranean Conference, certain annual OSCE events, the OSCE PA Mediterranean Forum and the visit by the Secretary General (SG).

The OSCE Mediterranean Conference is generally attended by international organisations, parliamentarians, academics and NGOs, and it provides a place for the exchange of ideas and exploring new ways to enhance cooperation. At the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting, partners engage in high-level meetings with the OSCE Troika (incoming, current and past Chairmen-in-Office) and the OSCE SG. In 2003, OSCE Participating States decided to extend the fields for cooperation with partners (counter-terrorism, border issues, economic and environmental activities, trafficking in human beings, election observation, media freedom) besides encouraging them to voluntarily implement OSCE commitments. Since 2007, a special fund has been created to attend to Partners’ needs to participate in specific activities. The wave of uprisings that swept across the Southern Mediterranean as of 2011 confirmed the need to reinforce and adapt the Partnership to assist Partners on their way to democracy and stability. The Contact Group serves at the main venue for regular dialogue with the Partners. It generally meets seven times a year at ambassadorial level and its chairman is generally the incoming chair of the OSCE. It discusses topics relevant to OSCE Partners or members in the three OSCE dimensions: politico-military, economic and environmental and human. Since 2011, Partners have displayed a readiness to share relevant information and developments within the group while OSCE Participating States have reaffirmed their support to share their expertise, experience and OSCE toolbox for democratic transition.

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCE PA) enhances relations between Participating States and MPCs from a parliamentary perspective. MPCs are invited to participate in the OSCE PA conferences, and also to country observation missions offering them the opportunity to study best practices and democratic processes.

**Mediterranean Contact Group**

Under the 2014 Serbian Chairmanship of the Mediterranean Contact Group (MCG) six meetings are held and one joint meeting with Asian Partners. Different topics are tackled in these meetings such as: the importance of strengthening the dialogue between MPCs and Participating States in order to deal with the threats and challenges in the Mediterranean Region; the significance of Tunisia’s new constitution and the role of ODIHR in elections observation; the Syrian refugees’ impact on Jordan and other States neighbouring Syria and the role of UNHCR in responding to the refugee influx; trafficking in human beings; migration and terrorism. The Joint meeting of Mediterranean and Asian Contact Groups takes place on 17 October and is focused on “The role of women in building democracy” providing the opportunity for an update on recent progress achieved by Participating States and Partners in promoting the active participation of women in public affairs. In 2015 the group will be chaired by Germany.

**23rd Annual Session of the OSCE PA**

- 28 June – 2 July, Baku (Azerbaijan): Nearly 300 MPs from more than 50 OSCE participating States gather at the Parliamentary dimension of the OSCE to assess developments and challenges relating to security and cooperation, in particular at “Helsinki +40: Towards Human Security For All.” Their views and policy recommendations in the fields of political affairs, security, economics, the environment and human rights are offered to the OSCE ministers for the next OSCE Ministerial Council. Among the resolutions issued in the Declaration, participants consider the humanitarian consequences of the Mediterranean crises, the situation of refugees in the OSCE area, the tragic events off the coast of Lampedusa and call for stronger dialogue among the countries of origin and transit, developing cooperation and committing to a solidarity policy on asylum. The 23rd Annual Session also features a special debate on “The Rise of Extremism, Radicalism and Xenophobia: Challenges for the OSCE Region” as well as a debate on the situation in Ukraine. In the Baku Declaration, parliamentarians reiterate their commitment to engage OSCE Mediterranean partners in the PA’s work in all three dimensions and commend Tunisia on the adoption of the new Constitution.
For further information on the Helsinki +40 Process: www.osce.org/cio/110111

2014 OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Autumn Meeting - Mediterranean Forum

• 3 October, Geneva (Switzerland): The Mediterranean Forum is held in the framework of the OSCE PA Autumn Meeting under the theme "Facing Current Challenges to Security in the Mediterranean Region: the OSCE Model." It brings together the members of the OSCE PA Participating States and the MPCs once a year, providing a platform for discussion on the Mediterranean region’s political challenges. The debate focuses on how the OSCE model can best cooperate with Mediterranean partners in order to address instability and conflict in the region. The main issues tackled are: the growing threat represented by ISIS to the OSCE area; the mass influx of refugees; the inadequate international response to the Syrian Conflict; and the urgency to support Libya’s application for Partner State Status.

2014 OSCE Mediterranean Conference

• 27-28 October, Neum (Bosnia and Herzegovina): The Conference gathers representatives of the OSCE Participating States, the OSCE MPCs, international organisations and NGOs to discuss the topic “Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Light Weapons and Fight against Terrorism in the Mediterranean Region.” The proliferation of illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) constitutes a grave threat to global security, fuelling conflicts, preventing lasting peace and socio-economic development in conflict-inflicted regions. Participants tackle this topic also considering routes and modalities of illicit trafficking: the Mediterranean region provides the route for much of the illicit trafficking of SALW. The spread of transnational terrorism, growing porosity of borders, the spreading of violent crime in some southern Mediterranean countries is further cause for the OSCE to actively engage MPCs in order to find a common-oriented action approach. Participants also share experiences on issues related to counter-terrorism and de-radicalisation and rehabilitation of Foreign Fighters. Another session is devoted to enhancing the role of women in public, political and economic life as a follow-up to the 2013 Mediterranean Conference.

www.osce.org/networks/135276

58th Joint Meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation and the Permanent Council

• 27 November, Vienna: During the meeting, Jihadist terrorism is dealt with as the major transnational threat against the Mediterranean region where police cooperation between states is essential to confront this threat. Particular emphasis is placed on the need to identify those methods being employed to recruit Europeans to the ranks of this Jihadist DAESH, along with their ‘modus operandi’ to infiltrate into Europe. Another issue tackled is the fight against smugglers and networks of human trafficking as well as drug trafficking between opposite shores of the Mediterranean.

www.osce.org/fsc/128741

21th OSCE Ministerial Council

• 4-5 Basel (Switzerland): This year the OSCE Ministerial Council is focused on the crisis in Ukraine. The Ministerial Council finally adopts 17 declarations and decisions that comprehensively cover all three OSCE security dimensions. The Foreign Ministers of the Participating States agree also on the Declaration on the OSCE’s role in countering the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters. This document, together with the declaration on countering kidnapping and hostage-taking committed by terrorist groups, should be regarded as an important factor in the fight against ISIS. MPCs participate in the council as observers. The Mediterranean should be kept on the OSCE Agenda in 2015 and should consider the events occurring in the Middle East and in North Africa, especially in Libya, which threaten the OSCE region’s security. OSCE Foreign Affairs Ministers also adopt a declaration concerning the cooperation with Mediterranean Partners in which they underline the inextricable link between secu-
3. 5+5 Dialogue

The 5+5 Dialogue comes from a French proposal and was set up on 10 October 1990 during a ministerial meeting in Rome. It gathers the ten countries of the Western Mediterranean Basin: five countries from the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Libya and Tunisia) and five members of the European Union (France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Malta who joined in 1991). The 5+5 Dialogue has a flexible and informal nature. Over the years, it has been transformed from a merely political forum to one for strengthened regional and multidisciplinary cooperation in the western Mediterranean. Its flexibility and informality have enabled a gradual opening up, and the participating ministers and senior officials now meet to discuss an increasing number of issues. Originally just a political compromise between Foreign Ministers dealing with security and stability, as well as economic integration, it later expanded to include other spheres, such as Education, the Environment and Renewable Energies, Home Affairs (since 1995), Migration (since 2002), Inter-parliamentary Relations (since 2003), Defence (since 2004), Tourism (since 2006) and Transport (since 2007). Due to its practical and operational nature, it is a forum for the exchange of ideas and the launch of new initiatives. It can also capitalise on its restricted geographical scope, which is limited to the western Mediterranean. This initiative has encouraged the insertion of Libya and Mauritania in the regional context.

Main Meetings in 2014

Health

During the 10th Foreign Affairs Meeting of the 5+5 Dialogue held in Nouakchott in 2013, emphasis is placed on the importance of deepening the dialogue on health issues. In this regard the Moroccan Ministry of Health, with the support of the Institut de Prospective Economique du Monde Méditerranéen (IPEMED), launches the Technical Working Group “Health in the Western Mediterranean” to hold a dialogue on health between the “5+5 countries” and in order to identify areas of collaboration (as both shores face common challenges that need a global reflection and answer). The final aim is to develop a common policy on Health in the Western Mediterranean. The first areas identified for collaboration are pharmacovigilance as well as health coverage and pharmaceutical biotechnology. The Technical Working group holds two meetings in 2014 (on 17 January and 26 November), both of which take place in Rabat.

Parliamentary Dimension

The Parliamentary Dimension of the 5+5 Dialogue is entrusted to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM), which coordinates and promotes the activities of this important sub-regional parliamentary forum. PAM, moreover, represents itself at ministerial meetings and Heads of State and Government Summits of the 5+5 Dialogue, as well as special events of this initiative, such as dedicated military exercises.

- 25-26 February, Valence (Spain): The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs points out the need to address the risks and challenges relating to water through three fundamental approaches: peace and security; development; and human rights.
- 25-26 June, Oran (Algeria): 2nd Workshop of the Water Expert Group of the 5+5 Dialogue. At the end of the meeting they provide a preliminary draft for the 5+5 Water Strategy and agree to intensify their contacts by creating a network of focal points in charge of water issues.
institutions, address the main issues on the table from the parliamentary perspective in the sectors of regional security, economic growth, climate change and the protection of victims of human trafficking and the fight against organised crime. They reaffirm the fundamental role of the parliaments in the 5+5 Dialogue since these are best placed to respond to political and economic challenges and to deepen integration.

Economic Forum

- 21 May, Lisbon (Portugal): The 2nd Economic Forum of the Western Mediterranean “Towards a strengthened regional economic integration” brings together more than 400 business leaders and high-level representatives of major enterprises and economic institutions from the 5+5 countries. The Portuguese deputy Prime Minister reaffirms Portugal’s full support for this informal but dynamic and efficient process and stresses the importance of the UfM’s role for its consolidation. The central theme of the event is Sustainable Development and it is structured around four strategic pillars: water, environment, infrastructure and financing. The forum provides a space for reflection and discussion on each country’s economic challenges and the opportunities for cooperation in joint projects or initiatives.

Foreign Affairs

- 22 May, Lisbon (Portugal): The 11th Foreign Affairs Meeting of the 5+5 Dialogue takes place under the Portuguese and Mauritanian Co-Presidency and provides the opportunity to discuss different regional issues, set a series of objectives and assess the work carried out so far. Ministers consider the 5+5 Dialogue a paradigmatic framework for political dialogue and cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean. This cooperation has to be inspired by the democratic principles spreading in the region. They praise Tunisia’s adoption of a new Constitution and express their concern for the situation in Libya. On regional Security they agree to enhance strategic and regional cooperation to fight terrorism through judicial cooperation and intelligence exchange. The situation in Sahel with the proliferation of international illicit networks; the degradation of the situation in Mali; the ongoing violence in Syria; the development of the Peace Process in the Middle East; and the need for a global approach to tackle migration in the Mediterranean are other topics linked with security and discussed by Ministers. Economic and Social development are also on the agenda. Ministers reaffirm the need to promote investments and trade and develop infrastructures, and facilitate the exchange of expertise and human exchange between the two shores. The Foreign Affairs meeting is the occasion to review the work carried out so far on the different sectors of the 5+5 Dialogue: Environment, Water, Energy, Climate Change, Defence, Transport, Education and Tourism. Besides these sectors, new perspectives are envisaged: Health, Culture, Trade and Investments. Finally they underline the importance of strengthening complementarity between the Dialogue and the UfM.

Final Declaration:

Transport

The 5+5 Dialogue on Transport brings together the GTMO 5+5 - the Transport Group of the Western Mediterranean. Ministers of the 10 countries of the western Mediterranean participate as members while the EC Directorate General for Mobility and Transport and the General Secretariat of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) attend as observers. CETMO performs the function of Technical Secretariat. Operational cooperation with UfM has been consolidated since 2013.

- 22 October, Lisbon (Portugal): The Transport Ministers of the Western Mediterranean gather for the 8th Conference of the GTMO 5+5. Ministers agree to intensify their efforts to complete the Central Section of the Trans-Maghreb Motorway Axis project (the first example of effective operational collaboration between GTMO 5+5 and the UfM). This project will generate a positive impact on regional and international levels because it will increase the mobility of persons and international freight flows. The next conference will be organised in 2016 by Mauritania.

Final Declaration:
www.cetmo.org/pdf/Conclusions%20GTMO%205+5%20Lisbonne.pdf

Education

- 27-28 October, Marseille (France): Following the recommendation made during the 5+5 Dialogue Foreign Affairs Meeting in Lisbon, the Education/Vocational Training Ministers of the ten countries of the western Mediterranean gather under the Moroccan and Portuguese Co-Presidency. There are many different challenges, which vary between countries but which are often shared: low participation and employment rates, inadequate correlation between education and employment, high school or vocational training drop-out rates and a lack of vocationally-oriented higher education. The Ministers of Education express their willingness to develop vocational education and training and align it with the economic and labour market demand; promote a better match between training provision and business needs; promote the social inclusion of young people; improve the efficiency of vocational education and training systems; propose new governance models and public practices; and establish avenues for the mutual recognition of qualifications of each country by all the others. They identify three objectives to be achieved: improve the quality and attractiveness of vocational education and training; secure and facilitate young people’s training programmes; and take better account of business needs in vocational education and training. In this perspective, they identify some priority occupational sectors: Automobile and aircraft maintenance, Mechanics and mechatronics; Digital professions; Building and public works; Tourism, hotels and catering; Transport; Energy
and mining industries; Agriculture and agri-food businesses; Environment and sustainable development; and the Maritime sector. A concrete Action Plan for 2015-2016 is also signed, whose aim is to promote mobility and improve the comparability of systems by establishing a Euro-Mediterranean competence framework, which should help increase the employability of young people in the Mediterranean region. Some of the Action Plan priority axes are to establish a Euro-Mediterranean competence assessment framework, to favour the use of digital media to create a EURO MED PASS, a ‘passport’ to enhance mobility. The next 5+5 Education meeting will take place in Mauritania in 2016. Meanwhile, an expert group will be responsible for implementing these recommendations, and in 2015 a conference will be held as a forum for reflection and dialogue and to propose initiatives.

Final Declaration:

Tourism

• 3 December, Lisbon (Portugal): The ministers of the 5+5 Dialogue and representatives from the UfM and World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) gather and recognise the strategic role played by the tourism sector in the socio-economic development of the western Mediterranean countries. In this perspective, a common approach to enhance tourism cooperation is necessary. They acknowledge the importance of training and qualifications for human capital, as well as the need for an evaluation of the services and performances in the field of tourism. To this end, they decide to share their common experience and heritage as well as best practices. The fourth Ministerial conference on tourism will take place in Morocco in 2016.

Final Declaration:
www.turismodeportugal.pt/PortugalC3%25As/turismodeportugal/destaque/Documents/Declara%C3%A7ao-de-Lisboa-3-12-2014.pdf

Defence

The ‘5+5 Defence Initiative’ was set up in 2004 after a Declaration of Intent was signed to foster mutual knowledge about Member States, strengthen understanding and confidence between them and develop multilateral cooperation with a view to promoting security in the Western Mediterranean. The presidency is held on a rotating basis for one year, during which time that country is responsible for organising the forums for developing the proposals made in the annual Action Plan and the ministerial meeting, while defining the strategic directives for forthcoming activities. In 2014, Spain holds the Chairmanship of the Initiative. Practical activities focus on three areas: maritime security, aviation security and participation by armed forces in support of civil protection.

• 10-11 December, Granada (Spain): The Ministerial Meeting on cooperation, security and defence of the 5+5 Defence Initiative focuses, among other themes, on security in the western Mediterranean area and regional crisis scenarios, in particular Libya, Iraq and Syria. The Ministers discuss major threats such as terrorism and illegal trafficking and issues connected with migration flows and humanitarian crises such as natural disasters and healthcare emergencies. Furthermore, Defence Ministers reiterate the value of the 5+5 Initiative as a discussion forum given the concrete contribution it provides to the sectors of maritime surveillance, airspace security and Armed Forces’ aid to civil protection operations, education and training. Ministers also sign a joint declaration to further develop multilateral cooperation and convert the western Mediterranean into a privileged forum of confidence and security. They approve the 2015 Action Plan and agree to implement a coordination mechanism for issuing instructions to tackle the management of natural disasters and emergencies, as well as during any healthcare activities carried out with affected populations, and the development of an operational Coordination and Planning Centre for armed forces support for civil protection. For 2015, the Chairmanship hands over to Tunisia.

www.defensa.gob.es/5mas5/es/

4. Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AII)

After the dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia and the growing tensions among ethnic, cultural and religious groups in the Balkan area, the EU, in its attempts to cope with these crises, promoted the “Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe” for southeastern European countries hoping to join the Union in the future. Within this treaty, at the Finnish EU Summit in 1999, the Italian Government presented the “Adriatic-Ionian Initiative.” The Adriatic and Ionian Initiative (AII) was established at the Summit on the Development and Security of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, held in Ancona (Italy) in May 2000. At the end of the Conference, the Foreign Ministers of the participating countries, Italy, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece and Slovenia signed the “Ancona Declaration” in order to strengthen regional cooperation to promote political and economic stability, thus creating a solid base for the process of European integration. Today, the AII has eight members: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. The initiative’s Chairmanship rotates every May/June according to alphabetical criteria. The Albanian Chairmanship started in June 2013 and ended in May 2014 and Slovenia takes over from June 2014 until May 2015.

Following the recent EU approach to support multilateral sub-regional cooperation, the AII started working, in 2010, on the idea of a Macro-Region for the Adriatic Ionian Region. Since then the AII Participating States, started raising awareness regarding the need to establish a Macro-Region for the Adriatic Ionian basin. The European Council has given a mandate to the EU Commission to present a new “Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region” (EUSAIR) by the end of 2014. The EUSAIR has been endorsed by the Council on 24 October 2014 and is now in its implementation phase. Many years after the establishment of the AII, the geopolitical environment has deeply changed. Slovenia in 2004 and Croatia in 2013 entered the EU
Main Activities under the Albanian Chairmanship

Albania took over the AII presidency in June 2013 in a very special moment for relations between Member States and for all relations with the European Union. A discussion started within the EU on the adoption of an Adriatic-Ionian Macro Regional strategy has reached a crucial stage.

- 6 February, Athens (Greece): 16th Adriatic and Ionian Council: a special meeting of the AIC is convened by the Albanian Chairmanship, unscheduled in the regular calendar, in order to stress the support of the eight AII Governments to the EUSAIR process. The Special meeting of the AIC offers the opportunity to take stock of the intergovernmental activity of the first part of the Albanian Presidency and enables a discussion to be held at Ministerial level on the preparation of the final phase of the macro regional process. An Action Plan will be adopted in the second half of the year.


- 27-28 April, Tirana (Albania): 12th Conference of All Parliament Speakers organised into two sessions: Driving closer towards the EU and Promoting sustainable Economic and Social prosperity of the All Region. In the Joint Statement approved at the end of the conference, they decide to set up ad hoc Parliamentary Representations to follow the work of All and the Progress of the EUSAIR, they also commit themselves to closely following the EUSAIR in the final phase of the process and in the implementation phase starting early in 2015.


- 13 May, Brussels (Belgium): The 17th AIC Adriatic Ionian Council marks the end of a successful Albanian Chairmanship and hands it over to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the final Declaration, ministers confirm that the goal of regional cooperation in the Adriatic Ionian basin is fostering stability and growth and paving the way to the EU integration of the candidate and potential candidate countries in the region; they are also convinced that the EUSAIR will give new impetus for cooperation and investment to the benefit of all involved and to the peace and security of the entire area; they recognise the crucial importance of cooperation with the EU commission and invite the Participating States to continue raising awareness among internal stakeholders and representatives of the Adriatic Ionian civil society to give their contribution to the activities within the All and the EUSAIR.


Main Activities under the Bosnia and Herzegovian Chairmanship

Bosnian and Herzegovian priorities as Chair of the AII are to further strengthen good neighbourly relations, stability and prosperity for all members and the West Balkan region in order to come closer to the EU through the EUSAIR, which should provide an adequate framework to this end. The roundtables will be organised according to the EUSAIR pillars. The period of its Presidency, coinciding with the first semester of the Italian Presidency of the EU and with the approval of the Strategy by the European Council by the end of the year, will be of particular significance and crucial for the future developments of the Adriatic and Ionian macro region.

- 17 June, Sarajevo (BiH): At the first Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) meeting the new Chairman presents the programme and the priorities of the Chairmanship that this year are also strictly linked with the EUSAIR priority pillars. Attention is also given to the damages and the consequences of the catastrophic floods that hit Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia. All AII countries have given support and solidarity in different forms to the people of the region.

- 23-24 October, Brussels (Belgium): In the European Council Conclusions, the Heads of State and Government of the 28 Member States of the European Union adopted the “EU Strategy for the Adriatic Ionian Region” (EUSAIR) asking “all relevant actors” to implement it without delay. The new strategy benefits from: the long experience of the All which fosters cooperation at the level of civil society (Chambers of Commerce, Cities, Universities); the Maritime Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Seas adopted in November 2012; the coincidence of the programming period 2014-2020; the lessons learned from the already existing macro-regional strategies. The EUSAIR will address major challenges of the region through its four-pillar architecture focusing on: Blue Growth, aimed at boosting marine and maritime innovations; Connecting the Region, aimed at improving connectivity in terms of transport and energy; Environmental quality, focused on coastal and marine biodiversity; and Sustainable Tourism.


5. League of Arab States

The League of Arab States is an association of 22 countries founded in 1945 with the aim of improving coordination among its members on matters of common interest. The founding members of the League (Egypt, Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Yemen) agreed to seek closer cooperation on issues regarding economics, communication, culture, nationality, social welfare and health. The highest body of the League is the Council, composed of representatives of member states, generally Foreign Ministers. Each member state has one vote, regardless of the size of the country. The Council meets twice a year, in March and September but it may also convene a special ses-
The Arab League struggles with dysfunction and disunity among its members. In 2002 it achieved remarkable consensus on the Arab Peace Initiative. The 2011 Arab revolts in Middle East and North Africa offered an occasion to propose actions and initiatives: it backed the UN action against Gaddafi’s forces in Libya and sent, for the first time in history, a mission of observers to Syria (after suspending its membership in the League).

Further information:  
www.lasportal.org/en/Pages/default.aspx

Main Events during 2014

25th Arab League Summit

- 25-26 March, Kuwait City (Kuwait): The 25th Arab League Summit starts with polarisation among the participants. Part of the divide is due to the labelling or not of the Muslim Brotherhood as a ‘terrorist Organisation.’ Egypt and Saudi Arabia already do so, while Qatar, their regional sponsor, continues to support it. Syria is another point of divide as different members of the League support different sides in the civil war. Due to all these disagreements, the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates do not attend the summit. The Syrian seat at the summit also opens a discussion between those defending it should remain vacant for following events and those supporting the rebels and considering it should be filled by the opposition national coalition. In the final declaration, Arab leaders pledge to provide support to Arab countries undergoing political transformation and social shifts, reaffirm the Palestinian cause to be the core issue of all Arab and Muslim nations and refuse to recognise Israel as a Jewish state.

Kuwait Declaration:  

3rd European Union - League of Arab States Foreign Affairs Ministerial Meeting

- 10-11 June, Athens (Greece): The third European Union - League of Arab States Foreign Affairs Ministerial Meeting serves to adopt a 34-point joint declaration on cooperation between the two international organisations. The statement sets shared ideas on several current issues, most of them focusing on the MENA region. They agree to address common challenges together in security, political and socio-economic fields. More specifically, the Euro-Arab cooperation seeks to provide an integrated regional response to strategic challenges, to exchange views on political and security matters, to prepare a humanitarian assistance plan on crisis situations, to face terrorist threats (including acting against radicalisation, recruitment and foreign fighters) and combating transnational organised crime. They also stress the importance of implementing the 1995 NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty), the role of civil society and free media in democratic process, and cooperation on human rights, environment, energy and business. In addition, they express their concern for the Middle East peace process – defining it as a strategic objective and vital for stability and international peace and security – the Syrian conflict, its internal situation and the refugee crisis, and the democratic process and state institution building in Libya.

Declaration:  

1st Conference on Human Rights in the Arab Region: Challenges and the Way Forward

- 30 June, Cairo (Egypt): The conference is jointly organised by the UN Human Rights Office and the LAS, and is attended by some government representatives, national human rights institutions and Arab civil society organisations. The principal goal is to develop a regional HR strategy. They identify the continuing HR violations as the main challenges to transitions to sustainable democracies in some of the countries. Nabil El Araby states that discrimination and hate speech could be the root of many other political and social problems in Arab societies. Moreover, priorities are agreed to monitor those violations and focus on vulnerable groups, mainly women, refugees, IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons), migrants and HR activists.

Both organisations encourage delegates to take action, for instance, to protect individuals working on HR defence, and call on Arab civil society to engage to guarantee HR promotion, especially with regard to gender organisations and strengthening women’s role in all areas. At the same time, they propose to strengthen mechanisms already established, such as the Arab HR Committee and the Arab Court for HR. It is decided to organise this conference regularly every two years in order to boost cooperation and enhance ties, so the next one would be in 2016, when it is planned to approve a joint strategy.

Further Information:  
www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/AroadmapagreedforanArabregional-humanrightsstrategy.aspx

2nd Arab Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction

- 14-16 September, Sharm El Sheikh (Egypt): The UNISDR (UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction), the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the LAS organised this intergovernmental high level conference attended by national delegations, ministers, senior government officials, city mayors, civil society representatives and scientific and academic institutions. Its aim is to review the commitment from the Arab countries to the advancement of DRR (disaster risk reduction) policies and the implementation of the HFA (Hyogo Framework for Action). The conference also provides an opportunity to generate stronger political commitment and investment in Arab countries in disaster risk management and sustainable management. This is the last inter-governmental meeting before the Third World Disaster Risk Reduction Conference to be organised in Japan in 2015.
6. Arab Maghreb Union

The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) celebrates its 25th anniversary. Founded in 1989 in Marrakesh, the five member countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania) expressed their common wish for greater unity among the Maghreb countries, reflecting the ties existing between their peoples and their synergy. The Union’s main goals are the free circulation of goods and people, the eventual establishment of a free trade area, a customs union and a common market, and the adoption of common policies in all the spheres possible, as well as fostering progress and the well-being of populations. The main decision-making bodies are the Presidential Council, consisting of heads of state, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs Council and the Specialised Ministerial Commissions. The secretariat general is based in Rabat, the post of secretary general currently held by the Tunisian, Habib Ben Yahia. Major projects are the creation of a Maghrebi Investment and Foreign Trade Bank, a Maghrebi University and a Maghrebi Science Academy. However, the AMU is experiencing difficulties functioning, for a great number of problems hinder good relations between the Maghrebi partners: the issues of the Moroccan-Algerian border, closed since 1994, Western Sahara, which poisons relations between Morocco and Algeria, and the embargo against Libya from the 1990s to 2003. The Council of Heads of State has thus not met since 1994 and the future of the AMU remains dependent on relations between the partners.

Meetings Held in 2014

- 17-18 February, Marrakesh (Morocco): The AMU countries and its Secretary General, Habib Ben Yahia, participated in the 3rd Forum of Maghrebi Entrepreneurs organised by the Moroccan General Business Federation (Confédération générale des entreprises du Maroc, CGEM), presided by the Maghrebi Entrepreneurs’ Union (Union maghrébine des entrepreneurs, UME). The forum’s aim, among other things, is to stimulate economic integration in the AMU and foster intra-Maghrebi commerce by accelerating the implementation of the Maghrebi Integrated Economic Area and creating a favourable legal climate in AMU countries. The forum likewise emphasised the need to strengthen the legal and organisational dimensions of the Entrepreneurs’ Union. With regard to boosting partnerships, they decide to hold a meeting of the Entrepreneurs’ Union with the EU delegation in order to study means of cooperation, partnership and support between the two institutions.

Marrakesh Statement
www.maghrebarabe.org/fr/communiques.cfm?id=128 (in French and Arabic)

- 9-10 May, Rabat (Morocco): The 32nd Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers of AMU Countries is held in a particular context marked by security, political and economic challenges requiring a global approach to handle them and foster stability in the region. The Ministers insist on the need to get out of the deadlock situation and fulfil the aspirations of the region’s people. They call for the launching of the Maghrebi Investment and Foreign Trade Bank. The Ministers also agree to hold the 7th session of the AMU Presidency Council in Tunisia in coordination with Libya, who will hold the AMU’s rotating presidency (in the end, the meeting was never held).

- 29-27 June, Rabat (Morocco): The AMU Secretariat General holds coordination meetings with the regional ensemble and other international organisations (including, among others, the WHO, FAO, UNESCO, UNDP, UNICEF, IOM, the EU and the EIB) to define priority lines of action for regional integration and raise awareness of all the projects being carried out in the Maghreb in the economic, legal, food, energy and environmental spheres, among others. As part of the UN-fostered Regional Coordination Mechanism (RCM), these meetings seek to establish a support system for the AMU and a coordination mechanism between the Union and its development partners in order to combine efforts.

www.maghrebarabe.org/fr/communiques.cfm?id=128 (in French and Arabic)

- 8 December, Rabat (Morocco): The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the AMU Secretary General sign a joint programme to relaunch cooperation on food security. They specify a series of goals to attain within four years regarding improved performance in the agricultural sector, sustainable management of natural resources, protection of agrifood systems against natural disasters and Maghreb economic integration.

www.maghrebarabe.org/fr/communiques.cfm?id=134 (in French and Arabic)

7. The Deauville Partnership

As a response to the upheavals in the Arab world in 2011, the G8 launched the Deauville Partnership (DP) at the summit held in May 2011 in the French city of Deauville. The aim of the partnership is to improve and coordinate international political and financial aid for countries in a transition process such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Jordan and Yemen. The partnership also aims at strengthening cooperation with relevant regional partners (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates) and to guarantee coordination with international financial institutions (International Monetary Fund, World Bank) and key international organisations (OECD, UNDP, EBRD, EIB). The DP requested the WB to establish a special fund to support the transformation underway in several countries. The MENA Transition Fund was established in September 2012 and its aim is to provide funds for technical cooperation to improve governance and public institutions and foster sustainable and inclusive economic growth in such a way as to improve the lives of the citizens of these transition countries. In June 2014, Germany assumed the presidency of the initiative, following France, the US and the UK. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development is currently managing the action to coordinate the IFIs and Development banks. The key events of the Partnerships are the annual meetings of Foreign Ministers and of Finance.
Ministers. The priorities of this initiative are supporting SMEs, strengthening the legal framework, promoting investments and improving opportunities for women.

Main events during 2014

• 25 September, New York (USA): The 4th Ministerial Meeting of the G7 Deauville Partnership takes place on the margins of the UN General Assembly. Ministers recognise that Arab countries in transition are facing huge challenges and that political tension and instability in the broader region is a major obstacle towards its economic and social development. They condemn all terrorist acts committed by the Islamic State terrorist organisation in Syria and Iraq. They call for an immediate political settlement in Syria and Libya. In this sense, ministers reaffirm that the aim of the initiative is to assist the Arab countries in consolidating democracy, rule of law, human rights, developing institutions and building an inclusive society. They reconfirm that the assistance should be demand-led according to the priorities set by Arab countries. They also agree to seek greater civil society and private sector involvement.

German Chair’s Statement:
www.auswaertiges-amt.de/.../140926_Statement.pdf

• 9 October, Washington (USA): Finance Ministers and IFIs of the Deauville Partnerships gather to confirm their commitment to give support to Arab countries in transition in their reform agenda. They agree that in order to tackle challenges like unemployment, labour force inactivity and socio-economic imbalances, it is necessary to enhance economic stability, foster sustainable and inclusive growth and increase economic opportunities for women and young people. They set four priorities: to acknowledge the importance of sound public finances and structural reforms; promote the efficient division of labour among partners and coordinate among donors; support financial inclusion, financial literacy and responsible finance; and enhance the MENA Transitional Fund’s efficiency and impact.

Chair Statement:
www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Standardartikel/Topics/International_affairs/G7Articles/2014-10-10-chair%20statement.html

8. Mediterranean Group

The Mediterranean Group gathers the Foreign Ministers of seven European Mediterranean Countries, namely, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain on an informal basis. The proposal to create this group came from Spain and Cyprus with the aim of generating a space for informal consultations in order to resume the aims and initiative of the former Olive Group. It was formally presented to the EU Foreign Affairs Council in December 2013.

• 16 April, Alicante (Spain): The Foreign ministers of the Mediterranean Group gather for the first time and discuss the European Neighbourhood Policy with particular focus on the Southern neighbourhood, the role of the UfM and the challenges associated to migratory flows. Ministers restate their political support of the UfM, reinforcing its role as a platform for coordination with other institutions and instruments of economic diplomacy. On the issue of migration, ministers express the need to continue to make major efforts considering that migration pressure is far from diminishing due to the instability and poverty in the countries of origin. Ministers consider that the efforts carried out by EU Mediterranean countries are a benefit for the entire European Union. These challenges need to be addressed comprehensively through both short and long-term measures involving both the European Union and third countries.

Declaration of the Mediterranean Group:
This chapter provides details of the results of presidential and legislative elections that took place in 2014 in independent states, presented in circum-Mediterranean order. The list also includes referenda and those elections held in autonomous entities or in any other relevant territory that are of particular political significance.

**Slovenia**

**Legislative elections**

13 July 2014

Previous elections: 4 December 2011

Slovenia is a parliamentary republic. It has a bicameral legislative system, where the National Assembly (Drzavni Zbor) has 90 seats to serve 4-year terms. Of those, 88 deputies are elected through an open-list proportional representation system, and the other two are elected by the registered members of the Italian and Hungarian minorities. The constitution establishes a 4% threshold.

### Parties

- **Party of Miro Cerar (SMC)** (Social liberalism) -- 34.5
- **Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS)** (Conservatism) -- 20.7
- **Democratic Pensioners’ Party of Slovenia (DES-US)** (Single-issue) -- 10.2
- **Social Democrats (SD)** (Social democracy) -- 6.0
- **Coalition United Left (ZL)** (Social democracy) -- 6.0
- **New Slovenia – Christian Democrats (NSI)** (Social conservatism) -- 5.6
- **Alliance of Alenka Bratusek (ZaAB)** (Liberalism) -- 4.4
- **Minorities (Hungarian and Italian minorities’ interests)** -- 2

Turnout: 51.7%

### Candidates

- **Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ)** (Conservatism) -- 37.2
- **Ivo Josipovic** -- 38.5
- **Ivan Sincic** -- 16.4
- **Milan Kujundžić, Alliance for Croatia (SH)** (Conservatism, Right wing) -- 6.3

Turnout: 47.1% (1st round) and 59.1% (2nd round)

**Croatia**

**Presidential elections**

28 December 2014 (first round) and 11 January 2015 (second round)

Previous elections: 27 December 2009 (first round) and 10 January 2010 (second round)

Croatia is a parliamentary republic. The President is elected by absolute majority vote through a two-round system to serve 5-year term.

### Candidates

- **Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, Croatian Democratic Community (HDZ)** (Conservatism) -- 37.2
- **Ivo Josipovic** -- 38.5
- **Ivan Sincic** -- 16.4
- **Milan Kujundžić, Alliance for Croatia (SH)** (Conservatism, Right wing) -- 6.3

Turnout: 47.1% (1st round) and 59.1% (2nd round)

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

**Presidential elections**

12 October 2014

Previous elections: 3 October 2010

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a parliamentary republic. The presidency is composed by three members elected through a plurality voting system, each belonging to the three ethnic communities. The Bosniak and Croat representatives are elected by citizens from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Serb is elected from the Republika Srpska. The three of them serve 4-year terms, although the chairmanship of the presidency rotates among them every eight months.

### Bosniak representative

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<th>% 2nd round</th>
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<td>Bakir Izetbegovic, Party of Democratic Action (SDA) (Centre-right)</td>
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<td>Fahrudin Radoncic, Union for a Better Future (SBB) (Conservatism)</td>
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<td>Emir Suljagić, Democratic Front (DF) (Social democracy)</td>
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<td>Bakir Hadžiomorović, Social Democratic Party (SDPBiH) (Social democracy)</td>
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<td>Sefer Halilović, Patriotic Party (BPS) (Right wing)</td>
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<td>Mustafa Ćerić</td>
<td>4.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Džemral Bajramović, Diaspora Party (SDBiH) (Interests of BiH citizens living abroad)</td>
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<td>Miračko Delić</td>
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<td>Halil Tuđman</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adžić</td>
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### Croat representative

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dragan Ćokić, Democratic Community (HDZBiH) (Conservatism)</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin Raguž, Democratic Community-1990 (HDZ-1990) (Conservatism)</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Živko Budimir, Party of Justice and Trust (SPiP) (Social conservatism)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anto Popović, Democratic Front (DF) (Social democracy)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Serb representative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>% 1st round</th>
<th>% 2nd round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mladen Ivanic, Alliance for Change (SZP) (Conservatism)</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Željka Cvijanović, Social Democratic Union (SNSD) (Social democracy)</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goran Žmijančić, Party for Fair Politics (SPP)</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

General turnout: 54.5%
Legislative elections

12 October 2014

Previous elections: 3 October 2010

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a parliamentary republic. It has a bicameral legislative system, where the House of Representatives (Zastupnički dom) has 42 seats which are elected through an open-list proportional representation system to serve 4-year terms. 28 deputies are elected by citizens from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 14 by citizens from the Republika Srpska. A 3% threshold is established.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Action (SDA) (Bosnian nationalism, Centre-right)</td>
<td>18.7 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) (Serbian nationalism, Social democracy, Separatism)</td>
<td>15.6 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) (Serbian nationalism)</td>
<td>13.0 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Front (DF) (Social democracy)</td>
<td>9.2 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for a Better Future (SSB) (Conservatism)</td>
<td>8.7 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union of BiH (HDZ BiH) (Croatian nationalism, Conservatism)</td>
<td>7.5 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party of BiH (SDP) (Social democracy)</td>
<td>6.7 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party for Democratic Progress (PDP) (Serbian nationalism, Conservatism)</td>
<td>3.1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ-1990) (Croatian nationalism, Conservatism)</td>
<td>2.5 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnian-Herzegovinian Patriotic Party (BPS) (Bosnian nationalism, Conservatism)</td>
<td>2.4 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic People’s Alliance (DNS) (Serbian nationalism, Conservatism)</td>
<td>2.3 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Activity (ASDA) (Bosnian nationalism, Conservatism)</td>
<td>1.4 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 64.3%

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244

Legislative elections

8 June 2014

Previous elections: 12 December 2010

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244 is a parliamentary republic. It has a unicameral legislative system (Kuvendi i Kosovës) with 120 seats elected through an open-list proportional representation system to serve 4-year terms. 10 of those deputies are elected by the Serbian community and other 10 by other minorities. A 5% threshold is established for political parties representing the Albanian majority, and no threshold for the minorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) (Social liberalism)</td>
<td>30.4 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) (Conservatism)</td>
<td>25.2 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Determination Movement (LV) (Nationalism)</td>
<td>13.6 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) (Conservatism)</td>
<td>9.5 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian List (SL) (Minority interests, Serbian nationalism)</td>
<td>5.2 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative for Kosovo (NPK/NK) (Conservatism, Albanian nationalism)</td>
<td>5.2 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Parties</td>
<td>6.1 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 42.6%

Serbia

Legislative elections

16 March 2014

Previous elections: 6 May 2012

Serbia is a parliamentary republic. It has a unicameral legislative system (Narodna skupština) with 250 seats. The deputies are elected through a closed-list proportional representation system to serve 4-year terms. A 5% threshold is established for all political parties, except for those representing minorities for whom the threshold correspond to 0.4%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) (Conservatism)</td>
<td>48.4 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) (Social democracy)</td>
<td>33.5 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DS) (Social democracy, Third way)</td>
<td>6.0 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic Party (NDS) (Social democracy)</td>
<td>5.7 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians (MVS) (Minority interests)</td>
<td>2.2 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Action of Sandzak (SDAS) (Bosniak minority interests)</td>
<td>1.0 3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 53.1%

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Presidential elections

13 April 2014 (first round), and 27 April 2014 (second round)

Previous elections: 22 March 2009 and 5 April 2009

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is a parliamentary republic. The president is elected by absolute majority vote through a two-round system to serve a 5-year terms. The constitution establishes that a candidate must achieve support from the majority of registered voters in a first round, or a second round between the top two candidates would be organised.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>% 1st round</th>
<th>% 2nd round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gjorge Ivanov, Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) (Conservatism)</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>57.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevo Pendarovski, Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) (Social democracy, Third way)</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iljaz Halimi, Democratic Party of the Albanians (DPA/PDSH) (Albanian minority interests)</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoran Popovski, People for Macedonia (GROM) (Centrism)</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 49.1% (1st round) and 54.6% (2nd round)

Legislative elections

27 April 2014

Previous elections: 5 June 2011

The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has a unicameral parliament (Soberëti) with 123 seats to serve 4-year terms. Deputies are elected through a closed-list proportional representation system, and three of them represent the diaspora. There is no threshold.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Action (PDD) (Albanian minority interests)</td>
<td>42.2 61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Party of Democratic Action (PDD) (Albanian minority interests) | 42.2 | 61 |
Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) (Social democracy, Third way) 24.9 34
Democratic Union for Integration (DUI/BDI) (Albanian minority interests) 13.5 19
Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA/PDSH) (Albanian minority interests) 5.8 7
Citizens Option for Macedonia (GROM) (Centrism) 2.8 1
National Democratic Revival (RDK) (Albanian minority interests) 1.6 1
Turnout: 63.3%

**Turkey**

**Presidential elections**

10 August 2014
Previous elections: First direct presidential elections
Turkey is a parliamentary republic. The president is elected by absolute majority vote through a two-round system to serve a 5-year terms. A second round was not necessary due to one of the candidates achieved absolute majority in the first round.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>% 1st round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tayyip Erdogan, Justice and Development Party (AKP) (Conservatism)</td>
<td>51.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ekmeleddin Ilhanolu, Republican People’s Party (CHP) (Social democracy and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) (Turkish nationalism)</td>
<td>38.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selahattin Demirtas, Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) (Left-wing, Minority rights)</td>
<td>9.76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 74.19%

**Syria**

**Presidential elections**

3 June 2014
Previous elections: First Direct Multicandidate Presidential Elections
Syria is a presidential republic. The President is elected by a majoritarian electoral system to serve a 7-year terms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>% 1st round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bashar Hafez al-Assad, Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party</td>
<td>88.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hassan Abdullah al-Nouri</td>
<td>4.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maher Abdul-Hafiz Hajar</td>
<td>3.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 73.42%

**Egypt**

**Referendum**

14 January 2014
The referendum was promoted by the acting president, proposing the adoption of a new Constitution. It deals, among other issues, with strengthening military, women rights and removes certain Islamist matter. The question was ‘Do you approve of the new Constitution of Egypt?’, and offered two options: ‘Yes’ and ‘No’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>98.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1.87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 38.59%

**Turkey**

**Presidential elections**

26 May 2014
Previous elections: 17 June 2012
Egypt is a presidential republic. The President is elected by absolute majority vote through a two-round system to serve a 4-year terms. A second round was not necessary as only two candidates ran for election.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>% 1st round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdel Fattah al Sisi</td>
<td>96.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamdeen Sabahi, Egyptian Popular Current (TSM)</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 47.45%

**Libya**

**Constituent Assembly elections**

20 February 2014
The General National Congress (Al Mutamar Al Watani Al Aam, elected in legislative elections in 2012) voted to celebrate elections in order to choose the Constituent Assembly’s members. This was conformed of 60 seats, from which only 47 were assigned and 13 remained unfilled due to boycott and violence during the polls in the respective places. Deputies are elected through an individual majoritarian system, so candidates were not indicated to be affiliated to any political party. A list of 47 names formed the new Constituent Assembly. Elected candidates and their respective constituencies can be found on: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/l/libya/libya2014.txt

| Countries/l/libya/libya20142.txt |

**Tunisia**

**Legislative elections**

26 October 2014
Previous elections: 23 October 2011 (Constituent Assembly)
Tunisia is a semi-presidential republic. It has a unicameral parliament (Majlis Al Nuwaab) with 200 seats. Representatives are elected through an individual majoritarian system, so candidates were not indicated to be affiliated to any political party. A list of 188 independent deputies formed the new parliament. Their names and their respective constituencies can be found on: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/l/libya/libya20142.txt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Call to Tunisia (NT) (Secularism, Social democracy)</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ennahdha Renaissance Party (Islamic, Conservatism)</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Patriotic Union (UPL) (Secularism, Liberalism)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front (FP) (Secularism, Islamism)</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisian Aspiration (Secularism, Liberalism)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress of the Republic (CPR) (Secularism, Social liberalism)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Current (Pan-Arabian)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party (Secularism, Liberalism)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Movement (Secularism, Socialism)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Destourian Initiative (Social liberalism)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Current of Love (Populism)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 67.72%
Presidential elections

23 November 2014 (first round) and 21 December 2014 (second round)

Previous elections: 25 October 2009

The President is elected by absolute majority vote through a two-round system to serve a 5-year terms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>% 1st round</th>
<th>% 2nd round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beji Caid Essebsi, Call to Tunisia (NT) (Secularism, Social democracy)</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>55.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moncef Marzouki, Congress of the Republic (CPR) (Secularism, Social liberalism)</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamma Hammami, Popular Front (PP) (Secularism, Socialism)</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hechmi Hamdi, Current of Love (Populism)</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slim Riahi, Free Patriotic Union (UPL) (Secularism, Liberalism)</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kamel Morjane, National Destourian Initiative (Social liberalism)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, Republican Party (Secularism, Liberalism)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 67.80% (1st round) and 64.75% (2nd round)

Algeria

Presidential elections

17 April 2014

Previous elections: 9 April 2009

Algeria is a presidential republic. The president is elected by absolute majority, voted through a two-round system to serve a 5-year terms. There is no presidential term limit.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>% 1st round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Front for National Liberation (FLN)</td>
<td>81.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Benflis</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdelaziz Belaid, Front for the Future (FA)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisa Hanoune, Workers’ Party (PT) (Left wing)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ali Fawzi Rebane, Generation of ’54 (Ahd 54)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moussa Touati, Algerian National Front (FNA) (Conservatism)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 49.42%

Mauritania

Presidential elections

21 June 2014

Previous elections: 18 July 2009

Mauritania is a presidential republic. The President is elected by absolute majority vote through a two-round system to serve a 5-year terms. A second round was not necessary due to one of the candidates achieving an absolute majority in the first round. There is a presidential limit of two consecutive terms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>% 1st round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, Union for the Republic Party (URP) (Centrist, Populism)</td>
<td>81.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biram Dah Abeid, Resurgence of the Abolitionist Movement (IRA) (Anti-slavery movement)</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boidiel Oud Houmeit, Party for Democracy and Entente</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ibrahima Moctar Sarr, Alliance for Justice and Democracy/Movement for Renewal (AJD/MR) (Minority rights)</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lalla Maryam Mint Moulaye Idriss</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 56.46%

European Union (EU)

European Parliament elections

22, 23, 24, 25 May 2014

Previous elections: 4, 5, 6, 7 June 2009

The European Parliament has 751 members that are elected by proportional representation to serve a 5-year terms. Each Member State sets its own electoral system and has a specific number of seats according to its population within the EU.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats) (EPP)</td>
<td>29.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament (S&amp;D)</td>
<td>25.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR)</td>
<td>9.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE)</td>
<td>8.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL)</td>
<td>6.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 67.80%(1st round) and 64.75%(2nd round)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Parties % Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>42.43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties % Seats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN: Front national (NI)</td>
<td>24.86</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMP: Union pour un Mouvement Populaire (EPP)</td>
<td>20.81</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS - PRG: Parti Socialiste - Parti radical de gauche (S&amp;D)</td>
<td>13.98</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative (UDI+MoDem):</td>
<td>9.94</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition: Union des Démocrates et Indépendants + Mouvement Démocrate (ALDE)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe écologie; Europe Ecologie (Greens/EFA)</td>
<td>8.95</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FG (PCF + PG + Ens. + et al.): Coalition Front de gauche: Parti Communiste Français + Parti de Gauche + Ensemble + Front de gauche (GUE/NGL)</td>
<td>6.33</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UOM: Union pour les Ouvres-Mer (GUE/NGL)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ind.: Indépendant (EFDD)</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>57.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties % Seats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD: Partito Democratico (S&amp;D)</td>
<td>40.81</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M5S: Movimento Cinque Stelle (EFDD)</td>
<td>21.15</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FI: Forza Italia (EPP)</td>
<td>16.81</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LN: Lega Nord (NI)</td>
<td>6.15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal. (NCD+UCD+PPI): 4.38</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition: Nuovo Centrodestra + Unione de Centro Democratico + Popolari per l’Italia (EPP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>59.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties % Seats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYRIZA: Coalition of the Radical Left (GUE/NGL)</td>
<td>26.57</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.D.: New Democracy (EPP)</td>
<td>22.72</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X.A.: Golden Dawn (NI)</td>
<td>9.39</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELIA DA: Olive Tree-Democratic Allignment (S&amp;D)</td>
<td>8.02</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Potami: The River (S&amp;D)</td>
<td>6.60</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKE: Communist Party of Greece (NI)</td>
<td>6.11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>43.97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties % Seats</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DYS: Democratic Rally 37.75</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AKEL: Progressive Party of Working People (GUE/NGL)</td>
<td>26.98</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diko: Democratic Party 10.83</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KS EDEK: Movement for Social Democracy EDEK (S&amp;D)</td>
<td>7.68</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources**

- Electoral Calendar: [http://pomed.org](http://pomed.org)
- Fondation Robert Schuman: [http://www.robert-schuman.eu](http://www.robert-schuman.eu)
- Freedom House: [https://freedomhouse.org](https://freedomhouse.org)
- Inter-Parliamentary Union – PARLINE database on national parliaments: [http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp)
- International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: [http://www.idea.int](http://www.idea.int)
- Observatory on Politics and Elections in the Arab and Muslim World (OPEMAM): [http://www.opemam.org](http://www.opemam.org)
- Project on Middle East Democracy: [http://pomed.org](http://pomed.org)
- National Democratic Institute: [https://www.ndi.org](https://www.ndi.org)
- Freedom House: [http://www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)
- Fondation Robert Schuman: [http://www.robert-schuman.eu](http://www.robert-schuman.eu)
- International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: [http://www.idea.int](http://www.idea.int)
- Observatory on Politics and Elections in the Arab and Muslim World (OPEMAM): [http://www.opemam.org](http://www.opemam.org)
- Project on Middle East Democracy: [http://pomed.org](http://pomed.org)
### TABLE A1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Payments</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>85.84</td>
<td>181.82</td>
</tr>
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<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>61.45</td>
<td>91.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>183.88</td>
<td>127.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>220.04</td>
<td>174.28</td>
</tr>
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<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>35.71</td>
<td>20.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>111.27</td>
<td>28.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>86.74</td>
<td>48.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>32.72</td>
<td>20.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>900.73</td>
<td>403.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>437.64</td>
<td>137.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>135.08</td>
<td>136.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>137.45</td>
<td>167.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>6.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>268.69</td>
<td>270.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>47.24</td>
<td>29.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>65.71</td>
<td>45.25</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>60.00</td>
<td>50.87</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>339.90</td>
<td>86.60</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>65.70</td>
<td>60.18</td>
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### CHART A1

**EU Cooperation 2013**

[Bar chart showing EU cooperation 2013 with Commitments and Payments categories]
### TABLE A2  European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI): 2014-2020

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>2014-2020</th>
<th>2014-2017 (First period)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>221/270</td>
<td>121/148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt*</td>
<td>210/257</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>567/693</td>
<td>312/382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>315/385</td>
<td>130/159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>126/154</td>
<td>36/44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,323/1,671</td>
<td>728/890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>725/886</td>
<td>202/246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank and Gaza</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The interventions in Egypt are to be considered under the Programme for Single Support Framework (SSF) and only for the period 2014-2015.


### TABLE A3  Comparisons between ENPI and ENI fundings for the Mediterranean Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries and Indicative allocations</th>
<th>2007-2013</th>
<th>2014-2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>366.1</td>
<td>221/270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt*</td>
<td>1,007</td>
<td>210/257*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>640.6</td>
<td>567/693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>315/385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>126/154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>1,431.1</td>
<td>1,323/1,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>239.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>725/886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank and Gaza **</td>
<td>2,521.7**</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The interventions in Egypt are to be considered under the Programme for Single Support Framework (SSF) and only for the period 2014-2015.

** The data for the West Bank and Gaza include the ENPI, Development Programmes, humanitarian aid, UNRWA, PEGASE, Partnership for Peace and the Instrument for Stability.


### TABLE A4  Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) 2013 (Indicative Allocations)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate Countries</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Croatia</strong></td>
<td>93.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component I</td>
<td>Transition Assistance and Institution building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component II</td>
<td>Cross-Border Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component III</td>
<td>Regional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component IV</td>
<td>Human Resource Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component V</td>
<td>Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FYROM</strong></td>
<td>113.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component I</td>
<td>Transition Assistance and Institution building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component II</td>
<td>Cross-Border Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component III</td>
<td>Regional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component IV</td>
<td>Human Resource Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component V</td>
<td>Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Montenegro</strong></td>
<td>34.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component I</td>
<td>Transition Assistance and Institution building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component II</td>
<td>Cross-Border Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component III</td>
<td>Regional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component IV</td>
<td>Human Resource Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component V</td>
<td>Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>902.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component I</td>
<td>Transition Assistance and Institution building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component II</td>
<td>Cross-Border Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Component III</td>
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<td>Component V</td>
<td>Rural Development</td>
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(Continue)
TABLE A4  Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) 2013 (Indicative Allocations)  (Continuation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential candidates</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Albania</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component I</td>
<td>Transition Assistance and Institution building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component II</td>
<td>Cross-Border Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bosnia and Herzegovina</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component I</td>
<td>Transition Assistance and Institution building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component II</td>
<td>Cross-Border Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kosovo (Res. 1244 of the UNSC)</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component I</td>
<td>Transition Assistance and Institution building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component II</td>
<td>Cross-Border Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serbia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component I</td>
<td>Transition Assistance and Institution building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component II</td>
<td>Cross-Border Cooperation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As potential candidates the following countries will have access to Components III to V when each country receives accreditation to manage assistance itself (under the Decentralised Implementation System).


---

TABLE A5  Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II) (Indicative Allocations for the period 2014-2020)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate Countries</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>644.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Reforms in preparation for Union membership</td>
<td>205.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy and governance</td>
<td>122.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law and fundamental rights</td>
<td>83.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Socio-economic and Regional development</td>
<td>298.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment and climate action</td>
<td>112.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>112.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness and innovation</td>
<td>73.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Employment, social policies, education, promotion of gender equality, and human resources development</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>106.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>270.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Reforms in preparation for Union membership</td>
<td>99.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy and governance</td>
<td>46.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law and fundamental rights</td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Socio-economic and Regional development</td>
<td>90.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment and climate action</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness and innovation</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Employment, social policies, education, promotion of gender equality, and human resources development</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, Employment and social policies</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4,453.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Reforms in preparation for Union membership</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy and governance</td>
<td>956.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law and fundamental rights</td>
<td>624.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Socio-economic and Regional development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environment and climate action</td>
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<td>Transport</td>
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<td>Energy</td>
<td>93.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Competitiveness and innovation</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Employment, social policies, education, promotion of gender equality, and human resources development</td>
<td>435.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>912.2</td>
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(Continue)
### TABLE A5
**Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II) (Indicative Allocations for the period 2014-2020)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential candidates</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Albania</strong></td>
<td>649.4</td>
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<td>320.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy and governance</td>
<td>223.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law and fundamental rights</td>
<td>97.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Socio-economic and Regional development</td>
<td>168.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>56.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Competitiveness and innovation</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Employment, social policies, education, promotion of gender equality, and human resources development</td>
<td>69.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>d. Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>92.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bosnia and Herzegovina</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Reforms in preparation for Union membership</td>
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<td>Democracy and governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rule of law and fundamental rights</td>
<td>33.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>b. Socio-economic and Regional development</td>
<td>63.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Employment, social policies, education, promotion of gender equality, and human resources development</td>
<td>38.0</td>
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<td><strong>Kosovo (Res. 1244 of the UNSC)</strong></td>
<td>645.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Reforms in preparation for EU approximation</td>
<td>236.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy and governance</td>
<td>110.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rule of law and fundamental rights</td>
<td>126.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Socio-economic and Regional development</td>
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<td>Energy</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness and innovation</td>
<td>135.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Employment, social policies, education, promotion of gender equality, and human resources development</td>
<td>94.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>79.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serbia</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>a. Reforms in preparation for Union membership</td>
<td>543.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democracy and governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rule of law and fundamental rights</td>
<td>265.0</td>
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<td>b. Socio-economic and Regional development</td>
<td>565.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environment and climate change</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
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<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>125.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitiveness and innovation</td>
<td>105.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Employment, social policies, education, promotion of gender equality, and human resources development</td>
<td>190.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Agriculture and rural development</td>
<td>210.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE A6
**European Investment Bank Loans toward Mediterranean Countries in 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans by Sector</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Albania</strong></td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efse III</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green for growth Fund II</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bosnia and Herzegovina</strong></td>
<td>212.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banja luka-Doboj motorway</td>
<td>160.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efse III</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green for growth Fund II</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISP Loan for SMEs &amp; priority projects II</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kosovo (Res. 1244 of the UNSC)</strong></td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCH Loan for SME and Priority Projects</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continue)
### TABLE A6
European Investment Bank Loans toward Mediterranean Countries in 2013

(Continuation)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans by Sector</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>FYROM</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Else III</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green for growth Fund II</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBDP Loan for SME &amp; other priorities IV</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Montenegro</strong></td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Else III</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green for growth Fund II</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serbia</strong></td>
<td>317.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road rehabilitation and safety</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Else III</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green for growth Fund II</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apex Loan for SMEs &amp; other priorities III</td>
<td>150.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Agricole Loan for SMEs and priority projects</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>2,301.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul-Ankara railway tranche B</td>
<td>200.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul earthquake risk mitigation II</td>
<td>200.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadband roll-out Eastern Regions</td>
<td>200.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afforestation and erosion control II</td>
<td>150.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vodafone see Mobile Broadband</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainable tourism &amp; EE Global Loan</td>
<td>200.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yapi Kredi climate change facility II</td>
<td>99.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy efficiency cofinancing facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Green for growth Fund II</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSKB Loan II for SMEs MidCaps &amp; other priorities</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Loan II SMEs MidCaps &amp; priorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Isbank facility for sustainable communities</td>
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<td>Ziraatbank Loan for SMEs and MidCaps</td>
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<td>Eximbank Loan for SMEs and MidCaps</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Vakifbank municipal Global Loan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greater Anatolia SME Loan extension</td>
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<td>Tafila Wind Farm</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badia Impact Fund</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lebanon</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Majmoua II</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>IWSP II (Upper Egypt)</td>
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<td>NBE Global Loan (Egypt)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>ONEE - Projet Eolien</td>
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<td>Cpscl Tunisie 2013</td>
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(Continue)
### TABLE A6
**European Investment Bank Loans toward Mediterranean Countries in 2013 (Continuation)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans by Sector</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
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<td>Regional - Mediterranean</td>
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<tr>
<td>Euromena III Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capmezzarine Fund II</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional – North Africa</td>
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<td>Fund for the Mediterranean Region II</td>
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Sources: [http://www.eib.org/attachments/general/reports/er2013en.pdf](http://www.eib.org/attachments/general/reports/er2013en.pdf)

### TABLE A7
**Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO)**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Funding Allocations in Mediterranean Areas</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine Territoires</td>
<td>35.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Crisis</td>
<td>20.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria / Tindouf</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>65.00</strong></td>
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Table B1: Breakdown of Net Spanish Official Development Assistance in the Mediterranean Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2012-2013</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>€</td>
<td>€</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maghreb and Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1,562,626</td>
<td>-12,155,096</td>
<td>-877.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>835,752</td>
<td>1,274,341</td>
<td>52.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2,812,598</td>
<td>4,965,190</td>
<td>76.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>12,058,433</td>
<td>8,568,053</td>
<td>-28.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>104,159</td>
<td>316.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>11,656,129</td>
<td>15,357,475</td>
<td>31.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>19,966,775</td>
<td>13,761,501</td>
<td>-31.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Saharan Refugees</td>
<td>14,917,893</td>
<td>7,620,060</td>
<td>-48.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>7,239,539</td>
<td>8,600,083</td>
<td>18.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>401,986</td>
<td>18,963,066</td>
<td>4,617.3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>71,506,731</td>
<td>67,058,832</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Balkans and Turkey</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>-1,160,453</td>
<td>-3,746,564</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>-3,042,986</td>
<td>-3,503,323</td>
<td>-15.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>82,709</td>
<td>17,725.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-500,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>-2,188,776</td>
<td>-2,439,529</td>
<td>-11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo (Res.1244 of the UNSC)</td>
<td>406,852</td>
<td>71,771</td>
<td>-82.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,200,629</td>
<td>-713,049</td>
<td>-159.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>28,120,719</td>
<td>-10,747,985</td>
<td>-138.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AECID, Seguimiento PACI (PACI Follow-ups, i.e. reports on the Annual International Cooperation Plan) for 2013.

Chart B1: Breakdown of Spanish Gross Development Aid in the Maghreb and the Middle East by Sector (2013)

Source: AECID, Seguimiento PACI 2013.
### Chart B2

**Breakdown of Spanish Gross Development Aid in the Balkans and Turkey by Sector (2013)**

- **Education**: 43%
- **Economic Infrastructure and Services**: 21%
- **Health**: 9%
- **Governance and Civil Society**: 3%
- **Other Social Services and Infrastructure**: 14%
- **Productive Sectors**: 1%
- **Multi-Sector**: 4%
- **Non-Sectoral**: 5%

Source: AECID, Seguimientos PACI 2013.

### Table B2

**Breakdown of Net Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean Region by Objective (2013)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Maghreb and Middle East</th>
<th>Balkans and Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Consolidating democratic processes and the rule of law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural development and fight against hunger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reducing inequality and exposure to extreme poverty and crises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Promoting economic opportunities for the poorest members of society</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Fostering systems of social cohesion, emphasising basic social services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Promoting women’s rights and gender equality</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Improving the provision of global and regional public goods</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Providing quality solutions to humanitarian crises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Creating a global society committed to development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Other /Not specified</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Maghreb and Middle East**

- **Algeria**: 234,423
  - Rural development and fight against hunger: 35,750
  - Reduction in extreme poverty and crises: -13,840,190
  - Promoting economic opportunities: 629,714
  - Fostering systems of social cohesion: 226,793
  - Improving global and regional public goods: 210,000
  - Providing quality solutions: 31,735
  - Total: 316,679
- **Egypt**: 518,954
  - Rural development and fight against hunger: 1,210,971
  - Reduction in extreme poverty and crises: -1,430,174
  - Promoting economic opportunities: 498,979
  - Fostering systems of social cohesion: 275,400
  - Improving global and regional public goods: 112,421
  - Providing quality solutions: 87,791
  - Total: 498,979
- **Jordan**: 162,368
  - Rural development and fight against hunger: 656,248
  - Reduction in extreme poverty and crises: 3,500,000
  - Promoting economic opportunities: -34,485
  - Fostering systems of social cohesion: 198,421
  - Improving global and regional public goods: 425,000
  - Providing quality solutions: 148,050
  - Total: 354,270
- **Lebanon**: 5,852,841
  - Rural development and fight against hunger: 100,000
  - Reduction in extreme poverty and crises: 17,000
  - Promoting economic opportunities: 1,196,565
  - Fostering systems of social cohesion: 869,262
  - Improving global and regional public goods: 300,000
  - Providing quality solutions: 222,386
  - Total: 173,520
- **Libya**: 19,782
  - Rural development and fight against hunger: 4,000
  - Reduction in extreme poverty and crises: -6,065,352
  - Promoting economic opportunities: 301,499
  - Fostering systems of social cohesion: 834,464
  - Improving global and regional public goods: 5,779
  - Providing quality solutions: 287,969
  - Total: 742,804
- **Morocco**: 8,061,549
  - Rural development and fight against hunger: 2,834,692
  - Reduction in extreme poverty and crises: -6,065,352
  - Promoting economic opportunities: 9,296,870
  - Fostering systems of social cohesion: 301,499
  - Improving global and regional public goods: 834,464
  - Providing quality solutions: 5,779
  - Total: 742,804
- **Palestine**: 1,310,209
  - Rural development and fight against hunger: 2,228,510
  - Reduction in extreme poverty and crises: 1,877,028
  - Promoting economic opportunities: 4,470,734
  - Fostering systems of social cohesion: 183,162
  - Improving global and regional public goods: 79,194
  - Providing quality solutions: 2,800,201
  - Total: 760,035
- **Western Saharan Refugees**: 218,328
  - Rural development and fight against hunger: 4,609,751
  - Reduction in extreme poverty and crises: 892,400
  - Promoting economic opportunities: 552,627
  - Fostering systems of social cohesion: 2,237
  - Improving global and regional public goods: 224,559
  - Providing quality solutions: 407,904
  - Total: 662,980
- **Syria**: 155,733
  - Rural development and fight against hunger: 875,173
  - Reduction in extreme poverty and crises: 1,070,253
  - Promoting economic opportunities: 254,775
  - Fostering systems of social cohesion: 139,711
  - Improving global and regional public goods: 4,319,067
  - Providing quality solutions: 1,785,371
  - Total: 1,785,371
- **Tunisia**: 56,896
  - Rural development and fight against hunger: 20,184,700
  - Reduction in extreme poverty and crises: 69,599
  - Promoting economic opportunities: 139,947
  - Fostering systems of social cohesion: -1,488,075
  - Total: -1,488,075

**Balkans and Turkey**

- **Albania**: -3,000,000
  - Rural development and fight against hunger: 672
  - Reduction in extreme poverty and crises: 8,000
  - Providing quality solutions: 44,764
  - Total: 44,764
- **Bosnia and Herzegovina**: 5,000
  - Rural development and fight against hunger: -3,605,146
  - Reduction in extreme poverty and crises: 8,823
  - Promoting economic opportunities: 88,000
  - Fostering systems of social cohesion: 0
  - Improving global and regional public goods: 0
  - Providing quality solutions: 0
  - Total: 0
- **FYROM**: 0
  - Rural development and fight against hunger: 35,245
  - Reduction in extreme poverty and crises: 4,000
  - Promoting economic opportunities: 43,464
  - Fostering systems of social cohesion: 0
  - Improving global and regional public goods: 0
  - Providing quality solutions: 0
  - Total: 0
- **Montenegro**: -500,000
  - Rural development and fight against hunger: 0
  - Reduction in extreme poverty and crises: 0
  - Promoting economic opportunities: 0
  - Fostering systems of social cohesion: 0
  - Improving global and regional public goods: 0
  - Providing quality solutions: 0
  - Total: 0
- **Serbia**: -3,000,000
  - Rural development and fight against hunger: 412,986
  - Reduction in extreme poverty and crises: 145,894
  - Promoting economic opportunities: 1,590
  - Fostering systems of social cohesion: 0
  - Improving global and regional public goods: 0
  - Providing quality solutions: 0
  - Total: 0
- **Kosovo (Res. 1244 of the UNSC)**
  - Rural development and fight against hunger: 70,587
  - Reduction in extreme poverty and crises: 1,184
  - Promoting economic opportunities: 0
  - Fostering systems of social cohesion: 0
  - Improving global and regional public goods: 0
  - Providing quality solutions: 0
  - Total: 0
- **Turkey**: 3,133
  - Rural development and fight against hunger: 6,000
  - Reduction in extreme poverty and crises: -398,764
  - Promoting economic opportunities: -355,262
  - Fostering systems of social cohesion: 167,368
  - Improving global and regional public goods: -165,525
  - Providing quality solutions: 0
  - Total: 0

Source: AECID, Seguimientos PACI 2013.
## TABLE C1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Libya</th>
<th>Total Euromed immigrants</th>
<th>Total non-EU-27 immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>81</td>
<td>90</td>
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<td>413</td>
<td>6,227</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>9,635</td>
<td>59,555</td>
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<td>273</td>
<td>689</td>
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<td>324</td>
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<td>375</td>
<td>390</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>124,379</td>
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<tr>
<td>Luxembourg (2008)</td>
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<td>37</td>
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<td>396</td>
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<td>75</td>
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<td>195</td>
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<td>Austria (2013)*</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>1,860</td>
<td>3,437</td>
<td>12,691</td>
<td>4,050</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>1,569</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>2,097</td>
<td>159,388</td>
<td>467</td>
<td>187,882</td>
<td>788,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (2013)*</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>661</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>1,014</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>5,113</td>
<td>411,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal (2010)*</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>2,033</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>434</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3,693</td>
<td>660,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (2013)*</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1,034</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2,295</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,665</td>
<td>5,057</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10,368</td>
<td>109,782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia (2013)*</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>211,477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia (2013)*</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>25,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (2013)*</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>1,814</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>931</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>5,736</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>12,147</td>
<td>178,151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden(2013)*</td>
<td>2,775</td>
<td>8,174</td>
<td>4,512</td>
<td>4,962</td>
<td>27,510</td>
<td>3,280</td>
<td>24,743</td>
<td>4,228</td>
<td>24,333</td>
<td>45,095</td>
<td>1,756</td>
<td>129,458</td>
<td>976,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>20,889</td>
<td>23,080</td>
<td>9,032</td>
<td>30,289</td>
<td>10,035</td>
<td>7,311</td>
<td>17,755</td>
<td>5,146</td>
<td>20,786</td>
<td>82,941</td>
<td>20,069</td>
<td>247,333</td>
<td>5,150,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,611,672</td>
<td>2,587,235</td>
<td>576,224</td>
<td>243,902</td>
<td>152,166</td>
<td>33,789</td>
<td>199,633</td>
<td>13,034</td>
<td>80,354</td>
<td>2,477,461</td>
<td>69,764</td>
<td>8,045,234</td>
<td>33,537,867</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHART C1  
**Asylum Applications Lodged in the European Union**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Annual Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>180k</td>
<td>200k</td>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>140k</td>
<td>160k</td>
<td></td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>120k</td>
<td>140k</td>
<td></td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>100k</td>
<td>120k</td>
<td></td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>80k</td>
<td>100k</td>
<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>60k</td>
<td>80k</td>
<td></td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>40k</td>
<td>60k</td>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>20k</td>
<td>30k</td>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>10k</td>
<td>15k</td>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>5k</td>
<td>8k</td>
<td></td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE C2  
**Origin of Asylum Applications Lodged in the European Union 2013-2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Annual Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Arab Rep.</td>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>48,877</td>
<td>120,595</td>
<td>169,472</td>
<td>147%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>6,805</td>
<td>6,260</td>
<td>13,065</td>
<td>-8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>4,262</td>
<td>3,972</td>
<td>8,234</td>
<td>-7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>5,273</td>
<td>3,714</td>
<td>8,987</td>
<td>-30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>1,865</td>
<td>3,062</td>
<td>4,927</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>2,508</td>
<td>2,150</td>
<td>4,658</td>
<td>-14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian</td>
<td>MPC</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>1,981</td>
<td>2,903</td>
<td>115%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL MPC</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>70,512</td>
<td>141,734</td>
<td>212,246</td>
<td>101%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Kosovo</td>
<td>Balkans</td>
<td>33,161</td>
<td>54,631</td>
<td>87,792</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>Balkans</td>
<td>10,586</td>
<td>16,029</td>
<td>26,615</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</td>
<td>Balkans</td>
<td>5,409</td>
<td>7,793</td>
<td>13,202</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYR Macedonia</td>
<td>Balkans</td>
<td>7,594</td>
<td>6,758</td>
<td>14,352</td>
<td>-11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL Balkans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>56,750</td>
<td>85,211</td>
<td>141,961</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eritrea</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>14,386</td>
<td>36,305</td>
<td>50,691</td>
<td>152%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>10,953</td>
<td>19,116</td>
<td>30,069</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>18,081</td>
<td>15,322</td>
<td>33,403</td>
<td>-15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>6,497</td>
<td>12,822</td>
<td>19,319</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>3,431</td>
<td>11,323</td>
<td>14,754</td>
<td>230%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>7,668</td>
<td>6,786</td>
<td>14,454</td>
<td>-12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2,833</td>
<td>6,334</td>
<td>9,167</td>
<td>124%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>3,092</td>
<td>6,046</td>
<td>9,138</td>
<td>96%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>5,662</td>
<td>5,303</td>
<td>10,965</td>
<td>-6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>3,986</td>
<td>6,186</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin</td>
<td>Area</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Annual Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cote d’Ivoire</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2,383</td>
<td>3,272</td>
<td>5,655</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>2,012</td>
<td>2,669</td>
<td>4,681</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>1,735</td>
<td>2,330</td>
<td>4,065</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL Sub-Saharan Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>80,933</td>
<td>131,614</td>
<td>212,547</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>23,842</td>
<td>38,149</td>
<td>61,991</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>20,198</td>
<td>21,222</td>
<td>41,420</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>9,863</td>
<td>15,029</td>
<td>24,892</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>7,748</td>
<td>10,275</td>
<td>18,023</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Rep. of Iran</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>11,634</td>
<td>9,795</td>
<td>21,429</td>
<td>-16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>4,734</td>
<td>4,932</td>
<td>9,666</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>5,680</td>
<td>4,714</td>
<td>10,394</td>
<td>-17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>4,982</td>
<td>4,475</td>
<td>9,457</td>
<td>-10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>3,088</td>
<td>3,371</td>
<td>6,459</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Azerbaijan</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>2,372</td>
<td>2,558</td>
<td>4,930</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL Asia</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>94,141</td>
<td>114,520</td>
<td>208,661</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>38,014</td>
<td>15,641</td>
<td>53,655</td>
<td>-59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>13,629</td>
<td>14,532</td>
<td>1,409%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>8,345</td>
<td>7,646</td>
<td>15,991</td>
<td>-8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenia</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>4,493</td>
<td>4,930</td>
<td>9,423</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>51,755</td>
<td>41,846</td>
<td>93,601</td>
<td>-19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stateless</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9,572</td>
<td>15,319</td>
<td>24,891</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,498</td>
<td>1,869</td>
<td>3,367</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>31,327</td>
<td>38,686</td>
<td>70,013</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL Other</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>42,397</td>
<td>55,874</td>
<td>98,271</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>396,488</td>
<td>570,799</td>
<td>967,287</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements

### TABLE D1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start of Negotiations</th>
<th>Agreement Concluded</th>
<th>Agreement Signed</th>
<th>Entry into Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>May 1996</td>
<td>December 1996</td>
<td>February 1997</td>
<td>July 1997*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>March 1995</td>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>June 1997</td>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td>April 2002</td>
<td>September 2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Interim agreement signed by the EU and the PLO (to the benefit of the Palestinian Authority).

- To enter into force each Association Agreement must be ratified by the European Parliament, the Parliament of the Partner Country and the Parliaments of the 25 Member States of the European Union.
- Until its accession to the EU, Turkey shall be governed by the Customs Union Agreement, which entered into force in January 1996 and is based on the First Generation Agreement of 1963.
- In 2008 the Association Agreement with Syria was revised. It was planned to be ratified on 26 October 2009. However, Syria indefinitely postponed signing the Association Agreement with the European Union. The agreement will enter into force provisionally when it is signed by Syria. The definitive entry into force requires the European Parliament’s evaluation and ratification by the Member States. In December 2011, Syria suspended its accession to UfM. During 2012, as a result of the conflict escalation and the pressure from the international community, there has not been progress in the signing and ratification of the Association Agreement.
- Negotiations for a Framework Agreement between the European Union and Libya are currently suspended.

### TABLE D2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start of Negotiations</th>
<th>Agreement Signed</th>
<th>Entry into Force (Interim Agreement)</th>
<th>Entry into Force</th>
<th>Candidate Country</th>
<th>Start of Negotiations</th>
<th>Entry into Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

* On 21 May 2008, a referendum was held, which led to Montenegro’s independence from the Federation it had formed with Serbia.

- EU relations with the Western Balkan Countries are regulated by the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). The SAP serves as a framework for the development of various instruments and helps each country to carry out political and economic transition preparing them for a new contractual relationship with the EU: the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs), under which they aim to progress towards closer association with the EU.
- Negotiations with Serbia were interrupted in May 2006 due to lack of progress in cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In early 2007, the new administration in Belgrade constituted a National Council for cooperation with the ICTY, a measure which allowed negotiations to resume on 13 June 2007. In April 2008, the EU and Serbia signed the agreement. The Interim Agreement will not enter into force until the EU Council considers that Serbia is fully cooperating with the ICTY. In December 2009, the Council unfroze the Interim Agreement, which entered into force in February 2010. In March 2012 Serbia achieved the status of candidate for EU membership. In September 2013 the SAA between the EU and Serbia entered into force. In line with the decision of the European Council in June 2013 to open accession negotiations with Serbia, the Council adopted in December 2013 the negotiating framework and agreed to hold the 1st Intergovernmental Conference with Serbia in January 2014.
After its declaration and the EU’s acknowledgement of Montenegro as a sovereign and independent state, the EU has maintained relations with independent Montenegro. The SAA was signed on 15 October 2007. In January 2008, the entry into force of the Interim Agreement represented progress towards the national ratification process and closer relations with the EU. The SAA entered into force in May 2010. In June 2012 negotiations began for the accession of Montenegro to the EU.

Three years after the start of negotiations between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005, the SAA was signed and the Interim Agreement took effect. However, despite real progress in collaboration with the ICTY, the Commission still notes numerous dysfunctions in the institutional and judiciary spheres. On April 21, 2015 the EU notes that Bosnia and Herzegovina meets certain pre-basic criteria: the adoption of a federal law governing public aid and the establishment of a stable system of population census; the implementation of the European Court of Human Rights verdict on the Sejdic - Finci case requiring constitutional amendments for members of the communities of the country, other than the Bosnian, Serbian and Croatian, to be elected to the Presidency or as deputies; and that the country creates a unitary body to regulate bilateral relations with the EU. For all these reasons the EU adopted the SAA on April 21, 2015, allowing its entry into force on June 1, 2015.

More than seven years after the start of the negotiations, Croatia joined the European Union on 1st July 2013.

In June 2003, the Thessaloniki European Council decided that all Western Balkan countries be considered as potential candidates for EU accession. Macedonia (2005) and Serbia (2012) have already been granted candidate country status. Albania (2009) has also applied for EU accession. In October 2012, the Commission recommended that Albania be granted EU candidate status, subject to completion of key measures in the areas of judicial and public administration reform and revision of the parliamentary rules of procedures. In June 2014, Albania was granted the EU candidate status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Palestinian Territories</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Libya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The ENP Action Plans allow the European Union to maintain a progressive, differentiated policy towards its neighbouring countries based on the different levels of cooperation established.

An Action Plan, developed after the signing of an Association Agreement, establishes priorities and a timetable for political and economic reform. Action Plans are the operational tools of the legal framework represented by the Association Agreements.

Progress is analysed each year through evaluation reports. The extent of the progress made determines the levels of cooperation and access to the European Market.

In 2012 there was no progress made by the two countries which are yet to agree an Action Plan (However on December 2011, Algeria officially indicated its willingness to start exploratory negotiations regarding the elaboration of an Action Plan under the renewed ENP. Two rounds of informal discussions at working level have been held so far).

In Egypt formal dialogue under the ENP, which had been suspended since January 2011, resumed in February 2013, through an Association Committee.

ENP Action Plans in Tunisia and Morocco were adopted in 2005 and were to come to an end in 2010, but in both cases it was agreed to extend the implementemation during the negotiation of the new 2013-2017 Action Plans.

ENP Action Plans in Israel and Palestine were adopted in 2005 for a period of three years, but in both cases its validity was extended. On 24 October 2012, the EU’s High Representative and Security Policy Catherine Ashton and Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad announced the conclusion of negotiations of a new ENP Action Plan.

An EU-Lebanon Action Plan was adopted in 2007 for a period of five years. In 2012 Lebanon and the EU jointly drafted a new ENP Action Plan. The negotiations were concluded in October 2012 and the Action Plan entered into force after legal procedures were completed.
## Signature of Multilateral Treaties and Conventions

### TABLE E1  
**Multilateral Treaties on Human Rights and Penal Matters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of adoption</th>
<th>Rights of the child</th>
<th>Crime of genocide</th>
<th>International Criminal Court</th>
<th>Financing of terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source:  

a. Ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or succession.  
b. Signature.  
d. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
g. Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.  
l. Partial withdrawal of declaration and withdrawal of reservations.

### TABLE E2  
**Multilateral Treaties on Labour Rights (year of ratification)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Date of adoption</th>
<th>Freedom of association and collective bargaining</th>
<th>Elimination of forced or obligatory labour</th>
<th>Elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation</th>
<th>Abolition of child labour</th>
<th>Rights of immigrant workers</th>
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<td>1948</td>
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<td>1930</td>
<td>1957</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1958</td>
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<td>1957</td>
<td>1957</td>
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<td>1957</td>
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</table>

Source:  

f. Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention.  
g. Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment.  
h. Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention.  
i. Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.  
j. Ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or succession.  
k. Signature.
### TABLE E3: Multilateral Environmental Treaties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Climate change</th>
<th>Kyoto protocol</th>
<th>Biological diversity</th>
<th>Biosafety protocol</th>
<th>CITES</th>
<th>Desertification</th>
<th>Persistent organic pollutants</th>
<th>Ozone layer</th>
<th>Control of hazardous wastes and their disposal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Table E3** Multilateral Environmental Treaties

**Sources:** UN, UN, UN, UN, CITES, UN, UN, UN, UN, CITES

- b. From the Framework Convention on Climate Change.
- d. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity.
- f. Convention to Combat Desertification.
- j. Ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or succession.
- k. Signature.

### TABLE E4: Multilateral Disarmament Treaties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geneva protocol</th>
<th>Nuclear weapons</th>
<th>Bacteriological weapons</th>
<th>Conventional weapons</th>
<th>Chemical weapons</th>
<th>Nuclear testing</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Table E4** Multilateral Disarmament Treaties

**Source:** UN, UN, UN, UN, UN, UN

- a. Ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or succession.
- b. Signature.
- c. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.
- d. Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
- h. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

**IE Med. Mediterranean Yearbook 2015**
The Mediterranean in Brief

### TABLE F1  Human Development Index (HDI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling</th>
<th>GNI per capita</th>
<th>Human Development Index</th>
<th>Position in HDI</th>
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<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2012*</td>
<td>2012*</td>
<td>PPP $</td>
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<td>13.6</td>
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Own production. Source: UNDP. Data refer to 2012 or the most recent year available.

### CHART F1  Years of Schooling (2012*)

Mean years of schooling vs. Expected years of schooling.
### TABLE F2  
**Population: Demography**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total population millions 2013</th>
<th>Estimated population for 2050 millions</th>
<th>Crude birth rate per 1,000 inhabitants 2013</th>
<th>Crude death rate per 1,000 inhabitants 2013</th>
<th>Average annual population growth rate % 2010/15</th>
<th>Total fertility rate 2013</th>
<th>Immigrants 2013 thousands</th>
<th>% of total population 2010/15</th>
<th>Net number of immigrants 2010/15 thousands</th>
<th>Net migration rate b 2010/15 per 1,000 inhabitants</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>-2.1</td>
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<td>6.2</td>
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<td>6</td>
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Own production. Source: WB UNPOP WB WB WB UNPOP UNPOP UNPOP UNPOP UNPOP.

- *Net annual average of migrants: the annual number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants.*
- **Net number of migrants divided by the average population of the receiving country for the period under consideration.**

(____) Data unavailable.

### CHART F2  
**Births (2013)**

![Births in Mediterranean Countries (in thousands)](chart.png)

North Mediterranean Countries
South and East Mediterranean Countries

**Own production. Source:** National Statistical Offices. *Data from UNICEF. **Only West Bank.*
### TABLE F3  Population: Structure and Distribution

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>age 0-14</th>
<th>age 15-64</th>
<th>≥ age 65</th>
<th>Rural population</th>
<th>Population in urban agglomerations of more than 750,000 inhabitants</th>
<th>Population located on the Mediterranean coastline</th>
<th>Urban population living in slums</th>
<th>Population density people per km²</th>
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*Own production. Source: WB, UNPOP, Bleu Plan, UN-Habitat. \(a\) Latest data available from this period. \(b\) Own production according to UNPOP data. (..) Data unavailable.*

### CHART F3  Population of the Biggest Urban Agglomerations in 2014

- Percentage of the Total Population of Mediterranean Countries Residing in Urban Agglomeration with 750,000 Inhabitants or More

- *Own production. Source: UNPOP*
### TABLE F4 Education and Training of Human Capital

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Primary Education</th>
<th>Secondary Education</th>
<th>Primary Pupil-Teacher Ratio</th>
<th>Duration of Compulsory Education</th>
<th>Scientists and Technicians in R&amp;D</th>
<th>R&amp;D Expenditures</th>
<th>Pre-Primary and Primary Education</th>
<th>Secondary and Post-Secondary Education</th>
<th>Tertiary Education</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2011/14a %</td>
<td>2011/14a %</td>
<td>2010/14a</td>
<td>2010/14a</td>
<td>2008/12a</td>
<td>2008/12a</td>
<td>% of GDP</td>
<td>2008/2013a</td>
<td>2008/2013a</td>
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### CHART F4 Educational Attainment of the Population Aged 25 Years and Older (latest year available)

![Educational Attainment Chart](chart.png)

Own production. Source: UNESCO.
### TABLE F5  Health and Survival

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<th>Infant mortality rate</th>
<th>Maternal mortality ratio</th>
<th>People living with HIV/AIDS</th>
<th>Prevalence of smoking</th>
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<td>7.0</td>
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<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
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<td>16.0</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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Own production. Source: CME, CME, WB, UNAIDS, UNAIDS, WB, WB

*Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F5  Sex-specific Under-Five Mortality Rate (2013)

[Graph showing sex-specific under-five mortality rate by region in various countries.]

Own production. Source: CME.
### TABLE F6 Nutrition and Food Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Food Supply kcal/person/day</th>
<th>Cereal trade</th>
<th>Children under weight for their age</th>
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Own production. Source: FAO

*Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F6 Protein and Fat Supply (2011) (kcal/capita/day)

![Protein and Fat Supply Chart](chart_f6.png)

Own production. Source: FAO.
### TABLE F7  Access to Health Resources

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<th>Physicians per 10,000 population</th>
<th>Population using improved drinking-water sources</th>
<th>Population using improved sanitation</th>
<th>Births attended by skilled health personnel</th>
<th>% of women with a husband or partner who report use</th>
<th>Contraceptive prevalence rate</th>
<th>Total health expenditure 2011</th>
<th>Births per 1,000 women ages 15-19</th>
<th>% of GDP</th>
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Country: Own production. Source: WHO  
* Latest data available from this period.  
( ..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F7  Immunisation. Coverage of Infants with Measles Vaccine (1990-2012)

[Graph depicting measles vaccination coverage from 1990 to 2012 for various countries in the Mediterranean region.]

Own production. Source: WHO.
### TABLE F8  Gender: Social Development

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Adult literacy rate ( \geq ) age 15</th>
<th>Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio</th>
<th>Year women received right to vote</th>
<th>Year women received right to stand for election</th>
<th>Year first woman elected or appointed to parliament</th>
<th>Seats in parliament held by women*</th>
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<td>men years</td>
<td>women %</td>
<td>men %</td>
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<td>2010/2013</td>
<td>2014</td>
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Own production. Source: WB UNESCO. * Latest data available from this period.

### CHART F8  Gender Parity Index (GPI) of Gross Enrolment Ratios (2011-2013)*

![Gender Parity Index (GPI) of Gross Enrolment Ratios (2011-2013)](chart)

Own production. Source: UNESCO. * Latest data available from this period.
### TABLE F9  Technology and Communication

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Fixed-telephone subscriptions total</th>
<th>Fixed-telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants</th>
<th>Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions total</th>
<th>Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants</th>
<th>Outgoing international calls minutes per capita</th>
<th>Incoming international calls minutes per capita</th>
<th>Proportion of households with computer</th>
<th>Internet access</th>
<th>Share of ICT goods of total trade</th>
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a. Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

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### CHART F9  Telephone Subscriptions in Mediterranean Countries (2000-2013)

![Telephone Subscriptions Chart](chart.png)

Own Production. Source: ITU.
### TABLE F10  Security and Military Expenditure

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Own production. Source: DMC UNHCR UNHCR WB SIPRI SIPRI SIPRI SIPRI

- Data refer only to Palestinian refugees under UNHCR mandate.
- Military pensions not included.
- Data from 2012.
- Total exports or imports for the entire period.
- Includes part of the military pensions.
- Data refer to the approved budget, not real spending.
- Excluding paramilitary forces.
- Includes civil defence spending, which usually accounts for about 4.5% of the total.
- Data unavailable.

### CHART F10  Conventional Arms Exports (2010-2014)

![Conventional Arms Exports Chart](chart)

Own production. Source: SIPRI.
### TABLE F11 | Economic Structure and Production

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<th>GDP growth 2013</th>
<th>Share in GDP by sector</th>
<th>Consumer price index</th>
<th>Own production. Source: IMF WB WB WB IMF</th>
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Own production. Source: IMF WB WB WB IMF.

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### CHART F11 | Share in GDP by Sector (2013)

[Chart showing the share in GDP by sector (2013) for various countries, with Agriculture, Industry, and Services sectors represented.]
### TABLE F12  Agriculture

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<th>Permanent pasture</th>
<th>Total area equipped for irrigation</th>
<th>Land under cereal production</th>
<th>Cereal production</th>
<th>Cereal yield</th>
<th>Fertiliser consumption</th>
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Own production. Source: FAO.

### CHART F12  Economically Active Population in Agriculture (2013)

- **World**
- **Turkey**
- **Egypt**
- **Algeria**
- **Morocco**
- **Syria**
- **Spain**
- **Tunisia**
- **Italy**
- **France**
- **Albania**
- **Greece**
- **Serbia**
- **Libya**
- **Portugal**
- **Bosnia and Herzegovina**
- **Malta**
- **Cyprus**
- **Slovenia**

Own production. Source: FAO.
TABLE F13 Livestock

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Own production. Source: FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO

<sup>a</sup> Included bovine, caprine, ovine and buffalo livestock. <sup>b</sup> Includes chicken, hens, ducks, turkeys and geese. <sup>c</sup> Includes horses, asses, mules and camels. (..) Data unavailable.

CHART F13 Natural Honey Production in Tonnes (2013)

- Turkey 94,694
- Spain 30,613
- Other Mediterranean Countries 21,679
- Tunisia 5,100
- Egypt 5,100
- Morocco 5,300
- Algeria 6,147
- Serbia 8,554
- Portugal 9,346
- Italy 9,500
- France 11,414
- Greece 15,000

- Total Mediterranean Countries: 222,447
- Total World: 1,441,350.73

The Mediterranean in Brief

The Mediterranean Yearbook 2015

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### TABLE F14  Fisheries

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<th>Total fisheries</th>
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Own production. Source: FAO.

* a. Motorized vessels propelled by engines
* b. Latest data available from this period.
* c. Data unavailable.

### CHART F14  Fishery Production in Mediterranean Countries (2003-2013)

[Graph showing fishery production in Mediterranean countries with data from 2003 to 2013, including capture and aquaculture for marine, inland, and brackishwater areas.]
### TABLE F15: Employment and Unemployment

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*Own production. Source: ILO*

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*Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.*

### CHART F15: Status in Employment (2011-2013)

- **Wage & salaried workers (employees) (%)**
- **Total self-employed workers (%)**

*Own production. Source: ILO.*
### TABLE F16  Income Distribution

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<th>fourth 20%</th>
<th>highest 20%</th>
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* Own production. Source: WB. *(..) Data unavailable.

---

### CHART F16  Income Share Held by Subgroups of Population (2010-2012)*

Top 5 countries* with highest Gini Index (2010-12)

* Among the countries with available data from this period.

---

Own production. Source: WB. * Latest data available from this period.
### TABLE F17: Gender: Economic Activity

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<th>France</th>
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<th>Malta</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Croatia</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
<th>Serbia</th>
<th>Montenegro</th>
<th>FYROM</th>
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<th>Greece</th>
<th>Cyprus</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Syria</th>
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**Notes:**
- Own production. Source: ILO ILO ILO ILO ILO ILO ILO ILO UNDP UNDP
- a. Latest data available from this period.
- .. Data unavailable.

### CHART F17: Female Unemployment (2013)

[Chart showing female unemployment rates for various countries]
### TABLE F18  Production and Energy Consumption

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<th>Energy production</th>
<th>Energy use</th>
<th>Energy use per capita</th>
<th>GDP per unit of energy use</th>
<th>Net energy import</th>
<th>Share of total primary energy supply</th>
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<td>kg oil eq</td>
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Own production. Source: WB IEA IEA IEA IEA IEA IEA IEA IEA IEA IEA.

* Negative values indicate that the country is a net exporter. ** Includes hydroelectric, biofuels and waste and geothermal, solar and wind. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F18  Share of Total Primary Energy Supply in Mediterranean Countries (2012)

**Northern Mediterranean Countries**
- Coal/peat: 22%
- Oil: 21%
- Natural Gas: 7%
- Nuclear: 3%
- Other: 0%

**Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries**
- Coal/peat: 34%
- Oil: 31%
- Natural Gas: 22%
- Nuclear: 2%
- Other: 0%
### Production, Consumption and Access to Electricity

<table>
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<th>Population with access to electricity</th>
<th>Electricity production (billion kWh)</th>
<th>Electricity consumption per capita (kWh)</th>
<th>Sources of electricity</th>
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<th>2012</th>
<th>2011/12&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>2011/12&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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#### Sources of electricity:
- **coal**: %
- **gas**: %
- **oil**: %
- **hydro-electric**: %
- **renewables**: %
- **nuclear**: %

---

### Electricity Consumption per capita (2012)

**CHART F19**

![Electricity Consumption per capita (2012) chart](chart_image.png)

**Population with accessting to electricity:**
- Portugal
- Spain
- France
- Italy
- Malta
- Portugal
- Croatia
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Serbia
- Montenegro
- FYROM
- Albania
- Greece
- Cyprus
- Turkey
- Syria
- Lebanon
- Jordan
- Israel
- Palestine
- Egypt
- Libya
- Tunisia
- Algeria
- Morocco

**Electricity production (billion kWh):**
- Portugal: 46.6
- Spain: 297.6
- France: 564.3
- Italy: 299.3
- Malta: 2.3
- Slovenia: 15.7
- Croatia: 18.6
- Bosnia and Herzegovina: 14.1
- Serbia: 36.8
- Montenegro: 2.8
- FYROM: 6.3
- Albania: 4.7
- Greece: 61.0
- Cyprus: 4.7
- Turkey: 239.5
- Syria: 31.2
- Lebanon: 164.4
- Jordan: 16.6
- Israel: 63.0
- Palestine: 31.2
- Egypt: 164.4
- Libya: 34.0
- Tunisia: 18.0
- Algeria: 57.4
- Morocco: 27.5

**Electricity consumption per capita (kWh):**
- Portugal: 4,707
- Spain: 5,629
- France: 7,419
- Italy: 5,276
- Malta: 4,733
- Slovenia: 6,768
- Croatia: 3,817
- Bosnia and Herzegovina: 3,275
- Serbia: 5,870
- Montenegro: 5,421
- FYROM: 3,818
- Albania: 2,031
- Greece: 5,512
- Cyprus: 5,338
- Turkey: 2,760
- Syria: 1,168
- Lebanon: 4,801
- Jordan: 2,369
- Israel: 7,255
- Palestine: 1,798
- Egypt: 4,801
- Libya: 1,417
- Tunisia: 1,203
- Algeria: 891
- Morocco: 891

---

Own production, Source: IEA

---

OECD Countries: World: Non OECD Countries: Mediterranean Countries

---

Mediterranean Countries Average
### TABLE F20

#### CO₂ Emissions by Sector

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**Note:** Own production. Source: IEA.

### CHART F20

#### CO₂ Emissions by Sector

- Industry and Construction
- Transport
- Electricity and Heat Production
- Others

Own production. Source: IEA.
## Water

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Own production. Source: FAO. 

*Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.*

---

### CHART F21

**Water Dependency (2014)**

![Water Dependency Chart](chart_image)

**Countries with Highest Water Dependency Ratio**

- Kuwait, Turkmenistan, Egypt, Bahrain, Mauritania

---

Own production. Source: FAO.
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**Source:** FAO, FAO, FAO, FAO, FAO, UICN, UICN, UICN, GFN

- **Forest Area (2012)**

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**CHART F22: Forest Area (2012)**

- Own production. Source: FAO.
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Own production. Source: UNCTAD.

- Percentage of exports and imports of goods and services.
- Personal transfers and compensation of employees.
- Own production using UNCTAD data.
- Estimated.
- Data unavailable.

### CHART F23 Workers' Remittances (1995-2013)

[Graph showing Workers' remittances in percentage of GDP from 1995 to 2013 for various countries, with peaks and trends indicated.]
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Own production. Source: UNCTAD.

### CHART F24 Exports of Manufactured Products (2013) (% of total exports)

![Chart F24: Exports of Manufactured Products (2013) (% of total exports)](chart.png)

Own production. Source: UNCTAD.
### TABLE F25

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<th>Fuels</th>
<th>Minerals and metals</th>
<th>Manufactured products</th>
<th>Others</th>
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Own production. Source: UNCTAD.

### CHART F25

**Imports of Manufactured Products (2013) (% of total imports)**

[Diagram showing imports by country, with data points for each country representing the percentage of manufactured products imported.]

Own production. Source: UNCTAD.
### TABLE F26  Tourism in the Mediterranean

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*Own production. Source: UNWTO WB*  
*Value calculated using WB data. (..) Data unavailable*

### CHART F26  International Tourism by Country of Origin (2013)

#### Share of Mediterranean Countries Tourism on World tourism

- **Italy**: 53,157
- **Spain**: 33,504
- **France**: 46,190
- **Egypt**: 5,782
- **Morocco**: 2,598
- **Tunisia**: 4,267
- **Algeria**: 482
- **Portugal**: 2,922
- **Tunisia**: 788
- **Greece**: 1,911
- **Libya**: 2,486
- **Syria**: -
- **Rest of Mediterranean Countries**: 3,466

#### Departures (thousands) Expenditure (millions $)

- **France**: 11,246 1,911
- **Italy**: 4,267 1,911
- **Spain**: 2,922 1,911
- **Israel**: 2,772 1,911
- **Montenegro**: 1,136 1,911
- **Greece**: 1,772 1,911
- **Morocco**: 1,136 1,911
- **Libya**: -
- **Tunisia**: 1,911
- **Algeria**: 1,911
- **Syria**: -

*Own production. Source: WB.*
### TABLE F27 Official Development Assistance (ODA)

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Own production. Source: OECD. 

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<th>Spain</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Greece</th>
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Own production. Source: OECD.
### TABLE F28  External Debt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Long-Term debt millions $</th>
<th>Short-Term debt millions $</th>
<th>Debt service % of exports</th>
<th>External debt $ per capita</th>
<th>Debt Service % of GNI</th>
<th>Debt Service % of exports</th>
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</table>

Own production. Source: WB.

### CHART F28  External Debt (2013)

Own production. Source: WB.
Adolescent fertility rate
Number of births per thousand women aged between 15 and 19.

Agricultural land area
Land surface area made up of arable and permanently cultivated lands and by permanent meadows and pastures.

Annual population growth rate
Exponential change in the growth of the population during the period indicated.

Aquaculture production
Includes marine, freshwater and diadromous fish, molluscs and crustaceans cultivated in marine, inland or brackish environments.

Arable lands and permanent crops
Agricultural surface area that groups the data on arable or farm land and land used for permanent crops. Arable and farm land is land given over to temporary crops (those giving two yields are only counted once) temporal meadows for cutting or grazing, land dedicated to commercial vegetable gardens or orchards and land temporarily fallow for a period of less than five years. The term does not include land that has been abandoned as a result of migratory cultivation. Land destined for permanent crops refers to land dedicated to crops that occupy the terrain during long periods and that do not need to be replanted after each harvest, such as cacao, coffee and rubber. It includes land occupied by bushes destined to flower production, fruit trees, walnut trees and vineyards, but excludes land planted with trees destined to the production of firewood or wood.

Armed forces
Strategic, land, naval, aerial, command and support forces. It also includes paramilitary forces, such as the gendarmerie, the customs services and the border guard if they are trained in military strategy.

Births attended by skilled health personnel
Percentage of births attended by health personnel (physicians, nurses and midwives) that are trained in the care, supervision and counselling of women during pregnancy, birthgiving and puerperium, and who can also deliver babies and assist them on their own.

Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions
The emissions of carbon dioxide produced in the burning of all fossil fuels used by a country.

Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions by sector
Shows the proportion of carbon dioxide emissions produced by the burning of fossil fuels in the sectors of transport, industry and electricity production. The transport sector includes emissions produced by all forms of transport by road, rail and air, including agricultural vehicles travelling by road. International journeys by boat or aeroplane are excluded. The industrial and construction sector includes emissions produced by all types of industry and construction. The electricity sector includes emissions produced by the generation of electricity for public use, including thermal power stations.

Cereal production
The figures for cereal production only refer to harvests of dry grain. Crops harvested for hay, unripe foodstuffs, forage and silage, or are used for grazing, are therefore excluded.

Cereal production yield
The outputs per hectare have been calculated using the data on surface area and production.

Cereal trade
The figures obtained by the FAO, have been supplied by the respective governments in the questionnaires sent out by the FAO.

Children under weight for their age
Percentage of children under five whose weight and height, for their age, is less than twice the standard deviation in comparison with the average for the relevant age group. The population of reference is the child population of the USA, which is assumed to be well nourished.

CO₂ emissions intensity by GDP
Average quantity of CO₂ emitted per unit of incomes generated by a particular economy.

Consumer price index
Reflects changes in the cost, for an average consumer, in the acquisition of a basket of goods and services that can be fixed or can change at specific intervals; for example annually. The Laspeyres formula is normally used.

Contraceptive prevalence rate
Percentage of women who are married or in a relationship who report using at least one method of contraception.
**Appendices Definitions**

**Crude birth rate**
Number of births per year per thousand inhabitants. An estimate is made in the middle of the current year.

**Crude death rate**
Number of deaths per year per thousand inhabitants. An estimate is made in the middle of the current year.

**Current account balance**
The sum of the net exports – exports minus imports – of goods and services, incomes and net transfers.

**Debt service**
The sum of the main payments and interest payments made for long-term debts, interest paid on short-term debts and repayments (redemption and charges) to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

**Desalinated water production**
Amount of water produced by elimination of salt from salt water using a variety of techniques, including inverse osmosis. Most of this water is used for domestic purposes.

**Duration of compulsory education**
Number of years, within a determined age group, that children and young people are legally obliged to attend school.

**Ecological footprint**
Measurement of the use of renewable natural resources by humanity. For a given population it is defined as the total area of biologically productive land and water required to produce the resources consumed, to maintain energy consumption, to make way for infrastructures and to absorb the waste generated by the population. The unit used to measure the ecological footprint is the global hectare and is defined as a hectare of biologically productive space, equal to the world average.

**Economically active population in agriculture**
Part of the economically active population engaged in or seeking work in agriculture, hunting, fishing or forestry.

**Electricity consumption per capita**
Refers to the gross production per inhabitant and includes the consumption of auxiliary stations and the losses in the transformers considered an integral part of the central station. It also includes the total electricity produced by pumping stations, without deducting the electricity absorbed by the pumps.

**Electricity production**
Measured in the alternating equipment terminals of electric power stations. Also includes hydroelectric, coal, gas and nuclear energy sources and generation by geothermal, solar, wind, tidal and marine energy, as well as renewable residues and fuels.

**Electricity sources**
Refers to the energy sources used to generate electricity: hydroelectric, coal, oil, gas and nuclear.

**Employed population**
Proportion of the economically active population that is employed. When adding the employed population to the unemployed the result is the whole economically active population or labour force.

**Employment by sector**
According to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), the Agriculture category also includes hunting, fishing and forest exploitation; the Industry category includes mining, extraction activities (including oil production), manufacturing, construction and public services (electricity, water and gas); the Services category includes the wholesale and retail trades, restaurants and hotels, transport, storage services, communications, financial services, insurance, real estate, business services, as well as community, social and personal services.

**Employment rate**
Percentage of population in work relative to the total population of working age.

**Energy use**
Energy use refers to use of primary energy before transformation to other end-use fuels, which is equal to indigenous production plus imports and stock changes, minus exports and fuels supplied to ships and aircraft engaged in international transport.

**Energy production**
Primary energy forms – oil, natural gas, coal and its derivatives and renewable fuels and residues – and primary electricity, all converted into equivalents of oil. The renewable fuels and residues refer to solid and liquid biomass, biogas and industrial and municipal residues.

**Expected years of schooling**
Number of years of schooling that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates were to stay the same throughout the child’s life.

**Export/Import concentration index**
The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index is used, in a normalised version, to obtain values between zero and one (maximum concentration). It measures the degree of market concentration and the calculation takes into account the different product groups exported, according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC).

**Exports**
The value of all goods supplied by an economy to the rest of the world. It excludes labour and income in concept of property, as well as transfer payments.

**External debt**
The sum of the national debt, with public guarantee, private unsecured long-term debt, credit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and short-term debt.

**Fertility rate**
Number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current age specific fertility rates.

**Fertiliser consumption**
Amount of vegetable nutrients used per unit of cultivatable land. The fertilisers considered are nitrogen, phosphorous
and potassium. Consumption is calculated as production plus imports minus exports, and traditional nutrients (animal and vegetable fertilisers) are not included. The data obtained is the result of dividing the consumption of fertiliser of each country by the surface area of arable and permanently cultivated land.

Fish and seafood supply quantity
Calculated from the availability of fish and seafood for human consumption, divided by the total population within the geographical borders of any given country. Nationals living in other countries are excluded, although foreigners living in the country are included.

Fishery fleet
Aggregation of fishing vessels of a particular country

Fixed telephone subscriptions
Fixed telephone line connecting the subscriber’s terminal equipment to the public switched network

Food supply
Amount of food, in kilocalories per day, available for each person in the population.

Foreign direct investment
Net direct investment that is made in order to achieve a lasting participation in the management of a business company operating in a country other than that of the investor. It is equal to the sum of the equity capital, the reinvestment of earnings and other long-term and short-term capital.

Forest area
Understood as all land with natural or artificial plots of trees, whether productive or not.

GDP (see Gross Domestic Product)

GDP per capita (see Gross Domestic Product per capita)

GDP growth rate
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.

GDP per unit of energy use
Indicator of energy efficiency. The temporary differences and entire countries partly reflect, structural economic changes, changes in the efficiency of particular sectors and differences in the use of fuels. The GDP has been converted into 2005 international dollars.

Gender inequality index
The Gender Inequality Index (GII) reflects women’s disadvantage in three dimensions—reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market—for as many countries as data of reasonable quality allow. The index shows the loss in human development due to inequality between female and male achievements in these dimensions. It ranges from 0, which indicates that women and men fare equally, to 1, which indicates that women fare as poorly as possible in all measured dimensions.

Gini index
Measure of greater or lesser inequality in the distribution of income and consumption, considering a state of perfectly equal distribution. A value of zero represents perfect equality and a value of one hundred total inequality.

GNI (see Gross National Income)

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
The sum of the added value by all resident producers in an economy, plus any tax on the product (without taking into account the subsidies). The added value is the net profit of an industry after adding together all the profits and subtracting the intermediate contributions.

Gross Domestic Product by sector
The contribution of the distinct economic sectors in the GDP is determined according to the added value determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC).

Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita)
Using the official exchange rates to convert the figures in national currency into US dollars does not measure the relative internal acquisition powers of each currency in each country. The International Comparison Project (ICP) of the United Nations and the World Bank develop measures of the GDP on an internationally comparable scale using as conversion factors, the Purchase Power Parities (PPP) in respect to each country.

Gross National Income (GNI)
The sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. The added value of the net profit of an industry after having summed up all profits and deducted international contributions.

HDI (see Human Development Index)

Human Development Index (HDI)
Index elaborated by the United Nations Development Project (UNDP) relating three indicators: income level (per capita GNI), health (life expectancy at birth) and level of education (mean years of education and expected years of schooling).

Immigrants
Refers to the people born outside of a given country at the mid point of the year. The data is given in absolute figures and as a percentage in respect to the population of the receiving country.

Imports
Value of all goods received by an economy from the rest of the world. It excludes labour and income in concept of property, as well as transfer payments.

Inbound tourists by destination country
Number of tourists who travel to a country other than that in which they have their usual residence, for a period not exceeding 12 months and whose main purpose in visiting is other than an activity remunerated from within the country visited.

Infant mortality rate
Shows the number of deaths of infants under one year of age per thousand live births.
Internally displaced people
As a result of armed conflicts or human rights abuses, some 25 million people live as internally displaced population. These people were forced to flee from their homes for fear of losing their lives, but unlike refugees, they were displaced within their country’s borders. Even though internally displaced people are twice as many as refugees, their situation receives less international attention.

International tourism receipts
Income received in a given country from visitors, including payments made to national freight companies for international freight. It also includes the prepayment of goods and services received in the destination country. It can include the income from single day visitors. The percentage it represents in respect to exports is calculated as a ratio of the exports of goods and services.

Internet users
The estimated number of Internet users out of total population. This includes those using the Internet from any device (including mobile phones) in the last 12 months.

Labour force participation rate
The labour force participation rate is defined as the ratio of the labour force to the working-age population, expressed as a percentage. The labour force is the sum of the number of persons employed and the number of persons unemployed.

Land area
Refers to the total surface area minus the surface covered by inland waters. Inland waters are defined in general as rivers and principle lakes.

Land under cereal production
The figures related to cultivated crop surface areas generally refer to the area harvested, although those corresponding to permanent crops can refer to the total planted area. The figures for the cultivated cereal area only refer to harvests of dry grain. Crops harvested for hay, unripe foodstuffs, forage and silage, or used for grazing, are therefore excluded.

Life expectancy at birth
The number of years that a new-born infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.

Literacy rate
Total is the percentage of the population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Generally, ‘literacy’ also encompasses ‘numeracy’, the ability to make simple arithmetic calculations.

Live animal stock
Enormous quantities of unregistered animals cross the borders of some countries. In order to obtain more representative international trade figures of live animals, the FAO has incorporated estimates of the unregistered trade.

Long term external debt
Debt that has an original or extended maturity of more than one year. It has three components: public, publicly guaranteed and private non guaranteed debt.

Maternal mortality ratio
Annual number of deaths of women owing to causes related to pregnancy, for every 100,000 live births.

Mean years of schooling
Average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older in their lifetime based on education attainment levels of the population converted into years of schooling based on theoretical durations of each level of education attended.

Military expenditure
Total expenses effected by the Ministry of Defence and other ministries on the recruitment and training of military personnel, as well as the manufacture and acquisition of military supplies and equipment. Military assistance is included in the expenses of the donor country.

Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions
Refers to the subscriptions to a public mobile telephone service and provides access to Public Switched Telephone Network using cellular technology.

Net energy import
Shows the amount of energy use by an economy and to what extent it exceeds its domestic production.

Net enrolment ratio
Number of students enrolled in a level of education who are of the official school age for that level, as a percentage of the total of the population of official school age for that level. The figures are shown for primary and secondary education.

Net migration rate
Net number of migrants divided by the average population of the receiving country within the period considered.

Net number of migrants
The entry of immigrants into a given country minus the outgoing emigrants of the same country.

Official Development Assistance (ODA)
The net payment of donations and loans granted under advantageous financial terms by official boards of partner countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as international organisations, with a view to promoting economic development and wellbeing, including co-operation and technical assistance.
Oil equivalent
All the values of energy production and consumption presented in this classification are calculated and published by the International Energy Agency (IEA) which uses the equivalent metric tonne of oil based on the calorific content of the energy products as the unit of measurement. An equivalent metric tonne of oil is defined as 107 kilo calories or 11,628 gigawatts per hour (GWh). This amount of energy is practically equal to the amount of energy contained in a tonne of crude oil.

Outbound tourists by country of origin
Number of trips that travellers make to a given country from their normal country of residence, for a period of less than one year, for any other reason than to undertake a paid activity in the country visited.

Passenger cars
Road motor vehicles, other than two-wheelers, intended for the carriage of passengers and designed to seat no more than nine people (including the driver).

Permanent pasture
Refers to land used permanently (five years or more) for herbaceous fodder, whether cultivated or uncultivated (meadows or uncultivated land for grazing).

Physicians
Number of medical doctors (physicians), including generalist and specialist medical practitioners, per 10,000 population

Population density
The result of dividing the average annual population of a country by its land surface area expressed in square kilometres.

Population in urban agglomerations of more than 750,000 inhabitants
Percentage of the population of a country living in metropolitan areas, that in 2005 had a population of more than 750,000 people.

Population on the Mediterranean coast
Estimates of the percentage of the population that lives in the coastal area.

Population living with HIV/AIDS
Estimated number of people of any age infected with HIV or AIDS. Includes the whole living infected population at the end of 2003, regardless of whether or not they have developed the disease. It shows the actual figure and the percentage in respect of the population of the country.

Population using improved drinking-water sources
The percentage of population using an improved drinking water source. An improved drinking water source, by nature of its construction and design, is likely to protect the source from outside contamination, in particular from faecal matter.

Population using improved sanitation
Percentage of population using an improved sanitation facility. An improved sanitation facility is one that likely hygienically separates human excreta from human contact. Improved sanitation facilities include: Flush or pour-flush to piped sewer system, septic tank or pit latrine, ventilated improved pit latrine, pit latrine with slab and composting toilet.

Population with access to electricity
Refers to the number of people with access to electricity as a percentage of the total population.

Prevalence of smoking
The percentage of men and women who smoke cigarettes. The age range varies between countries, but in general it is 15 years of age or above.

Primary pupil-teacher ratio
Number of pupils registered in primary schools divided by the number of teachers in primary schools.

Proportion of households with a computer
Number of households which declared to have access to a computer at home.

Proportion of households with internet access
Number of households which declared to have access to internet at home. The Internet is a world-wide public computer network. It provides access to a number of communication services including the World Wide Web and carries email, news, entertainment and data files. Access is not assumed to be only via a computer - it may also be by mobile phone, digital TV etc.

Protected areas
Areas of land or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biodiversity, natural and associated cultural resources and managed through legal and other instruments. According to The World Conservation Union (IUCN) it includes the total area of all natural reserves, virgin areas, national parks, natural monuments, management areas of habitats and species, as well as protected land and sea areas in each country.

Public expenditure on education
Composed of capital expenses (construction, renovation, major repairs and purchase of heavy equipment or vehicles) and running costs (goods and services consumed during the current year and that need to be renewed the following year). It covers expenses such as salaries and rendering of services, contracted or acquired services, books and didactic material, social welfare services, furniture and equipment, minor repairs, fuel, insurance, rent, telecommunications and travel.

Public health expenditure
Refers to the recurring and capital expenses in government budgets (central and local), loans and external concessions (including donations by international agencies and non-governmental organisations) and social or compulsory medical insurance funds.
R & D expenditures
The current and capital expenses of creative and systematic activities that increase the stock of knowledge. Includes basic and applied research and experimental development work that leads to new devices, products or processes.

Refugees
People who have been forced to flee their country for fear of persecution owing to reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinions or membership of determined social groups and who are unable or unwilling to return. The asylum country is the country in which the refugee has requested asylum, but has not yet received a response, or where he or she has been registered as an asylum seeker. The country of origin refers to the nationality of the seeker or to the country in which he or she is a citizen.

Rural population
The estimated population at the mid point of the year in areas defined as rural, as a percentage of the total population of the country.

Scientists and technicians in R&D
Professionals that have received further training to work in any scientific field.

Sectorial distribution of the active population
Shown by the percentages of the workforce employed in the different economic sectors: agriculture, industry and services.

Share of income or consumption
In the questionnaires carried out in homes in diverse countries to determine the distribution of income, they make five divisions (or quintiles) from the lowest to the greatest incomes. The two lower quintiles (40%) are considered the poorest. A relation is also made between the richest 10% and the poorest 10%, in order to establish the degree of inequality in incomes.

Share of ICT goods as percentage of total trade
Share of ICT goods imports and exports as a percentage of total imports and exports for every economy for which this information is available. The list of ICT goods is defined by the OECD, and was revised in 2010. This new list consists of 95 goods defined at the 6 digit level of the 2007 version of the Harmonised System.

Short-term external debt
Debt owed to non-residents having an original maturity of one year or less and interest arrears on long-term debt.

Surface area
Refers to the extension of the country in its totality, including the surface area occupied by inland waters.

Threatened species
Includes all the species classified by The World Conservation Union (IUCN), as “vulnerable, in danger, or in critical danger,” but excludes all introduced species, species whose status is not sufficiently known, extinguished species and those still without an assigned status.

Total area equipped for irrigation
Area equipped to provide water (via irrigation) to the crops. It includes areas equipped for full and partial control irrigation, equipped lowland areas, pastures, and areas equipped for spate irrigation.

Total catches
Fishing catches for commerce, industry or subsistence (including recreational catches where the data is available). The data refers to the catch by the fleet of a country in any part of the world. Marine fishing is practiced in seas or oceans, while freshwater fishing takes place in rivers, wetlands and inland lakes.

Total health expenditure
Funds mobilised by the system. Sum of general government and private expenditure on health.

Total population
Includes all of the residents of a country or territory with the legal status of citizen, except refugees settled in a country of asylum, who are generally considered as part of the population of their country of origin. Values for 2005 and projections for 2050 are shown.

Tourism expenditure in other countries
The expenditure in other countries of travellers from a given country, including the payments to national freight companies for international freight. It can include the expenses of single day travellers. The percentage it represents in respect of the exports, is calculated as a ratio of the exports of goods and services.

Trade balance
Account that holds the imports and exports of an economy during a certain period of time with the purpose of reflecting the corresponding balance. The negative values indicate a deficit in the trade balance.

Trade in fish and derivative products
Expresses the value associated to the exports and imports of live, fresh, frozen, chilled, dried, salted, smoked and tinned fish and derivative products. Includes fresh and salt water and aquaculture fish, molluscs and crustaceans.

Under-five mortality rate
Probability of death between birth and becoming five years old, expressed per thousand live births.

Unemployment rate
Percentage of the active population without work, but available for and seeking employment.

Urban population living in slums
A place of precarious settlement is a group of individuals who live under the same roof and lack one or more of the following conditions: secure tenure (state protection against illegal eviction), access to drinking water, access to basic healthcare, structural dwelling quality and sufficient vital space. In accordance with the situation of the city in which the precarious settlement is found, this concept can be locally adapted.
**Water consumption**
Total water used by humans in a year, without taking into account the losses due to evaporation in reservoirs. Includes water from non renewable underground sources, from rivers coming from other countries and from desalinated plants.

**Water dependency**
Percentage of water available in one country, coming from another.

**Water resources**
Refers to the total renewable resources, covering the watercourses of the country (rivers and underground rain water reserves) and the watercourses originating in other countries.

**Women in parliamentary seats**
Refers to the percentage of seats occupied by women in a lower or single chamber, or in a higher or senate, according to each case. In the case where there are two chambers, the data refers to the weighted average of the participation of women in both chambers.

**Wood fuel production**
Includes wood from trunks and branches, used as fuel for cooking, heating or producing energy.

**Workers’ remittances**
According to the definition of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Balance of Payments Manual, workers’ remittances are goods and financial assets transferred by immigrants living and working in an economy (where they are considered residents) in favour of the residents of their former country of residence. An immigrant must live and work in the new economy for more than one year to be considered a resident there. The transfers made to the immigrants own accounts abroad are not considered transfers. Moreover, all those derived from the possession of a business by an immigrant are only considered to be normal transfers to the country of origin.

**Year when women obtained the right to stand for election**
The dates refer to the year when the universal and equal right to stand for election was recognised. In the cases when two years appear, the first refers to the first partial recognition of the right to stand for election.

**Year when women obtained the right to vote**
The dates refer to the year when the universal and equal right to vote was recognised. In the cases when two years appear, the first refers to the first partial recognition of the right to vote.
List of the Organisms Consulted for Drawing Up Tables, Charts and Maps

CITES, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
www.cites.org

EIB, European Investment Bank
www.eib.org

Europeaid, Development and Cooperation
ec.europa.eu/europeaid

European Commission-Trade
ec.europa.eu/trade

EUROSTAT, Statistical Office of the European Commission
ec.europa.eu/eurostat

FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
www.fao.org

Frontex: Annual Risk Analysis 2015.
frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2015.pdf

IDMC, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
www.internal-displacement.org

IEA, International Energy Agency
www.iea.org

UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (IGME), Child Mortality Estimates
www.childmortality.org

ILO, International Labour Organization
www.ilo.org

IOM, International Organization for Migration
www.iom.int

IMF, International Monetary Fund
www.imf.org
IPU, Inter-Parliamentary Union
www.ipu.org

ITU, International Telecommunication Union
www.itu.int

IUCN, World Conservation Union
www.iucn.org

Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) 8th Edition
www.ilo.org

Med.Cronos
www.iemed.org

Millennium Development Goals Indicators
http://mdgs.un.org

OECD, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
www.oecd.org

Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive
psephos.adam-carr.net

Plan Bleu
www.planbleu.org

SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
www.sipri.org

Syria Needs Analysis Project (SNAP)
www.acaps.org/en/pages/syria-snap-project

The Fund for Peace. Fragile States Index
fsi.fundforpeace.org/

UNAIDS, Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS
www.unaids.org

UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
www.unctad.org

UNDP, United Nations Development Program
www.undp.org

UNEP, United Nations Environment Programme
www.unep.org

UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
www.unesco.org
UNFPA, United Nations Population Fund
www.unfpa.org

UNHCR, United Nations Refugee Agency
www.unhcr.ch

UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php

UNICEF, United Nations Children’s Fund
www.unicef.org

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
www.unocha.org

United Nations Treaty Collection
untreaty.un.org

United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN)

UNPOP, United Nations Population Division
www.unpopulation.org

UNSTAT, United Nations Statistics Division
unstats.un.org

UNWTO, World Tourism Organization
www.unwto.org

WB, World Bank
www.worldbank.org

World Economic Forum: Global Gender Gap Report 2014
reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2014/

WHO, World Health Organization
www.who.int

Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org

WRI, World Resources Institute
www.wri.org

WWF
www.wwf.org
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<td>AA</td>
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<td>CBRN</td>
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<td>CEEC</td>
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<td>CIB</td>
<td>Comprehensive Institution-Building</td>
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<td>CMI</td>
<td>Center for Mediterranean Integration</td>
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CNI  Ittihadi National Congress Party (MA)
CNIACM  National Commission to Investigate Cases of Corruption and Embezzlement (TN)
CNIDV  National Commission to Investigate Excesses and abuses (TN)
CORCAS  Royal Advisory Council for Saharan Affairs (MA)
CSO  Committee of Senior Officials
CSP  Country Strategy Paper
CTL  Coal to Liquid
DCFTA  Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
DCFTAD  Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
DG  Directorate-General
DP  Deauville Partnership
DRR  Disaster Risk Reduction
DRS  Intelligence and Security Department (DZ)
EaPIC  Eastern Partnership Integration and Cooperation
EBRD  European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
EC  European Commission
ECOTER  Commission for Economic, Social and Territorial Affairs
EEA  European Environment Agency
EEC  European Economic Community
EEZ  Exclusive Economic Zone
EHEA  European Higher Education Area
EI  Energy Infrastructures
EIB  European Investment Bank
EMFTA  Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area
EMP  Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
EMWIS  Euro-Mediterranean Information System on Know-How in the Water sector
ENI  European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP  European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPAD  European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development
ENPI  European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EOM  Election Observation Mission
EP  European Parliament
ESDP  European Security and Defence Policy
ETA  Euskadi and Freedom
ETF  European Training Foundation
EU  European Union
EULEX  European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUROMED  Euro-Mediterranean
EuroMeSCo  Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission
EUROSTAT  Statistical Office of the EU
EUSAIR  European Union Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region
FAO  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment
FEMIP  Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership
FIS  Islamic Salvation Front
FLN  National Liberation Front (DZ)
FNDU  National Forum for Democracy and Unity (MR)
FPM  Free Patriotic Movement (LB)
FRONTEX  European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders
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<th>Acronym</th>
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<td>Revenue Regulation Fund (DZ)</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat</td>
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<td>GTL</td>
<td>Gas to Liquid</td>
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<td>High Council for the Unity of Azawad</td>
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<td>High Commission for the Realisation of Revolution Objectives, Political Reform and Democratic Transition</td>
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<td>Host Nation Support mechanism</td>
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TSA Tout sur l’Algérie
UAE United Arab Emirates
UfM Union for the Mediterranean
UGTT Tunisian General Labour Union
UMP Union for a Popular Movement (FR)
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIMED Mediterranean Universities Union
UNISDR UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
UNODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRWA United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Refugees in the Near East
UNSMIL UN Support Mission in Libya
UNSMIL UN Special Mission in Libya
UNWTO World Tourism Organization
UP Umbrella programmes
USA United States of America
USFP Socialist Union of Popular Forces (MA)
UTICA Tunisian Union for Industry, Commerce and Handicrafts
VAT Value-Added Tax
WB World Bank
WFP World Food Programme
WGI Worldwide Governance Indicators
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
YPG People’s Protection Unit (SY)
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