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Foreword

Senén Florensa
Executive President
European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), Barcelona

The Mediterranean area is possibly the most exciting region on the planet to analyse and study, fruit of the complexity of its history, its different societies and its diverse political, social, cultural and economic relations. Despite the Yearbook’s length, covering all this complexity is an almost impossible task; our intention, however, is to come as close as we can to achieving this. The IEMed thereby offers its Yearbook readers a tool to gain information, insight and understanding of the Mediterranean reality, for both actors and experts, as well as the general public interested in the region.

In the IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2014, the articles are organised into its three traditional sections: Keys, which contains the region’s most relevant events, those we consider to be essential for understanding its major challenges. A second section entitled Dossier once again offers a series of articles that provides an in-depth analysis of, in this case, a single theme of particular significance, from a range of different perspectives. This year our Dossier is focused on the constitution-making processes used by the Arab countries in transition. This group of articles analyses these processes firstly across the board, including political models, constitutions, the role of Islam, human rights or political parties and elections, and then individually, looking at the cases of the constitutions of Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt.

As in all editions, the articles in Panorama complement and complete the perspective of the major events in the Mediterranean area. This section reveals the Yearbook’s intention not to leave aside any geographical area or theme, offering a wide selection of articles which deal with everything from internal politics to trade, immigration to security, energy to climate change, agriculture to freedom of expression and tourism to the situation of women. It also provides its readers with the political, economic, social and cultural keys of the Mediterranean agenda.

Finally, the Yearbook complements the analysis of the articles and offers a different perspective through the Appendices, which provide readers with direct information, from the wide selection of statistical indicators – offered both in Country Profiles and The Mediterranean in Brief – to the various exhaustive
chronologies or the selection of specific data related to cooperation, development, immigration or the signing of international agreements. Finally, Maps presents data and indicators, which may be difficult to understand in other sections, in a clearer format. To reach ten editions of a Yearbook certainly requires hard work and a lot of effort, but above all it needs a dream. The dream of giving our readers a rigorous and pluralistic analysis of the Mediterranean reality; of offering a tool to transmit the situation of a geographical area beyond the headlines; the dream of maintaining quality, both in terms of the authors and the appendices; the dream that anyone interested in the Mediterranean area can access a reference product containing a considered analysis. And all this at a time when the distribution of information and the search for immediacy increasingly leads us to give our opinion before we reflect, to focus on the trees before reaching a global vision of the forest. Our goal with the Yearbook is to offer this limited yet essential global vision, through the in-depth knowledge of our authors, who write the articles with this vision of synthesis. We hope we have achieved our goal.
Perspectives
Changes in the Arab world represent a historical milestone in the countries of the Southern Mediterranean. While the call for dignity, democracy, respect for human rights and more inclusive growth has permeated the entire region, each partner has undergone a different process of transition in the last three years.

Since 2011, progress was witnessed towards free and fair electoral processes in some countries of the region, often resulting in a change of government. The development of political parties and of civil society signals the emergence of a democratic culture, and in a few countries public debates have been initiated, in some cases around constitutional reform, on key societal issues such as the role of religion in the new democratic set up and the protection of human rights. However, the risk of crisis or set back is real in a context of polarisation of political forces and in the absence of an agreement among political actors on a joint vision for the political transformation process. In recent months, the unstable political situation and growing social unrest have strongly affected the performance of the Southern Mediterranean governments in implementing reforms. The continuing change revealed even greater differences between the transition trajectories of individual countries in the region.

Embedding deep democracy in the future will rely upon democratic institutions, in particular an independent, fair, accessible and efficient justice system and an accountable and democratic security sector. This will take time, while the respect for the rule of law and human rights, in particular gender equality, freedom of expression (including freedom of the media), of association, religion and belief will remain key challenges in the years ahead for Mediterranean partners and their successful cooperation with the EU. A thriving civil society supported by media that are both independent and professional, able to contribute to public debate and accountability will be essential to ensure the full participation of citizens in shaping their collective future, and authorities should favour its development rather than attempt to restrict it, as is often the case. Similarly, accountable local authorities are key to providing services that respond to local needs.

Ensuring peace and stability in the region remains an objective that can only be addressed through renewed efforts at the peaceful resolution of protracted conflicts and crises. Events over the last twelve months have not been encouraging.

The Syrian conflict triggered a profound crisis causing further political, social and religious divisions as well as a worsening humanitarian catastrophe in the region. The political track pursued through the Geneva peace process has not moved forward. The opposition to Bashar al-Assad remains divided and internal fights have intensified. The civil war in Syria led millions of people to flee their homes. The Syrian refugee crisis is a humanitarian catastrophe on an unprecedented scale - with 6.5 million 'internally displaced persons' inside Syria and nearly 3 million refugees in neighbouring countries. By summer 2014, it was estimated that the death toll of the conflict had reached 170,000 people. The EU and its Member States are the major donors of assistance to Syria with €2.8 billion pledged so far.

In Libya, despite parliamentary elections held in June 2014, not only is the democratic transition under question, but conflicting interests among various armed groups over power-sharing, the role of religion
and oil revenues have driven the country towards the brink of collapse and have prevented the emergence of functioning state institutions. In addition, the lack of any control over vast areas of the Sahara has allowed illegal trafficking to flourish and much easier movement of criminal and terrorist groups.

**EU Reaction**

As a reaction to the developments of 2011, the EU decided to support a comprehensive reform and transformation agenda, as provided for in the two joint Communications on “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” of March 2011 and “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” of May 2011. The EU has aimed to play an important and positive role in supporting the transformation process in the region as a whole. Since 2011 this policy had to adapt to changing circumstances in the region. It has remained sufficiently flexible to adapt to the increasing differentiation and fragmentation evident in the region. It has pursued a policy of renewed engagement, bilaterally and at regional level, while recognising that ownership of the transition lies with its partners. While the overall cooperation with the region in 2013 was heavily influenced by its political developments, in some sectors joint work continued in the best possible way.

In the **political area**, the EU has remained actively involved in all international fora dealing with the situation in the region, notably the Geneva Process peace talks on the Syria crisis, the Friends of Libya group, the international talks on Iran and the Middle East Peace Process.

For the future, cooperation and support for further constitutional and institutional reform, transitional justice, strengthened role of civil society and securing human rights, as well as security reform will remain fundamental to the sustainable development of the southern neighbourhood countries. In this area, the EU intends to continue providing support to partners, including through facilitating the cooperation with such bodies as the Council of Europe.

The EU is the **leading donor** in the region, providing considerable financial resources (loans and grants) to support the process of transformation and reform in southern partner countries. In 2011-2013, the EU has provided nearly €5 billion in support to the region: this includes the response to the Syrian crisis, the resources provided under the country programmes and the special SPRING programme as well as the Civil Society Facility. In addition, through the EU’s Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), the EU combined €200 million in grant funds with €2.2 billion in loans from international financial institutions.

For the 2014-2020 period, the adopted budget for the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) stands at €15.433 billion, comparable with the total funding allocated in years 2007-13. In addition to grants from the ENI, the EU will also mobilise its Macro-Financial Assistance (a €300 million operation has recently been decided for Tunisia after the €180 million operation for Jordan in 2013).

Regarding the **trade agenda**, the main EU medium to long-term objective with southern partners is to upgrade and strengthen trade and investment relations and pursue their economic integration with the EU internal market, in particular through the establishment of DCFTAs. Negotiations with Morocco were launched in March 2013. With Jordan, Tunisia and Egypt, the Commission continues preparatory work. In this context, the EU will have to further pursue its work of explaining the concrete benefits of its initiatives on trade and trade-related matters, notably for improving the business and investment climate. It will also need to give the matter the necessary attention and resources to ensure that the negotiations are conducted swiftly and that the agreements can enter into force as soon as is feasible.

Partners continue to have strong expectations of **easier mobility** to the EU and many of them have taken steps to establish national asylum systems as well as improved systems to prevent and combat trafficking in human beings and protect its victims. In recent months, cooperation on home affairs matters has been significantly strengthened: indeed, mobility partnerships have been signed with Morocco (June 2013) and Tunisia (March 2014); while negotiations are being finalised with Jordan. These agreements will serve the simplification of free movement of people. The EU is now considering launching dialogues on migration, mobility and security with more Southern Mediterranean countries, depending on their willingness and capacity to collaborate closer with the EU, as well as their legal and administrative frameworks.
The transformation of the political landscape that followed 2011 developments has been accompanied by a major upsurge in the number of civil society organisations in the region. At the same time, the EU policy put a strong focus on engaging with regional civil society. Support for civil society has increased and been made more systematic and coherent, with three main objectives: 1. Promotion of a conducive environment for civil society; 2. Better participation of civil society actors in policy processes and assistance programmes; and 3. Strengthening of civil society organisations’ capacities.

The EU will pursue its engagement with the region on all regional, sub-regional and bilateral tracks. In this context, the need for more effective regional mechanisms and institutions able to prevent, manage and solve crises and foster regional integration has been highlighted by recent events. The Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was given a strong impetus in 2012 when the EU took over the function of the Northern Co-Presidency (Jordan is the ‘Southern Presidency’). As Co-Presidency of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), the EU actively supports the effective functioning of this forum. In the second half of 2013 the UfM Ministerial Meetings were successfully re-launched and since then already five of them have taken place – addressing topics such as: women, transport, energy, industry and environment. More Ministerial meetings (digital economy and trade) are envisaged for September 2014.

The UfM has modernised itself and adapted its priorities, serving now as an important, unique forum grouping together all Mediterranean partner countries including Mauritania, Israel and Palestine, as well as EU Member States. The organisation became essential in debating political and economic problems of the region (through the regular Senior Officials meetings), supporting dialogue with civil society (including through the activities of the Anna Lindh Foundation) and local authorities as well as a catalyst for new regional projects. The EU intends to further support the UfM, both politically as well as financially under the next programming period (2014-2020).

There has also been an intensification of actions by the League of Arab States or under the ‘5+5 Dialogue.’ The third meeting of the EU and the League of Arab States (LAS) Foreign Affairs Ministers took place on 10-11 June 2014 in Athens. The Joint Declaration signed by all participants established an unprecedented strategic dialogue between both organisations. In 2012 both organisations had adopted a joint work programme with concrete fields of cooperation (human rights, electoral observation, energy, business, etc.). The EU has also enhanced cooperation with the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). A number of high level meetings between the EU and the OIC are envisaged for autumn 2014.

With its 2012 Communication on regional cooperation and integration in the Maghreb, the EU made suggestions for cooperative approaches in different fields. The EU remains determined to facilitate and catalyse efforts from the countries of the region assuming ownership in the spirit of partnership.

The events in the Southern Neighbourhood over recent years have dramatically altered the strategic landscape in the Southern Mediterranean, challenging the EU interests directly. They require the EU to rise to the challenge. In this context, our policy should not be rigid and should adapt to an evolving context. We are always ready to be more creative in order to fulfil the aspirations of a stronger and mutually-beneficial partnership between the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea.
Keys
Transitional Processes and Political Change in Arab Countries

The Arab Uprising and the Stalled Transition Process

Raymond Hinnebusch
Professor of International Relations
University of St. Andrews

The Arab Uprisings that began in 2010 have removed four presidents to date and seemingly made increasingly mobilised, mass publics a predominant factor in the politics of regional states. It is, however, one thing to remove a leader and quite another to create stable and inclusive ‘democratic’ institutions. With the possible exception of Tunisia, the mass mobilisation of the uprisings has not led to democratic transition; rather the main shared outcome has been the weakening of the State. The main divergence has been between countries in which the ‘deep State’ – remnants of the old regime – have proved resilient, and while making some concessions – notably elections and new constitutions – have re-established hybrid regimes based on some mix of authoritarian and pluralistic practices, notably Egypt and Yemen; as opposed to cases where the uprising unleashed civil war and failed states (Syria, Libya). Only Tunisia appeared to be the exception to this dismal picture. So what went wrong with the ‘Arab transition’?

Getting from Mass Protest to Democratic Transition

The transition from revolt to democratic consolidation is obviously no simple matter. Several bodies of literature, which proceed on quite different tracks, can usefully be brought together to understand this; namely, those that deal with mass protest, ‘pacted’ transitions and institution building in new states. The mass protest paradigm, as notably delineated by Stephan and Chenoweth (2008), could be said not only to describe the dynamics of mass protest, but also to have diffused discourse that inspired the Arab uprising. It argues that mass protest can effectively destabilise authoritarian regimes. Even if the regime refuses to accept protestors’ demands and uses violence against them, this is likely to backfire, stimulating wider anti-regime mobilisation, precipitating international sanctions and support for the opposition, and, most importantly, causing defections in the security forces, which will be reluctant to use violence against fellow citizens who are not themselves using violence.

The problem with this literature is that it leaves little agency to ruling elites, when, in fact, how they respond to mass protest makes all the difference to the outcome. Since it is not mass mobilisation alone but the interaction between it and regime (elite) behaviour that matters, we must turn to democratisation studies’ transition paradigm to understand the conditions that allow a peaceful transition to democracy. In this literature, the key is a pact between moderates in the ruling elite and among the opposition (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986), wherein the latter refrains from threatening the vital interests of incumbents who, in return, concede a pluralisation of the political system. Such a scenario is more likely when non-violent resistance encourages moderates within the regime to push for reform and/or withdraw their support from hard-line authoritarians, and less likely when rebels make maximalist demands or resort to violence, thereby empowering hardliners against the moderates. Moderates in the regime and opposition need to reach a pact on the parameters of democratisation, with a transition coalition composed of both insiders and outsiders presiding over democratisation. Where protests remain peaceful the chances of such a democratic transition increases; where the old regime is challenged via violent

* This article was finalised in April 2014 (Editor’s note).
revolution from below, the chances of democratisation diminish. The former scenario was arguably evident in the Egyptian and Tunisian cases, the latter in Syria or Libya.

Finally, the institution-building paradigm (Huntington, 1968) argues that power must first be created before it can be shared. Creating power requires, first, its concentration in an elite core, and then its expansion as institutions incorporate mass participation, notably through effective political parties. The prototype is Turkey where the Ataturk regime first concentrated power and built institutions. At a later stage, when the prerequisites of democratisation were thought sufficient, elites presided over democratisation from above by transformation of the one-party into a two-party system and allowing competitive elections. The alternative scenario, political mobilisation without institutions, takes the form of destabilising ‘praetorianism’ – strikes, riots and coups. In Arab uprising countries, despite political liberalisation and pluralisation experiments, the Turkish scenario of democratic institutionalisation from above never acquired momentum and instead change was initiated by the Arab Spring’s mobilisation from below. However, it is still possible that in uprising states, a transitional insider-outsider ruling coalition could concentrate authority while managing a peaceful transition to institutionalised participation. In such a scenario, the remnants of the old regime and leaders of peaceful protests would combine in a transitional government and the institutions of the old regime would be preserved. These normally included a parliament dominated by a single party. One of the keys to democratic transition is allowing opposition parties to form, the holding of multi-party elections, and convening of a constituent assembly to reach consensus on the distribution of powers in a new constitution.

This literature helps us to identify the main differences among states that underwent an uprising and to suggest some explanations for what went wrong. In Syria, the first stage of civil resistance failed. In Egypt, civil resistance succeeded, but institution-building failed, with the fracturing of the insider-outsider coalition. Only Tunisia appears to have sustained its transitional coalition and to have initiated institution-building.

**Syria: Failed Transition**

The Syrian uprising began with massive protests that the Assad regime could not quickly suppress and to which it took a highly defensive stance. Yet it did not stimulate a transition to a more politically inclusive political order and led instead to civil war. For one thing, the protests began in the peripheries, the suburbs and small towns and medium-sized provincial cities, rather than at the heart of power, and indeed never penetrated the two main urban centres, Damascus and Aleppo, where the regime had co-opted key social forces. The regime opted to use disproportionate force against protestors, and, in parallel, to frame the protests as radical Islamic terrorism in order to rally the support of the secular middle class, minorities, and, in particular, its Alawi constituency, which has a dominant presence in the security forces.

If non-violent protest was going to precipitate a transition, a coalition between soft-liners in the regime and opposition combining to marginalise the hardliners was needed, but in the Syrian case, the soft-liners were marginalised on both sides not only by the regime’s use of violence, but also by the maximalist demands of the opposition, i.e. the fall of the regime. In this respect, several analysts argued that the mistake of the Syrian protest movement was its “rush to confrontation” with the regime while it still retained significant support (Madour, 2013). With the hardline opposition insisting on the fall of the regime, the soft-liners in the regime were unlikely to marginalise the hardliners. While the al-Assad regime’s use of lethal force against non-violent protestors did alienate wide swaths of the public, because society became sharply, communally polarised, the opposition could be constructed, among the regime’s constituency, as the ‘other.’ As for the many Syrians caught
Several analysts argued that the mistake of the Syrian protest movement was its “rush to confrontation” with the regime while it still retained significant support in the middle, especially the upper and middle classes, the regime’s claim to defend order against the disruption unleashed by the uprising caused a significant portion of them to acquiesce in it as the lesser of two evils; this was all the more the case once radical Islamists, and especially al-Qaeda-linked jihadists, assumed a high profile within the opposition and as the opposition itself fragmented into warring camps. Finally, on the whole the security forces did not split, and, while there were defections, notably among Sunni officers, these did not threaten the regime’s power apparatus. Instead the conflict became militarised, with the opposition taking up arms, and, as the army proved unable to retain full territorial control, precipitating the division of the country into mutually exclusive and contested zones. This suggests that a blind spot in studies of non-violent resistance may be a failure to sufficiently differentiate kinds of authoritarianism, and, in particular, to take into account those that are capable of surviving significant mass protests and also defections within the army without disintegrating. This applies particularly to states constructed in fragmented societies around a cohesive communal and armed core that may be far less susceptible to non-violent resistance regardless of its magnitude and duration. Moreover, the paradigm ignores the need of the opposition to reach out to soft-liners in the regime and instead, in stressing the vulnerability of authoritarian regimes to mass protest, encourages maximalist demands that make an insider-outsider coalition unlikely.

Egypt: Transition Reverse

In Egypt, mass mobilisation was more effective, taking place as it did in Cairo, the centre of power. The fall of Mubarak was indeed the result of a split in the regime, with mass protest and the regime’s violent response enough to push the military high command to sacrifice Mubarak in order to save the regime and protect its own legitimacy as ‘guardian’ of the nation. However, Mubarak’s departure left three broad camps in contention to inherit power: the revolutionary youth (particularly in coalition with leftists and secularists), the Islamists, and the military (together with the remnants of the old regime). The army, initially led by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) that inherited power after the fall of Mubarak, set out to manage the post-Mubarak transition. The SCAF did not want to rule – and hence assume responsibility for Egypt’s intractable problems – but it did make a bid to enshrine extra-constitutional guardianship of the sort the Turkish military once exercised. The military’s immediate aim was to ensure that no future civilian government could scrutinise its budget and privileges, nor challenge the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and Egypt’s alliance with the US, which had poured billions of dollars into the army’s coffers over many decades. This bid was rebuffed by a consensus of all other forces, and the late 2012 retirement of the two top SCAF generals who had been most keen on a veto role, by the elected Islamist President, Mohamed Morsi – itself allowed by a split in the top brass – shifted the power balance toward civilian actors. Nevertheless, it was widely believed that the military and Muslim Brotherhood leadership had reached a deal to covertly share power. Indeed article 197 of the Islamist-drafted constitution left the military with substantial autonomy of civilian oversight. The army was arguably representative of the ‘deep State’ that stood for the Mubarak-era status quo, albeit without Mubarak. This included the security forces, possibly also elements of the Foreign, Economic and Finance ministries, and other left-overs of the old regime (foloul), either entrenched in the bureaucracy or former National Democratic Party network of local notables persisting from the Mubarak regime, all of which can be seen as aligned with the military in a sort of ‘Party of Order.’ While the ex-NDP chose to lay low in the face of revolutionary groundswell during the first parliamentary elections, it backed the old guard candidate, Ahmad Shafiq, in the presidential elections. The very close outcome in which the Muslim Brotherhood candidate, Mohamed Morsi edged out Shafiq suggested the potential of the Party of Order to drive a post-revolutionary Thermidor.
The Muslim Brotherhood was, after the army, the most organised force in Egyptian society, with around half a million members, an extensive social infrastructure, and considerable financial assets. It obtained over a third of the vote and 46% of the seats in the post-Mubarak parliamentary elections. Unexpectedly, the newly established Salafist Al-Nour party also did well in the parliamentary elections, especially in rural areas, adding a second thrust to an Islamist groundswell. The rise of the Islamist camp was confirmed when its candidate, Mohamed Morsi, narrowly won the presidential election. Finally, the youth and broader opposition movement that led the revolution was the main advocate of thorough democratisation. But the revolutionary youth, although united against Mubarak, appeared, compared to the military and the Islamists, to be otherwise divided over specific issues, notably social issues (role of religion, distribution of wealth), and quickly splintered into multiple rival factions. Without the organisation required to contest the elections, the revolutionary youth were barely represented in the first elected parliament and in the constitution-writing process. Nevertheless, the respectable showing in the presidential elections of the Nasserist Hamden Sabahi, arguably the standard bearer of the revolutionary camp, indicated considerable support for this alternative to both the establishment and the Islamists.

A three-sided struggle for power began soon after Mubarak’s fall. This struggle turned most immediately around the constitutional configuration of the new State. In an early conflict, the revolutionary youth who perceived a bid by their rivals to hijack the revolution, attempted, together with the left and secular liberals, to get parliamentary elections postponed, fearing the Muslim Brotherhood’s superior organisation, with some even wanting the military to protect the secular State against the latter. In a test of strength early in the transition, the 19 March 2011 referendum on amendments to the constitution already showed how an alliance of the military and the Islamists could mobilise a large majority of those wanting a return to ‘order’ and against what was framed as a bid by secularists to remove the constitutional clause designating the sharia as the main source of legislation. Only a quarter of voters backed the secularist liberal position on the amendments, mostly from the urban middle and upper classes.

Thereafter a struggle was mounted by the revolutionary youth and their allies to dislodge the SCAF from its arbitrary management of the transition.

In the transition period, the absence of a permanent constitution left the distribution of powers among the branches of government unclarified, encouraging all parties to resort to extra-constitutional power plays

In spite of an insider-outsider coalition (SCAF, the Brotherhood) taking control and elections being held to a constituency assembly, institution-building was stunted. The assembly was dominated by Islamists and insufficiently inclusive of all social forces, which institution-founding assemblies must arguably be if they are to incorporate a consensus on the rules of the game. In particular, the revolutionary youth were insufficiently represented and invested in the process. Moreover, in the transition period, the absence of a permanent constitution left the distribution of powers among the branches of government unclarified, encouraging all parties to resort to extra-constitutional power plays. Key conflicts included, secularist rejection of the Islamist domination of the parliamentary constitution-writing committee and the dismissal of the Parliament by a highly politicised judiciary dominated by secularists, anticipating the next parliamentary election to be Islamist dominated. A third struggle was over presidential powers in which President Morsi dismissed top generals and saw off SCAF efforts to hamstring him. A fourth showdown came in late 2012, over the Islamist-drafted constitution, which retained a strong presidency as well as clauses that were offensive to secularists. Then, Morsi’s November 2012 attempt to assume (temporary) decree powers and throw off judicial constraints sparked an opposition counter-mobilisation combining revolutionary and pro-Mubarak elements. In mid-2013 the power struggle came to a head with the military’s deposition of Morsi. Thereafter, in using violence against Morsi’s supporters and outlawing the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organisation, the military and the deep State, with the complicity of secularists and youth, in effect made a
transition to democracy impossible. No democracy that excludes one of the most important socio-political forces in Egypt can be consolidated. Only a hybrid regime, retaining extra-constitutional powers for the security forces, can hope to marginalise the Islamists and cope with the violent spillover of their resistance to repression. Controlled elections which exclude many competitors will be part of the formula, but the outcome will be very much a hybrid regime, with an authoritarian core and pluralist appendages.

**Tunisia: Incremental Institutionalisation**

Tunisia was widely seen as having the best prospects for consolidating democracy. In contrast to Syria’s ethnic and sectarian cleavages, Tunisia’s secular tradition, relative homogeneity and longer history of statehood allowed a stronger identification with the State as the common political community, an essential consensus needed to underpin contestation over other issues. The historically more moderate Islamist movement increased the likelihood of a compromise between Islamists and secularists. Unlike Egypt, Tunisia’s larger middle class, mass literacy and un politicised army were more compatible with a democratic political culture.

In Tunisia, the departure of Ben Ali was, as in Egypt, a result of the refusal of the army to fire on protestors in defence of the regime. The Islamist Ennahda won a plurality in the first post-uprising elections, owing to its unique name recognition, lack of complicity in the Ben Ali regime, grassroots organising capacity, higher penetration of rural areas compared to the city-centric secularists, and its moderate Islamic message attuned to Tunisia’s political culture. Unlike the Egyptian Ikhwan, however, Ennahda shared power with two secular parties, and a secularist politician became President alongside an Islamist Prime Minister.

Nevertheless, before long the secularist-Islamist cleavage threatened to destabilise the country. Once in power, the Ennahda party sought to ban members of the two-million strong former ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) from participating in politics, a move that would weaken secularists and liberals, some of whom were associated with the old regime at various points, and prevent them joining in a counter-coalition, which, polls showed, could mount a major challenge to Ennahda. Former regime party members were behind growing protests against the Ennahda government; the trade union movement called a general strike and faced attacks by an Islamist militia, the League for the Protection of the Revolution. Militant Salafists’ attempts to restrict cultural expression they considered anti-Islamic seemed tolerated by the government. The acrimonious discourse and the murders of secular political leaders critical of the Ennahda government plunged the country into crisis in 2013, similar to what was, in parallel, happening in Egypt. Inspired by the Egyptian protest movement against Morsi, secularists mounted demonstrations against the Ennahda government and the constituent assembly. However, unlike General al-Sisi in Egypt, there was no ‘man on horseback’ in Tunisia’s small politically unambitious military that rival political forces could call upon to ‘rescue’ the country from the other; hence they would need to compromise their differences through dialogue. The constituent assembly was more inclusive than in Egypt and was able to reach a compromise constitutional formula and the Ennahda government stepped down voluntarily. In Tunisia an insider-outsider coalition managed to foster enough institution-building to sustain peaceful democratisation.

**Political Economy Obstacles to Democratic Consolidation**

Democratic transition does not guarantee democratic consolidation and the latter is not just a matter of political dynamics, i.e. elite choices, mobilisation and institutionalisation. The political economy context, in which regional states are currently embedded, stacks the deck against democratic consolidation. The uprisings were a reaction against neo-liberal globalisation in the region, which created acute social inequalities; the revolutions, however, remained purely political, with no attempts to attack unjust economic inequalities. At the same time, they actually worsened economic
With post-uprising elites in the Arab world constrained by economic dependency and elections offering limited policy choices, the risk is that political competition will be diverted into cultural wars over identity issues framed in de-stabilising zero-sum terms (Islamist vs. secularist, Sunni vs. Shia).

growth, and hence prospects for addressing unemployment, by deterring investors and tourism. Moreover, enduring dependencies on the Western-centred international financial system locked Egypt and Tunisia into neo-liberal practices and removed the big issues of politics – distribution of wealth – from domestic political agendas, which risked mass disillusionment with democracy. Indeed, even in Tunisia, disillusionment with democracy set in, with nostalgia for the stability and relative prosperity of the Ben Ali period rising among the mass public. All that had changed for the unemployed as a result of the revolution was increased political freedom to express their frustrations.

Given the neo-liberal context in which democratisation must take place in the global periphery, the best of the bad outcomes has tended to be ‘low-intensity democracy,’ in which elections serve as an institutionalised mechanism for elite circulation that may constrain the State but only marginally empowers the masses. However, with post-uprising elites in the Arab world constrained by economic dependency and elections offering limited policy choices, the risk is that political competition will be diverted into cultural wars over identity issues framed in de-stabilising zero-sum terms (Islamist vs. secularist, Sunni vs. Shia). The likely result is that political pluralism will be mixed with doses of authoritarian power in order to manage identity conflicts and turn back demands for social justice that cannot be accommodated in a global neo-liberal economic order.

Conclusion

The Arab uprising unleashed both elite contestation and mass political mobilisation, in which the overthrow of authoritarian presidents, weakening of state establishments and initial empowerment of Islamist outsiders appeared to reverse inherited hierarchies. Mobilisation exceeded institutionalisation, precipitating ‘praetorianism’ in which politics was played via street protests, riots, and military intervention, as well as elections, without an agreed set of rules for the game. However, subsequent outcomes were radically divergent in different countries.

In Egypt a pacted transition enabled protests to remove the President while preserving the central power, but subsequently a hard-line insider (army)-outsider (secular youth) coalition came together to exclude the Islamists, aborting institution-building. The outcome will be a hybrid regime, mixing an authoritarian deep state with the residues of political mobilisation that have survived from the uprising. In Syria, where hardliners dominated in regime and opposition, protests precipitated not a pacted transition, but civil war; as the central power lost its monopoly of coercion, the result was a failed state. Only in Tunisia, the exceptional case in the region, did a transitional insider-outsider coalition survive, enabling incremental, inclusive institution-building to start incorporating participation and hence reverse praetorianism; the political economy context, however, stacked the odds against democratic consolidation.

Bibliography


The revolutions, popular uprisings and protests that have taken place in the vast majority of Arab countries since December 2010 have triggered a fifth wave of political change in the region of North Africa and the Middle East, with varying effects on the nature of the Arab regimes (Szmolka, 2013: 896).

Characterisation of the Political Regimes before the Arab Spring

In earlier works, we proposed a classification of political regimes based on three dimensions of analysis: pluralism and political competition, government performance, and civil rights and liberties (Szmolka, 2010 and 2011). At the time of the Arab Spring, there were no full democracies in the region. Thus, the Arab regimes were characterised as follows:

(a) **Defective illiberal democracies**: Lebanon and Iraq. Formally, these two countries can be considered democratic. Their political regimes are characterised by a significant degree of pluralism and political competition, the holding of competitive elections, and the facts that they allow the exercise of an effective government opposition and that the political system was designed by consensus and reflects the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional makeup of the population. However, significant shortcomings can be found in government performance (governability, corruption, lack of effective control of the territory) and the effective exercise of rights and freedoms.

(b) **Restrictive and quasi-competitive pluralist authoritarian systems**: Morocco and Kuwait. In these countries, parties or political associations compete freely and interact in representative institutions, elections and other political processes. The government opposition can criticise the government and propose alternative agendas. However, the opposition is conditioned by the need to observe limits imposed by the regime; as a result, politics is not fully competitive. Some groups prefer to remain outside the institutional arena; as they do not believe it offers the necessary democratic conditions to enable their participation in the political game, they prefer not to legitimise the power. Additionally, decision-making is centralised, with representative institutions having only limited and non-independent powers. Finally, the exercise of civil liberties is likewise limited whenever it threatens the foundations of political power.

(c) **Restrictive and hegemonic pluralist authoritarian systems**: Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain and Yemen. Competition is limited by the hegemonic and ultra-dominant position of a given party, group or coalition in political processes, by barriers to opposition activities, and by irregularities in electoral processes. Thus, the political system allows the pluralist interaction of...
Political change can take different directions, not all of which necessarily lead to a change in political regime. These changes may affect any of the dimensions of political regimes: pluralism and political competition, effective government performance, and political rights and civil liberties. Conditions are met: there must be sufficient agreement on the procedures for electing a government; the government must have come to power as the result of a free and popular vote; the government must have de facto authority to generate new policies; and the new legislative, executive and judicial powers must not have to share power with other actors (such as the military or religious leaders). Another widely held view among scholars holds that it is only possible to speak of democratisation when Dahl’s (1989) eight conditions for a polyarchy have been met: equal and universal suffrage; the right to hold elected office; free, fair and regular elections; freedom of expression; freedom of association and the independence of associations; a plurality of sources of information; institutions that allow public policy to depend on votes and other expressions of preference; and safeguards of the rights of minorities against any form of abuse by the majority. However,

### Types of Processes of Political Change

Political change can take different directions, not all of which necessarily lead to a change in political regime. These changes may affect any of the aforementioned dimensions of political regimes: pluralism and political competition, effective government performance, and political rights and civil liberties. It is thus possible to identify seven types of political change processes: democratisation, autocratisation, democratic regression, political liberalisation, authoritarian progression, democratic deepening, and democratic consolidation (see Chart 1).

**Democratisation** entails a transition from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. For Linz and Stepan (1996: 1), democratisation occurs when four conditions are met: there must be sufficient agreement on the procedures for electing a government; the government must have come to power as the result of a free and popular vote; the government must have de facto authority to generate new policies; and the new legislative, executive and judicial powers must not have to share power with other actors (such as the military or religious leaders). Another widely held view among scholars holds that it is only possible to speak of democratisation when Dahl’s (1989) eight conditions for a polyarchy have been met: equal and universal suffrage; the right to hold elected office; free, fair and regular elections; freedom of expression; freedom of association and the independence of associations; a plurality of sources of information; institutions that allow public policy to depend on votes and other expressions of preference; and safeguards of the rights of minorities against any form of abuse by the majority. However,

### Table 1: Classification of Arab Political Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Political Regime</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Pluralism and Political Competition</th>
<th>Government Performance</th>
<th>Civil Rights and Liberties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defective illiberal democracies</td>
<td>Iraq, Lebanon</td>
<td>Competitive and pluralist</td>
<td>Defective</td>
<td>Restrictive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive and quasi-competitive pluralist</td>
<td>Kuwait, Morocco</td>
<td>Quasi-competitive and pluralist</td>
<td>Autocratic</td>
<td>Restrictive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authoritarian systems</td>
<td>Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Mauritania, Tunisia, Yemen</td>
<td>Hegemonic and pluralist</td>
<td>Autocratic</td>
<td>Restrictive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restrictive and hegemonic pluralist</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia, UAE, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Syria</td>
<td>Not pluralist</td>
<td>Totalitarian</td>
<td>Very restrictive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration.
the situation in Tunisia, for instance, following the 2011 elections, met the conditions described by these authors, and yet it could not be called democratisation as there had been no consensual acceptance of a common framework of social and political co-existence. In our view, this final condition must also be fulfilled, in addition to the others, before it is possible to speak of democratisation.

Second, unlike democratisation, autocratisation entails the transition from a democratic regime to an authoritarian one. This occurs due to the arbitrary exercise of power and/or the placement of considerable restrictions on political competition and/or political rights and civil liberties.

Third, democratic regression entails the loss of certain democratic qualities without, however, losing the substantive democratic core (competitive elections, effective political opposition, guaranteed rights and freedoms for a large majority). A regime can go from being a full democracy to a defective one due to interference in political decision-making by actors not subject to democratic control or the limitation of the rights and freedoms of minorities (whether political, ethnic or religious).

Fourth, political liberalisation occurs in authoritarian contexts. It involves an easing of political repression and an expansion of political rights and civil liberties, without fully guaranteeing them. Political liberalisation does not necessarily signify the start of a democratic transition. It can lead to a shift from a hegemonic authoritarian regime to a quasi-competitive one through expanded political compe-
The Arab revolutions and protests triggered processes of political change that, in most cases, have ultimately had little impact on the nature of the respective political regimes.

government and the formation of a technocratic transitional government, the adoption of a Constitution, the passage of an electoral law and the holding of the next legislative and presidential elections. As a result of this partisan consensus, the National Assembly was able to approve the democratic Constitution at its plenary session on 26 January 2014. Days later, an agreed government of technocrats was formed with the aim of holding the planned legislative and presidential elections by the end of 2014. Should these two electoral processes succeed, they will confirm the democratic path taken by Tunisia.

In Egypt, it is necessary to distinguish between two different processes of political change following the fall of President Mubarak on 11 February 2011. First, the country embarked on a process of democratic transition, which failed due to a lack of understanding between the various political forces, the imposition of a specific political model, and the Army’s interference in political affairs. As a result, the country has undergone a process of autocratisation and a return to a restrictive and hegemonic pluralist regime. The holding of competitive legislative and presidential elections was not enough to democratis Egypt. The elected Parliament was suspended in October 2012, following the Supreme Constitutional Court’s ruling, on 14 June 2012, finding the electoral system to be partially unconstitutional. With regard to the government, President Mohamed Morsi proved unable to make concessions and reach agreements with other political forces, choosing to impose instead his own model of political co-existence, the Constitution of 25 December 2012, which was rejected by liberal, nationalist and progressive forces. Widespread social mobilisation against Morsi’s authoritarian politics served as an excuse for the Military to abort the stalled process of transition. The military coup of 3 July 2013 ousted President Morsi and suspended the Constitution. Subsequently, a new process was launched entailing a return to a restrictive
and hegemonic authoritarian regime, albeit with new actors. The new political system prohibits the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood, which, despite representing a significant portion of Egyptian society, was declared to be a terrorist organisation on 23 September 2013.

Libya is currently immersed in a situation of uncertainty with regard to its process of democratic transition. Following the death of Gaddafi, the emerging political forces reached consensuses on several key points: approval of the electoral system; holding of the first competitive elections; formation of transitional coalition governments representing the main political trends (independent, liberal and Islamist); approval of the procedure for drafting the Constitution; recognition of Libya’s multicultural identity (Arab, Amazigh, Tuareg and Toubou); etc. However, the lack of prior institutional architecture and of experience with political participation is proving to be an obstacle to the country’s democratisation, which is moreover hindered by other serious problems, such as the unilateral declaration of independence of the Cyrenaica region, insecurity due to terrorist actions, tribal confrontations, the lack of state control over the territory — as certain groups that fought both for and against the Gaddafi regime remain armed — etc. Moreover, the Constitution has yet to be approved. On 3 February 2014, the political forces agreed to extend the current Parliament’s term to August to allow it to finish writing the Constitution. To this end, elections were held on 20 February 2014 to recruit the 60 members of the Constituent Assembly tasked with writing the draft Constitution. Should the Constituent Assembly fail in this mission, a committee of 15 experts will be appointed and tasked with drafting a provisional Constitution and an electoral system that will enable the holding of both presidential and parliamentary elections in September. This would signify a third transitional period, to last a maximum of 18 months, after which it could only be extended again by referendum.

The democratic transition in Yemen began when President Saleh stepped down, thanks to an agreement promoted by the Gulf Cooperation Council and signed on 23 November 2011, whereby the President ceded power in exchange for immunity for himself and his family. The Yemen transition has followed a different model from that of the other three countries examined here. First, Yemen chose a reformist route that includes the participation of the former regime’s elites. Thus, the provisional government arising in the aftermath of Saleh’s resignation was formed in such a way as to ensure parity between representatives of the General People’s Congress – the dominant party since Yemen’s unification in 1990 – and the institutional opposition parties. Likewise, the president elected in the 2012 elections, Abd Rabbuh Mansour Hadi, represents an element of continuity with regard to the previous regime, in which he had served as Vice-President since October 1994. Hadi stood as the sole consensus candidate, earning 99.8% of the vote with a turnout of 64.8% of registered voters. Additionally, unlike Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, Yemen chose to reach an initial consensus among the different political forces before embarking on the processes of approving the Constitution and holding legislative and presidential elections. Thus, the National Dialogue Conference, made up of more than 500 political and social representatives, was created. This body has recommended extending the transitional period for another year — it was to expire in February 2014 — and adopting a federal system of government. The road map for the democratic transition calls for the reform of the electoral system, the approval of the Constitution and the holding of legislative and presidential elections in 2015. However, the Yemeni democratic transition faces major hurdles, such as the different points of view on the federal model of the State, the Houthi rebellion, the separatist movements in the south, and the terrorist actions of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Political Liberalisation without Democratising Effects

As a result of the Arab Spring, other countries in the region also launched processes of political liberalisation, although not with a view to achieving democratisation. Of these countries, Morocco has carried out the most far-reaching process of political liberalisation, although it has not had democratising effects for the political regime. As a result of the social protests that gave rise to the 20 February movement, on 9 March 2011, King Mohammed VI announced political reforms. Within this process of political liberalisation, attention should be called to the high degree of pluralism and competitiveness of the legislative
Transitional Processes and Political Change in Arab Countries

In Algeria, political liberalisation has occurred through various events and processes: the lifting (on 24 February 2011) of the state of emergency, in force in the country since 1992; the amendment of the law on parties, associations and the press; the partial reform of the electoral system; and increased representation of women in elected assemblies. The reform of the Constitution – promised by President Bouteflika three years ago – is still pending and slated to be completed during the current parliamentary term. However, the 2012 legislative elections and the presidential elections of 17 April 2014 reproduced the hegemony of traditional political actors. The FLN won the legislative elections with an almost absolute majority of seats (220 of 462). The Islamist coalition, formed prior to the elections, denounced
electoral fraud. Moreover, following a broad victory in the first round of the presidential elections, Bouteflika began his fourth term. The results of the legislative and presidential elections underscore the difficulty of achieving an alternation in power through the ballot box. Thus, Algeria remains a restrictive and hegemonic pluralist regime.

Finally, on the heels of the timely protests that took place in the Sultanate, Oman amended the Basic Law of the State by unilateral decision of Sultan Qaboos bin Said. New sections were added on the institution of Parliament and the election of the successor to the Head of State, who will be chosen by the Royal Family Council. On 8 and 15 October 2011, the Majlis al Shura, a lower house with strictly consultative powers, was elected for the first time. However, these two political processes are not enough to mark a change in the status of the political regime: the Sultan continues to wield absolute power, there is neither political pluralism nor the possibility of proposing alternatives, there are no mechanisms for reaching agreements between political actors, and there is not even a minimum exercise of political rights and civil liberties. Therefore, Oman remains a closed authoritarian regime.

Authoritarian Progression despite Political Reforms

In Syria, the political regime’s intransigence in the face of citizens’ democratic demands and its recourse to war are indicative of an authoritarian progression of the system, which continues to be a closed authoritarian regime. In this context of armed conflict, some reforms and political processes of minor importance were undertaken: the approval of the decree on political parties with a view to recognising new political forces, although the Party Affairs Committee continues to exercise control over their legalisation; elections to the People’s Council without the participation of the democratic opposition; and the reform of the Constitution, on 26 February 2012, for the primary purpose of eliminating the reference to the Baath party as the leading party in the State and Syrian society and establishing a presidential term limit of two seven-year terms (to take effect as of the presidential elections scheduled for 2014).

Bahrain was one of the Arab countries in which the social protests gained most momentum in 2011. However, they were harshly repressed by the regime with the help of the GCC countries. Following the repression of the protests, an independent committee was set up to propose political reforms. The result was a constitutional reform that aimed to strengthen Parliament, speed up legislative procedures and increase legislative control over the government (parliamentary vote of confidence on new governments, limited motions to censure the government – limited because the King can decide whether or not to proceed to the removal thereof –, possibility of setting up commissions of inquiry and of questioning ministers in plenary sessions). However, these proposals ignored the opposition’s main demands, including with regard to the King’s discretion in the choice of the Prime Minister and appointment of the upper house. The Shiite opposition, in a Shiite-majority country ruled by a Sunni monarchy, has remained absent from Parliament since the withdrawal of the Shiite Wifaq coalition in protest for the repression of the demonstrations. The partial elections held to fill these vacant seats were boycotted by the coalition, along with other political forces such as al-Minbar (a Sunni Islamist movement) and Waad (a secular leftist movement). In short, the regime’s repression invalidates any progress that may have been made in the political system, while the opposition’s self-exclusion from the institutions means that the Bahraini political regime continues to be a restrictive and hegemonic pluralist authoritarian system.

Over the last three years, many Arab countries have undertaken legal and constitutional reforms, and more than twenty electoral processes have been carried out. However, the democratising effect of these processes has been negligible in all cases except Tunisia.

Prior to the Arab Spring, Kuwait was considered to have a restrictive and quasi-competitive pluralist authoritarian regime. However, it has since progressed towards a restrictive and hegemonic pluralist authoritarian system. Kuwait witnessed large public demonstrations, primarily due to the involvement of
certain members of the government in corruption cases. This could have been an opportunity for the political regime to open up. Instead, the protests were repressed, although they did lead to the fall of the government and the dissolution of Parliament. Legislative elections were thus held on 2 February 2012, from which the opposition movements emerged victorious. However, they were subsequently invalidated by the Constitutional Court. On 1 December 2012, new elections were held without the participation of the political opposition. Therefore, in recent years, political competition has been compromised, as can be seen in the legislative processes and in Parliament, which had previously acted as a counterweight to government action.

**Conclusions**

So high were the expectations generated by the Arab Spring for political change in the region of North Africa and the Middle East that there was talk of the possibility of a fifth wave of democratisation. Over the last three years, many Arab countries have undertaken legal and constitutional reforms, and more than twenty electoral processes have been carried out. However, the democratising effect of these processes has been negligible in all cases except Tunisia. This article offers a theoretical framework for classifying and evaluating the processes of political change that have taken place in Arab countries.

Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen all embarked on democratic transitions with varying results. While Tunisia is on course towards democratisation, in Egypt, the transition has failed and the regime has regressed to a system of restrictive and hegemonic pluralist authoritarianism. Meanwhile, Libya and Yemen remain immersed in their respective transition processes, for which they will need to overcome major hurdles to establish democracies. Other countries (Morocco, Jordan, Mauritania, Algeria and Oman) undertook processes of political liberalisation, although they have not altered the authoritarian nature of power in them. In still other cases (Syria, Bahrain and Kuwait), it is necessary to speak of authoritarian progression, as power continues to be exercised without the counterweight of an opposition, despite the undertaking of political reforms. Finally, in the rest of the Arab countries (Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE), there is no evidence that any processes of political change have been undertaken as a result of the Arab Spring.

**References**


The System of Arab States in the Post-War International Order

On 14 February 1945, on his return from the Yalta Conference to lay the foundations for the political organisation of post-war Europe together with Stalin and Churchill, President Franklin D. Roosevelt held his famous meeting with the Saudi King, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, aboard the cruiser USS Quincy in the Suez Canal. This was where the alliance between the two countries was sealed, in a pact in which the US offered Saudi Arabia military protection and support in exchange for access to the exploitation and supplies of oil and a guarantee of stability in the area. In addition to the agreements on oil, defence and stability in the area, President Roosevelt tried in vain to persuade the Saudi Monarch to facilitate the flow of Jewish refugees to Palestine. The Quincy Agreement marked the beginning of an era of growing North American hegemony in the Middle East, based on oil production. Likewise, what were to become the three basic elements of US policy in the Middle East were also established: a guaranteed oil supply and the stability of the crude oil market; the US interest in the Jewish population of Palestine followed by the security of the State of Israel as of 1948; and the general stability of the Middle East area.

During World War II, the post-war order was already in preparation and would revolve around the system outlined in the United Nations Charter signed in San Francisco. To this universalist system were added a series of economic institutions that have come to be known as the Bretton Woods system, consisting essentially of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and later the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This international political, institutional and economic architecture, under the new and dominant leadership of the United States, was to give the world economy as a whole, and especially the Western economies, the so-called Thirty Glorious Years, the great cycle of economic growth and transformation that ran from the forties to the economic and energy crises of the seventies.

Regarding the geopolitical order, this period would be marked by bipolarity, with two major powers emerging from World War II. The First and Second World Wars brought an end to Europe’s position of domination, confirming the bipolar nature of the international balance of power. Soviet expansionism, especially in Europe during the immediate post-war period and then in dozens of different ways in what was known as the Third World, was met with the so-called US ‘containment policy.’ The policy, proposed initially by Kennan in his ‘long telegram’ and then in his famous article in Foreign Affairs magazine in 1948 implied the coexistence and mutual acceptance of the two major powers as two opposing worlds, but in balance. Later, however, the situation would become known as the balance of terror as the threat of nuclear armament developed. On the geostrategic level, it was best represented by the confrontation between the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO), led by the US, and the Warsaw Pact, led by the USSR. This was central to the bipolar confrontation, perfectly defining the countries that were brought together by NATO on the one hand, and those of the Warsaw Pact in Eastern Europe and the USSR on the other. As for the rest of the world, since this was a geopolitical and ideological confrontation, the two hegemonic powers competed
with each other in an attempt to attract the broad spectrum of non-aligned – known then as Third-World – countries to their side and cause. The containment policy also entailed, in particular, that the United States would attempt to establish an effective system of containment through a series of political and military alliances with the countries bordering the Warsaw Pact. In Europe, the main stage of the confrontation, the quintessential alliance was NATO. The system of alliances that began with NATO in 1949, and which was to include Turkey as of 1952, continued along the immense periphery of the Warsaw Pact, through the Middle East and Central Asia by way of the Bagdad Pact, and beyond with alliance systems woven by the US over the years in Southeast Asia, especially Thailand, as well as the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, the China of Chiang Kai-shek, Korea and Japan.

In the Arab World, influence from the still-present British and French Empires in the immediate post-war period would continue to guarantee the countries’ alignment with the West. By 1944, however, the League of Arab States was already under construction and was officially founded at the Cairo Conference in 1945. The Arab League has constituted the fundamental basis of the multilateral Arab system since the war, notwithstanding its capacity and effectiveness, or lack thereof, during its different periods. Moreover, and clearly as part of the US containment policy, the so-called CENTO Pact (Central Treaty Organisation), otherwise known as the Bagdad Pact, was signed in Bagdad in 1955. Advocated by the United States and United Kingdom – only the latter of which would sign the Treaty and become a member of the organisation – Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan would form part of the pact. Its efficiency and trajectory were complicated, largely because of the instability in the countries involved, their tendency to distance themselves from Anglo-American influence, with the exception of Turkey, and the absence of a direct commitment from the US right from the beginning.

But in the Arab world, the post-war and Cold War periods were fundamentally the era of independence and construction of new nation states. Both the British and French colonies (with the vicissitudes of the Vichy and Free French governments), and even the former colonies, helped their respective mother countries in their war efforts in the hope that peace would bring the opportunity to build their new independent states. The countries that began to gain independence, therefore, joined the organisation alongside the initial core of Arab League founding countries (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, plus North Yemen as early as 1945). Of particular significance were Morocco and Tunisia, joining in 1956, and, after its bloody independence war, Algeria in 1962. The system of Arab states marked the start of a club for conservative countries, which clearly included the Hashemite monarchies of Jordan and Iraq, and that of King Farouk in Egypt, not to mention the Libyan monarchy under King Idris up until 1969. An even more fitting member of the club was Saudi Arabia, where Abdelaziz ibn Saud had proclaimed himself King in 1932 after reconquering and unifying the country, first becoming Sultan of Nejd (1912) and then King of Hejaz (1926). During this initial post-war period, Great Britain and France continued to wield great power in the area. Gradually, however, their hegemonic role would be replaced by that of the US, revealing the major geostrategic and geopolitical change in the area as a result of World War II. In 1948, the first Arab-Israeli War and the creation of the State of Israel marked the system of Arab states’ first major failure. As well as the progressive incorporation of the remainder of Arab countries as they gained independence from colonial rule, the Arab League’s 1945 founding charter also forewished the constitution of an independent Arab Palestine and gave it provisional representation in the bodies of the League. The catastrophe of 1948 – the Palestinian Nakba – and the proclamation of the State of Israel therefore constituted a difficult situation for the group of Arab countries to accept. This was to be the origin of the subsequent history of unrest and instability in the area.

The Suez Crisis in 1956 was confirmation that Great Britain and France were no longer major powers in the area. After the humiliation of being forced to withdraw by Moscow and Washington, both went on to occupy secondary roles in a bipolar system that allowed for just a single leader on each side – the United States and the Soviet Union. Throughout the Cold War years, one of the most important successes of the Soviet Union was achieving a series of political, and in some cases military, alliances with countries from the other side of the
cordon sanitaire surrounding it, and particularly with certain countries of the Arab world. This began spectacularly with the fall of the Egyptian monarchy of King Farouk at the hands of the Free Officers, whose revolution was to claim victory in 1952. Egypt was the central country of the Arab world from a geographical, demographic, cultural and historical viewpoint and Nasser was to be the quintessential leader of the young states’ new Arab nationalisms. After the clash with France and Great Britain over the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the subsequent Suez Crisis as well as US refusal to finance the Aswan Dam, Egypt formed an alliance with the USSR. The 1958-59 revolution brought about the fall of the Hashemite monarchy of Iraq. In the unstable republican Syria of the time, alignment with Nasser and Moscow also prevailed, first after the rise to power of Shukri al-Quwatli in 1955 and then under the rule of Hafez El Assad and the Baath Party, following the 1970 coup. Algerian independence and the victory of the National Liberation Front (FLN) in 1962 after the bloody civil war would add another important member to the so-called radical front of the new secular and leftist Arab nationalisms. Colonel Gaddafi’s overthrow of the monarchy of King Idris of Libya in 1969 extended the list of major countries advocating left-wing Arab nationalism, which had strong anti-West sentiments and flew the flag for Third-World causes and non-aligned countries. The new Arab states, with the legitimacy gained from independence, spent those years building the basic institutions of the State

In addition to this group of radical Arab countries, led by the Egypt of Gamal Abdel Nasser, was the moderate front, consisting of the Gulf monarchies in general, led by Saudi Arabia, together with Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, and, importantly, the new moderate Egypt following Sadat’s expulsion of the Soviets in 1973. This was the traditional system of Arab states in the different Cold War and détente periods, with the obvious addition of elements that bolstered the pro-Western front on the area’s peripheries. This included Turkey’s NATO membership in the eastern Mediterranean and the US alliance with the Shah of Iran, Reza Pahlavi, in the Gulf, particularly after the US-orchestrated defeat of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh and the democratic system itself in 1953, after the Iranian PM dared to nationalise oil production. This was a system of tension and balance typical of the bipolar global panorama (though it did nothing to stop the repeated crises) especially in this case throughout the Middle East due to the impact of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and the Arabs in general, ongoing since 1948.

This was, it is worth repeating, a crucial period for the construction of the Arab nation states. In general, the construction of the modern states was based on the administrative-political structures inherited from colonial administration and not as a continuation of the former, pre-colonial political and institutional structures, which had partially persisted in many cases, especially under the protectorates. In any case, the new Arab states, with the legitimacy gained from independence, spent those years enthusiastically building the basic institutions of the State, from defence to education, health and tax systems; and advancing their industrialisation. This was all carried out under a state-driven philosophy of economic development along interventionist and in many cases socialist lines, and also to compensate for the weak or non-existent private initiative.

The Crises of the Bipolar World

Due to a series of events that would have major repercussions, 1979 has become a key year in modern history. Some of these events were of extraordinary geopolitical relevance in the Arab world and Middle East.

- The Russian invasion of Afghanistan was the first of a long sequence of moves that, besides the consequences inside the USSR itself, was to lead to increasingly serious crises throughout the Muslim, and especially the Arab, world. It is a known fact that in Afghanistan, the fight against the atheist Soviet invaders engendered the first modern jihadist groups, backed by the US and Saudi Arabia. These notably included al-Qaeda and Bin Laden.
1979 was also the year of the bilateral Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt, the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League and the subsequent move of the League’s headquarters to Tunisia for the next 10 years (1979-1989) as a consequence of the 1978 Camp David Accords, that, without actually achieving peace, introduced geopolitical changes in the Middle East. Jordan would also sign a Peace Treaty with Israel in 1994, after the 1993 Oslo Accords.

1979 was the year of the second oil crisis. Although rising petrol prices initially multiplied OPEC countries’ revenues, their subsequent fall was to lead to difficult years of forced macro-economic adjustments that gave rise to social revolts in certain Arab countries in the eighties.

As a result of regional geopolitics, 1979 was above all the year of the Islamic revolution in Iran, led by Ayatollah Khomeini. The geopolitical significance of the revolution in Iran was enormous, although less so on a global geo-strategic level, as bipolarity was soon to decline. In the Soviet Union, as was the case later for Russia, Khomeini’s example was viewed with great concern, due to the possible contagion effects in republics that were traditionally majority Muslim, dotted across the southern periphery of the extensive Soviet territories. Until then, the Persian Gulf, or Arabian Gulf (depending on your standpoint) had been a lagoon of stability under Anglo-American rule. Khomeini’s revolution changed the system of balance, or tension, in the Persian Gulf. The construction of the modern states, both in the Arab world and especially in Turkey and Iran under the Shah, was a secular process based on a policy of economic and social modernisation, as well as a modernisation of mentalities. Internal political confrontations in Arab countries originally consisted of Arab national movements fighting for independence, against colonial rule, and later of struggles between leftists – not all of which would fall into the modern concept of the word in politics and society – and conservatives. Nationalism was the dominant mentality in all the countries. The ruling civilian, or in many cases military, elites, were of secular tradition, and more so in the republics than in the monarchies: Syria and Iraq’s Baathism, Egypt’s Nasserism, Bourguiba’s Destour and later the Algerian FLN or Morocco’s Istiqlal had an entirely different political makeup to the old qadi jurists and politicians of the Quranic tradition and pre-colonial governments. Furthermore, the elites educated at the old Islamic universities of large mosques like Al-Zaytuna in Tunisia were seen as submissive or even collaborators in the colonial or protectorate days, which is why they were side-lined after independence. Khomeini’s revolution, however, rekindled the fire of Muslim sentiment, which had always remained alive among the masses. It would increasingly be used as a flag for opposition discontent with Arab regimes that had become fossilised and bureaucratised under the iron grip of authoritarian regimes and leaders clinging to power.

Political Islam has deep roots, although the origins of its contemporary versions can often be identified with al-Banna’s creation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo in 1928. In a world already becoming increasingly unipolar, after the eighties, with communist ideologies and systems falling into disrepute, the social and political opposition to Arab regimes began to adopt an Islamist flavour. The secular and modernising authoritarian regimes’ failure with regard to Israel was key in their fall from grace. The humiliating and successive defeats of several combined Arab armies, at the hands of the small and despised State of Israel, particularly in 1967, seriously damaged the popular support of Arab leaders and their regimes. The other major source of frustration was the failure of authoritarian governments to offer their populations the economic and social improvements promised with independence. Islamism would be the beneficiary of this feeling of failure, humiliation and oppression.

On a regional level, the massive geopolitical significance of Khomeini’s Iranian revolution became even clearer after 1989. The fall of the Berlin Wall marked the beginning of the Soviet Empire’s deconstruction. Countries throughout Central Europe began to change camp, some of the Soviet Union’s republics broke away and gained independence and all countries from the Warsaw Pact experienced major changes in their economic and social systems. Without the bipolar tension of the Cold War, it would now be regional conflicts that took centre stage. Through the middle of the Gulf and along the Iran-Iraq border runs one of the historically important geopolitical borders. The Ottoman Empire reached
Iraq, always opposed to the Iranian Safavid Empire. This is the line that, since antiquity, has demarcated two cultural worlds: the Assyrian-Mesopotamian world and that of the Persians. In the history of Islam it is above all the demarcation line between the majority Sunni world on the Arab side and majority Shiite in Iran. Their confrontation and fight for regional hegemony and the control of resources, particularly energy, would gain increasing prominence in the future.

**The End of History? Instability and Wars in the Unipolar World**

The fall of the Soviet Empire and disrepute of the Communist ideology, as well as the rapid transformation of the economic systems of Central and Eastern Europe as of 1989 were welcomed by neoconservatism in the US as a possible *End of History*, in the sense of a final victory of liberalism, and as a consequence, of the historic confrontations with other ideologies. In the Middle East, geopolitical changes were already being felt in the previous decade with the Soviet failure in Afghanistan. The victory of Khomeini’s revolution in 1979 was especially seen as a threat from the other side of the Gulf, particularly by the conservative Saudi monarchy. The religious primacy of Saudi Arabia and the Al Saud dynasty as Guardian of the Holy Places of Islam constituted the very foundation of the monarchy’s legitimacy, which it has always claimed to be inseparable from the spiritual leadership of the Arab and Sunni world. The Khomeini revolution once again presented Iran as an alternative leader of Islam, which, unlike Saudi Arabia, was of the historically victimised and vindictive Shia denomination. The triumphant, revolutionary Shia Iran became the enemy of the Al Saud Monarchy and its most serious threat.

The Monarchy’s first response on a regional level was the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council in 1981 as an alliance between Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates, under Saudi hegemony. As of 1984 the GCC would have a joint military force – the Peninsula Shield Force – for mutual defence and with the capacity for military intervention, with its headquarters and command centre in Saudi Arabia. GCC forces finally intervened in Bahrain in 2011-2012, not against a foreign aggressor, but rather to crush the democratic demands of its own people.

But there was no direct confrontation with Iran after the 1979 revolution. Instead, Saudi Arabia, and to a lesser extent the rest of the Arab and Sunni world, offered support to Saddam Hussein in the destructive and bloody Iran-Iraq War, which would span the entire decade of the eighties. The old pact between Roosevelt and Abdelaziz ibn Saud from 1945 continued to function, giving rise to the so-called ‘dual containment’ policy, which was of interest to both the US and Saudi Arabia. Its aim was to contain both Iran’s Shiite and Islamist revolutionary impetus and the feverish expansionist aspirations of Iraq’s Rais, Saddam Hussein, in his bid for domination. Like a new Nasser, Saddam Hussein’s rule, besides being authoritarian and personalist, was secular and modernising in its own way. Dual containment worked, but only while the war lasted, with enormous loss of life and human suffering for the countries involved. Once over, Iran was still outcast by the international community while it remained involved in verbal confrontation with the ‘Great Satan’ – the United States – and the ‘Zionist entity’ – Israel. This was an era in which the regime of the Ayatollahs sought internal consolidation and to strengthen the country, despite the international siege against it. Saddam Hussein’s war with Iran, on the other hand, ended in 1990 with no winners and massive mutual destruction. Barely a year later, however, in 1991, the Rais had already launched his invasion of Kuwait.

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provoked the first massive invasion in the Middle East by what was by now the only world power after the fall of the USSR: the United States. President Bush established a major international coalition backed by resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, which would have proved complicated, if not impossible, in the Cold War and bipolar era. The capacities of the single superpower were far less limited now, with all the advantages and drawbacks that this implied. President Bush Sr. was intelligent enough to impose on himself the restrictions necessary to free Kuwait and destroy most of Saddam’s army, but without invading Iraq or defeating the Baathist regime or its Rais. The Americans and the British knew how important the Iraqi piece was, containing it so that they could also contain Iran. And on this point they coincided with Saudi interests. In the rest of the Arab world,
there was almost unanimous support from governments for the international coalition, who even participated militarily, despite the people on the Arab streets supporting Saddam Hussein over the plutocrats and egocentric millionaires of the Gulf. But the reality was that, despite the self-imposed limits of the Bush coalition, the weakening of Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime was such that Iraq began to break apart as a nation-state. It would be true to say that the creation of modern Iraq has its origin in its Hashemite monarchy, created by the British after World War I through the application of the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. But it is also true that states, and not only history, have created nation states. This was the case in Europe, where the modern nationalities were consolidated through the configuration of the states, beginning with France’s progressive change under its monarchy. Likewise in the Arab world, the states created in the 20th century had been established as nation states that were more or less solid, based on their historical and geographical congruity, but above all based on the conflicts they had faced. Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia are today nation states that are rooted in a longstanding tradition. Although the borders outlined in the Sykes-Picot Agreement to redistribute the territories in the Middle East among the British and French empires were drawn with a set square in the European chancelleries, the French and British foresaw a somewhat different outcome from the Sykes-Picot agreements, which was dashed by Kemal Ataturk’s recovery of the whole of Anatolia. The course of history had also done its work, including the additional incorporation of Alexandretta into Turkey, the final organisation of the states of Lebanon and Syria or the divisions of Palestine. The consolidation of new states, and new nationalisms, in any case, quickly ended the intended unity of the Ottoman provinces.

The end of the bipolar world and the dominion of a single superpower also contributed to certain other major problems. In countries throughout the Arab world, modern states have gradually created their own nationalities over the decades. The pan-Arab rhetoric posed no obstacle to the strong nationalism of each nation state, whether monarchical like Morocco, Jordan or Saudi Arabia, or republics like Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, Syria or Iraq. The first Gulf War in 1991 (or second if we count the Iran-Iraq War) seriously weakened Iraq’s Baathist State. Its military power was left in ruins, and the reputation of its great leader, Saddam Hussein, who has hoped to be the new Nasser and leader of the Arab world, was in tatters. The international coalition had encouraged both the Kurds in the north and the Shiites in the south of Iraq to rise against Saddam Hussein and contribute to the coalition’s war efforts. They were then left to their fate and only the brutal repression of Saddam Hussein was enough to enforce order and a pseudo-unity for the country, despite the international embargo on trade with Iraq and the no-fly zone throughout the Kurdish area. In the Iran-Iraq War in the eighties, all Iraqis had fought heroically as Iraqi patriots. From the fierce repression after ’91, however, rifts began to emerge in Iraq, with the fragmentation of national sentiment and sense of belonging which would be exacerbated as of 2003 by the US invasion and the ensuing disorder and sectarian strife. The end of the bipolar world and the dominion of a single superpower also contributed to certain other major problems. The Soviet defeat and Russian withdrawal from Afghanistan, plus the subsequent neglect of the area, allowed for the creation of the Islamic State of the Taliban, which was built in the lair of al-Qaeda. In addition, the massive flight of Russian Jewish emigrants to Israel strongly changed the country’s social, ideological and religious makeup, and therefore the behaviour of the State of Israel. The example set by the pioneers of the first Kibbutz, which had been admired by so many European leftists, was becoming a distant memory. The conservatism of the recent arrivals had little in common with the tradition of the Sephardic Jews from the Mediterranean world or with the progressiveness of the Ashkenazi pioneers of the first decades of the Israeli State. These are all factors that have contributed to the ethnic-religious and political polarisation both in Israel and in the Arab world. The Camp David Accords were sabotaged and radicalism on either side became heated to the point that both Rabin and Sadat were assassinated at the hands of their respective extremist enemies. A result of the growing ideological and religious radicalisation was the growing boom of Islamist movements, both moderate and violent, from which...
terrorism on an increasingly large scale emerged. The devastating civil war in Algeria throughout the nineties, which pitted the Islamist FIS radicals against the State, and, driven by paranoia, even against the population at large, was just an initial phase. Prominent participants in this were former Islamist combatants in Afghanistan, allied with the Taliban. The mega-attacks of 11 September 2001 were to raise the confrontation to a global scale and lead to the direct involvement of the United States and Washington’s neo-conservative administration.

The invasion and defeat of Afghanistan under the Taliban was the first episode of the ‘War on Terror’ launched by President Bush Jr. The second was when President Bush and the neoconservatives launched the invasion of Iraq in 2003 as an attack on Islamist terrorism. Today it is clear that the weakened regime of Saddam Hussein had none of the highly sought-after weapons of mass destruction, nor that it was a pro-Islamist regime, or linked with al-Qaeda. Rather it was a harsh, authoritarian, but of the secular and socialist tradition of the Baath, and therefore in opposition to Islamism. In any case, this time the destruction of the Iraqi State was total, including the military and police apparatus, the administration, institutions and the existing social structure, whether good or bad. The result, as we know, led to destruction, disorder and confusion amid all kinds of violence and sectarian, ideological and territorial fighting, whose consequences are still incalculable.

**Democratic Revolutions: Revolts and Geopolitics**

The gradual appropriation of the Arab states by the groups in power created a growing authoritarian and repressive spiral in the face of an increasingly educated population less inclined to tolerate predatory regimes. Revolution, driven by the citizens, was the result, which has introduced new variables of major significance in the area’s geopolitical framework. The Arab Springs were citizen revolts led by youth and the more erudite sectors of society, although the Islamist parties have subsequently shown their strength. The results at the moment are variable, with an Arab world with greater internal differences than ever:

- There is just one case of a victorious revolution, namely where it all began, in Tunisia, where a democratic transition is now in the process of consolidation.
- A group of countries is in transition by reformism, fundamentally Morocco and Jordan.
- Some movements have been re-channelled by the authorities, with the population awaiting reforms, as in Algeria.
- There are certain countries, fundamentally from the Gulf, where the citizen revolution has not even had the chance to take off as a political movement, or where it was crushed right from the start with Saudi and GCC support and intervention, as was the case in Bahrain.
- There has been a Thermidorian reaction to the Egyptian revolution, following General el-Sisi’s coup.
- There are two serious cases of open war against a country’s own citizens: one by Gaddafi’s Libyan regime, where, after his defeat, militia chaos is still reigning; and the other by Assad’s regime in Syria, where destruction on a massive scale and civil war continues its blackened path. The case of Syria, as the heart of the Arab world, is especially serious from a geopolitical standpoint. As well as the immense suffering of the Syrian people and the destruction of the country, the consequences of the sectarian struggles and immense difficulties of reconstructing a viable state in neighbouring Iraq may well disrupt the area’s traditional geopolitical landscape.

**Organising the Disorder**

*Fragmentation of Middle East States and Resurgence of the Shiite Arc*

The implosion of the State in Iraq – as a consequence of the US invasion – and in Syria – due to the prolongation of a war of incredible proportions that is being waged by the Syrian regime against the opposition in its own country – have blown to pieces the fragile balances in the complex ethnic, cultural, religious and political mosaic of the entire Middle East area. The traditional order could only be authoritarian in both cases, with an Alawite, and therefore Shiite although heterodox, military elite governing
a majority Sunni Syria – with several other small minorities –, and with a minority Sunni elite governing Iraq, with a 60% Shiite population and a 20% Kurdish population. But in the area’s complex geopolitical architecture this configuration produced a situation of stability – albeit an unjust one – for decades. The fall of these two major, oppressive states, which have left an area massively weakened, adds to the already fragile and complicated situation throughout the East:

- the Palestinian territories: extremely weakened and divided between the West Bank and Gaza, with structures with very little power, fought over between Hamas and Fatah’s Palestinian Authority;
- Lebanon: multiconfessional, multiethnic and multicultural, victim of atrocities and successive wars incited by all kinds of interferences, as well as being a country claimed by Syria, and therefore always under threat from it;
- Syria: whose nerve centres are still under the rule of the Alawite military;
- Iraq: supposedly democratic and governed by the Shiite majority, whose hegemony fuels and deepens the divide with the Sunnis and Kurds.

This great arc of instability serves as the stage for new struggles between Shiite Islam, fundamentally backed by Iran, and Sunni Islam supported by Saudi Arabia. After the First Gulf War in 1991, the destruction of Iraq’s army and the country’s quarantine, Iran clearly emerged as the great beneficiary of the US operation; a Shiite and revolutionary Iran which Saudi Arabia and the US had hitherto been able to contain with the war against Saddam Hussein. In recent times, the Shiite Prime Minister al-Maliki’s reluctance to implement policy inclusive of the different parties and factions of Iraq has succeeded in destabilising the area, again in favour of Iran. The great geopolitical turnaround in the regional panorama is the possible constitution of a Shiite arc, which groups together the countries of the former Fertile Crescent under a single Shiite alliance with Iran. Although fragile, this alliance would combine revolutionary movements like Lebanon’s Hezbollah, states, or by now pseudo-states en route to implosion, such as Syria’s Alawite regime, and the Shiite government in Iraq, as well as Iran itself. With the exception of Iran, none of these groups exist in a cohesive society or solid nation state, regardless of whether or not they may have approached such a state in the past.

Local, Regional and Global Conflicts

What is happening in Syria, as in Iraq, is not a war, but rather several wars at the same time and on several levels. The conflicts may be external, whether territorial or border-related, ideological, over regional hegemony or economic exploitation; or internal, whether secessionist, ideological, religious, ethnic or social; or they could be the internal reflection of global conflicts, as has unfortunately been the case so often between communists and anti-communists in many Third-World countries. The problem with the geopolitics of the Middle East is that all these conflicts coexist at the same time, in each of the countries and in the region at large. For each conflict, a different system of alliances, and interferences, may arise. All of these different conflicts coexist within a framework, or rather a state of chaos, which, once unleashed, is contradictory, ungovernable and explosive.

Of all the conflicts and wars being waged in the Middle East, therefore, we must distinguish between local wars, those on a regional level and those that are a reflection of global confrontations.

- On a global level, fortunately, there is no open confrontation, despite Russia’s intervention under Putin in favour of the Al-Assad regime, which escaped US air strikes in the summer of 2013 after the regime had bombed the population with chemical weapons. Russia is trying to regain some of the Soviet Union’s global power, which explains its attempts to re-establish ties not only with Syria, home to the only Russian naval base in the Mediterranean, but also with other former allies that Putin hopes to woo, such as Egypt, or other countries in areas like Latin America. The success of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the increasingly violent clashes in Ukraine might seriously complicate things. But Russia, today, is not the Soviet superpower it once was, capable of acting as such anywhere in the world within its areas of influence, or expanding these by force. The Middle East conflicts, therefore, are today essentially regional or internal. By the same token, the confrontation that al-Qaeda and the jihadists claim to have with the ‘Crusaders’ and
All of these different conflicts coexist within a framework, or rather a state of chaos, which, once unleashed, is contradictory, ungovernable and explosive. Of all the conflicts and wars being waged in the Middle East, therefore, we must distinguish between local wars, those on a regional level and those that are a reflection of global confrontations with the whole of the West is, in fact, a reflection of the massive internal conflict in the Arab-Muslim world vis-à-vis its fit in a modernity constructed from a cultural tradition that is not their own. The vast majority of its victims are Muslims.

- On a **regional level**, the main conflicts are now between Israel on one side and the Palestinians and the Arab world at large on the other; between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as the major players of two territorial groups and two concepts of Islam around the Gulf; and between violent Islamist movements and their own societies, which the Islamists intend to dominate, and the countries of the Ummah, which they want to conquer.

- On an **internal level**, it is now in Syria and Iraq where the conflicts are turning into open wars of complex dimensions. In both cases, the implosion of the State – at the hands of the Americans in Iraq and as a result of the struggle between citizen revolution and massive military repression in Syria – has unleashed a spiral of confrontation that is going beyond the control of their Iranian and Saudi mentors.

- In Syria, the increasingly active presence of jihadists and Islamist radicals in the insurgents’ camp has blocked any possible military support from the US, Europe and the international community. Beyond the Iranian support for the Alawite Syrian government and that of Putin’s Russia for its traditional ally, the infiltration and growing armed activity of jihadi movements, first al-Qaeda and then ISIS or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (or Greater Syria, or al-Sham), though fighting the regime, has proven to be its salvation. It has blocked international intervention and left the democratic insurgency to the mercy of Assad’s ruthless military apparatus. The suffering of the Syrian people has been prolonged indefinitely and the effects on the neighbouring countries (the arrival of masses of refugees, the formal and informal transit of arms and combatants and the effect on the different minorities and internal factions) are putting great pressure on and endangering the stability of all countries involved, particularly that of Lebanon and Jordan.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is what causes most friction between the Arab world as a whole and Europe and the United States. The situation is continuing to worsen in a perverse spiral of growing extremism. The disproportionate use of force on July-August 2014 and destruction and the asphyxiation of Gaza by Israel not only offends and irritates all Arabs without distinction to unfathomable degrees, but also causes outrage and stupor among the international community, including among traditional supporters of the Jewish and Israeli cause and among those who condemn the Hamas attacks from Gaza. Its contribution towards the growth of radical Islamism is equally significant.

In the conflict around the Arabian (or Persian) Gulf, which is home to the greatest changes – and none of them good –, violence is also spiralling though once again not as a direct confrontation, but by interference in the domestic conflicts of other countries.

Today it seems clear that the basic war between the government and opposition in Syria does not have a military solution. The only way out seems to be if foreign interference, at some stage, has a positive influence on the different parties, allowing them to reach some kind of understanding, which is hard to imagine after the pain and suffering that has already been inflicted. Besides the US, Iran and Russia, there is an important part to be played by Turkey, Saudi Arabia, possibly Qatar and a stable, strong Egypt under the presidency of el-Sisi. Little is known about Israel’s role to date. If they were to reach an understanding they could fight together against their mutual threat: international jihadi terrorism.

- In Iraq, there are also three levels of conflict underway:
On the *internal level* the first conflict is the Kurdish secessionist tension, which is now practically a state within the State, having grown in self-governance under the protection of the no-fly zone and US defence against Saddam Hussein’s army between 1991 and 2003. The Kurdish government is now signing international agreements with Turkey and exports its oil directly. Only the savage attack by ISIS jihadism, now self-styled the Islamic State (IS) after proclaiming its brutal caliphate, has made it essential to form a common front between the Kurds and the majority Shiite central government in Baghdad. The second internal conflict, which began as armed resistance against the old Baathists wanting to restore Sunni power in Iraq, has turned into the general Sunni and specifically jihadi struggle against the Shiite government of Baghdad. If this evolves into an inclusive configuration and policies inclusive of the moderate and generally secular Sunnis, the Sunni-Shiite conflict would be replaced by the struggle of all parties against radical Sunni jihadism.

On the *second level*, that of *regional conflicts*, there are also various confrontations in Iraq. These are being waged indirectly – by proxy – through foreign interference, the financing and supply of arms or the manipulation of information and international policy coverage. Paradoxically, the US and Iran have been the major advocates of the government in Baghdad, to the point of finally being in agreement on the excessive anti-Sunni sectarianism of al-Maliki. Politics, and especially international politics, creates strange bedfellows, in this case the US and Iran, which, through the bloody war between their proxies in Syria, are still in conflict over the nuclear question, the defence of Israel, etc.

But on the *regional level* the basic confrontation is between Iran and Saudi Arabia; and here there are some interesting developments significant for their importance on a regional level and their possible impact on internal confrontations. The first development is the coup d’état (and new regime?) of el-Sisi, with massive Saudi financial and political support against the Muslim Brotherhood and the government of President Morsi, which enormously strengthens the position of Saudi Arabia in the Gulf and that of the Arab and Sunni conservatives in general. Ironically also, the disappearance of the bipolar confrontation has clearly brought to light the fact that the Saudis consider as enemies both Iran’s Shiites, who threaten their stability and hegemony in the area, and the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists, whose contagion might threaten the internal stability of their rule.

The second development affects the *third geopolitical level*, the *global one*. Despite President Obama’s efforts, the US is still involved in Iraq’s conflicts. But the development consists in the election of the new Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, and the possibility of an understanding with the US on the nuclear dossier, a priority for the US in part because of how it affects Israel’s security. On the other hand, the third development is the spectacular growth and potential of the United States’ own production of oil and gas through fracking techniques, which represents a complete geopolitical change in and of itself, in particular for the Gulf States and other oil-producing countries. These developments have led to a certain fear in Saudi Arabia over the continuity and firmness of the alliance sealed by Roosevelt and first monarch of the modern Saudi State aboard the USS Quincy in 1945.

Furthermore, in the case of Iraq, forming a government that is inclusive of the different minorities and internal factions and attaining the difficult understanding among the regional and global powers involved in the internal conflicts are key elements for the country’s peace and viability.
From Chaos to Reason?

Finally, on a level that includes the whole of the Arab world, there is the conflict unleashed by the Arab Spring; that is to say, that of the modernising citizen movements against the oligarchies of the traditional Arab authoritarian State, whatever their political, confessional or ethnic denomination. Essentially, and despite the current splits in the Arab world, this is the conflict with the greatest long-term trajectory, insofar as it represents the difficulties Arab Muslim societies have in adapting to modernity. But there is no changing the course of history, and the reactionary movements, in the most literal sense of the expression, have lost the battle in the medium and long term, whatever their denomination and for all the violence and damage they can inflict in the meantime. For the time being, the modernising and democratic movement is winning in Tunisia and doing so gradually in other reformist countries. The battle, however, in addition to achieving democracy, is fundamentally of another kind; that of modernising societies and not only political power structures. This is the battle for literacy, for growth in levels of education and culture and for the countries’ economic and social development as an essential foundation for the successful process of democratisation of societies and people’s mentalities and not just political structures. This is the battle that the Arab populations have been fighting day after day for many years and through which they are now demanding democracy. It is in this context that Europe’s help and the influence of European soft power can be most effective and even essential. The truth is that the absence of Europe throughout the last cycle of conflicts in the Arab world in its multiple dimensions, and especially in the Middle East, is shameful. And this situation must be urgently remedied. Europe cannot go on allowing itself the luxury of being a political dwarf in areas of its own vital interest.

If there have been successive waves of democratisation in the world – the powers defeated in the immediate post-World War II period; Spain, Greece and Portugal in the seventies; Latin America in the eighties, Central and Eastern Europe in the nineties; the countries of Asia and the Balkans and gradually other areas in subsequent years – there is no reason to believe that the Arab world will be a permanent exception. In the long term, the construction of democracy demanded by its citizens as a whole and their efforts to improve the situation will lead to the evolution of political and administrative structures in all Arab countries. But in the short and even medium term, many of them may encounter great resistance, conflict and suffering.

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Transitional Processes and Political Change in Arab Countries

Gulf Countries and Arab Transitions: Role, Support and Effects

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The recent decades have witnessed a great transformation of what were once peripheral and largely inconsequential Gulf states. The members of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC); Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have witnessed an influx of enormous wealth generated by rising hydrocarbon prices, which elevated these countries into pre-eminence in regional politics. As GCC states started to accumulate more soft and smart power through their economic, financial, media and international status, they began to act more visibly within the wider Middle East and the Mediterranean region (MENA) and beyond. This was more evident in the role of Gulf States in mediation, economic and financial aid and their growing investments and growing political influence in the region. Indeed, the GCC states started to take centre stage in Arab regional economics and politics. The Arab Spring, which started in 2011, initiated one of the greatest transformations within the Arab world and further enhanced the roles of the GCC states. However, the GCC states do not follow a coherent strategy and nor do they have a unified foreign policy, but rather different sets of conflicting foreign policies, which has often led to misunderstandings and disagreements within the group. The Arab Spring has further accentuated these differences among the GCC states and widened their policy divergence, leading to further ruptures and conflicts between them. These inharmonious and conflictual policies have had a negative effect on the whole region, especially on the Arab countries in transition.

The Gulf States and the Arab Spring:

Starting in Tunisia in 2011 and then spreading across the Arab world, the wave of popular political protests and revolutions known as the Arab Spring dramatically transformed the political landscape of Arab countries and even threatened some of the GCC states themselves. This historic wave of uprisings not only took everyone by surprise, but sent a shockwave through the prevailing regional order and presented a serious challenge to the status quo that prevailed during the dormant Arab Regional System. The widespread call for democracy in the region has not spared the GCC states. These countries have witnessed currents and ripple effects of the wave, and in different variations, ranging from demands for reforms, to public protests and even violent confrontations with the regimes. The wave of the Arab Spring promised to rid the region of the autocratic and authoritarian regimes that have ruled over their people for decades and establish long-awaited democracy in the Arab world. As the Arab Spring wave gathered momentum, autocratic Arab leaders started to fall one after another in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. These seismic changes in the Arab world created new geopolitical dynamics, regional instability and great uncertainty, in turn posing an enormous security challenge for the Gulf States. Naturally, as GCC state leaders had different views of the Arab Spring, they reacted differently. Internally, the GCC states tried to stem the tide of the wave through a number of policies, including financial handouts, increased job opportunities, repression and military intervention, as happened in Bahrain.

* This article was finalised in July 2014 (Editor’s note).
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The GCC states also offered the two most affected members, Bahrain and Oman, financial aid of $10 billion for each state over 10 years. This apparent consensus on confronting the Arab Spring on the home front was not matched by similar GCC state agreements on how to deal with the Arab uprising in other Arab countries. On the contrary, it became evident that GCC states had different views on the Arab Spring and followed different policies in dealing with it, thereby reflecting their divergent foreign policies, their dissimilar threat perceptions and leadership orientation. In essence, Qatar is an exception as it is the main country that wholeheartedly supported the Arab Spring and the Arab transition. Qatar followed its policy of supporting the popular uprising by extending assistance to the newly elected governments that replaced the dictatorships; while Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain largely opposed the elected Islamic governments and saw them as a potential threat to their security. Kuwait and Oman remained largely quiet but still cautious of the emerging changes and apprehensive of the subsequent instability.

**GCC States’ Foreign Policy Differences Accentuated by the Arab Spring**

Despite several decades of regional integration, the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a political and economic group made up of the Arab states, still exhibit a lack of unification or coherence in their foreign policy making. Historical conflicts, boarder disputes, dynastic antagonism and competition were among the main reasons for GCC states’ divergent policies.

This results in them pursuing individual and differentiated foreign policies that converge or diverge, according to each state’s national interests and its leadership’s perceptions. In certain cases they are able to bury their foreign policy differences and act collectively, but mostly they do not, and conflicts re-surface. This is no truer than in the case of the GCC’s foreign policies towards the Arab Spring and subsequent Arab transitions. The Arab Spring did not only rid the Arab world of some of its autocratic leaders, who were favoured by some GCC states, but also brought about elected governments of Islamic political orientation and harboured geo-political and structural changes that threatened the prevailing order. Qatar has acted as a staunch supporter of the Arab uprisings and the Arab countries in transition while the other Gulf states have fretted about their own stability at a time of regional upheavals. Unsurprisingly, Qatar’s policy antagonised fellow GCC states, which viewed the Arab Spring and political Islam as a threat. The Al-Sisi Military coup, which overthrew the elected Muslim Brotherhood government of Mohammed Morsi, was an attempt to stem the tide of the Arab Spring and diminish the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood that had gained power in the transition. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain threw their weight behind the Military coup in Egypt, while Qatar continued to support Morsi’s ‘legitimate’ ousted Muslim Brotherhood government, which led to deeper disagreements between the GCC states. Having failed to change the Qatari position, three GCC states; Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain decided to withdraw their respective ambassadors from Doha in an effort to increase pressure on Qatar to change its stance. The March 2014 decision to withdraw ambassadors is but one of many examples of the deep-rooted conflicts and differences within the GCC states. This schism and conflictual environment within the GCC states has had a negative impact on their foreign policy and has led to what some would call a Gulf states ‘Cold war,’ where their differences and disagreements are being played out in the Arab countries in transition.

**Gulf Countries and Arab Transitions: Role, Support and Effects**

The Gulf states played different roles in the Arab transition reflecting their divergent foreign policies and their different leadership perceptions. In the
case of Tunisia and Egypt, with the exception of Qa-
tar, they were on friendly terms with the authoritarian regimes of Mubarak and Ben Ali. Indeed, some Arab leaders, like the ousted Mubarak of Egypt and Ben Ali of Tunisia, were cultivated by the Gulf states and became clients of their new patron – the Gulf rulers. Naturally, the GCC states were against the uprising in both countries, which led to the downfall of their staunch allies. Their negative attitude towards the popular uprisings continued to reflect in their lack of cooperation with the newly elected Muslim Brotherhood governments in both countries. Indeed, despite decades of somewhat convenient relations with the Gulf states, the Brotherhood is loathed by some Gulf leaders and is considered an enemy and a terrorist organisation in most of the Gulf states. One could also argue that if elections had brought about liberal/secular governments in both countries, the attitude of the Gulf states would not have been dramatically different. The Gulf states prefer the status quo and scorn any sign of real democracy in the Arab world. For the Gulf states, not only are democratic governments more difficult to influence than authoritarian rulers, but the spread of democracy may provide a model for their populations to aspire to. The rise of political Islam in and around the region provided another reason for Gulf states’ anxiety. Their support for the newly elected governments was, therefore, limited or non-existent.

The Gulf states prefer the status quo and scorn any sign of real democracy in the Arab world. For the Gulf states, not only are democratic governments more difficult to influence than authoritarian rulers, but the spread of democracy may provide a model for their populations to aspire to.

In part, the Gulf states were obliged to support the post-Arab Spring transitional economies. Their governments have a strong incentive to provide aid to prevent Arab transitional countries from collapsing, from a moral and geopolitical standpoint: if the Arab Spring countries are not stabilised and their economies cannot generate enough growth and employment, political instability there could worsen and spread throughout the entire region. Additionally, the Gulf states had to be seen to be supporting their partner Arab countries, especially when international donors became involved. For instance, at the Deauville May 2011 summit in France, leaders of the Group of Eight (G8) pledged some $40 billion of aid, mostly cheap loans, to Egypt and Tunisia over an unspecified time period, which was later doubled. As part of the G8 partnership’s initiative, most of the GCC states (namely Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE) pledged $13 billion dollars to both Arab partner countries, much of which did not materialise. The problem was certainly not a lack of funds; sustained high oil prices over the past few years have increased GCC states’ wealth and financial surpluses. Political instability in some countries gave reason for both Arab and international donors to re-evaluate their pledges. However, for the Gulf states, there was another dimension that added to their lack of enthusiasm to support the countries in transition. GCC states used aid as a statecraft; by providing aid slowly and in relatively small amounts, they retain political leverage over the recipient countries. Moreover, political considerations made countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates more cautious about extending aid. Conservative GCC governments viewed the success of the uprisings and Islamic political parties winning elections in Egypt, Tunisia and Morrocco as an ideological and security threat. Indeed, the GCC states found themselves surrounded by a political Islam that could challenge their legitimacy and undermine their traditional monarchical system. Not only did they withdraw pledges of financial support to the post-Arab Spring transitional countries but, led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the GCC states soon mounted a counter revolution supporting counter-revolutionary and military forces to take power from elected governments. They used their soft and smart powers to undermine elected governments and to prop up and support military and other opponents of political Islam. Qatar, on the other hand, was doing the opposite. It not only supported the uprising, but also offered economic, political and media support to post-Arab Spring transitional countries and their elected governments.
Thus, in Egypt, which is central to Arab geopolitics – Cairo being the home of the Arab League which embodies the Arab regional System, and the country being the backbone of Gulf security and its cultural identity – the different GCC camps competed against each other to ensure that the country’s government was one that aligned more closely with their respective orientations.

As the elected Morsi government failed to meet the aspirations of Egypt’s revolutionary youth, due to the nature of the ‘deep State,’ where the well-entrenched remnants of the previous regime continued to manage state apparatus and played an obstructing role, coupled with the Morsi government’s lack of experience, it was overthrown by a military coup in July 2013, and the country returned to military rule.

The Morsi government did not last more than a year and its dramatic downfall was enthusiastically welcomed by the Gulf states, which extended political and economic support to the Al-Sisi government. Beside political statements and diplomatic support to the military-led government, the GCC countries were quick to pledge financial and economic backing to Egypt’s ailing economy. Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait offered Egypt $15 billion after the coup. There were also more pledges to support Egypt announced by the three GCC states and a large influx of politically-inspired public and private funds were channelled to Egypt, including a $40-billion housing project for the Egyptian army to build one million housing units for low-income youth from a UAE-based company, Arabtec. The GCC states also proposed a ‘Friends of Egypt’ conference to ensure the regime’s financial stability.

Meanwhile, Qatar continued to support the toppled, ‘legitimate’ Muslim Brotherhood Morsi government. Qatar had provided financial aid to Egypt in 2011–2013 estimated to total $8 billion. The Qatari government remained faithful to the Morsi government and continued its media and diplomatic offensive against the military rule, despite Al-Sisi’s landslide victory in the presidential elections of June 2014. Egypt’s new rulers felt threatened by the Qatari stand and initiated their own propaganda against Qatar. Qatar, which a year ago during Morsi’s rule had been the supporter, has become the enemy. Egypt’s central bank went to the extent of returning a US$2 billion loan agreed previously with Qatar.

In Tunisia, while Qatar supported the uprising and the newly elected Ennahda government, Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, offered a refuge for Ben Ali, the ousted President

The conflicting positions of the GCC states regarding Egypt reflected not only on their role in that country but also on their own bilateral relations. Egypt’s relations with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain turned from cold to warm after the military coup, while relations with Qatar went the opposite direction and started to deteriorate. The withdrawal of Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain’s ambassadors from Doha is largely a result of their opposing positions with regard to Egypt. Qatar was considered, by its Gulf partners, as a spoiler of the well-orchestrated military coup against the Brotherhood and, therefore, must be banished. The withdrawal of ambassadors was considered as the first of a number of measures to force Qatar to abandon its strategy of supporting the Arab Spring and particularly its support for the Brotherhood. However, Qatar’s position has not changed, despite its ruler Sheikh Hamad, the architect of Qatar’s Arab Spring-era foreign policy, stepping aside last year. When his son, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, assumed power, many speculated that the new, young Emir would tame his country’s foreign policy ambitions. However, that did not materialise and he continued with the same policy.

The anti-revolutionary and anti-Arab Spring camp of Saudi Arabia, UAE and Bahrain and even Kuwait, along with Egypt, went to the extent of branding the Brotherhood a terrorist organisation and making it illegal. Many Brotherhood leaders and followers in Egypt and the Gulf have been arrested and imprisoned. Mr Morsi’s removal by the Egyptian military was a major setback to any real democracy taking place in the region, and in countries where Doha was once seen as a liberator, it is now sidelined and is being perceived as a supporter only of Islamists, rather than the national interest.

In Tunisia, while Qatar supported the uprising and the newly elected Ennahda government, which is a brand of the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, offered a refuge for Zine El Abidine
Ben Ali, the ousted President. When the Islamist Ennahda Party was elected to government, Doha invested hundreds of millions of dollars. Last year, Qatar National Bank gave Tunis US$500 million to bolster its foreign currency reserves as the government came under pressure from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to enact reforms. Qatar also spent US$31 million on housing projects in Tunisia, and invested in infrastructure and telecom projects. Saudi Arabia and UAE, on the other hand, stand accused of working against Ennahda and supporting other groups bent on toppling it and destabilising the country.

In Libya, the policy of GCC states, which initially supported the uprising by providing political, economic, media and even military means against the ousted and brutally murdered Libyan leader Muammar al-Gaddafi, soon started to diverge, as Islamic forces began to emerge and take over power in the country. Saudi Arabia and UAE were accused of supporting the attempted military coup led by the retired Libyan Brigadier General Khalifa Haftar. Both countries were said to support Haftar’s armed forces against the elected, Qatari-backed central government. Media in Saudi Arabia and the UAE have expressed tacit support for the onslaught launched by armed forces loyal to General Haftar amid the escalation of events in the city of Benghazi.

In Yemen, there was some consensus on the part of the Gulf states given its close proximity and its contiguous borders with two GCC member states; Oman and Saudi Arabia. In fact, given Saudi Arabia’s ultra-sensitivity to the plight of its southern neighbour, the Gulf states deferred it a leading role in the situation. Here the GCC Secretariat General, supported largely by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, played a major role in finding a peaceful solution to the popular uprising, demanding the downfall of the Saleh government. The GCC brokered a deal to transfer power from President Ali Abdullah to the Yemeni vice-President Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi. The agreement, signed in Saudi Arabia, was expected to clear a key hurdle in the transition to a new era for Yemen, which had been the scene of violent protests for months as Saleh’s opponents demanded that he leave power after 33 years in office. Ali Abdullah Saleh, thus, became the fourth Arab leader forced from power by the popular uprising. GCC states took part in the Friends of Yemen Conference aimed at providing financial support to stabilise the country and pledged the highest percentage of aid, although very little was actually disbursed. Less is known about Qatar’s alleged support of the opposition factions, especially the Muslim Brotherhood, but Doha reportedly donated US$80 million to the Yemeni branch of the Brotherhood during the unrest that led to the end of President Saleh’s decades-long rule. Qatar also funded the establishment of a Yemeni television station, the Yemen Youth Channel, but its investment has since ebbed. Along with Iran, Qatar is also alleged to be supporting the Houthis against the Saudi-backed Abdrabuh Mansur Hadi government, which have recently made many military advances against the central government, threatening the country’s capital Sanaa.

Even in Syria, where geostrategic considerations and Damascus’ close relations with Iran and Hezbollah and its role in Lebanon galvanised GCC support for the opposition against the brutal rule of the Assad regime and its harsh treatment of the uprising, GCC states’ interests were not aligned. GCC states supported competing rebel groups, thus reducing the opposition’s effectiveness. Qatar is said to have significantly reduced its involvement in Syria as Saudi Arabia and UAE began to pour money into different rebel groups not favoured by Qatar.

**Conclusion**

These conflicting GCC state positions did more harm than good to Arab countries in transition and polarised their societies into at least two camps: one backed by Qatar supporting the revolutions and political Islam, and the other a counter-revolutionary camp led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, aimed at returning the transition countries to their
pre-Arab Spring status quo. The competitive and uncooperative environment between the GCC states has resulted in conflicting policies aimed mainly at thwarting and frustrating each other’s plans, rather than genuinely supporting Arab countries in transition. It is, therefore, becoming more evident that the GCC states are playing out their differences in the Arab transition countries, which are more in need of sincere political, economic and social support and reform than being used as the playground for a GCC cold war. Moreover, such an opaque and unstable environment creates the ideal conditions for further external (international and regional) forces to interfere in Arab politics, particularly in the Arab countries in transition, which have also become fertile grounds for fundamentalist groups and radical forces who have found gaps in which to operate and gain strength and support, thereby increasing instability and posing greater security challenges in the future.

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State of Play and Outlook of the Syrian Crisis

The Syria Conflict and the Geopolitics of the Region

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The Syrian civil war had forced 2.7 million Syrians to register as refugees outside the country between 2011 and May 2014. This is equivalent to more than half the number of Palestinians registered as refugees as a result of the 66-year Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Moreover, the situation has continued to worsen: the UN High Commissioner on Refugees estimated the number of registered Syrian refugees would rise by more than one third, to 4.1 million, by the end of the year, on top of an estimated 4.5 million displaced people inside the country. Altogether, this means a third of Syria’s population is displaced. Most of the refugees remain within neighbouring countries, with only a few tens of thousands given homes in the European countries that have supported the Syrian opposition. The pre-existing political, social and economic pressures troubling Syria’s neighbours, especially Iraq and Lebanon, are being exacerbated by the influx of Syrian refugees from different political sides and sectarian groupings.

As it has become more internationalised, the conflict has become bloodier and harder to resolve. What started as a local revolt against corruption and brutality has increasingly become a theatre for regional and international power struggles, especially a rivalry that has been described as a ‘cold war’ between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The failure of international efforts to resolve the Syrian crisis, along with ongoing failures to stabilise Iraq or achieve Israeli-Palestinian peace, has led the West’s allies in the region to question the willingness and ability of the US to offer the kind of security they would like. Direct military intervention by Western countries appeared less likely than ever, given the UK parliament’s refusal to authorise British participation in airstrikes that were briefly mooted by the US as punishment for the use of chemical weapons in Syria, and the US’s subsequent decision to avoid airstrikes in favour of a UN-supervised dismantling of the Syrian government’s chemical weapons stocks. The US and Europe have subsequently focused their efforts more on diplomacy and humanitarian assistance, but UN-brokered talks have made scant progress, and the Syrian government has escalated its violence against opposition-held areas. The crisis has also cast a shadow over the wider Arab uprisings, as the preeminent example of how an uprising initially concerned with social justice and an end to police brutality has been derailed by ethnic and sectarian identity politics.

The International Geopolitics of the Syrian Crisis: Troubles among Allies

The second half of 2013 saw tensions grow among the backers of the opposition, as the opposition forces made losses on the ground, and as it became evident that no Western powers had the appetite for direct military intervention, contrary to the expectations of the Gulf States and Turkey. Initially, Western states were the first governments to support the Syrian opposition when the uprising began in 2011, and were joined by Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey in the latter half of the year. Meanwhile Syria’s traditional allies, Iran and Russia, have remained strong supporters of the regime throughout the crisis. However, while Saudi Arabia sees the Syria conflict partly through the prism of its regional rivalry with

* This article was finalised in April 2014 (Editor’s note).
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Iran, the US has explicitly sought a rapprochement with Iran since the election of a new Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, in June 2013. This has raised questions over the extent to which the regional interests of the US may be beginning to diverge with its longstanding Gulf Arab allies, especially since the US is no longer directly dependent on energy supplies from the Gulf (though it retains an interest in the stability of global energy markets). The US and the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, have also generally taken different attitudes to the Arab uprisings, as the Gulf countries do not look kindly on the US administration’s rhetoric of supporting democracy. They were nonetheless agreed that there should be political transitions in Syria, Yemen and Libya. The Gulf countries, the US and most European powers have all said that President Bashar al-Assad has lost legitimacy and should step down.

But the Gulf and Western countries take different views over the level of priority they accord to this goal, and the means to achieve it (see below). A rivalry between the main regional backers of the opposition, Saudi Arabia and Jordan on one hand and Qatar and Turkey on the other, have further complicated the picture. These countries, which officially support the Syrian National Coalition (SNC), have backed different elements of the opposition in practice. Competition between different backers of the opposition has exacerbated the existing fissures between different opposition groups. Syria’s opposition is naturally fragmented, being a loose decentralised movement that has sprung up in different locales to rise up against a highly centralised state, and encompassing a wide range of ideological, political and economic motivations. Given the highly localised and diverse nature of the opposition, international efforts to unify it, often from afar, have had little success. This fragmentation places the opposition at a disadvantage when it comes to participating in international negotiations, such as the talks that took place in Geneva in 2014, brokered by the UN envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi. These were boycotted by several (mainly Islamist) opposition groups and excluded all armed groups other than the Free Syrian Army (FSA); these more Islamist armed groups are unpalatable to the West but wield significant power in practice. At the talks, which made little progress, the SNC delegation was confronted with representatives of a government that may have lost control of huge swathes of its former territory, but which has managed to maintain relative cohesion among its senior ranks.

The chronic difficulty of effectively representing the opposition raises the possibility that the best objective for the international talks could be to secure an agreement among the external players to work to end the conflict. (While the US insisted that Brahimi withdraw an invitation to Iran to attend the talks, there are channels of communication with Iran through Iranians who are not formally part of the regime.) To be effective, this would need to come in parallel with an agreement or agreements among the local players, including local ceasefires. However, at the time of writing, the Syrian regime appeared to be betting on the likelihood that it could win the civil war militarily; its willingness to come to the negotiating table reflected a perception that it was winning on the ground and could thus negotiate a deal that would reduce international pressure upon it, rather than any sense that political compromise was necessary to avoid military defeat or stalemate. At the talks, government representatives tended towards offering improvements in humanitarian access as bargaining chips, rather than political concessions. As of May 2014, formal talks had given way to track-two contacts. Meanwhile, violence on the ground escalated.

The US Decides against Military Intervention

In August 2013, following reports that chemical weapons had been used in Syria, the US administration considered launching limited airstrikes against Syrian regime targets, on the basis that this would be a punishment for crossing what President Barack Obama had previously deemed to be a “red line,” and that it would deter similar breaches of interna-
tional law in the future. The UK and French leaders expressed their readiness to join the US. At the same time, despite the nominal US stance that “Assad must go,” US military leaders were briefing against intervening militarily to overthrow him; the head of the joint chiefs-of-staff, General Martin Dempsey, said he did not believe Syrian opposition forces would support US interests if they won. President Obama insisted any strikes would be strictly limited, and would not be aimed at changing the regime, speaking of “a shot across the bows.” On several occasions it has been reported that Israel has carried out targeted airstrikes in Syria to deter possible arms transfers to Hezbollah, but neither Syria nor Israel have acknowledged this publicly, nor has Syria retaliated against Israel. However, high-profile strikes by the US would likely be a different scenario.

The President was also expected to seek Congressional approval for any military action, and it was unclear whether Congress would give this, given the unpopularity of becoming involved in another conflict in the Middle East and the fact that Mr Obama had been elected on a platform of withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan. While the world waited for Congressmen to return from their summer break, the UK parliament refused to give the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, approval for the UK to participate alongside the US in military strikes on Syria. The parliamentary debate on this repeatedly referred to the experience of the 2003 Iraq war and, tellingly, more than one MP made the Freudian slip of referring to “Saddam” when they meant “Assad.”

Meanwhile, Russia gave the US the opportunity to address the chemical weapons issue, and to avoid military action without entirely losing face, by offering to broker a deal whereby Mr Assad would agree to have Syria’s chemical weapons stocks dismantled under UN supervision. The US seized on this opportunity. Not only did it drop the idea of military intervention, it in effect accepted the Syrian regime’s continuation in power at least in the short term, as the main agency that would oversee the dismantling of the chemical weapons. From September 2013 onwards, the leading Western powers that supported the Syrian opposition – namely the US, UK and France – became focused on seeking a diplomatic solution and stepping up the humanitarian response to the crisis, while continuing to provide aid to the SNC and the FSA. The US provides the FSA with limited amounts of weapons, whereas the UK government was prevented by parliament from providing anything other than non-lethal aid.

Ironically, after being roundly criticised by its allies for intervening militarily in Iraq, the US is now in the unusual position of being criticised by the Gulf countries for not intervening militarily in Syria. The Saudi leadership in particular felt betrayed, especially after their Foreign Minister, Prince Saud Al Faisal bin Abdel-Aziz Al Saud, had taken the rare step of publicly endorsing the putative US airstrikes, a stance that was always likely to be controversial in the region. In October, in an apparent fit of pique at the highest level, Saudi Arabia turned down the opportunity to take up a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, citing the UN’s failure to resolve the conflict in Syria as one of the reasons. In the same month, the then head of intelligence, Prince Bandar bin Sultan bin Abdel-Aziz Al Saud, who had previously spent close to twenty years as the Kingdom’s ambassador to Washington, said this rejection had been a message for the US, not the UN, and that Saudi Arabia would be moving away from the US and towards other allies. It was not clear who those other allies could be.

None of the world’s major rising powers has shown any appetite to intervene militarily in Syria either, and countries such as China, India and Brazil generally prefer to be non-aligned when it comes to the Saudi-Iranian cold war, rather than offering Saudi Arabia a stronger ally against Iran. The Kingdom said it would work more closely with France and Jordan. It underlined its appreciation for France’s stance in support of military action by using arms-sales diplomacy: purchasing 142 French helicopters and by providing Lebanon with US$3bn to spend on military equipment from France. However, France’s support for airstrikes was purely theoretical as the country would only have carried them out in concert with the US, and in the event the issue was never brought to the French Parliament.

It seems unlikely that the US or other Western countries will return to serious consideration of military action. Such action is generally unpopular at a time when government budgets are under pressure and when there is widespread public scepticism about the potential for military intervention to effect positive
change in Syria. Moreover, Western countries are concerned by the increasingly widespread perception that the opposition is increasingly dominated by anti-Western jihadis, an initially exaggerated narrative that may be becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. This makes them – like General Dempsey – wary of regime change. They have also become increasingly concerned about their own nationals going to fight in Syria and the possible risk that this could lead to blowback. The Syrian regime knows how to exploit such fears; its parliamentary speaker wrote to British MPs before their vote to portray the regime as a supporter of the international war on terror.

**Russia’s Role**

The US and European countries have sought to work with Russia to find a diplomatic solution to the crisis in Syria. They have hoped to build on the perceived breakthrough of reaching an international deal for Syria to dismantle its stockpiles of chemical weapons, which for years the regime had denied possessing. However this dismantling process is far from complete and cannot yet be decisively labelled a success. The US, EU and Russia have all supported the efforts of the UN envoy, Lakdar Brahimi, to secure both government and (at least partial) opposition participation in several rounds of peace talks in Geneva. But while faltering peace talks have given way to less high-profile track-two negotiations, violence has increased on the ground, with the Syrian government now using aircraft and barrel bombs to bombard opposition-held areas. Sharply heightened tensions between the US and Russia over the political crisis in Ukraine in April 2014 suggest the prospects for co-operation over Syria are dimming be seen as a key player in any possible peace deal. Some of the Arab states are also saying to the US they wish the US would stick by them like Russia sticks by Assad, and Egypt pointedly entered discussions with Russia about the possibility of buying Russian fighter jets after some of its usual military aid from the US was suspended as a result of the 2013 coup against Mohammed Morsi. There has also been more talk of the need for greater Arab self-reliance when it comes to regional security.

**Syria’s Significance for Iran**

In 2013 and the first half of 2014, Iran has doubled down on its support for Bashar al-Assad and his regime, acknowledging that it sent its Revolutionary Guards to train a new pro-regime militia force. Iranian officials justified this policy by claiming that they needed to fight al-Qaeda in Syria, or they would end up having to fight it on their own territory. Iran’s ally, Hezbollah, also openly entered the conflict in Syria.

Iran’s key interests in Syria are geopolitical more than they are ideological; the Islamic Republic’s ideology is very different from that of the secular Syrian State, but they have a longstanding alliance as part of a self-styled ‘resistance axis’ opposed to US and Israeli interests in the region, along with Hamas and Hezbollah. It has been argued that their ideological differences have even helped to sustain their alliance, as they are not competing for the same constituency, in contrast to Iran and Saudi Arabia, which both claim Islamic legitimacy and leadership, but interpret this in radically different ways. Iran’s primary interest in Syria has traditionally been to maintain its land corridor to supply Hezbollah with arms. In the current conflict, Syria has also become a key theatre for Iran’s rivalry with Saudi Arabia, and Iran has become concerned that if the Syrian regime falls, its opponents will be emboldened enough to try to take

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down the Iranian-allied government led by Nuri Al-Maliki in Iraq.

**Iran’s key interests in Syria are geopolitical more than ideological; they have a longstanding alliance as part of a self-styled ‘resistance axis’ opposed to US and Israeli interests in the region, along with Hamas and Hezbollah**

Iran has therefore consistently backed the Syrian government in its violent response to the uprising, with the only hint of criticism coming when President Rouhani condemned the use of chemical weapons, without attributing this to the regime. This policy has had costs for Iran, which is in a religious and ethnic minority in the Middle East and has traditionally sought to use pan-Islamic and anti-imperialist causes, such as the Palestinian issue, to reach a constituency of sympathisers beyond the Shia world. In 2011 it sought to portray the Arab uprisings as Iranian-inspired Islamic revolutions and made overtures towards the Muslim Brotherhood. Instead, Iran’s Syria policy has undermined all these efforts and has caused a split with Hamas, while its allies Hezbollah and Assad have become isolated internationally. However, Iran’s appeal to its core Shia constituency has been strengthened by their general perception that Assad represents the ‘lesser of two evils’ compared with Gulf-backed jihadi groups (which have come – however unfairly – to dominate international perceptions of the fighters in Syria).

**Turkey and the Gulf**

There is a growing tendency to view the Syrian civil war as the latest manifestation of a centuries-old Sunni-Shia struggle, but this is overly simplistic and masks the geopolitical and socioeconomic roots of the uprising. As part of this narrative, many commentators have portrayed Turkey and the Gulf States as having sectarian motivations for opposing an Alawite regime allied with Shia Iran. Identity politics certainly play a part in this conflict and sectarian rhetoric has been used extensively. But the sectarian narrative fails to explain why, prior to 2011, the Turkish government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan had worked with Syria to reduce the traditional tensions between the two countries over their borders, creating a free trade zone and providing for visa-free travel; why, several times in the preceding decade, Saudi Arabia reached out to Syria in the hope of using their shared Arab identity – coupled with financial and business incentives – to wean it away from Iran; nor why Qatar had cordial relations with the Assad family, and made significant investments in Syria, prior to 2011. All three countries changed their positions some months into the Syrian uprising – not at the first waves of state violence, but rather when each of their leaders attempted to reach personal understandings with Mr Assad about resolving the crisis, and blamed him for reneging on commitments he made to them.

Turkey has also blamed Mr Assad for fomenting violent unrest among its own Kurds. Meanwhile, Mr Erdogan has sought to reset Turkey’s relations with the Kurds of the region, above all by becoming the key economic partner of the regional government in Iraqi Kurdistan, and, more tentatively (since it is more controversial), trying to reach an accommodation with the PKK, a Kurdish armed movement whose imprisoned leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was revealed in 2013 to be negotiating with the Turkish government. Against this backdrop, the Turkish government has tried to manage the impact of the growing autonomy of Syrian Kurdish groups on wider Kurdish aspirations, rather than necessarily seeing them as a major threat to the integrity of Turkey. But Mr Erdogan’s domestic opponents argue his policies towards Syria and towards the Kurds are threatening Turkey’s national security.

Of the three, Saudi Arabia has been the most committed to countering the Iranian presence in Syria. Those who know the King say he has been horrified by the brutality in Syria and the Foreign Minister has spoken of “genocide” in a country under “occupation” by Iran. It appears that different centres of power in Saudi Arabia have different views on how to counter this; the Foreign Ministry was among the ‘London 11’ group of Foreign Ministers that reiterated their support for the SNC in 2013, but there is a perception that Saudi intelligence has supported other, more Islamist militant groups, prioritising the
‘great game’ against Iran over the risks of blowback that have worried the Saudi Interior Ministry. This could change with the departure of the head of intelligence, Prince Bandar, in 2014. Qatar had previously been at the forefront of efforts to back the opposition, but took a step back in 2013, given perceptions it was running into difficulties, and given the accession of a new Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, who was assumed to be focusing his energies initially on consolidating his domestic position. It has said it disagrees with Iran over Syria but does not view Iran as an enemy. In late 2013, Qatar and Turkey – increasingly distrustful of Saudi Arabia, owing to its support for the coup against their Egyptian ally, Mohammed Morsi – reached out to the new government of Iran and expressed hope they could work together to reduce sectarian tensions in the region.

Iraq, Lebanon and Jordan

The conflict in Syria has exacerbated existing political and socio-economic strains on Syria’s Arab neighbours. Iraq and Lebanon have been the worst affected, as the increasingly sectarian alignment of different groups in Syria has overlapped with, and exacerbated, their own sectarian fissures. Lebanese and Iraqi fighters are now taking part on both sides of the Syrian conflict, with Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia militias supporting the Assad government (saying they need to fight al-Qaeda and defend Syria’s holy places) while Sunni fighters have gone to support the opposition. The conflict has spilled over into Lebanon, leading to gun battles and bombing, with major incidents in late 2013 including a series of bomb attacks on the Iranian embassy in Beirut and the assassination of a former Finance Minister and adviser to the anti-Syrian Future Movement, Mohammed Chatah, in a car bomb. The leaders of Lebanon’s major political factions have nonetheless tried to avoid an all-out civil war returning to their own territory. The country also faces economic strains as the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has reached over one million, or close to one-fifth of the population.

Iraq has seen more severe violence, reaching levels not previously seen since 2007. While Mr Maliki’s government previously had little love for Assad, who had allowed Sunni militants to cross into Iraqi territory to fight the US occupation there, it sees the Syrian opposition as a larger threat, and has allowed Shia militants to cross into Syrian territory to fight with the regime. This has proven bitterly divisive in Iraq. However, while support for Assad is the main dividing line in Lebanese politics, it is not so in Iraq, where there is severe rivalry within the majority Shia community, with major Shia factions now opposing Mr Maliki’s attempts to build another ruling coalition after the 2014 election.

Jordanian, Iraqi and Israeli officials are agreed on one thing: that they all warned the US Assad would not go easily

Jordan has avoided such divisions as it has sought to take a more neutral public stance on Syria, though it is reportedly used as a training ground for opposition fighters, and as it does not have the same sectarian fissures. Jordanian, Iraqi and Israeli officials are agreed on one thing: that they all warned the US Assad would not go easily. However the country’s economic resources have been strained by the thousands of refugees coming on top of previous waves of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees, and shortages of water and electricity have worsened. At the same time the crisis in Syria has also taken some pressure off the monarchy in terms of domestic social and political unrest, as the conflict has been widely seen (and used) as a warning of the risks of rebellion.
The UN refugee agency (UNHCR) announced in June 2014 that the global population of refugees, asylum seekers, and internally displaced people (IDPs) has, for the first time since the Second World War, topped 50 million people. The conflict in Syria, now in its fourth year and with no sign of resolution on the horizon, has been a primary driver of this truly awful accomplishment.

Since the start of the conflict in March 2011, violence and warfare there – apart from claiming more than 100,000 lives (some estimates are more than twice that number) – have displaced an estimated 6.5 million people within Syria and sent nearly 3 million people fleeing across borders into neighbouring countries. The fighting has spilled over as well into Lebanon and Iraq, and in doing so it has displaced local populations, created new refugees, and further threatened Syrians already taking refuge there. This ever-expanding tragedy is one of the biggest humanitarian issues facing the world today. It is also an increasing pressing issue for EU Member States. The cost of the humanitarian operation is mounting and the regional security of the EU neighbourhood is being undermined. Furthermore, while the vast majority of Syrian refugees will remain in their homes and as they have not exited the country, a small but growing portion of these individuals are attempting to cross European borders by land, sea, and air in order to claim asylum in an EU Member State.

Internally Displaced Persons in Syria

UNHCR figures which respectively amount to 30% and 42% of Syria’s pre-crisis population of some 22 million. The actual figures are likely much higher, but as the UN and other humanitarian actors are only afforded limited and sporadic access to many parts of Syria, their ability to provide accurate statistics on the crisis is limited at best. As a case in point, the UN stopped updating its tally of casualties in January 2014 due to its lack of first-hand access and its inability to verify second-hand accounts. Lack of access, as well as large variations in local circumstances, make summary comment on the plight of Syrian IDPs difficult.

Many of Syria’s IDPs reside with friends and family or rent private accommodation, others squat in vacant structures or pitch tents informally in rural areas, while still others move into dedicated camps for IDPs. They live in extremely vulnerable, precarious circumstances. As a result, many of Syria’s IDPs have moved within the local neighbourhood or town where they have left to a different part of the country.

IDP is an umbrella term that refers to anybody who has been forced to leave their home but who has not crossed a national border. This could mean that they have moved across a city, a town, or even the entire country. Many of Syria’s IDPs, as a result, are forced to leave their homes and move to other parts of the country in search of safety and basic necessities such as food, shelter, and medical care. As a result, they often find themselves living in extreme poverty and struggle to make ends meet. The situation is made worse by the lack of access to services and resources, which can lead to further challenges and hardships.

The conflict in Syria has had a profound impact on the lives of millions of people, forcing them to flee their homes and seek refuge in other countries. The situation is further complicated by the ongoing violence and instability in the region, which has made it difficult for aid organizations to provide assistance to those in need. Despite these challenges, there are many organizations working tirelessly to provide aid and support to those affected by the crisis. However, much more needs to be done to help those in need and to address the root causes of the conflict. It is clear that a comprehensive and sustained effort is needed to ensure the safety and well-being of those affected by the crisis.
Lack of access, as well as large variations in local circumstances, make summary comment on the plight of Syrian IDPs difficult. IDP is an umbrella term that refers to anybody who has been forced to leave their home but who has not crossed a national border as shifts in fighting occur. Indeed, more IDPs are displaced or re-displaced every month, and the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS) estimates that a further 1.5 million people became IDPs in the first half of 2014 alone. The extremely limited, and at times deliberately obstructed, access of humanitarian aid has caused much of this population to sink into dire conditions. Repeated UN Security Council resolutions demanding unfettered humanitarian access have met with little success to date, and relief convoys/personnel have been repeatedly attacked.

**Syrian Refugees in Neighbouring Countries**

The overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees have escaped to one of five neighbouring countries (see Chart 2). With a combined total of nearly 2.9 million refugees at the end of July 2014, these countries are: Lebanon (ca. 1.1 million Syrian refugees); Turkey (809,000); Jordan (607,000); Iraq (217,000); and Egypt (138,000). Lebanon, the smallest and hardest hit of any country, has absorbed more than 47,000 people each month for the past 12 months and has experienced an approximately 25% increase in population since the crisis began. It must be born in mind that these numbers, which capture only those registered by UNHCR in the Arab countries and the department of disaster and emergency management in Turkey (AFAD), underrepresent the scale of the flight. Many refugees, for a variety of reasons, remain unregistered. The Turkish authorities, for example, estimated that by 1 August more than 1.1 million Syrian refugees were residing on Turkish soil. These overwhelming numbers have stretched the absorptive capacities of host communities to their limits, prompting the governments of all neighbouring countries save Lebanon to increasingly restrict access throughout 2013. Many border crossings are now permanently or sporadically closed, one result of which has been the rise of camps on the Syrian side of the Turkish and Iraqi borders in which people wait for an opportunity to cross.

Most of the refugees who have made it across the border currently reside in host communities and informal settlements. Lebanon has consistently refused to allow the construction of formal camps for Syrian refugees, and today only around one quarter of Syrian refugees in Jordan and Turkey live in the formal camps administered by UNHCR and AFAD, respectively. This is a marked change from a year ago. Refugee populations were more or less evenly split in Turkey back in July 2013, according to UNHCR’s daily situation reports, with 201,000 Syrians living in camps and 208,000 living outside of them. Today, total camp populations have only slightly increased (ca. 219,000), whereas the non-camp population has nearly tripled. A similar shift has happened in Jordan. A year ago, 40% of the nearly 500,000 Syrian refugees registered in Jordan lived in camps. The biggest of these camps is Za’atari, which became Jordan’s 5th largest city last April when its population hit 202,000 people. Za’atari has steadily shrunk since then to less than 90,000, and now approximately 84% of Jordan’s 607,000 registered Syrian refugees live in local communities. In Lebanon, refugees have spread out across some 1,600 localities, where they rent apartments, garages, office space, or squat in construction sites and abandoned buildings, among other places. They have also established around 1,200 tented settlements in rural areas, often on private land for which the owners extract rent or labour as compensation.

**Host Communities**

Efforts to cope with the extremely high numbers of Syrian refugees appearing in local communities has overwhelmed municipal labour markets, services, and infrastructures, and many places have reported rising resentment and increased social tensions be-

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2 "Regional Analysis Syria," ACAPS, 3 July 2014.

tween refugee and local populations. It is an unfortunate fact that many of the areas with high concentrations of refugees are also places with high levels of local poverty. Thus, the population most vulnerable to any shock is being asked to give the most.

For example, Lebanon is a small country of approximately 4.45 million people, more than a quarter of whom lived under the national poverty line of €2.89 per day (US$4/day) in 2007 according to the International Poverty Centre (the most recent data available). The World Bank estimated in 2013 that, because of the refugee influx, “by end–2014, some 170,000 additional Lebanese will be pushed into poverty. An additional 220,000–324,000 Lebanese are expected to become unemployed… most of them unskilled youth which would about double the unemployment rate, to over 20%.”

Refugees and the local residents of many rural communities both tend to work in the agricultural and construction sectors, and thus are often in direct competition for scarce jobs, which can depress wages. The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) of the UN reported last year that some areas of Lebanon had seen up to a 60% decrease in the wage rate for day labour.

The strain on these communities is obvious regardless of the metric used. Employment, education, health-care, housing, sanitation, physical infrastructure, or living costs: all have experienced spikes that have severely reduced already insufficient capacity. Costs for rent and provisions have also risen substantially in areas of high refugee density. Refugee families are often more willing than local Lebanese to pool resources and live together under one roof. In such cases a group of refugees is often able to pay more rent in absolute terms than a single Lebanese or refugee family. According to UNHCR situation reports, evictions have become increasingly common as rent inflation has priced many of the poorest out of the market.

These dynamics have led to an increase in tensions between refugees and the inhabitants of host communities in some areas. Such instances of animosity are often attributed to the perception of some local residents – many of whom face some of the same structural constraints as refugees – that Syrian refugees unfairly benefit from humanitarian aid while dragging down the living conditions and employment prospects of local residents. It is important to stress that – to an extent – this is only perception.

The International Labour Organisation reported that Lebanese workers in the Bekaa still earn around double their Syrian counterparts, albeit still below the official minimum wage. Nevertheless, such per-

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5 “Assessment of the impact of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and their employment profile,” ILO, 1 April 2014, p. 28.
exceptions are widely reported to have negatively impacted refugee-community relations.

Expansion of the Conflict

The ‘Syrian conflict’ is not neatly contained within the national borders of Syria, and over the past year its neighbours to the east and west have been drawn into the turmoil.

Lebanon – a Secondary Theatre of War

Lebanon’s central state is weak and dysfunctional, and in the current context it is noteworthy only for its near-total absence in the crisis response. It operates in parallel with myriad private, quasi-state and extra-state actors, most notably Hezbollah. The country’s politics is further fractured by its deeply sectarian system, with power distributed in state institutions on a confessional [religious affiliation] basis and most (formally) non-state political actors are organised along confessional lines.

The influx of Syrian refugees has the potential to greatly destabilise Lebanon’s politics, primarily because it alters the relative populations of Lebanon’s confessional groups. The vast majority of refugees are Sunni Muslims and they have migrated to communities that share that religious/communal identity. This increases the demographic weight of Sunnis, unofficially the third largest confessional group in Lebanon today, and directly threatens the clout wielded by the political actors of other confessional groups. The group most threatened is Shi’ite Hezbollah, which is further motivated by the rise of a particular type of Sunni extremism in the region, specifically groups that view Shi’ites as infidels (takfiri groups), and the challenge to Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, Hezbollah’s patron in Damascus.6

The violence destabilising Lebanon today has escalated in parallel with Hezbollah’s increasingly open support for the Syrian regime. After Hezbollah announced its direct, cross-border cooperation with the Syrian military in April 2013, Sunni extremist and Syrian rebel groups promised reprisals against Hezbollah, its patrons, and Shi’ite civilians. Syrian refugees have the potential to further destabilise the situation by joining this fight against Hezbollah on Lebanese soil. Not only are most refugees Sunni, but many have links with the Syrian opposition forces, and at times militants who have faced off against Hezbollah in Syria are directly mixed in with refugee flows.

Today the northeast border regions remain extremely unstable, with occurrences of cross-border shelling of Lebanese villages by the Syrian regime, inter-factional fighting, and a near complete lack of Lebanese state presence. Lebanon has suffered 21 car and suicide bombings since Hezbollah openly declared its support for the Syrian regime in April 2013, 17 of which targeted Hezbollah or Shi’ite neighbourhoods.7 Most recently, Lebanese territory has been threatened – and parts of it captured – by the militant group Islamic State of Iraq and as-Sham (ISIS).

Iraq – Erased Borders and the Creation of New Refugees

The rise of ISIS over the past year has deeply impacted the region’s stability and IDP/refugee flows. Born from the Iraq-based Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), ISIS was formed in mid-April 2013 with the express purpose of involving the group in the Syrian Civil War. It is widely considered to be one of the most extreme and brutal factions fighting today, to the extent that al-Qaeda disavowed it in February 2014. Since the beginning of the year, the Western-backed Free Syrian Army and the al-Qaeda affiliated Nusra Front (Jabhat an-Nusra) have fought against ISIS as a common enemy. They succeeded in expelling ISIS from most of Syria’s northwest provinces by mid-March, but it continues to maintain a strong presence in the eastern provinces of ar-Raqqa, al-Hasakah, and Deir az-Zor.

Following these defeats, ISIS launched a blitz eastward and quickly captured wide swaths of Syrian and Iraqi territory, effectively erasing much of Iraq’s western border with Syria. This campaign culminated on 9 June 2014 with the capture of Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city, and the declaration of a caliphate spanning the Iraq-Syria border shortly thereafter. As of this writing ISIS continues to make territo-

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7 Compiled by the author from news reports.
rial gains. It is increasingly challenging Kurdish peshmerga forces on the borders of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KR-I), which is where more than 90% of Syrian refugees in Iraq currently reside. It has also captured several key border crossings on the Iraq-Syria border including the Al-Qaim crossing and, with it, the Al-Qaim Syrian refugee camp.

The United Nations estimates that ISIS’s campaign has displaced 1.2 million people in Iraq. The vast majority of these are now IDPs, and while most are able to rent accommodation or stay with a host family, many are now living in public buildings as well as two IDP camps recently established by the KR-I government. Some Iraqis, however, have reportedly escaped to Jordan to join the already sizeable Iraqi refugee population there – some 30,000, according to UNHCR – that are part of the fallout of the 2003 American invasion of Iraq. Others have chosen to escape the violence in Iraq by crossing into Syria’s al-Hasakeh province, even while many in al-Hasakeh are attempting to cross into Iraq to escape the violence in Syria. Thus the turmoil is spreading, and fighting in both countries has created cross flows of refugees and is generating hundreds of thousands of new IDPs with few good options.

The Syrian Crisis in Europe

Crises such as this one demand that rich world countries not only open their pocketbooks but also their doors to the refugee population. It takes both aspects of international solidarity to not only alleviate individual human suffering, but also to relieve stress on national infrastructures and mitigate the social tensions inevitably arising from such dramatic and sudden influxes of population. The response to date of European Member States has, with few exceptions, concentrated on financial assistance to the neglect of its human responsibilities.

Financially speaking, Europe has been generous. The 28 Member States had, by mid-July 2014, donated ca. €1.06 billion to the relief effort since the start of the crisis. In addition to these individual contributions the European Commission had contributed €1.3 billion from communal funds, according to the EU Humanitarian Affairs Office (ECHO), which brings the total EU effort up to approximately €2.36 billion. EU Member States have so far contributed around 20% of all donations received by the UN in conjunction with their 2014 SHARP (Syria domestic) and RRP (regional) appeals. That said, those appeals, which total €4.43 billion, remain 68% unfunded. Thus, while the generosity of the EU is laudable – especially Germany and the United Kingdom, which combined have given 65% of all Member State donations – the scale of the crisis ultimately demands much more than has so far been given.

Asylum Seekers

In contrast to this financial largess, Member States’ willingness to relieve the human pressure on neighbouring countries remains limited. This is partially attributable to the current European climate of increasing xenophobia and prolonged economic crisis, in which most politicians are loath to appear ‘soft’ on immigration and are quick to invoke images of the EU being overwhelmed by a flood of refugees. This is especially obvious in the rhetoric of the self-described ‘front-line’ countries of the Mediterranean, despite the fact that they are not actually the primary destination countries for Syrian refugees, the majority of whom (63%) have applied for asylum in Germany and Sweden. The simple fact is that Europe has NOT suffered a deluge of destitute Syrians, either in terms of absolute numbers or, certainly, in comparison to the actual front-line countries bordering Syria.

The EU28 received 109,070 new asylum applications from Syrians between the start of 2011 and June 2014. Once lodged, the vast majority of asylum applications from Syrian nationals are accepted. Of the 83,820 decisions reached by mid-2014, 90% of them (75,560) were positive, according to Eurostat data. To apply for asylum, however, one must be physically present on EU territory and EU Member States have thrown up many obstacles to disrupt this flow, such as the new border fences that have been erected in both Greece and Bulgaria since the start of the crisis.

Nevertheless, as the duration of the conflict has increased so has the flow of Syrians to Europe, and Syrians are now the top nationality applying for asylum in Europe today. That said, their number remains surprisingly modest in comparison with Europe’s total annual number of asylum seekers. As shown in Chart 3, some 5,415 Syrians requested asylum in 2011, accounting for merely 2% of the total number of applications lodged that year. By 2013, that proportion was up to 12%, and during the first six months of 2014 Syrians lodged nearly 20% of all new asylum applications received. This is due, in part, to the increased use of Libya as a staging ground for human smugglers who are capitalising on the current political instability there.

In conjunction with this, the increase in Syrian asylum applications is also due to the success of Italy’s Mare Nostrum programme, which rescued more than 50,000 people from the Mediterranean Sea in eight months between its inception in October 2013 and July 2014. This life-saving programme has cost the Italian government approximately €9 million per month, for which Italian politicians have come under fire. Without financial help from Brussels it is unlikely that the effort will be sustained.

**Concluding Remarks**

The Syrian crisis is currently stalemating in some areas and worsening in others, but it is not getting better. Half of the population of Syria has become an IDP or a refugee, and humanitarian actors continue to struggle to acquire both the funds and the access necessary to deliver services to them. ISIS, founded little more than a year ago, has erased much of Syria’s border with Iraq and helped to displace 1.2 million people in the latter country alone. It has further challenged Lebanon’s sovereignty.
and directly engaged Lebanese forces for control of Lebanese territory. Through all this, Syria’s civilians suffer. EU and humanitarian actors must understand that this is the beginning of a protracted refugee crisis, and in no scenario will the fighting end quickly and the bulk of Syria’s refugees and IDPs return home. Its actions must be proportionate to the scale of the problem at hand, and it must open not only its wallet but also its doors to receive more Syrian refugees. Money can only go so far, and it is the human pressure upon neighbouring countries, their communities, and their economies that threatens to further destabilise the region, as much as a lack of humanitarian aid. Europe, while it cannot fix the problem outright, must show greater solidarity with the region or it will only continue to watch it burn.
State of Play and Outlook of the Syrian Crisis

Evolution and Outlook of the Syrian Crisis

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The current shape of the Syrian crisis derives from three key developments witnessed in 2013. Two of them directly strengthened the Assad regime after a succession of military setbacks: first, the growing involvement of foreign Shia militias such as the Lebanese Hezbollah on the side of loyalist forces, starting with the battle for al-Qusayr in the spring; second, the United States’ decision to respond diplomatically, rather than militarily, to the chemical attack carried out in Damascus in August. These turning points were followed by a long series of loyalist victories that culminated with the evacuation of the centre of Homs by the rebels in May 2014. Politically, Assad’s renewed sense of confidence resulted in the failure of the Geneva II peace talks in February 2014, and in the holding of a de facto non-contest presidential election in June.

The third major event of 2013 was the creation of the radical Jihadi group the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS) in April. ISIS’ hostile behaviour towards other rebel factions led to an all-out war from early 2014 on, adding a new fault line to an already multi-front conflict, since the regime-opposition struggle had been supplemented with fighting between the opposition and Kurdish nationalists from late 2012. The struggle against ISIS diverted much of the military resources of the rebels, but it also had positive effects for the latter, as it accelerated the restructuring of the decaying Free Syrian Army around a handful of robust military coalitions, and helped to ease tensions with Kurdish nationalists.

By May 2014, the state of play was thus determined by two major trends: on the one hand, a reinvigorated regime gradually cleansing the centre of the country from rebel presence and strengthening its hold over Damascus; on the other hand, a rebellion which, after expelling ISIS from the western half of the country, demonstrated its persistent capacity to deal severe blows to the regime in peripheral provinces. As no major breakthrough by either side was likely in the foreseeable future, and with a moribund diplomatic process, all the ingredients for the war to continue in the long term were in place.

The Regime Turns the Tide

Between the summer of 2012 and March 2013, the Assad regime was forced to retreat on many fronts, thereby suggesting that it was on the verge of collapse: in July 2012, it lost the eastern half of Aleppo and most of its province, including the border crossings with Turkey; concurrently, a similar scenario was witnessed in the eastern region of Deir ez-Zor, on the Iraqi border; it is in this context that Prime Minister Riyad Hijab defected and fled to Jordan; in November, rebels seized important military bases in the vicinity of the capital, reached the gates of the international airport, and came dangerously close to laying siege to the centre of Damascus; in early 2013, loyalist forces abandoned two airbases in the north (Taftanaz and al-Jirah); in March, Raqqa was the first (and so far, only) provincial capital to fall into the insurgents’ hands; the same month, rebels in the south took advantage of a recent shipment of Saudi-purchased Croatian weapons to cut off supply lines between Damascus and the southern city of Der’a.

Throughout the spring of 2013, however, loyalist forces managed to turn the tide by adopting a new

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* This article was finalised in April 2014 (Editor’s note).
counter-insurgency strategy aimed at making up for the structural lack of manpower caused by the Aalam-dominated regime’s distrust of its own Sunni soldiers: first, increasing firepower by supplementing heavy artillery and airpower with ballistic missiles and, eventually, chemical weapons; second, abandoning non-essential areas and focusing on the defense and recapturing of a limited number of strategic positions; third, recruiting reinforcements on a sectarian basis, both inside Syria, with the formation of a predominantly Aalam auxiliary militia called the National Defence Force, and abroad, with the arrival, under the supervision of Iranian officers, of thousands of Shia fighters from Lebanon (Hezbollah) and Iraq (Abu al-Fadl al-‘Abbas Brigade, Nujaba Movement, Badr Organisation) who played a crucial role in virtually all the victories won by the regime from that moment on.

Results were quick to materialise: loyalist forces gradually pushed back the rebels from central Damascus and cut off the supply lines of their strongholds in the city’s suburbs; the road to Der’a and important communication lines in the north were re-opened; in June, Hezbollah infantry captured the city of Qusayr, which isolated the insurgent pockets in Homs from their networks of logistical support in northern Lebanon.

**Opposition in Turmoil: the Chemical Crisis and Saudi-Qatari Rivalry**

Over the summer of 2013, a new, albeit less spectacular, reversal of fortune occurred when insurgents won victories west and north of Aleppo (Khan al-‘Asl, Munnagh) and reached the eastern outskirts of central Damascus. The latter development was worrying enough for the regime to prompt the use of the sarin nerve agent in the capital’s suburbs on August 21, killing hundreds of civilians within a couple of hours. Although the chemical attack allowed loyalist forces to make immediate territorial gains as part of the broader Operation Capital Shield, its main consequences derived from the Western reaction to the massacre. Barak Obama having described the use of chemical weapons as a “red line” one year before, initially threatened the Syrian regime with military retaliation, but the US administration rapidly rallied to a Russian initiative providing for the dismantlement of Syria’s chemical arsenal by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Obama’s volte-face was deeply comforting for the Syrian regime: it proved that Washington had no intention of getting more involved in the conflict, let alone to actively push for regime change; Assad was now re-legitimised as a partner of the international community in the implementation of the agreement; it signalled to Assad that he would be safe provided he refrained from using chemical weapons, thereby paving the way for a conventional escalation in the form of forced starvation and daily barrel-bombings over Aleppo; the requirements of the agreement even implicitly encouraged loyalist forces to step up their military effort in order to secure strategic roads linking chemical plants in Damascus and Aleppo (Sfire) to the port of Latakia, where chemical stockpiles were to be embarked for destruction at sea; last but not least, Washington’s failure to enforce its own red lines on the use of chemical weapons prepared the latter’s re-emergence in the spring of 2014, when several chlorine attacks were reported across the country.

Thus, in the months that followed the chemical attack, loyalist forces achieved an impressive series of successes: they cordoned off Damascus’ southern suburbs and subsequently imposed humiliating truces upon their rebel defenders; re-opened land communication towards the south-eastern entrance of Aleppo in Khanasir, then attacked the rebel-controlled half of the city from the east; re-captured the strategic town of Ariha on the Idlib-Latakia road; gradually seized all the major towns of the Qalamun mountains north of Damascus up until the battle of Yabrud in April 2014; destroyed insurgent pockets west of Homs (Krak des Chevaliers) in March and
forced rebels to evacuate central Homs itself in May. In all of these campaigns, the regime compensated its lack of manpower with the massive use of artillery and airpower, thereby provoking mass displacements of populations making Syria’s refugee crisis the largest of its kind in decades: by the spring of 2014, it was estimated that 9 million Syrians (out of 22 million) had been displaced, 2.5 million of which had taken refuge in neighbouring countries. Politically, the chemical episode also struck a devastating blow to the moderate opposition, whose pro-Western stance was now widely reviled in the light of Washington’s attitude. At the end of September 2013, a dozen major rebel groups formally broke with the Syrian National Coalition, the opposition’s main representative body, while whole divisions of General Salim Idriss’ Free Syrian Army (FSA) literally collapsed as their units rallied to Islamist factions. Insurgent defiance towards the mainstream opposition was apparently fuelled by Qatar, whose influence within the National Coalition had recently dwindled as a result of the July election of Saudi-aligned Ahmad al-Jarba at the head of the organisation.

The Rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham and Rebel Consolidation

The travails of the moderate opposition following the chemical crisis emboldened the most radical end of the insurgency, namely, the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS). The organisation was created in April 2013 by the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who proclaimed the merger of his organisation with its Syrian franchise, the Nusra Front of Abu Muhammad al-Jolani. Al-Jolani’s rejection of that decision resulted in a split between the Nusra Front, which was recognised as al-Qaeda’s official branch in Syria by Ayman al-Zawahiri, and ISIS, which attracted to its ranks the majority of the thousands of foreign volunteers fighting alongside the opposition.

Whereas the Nusra Front had maintained decent relations with the rest of the opposition, ISIS rapidly alienated many because of its brutal implementation of Islamic law, abduction of journalists and civilian activists, and paranoid behaviour towards other rebel groups. Over the summer of 2013, ISIS assassinated a prominent FSA commander in Latakia, ousted the FSA-affiliated Ahfad al-Rasul Brigades from Raqqa, and preyed on the small Northern Storm Brigade in A’zaz, north of Aleppo. The latter attack was part of a broader strategy aimed at taking control of border crossings with Turkey in order to cut off the mainstream insurgents’ supply lines. Tensions continued to mount during the autumn as a result of further aggressive moves by ISIS, including the kidnapping and execution of rebel commanders affiliated with Islamist groups such as the Nusra Front and Ahrar al-Sham.

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In January 2014, rebel forces ranging from FSA-affiliates to the Nusra Front launched a joint military offensive against ISIS across the country. Following fierce battles and car-bombings that took a thousand lives within a few weeks, ISIS was forced to evacuate its positions in Idlib, Latakia and most of Aleppo, and concentrated on the defence of its stronghold of Raqqa. By May 2014, fierce battles were still raging for domination over the Deir ez-Zor province.

During the last months of 2013, the need for unity against ISIS, the decay of the FSA as a result of Western abandonment and internal factional rivalries, and the feeling that uniting the most credible insurgent groups would maximise both military efficiency and fund-raising capabilities, combined to prompt a reorganisation movement among rebel ranks. Instead of a broad but loose umbrella like the FSA, this movement took the form of smaller, but more robust and cohesive coalitions. The largest one was the Islamic Front, a nationwide alliance dominated by the Salafi groups Ahrar al-Sham (Free Men of the Levant) and Jaysh al-Islam (Army of Islam). Moderate Islamists affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and/or traditional religious
Leaders established the Ajnad al-Sham (Soldiers of the Levant) Islamic Union in Damascus, Jaysh al-Mujahidin (Army of the Holy Warriors) in Aleppo, and Faylaq al-Sham (The Sham Legion) in Idlib. As for the remnants of the FSA, they reorganised into the Syria Revolutionaries Front and the Hazm (Steadfastness) Movement.

The challenge constituted by ISIS also entailed another positive development for the rebels, namely, an easing of tensions with Kurdish nationalists. From late 2012 on, rebel groups had been battling the YPG (the military wing of the PYD, itself the Syrian branch of the PKK) on the outskirts of Kurdish-majority areas in the north. Hostilities were rooted in the fact that the PYD maintained ambiguous relations with the Assad regime as part of a strategy prioritising Kurdish autonomy over any other goal. Accordingly, the regime had handed over control of several Kurdish-majority regions to the PYD over the summer of 2012 in order to prevent any alliance between Kurdish nationalists and the rebels. Conflict between the latter was also fuelled by local Kurdish-Arab ethnic tensions as well as by a drive for resources, in particular the oil wells in the province of Hassake. With the January 2014 anti-ISIS campaign, however, the rebels and YPG found themselves fighting the same enemy, a situation that paved the way for local truces and even instances of military cooperation against ISIS.

Geneva II, Presidential Elections, and the End of The Diplomatic Process

At the end of the Geneva I conference on Syria in June 2012, the United States and Russia had expressed support for a political transition managed by an executive authority composed of regime members and opponents, and endowed with full prerogatives. Behind this façade of unity, however, Washington and Moscow were strongly divided about whether or not Assad should leave power. This disagreement seriously hindered any move forward, a situation that prompted the resignation of the Joint UN-Arab League Special Envoy Kofi Annan.

During the year that followed the appointment of Annan’s successor Lakhdar Brahimi in August 2012, no progress was made on the diplomatic front because of the considerable deterioration of the situation on the ground but also, first and foremost, because of the United States and Russia’s lack of determination in pushing the process forward. Although during that period both sides continued to discuss the possible convening of a Geneva II conference, they were obviously more interested in the idea of a diplomatic process than in the actual implementation of a peace plan: for Washington, claiming that a diplomatic solution was in sight was a way to justify a policy of non-intervention in Syria; yet, precisely because of this policy, the Obama administration had very little leverage over the conflict, and therefore lacked the means to impose a diplomatic solution on the warring parties; for Moscow, speaking of a “political solution” was a convenient way to cover for the fact that Russian arms were flowing to the Syrian regime – the Kremlin had already gone too far in its support for Assad to hope it could salvage its interests in a post-revolutionary Syria.

Plans for a Geneva II conference were revived in the autumn of 2013 as a follow-up to the agreement on the dismantlement of Syria’s chemical weapons. The conference, which took place in January 2014, was marked by the first direct negotiations between the regime and the opposition, but rapidly proved a complete failure, as circumstances were even less auspicious than two years before. Assad’s position of strength on the ground encouraged him to flatly reject any prospect of transition. This stance was endorsed by his allies, whose position was less uncomfortable than it was two years earlier due to the gradual desensitisation of international public opinion towards Syria’s atrocities after two years of all-out war. Iran had never accepted the principle of political transition in Syria, and while continuing to pay lip service to Geneva I, Russia (which was now involved in a major diplomatic crisis with the West over the Ukraine) drifted...
away from its earlier commitment by announcing it would accept the result of the Syrian presidential election planned for June 2014. Although formally pluralistic, this was designed to be a de facto non-contest election, thereby ensuring the re-election of Assad, hence the final collapse of the transition talks initiated in Geneva in 2012.

Current State of Play and Prospects

In May 2014, the succession of regime victories in southern Damascus, the Qalamun and Homs, a city once dubbed the ‘capital of the revolution,’ was widely interpreted as a sign that Assad was winning the war. However, this was probably a partial and short-sighted reading of the situation. The aforementioned successes were local developments that were unlikely to be replicated in other parts of the country, where loyalist forces were lacking what made their strength in central regions, that is, manpower and strategic depth.

The Damascus-Homs axis was always predominantly controlled by the regime; it borders the strongholds of the Lebanese Hezbollah, which sealed off much of the border to rebel movements and committed its own troops in support of Assad; given the importance of these provinces for the regime, they have been home to a very large share of the military’s units and infrastructures; in Homs in particular, the presence of large Alawite and Christian communities allowed for the recruitment of sizeable auxiliary militias. The lack of such factors explains the mixed results witnessed in Aleppo, a very predominantly Sunni province whose countryside was under rebel control since early 2012. By May 2014, while regime forces were still threatening rebel-held neighbourhoods from the east, insurgents were closing in on loyalist strongholds in the western part of the city. At the same time, the rebels were able to tunnel-mine several headquarters of loyalist forces in the city centre.

A fortiori, the situation was even more difficult for the regime in less strategic peripheral provinces in the south (Der’a, Qunaytra), centre-north (Idlib, Hama) and east (Deir ez-Zor), where Assad’s forces steadily lost ground to the rebels throughout the spring of 2014. Interestingly, the regime also suffered from a shortage of manpower in the Alawite stronghold of Latakia, where rebels seized the Armenian border town of Kassab during the March 2014 Anfal campaign. Whereas a similar attack in the province in August 2013 had been met with a sweeping counter-offensive, this time, loyalist forces were still struggling to regain the lost ground two months after the rebel offensive.

Saudi Arabia and Qatar were providing money and weapons but, in addition to being pitted against each other by a bitter rivalry, they lacked the know-how required to really boost the rebels’ military standing.

Of course, the regime was still advantaged by the respective strategies of foreign actors. Whereas its Iranian and Russian allies were firmly and actively committed to its survival, the opposition had to deal with allies that were problematic in many respects: unlike France, the United States were unenthusiastic about toppling Assad and, out of proliferation concerns, were preventing their regional allies from delivering anti-aircraft missiles to the rebels; Saudi Arabia and Qatar were providing money and weapons but, in addition to being pitted against each other by a bitter rivalry, they lacked the know-how required to really boost the rebels’ military standing; Jordan, although a major conduit of Saudi help for the rebels, was hesitant given its anxiety regarding the destabilising potential of refugees and Jihadi militancy; Turkey, although increasingly open in its support for rebel operations in the north, was constrained by the democratic character of its polity; as for Israel, which targeted several military facilities in Syria from 2013 on, it was distrustful of the rebels until early 2014, when its intelligence started to establish contacts with insurgent units fighting along the Golan ceasefire line, with the goal in mind of establishing a buffer zone to prevent Jihadi incursions. In spite of all this, pro-opposition states had an advantage over Assad and his friends: because of the relatively limited nature of their support for the rebels, they retained many options for escalation, whereas Russia and Iran’s war effort in Syria had already
reached proportions that were probably unsustainable in the long run. Teheran had reportedly spent several billion dollars to keep Assad afloat, in addition to the commitment of troops on the ground in the form of pro-Iranian Lebanese and Iraqi contingents. From the spring of 2013 on, the anti-tank guided missiles provided to the rebels by their Gulf allies destroyed hundreds of armoured vehicles that could not be systematically replaced. As for the regime’s air force, it had lost relatively few aircraft, but it was increasingly overstretched as a result of daily missions. Despite their many flaws, loyalist forces were likely to keep the means to retain strategic positions in the long run, roll back rebel presence in the regime’s heartlands, and disrupt insurgent control over peripheral provinces. However, problems of manpower and hardware made total victory by the regime unrealistic, thereby making regime strongholds vulnerable to future rebel attacks from peripheral regions, as exemplified by the May 2014 hit-and-run attacks against key military facilities in Damascus’ eastern desert periphery.

Three years after the beginning of the Syrian uprising, therefore, nothing suggested that the war was close to an end, except, maybe, Saudi Arabia’s announcement that it was ready to settle differences with Iran through negotiations. However, a rapprochement between Riyadh and Teheran would probably not suffice to solve the Syrian crisis. Whatever influence the two regional powers could exert over their respective Syrian protégés, the latter were engaged in a zero-sum game that made the problem particularly intractable: genuine power-sharing was not an option for Assad because it would ultimately lead to the demise of his highly personalised regime; while the rebels, for their part, would probably never become weak enough to be forced to accept mere cosmetic reforms.
The Challenges of Young People in Arab countries

Youth Empowerment as a Collective, Bottom-Up and Long-Term Process

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The exceptional youth-led wave of anti-authoritarian protests in several Arab countries in 2010-2011, re-focused the world’s attention on Arab youth. In particular, the rapid and unexpected mass mobilisations, anticipated by the development of youth-based activist groups in the last decade and the spread of new communication technologies, brought to the fore the idea of youth as the engine for long-needed change in the region.

The recent negative, if not dramatic, course of events in most countries of the Arab region, should not divert our attention from the fact that youth can, and indeed should, represent “a force of cultural and social regeneration.”1 However, due to the severe political, economic and social conditions regarding youth exclusion in the region, this potential can only be realised through a transformation of the systemic inequalities that lead to exclusion in the first place. This can only happen through collective, bottom-up and long-term processes whereby young people gain by themselves the ability, authority and agency to implement change in their own life and in the life of society at large, or, in other words, through processes of youth empowerment.

Youth Empowerment as a Collective and Bottom-Up Process

Empowerment is a widely used concept, but also one that is difficult to define and use correctly. As can be derived from the composition of the word itself, the concept has to do with the issue of power and implies a change in power relations. Youth empowerment should imply an expansion of the ability to make strategic life choices in a situation in which that ability was previously denied, as much as it should imply a challenge and a destabilisation of unequal power relations through a transformative process.

However, in a context in which dominant norms and cultural values strongly limit the ability of young people to make strategic life choices, structural constraints cannot be addressed by individuals alone. Young individuals can and do act against dominant norms, but their impact on the general situation of youth is limited and they might pay a high price for their autonomy. The process of youth empowerment depends on collective solidarity in the public arena, as well as individual assertiveness in the private one. Youth organisations and social movements thus have an important role to play in creating the conditions for change and in reducing the costs of individual action.2

Understanding youth empowerment as a transformation process of existing exclusionary power relations implies that it can only be brought about through a bottom-up process rather than a top-down strategy. To deal with social exclusion, young people cannot be ‘empowered,’ but they must empower themselves through forms of agency, although the pre-conditions for this to take place could depend on structural factors or even be facilitated by top-down policies. For instance, giving young people access to better education is unlikely to be automatically empowering, but it creates a favourable factor for creating the pre-condition for

youth empowerment (such as a more critical consciousness). Youth empowerment is also an open-ended process and cannot be predicted at its outset without running the risk of violating its essence, which is to enhance young people’s capacity for self-determination.

The process of youth empowerment depends on collective solidarity in the public arena, as well as individual assertiveness in the private one. Youth organisations and social movements thus have an important role to play in creating the conditions for change and in reducing the costs of individual action.

It is, furthermore, critical to recognise youth as a diversified category. The expressions, ideas and experiences of being young vary across cultures, classes, genders, ethnicities and other groupings. Young people from different social strata experience important social changes in different ways, and have different needs and demands. However, while it is true that young people cannot be considered a single homogeneous category, it is equally true that schooling, mass media, urban spaces (public parks, shopping malls) and new information technologies have played a crucial role in developing a particular consciousness about being young, which facilitates mutual influence and peer interactions. Moreover, youth in Arab countries from almost all social classes have been confronted with an increasingly problematic transition into adulthood owing to economic, political and social failures of the system created by the older generation. This means that being young in the Arab region today is more than a biological attribute: it is the consciousness of a shared experience of exclusion determined by the failure of post-independence development models.

More in general, and beyond the Arab region, certain conditions of the contemporary period have contributed to creating a distinct global political youth culture, thus increasing youth self-awareness and the chances for collective youth agency. For example, new forms of horizontal youth political involvement unmediated by the older generation (social movements vs. the youth section of traditional political parties) and new technologies mastered by youth (with young people playing a larger role than in the past in teaching and acquainting the older generation with new technologies and cultural patterns associated with globalisation) have opened up new avenues of active political, economic and socio-cultural participation for the current generation. The 2011 uprisings that led to the overthrow of Ben Ali and Mubarak and seriously challenged other regimes in the region are a testimony that youth collective agency has today a great potential in transforming existing power relations, although its impact may be subtle, long-term and often unintended. During the decade prior to the uprisings, youth collective agency in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere in the region, brought about broad cultural transformations by affecting values, symbols and political cultures and challenged many of the dominant ideas that sustained the power structure of authoritarian regimes, such as hereditary rule, police brutality, emergency law and corruption.

Within political parties and organisations, a generation of young activists started to openly dissent from the old conservative leadership and to develop a more critical and less subordinate culture vis-à-vis the older generation (the young bloggers within the Muslim Brotherhood; Youth for Change within Kifaya). Young women activists also started to gradually shift the boundaries of acceptable public behaviour for their group, thus transforming power relations both within family and youth groups (for example, a young woman, Israa Abdel-Fattah was the co-founder of the April 6 Movement). In Tunisia, in 2006, unemployed graduates established the Union des Diplômés Chômeurs (UDC) to denounce their precarious situation. In a few months, the UDC, initially tolerated by the regime, was able to establish a

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number of small committees in the most marginalised areas of the country, including Gafsa and Rедeyef. These committees were at the heart of the large protest movement that erupted in the mining area of Gafsa in January 2008. The protests, although harshly repressed by police, began to call into discussion the prevailing discourse of Tunisia’s economic miracle, seriously undermining the legitimacy of the Ben Ali regime.⁵

Largely unnoticed or underestimated by scholars and analysts working in the region, these ideas started to enter the public debate and gained increasing legitimacy among the masses, thereby laying the groundwork for widespread protests.

Youth Empowerment as a Nonlinear and Long-Term Process

It is also of fundamental importance to consider that, like all social processes, youth empowerment is a complex, contradictory and long-term process. As such, it does not have a linear development: it can make significant achievements and also suffer major setbacks.

As stated above, the wave of youth-led protests in most Arab countries in 2010-11 represented a significant challenge to traditional power relations. Not only were the security apparatuses taken by surprise and, at least in Tunisia and Egypt, temporarily defeated by the unexpected and large-scale spontaneous mobilisation of millions of people, but also protestors subverted well-established patterns of oppositional politics in the region by creating new slogans and symbols and by side-stepping traditional opposition parties and organisations, which did not have a significant role in promoting and sustaining the uprisings.

However, shortly after the revolutionary events, it became apparent that the entrenched structure of power was much more difficult to eradicate than the activists had initially hoped, especially in the absence of organised revolutionary movements that could channel youth energy and demands. This is most evident in the case of post-Mubarak Egypt, but also in Tunisia, where the voices of youth and particularly those who inspired the popular uprisings have continued to remain unheard in policy decision-making and also excluded from major political organisations. In Egypt, all post-uprising authorities have governed in a top-down manner without any genuine involvement or consultation with youth groups, have been reluctant to discard the old system of power and have increasingly resorted to repressive tactics such as arrests, intimidation, and the use of force to placate youth protests. After the first elected President, Mohamed Morsi, was deposed, the crackdown on youth activists has intensified. Prominent activists of the April 6 Youth Movement were sentenced to three years in jail for joining the “No Military Trials for Civilians” campaign last November against the new protest law, approved by President Adly Mansour on 24 November.

Youth groups who were behind the mass protests against authoritarian regimes have been left out of emerging institutions and parties, both in Egypt and Tunisia, or simply destroyed by the violent turn of events in other contexts. For example, in the first parliamentary elections after the overthrow of Mubarak and Ben Ali, not only did youth groups from traditional opposition forces play a minor role in setting the agenda, but also youth coalitions such as the Egyptian Revolution Continues Alliance coalition, which included a number of youth groups and activists that contributed to the fall of Mubarak, took less than ten parliamentary seats, while al-Adl Party, another force composed of youth activists, only won two seats. Similarly, in Tunisia, despite a number of newly formed political parties (e.g., the Mouvement des Jeunes Tunisiens Libres and Rencontre Jeunes Libres) and independent lists representing youth and the unemployed (e.g., the Afkar Mostaquilla platform and some members of the Union of Unemployed Graduates) as well as the requirement that at least one candidate on each list be under the age of 30, the Constituent Assembly elected in October 2011 was unrepresentative of young people. Finally, the involvement of a few youth representatives in decision-making is likely to reflect the post-uprising authorities’ attempts to co-opt young activists into

the existing system. For example, Ahmed Maher, leader of the April 6 Youth Movement was member of the second Constituent Assembly elected in June 2012, but later withdrew from the assembly criticising the slow pace of drafting, the scarce representativeness of the Assembly and the lack of consideration for proposals made by civil society forces. Much worse is the situation in countries where the initial peaceful uprisings led to immediate harsh repression, foreign military interventions or to the escalation of violence and civil war, such as Bahrein, Libya or Syria.

More in general, the transformative potential of youth collective agency on the existing power system has been weakened over the last three years by a number of factors. Youth activism has been dispersed in myriad groups and initiatives, scarcely coordinated and representing different, albeit not necessarily, conflicting demands. Political youth groups have suffered from ideological and strategic divergences, as well as rivalries and a lack of a clear coherent strategy to adopt in the post-uprisings era. For example, in Egypt, they were unprepared, divided and confused regarding the best strategy to follow ahead of the 19 March Referendum of 2011 and the legislative elections of November 2011. After the military coup that deposed Morsi, youth groups are now even more plagued by contrasts and divisions. As it was for the first presidential elections, they have not reached a unified consensus on a presidential candidate. The leaders of the Tamarrod movement have decided to support the military and the presidential candidacy of Field Marshal General Abdel Fattah Sisi. At the same time, the April 6 Movement and others have expressed their refusal. The same Tamarrod is now plagued by internal divisions, as a number of its activists have announced their support for Hamdeh Sabahi. Ideological and strategic divergences have thus prevented youth groups from elaborating a unified and coherent policy vis-à-vis the post-Mubarak authorities, have diminished their ability to influence Egyptian politics beyond street protests and have compromised their credibility, causing them to lose popular support. In many Arab countries, the Islamist / non-Islamist ideological divide among youth activists, which has deepened in the wake of the uprisings, is likely to undermine youth collective action. The Tamarrod movement in Egypt, for example, has led to similar movements in other countries such as Tunisia, Morocco and the Palestinian Territories, raising contrasts among young people. In Egypt, the lack of alliance and cooperation between youth groups and independent trade unions has also weakened the likelihood of revolutionary forces having a stronger influence on policy decision-making. Similarly, in Morocco, the 20 February Movement and the unemployed graduates have failed to cooperate.

However, in the face of the current and well-placed widespread pessimism, many observers have underlined the long-term importance of an ‘awakened and mobilised society,’ one in which a youth component that does not passively accept the long-term authoritarian re-composition of power relations is crucial. After decades of authoritarianism it would be at best naïve to think that bottom-up, well-organised and participatory political actors could suddenly emerge, or that traditional parties and organisation could promptly welcome the active participation of young activists. The renewal of the dynamics of participation in any context is a long and difficult process and could take years or even decades to actually have an impact at the macro-structural level.

Nevertheless, the largely unexpected nature of the 2010-11 mobilisations should teach us a lesson: the importance of looking at below-the-radar dynamics and processes to understand the prospects for change. In the last few years, some authors, mainly from the field of political sociology, have given new strength to promising bottom-up approaches, paying more attention to subaltern actors (such as youth) and to informal and often unnoticed forms of (political) agency.

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6 For example, the young blogger and activist Slim Amamou, who was arrested during the early days of the anti-Ben Ali protests, was appointed Secretary of State for Youth and Sport Affairs in January 2011. Probably being aware of the risk of cooptation, Amamou resigned from his cabinet post in May 2011. In Egypt, Mahmoud Badr et Mohamed Abdel Aziz from Tamarrod were appointed in Egypt’s 50 member constitution committee to modify the 2012 constitution.

Although the current structural/policy context is unfavourable to creating the right pre-conditions for youth empowerment and young people are excluded from political processes, we should not overlook the long-term implications of youth agency in challenging existing power relations. For example, in Tunisia, last December, in response to the candidature of old personalities to form a new government, a group of young Tunisians launched a campaign, “Jeunesse Décide” (Youth Decides), on Facebook, calling for youth to take part in decision-making. Young people posted their candidature to Prime Minister and their CV. Within a few days, many Facebook pages and groups were created drawing thousands of followers. While this campaign did not lead to an immediate visible success, these young people continue to openly challenge the prevailing hierarchical structure of power, which is biased against youth.

More in general, beyond street protests, young activists and groups in Egypt, Tunisia and other Arab countries have been experimenting with new creative ways of doing politics and raising public awareness of political manipulations, based on transparency and participatory democracy. While it is too early to gauge the extent to which these forms of youth agency will effectively undermine existing power relations, they are likely to generate self-identity, confidence and awareness among those involved. In Egypt, with the renewed crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, women, particularly young women, seem to be playing a more central role within the movement. In November 2013, twenty-one female members of the Muslim Brotherhood, many of them under the age of 18, were condemned to 11 years in prison for taking part in pro-Morsi demonstrations. The growing mobilisation of young MB women could have an enormous transformative potential: destabilising existing gender relations within the movement; enlarging the chances for collective agency among young women in a country where the public sphere of political activism remains heavily male; and favouring important psychological transformations among women from being passive subjects to more active agents of self-expression. In the Palestinian Territories, although most young Palestinians are disillusioned and have abandoned politics, a vibrant, albeit small, youth movement has been emerging that is challenging not only Israeli occupation but also the existing elite, the Palestinian leadership. While the movement is faced with many obstacles such as the Israeli occupation and oppression by Fatah and Hamas, it bears many similarities to the youth activism of the 1980s which eventually led to the First Intifada. In addition, as Bayat argued, beyond organised collective agency, under repressive contexts, youth continue to reclaim their youthfulness and enhance their individual lives through dispersed actions and with no aim of overthrowing authoritarian regimes. These non-movements of youth, according to Bayat, probably became part of the 2011 Arab uprisings and merged into a more concerted collective action once they were provided with an opportunity. The transformative impact of youth activism should then be assessed in multiple dimensions, even, and maybe most of all, below the level of real immediate impact on state policies or institutions. The Arab region is rich with forms of political contestation and mobilisation – mostly led by youth – which, while not leading inexorably towards the expansion of civil society or democratisation, still have potential for a long-term transformative impact on the political culture or on forms of participation (although this is less visible).

For example, as was mentioned above and as has already happened, social movements can bring about cultural transformation by affecting values and symbols as well as by reshaping public debates towards key political issues. Other kinds of consequences include movement spill-over effects. Social movements may indeed have an impact in that they inspire other forms of mobilisations. The gains or losses made by one movement can have beneficial consequences for the demands or the strategies of other movements, or their success can encourage further mobilisation (e.g. the labour movement vs the youth movement as happened in 1968 in the US and Europe).

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The Challenges of Young People in Arab countries

Arab Youth Values and Identities: Impact of the Arab Uprisings

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The wave of uprisings and social unrest that swept through Arab countries, together with the prominent role played by youth in instigating and maintaining a "revolutionary" momentum, have motivated reflections about the transformative influence these events might have had in shaping new identities and emerging values. This paper focuses on youth in the Arab region and explores identity dynamics and value preferences in the diverse Arab landscape following the 2011 uprisings.

The Youth Bulge

The Arab uprisings occurred in the context of seriously deteriorated living conditions under highly repressive autocratic regimes and a bulging youth population (see the Arab Human Development Reports, 2002-2009). The Arab populations’ 357 million people are young, with a majority in many countries under the age of 25. Some estimate that a third of the Arab region’s population is under the age of 15, and a fifth is between the ages of 15 and 24. This “youth bulge” is thought to have peaked in 2010, and it is set to decline from 20 to 17% in the coming years (Mirkin, 2013).

While Arab youth are more educated and marrying at a later age than before, some Arab countries still suffer from high illiteracy rates. The majority of Arabs (55%) do not access the Internet (Arab Opinion Index, 2013) and rely on TV as their main source of information. Rates, however, differ greatly by country. While only a minority (22%) of Egyptians use the Internet, majorities do in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Lebanon, and Tunisia (Dennis et al., 2013). Even before the Arab uprisings, youth unemployment rates in the region were the highest in the world, ranging between 20 and 40% compared to worldwide averages of 10 to 20% (ESCWA, 2009). Post-uprisings assessments report a significant increase in youth unemployment, with one in three Arab young people without a job (Urdal, 2012). The Arab region is the only region where unemployment exceeds 10% (around 27% in 2012), and with twice the global rate for youth (Mirkin, 2013). Conservative estimates suggest that 12 million jobs need to be added by 2025 to absorb this young workforce, while others put estimates as high as 5 million jobs per year until 2020.

These global figures also differ by region. While youth unemployment rates are low in most GCC countries (as low as 2% in Qatar), they rise to about 30% in Egypt, and up to 44% in Iraq (Mirkin, 2013). It is no wonder that almost a quarter of Arabs would like to emigrate in search of better prospects, and that employment concerns rank as the highest priority across several polls and countries (e.g. Arab Opinion Index, 2013; Asdaa, 2014).

It is also no surprise that some analysts associate youth bulges with political violence (e.g. Urdal, 2012). Given the right conditions, a surge in the youth population could galvanise socio-economic development and enable societies to “reap the dividends of the youth bulge.” However, in the context of exceptionally high unemployment rates and
significant socio-economic challenges, a youth bulge can turn into a liability, with increased risks of social upheavals and challenges to the status quo.

The Arab Uprising: Authoritarian Regimes and the Absence of Ideology

High levels of corruption, incompetent and ageing authoritarian regimes, socio-political repression, abusive treatment, and difficult living conditions are some of the factors that eventually led to massive social protests across several Arab countries. Long-standing autocrats in Egypt and Tunisia were ousted in a matter of weeks, sending shockwaves across the Arab region and pushing neighbouring regimes to quickly instigate reforms (e.g. Morocco), disburse large cash bonuses (e.g. Saudi Arabia), or brutally repress dissent (e.g. Bahrain, Syria).

Young people occupied public spaces in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria, while smaller protests occurred in every other Arab country from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian-Arabian Gulf. The fact that the uprisings neither involved ideological platforms nor proposed alternative governance models or regimes is quite telling. Concerns for dignity, social justice and better overall governance are often cited as the primary motivators behind the uprisings, and they are indicative of the values and identities that animated the youth.

Identities: Unity in Diversity

Each of the uprisings in the Arab world took a different path and reached a different outcome, clearly reflecting the diverse socio-historical dynamics behind them. The discrepancies and divergences in the path the uprisings took hint at widely differing conditions, populations, and aspirations. Furthermore, country-specific outcomes ranged from peaceful and rapid transitions to the most brutal and protracted of repressions.

Yet, the rapid – contagious – spread of popular uprisings across different Arab contexts points to a shared sense of future and communality across populations and identities. A recent representative survey of 20,350 people from 14 Arab countries (Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Mauritania, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen, Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait and Libya) showed that “79% of the Arab public believes in the integrity of a single Arab nation, or that the various Arab peoples comprise one nation, notwithstanding the possible differences between Arab peoples” (Arab Opinion Index, 2013). This unitary identity, endorsed by an overwhelming majority of citizens across the spectrum of Arab countries, has also been growing over time, with a 7% increase between 2011 and 2013.

Yet, this consensus about Arab identity and the communality of Arab peoples does not preclude the prominent co-existence of other social identities specific to each of the Arab countries or cultural regions. While multiple identities can be organised in a hierarchical model of inclusiveness (Harb, 2010), specific identities are preferentially sampled in different contexts. An overview of the uprisings in the Arab world points to four salient social identities: national, pan-national (Islamic and/or Arab), tribal-familial, and ethno-sectarian. For example, an Al-Jazeera poll of 8,045 young people in “four uprising countries” showed youth endorsing an Islamic identity before a national one in Tunisia, Yemen and Libya, but not in Egypt, where national identity was held first. Other identities (political, professional, regional, etc.) do not seem to be widely endorsed in Arab societies.

Cultural Differences

The Arab world is often perceived as four large cultural entities: the Fertile Crescent countries (Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine), the Gulf Countries (the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries), the Nile countries (Egypt and Sudan), and the Maghreb (Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco). The Fertile Crescent countries have the most diverse populations within the Arab world, with multiple ethnicities and sects spread across their territories. Nationalist and secular parties have dominated rule in these countries, often under authoritarian regimes. The region is now plagued by inter-sectarian conflict, insecurity, and potential disintegration pushing youth towards immigration or stricter sectarian and tribal affiliations. The US invasion of Iraq fed Sunni-Shia divisions, and the uprising in Syria quickly drew in regional sectarian actors, each push-
The presence of radicalised Sunni groups affiliated with al-Qaeda in all countries of the Fertile Crescent further polarised the youth along sectarian lines, especially in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon. The weakened central governments and the pervasive security threats left youth with few options other than affiliating with sectarian networks that provided them with a sense of group security and a source of basic services. The multi-polarity of the financial and military assistance provided by regional (Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel) and international (US, Europe and Russia) powers exacerbated the conflict and continues to fan the flames of sectarian tensions.

**Egypt** Historically, the political dynamics in Egypt have continuously pitted two main ideological streams: the military-nationalistic parties and the Islamic parties. Until the 2011 uprising, all Egyptian presidents had a military background and entertained a nationalistic discourse. The popular uprising of 2011, initiated by progressive youth groups, eventually brought together secular, nationalist and Islamist forces against the corruption of an ageing and abusive autocratic regime. The post-Mubarak era was quickly transformed into a competition between three main factions: the weakened old guard, with its extensive network of clients and dependents; the Muslim Brotherhood, with its organised and ideologically driven membership; and youth and civil groups, with weak organisational skills and little experience. The Muslim Brotherhood’s experienced political organisation helped them win (albeit with a small margin) the first democratic election since the founding of the Egyptian republic in 1953.

The instability that rocked Egypt after the election of the Muslim Brotherhood to Parliament, and then to the Presidency, along with the continued insecurity and difficult living conditions across Egypt, pushed a sizeable portion of the population to seek stability and security. The promises made by the military appealed to some, while the persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood and, later, of youth revolutionary groups (e.g. the 6 April movement) upset others.

Egyptians are currently split with regard to their leadership preferences. A recent Pew poll conducted just prior to the May 2014 elections showed an almost 20% decline in favourable attitudes towards the army, the Muslim Brotherhood and the judicial courts. Support for Al-Sisi was marginal, with 54% for and 45% against. Importantly, a large majority of Egyptians (72%) reported being dissatisfied with the way things are going in Egypt, on par with dissatisfaction levels prior to the 2011 uprisings and on course for more instability ahead.

A majority of Egyptian youth (72%) support a civil state with little military involvement, and 96% reported not belonging to any political party (Al Jazeera, 2013). While a majority of Egyptians do not support the Muslim Brotherhood, a large proportion does not support a return to military rule either. The latest presidential election saw only a third of the electorate turn out to vote in the first two days of the election, and a noticeable absence of young voters. The massive media campaigns in support of Al-Sisi, a questionable 24-hour extension of voting, and rumoured threats of fines and prosecution for those who boycotted the election did little to change the results.

The **GCC countries** present a different socio-economic profile from the Fertile Crescent countries and Egypt. The oil-rich nations continued their clampdown on political dissent at home and immediately spent billions of dollars to prevent the contagious uprisings from reaching their kingdoms (e.g. the 3 months’ salary bonus provided to employees in Saudi Arabia). While freedoms are certainly restricted in most GCC countries, their oil-based economies and high GDP make their populations slightly less inclined to rebel.

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The GCC monarchies are strongly dependent on family networks and ties, and a strict socio-normative enforcement of Islamic texts. While a number of youth espouse conservative values and observe strict Wahabi or Salafi codes, another substantial segment of the youth population aspires to lifestyles and values more in line with their globalised identities. Saudi Arabia has already sent over 145,000 students to study abroad, and the number of scholarships for
The Challenges of Young People in Arab countries

studying in the West continues to grow. International centres of excellence have opened branches in the GCC countries, and both Dubai and Doha are now recognised globalised cities. **The Maghreb:** Popular unrest in Libya and Tunisia led to the demise of the leadership in both countries, but the current situation between the two neighbours could not be any more different. While transition to democratic governance is proceeding relatively smoothly in Tunisia, chaos and warfare plague post-Gaddafi-era Libya. Tunisian youth continue to be divided between left-wing secular groups and Islamic parties, but the dialogue between them tends to be pragmatic and peaceful. Tunisian youth remain engaged in public life, and national debates on the future of Tunisia continue unabated. In contrast, Libya remains beset by tribal and regional loyalties, and warring factions do not seem any closer to unity or a national identity. The administrative vacuum left in the wake of an uprising largely supported by international forces is difficult to fill in a country saddled by decades of international isolation and no history of political parties and debates. The 2011 uprisings briefly affected Algeria and Morocco. However, vivid memories of Algeria’s bloody civil war, with its 100,000 dead, may have made Algerians wary of brutal change. The recent re-election of the ailing President may signal a concern for stability, especially in light of the violent outcomes in Libya, Syria, Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain. However, the low voter turnout and the boycott by some parties may be indicative of growing dissatisfaction. On the other hand, Morocco’s monarch was quick to seize the post-uprising moment and initiated large-scale constitutional reforms that were overwhelmingly adopted in a July 2011 referendum. This was quickly followed by national elections that saw the rise of moderate Islamic parties on par with developments in Egypt and Tunisia.

**Values**

The Arab uprisings have also raised questions about the changes in the value systems of the rebellious populations, with many assuming that the 2011 events transformed Arab societies from passive and subdued populations to dynamic and potentially democratically-oriented ones. Values are beliefs or concepts that pertain to desirable behaviours or end states and that guide the selection or evaluation of events and behaviour (Schwartz, 1992). Because values represent motivational goals, they tend to transcend specific situations and change only in the context of major life events. The proposition that the uprisings were sufficient to change individual values beyond the increased need for security may not be warranted. A majority of Arabs did not partake in the uprisings and little has changed in their immediate lives: some heads may have rolled in some countries, but the difficult conditions that preceded the uprisings have only worsened since. The groups directly involved in collective action may have experienced substantial changes to their worldview, but not necessarily in the direction advertised by some media outlets.

The Arab uprisings have also raised questions about the changes in the value systems of the rebellious populations, with many assuming that the 2011 events transformed Arab societies from passive and subdued populations to dynamic and potentially democratically-oriented ones. The sixth wave of the World Value Survey, released in May 2014, included a record number of 12 Arab countries (Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Tunisia, Yemen, Bahrain, Kuwait, Algeria, Qatar, Morocco, Egypt, and Jordan). This popular worldwide survey of values posits that countries can be classified along two bipolar dimensions: a) traditional versus secular-rational values (sic) and b) survival versus self-expression values (WVS, 2014). This latest post-uprising survey showed Arab countries ranking highest globally on both traditional and survival values, i.e. at the conceptual opposites of the secular, rational, self-expressive countries composed of “Protestant

3 The labelling of these value dimensions has condescending connotations and assumes that traditional societies may possess irrational values.
The Challenges of Young People in Arab countries

Europe” and “English-speaking countries” (WVS, 2014). The authors also state that “the social dominance of Islam and individual identification as Muslim both weaken emancipative values,” oblivious to the rebellions that swept the Arab world. This reductionist view assumes a rather static set of Arab societies and fails to capture the popular uprisings’ demands for change (emancipation) without the need to transform their value system.

Repeated polls in the Arab world show a high Arab endorsement of religion across countries. While such findings allude to a potentially observant and devout population, they do not explain the cultural practices and the role religion actually plays in the lives of Arab peoples. The idea that Islam is a monolithic religion permeates the (Orientalist) literature, and little attention is given to the competing creeds within Islam: dozens of traditions and sects exist within each of the main branches of Islam (SUNNI, Shia and Sufi), and they range from the strictest interpretation to the loosest. The region’s diversity of traditions and beliefs also reflects the social complexity of an area rich with millennia-old history. As such, monolithic and reductionist approaches are both faulty and prejudicial. In addition, political freedoms are denied in most Arab countries, with state security brutally clamping down on dissent and organised action. Mosques (and universities) remain the only “free” spaces where people can gather and discuss social and political challenges (virtual spaces excepted). Under ideologically bankrupt regimes, and in the absence of political freedoms, religion was quick to flourish.

Under ideologically bankrupt regimes, and in the absence of political freedoms, religion was quick to flourish

A poll of 3,500 young people from 16 different Arab countries showed that family, friends and religion held the most influence in shaping the youths’ lives, but also found a growing number of young people embracing “modern values” (ASDA’A, 2014). Almost half the participants in the 2014 poll endorsed the statement “Traditional values are outdated and belong in the past. I am keen to embrace modern values and beliefs,” a three-fold increase over the 2011 findings (17%, 25%, 40%, and 46% for 2011, 2012, 2013, and 2014, respectively). While the survey has serious limitations (e.g. small sample sizes, construct validity, etc.), this noticeable and robust trend was consistent across data sets.

Conclusions

The euphoric images of millions of youths gathering in public spaces chanting for a change of regime across several Arab countries have long faded. The public spaces in Cairo, Sanaa, Tunis, Tripoli, Damascus and Manama are now largely empty. Three overlapping phases can be observed in the post-2011 uprisings era: the first phase saw popular uprisings and youth groups taking to the streets; the second saw Islamic parties affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood reap the electoral benefits; and the third saw counter-revolutionary efforts spread across the region, especially in Egypt and Syria. The pan-Arab revolutionary ebb of 2011 has now been replaced by a counterrevolutionary flow in key states and chaotic infighting in others.

It is no wonder that many citizens in the Arab world are wary of the uprisings. The Al Jazeera poll (2013) found that more than 90% of young people surveyed refrain from partisan affiliation and do not want to belong to any political party in future. Political disaffection does not mean young people are any less involved in current affairs, with a majority in all countries now following news developments and events.

Regional interference: The large majority of Arabs (82%) continue to support a “pluralistic political system in which all parties can compete through regular elections, regardless of ideology” (Arab Opinion Index, 2013). However, the youth’s aspirations and the process of self-determination are not occurring in a vacuum, but amidst strong local, regional and international interference. Old elites are on the counter-offensive in Egypt, Syria and Yemen, and regional powers (Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran) are directly interfering in the various contexts, each vying to protect its self-interests or expand its area of influence.

The oil-rich GCC countries constitute a primary Western strategic interest and the security of the monarchies is assured by a heavy US military
presence in the region. On the other hand, the GCC monarchies (especially Saudi Arabia) have a strategic interest in actively curbing the Arab uprisings because a) unrest may spread to their kingdoms and threaten their own rule and b) the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and its relatively moderate version of Islam is a direct threat to their own Wahhabi interpretation and influence. The fact that Saudi Arabia hosts the deposed Yemeni and Tunisian autocrats, backed the King of Bahrain, and poured billions of dollars into support for the military coup in Egypt is quite telling.

Old elites are on the counter-offensive in Egypt, Syria and Yemen, and regional powers (Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran) are directly interfering in the various contexts, each vying to protect its self-interests or expand its area of influence.

The Arab uprisings were not driven by ideological change (e.g. a religious uprising or democracy-seeking populations) but by feelings of exasperation with current conditions and practices. While many now seem to call for stability and security, the social conditions that led to the uprisings continue to worsen, and instability is likely to remain. The Arab uprisings are still ongoing and have yet to settle. It may thus be too early to cast identities and values as crystallised, as both are still being forged and shaped by the fires sweeping the region.

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Labour Market and Education: Youth and Unemployment in the Spotlight

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Since the global economic crisis, youth employment prospects have worsened continuously throughout the world, in developed, transition and developing countries alike. The situation is particularly acute in the Arab Mediterranean Countries (AMCs) as a result of additional specific factors. As well as the global economic crisis, some countries experienced extraordinary political changes in what is now called the Arab Spring. ‘Employment, Liberty, Dignity’ was the slogan of the Jasmin Revolution of January 2011 in Tunisia, which created a domino effect across the whole region. The initial economic impact of the Arab Spring was rather negative owing to political turbulence and social unrest, which have had a particular impact on the tourism, production and export sectors and on foreign direct investment.

Beyond this political and economic context, what is unique about youth in AMCs is the high share of youth population. Indeed AMCs are experiencing the largest cohorts of their youth population in history, which is likely to continue for at least three to four decades. Whether youth is a ‘gift’ or a ‘burden’ is a matter of long discussion, but demographic pressure is a key feature of educational systems and labour markets in most of the AMCs. The share of the population under the age of 30 years has exceeded 60%, and as a result the working-age population is approaching 70% (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2012). Considering the high aspirations of youth for education, jobs, marriage, housing etc., this puts a tremendous pressure on national economies and political systems in general. If the situation is not well managed, it may well pose a risk of social instability (ETF, 2013).

Key Features of the Youth Labour Market

Labour markets in AMCs have many challenges, but this article focuses on the youth labour market. Before youth unemployment rates, though, one should start with labour force participation rates of youth. According to the ILO (2013), on average, the youth labour force participation rate in 2012 ranged from 30.3% in the Middle East to 33.2% in North Africa, while the world average of youth labour force participation stands at slightly below 50%. Furthermore, there is a significant difference by gender: on average around 45% of young males and only 15% of young females are active in the labour markets of AMCs. Female labour force participation is particularly low in Mashreq countries (Jordan, Palestine), while the regional youth male participation rate – 45% – is comparable to the rates in advanced economies. Youth employment rates are even lower (around 35% for males and around 10% for females).

This very low youth activity rate (less than one third) suggests three important implications. Firstly, youth unemployment rates (Table 2 below) refer to only those unemployed within this ‘active youth group’ (currently standing at around 31%). In other words, although the youth unemployment rate is very high in the region, the highest regional average in the world and more than twice as high as the global average (as highlighted by ILO 2014), it corresponds only to the share of unemployed within 31% of youth, not the whole youth population. Hence when we talk of youth unemployment this refers to quite a small number of youth (approximately 8.6% of the total young population).
Nevertheless, the youth unemployment rate has increased after the Arab Spring, estimated at 28.1% in 2013 in the region, and is projected to increase gradually to 30% by 2018 (ILO, 2014). For example, unemployment among young people was 25% in Algeria, 30% in Egypt, 31% in Jordan, 42% in Tunisia, 44% in Palestine and 49% in Libya (see Chart 5). Indeed, the majority of unemployed people in MPCs (up to 80% in some countries, such as Egypt) are first job seekers with no previous work experience. Moreover, most of them have intermediate and higher education, implying that educational attainment actually increases the risk of joblessness. For instance, the unemployment rates for those with tertiary education are 30% in Tunisia, 22% in Egypt, 19% in Morocco and 18% in Jordan (see Chart 6).

Secondly, there is also clear gender segmentation in the labour market opportunities for young people: employment opportunities are rare for young men in the region, but almost non-existent for young women, as most employers openly give preference to male job seekers (ETF, 2012). Other employers do prefer female workers, though the jobs offered are low skilled and low paid, and hence not attractive to the few ‘educated’ females who seek employment. As seen in Table 2, the unemployment rate for young women is extremely high despite the fact that the female labour force participation rate is the lowest of

### Table 2: Unemployment Rates: Total, Female Total, Youth Total and Youth Female (last available year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and date of data</th>
<th>Total Unemployment (15+)</th>
<th>Female Unemployment (15+)</th>
<th>Total Youth Unemployment (15-24)</th>
<th>Youth Female Unemployment (15-24)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria 2013</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>24.8</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt 2012</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan 2013</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>55.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon 2009</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya 2012</td>
<td>19.03</td>
<td>25.05</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco 2013</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine 2013</td>
<td>23.4</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia 2013</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>45.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU28</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: National Statistical Offices; EU28: Eurostat; Libya ILOSTAT database. Notes: Egypt unemployment rates 15-64; EU28 15-74; Tunisia: data from 2nd trimester of 2013

### Chart 4: Gross Enrolment Rates in Lower Secondary and Upper Secondary Education and the Share of VET Students in Upper Secondary

Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics UIS-UNESCO; Note: *Libya are UIS estimations
all regions. Young female unemployment is particularly high in Palestine (62%), Jordan (55%), Egypt (53%), Tunisia (45%) and Algeria (40%). Therefore, the current employment gap between males and females is reflected in the same way among the youth population as well – and this gap will not decrease, even in the medium term, in the AMCs.

Thirdly, we do not know exactly what the rest of the youth population (almost 70%) is doing, as they are neither employed nor unemployed (not in the labour market). Given the age group 15-24, part of the youth population are students at different levels and types of education. As seen in Chart 4, gross enrolment rates in lower secondary education are almost universal (with the exceptions of Morocco, Lebanon and Palestine), but they are relatively low in upper secondary education which corresponds to the age group of 15-18 (ranging from 54% to 77%). Moreover, the share of vocational education and training (VET) students at upper secondary level is extremely small in AMCs – with the exception of Egypt, with almost half of students directed to VET streams. This means that there are a considerable number of early school leavers (or school drop-outs) in most AMCs.
Considering the gross enrolment rates of secondary and higher education in the region, ETF calculated that around 30-40% of youth population are currently in education (with wide variations between countries) (ETF, 2012). Putting together the ‘active youth population’ (31% including employed and unemployed) and ‘youth in education’ (30-40%), there is no information on the remaining one-third of the youth population. Indeed this group is neither in education nor in the labour market, and is not visible in statistics. The article employs here the concept of NEETs: young people who are not in education, training and employment. NEETs refer to those youth who currently do not have a job, are not enrolled in training or are not classified as students. Therefore it focuses on the ‘youth at risk’ who lack access to learning opportunities and are jobless and/or inactive.

As seen in Table 3 (and Chart 7), the NEETs are a more serious problem in AMCs and exceed the EU28 average. They increase from the age group 15-24 towards 15-29. For the age group 15-29, it reaches 41% in Egypt, for which data is available, 35% in Palestine, 32% in Tunisia and 29% in Jordan. This means that at least one out of three youth aged 15-29 is not in education or training, and not employed. Moreover, there is a big difference in the NEET rate for males and females. In Egypt, for instance, there are 40 percentage points difference between males and females in the NEET rate, 30 percentage points in Jordan, 23 in Palestine and 20 in Tunisia (see Table 2). Female NEETs are primarily ‘inactive’ in these countries (around 80% of them), while male NEETs are mainly ‘unemployed’ instead of inactive. This may be explained by typical gender roles pushing women to take care of a household, children or other relatives and remain at home.

### High Diversity among the Youth Groups

Youth are not only at a disadvantage compared with adults, there are also particular youth groups that are more vulnerable to social and economic disadvantages and poor performance in education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3</th>
<th>NEETs Rate in Available AMCs and EU28</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15-24 age group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt 2012</td>
<td>35.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan 2012</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine 2013</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia 2013</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU28 2013</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jordan, Tunisia, Palestine: ETF calculations based on ILO School to Work Transition Surveys; Egypt: ETF calculations based on the Egyptian labour market panel survey 2012 (ELMPS); EU28: Eurostat.

| CHART 7 | NEETs Rate in Available AMCs and EU28 (15-29 age group) |

The Challenges of Young People in Arab countries

and employment. This is particularly the case in AMCs where the social and economic inequality is very high (ETF, 2012) and the traditional state institutions (including education and the job market) tend to reinforce inequality rather than reduce it. The determinants of such disadvantages include:

- **Socio-economic background**: Young people from poor households tend to become young working poor, because of missed education opportunities and/or poor employment opportunities. They tend to leave education early.
- **Literacy, education and skills**: Less-educated (uneducated) youth are more vulnerable in life and in the job market, although they may start working earlier in poor quality and informal jobs. In most cases, they remain trapped in these jobs.
- **Gender**: Being female means a higher risk of being inactive or unemployed, having lower wages and directed to low-paid segregated jobs that are traditionally accepted ‘female’ jobs.
- **Rural/urban (and regional)**: The prospects and opportunities of youth in urban and rural areas are completely different. In general rural youth and youth from less developed regions are more vulnerable in education and employment.
- **Health conditions**: Youth with learning difficulties and the disabled youth are not even visible in society and public policies, although in most cases they are vulnerable to much abuse.

Therefore, ‘heterogeneity’ and ‘diversity’ are the key words to understanding the youth in AMCs, as well as their labour market situation. Despite the difficulties of mapping all youth groups in the region, and at the risk of oversimplification, a few distinct groups of young people with different types of employment challenges can already be identified.

The first such group is the youth with relatively good access to education opportunities and who go through the upper secondary, post-secondary and/or university education. Strangely enough, this is the group who face higher unemployment in the region, the so-called ‘educated unemployed,’ which receives a lot of attention. Despite the seriousness of the problem, we must remember that the proportion and absolute number of educated youth within the total age group of 15–30 is very small, and they are more likely to belong to the higher socioeconomic strata of society. This means that they may be able to choose between ‘available jobs’ or ‘remain unemployed.’ Their labour market entry is slow (postponed adulthood), but they are more likely to get better jobs in the end. Exception to this pattern is young females, whose unemployment rate is three times higher than that of their male counterparts (e.g. Egypt, Jordan and Palestine). As the labour market (in particular the private sector) is mostly closed to females, the majority become discouraged and drop out of it after a few attempts.

The second youth group consists of unskilled and low-skilled young people who tend to start working early. They are, in general, early school leavers and under strong social pressure to meet the economic needs of their families (early adulthood). A large part of this group is young males who occupy precarious positions in the labour market and move between short-term insecure jobs without experiencing long-term unemployment. There are also some young females working mainly in subsistence agriculture as family helpers in this group. Being employed, they may not get attention, but in reality they cannot afford to be unemployed. They do not have the necessary financial or human resources to improve/upgrade their skills. Thus they search for any (precarious) jobs and accept the poorest working conditions in the informal sector that will allow them to make a living, with subsistence wages and without any prospects for improvement.

The third group is inactive youth who are neither in education and training nor in the labour market. This is the most vulnerable to social exclusion as they are likely to be illiterate and/or uneducated women, including those who have dropped out of school. Surveys for some countries indicate that more than 40% of the young population is in this situation. Evidence points to rates close to 25% of the young male population in countries such as Jordan, Egypt and Palestine and close to 70% for young women (ETF, 2012). A large part of this gender difference is due to early school leaving and gender-related social norms that restrict mobility and access to further education or work for young girls after they have completed compulsory education.

It is clear that each of these groups requires different types of help for their specific needs. Given the large numbers of disadvantaged and vulnerable youth in
the second and third groups, there is a need to balance policy measures among these youth groups and to develop more instruments for those young people who are less visible in AMCs. For example, the second group needs special programmes for school reintegration combined with apprenticeships and/or second-chance adult training courses to enable them to upgrade their skills and hence progress in their careers and find better-quality jobs. The most effective actions for the third group would be those that promote universal literacy, together with developing key life competences for women, including mentoring programmes and second-chance adult training courses.

**Key Barriers for Youth Insertion in the Labour Market**

It must be remembered that the main factors affecting youth employment prospects are poor macroeconomic performance and growth (particularly deteriorated after the Arab Spring), the model of development, which determines the intensity of employment growth and the level of skilled job creation, and a lack of sufficient labour demand corresponding to the high demographic pressure. This is related to the model and stage of economic development in AMCs, but also to inbuilt factors such as the rigidity of labour market regulations. However, from the point of view of employability there are also a number of factors that make insertion into the labour market more difficult (ETF, 2012).

*Adequate education and training:* Despite wide-ranging improvements in educational coverage and achievement, school drop-out and illiteracy rates are still relatively high, and upper secondary enrolment rates relatively low. Young people refuse to enrol in VET programmes and are unwilling to learn manual work or craft professions. This still poses a major challenge to employability in large populations. Moreover, the low quality and Labour Market relevance of academic-oriented education, individuals’ preference for humanities degrees, the low proportion of young people opting for VETs, the strong gender segregation in VET occupations and the mismatch between individuals’ skills and employers’ needs are frequently mentioned in this regard.

*Generic and/or soft skills (key competences):* These include ICT literacy, foreign languages, communications and social skills, analysis and synthesis, critical thinking and work discipline. All studies point to this element as a major shortcoming in AMCs. Soft skills are tightly linked to cultural attitudes and need to be seen as a process rather than a single intervention. Teachers’ professional development and changes in school and university curricula and teaching methods could contribute much more to improving them than a proliferation of programmes such as those being implemented in some countries.

*Social expectations:* These still dissuade young people from enrolling in VETs and working in technical/manual occupations. Even graduation from prestigious VET centres, a step that opens positive employment prospects, is used as a method of entry into university by many students, and there is still a strong preference, in particular among graduates, for obtaining a state job (offering full social security and job security), despite the fact that for many young individuals this entails undertaking unproductive and unsatisfactory work. Although the State is no longer the employer of last resort for all graduates, political mobilisation often leads to increased public sector hiring, and being unemployed is a precondition for entry into the public sector.

*Overall business environment:* The business environment, the amount of red tape and bureaucracy involved in creating a company, and in particular the conditions prevailing in the financial sector do not encourage self-employment and SME development, despite positive experiences of entrepreneurship programmes on labour market insertion and employability. The structure of unemployment suggests that a significant part of unemployment results from high job expectations by workers with some formal education and a low valuation of these credentials by the private sector. Indeed many private companies identify the lack of skills among workers as a major constraint to business development.

*Efficient job-matching services and transparent labour market information systems:* Weak job-matching services is reflected in the fact that most jobs are found through personal contacts and social networks by those who are already employed, rather than through transparent and merit-based recruitment mechanisms involving open competition and/or job intermediation by public employment services.
Women are in particular at a great disadvantage as they lack personal contacts. Very low activity rates and very high unemployment rates imply strong discrimination suffered by women in relation to access to employment. Indeed, female employment is highly concentrated either in the public sector (in the education, health and social sectors) or in agriculture as family helpers.

**Conclusions**

The above analysis of the youth labour market implies much vulnerability among a highly diverse young population, poor performance of education and training systems, strong discrimination of females in the labour market, the devaluation of (scarce) national human resources and an increased risk of social instability. Some social theories point to the correlation between the proportion of unemployed young people in a society and the incidence of political violence (ETF, 2012). Nonetheless, there is a wide spectrum of policy options available in the field of youth employment promotion and employability to address the challenges of specific youth groups over the short, medium and long term, given the need to optimise the limited resources allocated to promoting employment.

- Young people are not a homogeneous group; therefore, targeting specific groups and specific disadvantages in the labour market is more effective. In particular, more measures for vulnerable groups are needed (early school leavers, inactive females, informal workers, NEETs etc.).
- The quality and relevance of, and access to, universal education need to be improved to reduce school drop-out rates and prevent youth from falling into the unemployment and poverty trap. Particular attention needs to be given to secondary education (both lower and upper secondary).
- Focusing principally on supply-side interventions will not solve the problem. Job creation policies (e.g. growth strategy, private sector development) and the use of labour market policies for targeted groups, such as wage subsidies, apprenticeships and training programmes, are needed.
- Entrepreneurship, self-employment, cooperatives, public investment programmes and employment intermediation services should be given priority to increase employment opportunities, particularly for the disadvantaged youth groups identified.
- VET systems have to be made more attractive, better quality and more responsive to the rapidly changing demand for skills in local labour markets. A more diverse offer of VET programmes, improved curricula and teachers, and extended outreach of VET to the youth are all needed. More emphasis on lifelong learning and soft skills is key to improving youth employability.

**References**


Regional Integration in the Western Mediterranean: the AMU and 5+5

The Added Value of Regional Integration

We are also aware of what has come to be known as the cost of this situation, the cost of the non-Maghreb (others prefer to speak in more positive terms of the added value regional integration would have), to which numerous studies and seminars have been dedicated, as well as the benefits that would arise from greater integration.¹

The fact is that the challenges and problems that are burdening the region require urgent solutions. It is not just a question of economic integration; desertification and climate change have meant, for example, that 80% of arable land is under threat of desertification. The countries of the region are unable to slow their imports. Imports of food products alone exceed €30 billion, hence the importance of cooperation in, among others, the area of food security, which is increasingly crucial to breaking away from this reliance on imports.

Once more, we will try to understand the reasons behind this situation, and what can be done to create a more stable and prosperous region, especially for its youth, who wish for a future of opportunities, and not the frustration and discontent they face today.

The reality is that the project for the unification of the Maghreb is one that is deeply rooted in the conscious of the region’s peoples, through their myths and historical references, and re-emerged in the context of the struggles for independence.²

Since their inception, nationalist movements have always incorporated the Maghreb dimension into their ideologies and actions. This is the case for Tunisia’s Destour and Neo-Destour, Messali Hadj’s North African Star, originating from the Algerian FLN, and Morocco’s Istiqlal, which in 1958 (FLN – Neo-Destour and Istiqlal) organised the Tangiers conference to support the Algerian cause during the Algerian War, reaffirming the common destiny of the Maghreb peoples.

In a letter to the congress attendees, Mohammed V proposed the creation of a Maghreb federation. During the struggle for independence, solidarity among the Maghreb nations created an entire generation committed to the Maghreb ideal, who, after independence, set to turning the dream of greater unification into a reality.

However, once the struggles for independence came to an end, the priority became that of strengthening their structures as independent states within...
The reality is that the project for the unification of the Maghreb is one that is deeply rooted in the conscious of the region’s peoples, through their myths and historical references.

The colonial borders; nations which, some would argue, people had fought and died for. From here arose the initial problems, which had hitherto lain dormant, although were often insinuated in talks aimed at gaining mutual support and subsequently winning independence.

The history of the region is replete with examples: the dispute over Mauritania, whose recognition by Morocco was not forthcoming until 1969; the territorial dispute between Tunisia and Algeria that went unresolved until 1970; the so-called Sand War between Algeria and Morocco, which was resolved in different stages, as of 1973, through the treaty concerning the state border between the two countries (ratified in 1973 by Algeria and only in 1989 by Morocco), or the comparable issue concerning the continental shelf in the Gulf of Gabès between Libya and Tunisia, which remained disputed until 1988.

Worthy of a separate mention is the conflict of the Western Sahara, and likewise Gaddafi’s adopted stance, which was more pan-Arab and less Maghreb right from the beginning of his rule.

Furthermore, each state, protective of their sovereignty and independence, made decisions on economic policy without taking into account their neighbouring states, resulting in each following a different model.

All this explains why it took several attempts and changes on the international panorama (US-Russian dialogue, a fall in oil prices, accession perspectives of Spain and Portugal to the EEC) for the logic on economic integration to be put into practice. In June 1985, HM King Hassan II presented Morocco’s candidature to the EC at the European Summit at Fontainebleau and in September of the same year the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA) declared that Algeria was ready to commit to economic integration and the union of the Maghreb in presenting a united front in the dialogue with Europe. The Saudi-brokered talks between Algeria and Morocco led to the Zeralda Summit in June 1988, which launched the process of the Arab Maghreb Union.

At the outset, five sub-committees were set up to study different aspects and problems arising from Maghreb unification: Finances and Customs, Economy, Education, Culture and Information, Social, Human and Security issues and Institutions.

Morocco and Algeria were to preside over the sub-committees related with the economy, Tunisia, security and Libya, institutions. Besides needing to keep some kind of balance in mind, this meant dealing with different standpoints, Libya’s being more political and Morocco and Algeria’s more economic, and the need to come to a compromise.

The Treaty of Marrakesh

The Marrakesh Summit in February 1989 adopted a declaration instituting the Arab Maghreb Union. Article 9 of this declaration refers, albeit without mentioning it, to the EEC as an example of a regional union that has progressed through carefully considered phases and which can be used as a model.

The Treaty of Marrakesh itself is structured in a Preamble of five points that reproduces some elements of the Declaration and 19 articles, ten of which refer to the organisation of the union, one to mutual defence, although in reality without a mechanism for applying it, two to security, four to final provisions and just two to real goals, articles 2 and 3.

In summary, a union of states was set up (interpreted by some as a non-integration and thereby contradicting the economic goals it alleged to pursue), with the purpose of developing common practices in specific areas and working to achieve the free movement of people, services, goods and capital between them and without supranational institutions. Their supreme body and the only one established to take unanimous decisions is the Presidential Council.

3 The 1972 Rabat Declaration, which refers to the conclusion and signing of this treaty and the treaty for the use of the Gara-Djebilet mine (a joint enterprise was established to allow iron ore located in Algeria to be exported from a Moroccan port located in the Atlantic), speaks of the will to begin a period of agreement and cooperation and thereby realise the people’s greatest aspirations regarding unification.

4 A detailed analysis of the Treaty, as well as its creation, can be found in the doctoral thesis of the then Crown Prince of Morocco, MOHAMMED BEN EL HASSAN ALAoui: La coopération entre l’UE y les pays du Magreb. ECL, Nathan 1994.
The first years of the AMU were characterised by an exuberance that led to the creation of numerous regulations. This initial impulse, however, would later be brought to an almost complete standstill. Regarding the 38 agreements signed in the framework of the AMU, 21 are of an economic nature. However, the commercial transactions between the countries of the region continue to be marginal, less than 3%, while commercial trade with the EU has reached 65%.

Virtual Integration

After 25 years of existence, the achievements of the AMU can only be seen as disappointing; the mere mention of virtual integration confirms this. In reality, the progress registered has been more in the area of security than the economy. The obstacles to its development have been practically the same ones that complicated its creation and launch. Reoccurring political tensions have led to institutional paralysis. If the only decision-making body does not meet, then progress is not possible (it has not met since 1994). The intra-Maghreb relations have been subject to a process which, instead of generating confidence, has bred mistrust among its leaders. The policies aimed at reaffirming regional hegemony have separated more than they have united, as has the competition between the states to show their own successful economic and social model to be superior to that of their neighbour. Any consensus reached for the conflict of the Western Sahara not to influence the development of regional cooperation was but a fleeting one.\(^5\)

At the same time, neither have economic conditions created the shared interests that could accelerate development and dampen political tensions. The convergence of economic policies towards a model of open economies has been insufficient and the structural adjustments implemented in the nineties did not lead to the desired progress in this sense. Although we are no longer dealing with different economic systems – Tunisia and Morocco on the one hand, and Algeria and Libya on the other – there is still a tendency towards protectionism. Likewise, there is insufficient complementarity, and this does not generate the desired trade flows.

Regional integration is led from above, but must also come from below, hence the importance of the role played by the respective civil societies

Such an ambitious initiative also requires a solid legal framework, a balance between means and ambitions and a change in both public opinion and economic agents towards valuing the benefits of a more open market, without the protection it previously enjoyed. Regional integration is led from above, but must also come from below, hence the importance of the role played by the respective civil societies. In this regard, at least, there is movement in the region. The Maghreb Entrepreneurs Forum, which has met for the third time this year in Marrakesh (the first two took place in Algeria and Tunisia) has launched the Maghreb Initiative on Trade and Investment with the aim of bringing fresh dynamics and relaunching the economic integration process, outlined in a series of measures to be carried out over a period of one to five years.

At this point, it is worth asking whether rather than revitalising the AMU, it should instead be re-established.

Revitalise or Re-establish the AMU?

The people have changed. None of the Heads of State present at the meetings in Zeralda in 1988 and Marrakech in 1989 are present on today’s political scene. There have also been major changes in the political reality of the Maghreb, which means that the issue of regional integration is no longer the exclusive domain of the political elites.

The Tunisian President Marzouki has been the first to call for regional cooperation, touring the other four Maghreb countries to highlight this need and see how far the idea can be taken. In so doing, he has overcome Tunisia’s historically muted stance on the

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subject, in favour of becoming a driving force behind the idea. Consequently, the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the AMU met in Rabat and then travelled to Libya. Although the meeting should be interpreted more as a reaction to the situation in the Maghreb and the trip as a show of solidarity with Libya than as a moment of understanding and unity with regard to the AMU, they talked of the need to reform the organisation and proposed programmes to reinforce cooperation, related to the area of security. Although this falls way short of organising a meeting at the Summit, it reveals a closer understanding that if the region does not move towards integration it will not have a future.

There are still elements, of a political nature, that obstruct the AMU’s reactivation, with particular relevance to security. Above all, these affect Morocco and Algeria, which is why these two countries need to know how to handle and differentiate their security interests in a way that does not steer them away from their goal of greater integration. This focus, as well as the clarification of political conditions, demanded to relaunch cooperation, could be a springboard to overcoming the difficulties that have delayed the process until now and opening the door to it being relaunched or re-established.

The Maghreb is an economic actor with little weight on the international economic stage and must respond to two frameworks, that of world globalisation and the European-focused Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, which occupies an intermediate space between the regional and the global. This is why another framework, that of the Maghreb project, must be relaunched thus allowing the demands of the other frameworks to be more easily met.  

The EU and Regional Integration

The EU is the Maghreb’s main trading partner, and although European cooperation, and even more so that of the Member States, is often focused more on the national panorama than the regional one, this dimension has taken on increasing importance. The European Union constitutes an undeniable ally to the South-South cooperation in the Mediterranean and in particular to Maghreb integration. Above all, this is thanks to the Neighbourhood (and all the policies that implies) and the fact that, unlike other actors, it does not see the region as just a market place.

The European Union constitutes an undeniable ally to the South-South cooperation in the Mediterranean and in particular to Maghreb integration

There is no contradiction, as some claim, between a united Maghreb and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), in the same way that there is not one between the processes of vertical and horizontal integration. The perspectives for closer cooperation between the EU and countries of the Maghreb both on the bilateral and regional level are real, and in 2013 were evidenced by the Joint Communication Supporting closer cooperation and regional integration in the Maghreb. Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia were discussed as countries of the Maghreb and a list of priorities for reinforcing cooperation was agreed. The countries of the Maghreb should respond to the EU’s offer to support regional cooperation on the basis of concrete ideas and proposals.

The 5+5

In this context of dialogue and support for regional integration is the so-called 5+5 dialogue. Established in 1990, this forum for informal dialogue has brought together the five countries from the northern shore (Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Portugal) and the five countries from the AMU. Already in 1983, the French Foreign Affairs Minister Claude Cheysson had informed the southern countries of President Mitterrand’s idea of the six countries of the Western Mediterranean (France, Spain, Italy, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco) meeting regularly to bring up issues of common interest and as a show of solidarity in the Mediterranean region, which

was not to replace the solidarity already existing between the different countries.

These meetings were to be considered as a step towards a global Mediterranean agreement, which was hard to imagine at the time because of issues with Cyprus and Palestine.

The reactions were not overly enthusiastic and Algeria in particular placed more importance in its relations with non-aligned Mediterranean countries and solutions to the problems, i.e. the right to self-determination, respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity and a dialogue that was more focused on economic problems and North-South dialogue.

But the idea took shape and the French proposal, backed by Spain and Italy, would lead to the first Ministerial Conference in Rome in 1990, initially paving the way to an informal 4+5 dialogue, which almost immediately became the 5+5 Dialogue, through the addition of Malta.

The new regional context of the Western Mediterranean (creation of the AMU in 1989 and consolidation of the Mediterranean flank of the European community project in 1986 with the accession of Spain and Portugal) together with the ongoing problems in the Eastern Mediterranean, precluding a global Mediterranean focus, revealed the usefulness, indeed the need, for an informal framework of dialogue and cooperation built on solid foundations, which took into account the new globalised reality and the inevitable interdependence of crucial issues such as security in the Mediterranean.

More reticent at the outset than any other country, Algeria enthusiastically assumed the presidency in 1991 and hosted the second Ministerial Meeting in the same year.

What had been a promising start was hampered by sanctions imposed on Libya by the Security Council following the Lockerbie disaster, which paralysed the dialogue’s activities.

Faced with this situation and Egypt’s interest in being present in all Mediterranean fora, France and Egypt launched the Mediterranean Forum in 1994, which was not burdened by the presence of Libya and incorporated an Eastern Mediterranean dimension, thereby sidestepping the Palestinian conflict.

A year later, in 1995, the Barcelona Process was launched as a multi-lateral framework of relations between the EU and its Mediterranean members. This, the most ambitious initiative in the Euro-Mediterranean area, had a global and coordinated focus, and was based on two assumptions: first, that the southern and eastern borders of the EU had to be restabilised without drawing false parallels, and second, that changes were needed for the EU to maintain its relations with its Mediterranean neighbours, while Central and Eastern Europe were becoming progressively integrated.

This was also the beginning of a process that aimed to overcome the bilateralism vs multilateralism binomial through multi-bilateralism.

(Apparently superfluous and unnecessary when compared with other Mediterranean initiatives, the 5+5 initiative seemed destined to disappear. However, it was reactivated)

(Apparently superfluous and unnecessary when compared with other Mediterranean initiatives, the 5+5 initiative seemed destined to disappear. However, when international sanctions against Libya were lifted, it was reactivated at the ministerial conference held in Lisbon in 2001, the first after a long hiatus of ten years. The meeting served to relaunch the 5+5 dialogue and, with regard to fostering integration in the Western Mediterranean, offered the added value that it both re-established Euro-Maghreb dialogue and included the presence of Libya (unlike the Mediterranean Forum).

In 2002, Libya held its first MFA meeting, also the first meeting since the attacks of 11 September 2001, which reinforced dialogue and tested Libya’s readiness to normalise its position in the international community.

The next stage was the first Summit of Heads of State and Government, which took place in Tunisia (2003) and concluded with a Joint Declaration by all participants confirming the following axes of dialogue: Stability, Maghreb Economic Cooperation and Integration, Social and Human Cooperation (immigration), Dialogue between Cultures and Civilisations, and Political Dialogue on major issues. Also in attendance at the meeting was the President of the European Commission.
From Reflection to Strengthened Cooperation

This agenda has been enriched by the inclusion of new issues and with the permanent participation of the European Commission in all sectors of the dialogue. The initiative has thereby been strengthened as a think tank for issues relevant to the Mediterranean architecture, transcending the merely governmental sphere and opening to other actors such as business associations, the media and youth organisations, as well as academic observatories, which would go on to develop their own networks.

The dialogue which began between MFAs has widened to include areas that are not just political, taking advantage of their informal and flexible character to promote strengthened cooperation of an eminently operative and practical nature, which can be translated into concrete actions.

It has developed in the areas of the Interior, Immigration, Transport, Defence, Tourism, Education and Research, the Environment and Energy, Agriculture and Food Security, as well as including representatives of national parliaments. There is an interest in widening these formats in the near future.

Likewise, some of these formations have already been given technical support structures, as is the case for transport with the CETMO (Centre for Transportation Studies for the Western Mediterranean), and formalised relations with other institutions in the Mediterranean sphere. Action plans have also been developed, including activities carried out by defence ministries with a greater reach.

The second Summit of Heads of State and Government met in Malta (October 2012) in the context of changes in the region, which were duly noted (the situation in Syria was given particular emphasis), and reiterated its support for Maghreb integration. Issues concerning the economy, education and youth, considered to be fundamental to the development of the Mediterranean, were central to the discussions.

Some of its initiatives have been considered as a model of regional cooperation as they tackle basic and widely shared aspects that are fundamental to Maghreb integration, such as investments, SMEs and immigration, but also strategic affairs like defence, transport, energy and water.

At no time has the forum weakened the globalising principle of Mediterranean cooperation. In fact, the opposite is the case: it contributes ideas and experiences, strengthens the Magreb’s position in Europe and gives a more relevant role to southern Europe. In recent years it has also shown that by creating connections with the EU it offers an added value that strengthens its operability, as well as that of the EU, in the region.

It is criticised at times for not discussing thorny bilateral issues (Western Sahara, closure of land borders between Algeria and Morocco) but sheds light on certain issues on the international agenda (Iraq, Syria, Terrorism), which rather than creating problems, opens interesting perspectives thanks to the importance given to formalising agreements, even when the positions involved are very different.

Today the 5+5 is the forum for dialogue and cooperation that creates the highest level of consensus among the Southern Partners. Its vitality responds to a flexible focus and participation based on shared interests, and, even without formal structures, it gives greater coherence to South-South integration strategies.

The forum has become an essential link in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and an example of how reinforced cooperation can contribute towards horizontal integration. The step from reflection to action is taken based on common interests and interaction with other mechanisms of regional cooperation.

The new dynamic initiated by the Union for the Mediterranean with the implementation of projects that respond to socio-economic challenges and the goal of regional integration, based on the concept of variable geometry, opens new perspectives for establishing complementarities and underlining the contribution of the 5+5 to regional integration.
The Gulf monarchs and emirs have managed to escape the tragic fate of other Middle Eastern and North Africans monarchs, who have been killed or dethroned; indeed, they have shown great resilience.

To date, the main challenge to the stability of the Gulf has been the Iraqi invasion of the Emirate of Kuwait, on 2 August 1990, which triggered a massive Western military build-up and foreign intervention to liberate the small State and oil giant. This sheds light on a significant geostrategic factor: given the world’s reliance on Gulf oil and gas exports, the Gulf’s stability is not only a regional concern but an international one. It also explains why there has been little elite turnover in the Gulf countries and why the question of reform in the Gulf has never topped the agenda in the West, including in the EU: Western policies in the Gulf are stability-driven.

Stability, but Not Stagnation

But the Gulf’s stability can also be explained by the fact that it does not go hand in hand with stagnation. This is due not only to demographic factors (small countries with vast resources) but also to better distribution of welfare benefits. The GDP of some of these small countries, such as the Emirates or Qatar, is among the highest in the world. Should oil prices stabilise at around $100-120 per barrel, the combined GDP of the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries may well make them the world’s fifth- or sixth-largest economy by 2025.

Given these prospects, the distribution of power and wealth may eventually be questioned. Growing middle classes and burgeoning local bourgeoisies and entrepreneurship will challenge the current order. There will be more voices asking for a greater say in the decision-making processes. Claims for better, more transparent governance will become more frequent, placing pressure on the ruling elites to reach out to civil society and business owners to ward off and pre-empt potential opposition.

Even before the winds of change blew over Tunisia in 2011, opposition forces were bubbling below and above the surface in Kuwait and Bahrain; in Oman, they were calling for more transparency, better governance and deeper inclusion. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, the Gulf states cannot simply carry on with “business as usual.” The GCC has to respond.

The GCC and the Arab Spring

The clarion call of the Arab Spring caught the GCC off guard. Gulf responses have been diverse. Some governments tried to nip the reform movement in the bud by immediately introducing reforms, while others started to hand out generous subsidies or to create new jobs in the already inflated and saturated public sector. Some of the smaller emirates, like Qatar, went even further, assuming the role of “key moderniser” and offering support and extensive me-

dia coverage to freedom protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya and Syria.

None of these options is risk-free. Kuwait, which pioneered democratic parliamentary elections in the region, is now riven by deep divisions resulting from frequent cabinet reshuffles, which hinder the decision-making process. In Bahrain, the protests have been repressed with the help of fellow Gulf monarchs in a move to shore up a threatened Sunni monarchy against what is described as an “Iran-driven Shi’a opposition.” Saudi Arabia has promised future reforms, relying heavily on strong financial and employment incentives in the interim.

Qatar, too, resorted to this method, pledging a financial package of more than $8 billion including salary hikes: this explains why less than 10% of Qatari nationals work in the private sector. However, Qatar also embarked on a very proactive form of diplomacy, presenting itself as a “flag-bearer” of the Arab Spring, to the puzzlement of many. Not only did it offer financial and political support and media coverage through Al Jazeera, it went one step further, participating in the NATO operations in Libya and adopting a high profile in the case of Syria. In doing so, the country runs a clear risk of being accused of double standards, championing the Arab Spring abroad even as it fights to tighten its grip at home. Despite the wide variety of their responses to the Arab Spring, none of the Gulf states is shielded from its repercussions. The Gulf states must thus endeavour to transform the challenge posed by the Arab Spring into a new opportunity.

One course of action would be to deepen their integration process, by pooling their military forces, adopting a single currency, or launching a Gulf Conference for Cooperation and Security including Iraq, Yemen and even, potentially, Iran. Another would be to support governments that promote stability. After the removal of President Morsi in Egypt by General Sissi, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates were the first countries to announce an aid package for Egypt, worth more than $12 billion. Before that move, the GCC countries had come out with a stunning proposal to integrate Jordan and Morocco, which are obviously not Gulf states, but whose integration would have the benefit of enhancing Gulf security and stability in exchange for financial assistance. With the exception of the specific case of social upheaval in Bahrain and some limited street manifestations in Oman, it seems that the other GCC countries are faring well. It thus seems overblown to view the Arab Spring as a potential threat to Gulf stability, let alone the regimes’ survival.

This is not to imply that there is a “Gulf exception,” or that oil and gas are a sufficient bulwark against the storms of change. However, the traditional power structure is not under threat for the time being and there is an unwavering interest in the West and the international community at large in maintaining Gulf regional stability. No European country vehemently objected when Saudi tanks went to patrol in Manama, in support of the Sunni monarchy of Bahrain. And there has been convergence of opinion between the GCC and the EU on the need for Yemen’s President, Ali Saleh, to step down, which was a GCC initiative. Today, there are convergences of opinion and interests between the West – in particular, the EU – and the Gulf states in the case of Syria.

In light of these considerations, there seems to be no contradiction between championing the battle of freedom abroad and the status quo at home. By siding with fellow Arabs, in Egypt or elsewhere, not only do GCC countries increase their stature in the Arab region and the world at large, but they also convey a message to their own population that Gulf countries are not minor players in regional and world politics.

The EU and the GCC: A Strategic Partnership?

There are insistent calls in Europe for an enhanced, deep and strategic relationship between the EU and the GCC. These calls are not motivated only by oil supplies from the Gulf. They are also motivated by the fact that the GCC is playing a more and more significant diplomatic and economic role in the Middle East and North Africa. Many experts highlight the


fact that the GCC has filled the strategic vacuum left by Egypt under the rule of Mubarak: Saudi Arabia brokered the Taif Agreement for Lebanon (22 October 1989); pushed for the adoption, at the Arab level, of the “Arab Initiative for Peace” in 2002 and 2007; tried to reconcile Palestinian parties; and, in 2010, extracted Lebanon from a dangerous stalemate. Another GCC country, Qatar, has likewise played a significant diplomatic role in mediations in Darfur, Sudan, Palestine and Lebanon and, for two years, has spared no resources or energy in its support of the Arab Spring.

On the economic front, the GCC has emerged as the second biggest investor in the Mediterranean Basin and, mainly since 2003, has played “a more assertive role in Mediterranean Countries’ affairs,” both before and after the Arab Spring. Whatever the GCC’s real motives in the Middle East and Mediterranean countries, it is becoming crystal clear in the eyes of the EU that the Gulf is a force to be reckoned with and, therefore, that a strategic EU-GCC partnership is not only necessary, but urgent.

A number of analysts have argued that the Gulf states are gaining a “prominent place in the international security agenda,” that Gulf states already play “a pivotal role in solving global challenges,” and that it is time for Europe, after decades of little ambition, to “propose a strategic partnership.”

They recognise that the Gulf region’s security is important not only for the EU but also for other external actors.

**But Does the GCC Matter for the EU?**

There is no question that it does, and for many reasons:

**a)** GCC countries are of overwhelming importance for the energy supply of both Europe and the world at large. Suffice it to say that the GCC countries’ huge oil reserves account for about 40% of the global total, with an estimated average reserves-to-production ratio of 73 years. To this vast oil wealth, one must add the region’s likewise huge gas reserves, estimated at an aggregate total of 43 billion cubic metres, or 25% of the global total (Qatar alone has reserves of 25 billion cubic metres), and yet Gulf production accounts for only 8.3% of the global total, leaving considerable margin for future development.

**b)** The GCC is the only functioning regional organisation in the Arab Middle East, and it has been both a reliable ally and a stable economic partner of the West.

**c)** The region reinvests vast amounts of funds in European countries (government bonds, real estate, equities).

**d)** The EU and GCC agree on various issues, such as the need to stabilise Iraq, the need to promote development in Yemen, the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict or the non-proliferation issue.

**e)** It is in the interest of the GCC countries to diversify their external alliances, and the EU’s expertise in integration processes is amply recognised.

**f)** The GCC countries’ combined domestic product is estimated at $1.6 trillion (2013). With a total population of 47 million (50% foreigners), GCC countries have accumulated some $2 trillion in foreign assets, which could grow to $2.2 trillion in 2014.

And yet relations between the EU and the GCC continue to be low-intensity, well below what the GCC’s strategic importance and the EU’s interests and stakes would merit.

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Why Such a “Strategic Mismatch”?\(^{10}\)

Analysts generally cite several reasons:

a) EU foreign policy has been driven by short-term reactions to events and not by a far-reaching vision.

b) The EU believes that the signing of a free trade agreement with the GCC should be a pre-requisite for a broader strategic partnership.

c) After the stalemate of the Euro-Arab dialogue in which the Gulf states took part, the EU shifted its attention to its Mediterranean policies.

d) In 2003, the EU issued a policy document entitled “Strengthening the EU’s partnership with the Arab World,”\(^{11}\) and in June 2004, the European Council adopted a “Strategic partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East.”\(^{12}\)

The EU feels that the Gulf countries are included in this partnership and that a specific EU-GCC strategic partnership would thus be an unnecessary duplication.

e) Historically, EU Member States have pursued bilateral relations with Gulf countries and are thus opposed or reluctant to pursue the “Europeanisation” of relations with the GCC.

f) Finally, given the standard of living in the Gulf, the EU cannot resort to the same toolbox and policy instruments (aid, conditionality, etc.) that it has used for its Mediterranean relations.

For all these reasons, the EU has failed to adopt a higher profile, to increase its visibility in the Gulf and to propose a strategic partnership.

But Is a “Strategic Partnership” with the GCC Necessary and Useful?

On this issue, I disagree with the enthusiastic calls by many scholars for such a “strategic partnership” between the EU and the GCC. Let us briefly review these arguments.


\(^{11}\) European Commission and High Representative report. Strengthening the EU’s partnership with the Arab World, D(2003)10318, Brussels, 4 December 2003.

\(^{12}\) European Council. Final report on A European Strategic partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, June 2004.

\(^{13}\) “Since 1980, oil and gas consumption in GCC states have risen by 405% and 722% respectively against average global rises of 41% and 122% according to the US Energy Administration,” Cortes Ulrichsen, Kristian. In: “Sustainable Growth or More of the Same?” Al Shark al Awsat (English), 21 November 2013.

been more preservative and conservative than transformational.

e) The EU and the Gulf have common interests in the Mediterranean, such as managing maritime transport, protecting the environment, or mobilising investments for the region.

The proponents of an EU-GCC strategic partnership argue that almost two thirds of the Foreign Direct Investment received by the Mediterranean region between 2003 and 2009 consisted of EU and Gulf investments.¹⁵ They conclude that there is a rationale for a shared development project, thus paving the way for changing the format of EU-Mediterranean policy in order to integrate Iraq and Yemen. This argument seems valid: indeed, the delinking of EU-Mediterranean policy and the GCC countries is more and more incongruous in light of recent developments (increasing Gulf investment, Gulf diplomatic activism, Gulf support for Arab Spring countries, etc.)

But does this argument justify a specific EU-GCC strategic partnership? I doubt it. Instead, I remain a staunch advocate of a “Euro-Arab Partnership.”¹⁶ This partnership does not preclude regional partnerships with Maghreb states or Gulf states on specific issues. However, an EU-Arab partnership as a single regional framework would encompass all Arab states. It would go beyond the so-called “triangulation” between the EU, the GCC and the Mediterranean region. It would moreover be preferable to the American “Broader Middle East Policy,”¹⁷ which includes non-Arab states.

There is resistance, among EU officials, to the very concept of a “Euro-Arab partnership”: because it excludes Israel, dilutes the EU’s Mediterranean policy into a larger space, and places various distinct situations in a single sack. To these objections, my answer is simple:

a) The presence of Israel in Mediterranean policies has been an objectively complicating factor and a major hurdle in EU-Mediterranean relations.

b) Past experiences of Euro-Arab dialogue as an initial exercise of multilateral diplomacy have met with success despite the format.

c) The “Mediterranean,” as an object of EU policy for more than 40 years, is mainly a European construct and does not take into account the issue of identity and inter-Arab connections.

Conclusion

EU-GCC relations do not seem to be dictated by spontaneous empathy, cultural proximity or a similar value system, but rather by prosaic interests and challenges. There remains a striking gap between the polite and friendly atmosphere of the joint meetings and the Gulf’s poor image at the level of European public opinion at large, and even among certain individuals responsible for Europe’s foreign relations.

And yet, the Gulf should matter to Europe for various reasons:

- The GCC countries are of enormous strategic and economic importance to the EU.
- Some 60% of all oil reserves are concentrated in the Gulf, and 45 to 50% of these reserves are in GCC countries.
- At the strategic level, the Gulf is key. A mere glance at the map reveals its geopolitical and geostrategic value.
- The GCC countries still have oil-driven and oil-dependent economies. Energy continues to account for the bulk of revenues and exports.
- The Gulf countries have consistently been open to the West, and many of them have been reliable allies of the West as well, both during the Cold War period and once the bi-polar system fell apart.
- The GCC countries established a customs union in 2003, thereby clearing away a stumbling block in their negotiations with the EU for the free trade agreement. Europe will be the prime beneficiary of such an agreement given the diversity of its exports.

Gulf countries should therefore matter. And yet, as correctly pointed out in a recent strategy paper presented by the Bertelsmann Group: “the relationship between [the] EU and the GCC and its member countries has been of low intensity, and reflects neither the geographic proximity nor the vital links in several fields existing between the two sides.”

Why, then, did EU-GCC cooperation take off only to continue to fly so low after more than three decades? Several reasons are often singled out:

1. **The different nature of the two regional organisations.** The EU has been economy-driven, while the GCC has been security-motivated.

2. **The reluctance of some countries, such as France and England, to Europeanise their traditional ties with the Gulf states.** German experts often put forward this argument, although, as the first- or second-largest exporter to all Arab countries, Germany itself is not immune to the same charge.

3. **The EU does not want to antagonise the US in a region believed to be its “captive market,” “political reserve” and geopolitical “launching pad.”** Although this perception may be correct from a political point of view, it is incorrect to suggest that the Gulf is a captive market for the US, as the GCC’s economic ties with Europe are by far larger than its ties with the US.

4. **The EU’s vital interest in the GCC is to have access to energy and a secured supply.** But this interest is shared by the entire global community. There is thus a feeling in European circles that a special relationship with the Gulf countries would do nothing to foster the interests of Europe.

5. **The European Petrochemical Industry is fiercely opposed to the signing of a strategic agreement including a free trade area.**

Whatever the reasons, whether obvious or undeclared, there is no doubt that EU-GCC relations have been shy and shallow, in spite of the €144.5 billion of total trade (2012).

However, new developments are pushing Europe to change course and give more momentum and impetus to its relationship with the Gulf. Without delving into excessive details, let us single out just a few:

1) The US seems incapable of adequately managing the aftermath of the war in Iraq, and Europe is called upon to contribute to the country’s stabilisation. Yet obviously Europe will not rush in if other regional actors, mainly the GCC countries, remain on the sidelines watching how events unfold. It is, therefore, in the interest of both sides to coordinate their efforts and maybe to think about a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)-style arrangement for the Gulf to address the challenges of post-war Iraq. The time is ripe to move away from the state-based centrality of security issues. Only then can the GCC meet non-state challenges, such as terrorism, piracy, illegal migration, drug trafficking, etc.; contribute to the stabilisation of regional hotspots, such as Yemen, Somalia and, potentially, Afghanistan; and work with Iran, on an equal footing, towards a shared concept of regional security in the Gulf.

2) The worsening situation in Palestine is becoming a breeding ground of regional discontent and resentment. While Europe has been marginalised as a broker by the US and Israel, there is a strong feeling that a strategic EU-GCC dialogue would enhance Europe’s role in the region.

3) The burgeoning trade between Asia and the GCC is forcing Europe to reconsider its attitude in order not to be overtaken and eventually replaced by countries whose image is not linked to past colonialism and to present patronisation.

4) In spite of sporadic street demonstrations in some of the smaller Gulf countries, on the whole, the GCC has proved to be the most stable oil region when compared to other oil-producing countries.

5) China’s new appetite for oil is straining the supply-and-demand equation. Although the immediate effect on world oil demand may be overstated, the classic rivalry between producers is bound to give way to a new rivalry between consumers. Europe cannot afford to sit with its arms crossed, watching.

6) Should world demand for oil continue to rise, there will be difficulties in physically raising output to meet consumers’ future needs. Only the GCC countries, with the world’s largest reserves, are in

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18 The EU and GCC: A New Partnership, Bertelsmann Foundation, in cooperation with the Mediterranean programme of the European University Institute of Florence, March 2002.
a position to increase output, but only over time and with the necessary investments and technical expertise. There is thus a growing feeling that Europe cannot afford to be absent or distracted from this potentially huge market.

7) Finally, in addition to the oil parameter, there is another reason for Europe to redirect its attention to the Gulf: the Neighbourhood Policy. Indeed, since the last enlargement, Europe has set up a new framework for its relations with its immediate neighbours. Within this framework, the GCC happens to be what is called, in the EU jargon, a “neighbour of the neighbour.”

For all the above-mentioned reasons, a fresh start in EU-GCC relations is not only desirable, but necessary. It is dictated by shared interests and common concerns. Those who think that the oil age is over or that shale oil will soon replace Gulf oil are dealing in false expectations. The replacement of oil, however desirable it may be from an ecological perspective, will not occur soon. Therefore, Europe has to show decisiveness and clarity of purpose. A free trade agreement with the GCC is in its interest. Europe’s insistence on human rights is understandable and necessary. But Gulf officials understand that many of the problems are largely due to traditional social and cultural practices, rather than systematic governmental abuse, and that the EU would be well-advised to give them time, as changes in social practices cannot be dictated or imposed but rather must come from within and be socially assumed.

Cooperation on more pressing issues should foster a real partnership: the common fight against terrorism, and the promotion, by both sides, of a culture of respect and mutual understanding. Both parties should likewise endeavour to help to bring about a lasting solution in Palestine to avoid the utilisation of this protracted conflict by radicals who wish to fight Israel and the West “to the last Palestinian.” The GCC should view the integration of Yemen favourably. Such an audacious policy would stabilise this poor country and prevent it from becoming a sanctuary for radical groups.

The recent developments and transformation of the general geostrategic landscape in the Arab World are increasing GCC involvement in regional affairs. Indeed, while Egypt, Tunisia and Libya are struggling to stabilise the “political scene” and put their economies back on track, the GCC countries are gaining in prosperity, influence, visibility and stature.

Recent events in the Arab World call past European “security first” policies into question, while at the same time challenging the GCC’s traditional political behaviour based on the distribution of welfare benefits in exchange for acquiescence. Conversely, however, they also offer opportunities for better interaction and a reinforced relationship. This article has argued that it is past time to wrap up the free trade negotiations and to deepen European ties with the entire Arab World, of which the GCC countries are the most dynamic part.

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19 Bichara Khader: op. cit.
Dossier : From Revolutions to Constitutions
Marina Ottaway  
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The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington

The 2011 uprisings in the Arab world have triggered a wave of constitution-making, although not necessarily of democratisation. Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt have adopted new constitutions – with Egypt actually enacting one full-fledged constitution and several constitutional proclamations before finally adopting the current charter in January 2014. Even Syria was given a new constitution in 2012; written by a committee appointed by the President, it protected his position and power, although ostensibly it opened the way for competitive presidential elections. Libya and Yemen have also been trying to reach an agreement on new constitutions, although the process has stalled in both countries. A constitution is essentially an agreement among important political actors in a country about the principles and rules to be respected in governing. A constitution thus reflects the balance of power among political groups and their preferences – the ancestor of all constitutions, the Magna Charta, reflected the balance of power between crown and barons. But in the contemporary world the constitution-making process cannot completely ignore ordinary citizens and has to incorporate them and their demands in some form – even if this only means allowing the general public to vote in a referendum. Furthermore, at present, constitutions are seldom drafted through a purely domestic process, as the US constitution was drafted, for example. Drafters of modern constitutions are expected to observe internationally accepted principles as well: constitutions, like elections or, in a different realm, goods sold on the market, should meet international expectation and live up to international standards. The post-uprising Arab constitutions have been shaped by the three imperatives of bowing to power, addressing public expectations, and conforming to international standards sufficiently to avoid censure. This means that constitutions are not only normative or aspirational documents, but also a map of power relations in each country.

Examining the Three Imperatives

The three imperatives – respecting international standards, satisfying domestic constituencies, and accommodating powerful actors – affect constitution-making everywhere. It is also normal for them to conflict with each other. For both reasons, they merit further discussion.

Respect for International Standards

In its essence, a constitution should be an agreement among citizens of a country on how to govern themselves and which principles to uphold in doing so. Ideally, the writing of a constitution should thus be a domestic process and in fact successful constitutions usually owe little to foreign pressure. The long-surviving American constitution was the result of bargaining among the political elites of the original thirteen states. More recently, South Africans in the early 1990s wrote their constitution after discarding reams of models proposed by experts and disregarding the conflicting advice offered from different directions. On the other hand, the first post-colonial African constitutions were drafted by experts in London and Paris and did not survive for long; and Iraq is still struggling under a constitution that reflects...
what the United States hoped to accomplish rather than an agreement among Iraqis. Despite the evidence that constitutions need to reflect domestic agreement in order to last, countries in the process of writing constitutions are bombarded with advice from international experts anxious to inject in the document international standards, ‘lessons learned,’ or their pet theories.

“Constitutions are now being framed in an age when the dispersal of norms and of the principles of good governance is fairly widespread in all the continents of the world… Declining levels of violent conflict between states have also catalysed international dialogue on shared values, such as human rights, the rule of law, freedom, constitutionalism, justice, transparency and accountability – all of them important ingredients of any constitutional system. Shared values permit organisations such as the African Union and the Organization of American States to be stakeholders of constitutional governance in their member states, which may legitimately intervene when constitutions are not respected, for instance in the holding and transfer of power after free elections.”

The existence of such shared values and norms, and the recognition of the right of international or regional organisations to intervene when they are violated, is still more contested than the above statement admits. The widespread 1960s’ contention that democracy was a Western concept and the United Nations so-called universal declaration of human rights an attempt to impose Western values on the rest of the world appeared to be waning in recent decades.

But it is reappearing with increasing frequency, and not only in countries like China or Saudi Arabia that never embraced democracy and human rights. The official post-coup 2013 Egyptian narrative, for example, claims the country experienced not one but two democratic revolutions (in January 2011 and again in July 2013). Nevertheless, during his election campaign President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi openly declared democracy to be a luxury the country could not afford for another 25 years, even refusing to share his election platform with the voters because it would create unnecessary controversy (http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/8/egypt-s-sisi-tellsmedianotopushfreedoms.html). Many Muslim countries, and most Islamist movements and parties, refuse to accept the principle of separation of state and religion as incompatible with Islam. And few countries outside Europe, the United States and Canada are willing even to discuss the idea that protection of human rights should be extended to gays and lesbians, let alone transgender individuals.

The post-uprising Arab constitutions have been shaped by the three imperatives of bowing to power, addressing public expectations, and conforming to international standards sufficiently to avoid censure

Even more important than the direct challenge to the universality of principles of human rights and democracy is their de facto violation in many countries that enshrine them in their constitutions. To be sure, there are grey areas and battles in all countries concerning the balance between individual rights and national security – a problem unlikely to ever be clearly and permanently resolved. But the most serious problem is constitutions’ inclusion of principles the government has no intention of respecting, but incorporated in the charter simply to satisfy international expectations. It is open to debate how much international expectations have contributed to making countries more democratic, but they certainly contribute to making constitutions more hypocritical.

Responding to Domestic Constituency

Like international expert advice, popular input has become a normal feature of present day constitution-making processes, although it is often purely symbolic. Two approaches to incorporating public demands are frequently used: the drafting of the constitution

by an elected constituent assembly and the submission of the document to a popular referendum. Both were used recently in Arab countries – the referendum in Morocco and Egypt, and the election of a constituent assembly in Tunisia. Both can provide real representation of the public demands or be purely symbolic, depending on how they are implemented.

In Arab countries, a constitutional referendum is usually an empty process. Voters are asked to approve a document that the government has made no effort to publicise and that can even be difficult for voters to access; time for discussion is short, further ensuring that voters will endorse a document without knowing what it entails. Voters who approved the post-coup d’état Egyptian constitution in January 2014 expressed great relief that it superseded the one approved a year earlier when Mohammed Morsi was President and the Muslim Brotherhood governed the country. Very few would have been able to identify accurately the limited differences between the two documents. Even in the more benign political environment of Morocco, voters were more influenced in their decision by the King’s call to accept the document – he announced that he would vote ‘yes’ in the referendum – than by the content, with which most were not familiar.

On the other hand, some countries have a meaningful process of popular consultation without holding a referendum or electing a constituent assembly. The 1993 constitution that put an end to apartheid was written by an appointed body and only approved by the political organisations involved in negotiating the transition. But before final approved, the draft was widely disseminated throughout the country, and organisations and private citizens were invited to submit comments and suggestions. Thousands of submissions were received helping to consolidate support for the new political system and turn the constitution into a living document.

Accepting the Reality of Power

Constitutions are most often discussed in terms of their normative and aspirational content, rarely as a reflection of the power relations that exist in a country. This is particularly true in the discussion of contemporary constitutions with democratic features. It is widely acknowledged that the US constitution’s acceptance of slavery was an expedient adaptation to the realities of power. There is greater reluctance to read contemporary constitutions as being, at least in part, a map of the existing power distribution in a particular country. In reality, the more a constitution is the outcome of a domestic drafting process, the more it reflects the distribution of power.

Bowing to the reality of power distribution is inevitable. A constitution is nothing but a piece of paper if it is not accepted by those who are in a position to prevent its implementation.

Adapting to the reality of power distribution and to the political calculus of important actors can be subtle or blatant. In the case of recent Arab constitutions, the heated debate on the respective merits and shortcomings of presidential and parliamentary systems – a perfectly legitimate debate from all points of view – also reflected the political calculus of the different parties about their comparative advantage in presidential and parliamentary elections. In other cases, the power play is more blatant: the Egyptian military would not allow itself to be challenged by the drafters of either the 2013 or the 2014 constitution, who were forced to exempt the military from civilian oversight and to put its budget outside parliamentary scrutiny.

Balancing Imperatives in the Post-Uprising Constitutions

The three constitutions recently enacted in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco are all shaped, inevitably, by the need to balance the three imperatives. None of the countries could disregard the reality of power distribution; they could not disregard completely the demands of the population and above all of the more mobilised interest groups, although there was also much manipulation of those demands and expectations. Finally, as countries were anxious to maintain good relations with the United States and Europe, and were also in need of foreign assistance, they could not disregard international expectation. Different factors, however, weighed differently in each country and the mixture produced constitutions with different levels of internal coherence as well as of credibility. These differences reflect the de facto situation in the three countries much more than the skills of the drafters.
Tunisia

The constitution of Tunisia is the most coherent internally as well as the most credible of the three for two reasons: first, it was not distorted by a lopsided power distribution; and second, it was the object of intense bargaining among all parties, with important civil society organisations such as the labour unions federation and the employers association also weighing in at times.

With a truly pluralistic spectrum of political parties, ranging from the Islamist Ennahda to a wide array of centrists and secular parties and a very vocal set of far-left political factions with small electoral support but strong ties to the powerful labour unions, Tunisia was not dominated by any one political force. Ennahda, which received about 40% of the vote in the constituent assembly elections, could not govern alone or impose a constitution of its own choosing. As a result, the only articles that could gain acceptance from everyone, after months of bargaining, were relatively neutral in terms of their political implications, favoring no political party. Thus, the constitution lives up to international standards by recognising and defending a broad array of individual rights and freedoms, but without making promises the government could not possibly keep – such as freedom from unemployment or the right to adequate housing. It is a secular constitution in that it does not provide an official role for religious authorities nor recognise a state religion; however, it is not militantly secular, because it acknowledges that Islam is the religion of most Tunisians.

Morocco

The Moroccan constitution also has a high degree of internal coherence. It balances successfully a degree of commitment to civil and political rights and democratic processes with the acknowledgment that the King remains the highest and unchallengeable authority, even while accepting to exercise that power through democratic institutions – at least most of the time.

The constitution does not make Morocco into a constitutional monarchy in the classical sense of one where the King rules but does not govern. The Moroccan King has the authority to govern when he wants, but he can delegate that authority when he sees fit. The cabinet can meet and make decisions without the King on ordinary matters, but it can only consider issues of strategic importance when the monarch presides over the meeting. And it is the King who makes the determination of what is and is not of strategic importance. The King may decide not to involve himself directly with issues he considers of marginal importance, but he cannot be kept away from any decision he considers important. In other words, the constitution lightens the King’s burden by not requiring him to be in charge of all decisions, without limiting his power by excluding him from anything in which he wants to become involved. The smooth and swift process through which the constitution was enacted confirms that the drafters never confronted, or even intended to confront, the King. They were appointed by the palace, as was a second commission charged with developing consensus around the new charter. By announcing that a new constitution would be prepared before street movements could gain a strong following and issue their demands, the King managed to maintain complete control of the process. The new constitution was approved by a large majority of those voting in the referendum and even gained some praise by the international community, although in fact it changed little in the way Morocco is governed.

A potentially controversial aspect of the constitution, that it de facto withdrew the promise of regional autonomy for the Western Sahara by subsuming into a project of countrywide administrative decentralisation, slipped by unnoticed, or at least undiscussed, not only at home but also abroad. Yet, Morocco’s annexation of the Western Sahara has not been officially accepted by any country or international organisation.

Egypt

The Egyptian constitution is the least consistent internally and the least credible of the three and it is
thus no surprise that many of its provisions, particularly on rights and liberties, are constantly violated. The drafters faced an impossible task: to write a document that appeared to respond to the demands for democracy of Egyptians that has rejected the Mubarak regime as too authoritarian; to convince the United States and Europe that Egypt was not turn into a military dictatorship, and thus deserved military and economic assistance, despite the coup d’état of July 2013; and to provide the military a constitutional guarantee of complete autonomy. The result is a constitution that is extravagant in terms of the promises it makes about protecting rights and liberties, outlines a normal democratic system of government, but undermines the democratic façade and blatantly violates democratic government by giving the military complete freedom from accountability. The constitution exempts the military budget from parliamentary scrutiny and gives the military sole authority to appoint the Minister of Defense. Exemption from civilian oversight was justified, according to the official line, by the exceptional nature of the Egyptian military and its role in the country and its history. According to this narrative, the rejection of civilian oversight was natural, while its imposition would have been an aberration.

It is worth noting that another institution that has played an abnormally important political role since 2011 and continues to do so, the judiciary, also tried to gain the same freedom from oversight as the military, but only partially succeeded. It demanded, unsuccessfully, that its budget should also be exempted from parliamentary supervision. Nevertheless, the judiciary has gained recognition in the constitution as an institution that is subordinate to no authority except the law and is self-regulating. The independence of the judiciary is of course a fundamental tenet of democracy, but in the case of the highly politicised Egyptian judiciary, the principle of judiciary independence also enshrined the lack of accountability of a major political player.

The Viability of the Post-revolutionary Constitutions

The viability of any constitution depends to a large extent on how well it serves the needs of a country’s citizens and above all of its major political actors. Constitutions that survive for long periods are those that serve, or can be made to serve, the needs of public and power players alike. Such constitutions are rare. The longevity of constitutions is generally tied to that of specific political regimes. And even in politically stable countries, constitutions need to be reinterpreted and amended in order to accommodate changing circumstances.

The post-revolutionary constitutions are no exception. Their longevity will depend on the stability of the staying power of the regimes that have emerged from the upheaval.

The Tunisian constitution, the politically neutral end result of much haggling and compromise, has some chances to prove viable if the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for the late fall prove successful. Any possible coalition of political parties could work within the boundaries established by the constitution. Furthermore, Tunisia has a history of constitutional stability – the first Tunisian constitution survived for more than half a century.

The Moroccan constitution will survive as long as the power of the King is not directly challenged. It represents a reasonable compromise between democratic principles and royal prerogative and also would allow a more lively democratic process if the parties took full advantage of the opportunities. And there is no indication that the King will encounter a direct challenge to his authority in the foreseeable future. There is no indication that a major opposition force is likely to emerge and the palace has shown great ability to defuse lesser challenges.

The constitution that will certainly not prove viable for long is the Egyptian one. It was designed to serve the needs of a particular moment and of specific players, above all the military and the judiciary. The constitution could not survive a loss of power by the military, because any civilian government would be anxious to rein in a dangerous rival and would amend the constitution. But even while the military remains in power – and this might be for a long time – the constitution will not be a viable document, truly regulating the country’s political life. The contradictions between political reality and the constitutional principle started eroding the constitution as soon as it was enacted.
Dossier: From Revolutions to Constitutions

The Secular State for Religious Society: The Role of Islam in New Arab Constitutions and the Quest for Democracy

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The first part of the title of this article refers to the mediation I am proposing through the constitutional neutrality of the State regarding all religion in order to secure the possibility of religious piety by conviction and choice, rather than coercive conformity. I am advocating a secular nature for the State and its constitutional and legal systems from an Islamic point of view because the religious neutrality of the State is necessary to ensure the possibility of being a Muslim by conviction and choice, which is the only way to be a Muslim. The State is a political institution that is incapable of having a religion, and the claim that any state is Islamic can only mean that the ruling elite are using the State to enforce their own view of Islam, regardless of the religious beliefs of the citizens at large. In fact, there is no agreed criterion for judging the Islamic quality of the State and no way of verifying any Islamic quality of an institution except through the political judgment of fallible human beings.

The second part of the title indicates that the democratic legitimacy of demands for a role of Islam must be balanced by the constitutional quality of the State. Since we are speaking of a “quest for democracy,” the political will of the general population should prevail, and this will is bound to include a role for Islam among the predominantly Muslim populations of the Arab world. The reference to constitutions, however, means that the role of Islam must be consistent with the protection of the constitutional rights of all citizens, equally and without any discrimination on such grounds as sex, religion, race, ethnicity or language. The quest for constitutional democracy means a combination of government by the political majority subject to the constitutional rights of the minority, even of a single person.

The basic selfish reason for this emphasis on the rights of minorities is that every person is a member of both a majority through one identity and a minority through another. For example, a person may feel empowered by his membership in a dominant political party, although he may be disempowered by his membership in an ethnic or socio-economic group. Women often suffer all sorts of violations and discrimination, even when they identify with the governing political party, which is usually controlled by men. In addition to the overlapping status of being a member of both a minority and majority at the same time, an apparently dominant identity may decline over time through democratic or other means. A recent striking example of this is the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which turned from a hegemonic political power in government to a persecuted and repressed unlawful organisation within weeks. It is clear in light of these remarks that all citizens should be equally concerned with preserving the constitutional rights of every group or segment of the population because of overlapping and consecutive majority/minority statuses.

Commitment to the protection of the rights of all citizens also means safeguarding disagreement and dissent because that is the source of all political formations, regardless of demographic size or profile. Freedom of thought and opinion, and the right to organise in order to express and propagate even the most marginal or radical views must therefore be consistently protected. This is particularly important for dissident views that tend to challenge the

conventional sensibilities of majorities of the population because such views are most likely to be repressed despite, or perhaps because of, their potential for initiating social and political reform. All religious and philosophical orthodoxies that we take for granted today started as heresies of the pre-existing orthodoxies of the time and place. Islam emerged as a heresy to the pre-existing polytheism and tribal relations of Arabia in the early seventh century.

The roles (in the plural) of Islam in the recent political and legal developments in the Arab region should be evaluated in relation to the quests of those societies for constitutional democratic governance. Though we tend to speak of the role of Islam, there are in fact competing interpretations of Islam and competing views of its role in politics and the State. Focusing on what Muslims think and do rather than on Islam in the abstract, underscores the relevance of history, context, demographic factors and power relations, which also tend to shift and change over time. The criteria and process are therefore about neither a monolithic and static Islam, nor a trans-historical and uniform regional identity within any of the countries of the so-called Arab region, let alone among all of them. We should therefore avoid generalised evaluations of the role of Islam even within, for instance, the sub-region of North Africa in view of the theological, historical and contextual differences between Libya, Tunisia and Morocco.

There is also the need for an evolving perspective on the democratic constitutional development of any of the countries of the region, as has been the case with all other countries in the world. As indicated by even the briefest review of the progression and regression of democratic constitutional development in any of the countries of Western Europe or North America, for instance, this process is not inevitable, immediate, linear or permanent anywhere in the world. Democratic constitutional development has always taken time and has been contingent and contested everywhere. With regard to the role of religion for our purposes here, that also has not been inevitable or permanent for any of the world’s faiths. There are significant variations in the role of Christianity, whether Catholic or Protestant, in North and South America and in northern and southern Europe. Likewise, there are significant variations in the role of Islam, whether Sunni or Shia, in West Africa and Central, South or Southeast Asia, Turkey, Syria and Yemen.

Incompatibility of Sharia and Constitutional Rights

The Medina State established in western Arabia by the Prophet in 622 CE is commonly cited in Islamic discourse as the model of an Islamic state that will enforce Sharia. That model is projected in modern constitutional terms as a fully developed state ruled by the Prophet as the original and exclusive human sovereign and sole source of law and political authority. That state is believed to have been populated by ideal Muslims, both individually and collectively as a community of devout believers. According to modern Islamists, since they are instructed by the Quran to strictly adhere to the example of the Prophet, Muslims today are religiously obliged to seek to re-enact the model of the Medina State in their respective post-colonial nation-states.

The roles (in the plural) of Islam in the recent political and legal developments in the Arab region should be evaluated in relation to the quests of those societies for constitutional democratic governance.

Even if the Islamists’ anachronistic projection of the modern State and its constitutional order into the ancient past is accepted for the sake of argument, it is clear that the model of the Medina State cannot be replicated today because the role of the Prophet was unique and cannot be repeated. Muslims do not accept the possibility of another Prophet after Muhammad who can govern, enact Sharia law and enforce it as divinely ordained. To Muslims of the Medina State, what the Prophet said and did was Islam itself, while for all subsequent generations of Muslims governments can at best seek to implement what fallible human beings can do. Yet the cultural and psychological risk of adherence to the Medina State model remains among Muslims today who support an un-
constitutional model in which the rulers enjoy unfettered legislative, executive, and judicial powers. This belief contradicts the idea of formal or institutional limitation or separation of powers of rulers. Muslims have experienced a variety of methods for identifying rulers throughout history, but regardless of the method of selection or appointment, the Caliph enjoyed absolute powers for life because once an oath of allegiance was given, there was no organised and peaceful mechanism for withdrawing or restricting it. As the nature of the State was transformed by European colonialism, Islamists today tend to place modern constitutional and legal constraints on the powers of the State through an expansive re-interpretation of traditional notions of consultation (shura) in order to support constitutional and democratic principles in the modern sense. Such efforts may be politically attractive at the time they are invoked, but they can easily be reversed in practice because they lack methodological support in traditional Islamic jurisprudence (usul al-Fiqh). Being consistent with the values and institutions of their time, the founding jurists of Sharia did not address the need to limit the powers of the Caliph through notions of the separation of powers or an independent judiciary. Advocates of the shura as an Islamic basis for constitutional democratic governance should first revise the methodology of Islamic jurisprudence to support systematic and coherent reform, instead of opportunistic and arbitrarily selective apologia for political expediency.

As the nature of the State was transformed by European colonialism, Islamists today tend to place modern constitutional and legal constraints on the powers of the State through an expansive re-interpretation of traditional notions of consultation (shura) in order to support constitutional and democratic principles in the modern sense. A similar point can be made regarding some constitutional rights (human rights) concerns about historical interpretations of Sharia in relation to equality for women and non-Muslims and freedom of religion. It is true that alternative interpretations of Sharia are theoretically possible today, but the more pertinent issue here is the practical difficulties facing the mediation of the tensions between Sharia and constitutional democratic governance, regardless of the precise reform methodology one is proposing to resolve those tensions. Part of the problem is the attitude of scholars and policymakers, both within Islamic societies and elsewhere, who take claims of the unity of Islam and the State at face value. In my view, realistic mediation of the tensions can begin only when the issue is framed in terms of historical and contextual forms of the relationship between Islam and the State, rather than a sharp dichotomy between total unity of religion and the State or categorical separation. Taken in contextual terms, the issue becomes one of understanding the basis and dynamics of this relationship as a process that is capable of change and transformation, rather than a permanent or inescapable fact of nature.

Mediation of Sharia and Secular Law of the State

As noted earlier, the enforcement of Sharia through the coercive power or authority of the State repudiates the religious quality of compliance, which must be voluntary and deliberate to be valid. Moreover, the claim that Iran and Saudi Arabia are Islamic states is belied by the fact that each of those two states regards the other as a heresy, so which is “Islamic” and how do we know that? If we take each claim at face value, we have deadlock on the issue. The fact that it is simply not possible to decide whether either of them is “truly” Islamic, or which has the better claim, shows the inherently political nature of the claim. Yet, the separation of Islam and the State does not mean that Islam and politics should or can be separated. I distinguish between the State

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4 Ibid.
and politics in order to facilitate the regulation of the relationship of Islam and the State through politics, but subject to constitutional safeguards.\(^5\)

The claim to implement the totality of the precepts of Sharia in the everyday life of a society is a contradiction in terms because enforcement through the will of the State is the negation of the religious rationale of the binding force of Sharia. Legal prohibition may increase apparent conformity with religious norms, but that does not justify either enhancing piety by force or the violation of the freedom of religion and other human rights of believers and non-believers alike. As a practical matter, moreover, since enforcement by the State requires formal enactment as the law of the land, the legislature of the day will have to choose among equally authoritative but different interpretations of the Quran and Sunna. The practical impossibility of enforcing Sharia as positive law is reflected in the fact that such centralised coercive enforcement of Sharia as a code of State law was never attempted in Islamic history until the twentieth century.

Although the decentralised imperial states that have historically ruled over Muslims did seek Islamic legitimacy in a variety of ways, none claims to be an Islamic State. The proponents of a so-called Islamic state seek to use the powers and institutions of the State, as constituted by European colonialism and continued after independence, to coercively regulate individual behaviour and social relations in the specific ways selected by ruling elites. It is particularly dangerous to attempt implementing such totalitarian models in the name of Islam because that would make it far more difficult to resist than when that is done by a secular state that does not claim religious legitimacy. At the same time, it is clear that the institutional separation of religion and state is not easy because the State will necessarily have to regulate the role of religion in order to maintain its own religious neutrality, which is necessary for the role of the State as mediator and adjudicator among competing social and political forces.

There are also major practical and political problems facing any effort to found a modern state on principles of Sharia. Difficulties facing this model include the profound ambivalence of the founding jurists of Sharia to political authority. They neither sought to control nor knew how to make those who control the State accountable to the Sharia itself. Moreover, economic activities would be crippled by the formal enforcement of a prohibition on a fixed rate of interest on loans (\textit{riba}) or of insurance on the grounds that it is founded on speculative contracts (\textit{gharar}). It is simply impossible to operate a modern economy and engage in international trade on the basis of those norms of traditional Sharia. Another type of major problem noted earlier is the violation of basic citizenship rights for women and non-Muslims under Sharia, which will not only face serious challenge abroad but will also be resisted by these groups internally.

It is clear that the institutional separation of religion and state is not easy because the State will necessarily have to regulate the role of religion in order to maintain its own religious neutrality, which is necessary for the role of the State as mediator and adjudicator among competing social and political forces.

Such objections to a so-called Islamic state enforcing Sharia as the law of the land does not of course preclude individual Muslims from observing Sharia norms in their own daily lives as a matter of freedom of religion, as long as they do not violate the rights of others. The fact that \textit{riba} and \textit{gharar} contracts are legal in a country does not coerce Muslims who live there to engage in these practices. Not only are Muslims free to engage in alternative commercial practices, but secular financial institutions are also offering a variety of services in compliance with Sharia norms for Muslims who wish to observe those principles. The arguments I am making here are against coercive enforcement of religious obligations by the State, not for suppressing private conformity with the dictates of one’s beliefs. Constitutional rights such as freedom of religion and respect

for privacy enable believers to reinforce their religious or moral values through the activities of non-governmental organisations and other forms of agency of civil society.

Affirming the religious neutrality of the State does not mean that Islamic principles are irrelevant to law and public policy. Indeed, Muslims can and should propose policy or legislation out of their religious or other beliefs, in the same way that all citizens of any State in the world have the right to do so. At the same time, the religious neutrality of the State requires that such proposed legislation be supported by “civic reason,” instead of simply being asserted as required by Sharia. By civic reason I mean reasons that can be debated, accepted or rejected by all citizens without reference to religious beliefs.\(^6\) If *riba* is to be illegal, that should be based on economic and social reasons, and not simply on the religious belief that it is a sin to charge or pay a fixed rate of interest. This is necessary whether Muslims constitute the majority or minority of the State’s population, because even if Muslims are the predominant majority, they would not agree on what policy and legislation necessarily follow from their Islamic beliefs.

Each Muslim-majority country in the Arab region and elsewhere is striving to find its own balance between Islam and constitutional democratic development, and they will all achieve that on their own terms.

In conclusion, each Muslim-majority country in the Arab region and elsewhere is striving to find its own balance between Islam and constitutional democratic development, and they will all achieve that on their own terms, as every other country in the world has or can do. There are no set scenarios or predetermined models for this process to unfold according to the historical context of each society, including recent colonial and post-colonial experiences and influences.\(^7\) My own premise and approach would require me to step back and try to see how the quest for democratic constitutional development will take its course. What I can do in this limited space is contribute to clarifying the basic underlying tension in current debates regarding the role of Islam and democratic constitutionalism.

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Arms above Laws? The Security Sector, Constitutions, and the Arab Uprisings

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Armed Institutions and the Arab-Majority Uprisings

“The only single stable solution is for the military to accept that its subordination to civil power is an entirely necessary prerequisite for a country to function in a democratic way… this subordination is also necessary if the military as a group is to serve the State effectively,” once wrote the man who was in charge of Spain’s process of democratic control of the armed forces. Narcís Serra was the longest serving European Defence Minister, and he led the process of building the foundations of democratic civil-military relations in a country where a group of generals had sparked a brutal civil war four decades earlier.

But if Serra’s statement were to be repeated in Egypt after the 2013 coup, the authority’s reactions would not be different from those of General Franco’s in 1940s Spain: repress the idea and its upholders. In a strange way, several Arab Islamist parties find themselves in the position of many Latin American and southern European leftist parties in the last century. They can win elections, but they are not allowed to govern. They are popular among the lower and lower-middle classes, but the upper and upper-middle classes cheer and fund their exclusion and repression. More importantly, the armed institutions of the State believe that they threaten their interests, even if their rhetoric and policies indicate otherwise.

The enduring crisis of civil-military relations in the Arab-majority world is centuries old. In its modern form, it started with the coup of Husni al-Za'im in Syria in 1949. This was followed by another nine coups in Syria. That sparked a regional trend, whose common bottom line was the assertion of the supremacy of the armed institutions over any other judicial or elected ones.


The 2011 Arab revolutions challenged the officers’ republics in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and elsewhere. The slogans of “bread, freedom, dignity and justice” directly and indirectly conflicted with the entrenched interests of politicised armed institutions in the aforementioned states. And the idea of “elected civilian control of the armed forces” was not only radical and alien for the ruling generals, but was also equated to a lack of “patriotism” and even national treason.

Behind the Arab Uprisings

The Arab-majority uprisings were principally sparked by the brutality of the security sector in almost every single country where they occurred. In Tunisia, Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation following an insult

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by a policewoman in December 2010 triggered the revolution. In Egypt, the June 2010 murder by two policemen of Internet activist Khaled Said, followed by the brutality of police during the fraudulent parliamentary elections of November–December 2010, provided the revolution’s context. In Libya, the arrest in February 2011 of Fathy Terbil – a human rights lawyer who had represented the families of the victims of the June 1996 Abu Selim Prison massacre, in which more than 1,236 political prisoners were gunned down by Muammar Gaddafi’s security forces – sparked that country’s revolution. In Syria, abuses committed in March 2011 by Assad’s security forces, which included the pulling out of the fingernails of children and teenagers in Deraa, triggered the protests that ignited a revolution, followed by that country’s ongoing armed conflict. In many ways, the process optimistically named the “Arab Spring” was a region-wide reaction against violations by the security services.

Concepts such as human rights, human security, democratic control, civilian oversight and accountability were absent from the lexicons of Arab interior and defence ministries, and any attempts to introduce them were staunchly blocked. Throughout the decades prior to the 2011 revolutions, Arab security establishments behaved more like organised crime syndicates than professional security services. Concepts such as human rights, human security, democratic control, civilian oversight and accountability were absent from the lexicons of Arab interior and defence ministries, and any attempts to introduce them were staunchly blocked.3

Indeed, Egyptian opposition activists unsurprisingly chose to stage the massive protests that began Egypt’s uprising on 25 January – Egypt’s “Police Day,” intended to “honour” the security services. “[We] wanted to ruin their party like they ruined our lives,” a young Egyptian revolutionary told me. Following the removal of the 2011 dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen, security sector reform (SSR) became an immediate objective of both revolutionary and reformist forces, regardless of ideological or political affiliation. The same would have happened in any other post-despotic transition in the Arab-majority world. However, that immediate urge for SSR did not last long. By 2014, the commanders of the Egyptian military had held the elected President in one of their camps, dissolved the Parliament, and suspended the constitution via a bloody process that left more than 2,000 people dead and more than 23,000 detained. In Libya, the General National Congress, the only elected body in the country, has been a target of multiple attacks by armed units of various affiliations. The country could well be en route to a civil war. In Yemen, the country has descended into a series of armed clashes involving the army and other non-state armed actors, with significant military capabilities. The intensity, duration, scale, and scope of these armed clashes ebb and flow. But elected civilian control of the armed forces remains an unrealised dream, like in Egypt and Libya. In Tunisia, although significant progress has been made on various dimensions of security sector reform, the political polarisation has had a visible negative impact on that process.

Security Sector Reform?

SSR can be described as the transformation of a country’s security apparatus – including the roles, responsibilities and actions of all the actors involved – so that it is managed and operated in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework. Ideally, the reform process should embrace all branches of the security sector, from the armed forces to the customs authorities.

In Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, security bureaucracies under the Interior Ministries include: the police; paramilitary forces, such as the Central Security Forces in Egypt and the Intervention Forces in Tunisia; domestic intelligence services, such as the National Security

Security Sector Reform can be described as the transformation of a country’s security apparatus so that it is managed and operated in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance.

Apparatus in Egypt; and temporary irregulars, such as the Supreme Security Committee in Libya.

Two core objectives of SSR are critical in the case of Arab-majority states in general and Arab Spring countries witnessing post-despotic transitions in particular. First, effective governance, oversight and accountability must be established in the security system; and, second, the delivery of security and justice services must be improved. The challenges of SSR are numerous, however, beginning with the technical, organisational and administrative dimensions of the process. In addition, SSR is a highly political process involving powerful anti-reform factions within the relevant bureaucracies. Indeed, this political dimension can dictate the direction and success of the entire project.

Attempted Reforms

Following each successful revolution of the Arab Spring, various SSR initiatives were put forward by governmental and non-governmental institutions, as well as by independent experts. In Tunisia, SSR efforts started as early as June 2011, a few months after President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali fled. In November 2011, the Ministry of the Interior laid out a roadmap for reforming Tunisia’s security sector in a white paper, which discussed transforming the security sector from a police order to a police service that could respond urgently to the new challenges of crime. Tunisia’s current leaders, however, view this white paper as the product of former regime elements within the Ministry of the Interior who are not necessarily pro-reform. “There are some good elements [in the white paper]. But it offers no comprehensive reform,” Amer Larayedh, head of the Political Bureau of the Ennahda party, the lead party in Tunisia’s ruling coalition, told me. Meanwhile, in December 2011, Ali Larayedh, a civilian who was himself a torture victim during the 16 years he was jailed by the Ben Ali regime, became the Interior Minister; he became Prime Minister this March.

In Egypt, more than 10 SSR initiatives have been proposed since March 2011. The proposals, which vary significantly in terms of quality and comprehensiveness, have been put forward by a range of stakeholders including independent experts, civil society groups, disenchanted police officers, the Ministry of the Interior and Parliament. Civil society organisations have offered various initiatives focused on legal reform, oversight and civilianisation of the security sector. Disenchanted police officers were able to form several independent organisations, such as the General Coalition for Police Officers (GCPO), which lobbied for official recognition as a police union with an elected leadership. The initiatives proposed by GCPO and others were focused on cleansing the police force of corrupt generals; improving work conditions, training, media relations and public relations; and increasing salaries and pensions. Several independent SSR experts were consulted by both the Presidency and the Parliament regarding implementation of the various proposals.

But perhaps the boldest step towards civilian control over the security sector was taken by the Egyptian Presidency. In August 2012, a massacre of Egyptian soldiers in Sinai by an armed group led to the culling of the top brass of Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), including its head, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, and his deputy, General Sami Annan. The Sinai incident also sparked a process of removing some of the most powerful generals across the security sector. These included the head of the General Intelligence Directorate, Murad Muwafi; the head of the Presidential Guard, Nagib Mohammed Abd al-Salam; the head of the Military Police, Hamdy Badin; the head of the Cairo Security Directorate, Mohsen Murad; and the head of the Central Security Forces, Emad al-Wakil. These generals all shared an anti-reform stance, defiance of elected civilian rule and a desire to maintain as many Mubarak-era policies and practices as possible. Two of them, Badin and Murad, were specifically accused by several revolutionary and reformist groups, including the GCPO, of organising a campaign of repression against activists.

In Libya, security sector reform began with the appointment of Salem al-Hasi as the head of the Libyan...
intelligence agency, the Foreign Security Apparatus (FSA). Al-Hasi, who was a member of the armed wing of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL) and spent more than two decades in exile in the United States, thus became the first civilian opposition figure to lead an Arab intelligence service. “All of the Arab intelligence services were there to protect the regime and oppress citizens. I will change that,” al-Hasi said upon taking his post. “The Libyan intelligence will be under the control of the elected executive and the direct oversight of the legislative assembly.” Whether he will succeed or not is another matter. Accusations have been levelled against al-Hasi and his agents for allegedly tapping phones and electronically monitoring Gaddafi loyalists, using the interception equipment they inherited from his regime. Libya’s General National Congress (GNC) and future parliaments will need to craft laws for oversight and control of the security and intelligence apparatuses, as well as a clear mechanism for enforcing that control. Such steps will require the help of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) as well as independent experts. At the same time, Libya also critically needs a thorough process of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), and several steps have already been taken to that end.

Army and Constitution: the Case of Egypt

The story of constitutions and armed institutions in Egypt is a thorny, controversial one. It started in 1952 with a process of constitutionalising the dominant role of a military junta in politics. By 2014, Egypt had not gone far, if it hadn’t dramatically deteriorated. The prerogatives of the army in Egyptian constitutions have steadily expanded since the 1952 coup. But the story begins a bit earlier. In the 1923 constitution, both the laws governing the army and the police force were left entirely in the hands of lawmakers in the elected Parliament (articles 146, 147, and 148). This reflected one necessary form of elected civilian control over armed institutions. However, back then the army and the police force were not the dominant armed institutions; the balance of power was on the side of the much superior British armed forces in Egypt. The 1952 coup changed these conditions quite significantly. The army staged the coup not only against the monarchy, but also against an elected parliament. Once King Faruk I departed, a minority of the junta wanted to recall the Parliament and resume constitutional democratic politics. Those were mainly represented by Col. Yusuf Siddiq, Col. Ahmed Shawky, Col. Rashad Mehanna, Maj. Khaled Mohyiddin and others. The overwhelming majority of the junta, however, wanted a military dictatorship. With the pro-democracy minority controlling significant firepower, especially in the artillery corps, a compromise had to be reached: ask the judges.

On 31 July 1952, a highly politicised State Council ruled with a nine-to-one majority that the Parliament should not be recalled. Abd al-Razzaq al-Sanhouri, the head of the Council, and Suleiman Hafiz, the deputy head of the Council, were anti-Wafd judges, who aimed to block the Wafd Party, the most popular at the time, from controlling Parliament. At a later stage, they also ruled that it is constitutionally legitimate for an army officer to preside over a civilian government. Nine unelected, politicised judges ruled to bring down their elected political rivals, and with them the fragile Egyptian democracy. But the 1954 draft constitution was an attempt to retract the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) course of military rule. The draft not only outlawed the prosecution of civilians by military tribunals under any circumstances (article 20), but also required that the State educate and teach the conscripts (article 180). It did establish a National Defence Council (NDC), but relegated it to a mere advisory role on three specific issues (declaration of war, reconciliation, and defensive measures) (article 185). Most of the laws controlling armed institutions (both army and police) were left to the elected Parliament, to which the first article of the draft gave a special status: “Egypt is a parliamentary representative republic.”

But the 1954 draft was never ratified. Nasser and his junta wanted a dictatorship built around a cult of personality, not a state with functioning democratic institutions. Instead of ratification, historian Salah Issa found the only copy of the 1954 draft in 1999,

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5 A nationalist liberal party, which was the most popular one in 1952.
in the basement of the think-tank affiliated with the Arab League. He wrote a book entitled *A Constitution in a Trash Bin* to reflect the tragic story of constitutional democracy in Egypt.

Compared to the 1954 draft, the 2012 constitution certainly looks like a step backward on democratization, liberties and balanced civil–military relations. For example, the Defence Minister can only be a military officer (article 195), and the NDC must have a majority of military commanders (article 197). In addition, article 198 allows military tribunals for civilians “when a crime harms the armed forces.” A list of specific crimes would have been put forth by lawmakers had the elections taken place in 2013 as planned. This law would probably have been another tug-of-war between civilian representatives and army generals.

However, compared to the 1971 constitution or the 2014 constitution, the 2012 constitution looks like a step forward. Aside from the question of the legitimacy of a junta-appointed constitutional assembly, the highly repressive conditions, the extreme levels of bloodshed, and systematic exclusion accompanying the process of a post-coup constitutional crafting, not only were all of the aforementioned military prerogatives from the 2012 constitution upheld in the 2014 constitution, but more were added, including those in articles 152, 201, 203, 206, 207, 234, and 237. The overall package of prerogatives not only turns the Ministry of Defence into an autonomous power, but also grants significant prerogatives to the General Intelligence Apparatus and the Ministry of Interior. The prerogatives can be grouped into three categories: institutional autonomy, legal immunity and constitutional rights, and formulation of national high policy.

The first category includes articles such as 201 and 234. Article 201 provides that the Defence Minister must be a military officer and article 234 requires the SCAF to approve the Defence Minister for the next two presidential terms. An example of the second category is article 204, which is an expansion, with multiple additions, of article 198 from 2012. It allows civilians to be tried in military tribunals in a way that is likely to grant these tribunals jurisdiction whenever they wish. The article also shields both military and intelligence staff and their “equivalents” from any civilian oversight (whether judicial, parliamentarian, or other). An example of the third category would be article 203, a modified version of article 197 from 2012. The article drops one civilian representative from the NDC (due to the abandonment of the bicameral system and, therefore, the Upper House), yielding an absolute military majority of nine-to-five.

No reference is made in this draft or others to the military-economic complex, and no articles provide for oversight institutions to monitor or regulate the military’s civilian assets, including land acquisition and confiscation.

### The Police Sector and the 2014 Constitution

The police sector was also given new prerogatives that did not exist in the 2012 constitution. Article 206 asserts that the police’s loyalty is to “the people.” No official elected institution is mentioned. This could mean that a 100,000-strong demonstration filling Tahrir Square, extensively covered by local media, and declared a representation of the 84.5 million “Egyptian people,” would legitimate a police crackdown similar to that carried out by the military in July 2013. Additionally, article 207 declares that the Supreme Police Council (SPC) will be established from senior police officers and must be consulted on any law(s) affecting the police. This article can be used to veto any attempt at security sector reform, via the SPC, which is what happened under President Morsi. Finally, article 237 requires that the State fight “terrorism,” a term broadly and selectively used to describe and deliberately conflate both armed and peaceful opposition to the military coup. That included the accusation that President Obama was a member of the “terrorist” Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the accusation that Mohamed ElBaradei was conspiring with the MB to instigate violence in Sinai, and even the accusation that a fictional female puppet-character, Abla Fajita, was inciting violence and sponsoring terrorism.

The prerogatives that the 2013 draft grants to the armed institutions are unprecedented in the history of Egypt's constitutions.
of Egyptian constitutions. Those prerogatives would not have passed without collaboration from civilians. Article 204, which allows military tribunals for civilians, was approved by the overwhelming majority of 41 to 6 in the constitutional assembly appointed by the 2013 junta. Article 203 on the NDC’s military majority and defence budget was approved almost unanimously: 48 to 1. Even though the 1954 constitutional assembly was also appointed by junta, the quality of the articles, the checks on authoritarian tendencies, and the guarantees of basic freedoms were of a different level.

Conclusion

Although the repressive societal model known as the “mukhabarat state” was initially severely undermined by the Arab revolutions, many of its subcultures survived in Tunisia, Yemen and Libya and it is making a brutal comeback in Egypt. To ensure that SSR progresses further, three recommendations are essential. They are related to the political, institutional and legal dimensions of the SSR process and can be summarised in a few words: a political consensus on SSR, institutional oversight and new police laws. The involvement of international democratic partners such as Spain, the United Kingdom, the United States and other democracies in Arab SSR is useful for knowledge transfer – for example, oversight training for MPs, non-lethal riot control training for the police and assistance with depoliticising security institutions – as well as for advanced equipment supply and training. However, direct Western support of SSR in the Arab world may be used by anti-reform generals, old regime remnants and even by some opposition groups to delegitimise SSR as a “foreign conspiracy” to weaken or infiltrate the security services.

No democratic transition is complete without targeting abuse, eradicating torture and ending the impunity of the security services while at the same time imposing effective and meaningful elected-civilian control of both the armed forces and security establishments.

In any case, no democratic transition is complete without targeting abuse, eradicating torture and ending the impunity of the security services while at the same time imposing effective and meaningful elected-civilian control of both the armed forces and security establishments. Those objectives were at the core of the Arab revolutions of 2010-2011. They have yet to be attained.
Save for Tunisia, the country where the ‘Arab Spring’ started, the year was morose for those who believed in the promises of the revolution that had brought down four despots three years earlier. In Egypt, where the nonviolent revolution swept away a three-decade entrenched President, the ‘eighteen days that shook the world’ appear as a distant moment of fleeting exhilaration. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has turned into another Hosni Mubarak. Registering a heavy record of dismal human rights violations even before he took on the presidential mantle, his score of 96 per cent of the votes in June 2014 is typical of dictators. The military hijacked the Egyptian revolution twice in just two years. In March 2011, Field Marshal Tantawi took over Egypt. In July 2013, it was the turn of Field Marshal Sisi.

In Yemen, the former President continues to play havoc with the country, protected by a 2011 UN-GCC agreement that gave him immunity for three decades of authoritarian rule. Meanwhile, the country has descended into cyclical bouts of violence, despite a National Dialogue which had kept the flame of unity and the future of peace alive for two years. In Libya, the revolution was violent from its very first days, and Gaddafi fought it, literally, to the death, leaving a reservoir of hatred on both sides fuelled by the militias. Daily life in Libya is insecure and brutal. As for other countries, where similarly massive demonstrations failed to unseat the dictator, most prominently in Syria and Bahrain, human rights have receded in the face of further authoritarianism and/or daily massacres. In Syria in particular, where the revolution was nonviolent for six straight months since a massive demonstration led by women in the heart of Damascus was brutally repressed on 16 March 2011, a ruthless display of brutality is being played out between the Assad dynasty and its Islamist challengers. Save for Tunisia, the gap between reality and bills of rights has widened.

Rights in the New Constitutions: Egypt and Tunisia

Despite the failure to deliver on the human rights promise of early 2011, the constitutional experimentation across the region is slowly proceeding. Two countries established new constitutions: Egypt and Tunisia. Libya started the process haltingly in 2014 with the election of a chamber of 60 constituents. Yemen also started a more formal process in 2014 with the appointment of a constituent committee in charge of translating the National Unity dialogue results into a new social contract. Throughout all these experiences, the bill of rights was an integral part of wide-ranging discussions over several issues, from the role of women to the judicial protection of basic rights.

In a plethora of constitutional texts and declarations since the dictators were deposed, I briefly look at four indicators for progress and retreat: religious symbolism, the place of Islamic law as a reference, enumerated rights, and their judicial protection. Progress and retreat depend obviously on the position...
of the reader of the constitution, and mine is set on the universal values of human rights.

I will examine the two legally binding constitutions we can draw on, those of Egypt and Tunisia. The others remain in the making.

**Egypt**

The Egyptian Constitution, confirmed by referendum on 14-15 January 2014, replaced the Constitution passed a year earlier by the Muslim Brotherhood. Since Sisi took over in July 2013 as the effective ruler until his ‘election’ as President in June 2014, the previous Morsi Constitution is referred to officially as ‘al-dustur al-mu’atta,’ – the voided Constitution. Mu’attal is a derogatory term which underlines the political chasm between the constituents who signed off the Morsi Constitution, many of whom ended up in prison, and the constituents who rushed in a year later to pass the Sisi Constitution.

**a) Religious symbolism.** Regarding the necessary equality of citizens in any bill of rights, Egypt missed its calling in the very first words of the 2014 Constitution. The Preamble starts with the opening of the Quran’s first chapter, the basmala – ‘bismillah al-rahman al-rahim,’ the formula which is usually translated as ‘In the name of God, most gracious, most merciful.’ Non-Muslim Egyptians, including a sizeable number of Copts, can hardly identify with the formula. An extensive debate in 2011-13 had resulted in a ‘compromise’ which non-Muslim Copts and (the very few Jews) could accept more readily, and which remained in the ‘final draft’ of the Muslim Brotherhood Constitution. It was passed by the constituent assembly on 29 November 2013, and says simply ‘bismillah, in the name of God,’ which all religious communities of Egypt can identify with. On 30 November, the following day, the same text was released again, with one difference: Egypt was back to full Quranic formula. This did not change under Sisi. The current Constitution has retained the charged discriminatory reference, defeating an important symbol for equality reached by Egypt’s Muslims and a sizeable number of non-Muslims.

**b) Islamic law template.** A second indicator is found in the now classic Article 2 reference to Islamic law as ‘the principal source of legislation.’ Here there is nothing new, and the amendment introduced in 1980 by former President Anwar al-Sadat still stands. There was generally no debate in Egypt about modifying the text, which the Supreme Constitutional Court had developed in a progressive, enlightened reading of the Islamic legal tradition. In late 2012, however, in the Muslim Brotherhood Constitution, an additional Article 219 was suddenly added in the rush to complete the text forced on the constituent assembly by President Morsi. Article 219 stipulated that ‘the principles of Islamic law comprise its general rules and jurisprudential method as understood in the Sunni schools.’ This was a clearly sectarian article set to exclude Shiism. It was not reproduced in the Sisi Constitution.

**c) Rights overview.** Then there is the list itself, which is the equivalent of the bill of rights after the fashion of English and American constitutionalism. Here I could not really detect much change. The relevant Egyptian text reads generally as a litany of Western-style human rights with some corporatist localisms, a feature which appears in almost all Arab constitutions. In the new Egyptian Constitution the list is extensive and sometimes repetitive, with about a hundred articles dedicated to rights, almost half the constitution (Art. 3 to 99). The more specific section on ‘public rights, freedoms and obligations’ (Art. 51-93), includes little which is novel or contentious.

Egypt in 2014 is a replica of Mubarak’s, with a revolution in between. Rights in the 2014 Constitution do not offer any significant improvement to those one could find in the Constitution of 1971.

**d) The role of the judiciary** in the protection of human rights defines how rights are implemented. The new Constitution changed little to a several-tiered system of courts, which is dysfunctional, and includes a separate system of administrative and military courts. Only the Supreme Constitu-
tional Court (SCC) can look into the constitutionality of laws and regulations (Art. 192), but the Constitution leaves it to the law to determine the mechanisms by which the SCC is seized of a constitutional matter. Traditionally, the SCC ruled mostly in cases brought to it by lower courts on the occasion of a dispute over the constitutionality of a statute, but the travails of the SCC in the years since the fall of Mubarak have dissipated much of its aura amongst the Egyptian public and in the comparative constitutional world.

Since implementation is key, the test had come even before the Constitution was passed. The army’s brutal killings of Muslim Brotherhood demonstrators in Rabaa square followed the massive popular removal of Morsi from power in the revolutionary days of 18 June – 3 July 2013. The killings in Cairo’s public squares were compounded by the humiliation of the Egyptian judiciary forced into mass trials of dozens of people and death sentences running into the hundreds. On that score, in just a few months Sisi has already over-taken Mubarak’s record over three decades. In short, Egypt in 2014 is a replica of Mubarak’s, with a revolution in between. Rights in the 2014 Constitution do not offer any significant improvement to those one could find in the Constitution of 1971, and military dictatorship is back with the usual veneer of constitutionalism.

**Tunisia**

The constitutional process in Tunis was much more serious than the one undertaken in Cairo. The process went through several drafts, each word was parsed and discussed, and it took three years of a relatively smooth process to produce a constitution. It was completed by the Parliament acting as a constituent assembly, and the new Tunisian Constitution was passed by a massive majority of parliamentarians on 26 January 2014. No country in the world is the exact replica of another country, but for didactic purposes, I propose to use the four indicators above for the assessment of rights in the Tunisian Constitution.

a) **Religious symbolism.** Because Tunisia is almost entirely composed of Sunni Muslims, the *mala* formula figuring at the beginning of the Preamble did not create a significant stir in society. On the more constructive side, the Tunisian constituents adopted into their Constitution a common mantra of the Middle East revolution by reference to the system as civil, *madani*, in opposition both to the military (‘*askari*) and the religious (*dini*). (Art. 2, considered as ‘unamendable’).

b) **Islamic law template.** Notwithstanding a sustained battle between entrenched secularists (represented mostly by the President) and Islamists (dominated by the ruling Ennahda party) on the political front, the Article 2 template of the Egyptian Constitution was never strongly advocated by Ennahda. There is no reference to Islamic law in the Tunisian Constitution. Instead, the traditional formulation prevailed, consecrating Islam as ‘the state religion.’ (Art. 1, also enshrined as ‘unamendable’).

There is no reference to Islamic law in the Tunisian Constitution. Instead, the traditional formulation prevailed, consecrating Islam as ‘the state religion.’

c) **The bill of rights,** covering a full chapter (Art. 21-49), is similar to that in traditional democracies, with additional rhetorical references to the role of the State in providing for health and education, also common to third world countries. The list offers little variation on the expected enumeration, but there is one conspicuous innovation. Article 46.3 adds to formal gender equality, the request for the State to ‘strive for realising parity between men and women in elected councils.’ ‘Striving’ and ‘elected councils’ weakens the Article, yet of all rights mentioned in the Constitution, parity (the Arabic *tanasuf*, a neologism, is a probable translation from the French *parité*) reads as the most progressive contribution to comparative constitutionalism.

d) **The protection of rights** by the judiciary is confusing, but it adds an important feature which had represented the hallmark of success for the
Supreme Constitutional Court of Egypt before 2011. The confusion comes from Tunisia continuing the traditional French judicial system, with a high judicial council organising the work of lower courts, and the Court of Cassation (mahkamat al-ta’qib) at the apex (Art. 106-17); while, in parallel and without much coherence, the Constitution adopted for its, so far, innocuous Constitutional Council the possibility for the citizen, indirectly, to test the constitutionality of a law in the way it affects him or her (Art. 121.4). This is the most significant innovation for the protection of the constitutional rights of the citizen, but it is buried in a brief line, and leaves it to the law to develop the appropriate mechanisms. All in all, the judicial structure is not conceived well in the new Tunisian Constitution to protect the rights of the citizen.

Conclusion

In the treatment of basic rights in the two constitutions brought about by the Arab Spring, the model is close enough in both countries. It is also clear that the new constitutions took over established templates from each country’s own pre-revolutionary past, with few changes made.

The two texts say little about the gap between rights expressed in grand terms within a constitution, and the daily reality of trampled human rights

The two texts say little about the gap between rights expressed in grand terms within a constitution, and the daily reality of trampled human rights. The difference between Egypt and Tunisia is far less in the list of rights they chose to enumerate, or the reference to human rights treaties and/or Islamic law. It is the difference between an Egyptian society which was unable to shake off a fifty-year old military system of domination, and a Tunisian society which has so far succeeded in remaining generally faithful to the principles of its revolution.

In Egypt, society was unable to protect the making of the Constitution from the authoritarian ambitions of the Muslim Brotherhood or the army. The showdown which started with Morsi and continued until Sisi has turned the constitutional process into a one-faction show, and led to the replacement of a 1971 text by two successive texts in 2013 and 2014 that did not read as well as the original. More dramatically, a hundred or so articles enumerating a wide-ranging list of rights in the current Constitution have been massively violated well before the ink had dried on the paper they were written on.

In Tunisia, the process was more inclusive, and the energies liberated by the revolution kept to a minimal understanding that allowed for a reasonably comprehensive support for the Constitution when it was finally passed in Parliament. Unfortunately, the constitutional imagination remained prisoner to a template where not enough thinking was devoted to the Islamic legal tradition, or to better ways to conceive of a judiciary that protects the citizen against the violation of his or her basic rights.

And yet the writing of a bill of rights could be a far more alluring exercise than hitherto adopted. Between the riches of the Islamic/Middle Eastern legal tradition, which were all but ignored in constitution-making, and the comparative constitutional advances in the structuring of a judiciary better capable to act as the citizen’s constitutional protector, there is better leeway for bills of rights than the rendering, in Arabic, of rights translated from Western constitutionalists.

This survey suggests that forthcoming constitutions and constitutional amendments in Yemen or Libya will bring little new to the traditional template one has found in human rights since the Enlightenment. If Libyan and Yemeni societies can be as successful as Tunisia, this would be a significant achievement considering the turn to violence in both societies. One should not expect much more. In other countries of the Middle East, the constitutional debate will have to wait for the end of authoritarian rulers.
Almost four years after the revolutions that shook many of the Arab countries, their diverse geographies and societies, as well as the divergent attitudes of their respective key players, have turned each political transition into a distinct and specific case. Whereas geopolitics in the Gulf dictated that the military crush the revolution in Bahrain, the shared interest of tribal leaders, the military and the political opposition in ousting President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen has allowed that country to embark on a complex but steady process of political transition – perhaps because it poses no challenge to either Saudi influence or American counterterrorism policy there. Whereas in Libya, the international community acted decisively, through NATO, to put an end to the tyrant and his regime, in Syria containment, rather than intervention, has been the order of the day and the regime has managed to retain the army’s unbroken loyalty, resulting in a devastating war for the civilian population. Whereas in Tunisia, cooler heads and state responsibility prevailed to save the democratic transition, the transition in Egypt ended in a coup, leaving the much smaller North African State alone to represent the best organised model of democratic transition, a role that, until July 2013, both countries had shared.

Bahrain: The Persistence of the Protest Movement

Although the Bahraini revolution was snuffed out in its infancy by powerful Saudi and Emirati military forces acting on behalf of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the protest movement and demonstrations have not systematically stopped in the small Persian Gulf archipelago. The political situation in Bahrain is characterised by unconditional support for the ruling family by the GCC, the US and Great Britain. However, both the Americans and the British are concerned about the risk of instability to their vast interests in the country posed by a citizens in constant revolt; hence, their silent participation in pushing for dialogue and negotiations between the government and the opposition with a view to achieving a better power-sharing arrangement that will calm the protest movement without jeopardising the dominant position of the royal Al-Khalifa family. However, the ruling family itself is divided on the issue. While Crown Prince Salman is presented as a reformer and has led both the failed attempts at a national dialogue and some secret negotiations with the main opposition parties, the regime’s hardliners are represented by the long-lived and extremely powerful Prime Minister and the security circles he controls. Likewise, although they share the same framework of democratic demands, the political opposition is also fragmented between parties (mainly, al-Wifaq – an Islamic party with a Shia social base, although it has always insisted that its cause is national and not sectarian – and al-Waad – representing the secular left) and civil-society political activism movements (among which particular attention should be called to the Haq Movement for Liberty and Democracy and the Bahrain Center for Human Rights). The former are more practised at negotiating with the government, which, since January 2014, has regained momentum heading into the October elections, even as the civil associations’ demands have become increasingly intransigent and less negotiable. Nothing suggests
that anything approximating a pro-democratic political change will be achieved in Bahrein, but there is likewise nothing to suggest that the protest movement’s strength has waned or that it has become less decisive for the country’s citizens.

**Yemen: A Long and Complex Transition**

Unlike with the other Arab revolutions, in Yemen it was not the civic movement that led to the resignation of the President of the Republic, but rather the shared interest in ousting him of several key sectors of the country, including tribal and military leaders, who joined the dogged civil-society movement in its revolt. As a result, Yemen has, for now, managed to continue to pursue a relatively stable political transition, albeit one rife with challenges (including, among others, secessionism in the south and the Houthi rebellion in the north). January 2014 saw the end of a ten-month National Dialogue conducted by 565 delegates representing the traditional political parties (such as the Islamist al-Islah party or the parties from the country’s south), the Houthis, new emerging political forces, youth and women activists, tribal leaders, and civil-society organisations. The more than 1,000 resolutions this body passed are intended to guide the drafting of a new constitution and to culminate, one year hence, in general elections. Initially, this political platform was shrouded in uncertainty; however, it has ultimately managed to achieve its goal, contain a bloody civil war, and get vehemently opposed political groups to sit down together to talk. Yemeni public opinion is reasonably supportive of the process, with 50% in favour of the National Dialogue Conference Document, 69% supporting the decision to hold presidential and legislative elections once the new Constitution has been ratified, and 56% in favour of the decision to extend the term of the current President Abd Rabuh Mansour Hadi until the process is finished.¹

Libya: Elections, Militias and Public Opinion

Since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi and his regime, Libya has found itself facing the immense task of re-founding the State and the nation. Unlike in other Arab countries, in Libya, the legacy bequeathed by the dictator was a vast institutional vacuum, the result of the peculiar conception of *Jamahiriya*, or “government by the masses,” that Gaddafi had established in the country. The former leader’s model was based on creating local political structures in which tribes played a key role to the detriment of the State, such that in the aftermath of the revolution, there was no real strong state institutional structure in place. Like-

Insecurity is thus the most acute problem facing the Libyan political transition and the solution seems to lie in institutionalising the regional militias in order to weed out armed groups with murkier interests.

wise, Gaddafi’s model made virtually no room for an army or police, preferring instead to use paramilitary brigades; consequently, both during and after the revolution, it was the regional militias that took over the management of their territories and the security of those who lived in them. Although the new Libya has created an army that held its first parade on 9 February 2013, it consists of only about 6,000 troops and, in fact, continues to rely on auxiliary forces from the militias, which, in theory, operate under the command of the similarly new Supreme Security Council. While many of these forces do indeed provide security in areas where the State is still unable to do so, their loyalty isickle and, above all, the inherited institutional weakness generates mistrust and detachment towards Tripoli in favour of regional territoriality. The militias attribute political and economic powers to themselves, giving rise to tensions between the revolutionary legitimacy that they represent and the new democratic legitimacy of the elected institutions represented in the central government in Tripoli. However, there are also personal ambitions, which some militias turn to their advantage, sometimes in alliance with foreign powers opposed to democratic developments in the region, in order to destabilise the elected institutions. Insecurity is thus the most acute problem facing the Libyan political transition and the solution seems to lie in institutionalising the regional militias in order to weed out armed groups with murkier interests.

Nevertheless, the transition has not been derailed, despite the instability, crises and improvisation. One year later than planned, in February 2014, a constituent body, known as the “Committee of 60” for its composition consisting of twenty representatives from each of the country’s three main regions (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan), was elected, although it did not begin work on drafting the Constitution until late April 2014. This was followed by a political and institutional crisis leading to the complex removal of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan after a parliamentary vote of no confidence. The growing insecurity since mid-September 2013 (a strike by oil sector workers interrupted Libyan oil production, militias occupied oil facilities in the eastern part of the country, and an armed group cut the electricity and water supplies to many cities on the eastern coast) had led the parliamentary opposition – primarily the Islamist al-Adala wa-l-Bina (Justice and Construction) party, the second largest force in Parliament – to call for his resignation. Finally, on 4 May, Ahmed Maiteg, a young businessman from Misrata who does not hail from the Libyan diaspora but rather the country’s interior and who moreover stated he did not belong to any political party, was elected with the support of Islamist blocs with 121 votes, 1 more than the minimum 120 required. In June the Libyan Supreme Court has annulled his election and Abdullah al-Thani became Prime Minister.

The weakness of the new political institutions – Parliament and government – are the result of an electoral law (drafted to prevent an Islamist victory) that excessively atomises parliamentary representation and prevents the formation of a strong government.

In addition to the weakness of the army and the national police, which have proven incapable of preventing the militias from controlling large swaths of the country, the weakness of the new political institutions – Parliament and government – must also be taken into account. They are the result of an electoral law (drafted to prevent an Islamist victory) that excessively atomises parliamentary representation, thereby allowing disagreements and tensions to consistently destabilise Parliament and preventing the formation of a strong government with sufficient backing. Although this unstable situation has culminated in popular pressure on the institutions of the political transition, a fact underscored by the February 2014 protests outside Parliament, some 85% of Libyans still believe that democracy is the best form of government. They are moreover closer to reaching a consensus on key issues that divide their elected representatives: 55% of the population is in favour of recognising other languages in addition to Arabic, such as the minority Amazigh and Tebou languages, and a majority is also in favour of setting aside seats for women and ethnic minorities (in fact, the electoral law drawn up to elect the Constitutional Committee in 2014 already contained such a positive action.
provision). Likewise, the vast majority of Libyans believe that the Constitution should cite Sharia as a source of law, although not the only one, and, agreeing on the need for some form of institutionalised regional autonomy, many – in particular, survey respondents from Cyrenaica – claim to be in favour of a centralised State.

Egypt, or How to Put an End to a Democratic Transition

A certain segment of the Egyptian population chose the worst possible way to oppose a popularly elected government: calling for a military coup. Thus, on 3 July 2013, the fledgling Egyptian democratic transition and all that it had achieved came to an abrupt halt in exchange for the satisfaction of excluding the Muslim Brotherhood from the country’s public and political spheres, to which it had belonged since 1928. It is a new process of return to totalitarianism, and it confirms Egypt’s status as a “military society,” as described by the sociologist Anouar Abdel-Malek decades ago.

The exclusion of a large segment of the Egyptian political class, and the mass death sentences, as well as a plethora of new laws rescinding civil liberties and rights cannot be considered a transition to democracy but rather a renewed descent into authoritarian hell.

Those who argue that the democratic transition continues directly contradict the definitions provided in any modern political science textbook. The exclusion of a large segment of the Egyptian political class, its persecution and classification as a terrorist organisation in the absence of any proof, and the mass death sentences handed down at summary trials with no defence lawyers, as well as a plethora of new laws rescinding civil liberties and rights that have been used to imprison journalists, activists and civil society figures who have dared to be critical of the current situation (since July 2013, at least 2,500 Egyptians have died at demonstrations and 19,000 have been arrested) cannot be considered a transition to democracy but rather a renewed descent into authoritarian hell. The new 2014 Constitution hardly strays from the much maligned 2012 Magna Carta, and when it does, it is only to strengthen the regime’s military and presidentialist power. This leads to the conclusion that the key issue was not what the Constitution said, but rather who was writing it. The appointed Committee of 50 members to this end, was the result of a non elected constituent body that excluded the country’s largest political party, and was dominated by state institutions and a handful of political figures whose role was simply to make a few tweaks. The document’s approval by 98.1% of voters in a referendum in January 2014 was reminiscent of earlier times that had fleetingly been believed to have been overcome. In violation of the road map he himself issued after the coup he led, rather than holding legislative elections, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi will first hold presidential ones, in late May 2014, in which he himself will stand as a candidate and which he will surely win. As for the legislative election process, the Justice and Freedom party will obviously be excluded because of its affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood. However, even parties that supported the coup (the Social Democrats, Free Egyptians, al-Wafd, etc.) will find themselves facing tougher odds due to the reinstitution of the Mubarak-era electoral system based on independent candidates as opposed to party lists (which will favour the re-entry into Parliament of the old clans and of circles linked to the army and security services). Additional proof that what happened is no more than a power struggle can be found in the complacency of the Salafist Al-Nour party – a much more ultra-conservative formation than the Muslim Brotherhood and a greater stickler – which has thrown its support behind the new military regime and is in the process of expanding its social and political networks with a view to filling the vacuum the Muslim Brotherhood has left behind.

Tunisia as a Model

In Tunisia, the year 2014 began with two major political events: the resignation of the government led by the Islamist Ennahda party to make way for a technocratic government that would lead the political process until the new legislative elections scheduled for December 2014 could be held, and the enactment, on 26 January, of a new Constitution laying down democratic principles. These events were the “happy” outcome of a serious crisis that threatened to derail the relatively orderly Tunisian transition in 2013. The antagonism that the secular parties and associations, the losers in the October 2011 elections, have historically harboured towards the brand of Islamism represented by Ennahda was leading to increasing polarisation, which was further exacerbated by the assassinations, in February and August 2013, of two leaders of the secular left, most likely by Salafi extremists. The secularists’ unusual show of unity around the National Salvation Front, which organised a mass mobilisation calling for the government to resign, and, in some cases, for the dissolution of Parliament too, together with the decisive support of the country’s media and the leadership of the powerful Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT), both closely linked to the secular current, placed unsustainable pressure on the government. A segment of this sector viewed the Egyptian experience of the coup against the government led by Muhammad Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood with enthusiasm, and some were tempted by the illusory promises of following the same path (although, crucially, the Tunisian army shares none of the political and economic characteristics of the influential and powerful Egyptian army). Both because the events in Egypt were, in turn, reminiscent of the tragic experience of earlier events in Algeria, and because the Egyptian developments themselves underscored the risk of violence and authoritarianism that the July coup had triggered, Ennahda agreed to negotiations and dialogue (which effectively meant stepping down from the government), and the more radical secular voices were overpowered by those who chose instead to embrace that dialogue, thereby leading Tunisia away from the Egyptian path.

The country’s public and political sphere is thus being restructured in preparation for the forthcoming legislative elections. The Ennahda party clearly emerged weaker from this stage of the transition, while the secularists have been strengthened by their success in ousting their Islamist rival. However, the country’s various secular currents will need to profoundly transform their discourse, strategy and platform if they are ever to govern the country, as is their goal.

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The country’s public and political sphere is thus being restructured in preparation for the forthcoming legislative elections. The Ennahda party clearly emerged weaker from this stage of the transition, while the secularists have been strengthened by their success in ousting their Islamist rival. However, the country’s various secular currents will need to profoundly transform their discourse, strategy and platform if they are ever to govern the country, as is their goal. The obsessively anti-Islamist bent of their discourse is one of their greatest liabilities, as seen both in the Ben Ali period (when they shared the same discourse as the regime and thus were perceived as having been co-opted by it) and following the revolution (with their poor electoral showing: of the 21 anti-Islamist opposition parties, 15 won four or fewer seats). Moreover, Ennahda’s fulfilment of its promise to leave government peacefully, despite having won the elections, undermines this discourse further, by offering proof that, contrary to what the secularists have always claimed, the Islamists are not seeking power by any means. By making their anti-Islamist stance the sole focus of their agenda, they have neglected to address what the majority of Tunisians consider to be most important: a socioeconomic, political and security programme that offers solutions for citizens’ true concerns. In this regard, the tension and polarisation the country is experiencing, as noted by the National Council of Social Dialogue, has also distracted the government from achieving these goals, and the citizens that carried out the revolution do not perceive that it has led to any changes in their situation; hence, the strikes and social movements taking place in post-revolutionary Tunisia.

This new stage is being defined by attempts to overcome the deep-seated drift towards division and confrontation that has, to date, prevented the various political groups in the secularist current from forming...
strong coalitions. The results have been mixed. Indeed, as the upcoming elections grow nearer, the unity achieved around the National Salvation Front (NSF), founded to spearhead the opposition to the Islamist government, is crumbling. For now, the main bloc, an NSF splinter group, is Nida Tounes, led by Beji Caid Essebsi, a former Prime Minister under Habib Bourguiba with presidential ambitions in the near future, who presents himself as the best bet to defeat Ennahda. The uncertainty regarding the formation’s capacity to offer an effective government alternative stems from the extreme ideological heterogeneity of its members (including leftists, UGTT leaders such as Tayeb Baccouche, and well known members of Ben Ali’s former party with important business ties, such as Faouzi Elloumi or Mohamed Ghariani, the last secretary general of Ben Ali’s RCD party) and Essebsi’s advanced age –he is 87 – as he is viewed as the formation’s nexus and sole source of charisma. In addition, consideration must be given to another typical problem affecting such secular formations, namely that, unlike Ennahda, Nida Tounes suffers from a remarkable lack of democratisation with regard to its internal organisation, leading to schisms and generational clashes.

Other parties are trying to forge coalitions able to break up the growing bipolarity arising in relation to Ennahda and Nida Tounes, which is increasingly coming under fire for its inclusion of former regime figures. This is the goal of the Popular Front, another NSF splinter group, which comprises 12 political parties from the communist and Arab nationalist spheres and is led by Hamma Hammami, as well as of a plethora of parties that have not yet managed to form coalitions, including Ettakatol and the Congress for the Republic, which have governed with Ennahda. Many uncertainties still surround the Tunisian transition, which will culminate in the upcoming December 2014 elections, the outcome of which remains difficult to predict, given that the final text of the electoral law to be applied has not yet been disclosed.

However, by enacting a new Constitution and showing how, in democracy, consensus and negotiation must always prevail over any other temptation to be exclusive or intolerant, Tunisia has already made history in the Arab world.
Constitutions of Arab Countries in Transition: Constitutional Review and Separation of Powers

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As of 2014, new or newly restructured constitutional courts have appeared throughout the Arab Mediterranean. In the wake of the Arab Spring of 2011, Arab liberals and Western donors promoting democracy encouraged authoritarian Arab rulers to strengthen judicial review in their countries. They had hoped that this would help to entrench the democratic reforms that had recently begun in the region. Today, however, real democratisation seems to have stalled in most of the Arab Mediterranean, and the region’s newly established and newly empowered constitutional courts are doing little to effectively promote further democratisation.

The failure of constitutional courts to guarantee an entrenchment of democracy is naturally disappointing to liberals. But it should, perhaps, not surprise them. The understanding of constitutional review as synergistic with democracy is a relatively new development in the second half of the 20th century. Some contemporary legal scholars and social scientists have recently voiced significant scepticism about the relationship between constitutional courts and democracy and, in particular, about whether politically insulated constitutional courts are likely to serve as effective agents of transition from authoritarian government to democracy. Looking at the behaviour of constitutional courts in the Arab Mediterranean after the Arab Spring, it is too early to say with confidence whether they support the sceptics’ claim that constitutional review is often ineffective or counter-productive in encouraging a long-term transition away from authoritarian rule to full democracy. They do suggest that due to a lack of popular legitimacy or, in some cases, due to concerns about the rise of a tyrannical majority in rapidly democratising states, independent courts will often fail to support rapid democratisation. The hope for liberals can only be that they will play a productive role in promoting democratisation in the longer term.

Constitutional Review, Its Early Liberal Critics, and Its Global Spread

Liberals have long debated whether democracy is enhanced by constitutional review. Despite 19th century pessimism, consensus appeared to congeal in the late 20th century that the two work together well. Increasingly, however, a new generation of sceptics has argued that constitutional review can be undemocratic. Furthermore, they argue that, when constitutional review is imposed during a transition away from authoritarianism, it impedes the establishment of a truly democratic society.

The Birth of Constitutional Review and Early Liberal Scepticism

The United States was the first country in the world to draft a written constitution. Thereafter, it vested its courts with the power of constitutional review. Outside the US any governments, both autocratic and liberal, decided thereafter to draft national constitutions of their own. Neither autocrats nor liberals, however, tended to welcome the institution of constitutional review by genuinely independent institutions. Autocrats did not wish to constrain their power in any way.

19th century liberals tended to believe that constitutional judiciaries prevented the orderly operation of
democracy and the natural evolution of a society. Rejecting the US model of “legal constitutionalism” in which judges interpreted and enforced the constitution, many European liberals in the 19th century preferred a regime of “political constitutionalism” in which political institutions were trusted to consider thoughtfully whether a law or policy that they were considering violated constitutional values. If they acted in accordance with an implausible or offensive answer, they would answer politically.

Outside of the US, a few 19th and early 20th century states did leave some room for constitutional review by judges. Often, however, the powers of constitutional review were limited or, as sceptics had predicted, the institutions entrusted with the power of review failed to exercise their powers in a meaningful fashion. Through the Second World War, liberal democracies outside the US tended to put their faith in political more than legal constitutionalism.

The Global Spread of Constitutional Review in the Second Half of the 20th Century and Contemporary Sceptics

After the Second World War, constitutional review came to be associated popularly with the rise of democratisation. The American model of legal constitutionalism gained sway, as the United States came to be seen as a model for the rest of the world, and as the United States used its power to shape the political reconstruction of numerous countries after WWII.

In the aftermath of WWII, the US helped reconstruct the political and legal systems in a number of formerly authoritarian countries, including Germany, Italy and Japan. Each adopted the institution of constitutional review. Democratisation in these countries appeared to be successful and they proved inspirations to other countries that hoped to democratisce. The late 1960s and the 1970s witnessed a second wave of expansion for constitutional review, when the collapse of military regimes in Greece, Portugal and Spain led to democratisation. These countries also incorporated institutions of constitutional review. In the 1980s and 90s, the Soviet Union fell, as did the apartheid regime in South Africa and numerous military dictatorships in South America and East Asia. Thereafter in a third wave of expansion, constitutional review re-emerged in Central and Eastern Europe, South Africa, the Americas and in many parts of East Asia.

Increasingly, some legal scholars and social scientists are challenging the new orthodoxy. Tom Ginsburg, for example, argues that authoritarians who face democratic pressure sometimes create politically independent constitutional courts as a form of “insurance” against the possibility that future democratic governments might seek to reverse their most cherished policies. Ran Hirschl has made a similar argument. Staffed with jurists known to share the constitutional vision of the threatened elites, the courts may, from the sidelines, limit the power of the authoritarian. But the authoritarian has the satisfaction of knowing that they are likely to interfere far more with the plans of a future democratic government that tries to overturn core policies to which he and his judges are committed. These contemporary critics often echo 19th century liberal concerns about constitutional review’s relationship with democratisation.

Constitutional Review in the Arab World

Until the 21st century, much of the Arab world had continued to resist the institution of constitutional review. At various times in the first three quarters of the century, monarchies in the Arab Mediterranean region, such as Iraq and Libya, experimented with constitutional review. As the monarchies collapsed, however, military governments in Iraq stripped these courts of their constitutional jurisdiction, and Libya stripped them of their independence from executive control. Courts in Jordan asserted, in theory, the right to interpret the constitution and to refuse to enforce laws that were inconsistent with the constitution as they understood it. However, they were unable to exercise this power vigorously. At the close of the 20th century, Morocco established a constitutional council to review proposed legislation. But it was staffed entirely by figures appointed by the King and was seen as a tool by which the King retained a veto over legislation. Among states in the Arab Mediterranean at the end of the 20th century, only Egypt had developed a truly robust tradition of independent constitutional review within the Arab Mediterranean world. Even there, the independence of the...
constitutional court had gained power in an unusual fashion and was currently under attack. Although Egyptian judges in the early 1950s tentatively asserted a limited power of constitutional review, the increasingly authoritarian government of Gamal Abd al-Nasser explicitly denied regular judiciary any right of constitutional review and placed the power of constitutional review in an institution deemed to be firmly under his thumb. After the death of Nasser, his authoritarian and politically weak successor, Anwar al-Sadat, made concessions to liberals who demanded that he re-establish the legitimacy of his new government on something other than mere charisma and military power. In his 1971 Constitution and supplementary legislation, Sadat decided to enact laws creating the possibility of limited democratisation, alongside safeguards that would enable him to check any potentially threatening institution. Consistent with this plan, Sadat’s new 1971 Egyptian constitution created a Supreme Constitutional Court with robust powers of constitutional review and considerable independence from direct executive control. The President, however, had the ability to increase the number of judges and, indirectly, to control appointments to the Court. Thus, if the court defied him, he could stack it with sympathetic figures. After the assassination of Sadat, a new authoritarian President, Hosni Mubarak, continued to operate under the 1971 constitution and allowed the court to establish itself. He permitted the court’s sitting members to decide upon appointments and, importantly, demonstrated a pattern of respecting the court’s increasingly liberal judgments. At first, the court was very cautious about how aggressively to challenge the laws that the President used to stay in power. Over time, however, the Court began increasingly to issue opinions that were perceived as threatening to the regime. By the late 1990s, President Mubarak lost patience and he began to take steps to rein in the Court, exercising his power to pack it with friendly judges. Fairly quickly, the Court began to turn its back on its recent tradition of liberal activism and started to rubber stamp increasingly authoritarian and deeply unpopular policies. It was unclear whether these opinions genuinely reflected the justices’ understanding of the Egyptian constitution, or whether it reflected merely a tactical willingness on the part of astute judges to avoid antagonising a resurgent executive.

The Strengthening of Constitutional Review in the Arab Mediterranean in the 21st Century

Across the Arab Mediterranean, then, constitutional courts had democratic cachet and, in theory, could support democratisation, but in practice were carefully designed and staffed in a way that prevented them from forcing democratisation. These courts could be designed in a manner so unthreatening that as the 21st century dawned, authoritarian rulers seemed increasingly willing to create Potemkin institutions of judicial review. In Tunisia, the authoritarian President Ben Ali granted the power of constitutional review to a constitutional council with almost no independence. Shortly before his fall, under pressure from European governments, Muammar Gaddafi began to reform his judiciary. On paper, Libya’s Supreme Court had long had the power of constitutional review. However, the courts were organised in a way that precluded them from exercising this power with any independence. The reforms, in theory, granted them some new degree of independence. In practice, however, the courts did not really exercise their power until Gaddafi’s fall in 2011.

In the 21st century, however, even before the Arab Spring, Arab liberals and Western donor countries were encouraging authoritarian Arab regimes to establish more meaningful constitutional review as a step towards genuine democratisation. Most notably, in the wake of the US invasion of 2003, Iraq established a new Supreme Court with the power of constitutional review. Furthermore, starting in 2011, the political uprisings of the so-called Arab Spring seemed to promise a revolutionary change in the patterns of Arab governance. Events suggested that Arab governments would create new space for both participatory politics and constitutional review. The early phases of the post-Arab Spring transitions did provide evidence of such developments. Many countries in the Arabian Peninsula and the Arab Mediterranean alike came under mass pressures to democratisate. A number of constitutions were replaced or reformed in ways that appeared to create new room for liberal democratic politics. In many countries, the political sphere was opened. Furthermore, constitutional review arose where it had not previously existed, or it was strengthened, at least on paper, in other countries.
The Strengthening of Constitutional Review during the Arab Spring

Tunisia

The Arab Spring transitions began when popular protests led to the ouster of Tunisia’s authoritarian President Ben Ali. Thereafter, a new Tunisian constitution was enacted that grants the power of constitutional review to a special court. In an attempt to guarantee that the judiciary reflected the opinions of multiple constituencies, different branches of government would each be allowed to appoint a number of justices.

Libya

In neighbouring Libya the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi led to a political vacuum. With competing factions unable to agree on a new constitution, the Supreme Court retains constitutional jurisdiction and, given the weakness of the political branches of government, it has assumed some important responsibilities. For example, it has weighed in on some thorny questions of parliamentary procedure that have had real impact on political outcomes.

The Kingdoms of Morocco and Jordan

In 2011, after popular protests in favour of democratisation, Morocco adopted a new constitution that purported to usher in more political openness. It also strengthened, albeit marginally, the institution of constitutional review. It eliminated the Constitutional Council, which was viewed as lacking in independence. In its place, the constitution created a Constitutional Court and gave the King the power to appoint only half the members, with the Parliament holding the power to appoint the other half. Parliament itself, however, continues to be elected in a manner that many people believe is less than free and fair. The new Constitutional Court thus still seems to lack, for now, meaningful independence.

Similarly, Jordan’s government responded to the Arab Spring by establishing, in 2011, a new Constitutional Court that lacks independence. Indeed, all members of the court are appointed by the King.

Egypt

In Egypt, the Arab Spring led to the military ouster of authoritarian President Hosni Mubarak and an extremely messy transition. Under a transitional constitutional document, a parliament was elected that was dominated by the long-banned Muslim opposition party, the Muslim Brotherhood. A Muslim Brother, Muhammad Morsi, was elected President in free and open presidential elections. The Constitutional Court continued to operate. Relying on a precedent from the Mubarak years, the Constitutional Court annulled the parliamentary elections and dissolved the Parliament, leaving some question about who was to create laws and draft a new constitution. After complex negotiations with the army, the President acquired power not only over policy but also over drafting a new constitution. In the ensuing months, many Egyptians became uncomfortable with the new constitution that was drafted and also with the policies of President Morsi. Ignoring dangerous signs of discontent among powerful factions within the judiciary, military and security services, President Morsi continued to demonstrate some latent authoritarian tendencies infused with a commitment to a vision of Islam that made many Egyptians uncomfortable. After mass protests, the military removed President Morsi and violently repressed his supporters. In a gesture that seemed to signal approval of the coup, the Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court accepted the position of President in the transitional government and formally accepted a draft of a new constitution which was subsequently approved by referendum. This was followed by an election boycotted by the Muslim Brotherhood, in which the recent Army Chief, General al-Sisi, ran effectively unopposed.

By the time the regime of General al-Sisi took power, the Supreme Constitutional Court had negotiated for itself a position as a self-perpetuating, largely autonomous, unelected branch of government.
Throughout these complex events, the strong Egyptian Constitutional Court morphed into an institution even more independent and powerful than it had previously been. Although the court seems, at the very least, to have accepted the return of guided democracy in Egypt, the country’s judges demanded that they take a far more powerful position among the guides. The Supreme Constitutional Court had come to exercise an important role under President Mubarak in policing abuses of executive power. It ensured some freedom of speech and at least minimal freedom of political association. Its ability to police the executive had been limited, however, by its vulnerability to court packing. The President controlled the number of justices and, indirectly, appointments to the Court. Since the fall of Mubarak, the justices on Egypt’s SCC have negotiated significant independence from control by the political branches of the emerging State. Most importantly, the judges on the Constitutional Court gained, for the first time, near total control over appointments to the Court as well as control over discipline of its members. By the time the regime of General al-Sisi took power, the Supreme Constitutional Court had negotiated for itself a position as a self-perpetuating, largely autonomous, unelected branch of government. It selects and disciplines its own members and has no responsibility to answer to any elected political body or indeed to any other body at all. Indeed, it is on paper today one of the most independent constitutional courts in the world.

Have Newly Empowered Constitutional Courts in the Arab Mediterranean Promoted Democratisation?

In the immediate aftermath of the Arab Spring, optimistic liberals anticipated a virtuous cycle. Democratic forces would call for a strengthening of constitutional review. Constitutional courts would exercise their new power to enforce Constitutional rules protecting citizens’ political rights and requiring orderly democratic transitions of power. For these optimists, the past three years have been a disappointment. In many countries, democratisation has stalled, and constitutional courts appear to have done little to restart the process. It is possible, however, that they will do so in the future.

Doubts about the Ability or Desire of New Constitutional Courts to Promote Deep Democratisation in Morocco and Jordan

In the resilient monarchies of Morocco and Jordan, the monarchs have made concessions to the democratic opposition by promising to open the political sphere and by creating or strengthening constitutional tribunals. Nonetheless, these institutions appear too weak or lacking in independence to promote democratisation deeper than the King approves. If anything, they might be expected to subvert democratisation by striking down laws that are contrary to the interests of the King.

Open Questions about the Power and Philosophy of Courts in Tunisia and Libya

Tunisia has followed the most significant path towards democratisation. Its new Constitutional Court has been carefully designed to help continue the process. An inclusive mode of judicial appointment would appear likely to promote its legitimacy in the eyes of multiple political factions. It should, in theory, be well suited to address constitutional questions in a way that promotes democracy and is accepted as legitimate. However, it is, until now, untested. It is hard to say how much popular legitimacy the new Constitutional Court has or whether, if a true constitutional crisis erupts it will have the power and inclination to guide politics systematically in a democratic direction.
chamber of the Supreme Court in Libya. This chamber, reorganised under the ousted Gaddafi regime, has continued to operate during the transitional period. Indeed, it has opined on at least one potentially explosive question of political process. At the time of writing, however, the country has not approved a new constitution, and appears to be descending ever deeper into warlordism. If that continues, it seems hard to imagine the court continuing to play any significant role in shaping the behaviour of political actors, and it might, in any case, be replaced or significantly redesigned when a new constitution emerges.

Ambiguities about the Egyptian SCC’s Behaviour to Date

Unlike other courts, the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court has demonstrated both power and a willingness to use it. Its dramatic actions have, however, been highly controversial. It is very difficult to evaluate at this point whether the Court was actually trying to promote democracy or, if so, whether its actions have been productive.

The SCC’s Role in the Early Transition from Authoritarianism

After the fall of President Mubarak, Egypt moved into a transitional period governed by a mixture of existing laws and new transitional documents. After the election of a new legislature and President, a new constitution would be drafted. The constitutional order was to be overseen by Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC), which continued to be staffed by figures appointed by the ousted authoritarian President Mubarak. The SCC exercised oversight in a manner that betrayed discomfort with the implications of electoral democracy as it was emerging in Egypt.

The SCC’s Actions after the Electoral Victories of the Muslim Brotherhood

During the post-Mubarak elections, the venerable Islamist organisation the Muslim Brotherhood formed a political party and vastly outperformed most rival parties. The group had already developed a large and sophisticated organisation that could manage proselytisation programmes and charitable services. It leveraged this to win both a majority in parliament as well as the presidency. Shortsightedness, in retrospect, the resurgent Brotherhood proved insensitive to the concerns of communities who had not been able to organise themselves politically and who felt disenfranchised. Ominously, this included a number of important communities, including urban secular-leaning elites whose vision for Egypt probably coincided with those of many military officers and justices on the SCC. Critics in these communities argued, self-servingly, that the electoral returns did not represent national opinion, and they warned that the Brotherhood would use its temporary majority to entrench itself politically. Perhaps taking those concerns seriously, the SCC, early in the transition, issued decisions that interfered with the Muslim Brotherhood’s ability to quickly translate its electoral victories into effective control over policymaking. Most notably, citing a precedent from the Mubarak era, the Court declared the law under which the Parliament had been elected to be unconstitutional, and thereafter dissolved the Brotherhood-dominated Parliament.

Already sceptical about the wisdom of Brotherhood policies and concerned about the inability of its opponents to organise themselves politically, a majority of justices on the SCC seem to have feared the possibility that, under the Brotherhood’s new constitution and under laws enacted by a Brotherhood-dominated government, judges might lose their power to check government abuses.

The dissolution of Parliament did not disempower the Brotherhood, which still controlled the presidency. The President and Army negotiated a tense modus vivendi. The President was allowed to exercise executive and some legislative power, and a constituent assembly controlled by the President was appointed to draft a constitution. The President and
his allies continued to alienate numerous communities, and the new constitution did little to alleviate concerns about the direction that Egypt was headed. While concerns mounted among Egyptians who were not supporters of the Brotherhood, judges worried about Brotherhood actions that seemed to encroach upon judicial and prosecutorial independence. Already sceptical about the wisdom of Brotherhood policies and concerned about the inability of its opponents to organise themselves politically, a majority of justices on the SCC seem to have feared the possibility that, under the Brotherhood’s new constitution and under laws enacted by a Brotherhood-dominated government, judges might lose their power to check government abuses. After large public protests against the Brotherhood’s policies, the military ousted the elected president Muhammad Morsi.

The SCC’s Behaviour since the Military Coup of 2013

Strikingly, the Court refused to consider the constitutionality of the action. Indeed, the Chief Justice appeared to legitimise the military’s actions by serving a powerful symbolic role as President of the military-dominated transitional government. After nominally supervising the drafting of a new constitution, he handed power to the Army Chief of Staff who was elected, effectively unopposed, as the first President under the new regime. His regime, in turn, granted remarkable power to the SCC, which was granted near-total control over appointments to the court and over its own internal affairs. The military, in short, took power but relinquished the one tool that it had previously needed to restrain the judiciary. Egypt appears to have returned to a period of guided democracy – but one in which the judiciary will have a remarkably powerful role, at least on paper, as one of the guides.

Evaluating the SCC’s Actions

There is room for argument about whether the Court’s actions represent a defeat or a victory for democracy in Egypt. The case for defeat can be made simply. After the fall of a dictator, unelected judges appointed by that dictator stood silently by as the military reinstated the dictator and assisted in the reinstatement of what appears to be a new form of authoritarian “guided democracy.” Although the SCC has acquired new independence from the executive, and is now an autonomous, self-governing institution, it is unlikely to use that power to promote democratisation and may, indeed, act to forestall it. Supporters of the Court argue that the story is more nuanced. By their account, the justices on the SCC were not pre-disposed against elections generally or against the Brotherhood in particular. The Brotherhood, however, consistently acted in a fashion that suggested that it was planning to leverage a temporary electoral majority into entrenched power unchecked by independent judges. In those circumstances, it was compelled to turn to the only force that could prevent this – the military. But it extracted guarantees of independence that will allow it to push the military-backed government to democratis in the future without fear of suppression. The Court’s actions are thus democracy-promoting.

Almost four years after the start of the Arab Spring, there is, at a formal level, more constitutional review than ever before in the region, and the institutions empowered to perform it have, at least on paper, new independence and power.

To determine which account is correct would require insight into the motivations of the justices, knowledge about how the Brotherhood-led government would have behaved if it had remained in power and, finally, an ability to predict with confidence whether the SCC will, indeed, reach out to constrain the new regime. It seems too early to engage in that task. Even accepting the second version, however, it seems that the Court betrayed a notable aversion to the democratic risks of rapid democratisation and significant tolerance of risks that might accompany the re-empowerment of the military.

Conclusion

Ever since the US developed the institutions of written constitutions and constitutional review in the
18th century, there have been debates about whether, in a democratising society, the institution of constitutional review tends to promote or enrich democracy. After the Second World War, the consensus began to congeal around the position that constitutional review was, indeed, synergistic with democracy and that the adoption of judicial review early in the process of democratisation tended to promote democratisation moving forward. There have always been dissenters from this view, and recently they have grown louder. Although it has not completely resolved the question, the experience of Arab Mediterranean states since the Arab Spring provides some support for the sceptics.

Today, almost four years after the start of the Arab Spring, there is, at a formal level, more constitutional review than ever before in the region, and the institutions empowered to perform it have, at least on paper, new independence and power. Nevertheless, setting aside Tunisia, where the Court has been largely untested, constitutional courts seem to lack the power or desire to encourage further democratisation. Some of this failure is by design. In some of the region’s monarchies, where the executive was never truly threatened, the institutions of judicial review, though strengthened, still lack the independence that would be necessary to challenge the ruling elite or its policies. In others, it is a product of extreme circumstances. In Libya, the country has descended into violence and warlordism that no court could reasonably be expected to halt. A more perplexing case is found in Egypt. There, a powerful court actively weighed in on important questions in a messy but generally peaceful democratic transition. Then, as Egyptian factions grew increasingly divided, it seems to have given its blessing to a return to authoritarian rule – albeit one in which it was to operate with enormous independence. Its champions suggest that counter-intuitively, its embrace of guided democracy will actually enrich democracy in the long run. By their reading, the alternative was even less democratic, and the court, having retained the power to force a more gradual and productive democratisation, will wield it wisely.

Recent events in the Arab Mediterranean cannot tell us whether 19th century and contemporary critics are correct to question the role that constitutional review is said to play in promoting democracy – and particularly in promoting democracy in the early phases of a transition from authoritarianism. At this point, it certainly seems safe to say that the strengthening of constitutional review in the Arab Mediterranean has not done much to promote rapid democratisation in the area. For liberals, the hope must be that newly empowered courts in the region will fulfil their promise during a longer-term process of democratisation in the future.

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The Moroccan Constitution of 29 July 2011 is the first constitution promulgated under the reign of Mohammed VI. The role of the circumstances under which it emerged should not be overestimated. The temporality of the Arab Spring does not apply to Morocco, and the 20th February Movement was not a response to the movement on Tahrir Square, even if it did attempt to slip into the chink of opportunity opened by the latter. When the first protest organised by the 20th February Movement took place, Morocco had already long been in a reform dynamic. This is the outcome of two measures that defused the situation. The first dates back to the last decade of the Hassan II regime and consisted of governmental integration of opposition parties. The second consisted of the attention placed on human development by the new sovereign since his accession to the throne. Regardless of the results, which may be mixed, these measures have had an effect on the manner in which the regime is perceived and on its legitimacy. The double political and social defusing has led to an expansion of the space for discussion, whose door was only ajar at the end of the preceding monarch’s regime. In twelve years, Morocco has changed a great deal.

Although the Constitution of 2011 appeared liberal at first, embodying the regime’s intended position regarding democracy and authoritarianism, its implementation – when viewed in a three-year retrospect – seems prudent and of a more parsimonious liberalism. It is part of a project to consolidate a system clearly conceived as hybrid, in which monarchical leadership and parliamentarism each play a role.

The Context

A number of institutional developments have long indicated a reorientation of governance: regionalisation has implied and entailed an in-depth change of relations between those governing and those governed, such as the establishment of the National Human Rights Council and the Economic and Social Council. Although these councils were created after 20th February 2011, they were conceived well before the timeframe for their creation had been established. It was, however, on the basis of regionalisation that the sovereign, in his 9 March speech, announced constitutional reform. This announcement, in its breadth, affirmed the regime’s liberal orientation. Whereas the 20th February Movement, beyond its agenda of protest, lacks a consensual and thus potentially mobilising platform. The weeks following the speech demonstrated the Movement’s difficulty in taking up other demands of the same nature; its capacity to mobilise was clearly diminishing. It did, nevertheless, trigger an important movement of sectoral demonstrations in which people in different socio-professional categories demanded an improvement in their living conditions. This has above all served as an opportunity for the monarchy, allowing it to accelerate reforms based on explicit demands by the population and benefiting from the media coverage of a movement that, though it does not precisely represent “the population,” has succeeded in gaining exposure.

Was this device necessary? For their relative importance, it is not certain that the reforms contained in the draft constitution would have been received
without causing commotion. Just consider the circumstances – the Casablanca attacks in May 2003 – that allowed the adoption of Morocco’s new Personal Status Code in 2004, whereas an initial attempt had been dropped under the pressure of a more or less interested, conservative coalition. In any case, the constitutional reforms go further: Tamazight has become an official language, gender equality has been affirmed, citizens can contest the constitutionality of laws in a constitutional court, the freedom of thought is recognised, the struggle against corruption has been encoded in the constitution… One can easily imagine how many interests and beliefs rigidified by habit these transformations can affect. They range from the Administration, which could frown upon independent judicial controls, to the Salafists, for whom identity is never restrictive enough, not to mention political personnel, who balk at change, often preferring not to upset their constituents. The monarchy was thus able to rely on the 20 February Movement to preventively defuse opposition to the draft Constitution.

**The Content**

The new Constitution displays three essential characteristics: the delineation of a broad scope of action for the head of government, who is given the means necessary to carry out their task and, above all, to control the parliamentary majority supporting them; the assertion of the sovereign’s powers of arbitration and influence; and the establishment of independent institutions in charge of protecting and developing rights. The separation of powers is not designed as much to separate the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary Branches as it is to limit their spheres of influence.

Hence the Executive Branch and Parliament are functionally linked, as they would be in a parliamentary regime, rather than checking or balancing each other out. The head of government is necessarily selected from among the members of the winning party, which is a parliamentary approach. Said head of government has the right to dissolve parliament. This is a rationalisation of parliamentarism, all the more necessary since Moroccan Administrations have always been coalitions. The right to dissolve parliament helps make the head of government the true “master” of the majority party or coalition. The latter, moreover, has the option of engaging the government’s support on a bill of law, which is a strong means of constraint for Parliament, a motion of no confidence in the government almost certainly entailing a new round of elections. From this perspective, the new Constitution is truly innovative. Moreover, it differs greatly from preceding ones, which effectively aimed, above all, to protect the monarchy against the government and Parliament (even if it wasn’t at great risk anyway). This one, on the contrary, aims to consolidate a space for autonomous government in which the head of government is, de facto, directly responsible before those governed via elections. It is obligatory designation of the head of government from among the representatives of the party having won the elections that establishes this rationale, very similar to the British and German parliamentary systems, where voting for a party means simultaneously choosing the head of the executive branch. Voters will effectively know whom they are voting in as head of government and the latter will know that they will not be able to continue in that post without the voters’ support, since the King cannot freely appoint (or remove) them, and will not expect to keep the post even with the support of a coalition if their party does not win the elections.

This “weapon” seems destined to synchronise politics and policies, that is, political activity itself (politicians, partisans…) and the conducting of public policy; in other words, it could be a means to overcome the situation whereby public policy is conducted although it is not sufficiently effective. A constant problem of conducting public policy is that of the multiple channels of the State apparatus and the wastage arising therefrom. In the conduction of public policy, Morocco had until now given precedence to consensual action (establishment of consultative bodies of evaluation, negotiation with interested parties…) or “direct action.” Direct action is illustrated by the King’s intervention in the establishment of infrastructure or by removal of government officials carrying out their duties poorly. In any case, this latter mode of action is only effective in certain domains. It is not effective when applied in the healthcare, social welfare, justice and educational systems. Why? Because, in the healthcare sphere, for instance, attempting to rectify the poor functioning of hospitals would also entail reconsidering civil servants’ salaries...
By creating a head of government and an executive different from the King, the constitutional reform, at least in theory, has created an actor who has an interest in abusing public officials in order to keep their post and maintain the pre-eminence of their party and doctors’ careers. To take another example, in the sphere of social welfare, which has been under construction since 1998, the issue is not just to establish a good system, but to strike a balance between what businesses can offer, the effort that the State can afford and the participation of beneficiaries, each of these three partners being caught in their own systems of constraints. In other words, the idea is to manage to mobilise different categories of actors involved in government action on the long term. This is never easy, particularly because the stability of those in power is often due to immobility involving not offending or annoying too many people, which is particularly true for State officials, who, each in their place, ensure the regime’s stability, if not necessarily ensuring the Rule of Law. Thus, by creating a head of government and an executive different from the King, the constitutional reform, at least in theory, has created an actor who has an interest in abusing public officials in order to keep their post and maintain the pre-eminence of their party.

The parliamentary rationale of the Constitution’s text is nonetheless limited by the powers assigned to the sovereign, although they do not undermine it. They should be perceived as the presidential powers were construed at the beginning of the 5th French Republic (between 1958 and 1962), at a time when the president was not the effective head of the parliamentary majority, but he did have great historical legitimacy. His powers were considered the means to best protect the country’s fundamental interests by not placing them at the centre of partisan negotiations. In the same spirit, the establishment of a constitutional court to which citizens can turn, backed by the ample Declaration of Rights contained in the Constitution, guarantees the existence of an independent sphere for the protection and development of rights that also escapes the vagaries of governance and electoral conservatism. Moreover, the Constitution has established numerous authorities to ensure good governance and the protection of rights (namely in the sphere of equality and human rights). These authorities are conceived as independent from the government and, for the most part, are designed to create a link with civil society.

The Current Situation

There is no denying, however, that the course of political life does not, for the time being, reveal any significant change. First of all, the majority of organic laws that must be adopted according to the Constitution have not yet been voted on. This is the case namely with the one concerning the Constitutional Court. Its role is apparently destined to be significant, insofar as citizens can contest the constitutionality of a law via a court case. The Declaration of Rights contained in the Constitution a priori opens a major sphere of dissent. In any case, the two organic laws establishing this recourse are not yet ready, such that the Declaration is, de facto, not yet effective. The same is true of numerous other spheres and other authorities based on organic laws. These laws, however, must perforce be adopted during the current legislature, which will lead either to a final bottleneck of more or less slapdash organic laws, or a constitutional reform extending their deadline for adoption. Note also that regionalisation, which partially justified constitutional reform, has not progressed.

Government action itself does not always seem to reflect the strengthening of the head of government, the latter remaining indebted to a coalition. The departure of the Istiqlal party from government and its replacement by the National Rally of Independents (RNI) resulted, for instance, in the loss of ministerial posts for the head of government’s party. By the same token, although appointment of senior officials is shared, in application of the Constitution and via an organic law, by the King and the head of government, it is not certain that the latter’s power of appointment is entirely independent. Indeed, the adoption of a new Constitution does not change practices overnight. In this respect, perhaps the Constitution of 29 July 2011 should be considered more a programme or objective rather than an accomplishment.
Tunisia has achieved an elusive goal in the political development of the Arab Mediterranean: a democratic constitution drafted outside the influence of a foreign occupier or an authoritarian dictator. To be sure, democracy is not yet secure in Tunisia, as implementation of the constitution amid pressing challenges of economic growth and domestic security will present enormous challenges. Yet the constitution gives hope for the region’s first home-grown democracy. The constitution is democratic, progressive and the result of broad political consensus. The question remains whether it can work in practice.

**Process Design**

The Tunisian constitutional process was characterised by a commitment to consensus building. Elites from across the political spectrum contributed to various stages of the transition, broadening the number of actors with a sense of ownership and a stake in the outcome. The electoral law for the National Constituent Assembly was written by a political-reform commission of French-influenced law professors and opposition political parties. Ennahda, the self-described Islamic party, won the elections and formed a coalition government with two secular parties, which assumed the offices of Speaker of the Assembly and President of the Republic. When the constitutional process stalled in the wake of two political assassinations in 2013, the President called a National Dialogue with representatives from leading opposition parties, the national labour union and the human-rights league, among others. All of these institutions, except for the National Dialogue, were founded in laws developed with wide consensus among political groups and consultation with civil society. The result is a highly credible constitution. Of course, the constitution is only a means to an end; it must now be implemented, and the challenges of political development might be even stronger in the face of risks to national security and economic growth. For the moment, however, the political transition in Tunisia is headed in the right direction. Tunisia has pulled off a snowball effect of legitimacy for democratic institutions in a way that other political transitions in the Arab world have not yet been able to achieve.

**Text Analysis**

The key remaining question is whether political groups in Tunisia will maintain their commitment to the rule of law and consensus building. The constitution provides the foundation of the political bargain, and it is a good place from which to start. Constitutions in the Arab world have often set out to violate rights or to consolidate the power of one person or party. Tunisians are fond of saying that the Ben Ali regime ignored the constitution. While Ben Ali certainly saw himself as above the constitution, he also used it as a tool for extending state power and directing the institutions of state in his favour. For example, a 2002 amendment to the constitution created an upper house of Parliament, the Chamber of Advisors, the members of which were appointed by Ben Ali, thus expanding his control over law making. The Tunisian constitution departs from the tradition of constitutional authoritarianism and, at least in its
written form, could serve as a genuine guarantor of democracy.

The question is how the institutions created by the new constitution will work in practice. In particular, the care which constitution-makers took to check executive authority might result in a system where decision-making is convoluted, given the limited power of the President and Prime Minister. The President is directly elected and has exclusive authority over foreign affairs and national security. The President also can veto legislation and, under certain circumstances, declare a state of emergency and dissolve Parliament. The Prime Minister is indirectly elected and directs the cabinet and the general policy of the State.

The constitution is only a means to an end; it must now be implemented, and the challenges of political development might be even stronger in the face of risks to national security and economic growth.

The President and the Prime Minister are both powerful – a result of compromises between political parties, and to diffuse the executive in order to prevent the kind of antidemocratic consolidation of power that has plagued other attempts at democratisation in the Arab world. The impulse was genuine, but the system created raises the possibility of what Cindy Skach has called a divided minority government. In such a situation, the President and Prime Minister are from different parties, neither of which has a majority in Parliament. Skach argues that a divided minority government doomed Germany’s Weimar Republic, among others. Indeed, the political scientist Robert Elgie has chronicled twenty-two experiments with semi-presidentialism in the twentieth century and found that sixteen of them were “democratic failures” (such as Armenia, Belarus and Niger), largely due to divided governments.

More positively, the constitution takes new steps to ensure the balance of power. The legislature is empowered as a genuine oversight body, with the authority to call ministers to testify and strict control over the state budget. The constitution also prevents single-party rule by enshrining important rights of opposition parties, as well as assigning the chairmanship of the powerful finance committee to a member of the opposition.

The constitution also calls for a new Constitutional Court, which is empowered to rule on the constitutionality of bills and laws. The court will also arbitrate in times of potential constitutional crises, such as in disputes between the President and Prime Minister, during a state of emergency, or in the absence of the President. Members of the court will be appointed by the President, Parliament and Supreme Judicial Council – a further check against partisan control over this important body. The court will be a new institution in Tunisia, as it is much more powerful than the previous Constitutional Council. The court will have to quickly establish itself as an equal player to the executive and the legislature.

In addition to providing a workable and democratic structure of the State, the constitution is also progressive. The rights and freedoms chapter includes a comprehensive list of protections, based on and sometimes exceeding international obligations. Article 46 includes perhaps the world’s most progressive provision regarding women’s representation, declaring equal representation between men and women a priority of the State. The constitution protects individual rights to health, education, a healthy and clean environment, expression and freedom from torture, among many others. The constitution makes no reference to Islamic sharia after Ennahda refused to put it on the table.

The constitution not only lists rights but also accounts for the implementation of rights protections. The constitution establishes a human-rights commission and guarantees the right of persons to seek recourse in courts for alleged rights violations. Article 49, which specifies how rights can be lawfully limited in accordance with international obligations, is the first of its kind in the Arab world. Many Arab constitutions attach a familiar phrase to a protected right, saying, for example, “The right of peaceful meetings is guaranteed within the limits of law” (Article 25 of the 1951 constitution of Libya). Arab parliaments or dictators would then abridge the protected right in subsequent legislation. The Tunisian constitution defends against this by copying language from the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights about the conditions under which...
rights can be limited, such as for reasons of public health or public safety.
The comprehensive nature of the rights protected and the view taken to implementing those protections makes the Tunisian chapter on rights and freedoms the most progressive in the region.

Looking Ahead: Next Steps in Implementation

No matter how detailed constitutions are, precedents and traditions are important to the way that a political system operates. The parties that win the next parliamentary elections will be the next stewards of the transition in Tunisia and will play an important role in defining how the new political system works. Whether the winning parties commit themselves to the same principles under which the constitution was drafted is the next big question about Tunisia’s political future. Large democracies can survive constitutional hiccoughs, such as the 2000 election in the United States or the recent ouster of the Prime Minister in Australia. Fragile democracies, like Tunisia, are less resilient to those shocks.

Elections are likely in the fall, under an election law to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly. The elections have the potential to exacerbate the partisanship between Tunisia’s largest political parties. The two most important now are Ennahda and Nida Tounes, led by Beji Caid Essebsi, a senior official from the era of Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Nida Tounes represents the old, secular elite, while Ennahda has marketed itself as the party that can leverage Islam to restore the dignity of Tunisia by getting over the past. Tunisian voters could hardly be presented with more distinct parties in history or outlook, but no single party has emerged in the middle. The Tunisian electoral system tends to favour small parties, meaning that it is unlikely for any one party to win an outright majority in Parliament. A coalition government is thus likely, perhaps further complicating the sharing of executive powers.

The Constituent Assembly has adopted an organic law on the establishment of an interim constitutional court, comprising six judges, who are the current appellate judges. The new Parliament will draft another organic law to create the permanent Constitutional Court with twelve members. The interim court could be an important guarantor of democracy in the meantime. The permanent court would be a natural target for assistance from the European Union.

The comprehensive nature of the rights protected and the view taken to implementing those protections makes the Tunisian chapter on rights and freedoms the most progressive in the region.

The Tunisian constitution should be celebrated for the system that it creates, the rights it protects and the manner in which it was written. It is an historic document and one answer to the problem of how to build a democracy, which has beguiled the region in the modern era. But the constitution alone will not run the country; indeed, a system of government based on compromise and consensus is more democratic but less streamlined than an authoritarian one. Tunisia’s political parties – the winners and losers of the next elections – will have to commit themselves to the rule of law and the peaceful transfer of power.

References


The 2014 Constitution of Egypt: An Overview

In January 2014, a new permanent constitution came into force in Egypt. It was the second such document since January 2011, and the fourth considering the two temporary constitutions adopted by constitutional declaration in March 2011 and July 2013, without counting the other eight constitutional declarations that slightly or significantly amended previous texts (in February, September, and November 2011, June, August, November and December 2012, and July 2013).

The process that led to the 2014 Constitution was originally presented as an operation to simply amend the 2012 Constitution. A committee of ten jurists (the C-10) was appointed by the interim President to draft amendments to be discussed by a Committee of fifty figures representing wider sections of Egyptian society (the C-50). The C-10 drafted a number of suggested amendments, but the C-50 decided to reassess the entire text. The text as voted on by the C-50 in late 2013 was approved by referendum in January 2014.

Length and Structure

The structure of the 2014 Constitution displays elements of continuity with previous texts, all the way back to the 1971 Constitution. This should come as no surprise, as the previous text was always used as a working document or a blueprint for discussion, and when committees were drafting a new text their work was organised in sub-committees along the sub-sections of the previous text.

The 2014 Constitution qualifies as a long constitution, carrying 247 articles. It is preceded by a preamble and is divided into six sections. The two larger sections are on fundamental rights (section three: 43 articles), and institutional design (section five: 121 articles). Both sections are quite wordy, but generally allow ordinary legislation to intervene in many of the more controversial provisions (often with the possibility of voiding the entire provision).

Rigidity

The procedure to amend the 2014 Constitution is quite onerous. Arguments in favour of more flexible constitutions in a transitional phase seem to have been discarded by the drafters, and the result is a rather rigid 2014 text. Flexibility has been valued by some scholars for its ability in transitional contexts to allow the text to adjust to changing political conditions, without crumbling. This feature could have proven useful also in Egypt, where the political landscape is largely unknown mainly because of the taboo of political mobilisation that reigned until January 2011.

An amendment can be proposed either by the President or by a fifth of the MPs. Within thirty days, the Assembly can approve the proposal by an absolute majority. If the proposal passes, the amendments can start being discussed after sixty days. The amendments need to be approved by a super-majority of two thirds and later confirmed in a popular referendum. There is no minimum turnout requirement for the referendum to be valid (art. 226).

Provisions on the number of presidential terms in office cannot be amended, as is the case for provisions on the principles of freedom and equality (unless drafted in order to expand their guarantees) (art. 226).
State/Islam Relations

Art. 2 has been maintained in its 1980 formulation, carrying an establishment clause (Islam is the religion of the State) and a sharia provision (the principles of Islamic law are the chief source of legislation). In the 2012 Constitution, an explanatory note was added with the purpose of better defining the ‘principles of Islamic law’ (art. 219), but the provision was left out of the 2014 text. Instead, the preamble carries a reference to the Supreme Constitutional Court’s case law on art. 2 as the binding reference on how to construe it. Oddly enough, the brief preamble sentence is footnoted with an undefined set of SCC rulings to be found in the minutes of the C-50.

Art. 3 carries a mirror sharia provision for Egyptian non-Muslims. It reads that the principles of confessional laws of Christians and Jews are the chief source of legislation regulating their personal status, their religious affairs, and how to choose their religious authorities. The idea of a mirror sharia provision was introduced during the transition, and somehow opposed by secular Copts and all those in favour of non-confessional laws regulating personal status. Notably, the combined reading of the two provisions now weakens the confining construction of art. 2 offered by the SCC, since the latter provision does not include any of the limitations listed in art. 3. In fact, both art. 2 and art. 3 declare confessional laws to be the chief sources of legislation, but while the latter limits the operation of the provision to personal status, religious affairs and the choice of religious authorities, the former does not carry any such limitation. One could then argue that the principles of Islamic law need not only be the chief source of legislation within those narrow boundaries, but actually extend to the entire scope of state legislation. In the past, the reading offered by the SCC, however, was heading quite in the opposite direction, limiting the operation of art. 2 to personal status matters.

The controversial provision requiring an advisory opinion by the highest religious institution in Egypt (al-Azhar) on all sharia matters was removed from the 2012 text. The article now celebrates al-Azhar’s independence, affirms that the State is to provide it with the necessary means to pursue its goals, and that the law regulates how the head of al-Azhar (the Sheikh al-Azhar) is to be chosen within the Body of Senior Scholars (art. 7).

Fundamental Constituents of Society

The 2014 Constitution comes across as a constitution with strong neo-liberal inclinations. Some of its socialist language from the 1971 text has been maintained, but closer scrutiny reveals a firm departure from that spirit. Cooperative ownership, for instance, is mentioned as one of the three forms of ownership which deserve state protection (art. 33 and 37). However, in art. 1 the text declares that the underpinnings of Egypt’s republican, democratic system are citizenship (muwatanah) and the rule of law (siyadat al-qanun). The 2014 Constitution, therefore, signals the intention to follow the pre-2011 move towards neo-liberalism that characterised the 2007 amendments to the 1971 text, when the reference to the alliance of the working forces was substituted with citizenship.

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A clear example of the neo-liberal approach is also the preference for formal over substantial equality. In art. 11, the 2014 Constitution affirms the State’s duty to pursue gender equality. The provision delegates to ordinary legislation the regulation of guarantees of an appropriate representation of women in elective bodies, and affirms women’s right to assume public office, and higher administrative positions, and to serve in the judiciary, “with no discrimination against her” (art. 11(1)). The closing line rules out the possibility of engaging with affirmative action policies which could address structural gender inequalities, and signals the drafters’ preference for a formal notion of equality as sheer equality of opportunities.
A number of provisions enumerating rights are included in the sub-sections on the fundamental constituents of society. Drafters in the C-50 feared that these provisions could be simply emptied by non-compliance, thus a system of benchmarks was introduced. For example, the 2014 text sets a minimum 4% GDP expense for primary and secondary education (art. 19), and 2% for higher education (art. 21). The same applies to the right to healthcare, where government needs to invest a minimum 3% of Egypt’s GDP every year (art. 18).

**Fundamental Rights**

The verbose section on fundamental rights falls into the old trap of leaving to ordinary legislation the regulation of rights, or just leaving the door open to it. This can be easily observed in the provisions on pre-trial detention (art. 54(4)), privacy of correspondence (art. 57), home searches (art. 58), limitations to freedom of movement (art. 62), religion (art. 64), assembly (art. 73) and association (art. 75 ff.), etc. These rights are thus not properly entrenched, as ordinary majorities in parliament can easily curtail them.

The verbose section on fundamental rights falls into the old trap of leaving to ordinary legislation the regulation of rights, or just leaving the door open to it

Drafters in the C-50, however, seemed to be aware of the risks of such a weak entrenchment, and included a general provision preventing ordinary legislation from touching the core and essence of a right when regulating its exercise (art. 92). The decision on what constitutes the core and essence of a right will therefore be determined by the SCC.

**Institutional Design**

*Parliament*

The 2014 Constitution opted for a unicameral system, thus terminating a bicameral experience that was heavily criticised in the past - often for the role played by the upper house rather than on the merits of the bicameral system itself (art. 101).

The assembly is free to determine what electoral system to adopt, and how to draw electoral districts, provided the outcome is a fair representation of residents and governorates - a somehow ambiguous expression in itself. Drafters in the C-50 also wanted to discontinue the practice of repeated dissolutions of parliament by the SCC on grounds of unfair electoral systems, so they expressly inserted in the text a provision that states that the legislature is free to opt for a single-winner or multiple-winner method, or a combination of the two (art. 102(3)).

The assembly has legislative powers, but the President can return legislation to the house for reconsideration. The assembly can overrule the presidential decision by a two-thirds majority (art. 123(3)). The assembly can pass a no-confidence vote against any member of government or its head by a plurality of votes, and the motion can be put to a vote only after formal interrogation of the minister or Prime Minister. The government has the right to transform an individual no-confidence motion into a collective no-confidence motion by declaring its solidarity with the minister or Prime Minister against whom the motion was originally directed (art. 131).

The President has the right to dissolve the assembly, but the decision always needs to be confirmed by referendum before taking effect. The assembly is suspended until the referendum is held (art. 137).

*The President*

The President is directly elected and can only serve for two terms (art. 140). The stringent citizenship requirements first introduced in March 2011 have been maintained in the 2014 text; a candidate cannot have ever held any foreign citizenship, nor can her parents or spouse. The candidate also needs to enjoy civil and political rights, have fulfilled his military obligations (or having legally been exonerated from them), and be at least forty years old on the day of the opening of the registration of candidates. The legislature can add further requirements beyond what the constitutional text prescribes (art. 141).

The 2014 Constitution, in line with previous texts, opted for a semi-presidential form of government,
but requires an initial vote of confidence regulated in quite rigid terms. The President is free to appoint as Prime Minister whomever she pleases, but that candidate needs to obtain an absolute majority of votes in parliament to take up the office. If this fails, the President is then constrained to appoint as Prime Minister the candidate put forward by the party or coalition with the largest number of seats in parliament. If this second candidate fails to obtain the same absolute majority of votes in parliament, the assembly is automatically dissolved (art. 146(1)). In case of a candidate put forward by the party or coalition with the largest number of seats in parliament, the President retains the appointment of the ministers of Defence, Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Justice (art. 146(4)).

The rigidity of the procedure established in art. 146 seems to offer the President the possibility of coercing the assembly into accepting her candidate since the procedure includes a self-destruction mechanism that comparative studies show as particularly effective.

The President also retains the power to declare the state of emergency, but the decision will have to be ratified within seven days by an absolute majority in the assembly. The state of emergency can be declared for up to three months and renewed only once; in this case, the renewal requires a two-third majority in the assembly.

The President is declared to be the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, but can deploy troops on external fighting missions only after having obtained an advisory opinion of the National Council for Defence (an institution where the army is largely represented), and the approval of the assembly with a two-third majority (art. 152). If the assembly is not in session, the President needs to obtain an advisory opinion from the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (an institution representing the army), and the approval of the Council of Ministers and the National Council for Defence.

The President can be impeached by parliament with a two-third majority for any breach of the constitution (!), high treason or any other crime (!), and will be judged by a special panel formed by members of the judiciary (art. 159).

Drafters in the Committee of fifty were heavily criticised for giving in on all fronts to the army’s requests, especially on military trials for civilians

The Judiciary

The judiciary emerges as one of the main winners, along with the army. Just like the army, its higher councils need to be consulted when drafting any legislation affecting them, and their budgets are included in the state budget as a single figure: there is no further parliamentary oversight over their budgetary items (art. 185). Public prosecution is presented as a fully judicial body, but the Constitution delegates ordinary legislation to regulate most of its affairs, including the appointment of the Chief Public Prosecutor (art. 189). Regulation of the Supreme Constitutional Court is left to ordinary legislation as well, and the Constitution even refrains from fixing the number of judges, thus allowing possible court-packing schemes in the future (art. 193(1)).

The Army

The Army obtained all it desired from the new Constitution: (1) the preservation of a Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF, art. 200); (2) the requirement of the Minister of Defence to be an army officer (art. 201); (3) the creation of a body, the National Council for Defence, with a majority of army members (a) to decide on all matters relating to national security and internal unity, (b) to approve the army’s budget, and (c) offer an advisory opinion on all legislation affecting the army (art. 203); (4) limited parliamentary oversight over the army’s internal budget (art. 203); and (5) the preservation of military jurisdiction over civilians (art. 204). Drafters in the C-50 were heavily criticised for giving in on all fronts to the army’s requests, especially on military trials for civilians. The provision is particularly instructive, because it offers an extensive list of cases in which military courts have jurisdiction over civilians, and beyond that it still allows ordinary legislation to add further areas of jurisdiction to the military courts (art. 204(3)).
Panorama: The Mediterranean Year
### ALBANIA

**Official Name:** Republic of Albania  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Bujar Nishani  
**Head of Government:** Edi Rama

**Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats):**  
- Socialist Party of Albania (PSSH, social democrat) 66  
- Democratic Party of Albania (PDS, conservative) 49  
- Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI, social democrat) 16  
- Party for Justice and Integration (PDI, Albanian Chams minority) 4  
- Republican Party (PR, conservative) 3  
- Unity for Human Rights Party (PBDBNJ, greek minority) 1  
- Christian Democratic Party (PKDSH) 1

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Tirana (0.42)  
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Durrës (0.12); Vlorë (0.08)

- **Area km²:** 28,750  
- **Population (millions):** 3.2

- **Population density (hab/km²):** 115  
- **Population age <15 (%):** 21  
- **Population age >64 (%):** 11  
- **Total fertility rate (births per woman):** 1.79  
- **Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):** 74/80  
- **Urban population (%):** 54  
- **Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 15

### Economy

**GDP & Debt**  
- **GDP (millions $):** 12,261  
- **GDP per capita ($, PPP):** 9,207  
- **GDP growth (%):** 1.6  
- **Public Debt (in % GDP):** 62.4  
- **Public Deficit (in % of GDP):** -3.3  
- **External Debt (millions $):** 6,934  
- **Inflation Rate (%):** 2.0

**FDI**  
- **Inflows (millions $):** 957  
- **Outflows (millions $):** 23

**International tourism**  
- **Tourists arrivals (000):** 2,932  
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** 1,833

**Migrant remittances**  
- **Receipts (millions $):** 1,035  
- **Receipts (in % GDP):** 8.3

**Total trade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goods and services (millions $)</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods ($ millions)</td>
<td>6,399</td>
<td>4,078</td>
<td>-2,321</td>
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<tr>
<td>in goods ($ millions)</td>
<td>4,527</td>
<td>1,960</td>
<td>-2,567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services ($ millions)</td>
<td>1,872</td>
<td>2,118</td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>-18.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Main Trading Partners**

- **Import:** Italy (34%), Greece (11%), China (7%), Turkey (6%), Germany (5%)  
- **Export:** Italy (49%), Spain (10%), China (7%), Greece (5%), Turkey (5%)

### Society

**Education**  
- **Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):** 98.0/95.7  
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** -  
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 82.4  
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 55.5  
- **Mean years of schooling:** 11.4  
- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):** 3.3  
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** 0.15

**Water**  
- **Water resources (km³):** 41.7  
- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 414  
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):** 39  
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):** 18  
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 0

**Security**  
- **Total armed forces (000):** 15  
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 1.3

**Development**  
- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.749  
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 70

**Health**  
- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** 11.1  
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** 24.0  
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 6.0

**Emissions**  
- **CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):** 1.2  
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** 94

**Protected areas**  
- **Terrestrial (% of total land area):** 11.0  
- **Marine (% of territorial waters):** 0.4

**ICT**  
- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 98.0  
- **Households with computer (per 100):** 15.6  
- **Internet users (per 100):** 54.7
### Algeria

**Official Name:** People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria  
**Form of Government:** Semi-presidential republic  
**Head of State:** Abdelaziz Bouteflika  
**Head of Government:** Abdelmalek Sellal

#### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Front (FLN)</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Rally for Democracy (RND)</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Algeria Alliance (AVV, Islamist coalition)</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Forces Front (FFS, social democrat)</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>independents</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Algiers (2.92)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Oran (0.78); Constantine (0.45)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area (km²)</td>
<td>2,381,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &lt;15 (%)</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &gt;64 (%)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fertility rate (births per woman)</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, Men/Women (years)</td>
<td>69/73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Economy

- **GDP (millions $):** 204,289
- **GDP per capita ($, PPP):** 7,305
- **GDP growth (%):** 3.3
- **Public Debt (in % GDP):** 9.6
- **External Debt (millions $):** 5,643
- **Inflation Rate (%):** 8.9
- **FDI**
  - Inflows (millions $): 1,484
  - Outflows (millions $): -41
- **International tourism**
  - Tourists arrivals (000): 2,395
  - Tourism receipts (million $): 300
- **Migrant remittances**
  - Receipts (millions $): 1,843
  - Remittances (in % GDP): 0.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total trade</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>62,592</td>
<td>75,548</td>
<td>12,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>51,568</td>
<td>71,558</td>
<td>19,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>11,025</td>
<td>3,990</td>
<td>-7,035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Society

- **Adult literacy rate, Men / Women (%):** 81.3/63.9
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 97
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 98
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 32
- **Mean years of schooling:** 76
- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):** 4.3
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** 0.07

#### Water

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Metric</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water resources (km³):</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (agriculture):</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (industry):</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desalinated water production (millions m³):</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Security

- **Total armed forces (000):** 317
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 4.8

#### Development

- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.713
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 93

#### Health

- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** 12.1
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** ..
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 4.3

#### Emissions

- **CO₂ Emissions (mt oil eq):** 145.8
- **Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):** 41.9
- **Import (% energy used):** -248.0

#### Main Trading Partners

- **Import:** France (13%), China (12%), Italy (10%), Spain (9%), Germany (5%)
- **Export:** Italy (16%), United States (15%), Spain (11%), France (9%), Netherlands (7%)
### Bosnia and Herzegovina

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official Name:</th>
<th>Bosnia and Herzegovina</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Form of Government:</td>
<td>Federal democratic republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of State:</td>
<td>Nebojša Radmanović (Serb); Bakir Izetbegović (Bosniak); Željko Komšić (Croat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Government:</td>
<td>Vjekoslav Bevanda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (House of Representatives)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SDP)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSSD)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Action (SDA, centre-right)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for a Better Future (SBB, centre-right)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian Democratic Party (SDS, Serbian nationalist)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ, Croatian nationalist and conservative)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Sarajevo (0.39)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Banja Luka (0.20); Tuzla (0.10)

| Area km²: | 51,210 |
| Population (millions): | 3.8 |
| Population density (hab/km²): | 75 |
| Urban population (%): | 49 |
| Average annual population growth rate (%): | -0.1 |

| Population age <15 (%): | 16 |
| Population age >64 (%): | 15 |
| Total fertility rate (births per woman): | 1.28 |
| Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years): | 74/79 |
| Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive): | 6 |

#### Economy

- **GDP & Debt**
  - GDP (millions $): 16,906
  - GDP per capita ($, PPP): 8,048
  - GDP growth (%): -0.7
  - Public Debt (in % GDP): 44.6
  - Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -3.1
  - External Debt (millions $): 10,577
  - Inflation Rate (%): 2.1
- **FDI**
  - Inflows (millions $): 633
  - Outflows (millions $): 36
- **International tourism**
  - Tourists arrivals (000): 392
  - Tourism receipts (millions $): 734
- **Migrant remittances**
  - Receipts (millions $): 1,863
  - Receipts (in % GDP): 10.8

#### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>10,506</td>
<td>6,319</td>
<td>-4,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>9,996</td>
<td>5,224</td>
<td>-4,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>1,096</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>-24.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Education

- **Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):** 99.5/96.7
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** ...
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** ...
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 38
- **Mean years of schooling:** 8.3
- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):** ...
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** 0.02

#### Water

- **Water resources (km³):** 375
- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 88
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):** ...
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):** ...
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 0

#### Security

- **Total armed forces (000):** 11
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 0.9

### Development

- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.735
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 81

### Health

- **Physicians density (per 1,000):** 16.9
- **Hospital beds (per 1,000):** 35.0
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 10.2

### Emissions

- **CO₂ Emissions (mt oil eq):** 6.1
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** 196

### ICT

- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 87.6
- **Internet users (per 100):** 65.4

### Main Trading Partners

- **Import:** Croatia (18%), Serbia (14), Germany (11%), Slovenia (10%), Italy (9%)
- **Export:** Croatia (14%), Slovenia (13%), Italy (12%), Germany (12%), Serbia (11%)
## Croatia

### Official Name: Republic of Croatia

### Form of Government: Parliamentary constitutional republic

### Head of State: Ivo Josipović

### Head of Government: Zoran Milanović

#### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kukuriku coalition (KK)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union and allies (HDZ, conservative)</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Labourists - Labour Party (HL SR)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Assembly of Slavonija and Baranja (HDSSB)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) (aboard district)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Democratic Serb Party (SDSS) - Serb national minority</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Labourists - Labour Party (HL SR) national minority</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent list Ivan Grubisic</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) (aboard district)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other national minority representatives</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):</td>
<td>Zagreb (0.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):</td>
<td>Split (0.17); Rijeka (0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area km²:</td>
<td>56,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions):</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²):</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%):</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%):</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &lt;15 (%):</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &gt;64 (%):</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fertility rate (births per woman):</td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):</td>
<td>74/80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):</td>
<td>4</td>
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</table>

#### Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (millions $):</td>
<td>56,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP):</td>
<td>18,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%):</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP):</td>
<td>54.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (in % of GDP):</td>
<td>-3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $):</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%):</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI Inflows (millions $):</td>
<td>1,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI Outflows (millions $):</td>
<td>-99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourist arrivals (000):</td>
<td>9,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism receipts (million $):</td>
<td>9,638</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant remittances Receipts (million $):</td>
<td>1,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant remittances Receipts (in % GDP):</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>24,014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>24,539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>20,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>12,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (% GDP)</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):</td>
<td>99.5/98.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment rate (primary):</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (secondary):</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling:</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure on education (% of GDP):</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
<td>0.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water resources (km³):</td>
<td>105.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):</td>
<td>1.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desalinated water production (millions m³):</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total armed forces (000):</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure (% GDP):</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (Value):</td>
<td>0.805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (Position in ranking):</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Health

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physicians density (per 10,000):</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital beds (per 10,000):</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Emissions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial (% of total land area):</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine (% of territorial waters):</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### ICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobile subscriptions (per 100):</td>
<td>115.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with computer (per 100):</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet users (per 100):</td>
<td>63.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Country Profiles

CYPRESS

IE Med. Mediterranean Yearbook 2014

149

Official Name: Republic of Cyprus
Form of Government: Presidential constitutional republic
Head of State: Nicos Anastasiades
Head of Government:

Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (House of Representatives)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Coalition (DISY, conservative)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL, socialist)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DIKO, liberal)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement of Social Democracy (EDEK)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Party (EVRO.KO, centre)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological and Environmental Movement (ecologist)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Population

Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Nicosia (0.25)
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Limassol (0.23); Larnaca (0.07)

| Area km²: | 9,250 |
| Population (millions): | 1.1 |
| Population density (hab/km²): | 121 |
| Urban population (%): | 71 |
| Average annual population growth rate (%): | 1.1 |

Economy

GDP & Debt

| GDP (millions $): | 22,995 |
| GDP per capita ($, PPP): | 26,773 |
| GDP growth (%): | -2.4 |
| Public Debt (in % GDP): | 85.5 |
| Public Deficit (in % of GDP): | -6.4 |
| External Debt (millions $): | - |
| Inflation Rate (%): | 3.1 |

FDI

Inflows (millions $): 849
Outflows (millions $): -1,929

International tourism

Tourists arrivals (000): 2,392
Tourism receipts (million $): 2,751

Migrant remittances

Receipts (millions $): 110
Receipts (in % GDP): 0.5

Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>10,408</td>
<td>9,778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>6,808</td>
<td>1,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>3,673</td>
<td>7,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main Trading Partners

Import: Greece (21%), Israel (12%), Italy (8%), United Kingdom (7%), Germany (7%)
Export: Greece (14%), Republic of Korea (14%), Israel (13%), United Kingdom (5%), Germany (3%)
**EGYPT**

**Official Name:** Arab Republic of Egypt  
**Form of Government:** Unitary semi-presidential constitutional republic  
**Head of State:** Abdel Fattah el-Sisi  
**Head of Government:** Ibrahim Mahlab

Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (People’s Assembly) (dissolved)

### Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):</th>
<th>Cairo (11.17)* [including the population of Giza (3.63) and Shubra El-Khema (1.10)]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):</td>
<td>Alexandria (4.49); Port Said (0.60)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area km²:</th>
<th>1,001,450</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions):</td>
<td>82.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²):</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%):</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%):</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Population age <15 (%):** 31  
**Population age >64 (%):** 6  
**Total fertility rate (births per woman):** 2.79  
**Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):** 69/73  
**Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 18

### Economy

**GDP & Debt**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP (millions $):</th>
<th>262,263</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP):</td>
<td>6,474</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%):</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP):</td>
<td>78.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (in % of GDP):</td>
<td>-10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $):</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%):</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FDI**

| Inflows (millions $): | 2,798 |
| Outflows (millions $): | 211 |

**International tourism**

| Tourists arrivals (000): | 9,497 |
| Tourism receipts (million $): | 9,333 |

**Migrant remittances**

| Receipts (millions $): | 20,515 |
| Receipts (in % GDP): | 8.1 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total trade</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $):</td>
<td>68,801</td>
<td>48,601</td>
<td>-20,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $):</td>
<td>52,350</td>
<td>26,835</td>
<td>-25,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $):</td>
<td>16,450</td>
<td>21,767</td>
<td>5,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP):</td>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### GDP sectors

| Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): | 14 |
| Industry, value added (% of GDP): | 39 |
| Services, value added (% of GDP): | 46 |

#### Labour market

| Labour participation rate, female (%): | 23.6 |
| Unemployment rate (%): | 1.9 |
| Youth unemployment rate (%): | 35.7 |

#### Employment in

| Agriculture (% total employment): | 29.2 |
| Industry (% total employment): | 23.5 |
| Services (% total employment): | 47.1 |

#### Energy

| Production (millions mt oil eq): | 88.2 |
| Consumption (millions mt oil eq): | 72.6 |
| Import (% energy used): | 97.8 |

### Total trade

| Import: China (11%), United States (8%), Germany (6%), Turkey (5%), Italy (5%) | Export: United States (8%), India (7%), Italy (7%), Saudi Arabia (6%), Libya (5%) |

### Society

**Education**

| Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): | 81.7/65.8 |
| Net enrolment rate (primary): | 95 |
| Gross enrolment rate (secondary): | 86 |
| Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): | 30 |
| Mean years of schooling: | 6.4 |
| Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): | 3.8 |
| R&D expenditure (% of GDP): | 0.21 |

### Water

| Water resources (km³): | 58.3 |
| Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): | 973 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): | 88 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): | 6 |
| Desalinated water production (millions m³): | 100 |

### Security

| Total armed forces (000): | 838 |
| Military expenditure (% GDP): | 1.7 |

### Development

| Human Development Index (Value): | 0.662 |
| Human Development Index (Position in ranking): | 112 |

### Health

| Physicians density (per 10,000): | 28.3 |
| Hospital beds (per 10,000): | 17.0 |
| Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): | 4.7 |

### Emissions

| CO₂, Emissions (mt per capita): | 2.3 |
| Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): | 34 |

### Protected areas

| Terrestrial (% of total land area): | 11.2 |
| Marine (% of territorial waters): | 9.5 |

### ICT

| Mobile subscriptions (per 100): | 119.9 |
| Households with computer (per 100): | 37.9 |
| Internet users (per 100): | 44.7 |
FRANCE

**Official Name:** French Republic  
**Form of Government:** Semi-presidential constitutional republic  
**Head of State:** François Hollande  
**Head of Government:** Manuel Valls

**Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name (centre-left, social democrat)</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialist, Republican, and Citizen Group</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Party of the Left (centre-left, social liberal)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic and Republican Left (left coalition)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for a Popular Movement (UMP, liberal conservative)</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non registered</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Democrats and Independents (centre-right, liberal)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecologists</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Population**

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Paris (11.17)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Marseille-Aix-en-Provence (1.49); Lyon (1.49); Lille (1.04); Nice-Cannes (0.99); Toulouse (0.93)

| Area (km²): | 549,190 |
| Population (millions): | 64.3 |
| Population density (hab/km²): | 119 |
| Urban population (%): | 86 |
| Average annual population growth rate (%): | 0.5 |

**Economy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP &amp; Debt</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (millions $):</td>
<td>2,612,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP):</td>
<td>35,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%):</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP):</td>
<td>90.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (in % of GDP):</td>
<td>-4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $):</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%):</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FDI**

- **Inflows (millions $):** 25,093
- **Outflows (millions $):** 37,197

**International tourism**

- **Tourists arrivals (000):** 81,552
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** 69,959

**Migrant remittances**

- **Receipts (millions $):** 0.6
- **Receipts (in % GDP):** 0.8

**Total trade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>827,917</td>
<td>779,137</td>
<td>-48,781</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>653,536</td>
<td>562,809</td>
<td>-90,726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>174,381</td>
<td>216,327</td>
<td>41,946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services ( % GDP)</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Society**

**Education**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate, Men / Women (%):</td>
<td>98</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment rate (primary):</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (secondary):</td>
<td>58</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling:</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Water**

- **Water resources (km³):** 211.0
- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 512
- **Water withdrawal by sector ( % agriculture):** 12
- **Water withdrawal by sector ( % industry):** 69
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 12

**Security**

- **Total armed forces (000):** 326
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 2.2

**Development**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (Value):</td>
<td>0.893</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (Position in ranking):</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Health**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physicians density (per 10,000):</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital beds (per 10,000):</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Emissions**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):</td>
<td>482</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ICT**

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobile subscriptions (per 100):</td>
<td>97.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with computer (per 100):</td>
<td>81.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet users (per 100):</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### GRECE

**Official Name:** Hellenic Republic  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary constitutional republic  
**Head of State:** Karolos Papoulias  
**Head of Government:** Antonis Samaras

| Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) | Democratic Left (DIMAR) | Communist Party of Greece (KKE) | Independent Democratic MPs | Independents | Golden Dawn (XA, far-right xenophobic) |
|---------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------|----------------|----------------|
| New Democracy (ND, conservative)                              | 125                     |                               |                           |             | 16             |
| Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)                        | 71                      |                               |                           |             | 13             |
| Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)                        | 27                      |                               |                           |             | 6              |
| Independent Greeks (AE, right)                               | 13                      |                               |                           |             | 13             |
| Independent Greeks                                            | 13                      |                               |                           |             | 6              |
| Independent Democratic MPs                                   | 17                      |                               |                           |             | 6              |
| Golden Dawn (XA, far-right xenophobic)                       | 13                      |                               |                           |             | 6              |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):</td>
<td>Athens (3.41)</td>
<td>Thessaloniki (0.88): Patras (0.21); Herakliom (0.17); Larissa (0.16); Volos (0.14)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area km²:</td>
<td>131,960</td>
<td>Population age &lt;15 (%):</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions):</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>Population age &gt;64 (%):</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²):</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Total fertility rate (births per woman):</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%):</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):</td>
<td>78/83</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%):</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economy</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP &amp; Debt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP (millions $):</td>
<td>248,562</td>
<td>Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP):</td>
<td>24,469</td>
<td>Industry, value added (% of GDP):</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%):</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
<td>Services, value added (% of GDP):</td>
<td>80</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP):</td>
<td>157.2</td>
<td>Labour market</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $):</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
<td>Labour participation rate, female (%):</td>
<td>44.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%):</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>Unemployment rate (%):</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflows (millions $):</td>
<td>2,945</td>
<td>Youth unemployment rate (%):</td>
<td>54.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outflows (millions $):</td>
<td>-39</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International tourism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourists arrivals (000):</td>
<td>15,427</td>
<td>Employment in</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism receipts (million $):</td>
<td>14,984</td>
<td>Agriculture (% of total employment):</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant remittances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipts (millions $):</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>Industry (% of total employment):</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipts (in % GDP):</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>Services (% of total employment):</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| GDP | | | | | |
| Total trade | | | | | |
| Imports | | | | | |
| in goods and services (millions $): | 69,444 | Economic Development | | |
| in goods (millions $): | 53,520 | Human Development Index (Value): | 0.860 |
| in services (millions $): | 15,924 | Human Development Index (Position in ranking): | 29 |
| in goods and services (% GDP): | 26.9 | | | |
| Exports | | | | | |
| Balance | | | | | |
| in goods and services (millions $): | 63,693 | Health | | |
| in goods (millions $): | 28,307 | Physicians density (per 10,000): | .. |
| in services (millions $): | 19,462 | Hospital beds (per 10,000): | 48.0 |
| in goods and services (% GDP): | 24.3 | Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): | 10.8 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):</td>
<td>98.4/96.3</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment rate (primary):</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Human Development Index (Value):</td>
<td>0.860</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (secondary):</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>Human Development Index (Position in ranking):</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):</td>
<td>114</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling:</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>Health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Physicians density (per 10,000):</td>
<td>..</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>Hospital beds (per 10,000):</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water resources (km³):</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>Emissions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):</td>
<td>460</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desalinated water production (millions m³):</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Protected areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total armed forces (000):</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>Terrestrial (% of total land area):</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure (% GDP):</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Marine (% of territorial waters):</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile subscriptions (per 100):</td>
<td>120.0</td>
<td>ICT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with computer (per 100):</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>LDAC ( (\text{V}) \times \text{Y} )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet users (per 100):</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ISRAEL

Official Name: State of Israel
Form of Government: Parliamentary democracy
Head of State: Shimon Peres
Head of Government: Benjamin Netanyahu

Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

- Likud (neo-conservatives) - Yisrael Beiteinu: 31
- Shas (ultraorthodox Sephardis): 11
- Yesh Atid (centre, laics): 19
- Labour Party (centre-left): 15
- The Jewish Home (religious far-right): 12
- United Torah Judaism (ultraorthodox Ashkenazis): 7
- Meretz (social democrats, ecologists): 6
- Hatnuah (centre): 6
- Others: 13

Population

- Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Jerusalem (0.79)
- Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Tel Aviv-Jaffa (3.38) [includes Rishon LeZion (0.23) and Petah Tikva (0.20)]; Haifa (1.05);

Population

- Area km²: 22,070
- Population (millions): 7.7
- Population density (hab/km²): 359
- Population age <15 (%): 28
- Population age >64 (%): 11
- Population growth rate (%): 1.8
- Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years): 80/84
- Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive): 3

Economy

GDP & Debt

- GDP (millions $): 257,621
- GDP per capita ($, PPP): 33,878
- GDP growth (%): 3.4
- Public Debt (in % GDP): 68.2
- Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -3.9
- Inflation Rate (%): 1.7

FDI

- Inflows (millions $): 10,414
- Outflows (millions $): 3,174

International tourism

- Tourists arrivals (000): 2,820
- Tourism receipts (million $): 6,029

Migrant remittances

- Receipts (millions $): 1,300
- Receipts (in % GDP): 0.5

Total trade

- in goods and services (millions $): 92,712
- in goods (millions $): 71,667
- in services (millions $): 21,045
- in goods and services (% GDP): 38.3

Economic Sectors

- Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): ..
- Industry, value added (% of GDP): ..
- Services, value added (% of GDP): ..

Labour market

- Labour participation rate, female (%): 58.1
- Unemployment rate (%): 6.9
- Youth unemployment rate (%): 12.2

Employment in

- Agriculture (% of total employment): 1.7
- Industry (% of total employment): 20.4
- Services (% of total employment): 77.1

Energy

- Production (millions mt oil eq): 3.3
- Consumption (millions mt oil eq): 24.1
- Consumption per capita (kg oil eq): 3,044
- Import % energy used: 86.0

Main Trading Partners

Import: United States (13%), China (7%), Germany (6%), Switzerland (6%), Belgium (5%)
Export: United States (28%), Hong Kong (8%), United Kingdom (6%), Belgium (5%), China (4%)

Society

Education

- Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): ..
- Net enrolment rate (primary): 97
- Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 102
- Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 66
- Mean years of schooling: 11.9
- Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): 5.6
- R&D expenditure (% of GDP): 4.40

Water

- Water resources (km³): 1.8
- Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 282
- Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 58
- Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 6
- Desalinated water production (millions m³): 140

Security

- Total armed forces (000): 185
- Military expenditure (% GDP): 5.6

Development

- Human Development Index (Value): 0.900
- Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 16

Health

- Physicians density (per 10,000): 31.1
- Hospital beds (per 10,000): 34.0
- Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 7.7

Emissions

- CO₂, Emissions (mt per capita): 8.7
- Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 282

Protected areas

- Terrestrial (% of total land area): 17.4
- Marine (% of territorial waters): 19.9

ICT

- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 120.7
- Households with computer (per 100): 82.1
- Internet users (per 100): 73.4
ITALY

Official Name: Italian Republic
Form of Government: Parliamentary constitutional republic
Head of State: Giorgio Napolitano
Head of Government: Matteo Renzi

**Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (Chamber of Deputies)**
- Democratic Party (social democrat): 296
- Five Star Movement (M5S, populist movement): 104
- Forza Italia- The People of Freedom (PdL, conservative): 69
- New Centre-Right (centre-right): 28
- Civic choice (centre-liberal): 27

**Population**
- Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Rome (3.30)
- Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Milan (2.91); Naples (2.37); Torino (1.61); Palermo (0.92); Bergamo (0.78)

**Economy**

**GDP & Debt**
- GDP (millions $): 2,014,382
- GDP per capita ($, PPP): 30,551
- GDP growth (%): -2.5
- Public Debt (in % GDP): 127.0
- External Debt (millions $): -2.9
- Inflation Rate (%): 3.3
- Total FDI inflows (millions $): 9,625
- Total FDI outflows (millions $): 30,397

**International tourism**
- Tourists arrivals (000): 46,119
- Tourism receipts (million $): 45,368

**Migrant remittances**
- Receipts (millions $): 7,226
- Receipts (in % GDP): 0.4

**Total trade**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $):</td>
<td>585,049</td>
<td>607,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $):</td>
<td>478,910</td>
<td>501,834</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $):</td>
<td>106,139</td>
<td>105,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP):</td>
<td>29.1</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Economic Sectors**
- Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): 2
- Industry, value added (% of GDP): 24
- Services, value added (% of GDP): 74

**Labour market**
- Employment in: Agriculture (% of total employment): 3.7
- Employment in: Industry (% of total employment): 27.8
- Employment in: Services (% of total employment): 68.5

**Energy**
- Energy: Production (millions mt oil eq): 32.7
- Energy: Consumption (millions mt oil eq): 158.6
- Energy: Import (% energy used): 79.0

**Main Trading Partners**
- Import: Germany (15%), France (8%), China (7%), Netherlands (5%), Russian Federation (5%)
- Export: Germany (13%), France (11%), United States (7%), Switzerland (6%), United Kingdom (5%)

**Society**

**Education**
- Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 99.2/98.7
- Net enrolment rate (primary): 97
- Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 62
- Mean years of schooling: 10.1
- R&D expenditure (% of GDP): 1.26

**Health**
- Physicians density (per 10,000): 38.0
- Hospital beds (per 10,000): 35.0
- Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 9.5

**Emissions**
- CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 6.5
- Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 605

**ICT**
- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 159.8
- Households with computer (per 100): 67.0
- Internet users (per 100): 58.0
### JORDAN

**Official Name:** Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary constitutional monarchy  
**Head of State:** King Abdullah II  
**Head of Government:** Abdullah Ensour  

#### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)
- Independents: 123  
- National Union Party: 2  
- Islamic Centrist Party (ICP, Islamists): 3  
- Stronger Jordan: 2  
- Homeland: 2  
- Others: 18  

#### Population
- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Amman (1.18)  
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Zarqa (0.70); Irbid (0.60)  
- **Area km²:** 89,320  
- **Population (millions):** 7.3  
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 70  
- **Urban population (%):** 83  
- **Average annual population growth rate (%):** 2.2  

#### Economy
- **GDP & Debt**  
  - GDP (millions $): 30,981  
  - GDP per capita ($, PPP): 5,968  
  - GDP growth (%): 2.7  
  - Public Debt (in % GDP): 60.2  
  - Public Deficit (in % of GDP): 8.2  
  - External Debt (millions $): 18,632  
  - Inflation Rate (%): 4.6  
  - **FDI**  
    - Inflows (millions $): 1,403  
    - Outflows (millions $): 5  
  - **International tourism**  
    - Tourists arrivals (000): 3,960  
    - Tourism receipts (million $): 3,860  
  - **Migrant remittances**  
    - Receipts (millions $): 3,643  
    - Receipts (in % GDP): 11.7  
  - **Total trade**  
    - in goods and services (millions $): 22,975  
    - in goods (millions $): 18,431  
    - in services (millions $): 4,544  
  - **Trade balance (in % GDP):** -30.0  

#### Society
- **Education**  
  - Adult literacy rate: 97.7/93.9  
  - Net enrolment rate (primary): 98  
  - Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 88  
  - Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 47  
  - Mean years of schooling: 8.6  
  - Public expenditure in education (in % of GDP): 0.43  
- **Water**  
  - Water resources (km³): 1.0  
  - Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 166  
  - Water withdrawal by sector (in % agriculture): 65  
  - Water withdrawal by sector (in % industry): 4  
  - Desalinated water production (millions m³): 10  
- **Security**  
  - Total armed forces (000): 116  
  - Military expenditure (in % GDP): 3.5  

#### Development
- Human Development Index (Value): 0.700  
- Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 100  

#### Health
- Physicians density (per 10,000): 25.6  
- Hospital beds (per 10,000): 18.0  
- Total Health Expenditure (in % GDP): 8.3

#### Emissions
- CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 3.2  
- Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 131

#### ICT
- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 128.2  
- Households with computer (per 100): 54.6  
- Internet users (per 100): 41.0
## LEBANON

### Official Name:
Lebanese Republic

### Form of Government:
Confessionalist parliamentary republic

### Head of State:
Tamam Salam (acting President)

### Head of Government:
Tamam Salam (designated)

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)
- Change and Reform bloc (Free Patriotic Movement [19]; Lebanese Democratic Party [4]; Marada [3]; Others [3])
- Lebanon March 8 Alliance (Amal Movement [13]; Hezbollah [12]; Syrian Social Nationalist Party [2]; Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party [2])
- March 14 Alliance (Future Movement [26]; Lebanese Forces [8]; Kataeb Party [8]; Murr Bloc [2]; Others [8]; Independents [11])

### Pro-Government Independents (Progressive Socialist Party [7]; Glory Movement [2]; Other [1])

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Beirut (2.02)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Tripoli (0.19); Sidon (0.08)
- **Area km²:** 10,450
- **Population (millions):** 4.8
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 428
- **Population age <15 (%):** 22
- **Population age >64 (%):** 9
- **Population growth rate (%):** 1.0
- **Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 8

### GDP & Debt

- **GDP (millions $):** 42,519
- **GDP per capita ($, PPP):** 14,618
- **GDP growth (%):** 1.4
- **Public Debt (in % GDP):** 135.7
- **External Debt (millions $):** 28,950
- **Inflation Rate (%):** 4.9

### FDI

- **Inflows (millions $):** 3,787
- **Outflows (millions $):** 611

### International tourism

- **Tourists arrivals (000):** 1,655
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** 6,797

### Migrant remittances

- **Receipts (millions $):** 7,472
- **Receipts (in % GDP):** 18.0

### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>33,093</td>
<td>28,373</td>
<td>-4,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>20,827</td>
<td>6,234</td>
<td>-14,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>12,266</td>
<td>22,139</td>
<td>9,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>84.2</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>-15.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Education

- **Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):** 93.4/86.0
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 93
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 74
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 46
- **Mean years of schooling:** 7.9
- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):** 2.2
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** -

### Water

- **Water resources (km³):** 4.5
- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 317
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):** 60
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):** 11
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 47

### Security

- **Total armed forces (000):** 80
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 4.4

### Economic Sectors

- **Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):** 6
- **Industry, value added (% of GDP):** 20
- **Services, value added (% of GDP):** 73

### Labour market

- **Unemployment rate (%):** 5.9
- **Youth unemployment rate (%):** 22.8

### Employment in

- **Agriculture (% of total employment):** -
- **Industry (% of total employment):** -
- **Services (% of total employment):** -

### Energy

- **Production (millions mt oil eq):** 0.2
- **Consumption (millions mt oil eq):** 6.3
- **Import (Imports) (% energy used):** 1,449
- **Import (% energy used):** 55.0

### Main Trading Partners

- **Import:** China (8%), United States (8%), France (8%), Italy (8%), Germany (5%)
- **Export:** Switzerland (11%), South Africa (10%), United Arab Emirates (10%), Saudi Arabia (8%), Syria (7%)

### Development

- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.745
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 72

### Health

- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** 35.4
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** 35.0
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 11.5

### Emissions

- **CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):** 4.3
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** -

### Protected areas

- **Terrestrial (% of total land area):** 0.6
- **Marine (% of territorial waters):** 0.1

### ICT

- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 80.8
- **Households with computer (per 100):** 71.5
- **Internet users (per 100):** 61.3
**LIBYA**

**Official Name:** State of Libya  
**Form of Government:** Provisional parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Nouri Abusahmain (President of the General National Congress)  
**Head of Government:** Abdullah al-Thani

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National Forces Alliance (NFA, nationalist and liberal)</th>
<th>39 National Centrist Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Construction Party (JCP, Islamist)</td>
<td>17 Wadi Al-Hayah Rally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Front Party (NFP, liberal and progressive)</td>
<td>3 Other parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for the Homeland Party (liberal)</td>
<td>2 Independents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Tripoli (2.20)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Benghazi (1.00); Misrata (0.35); Zawiya (0.20)
- **Area km²:** 1,759,540
- **Population (millions):** 6.2
- **Population age <15 (%):** 29
- **Population age >64 (%):** 5
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 3
- **Total fertility rate (births per woman):** 3.8
- **Life expectancy at birth, Men/Women (years):** 73/77
- **Average annual population growth rate (%):** 0.8
- **Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 13

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt
- **GDP (millions $):** 81,915
- **GDP per capita ($, PPP):** 12,686
- **GDP growth (%):** 2.1
- **Public Debt (in % GDP):** 25.9
- **Inflation Rate (%):** 6.1

#### FDI
- **Inflows (millions $):** ..
- **Outflows (millions $):** 2,509

#### International tourism
- **Tourists arrivals (000):** ..
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** ..

#### Migrant remittances
- **Receipts (millions $):** ..
- **Receipts (in % GDP):** ..

#### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>32,596</td>
<td>61,178</td>
<td>-28,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>25,590</td>
<td>61,026</td>
<td>35,436</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>6,996</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>-6,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Society

#### Education
- **Adult literacy rate, Men / Women (%):** 95.8/83.3
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** ..
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 104
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** ..
- **Mean years of schooling:** 7.3
- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):** ..
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** ..

#### Water
- **Water resources (km³):** 0.7
- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 796
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):** 83
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):** 3
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 18

#### Security
- **Total armed forces (000):** 7
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 3.3

### Main Trading Partners

- **Import:** China (12%), Italy (11%), Turkey (11%), Egypt (7%), Republic of Korea (6%)
- **Export:** Italy (28%), Germany (11%), China (10%), France (10%), Spain (8%)
**Malta**

**Official Name:** Republic of Malta  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Marie Louise Coleiro Preca  
**Head of Government:** Joseph Muscat

Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>House of Representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malta Labour Party (MLP, social democracy) 39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Valetta (0.006)</th>
<th>Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Birkirkara (0.02); Qormi (0.01)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Area km²: 320</td>
<td>Populations &lt;15 (%): 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions): 0.4</td>
<td>Population age &gt;64 (%): 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²): 1,302</td>
<td>Total fertility rate (births per woman): 1.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%): 95</td>
<td>Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years): 79/83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%): 0.8</td>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive): 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Economy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP &amp; Debt</th>
<th>Economic Sectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (millions $): 8,845</td>
<td>Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP): 26,821</td>
<td>Industry, value added (% of GDP): 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%): 1.0</td>
<td>Services, value added (% of GDP): 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP): 70.8</td>
<td>Labour market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -3.3</td>
<td>Labour participation rate, female (%): 38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $):</td>
<td>Unemployment rate (%): 6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%): 3.2</td>
<td>Youth unemployment rate (%): 14.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FDI**

| Inflows (millions $): 157 | Outflows (millions $): -89 |

**International tourism**

| Tourist arrivals (000): 1,425 | Tourism receipts (million $): 1,465 |

**Migrant remittances**

| Receipts (millions $): 33 | Receipts (in % GDP): 0.4 |

**Total trade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>in goods and services (millions $): 8,513</th>
<th>in goods (millions $): 5,466</th>
<th>in services (millions $): 3,047</th>
<th>in goods and services (% GDP): 98.7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Imports 9,103</td>
<td>Exports 4,216</td>
<td>Balance 1,840</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Society**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy, Men / Women (%): 91.2/93.5</td>
<td>Human Development Index (Value): 0.847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment rate (primary): 81</td>
<td>Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 86</td>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 41</td>
<td>Physicians density (per 10,000): 32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling: 9.9</td>
<td>Hospital beds (per 10,000): 44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): 6.9</td>
<td>Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D expenditure (% of GDP): 0.63</td>
<td>Emissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>Protected areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water resources (km³): 0.1</td>
<td>CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 134</td>
<td>Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 35</td>
<td>Terrestrial (% of total land area): 21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 1</td>
<td>Marine (% of territorial waters): 0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desalinated water production (millions m³): 19</td>
<td>ICT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure (% GDP): 0.8</td>
<td>Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 127.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total armed forces (000): 2</td>
<td>Households with computer (per 100): 78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Internet users (per 100): 70.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Water resources (km³): 0.1 | Emissions |
| Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 134 | Financial Sector |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 35 | Public Debt (in % GDP): 70.8 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 1 | Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -3.3 |
| Desalinated water production (millions m³): 19 | Total trade |
| Total trade (millions $): 8,513 | Total trade (in % GDP): 98.7 |
| Imports 9,103 | Exports 4,216 | Balance 1,840 |
## Montenegro

**Official Name:** Montenegro  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Filip Vujanović  
**Head of Government:** Milo Đukanović

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Socialists (centre-left)</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Front (centre-right)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro (SNP, social democrat)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (social-democracy)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive Montenegro (PCG, Social democrats, ecologists)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosniak Party (BS)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Party of Montenegro (LPCG)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian Coalition</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Civic Initiative (HGI)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Podgorica (0.16)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Niksic (0.08); Pljevlja (0.02)
- **Area km²:** 13,810
- **Population (millions):** 0.6
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 46
- **Urban population (%):** 63
- **Average annual population growth rate (%):** 0.1
- **Population age <15 (%):** 19
- **Population age >64 (%):** 13
- **Population (millions):** 0.6
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 46
- **Urban population (%):** 63
- **Average annual population growth rate (%):** 0.1
- **Population age <15 (%):** 19
- **Population age >64 (%):** 13

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

- **GDP (millions $):** 4,048
- **GDP per capita ($, PPP):** 11,377
- **GDP growth (%):** -0.5
- **Public Debt (in % GDP):** 54.0
- **Public Deficit (in % of GDP):** -5.9
- **External Debt (millions $):** 2,833
- **Inflation Rate (%):** 3.6

#### FDI

- **Inflows (millions $):** 610
- **Outflows (millions $):** 27

#### International tourism

- **Tourists arrivals (000):** 1,201
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** 926

#### Migrant remittances

- **Receipts (millions $):** 327
- **Receipts (in % GDP):** 7.5

#### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>2,780</td>
<td>1,767</td>
<td>-1,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>2,286</td>
<td>503</td>
<td>-1,783</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>1,264</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>-25.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Education

- **Adult literacy rate, Men / Women (%):** 99.4/976
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 98
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 91
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 56
- **Mean years of schooling:** 10.5
- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):** 1.15
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** 1.15

#### Water

- **Water resources (km³):** ..
- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 254
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):** 1
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):** 39
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** ..

#### Security

- **Total armed forces (000):** 12
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 1.5

#### Development

- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.791
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 52

#### Health

- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** 20.3
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** 40.0
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 9.0

#### Emissions

- **CO₂, Emissions (mt per capita):** 4.0
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** 272

#### Protected areas

- **Terrestrial (% of total land area):** 14.8
- **Marine (% of territorial waters):** 0.0

#### ICT

- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 181.3
- **Households with computer (per 100):** 51.3
- **Internet users (per 100):** 56.8

### Main Trading Partners

- **Import:** Serbia (29%), Greece (9%), China (7%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (7%), Germany (6%)
- **Export:** Croatia (23%), Serbia (23%), Slovenia (8%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (8%), Hungary (5%)
**MOROCCO**

**Official Name:** Kingdom of Morocco  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary constitutional monarchy  
**Head of State:** King Mohammed VI  
**Head of Government:** Abdelilah Benkirane

**Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (House of Representatives)**

- Justice and Development Party (PJD, Islamist): 107  
- Popular Movement (MP, conservative): 32  
- Istiqlal Party (PI, Centre-right, nationalism): 60  
- Constitutional Union (UC, centrist): 23  
- National Rally of Independents (RNI, Centre-right, liberal): 52  
- Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS, communist): 18  
- Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM, liberal): 47  
- Labour Party (PT, Centre-left): 4  
- Constitutional Union (UC, centrist): 23  
- National Rally of Independents (RNI, centre-right, liberal): 52  
- Socialist Union of People’s Forces (USFP): 39  
- Others: 13

**Population**

- Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Rabat (1.84)  
- Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Casablanca (3.05); Fes (1.09); Marrakech (0.94); Tanger (0.81); Agadir (0.81)

**Area km²:** 446,550  
**Population (millions):** 33.0  
**Population age <15 (%):** 28  
**Population age >64 (%):** 5  
**Population density (hab/km²):** 72  
**Total fertility rate (births per woman):** 2.78  
**Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):** 69/72  
**Average annual population growth rate (%):** 1.4  
**Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 27

**Economy**

**GDP & Debt**

- GDP (millions $): 95,981  
- GDP per capita ($) (PPP): 5,193  
- GDP growth (%): 4.2  
- Public Debt (in % GDP): 60.2  
- External Debt (millions $): 33,816  
- Inflation Rate (%): 1.3

**FDI**

- Inflows (millions $): 2,836  
- Outflows (millions $): 361

**International tourism**

- Tourists arrivals (000): 9,342  
- Tourism receipts (million $): 9,101

**Migrant remittances**

- Receipts (millions $): 6,894  
- Receipts (in % GDP): 7.0

**Total trade**

- in goods and services (millions $): 49,551  
- in goods (millions $): 41,414  
- in services (millions $): 8,136  
- in goods and services (% GDP): 50.6

**Economic Sectors**

- Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): 15  
- Industry, value added (% of GDP): 30  
- Services, value added (% of GDP): 55

**Labour market**

- Unemployment rate (%): 9.0  
- Youth unemployment rate (%): 17.4

**Employment in**

- Agriculture (% of total employment): 39.2  
- Industry (% of total employment): 21.4  
- Services (% of total employment): 39.3

**Energy**

- Production (millions mt oil eq): 0.8  
- Consumption (millions mt oil eq): 12.3  
- Import % energy used: 539

**Main Trading Partners**

Import: Spain (16%), France (12%), China (7%), United States (6%), Saudi Arabia (6%)  
Export: France (19%), Spain (16%), India (6%), Brazil (6%), United States (4%)

**Society**

**Education**

- Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 71.6/576  
- Net enrolment rate (primary): 98  
- Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 69  
- Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 16  
- Mean years of schooling: 4.4  
- Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): 5.4  
- R&D expenditure (% of GDP): 0.64

**Health**

- Physicians density (per 10,000): 6.2  
- Hospital beds (per 10,000): 11.0  
- Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 5.4

**Emissions**

- CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 1.6  
- Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 65

**ICT**

- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 120.0  
- Internet users (per 100): 55.0
**PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES**

**Name (UN use):** Occupied Palestinian Territories

**Form of Government:** De jure parliamentary democracy operating de facto as a semi-presidential system

**Head of State:** Mahmoud Abbas

**Head of Government:** Rami Hamdallah

**Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)** (Palestinian legislative council has been unable to meet and govern since 2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamas (Islamists)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah (nationalists, socialists)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, nationalists, Marxists)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Alternative (socialist alliance)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Palestine (centre-left)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third Way (centre)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Population**

**Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Ramallah (0.08)[Administrative capital]

**Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Gaza City (0.65); Hebron (0.26); Nablus (0.23); Jenin (0.16); Khan Yunis (0.14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area km²:</th>
<th>6,020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions):</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²):</td>
<td>652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%):</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%):</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Economy**

**GDP & Debt**

| GDP (millions $): | .. |
| GDP per capita ($, PPP): | .. |
| GDP growth (%): | .. |
| Public Debt (in % GDP): | .. |
| Public Deficit (in % of GDP): | .. |
| External Debt (millions $): | .. |
| Inflation Rate (%): | .. |

**FDI**

| Inflows (millions $): | 244 |
| Outflows (millions $): | -2 |

**International tourism**

| Tourists arrivals (000): | 449 |
| Tourism receipts (million $): | 795 |

**Migrant remittances**

| Receipts (million $): | 3,895 |
| Receipts (in % GDP): | 1.8 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total trade</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>6,590</td>
<td>1,598</td>
<td>-4,992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>5,426</td>
<td>695</td>
<td>-4,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>1,164</td>
<td>903</td>
<td>-262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Society**

**Education**

| Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): | 97.9/92.6 |
| Net enrolment rate (primary): | 90 |
| Gross enrolment rate (secondary): | 83 |
| Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): | 49 |
| Mean years of schooling: | 8.0 |
| Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): | .. |
| R&D expenditure (% of GDP): | .. |

**Water**

| Water resources (km²): | 0.8 |
| Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): | 112 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): | 45 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): | 7 |
| Desalinated water production (millions m³): | 0 |

**Security**

| Total armed forces (000): | 56 |
| Military expenditure (% GDP): | .. |

**Development**

| Human Development Index (Value): | 0.670 |
| Human Development Index (Position in ranking): | 110 |

**Health**

| Physicians density (per 10,000): | .. |
| Hospital beds (per 10,000): | .. |
| Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): | .. |

**Emissions**

| CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): | .. |
| Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): | 28 |

**Protected areas**

| Terrestrial (% of total land area): | 0.6 |
| Marine (% of territorial waters): | .. |

**ICT**

| Mobile subscriptions (per 100): | 75.6 |
| Households with computer (per 100): | 53.9 |
| Internet users (per 100): | 41.1 |
## PORTUGAL

**Official Name:** Portuguese Republic  
**Form of Government:** Semi-presidential constitutional republic  
**Head of State:** Aníbal Cavaco Silva  
**Head of Government:** Pedro Passos Coelho

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (PSD)</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party (PS)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic and Social Centre - People’s Party (CDS/PP, Christian democracy)</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unity Coalition (CDU, Portuguese Socialist Party (PS) - Communist Party - Ecologist Party “The Greens”)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bloc (BE, socialism / Trotskyism / communism)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

| Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): | Lisbon (2.84) |
| Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): | Porto (1.37); Vila Nova de Gaia (0.29); Amadora (0.18); Braga (0.18) |

| Area km²: | 92,090 |
| Population (millions): | 10.6 |
| Population density (hab/km²): | 115 |
| Urban population (%): | 62 |
| Average annual population growth rate (%): | -0.4 |

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

| GDP (millions $): | 212,257 |
| GDP per capita ($, PPP): | 23,059 |
| GDP growth (%): | -3.2 |
| Public Debt (in % GDP): | 124.1 |
| External Debt (millions $): | -6.5 |
| Inflation Rate (%): | 2.8 |

#### FDI

| Inflows (millions $): | 8,916 |
| Outflows (millions $): | 1,915 |

#### International tourism

| Tourists arrivals (000): | 7,412 |
| Tourism receipts (million $): | 14,882 |

#### Migrant remittances

| Receipts (millions $): | 3,895 |
| Receipts (in % GDP): | 1.8 |

### Total trade

| in goods and services (millions $): | Imports: 83,147 | Exports: 82,956 | Balance: -191 |
| in goods (millions $): | 69,764 | 58,406 | -11,358 |
| in services (millions $): | 13,383 | 24,550 | 11,167 |
| in goods and services (% GDP): | 39.0 | 39.1 | 0.1 |

### Society

#### Education

| Adult literacy rate, Men / Women (%): | 97.0/94.0 |
| Net enrolment rate (primary): | 99 |
| Gross enrolment rate (secondary): | 113 |
| Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): | 69 |
| Mean years of schooling: | 7.7 |
| Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): | 5.6 |
| R&D expenditure (% of GDP): | 1.59 |

#### Water

| Water resources (km³): | 68.7 |
| Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): | 812 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): | 73 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): | 8 |
| Desalinated water production (millions m³): | 2 |

#### Security

| Total armed forces (000): | 90 |
| Military expenditure (% GDP): | 2.2 |

### Main Trading Partners

**Import:** Spain (29%), Germany (11%), France (6%), Italy (5%), Netherlands (5%)  
**Export:** Spain (22%), Germany (12%), France (12%), Angola (7%), United Kingdom (4%)
## SERBIA

**Official Name:** Republic of Serbia  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Tomislav Nikolic  
**Head of Government:** Aleksandar Vučić

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (National Assembly of Serbia)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbian Progressive Party (conservatism, pro-european)</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party of Serbia (socialism)</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (social democracy)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic Party Coalition (greens, social democracy)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of United Pensioners of Serbia (left, pensioners' interests)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions) | Belgrade (1.66)  
| Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): | Novi Sad (0.34); Nis (0.26); Kragujevac (0.18); Subotica (0.14) |
| Area km²| 88,360 |
| Population (millions): | 9.5 |
| Population density (hab/km²): | 83 |
| Urban population (%): | 57 |
| Average annual population growth rate (%): | -0.5 |

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (millions $):</td>
<td>38,094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP):</td>
<td>10,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%):</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP):</td>
<td>62.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (in % of GDP):</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $):</td>
<td>34,438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%):</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI Inflows (millions $):</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI Outflows (millions $):</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### International tourism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tourists arrivals (000):</td>
<td>764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism receipts (million $):</td>
<td>1,149</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Migrant remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Receipts (millions $):</td>
<td>2,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipts (in % GDP):</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>21,297</td>
<td>11,703</td>
<td>-9,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>60.9</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td>-21.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Society

#### Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate, Men / Women (%):</td>
<td>99.2/970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment rate (primary):</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (secondary):</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling:</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Water

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water resources (km³):</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desalinated water production (millions m³):</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total armed forces (0000):</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure (% GDP):</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (Value):</td>
<td>0.769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (Position in ranking):</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Health

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physicians density (per 10,000):</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital beds (per 10,000):</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Emissions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Protected areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial (% of total land area):</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine (% of territorial waters):</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobile subscriptions (per 100):</td>
<td>1179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with computer (per 100):</td>
<td>50.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet users (per 100):</td>
<td>48.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**SLOVENIA**

**Official Name:** Republic of Slovenia  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary constitutional republic  
**Head of State:** Borut Pahor  
**Head of Government:** Alenka Bratušek

**Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)**
- Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS, conservative) 26  
- Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS) 6  
- Positive Slovenia (PS, Social liberalism) 13  
- Slovenian People’s Party (SLS) 6  
- New Slovenia - Christian People’s Party (NSi) 4  
- Social Democrats (SD) 10  
- Unaffiliated group 11  
- Independents 4

**Population**
- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Ljubljana (0.27)  
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Maribor (0.13); Celje (0.06); Kranj (0.05)

**Economy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP &amp; Debt</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (millions $):</td>
<td>45,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP):</td>
<td>27,837</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%):</td>
<td>-2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP):</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (in % of GDP):</td>
<td>-3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $):</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%):</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FDI**
- **Inflows (millions $):** 145  
- **Outflows (millions $):** -94

**International tourism**
- **Tourists arrivals (000):** 2,037  
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** 2,953

**Migrant remittances**
- **Receipts (millions $):** 536
- **Receipts (in % GDP):** 1.2

**Total trade**
- **in goods and services (millions $):** 32,270  
- **Exports (millions $):** 34,446  
- **Balance:** 2,175

**Water**
- **Water resources (km$^3$):** 31.9  
- **Water withdrawal (m$^3$ per capita):** 462  
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):** 0  
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):** 82  
- **Desalinated water production (millions m$^3$):** 0

**Society**

**Education**
- **Adult literacy rate, Men / Women (%):** 99.7/99.7  
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 98  
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 98  
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 86  
- **Mean years of schooling:** 11.7  
- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):** 5.7  
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** 2.11

**Development**
- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.892  
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 21

**Health**
- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** 25.4  
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** 46.0  
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 9.0

**Emissions**
- **CO$\text{\textsubscript{2}}$ Emissions (mt per capita):** 2.4  
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** 520

**ICT**
- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 108.6  
- **Internet users (per 100):** 74.0

**Main Trading Partners**
- **Import:** Italy (15%), Germany (14%), Austria (7%), China (5%), Croatia (4%)  
- **Export:** Germany (18%), Italy (10%), Austria (7%), Croatia (5%), France (5%)
### Spain

**Official Name:** Kingdom of Spain  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary constitutional monarchy  
**Head of State:** King Felipe VI  
**Head of Government:** Mariano Rajoy

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (Congress of Deputies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People’s Party (PP, conservative)</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE, social democrat)</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convergence and Union (CiU, conservative regional)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Left (IU-ICV-CHA, left wing)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amair (left wing independentist regional)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union, Progress and Democracy (UPD, liberal)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV, conservative regional)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC, independentist regional)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG, left independentist regional)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

- **Capital:** Madrid (6.57)  
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):**  
  - Barcelona (5.57), Valencia (0.80), Sevilla (0.70), Zaragoza (0.67)

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

- GDP (millions $): 1,323,214  
- GDP per capita ($, PPP): 29,670  
- GDP growth (%): -1.6  
- Public Debt (in % GDP): 85.9  
- Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -10.8

#### FDI

- Inflows (millions $): 27,750  
- Outflows (millions $): -4,869

#### International tourism

- Tourists arrivals (000): 56,177  
- Tourism receipts (million $): 67,698

#### Migrant remittances

- Receipts (millions $): 10,133  
- Receipts in % GDP: 0.8

#### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>429,201</td>
<td>434,744</td>
<td>14,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>329,947</td>
<td>296,951</td>
<td>-32,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>90,253</td>
<td>137,793</td>
<td>47,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate, Men / Women (%)</td>
<td>98.5/970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment rate (primary):</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (secondary):</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling:</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
<td>1.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water resources (km²):</td>
<td>111.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):</td>
<td>964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desalinated water production (millions m³):</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total armed forces (000):</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure (% GDP):</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Development

- Human Development Index (Value): 0.885
- Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 23

### Health

- Physicians density (per 10,000): 39.6
- Hospital beds (per 10,000): 32.0
- Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 9.6

### Emissions

- CO₂ Emissions (mt oil eq): 5.9
- Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 482

### ICT

- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 108.6
- Households with computer (per 100): 74.0
- Internet users (per 100): 72.0
**SYRIA**

**Official Name:** Syrian Arab Republic  
**Form of Government:** Dominant-party semi-presidential state  
**Head of State:** Bashar al-Assad  
**Head of Government:** Wael Nader al-Halqi

**National Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)**  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Progressive Front (NFP, coalition led by Baath Party)</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front for Change and Liberation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(coalition of opponents of the regime)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Population**
- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Damascus (2.65)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Aleppo (3.16); Homs (1.37); Hamah (0.93); Latakia (0.43)
- **Area (km²):** 185,180
- **Population (millions):** 21.9
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 120
- **Urban population (%):** 56
- **Average annual population growth rate (%):** 2.0

**Economy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP &amp; Debt</th>
<th>Economic Sectors</th>
<th>Labour market</th>
<th>Employment in</th>
<th>Energy</th>
<th>FDI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%):</td>
<td>Inflation Rate (%):</td>
<td>Unemployment rate (%):</td>
<td>Youth unemployment rate (%):</td>
<td>Energy Production (Energy Production millions mt oil eq):</td>
<td>Consumption (Consumption millions mt oil eq):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (Debt % of GDP):</td>
<td>Inflows (Inflows $):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (Deficit % of GDP):</td>
<td>Outflows (Outflows $):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (External Debt $):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflows (Inflows $):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outflows (Outflows $):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International tourism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourists arrivals (000):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism receipts (million $):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Migrant remittances**
- **Receipts (millions $):** 2,079
- **Receipts (in % GDP):** 3.8

**Total trade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $):</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $):</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $):</td>
<td>7,893</td>
<td>4,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP):</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Society**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy, Men / Women (%):</td>
<td>Human Development Index (Value): 0.648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment rate (primary):</td>
<td>Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (secondary):</td>
<td>Health</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):</td>
<td>Physicians density (per 10,000): 15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling:</td>
<td>Hospital beds (per 10,000): 15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure jn education (% of GDP):</td>
<td>Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
<td>Emissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water resources (km²):</td>
<td>Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):</td>
<td>Protected areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (m³ per capita): Agriculture: 88</td>
<td>Terrestrial (% of total land area): 0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):</td>
<td>Marine (% of territorial waters): 0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desalinated water production (millions m³):</td>
<td>ICT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 59.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total armed forces (000):</td>
<td>Households with computer (per 100): 40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure (% GDP):</td>
<td>Internet users (per 100): 24.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Country Profile: FYROM**

**IE Med. Mediterranean Yearbook 2014**

**Provisional reference:** the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Gjorge Ivanov  
**Head of Government:** Nikola Gruevski

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coalition</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Democratic Union for Integration (BDI/DUI, Albanian minority)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Albanians (PDS/DPA, Albanian minority)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Revival (NDR, centre-left)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Skopje (0.50)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Bitola (0.12); Kumanovo (0.10)

| Area (km²): | 2,571 |
| Population (millions): | 2.1 |
| Population density (hab/km²): | 83 |
| Urban population (%): | 59 |

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

- **GDP (millions $):** 9,585  
- **GDP per capita ($, PPP):** 10,442  
- **GDP growth (%):** -0.3  
- **Public Debt (in % GDP):** 34.1  
- **External Debt (millions $):** 6,678  
- **Inflation Rate (%):** 3.3  

#### FDI

- **Inflows (millions $):** 135  
- **Outflows (millions $):** -8

#### International tourism

- **Tourists arrivals (000):** 327  
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** 242  

#### Migrant remittances

- **Receipts (millions $):** 393  
- **Receipts in % GDP:** 4.2

### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $):</td>
<td>7,240</td>
<td>5,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $):</td>
<td>6,247</td>
<td>3,990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $):</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>1,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP):</td>
<td>77.6</td>
<td>53.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Society

#### Education

- **Adult literacy rate, Men / Women (%):** 98.7/96.0  
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 88  
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 83  
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 39  
- **Mean years of schooling:** 8.2  
- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):** ..  
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** 0.23

#### Water

- **Water resources (km³):** 6.4  
- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 502  
- **Water withdrawal by sector (percentage):** Agriculture 12, Industry 21  
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 67

#### Security

- **Total armed forces (0000):** 8  
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 1.2

### Development

- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.740  
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 78

### Health

- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** 26.2  
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** 46.0  
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 6.6

### Emissions

- **CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):** 4.4  
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** 152

### Protected areas

- **Terrestrial (% of total land area):** 7.3  
- **Marine (% of territorial waters):** ..

### ICT

- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 106.2  
- **Households with computer (per 100):** 53.6  
- **Internet users (per 100):** 63.2
TUNISIA

Official Name: Republic of Tunisia
Form of Government: Semi-Presidential Republic
Head of State: Moncef Marzouki
Head of Government: Mehdi Jomaa

Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (National Constituent Assembly)
- Ennahda (Islamist): 89
- Republican Party (secualism, liberalism): 11
- Congress for the Republic (social democratic): 17
- Popular Petition (populism): 11
- Call for Tunisia (big tent, secularism): 11
- Ettakatol (social democratic): 17
- Other parties: 40

Population
- Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Tunis (0.98)
- Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Sfax (0.86); Sousse (0.54); Ettadhamen (0.42); Gabès (0.34)
- Population (millions): 11.0
- Population density (hab/km²): 69
- Total fertility rate (births per woman): 2.02
- Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years): 73/77

Economy
- GDP & Debt
  - GDP (millions $): 45,425
  - GDP per capita ($, PPP): 9,650
  - GDP growth (%): 3.6
  - Public Debt (in % GDP): 44.3
  - External Debt (millions $): 25,475
  - Inflation Rate (%): 5.6
- FDI
  - Inflows (millions $): 1,918
  - Outflows (millions $): 13
- International tourism
  - Tourists arrivals (000): 4,782
  - Tourism receipts (million $): 2,529
- Migrant remittances
  - Receipts (millions $): 2,198
  - In % GDP: 4.8
- Total trade
  - In goods and services (millions $): 26,452
  - Exports (millions $): 22,250
  - Balance: -4,202
- Total trade in services (millions $): 23,102
  - In % GDP: 33.5
  - In goods (millions $): 16,997
  - In % GDP: 58.0
  - Exports (millions $): 5,253
  - In % GDP: 35
  - Balance: -1,744

Society
- Education
  - Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 87.4/71.1
- Health
  - Physicians density (per 10,000): 12.2
  - Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 5.7
- Water
  - Water resources (km³): 4.6
  - Desalinated water production (millions m³): 13
- Security
  - Total armed forces (000): 48

Main Trading Partners
- Import: France (20%), Italy (17%), Germany (9%), China (6%), Spain (5%)
- Export: France (26%), Italy (16%), Germany (9%), Libya (8%), United States (4%)

Development
- Human Development Index (Value): 0.712
- Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 94

ICT
- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 118.1
- Internet users (per 100): 41.4
## TURKEY

**Official Name:** Republic of Turkey  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Abdullah Gül  
**Head of Government:** Recep Tayyip Erdoğan  

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Development Party (AKP, Islamism, conservatism)</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican People’s Party (CHP, social democracy, laicism)</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Movement Party (MHP, Turkish nationalism)</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace and Democracy Party (BDP, Democratic socialism, Kurdish)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of the people Others</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Ankara (4.19)  
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):**  
  - Istanbul (11.25)  
  - İzmir (2.93)  
  - Bursa (1.71)  
  - Adana (1.46)  
  - Gaziantep (1.20)  
  - Konya (1.06)  

- **Area km²:** 783,560  
- **Population (millions):** 74.9  
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 95  
- **Urban population (%):** 72  
- **Average annual population growth rate (%):** 1.3  
- **Population age <15 (%):** 26  
- **Population age >64 (%):** 7  
- **Population age by sex (years):** 72/78  
- **Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 12  

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value (millions $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>788,042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (PPP)</td>
<td>14,812</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP)</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (in % of GDP)</td>
<td>-1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $)</td>
<td>337,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%)</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### FDI

- **Inflows (millions $):** 12,419  
- **Outflows (millions $):** 4,073  

#### International tourism

- **Tourists arrivals (000):** 34,654  
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** 30,093  

#### Migrant remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value (millions $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Receipts</td>
<td>940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipts in % GDP</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Value (millions $)</th>
<th>Value (millions $)</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services</td>
<td>249,702</td>
<td>204,722</td>
<td>-44,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>228,698</td>
<td>163,331</td>
<td>-65,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>21,004</td>
<td>41,319</td>
<td>20,386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>-5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Society

#### Education

- **Adult literacy rate, Men / Women (%):** 979/90.3  
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 96  
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 86  
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 69  
- **Mean years of schooling:** 6.5  
- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):** 2.9  
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** 0.84  

#### Water

- **Water resources (km³):** 211.6  
- **Water withdrawal (m³) per capita:** 273  
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):** 74  
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):** 11  
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 1  

#### Security

- **Total armed forces (0000):** 613  
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 2.3  

### Development

- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.722  
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 90  
- **Health:**  
  - Physicians density (per 10,000): 17.1  
  - Hospital beds (per 10,000): 25.0  
  - Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 6.7  

### Emissions

- **CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):** 3.9  
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** 110  

### Protected areas

- **Terrestrial (% of total land area):** 2.1  
- **Marine (% of territorial waters):** 2.4  

### ICT

- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 91.5  
- **Households with computer (per 100):** 50.2  
- **Internet users (per 100):** 45.1
Will 2014 Mark Greece’s Turn Around?

Greece has been experiencing six years of continuous recession that produced the longest and deepest depression in history during peacetime. Deep crises polarise society and drive a wedge between the ‘official version’ and the reality on the ground. Every year, the Athens government (and there have been three different ones over the last six years), along with the European Commission, issue optimistic statements according to which the crisis is “about to end” and recovery is around the corner. Yet, every year the crisis deepens and the social fabric is further depleted.

The question, therefore, is: Can 2014 be the year when the official forecasts are, finally, vindicated by the facts? Will 2014 be the year that the Greek economy turns around?

According to the ‘official version,’ all the signs are pointing to recovery. The government budget has been brought into primary balance (i.e. excluding any debt repayments), the nation’s balance of payments has yielded a small surplus for the first time in many decades, the rate of GDP contraction has slowed to -2% (from a height of -7%), banks are managing to attract overseas capital to their share offerings, the stock exchange is higher than it has been for a while, tourism is booming, bond yields are stabilising at 5% (down from 30%) and, importantly, the European Commission and the European Central Bank are confirming that Greece has stabilised and is about to recover.

Before throwing critical light upon these claims, it is important to consider the vested interests hidden behind them. In early 2010, the Greek public sector became insolvent. To prevent a default, and in the absence of a fiscal union within the eurozone, the European Union (in association with the International Monetary Fund), decided to extend to the Greek government the largest loan in international history on condition that national income would be cut drastically (for an economy that could not devalue its currency). Simple arithmetic sufficed to forecast that the nation’s debt would become hopelessly unsustainable, local businesses and banks would also become insolvent and investors (Greek and otherwise) would go on a prolonged, abrupt investment strike, therefore deepening the insolvency of both the private and public sectors.

This is precisely what happened. As the table below shows, the combination of the collapse in national income with a rising public debt (in spite of a substantial haircut amounting to €100 billion worth of privately owned Greek government bonds in early 2012) produced utterly unsustainable debt dynamics which, in turn, bankrupted the private sector and caused severe social dislocation, absolute poverty and mass emigration of the most talented young Greeks.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 4: Public Debt</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2010</strong></td>
<td><strong>2014</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt</td>
<td>€300 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>€235 billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt-to-GDP</td>
<td>127.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Burdened by this ‘guilty past,’ it is understandable that the authorities in Athens and in Brussels are keen to suggest that the tough medicine has paid off.

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1 This article was finalised in March 2014. All the data used in tables and charts are provided by www.tradingeconomics.com
and that Greek recovery is around the corner. Throughout 2013, they claimed that Greece was stabilising and that 2014 would be the year of the long awaited recovery. The fact that their forecasts had been wrong for five years and that they have a vested interest to keep issuing over-optimistic forecasts, does not necessarily mean that, this time, they will be proven wrong again. Only time will tell. Meanwhile, however, what we can, and ought to, do is look carefully at the claims regarding Greece’s ‘stabilisation’ during 2013 and to look for clues in the data as to whether recovery is likely in 2014.

The Real Economy: the Contraction Accelerated in 2013

According to the government and the EU, 2013 was the year the recession decelerated. It did no such thing. While it is true that, in real terms, the rate of shrinkage declined (see Chart 8), the reality is less heroic.

If we look at nominal GDP, a far more poignant statistic than real GDP in times of recession, we shall be horrified to discover that the recession picked up speed in 2013, even compared to the abysmal years: 2012, 2011 and 2010. Indeed, as the figures below show, whereas nominal GDP fell from 2011 to 2012 by a modest 1.1%, between 2012 and 2013 it shrank by as much as 14%. In this sense, the Greek economy’s performance in 2013 was even worse than that of 2010 and 2011 – the first two years after Greece’s implosion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nominal Annual GDP Growth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-7.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-8.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>-1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>-14.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall: 2009-13</td>
<td>-27.08%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

None of this is surprising if we look more closely at what was going on in the guts of the real economy. Manufacturing output was shrinking at between -4% and -15% for the first two and a half years of the Memorandum (2010-12). Once the ECB announced its Outright Monetary Transactions programme (OMT) in the summer of 2012, steadying the markets’ nerves, and the German Chancellor confirmed that Greece was not to be forced to leave the eurozone (September 2012), there were some quarters when Greek manufacturing stopped shrinking further (see below: the blips between August 2012 and July 2013). However, since the autumn of 2013, manufacturing output has started shrinking again. Indeed, the latest figures for January 2014 confirm this ‘incredible shrinking’ act: we are in -5% territory again.

2 It is like this for two reasons. Firstly, during recessions the GDP deflator overestimates the price drops that affect the majority of people. Secondly, in an economy with gigantic debt overhang (private and public), nominal output and income is crucial, since the nominal value of the debts remains constant. The evolution of the inflation rate confirms, for those that have not seen it before, that Greece is in the clasps of deflation.
What of industrial production more generally? As chart 10 shows, Greek industry is also continuing to shrink by around 5% annually.

Might the government and EU’s optimistic verdict that Greece’s economy is stabilising be due to good news on the investment front? A brief look at the data of Chart 11 confirms that nothing of the sort is in train. Gross fixed capital formation has flat-lined at 0%, leaving net investment firmly in negative territory. What about employment? Did the huge reduction in minimum wages (of -35%) cause employers to take on more workers instead of investing in machinery? Is labour-capital substitution favouring labour over capital goods given the latter’s ‘cheapening’? As chart 12 demonstrates, employment is continuing its downward slide, confirming that wage cuts in the midst of a multi-dimensional, cruel recession is bound to fail to instil badly needed confidence in employers’ hearts and minds. The lower the minimum wages, the more pessimistic Greek employers became about finding paying customers for the wares that freshly hired employees might produce.

The Money Market

Another source of optimism for the Greek government and its EU-IMF supervisors was the banking system’s recapitalisation. Having borrowed €41 billion from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to hand over as capital to the bankers (without daring to demand that the boards of these bankrupt banks are cleared of the bankers that saw the banks fail), the authorities proclaimed that liquidity was about to hit the markets. Indeed, the Greek PM, Mr Samaras, made it his crying call in early 2013: “Once the recapitalisation is complete, by the Spring of 2013,” he repeated on a number of occasions, “businesses will regain access to loans and Greekvery will be on its way.” This, of course, was never going to happen – for the simple reason that the true capital needs of the banks were always much greater than what was acknowledged. Had they been acknowledged, the bank owners would have had to forfeit their majority stakes.

In February 2014, the IMF and the ECB began frantically signalling that Greece’s banks need at least another €20 billion. And since the proof of the pie must be in the eating, Chart 13 makes for interesting reading: not only has liquidity in the private sector not returned but, in addition, the rate of its decline has risen sharply throughout 2013. Indeed, according to the Bank of Greece, credit fell by 3.9% in December 2013 and, even more ominously, fell again by another 4% in January 2014.

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3 For a recent report in the Financial Times see: www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/90df6be6-9ca7-11e3-b535-00144feab7de.html?siteedition=Intl#axzz2ubV6FVJg
Despite all this, the Central Bank of Greece (part of the European System of Central Banks) is hailing the banks’ recapitalisation as a success story, criticising the IMF for exaggerating the banks’ capital black holes. In fact, the Governor of the Central Bank of Greece stated in March 2014 that “too stringent stress tests would be bad for the confidence in those who may wish to invest in Greek banks.” In other words, the Central Bank of Greece, that is meant to regulate the private banks, is opting for a cover-up of the terrible state of the banks’ asset books in order to make them more attractive to investors. This is hardly a situation that inspires confidence in the regulatory authorities and in the prospect that the banks, whose asset books remain in a poor state, will start lending again to businesses and households. Indeed, the Governor’s own Annual 2013 Report reports that the rate of non-performing loans has increased from 29.3% in the second quarter of 2013 to 31.2% in the third.

Turning now to the money supply, Chart 14 confirms the lack of élan in the Greek marketplace. The supply of M2 money was falling steadfastly from the moment the Greek State was found to be insolvent, and the economy embarked on its never-ending recession, until the summer of 2012. Around election time, while the establishment parties were investing
in fear of a Greek exit from the eurozone, cash was hoarded at alarming rates. Some of that liquidity returned by early 2013, along with a fraction of the bank deposits that had fled the country. For the rest of the year, however, M2 remained flat when even a modicum of growing economic activity would have caused M2 to rise. It did not. Why? Because economic activity has not picked up (as shown in chart 14).

Privatisations

2013 was a disastrous year for the privatisation programme. The spectacular failure to sell a public monopoly to Gazprom (which refused to buy at almost any price, citing the deflationary forces raging in the Greek economy as the reason for its withdrawal), left the government with a single success story: the sale of the state lottery OPAP to a shadowy consortium at a low, low price and under conditions that will prove, undoubtedly, to be detrimental to the government’s long term financial benefits.

Perhaps the most distressing news from the privatisation front is that it seems impossible to stage a genuine auction; not even for supposedly valuable assets. Once Gazprom walked away from the energy market, the privatisation of the public energy company just fell through – for there was no other bidder. Likewise, OPAP was, in the end, sold to the only bidder. The fact that a goose laying golden eggs (i.e. a monopolistic lottery) was not only sold at a knock-down price, but was also incapable of drumming up competitive bidding, is quite telling. The latest news on this trend is perhaps the greatest real estate deal Greece has to offer: the old Athens airport site at Hellinikon. Even though Hellinikon is a prime seaside plot, covering more than twice the area of London’s Hyde Park, and located next to the most upmarket suburbs of Athens, once more only one bidder appeared during the privatisation process.

Public Debt and Bond Yields

The Greek government is celebrating that its bond yields have fallen to less than 5%, from 30% eighteen months ago. Is this not cause for some celebration? It is, but only for those ignorant of the Greek State’s public debt structure.

Following two massive official loans (one in 2010, another in 2012), Greece’s debt remains more or less what it was when the country imploded in early 2010 – north of €310 billion (while GDP is 27% lower, of course). So, what did these official loans achieve? They simply shifted the Greek public debt from the private sector to the official sector. In combination with the PSI (haircut of bonds held by the private sector) in the spring of 2012, this substitution meant that only 10% of Greek government debt remains in the hands of privateers – primarily hedge funds. Also, and this is important to the hedge funds’ calculations, the bonds remaining in private hands are all English Law contracts, which make it hard for Greece and Europe to haircut them again. The gist of this is simple: it is now common knowledge that, while Greece’s public debt is spectacularly unsustainable and will be haircut again (one way or another), the bonds still in private hands will not be touched. It is simply not worth fighting the vulture funds over them in the courts of London or New York as they represent a small portion of the total debt. This common knowledge inspires confidence in the bond markets regarding these few, remaining post-PSI Greek government bonds. Herein lies the paradox: everyone knows that Greece’s debt will be restructured, and yet no one really fears that the bonds still with the private sector will be haircut. Is it any wonder that their yields have fallen? No, of course not. Is that fall a sign that Greece’s creditworthiness has risen? Not at all. (For that, we would need to observe the yields of fresh issues of Greek government bonds. Only there have not been any fresh issues since... 2010.)

Everyone knows that Greece’s debt will be restructured, and yet no one really fears that the bonds still with the private sector will be haircut

Looking forward, the EU’s Plan A for Greece’s public debt is that:

4 A consortium called Lambda Development, a vehicle for Global Investment Group, which in turn comprises Abu Dhabi company Al Maabar, China’s Fosun Group and several smaller European investors.
1. The Greek debt will only be very mildly restructured in the summer of 2014 (with no haircut to the principal, a long extension to the repayment schedule and a small reduction in interest rates; i.e. with a haircut of its present value, but not its face value).

2. The ad-infinitum-bankrupt Greek State will be allowed to return to the markets, by the third quarter of 2014, under the oversight of the ECB, whose implicit OMT threat will ensure that investors are prepared to lend at interest rates of around 4% to 5%, to a state that they know is bankrupt (and which they are prepared to lend to only because of the ECB’s OMT).

3. The above will be conditional on another troika-administered Memorandum of Understanding, which may (for the purposes of political marketing) be called something different.

In summary, new bonds will be issued when the above steps have been taken, and Athens proves that it can acquiesce fully and reliably to such a plan, even after the present government has folded its tent. The essence of Berlin’s plans for a third Greek ‘bailout’ is that it will not be funded by European taxpayers through the ESM, but instead will be funded by privateers under the pressure/guarantee of the ECB’s OMT – assuming, of course, that the latter remains a credible threat following the German Constitutional Court’s referral of OMT to the European Courts.

**Beyond the statistics**

Besides the wretched data above, there are other facts that paint a more accurate picture of Greece’s current state of affairs. Here are some of them:

- There are 10 million Greeks living in Greece (and falling fast due to migration), ‘organised’ in around 2.8 million households that have a ‘relationship’ with the Tax Office. Of those 2.8 million households, 2.3 million have a debt to the Tax Office that they cannot service.
- 1 million households cannot pay their electricity bill in full, forcing the electricity company to ‘extend and pretend,’ thus ensuring that 1 million homes live in fear of darkness at night while the electricity company is insolvent. Indeed, the Public Power Corporation is disconnecting around 30,000 homes and businesses a month due to unpaid bills.
- For 48.6% of families, pensions are the main source of income, expected to be cut even further. The €700 pension has been reduced by about 25% since 2010 and is due to be halved over the next few years.
- Minimum wages are down (on the troika’s orders) by between 35% and 40%
- Social transfers have been cut by more than 18%
- 40% say they will not be able to meet commitments this year
- Of the 4.9 million people constituting Greece’s labour force, 1.4 million are jobless

**Current Account**

Greece is now a surplus nation! At least in current account terms. If this small surplus were due to a significant rise in exports, and some strong import substitution (with domestically produced goods and services edging imported competitors out), this would have been excellent news. Only this is not the reason Greece has a current account surplus today. The sorry reason for this surplus is that the deepening recession shrunk imports by a further 11% while tourist income last summer rose a little as Turkey and Egypt’s political troubles diverted tourists to Greek shores. What about exports? They were lower in 2013 than in 2011, when they were much lower than in… 2008.

Still, the media were only too quick to hail the miracle of a Greek current account surplus. Foolish as they tend to be, they added that “Greece has not posted a current account surplus for many decades.” That is quite so. What they failed to add, however, is the year when Greece’s current account was positive last: 1943 – under the Nazi occupation, when Greeks could not afford to eat (let alone import goods from abroad), but still managed to export a few oranges, apples etc. Today, once more, the collapse of domestic demand, even in the absence of an export drive (due to the lack of credit to export-oriented businesses), has produced a 1943-like situation. This is hardly cause for celebration.
• 3.5 million employed people have to support 4.7 million unemployed or inactive Greeks
• Of the 1.4 million jobless only 10% receive unemployment benefits and only 15% any benefits at all
• The rest must fend for themselves. E.g. of the self-employed who have been driven out of business, none receives benefits
• Of those employed in the private sector 500,000 have not been paid for more than three months
• Contractors who work for the public sector are paid up to 24 months after they provided the service and pre-paid sales tax to the Tax Office
• Half of the businesses still in operation throughout the country are seriously in arrears vis-à-vis their (compulsory) contributions, their employees’ pensions and social security fund.
• 34.6% of the population live at risk of poverty or social exclusion (2012 figure)
• Households’ disposable income contracted 30% since 2010
• Healthcare has been cut by 11.1% between 2009 and 2011 – with a significant rise in HIV infections, tuberculosis and still births

Epilogue

2013 was not the year when Greece’s economy stabilised. Will 2014 prove different?
In real GDP terms, there is little doubt that there will be stabilisation, allowing Athens and Brussels to claim that the recession is over. But this will be due not to any increases in output, investment and employment. It will happen, instead, because:

a) price deflation will continue, thus propping up the ratio of output to prices
b) tourism will remain a strong contributor (courtesy of Egypt and Turkey’s continuing strife)
c) capital that is flowing into the European Union from emerging markets will also come into Greece in a speculative search for bargains (e.g. shares in the poorly regulated banks) and convinced that the German government is no longer considering pushing Greece out of the eurozone
d) a small increase in structural funds from Brussels will compensate for the further drop in domestic demand.

2014 seems most likely to signal the end of Greece’s recession and the beginning of a period of stagnation that pins an exhausted social economy onto a terrible equilibrium

In short, in the absence of any evidence whatsoever of a recovery in investment and/or bank lending to businesses, 2014 seems most likely to signal the end of Greece’s recession and the beginning of a period of stagnation that pins an exhausted social economy onto a terrible equilibrium.
Causes of the Rise of the Far Right

While there are multiple economic, social, cultural and political causes for the current rise in the radical right in various European countries, it is difficult to say which is the most important. Certainly, the economic crisis triggered in 2008 and the ensuing single-minded pursuit by EU and national authorities of neoliberal deficit-control and austerity measures are one key factor. Such economic policies increase the gap between the privileged elite and the brunt of the population and thus offer the far right opportunities to harness the dissatisfaction of those who have been left behind. The situation is compounded by social changes that have shrunk the former industrial working class, which had traditionally supported classic left-wing parties. Cultural changes and, in particular, the crisis of the great ideologies (especially on the left, with its transformational aspirations) have led to the spread of individualist, divisive and cynical views of reality throughout society.

However, perhaps the best explanation can be found in the crisis of democracy, which today, more than ever before, seems incapable of fulfilling its theoretical promise. Conventional democratic politics has adapted itself to (one might even say, given in to) the interests of high finance; thus, the alternation between centre-right and centre-left governments offers no real alternatives in terms of economic models, but rather subtle variations on a single immutable pattern that seems to strip representative institutions of meaning and reduce pluralist elections to mere empty rituals. As a result, the far right benefits from popular disgust with a corrupt, privileged and oligopolistic political class, even as actual democracy seems powerless in the face of the untouchable large economic and financial corporations. In this regard, establishment parties are regularly accused of not representing the true people; in opposition to this, and to representative institutions as a whole, the far right calls for direct political participation and for placing trust in more or less “charismatic” leaders able to connect with the people without intermediaries. The old “political class” is written off en masse (regardless of whether the conventional left or conventional right is in power) for its partisan cronyism and inability to solve social problems.

Core Ideas of the Radical Right

The far right embodies the worst of the European ideological tradition: exclusive nationalist essentialism, counter-Enlightenment dogmatism and political authoritarianism. Its message today is based on three core ideas: chauvinistic and ethnic exaltation of the nation; anti-immigrant xenophobia; and “anti-politician,” anti-establishment populism. In this regard, the far right offers its followers an exclusive identity, singles out the culprits (the establishment) and advocates simple and expeditious solutions (throw out the foreigners, overthrow the “political class”).

The main ideological obsession of the far right is the sacrosanct nation; hence, the myth of the ethnic purity of “our people.” This central tenet of the far right’s discourse and actions shows itself in two ways: outright rejection of non-EU immigration and, increasingly, rejection of the EU itself. Xenophobia, of course, is one of the factors offering the greatest electoral dividends to the far right, which is notorious
for its demagoguery regarding the alleged “dangers” of immigration and, in particular, of Muslim immigrants, who are depicted as being incapable of integration and as intractable opponents of “Christian and Western civilisation.” In this context, immigrants are blamed for “freeloading” off the welfare state, rising crime rates (including terrorism), and even for reintroducing diseases that had been eradicated in Europe.

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At the same time, the far right no longer encourages mere Euro-scepticism, but rather full-blown Euro-phobia, arguing that globalisation and Europeanisation are two sides of the same coin, that is, manoeuvres by the powerful elites to denationalise European peoples. From this point of view, the EU is portrayed as a sort of modern-day Soviet Union, artificial and an oppressor of homelands. While the entire far right coincides in its outright rejection of any possible future political federalisation of the EU, some of its members might support certain types of intergovernmental cooperation. In this regard, some far-right parties advocate leaving the EU (UKIP), others dissolving it (FN), and still others “shrinking it down” to a mere economic coordinator of sovereign states (PRM, NSA). This rejection of the EU in its current form does not, however, preclude having a significant presence in the European Parliament, in which the various parties hope to form a strong bloc following the May 2014 elections (the fleeting attempt to form such a bloc in 2007-2008 failed due to internal differences and it was ultimately dissolved).

In short, for the far right, democracy as we know it is an empty shell and current economic policy is an anti-popular plan to advance the globalising agenda. Its solutions are thus quite simple: for the economy, protectionism and welfare chauvinism; in politics, a hard line and direct participation; at the social level, an anti-immigrant discourse based on fear and hatred; and at the cultural level, an emphasis on traditional family and religious values.

### Types of Far-right Parties

The European radical right can be divided into two main, albeit increasingly indistinguishable, categories: the old parties of neo-fascist origin and the newer populist ones. In any case, all are based on strong leadership, hierarchical organisations and a radicalised activist rank-and-file. The first category includes an especially extremist sub-group (ChA, JMM) and a group of parties that have engaged in a bit of cosmetic marketing (FN, VB, FPÖ); the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 6</th>
<th>Party Acronyms</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ChA</td>
<td>Chrysí Avgí / Golden Dawn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>Dansk Folkeparti / Danish People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>Front National / National Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPÖ</td>
<td>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs / Austrian Freedom Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FrP</td>
<td>Fremskrittspartiet / Progress Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMM</td>
<td>Jobbik Magyarországi Mozgalom / Movement for a Better Hungary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LN</td>
<td>Lega Nord / Northern League</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands / German National Democrat Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>Nationalen Sayuz Ataka / National Attack Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>Partidul România Mare / Greater Romania Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>Perussuomalaiset / Finns Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>Partij Voor de Vrijheid / Party for Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Sverigedemokraterna / Sweden Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVP</td>
<td>Schweizerische Volkspartei / Swiss People’s Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VB</td>
<td>Vlaams Belang / Flemish Interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>United Kingdom Independence Party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
second category includes a notoriously demagogic sub-group (UKIP, LN, PVV, NSA, PRM) and another group of parties that are somewhat more outwardly reserved (FrP, DF, SD, PS, SVP).

Marine Le Pen’s National Front (FN) has emerged as a sort of benchmark party for the rest and expects to receive a considerable share of the vote due to the disappointment of many French voters with the current governing national political majority. Its strategy of proposing anti-EU, anti-immigration and anti-political class solutions is thus working. The FN recently signed an agreement with Geert Wilders (PVV), an Islamophobe who earns his greatest electoral dividends in Holland by fanning the flames of xenophobia.

Two of the parties in this category are particularly dangerous. The first is the Greek neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn, due to its paramilitary structure and violence against immigrants and anti-fascists. Golden Dawn is a radically ethnocentric and xenophobic party, and the Greek government has been slow to act against it. The second is Jobbik, which is a reflection of Hungary’s reactionary regression under the “moderate” Viktor Orban. The Hungarian far right is linked to the legacy of the sinister “Arrow Cross” party (the Hungarian Nazis from the final stages of WWII) and espouses an anti-Roma, anti-gay and anti-EU agenda.

Among the populists, the most important ones are UKIP, a nearly single-issue party that aims to get the United Kingdom out of the EU and bring incoming immigration to an immediate halt, and the Northern League. The latter has fallen on hard times of late and has clearly chosen to embrace a xenophobic and racist discourse. The intolerable and repeated insults, as well as the harassment of the former Italian Minister of Integration, Cécile Kyenge, bear testament to the party’s reactionary strategy.

**TABLE 7**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>MPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ChA</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>21 out of 300 (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DF</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>25 out of 179 (2011) 1 euro-MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FN</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2 out of 577 (2012) 3 euro-MPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPÖ</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>40 out of 183 (2013) 2 euro-MPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FrP</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>29 out of 169 (2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMM</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>47 out of 386 (2010) 3 euro-MPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LN</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>18 out of 630 (2013) 9 euro-MPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSA</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>21 out of 240 (2009) 2 euro-MPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRM</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>- (2012) 3 euro-MPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>39 out of 200 (2012) 1 euro-MP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVV</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>15 out of 150 (2012) 4 euro-MPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>20 out of 349 (2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SVP</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>54 out of 200 (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VB</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>12 out of 150 (2010) 2 euro-MPs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKIP</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>- (2010) 9 euro-MPs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In short, it is incongruous to share part of the discourse and solutions prescribed by the far right, as it legitimates policies and values that fly in the face of the best of the European Enlightenment tradition and, moreover, serves only to benefit the far right itself at the polls. It leads to confusion and even withdrawal from the electoral process entirely (in favour of abstention) among the voters of truly moderate parties, who are fed up with the overall back-
wards slide, which is hardly good news for European democracy.

It is incongruous to share part of the discourse and solutions prescribed by the far right, as it legitimates policies and values that fly in the face of the best of the European Enlightenment tradition and, moreover, serves only to benefit the far right itself at the polls.

In light of this situation, the moderate right, centre-left and left must redouble their cooperation to rethink current restrictive migratory policies, which are ineffective and unfair, from top to bottom. Likewise, they must revive their defence of the welfare state, for its egalitarian redistributive value. And last, but not least, they must strengthen all the facets and potential of pluralist democracy to make it more transparent, more oriented towards the safeguard of basic rights, and more participatory. Such a programme would doubtless be difficult to achieve; however, it could significantly contribute to stopping the seemingly overwhelming tide of reactionary populisms now sweeping across Europe, which are benefited not only by the especially adverse objective conditions caused by the crisis, but also the inability of the conventional "political class" to renew itself completely and connect with the large majority of citizens.

**Bibliography**


Geographical Overview | Western Balkans

Serbia-Kosovo: Six Years after the Unilateral Declaration of Independence of the Republic of Kosovo

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The Agreement on the Normalisation of Relations between Serbia and Kosovo (2013)

1. On 19 April 2013, at the headquarters of the EU’s European External Action Service, the Prime Ministers of Serbia (Ivica Dacic) and Kosovo (Hashim Thaçi) signed the First Agreement of Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations, thereby marking the close of six months of negotiations presided over by the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton.1

Its content is clear and specific. Both parties, Serbia and Kosovo, agree to a statute of autonomy for the Serb population of Northern Kosovo, which, since Kosovo’s universal declaration of independence (UDI) in 2008, has been self-governed and fully dependent on the Ministry of Kosovo created in and by the motherland. According to the Kosovo Office of Statistics, there are some 130,000 people of Serb origin, accounting for 5.3% of the total population of just over two million people.

The Serb majority municipalities of the north may form an association (which would join the existing Association of Municipalities of Kosovo) with full competences on matters of economic development, education, health and urban and rural planning (points 1 and 4 of the Agreement), as well as such others as may be delegated by the central authorities (point 5). As for the police, the parties agree that “there shall be one police force in Kosovo” (point 7), and the members of other security structures created by Serbia will have the option of being integrated into the equivalent Kosovo structures (point 8). In exchange, Kosovo agrees that the police commander for the Serb majority municipalities will be a Kosovo Serb, appointed by the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Kosovo from a list of candidates provided by the mayors of these municipalities, and that this regional police force will reflect the ethnic composition of the populations of the indicated municipalities (point 9), that is, that it will also have a Serb majority. With regard to the judiciary, the parties agree that all judicial authorities will be integrated within the “Kosovo legal framework,” although the Appellate Court in Pristina, the capital of the Republic, will establish a “panel” made up of a majority of Kosovo Serb judges to deal with matters arising in Serb majority municipalities (point 10). This Court will moreover have a permanent “division” in northern Mitrovica that will have a majority of Kosovo Serb judges (point 11).

The conclusion of this Agreement clearly impacts various stakeholders. For Serbia, it will have the following important consequences:

A) States cannot go about acting in ways that belie their own actions. If, on 19 April 2013, Serbia recognised that the government of the Republic of Kosovo (which it does not recognise as a state) exercises its authority throughout the territory of the Republic, including in the Serb majority municipalities, and that the entire territory is subject to Kosovo law, how can it then ignore the existence of an independent Kosovo governed by its own laws in the world of international relations? (The thesis

that, through its decision, Serbia has granted Kosovo de facto recognition is shared by more than a few observers. Indeed, Vojislav Kostunica, leader of the main opposition party in Serbia, even argued it in the debates conducted on the agreement’s negotiation process in the Serbian Parliament.\(^2\) Likewise, if one considers that the EU has, since December 2012, been demanding that Serbia transfer the judicial and security structures in Northern Kosovo as a condition to starting accession negotiations, Serbia has ultimately given in. In fact, three days after the announcement of the Agreement’s signing, the Commission formally recommended that the negotiations be started with Serbia and that a Stabilisation and Association Agreement be negotiated with Kosovo. (The European Council announced the opening of these latter negotiations on 28 June 2013).\(^3\) Indeed, the EU seems to wish to pursue with Kosovo the same path it has already travelled with Serbia: a Stabilisation Agreement as a prior step to accession. (The Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the European Communities and Their Member States of the One Part, and the Republic of Serbia, of the Other Part entered into in Luxembourg, on 29 April 2008, came into force on 1 September 2013.)\(^4\)

Three days after the announcement of the Agreement’s signing, the Commission formally recommended that the negotiations be started with Serbia and that a Stabilisation and Association Agreement be negotiated with Kosovo

B) Under the Agreement of April 2013, both Serbia and Kosovo undertake not to hinder each other’s progress on their paths to EU accession (point 14). Serbia will probably achieve accession first. Once it is a Member State, it will have in its power the means provided to it by the accession process established in the Treaties: namely, to vote “no” on the Council’s decision (which must be unanimous) to sign the relevant Accession Agreement and not to ratify it, in application of its national law. By signing this Agreement (2013), Serbia undertakes not to attempt to block the accession of Kosovo to the EU. (It must be remembered that candidates must meet certain requirements, including, among other things, the requirement to be a state.)\(^5\)

C) By accepting the plan to implement the Agreement, Serbia managed to include its position that the agreed plan is “without prejudice to the positions of the two sides on the Kosovo status.”\(^6\) And yet, how can such a statement by Serbia be reconciled with the explicit recognition in the Agreement (2013) that there is a Kosovo government that enforces Kosovo law throughout Kosovo? At times, words alone are not enough.

For Kosovo, the Agreement is a step forward. True, it must agree to a statute of autonomy for the Serb minority, but in exchange it receives Serbia’s acceptance of two points: first, political recognition (before the world and the mediator, the EU) of the Kosovo authority, throughout the territory of the Republic, and of its government and law; and second, that Serbia will not impede Kosovo’s accession to the EU (in which case, it would be accepting that Kosovo is a state under international law).

The Agreement is a success for the EU, which has helped to achieve a significant step forward in the normalisation of relations between Serbia and its former province and to convince Serbia to accept, politically and publicly, that Kosovo, like Serbia, is likely to become an EU Member State.\(^7\) The step is important both for regional peace and for the EU to showcase its excellent relations with the UN, given that, in accepting the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (2010), the General Assembly welcomed the EU’s intervention in the process of dialogue that it has called for between

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\(^2\) [www.dw.de](http://www.dw.de), 21 April 2013.

\(^3\) EU CO 104/1/13, European Council Conclusion 27-28 June 2013.


\(^5\) Art 49, TEU.

\(^6\) Statement by High Representative Catherine Ashton on the implementation plan for the April agreement, Brussels, 27 May 2013 (A 267/13). It may be interesting to recall that Art. 135.2 of the 2008 Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia essentially provides for the same thing.

Serbia and Kosovo. Both outcomes help the EU in its indefatigable effort to convey to the world the message that it is a global player in international relations.

The signing of the Agreement was good news, then, for Kosovo’s “protectors.”

The April Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo may encourage “those states that have to date refused to recognise Kosovo” to ask themselves whether they should continue to do so and, if so, for how much longer. In Spain, the government has already been asked to change its policy and recognise the Republic of Kosovo, but, so far, it has not appeared willing to do so. In our view, it has done well in this regard. (Only once Serbia has recognised Kosovo’s independence, which has not yet occurred, should Spain begin to consider its recognition, too, along with the statement that would have to accompany such a recognition.)

The April Agreement between Serbia and Kosovo may encourage “those states that have to date refused to recognise Kosovo” to ask themselves whether they should continue to do so and, if so, for how much longer.

3. In any case, for the Agreement to have any actual consequences, it must first be implemented, and that will not be easy. In addition to the hostility it faces from certain sectors in Serbia, it has enemies in Kosovo, too. Not only does a segment of the Kosovo political class believe that it signifies the acceptance of a Serb enclave in their territory, but it is also rejected by the portion of the population of Serbian origin, who have called for (yet another) new state of their own, namely, Northern Kosovo.

The Start of Formal Membership Talks between the EU and Serbia (2014)

4. Things are advancing. On 5 December 2013, the High Representative announced that “decisive progress” had been made on the negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo regarding police issues and on the eventual implementation of the Agreement for the normalisation of relations between them. As the issue of the judicial structures had not been resolved in the negotiations of 5 December 2013, the Prime Ministers of the two parties met again, albeit without success, in Brussels on the 13th of that same month. However, on 12 January 2014, the Europa Press agency, citing the High Representative, reported that the Prime Ministers would discuss all relevant points together, as a “package deal,” and that the negotiations were expected to be concluded in April.

5. Optimism seems to abound; the EU has already begun formal membership talks with Serbia. On 21 January 2014, the relevant intergovernmental conference was convened. The first chapters to be negotiated will be justice and fundamental rights. The Serbian Prime Minister has repeatedly stated that his country has not recognised Kosovo nor has it been asked to.

The Unilateral Independence of Kosovo: Gaining Ground

6. Time, that incomparable ally… The more time goes by, the more petits pas that are taken (and the EU is an expert on petits pas, given its own philosophical origins in the petit pas of the 1950 Schu-
man Declaration), the more the situation arising from the illegal origin – in this case, the unilateral declaration of independence of the Republic of Kosovo – will become a reality on the ground.

The Serbian Prime Minister has repeatedly stated that his country has not recognised Kosovo nor has it been asked to

7. An initial petit pas: the aforementioned normalisation and stabilisation agreement with Serbia. Another: the April 2013 agreement on the normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo. And a third: the opening, on 28 October 2013, of formal negotiations of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo in Pristina, with the Commissioner for Enlargement, Stefan Füle, presiding over the first session, negotiations that are expected to be concluded in spring of 2014.16 The Spanish government accepted the negotiation of this Agreement after receiving guarantees that it would not entail the recognition of Kosovo, as announced by the Secretary of State for the EU, Íñigo Méndez de Vigo. Secretary Méndez de Vigo explained that Spain had “negotiated” this issue with the Commission. The government moreover stated that it had not opposed the opening of these negotiations with Kosovo because its demand that the agreement “deal only with EU competences” and “not mixed competences” had been accepted, such that it “would not have to be ratified by the Spanish Parliament.”17

How Many Yardsticks Do States Have? From Kosovo to Crimea…

8. In February 2008, Kosovo made its UDI from Serbia. The Crimean Parliament passed its declaration of independence from Ukraine on Tuesday, 11 March 2014.18 The vast majority of the EU’s 28 Member States, with the exception of only Greece, Spain, Cyprus, the Slovak Republic and Romania, have recognised the Republic of Kosovo as a new state, as has the United States (which has described the Crimean declaration as contrary to the Ukraine constitution).19 In contrast, Russia, which fiercely criticised Kosovo’s declaration of independence, obviously did not follow suit with Crimea’s (which the Russian Foreign Affairs Minister described as “perfectly legal”).20 Are Kosovo and the Crimea really so different and distant? The essence is the same: two peoples who do not wish to live in the state that they are a part of…

9. Would it not perhaps be suitable for international law to clearly state whether or not a people’s “right to decide” should trump the territorial integrity of the state to which they belong? This is what Serbia (and so many others) was hoping the ICJ would clarify in its 2010 advisory opinion on Kosovo. It failed to do so.21

16 EFE: www.abc.es
18 www.spria.ru
19 http://spanish.ru/ru/
Ungovernable Bosnia? From the Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights on the Sejdić-Finci Case to the Government Crisis

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In the past years, politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been marked by continuous crisis and blockade. Reforms in the country have largely stagnated and the accession process is stalling. Despite the offer of EU accession and the reduction of international intervention that had predominated the first decade of post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, institutions have failed to foster compromise, and multiple-veto mechanisms and complex mechanisms of governance have blocked key legislation.

The Sejdić-Finci Case and the Failure of Implementation

In 2009, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found Bosnia and Herzegovina in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights for not allowing a Roma and a Jew to stand in elections for the state Presidency and the second chamber of the Bosnian Parliament, the House of Peoples. In both bodies, all seats are reserved for members of the three constituent peoples: Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs. Following the inability of the Bosnian institutions to revise the constitution and the electoral law to accommodate this ruling, the Council of the EU has made implementation of this judgement a condition for a “credible application” for membership. Since 2010, there have been several efforts by the EU and by individual Member States to negotiate constitutional reforms to accommodate the judgement, but all efforts have come to naught as the representatives of the leading political parties have been unable to agree on a universally acceptable compromise.

While the main political parties have not rejected a change to the constitution per se, their views have diverged substantially and, in spite of the multiple deadlines set by the EU, they have failed to agree on a solution. The debates again highlighted deeper disagreements between the political parties, whose voters are from different parts of the country and represent different constituent peoples. In effect, few of the controversies were related to the representation of citizens who do not hail from the three constituent peoples, while the most difficult question concerned the balance of power between the State and its entities and the representation of the three dominant nations.

The Croat Question

The Sejdić-Finci case was rendered more difficult to resolve due to the continued grievances of Croatian parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In both 2006 and 2010, the Croat member elected to the state Presidency was Željko Komšić of the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Although a Croat himself, he and his party led a campaign that was not limited to Croat issues and appealed to many non-Croat voters. By not running a Bosniak candidate for the presidency, the SDP ensured that the support of its electorate


went to Komšić. As a result, he won both elections resoundingly and with the support of many voters who did not hail from the Croat community. Technically, this did not present a problem for the electoral system, which merely prescribes that a Croat from the Federation has to be elected to the state Presidency. However, Komšić’s victory undermined the presumption that the victorious candidate would also represent the interests of the Croat community. As non-Croats (Bosniaks and others) by far outnumber Croats in the Federation, Croat parties claimed that their constituencies were marginalised by the outcome of the election.\(^3\)

Few of the controversies were related to the representation of citizens who do not hail from the three constituent peoples, while the most difficult question concerned the balance of power between the State and its entities and the representation of the three dominant nations.

The resulting marginalisation of Croats in the Federation led to demands from Croat parties to ensure that any reform of the state Presidency to reflect the Sejdjić-Finci ruling would also secure the election of a Croat member of the state Presidency who would represent the Croat community. This has complicated a compromise on Sejdjić-Finci and shifted the attention in the negotiations from the inclusion of those citizens who are not members of the three constituent peoples to the inclusion of all three dominant nations.

The Permanent Government Crisis

The difficulty in resolving the Sejdjić-Finci case was compounded by unstable governments in Bosnia and Herzegovina both at the state level and in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Following the 2010 general elections, it took over a year for a state government to be formed, as the divergent views of the main parties and the power-sharing requirements made a government formation difficult. In the Federation, the victorious Social Democratic Party (SDP), mostly voted for by Bosniak voters and voters who identify as Bosnians, sought to take control, but could only rely on marginal Croat parties, leading to an instable coalition that could only take office after a controversial intervention of the High Representative. The governing coalitions have thus been unstable and subject to changing alliances. For example, there was a major government reshuffle in the Federation and at the state level in 2012, resulting in the controversial businessman Fahrudin Radonić joining the government as Minister of Security.\(^4\)

Protests and the Government Response

In 2013 and 2014, Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced two waves of protest. In June 2013, protests erupted in Sarajevo over a Parliament impasse on a new law on personal identification numbers. Because the law had stalled in Parliament, newborn babies could not receive identification numbers and documents. As some newborns needed urgent medical treatment abroad, the blockage became life-threatening, mobilising citizens to protest in front of Parliament. However, the protests quickly petered out as a parliamentary decision enabled the issuing of identification numbers.

Another wave of protests, this time much broader in scope and larger in number, broke out in February 2014. Starting in Tuzla over factory closures, the protests spread to several towns across the Federation and led to large-scale violence against local and cantonal government buildings, as well as the state Presidency. Several buildings were severely damaged, including part of the state archives housed in the Presidency building. As the protests quieted down, a number of citizens’ assemblies sprung up to articulate citizens’ demands, including...

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the resignation of local and cantonal officials and other reforms. While a number of cantonal governments resigned as a result of the protests and assemblies, known as plenums, the protests and assemblies themselves also lost their momentum.  

The difficulty in resolving the Sejdić-Finci case was compounded by unstable governments in Bosnia and Herzegovina both at the state level and in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Although the protests have failed to bring about large-scale change in Bosnia and Herzegovina, they highlight a deep-seated sense of frustration among many citizens. The fact that the protests primarily focused on the Federation suggests that citizens do not perceive Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single polity. In the Republika Srpska, the fundamental causes of the grievances articulated in the protests continue to exist, but a combination of more authoritarian government – control of the media and public debate – and less complex institutions has reduced the number of public protests.

International Responses

For most of the post-war period, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a partial protectorate with the Office of the High Representative (OHR) wielding considerable power and influence over the government, including the ability to dismiss elected and appointed officials and to impose legislation. Since 2006, this influence has considerably declined. Although formally the OHR retains the powers to make such impositions, it has made little use of them over the past eight years. This has been in part due to the decision of key international actors (primarily the EU) to reduce the use of the OHR’s executive powers, a critical report of the OHR’s role by the Venice Commission, and, later on, divergent views on the use of these powers between different key countries overseeing this body’s work.

Instead, the EU has become engaged as the prime international actor. The shift from state-building by decree of the OHR to state-building through EU accession was the primary conceptual change around 2006. However, the remoteness of eventual membership and intransigent elites have led to a stalemate that the country continues to experience. Several efforts by the EU and, to a lesser degree, the USA to induce fundamental reforms, such as the April 2006 package of constitutional reforms, the 2009 Butmir Process of constitutional reforms, the police reform or, most recently, the implementation of the Sejdić-Finci judgement, have all failed. Instead, a number of state-building measures undertaken by the OHR during the 1997-2006 period have been rolled back in recent years and institutions at the state level have been blocked by the intransigence of the political parties. In the Serb Republic in particular, the dominant party since 2006, Milorad Dodik’s Independent Alliance of Social Democrats, has pursued an uncompromising nationalist line, seeking to strengthen the Serb Republic and blocking decisions at the state level.  

The failure to implement the ECHR’s Sejdić-Finci ruling is a reflection of the broader stalemate in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU’s inability to provide sufficient incentives for reform by offering the prospect of EU membership.

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5 The 2014 protests are documented at: http://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com.
Morocco 2013: A Year of Crises

The second year of the government led by the Islamist Abdelilah Benkirane in Morocco was a tough one, according to data published by the newspaper Al Massae on 20 March 2014, marked by a drop of more than 60% in foreign investment, compounded by falling phosphate revenues, dwindling remittances from Moroccan emigrants, and an increased trade deficit. According to the newspaper, all of these factors have put the Benkirane government in a tight spot, despite the positive assessment offered by the government spokesman, who, at about the same time, was announcing that the country had registered 4.8% growth in 2013, up from 2.7% the year before.

Government and Opposition: Unclear Roles

For its part, the Moroccan opposition has written off 2013 as a “wasted year” due to the various crises that afflicted the country throughout it. The crisis within the governing majority and the crisis in the relationship with the country’s great ally, the United States, both occurred within the framework of the economic crisis with its associated burden of a growing public debt that, according to the Office of the High Commissioner for Planning, the government agency responsible for forecasts and statistics, rose from 71.2% of GDP in 2012 to 77.4% in 2013 and is expected to continue to rise to 83.7% in 2014. In the view of Ahmed Lahlimi, head of the agency, all of these figures are “disturbing.” However, it must not be forgotten that, in Morocco, the government and the opposition sometimes seem to swap roles. Since its constitution in January 2012, the government has been embroiled in an unspoken war with those who seek to discredit it by hindering its actions, including more than a few of the country’s de facto powers. Tensions between ministers and the Moroccan business community (the most striking being the boycott by the members of the CGEM employers federation of the meeting between Moroccan and Turkish businessmen during Erdogan’s visit to Morocco in June 2013) and the common front formed by the main trade unions against government policy and, in particular, against the Prime Minister himself, are just a few examples of this war.

However, the subtest part of this situation is that playing out between the country’s highest authority and the Head of Government, who holds only a portion of the power and whose area of shared and poorly demarcated competences is often encroached upon. The appointments of walis and ambassadors are a good example of this. Nevertheless, Benkirane has been notoriously resistant to implementing policies imposed from above, especially when compared to his predecessor, Abbas El Fassi, who never hid the fact that his own policy was simply to carry out His Majesty’s orders. This resistance has been particularly visible in his defence of the Compensation Fund for oil products, gas and sugar, which in his view remains one of the key mechanisms for ensuring social cohesion and solidarity, despite pressure from the IMF.

The Long Crisis of the Government

However, the most striking aspect of 2013 was the fact that this war was also being waged at the heart...
Since its constitution in January 2012, the government has been embroiled in an unspoken war with those who seek to discredit it by hindering its actions, including more than a few of the country’s de facto powers of the governing coalition itself. The government’s internal crisis began on 3 January with the “Memorandum” submitted to the Chief Executive by Hamid Chabat, leader of the Istiqlal Party, the coalition government’s main partner, demanding cabinet changes and greater representation for his party. The crisis was the result of an earlier crisis in his own party, which had been settled a few months earlier, on 23 September 2012, with the election of Chabat himself as Secretary General. Chabat’s faction had defeated that of his predecessor, the former Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi, which had dominated the party to date and was represented by the party’s six ministers in the Benkirane cabinet.

This bold move, it was initially thought, would culminate in tough negotiations to impose his candidates on the new government and make the desired adjustments to it. However, against all odds, the process was long and dragged on for six months, bringing the government to a virtual standstill. In May, the leader of Istiqlal turned to Mohammed VI to request arbitration, pursuant to Article 42 of the new constitution, which provides that the King shall be the supreme arbiter of all state institutions.

While the sovereign refused to play the role of mediator, he did receive Chabat for a brief hearing. The hearing came on the heels of the resignation, accepted by the King, of five Istiqlal ministers on 9 July, an extremely rare turn of events in the annals of Moroccan history. Bizarrely, the sixth Istiqlal minister refused to leave the government and, thus, had to leave his party instead. Following the crisis, Mohammed El Ouafa, who, as Minister of Education, had received very bad press and achieved equally poor results, was tapped to be the Minister of General Affairs in the new “Benkirane II” cabinet.

The government crisis did not end there. The loss of the support of the 61 MPs from the outgoing party meant that replacements had to be sought from amongst one or more other political forces to achieve the parliamentary majority of 198 MPs needed to avoid a minority government. It was not easy to find new partners for the government amongst the other parties with a significant representation in Parliament. In some cases, such as the National Rally of Independents (RNI) or the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), the parties had participated in the electoral front formed against the Justice and Development Party (PJD) in the November 2011 elections known as the “G8,” an eclectic group made up of eight, mostly liberal political formations, including minor socialist, green and even Islamist factions. In others, such as the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), it was because they had openly declared their willingness to engage in opposition following thirteen years of being worn down in the government.

The New “Benkirane II” Cabinet

Ultimately, it was the RNI, led by Salaheddine Mezouar, that agreed, after two months of negotiations, to form a new majority, leading to a major cabinet reshuffle. Mezouar, who had, with the Palace’s blessing, been Benkirane’s rival for Prime Minister in the November 2011 elections, accepted the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs in the “Benkirane II” cabinet, formed on 10 October 2013. The new cabinet included eight ministers from his party – nearly as many as from the PJD itself – including Mohammed Boussaid, the former wali of Greater Casablanca, appointed Minister of Economy and Finance, and Moulay Hafid Elalamy, former president of the CGEM, appointed Minister of Industry and Trade. Several of these new ministers were suggested by the Palace, and, together with the so-called sovereign ministries (Interior, Religious Affairs, Secretariat General of the Government, and Agriculture), form the largest bloc in the current government.
The Ministry of the Interior, which, in the previous Benkirane cabinet, had, for the first time in Moroccan history, been headed up by a party man, Mohand Laenser, leader of the Popular Movement, was restored to the Palace through the figure of Mohamed Hassad, a former minister in the 1990s and wali, under the new King, of Marrakesh and Tangier.

The American Scare and the Sahara

The crisis opened in April with the United States on the issue of the Sahara was of a different nature entirely. The tension with the United Nations from the year before due to the Moroccan rejection of the Secretary General’s personal representative for the Sahara, Christopher Ross, who was ultimately reaccepted by Morocco thanks only to Ban Ki-Moon’s staunch support, had barely been overcome when a new problem arose when it was learned that the US had submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council in favour of broadening the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) in the sphere of human rights in the Sahara.

Morocco reacted immediately, cancelling all joint manoeuvres for Operation African Lion planned for the month in the country. Although the US withdrew the draft, after France and Spain submitted an alternative that did not include a broader mandate, the crisis was not entirely resolved, but rather lasted until the Moroccan monarch’s trip to Washington in November 2013 and his interview with President Obama. There, he managed to convince an American administration, for the first time, to consider the Moroccan proposal of autonomy as “serious, realistic and credible” and as a possible approach to fulfilling the aspirations of the people of the Western Sahara and to allowing them to settle their own affairs in peace and dignity.

What came to be known as the “Danielgate” affair can also be considered a crisis. On the occasion of Throne Day, a royal pardon was granted to a Spanish paedophile of Iraqi origin who had been imprisoned in Morocco after having been sentenced to 30 years of prison by a Kenitra court in May 2011. Apparently, the pardon was due to a series of misunderstandings and mistakes following a visit from King Juan Carlos I to Morocco in July 2013, in which the Spanish monarch inquired about a different Spaniard being held in custody. The result was the freeing of various Spanish prisoners, including, inadvertently, Daniel Fina Galván. Hamid Krairi, the lawyer of three families of victims of the pardoned prisoner, used social media to sound the alarm, triggering an unprecedented popular mobilisation, as the protest called into question – for the first time in Moroccan history – an action taken by the King. The King had no choice but to acknowledge his mistake and, exceptionally, to revoke the pardon.

The crisis of the Istiqlal party, which affected the government’s own crisis, cannot be viewed as an isolated incident, but rather must be understood as indicative of the widespread crisis affecting the country’s political parties, which the 2004 Parties Act failed to quash. There is a visible crisis in the main party of the left, the USFP, whose Secretary General, Driss Lachgar, elected at the congress held in December 2012, is questioned by the faction led by Ahmed Zaidi, the opponent he defeated. This confrontation was maintained throughout 2013 and has yet to be resolved, despite the attempts by other leaders to mediate and the Secretary General’s (successful) efforts to draw two splinter groups of the party – the Socialist Party (PS) and the Workers’ Party (PT) – back into the fold.

Morocco’s main parties are led by a new generation of populist politicians. It is a generation marked more by political pragmatism than by ideologies derived from the struggle for independence.

Today, Morocco’s main parties are led by a new generation of populist politicians. It is a generation marked more by political pragmatism than by ideologies derived from the struggle for independence that characterised Moroccan political life for many years. This is true of Chabat and Lachgar, of Istiqlal and the USFP, respectively, the “national movement” parties. However, it is also true of more recently founded parties, such as Benkirane’s own PJD, and of PAM leaders, such as that party’s founder, Fouad Ali El Himma, or Ilyas El Omari.
Conclusion: The Actual Epicentre

On another level, 2013 was an especially African year for Morocco, signifying a certain return to a continent from which the country had remained all too absent since its withdrawal from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1984. In March, Mohammed VI took a royal tour of Senegal, Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon on a trip described as “religious and economic diplomacy.” Morocco is trying to leverage the large presence in these countries of members of the Tijani brotherhood, whose main zaouia, or shrine, is in Fez, to develop its investments in them. In September, on the occasion of the investiture of the new president of Mali, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, Mohammed VI travelled to Bamako, making much of his role as “Commander of the Faithful” and ambassador of a “moderate Islam.” His involvement in that country’s internal conflict increased when he received the Secretary General of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad on 31 January 2014, a move viewed with suspicion by Algiers.

Just as his father once did, Mohammed VI, the “epicentre of general attention,” as the monarch was called in a recent book by the journalist Souleiman Bencheikh, Le dilemme du Roi ou la monarchie marocaine à l’épreuve (Casa-Express, Rabat 2013), has used some of his speeches to sound the alarm on key issues. In his speech on the 60th anniversary of the Revolution of the King and the People in August, he called attention to the country’s deteriorated education system, offering a highly critical view of the situation. At the opening of the most recent session of Parliament, the King harshly criticised the governance of Casablanca, one of the country’s most important cities, causing a veritable institutional tsunami in the kingdom’s economic capital. Likewise, he used his speech on the anniversary of the Green March to report on a new development-oriented approach to Saharan policy by means of the Economic, Social and Environmental Council.

Just as his father once did, Mohammed VI, has used some of his speeches to sound the alarm on key issues.
The Illusion of a Triumph

The re-election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika on 17 April 2014 for a fourth consecutive term was surprising, above all for the announced voting results. Indeed, the incumbent, who was not able to campaign for health reasons – and who delegated this task to his supporters, all of them connected to the state apparatus – , nevertheless purportedly obtained 81.49% of the votes in the first round (90.24% in 2009), according to the results officially announced by the Constitutional Council. Participation was said to be only 50.70% (74.54% in 2009).

The opposition’s representatives, most of whom chose to boycott the elections, not only denounced election results that were set in advance – as well as systemic fraud – but they were likewise outraged to see Bouteflika moving about in a wheelchair on election day, an additional indication of his inability to manage the nation’s affairs, according to them. In any case, the incumbent provided a medical certificate with his candidate file, in accordance with the law.

Transferred to the Val-de-Grâce Hospital in January 2014 – after a long period in the same institution in the preceding year, fuelling the wildest rumours – , Abdelaziz Bouteflika was hospitalised for several days in the French capital to “complete his medical check-up” on the eve of convening the elections. This unprecedented situation led certain protesters to demand application of Article 88 of the Constitution, regarding presidential incapacity to serve “due to serious and lasting illness.”

This incident illustrates the weakness of the regime’s opponents, since there is no autonomy of powers and the population at large remains deaf, for the time being, to appeals calling for a rupture with the system. This does not mean, however, that the government’s people exercise their hegemony without the least dissent – which has expressed itself primarily through abstention or invalid ballots (1,132,136 out of 11,600,984 voters). Despite its liberality since the uprisings in January 2011, the regime’s underpinnings ultimately remain fragile.

Diffuse Dissent and Political Reshuffling

Certain analysts have magnified the parallels between the invalid President and an outdated regime, though the supporters of the latter have more time and resources than the former. Bouteflika’s state of health – not to mention his old age, his status as veteran in the war of independence or his policy of reconciliation with armed Islamist groups – has conveniently prevented the Algerian population’s grievances from being blamed on him. The slogan “Bouteflika, get out” will not last long.

Against the diffuse, opaque nature of the Algerian system, there is a no less diffuse dissent that is above all resistant to any form of institutionalisation. The diverse protests through which the population expresses its rejection of arbitrariness, of the housing shortage, the decreasing quality of life, the fall in purchasing power, etc., are not, strictly speaking, apolitical, but remain distant from the parties weakly entrenched in the country and tactically avoid questioning the legitimacy of the ruling regime.
In the face of this cycle of protests stirring society since the civil war's intensity dropped in the early 2000s, we are witnessing a reshuffling in the political arena, apart from the two parties of the Administration, which are the National Liberation Front (FLN) — the only party from 1962 to 1989 — and the National Rally for Democracy (RND), the main backers of Bouteflika's candidacy, together with the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) — formerly the only trade union — and employers' associations.

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The Workers' Party (PT), whose candidate in the presidential elections, Louisa Hanoune, won 1.37% of votes (4.22% in 2009), in contrast to the preceding elections, was careful not to denounce electoral fraud and even spoke of a “victory.” This Trotskyist organisation now refuses to be associated with the opposition in the name of a sovereignist rhetoric that leads it to fuel propaganda based on fear, spreading rumours, for instance, in the spring of 2013 on the possibility of an American landing from a Spanish military base.

Seeking an Alternative Coalition

The Movement of Society for Peace (MSP), in contrast, has lately distanced itself from the perimeter of Algerian power. This Islamist party began distancing itself in January 2012, in the wake of the Arab Spring, believing it could ride the wave of sympathy for the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia and Egypt. The MSP thus left the Presidential Alliance coalition, of which it had been a member since 2004 together with the FLN and the RND, to found the Green Algeria Alliance for the May 2012 legislative elections, with El Islah and Ennahda.

The emergence of Abderrazak Mokri as head of the MSP in May 2013 confirms the Islamist party’s shift to the opposition and allows exchange with other political movements such as the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), an organisation considered secular, liberal and even pro-Western. Above all present in Kabylia, the RCD has long maintained its label of “pro-eradication” for its opposition to dialoguing with the armed Islamists during the civil war, in contrast to the MSP.

The RCD’s repositioning followed the failure of the National Coordination for Change and Democracy (CNCD) umbrella group, created in response to the so-called national “cooking oil and sugar” uprisings in January 2011 and calling for Bouteflika’s departure. Leading the dissent, the then-president of the RCD, Saïd Sadi – replaced by Mohsen Belabes in March 2012 – was reproached for drawing media coverage to himself to the detriment of a collective dynamic, which in any case has run up against repression and government counter-measures.

Since the national uprisings, attempts at regrouping opposition movements have been announced, materialising through press releases, demonstrations or the creation of often ephemeral coalitions such as the National Alliance for Change (ANC), founded in February 2011 by the former head of government, Ahmed Benbitour, and other organisations, particularly Islamist ones. The feature these initiatives share is the will to overcome the rifts inherited from the civil war between “eradicators” and “dialoguers.”

“Democratic Crowd Control” or Classic Repression?

The success of the meeting held in Algiers on 21 March 2014 on the initiative of the National Boycott Coordination platform constitutes another illustration of this rapprochement, since speakers include Mohsen Belabes, Ahmed Benbitour and Abderrazak Mokri. This event was tolerated by the authorities because it was held indoors, which was not the case with other protests held in the street, which were quelled by the police, above all in the capital, despite the lifting of the state of emergency in February 2011.
The opposition is thus confined to indoor meetings or certain private newspapers. The mass media, such as radio or television, have been state monopolies since independence and remain propaganda tools for the regime. A breach was made, in any case, by the appearance of private television networks in autumn 2011, such as Echorouk TV, but their reporting of the news in the electoral period was generally assimilated to the themes of the ruling regime, giving the impression of false pluralism.

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The private television station Al Atlas TV was thus suspended in March 2014 for criticising the regime on its programmes. Insofar as the Barakat! Movement, founded in the same period in opposition to Bouteflika’s fourth term, several of its protests have been the object of police intervention. The latter, headed by Major General Abdelghani Hamel, subscribe to the doctrine of “democratic crowd control,” though in practice, they are not very convincing of real change.

In fact, the violent repression of a demonstration in Tizi-Ouzou on 20 April 2014 revealed the limits of the National Security Forces’ “democratic” pretensions. A video uploaded on the internet showing police officers brutalising individuals has scandalised public opinion. The attitude of the security forces has likewise been questioned due to the recurrent confrontations between Ibadis and Sunnis in Ghardaïa. Since December 2013, the resumption of the conflict has caused the destruction of homes and shops as well as the death of numerous citizens.

The Advantages of Counter-Revolutionary Legitimacy

Despite the low intensity of the conflict that bloodied the country in the 1990s, Jihadi attacks continue against the People’s National Army (PNA, the Algerian army), in particular in Kabylia, where groups affiliated to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operate. In January 2013, AQIM dissidents, moreover, took several hundred workers hostage at the In Amenas natural gas facility. The subsequent assault by the PNA resulted in the neutralisation of the majority of AQIM assailants, who executed dozens of hostages in retaliation.

The period that began with the 11 September 2001 attacks has allowed the Algerian regime to reposition itself on the international arena on behalf of the war against terrorism and to assert its status as the key State in the region, thus creating a new advantage after that of non-alignment since independence. The rise of danger in the Sahel as well as the instability in Tunisia and Libya since the fall of Ben Ali and Gaddafi contrast with the capacity of the Algerian government to continue stable, thus reassuring its Western partners.

The recent visit to Algiers of US Secretary of State John Kerry several days before the first round of presidential elections was, in fact, essentially motivated by the struggle against terrorism. Largely dependent on its hydrocarbon resources, Algeria can still afford to figure among the 20 countries spending the most to equip themselves with arms in 2013, with a budget estimated at 10.8 billion dollars, which places it just behind the State of Israel, according to IHS Jane’s.

Largely dependent on its hydrocarbon resources, Algeria can still afford to figure among the 20 countries spending the most to equip themselves with arms in 2013.

In any case, it is first and foremost on the interior front that the Algerian regime’s resources would appear decisive to preserving its legitimacy, tarnished at least since the riots of October 1988, and ensure the loyalty of its clientele (the army, police, civil servants, veterans, guilds or brotherhoods, merchants and entrepreneurs associated with the purchase orders or loans guaranteed by
the State). The revolutionary legitimacy resulting from the struggle against French colonialism has become a counter-revolutionary legitimacy in the name of stability.

A Struggle against the Clock

The magnitude of the corruption – Algeria is among the 100 countries most affected by the phenomenon in 2013, according to Transparency International – fosters the maintenance of the status quo despite the scandals revealed by the national and international press. The businessman, Farid Bedjaoui, for instance, is the object of an international arrest warrant put out by the Italian judiciary regarding contracts signed by the oil companies Saipem – subsidiary of the Italian ENI Group – and Sonatrach – a true State within a State in Algeria. In any case, neither corruption nor repression nor the civil war or natural resources are factors that can explain in and of themselves how this authoritarian regime with totalitarian overtones continues in place. It is above all the absence of a radical alternative that would provide a rupture with the current system and its populist practices and ideas that prevents a sustainable “changeover” – sought by diverse opposition movements or by the unsuccessful candidate and former head of government, Ali Benflis – from taking place.

Whereas the Barakat! Movement – highly publicised due to the presence of journalists among its members – proposes “the establishment of a transition period” with a view to instituting a second Republic, the Platform for an Independent Labour Policy (Collectif pour une politique ouvrière indépendante) convened a rally on 1 May 2014 in Algiers – broken up by the police – in support of social demands and against “neo-liberal policies.” The Algerian situation in the medium term will depend to a large extent on the ability to make sectoral struggles converge.

For its part, shortly after Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s re-election, the government relaunched a process of consultation on revisions of the Constitution. These discussions, which will be led by former head of government Ahmed Ouyahia, will not take into account the results of preceding discussions on political reform initiated in May-June 2011. The latter had the effect of providing those in power the time to better adopt a series of repressive measures.

Bibliography


Three years after the fall of the former dictatorial Ben Ali regime on 14 January 2011 that set off the shock wave of popular uprisings of the Arab Spring, where is Tunisia now with regard to its project for democratic transition? The reply to this question is qualified. On the one hand, and in comparison to what has been happening over the course of the past three years in Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria, where the situation remains politically fragile if not altogether tragic, as in the case of Syria, Tunisia has fared rather advantageously, with perspectives that generally give cause for optimism. On the other hand, although this transition has achieved genuine gains, it remains indecisive, quite slow, at times confused and subject to being called into question, whereas the difficult economic situation is a dark cloud looming on the horizon, creating social tensions that could jeopardise the hopes placed on what Western commentators call the “Jasmine Revolution.”

**From Confrontation to Consensus**

The rise to power of the Ennahda Islamist movement on 23 October 2011 as a result of the first free and transparent elections in the country’s history made progressive democrats, whether liberal or left-wing, fear the worst. Though they were defeated in the elections, they continue to have a strong influence over civil society. The rise of religious extremism and its corollaries, terrorism and political violence, namely with the assassination of two opposition leaders – Chokri Belaïd on 6 February 2013 and Mohamed Brahmi on 25 July 2013 – as well as the threat of a return to dictatorship, this time theocratic, have likewise cast doubt on the political transition’s chances of success.

The worst has, however, been avoided, thanks to strong opposition by civil society, and in particular youth and women, to the attempts at progressive Islamisation of society. The friendly pressure of Tunisia’s international partners (the European Union and United States) has likewise helped a great deal, by pushing the “Troika,” the coalition in power dominated by Ennahda, to make concessions in order to preserve the country’s unity on the basis of a minimal consensus where conservative Islamists and progressive democrats could ultimately benefit and avoid a confrontation whose dangerous consequences they recognise.

In this regard, it must be said that the recollection of the “Dark Decade” in neighbouring Algeria (1990-2000), the spectacle of violent clashes in Syria, the takeover by the military in Egypt and the threats by armed groups in neighbouring Libya seem to have prompted the political actors towards moderation and opened them to making reciprocal concessions. The first consequence of this rapprochement: the new constitution, adopted on 26 January 2014 by an overwhelming majority (200 votes in favour, 12 against and 4 abstentions) and enacted on 10 February of the same year, was the result of a compromise negotiated between Ennahda, which had a relative majority in the Constituent Assembly, and the progressive democratic forces backed by a highly protest-spirited civil society. This document, drafted with great effort after tough negotiations, proclaims a certain number of freedoms (including freedom of expression, freedom of information and freedom of conscience), establishes a dual executive whereby the
powers of the head of government and the President of the republic are relatively balanced, does not lend a preponderant role to Islam as the Islamists wanted at the outset, and, for the first time in the legal history of the Arab world, introduces the goal of male-female parity in elected assemblies. The second consequence of this rapprochement: the National Dialogue officially launched in October 2013, under the leadership of a “Quartet” of national organisations (UGTT, UTICA, LTDH and the Bar Association), resulted in the formation, in January 2014, of a government of independent national experts presided by the technocrat, Mehdi Jomaa, a man in his fifties whose entire career had been in the private sector. This administration, which succeeded two cabinets presided by Islamist leaders (Hamadi Jebali and Ali Laarayedh), is the outcome of a common will to prevent the strong political polarisation dividing society into two diametrically opposed camps from leading to a confrontation whose consequences all parties fear.

The main mission of the new government of independent technocrats is to restore security, revitalise the economy, alleviate social unrest and establish the conditions necessary for free and transparent elections before the end of 2014.

The main mission of the new government of independent technocrats is to restore security, revitalise the economy, alleviate social unrest, particularly in disadvantaged regions, the cradle of the revolution, and above all, establish the security, political and logistic conditions necessary for free and transparent elections before the end of 2014, elections expected to bring the country out of a transitional phase lasting longer than foreseen and place it on the road towards constitutional legality. In this context, it must review the thousands of Ennahda partisans appointed to important administration and public enterprise positions (ministerial cabinet attaches, policy officers, prefects, sub-prefects, executive directors, audiovisual media directors, etc.) because they could influence the course of the elections through their respective positions and prerogatives. This requirement is, in fact, included in the “National Dialogue Roadmap” signed by all parties, including Ennahda, and on the basis of which the Mehdi Jomaa Administration was established.

Islamists, or Democracy in Retreat

One question, however, remains to be asked: how could Ennahda, which two years earlier believed it could impose its unshared domination of the political sphere, even attempting to push through a constitution of Islamist connotations, consent to engage in a National Dialogue which ended in its leaving the government and the promulgation of a consensual Fundamental Law lending particular attention to the demands of liberal and left-wing parties?

On the morrow of the 23 October 2011 elections that put the Islamists in power, a series of significant events profoundly affected the country, creating a situation of continuous tension. First there was the attack on the American embassy in Tunis on 6 September 2012 by Ennahda followers associated with Jihadi Salafists of the Ansar Al-Sharia movement, aligned with Al Qaeda, which initiated a fracture in the Islamist party between the moderate, centrist factions and the extremists, aligned with Jihadi Salafist movements, particularly since the Administration had to take action against the latter, who suddenly went from the status of Ennahda allies to daunting adversaries.

This was followed by the assassination of the radical left leader, Chokri Belaïd, on 6 February 2013 by a group of religious extremists belonging to Ansar Al-Sharia. Over a million people accompanied the deceased to his final resting place. This was the largest popular gathering in the country’s history, expressing a generalised exasperation and addressing a message of rejection to the Islamist power. Distressed by this assassination, Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali attempted to constitute a government...
of technocrats to conduct the remainder of the transition phase, but he was thwarted by his own party, Ennahda, and had to resign, giving up his position to the Minister of the Interior, Ali Laarayedh, also a former leader of the Islamist party. This did not fail to aggravate the party fracture between the moderate elements rallying around their leader Rashid Ghannushi, and the extremists, who reproach Ennahda, among other things for having succumbed to the pressure of the opposition and of civil society and given up the project to clearly set down in the constitution that Sharia would be the main source of legislation.

There was another determining factor in changing the Islamists’ attitude: the economic crisis, which fuelled social movements throughout the country, rendering the government’s task more difficult, since part of its members, coming out of prison and/or exile, had no experience in the sphere of public administration. Learning the trade proved difficult and the results were rather negative, if not wholly catastrophic. Ennahda then realised that it could no longer monopolise power without running the risk of leading the country to an economic catastrophe and paying the consequences, whether through a protest vote in the next elections or a new popular revolt. It thus began to reach out to the opposition to attempt to smooth out differences, set the political calendar and accelerate the establishment of conditions for transparent elections in a spirit of national consensus.

The National Dialogue, launched over the course of May 2013 with the participation of the political parties and the main national organisations (employers’ associations, trade unions, human rights organisations, bar association, etc.), was soon, however, treading water, namely due to the intransigence of Ennahda’s radical wing. The latter, highly active in the Constituent Assembly and the media, did not accept the Islamist party’s making any further concessions. It opposed “electoral legitimacy” to the “consensual legitimacy” invoked by the opposition as the only means to make the democratic transition advance.

It was then that two incidents occurred that spelled the last straw for popular discontent: the assassination of opposition leader Mohamed Brahmi on 25 July 2013, when the country was celebrating Republic Day, and the massacre of eight soldiers at Mount Chaambi four days later by a terrorist group entrenched in this mountainous area on the Tunisian-Algerian border.

A majority of Tunisians could no longer abide the government’s laxness in matters of security and its incompetence in the economic sphere, and demanded it step down

The first consequences of this earthquake: some 60 opposition members left the Assembly to protest against the government’s laxness in the face of terrorism. In the aftermath, the Assembly’s work was suspended during nearly two months by the President of the Constituent Assembly, Mustapha Ben Jaâfar, who hoped to thus absorb the shock caused by the second political assassination in the country in less than six months. Numerous protest marches organised by opposition parties and national organisations (27 July, 6 August, 13 August, 6 September, 23 October...) as part of the “Erhal” (Leave!) campaign, rallied tens of thousands of male and above all female citizens at each protest, thus demonstrating, as if it weren’t obvious enough, that a majority of Tunisians could no longer abide the government’s laxness in matters of security and its incompetence in the economic sphere, and demanding it step down. This majority, moreover, was already beginning to stand out in opinion polls, which showed voting intentions shifting towards the opposition. The latter, at this point united under the National Salvation Front (Front de salut national, FSN), found precious support in the four main national organisations rallying to its positions: the UGTT, UTICA, the LTDH
and the Bar Association, as well as many civil society figures and associations.

The FSN rightly estimated that the Ali Laarayedh Administration, incompetent and above all partisan, could not continue to lead the country, much less oversee the organisation of elections. It even went as far as to call for the dissolution, pure and simple, of the political system emerging from the 23 October 2011 elections (Constituent Assembly, provisional government and provisional presidencies) and the formation of a national salvation government comprised of independent experts that would commit not to run in the next elections.

It is thus under the effect of this strong pressure, both popular and political, that Ennahda consented to engage, at first reluctantly, then eagerly and with conviction, in the National Dialogue and sign the Roadmap, thus sealing its “departure from the government but not from power,” according to its leader, Rashid al-Ghannushi. The latter surely meant to express that the Islamists, who predominate in the Assembly, retain the power of control over the Mehdi Jomaa Administration, which they can topple at any time by a simple vote of no confidence. This is a simplistic hypothesis, for it is unlikely that Ennahda dare to go over to the opposition, knowing that it can take credit for the dividends of an eventual end to the crisis and thus retain its chances of a return to government in the coming elections.

The Narrow Margin of the Jomaa Administration

The Jomaa administration, whose constitution in late January 2014 was welcomed with great relief by both Tunisians and the country’s foreign partners, namely the Europeans and Americans, enjoys a favourable disposition towards it for the time being.

Apart from their independence vis-à-vis political parties (which constitutes both their strength and their weakness), its members can be distinguished by their youth, competence and mastery of their respective fields. Their profiles likewise break with those of their predecessors, who were more politicians than administrators. For the time being, no party has ventured to call their credibility into question or criticise their decisions.

In any case, the task of the new administration promises to be even more difficult, given that the general situation in Tunisia has deteriorated greatly over the course of the past three years. Let’s take stock: the unemployment rate remains very high (approximately 17%, with peaks of 40% in some regions in the West and South), inflation has peaked at nearly 7%, the budget deficit surpasses 6%, the dinar (the national currency) is plummeting against the euro, widening trade and balance of payment deficits, while the level of foreign debt is dangerously close to 50% of the GDP. Moreover, the downgrading of the country’s sovereign rating on 3 or 4 occasions in less than two years renders any outlet on the international financial markets hypothetical and does not encourage investors, national or foreign, to launch new projects.

Moreover, and for a country whose economy depends up to 70-80% on foreign trade with the European Union (tourism, exports of goods and services, FDI, remittances from expatriate workers, etc.), the current crisis in Europe and above all France (Tunisia’s premier supplier, premiere client and premiere foreign investor, etc.) dangerously complicates the situation.

The preceding administration had a hard time mobilising the resources necessary to balance the State budget for the 2013 fiscal year due to the low revenue as a result of the economic downturn. It also had a hard time balancing the budget for 2014, mainly because it had lost the confidence of the traditional lending agencies (World Bank, IMF, European Union...), which suspended their financial aid, justifying their decision by the country’s absence of political visibility.

The current administration, which has inherited such a severely compromised situation, knows that its room for manoeuvring is narrow. Though it has managed to regain the confidence of international funding agencies, it knows it needs to make painful trade-offs to allocate the scarce financial resources available.
The other problem facing the Jomaa administration concerns subsidising commodities and hydrocarbons. It now represents nearly 3% of the GDP, that is, over half of the budgetary deficit, estimated at 7.4%

for manoeuvring is narrow. Though it has managed, since taking office, to regain the confidence of international funding agencies, which have been quick to lend their support, it knows it needs to make painful trade-offs to allocate the scarce financial resources available so as to obtain rapid results without jeopardising the initiation of reforms (banking system, taxation, award of public contracts, investment law, etc.) demanded by these same international funding agencies and whose effects will only be felt in the medium and long terms.

The other problem facing the Jomaa administration concerns subsidising commodities and hydrocarbons (electricity, natural gas, oil), which have increased by 30% from 2010 to 2013, dangerously encumbering the national budget. It now represents nearly 3% of the GDP, that is, over half of the budgetary deficit, estimated at 7.4%. Energy product subsidies alone represent 60% of the Compensation Fund budget. However, they do not benefit only the underprivileged, whose share is only 11% of the total, but also and above all the middle and upper-class sectors and economic operators, including certain energy-intensive industries.

Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa, the former minister of industry, is aware of these inconsistencies, which cost the taxpayers dearly. In his speech in late January before the Assembly, he thus insisted on “bringing the system for subsidising certain products under control” as one of the priorities of his administration. He will undoubtedly endeavour to reduce fuel subsidies by using the system of targeted subsidies recommended by the World Bank, that is, granting 11% of the subsidy amounts in the form of direct aid to the underprivileged population.

This decision will not be to the liking of industrialists, who consider the relatively low cost of energy a competitive factor. The central employer’s association (UTICA) has already expressed its strong opposition. The fact remains, however, that the government has no other choice, particularly since the loans disbursed by the IMF, World Bank and EU cannot be used to palliate the growing deficit of the Compensation Fund or the national budget, but rather to stimulate investment, create employment and boost the economic machine.
The Dangerous Impasses of the Libyan Transition

By contributing its support to the “ideal scenario” on 4 February 2014, i.e. international intervention in southern Libya, an intervention suggested by the French Armed Forces Chief of Staff on 27 January 2014, Niger, via its Minister of the Interior, summed up the concern of part of the international community regarding the evolution of Libya’s internal situation and its repercussions on the ensemble of the Sahel-Maghreb area. These statements echo those made by Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan on 10 November 2013, regarding the threat of foreign intervention if the trouble persisted in the country. Although such an incident, with the country still under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, has been avoided for the time being, Libya remains the focus of concern among the international community, as demonstrated by the Ministerial Conference regarding international support to Libya held in Rome on 6 March 2014. By insisting on the need for Libyan national dialogue, the struggle against arms trafficking, the reestablishment of security, the pursuit of the transition process and the revitalisation of the hydrocarbon industry, the Conference emphasised the difficulties faced by the new regime. Although the current Libyan instability traces its roots back to the heritage of the former regime and the conditions of its overthrow, its dynamics also lie in the configuration of the power relations established since 2011.

The End of the Second Transition

The ousting of Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan on 11 March 2014 by the General National Congress (GNC, the Libyan Parliament), closed the sequence that began with the legislative elections of 7 July 2012, the first free elections since 1969, which culminated the first transition begun by the National Transitional Council (NTC), the “mirror” of the Revolution of 17 February 2011. With a voter turnout of 60% of registered voters, the election of the GNC president Mohamed Yusuf al-Magariaf on 9 July 2012, the transfer of power from the NTC to the GNC on 8 August 2012 and the election of Ali Zeidan as Prime Minister on 14 October of the same year (after that of Mustafa Abushagur, elected on 12 September but who only remained in office for a month), the commitments contained in the Constitutional Declaration of 3 August 2011 were partially met. In any case, despite this success, the results of the election of the 200 GNC members themselves constituted a paradox that would contribute to political instability, the two poles of power – the GNC and the government – disputing their pre-eminence for leading the country. Indeed, in contrast to Tunisia and Egypt, the Justice and Construction Party (JCP), which arose from the Muslim Brotherhood, only took second place, with 17 out of the 80 seats reserved for members elected via a proportional representation system, behind the National Forces Alliance (NFA, 39 seats) led by Mahmoud Jibril, former chairman of the NTC Executive Committee and interim Prime Minister, the remainder of seats being distributed among a number of parties. Moreover, insofar as the 120 elected “independent members,” although it is somewhat difficult to determine their orientations
and allegiances, their support for various JCP initiatives would place them a posteriori within the Islamist movement, rendering the NFA’s victory even more relative. The enactment of the law on political exclusion on 5 May 2013, the resignation of GNC president Mohamed Yusuf al-Magariaf on 29 May 2013, his replacement by Nuri Abu Sahmein on 25 June 2013 and the ousting of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan on 11 March 2014 also bear the mark of the Islamist movement and attest to the fragility of the political balance in the GNC. This fragility is likewise accentuated by the grey area surrounding the scope of the executive and legislative powers. The GNC, which is led by an elected president, also elects the Prime Minister from among its members. The diarchy at the Head of State has certain practical consequences, as illustrated by the fact that the Chief of Staff of the Libyan Armed Forces does not report to the ministry in question, namely, that of defence, but rather to the GNC. This conflict of powers has fostered tensions between the Prime Minister and the president of the GNC, as illustrated by the abduction of Prime Minister Zeidan for several hours on 10 October 2013 by the Libyan Revolutionary Operations Chamber, a militia entrusted by the GNC with ensuring security in the capital city and whose head was appointed by the president of the GNC. Nonetheless, despite the apparent victory of Zeidan’s removal from office, the GNC’s previous decision to extend his term, originally slated to end on 7 February 2014, to December 2014 in order to allow legislative and/or presidential elections to be organised in case the constitutional process was not completed by summer 2014 sparked a number of protests against the GNC, held responsible, together with the interim government and the militias, for the difficulties of the population and the general instability and insecurity. This situation is a matter of particular concern for Libya, since participation and the number of voters registered for the Constitutional Assembly elections has decreased since the 2012 elections, revealing a certain disillusionment among the population. Only 45% of the 1.1 million registered voters turned out and 13 of the 60 seats could not be filled in the 20 February 2014 due to violence – primarily in the east, as, for instance, Derna – and the Amazigh boycott of the elections. After a failed attempt, probably new elections were to be held on 27 February in the areas where they could not be held earlier.

The Challenge of the Militias

The political impasse in which Libya seems to be plunged is not only due to the confrontation between two legitimate powers – the executive and the legislative. It is also fostered by other actors availing themselves of a legitimacy arising from the 2011 uprisings: the revolutionary militias; militias that likewise take advantage of the weakness of the State and in particular its armed forces, which consist of the regular army and the police forces. Competing with the State by supplanting it in the security sphere, the militias have become institutionalised and have become a permanent feature of the Libyan political arena. Whereas the interim government is attempting to rebuild a national army and police force by sending its personnel to train abroad, it is also attempting to take advantage of the population’s exasperation with the militias. After confrontations between the population and certain militia groups on 15 November 2013 in Tripoli and Benghazi, the authorities deployed the regular armed forces to restore order. The same occurred in operations against militia groups in eastern Libya, particularly Islamist ones such as Ansar al-Sharia. At the same time, the Libyan government is attempting to redefine its relations with certain independently-operating armed groups. The fact that the militias have become entwined within the emerging State apparatus, as well as their proximity to and/or exploitation by political actors, makes stopping them difficult. Estimated at several hundred, Libyan militia groups reflect different specific situations. They can thus be declared illegal or affiliated with the State as auxiliary or reserve forces, as is the case with the aforementioned Libyan Revolutionary Operations Chamber, of the Libya Shield, a national network of militia groups essentially emerging in the western and central areas of Libya and sponsored by the Ministry of Defence, or the Petroleum Facilities Guard, a sort of oil police in charge of protecting oil facilities and operating under the aegis of the Ministry of Petroleum. These militias or armed groups are thus officially under the authority of the State, but they regularly dispense with it, intervening in the political sphere, as was the case when the law on political exclusion was passed, clashing with regular army units on various occasions or openly defying the interim regime. The Libyan State’s authority is likewise contested or
seriously threatened by powerful militia groupings such as the Zintan Revolutionaries’ Military Council or the Misrata Union of Revolutionaries. Of varied importance, with diverse motivations and ideologies, the militias underscore the central government’s weakness, a constant in Libyan history since 1951, and are, to a certain extent, indicative of structural variables such as localism, weak relations with the central government and the demand for greater devolution of power.

**Federalism, Militias and Oil**

By declaring war on 19 March 2014 against the terrorism particularly active in the eastern and central parts of the country and appealing to the international community and the United Nations for aid in “eradicating” this scourge, the new Prime Minister, al-Thinni (likewise in charge of defence) reacted to the upsurge in attacks against the security forces, but also against the cocktail so dangerous to the country’s stability, consisting of the combination of federalist demands, the militia phenomenon and the oil issue.

In a situation of political deadlock, where all parties have the power to cause harm but none can prevail, the power struggle approaches zero-sum. Nonetheless, the combination of the stated three challenges in this political environment poses a threat to Libya’s unity. Indeed, whereas federalist ambitions have been growing since 2011 in Cyrenaica, which is home to nearly 80% of the country’s oil production and the bulk of its water reserves, the head of the Petroleum Facilities Guard militia, Ibrahim Jadhran, has engaged in a wrestling match with the interim authorities in Tripoli beginning in July 2013, accusing the latter of corruption and misappropriation of oil revenues. Despite the adoption of symbolic and material measures – such as the decentralisation of State services or the transfer of company headquarters, essentially oil companies, to Benghazi –, the creation of a Cyrenaica government, an oil and gas company and a bank in October and November 2013 by the federalists – whom Jadhran and his followers support, their militias blockading oil terminals and oil sites since July 2013 – represents a new level in the general disintegration. The drop in oil production deprives the Libyan State of a significant part of its revenue, with production plummeting from nearly 1.6 million barrels/day in 2012 to less than 400,000 by the end of 2013 and the economy shrinking by 5% in 2013. Although the federalist attempt to illegally export Libyan oil on 17 March 2014 failed thanks to the American navy, which managed to board the oil tanker in international waters, it nonetheless underscores, if not the impossibility, at least the difficulty of launching a national dialogue.

**Conclusion**

In a fragmented Libya with a weak State, internal instability raises the risk of regional destabilisation, underway since 2011. The weakness of the Libyan army and the country’s extensive borders render the latter porous. The proliferation of weapons from Libya, considered a veritable open-air arms depot, and the circulation of all sorts of groups, particularly Jihadi groups entering from Mali after Operation Serval, in a southern Libya likewise faced with the outbreak of inter-tribal conflict with multiple causes underscores the urgent need for international assistance, repeatedly expressed by the country’s authorities, not only in the sphere of security and arms collection, but also to institute a genuine process of national dialogue among all parties without exception, which would resolve the security issue underlying the matter of state-building.

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Egypt: An Overview

Geography and Population

Egypt covers an area of one million square kilometres, most of which is desert, and is traversed by the Nile River. Although it has borders with Libya, Sudan, Israel and Gaza, the desert makes it a country that is difficult to invade, with any successful attempts having come from the east. It has a kind of insular mentality. It has a large population of 94 million, including between 8 and 10 million living abroad. Most of the population in Egypt are concentrated in the tiny Nile valley and live in 7% of the territory. The population is homogeneous, with significant exceptions at the periphery: Nubians in the South, Berbers in the East, and Bedouins in Sinai. The latter’s troubled relations with the centre are a major issue. Around 6% of the population is Christian.

The country is strategically crucial: it is the only nation state of the area and has the most powerful army of the Arab world, which nevertheless remained hugely dependent on tourism and on expatriate remittances and more generally on relatively volatile revenues; in achieving, in its last years, respectable rates of growth; in launching a major privatisation programme; in managing inflation; and in consolidating the State’s finances and foreign reserves. However it did little to solve Egypt’s structural problems: a huge and bloated bureaucracy, an awkward set of subsidies, an inability to collect taxes and low productivity. Social inequalities increased and human development stalled during the last years.

The revolution and ensuing political turmoil seriously weakened the economy. Growth was, and still is, weak with a high fiscal deficit and gross public debt (domestic and external) rising to nearly 100% of

The Economic Challenge

Egypt’s problems are easy to point out and difficult to resolve: for the next two decades at least, it will need to create at least one million jobs per year, if it wants to absorb the new arrivals on the labour market and remain afloat. This is why Egypt’s savings are far from being enough, and why it desperately needs foreign investors. These, however, will not come unless the State’s finances are sound, which, in turn, will not be the case if the tourism industry does not recover, and if no solution to the subsidies (9% of GNP) problem is found – the subsidies for energy cost more than the Health and the Education budgets put together.

The Mubarak regime’s economic record was mixed: it succeeded in diversifying the Egyptian economy, which nevertheless remained hugely dependent on tourism and on expatriate remittances and more generally on relatively volatile revenues; in achieving, in its last years, respectable rates of growth; in launching a major privatisation programme; in managing inflation; and in consolidating the State’s finances and foreign reserves. However it did little to solve Egypt’s structural problems: a huge and bloated bureaucracy, an awkward set of subsidies, an inability to collect taxes and low productivity. Social inequalities increased and human development stalled during the last years.

The revolution and ensuing political turmoil seriously weakened the economy. Growth was, and still is, weak with a high fiscal deficit and gross public debt (domestic and external) rising to nearly 100% of
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GDP at the end of June 2013. Low growth rates posed the danger of fuelling social frustration as they could not deliver the numbers of jobs and opportunities needed. Unemployment reached over 13% in June 2013. Critically, more than three-quarters of the unemployed are between 15 and 29 years of age. Tourism collapsed and foreign reserves shrunk, despite a huge increase in expatriate remittances.

Fortunately, the Gulf states, which consider the Muslim Brotherhood to be an existential threat, provided the new regime with enormous support. They have already pledged a large amount of exceptional financial assistance for Egypt's transitional period. In mid-2013, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait pledged an aid package totalling around US$17 billion to support Egypt. This included cash grants of US$5 billion, in-kind grants of US$4 billion, interest-free deposits with the Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) of US$5 billion, and project financing of around US$3 billion. They are also said to be willing to fund important and huge social programmes against poverty, to deprive the Brotherhood of its support base in poor neighbourhoods. It remains to be seen if this help will last if nothing is done to tackle the structural problems that are stifling the economy.

Political Life: the Revolution, Transition and Morsi Presidency

A revolution occurred in Egypt that toppled the Mubarak regime in February 2011. Young and not so young activists from right across the political spectrum were involved. The Muslim Brothers, the only organised opposition political force, actively participated, while negotiating with several sectors of the ruling elite. The army, uneasy with the regime’s evolution, tried to calm things down, but on seeing that Mubarak was not willing to make the necessary concessions, and that his counterattack had failed miserably, demanded his resignation.

The military oversaw and mismanaged a tumultuous 18-month transition, based on a roadmap that organised legislative (November 2011/January 2012) and presidential elections (May/June 2012) before the drafting of a new constitution. Most of the time, the army worked with the Brotherhood, in an uneasy cooperation, to counter the young revolutionaries, who wanted radical reforms and trials for the former regime’s staff. It also used carrots and sticks to try to placate the social movements while avoiding any significant reform of the state apparatus. The controversial situation that arose from the process was the Muslim Brothers’ rise to power, for the first time in Egypt’s history, and the withdrawal of the army.

The Morsi presidency was a disaster. The set of measures undertaken by the Brotherhood looked like the implementation of a totalitarian plan, as it relentlessly tried to destroy the rule of law and judiciary. It opted for a set of alliances (with some Salafists, jihadists, and old regime members) antagonising public opinion, including those who voted for them and used militias to attack peaceful demonstrators, threaten judges, journalists, media and civil society, etc. It imposed a constitution with a set of controversial and worrying clauses and seemed to scorn Egypt’s nationalistic feelings by showing itself willing to toy with Egypt’s frontiers in Sinai and Sudan, to the benefit of its Islamist allies. Its regional policies set Egypt on a collision course with the Gulf monarchies, which were key allies and employers of Egyptian workers. Its internal policies led to increased polarisation. Its repeated attempts to weaken the military and create parallel institutions antagonised the army and the bureaucracy. Their way of doing things was seen by many actors as overt aggression, threatening the State, society, identity, and public and private liberties. They lost the crucial support of both the Salafists and the army.

At the end of April 2013, young Nasserists started a campaign to collect signatures calling for early presidential elections and for the organisation of a day (June 30th) of massive protest against the Muslim Brothers’ rule. This was hugely successful and they soon claimed to have collected more than 20 million signatures – from disgruntled Morsi electors, old regime supporters, Nasserist sympathisers and apoliti-
cal citizens fearing the Brotherhood, etc. The leadership of this campaign, which became the Tamarod movement, worked closely with non-Islamist political forces, security organisms and the army, to form a vast coalition. The Brotherhood’s leadership was oblivious to the threat and was unwilling to offer even minor concessions. The June 30 demonstrations were an impressive success, and allowed the army to topple President Morsi, on “behalf of the Egyptian people.” It soon jailed much of the Brotherhood leadership, including President Morsi, the Brotherhood’s Supreme Guide Badie, and its top strongman Khairat al-Shatir.

The New Regime

The new regime began with widespread popular support. It proposed a roadmap, based on radical modifications of the constitution (in effect, a new one was written), submitted to popular approval, and on the organisation of new presidential and legislative elections. The new constitution was drafted. In a referendum, it obtained more than 20 million “yes” votes (nearly twice more than the Brothers’ constitution). It is now set to organise presidential elections, with Field Marshal Abdel Fattah el-Sisi looking like the most likely winner. As President, he could probably count on massive financial support from the Gulf. But the regime mismanaged the Muslim Brothers’ expected reaction. The latter’s leadership was in no mood to compromise – for them, the rational strategy was to opt for the worst, to prevent the regime from capitalising on the Gulf and Egypt’s positive public opinion. They played a complicated hand, combining the organisation of a massive and long sit-in, lasting more than 40 days, peaceful and violent demonstrations, and terrorist attacks by their armed branch and jihadist allies. On August 14, the police dispersed the main sit-in, killing hundreds of Morsi’s supporters, most of them peaceful. It seems that the Muslim Brothers were the first to open fire, but this is no excuse for such a violent police reaction. For a long while, this state crime was very costly for the new coalition in terms of popular support, but the trend was reverted once again when terrorist attacks in the Nile Valley gained in strength.

Security

Egypt can be described as being the stage for two asymmetrical wars: one between the police and terrorist organisations in the Nile Valley, and the other between the Army and terrorists in Sinai. In Sinai alone, there are at least 7,000 jihadists, and probably many more. The police seem to be winning in the Valley, despite some serious setbacks. In Sinai, the situation is less clear and things are not going well, despite certain gains in certain areas. The main problem for the regime is that it cannot afford to lose either of the battles. The terrorists’ strategy seems to be to: a) target the conscripts, hoping for mass desertions that would decisively weaken both the police and the army (in Egypt the police as well as the army rely on massive conscription) b) exact revenge by killing key police officers. Until now, the first objective seems to have been out of reach.

This is not the only security issue: Egypt has major issues regarding “human security”: crime is growing, reaching unusual heights for the country (which remains relatively safe compared to others in the area), poverty is rapidly spreading, millions of weapons are in non-state actors’ hands (and not necessarily the hands of criminals or terrorists). Water security is another major concern: Egypt is looking on at Ethiopia’s Nile projects with great anxiety, concerned that they will seriously endanger its share of the water. Security is now the major issue for state actors and public opinion. Its deterioration has created a strong “demand” for a powerful and strong state and has led Egyptian public opinion to (temporarily, most probably) “forget” its democratic demands.
The political management of Jordan’s Arab Spring was marked, on the internal level, by the triggering of crisis “fuses” consisting of six changes of government in three years (2011-2014), that is, as many as in the first twelve years of King Abdullah II’s reign (1999-2011). In contrast, keeping the Jordanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nasser Judeh, in his post since February 2009, a minister who has thus held office under the successive administrations of six Prime Ministers (Nader al-Dahabi before the Arab Spring, Samir al-Rifai during it, and since then, Maaruf al-Bakhit, Awn al-Khasawneh, Fayez al-Tarawneh and Abdullah Ensour I and II) is probably meant, in this period of strong turbulence on the regional level, to reassure Jordan’s key allies – the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia – that its foreign policy will remain unchanged (EIU, 2011, p. 12).

Jordan, Regional “Shock Absorber”

For the United States, Jordan’s commitment to peace in the region has long constituted a useful function in the international system, a guarantor of its national security: a peace that was embodied, in the wake of the 1993 Oslo Israeli-Palestinian Accords, by the treaty concluded with Israel in 1994 and whose maintenance constitutes a guarantee of security for Amman, Tel-Aviv and their American ally. “Shock Absorber” is how Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf, former Prime Minister (1979-1980), qualified the function carried out by Jordan in the Israeli-Arab conflict at the time. Following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, Jordan took in hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees who acquired Jordanian nationality within the framework of the Unification of the Two Banks of the Jordan, proclaimed in 1950 and in effect until 1988, when Jordan disengaged from the West Bank (occupied by Israel following the 1967 Six-Day War). Its buffer state function was undeniable following the armed intervention of the US-led coalition in 2003 leading to the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime: the number of Iraqi refugees in Jordan is estimated at some 500,000 people (who are not necessarily registered nor have official status with the UN High Commission for Refugees – UNHCR). There are similar consequences of the conflict raging in Syria since the spring of 2011, the number of refugees in Jordan (idem in terms of their HCR status) estimated, three years later, at nearly 600,000 people (equivalent to approximately 10% of the country’s population).

Dependence on Foreign Financial Aid

This influx of Syrian refugees weighs heavily on Jordan’s resources and has increased the demand for foreign financial aid, on which it depends greatly – recalling the pertinence of Laurie Brand’s work (1994, p. 26) regarding the links, in this semi-rentier State, between foreign politics and budgetary security, understood, as she states, in terms of the reproduction of the conditions necessary for the leading coalition to continue paying the bills, pre-emptively anticipate the development of the opposition or cultivate sufficient

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internal support to enable coercive power against such groups. Which means, in a budget situation subject to strong constraints insofar as both revenue and expenditure, that the State needs to procure foreign aid—a problem more broadly related to the regime’s political economics.

**Economic Liberalisation and the Regime’s Political Economy**

In this regard, the Arab Spring in Jordan was marked by dissent among the regime’s traditionally loyal bastions, comprised of the country’s “native” population, i.e. the “Transjordanian” population, that is, those originally from the East Bank or Transjordan. While explicitly echoing the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, the Jordanian Spring, far from appearing out of nowhere, emerged in the wake of a dozen years of political and economic reform (or attempted reform) put forth by King Abdullah II as of his accession to the throne in 1999 (Muasher, 2011).

While explicitly echoing the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, the Jordanian Spring, far from appearing out of nowhere, emerged in the wake of a dozen years of reform

The neo-liberal economic reforms have particularly affected the Transjordanian sector of society, traditionally receiving redistributive public benefits in a neo-patrimonial, clientelist economy. Insofar as Jordanians of Palestinian origin (Palestinian Jordanians), who fell back on the more lucrative private sector and who are thus less dependent on the redistribution of government revenue, they have been less severely hit by the economic liberalisation (including privatisations), even tending to benefit therefrom; in any case, this is what their Transjordanian compatriots perceive. The Jordanian crisis, however, cannot be reduced to simply the rift between Transjordanians and Palestinian Jordanians; it is likewise internal to the Transjordanian sector, marked by a clientelist redistribution crisis between the elite and the general population, inadequate or unsatisfactory because it is poorly distributed in terms of repercussions for the latter and decried as “corruption” (Ryan, 2010; Vogt, 2011).

**Political Liberalisation? What Is It that “the People Want”**?

On the political level, the reforms implemented by the King have remained essentially cosmetic. The Jordanian political establishment does not consider them particularly in their interest, whether it be the strictly Transjordanian sector driven by rentier conservatism or “liberals,” associated, erroneously or not, with the Palestinian Jordanian elite, who would have preferred the continuation of an authoritative form of government, believing it would allow liberal economic reforms to be undertaken more quickly, in particular privatisations.

In terms of reform, what exactly is it that “the people want,” to take the currently famous protest slogan (al-sha’b yurîd ...) used in different countries during the Arab Spring? “It wants” change, but at times in completely opposing directions (Ryan, 2011; Susser, 2011). Among the Transjordanian sector, for instance, there are two main trends. On the one hand, there is a protest movement comprised primarily of young activists new to the political arena who consider that, whereas the economic liberalisation programme has gone too far insofar as privatisations, political liberalisation has not progressed at all. On the other hand, there is a conservative, Transjordanian nationalist protest movement that, while sharing certain of the pro-reform movement’s socio-economic grievances, wishes at the same time to retain its traditional privileges and maintain the underlying clientelist structures. On the political level, they fear domination by the Palestinian Jordanian sector.

The interests of the Palestinian Jordanian sector are defended by the Islamist opposition, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) the political wing of the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The leading political force among the traditional opposition, it does not seek a regime change but rather an in-depth reform with a view to its greater inclusion via a rebalancing of political forces. The electoral law benefits and over-represents the conservative, clientelist Transjordanian vote loyal to the regime, to the detriment of a more “political,” dissenting (Islamist) vote
LEBANON WITH NO PRESIDENT AND TWO MILLION SYRIAN REFUGEES

Since 25 May, Lebanon has been without a President. With the two parliamentary blocs – ‘March 14’ and ‘March 8’ – unable to reach an agreement, there could be no quorum for electing a successor to the outgoing President Michel Suleiman. It is not the first time that this small Middle Eastern republic has experienced a presidential vacuum. In 2007, the assembly deputies were unwilling to accept a compromise candidate to succeed the former Head of State, General Emile Lahoud. An international conference in Doha eventually led to the commander-in-chief being voted in as a last resort, despite constitutional impediments. Once again, an international decision, taken mainly from Saudi Arabia and Iran, will be needed to help the country’s feuding factions – Sunnis and Shites, and their divided Maronite Christian allies – to choose a new Head of State for the republic. Another general, the commander-in-chief or even General Aoun may be elected to the post. The latter, a prominent Maronite politician, has been tireless in his aspirations for the presidency, which, according to an unwritten ‘national pact,’ is always assumed by a member of this highly influential and ancient Christian community. It is not easy to draw a clear picture of a country like Lebanon, thanks to its great variety of lifestyles, distinctive nature and the intricate way in which foreign powers interfere in its affairs. For over half a century, its territory has served as an arena for the conflicts of the Middle East, and now, in particular, the ferocious war being waged in Syria.

“The problem with Lebanon – as one of its deputies clearly stated – is that it is not a democracy, but rather an oligarchy governed by a handful of local leaders that serve the interests of the regional powers, who are responsible for the country’s fate.” According to the Constitution, it is the Council of Ministers, under the authority of the Prime Minister, which provisionally adopts the responsibilities of the Head of State, although it is hard to tell what its prerogatives are, for example, when it comes to signing decrees. Do all ministers have to sign or just the head of government for pressing issues of major importance? Lebanon is like a chicken with its head cut off, running about like a madman with no idea where he is going. There is no quelling the vitality of its people, however, who are once again absorbed by the World Cup and are only too used to the anomalies of its political elite, which monopolises the command of its 18 faith communities. In Beirut, the summer has begun without the desperately needed wealthy tourists from the Gulf, and with two million Syrian refugees continuing to share the people’s daily lives. The situation is eating at the country’s fragile politics and economy, not to mention its effect on the already scarce water supply. Offering refuge to its neighbours was an unavoidable, monumental error. Not doing so, on the other hand, would have been a dreadful crime.

Tomás Alcoverro
La Vanguardia

Reform of the Electoral Law (2012)

Beyond the political response embodied by the rapid succession of premiers, the King attempted to provide an institutional response by setting up a National Dialogue Committee and a Royal Committee to revise the Constitution. Contrary to the successive administrations of Prime Ministers Marouf al-Bakhit and Awn al-Khasawneh, that of Fayez al-Tarawneh succeeded in reforming the electoral law in July 2012. The electoral system was modified, going from a single, non-transferable vote to a mixed single-vote and party-list proportional representation system, giving each voter one vote based on electoral districts and another based on national party lists. But opposition parties consider these amendments insufficient because on the whole, the system of tribal, clientelist voting loyal to the regime is maintained. The King seems to have shot his bolt with Jordan’s 16th parliamentary legislature: in October 2012, he dissolved Parliament and entrusted Abdullah Ensour to form a new government with a view to holding early legislative elections in January 2013.

The January 2013 Legislative Elections

The results of the January 2013 legislative elections, despite the IAF’s boycott, reveals the impact – however limited – of the changes in the electoral law: the number of Palestinian-Jordanian and opposition representatives rose slightly – partially the result of the greater weight granted by the new election system to the party vote based on national party lists. Since December 2012, King Abdullah II has published various discussion papers on his vision for democratic reforms. It was in his second paper, published in January 2013, that he presented the new system for designating the Prime Minister, which would henceforth be done by him in consultation with Parliament. It is in this new framework that Abdullah Ensour was reappointed Prime Minister, heading the new government emerging from the elections after a narrowly-passed motion of confidence in April 2013 before it experienced a cabinet reshuffle four months later.
Israel – Jordan – Palestine

In July 2013, the United States relaunched Israeli-Palestinian mediation with a view to negotiating a final status. Results are slated for within nine months, a timeline to which King Abdullah II has undertaken to hold, reiterating his support for a peace solution based on two States, the independent Palestinian State wishing, according to the terms dear to the Jordanian leadership, to be built on “national Palestinian territory,” recalling the firm rejection of any solutions to the conflict between Israel and Palestine where Jordan, as the Jordanian State, would bear the brunt, while a sector of the Israeli political spectrum toys with the prospect of making the latter the “substitute homeland” of the Palestinian people. The absence of a final resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has long been hampering progress on the Red Sea – Dead Sea Canal, designed to stem the latter’s evaporation and assuage the water stress from which the region suffers. The situation seemed to start moving forward again upon Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority’s conclusion of a regional accord in December 2013. But relations between Jordan and Israel have been tense since Israeli soldiers shot the Jordanian judge, Raed Zuaiter, at the King Hussein (or Allenby) Bridge border crossing in March 2014. The incident fuelled the generalised climate of “anti-normalisation” of relations with Israel and led to calls for the repeal of the unpopular peace treaty. Finally, in this delicate context of Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, the Jordanian Members of Parliament did not implement their threat of submitting a motion of no-confidence to Parliament if the administration did not take tangible measures against Israel.

Conclusion: A Resilient Regime “Useful” on the Regional/International Level, but Greatly Shaken on the Home Front

The role of regional shock absorber played by Jordan by taking in hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees has been further asserted since the spring of 2013, when the American armed forces were allowed in to defend its border with Syria – confirmation of the useful function carried out by the regime, in particular in the eyes of its American ally. Despite the unprecedented crossing of certain red lines during anti-government protests (in particular the November 2012 riots) demonstrating that the Transjordanian tribes’ traditional allegiance to the State’s Hashemite leadership is not unconditional, no political force of any weight has demanded a change of regime. This means there is strong underlying resistance to change, which can only prolong an unstable balance between a pro-reform opposition and disgruntled conservatives reluctant to accept reforms liable to undermine their traditional privileges.

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Israel: Domestic Politics and the Israel-Palestine Arena

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During the years 2012-2014, Israel has experienced a period of relative stability, especially as compared to its immediate neighbours (Egypt, Syria and Lebanon), all of which have been impacted by the effects of the “Arab Spring,” pseudo-democratisation processes influenced by grassroots religious fundamentalist groups, and the resultant civil wars (Syria) or military takeovers (Egypt) of their respective countries. The economy continues to grow, and domestic politics is relatively stable and not about to undergo any short-term change, despite policies aimed at undermining both orthodox Jewish and Arab groups. On the peace front, and despite the intensive efforts of the United States administration, there has been little progress and the latest round of talks is in imminent danger of collapse.

Domestic Politics

Despite the traditional complexity of Israel’s coalition governments, composed of many medium-sized parties, each of which has its own specific religious or political interests, Israel’s current right-wing government has proved to be remarkably stable under the experienced, but hard-headed, leadership of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Given the fact that it is now much more difficult to bring a government down in a vote of no confidence than was previously the case, Netanyahu’s administrations have demonstrated a considerable longevity in comparison to previous Israeli government coalitions. The recent law raising the lower election threshold to over 3% for the next elections will continue the trend towards governments composed of large and medium-sized parties, while the smaller parties with no more than 3-5 MPs each will disappear altogether, unless they unite on matters of common concern. This will particularly affect the fragmented political party structure amongst the religious and orthodox populations, as well as the many small Arab parties. The latter strongly oppose the new legislation, which they see as being aimed at excluding them from the Knesset, the Israeli parliament.

Two of the most influential parties in the present government coalition are the extreme right-wing Bayit Yehudi religious party, led by radical politician Naftali Bennett, and the Yisrael Beiteinu party, headed by Foreign Minister, and Russian immigrant, Avigdor Lieberman. Together with the right-wing Defence Minister, former Chief of Staff Bugi Yaalon, these government leaders have adopted extremist stances with respect to the Israel-Palestine conflict, to the extent of questioning the essence of the two-state solution. These leaders have gone so far as to criticise some of Israel’s strongest allies, including the US administration, while adopting extremist anti-European positions.

Lieberman is but one of a growing number of Russian immigrants who have become active in Israeli politics and risen to high positions within government – including the new Knesset speaker Yuli Edelstein. Some commentators see this as underlying the anti-democratic tendencies within the government and the adoption of exclusive ultra-patriotic positions in what has always been an open country for debate. Many of these figures, who never experienced real democracy in their former lives in Russia,
The recent law raising the lower election threshold to over 3% for the next elections will particularly affect the fragmented political party structure amongst the religious and orthodox populations, as well as the many small Arab parties

have been responsible for a process of increased delegitimisation of those groups promoting left-of-centre, pro-peace and pro-human rights positions. At one point in the 2012-13 period, this even extended to the activities of the government-appointed Council of Higher Education, responsible for the country’s universities, which, under the guise of an academic quality assessment, attempted to close down one of the country’s leading political science departments (the Department of Politics and Government at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, located in the southern city of Beer Sheva) due to what was seen as the politically “radical” views of some of its faculty members. They only backed down in the face of an international academic outcry, including by many important academic associations and universities with strong cooperative and collaborative scientific ties to the Israeli scientific community.

The main coalition partner, the Yesh Atid party headed by former newscaster Yair Lapid, has focussed on social and economic issues, while adopting a moderate, but by no means pro-peace, stance on the Israel-Palestine conflict (see below). In particular, Lapid has insisted on pushing through legislation that will force all ultra-religious males to complete their obligatory period of service in the army, as opposed to the current situation in which they are exempt from army service if they engage in full-time study in the Talmudic academies.

This move is viewed by the rapidly growing religious communities as crossing a red line, and it has met with significant opposition, both in the Knesset — where the orthodox parties are not part of the current right-wing government coalition — and in the public domain, with incidents of civil unrest and violent street demonstrations — spreading to orthodox communities elsewhere in the world, notably in New York and London. Nevertheless, this does not automatically mean that the orthodox parties will now become potential coalition partners for the Labour Party and other parties of the left, most of whom support the army service legislation and are moreover perceived by the orthodox population as being too secular and even anti-religious in their worldviews.

The Labour Party ousted its leader Sheli Yehimovitch and elected in her place one of the princes of Israeli politics, Isaac (Buzi) Herzog. Herzog is the son of former Israeli President Chaim Herzog and the grandson of the first Chief Rabbi of the State of Israel, after whom he is named. Unlike Yehimovitch, he has held a number of important positions in previous governments, is much better acquainted with the international diplomatic, political and Jewish community, and is perceived by many as being a potential alternative leader if public opinion were to switch back from its current right-of-centre position to the centre or centre-left.

The country’s economic position remains strong. Israel continues to be a global leader in R&D in the sophisticated high-tech industry, as well as in the arms industry.

The Israel-Palestine Conflict

At the time of writing (April 2014), the negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority have all
but come to an end, following the failure of US Secretary of State John Kerry to bring the sides any closer together. Despite the fact that the Israeli team to the negotiations was headed by one of the more moderate government ministers, Justice Minister Zipi Livni, the two governments have demonstrated their inability to make any further meaningful compromises, even at the level of confidence-building measures (CBMs). For their part, the Palestinians have refused to accept the Israeli demand to publicly recognise Israel as the bona fide State of the Jewish people, while Israel has negated any steps forward by automatically announcing new construction within West Bank settlements and by refusing, at the last minute, to honour its previous commitment to release a third batch of Palestinian prisoners.

Palestinian President Abu Mazen has suggested that the Palestinians will request full recognition from international organisations such as the UN, a move that has been seen by both Israel and the US as a breach of all previous understandings. In April 2014, the two main factions within Palestinian society – Fatah, headed by Abu Mazen, and the more radical Hamas movement, with its strong political and religious base in the Gaza Strip – reached a new understanding, another indication that the latest round of peace negotiations were close to collapsing. Israel’s immediate response was to announce a suspension of the talks, which, in turn, was interpreted by the Palestinians as being no more than a convenient excuse on the part of Israel to find a way out of the negotiations.

Settlement activity in the West Bank continues unabated. As of 2014, there were over 300,000 Israeli residents in the West Bank, a figure that increases to over half a million if East Jerusalem is included. This has significantly impacted the thinking of the negotiators with respect to the ultimate demarcation of a boundary or border between Israel and a future Palestinian state. The Palestinian position is based on a return to the pre-1967 Green Line, the border that was drawn up between Israel and Jordan at the 1949 Rhodes Armistice Talks and which became the de facto border between Israel and the West Bank from that point on. For its part, and assuming that all Israeli settlements on the Palestinian side of the border would have to be evacuated, similar to what occurred in the Gaza Strip in 2005, Israel argues that this is impossible to implement and that the many new settlement facts on the ground necessitate a new demarcation of a boundary to suit the present realities.

There has been some agreement concerning the redrawing of the line in such a way that Israel would be able to retain some of the major settlement blocs – those closest to the Green Line – in exchange for agreeing to land swaps and territorial exchanges in other areas along the course of the border, such that the total areal extent of the Palestinian State would be equivalent to that of the original West Bank. More recently, in 2013 and 2014, a public discourse has also emerged on the possibility of some Israeli settlements remaining in situ on the “wrong” side of the border, constituting territorial exclaves within which residents would be citizens of Israel, while some Arab-Palestinian communities located inside Israel could enjoy the same status within a Palestinian state. While this is far from ideal, it does suggest the need to find alternative territorial solutions for the implementation of a two-state solution, due to the growing complexities and inabilities to resolve the issue with the demarcation of a single clean line of separation between the two political entities. The alternatives – the continuation of occupation, or the establishment of a single bi-national democratic state to include both Israel and the West Bank, are considered to be less amenable to any form of conflict resolution, even though neither would require drawing a boundary. While the idea of exclaves and cross-citizenship may, at this stage, appear to be fictional, it could provide an acceptable ethno-territorial arrangement should Israel refuse, or find it impossible, to evacuate the settlements even if a peace agreement were to be signed.

The fact that local leaders, especially certain senior Israeli politicians, are now prepared to publically defy their main patron and superpower would seem to indicate that US influence in the region is weakening.

At the time of writing, the potential for peace, or even for progress towards the next stage of conflict resolution, does not seem good. The US administration
is being criticised for not devoting its attention to other global issues, notably the recent Russian intervention in Crimea, but rather continuing to focus its main foreign policy agenda on Israel-Palestine. The fact that local leaders, especially certain senior Israeli politicians, are now prepared to publicly defy their main patron and superpower would seem to indicate that US influence in the region is weakening, a situation that could leave an even greater vacuum than the one that currently exists.

**Israel and BDS**

The past two years have seen a significant increase in acceptance of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign on the part of diverse organisations around the world. The movement has spread from academic and educational trade unions in Europe to a growing number of economic and cultural organisations. In reality, the media attention given to it is far greater than its actual impact, but Israeli policymakers have, nevertheless, become alarmed at the growing world debate on the topic. While Israel does not foresee any significant impact equal to that which affected the apartheid regime of South Africa, it is disquieted by the way in which the debate has been taken up by a variety of institutions around the world. The Israeli response of comparing anti-Israel boycotts to those practiced in Nazi Germany, or of automatically accusing anyone in favour of the boycott of anti-Semitism, has not been an effective strategy, as it avoids any discussion of the real political issues on the table, particularly as they relate to the plight and future political status of the Palestinians. It is feared that, if and when the peace talks finally break down, Israel will be targeted as the scapegoat and that this will bring about an even greater increase in the level of global anti-Israel sentiment. To this end, the Ministry of Strategic Planning, in the Prime Minister's Office, has budgeted 100 million shekels for creating a counter strategy aimed at more proactively combating the BDS narrative around the globe.

BDS is viewed as an anti-Israel movement, rooted in new forms of anti-Semitism, which will not bring about rapprochement between Israelis and Palestinians

To counteract the effects of the movement, Israel has strengthened its economic, cultural and educational ties with many Asian countries, notably China, India and Korea, in addition to the strong ties it already enjoys with both North America and the EU countries. Some Israeli politicians see these new ties as indicative of the country’s future economic development or even as an alternative to many of its traditional ties, should they be affected by the boycott. Amongst the large majority of Israelis, including those in the pro-peace camp, BDS is viewed as an anti-Israel movement, rooted in new forms of anti-Semitism, which will not bring about rapprochement between Israelis and Palestinians and will not serve the peace process in either the short or long term.
Reflections on the Current Palestinian-Israeli Impasse

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In order to understand the dimensions of the current Palestinian-Israeli impasse and recent developments, it is necessary to look at a number of factors. These include the escalation of Israeli atrocities in Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the stalemate in the Palestinian political factions’ reconciliation process; the seemingly deadlocked mission of the US Secretary of State John Kerry to uphold the negotiation process; regional powers’ struggle with political Islam; and the current international crises, which have preoccupied the major external players – the US, EU, Russia and China: the ‘Crimea Crisis,’ the (nuclear) dialogue with Iran, and the Syrian civil war.

Israeli Atrocities and the Situation on the Ground

A new chapter of Israeli atrocities can be witnessed in Jerusalem, where Palestinians face unprecedented challenges to the Al-Aqsa Mosque, which were set off with the highly provocative ‘visit’ of Ariel Sharon in September 2000, which led to the second Palestinian Intifada. Israeli attempts to have a presence on the third holiest site in Islam are nothing new; however, in recent months the demand to have access to the holy site has emerged at the top of the agenda of different Israeli groups and actors – religious entities, military leaders, political figures. Coupled with the Israeli policy of restricting the religious freedom of Muslims and Christians on and during religious holidays by barring their access to the sites of worship in Jerusalem, the new focus of Israeli right-wing politicians and their religious zealot allies on touring the Al-Aqsa compound raises fears that there will be attempts to copy what has been done at Hebron’s Al-Ibrahimi Mosque since 1994: putting the site under Israeli military control and restricting Muslims from praying freely by imposing prayer times and locations for Muslims and Jews, respectively. In addition, Israel is creating a large network of settlers in and around East Jerusalem by expanding its settlements and claiming ownership of Palestinian property. Settlers now number around 200,000, with numerous settlement projects underway, all serving the goal of eventually outnumbering the city’s 370,000 Palestinians. Israel is furthermore working to create a ‘new city’ underneath Jerusalem, trying to connect the settlements with the Old City by building tunnels that pass under the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound. Alongside this, Palestinian residents of Jerusalem are exposed to routine

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1 This article was finalised in April 2014. (Editor’s note).
3 After the ‘Hebron massacre’ on 25 February of that year, when Baruch Goldstein, a Jewish fundamentalist from the nearby Kiryat Arba settlement, shot and killed 29 Palestinians in the mosque.
6 “East Jerusalem – By the Numbers,” The Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 7 May 2013, at www.acri.org.il/en/2013/05/07/ej-figures/ [accessed 03.04.2014].
7 Ramzy Baroud. “Saving al-Aqsa mosque.”
measures of violence and intimidation by Israeli forces, which raid houses, destroy homes, arrest Palestinians, severely restrict the movement of the people (through checkpoints and the separation barrier), and, altogether, create a culture of fear with the ultimate goal to 'legitimise' and legalise Israel's control over the city and shake the Palestinians' sense of religious and national identity.

Meanwhile in the West Bank, Palestinian land continues to be confiscated and Israel is accelerating the expansion of its colonies, most recently with plans to build over 2,300 new settlement homes. The underlying mentality is that Jews have a “God-given right” to the land.

In Gaza, Hamas is losing support from its traditional allies such as Syria, Hezbollah, Iran (which stopped most of its financial support), and Egypt (after the ousting of President Morsi) and has become isolated in the “world’s largest open-air prison,” where over 1.7 million Palestinians are effectively locked up on some 365 km². Recently, Egypt has closed over 1,300 tunnels to Gaza and Israel and Egypt are both limiting the movement across the three main border crossings.

Meanwhile the Islamic Jihad, another political faction in Gaza, is attempting to provoke Israel by firing missiles to get the Israelis re-involved in Gaza and draw the attention of the international community to the siege on the coastal strip. However, this strategy has catastrophic consequences for the people of Gaza, as Israeli retaliation is usually much worse than the initial provocation.

Israeli politicians are, furthermore, constantly attacking Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), smearing him, publicly questioning his ability to lead, and saying he is not a partner for a peace deal. Hinting at his age, the Israeli media compares his situation to the last days of the late President Yasser Arafat and the need for a ‘new leader’ in Palestine.

So what are the Israelis’ aims? They are clearly not interested in ending the occupation, but rather are quite content with the status quo which allows them to push forward the Israelisation of Jerusalem, while containing Palestinians elsewhere in big ‘prisons’ – whether Nablus, Ramallah, Hebron or the Gaza Strip – and carrying on its ‘colonisation tsunami’ in the West Bank. They nourish a ‘war culture’ directed at Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran and Syria rather than seeking a political settlement with the Palestinians, meanwhile performing as a spoiler in the region as well as in the global political arena.

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8. Israel’s discriminatory policies make it almost impossible for Palestinians to obtain the necessary permits to legally build in the city. As a result, over 500 Palestinian homes have been demolished during the last decade – either by Israeli authorities or by Palestinians themselves, in order to avoid high fines and demolition costs. Statistics on demolition of houses built without permits in East Jerusalem, B’Tselem, 10 March 2014.

9. Rightwing politicians have already introduced a bill in the Knesset, calling on “the Israeli government to enforce its ‘sovereignty’ over the holy site,” which officially is administered by Jordan as stipulated in the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty of 1994. Ibid.


12. This phrase was coined by the renowned American linguist, philosopher and political activist Noam Chomsky after visiting the area in 2012. See Noam Chomsky, “Noam Chomsky: My Visit to Gaza, the World’s Largest Open-Air Prison,” Truthout, 9 November 2012, at http://truth-out.org/opinion/item/12635-noam-chomsky-my-visit-to-gaza-the-worlds-largest-open-air-prison.


Palestinian Society and Affairs

Palestinian society has been divided politically and geographically since 2007, with all attempts at reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas leaders so far having been unsuccessful. Both factions are currently stuck within their own respective political ‘boxes,’ facing internal as well as external legitimacy problems, while in the meantime holding endless rounds of unity talks under Egyptian, Saudi and Qatari umbrellas.

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As Hamas has lost its traditional alliances with Iran, Syria, Hezbollah, and Egypt and finds itself cut off from the rest of the world following the destruction of smuggling tunnels and the Rafah border crossing, it is facing growing criticism from within Gaza, which challenges its position as the governing faction there. Fatah, too, is going through a leadership crisis, and, with the peace talks apparently at an impasse, also faces a crisis of vision. The turmoil within the ranks of Fatah became obvious when President Abbas, at a recent Fatah gathering in Ramallah, accused the deposed Fatah member Mohammad Dahlan of ‘conspiracy’ during his official posting in the PA’s Central Committee. This exposure of Fatah’s ‘dirty laundry’ occurred in “a critical period of diplomatic battle for the Palestinians’ future” and has shaken the credibility of Fatah among the Palestinians.

Palestinian youth, around 60% of the Palestinian population, have opened a new chapter of resistance, combining national pride and steadfastness with new means to resist. They stand up for themselves, their property and their dignity, for example, by increasingly confronting settlers’ assaults rather than asking the PA for protection – sometimes even ‘arresting’ and subsequently handing settlers to the PA. Another example is the erection of tent ‘villages’ like Bab Al-Shams and Ein Hijleh. Although they were short-lived, as Israel was quick to destroy the tents, they demonstrated an unprecedented confidence among youth and challenged the impotence of the PA.

It is not clear where this situation will be heading, but three scenarios are plausible: first, a continuation of the status quo, with the West Bank as a ‘semi-autonomous’ entity, de facto controlled by Israel and divided up into three small cantons; second, the (re-)emergence of Fatah leader Marwan Barghouthi as a candidate to head the Palestinian Authority (PA). However, his release from prison is rather unlikely. Third, new elections, which would open a window of opportunity for independent candidates to rise to the challenge.

In the meantime, Palestinian youth, who represent around 60% of the Palestinian population in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, have opened a new chapter of resistance, combining national pride and steadfastness with new means to resist. They stand up for themselves, their property and their dignity, for example, by increasingly confronting settlers’ assaults rather than asking the PA for protection – sometimes even ‘arresting’ and subsequently handing settlers to the PA. Another example is the erection of tent ‘villages’ like Bab Al-Shams and Ein Hijleh. Although they were short-lived, as Israel was quick to destroy the tents, they demonstrated an unprecedented confidence among youth and challenged the impotence of the PA.

Palestinian youth, around 60% of the Palestinian population, have opened a new chapter of resistance, combining national pride and steadfastness with new means to resist. They stand up for themselves, their property and their dignity.

The youth have also adopted the BDS (Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions) campaign, which promotes...
an economic and political boycott of Israel, and some groups have taken the boycott a step further, engaging in anti-normalisation activities, involving an unwillingness to even accept Israeli visitors and promoting a total divorce of Palestinian society from Israel.

In addition, committees such as the cultural group Zedni have emerged to awaken, empower and politicise the youth. Zedni began in Nablus as a student society that focused on book reviews but then went viral over the social media. It is based on youth educating themselves about the Palestinian struggle by interpreting and discussing Palestinian literature, films and videos.

Negotiations

It is interesting to draw a comparison between the ‘negotiations’ that are currently taking place and those in 1948. Back then, talks were held under the mediation of Count Folke Bernadotte, who was appointed by the UN Security Council. Today, US Secretary of State John Kerry, appointed by US President Obama, is in charge of roughly the same mission. The enormous difference in the approaches of these two mediators reflects not only shifts in the global power balance but also how much power the Israelis have gained relative to the Palestinians over the last decades. Especially striking are these observations with regard to four topics, namely refugees, Jerusalem, land, and the affiliation with Jordan.

Refugees: In the current Kerry mission, the issue of refugees is being dealt with based on the Clinton Parameters of 2000 and the clauses on refugees in the unofficial 2003 Geneva Accord. Accordingly, five options for refugees are distinguished, namely:

1. return to the future State of Palestine,
2. return to areas in Israel being transferred to Palestine as part of a land swap;
3. resettlement in present host countries
4. resettlement in third countries; and
5. return to/resettling in the State of Israel “at the sovereign discretion of Israel,” meaning that Israel will determine the total number of Palestinian refugees allowed to return.

As part of Kerry’s refugee scheme, host countries of the last 60 years – such as Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria – would receive compensation for offering citizenship to refugees. Since the refugee issue is left to the individual choice of refugees, this proposal takes it out from under the national PLO umbrella, although President Abbas has made it clear that holding a referendum is a condition for approving this scheme, whose particular danger lies with the fact that Israel would no longer carry responsibility for the creation of the refugee problem.

Jerusalem: In the current talks, Kerry is proposing a watered-down version of the Clinton Parameters of 2000 by stating that Palestine will have a capital in Jerusalem existing of ‘certain parts’ of East Jerusalem. In effect, this would mean a mere symbolic Palestinian presence in only parts of East Jerusalem, and not in the entirety of the occupied eastern part of the city.

Land (Swap): The Kerry mission is talking about a limited land swap, which would involve acceptance of the ‘status quo’ of the three major Israeli settle-


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22 The BDS campaign has been very successful and has led to numerous boycotting activities all over the world. For more information see www.bdemovement.net/. See also http://boycottisrael.info/.


24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.


28 On 12 March 2014, Mahmoud Abbas gave a speech to the Fatah Revolutionary Council in which he outlined Clinton and Kerry’s categories of refugees and stated that he had accepted the scheme. For the original Arabic text of his speech, see http://wafa.ps/arabic/index.php?action=details&id=170086. For a rough English translation, see Lt. Col. (ret.) Jonathan D. Halevi Has Mahmoud Abbas Really Accepted the Clinton Parameters on the Refugee Problem?, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 19 March 2014, at http://jcpa.org/mahmoud-abbas-really-accepted-clinton-parameters-refugee-problem/.


John Kerry has pleaded for a ‘peace economy’ involving Jordan, besides Israel and Palestine. The US wants a normalisation of Israel’s relations with its neighbours, in order to get Israel out of their ‘military ghetto’ in the Middle East. While normalisation has been on the table since the Arab Peace Initiative from 2002, the Israelis prefer their ‘military ghetto,’ which allows them the claim to serve as a base for the West in the region. This argument may not prove valid for much longer as the US and the EU have been involved in shaping and influencing events and relations in the Middle East, while Israel has emerged as a spoiler on various fronts.

Kerry is currently facing an unprecedented Israel-driven smear campaign against his mission and his personality (e.g. portraying him as an obsessed Christian\footnote{Barak Ravid, “Kerry: I won’t be intimidated by Israeli attacks against me,” Haaretz, 5 February 2014, at www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.572705.}) aimed at intimidating him and eventually ending his efforts. The Palestinian bargaining power has greatly diminished over the last decades to the benefit of Israel. John Kerry is not meeting the Palestinians’ expectations for self-determination and statehood. Instead, he has been restricted to merely keeping alive the process of dialogue and shuttle diplomacy between the two parties, without ending the Palestinian tragedy – although he has very recently acknowledged the asymmetry in the conflict and reinforced the Palestinian version regarding the deadlocked peace process, blaming Israel for letting the talks fall apart.\footnote{www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=689358.}

**Conclusion**

Under the current Palestinian-Israeli impasse, it is clear that there is no future for a two-state solution. Instead, Palestinians fear that they will be facing a political ‘one-state’ reality, in which they will be contained to separate cantons served by municipalities, which are controlled by military occupiers.

Israeli leaders seem unable to look at what lies ahead but are trapping themselves in their own rhetoric, full of vanity for their military muscles and their unquestioned strategic alliance with the US and EU.

The Palestinian cause, meanwhile, has been undermined by a severe leadership crisis, political division, the lack of a consensus on a vision, and the little support from their traditional allies in the Arab and Islamic world. However, the Palestinians have been facing military control for over four decades now and are proud to have maintained their national identity and cultural heritage. They are not desperate, but continue to be committed to their national cause – Palestine.

The negotiations under Kerry have arrived at a new impasse after Israel refused to release a final group of Palestinian prisoners as previously agreed upon, and the Palestinians responded by seeking accession to several international treaties as a state, including the Geneva Conventions. In retaliation, Israel unveiled new sanctions against the Palestinians, including the withholding of tax revenues it collects on behalf of the PA, and demolished several European Union-funded humanitarian housing shelters in the contentious E-1 area.\footnote{www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Kerry-hints-Israel-to-blame-for-deadlocked-peace-process-347943.}

It seems that the ‘battleground’ for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will eventually be entering the international arena. This will not just involve states, the UN, the International Court of Justice and other international organisations, but also global civil society in which the influence of the BDS movement will continue to rise.
"Revolution was, once upon a time, a probability and a very beautiful one." Murat Uyurkulak starts his novel To/ with this striking sentence, which tells the story of a long train journey made by two "defeated and exhausted" characters, once victims of the sweeping rage of the State and the brutal side of Turkey’s recent history. In the summer of 2013, the Gezi Park event in Turkey filled the hearts of those who took part with the beauty of this probability. Without any doubt, what had initially started as an objection against the demolition of the last remaining green space in the centre of Istanbul and turned into a fully-fledged upheaval against the authoritarian acts of the political establishment and Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan’s conservative AKP government, was not a strive for revolution in the Marxist sense of the word. Nevertheless, the nationwide uprising that transformed a park into the headquarters and symbol of a massive nationwide revolt clearly entailed the “ruthless criticism of the existing order” and the message that the demonstrators were “down with somethings”² (Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, 1844).

Initially, the protests began on 28 May 2013 against the demolition of some 600 trees in Gezi Park for the reconstruction of the former Taksim Military Barracks (demolished in 1940) and a shopping mall within the park. The platform, Taksim Solidarity, declared the demolition as illegal, protesting the decision by pitching tents in the park. The uprising then spilled over to other cities and parts of Turkey and gained tremendous support from people of various political ideologies and all walks of life. The police intervened with a heavy hand and anti-riot equipment. In Istanbul, after two days of intense clashes, the police retreated from the central areas, after which the protestors once again seized the park and the adjacent Taksim area. The park and square have been cleaned, and numerous kitchens, a small library and an infirmary have been built. As Mirko van Pampus, an editor from Research Turkey, argues, “the whole area is a constant stage for tens of thousands of people, either led by conviction or curiosity, and they are singing, dancing, shouting slogans, or bursting into spontaneous applause at random moments and places. It seems that an historical moment is indeed in the making” (Mirko van Pampus, 2013: 22). Gezi Park was turned into a commune, the so-called “Taksim Commune” until 16 June, when police attacked the park and evacuated it using tear gas and water cannons. The Gezi uprisings lasted until mid-July 2013, leading to eight casualties as a result of police brutality and leaving around 8,000 injured. More demonstrations were sparked very recently by the death of 15-year-old Berkin Elvan, who spent 269 days in a coma after being hit by a tear gas canister last June.

But, what was it in Gezi Park that turned a bunch-of-trees issue into a nationwide uprising?

1 Although the concepts ‘resistance’ and ‘uprising’ better reflect the spirit of what happened in June 2013, I prefer to use the term ‘event’ in order to denote the significance and continuous nature of the process.

2 One of the famous slogans of the Gezi event. One of the most significant characteristics of the Gezi revolt was the humorous and sarcastic, yet controversial and utterly political, slogans chanted in squares and written on walls protesting government and police brutality such as, “Enough! I’m calling the police,” “We take that gas in a single hit, bro,” “Pepper gas makes the skin healthy” and “You banned alcohol, people sobered up.”
Learning from the Squares: Tahrir, Zucotti, Puerta del Sol, Syntagma and…Taksim?

First of all, the Gezi events need to be considered in line with recent struggles in other parts of the world, which have aired grievances vis-à-vis the global financial crisis. As ROAR Magazine tells us, “Gezi was the indomitable genie of revolution that previously spooked ruling elites from Tahrir to Zucotti; the genie world leaders have been so desperately trying to stuff back into its suffocating neoliberal bottle ever since” (ROAR Collective, 2014). Indeed, the anti-globalisation spirit of the 1990s and early 2000s haunting Seattle, Genoa, Davos, Cologne and Montreal had a new target from around 2008 onwards: the financial crisis and the political leaders seen as the culprits of this economic and representational bottleneck. Activists of all ages and backgrounds have staged extensive demonstrations in the squares of various European cities, unhappy with the economic crisis, which has dashed people’s hopes for the future, especially among youth. Similarly, the Arab Spring, i.e. the wave of protests in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria, Morocco, Algeria, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, also involved a straightforward civil resistance against the repressive actions of local governments, human rights violations and income gaps between various classes. For almost two decades, it has been the spectre of disidence sweeping across various squares of the world, although the ‘demons’ have been different: corrupt politicians, political figures endangering middle-class lifestyles, global economic powers or urban regeneration projects.

However, “the Gezi movement is both all of these [previous] movements and none of them” (Göle, 2013: 8). Unlike the recent demonstrations in European countries, the uprising in Turkey was not sparked by extreme austerity measures. As Xypolia reminds us, “while in all these cases from the Mediterranean cities to the Western core of the Occupy movement, the young educated middle-class were protesting against their economic suffering, in Turkey the economic growth of the past decade has produced considerable benefits for the population. In particular, the emerging new middle-class in Turkey has seen its living standards rapidly increase during the AKP’s time in office” (Xypolia, 2013: 33). In this respect, therefore, any comparison between the protests in Turkey and the recent turmoil in the Mediterranean and the West lacks a basic understanding of the people’s demands in terms of their lifestyles. Neither is it comparable to the popular revolts of the Arab Spring in terms of the political structures of the respective geographies. Whereas the wave of protests in the Arab Spring put an end to decades-old dictatorships resulting in electoral systems being put in place, the protests in Turkey have rather been the criticism of the tyranny of the majority within the existing regime and the appreciation of individual and minority rights and freedoms.

The Social Fabric of Gezi

Another important debate on the Gezi event has been about the class background of the protestors. As previously mentioned, the demonstrators in almost all cities had different socio-economic backgrounds and political ideologies. Turkish flags, banners with pictures of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan, circle-A icons symbolising anarchy and football shirts of various clubs were all among the symbols visible at Taksim or Kızılay. This debate usually revolved around the argument that most protestors were well-educated ‘white Turks’ from middle class backgrounds, at odds with the government’s increasing interference with their lifestyles. This is partially true: the initial organising principle of the Gezi uprising did not entail working class militancy, directed against capitalism or unequal income distribution. All in all, protestors were, more often than not, people who were not struggling for their daily bread. Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that the movement appealed to a heterogeneous and hybrid group of people, including the working class, protesting against the repercussions of predatory capitalism, be it in the form of neo-liberal urban regeneration projects or workplace exploitation. On the night of 31 May 2013, the tens of thousands of marchers occupying and crossing the Bosphorus Bridge included many people from working class neighbourhoods. It was the protest of all people and all continents.

3 The central square in Ankara, which was flooded by hundreds of thousands of people during the Gezi period.
One thing is for sure: although the Gezi protests brought together hundreds of thousands of people of all backgrounds and ages, the activists were predominantly young and had an urban background. This rendered the Gezi event similar to the student movement of 1968 in Europe, where, particularly in France, the conservative, democratically elected leader in power had lost touch with urban youth. But, this time the younger generation did not turn against the older generation. On the contrary, parents were joining their children and participating in the same protest movement. “In Paris, the ‘68 slogan “ça suffit” (“enough is enough”) was aimed against Charles De Gaulle for holding power in office for ten years. Similar to the French context, the Gezi protests said “enough” to the last ten years of power held by Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan” (Göle, 2013: 8).

Not surprisingly, due to the young age of most of the protestors, the protests led to record-breaking tweeting and online sharing in Turkey. A final quotation from one of the protestors may help to explain why these ‘youngsters’ were on the streets: “We don’t have a name yet. Some call us the 88 generation; some call us the ones that were born in the 1990s. We were repeatedly told that we were apolitical, as a consequence of the suppressive politics of the 1980 military coup. We were taught that we couldn’t change anything. We kept quiet until PM Erdogan, who was blinded by his power, started to make decisions on behalf of us. Now he calls us “marginal groups” because we let the world know that “he gives democracy a bad name”. […] It just didn’t work. The AKP’s religion and ethnicity-based politics have kept us away from each other. Some of us call ourselves Mustafa Kemal’s soldiers. Some refuse to be a soldier for any reason. We were upset with the government for dissimilar reasons. That’s why we wrote “down with somethings” on the heart of Taksim Square” (Doğan, 2013: 69).

**Conclusion**

The Gezi event has probably been Turkey’s most significant news story of 2013. Millions occupied the streets and squares, angered by the violent reaction of the government and police to a peaceful protest. As the demonstrators frequently argued, the Gezi event’s strength lied not in adherence to flags and symbols, but in the fact that it created politically mobile protestors out of people whose most political action hitherto had been to vote at elections or share their favourite columnist’s article on Facebook. It is still too early to carry out a fully-fledged academic analysis on the process but right now it seems that nothing will ever be the same for the Turkish people, who are still mourning the death of eight civilians and genuinely hoping that Gezi will lead to freedom and justice. Let us hope that the Gezi experience has not only been a beautiful probability, but also the trigger of a better future for Turkish democracy.

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In the face of the currently ferocious and generalised competition imposed by a globalised economy, countries have attempted to improve their standing in the new world order by two means: on the one hand, creating regional sub-ensembles intended to play the role of "antechambers of globalisation," and on the other hand, stepping up their competitive edge by developing innovation and entering the knowledge society.

The Lisbon Strategy adopted by the European Council in June 2000 is a good example of this evolution; announcing the ambition of making "the European Union the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world," this strategy was based on the three pillars needed for any knowledge society: support to innovation (which was to amount to 3% of the GDP); modernisation of the educational system (in order to sustain our collective capacity to innovate and adapt); and management of the continent’s energy transition; a technological ambition that was to consolidate society’s participation in reindustrialisation on the basis of new foundations.

Revised in March 2010 to take into account the severe effects of the crisis, this policy was called the "Europe 2020" strategy, then "Horizon 2020." The latter added two priorities to the Lisbon Strategy goals: social cohesion (job creation and the struggle against poverty) and decentralisation of decision-making (civil society participation). The aim was to attenuate, among the neediest sectors, the effects of opening up to international markets and internal modernisation. And thus emerged, for the first time in Europe, the start of a true structural policy on the scale of the 28 EU Member States; considerable progress, even if, to be fully effective, Horizon 2020 should be complemented by two other structural components: common industrial and energy policies.

A Profound Economic and Social Mutation

To further this ambition, the EIB Group\(^2\) mobilised its entire financial "fire power" in the European Union: since the year 2000, the Group has invested nearly €130 billion to support technological innovation (R&D and RDI), over 45 billion to develop human capital and some 25 billion more to strengthen information network infrastructure (in particular to foster super-fast broadband connections). At the same time, the EIB Group dedicated over a quarter of its financing to accelerating energy transition: renewable energy, electric mobility, energy efficiency in cities and transport systems, etc. In any case, there is no denying that the results have fallen short of the goals, in particular that of restoring the industrial component of the European Union’s GDP to 20%. The main reasons are the difficulty for our economies of managing a head-on transformation towards a new industrial foundation and compensating for the effects of the world crisis, namely: preserving jobs despite relocation of average value-added pro-

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1. This article, completed in April 2014, is an expression of the author’s personal opinions.
2. The EIB Group consists of the European Investment Bank (www.bei.org), which is the bank of the European Union, and its subsidiary specialised in support to Small and Medium-Size Enterprises (SMEs): the European Investment Fund (www.eif.org).
duction; focalising priority investment on sectors with strong innovation and technology content; mobilising public finances for countercyclical response to the crisis; maintaining our social protection systems, etc.

I have taken this "European detour" to underscore two characteristics that affect European-Mediterranean relations.

The first has to do with the complexity of policies for transition to the knowledge society: even for highly developed countries, it is very difficult to ensure a type of transformation based not only on financial means and technology infrastructures, but above all on society’s participation in a collective project.

**Integrating South Mediterranean economies into the European value chain is both a challenge and an opportunity for success in a globalised economy**

The second is that, to guarantee its global competitiveness, the European economy needs to involve operators in the South with the production of certain segments of European added value. This is what the German industry’s experience with its Central European neighbours after the fall of the Wall demonstrates. Integrating South Mediterranean economies into the European value chain is thus both a challenge and an opportunity for success in a globalised economy.

**The Knowledge Economy in Arab Countries: An Improvable Attempt**

At the turn of the millennium, the South Mediterranean countries pursued, within their means, the same ambition of entering the world economy through regional integration and transition to the knowledge society. The results there likewise fell short for two reasons:

- First of all, the positive effects of opening to international markets were insufficiently compensated by structural policies aiming at a more equitable distribution of wealth. Indeed, authoritarian regimes fostered crony capitalism that left out many sectors, above all youth;
- Secondly, these same, pre-revolution autocratic regimes attempted to effect the transition to the knowledge society via centralised sectoral policies and the creation of innovation infrastructures. The component of society’s participation was thus neglected because they believed that a national identity thus reinforced would move public opinion towards an ambition for modernity.

Although there are tangible results in various countries, such as Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco (where the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership – FEMIP has financed a number of science and technology parks), it is evident that these policies have had only a relative effect in relation to the significant public financial resources employed, and have brought about very little change in society. It is thus with very good reason that the study done by the Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Economics Institutes (FEMISE) at the request of the EIB-FEMIP³ emphasises that it is above all through an organic approach and via the definition of societal goals that an innovation policy can have any chance of success, whether in the South or the North Mediterranean.

And paradoxically, the context of economic and political uncertainty currently prevailing on both shores of our common sea presents an opportunity to make innovation the core of the future “social contract” and place youth at the heart of the “new growth” for which the peoples of the Mediterranean are calling.

³ A link to the study is given in the “References” section at the end of this article.
chain than in the construction of infrastructures in which innovation can develop (even if the latter remain fundamental).

The success of the transition to the knowledge society resides more in the qualitative arrangement of the innovation chain than in the construction of infrastructures in which innovation can develop.

Without going into detail, note that the process should concern four priority sectors and should operate via two springboards. The four priorities are, of course, the following:

- Modernising education and training in their main functions, which are developing people, their employability and their social inclusion;
- The function of research, its organisation and promotion in society;
- Participation of enterprise in the innovation chain and its link to higher education;
- Fostering networks of innovation actors, whether they be individuals or structures.

But even more important are the springboards: The first is that of individual development, in the democratic and economic sense of the term; development that should allow individuals to liberate their creative faculties and boost their social and professional integration. Without significant progress in this sphere, there will be neither social response to the aspiration to democracy nor organic enrichment of the innovation chain. This is an essential point, because it conditions society’s participation in the global vision consisting of the new social contract to be defined, which should aim to establish the conditions for more equitable growth, for both generations and regions. Without freedom for the individual, there can be no research, no creation and no collective ambition!

The second springboard is that of decentralisation, one that consists of resituating individuals in their territory: decentralisation of decision-making, bringing it as close as possible to the local level, where civil society expresses itself and individuals are fulfilled; decentralisation of the decision to study, research, network, but also to undertake, finance, etc.

Such autonomy given to the different actors in the innovation chain is a formidable springboard for creation, but also for organisation: at schools and universities, in businesses, in networks, at banks. Is this to say that the State would lose all influence in defining the implementation of a policy for knowledge and innovation? Certainly not! It will be up to the State, on the basis of a democratically defined social contract, to establish a new growth strategy. A growth in which innovation will be one of the foremost pillars, together with territorial balance and decentralisation, and youth shall be the main actor and beneficiary. In this perspective, three key factors seem to me to be decisive:

- The autonomy of local authorities, particularly in matters of economic intervention;
- The autonomy of universities and public research structures, resulting in the freedom to organise synergies with local enterprise and with their foreign counterparts;
- The autonomy of public finance actors to make the most appropriate decisions on the local level with regard to financing research programmes and innovation infrastructures.

It is thus up to the State to define the course of action and to organise and ensure the coherence of the new strategy’s implementation; and also to accept that its action will not be solely top-down, that civil society is a voice to be heard and that it is pertinent to delegate forms of implementation to local actors.

Three implications to Consider for the Action of Development Finance Institutions

If countries in democratic transition gain a long-term vision placing creativity and youth at the core of their ambitions, then the international community should accompany this major evolution by finding ways of adapting their forms of development aid intervention.

In this regard, three conclusions can be reached.
1. If we are to pursue financing innovation infrastructures (as we have already done in Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan), we should also implement financial instruments for the South Mediterranean countries allowing us to finance immaterial R&D programmes, as the EIB Group has done in Europe (with over 45 billion euros invested in five years in this sort of project). But this entails that, with the help of the European Neighbourhood Policy budget, we develop risk-bearing instruments, primarily for innovative SMEs, in the spheres of both loans and equity.

2. Along the lines of what we have already done in nearly all of our Mediterranean Partner Countries, we should extend our technical assistance measures to the local banking sector to allow them to better grasp the nature of risk associated with innovation, establish competencies on the local or regional level and develop hedging instruments, either with state aid or with that of regional authorities (similar to the French “loans for innovation,” which have the support of the EIB Group).

Also along these lines is the important programme for the promotion of innovation systems (Innovation Capacities), directed by the EIB at the Marseille Center for Mediterranean Integration (CMI) over the course of four years now, together with the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Research and Innovation (DG Research), the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO), the Tunisian and Moroccan Ministries of Innovation and FEMISE as partners.

3. Since we are taking the dual perspective of decentralising decision-making and fostering networking among actors, the results should be cross-border cooperation between research structures and actors in various countries, and hopefully in a South-South direction. This poses a problem for development funders insofar as their instruments are defined on a regional basis, but they are most often implemented on the national level. We should also, in due time, envisage extending the scope of application of the regional guarantee mechanism for SMEs that the EIB, Switzerland’s State Secretariat for International Financial Matters (SFI) and the French Development Agency (AFD) have established within the framework of the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition for a volume of $400 million (190 million of which are subscribed by the EIB).

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The year 2014 was a special one for Euro-Mediterranean relations, insofar as it was the first year of implementation of the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which served as the legal basis for financial cooperation for all countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Russia from 2007 to 2013, has been replaced by a new European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI).

At the same time, the EU proposed negotiations concerning Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA), which are part of the revision of the ENP begun in 2011 – but that were also presented/put forth as a response to the Arab Spring – to Morocco, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia. These negotiations constitute a second essential element of the economic and financial Euro-Mediterranean relations. They began with Morocco and are in an exploratory stage with the three other partners.


It was in February 2013 that the European Council reached a political agreement on the “maximum total figure for expenditure for EU 28 for the period 2014-2020 is €959,988 million in appropriations for commitments, representing 1.00% of EU Gross National Income.”

Under Heading 4, “Global Europe” (58,704 million euros in commitment appropriations), the European Council underscored that the financing instruments should support the following goals: “support the objectives of promoting EU values abroad, projecting EU policies in support of addressing major global challenges, increasing the impact of EU development cooperation, investing in the long-term prosperity and stability of the EU’s Neighbourhood, supporting the process of EU enlargement, enhancing European solidarity following natural or man-made disasters, improving crisis prevention and resolution and combating climate change.” It also specified that “Where appropriate and subject to objective criteria, support to partners will be adapted to their development situation and commitment and progress with regard to human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance.”

These conclusions are particularly important. First of all, it confirms that the “long-term prosperity and stability of the EU’s Neighbourhood” is a priority of foreign action for the EU as a whole, and moreover, the principles of differentiation and enhanced incentive conditionality ("more for more") affect not only the ENP but the ensemble of foreign action.

In parallel to negotiations on the 2014-2020 MFF, discussions on the main sectoral policies were likewise held as part of ordinary legislative procedure. With the ENPI expiring on 31 December 2013, the

1 EUCO 37/13, Point 6, p. 3 (for more information, see Bibliography).
2 EUCO 37/13, Point 94, p. 38.
ENI was to replace it as of 1 January 2014, but discussion with the European Parliament has delayed its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU) by several months.

The European Neighbourhood Instrument: Stepping Up Differentiation, Conditionality and the Role of the European Parliament

The proposal made by the European Commission concerning the “Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument” (ENI)\(^3\) identified seven key elements by which to revise the ENPI. The ENI should namely:

i) Apply the principles of “more for more” and mutual accountability;
ii) Streamline the programming process;
iii) Streamline the scope of the Instrument (striking a balance between flexibility, strategic goals and key areas of cooperation);
iv) Improve coherence among external instruments;
v) Improve cross-border cooperation;
vi) Promote closer links with EU internal instruments and policies;
vii) Respond to the evolving relationship with Russia, an EU neighbour and strategic partner.

All of these elements are included in “Regulation (EU) No. 232/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 March 2014 Establishing a European Neighbourhood Instrument.”

Two essential points should be considered regarding the values and conditionality on which the ENI is based. With regard to values, the general objective of the ENI is to develop “a special relationship founded on cooperation, peace and security, mutual accountability and a shared commitment to the universal values of democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights in accordance with the [Treaty of the European Union (TEU)]” (Art. 1 § 1 of the ENI). In contrast, the ENPI only referred to the EU values and not to “universal values” (Art. 1 § 3 of the ENPI). The issue not only of the universality but also the “indivisibility” of human rights is mentioned in the ENI (Art. 1 § 1 and 4), which is a novelty.

With regard to conditionality, it is now indicated, on the level of more specific objectives (Art. 2 § 1), that Union Support “shall focus on promoting enhanced political cooperation, deep and sustainable democracy, progressive economic integration and a strengthened partnership with societies.” The question of the implementation of enhanced conditionality (“more for more”) is discussed in Article 4, on Differentiation. It includes a series of more precise criteria to be taken into account in the allocation of financial packages, among them not only the partner country’s “commitment to and progress in implementing mutually agreed political, economic and social reform objectives” and “commitment to and progress in building deep and sustainable democracy” but also its “absorption capacity” and the “potential impact of Union support under this Regulation.” These first components are consolidated in the second paragraph, which stipulates that “the share of available resources offered to partner countries shall be adapted primarily according to their progress in building and consolidating deep and sustainable democracy and in implementing agreed political, economic and social reform objectives, in line with the incentive-based approach.” It is also stipulated that “the progress of partner countries shall be regularly assessed, in particular by means of ENP progress reports which include trends as compared to previous years” and that “support may be reconsidered in the event of serious or persistent regression.” The revision of the ENP initiated in 2011 becomes a reality here, in 2014, in operational terms. Incentive-based

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conditionality, closely linked to the principle of differentiation, is clearly reinforced. It is also noteworthy that the ENI is entering into effect within a context where the European Parliament (EP)'s powers are strengthened on the budgetary level. This has a direct impact on aid administration. Hence the annex to the ENI Regulation entitled “Statement by the European Parliament on the suspension of assistance granted under the financial instruments.” The latter indicates that the EP should be able to exercise its prerogatives in case of suspension of “assistance in cases where a beneficiary country fails to observe the basic principles enunciated in the respective instrument and notably the principles of democracy, rule of law and the respect for human rights.” A second statement, i.e. “Declaration by the European Commission on the strategic dialogue with the European Parliament” allows the Commission to “conduct a strategic dialogue with the European Parliament prior to the programming of the Regulation” establishing the ENI. This dialogue shall regard the “indicative allocations foreseen per country/region, and, within a country/region, priorities, possible results and indicative allocations foreseen per priority for geographic programmes, as well as the choice of assistance modalities.” It is further stated that the “European Commission will take into account the position expressed by the European Parliament on the matter.” In addition, such dialogue shall also take place “in preparing the mid-term review and before any substantial revision of the programming documents during the period of validity of this Regulation.” The ENP could thus become politicised, with all of the implications that would entail, but the EP only has the power to express its opinion, even if political pressure is always effective. Let us hope above all that debate will be transparent.

Insofar as the financial envelope and its breakdown, Article 17 states that “for the period from 2014 to 2020” it will be “EUR 15,432,634,000 at current prices.” Annex II, under “Priorities for Union support under this Regulation” provides the following indicative breakdown: “bilateral programmes: up to 80%; multi-country programmes: up to 35%;” and “cross-border cooperation: up to 5%.” There is thus significant flexibility and this could strengthen differentiation even more.

**Negotiation of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTA)**

It was in June 2011 that the Foreign Affairs Council invited the European Commission to “submit recommendations for negotiating directives for DCFTAs with selected Southern Mediterranean partners” insofar as initiatives “aimed at enhancing trade and investment relations with partners engaged in democratic and economic reforms.” In December 2011, The European Council “authorised the Commission to open bilateral negotiations with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, with a view to establishing ‘deep and comprehensive’ free trade areas, as part of the existing Euro-Mediterranean association agreements with those countries.” These Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) were selected because, in addition to their own political will, they are also participating in the Agadir Process, they concluded their Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAs) relatively early (Tunisia and Morocco in particular) and three of them have advanced status or special partnerships with the EU. They are also engaged in economic and political reform, whether as part of violent transition processes of a revolutionary nature (Egypt and Tunisia) or more pacific reform processes, in particular constitutional reform (Morocco and Jordan), although the fact remains that the entire region has been affected by the wave of protest that began in southern Tunisia. This enhanced integration essentially consists, for the time being, in enhancing and completing existing EMAs. The latter continue to serve as the frame of reference because they already cover:

i) Liberalisation of industrial products under specific tariff dismantling schedules spanning 12 years on average;

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ii) The principle of liberalisation of services and capital through general clauses to be complemented by bilateral sectoral agreements or included in the DCFTAs;

iii) Liberalisation of trade in agricultural products (which is mentioned in a clause on negotiation meetings and takes shape through the conclusion of bilateral agricultural agreements annexed to the EMAAs);

It is thus not yet a question of negotiating a new generation of agreements as such, but the issue should be raised on the medium term.

The term ‘comprehensive’ means that the liberalisation foreseen in the EMAAs should be finalised insofar as (processed) agricultural products and services.

To gain a thorough understanding of this qualitative jump ahead, we must delve into the notions of “deep” and ‘comprehensive’ free trade. The term ‘comprehensive’ means that the liberalisation foreseen in the EMAAs should be finalised insofar as (processed) agricultural products and services. According to Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in order to be compatible with multilateral regulations, a free trade area should cover “substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating in such territories.” The term ‘deep’ means that integration will go beyond tariff liberalisation for industrial and agricultural goods and services to focus on the question of non-tariff trade obstacles.

They have focussed primarily on services and public markets, competition law and intellectual property rights. Jordan seems to be the next in line, since the process preliminary to launching negotiations is quite advanced, several meetings having already taken place. With regard to Tunisia, the preliminary process began in 2012 and focuses on the spheres of services and agricultural products. Exploratory discussions were launched with Egypt in June 2013 but, for the moment, it seems the latter are at a standstill. Let us recall that on the level of Association Agreements including a DCFTA with Eastern Neighbours, Georgia and Moldavia signed in November 2013, whereas Ukraine signed the political facet in March 2014 and will enjoy unilateral trade concessions.

The conclusion is clear: the implementation of the ENI and progress in DCFTA negotiations will increase differentiations between Partners and we may witness a progressive politicisation of financial cooperation, given the increased role of the EP on budgetary matters.

Countries such as Syria and Libya, which have always been special cases in Euro-Mediterranean relations, are greatly marginalised today. Algeria seems frozen after the presidential elections, whereas Lebanon remains at the mercy of the aggravated security situation in Syria. Egypt and Jordan, two countries more involved in the ENP, are also facing considerable challenges. Only Morocco and Tunisia seem to be undertaking this second stage of the ENP with greater serenity. It would therefore be wise to ensure the reactivation and development of regional Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. An excess of bilateralism and concentration on the more advanced countries could, in fact, lead to a fragmentation of rapprochement with European, to the detriment of regional Euro-Mediterranean integration and

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The implementation of the ENI and progress in DCFTA negotiations will increase differentiations between Partners and we may witness a progressive politicisation of financial cooperation, given the increased role of the EP on budgetary matters.

leave out the populations precisely aspiring to greater freedom and prosperity, while consolidating an ENP running at different speeds. It remains to be seen what the impact of a possible politicisation of financial cooperation would be, or whether the Members of the European Parliament will manage to go beyond traditional political rifts and the exploitation of EU aid to purely national political ends.

Bibliography


Russia and the Arab Spring

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Initial Assessments of the Causes of the “Arab Spring”

Unexpected developments in Tunisia and Egypt were at first rightly perceived in Russia as a revolt against corrupt regimes that could no longer cope with the challenges of contemporary socio-economic and political life. Later, due to the growing interference of Western countries in the region’s affairs, new interpretations gained momentum. The perception formed that any anti-government action was in one way or another organised with Western assistance, above all in light of the “colour revolutions” in the post-Soviet space (Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan), whose objective, many in Russia believed, was to take these states out of the sphere of Russian influence. While in comparison to the post-Soviet territory, the Middle East is of secondary importance to Russia, rampant global rivalry made Russian politicians even more suspicious of possible Western plans and intentions vis-à-vis the Arab countries.

The NATO Operation in Libya

The military operation to establish a no-fly zone and prevent the use of air force by Muammar Gaddafi against the rebels was a turning point for Russia: it did not meet its expectations. Russia had abstained from voting on Security Council Resolution 1973, and thus made the operation possible, because it had believed in its clear-cut and limited goals. However, the hunting down and murder of Gaddafi, the death of several members of his family, and the human losses were appalling and were even looked upon in Moscow as a form of revenge exacted by European leaders who had been dealing with the Libyan dictator for many years. Russia seems to have been deceived by its Western partners. It was thus no wonder that, after this experience, more and more observers in Russia tended to equate Arab transformations with revolts organised and staged by external powers. The fact that the US was following the events and that Barack Obama had taken the time to urge his ally Hosni Mubarak to step down could not change this perception. It was further compounded by the very active role played by the local actors, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar, who had their own distinct interests in the area, but who were also American allies and could thus be seen (for propagandistic purposes) to be conducting a pro-American policy.

The Russian Approach to the Crisis in Syria

For Russia, which feared a spillover of the instability and chaos in international relations, it was important to prevent regime change by military intervention and to save the Syrian State from breaking into pieces. The negative experience of Libya contributed a great deal to Russian stubbornness. The prolonged and bloody fighting in Syria has made it clear that none of the parties involved has been able to achieve a decisive victory. Despite harsh criticism from the Arab world and the West, the Assad regime has proved that it enjoys the support of a significant part of the population, namely, ethnic and confessional communities frightened by the atrocities of the opposition fighters. The growing number of victims and refugees demands more active policy
For Russia, it was important to prevent regime change by military intervention and to save the Syrian State from breaking into pieces. The negative experience of Libya contributed a great deal to Russian stubbornness.

measures. The proposal of the Russian Federation Foreign Affairs Minister on the elimination of chemical weapons in Syria turned out to be a successful step; it opened the door for the Geneva II conference. The proposal was welcomed by US diplomats and the UN. In fact, this decision and further measures on the elimination of chemical weapons bore testament to an ability to compromise regardless of substantial differences in approach.

The Crisis of Secularism in the Arab World

The Arab Spring, often viewed in Russia as a great Islamic revolution, has brought to the fore Islamists of different political orientations. The rise of Sunni radicals could have serious domestic implications for Russia. Based on figures from the 2010 census and the current growth trends of the populations of the respective national republics, less the number of non-titular citizens, the country is home to an estimated 14.9 million Muslims. However, if one allows for both legal and illegal migration, the number of Muslims in Russia is much greater – about 20 million. Russia’s Muslim population is concentrated in two main areas – Tatar-Bashkir and the North Caucasus. Trends towards radicalisation can be found in one way or another in both regions. The emergence in Russia of radical organisations, including those that resort to terrorist attacks, has largely been attributed to domestic causes, including the high level of corruption, unemployment, specific aspects of the distribution of jobs and resources, and the scramble among powerful factions over the redistribution of property. The intellectual failure in the training of cadres of mullahs has affected not only the Muslim elite but Russian society too, which was unprepared for multi-faceted contact with the Islamic world.

Likewise destabilising is the role played in Russia by such radical organisations as Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (HTI), al-Qaeda factions, etc. There is evidence that Russian citizens have been participating in the fighting in Syria within the ranks of the radical opposition. In the foreseeable future, instability in the Arab world, including direct military conflicts and civil war (the Sinai, Lebanon, Syria), as well as terrorist attacks (Iraq, Libya) will continue. Prospects of prolonged instability not far from Russia’s borders may result in a spillover of violence and arms trafficking and the movement of soldiers-of-fortune to and from Russian regions.

Prospects of prolonged instability not far from Russia’s borders may result in a spillover of violence and arms trafficking and the movement of soldiers-of-fortune to and from Russian regions.

Russia was developing contacts with moderate Islamists such as the legally elected Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and was not supportive of the military coup. At the same time, however, secular regimes seem more predictable and reliable. The trip to Moscow in February 2014 of Field Marshal Abdul Fattah al-Sisi and Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy can hardly be downplayed to a mere search for an arms deal; it must be viewed in a broader political context. According to one American analyst, it was primarily American policy that caused the volte-face. “The inconsistent US policy toward Egypt has made Cairo open to offers of weapons sales from other countries, and Russia was quick to seize the opportunity for commercial and geostrategic reasons.”

Moscow seems to have been motivated not so much by trade reasons as by a desire to restore Russia’s relations with the new-old regime in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood has been

banned in Russia, and despite the contacts and exchanges, Russia might have had problems with the Islamists, had they stayed in power.

The Egyptian case is an exception. Unlike other Arab states affected by transformations, Egypt boasts an organised military force – an army with corporate interests. The military has traditionally controlled all spheres of public life. The Islamists failed to grind it down and weaken it. In addition, they were too hasty in trying to restrict a handful of the secular regime’s significant achievements, thereby alienating the most modernised part of the population. However, the spread of the phenomenon of the Arab awakening seems to have been halted. This does not mean the end of the transformation of the Arab world, where the need for change is felt quite acutely, but rather should be looked upon as breathing room for those regimes that might have been next in line. Apparently, the coup in Egypt, the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood’s activities, and the formation of a new government in Tunisia have slowed the triumphant procession of the Islamists in the Arab world, while the continuing bloody clashes in Syria have drawn a significant portion of the most radical Islamic forces.

Russia’s Military-Political and Business Ties with the Arab World

Despite the efforts made, trade and economic relations with the Arab world in the early 21st century have remained relatively minor and unstable. Annual trade has averaged 6.5–7 billion dollars. There continues to be a demand in Arab countries for Russian-produced arms and armaments, which are traditionally known for being more durable than Chinese products and cheaper than similar Western makes. According to the Centre for Analysis of World Arms Trade, recent figures show that Arab countries remain significant arms buyers – accounting for 14% of Russia’s arms exports.3 The Arab Spring has made it much more difficult for some Russian companies to continue to fulfil their contracts and previous agreements. Russian businesses have had problems in Libya, for example. At the same time, Russia has concluded an agreement with the new Egyptian leaders for arms deliveries worth 4 billion dollars. Arms deliveries to Libya may also be restored, although at a lower level.

The Instrumental Role of Middle East Policy

For President Putin, policy in the region has always been more than just a regional policy. He aims at a world order in which Russia’s role as a permanent member of the Security Council and Russian interests are recognised and respected. In this context, Russia insists on being treated by the West as an indispensable partner in the search for peace in Syria and a compromise on the Iranian nuclear programme. According to Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, “Two decades after the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia continues to be a major international player as a permanent member of the Security Council. Moscow espouses a distinct worldview that increasingly diverges from that of the West, and it is not shy about offering alternative solutions to a range of international issues.”4

Russia insists on being treated by the West as an indispensable partner in the search for peace in Syria and a compromise on the Iranian nuclear programme

One might add that, as an international player, Russia has been striving to keep the world order (probably not an ideal one) from falling into havoc; it has opposed the toppling of regimes as a result of intervention, and its Middle East policy works in the service of this image of Russia.

The Crisis in Ukraine and the Middle East

The acceptance of the Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (following the referendum) into the Russian

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Federation has led to the most severe crisis in Russia’s relations with the US and the EU since the end of the Cold War. Vitaly Naumkin, director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, points out that the closing of Syria’s diplomatic missions in the United States "is interpreted as a signal that the American administration is pursuing a tougher policy with respect to Damascus, and that Washington is very likely to move away from cooperation with Moscow in resolving the Syrian crisis."  

Negative reactions by the EU and the US to Russian policy and the imposition of sanctions could make cooperation in the region much more complicated or even impossible. That said, one might doubt the wisdom of such an approach. Joint efforts to stabilise the situation in Syria or to ensure that the military aspects of Iran’s nuclear programme will never be revived are mutually beneficial, not to mention joint efforts in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Cooperation on Middle East issues could have prevented bilateral relations from sliding even further down the slope when other areas of mutual concern and interaction have been closed.

**Under the present circumstances, it seems that Middle East policy may become even more instrumental to Russia than before**

Under the present circumstances, it seems that Middle East policy may become even more instrumental to Russia than before. The developments in the region in 2013-2014 have proved that the general approaches of the various global actors to events there (as different as they still are) have been getting closer. It is more obvious now that the Islamic extremists fighting in Syria pose a serious threat not only to corrupt and inadequate regimes but also to modern international relations. There is the mutual goal of preserving Syrian statehood. These sober considerations may help to overcome the present crisis.

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Non-conventional weapons – biological, chemical, nuclear and ballistic missiles – continue to pose challenges to Middle Eastern security. Not only are they present, or believed to be present, in the region, but some of those weapon categories have actually been used in war. Internal political instability in many Middle Eastern countries and the opening of new geopolitical fissures in some sub-regions over the past few years have rekindled fears about possible nuclear weapon proliferation and regional competition in longer-range ballistic missiles. The recurrent use of chemical weapons (CWs) against civilians in the Syrian civil war carries echoes of Iraq’s chemical attacks against Iranian troops and its Kurdish minority during the 1980s. The region, however, faces a deep-seated paradox: Arab governments and Iran almost singularly focus on removing Israel’s nuclear capacity, whereas all actual use of unconventional weapons in the Middle East targeted fellow Arabs or Muslims.

The Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) calls for a “conference in 2012, to be attended by all states of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the states of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon states.” As of March 2014, the meeting had still not been convened due to widely diverging views on its format and purpose within the region. In addition, the domestic upheavals that roil many Arab countries and the questions about the true purpose of Iran’s nuclear programme have not been conducive to region-wide disarmament talks. Syria’s surprise accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) after a series of CW attacks outside Damascus in August 2013 and the subsequent dismantlement of its chemical warfare capacity under international supervision have altered security calculations and affect the rationale for the regional negotiations.

Status of Non-conventional Weapons in the Middle East

Four international agreements govern non-conventional weapons in the Middle East: the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which prohibits the use in armed conflict of chemical and biological weapons (CBWs); the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the CWC, which prohibit the development, acquisition, stockpiling and use of biological and chemical weapons respectively; and the NPT, which forbids non-nuclear weapon states to acquire nuclear weapons in exchange for access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and orders the five recognised nuclear-weapon states to pursue disarmament in good faith. The 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not yet entered into force, but as with the other international agreements, the vast majority of Middle Eastern states have deposited their instrument of ratification. Table 8 offers an overview of participation by Middle Eastern states in those agreements.

1 This article was completed in March 2014.
A look at the status of the different treaties would seem to indicate that the ambition to rid the Middle East of non-conventional weaponry could be achieved by having the few outsiders join the respective treaties. As the Geneva Protocol belongs to the laws of war and the CTBT has yet to enter into force, the focus can be narrowed to a mere two countries: Egypt (BTWC and CWC) and Israel (BTWC, CWC and NPT). Unfortunately, the situation is politically and psychologically more complicated.

Everything Is Connected to Everything Else

Disarmament requires a security environment that is conducive to its objective: the organisation of interstate security by means other than the weapon category to be eliminated. Such alternatives may include the deployment of weaponry not included in international prohibitions or diplomatic interaction. Even if this precondition materialises, the arms to be eliminated have to be in a functionally equivalent relationship among the key security actors, i.e., they must play a more or less similar role in the respective military doctrines. Those arms can belong to the same weapon category (e.g., strategic nuclear missiles in the US-Russian bilateral START agreement) or they can be dissimilar (e.g., nuclear and chemical weapons if both serve strategic deterrence purposes).²

On the surface, the disarmament question in the Middle East appears straightforward: Arab countries will totally renounce CBWs if Israel relinquishes its nuclear arsenal. The position evolved from Egypt’s original proposal in 1974 to create a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) to an acceptance that any regional agreement should include security incentives.

for Israel. In the course of the Arms Control & Regional Security Working Group (ACRS) meetings (1992–96), the country consolidated the proposal. Egypt thus laid the foundation for the call to eliminate all non-conventional weapons from the Middle East, first in the final document of the 1995 NPT Review Conference, and later in the aforementioned 2010 final document.

However, the linkage of Israel’s nuclear weapons to CW capacities held by Arab states (between the 1970s and 2013 this would have included Egypt, Libya, Iraq and Syria at various times), as suggested by the principle of functional equivalence, has always been tenuous at best. First, given its policy of opacity, Israel has never acknowledged possession of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Regarding the latter two categories, it has repeatedly reiterated that it will not be the first country to introduce them into the region. Given that Israel has never issued a specific nuclear threat to any adversary (in contrast to its policies of assured retaliation for any aggression and pre-emptive military strikes to neutralise emerging existential threats), there exists no declared doctrinal function for its nuclear weapons, even though most analysts accept their role as a deterrent of last resort. Second, questions can be raised about Israel’s role in Arab motivations to acquire chemical stockpiles. In every case, an Arab state has used them against another Arab or Islamic state (Egypt in Yemen during the 1960s; Iraq against Iran between 1982 and 1988; Libya allegedly in Chad in 1987) or against its own population (Iraq against the Kurds in the 1980s; Syria in the civil war in 2013). Only Syria’s CW arsenal could have served a doctrinal function of strategic and existential deterrence from the 1990s onwards, but in view of its accession to the CWC in 2013 and the current international operations to eliminate its chemical warfare capacity, this functionally equivalent doctrinal relationship – if it ever existed – has all but dissipated.  

Israel’s basic quest concerns recognition of its right to exist by the other Middle Eastern states. The hostility is reflected in treaty reservations by several Arab governments stating that their adherence to the treaty does not imply recognition of the State of Israel. Iran likewise formally declares at BTWC or CWC meetings that Israel’s participation as an observer or the presence of an Israeli NGO cannot be construed as a recognition of the State of Israel. The Palestinian political authorities, irrespective of the faction they belong to, also repeatedly question or steadfastly refuse to recognise the permanency of Israel in the region in spite of the 1993 and 1995 Oslo Accords with the Palestine Liberation Organisation. Israel consequently demands a variety of formal security guarantees from each partner as a precondition to entering into any form of disarmament or arms control colloquy.

**The Need for a New Security Discourse**

History proves that formal international accords require the mutual recognition of the interlocutors as equal partners. It was no accident that the first formal ban on the use of poison in war was signed between France and Germany in 1675, less than 30 years after the Peace of Westphalia, which had ushered in the international system of equal entities, the sovereign states. The international community’s ability to destroy Syria’s CWs resulted to a large extent from the requirement to set aside personalised animosities and involve the Syrian Arab Republic as an equal partner (which it has to be as a party to the CWC). Reintegrating Libya into the international fabric was key to the elimination of its CWs and nuclear activities. The current discussions to enhance nuclear transparency in Iran are founded on similar principles.

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3 Syria also maintained a policy of opacity regarding its CWs. However, under the CWC it declared a stockpile of 1,300 metric tonnes of predominantly precursor chemicals rather than final warfare agents, which suggests that the deterrent capacity of its chemical warfare arsenal in a rapidly escalating existential crisis might have been severely limited in view of the multiple days needed to prepare the agents and fill them into the missile warheads and other munitions.

Engaging the Middle Eastern partners in a disarmament or arms control dialogue will require a solid dose of Realpolitik, in which everybody will need to overcome personal grievances and tendencies towards demonising adversaries, and perhaps, defer justice until such time as primary security goals and patterns of dialogue have been attained. This is a complex and emotionally charged process, which can only be achieved if decision-makers and social entrepreneurs determine that weapon control is a primary objective. Direct engagement based on mutual recognition as equal partners can offer a pathway to resolving other outstanding issues (even though reality will dictate that not every grievance can be settled).

In the field of disarmament, the need to de-link nuclear weapons from the other weapon categories is imperative. Not simply because of “functional equivalence” imperatives, but because the original motives for their coupling have evolved. Given its pre-occupation with removing Israel’s nuclear arsenal from the regional security equation, Egypt also braved the possibility of withdrawing from the CBW as a coercive lever. Already at the Paris conference convened by France in January 1989 to restore the authority of the Geneva Protocol in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war and accelerate the CWC negotiations, Egypt threatened with a united Arab boycott of the future convention unless Israel became a party to the NPT. The Arab League formally adopted this position after finalisation of the CWC in 1992. It did not hold, however, as most Arab states joined the treaty within the first years of its entry into force (a reflection of the fact that economic and other interests dominate the policy preferences of countries on the periphery of the Arab–Israeli conflict). Today Egypt remains the sole country upholding the position. Nobody in the region now possesses CWs to offset Israel’s nuclear weapons.

There is an urgent need to move from declaratory politics to designing feasible strategies and testing their implementation. For example, it is easy to state that Israel should join the NPT and rescind its nuclear capacity. However, as Israel cannot become an NPT party while possessing such weapons, the critical policy choice is whether to insist on formal declarations of possession and the composition of the arsenal, followed by international oversight of its dismantlement, or whether to accord Israel continuation of its policy of opacity while disarming it. In the latter case, Israel could follow South Africa’s example of unilateral disarmament, after which it could accede to the NPT and have the International Atomic Energy Agency confirm the dismantlement through inspections. Knowing that Israel seeks to address its existential security threats first, removing reservations to arms control agreements that deny recognition of Israel could be a first small step that would open pathways to further dialogue. Multinational technical and scientific collaboration in the field to test and ameliorate verification proposals will gradually improve common understandings and make solutions politically acceptable, as the US and USSR experienced while discussing bilateral arms control treaties in the late 1980s. The key issue is to decide on the first small steps to be taken now to eventually enable significant progress tomorrow.
The US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 marked the birth of new geopolitics in the Middle East. Two years later, the Bush administration attacked Iraq hoping not only to topple the country’s brutal and unpredictable dictator, but also to pave the way towards the collapse of the Iranian system. The theory behind the US policy-makers’ thinking was the democratic domino effect. Paul Wolfowitz, then the US Deputy Defence Secretary and one of the masterminds of the Iraq invasion, maintained that Iraq could be, “the first Arab democracy” and that it would “cast a very large shadow, starting with Syria and Iran, but across the whole Arab world.” However, we now know that his theory was flawed. In fact, with the collapse of Iran’s two arch enemies, i.e., the Taliban to the east and Saddam Hussein to the west, Iran’s influence became increasingly stronger over time. This was entirely unexpected by the US while it happened, first in Iraq and, subsequently, in other parts of the region. Then there were two more colossal waves, the results of which began to reshape geopolitics of the Middle East. The first wave consisted of uprisings in part of the Arab world against long-lived dictatorships, the so-called “Arab Spring” that began in Tunisia in December 2010. The second wave, initially inspired by the first, was the eruption of the Syrian civil war. These two developments have also had a great impact on the geopolitics of the region and beyond.

The ties between Tehran and Damascus have historically been based on shared strategic interests, including circumvention of US and Israeli hegemony in the Middle East. The two countries also supported one another to balance Arab states that are allied with the US and unfriendly towards them. Once the civil war erupted in Syria, major regional and extra-regional actors became involved with a tacit consensus to curb Iran’s strategic depth in the region by toppling Bashar al-Assad’s regime. Additionally, each member of this group sought to gain a distinguished position with which to exert its influence in the region, thereby enabling it to fulfil its own interests. As such, a front involving the West – led by the United States – Israel, Turkey, and several Arab states in the region – led by Saudi Arabia – was formed to bring down Bashar al-Assad. The opposing front included the Syrian government, Iran and Russia. Subsequent developments created complexities that were unexpected by anti-Assad proponents. Out of these complexities emerged threats to the actors in the front and divisions amongst them. Let us see how the developments played out.

The United States

The US administration admits that “...it is clear that the crisis of Syria is growing, not diminishing.” The deplorable rise in Syria of al-Qaeda and affiliated groups that are arch enemies of the United States has sharply elevated Syria’s level of threat to the national...
security of the US. According to the US Secretary of Homeland Security, Jeh Johnson, “Syria has become a matter of homeland security.” In his annual report entitled “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” James R. Clapper, US Director of National Intelligence, told the US Senate that the war in Syria has, “created opportunities for extremist groups to find ungoverned spaces from where they can try to destabilise new governments and prepare attacks against Western interests.”

The US approach in Syria as described by President Barack Obama in his State of the Union address has been to “support the opposition that rejects the agenda of terrorist networks,” with the expectation of unseating Assad. This protocol, combined with turning a blind eye to the policies of those of its allies in Syria – mainly Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey – that have directly or indirectly contributed to Jihadi groups, both logistically and financially, has been responsible for the creation of the current, dangerous dilemma in Syria. Interestingly, in his statement Clapper referred to Syria as a “proxy war” between Iran and Hezbollah on the one hand and “Sunni Arab states” on the other.

Some observers argue that the Syrian crisis may provide the US with a strong enough incentive to reach a resolution with Iran over its nuclear programme more quickly so that the two countries can tackle the Syrian crisis in a concerted, cooperative manner.

By now, conventional wisdom dictates that there is no viable solution to remedy the crisis in Syria other than to engage Iran. Iran and the US share a common enemy and must strategically halt al-Qaeda advances, rooting them out in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan. As such, it is reasonable to expect that the US will engage Iran at such time as their dispute over Iran’s nuclear programme is resolved. In fact, some observers argue that the Syrian crisis may provide the US with a strong enough incentive to reach a resolution with Iran over its nuclear programme more quickly so that the two countries can tackle the Syrian crisis in a concerted, cooperative manner.

**Israel**

With the emergence of the moderate Hassan Rouhani as President in Iran, hardliners in Israel and the pro-Israel lobby in the US urged the US administration not to abandon its aggressive policies towards Iran. After the historic telephone conversation between Rouhani and Obama last November, the first direct communication between the two countries’ leaders since the Islamic revolution in 1979, Israel’s President Netanyahu called Rouhani a “wolf in sheep’s clothing” and warned the international community not to buy into his charm offensive. Meanwhile, after the Geneva interim agreement between Iran and the P5+1 in November 2013, aimed at permanently resolving Iran’s nuclear crisis, the pro-Israel lobby relentlessly sought to impose new sanctions on Iran through the US Congress in order to derail the process of reaching a peaceful solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. Had the move actualised, it would have been a clear violation of the Geneva agreement and, thus, the end of it. Israel and its lobby faced a major defeat on two fronts. First, the US took Tehran’s conciliatory messages seriously and, after ten tumultuous years, carried out covert and overt talks with Iran and, ultimately, entered into an agreement with Iran in the framework of the P5+1. Pouring cold water on the potential for new US sanctions against Iran, Obama publicly warned that he would veto such efforts by the pro-Israel lobby in the Congress.

Another major defeat experienced by Israel was its failure to convince the Obama administration to militarily attack Syria. The Russo-Iranian initiative of convincing Bashar al-Assad to annihilate Syria’s

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chemical weapons arsenal, as well as opposition to military attack from some European capitals, mainly the British Parliament, left no room for President Obama to pursue military options. As a result of these developments, Israel became isolated and unable to pursue its aggressive policies toward Iran. Worsening matters, as the Syrian war unfolded, the American expert on US security Bruce Riedel put it best: the jihadists surrounding Israel became the frontline threat to the country “like never before in the history of the global jihad.”

### Turkey

The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was another major element of the tacit coalition pursuing regime change in Syria. Erdogan has never shied away from expressing his firm support for Islamic groups including the Muslim Brotherhood. Furthermore, his crackdown on social media and threats to his rivals of “paying the price" for opposing him have resulted in a clear fragmentation of Turkish society and have also escalated friction between Turkey and Western countries. The situation was exacerbated with recent developments in the Syrian town of Kasab, where members of the Armenian community were attacked by the jihadist Jabhat al-Nusra group, a group that Erdogan’s government is accused of supporting. The case has already triggered focus by the US House of Representatives on Turkey’s role in Syria, given its support of jihadi groups. On the evening of his party’s March 2014 victory in the local elections, Erdogan declared that Turkey is at war with Syria. Erdogan relentlessly continues to pursue his initial plan to bring down the Assad regime. However, as the situation in Syria deteriorates and the threat of groups that are associated with al-Qaedaingers, Turkey will face two options: either shift from its existing failed policy towards Syria, or deal with the terrorist blowback, for a long time. Adding to the misery is Turkey’s economy. Once hailed as a miracle, its growth has abated and the Turkish currency has plunged to near record lows against the dollar. Erdogan’s dream of becoming a super power in the region and erecting a neo-Ottoman empire did not come true. Indeed, it is difficult for one to imagine how Turkey is prepared to play a significant role in the region.

### Saudi Arabia

Leading the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Saudi Arabia hoped to compensate for its loss in Iraq to Shia Iran by involving itself in efforts to topple Syria’s Assad, Iran’s strategic partner. Saudi Arabia intended to establish a Sunni Syria with one caveat: that a Muslim Brotherhood government in Damascus would threaten the monarchy. Things did not go as expected. Instead of moderate groups, there rose extremists who are sworn enemies of the Saudis. Making matters worse were heightened differences between Qatar, which has close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and has also played a major role in funding Islamic rebels in Syria, and three GCC countries led by Saudi Arabia in March 2014. These differences resulted in the withdrawal of the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE from Doha, Qatar’s capital. Qatar “suggested the move stemmed from displeasure over its actions beyond the Gulf, for example in Syria and Egypt, where it has backed groups opposed to the Saudi government.” If this claim holds true, it means that Saudi engagement in Syria has backfired. Not only would the Saudis have failed to expand their influence in the region by toppling Bashar al-Assad, but they would also have lost their leadership role in the GCC. Compounding the problem of their waning

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leadership is that Oman, another GCC member, acted as a mediator between the US and Iran, the outcome of which was the realisation of the most unprecedented deal between Iran and the US since the 1981 Algiers Accord.

As strange as it may seem, the US is encouraging Saudi Arabia to move towards the resolution of its disputes with Iran, allowing them to address their regional security and the threat from al-Qaeda in concert.

The US-Saudi relationship has also been strained by the US administration’s reluctance to pursue military action in Syria, as well as the secret negotiations with Iran leading to the Geneva agreement between Iran and the P5+1. Now, if the United States makes the likely decision to combat the dangerously organised terrorism in Syria, it would not be able to implement a coherent policy in Syria as long as its close ally, Saudi Arabia, is involved in a proxy war with Iran. Therefore, as strange as it may seem, the US is encouraging Saudi Arabia to move towards the resolution of its disputes with Iran, allowing them to address their regional security and the threat from al-Qaeda in concert. This unprecedented alliance has the potential to transform the geopolitics of the region from one driven by suspicion, hostility and competition, to a new one based on confidence-building and cooperation.

So far, it seems that Iran’s rivals have not benefited from their tacit consensus, and subsequent actions aimed at over overthrowing Bashar al-Assad and curbing Iran’s strategic depth in the region continue without success. However, one can calculate that if Iran’s nuclear issue is resolved, the United States will move towards cooperation with a willing Iran in combating organised terrorism in Syria as well as Iraq and seeking to bring the Syrian crisis to a diplomatic end. In that event, Qatar, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, being allies of the US, will not challenge US policy. On the contrary, Saudi Arabia in particular, as mentioned earlier, will likely engage in a reconciliation process with Iran and even cooperate in the interest of fighting extremists that threaten its own monarchy. Under the moderate Rouhani, with a strong mandate to improve relations with its neighbours, Iran will be receptive to this initiative. As Mohamed ElBaradei penned recently, a final resolution to Iran’s nuclear crisis “can be translated into a broad security and cooperation agreement, paving the way for a grand bargain with the West and a sea change in regional security and stability.”

Meanwhile, although the Israeli hardliners and the pro-Israel lobby in the US will likely make efforts to prevent the formation of such cooperation as it appears, the Obama administration has made its decision to pursue détente with Iran. However, if the Geneva interim agreement fails, the US, in all likelihood, will tighten the sanctions even further. In such an eventuality, communication and dialogue between Iran and America will likely come to a halt and the pattern of previous years, i.e. the exchange of hostile and threatening rhetoric from both sides, will once again culminate in hostilities. Irreconcilable and confictual policies on both sides of the fence cannot continue forever. History dictates that when governments fail to overcome their differences through dialogue, they seek military solutions.

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If anything can define the Middle East in 2014, it is its character as a region that is messy and in rapid flux. In this part of the world, as in others, insecurity leads to power struggles. Regional foreign policies are aimed at eliminating or containing threats, whether perceived or real, to ‘security,’ which can be understood in different ways. National security is often confused with the security of the regime and its capacity to remain in power. It also encompasses interests of the State, such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and the capacity to exert influence. The latter may be aimed at reaching regional leadership, advancing economic interests or gaining recognition from the major powers.

From a realist perspective, when faced with a serious threat, these states will often either seek balance by forming alliances or ‘bandwagon’ as opportunists. In other words, the choice is between forming alliances against common threats or aligning with the source of the threat in an attempt to stay safe from harm. The ensuing security dilemmas are, therefore, how countries can defend themselves without their rivals feeling threatened and subsequently triggering an arms race. Another security dilemma facing several countries in the Middle East is the choice between developing their own defensive capabilities and ‘contracting’ their defence from the major international powers. These dilemmas often generate paradoxes and contradictions.

For decades, the countries in the Middle East have formed different alliances, been the target of multiple threats and suffered numerous overlapping conflicts. These processes seem to have become much more complex in recent years. Three factors – which will be dealt with later – contribute to this growing complexity: 1) the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the consequences of having upset internal and regional balances, 2) the ‘Arab Awakening’ and the socio-political transformations experienced in the region since 2011, and 3) the foreign policy of the Obama administration towards the area, in part conditioned by the two preceding factors.

The Middle East is becoming a region with multiple centres of instability and increasingly complex conflicts, which stretch from north to south and east to west. The destruction of Syria, decomposition of Iraq, unrest in Egypt and Libya, rivalries between the petro-monarchies of the Gulf, complicated relations with Iran, widespread social discontent, exploitation of the ethno-sectarian divides, spread of jihadism, confusing US policy in the area and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict are some of the symptoms – and results – of the growing complexity that the Middle East is experiencing.

The above-described panorama is producing a rapidly growing uncertainty among the different regional actors, which increases the sense of insecurity. This, in turn, has a direct effect on their choice of alliances and foreign policy-making. Faced with different threats – real or potential – alliances arise that are not necessarily exclusive in character. Allies against one threat may not be the same against another. In today’s Middle East there are rivals that share common enemies, allies that support opposing sides of the same conflict, contradicting interests between ‘friendly’ countries, common interests between ‘enemies,’ unimaginable part-

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nervations until recently and unnatural pacts. Some old friendships and enmities are being replaced by new alliances in a highly volatile environment.

**Three Shock Waves**

Three factors – referred to here as ‘shock waves’ due to their capacity to dramatically increase tensions and generate explosions – are contributing to disfiguring the Middle East and altering the alliances and balances of power among its members. The first shock wave was produced by the invasion of Iraq, led by the United States in 2003, and the consequent regime change in Bagdad. According to the neo-conservatives, this invasion would serve to transform the country into a loyal ally of the United States and make it a model for democratisation for its neighbours. The reality, a decade later, is quite different: Iraq is a fractured country, plagued by violence and radicalism and whose sectarian government is in the hands of allies close to Iran.

The United States’ actions in the Middle East after 9/11 have contributed – unwittingly – to Iran’s regional rise. On the one hand, in 2001 the United States put an end to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (enemy of the Iranian Ayatollahs), which gave the power in Kabul to groups allied with Tehran. On the other hand, in 2003 the administration of George W. Bush toppled Saddam Hussein, who had acted as a containment wall against Iran’s ambitions of hegemony in its Arab neighbourhood. A predictable consequence was the increase in Iran’s influence on the arc that stretches from Iran to Lebanon and through Iraq and Syria. This, on the one hand, has sparked strong reactions from Iran’s rivals and, on the other, reluctance on the part of the United States to get involved in further Middle Eastern ventures.

The second shock wave was produced by the so-called ‘Arab Awakening,’ which, since 2011, has generated internal shake-ups in several countries. The effects of the socio-political changes can be felt throughout the region and have put all authoritarian regimes on the defensive, faced with the risk of coming under increasing criticism from their populations. This has led all regimes to trying to ‘shield’ themselves with all possible resources: economic (trying to contain social discontent or influencing other potentially problematic countries), ideological (exercising influence through certain religious-political interpretations), identity-focused (mobilising socio-political actors by appealing to their primary identities, whether tribal, religious or ethnic) or resorting to dependence (seeking protection from external security providers in exchange for guaranteeing certain strategic interests). The third shock wave was the change in the policies of the Obama administration towards the Middle East. Much has been debated on whether Washington is disengaging from the region as a result of its pivot towards Asia. What seems clear is that, more than having a ‘policy’ towards the region, Obama has adopted an ‘attitude’ based on the belief that such deep involvement in these countries creates more problems for the United States and depletes energy for tackling serious challenges in other regions. That change in attitude is altering the calculations of the United States’ traditional allies, which, in turn, is generating nervousness and mistrust in countries like Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, Turkey and the small petro-monarchies of the Gulf.

Growing levels of energy self-sufficiency, together with traumatic experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, have led the United States to ask its allies (and also its former enemy Iran) to assume more responsibility in guaranteeing a framework of regional security that does not depend almost entirely on Washington.

This focus explains why, in November 2013, an interim agreement was signed in Geneva – described by many as ‘historic’ – between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. The agreement was focused on the Iranian nuclear programme, although its reach would be much broader with the gradual lifting of international sanctions against Iran and its opening to the rest of the world. A key issue for Iran lies in the recognition implied in negotiating ‘face to face’ with the major world powers.

**Uncertain Alliances in a Convoluted Region**

The traditional analytical framework for explaining the formation of alliances in the Middle East is revealing.
serious limitations, owing to the fact that several of these states are fragmenting and have ceased to operate as cohesive actors. In fact, Syria and Iraq have ceased to act as states in their internationally recognised territories for some years already. The concept of the ‘State’ in the region as a whole is increasingly under question. The borders inherited from European colonialism (determined in the Sykes-Picot agreement) are also being brought into question, as well as the traditional leadership models in societies with large numbers of young people, low expectations in wealth distribution, little respect for freedoms and an increasing openness to the outside word.

Several of the conflicts currently affecting the Middle East are often viewed as part of a sectarian war between members of the two main branches of Islam: Sunnis and Shiites. While it is true that the religious element figures highly in the discourses of both sides’ ideologues, the key does not lie in a religious war, but in a bloody power struggle in the face of increasing insecurity, in which the opposing religious identities are replacing nationalism as a mobilising agent. It is easy to identify a kind of ‘Cold War’ in the Middle East between Saudi Arabia and Iran, each of which relies on clients and allies (both states and non-state actors) whom they support with resources, guarantees and direct involvement when possible.

Today, three regional blocs can be identified: the bloc under Iranian-Shiite leadership (which includes the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, the Iraqi regime of Nuri al-Maliki, Hezbollah and, in a more or less intermittent way, Palestinian militias like Hamas or the Islamic Jihad); the Saudi-Sunni bloc (on which the Egyptian regime depends, headed by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, together with countries like the United Arab Emirates, Bahrein, Jordan and, to an extent, the Palestinian National Authority); and lastly a much weakened bloc formed mainly by Qatar and different organisations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. The military/civilian coup against the Egyptian government of Mohamed Morsi in July 2013 strongly affected the composition of these alliances, as that government was close to both Qatar and Turkey. For its part, although Israel has not declared itself to be a member of any of the blocs, it is a de facto ally in the Riyadh-Cairo axis.

Despite the apparent clarity of the blocs described above, there is a high degree of complexity regarding their alliances and interactions. While Saudi Arabia and Qatar compete with one another and take opposing positions over the destiny of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the two countries are allied against Iran and its protégé al-Assad, supporting Syrian groups composed of the Muslim Brotherhood, among others. For its part, Iran massively supports the al-Assad regime against the Syrian Islamist rebels, who are backed by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinian movement Hamas, which, remarkably, have also received support from Tehran. With regard to Turkey, this country maintains good relations with the Arab Gulf states and is siding with them against al-Assad, while holding a very different view with regards the support that the military-backed Egyptian regime should be receiving. And lastly there is the so-called Islamic State (or ISIS), which has taken control of territories on both sides of the border between Syria and Iraq and is currently threatening countries that had previously given it their support.

**Whither the Middle East?**

Faced with the increase in regional instability and the – relative but firm – advance of powers fighting against the status quo from very different positions, there is a real risk of implosion, which would subsequently disfigure the Middle East. This could be caused by the disintegration of certain borders, the decomposition of more states, wars between neighbours or a regional conflagration. The question is whether there is time to halt the processes that could result in one of these scenarios and, if so, what policies could now avoid the appearance of much more serious problems in a not very distant future.

The United States seems to be trying to square the circle: reaching a definitive agreement with Iran, maintaining its traditional alliances in the Middle East, containing the devastating effects of the decomposition of Syria and Iraq, and, at the same time, avoiding being dragged into a new military intervention in the region. Achieving all these goals does not seem easy, or even probable; something many are counting on and will try to take advantage of when the time comes. All of the above bodes for an unstable short-term future in the Middle East, where today’s alliances can change abruptly and where one has to be prepared to expect the unexpected.
The Inverse Trajectories of the Salafists in Tunisia and Egypt

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The post-revolutionary transitions in Tunisia and Egypt have been marked by the emergence of Salafist movements whose real strength few observers have truly comprehended. The irruption of the Salafist phenomenon was accompanied by two highly contrasting situations. In Tunisia, the Salafist current progressively assumed an increasingly aggressive, anti-system posture; whereas in Egypt, the main Salafist party not only played the electoral game, but even provided its support to the overthrow of the Muslim Brotherhood by a military junta.

This complex process once again reveals the futility of attempts to interpret Arab societies according to a single “Islamism,” for it is clearly Islamisms that are competing in their plurality, at times highly contradictory. For Salafist movements, the challenge is twofold, for their aim is at once:

– To take on politicisation, although the “literalist” conception of Salafism (sometimes paradoxically qualified as “scientific”) rejects all forms of social activism as contrary to Islam, in particular any recognition of human institutions of an elected type;
– And to distance themselves from Jihadi groups, whose verbal and violent escalation could appeal to Salafist militants radicalised by the anathema placed on the entire transition, denounced as “impious.”

It is in Egypt that this twofold challenge has been undertaken with the greatest relative success for local Salafists, while their Tunisian counterparts, carried away by their anti-system logic, have been unable to stem the drift towards Jihadism. This is why we shall discuss the case of Egypt first, followed by Tunisia, the latter as an illustration of problematic reciprocal exclusion, whereas the former is, to date, the best example of “successful” integration.

The Relative Success of the Egyptian Salafists

The first free elections in contemporary Egypt were the legislative elections of December 2011 - January 2012. The victory of the Muslim Brotherhood, which obtained 37% of the votes, was anticipated by all the political forces, whether they considered it a positive or negative factor. On the other hand, the performance of the Salafist party, Al-Nour (The Light) was astonishing, nearly a quarter of the votes going to a party that had been established only a few months earlier. In contrast to the highly hierarchical apparatus of the Muslim Brotherhood, the politically novice Al-Nour party broadly opened nominations to their party, attracting part of the young post-revolutionary generation.

The Salafist parliamentarians’ results are quite meagre, however, despite certain symbolic, short-lived provocations. It is true that the Egyptian Assembly, despite its democratic character, does not have any real power, for the executive power continues to lie with the military junta that overthrew Hosni Mubarak, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

* This article was finalised on January 2014 (Editor’s note).
In the May-June 2012 presidential elections, Al-Nour decided at first to support Abdul Moneim Aboul Foutouh, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, who rallied a heteroclite coalition of Islamists and liberals. The elimination of Aboul Foutouh, who came in a meagre fourth position in the first electoral round, was a cruel disavowal for the Salafist leadership, forced to fall back on Mohammed Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate. During Morsi’s year as President (June 2012 - June 2013), the Salafists struggled to find their place in the face of the Muslim Brotherhood’s aspiration to hegemony over the entire Islamist sphere, if not beyond. They joined in the storm of protest denouncing the liberticidal tendencies of Morsi’s followers. But they actively supported the “Islamic” nature of the new constitution, adopted in December 2012.

The Armed Forces over the Brotherhood

The rising tension between the Muslim Brotherhood and the armed forces at the start of summer 2013 led the Salafists to primarily choose to take the side of the latter over the former. Al-Nour even enjoined the Muslim Brotherhood to conduct public self-criticism, thus de facto supporting the overthrow of Morsi by General Abdul Fattah al-Sisi. This position elicited heated internal debate within the Salafist movement:

- The willingness displayed by Al-Nour to occupy the terrain left empty by the prohibition of the Muslim Brotherhood disconcerted many of their members.
- This willingness has encouraged the establishment of competing, more protest-oriented Salafist parties.

Al-Nour has nonetheless managed to keep a large part of the Salafist base, thus also neutralising the temptation towards Jihadi tendencies. The Egyptian armed forces are not mistaken in focussing the bulk of their accusations of “terrorism” solely against the Muslim Brotherhood. Insofar as Jihadi groups, they are operating from the Sinai (including the Ansar Beit al-Maqdes group, responsible for the Mansoura attack in December 2013), among other places, and they claim full autonomy with regard to both the Brotherhood and the Salafists.

Tunisia’s Specificities as Compared to Egypt

In contrast to Egypt, Tunisia emerged from President Ben Ali’s 23 years in power without a structured organisation in the local Islamist field comparable to that of the Muslim Brotherhood. The Ennahda party, which was established in March 2011, is the result, insofar as its leadership, of a combination of exiled leaders, foremost among them being Rached Ghannouchi, and former political prisoners, notably Hamadi Jebali and Ali Laarayedh.

The Salafist party that emerged in protest to Ennahda would thus quickly become radical, with an anti-system posture that could not but encourage Jihadi escalation.

Ennahda’s overwhelming popularity stems from its capacity to attract votes of highly different natures: pious votes, security votes (in favour of the party expected to dominate the Tunisian political arena) and protest votes (in favour of the party that supposedly embodies rupture with the previous regime). Ennahda thus managed to obtain 36% of the votes at the October 2011 elections to Tunisia’s National Constituent Assembly (NCA).

The other major difference to the situation in Egypt is that its electoral success allowed Ennahda immediate access to government administration (whereas Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood had to wait until the June 2012 presidential elections, six months after their triumph in the parliamentary elections). Part of the Salafist movement was thus absorbed by Ennahda’s rising momentum. The Salafist party that emerged in protest to Ennahda would thus quickly become radical, with an anti-system posture that could not but encourage Jihadi escalation. The main figure behind this process was Seif Allah Ibn Hussein, nicknamed Abu Iyadh al-Tunisi (the Tunisian). He was formerly in charge of Tunisian “volunteers” to Afghanistan and as such, had had dealings with Osama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda hierarchy.
The Salafist Mortgage on the Tunisian Transition

Extradited in 2003 from Turkey to Tunisia, Ibn Hussein was sentenced to 63 years of prison for terrorist activities. He was released, however, in the general amnesty of January 2011, following the overthrow of the dictator. He did not take long to organise his supporters and form the “Partisans of Sharia” (Ansar al-Sharia) group. The Salafist “congress,” held in Kairouan in May 2012, saw thousands of militants chanting “Obama, Obama, we are all Osama.”

The Ennahda leadership nonetheless believed it could neutralise the Salafist risk through dialogue and cooptation. This tactic, which corresponds to the Salafist sensibility of a sector of Ennahda’s members, ended in the disastrous management of the September 2012 attacks against the US Embassy. Instead of immediately repressing these anti-American protests, the Islamist government allowed them to develop before dispersing them with bloodshed. It was then that Abu Iyadh/Ibn Hussein went into hiding.

In Egypt, the Salafists seem relatively immune to Jihadi escalation, as they so deeply dream of establishing a lasting relationship with the military hierarchy that would allow them to consolidate themselves in an apparatus that is still young. Ansar al-Sharia’s switchover to Jihadi subversion has contributed to aggravating the crisis in Tunisia by polarising the “secular” and “Islamist” camps, in particular after the assassinations of progressive figures, first in February, then in July of 2013. Ali Laarayedh, who succeeded Hamadi Jebali as Prime Minister in March 2013, has finally taken an uncompromising line against Ansar al-Sharia, which is prohibited from holding another “congress.”

The Jihadi tendencies of the main Salafist group are fostered in Tunisia by the activity of commandos associated with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) along the Algerian border, as well as through the various forms of traffic with neighbouring Libya. There have been successive clashes in the Mount Chambi (Jebel ech Chambi) area, with unprecedented losses for the Tunisian armed forces, in turn challenging the legitimacy of the democratic government.

The Persistent Unpredictability of the Salafist Factor

It is thus not so much the Jihadi threat in and of itself that is hanging over Tunisia as its impact on a political arena as vulnerable as it is volatile. The terrorist attacks marking the second anniversary of elections to the National Constituent Assembly did not manage to compromise Ennahda’s devolution of power in December 2013 to a technocratic government mandated to conduct the last stage of the transition. In Egypt, the Salafists seem relatively immune to Jihadi escalation, as they so deeply dream of establishing a lasting relationship with the military hierarchy that would allow them to consolidate themselves in an apparatus that is still young. They thus hope to supplant the formidable machine of the now illegal Muslim Brotherhood in the social sphere as well. This venture is closely linked to the vagaries of an Egyptian process that seems more like it is closing rather than opening spaces for freedom.

In Tunisia as in Egypt, the Salafists have long taken advantage of the errors of their Islamist rivals, i.e. the indulgence of the Ennahda leadership up until the spring of 2013, and the Morsi team’s blindness until the moment he was ousted in July 2013. They have not, on the other hand, demonstrated a capacity to establish themselves in a deep, lasting manner in the post-revolutionary landscape, at least not at this stage.

The complex (and indulgent) game played by the Egyptian Salafists with the military junta entails serious risks. On the exact opposite scale to such accommodation, Ansar al-Sharia’s Jihadi escalation may well result in a bloody impasse. Taken by surprise by the fall of the despots, the Salafists are thus far from having decided on their ultimate relationship with the political and institutional camp.
Diplomacy and Agricultural Cooperation to Relaunch the Euro-Mediterranean Dynamic

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Considering that 2015 will mark the 20th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration, it is a good time to consider the cooperation sectors that still mobilise the Mediterranean Region and to which the European Union should be interested in dedicating more of its Southern Neighbourhood-oriented action. Agriculture, food security and rural areas are spheres in which the needs of development require dialogue and multilateral solidarity. The challenges to be met on these strategic matters call for greater Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, now more than ever. If the ambition for a pragmatic relaunch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is reaffirmed in 2015, agricultural, food and rural issues will have to be placed at the core of the new regional cooperation agenda. Why have such an intention? Because the challenge of food security is both colossal and vital. Colossal because the constraints are becoming more pronounced: shortage of water and land, the effects of climate change, demographic growth and socioeconomic evolutions are modifying diets and trade balances. Vital, because it conditions the day-to-day existence of populations, the development of societies and geopolitical stability.

The Mediterranean is the region of the world that depends the most on international markets to feed itself. Recourse to imports is indispensable. In 2012, the Arab Mediterranean countries, from Morocco to Syria, had to pay a combined food invoice of 52 billion dollars, an amount seven times greater than in the early 1980s, a critical period in which the agricultural trade deficit of these countries grew significantly. The economic weight of their food dependence is thus structural. The global agricultural landscape has changed, however. The prices of raw materials are experiencing an upward trend. The price volatility for agricultural commodities, which has always existed, is showing worrisome signs of restlessness. The global demand for certain food products surpasses the supply despite record-beating production. But the growth of this demand is greater than that of agricultural yields, which are levelling off, particularly in the Mediterranean Basin, where geography remains a handicap and access to technology is limited.

The case of cereals is symptomatic. These countries make nearly 20% of the world’s grain purchases every year. They must find approximately 40 million tonnes (Mt) of grain on the markets to cover their human and animal food needs. Egypt is the world’s leading wheat importer. This cereal deficit will inevitably grow in the coming years in the South Mediterranean and it is clear that market surveillance will become increasingly necessary. Sharing information and statistics among Mediterranean countries in the sphere of grains has proven delicate but a major step forward was made in February 2014 with the decision by CIHEAM Member States to set up a network (the Mediterranean Agricultural Markets Information Network or MED-AMIN) dedicated to developing trust and increasing transparency regarding markets.

Given the rise in the food needs of its Southern Neighbourhood, the EU and its Member States, the majority of which enjoy favourable conditions for agricultural production and which some consider
The Mediterranean is the region of the world that depends the most on international markets to feed itself. Recourse to imports is indispensable capable of exporting vital commodities such as grains, milk or meat, should continue to contribute to the food balance of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs). The latter, however, do not only have Europe as their agricultural geo-economic partner. Indeed, two thirds of their supply comes from the rest of the world and half of their agricultural exports are to extra-regional states. While Russian, Ukrainian and US grains find their way to North Africa and the Middle East, citrus fruit also takes the inverse route, not to mention the fact that new agricultural trade relations are likewise emerging in Africa, such as those undertaken by the Kingdom of Morocco or by major Algerian and Egyptian agro-food industries.

Somewhere between the difficulty of producing and the need for supplying lies logistic complexity in the matter of food security in the Mediterranean. The 2014 edition of the regional Mediterra report, published biennially by the International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies (CIHEAM), revealed the key role of trade and logistics, accentuating interdependences between Mediterranean countries and creating new ties with the rest of the world. Although significant progress has been made, there is still a great deal to be done insofar as logistics to obtain better performance in the Mediterranean Basin, whose countries will have to rise to this challenge in order to improve their competitiveness and reduce food insecurity. The aim of this report is to recall that, although agricultural development is an objective for every Mediterranean country, it is likewise necessary to optimise the logistics conditions of food security (the cold chain, infrastructures, transport, standards, the struggle against post-harvest losses and losses during distribution, etc.) and find the means to better combine the dynamics of trade with the needs of development. In sum, it should be stressed that food self-sufficiency for these countries is a myth and that the difficult aim of attaining greater food security perforce requires a holistic approach involving aspects of national policy but also new perspectives in terms of regional cooperation.

In this context, it must be stressed that on 6 February 2014, the Agriculture Ministers of the 13 CIHEAM Member States held their tenth meeting in Algiers on the theme of sustainable food security for the Mediterranean Basin. The tenth multilateral meeting of this type organised since 1999, it testifies to the will of these countries, from both the North and South Mediterranean, to regularly enter into dialogue on agriculture, food and rural development. The declaration adopted is ambitious, but rises to the regional challenges. Whereas the quantitative and qualitative aspects of food security are central, water, land and climate issues are at the heart of this declaration whose leitmotif is sustainable development. The imperatives of agricultural production (producing more and better crops), the quality of foodstuffs (standards, identity), employment in agriculture (in particular of youth), the struggle against food wastage (after harvest or in consumption) and inclusive growth for rural areas were regularly underscored in the different ministers’ presentations and figure prominently in the Algiers Declaration.

This meeting also reflects a broader political process tending to reinstate Mediterranean agricultural and rural issues on the strategic international and regional agenda. In fact, the participation of the Director General of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in this meeting was appreciated by the Mediterranean countries and mention is made in the Algiers Declaration of the agriculture ministers’ will that CIHEAM, EU and FAO activities be synergised to foster development in the Mediterranean. It is an important appeal and certainly an inspiring one. Another sign of this strategic redeployment of agricultural issues on the regional agenda was the first agricultural conference convened by the 5+5 Dialogue on 27 November 2013 and also held in Algiers. It was the first time since the creation of the 5+5 Dialogue in 1990 that a ministerial conference was held on this topic. It should be commended and the pursuit of this trend encouraged.

Clearly, the world food crisis in spring 2008 and the recent socio-political events in the Arab world, in which inflation of food prices and water, land and climate insecurities have constituted catalysts of revolt, have – unfortunately – contributed to the process of reinstating agriculture and food at the top of the international and regional Mediterranean diplomatic agenda. In any case, it must be kept in mind
that agriculture remains inseparable from rural issues. In Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries, where a third of the population lives in a rural environment and where one job out of five is in agriculture, it is impossible to consider the development of rural areas without considering agriculture. It is likewise just as unreasonable to attempt to render urban development sustainable without succeeding in reconnecting cities and inland rural areas. Such a geographic split is geopolitically unsustainable. This is true throughout the world but is a particularly significant problem in the Mediterranean.

The world food crisis in spring 2008 and the recent socio-political events in the Arab world, have contributed to the process of reinstating agriculture and food at the top of the international and regional Mediterranean diplomatic agenda.

The implementation of new national policies for agricultural and rural development in the majority of North African and Middle East States is thus encouraging, for this sector and these territories belong to the future and not the past, as was ineptly assumed at the turn of the millennium. The past few years, with their series of events associated with agriculture and social turbulence in rural areas, have shaken spirits. The Green Plan and the recent creation of a Permanent Inter-ministerial Commission on the Development of Rural and Mountainous Areas in Morocco and Lebanon’s strategy to make agriculture a pillar of its development are only a few examples. In a similar vein is an initiative called the European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (ENPARD), which should be followed with interest. Launched by the EU in 2011, today it involves six pilot countries (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia) and constitutes a true offer of in-depth partnership. Fostering dialogue on agriculture and rural issues between the EU and these countries, including on a multilateral level, the ENPARD initiative has raised great hope in the Southern Mediterranean area. It has also drawn the attention of international and bilateral technical and financial actors, since ENPARD participates in providing support for political and environmental transitions in the region and is involved in the matter of job creation (in particular for rural youth). All of these factors call for the extension of this initiative in the EU’s 2014-2020 programming.

The agricultural and rural experience of North Mediterranean EU States could undeniably nurture and enrich this regional dialogue, all the more so since European countries such as Italy, Greece or Spain have a great deal to learn from the South Mediterranean’s experience in adaptation to climate constraints and management of rare resources such as water and arable land. The concept of agroecology, dear to France today, can certainly draw from the pool of projects and solutions that have been operating for years in the Mediterranean Basin. Regional Euro-Mediterranean dialogue on agriculture cannot be limited solely to commercial or health considerations. Economic relations should be combined with the dynamics of development and technical support. Research towards improved food security in the Mediterranean Region requires multilateral involvement while ensuring the implementation of strategies adapted to the local situations of the various countries and to the often highly differentiated situations within each country.

The matter of agriculture should also be considered in all of its dimensions, including the nutritional component, which we shall discuss. Declared an item of Intangible Cultural Heritage by UNESCO in 2010, the Mediterranean diet is not only a sphere of culinary cooperation. It opens up spheres of cultural, tourism, social and thus political solidarity for development in the region, as emphasised by the 2012 edition of the Mediterra report that CIHEAM wrote in collaboration with the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed). The search for greater and more sustainable food security in the Mediterranean is indivisible from the challenges associated with the diet and the economics of heritage and heritage conservation it is capable of generating. Moreover, progress is required in the improvement of connections between research, innovation and the needs of development. All the more so since the “Water - Food - Energy” nexus, essential in the climate equation to be solved, demands inter-sectoral, interdisciplinary approaches and thus greater cooperation among the actors (states, local governments,
enterprise, professional organisations and universities). The implementation of research, development and innovation platforms such as the Mediterranean Science, Policy, Research & Innovation Gateway (Med-Spring) and Eranet-Med, in which CIHEAM plays a major role, demonstrates that the Euro-Mediterranean exists in concrete scientific initiatives that contribute to improving living conditions in the essential spheres of food, water and specialised training in indispensable professions.

In sum, the struggle against waste can represent another mobilising facet of Euro-Mediterranean agricultural cooperation. Water and land resources must be preserved, as well as forest systems and the aquacultural wealth of the Mediterranean Sea. Their depletion can be attenuated if efforts are made to economise on water, prevent the urbanisation of the last sections of arable land, combat desertification and forest fires and foster more responsible fishing. We must also fight against post-harvest wastage of produce, both during the transport stage and at the time of consumption. Too much food is lost or thrown out, an intolerable paradox at a time when hunger remains a reality for many throughout the world, in the Mediterranean Region and even in Europe. It would also be appropriate, in a third stage, to struggle against waste of knowledge. In agronomy or the environment, traditional knowledge should be protected and valued. Students studying professions in agriculture, rural development and food security also expect to be able to get involved in these sectors, which means having the income and the resources to carry out a difficult occupation, full of uncertainties (such as the climate or the selling price of produce) and too often in areas where underdevelopment still predominates. The human capital trained in professions indispensable for the lives of populations and the political stability of states should not be wasted, considering the regional challenges.

Clearly, specific solidarities do exist in the Mediterranean Region, so often described as divided and incapable of constructive dialogue. In the sphere of agriculture and foodstuffs, the will to work together is growing. This ongoing process is destined to expand, since the immensity of the challenges ahead calls for greater trade and cooperation. The International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agromonic Studies (CIHEAM), an intergovernmental organisation with 13 Mediterranean Member States, has been working in this direction for over half a century now, convinced that intercultural dialogue, education, research and technical assistance to development perforce require dealing with the agricultural spheres in this region of the world. Some 12,500 people have taken its Masters Programmes and specialised training courses over the past ten years. Ninety research and cooperation projects are currently underway at CIHEAM, destined to be at the heart of Mediterranean food-related diplomacy, to paraphrase the wishes of the ministers of agriculture of its Member States.

2014 is a pivotal year. The UN has declared it the international year of family farming. It is a strong message, that could have been even more effective in the Mediterranean Region if it had been coupled with family fishing, which represents a great deal of employment there. Towards the end of 2014, a new political and institutional landscape will moreover emerge in the EU. But 2015 will be the major rendezvous. The EU will possibly have a new project, or at least a renewed political spirit. The outcome of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) will be assessed and the post-2015 development agenda will be established. Agriculture, rural issues and food security are likely to figure prominently. The theme of the Milan Universal Exposition (Expo Milano), to be held from May to October 2015, is “Feeding the Planet: Energy for Life.” And in November 2015, the Barcelona Declaration will turn 20. Two decades after this vibrant appeal in favour of building a space for Euro-Mediterranean partnership, we must lend renewed meaning to this vision and focus cooperation on issues in which the future of Europe, northern Africa and the Middle East hangs in the balance. Although difficult to render tangible, this beautiful Euro-Mediterranean idea should not be wasted. The year 2015 will provide the opportunity to decidedly advocate a Mediterranean Sea that unites in order counter the dangerous discourse of a Mediterranean acting as a wall to separate Europe from Africa.
Strategic Sectors | Economy and Territory

Survey of the Causes and Consequences of the Arab Spring: Storm Warning for Tourism

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Arab countries are experiencing a delicate period of social, economic and political turbulence. Already de facto fragile\(^1\) or weakened by skewed governance, some have felt the full effects of the spontaneous revolts, known by the laudatory name of Arab Spring. After the euphoria elicited by the fall of dictatorships, the situation in countries in the grip of violence turned into a nightmare. Not only has nothing changed for the majority of the people concerned, but uncertainty has also come to aggravate their daily lives even more. Three years of wait-and-see politics (2011–2013) have sufficed to disrupt the economies of the stable countries and crush those of the vulnerable ones. Bearers of great hope at first, these uprisings have revived dormant ideological rivalries and antagonisms of a religious or ethnic order. They have also revealed the insidious side of façade agreements compelled by the role-playing of the fallen systems.

In any case, the political upheaval along the South shore of the Mediterranean Basin took the world, including geopolitical experts, by surprise. One of the most astonishing factors was how quickly the regimes considered unassailable right up to the eve of their downfall collapsed. This was a first! Even more surprising was the fact that these radical revolts were taking place in the Arab countries along the shores of the Mediterranean,\(^2\) known for their “willing servitude.”\(^3\) An entire, old socio-political and economic structure was fissuring. In consequence, the production systems implemented by the fallen regimes began to flounder, seriously affecting tourism in countries economically dependent on that activity. With its keen interest in political stability and highly sensitive to social peace, tourism is experiencing a difficult period, even dangerous in certain areas. Ironically, in Mediterranean countries that were spared the violence, the tourism sector is beginning to benefit from the instability of the countries shaken by uprisings.

Do misfortunes never come singly to the Arab World? From the 2001 attacks to the Gulf War in 2003, and from the 2008 financial crisis to the Arab Spring sparked in 2011, popular revolts, fostered by the crisis and the population’s despair, have shattered the idyllic image of charismatic Heads of State, not to mention of unalterable regimes, which, let us recall once again, were or are great allies of the West. How can such a rapid, unexpected change be explained? The dilapidation of Arab nationalism, the clinical death of progressive parties, the decadent usury of historical parties, as well as political parties prefabricated and manipulated by the overthrown regimes have made the Islamist parties and movements seem like long-awaited messiahs. But once the latter are at the helm, they prove inexperienced and fumbling. Because from preaching to governing, the ways of power, just like those of the Lord, are inscrutable. Two to three years in power have sufficed to erode the popularity of the

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1 In the sense of absence of natural resources.
2 With the exception of Yemen.
acclaimed saviours. The practice of power has stripped theory bare by contradicting optimist promises turned wishful thinking.

In any case, the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs), which experienced changes between 2011 and 2013 ranging from preventive policy adjustments (Morocco, Algeria, Jordan) to radical change imposed by force (Tunisia, Libya, Egypt), in addition to Syria, which unfortunately has experienced cruel scenes of hara-kiri, are somewhat disillusioned. And it is rumoured that the Arab Spring, increasingly qualified as the ‘Arab Storm’ by the disenchanted and other pessimists, is beginning to emanate a certain nostalgia for the past that is shocking at first glance. A nostalgia displayed by the majority of the upper classes and part of the middle classes hard hit by the crisis that has been ongoing for three years now. Some demonstrators, although very rarely, have replaced the famous expression “Get out!” with “Come back,” alluding to the overthrown Heads of State! Is it Stockholm syndrome? Clearly, the Arab Spring has revealed the importance of tourism in certain countries of the region; and the tourism crisis has, in turn, demonstrated the fragility of non-diversified, satellite economies.

Islamists under the Test of Power: Tourism at Issue

From 1990 to 2010, numerous sporadic attacks were made against renowned tourist centres and resorts in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey. Violently shaken, tourism has nonetheless come out unscathed or with minimal damage, demonstrating great resilience. Not having suffered too greatly from these indiscriminate aggressions and after continually rising from the ashes of hotel and car bombings, experts have concluded that this industry has particular immunity. Hence, in the face of repeated violence and crises, it is vulnerable on the short term but enduring on the long term. Observers, each in their own way, attribute this astonishing immunity to an unfathomable baraka due to the secular heritage of this cradle of humankind which is the Mediterranean. But given the geographic extent of attacks (Indonesia, Kenya…), other, more rational analysts have attributed this enigmatic resistance rather to the perseverance of tourists. A commendable defiance represented by the recreational idleness of bons vivants in the face of the murderous folly of the faith-crazed. In other words, the adventurous or oblivious spirit of holidaymakers. On the other hand, everyone agrees that the major enemies of tourism are war and its adulterous sister, civil war. It is highly likely that the atrocious recollection of the murderous follies of the recent past will haunt the memory of tourists travelling to the SEMCs in these times of uprisings, anarchies and wars. In principle, the apparent dispute seems to pit libertarian celebration against orthodox faith. But for those who know the secrets of political Islam well, attacks against tourism would seek to fulfil three functions that are broken down into objectives meticulously planned in time and tactically limited in space. In its overzealousness, fundamentalist activism aims in the long term to introduce Sharia, purify Islam and bring about a return to the origins.

On the political level, the effect sought by targeted strikes on important tourist areas is both immediate and concrete. The media make these actions, those responsible for them and their demands known across the globe, providing free, direct propaganda. Ironically, far from tarnishing the image of pugnacious religious movements, the echoes of these attacks are tacitly appreciated in many developing countries. That is because those behind the violence claim to be avengers and defenders of the people, who are the victims of the world powers in collusion with the local regimes on their payroll. Combining communication with emotions, after each attack, they make consoling claims (condemnation of the faith-crazed). Allegedly avenging oppressed peoples, a large part of these attacks are appreciated or at least tolerated. Obviously, the Palestinian cause, considered constant and just, continues to constitute the grounds or pretext for certain conflicts, whether they claim to be holy or progressive.

4 The wars ravaging the Mediterranean Basin have paralysed tourism for years in the areas in question, with adverse effects on the entire Mediterranean Region, i.e. war in the Balkans: 1991-2000; the Gulf Wars: 1991 and 2003; Lebanon: 1975-1990; Algeria: 1991-2002; and Libya and Syria since 2011.
Economically, these attacks seek to destabilise the countries concerned by indirectly affecting foreign exchange earnings, direct employment and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Aware of the impact of poverty, exclusion and injustice on the spirit of the pious destitute, the hunters of ‘hotheads,’ the future fighters of the faith, have always known how to exploit the precariousness of the masses to gain their sympathy and eventually convince them to join their cause. Psychologists, ideologists and preachers of the Islamic revival have learned by experience (targeted aid, organic solidarity, \(^5\) gradual indoctrination…) that rallying based on frustration is easily turned into fury at the right time (cf. jihad in Syria). How has it come to this? In reality, in the post-independence Muslim Arab world, all of the hopes dashed in the wake of governance inspired by exogenous ideologies and imposed on the people have paved the way for the emergence of the “last” hope of the masses: Islamist power. Turned into a powder keg over the course of decades, the Arab region finally burst into flames at the first spark, lit in Tunisia in December 2010. But three years after the social explosion and the economic implosion, the movement is already running out of steam, with dashed or mixed hopes! Which leads to the gnawing question: what now?

Tourism and the Arab Spring: Revolutions for a Better Future or for a Glorious Past?

Change has come quickly; indeed, very quickly. The upheavals took everyone by surprise. Unexpectedly, the adversaries of tourism, a phenomenon non synonymous with alcohol, mixing of genders and semi-nudism, were projected to the summit of the power pyramid. Almost by accident. With the head of states having based a large part of their economy on tourism, some for decades (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey…), the supposedly repentant inspirers of bombers were faced with the fait accompli of their rise to power. In other words, with the importunate consequences of their actions or those of their associates. A major dilemma! In order to govern, the new masters of the political arena are forced to make painful decisions, beginning with the choice between continuity or rupture with their past. In other words, should they support tourism, a perverted activity in the eyes of fundamentalists, or eliminate it from their development policy? But without this well-established, profitable sector, funding for the flagship projects of their electoral promises would be compromised! Suffice it to look at tourism revenue on the eve of the Arab Spring, in 2010: (Table 9).

Following the 2011 uprisings, revenue from tourism slumped in certain SEMCs. The countries most affected by the revolutions (Libya, Tunisia, Syria) or having experienced collateral effects (Lebanon, Jordan) were unable to regain tourist confidence, although there was a slight improvement in 2012. That

\(^5\) According to Durkheim, mechanical solidarity occurs in developing countries whereas organic solidarity is at work in developed countries.
year, despite a modest recovery, socio-economic indicators were still struggling to return to normalcy. Having spent years addressing their prayers to Heaven, upon arriving in power, the Islamists have discovered more mundane realities. Their unease has risen in crescendo once they realised, or pretended to realise, that the tax on alcohol, to mention only a disliked yet highly valued industry, constitutes one of the mainstays of taxation and the balance of public finances. But even more inconveniently, government salaries – for ministers, councillors, members of parliament, civil servants… – indirectly come from products that are not quite halal: casinos, alcohol, prostitution, speculation…

After some equivocation, realism has had the last word. The pill, very bitter, was swallowed by the ex-purists, closing their eyes to the dogmas and other pious principles in order, so to speak, to keep the economy in good health. Tourism can now breathe easy and tourists can once again travel. For the moderates, this acclimatisation is courageous;\(^6\) for the hardliners, this sacrilege is both an affront and an imposture. The diehard members of the Islamist movement feel betrayed. It must also be kept in mind that the case of Turkey is a serious precedent and a solid argument, justifying the turnaround of the Islamist governments newly settled in power. To recap, tourism brought Turkey over 25 billion US dollars in 2012. Pragmatic, Turkey even innovated in the tourism sphere: “On the Mediterranean coast in the region of Antalya, resorts are renowned for their clientele of nude Russian women, beer-loving European tourists and foam parties in nightclubs. At the Şah Inn Paradise, young women in bathing suits are swaying their hips along the edge of the pool to the rhythm of the latest tunes in fashion. But in contrast to other establishments, the pool at this Islamic hotel is surrounded by a fence to protect users from the male gaze. ‘[I feel comfortable and can sunbathe as I please’], says Havva, a ravishing Turkish woman, who switched her bikini for loose trousers and a vivid orange foulard upon leaving the women-only complex.”\(^7\) This demonstrates that, in tourism, discreet luxury, personalised service and particular flexibility, in addition to quality, pay, as opposed to the classical mass tourism, which nonetheless constitutes the symbol of the freedom and democratisation of holidays!

In any case, once past the shame, the practice of power is beginning to deliver its secrets to the new leaders, who are growing more and more audacious. They are taking it upon themselves to protect hotels and tourist complexes against the attacks of the brothers and colleagues who have not managed to put a little water in their... soft drinks and tone it down. Islamic tourism, after the fashion of halal markets in Europe, is slowly but surely advancing.

**South Shore Mediterranean Countries: Between the Grip of Tourism and Dependence on Oil**

As chance, or conformity, would have it, the south shore Mediterranean countries’ economies primarily revolve around tourism or oil. The two oil and gas giants of the Maghreb (Algeria and Libya) have never granted tourism its place, despite their fabulous natural and cultural potential. Is this state of affairs attributable to the requirements of international division of labour? Because on the south shore of the Mediterranean, from Morocco to Egypt, tourism plays leapfrog: it is present in every other country.

This situation goes back to the period of bipolarity, when it sufficed to swear allegiance to one of the two world powers – The US or the former USSR – to gain infallible protection.

Tunisia has opted for mass tourism, in addition of a single type: seaside tourism\(^9\) represents 90%, in contrast to approximately 60% in Morocco. The fact remains that the mixed success of Tunisian tourism masks structural anomalies, according to certain observers. It is compromised by the proven stranglehold of tour operators on the reservation system and the systems of distribution of tourist flows, and thus of the price policy. "As with industry, tourism in Tunisia falls within the framework of a dependent, outward-looking economy. As we have amply explained above, it seemed to us profoundly dependent on international Western and

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\(^6\) cf. the flexibility adopted by the Islamist parties in power in Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey.


\(^8\) The percentage that follows (90%) is calculated on the basis of the number of overnights in seacoast lodgings.
Arab capital, and dependent on a world market concentrated on and thoroughly controlled by the major tour operators, which direct and orient tourist flows, essentially driven by speculative interests that often do not coincide with the interests of the host country. Morrocco, champion of “change within continuity,” and post-Nasser Egypt, known for its sudden about-faces, have slightly different practices and outcomes. But when viewed attentively, Morocco is advancing only at a measured pace towards globalisation, for it must deal with both conservative or traditional movements and the highly enterprising ultraliberal or speculative minorities. At the cost of enormous financial sacrifice, the Kingdom of Morocco has set itself the goal of balanced tourism, while Egypt, with its strong historical past, particularly the period of the Pharaohs, has managed to develop a tourism industry with good returns.

Table 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>288.09</td>
<td>289.07</td>
<td>271.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>402.51</td>
<td>544.38</td>
<td>561.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>597.32</td>
<td>581.30</td>
<td>563.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>647.20</td>
<td>672.56</td>
<td>658.63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Robert Lanquar 2012, according to data from the UNWTO.

From the start, Tunisia settled, incomprehensibly, on a single, low-cost tourist product (see Table 11), i.e. mass seaside tourism. Shaken by chronic crises in the 1970s, Morocco has a difficult time maintaining its brand image, which oscillates between midrange and high-end. On the whole, it is the Turkey of the Justice and Development Islamist party that stands at the head of the tourism countries in the region, having attracted 29 million of the 69 million tourists travelling to the SEMCs in 2011. With an intelligent diversified offer and a religiously Fordist management, the Turks have demonstrated magnificent pragmatism! They have understood that it is time to render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s and unto God what is God’s.

Table 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>2,070</td>
<td>2,395</td>
<td>15.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>5,506</td>
<td>14,051</td>
<td>9,497</td>
<td>-32.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2,672</td>
<td>2,803</td>
<td>2,820</td>
<td>0.61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1,427</td>
<td>4,557</td>
<td>3,975</td>
<td>-12.77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>2,168</td>
<td>1,655</td>
<td>-23.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-90.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>4,420</td>
<td>9,288</td>
<td>9,342</td>
<td>0.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>522</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>-14.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>3,015</td>
<td>6,546</td>
<td>5,070</td>
<td>-40.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>5,244</td>
<td>6,902</td>
<td>4,782</td>
<td>-30.72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>10,428</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>29,343</td>
<td>8.68%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>35,549</td>
<td>78,178</td>
<td>69,351</td>
<td>-11.30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The countries having made tourism the driving force of their economy and having experienced serious unrest (Tunisia, Egypt…) have sustained significant loss of employment, currency and investments. In 2011, they approached economic strangulation. Ironically, the countries that were spared the unrest rather profited therefrom (Morocco and Turkey). “Over two years after the onset of the Arab Spring, the perception of both Egypt and Tunisia abroad continues to weigh down the performance of their international hotel business. Morocco went relatively unscathed by the regional geopolitical context, whereas in Turkey, hitherto greatly benefiting from a transfer of foreign clients, this recent trend is becoming less positive due to the country’s own internal upheaval.”

The countries having made tourism the driving force of their economy and having experienced serious unrest (Tunisia, Egypt…) have sustained significant loss of employment, currency and investments.

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10 Direct expenditure is expenditure made directly in the destination country. It does not include any material, transport or agency commission expenses incurred in the country of origin.


Conclusion

Considering the poor state of their economic and social affairs, the South Mediterranean countries are no longer immune to violent social upheaval. The five countries along this shore (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Egypt), which are home to an overall population of over 160 million inhabitants, of whom over 40% are less than 25 years old, are already up against the wall: either ethical development or permanent unrest. The empty rhetoric of yeastereyear, designed to caress the chauvinism painted in the colours of the regime in power, has run its course, despite some atypical vestiges. Generation Y, obsessed with faith, football and internet, dreams above all of access to consumption and employment. And not just any employment: a decent, well-paid job!

Although the Arab Spring has failed to attain the bulk of its objectives, it has at least attained a less visible goal but one of paramount importance: it has vanquished fear. The ruling classes are aware of this, but habits die hard.

Moreover, although the Arab Spring has failed to attain the bulk of its objectives, it has at least attained a less visible goal but one of paramount importance: it has vanquished fear. The ruling classes are aware of this, but habits die hard. Half a century after these countries gained their independence, certain state dignitaries no longer differentiate between Public interest and their own, if, of course, ‘cleanliness,’ in the sense of integrity, still means something in politics. Certain members of the government are trying to address this issue, though without a great deal of success. In any case, they know that to stem future revolts, they will have to create hundreds of thousands of jobs that the oil and tourism industries cannot provide. They also know that the solution lies in development; a development that is impossible without the leadership of autocratic or theocratic regimes. Because repression – breaker of peaceful demonstrations and maker of forced consensus – has become, since 2011, a product flammable to contact with uncontrolled or explosive revolts.

Insofar as tourism, it will continue to create poorly paid jobs (in the future), generate currency and help balance state accounts. Always detestable for its heterodox facet, it will remain significant for its economic contribution and will thus continue to fuel controversy. In sum, the “illegitimate” child of Islamists and adoptive child of liberals, it will survive the “plots” against it, whatever the regime in power. Seen from this perspective, it has been playing the role it should have for decades, namely, being open to criticism and serving as a cash cow. Tourism, as stated above, holds a small place in the heart and a large one in economies. Need we recall that France alone received more tourists – 89 million in 2011 – than all of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries put together – 69 million in all?

In these countries, tourism, “the child of industrialisation and democracy, a good student of globalisation and consumption,” lacks the battery of resources specific to developed countries it needs to thrive. High technology, however, is a fifth element that is possibly responsible for the generalisation and success of protests (cf. Egypt). Virtual but capable of being mastered by youth, information and communication technology (ICT) escapes the throttlehold regimes have on information and freedom of expression. And this is only the beginning.

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Energy subsidies have traditionally played an important role in Middle Eastern and North African economies. Subsidies still represent a major component of social protection in the majority of Southern Mediterranean countries where low prices for energy and food play a significant role in reducing poverty and protecting vulnerable households. However, subsidies present a number of important shortcomings, both in terms of efficiency and equity. The need for a drastic reduction in subsidies became clear during the first years of the century, when oil prices rapidly increased triggering debt accumulation and pressure on public budgets, especially on energy-importing countries. In the last decade a number of countries have been able to start a gradual phasing out of subsidies, in some cases replaced by more efficient forms of social protection. However, subsidy removal and the introduction of more sophisticated social protection measures represent a complex process, which in many cases is implemented in a highly unstable political context, and it is still far from been concluded.

Subsidies Have a Role in Fighting Poverty and Mitigating the Adverse Effects of Price Fluctuation

Although a system of subsidies is common to the large majority of Southern Mediterranean countries, the mechanisms, entities, and products involved differ across countries. In Algeria for example the energy products subsidy is large, but implicit in the government energy pricing, while in Tunisia, the food subsidy system absorbs a larger share of the government budget than energy subsidies. In Egypt, in contrast, around 70% of subsidy spending is used to lower oil and gas prices. Energy subsidies have been introduced to meet a number of objectives. The first is to protect vulnerable households from rising prices. To achieve this, subsidies are often concentrated on types of good typically consumed by the poor such as food, kerosene or diesel. However, in many cases subsidies have involved a vast range of energy goods including electricity, fuel, and gas. The rationale for universal subsidies is to offset temporary commodity price fluctuations. Energy is a fundamental input for the vast majority of economic sectors, as higher prices here have repercussions on all markets and trigger inflationary pressures. This issue is particularly relevant for countries that are unable to anchor inflation expectations. Finally, energy subsidies have been defended on the grounds of their ability to facilitate the development of energy-intensive industries such as petrochemicals and cement. Despite all the above-mentioned desirable effects, subsidies have been roundly criticised.

Subsidies Have a Role in Fighting Poverty and Mitigating the Adverse Effects of Price Fluctuation

Energy Subsidies Have Wide-Ranging Negative Economic Consequences on Southern Mediterranean Economies

Subsidies have been criticised on equity grounds because of their targeting inefficiencies. Del Grano et al. (2010) show that richer households...
Subsidy removal and the introduction of more sophisticated social protection measures represent a complex process, which in many cases is implemented in a highly unstable political context. Systematically reap more benefits from subsidies than poorer households in 20 developing economies. In urban Egypt, for example, the top quintile of the income distribution receives eight times as much in energy subsidies as the bottom quintile (Roach, 2013). In Morocco, households in the top quintile of the income distribution are shown to get more than 75% of diesel subsidies (Vaglasindi, 2013).

From an efficiency standpoint, the subsidisation of fuel and gas encourages wasteful consumption of polluting, exhaustible resources. Fattouh and El-Katiri (2012) show how total primary energy consumption per dollar of GDP over the last 30 years has declined in all parts of the world, with the exception of the Arab world. The highest rates of increase in energy intensity are recorded in Gulf countries, but energy intensity is also increasing in some Mediterranean countries, namely Morocco, Algeria, Egypt and Syria. Low energy pricing contributes to distortions of relative prices, which, in turn, lead to under-investment in non-subsidised energy sectors. Moreover, the low prices of fuel and gas discourage the development of alternative energies and encourage smuggling. Therefore a realistic estimate of subsidy costs is much higher than the sum of financial subsidies explicitly recorded in the public budget, and should also include all economic distortions caused by artificially low energy prices.

The years before the 2008 financial crisis were characterised by increasingly high food and energy prices. This sharp increase in prices directly affected the population’s well-being, especially in food and oil-importing countries. Moreover, soaring prices worsened the sustainability of public budgets in all countries where food and energy prices were subsidised. Today the need to remove subsidies is one of the big issues on the political agenda in most Middle Eastern and North African countries. Chart 15 shows how the total government expenditure on oil subsidies is shared, as estimated by Elbers and Peeters (2011). Note, however, that this chart does not include implicit subsidies for energy such as the pricing policy in Algeria.

Other countries have been threatened by similar explosive trends in subsidy expenditure. The IMF (2012) estimated that in Libya, subsidies and transfers have increased from 11.7% of GDP before the

![Chart 15](attachment:image)
revolution, to 15.9% of GDP in 2012, close to a quarter of the government’s total expenditure.

**Subsidy Reforms Have Historically Been Very Unpopular: the Area’s Current Political Instability Is Jeopardising Ongoing and Planned Reforms**

The budget sustainability of food and energy subsidies led to an initial wave of reforms in the 1980s, which were often included in structural adjustment programmes and linked to credit lines agreed with the IMF and World Bank. Morocco is one of the first countries in the region that attempted to reform its subsidies scheme in the mid-1980s. More recently, Morocco started to phase out all energy subsidies – with the exception of LPG – to reflect international prices. The subsequent price hikes met with strong political opposition, and today the government has only partially indexed energy prices to international market levels. Jordan moved toward an automatic fuel pricing mechanism between 2005 and 2008. However, in January 2011, the country temporarily suspended the mechanism because of popular opposition. In Lebanon, fuel price subsidies were eliminated in 2008 with the reintroduction of fuel excise taxes. However, because of increasing international market prices and political pressure, the government reduced excise taxes in 2011. Tunisia is another country struggling to reform its subsidy system. After a number of gradual increases (2005-2009) and the fall of the Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali government, the complete removal of subsidies was programmed. However, the government recently decided to suspend the increase in energy prices planned for the 2014 budget. Reforms have also been suspended or delayed due to conflicts and political instability in Egypt, Syria and Libya. In Egypt, the government increased petrol prices, cut subsidies on electricity and natural gas between 2004 and 2008 and then, in 2010, introduced a quota system for LPG. Nevertheless, fuel prices in Egypt remain among the cheapest in the world. In recent months, the government has delayed the implementation of an electronic-card-based quota system, initiated by the former President Mohamed Morsi. Libya is expected to remove all kinds of subsidies in the next three years and has started to advertise its intention to compensate citizens with cash handouts. Finally, Syria also planned a broad reform of its subsidy scheme and fuel prices started to increase gradually in 2008. The subsidy cuts were interrupted in 2011 due to the ongoing conflicts in most areas of the country. However, in 2013, after two years of war, Syria has doubled the price of diesel fuel to reduce the cost of maintaining universal subsidies for the population.

**To Be Politically Viable, Phasing out Subsidies Should Be Accompanied by the Introduction of a Modern System of Social Protection**

The large number of recipients explains why, since the late 1970s, attempts to reform subsidy systems have been challenged by strong popular reactions in Egypt (1977), Morocco (1984), and Tunisia (1984). More recently, in reaction to the protests and riots of the ‘Arab Spring,’ most Arab countries increased their subsidies or suspended planned subsidy cuts. To prevent political opposition, a successful subsidy reform should be accompanied by a series of complementary reforms to neutralise the negative effects of higher energy prices. A safety net is often suggested as the best substitute for subsidies. However, cash transfers are often not feasible because governments lack the capacity to implement complex social protection mechanisms. In such cases, governments can implement packages of short-term measures to mitigate the impact of price increases. Moreover, subsidies can be improved by inducing self-targeting mechanisms.

All the Southern Mediterranean countries, including Gaza and West Bank territories, have some form of cash transfers for low-income households. In many cases these social benefits have been reinforced alongside the phasing out of subsidies. However, social benefits often remain unsystematic in the region and in some cases their scale and coverage are limited.²

In Jordan the government introduced a number of programmes to counterbalance the negative effects of subsidy removal, such as tax exemptions on basic

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² Marcus et al. (2011) present a review of policies implemented in the area with a focus on child-sensitive social protection.
food products and an increase in the role of the National Aid Fund, a well-developed social safety net scheme which is estimated to reach between 8% and 9% of the population. In Jordan, total spending on the safety net is estimated to be above 1% of GDP (Vagliasindi, 2013).

Conditional cash transfers represent an alternative to subsidies and have been adopted to achieve social protection together with other objectives such as improvements in school attendance. The Tayssir programme in Morocco made cash payments to parents with children in primary school resulting in substantial improvements in education attendance in more than 300 rural school districts between 2008 and 2010. Similarly, in Algeria the school meal programme has a twofold objective: to promote primary education and to target malnutrition and extreme poverty. The programme covers more than three million children attending primary school and is planned to achieve universal coverage by the end of 2014. In this case, school meals are complementary to a system of allowances that target particular groups (e.g. people with disabilities, widows, orphans, low-income households), which covers over 670,000 households (Marcus et al, 2011).

In areas of conflict, especially Syria and Libya, the growing number of refugees has put pressure on national social protection systems. The Syrian conflict is considered the world’s largest refugee crisis in recent decades, with more than seven million refugees, two and half of them displaced in neighbouring countries. Syrian refugees are targeted by a number of emergency actions to guarantee basic necessities. However, more comprehensive policies are needed, especially in Jordan and Lebanon.

**The Way Forward**

In the last decade, Southern Mediterranean countries have embarked on comprehensive reforms of their subsidies. Despite a long list of adverse effects, energy subsidies represent an important social safety net for poor and vulnerable households. Any attempt to eliminate or cut subsidies in absence of some form of compensatory programmes would lead to a decline in households’ welfare. Del Granado et al. (2010), for example, show that a $0.25 per litre increase in fuel prices in Jordan could reduce real consumption of the poorest 20% of households by more than 5%. There are some key ingredients that are likely to ease the process of reform, among others: public awareness, gradual phase out, and targeted social benefits to compensate ‘losers.’ However, there is not a single formula. Each country has to find the most suitable tools taking into account its socioeconomic and political context and traditional mechanisms of social protection. Efficiency gains from subsidy removals are very high, and reforms have the potential to be a source of political support rather than a source of political opposition and instability.

**References**


It is a well-known fact that youth unemployment rates are currently alarmingly high in all of the EU’s Mediterranean countries (comprising France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain). Even before the economic crisis hit in 2008, unemployment in each of these countries was already higher than the EU average. During and after the crisis, youth unemployment increased sharply, especially in Greece and Spain. By the end of 2012, the youth unemployment rate was above 50% in both countries: 55.0% in Spain and 58.1% in Greece. Likewise, the rate in Italy and Portugal was almost 40%, although in France it was only slightly higher than the EU average. In 2013, youth unemployment rates continued to rise, by 0.1% in the EU as a whole, 1.7% in Spain, and 2.9% in Italy. In Greece, youth unemployment remained quasi stable at 58.0% (-0.1). In France, the rate decreased in the third quarter of 2013 to 25.2%. The most significant drop was observed in Portugal.

According to Eurostat, the share of pupils in upper-secondary education enrolled in the vocational stream in the EU was 55.7% for males and 44.7% for females. The shares are lower than in the EU as a whole for all of the Mediterranean countries except Italy (70.1% male, 49.2% female).

The unemployment rate of people aged 15 to 24 is more than twice as high as that of people aged 25 and over, both in the EU as a whole and in the Mediterranean countries. However, those numbers must be interpreted carefully for two reasons (Barslund and Gros, 2013). First, the group of 15-to-24-year-olds actually consists of two subgroups, teenagers (aged 15 to 19) and young adults between the ages of 20 and 24. Most of the teenagers are still in school or training or, if not, are likely to be very low-skilled. Therefore, even in normal times, they would have difficulties finding a job. Young people aged 20 to 24 have typically completed secondary education or finished their university studies early and are seeking a full-time job. Second, only a small fraction of young people are in the labour force, on average only about 10%. A youth unemployment rate of 60% does not mean that 60% of the whole cohort is unemployed. It means that 60% of young people in the labour force are unemployed. The youth unemployment rate is thus potentially misleading, and it is therefore preferable to look at the youth unemployment ratio instead. This is the percentage of unemployed people in the reference population. The youth unemployment ratio of young people aged 15 to 24 is only slightly higher than the unemployment rate for those aged 25 and over and is somewhat less alarming.

In Italy and France, the youth unemployment ratio is similar to that for the EU-28 as a whole. In contrast, in Spain, the ratio increased dramatically during and after the economic crisis. In Greece and Portugal, the percentage of out-of-work young people looking for a job did not increase until 2009. After 2009, the ratio in both countries consistently went up, reaching 14.3% in Portugal and 16.1% in Greece in 2012.

An alternative indicator is the NEET rate. This includes all young people aged 15 to 24 who are not in education, employment, or training. The NEET rate for teenagers is usually much lower than the NEET rate both for young adults aged 20 to 24 and for the age group as a whole, as most of them are still in
school or training. The NEET average for the EU is lower than the youth unemployment rate. However, especially in Italy, Spain, and Greece, the NEET rate is much higher than in the EU as a whole. In Spain, it grew tremendously during and after the recession, rising from 12.2% in 2007 to 18.3% in 2009, and it has remained high at about 19%. The NEET rate in Italy was already high even before the recession, at
The youth unemployment rate is potentially misleading, and it is therefore preferable to look at the youth unemployment ratio instead. This is the percentage of unemployed people in the reference population about 17%. It, too, continued to grow during and after the crisis, reaching 21.1% in 2012. In Greece, the rate began to climb in 2009; by 2012, it had reached a similar level as in Italy (20.3%).

MACRO VS. INSTITUTIONS

The high youth unemployment rates in the EU’s Mediterranean countries clearly reflect a structural problem with regard to training for youths and other institutional aspects of the labour market. The first problem is the dualisation of the labour market between permanent and fixed-term contracts. While permanent employment has strict dismissal protection, with temporary employment this protection is reduced. This makes the transition to a permanent job more difficult as it is quite costly for the employer. Furthermore, the NEET rates are above the EU average; it is not only low-skilled young people but also university graduates who are having significant problems finding work. This is due to the marginal role of vocational training, which is mainly school-based. Better integration of employer-provided training could improve this situation. Active labour market policies (ALMPs), which focus on hiring subsidies for apprentices, have only a limited impact (Zimmermann et al., 2013).

It is not only low-skilled young people but also university graduates who are having significant problems finding work. This is due to the marginal role of vocational training, which is mainly school-based. Better integration of employer-provided training could improve this situation.

In Italy, the school-to-work transition is very problematic. In the Italian system, the presence of the State is marginal compared to the central role played by the family, which bears the primary costs of the transition to adulthood. In Italy, more than 60% of the unemployed belong to the category of new labour market entrants, and the share of long-term youth unemployment (more than 12 months) is also significant. This is due to the excessively rigid educational system, particularly in the tertiary stage, which results in very late entry into the labour market. Furthermore, Italy has extremely high dropout rates at all stages of schooling. Economic returns for tertiary education have fallen, and the number of university enrolments is higher than the number of graduates.
The level of secondary and tertiary education is low, and there is insufficient contact between the education system and the labour market. By focusing mainly on theory rather than practical applications, young people do not develop the problem-solving skills and competencies required by potential employers and have hardly any chance to gain early work experience. Moreover, the task of filling the youth experience gap has been left to the market, which has resulted in inadequate solutions such as temporary employment. Also, the lack of an adequate vocational training system and the absence of post-graduate bridges, such as job placement activities, are problematic. Furthermore, the significant mismatch of human capital generated by disparities in demand (technical) and supply (humanistic) is a problem in Italy. Because of the lack of demand for their particular type of qualification, young people are forced to accept jobs designed for candidates with lower qualifications. This phenomenon is called overeducation. McGuinness and Sloane (2010) report that overeducation is normally below 10% in the EU, but in Italy the percentage of graduates employed in posts designed for those with a secondary school diploma is one of the highest (23% for first-time hiring) in the EU. With a total of 13%, Italy is the third lowest in terms of performance five years after graduation, just marginally ahead of Spain.

In Spain the educational structure is also deeply polarised. The country has the highest rate of both early dropouts (almost 25% in 2012) and university graduates in the EU. University graduates have the same problem of mismatched skills as their Italian counterparts. More than 40% of young Spanish university graduates work in occupations requiring only low or medium skills (García, 2011). Prior to the crisis, the construction boom-and-bust cycle and high growth in low-knowledge intensive service jobs raised the wages for unskilled workers during the long expansion period, thereby discouraging the pursuit of education. As a consequence, both during and after the crisis, employment rates among unskilled workers have fallen considerably. Since the crisis, participation in education has risen again (Dolado et al., 2013). Prior to the crisis, the construction boom-and-bust cycle and high growth in low-knowledge intensive service jobs raised the wages for unskilled workers during the long expansion period, thereby discouraging the pursuit of education. As a consequence, both during and after the crisis, employment rates among unskilled workers have fallen considerably. Since the crisis, participation in education has risen again (Dolado et al., 2013). Furthermore, there is a lack of means for developing specific occupational skills and acquiring practical experience with employers. Most of the vocational training in Spain is school-based. Only 4% of vocational training combines school- and work-based training. Introducing dual training in Spain could facilitate screening by firms to find potentially good job matches and would provide young people with occupation-specific work experience, thereby easing their transition into permanent positions. Instead, youth employment policies have concentrated on offering training contracts, which mainly reduce the cost to the employer of hiring young workers via subsidies. This has not increased firms’ investment in the youth population’s specific human capital because the training is not work-based. Instead, it has increased youth employment turnover, shifting the occupational distribution towards less qualified jobs. Moreover, because these contracts have not lowered entry-level wages, they have provided the wrong kind of incentives, encouraging students to drop out of school at a young age (Zimmermann et al., 2013).

In France, vocational trainees can enrol in either full-time vocational schooling or on-the-job apprenticeships combined with part-time study at training centres. Apprenticeships in France suffer from the perception that this training path is an inferior alternative to full-time vocational schooling (Cahuc et al., 2013). Employers receive some support for providing training. To address the issue of young people who fail to enter the training system, there is a long-standing tradition in France of subsidising temporary employment and training contracts as an ALMP. During the crisis, support was also given for additional apprenticeships, as well as the conversion of temporary contracts into permanent ones. Yet the effectiveness of these measures is questionable (Zimmermann et al., 2013).

Dual vocational training connects with the changing needs of the economy and gives young people the opportunity to gain specific knowledge and preliminary job experience.

In general, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece have only limited provisions for training. In contrast, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and Denmark have maintained a highly successful dual education and
training system through apprenticeships. In all four countries, over 40% of young people who leave school when it ceases to be compulsory take on apprenticeships (EEAG, 2013). Dual vocational training connects with the changing needs of the economy and gives young people the opportunity to gain specific knowledge and preliminary job experience. Firms contribute alongside the government to the costs and co-management of the overall system (Eichhorst et al., 2013). In this system, the transition from education to work is smoothed and young people have better chances of ending up in a permanent job.

Over the last few years, the importance and the share of public expenditure on ALMPs have risen in all of the EU’s Mediterranean countries. The share of public expenditure spent on training is high in Portugal, modest in France and Italy, only small in Spain and almost non-existent in Greece. In Spain, most ALMPs consist of wage subsidies and reductions of non-wage labour costs in order to encourage companies to hire the unemployed or maintain their staff (Zimmermann et al., 2013). The same pattern can be found in Italy and Greece. This is not a good bridge to regular employment. Subsidised forms of employment should be combined with substantial job-related training by employers to increase young peoples’ employability and productivity. Furthermore, support for start-ups, which is minor in all Mediterranean countries, can be a useful tool for creating jobs for young people and help to boost economic development.

A high level of employment protection for permanent jobs makes dismissing employees expensive. In contrast, firing costs are much lower in fixed-term contracts. As especially marginal workers, young people are generally less qualified and are often employed with temporary contracts. On the one hand, fixed-term contracts can help workers accumulate human capital and experience, potentially resulting in a permanent job. On the other, there is a danger that young people will simply move from one fixed-term contract to the next without improving their job situation. Therefore, the effects on workers are ambiguous. The dualisation between permanent contracts and temporary contracts is crucial. Fixed-term employment has been highly responsive to the crisis. Most employment adjustment took place via termination of fixed-term contracts and was concentrated among young people (Zimmermann et al., 2013). In countries hit hard by the crisis, young people stay in school longer because of the lack of employment options. At the same time, more and more youths fall into the NEET category. In countries like Spain, France, and Italy, non-standard employment has been an alternative for jobseekers and for taking on apprenticeships. Non-standard employment provides learning opportunities, but at the same time, young workers are confined to the lower segment of a dual labour market, which leaves them to bear the brunt of labour demand shocks (EEAG, 2013).

![CHART 20: Temporary Employees Aged 15 to 24 as a Percentage of the Total Number of Employees](chart)

The share of temporary employment is high in all countries except for Greece. Spain has the highest share of temporary jobs in the EU for all sectors and occupations (Dolado et al., 2013). Spain has a long history of very high and volatile unemployment. A high share of temporary jobs results in a lack of employment stability and increasing job insecurity (Dolado et al., 2013). The strong concentration of temporary employment in conjunction with structural change problems caused the current youth unemployment disaster (Eichhorst et al., 2013). The share of temporary employment is also very high in Germany. But the vast majority of teenagers (94.4% in 2010) are covered by a training period as an apprentice or through training that culminates in permanent employment. In contrast, most teenagers in Spain (60% of teenagers and 77% of the young adults in the 20-to-24 age group) accept a fixed-
term contract because they failed to find a permanent job and are therefore on a fixed-term contract involuntarily (Dolado et al., 2013).

The existence of a minimum wage raises the payment of the least well-paid workers, who are generally young and less qualified. There are minimum wages in France, Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Some countries employ a special rule for the young workforce, normally consisting of a fraction of the prime-age minimum wage rate. Without a provision like this, young workers can be squeezed out of the labour market. In general, young people are less experienced, and those young people who are affected by the minimum wage are mostly less qualified and therefore less productive. In consequence, the minimum wage is too high in some countries to hire young people.

In France the monthly minimum wage is very high. This creates a substantial barrier to accessing employment for low-skilled, young and inexperienced job seekers. A large number of young people in France are not sufficiently qualified to be as productive as the minimum wage requires them to be. In Greece, the exception to the minimum wage is broader and includes a higher share of young people. Until 1998, the Spanish distinguished between employees under and over the age of 18, but the country no longer has a special rule for young people. In Portugal, a reduction of up to 20% can be applied to apprentices and interns for a period not to exceed one year.

### Outlook and Policy Conclusion

In EU Mediterranean countries, youth unemployment is mostly structural and has deteriorated during the Great Recession. Therefore, well organised strategies to fight youth unemployment should improve the overall performance of the labour market. The goal is to reduce the high unemployment level, the volatility of employment and the risk of exclusion of specific groups from the labour market. Reforms have to be introduced that try to reconcile the security, efficiency, and fiscal aspects of labour market policies. It is important to set the right incentives to reduce high dropout rates, smooth the transition from education to work and increase the possibility of securing a permanent job. At the same time, returns to (vocational) education have to be high, to make investing in all varieties of education worthwhile. Furthermore, the match between the supply and demand for skills has to be improved. Better interaction between the education system and the working world is pivotal in this regard. The gap between the high employment protection and firing costs of permanent contracts and the negligible protection and job security of fixed-term contracts has to be narrowed. The limits on the widespread use of fixed-term contracts must be stricter. Each employment contract could be seen as unlimited, and the longer it remains in force, the more claims could be granted (Eichhorst et al. 2013). Also more flexible wages are needed.

In EU Mediterranean countries, youth unemployment is mostly structural and has deteriorated during the Great Recession. Therefore, well organised strategies to fight youth unemployment should improve the overall performance of the labour market.

Still, structural reforms of this kind will need some time to show effects and improve the situation for young people in the labour market in a sustainable way. Of course, they will also interact with the overall
At the same time, returns to (vocational) education have to be high, to make investing in all varieties of education worthwhile. Furthermore, the match between the supply and demand for skills has to be improved. Better interaction between the education system and the working world is pivotal in this regard.

macroeconomic environment and labour demand. But the losers of the Great Recession and the labour market cannot be left on their own. The State has a responsibility and must give financial and active support to activate young people in the current situation.

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The Importance of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and Potential Drawbacks for Mediterranean Countries

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The EU and the US are the two most integrated economies in the world, due to imports and exports of goods and services, mutual investments, and their strong commercial presences in each other’s economies. Hence, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the agreement that the EU and the US started negotiating in February 2013, will potentially be the largest regional free-trade agreement in history (covering nearly 50% of global economic output and 25% of global trade). The aim of TTIP is (i) to eliminate or substantially decrease the (already low) tariff barriers between the EU and the US (on average, around 2% for the US and 3% for the EU); and (ii) to reduce (or prevent) non-tariff barriers through enhanced compatibility of regulations and standards and the elimination of behind-the-border non-tariff barriers (NTBs) in all categories. TTIP also aims to introduce a new generation of regulatory standards covering issues such as protection of foreign investments and intellectual property or, more ambitiously, public procurement.

The first proposals for a transatlantic free trade area date back to the 1990s. But only in February 2013, as a reaction to the stalemate of the multilateral negotiations within the WTO, and after important preliminary work throughout 2012, was the launch of TTIP announced. The first round of TTIP negotiations was in July 2013; as of April 2014, four rounds have been held, but the completion date, previously announced for the end of 2014, is still unknown. TTIP’s potential in terms of mutual economic benefit represents a long-term strategy that could help the EU and the US recover from the financial crises in a situation of increasing international competition with emerging economies. It could also help them regain their leading role at the international level. Furthermore, in light of the trend towards the signing of important regional agreements, especially in Asia, TTIP can be seen as the response of Western economies to potential trade diversion effects.

Given the size of the economies involved and the ambitious nature of the agreement, the welfare gains for the US and the EU are expected to be (very) positive, although they may vary depending on the nature of the exact agreement reached. TTIP will also have important consequences for “outsiders,” which may not necessarily be positive. As far as the EU and US are concerned, the welfare gains that will result from the additional trade created are likely to overcome the welfare losses due to trade diversion, although there will be substantial differences between and within EU countries and US states, depending on their specific sectoral and skill composition. Several independent studies – including those by CEPR (2013) and Felbermayr et al. (2013) – have forecast different scenarios in which deep liberalisation of trade between the two regions increases the real per capita gross domestic product of Member States while simultaneously boosting employment.

Without entering into the exact estimates, which depend too much on the hypotheses used by the different models, their structure, possible dynamics, the country’s (or State’s) specific production specialisation and the skill composition of the local workforce,¹

¹ According to the estimates of Felbermayr et al. (2013), in a scenario in which non-tariff barriers are also significantly reduced, real per capita income would increase by an average of 13.4% in the US and 5% in the EU (with important differences between countries). CEPR predictions are more conservative, with an estimated gain of 0.48% for the EU and 0.39% for the US. According to Felbermayr et al. (2013), the most
Given the size of the economies involved and the ambitious nature of the agreement, the welfare gains for the US and the EU are expected to be (very) positive, although they may vary depending on the nature of the exact agreement reached.

In what follows we shall highlight the impact the agreement will have on outsiders – a topic that has certainly been dealt with less in the literature so far – and, in particular, on Mediterranean countries. The economic gains of the EU and the US are in fact likely to come at a price, especially for neighbouring countries. Despite a boost for the EU and the US, which could favourably impact world GDP, countries that do not participate in TTIP, especially the US and EU’s traditional trade partners, could face a decrease in real income and employment. For instance, Canada and Mexico, members of NAFTA but outsiders to TTIP, are expected to suffer a substantial decline in GDP according to all existing estimates. More specifically, countries with an existing free trade agreement with the EU or US would be affected by an additional form of trade diversion, what Deardorff (2014) has called the reversal of trade diversion. On top of the conventional trade diversion effect, imports that were diverted from the new partner (US) under the first FTA will revert to it under the second (TTIP). This could further increase the already high inequalities currently found between developed Western and emerging economies.

Mediterranean countries are likely to be highly penalised by the signing of TTIP. The majority of these EU neighbours are fairly small countries that have signed a free trade agreement with the EU in the past. The trade effects of TTIP on these countries can be briefly summarised as follows.

1. Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia & Herzegovina and Macedonia have a free trade agreement (FTA) with each other – CEFTA – and with the EU, but not with the US. They have similar characteristics: the EU is their main export destination market and import origin, while their trade with the US is insignificant (Deardorff, 2014). These countries are likely to suffer from two forms of trade diversion. First, they will suffer from a conventional trade diversion effect, as their exports to the US will now have to compete with tariff-free exports from the EU; and second, the trade that was originally diverted from the US by the first FTA agreement between the EU and CEFTA members may now revert back to the US under TTIP.

Mediterranean countries are likely to be highly penalised by the signing of TTIP. The majority of these EU neighbours are fairly small countries that have signed a free trade agreement with the EU in the past. All countries that participated in the Barcelona Process – namely Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, Israel, Jordan and Morocco – have existing FTAs with the EU. Israel, Jordan and Morocco also have either an FTA or an economic integration agreement (EIA) with the US. The countries that have an FTA with only the EU have the EU as their main partner, but also trade significantly with the US; these countries are likely to suffer from a substantial decline in GDP according to all existing estimates. More specifically, countries with an existing free trade agreement with the EU or US would be affected by an additional form of trade diversion, what Deardorff (2014) has called the reversal of trade diversion. On top of the conventional trade diversion effect, imports that were diverted from the new partner (US) under the first FTA will revert to it under the second (TTIP). This could further increase the already high inequalities currently found between developed Western and emerging economies.

2 According to Felbermayr et al. (2013), their GDPs would decline 9.5% and 7.2%, respectively, in the deep liberalisation scenario (0.7% and 1.1% in the tariff scenario). CEPR predictions are again more conservative: the study predicts a collective gain for the rest of the world in the region of €99 billion, €36 billion of which is expected to be for OECD countries.

3 The member countries of CEFTA (Central Europe FTA) and the Barcelona Process (North Africa and the Middle East) have existing free trade agreements with the EU; the only exceptions are Moldova, Kosovo and Libya.

4 Deardorff (2014), on which our analysis partially builds, does not include Libya. We have considered it, given its geographical proximity and its importance as a trade partner for some EU countries.
to be penalised by a substantial trade diversion effect. Egypt is an interesting example: Felbermayr et al. (2013) predict that Egypt will lose 2.8% in real income per capita in a broad free trade agreement scenario. Countries that have free trade agreements with both the EU and the US (i.e., Israel, Jordan and Morocco) will be the ones to lose the most. To the extent that their significant exports to both of these partners were diverted from direct EU-US trade, this advantage will vanish under TTIP. Furthermore, Mediterranean countries may also face a decrease in foreign direct investment, since investors from Asia and sovereign wealth funds may increase their FDI in the EU (and the US) as a means of avoiding tariffs and NTBs. Turkey is a special case among the EU’s Mediterranean neighbours. In 2012, more than 40% of its foreign trade was with the EU and the US; two thirds of Turkish capital was invested in either the EU or the US, and it has a customs union (CU) with the EU, negotiated with the expectation that it would be a transitional arrangement while Turkey moved towards full EU membership and that it could help Turkey to strengthen its economy in the meantime. A closer transatlantic trade and investment partnership could affect Turkey more adversely than other countries. Turkey’s CU with the EU implies that it will share the EU’s external tariffs, which will presumably include its zero tariffs on imports from the US under TTIP; however, because it is not formally part of the EU, Turkey will not benefit from reduced US tariffs on its exports. In other words, US products would enter the Turkish market freely without duties, while Turkey would continue to face duties and other limitations in the US market. Turkey’s current trade deficit with the US (totalling around $8.5 billion in 2012; see Kirisci, 2013) would probably increase. Moreover, further trade diversion would also likely occur, as South Korean (thanks to the South Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, or KORUS FTA) and TransPacific Partnership (TPP) countries’ goods are likely to enter the US market preferentially (see Deardorff, 2014). This peculiar situation is likely to make Turkey worse off after TTIP. According to Felbermayr et al. (2013), Turkey will lose 2.8% in real income per capita. On the other hand, the possible inclusion of Turkey in TTIP could increase GDP up to 4.6% and would also favour the EU and the US in terms of higher GDP growth rates.

2. Libya, Moldova and Kosovo are the only Mediterranean countries that have not yet concluded a free trade agreement with the EU. Moldova’s largest trade partner is the EU, but it also has significant trade with Eastern European countries and Russia. The EU is also Libya’s main trading partner (in 2008, 49.7% of the country’s imports and 78% of its exports were from/to the EU). As complete outsiders to TTIP whose main trading partner is the EU, these countries are likely to suffer trade diversion.

Mediterranean countries, are likely to lose if TTIP is implemented, unless they can successfully integrate their firms into global value chains and the TTIP negotiations manage to take into account the impact of digitalisation and servicification

Summing up, TTIP concerns not only trade and investments between the US and the EU but also behind-the-border protectionism (e.g., regulations, rules of origin, procurement, investment protection, etc.) and outsiders. While different models give a range of estimates (for both insiders and outsiders), the interesting thing to point out is the transmission mechanisms and resulting changes in the composition of output and employment. The main mechanisms at work are both standard, such as the understanding that a larger market will bring higher competition, and non-standard. For instance, to the extent that trade is intra-industry, there is a dynamic effect from an increase in labour productivity. Likewise, the attraction of new investment flows, including from countries outside the

5 The top exports from Turkey to the US (vehicles, machinery, iron and steel products, and cement) overlap to a large extent with exports from the EU, South Korea and some Asian-Pacific countries. This is likely to amplify the adverse impact.

6 Deardorff (2014) does not include Kosovo in the analysis because of a lack of data.
agreement aiming to bypass tariffs and regulations, could have a positive impact (on both insiders and outsiders), especially in the long run. Furthermore, the likely increase in EU and US exports could lead to an increase in outsourcing (offshoring), especially of the low-value-added parts of global value chains, enabling foreign firms, including in the Mediterranean, to increase their role as suppliers. TTIP is therefore an important component of the broader globalisation process; however, when gauging its overall impact, it is important to account for the heterogeneity of its various specific impacts and for the fact that it will take time to know how the partnership will affect the dynamic relationships between countries, given the different possible geopolitical and economic scenarios and the changes that will effectively take place in terms of both tariffs and non-tariff barriers. For instance, regulatory convergence could result in important welfare gains at the worldwide level. As for the Mediterranean countries, they are likely to lose if TTIP is implemented, unless they can successfully integrate their firms into global value chains and the TTIP negotiations manage to take into account the impact of digitalisation and servicification.

References


Beyond political rapprochement with Latin American countries, Morocco wishes to diversify its trade partners. Moroccan products have been on the markets of certain Latin American countries since the 18th century. Historically, leather, honey and candles were transported by Portuguese merchants to resell in the markets of the region under Portuguese colonisation. In any case, it was not until the 20th century that trade agreements were signed between Morocco and countries in the region. It was with Cuba that the first agreement was signed in 1962 to supply the Moroccan market with sugar.

King Mohammed VI’s state visit to six Latin American countries – Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Peru and the Dominican Republic – gave a significant boost to commercial and economic relations with these countries, particularly since a delegation of business people had accompanied the sovereign on his tour.

**Brazil: A Strategic Trade Partner for Morocco**

First of all, trade between Morocco and Latin American countries is predominantly with Brazil, Morocco’s...
main partner in the region and third on a global scale. Over the course of the past two decades, trade between Morocco and Brazil has experienced remarkable evolution (Chart 21). It went from 147 million US dollars in 1993 to over 2 billion in 2013, with a positive trade balance for Morocco since 2011. In 2012, exports to Brazil grew to 80% of total Moroccan exports to Latin America (Chart 22), as compared to 35% in 1993, whereas imports from Brazil have represented half of Morocco’s imports from the region since the 1990s.

The evolution of commercial relations has encouraged the two countries to develop the various mechanisms necessary to consolidate this bilateral trade. Indeed, a Joint Morocco-Brazil Commission held its first session in Rabat in June 2008, and a Joint Morocco-Brazil Committee for the Promotion of Trade and Investment was instituted in January 2009. A Chamber of Commerce, Industry, Agriculture and Tourism was opened in Rio de Janeiro in early 2014. On the business level, this bilateral dynamic was accompanied by a Morocco-Brazil Forum that took place in Casablanca in December 2013. Apart from Brazil, trade with other countries in the region has remained below expectations, except with regard to Morocco’s exports to Mexico and Argentina, which represent only 13% of its total exports to the region, but are displaying continuous growth: +23.7% and +21.2%, respectively, in 2012 as compared to 2011. Insofar as imports, Argentina, accounting for over 30% of the total imports from the region, is second behind Brazil, as compared to only 2% from Mexico (Chart 23).

Chile has been seeking to enter a free trade agreement with Morocco for years. During the latest political consultations held in Rabat in May 2011, the two countries decided to initiate the studies to make this wish a reality and lend fresh impetus to trade, which at present does not surpass 4 million US dollars.

**Primary Commodities Predominate in Bilateral Trade**

In an analysis of exports per sector, cereals and phosphate take the lion’s share of bilateral trade. To wit, Moroccan imports consist essentially of sugar, maize and soybean oil, which account for over 90% of total imports from Brazil. Exports, in their turn, primarily consist of phosphate and its derivatives, accounting for 85% of total Moroccan exports to Brazil in 2013. The entire Latin America region displays a great interest in Moroccan fertilisers, essential for intensive agriculture. To meet the demands of its Brazilian clients, the Office Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP), a Moroccan group leading the world phosphates market, established a subsidiary in Sao Paulo in 2009, the OCP do Brasil Ltda. company, and is continually signing strategic agreements with the largest operators in Brazil in order to expand its storage and dis-
distribution capacity. With the establishment of an office in Buenos Aires, Argentina, in December 2011, the OCP strengthened its presence with a view to conquering other markets of the American subcontinent.

**Perspectives for Multilateral South-South Trade**

The Latin America region is considered the most dynamic geographical area insofar as regional economic integration. The Southern Common Market (Mercosur), which includes Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Uruguay and Paraguay, has constituted an important trading bloc since its creation in 1991, not only in the region but also on the international arena. In November 2004, during King Mohammed VI’s visit to Brazil, Morocco signed a framework agreement for trade with Mercosur with a view to progressively establishing a free trade area. Thus, a commission was set up to exchange tariff, commercial, health and provenance information between both parties, and a negotiation mechanism was established. In any case, negotiations have been stalled since the first round at the expert level held in Rabat in April 2008.

Concluding a Morocco-Mercosur free trade agreement could be highly advantageous, considering that Morocco’s trade with the countries in this bloc represents over 90% of the country’s total transactions with Latin America. This initiative could also expand on the long term and become a South-South cooperation agreement between two regional blocs, namely Mercosur and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), which includes Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania and Morocco, which would benefit from the existence of the Brazil-Maghreb Chamber of Commerce and Industry created in 1991.

Another economic bloc in Latin America has asserted its interest in developing trade relations with Morocco. The Pacific Alliance (PA), recently instituted (2012), granted Morocco observer member status at the 8th Summit held in Cartagena in February 2014. The Pacific Alliance member states – Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Chile – plan to open their first trade office in Africa in Casablanca, in order to promote trade and investment opportunities with Morocco. This could boost Morocco’s trade with a market that has 210 million inhabitants but that currently only represents 7% of its overall trade with the countries of the region.

South-South cooperation initiatives such as the Summit of South American and Arab Countries (ASPA) and the Africa-South America Summit (ASA), of which Morocco is an active member, could also constitute forums for cooperation and contribute to consolidating bilateral trade relations with Latin American countries.

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CHART 24 **Geographical Distribution of Moroccan Trade in 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
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<td>Europe</td>
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<td>Others</td>
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The Limits of Trade

Trade between Morocco and Latin American countries remains below its real potential. In fact, according to statistics from 2012, it represents only 5.4% of Morocco’s foreign trade (Chart 24). Moreover, the strong concentration of trade with Brazil and the predominance of phosphate and fertiliser as Morocco’s export products indicate a major dependence of trade with regard to the region. The legal cooperation framework is likewise very limited. Besides Brazil, Morocco has only concluded six bilateral trade agreements with Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Paraguay, El Salvador and Uruguay, although these agreements do not represent serious trade opportunities.

Insofar as joint commissions, apart from Brazil, there are only four joint commissions between Morocco and Latin American countries, namely Argentina, Mexico, Chile and Colombia. The most active among them, the Morocco-Argentina Joint Commission, has held six meetings, the last one in Buenos Aires in April 2006, whereas the joint commissions with Colombia and Mexico are to hold their second meeting in Rabat after the sessions taking place in 2006 in Bogota and Mexico City.

Insofar as actors in the private sector, although their contributions are negligible, there is nonetheless a progressively growing awareness of the goal of improving trade and economic relations. The recent launching of the new direct Casablanca-Sao Paulo flight by the Moroccan airline, Royal Air Maroc (RAM), adds to the favourable climate for the growth of trade between the two countries. Additional flight routes with countries in the region are conceivable.

Conclusion

In comparison with other countries of the Arab world, Morocco has a number of advantages placing it at the forefront of trade relations with Latin American countries. Its political stability, geographic location, hub ports and historic cultural ties distinguish Morocco within the Arab region. Moreover, Morocco has consolidated its presence in numerous regional American organisations. Indeed, it is an observer member of the Organisation of American States (OAS), the Ibero-American Summit, the Association of Caribbean States and the Pacific Alliance. It has recently applied for observer status with the Andean Community of Nations and the Central American Integration System as well.

In 2012, Morocco expanded its diplomatic missions, opening an embassy in Guatemala. Today Morocco has eight diplomatic missions in Latin America covering a great many countries in the region. The evolution of political relations between Morocco and the majority of countries of the American subcontinent over the past few years encourages the two parties to undertake a new stage of deep cooperation that could expand to new countries in the region. Nonetheless, Morocco is likely to keep in mind the need to diversify its trade and overcome the effects of dependence on Latin American countries.

References


Investment in Turbulent Times: How Political Turbulence Has Affected the FDI Level in the MENA Region

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At the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis, Mediterranean countries\(^1\) were facing important internal and external economic changes that enhanced their growth prospects. Integration in the global economy and trade liberalisation, reforms of the exchange rate systems and progress with the regional integration processes were paving the way to more diversified production and export structures. A transition had begun from planned and state-dominated economies to market economies with the privatisation of many public companies. Moreover, the boom of the Gulf states’ economies\(^2\) had produced investment spillovers of their oil rents in the region, and the region’s role as a logistics hub and export platform for entering new investment areas in Africa and Asia was reinforced.

Against this changed economic background, FDI flows to the region, which started out quite low, began to increase in the early 2000s, peaking in the second half of the decade, by which point they accounted for a major share of the foreign capital flow to the region. However, global financial and economic turbulence and, later, internal political turmoil caused FDI to drop in 2009, marking the end of the very short investment wave that occurred between 2004 and 2008. Whereas the rest of the world’s FDI picked up after 2010, FDI flows to the MENA region continued to decline as economic and political conditions worsened. While the 2009 collapse was not too dramatic, thanks to the region’s poor financial development and the positive spillovers of the Gulf countries’ increased government spending, the two crises that hit the region later, related to the eurozone countries’ sovereign deficits and the events of the Arab Springs, blocked the virtual processes and deeply affected FDI growth in 2011, 2012 and 2013. Governments were overthrown in the Arab Republic of Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and the Republic of Yemen; civil wars broke out in Libya and the Syrian Arab Republic; and major turmoil spread throughout Bahrain, Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon. These events led to an erosion of institutional quality, but also to a worsening of macroeconomic stability, poor economic performance and serious detrimental effects on FDI. The MENA region’s share of global FDI flows, which had doubled between the 1990s and 2000s, retreated to 1990s’ levels. While political instability has had an impact on all investors, evidence suggests that it has had a greater impact on multinational corporations operating in the region.

The regional outlook for 2014 is marked by uncertainty and subject to a variety of risks, mostly domestic in nature and linked to high policy uncertainty, which has become a key concern for investors and the most severe constraint to doing business in the Middle East and North Africa (World Bank, 2013). In the following pages, we will briefly describe FDI in the Mediterranean countries, focusing on the links between political factors and trends and FDI patterns at the global, European and intraregional level. Additionally, we will try to determine the sector composi-

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\(^1\) For the purposes of this article, the Mediterranean countries, or MED11, include the Maghreb countries (Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia), the Mashreq countries (Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and the Occupied Palestinian Territory), Israel, Egypt, and Turkey. When we refer to the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) economies, we are considering all MED11 countries, except for Israel and Turkey, as well as Iraq, Iran, Yemen and Djibouti.

\(^2\) The Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCCs), or Gulf States, are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
tion of FDI in the region and whether there is any hint of “higher-quality FDI,” i.e., diversification from natural-resource-based investment towards investment in manufacturing and more qualified and technology-intensive goods and services able to produce higher spillover effects in the region and enhance its growth potential. In the aftermath of the political crises, the picture we get suggests a strong heterogeneity in the national patterns of FDI collapse and revival and important changes in investor involvement, but also a strong overall persistence in terms of the sectoral FDI composition.

### TABLE 13

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Source: Own elaboration using UNCTAD data, accessed on March 2014.

### Foreign Investment Performance and Challenges Posed by the Arab Transitions

The participation of MENA countries in global FDI has been conditioned by their specialisation model, which is mostly based on three economic activities strongly affected by volatility and cyclical trends: resource-based activities such as agriculture and oil, manufacturing, and tourism (Diop et al., 2013). In spite of the efforts to improve trade integration and the tough macroeconomic reforms carried out in the 1990s, MENA countries are still not fully taking part in the...
development of global production networks or the new
potential of integration in global markets (Giovannetti,
2013). Moreover, they do not constitute an integrated
economic space yet, despite the many intra-regional
agreements that have been signed since the 1960s
(Romagnoli and Mengoni, 2013). The pace of FDI
growth in the MENA region (below 2% on average)
lags far behind that of many other emerging econo-
mies, such as China (which rose from a share of less
than 1% in 1980 to more than 9% in 2012), South
and East Asia (up from 6% to more than 15% over the
same period), and Central and Eastern Europe and the
Russian Federation (climbing to more than 6% in 1995) (see Table 13).
FDI in the MENA region tends to focus on countries
with greater political stability and more favourable
economic factors (rapid privatisation, deregulation
and liberalisation of financial markets and trade). On
the other hand, a crucial factor for localisation is a
country’s oil resources (Sekkat, 2012). In the Maghreb
region, flows are concentrated in Morocco, for rea-
sons of stability, and Algeria, where they are almost
entirely invested in the oil industry and its supplier and
user sectors. In the Mashreq, the main destinations
are Israel, Egypt and, before the conflict, Syria. Since
2005, large inflows of FDI into the GCC economies
have also predominated (see Table 13).
Chart 25 shows the level of FDI inflows to MED11
countries over 2000-2012. Total investment increased
from less than $13 million to more than $38 million at
its peak in 2006. It then dropped 30% in 2009, and
the ensuing political turmoil that took place in 2011
and 2012 undermined FDI recovery in the region.
The Arab transitions generated a substantial shock
to political stability, reflected in significantly deterio-
rated political risk rankings in almost all countries in
the region. Many countries have been experiencing
political turmoil since 2010 in terms of government
changes, conflicts, and policy instability, with major
effects on the business and legal environment.
We used the political stability index from the World
Bank’s governance indicators for 2010-2012 to check
whether investors were discouraged by the deteriora-
tion in the political and economic environment in
the region after 2010. Chart 26 shows the results. In gen-
eral, increased political instability in the host economy
was directly correlated with decreased FDI in MENA
countries, although there were some exceptions. Tunisia,
Morocco, Yemen and Turkey saw positive growth in
FDI, despite serious declines in political stability.

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<td>18,074</td>
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Source: Own elaboration based on OECD (EU15, United States) and UNCTAD (World) data, accessed on March 2014.

4 A similar relationship was tested with econometric estimates by Burger, Ianchovichina and Rijkers (2013).
5 In Tunisia, the decline in FDI rates was small, despite the political turmoil due to Tunisia’s dual economy structure, under which investment in the offshore sector is tax-exempt and subject to few regulations. Morocco experienced a significant rise in 2012 due to the less serious nature of the unrest experienced in the country.
countries registering the most serious losses in terms of both political stability and FDI inflows were Syria, Libya, Egypt, Algeria and Jordan. No FDI increase was registered in Syria over 2012, and investors did not return to Libya until 2012. Three years after peaking at $11.6 billion and subsequently collapsing to $6.7 billion in 2009, FDI in Egypt had still not recovered, due to the critical political and security situation. Jordan likewise remained in a critical situation in 2012, due, among other things, to the adoption of a rigid fixed exchange rate regime anchored to the dollar. In Israel, after reaching the record figure of $20 billion in 2006, FDI fell to less than $8 billion dollars in 2009 and, by

![Chart 26](image)

Source: UNCTAD data and World Bank Governance Indicators, accessed in March 2014. The size of the circle reflects the country’s share in world FDI inflows.

![Chart 27](image)

Source: Own elaboration based on UNCTAD data, accessed in March 2014.
2012, had rebounded to only $13 billion. In contrast, in Lebanon, FDI was generally quite resilient, given the country’s proximity to the conflicts in Syria.

**Emerging Actors and Intra-Arab Investment**

A crucial change in the geographical map of FDI has occurred over the last decade with the emergence of new investors (Chart 28). With the enormous surplus in the oil-rich Gulf economies, converted into sovereign funds, intra-Arab FDI from the GCC countries increased sharply between 2004 and 2008, rivalling the EU for leadership in the region and compensating for the loss of American investors. The improved positions of China and other Asian and emerging countries, such as Brazil and Russia, were likewise remarkable. The political uprisings in the region have further reinforced emerging countries’ rise and the slowdown in Western investors from the EU and US. Investment flows from the US have decreased in all countries in the region, especially Egypt and Tunisia. Conversely, the Gulf States have strengthened their support for the news Islamist governments in Northern Africa.

and, at the same time, have emerged from the financial crisis that affected the Gulf monarchies between 2007 and 2011. In contrast, the EU15 region, the main trade partner and investor, has lost relevance in the region since 2007, dropping from over 40% of total FDI in 2008 to only 21% in 2012. However, this slowdown may be cyclical, due to a loss of confidence by EU investors, and it could reflect the “wait and see” attitude of EU governments with regard to the new political leaders to emerge in the region. Many Mediterranean countries will revise their development and governance models, and this will most likely lead to increased investment from Europe in the near future. Intra-MED11 investment also remained very low and was further weakened over the crisis, although the changes taking place in the region should also lead to greater political and economic intra-regional integration in coming years (Noutary and Louçon, 2013).

**Patterns of FDI by Sector**

The wave of increasing FDI over the last decade fuelled by the oil boom was dominated by large inflows
of FDI in natural resources and non-tradable activities (Chart 29). There was a shift in the destination of FDI from MENA countries’ developing oil importers, which received over 60% of all net FDI inflows to the region between 1993 and 1997, to the region’s oil exporters, which received almost two thirds of FDI inflows between 2003 and 2007 (World Bank, 2013). Since the post-2011 collapse, this skewed composition has grown even worse, as the need for democratic reforms dampens certain investment flows, causing sectoral shifts similar to those seen with Dutch disease. While foreign investors in natural-resource-intensive and non-tradable sectors appear to be quite resilient to shocks to political stability for several reasons, including, simply, the geographically constrained availability of natural resources, which has decreased significantly over the past few decades, political instability has a strong negative effect on investment in non-resource tradable manufacturing and tradable service activities. Of the 50 largest multinational firms doing greenfield investment in the MENA region, as reflected by FDI market data for 2012, nearly half operate in resource and oil manufacturing sectors and only 12 are engaged in tradable non-oil activities, of which ten invest in commercial services, while only two invest primarily in non-oil manufacturing. The traditional sectors of utilities, such as energy, telecoms, banking, construction and public works have continued to attract the bulk of FDI, a pattern that has only been strengthened by the revival of the Gulf Countries’ position in the area (World Bank, 2013).

In the near future, an additional gain in the GCC countries’ position might further reduce the rate of increase for investment in more tech-intensive sectors, which are mainly linked to Western investors. Therefore, political unrest might amplify the effect of FDI clustering in traditional sectors such as oil renting and labour-intensive and non-tradable sectors, reducing the chance of investment in the types of high-quality, non-resource-intensive activities that

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**CHART 29**

Greenfield FDI Flows to the MENA Region by Sector (US$ Billion)

- Resource and Oil Manufacturing
- Non-Oil Manufacturing
- Commercial Services
- Non-tradables


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6 However, not all types of political instability matter equally to the MENA region’s foreign investors. Government instability, worsening bureaucratic quality, an unstable business environment, and conflicts have a strong negative effect on foreign investment, whereas other aspects of political instability, such as the lack of democratic accountability or law and order, corruption, and ethnic and religious tensions, seem to matter less (World Bank, 2013).
are essential to increasing the quality and diversification of exports and to job creation. At the aggregate level, the figures show a steeper decrease in investment in non-oil manufacturing with regard to resources manufacturing activities, while commercial services will remain quite stable. However, more disaggregated analyses, based on the number of projects announced in specific sectors, as recorded by the ANIMA-MIPO observatory, offer some signs of a positive reshuffling of sector compositions. In 2011 and 2012 in particular, there was evidence of slight progress in some new industrial sectors, such as software, the automotive industry and pharmaceuticals, and a sharp rise was observed in terms of projects announced in the two high-tech sectors of aeronautics and engineering (Noutary and Louçon, 2013).

Conclusions

Political turbulence since the early 2000s has negatively affected the level of FDI in the MENA region, as well as its composition, skewing it towards activities that create few jobs and have low spillover effects on growth, export upgrading and inclusive development. The regional picture for 2014 is still marked by uncertainty and serious political risks at the domestic level. Oil-exporting countries’ growth was more volatile in 2013 and was moreover weakened by the worsening of the political conflicts in Libya and Syria. Growth prospects for the region’s oil importers were weak in 2013, only slightly better than in 2012. The slow pace of economic reforms combined with increasing economic and political instability could undermine investment and growth in the long term. The economic policies and growth strategies pursued in the past must be thoroughly revised, and the challenges of political transition and economic governance must be addressed. This can be achieved only if institutions and the investment climate are reinforced, especially with regard to political and macro-economic stability, the legal framework, property rights and transparency rules (Gasiorek, 2013). Europe, which remains the main investor in the region, can play a key role in this process and could facilitate the transition by adopting a new more political, institutional and focused partnership (Femise, 2014).

References


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Director of the North-South Centre for Social
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The recent IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) report (2013) shows that global warming is human made, is accelerating and is having and is going to have massive impacts by altering the basic conditions of life on earth. It is increasingly interacting with everything that matters to humans; mainly food, health, water, energy, environment and livelihood securities. This is basically turning climate change into a political issue, and a matter of defence and security for all nations (Gwynn, 2008-2010).

Accordingly, global warming, as a new geostrategic issue, is putting international relations under pressure with the potential to affect existing governance structures. These are the reasons why climate change – as a growing multidimensional crisis – is becoming a prominent item on the agenda of world and regional concerns.

According to the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) report (2008), six key threats to international security will arise if mitigation efforts fail: the possible increase of vulnerable states; risks to global economic development; risks of growing international distributional conflicts between the main drivers of climate change and those most affected; the risk to human rights and the industrialised countries’ legitimacy as global governance actors; triggering and intensification of migration; and overstretched of classic security policy. For Brauch (2010), some of these conflict constellations are highly relevant for the Euro-Mediterranean region such as: climate-induced degradation of freshwater resources; climate-induced decline in food production; environmentally-induced migration; and climate-induced increase in storm and flood disasters.

This paper aims to highlight some of the most important geostrategic implications of climate change for the Mediterranean. After analysing climate change as a growing security and geostrategic issue both internationally and in the Mediterranean, the analysis assesses the vulnerability of the Mediterranean to climate change and shows the areas where climate change may provoke a geostrategic shift in the Mediterranean – such as water security, food security, and environmental migration.

Climate Change as a Growing Geostrategic Issue

Environmental geostrategy is happening now with the emergence of climate change, and appears to be the new way a growing number of governments and non-state actors are starting to adapt to its complex consequences. This new approach tends to orient strategic thinking towards understanding how and when new tensions and armed conflicts could arise through the convergence of environmental, social, political, and economic tensions (for example, we are witnessing an enhanced interest in the strategic implications of the summer melting of the Arctic, which may well open the famous ‘north-west passage’ in the coming years and start a new ‘all resources race’ in the region). This is the logic behind the new extreme environment security (Valentin, 2013).

Additionally, there is currently a large number of worldwide occurrences where and when the climate
Global warming, as a new geostrategic issue, is putting international relations under pressure with the potential to affect existing governance structures.

interacts with diverse, complex and volatile social, political, economic and strategic situations, making them merge in strange new ways. This accelerating and unstable redistribution of power and tensions around the world is deeply connected with the climate destabilisation of the planet. Climate change is one of a series of powerful planetary geophysical and biological changes that are under way (like biodiversity crises, land and freshwater use, ocean acidification, etc.). Since changes are taking place so fast, they are altering the basic equilibrium on which the security of nations rests and playing new roles as powerful strategic forces, which need to be fully understood. According to Valentin (2013), these forces are reshaping the entire international relationships network, as well as the fabric of nations, societies, and communities. They are causing new kinds of tensions, which are the engines of current, and coming, conflicts, struggles, revolutions, and wars.

From a state-centred international security perspective, the WBGU report (2008) argued that without resolute counteraction, climate change will overstretch many societies’ adaptive capacities within the coming decades. This could result in destabilisation and violence, jeopardising national and international security to a new degree.

The Mediterranean as a Climate Change ‘Hot-Spot’

The Mediterranean lies in a transition zone between the arid climate of North Africa and the temperate and rainy climate of central Europe and is affected by interactions between mid-latitude and tropical processes. Because of these features, even relatively minor modifications in the general circulation can lead to substantial changes in the Mediterranean climate.

Accordingly, a robust picture of climate change over the Mediterranean currently emerges, consisting of a pronounced decrease in precipitation and increase in warming. The projections ascertained from global and regional model simulations are generally consistent with each other on a broad scale. They suggest that the Mediterranean might be one of the most prominent ‘Hot-Spots’ in future climate change projections (Giorgi and Lionello, 2008).

According to existing studies, many climate-induced impacts are highly relevant for the Mediterranean such as the degradation of freshwater resources, decline in biodiversity, regression in food production, environmentally-induced migration, and increase in storm and flood disasters. These impacts are currently affecting the water, food, health, environmental and political security of the region and have the potential to increase climate-induced conflicts among and within Mediterranean countries.

Climate Change as a Security and Geostrategic Issue in the Mediterranean

Whether and in what way climate change may alter the conditions of international and regional security is still under investigation. From this perspective, the initial effects of climate change will vary according to existing economic, political and social structures in different parts of the world, including the Mediterranean region. Organised violence is more likely to happen in weak states and regions with conflictual inter-state dynamics than in those characterised by cooperative relations. In the short to medium term, climate change is unlikely to alter the constitutive structures of security. However, depending on the severity of global warming, these conditions may change over the long term. A long-term development marked by unmitigated climate change could very well have serious consequences in terms of security (Haldén, 2007).

In the implementation paper (2008) of the European Security Strategy (2003), the 27 countries of the European Council concluded that “natural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for resources exacerbate conflict, especially in situations of poverty and population growth, with humanitarian, health, political and security consequences, including greater migration.” This decision was based on a report of the High Representative and Commission presented in March 2008 “which described climate
change as a threat multiplier.” The European Council also noted that “climate change can lead to disputes over trade routes, maritime zones and resources previously inaccessible” (Brauch, 2010).

Many climate-induced impacts are highly relevant for the Mediterranean such as the degradation of freshwater resources, decline in biodiversity, regression in food production, environmentally-induced migration, and increase in storm and flood disasters.

The WBGU, in its 2008 report, argued that climate change could also unite the international community, provided that it recognises climate change as a threat to humankind and soon sets the course for the avoidance of dangerous anthropogenic climate change by adopting a dynamic and globally coordinated climate policy. If states fail to act early and proactively, climate change may trigger numerous conflicts between and within countries over the distribution of resources, management of migration or compensation payments between the countries mainly responsible for climate change and those countries most affected by its destructive effects. The report also argued that climate change amplifies mechanisms which lead to insecurity and violence affecting, specifically, countries in transition, those with weak governance structures and poor countries affected by resource scarcity and often with high population growth. These local or national conflicts may spill over and destabilise neighbouring countries through refugee flows, arms trafficking or combatant withdrawal. The social impacts of climate change can thus transcend borders and expand the geographical extent of crisis and conflict regions.

**Climate Change Impacts on Mediterranean Food and Water Security**

Mediterranean countries are diverse from various points of view including their socio-economic development, climate, water availability, infrastructure levels, or social and ecological resources. However, the region as a whole is undergoing rapid social and environmental changes which may harbour negative implications for current and future sustainability and human security (Iglesias et al., 2011). This is particularly true for Mediterranean food and water security where pressures and impacts on water, soil, and natural resources are predicted to multiply under climate change.

Our current understanding of the Mediterranean climate leads to a projected overall temperature increase from 2 to 4 °C and precipitation changes of 10% to 50% by the 2080s. The changes are not equally distributed across regions or seasons. In many Mediterranean countries, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, water systems are already under intense stress. Roughly two thirds of Arab countries depend on sources outside their borders for water. Existing tensions over access to water are almost certain to intensify in this region. This will unavoidably lead to further political instability with detrimental implications for Europe’s energy security and other interests. In southern Africa and the Sahel, droughts are contributing to poor harvests, leading to food insecurity in several areas with millions of people expected to face food shortages. Migration in this region, but also migration from other regions, through North Africa to Europe (transit migration) is likely to intensify. In Africa, and elsewhere, climate change is expected to have negative effects on people’s health, in particular due to the spread of vector-borne diseases, which will further aggravate tensions.

In terms of food security, and according to WBGU (2008), the self-sufficiency rate in food – and especially cereals – in the MENA region has been declining rapidly since the 1960s and it is projected by the FAO to drop rapidly until 2030 and 2050. Climate change and bioenergy development will affect food security in its four dimensions – availability, accessibility, stability and utilisation. With global warming set at 2-4 °C, a drop in agricultural productivity is anticipated worldwide. This trend will be substantially reinforced by desertification, soil salinisation or water scarcity. In North Africa, the areas suitable for agriculture are already largely exploited. This may well trigger regional food crises and further undermine the economic performance of weak and unstable states, thereby encouraging or exacerbating
destabilisation, the collapse of social systems, and violent conflicts. This situation will become even more dramatic in the ten countries in the Nile Basin that are already severely affected by a vicious circle of repeated droughts, hunger and famine.

**Triggering and Intensification of Climate-Induced Migration**

Decisions to migrate are usually the result of multiple considerations that reflect a complex combination of environmental, economic, social, security and political factors (Foresight, 2011). Early analyses of the impact of climate change and migration were based on an overly deterministic understanding of the relationship between the risk of environmental degradation faced by populations and the likelihood that they would migrate. In contrast, more recent research – such as the UK government’s Foresight study – has taken a more sophisticated approach, paying greater attention to both the adaptive capacity of persons in low income countries, and the factors behind decisions to migrate. Thus, vulnerability to climate change may significantly impact migration drivers, but does not automatically imply that migration will occur. For this reason, it remains a challenging task to make reliable forecasts of population movements which are likely to result from climate change and related environmental degradation (European Commission, 2013).

Brauch (2010) argues that migration from the MENA region to the EU is already considered as a major security issue and it can be assumed that the number of environmental migrants will substantially rise in the future due to climate change. The increase in drought, soil degradation and growing water scarcity in combination with high population growth, unstable institutions, poverty or a high level of dependency on agriculture means that there is a particularly significant risk of environmental migration occurring and increasing in scale.

The Mediterranean is currently a crossroads where foreign migrants travel to Mediterranean countries in order to make the leap to Europe or the Middle East, or sometimes simply settle where they are. The extent to which increased environmental migration is likely to exacerbate this trend remains unclear. Migration from the Middle East and Africa to the EU is the most significant of this migration, but to cross the Mediterranean requires a certain level of resources. The groups who become environmental migrants consist mainly of those whose livelihoods depend on the environment, and those with fewer resources with which to cope with environmental distress. Environmental migrants are thus likely to be poor, and without the means to procure passage across the sea. In fact, most environmental migration occurs either within borders or to neighbouring states. That they are poor and with few resources also means that they are likely to be classified as illegal migrants (Stuc Campana, 2010).

**Conclusion**

In the Mediterranean, there is a broad recognition that climate change is one of the defining challenges of the 21st century. However, for many decision makers in Europe the complexity and intractability of the diplomatic challenges posed by climate change, the short-term (political) costs of some of the policy actions required, and the risk of becoming associated with ‘failure,’ has led to a gradual disengagement. At a time of economic hardship, instead of investing in mitigation and adaptation, some governments are seeking to defer the necessary decisions. This attitude will generate consequences and carry high costs in the future, as mitigation today reduces the need for costly adaptation measures tomorrow. Through carbon lock-in today, we are foreclosing development options well into the 2030s and 2040s. Climate security is inextricably intertwined with food, water, energy and even physical security. These manifold challenges humankind faces in the 21st century cannot be solved by traditional and power-based security strategies. They require a shift to an extended security approach which involves other ministries and agencies responsible for environmental, development, science and technology, as well as

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References


The Economic Costs of Climate Change

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With the release of the April 2014 contribution of Working Group III (WGIII), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the international organisation responsible for collecting and synthesising the latest peer-reviewed scientific knowledge in the field of climate change, concluded its Fifth Assessment Report (AR5).¹ The report periodically improves on past reports – the last was released in 2007 – describing new advances and findings in climate research. It is organised according to three main areas: the physical science basis for climate change, impacts and adaptation, and mitigation. The AR5 is the most important and comprehensive document to date to analyse the negative repercussions of climate change and offer insightful and evidence-based suggestions for policy-making.

Compared to earlier editions, one new feature of the contribution of Working Group II (WGII), that on impacts and adaptation, is a much more detailed regional analysis. Confirming and strengthening past evidence, variations in climatic conditions emerge as one of the most challenging of the many change drivers affecting the Mediterranean region. This article will briefly summarise these current and future trends.

Climate Change: The Problem

Climate change refers to a set of variations in climatic and environmental conditions, such as changes in maximum, minimum and average temperatures, the intensity and frequency of precipitations (rainfall and snowfall), wind speed, ice melting, and ecosystems, that will eventually affect human wellbeing.

Climate change has both natural and anthropogenic causes; nonetheless, the AR5 concludes that “It is extremely likely that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century” (WGIII 2014). This human influence mainly takes the form of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions due to the combustion of fossil fuels for production and consumption activities and to changes in land use.

Once in the atmosphere, GHGs alter the energy balance, cause warming and lead to climatic changes. These, in turn, are already affecting, and will increasingly affect, through environmental changes (impacts), many human activities around the world, albeit with important regional differences. These differences will depend on the varying levels of vulnerability of different regions of the world, which are driven by changes in local climate drivers, the intrinsic nature of the environmental services affected (land and water availability, land productivity, extent of flood-prone areas, and so on) and society’s capacity to react to these changes with appropriate mitigation and adaptation measures.

Ultimately, climate change affects key aspects of our life: food and energy production, health, the degree of society’s exposure to extreme events, mobility, and the inter- and intra-generational distribution of wealth.

Climate Change Impact Assessment: Methodological Issues

Assessing the current impacts of climate change, in physical and, then, economic terms, is extremely difficult. The main problem is that the available historical observations do not go back far enough to enable the proper attribution of a given phenomenon, including those with a clear weather-related component such as droughts, floods or heat waves, to climate change rather than natural climate variability. Moreover, these phenomena are often exacerbated by resource mismanagement. The IPCC’s AR5 has made some progress on this issue, gathering better evidence that at least some of the episodes of water scarcity and yield decline experienced today can be imputed to climate change. There is then the difficulty of linking these phenomena to the right set of social and economic consequences (e.g. loss of land, labour and capital stock, or productivity) and, finally, of providing an economic assessment. Accordingly, estimates of the costs associated with current climate change are rare and basically consist of analyses of the direct economic losses entailed by a given well-defined extreme weather event. However, the main purpose of these exercises is more to offer an indication of what could reasonably be expected in a future characterised by greater changes in temperature than to determine current climate change costs.

The problem of attribution is somewhat less severe in long-term economic assessments of climate change impacts. However, in this case, uncertainty regarding future impacts, the structure of future societies and long-term aggregations of costs and benefits, including “intangibles,” poses other daunting challenges. The dominant approach in these exercises is the use of a suite of coupled models. This makes it possible both to manage the huge complexity associated with the task and, by integrating knowledge from different disciplines (climate science, environmental concerns, socio-economic factors), to address all relevant aspects of the issue. Against this background, many different methodologies are used to conduct economic assessments.

There are partial-equilibrium or bottom-up models providing detailed descriptions of impacts in a given market or sector with a focus on direct costs and there are top-down models emphasising long-term transitions, rebound effects and indirect costs.

Climate Change: Current Evidence and Future Trends in the Mediterranean

In the WGII’s contribution to the IPCC’s AR5 (2014), the Mediterranean picture can be derived by compounding the “regional” reports for Europe and Africa. Overall, the Mediterranean emerges as a climate hotspot in terms of both natural conditions and society’s attitude. Specifically, it is one of the regions of the world most subjected to phenomena such as soil degradation, desertification and water scarcity, especially on the southern shore. Moreover, the whole region may suffer from rising sea levels and droughts, the frequency and intensity of which have likely increased since 1950, as well as forest fires and heat waves. Extreme events such as coastal and river floods will be more frequent in the north. In Mediterranean Europe, for instance, there is already evidence of biodiversity reduction in plant and animal species, especially in mountain regions, which face a potential future loss of important ecosystem services. Wildfires have also generally consistently increased in recent decades, notwithstanding a decrease in the number of events and in total burnt area in the very last years. In the longer term, the region is expected to experience a significant decline in yields, especially for cereals, given the sharp reduction in groundwater resources induced by significant changes in total runoff and evapotranspiration. Health will likewise be strongly negatively impacted, due to more frequent and intense heat waves, with the associated reduction in labour productivity. The energy and recreational sectors will be also affected. Increased electricity demand due to increased cooling needs will raise generation costs, while outdoor tourism activities are expected to decline as a result of the deteriorating climatic conditions, including unpleasantly high temperatures and

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2 IPCC AR5 defines “hotspot” as “A geographical area characterised by high vulnerability and exposure to climate change.”
3 MARQUES et al. (2011) in IPCC (2014).
increasingly heavy precipitations in summer. Unlike Mediterranean Europe, where negative climate change impacts will prevail, northern Europe may benefit from climate change, at least in moderate warming scenarios. Therefore, climate change could be an additional factor contributing to widening the existing gap between northern and southern European countries.

The main climate change vulnerability of the southern Mediterranean region (i.e., North African countries) is expected in the agricultural sector. The observed changes in precipitation patterns in recent decades, with increases in autumn, but decreases in winter and spring, are expected to be further consolidated in the future. This will exacerbate water scarcity and accelerate the negative change in yields. Given the still high contribution of agriculture to the production of value added in the region, this effect is particularly worrisome. Another important stress factor is rising sea levels. In particular, the vulnerability of the Nile mega-delta will continue to increase due to higher population and infrastructure exposure on the already over-crowded and sea-flood-prone coastal system caused by migration/urbanisation phenomena and to a sea-level rise that seems to be worse than anticipated in the IPCC AR4 (2007). Underlying all of this, health statuses may also worsen, due to both water-borne and vector-borne diseases, challenging regional healthcare systems.

Economic Estimates of Current Climate Change and a Glimpse into the Future

With all the caveats of the previous sections, to give an idea of the possible costs associated with climate change, we will first refer to the EMDAT International Disaster Database, which reports extreme events occurring since 1900 by country and type, including, in some cases, the associated economic damage, although there is a particularly notable lack of data for North Africa and the Middle East.

The only two events somewhat related to weather conditions reported with the associated economic damage for the Mediterranean region in 2013 were a flash flood occurring in the French Pyrenees in June, killing two people and affecting 2,000 more, with an estimated cost of around $655 million, and a general flood occurring in Sardinia (Italy) in November, which killed 18 people and affected 2,700 more, causing $780 million in economic damage. In 2012, three flood events were recorded in Spain, Slovenia and Italy with estimated costs of $395, $265 and $15 million, respectively. Italy was also affected by a drought episode lasting from June to October, causing damage equal to $1,190 million. In Mediterranean Europe, the largest losses since 2005 were experienced by France, due to two storms, in 2010 and 2009, causing an estimated total damage of $4.23 and $3.2 billion, respectively. Wildfires have also been quite remarkable in the last decade, with two events in France (2005) and Greece (2007) causing economic losses of $2.05 and $1.75 billion, respectively. Overall, EEA (2012) estimates that costs linked to extreme events in Europe have increased from €9 billion/year in the 1980s to more than €13 billion/year in the 2000s (with a cumulative total of €445 billion over the 1980-2011 period) and that they could possibly increase to €15 billion/year by 2070.

The most recent economic assessment of a climate-related event for North Africa refers to a flood in the El-Bayadh region of Algeria occurring in October 2011, which killed 10 people and resulted in $779 million of economic damage. The EMDAT database reports other floods of minor intensity for Algeria in previous years, while other countries are very poorly covered. Only two floods are recorded for the eastern Mediterranean, both occurring in Turkey, in 2009 and 2006, entailing estimated losses of $550 and $317 million respectively; likewise, there is record of a wildfire in Israel in 2010, causing $270 million in damage. Overall, since 2005 the average annual economic damage in the Mediterranean region due to weather-related events recorded by EMDAT amounted to $1.408 billion for floods, $2.816 billion for storms, $1.190 billion for droughts, and $971 million for wildfires.
Looking back slightly further, the heat wave that swept Europe in the summer of 2003, in addition to causing a heavy death toll, led to a remarkable 20% reduction in grain yields in Mediterranean and eastern Europe. The net primary productivity of France and Italy fell 17% and 12%, respectively, with estimated economic losses of €4 billion each.

It is important to stress that we are not claiming that these losses were caused by climate change. Nonetheless, it can be correctly claimed that episodes such as heat waves, droughts, wildfires and extreme precipitation will increase in frequency and/or intensity in future due to climate change. Accordingly, the highlighted economic losses are also likely to increase in the absence of appropriate mitigation and adaptation strategies.

To conclude this section, we will just mention the results of the CIRCE FP6 project. Among many other findings on future climate change and impacts in the Mediterranean, it reports the associated expected costs in terms of changes in gross domestic product (GDP). An initial survey of the existing literature found GDP losses ranging from 0.25% (or even slight gains) for moderate temperature increases (less than +2°C with regard to preindustrial levels) to 1.4% for quite extreme 5°C temperature increases for southern Europe and of around 2% for North Africa and the eastern Mediterranean by mid-century. Of major concern for Euro-Mediterranean countries are the impacts originated by rising sea levels and changes in tourism attractiveness, while in North Africa impacts on agricultural productivity are of greater concern, accounting for 77% of total losses. CIRCE also developed its own impact estimates, restricting the analysis to sea-level rise, energy demand and tourism. In terms of aggregate impact, by 2050, for a temperature increase of roughly 2°C with regard to 2000, GDP for the entire Mediterranean region would fall 1.2%, with the northern Mediterranean countries clearly less vulnerable than southern Mediterranean ones. Among the former, the average loss by 2050 would be 0.5% GDP, while among the latter it would be more than double that (Bosello and Shechter, 2013).

**Conclusions**

The Mediterranean region is particularly exposed to climate change. Some of the effects of climate change can already be detected today. Nonetheless, attributing economic losses to current climate change is very difficult. What can be said is that current economic losses associated with weather-related events such as floods, droughts, heat waves, wildfires and sea-level rise will increase in future because of the additional pressures posed by climate change. Also, in a scenario of moderate climate change with a limited number of impacts, the Mediterranean region as a whole could experience GDP losses of 1.2% by the mid-century. Furthermore, these costs will not be evenly borne. Northern Mediterranean countries are clearly less vulnerable than southern Mediterranean ones. The potential scale of impacts and their distribution thus calls for appropriate mitigation and adaptation measures.

**References**


Energy Infrastructures in the Mediterranean: Fine Accomplishments but No Global Vision

A Strong Energy Interdependence

The Mediterranean Basin today is home to 7% of the world’s population and represents 10% of the world’s GDP and over 8% of global energy demand. The region has 4.7% of the planet’s natural gas reserves and 4.6% of oil reserves (though probably underestimated), concentrated in four countries that supply 22% of oil exports and 35% of gas exports to the ensemble of the Mediterranean Basin. There is a strong North-South interdependence: supply security for the former, funding of economic and social development for the latter.

Insofar as future perspectives, according to the Observatoire méditerranéen de l’énergie (OME, the Mediterranean Energy Observatory), if the current trend continues, it will lead to a rise in demand of over 40% by 2030, with equivalent effects regarding CO₂ emissions. The OME has also drawn up a proactive scenario with greater energy efficiency and more renewable energy, in which demand would increase less quickly (23% by 2030). The energy mix will continue to be dominated by hydrocarbons (nearly 80% of demand by 2030), above all natural gas.

The electricity sector will continue expanding, with the installation of over 320 GW of new capacity by 2030, more than half of it in the South, and a less carbon-based electricity mix (less than 45% fossil fuels, of which 28% will be natural gas; and over 50% renewable energy, a third of which will be hydroelectric). Renewable energy is taking the lion’s share, with the different national plans underway in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs), the 20 GW Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) and the Desertec initiative.

Since the energy resources are concentrated in the South while the greatest consumption is in the North, export flows move in a South to North direction, which requires heavy infrastructure. Also required in addition to production units are facilities designed for transport and distribution. Hence, considerable sums have been invested in developing various energy infrastructures around the Mediterranean Basin.

Important Energy Infrastructures

The *Enrico Mattei Gas Pipeline*, the first pipeline to cross the Mediterranean Sea, transports Algerian natural gas from Hassi R’mel to the terminal in Mazzara del Vallo (Sicily), after crossing Tunisian territory. Inaugurated in its first stage in August 1983, its capacity for transport was doubled to 24 Gm³/year as of 1995, then raised to 32 Gm³/year after bolstering the existing transport facilities in the Algerian and Tunisian sections. In 2012, the

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1 A Qualified Engineer, Abdelnour Keramane received his degree from the École nationale des ponts et chaussées (Paris Tech, civil engineering school), then served as Director General of the Algerian state electricity and gas company, Société algérienne de l’électricité et du gaz (Sonelgaz). A founding member and chairman of the Maghreb Electric Energy Committee (Comité maghrébin de l’énergie électrique, Comelec) and the Algerian Committee to the World Energy Conference and vice-president of the Algerian Gas Union (Union algérienne du gaz), he later became Algerian Minister of Industry and Mining and then Managing Director of the Trans-Mediterranean Pipeline Company (Milan). At present, he is the director of *MedEnergie*, a journal of his creation.

2 The *Mediterranean Energy Perspectives 2011* report presents an in-depth analysis of the energy situation in the Mediterranean Region and perspectives for the 2030 horizon.
Enrico Mattei Gas Pipeline transported 20.6 Gm$^3$, i.e. approximately a third of Italy’s natural gas imports.

The Pere Duran Farell Gas Pipeline connects the natural gas fields of Hassi R’Mel in Algeria to Morocco, Spain and Portugal. Its initial capacity was 8 Gm$^3$/year, with the first natural gas supply reaching Spain and Portugal in November 1996. The pipeline’s current capacity is 12 Gm$^3$/year and could reach 18 to 20 Gm$^3$/year with the installation of additional compression stations. Nearly 11 Gm$^3$ were transported in 2007 (8.8 Gm$^3$ to Spain, 1.4 Gm$^3$ to Portugal and 0.5 Gm$^3$ to Morocco).

The Medgas Pipeline is the second Algerian natural gas pipeline to Europe via Spain, but this one does not traverse Morocco. With a capacity of 8 Gm$^3$/year, it began operating in May 2011. In 2012, the volumes transported were 10.2 Gm$^3$ for Spain through the two natural gas pipelines, 1.4 Gm$^3$ for Portugal and 0.5 Gm$^3$ for Morocco.

The GreenStream Pipeline links the Libyan natural gas fields of Bouri (offshore) and Wafa (onshore) to Sicily across the Mediterranean. It began operating in October 2004 with a capacity of 8 Gm$^3$/year. The GreenStream delivered 9.2 Gm$^3$ of Libyan natural gas to Italy in 2007, but only 6.5 in 2012 due to the 2011 political events.

In 2012, the overall volume of natural gas supplied to Europe via these pipelines totalled 39.3 Gm$^3$ over a total capacity of 58 Gm$^3$, that is, a utilisation rate of 68%.

Liquefaction Factories

Algeria has two enormous liquefied natural gas (LNG) complexes at Arzew and Skikda, comprised of several liquefaction units that exported 25 Gm$^3$ to Europe and Asia in 2007. With the recent creation of two new liquefaction trains in Skikda (4.5 Mt/year) and another in Arzew (4.7 Mt/year), the total export capacity for LNG is 38 billion m$^3$/year. In 2012, Algeria exported 14.4 Gm$^3$ of LNG to Europe and 15.3 in total, with an overall capacity of 30. Thus, the utilisation rate was approximately 50%.

In Egypt, there are two LNG plants manufacturing for export: the Spanish Egyptian Gas Company, with a liquefaction train having a capacity of 7.5 Gm$^3$ per year, and Egyptian LNG in Iduku, with two trains having a total capacity of 10 Gm$^3$ per year. The total amount supplied in 2007 was 15 Gm$^3$, of which eight went to Mediterranean countries. In 2012, Egypt supplied 6.7 Gm$^3$ of LNG, of which 2.4 went to Europe.

Libya likewise has a liquefaction plant in Marsat Brega, with a capacity of 1 Gm$^3$/year. In 2011, it supplied 340 million m$^3$ of LNG to Spain.

Hence in total, according to these figures, less than 50% of LNG export capacity is being used.

The Maghreb–Europe Electricity Interconnection

The Maghreb’s electricity grids, which are interconnected, are also connected to European grids via two 400-kV, alternating-current submarine cables between Morocco (Ferdioua) and Spain (Tarifa) running through the Strait of Gibraltar (with a length of 26 km and at a maximum depth of 660 m) with a 1,400-MW capacity, the first of which began operating in October 1997 and the second in June 2006. During the first years, this 400-kV AC interconnection, which functioned from North to South, allowed an energy flow from Spain to Morocco of an amount equivalent to 20% of the production by Morocco’s Office National de l’Électricité (ONE).

Within the framework of the perspectives of increased exchange and the preparation of the Maghreb market’s integration into the European market, a 400-kV Spain–Morocco–Algeria–Tunisia electricity highway is being developed, with internal grids stepped up to 400 kV and an increase in the physical capacity of the Morocco–Algeria connection from 400 to 1000 MW. The strengthening of North-South and East-West electricity interconnections is considered a goal with multiple beneficial effects for the region. The same is true of the colossal project electricity companies of the Mediterranean Basin have been painstakingly implementing for nearly two decades now, which consists of connecting all electricity grids of the countries along the Mediterranean seaboard, from Spain to Morocco and across 8,000 km covering.

Insofar as future perspectives, if the current trend continues, it will lead to a rise in demand of over 40% by 2030, with equivalent effects regarding CO$_2$ emissions.
the Maghreb, Mashreq and Turkey in the South and East, and Greece, Italy, France in the North, the final goal of this unprecedented construction project being the establishment of Euro-Mediterranean electricity and natural gas markets.

The development of renewable energy – energy sources considered intermittent – poses new problems for grid managers and operators. This will require strengthening of electricity grids and interconnections, not only to stabilise grids but also to allow green electricity to be exported from South to North under Article 9 of EU Energy Directive 2009/28/EC. The Medgrid consortium is working precisely on a simplified system facilitating the transfer of renewable-source electricity via submarine cables at a number of corridors across the Mediterranean, through third countries to the EU within the framework of Article 9.

**Assessment: Lack of Global Vision**

*On the geostrategic level*, the major works projects constituted by the natural gas pipelines and submarine electricity cables are certainly the result of excellent regional-scale cooperation and greatly contribute to strengthening ties between the North and South shores of the Mediterranean. Nonetheless, the fact remains that, since these are sophisticated technical systems subject to contingencies and natural hazards, they must be the object of controls and attentive surveillance, not only insofar as the principles of supply security but also with regard to the imperatives of sustainable development: sustainable management of energy resources under acceptable economic conditions and in a manner limiting the effects of climate change, i.e. through the use of the appropriate, most environmentally-friendly forms of production and transport.

To this end, it is essential to establish appropriate regulatory and control mechanisms making it obligatory for owners and/or operators of these works to periodically publish detailed assessments and precise, transparent reports not only on their technical and commercial performance, but also on their state with regard to environmental impact. *From the standpoint of reliability and risks*, natural gas pipelines have been operating for several decades and have not experienced any major technical incidents. This means their operation is reliable. The precious data accumulated on the state of the conduits and that of the seabed and its environment have contributed a great deal to both the hydrographic and maritime communities and specialised research institutions.

*With regard to the environment*, the financial, economic and social crisis, the energy crisis, supply security concerns and the need to make transitions towards low-carbon economies in order to adapt to a context of climate change only accentuate the need for and the interest in a change of scale in the implementation of complementary policies of energy efficiency and conservation in the region, both in the North and the South. This complementarity could be extended to include in-depth cooperation not only in energy conservation and renewable energy, but also insofar as infrastructures and matters of common energy policy. It would also be appropriate to effect an energy assessment and a carbon assessment as well as an economic assessment before carrying out a project.

*On the economic level*, with the stagnation or reduction of the global energy demand, the works carried out are not being used to their full capacity, whether they be natural gas pipelines or liquefaction facilities. The question thus arises of whether, before undertaking certain projects as for instance, Medgaz, it would not be more economic to saturate the existing facilities and infrastructures, then proceed to their extension before considering new sites and routes. This would, moreover, allow environmental impact (soil deterioration, pollution, disturbance of wildlife, etc.) to be minimised. The existence of a long-term master plan for cross-Mediterranean energy highways would facilitate such an approach.

*On the industrial level*, in order to attain shared prosperity between North and South, it must be ensured that the projects carried out foster technology transfer and industrial partnership: stepping up research, construction, maintenance and operational capacities in countries of the South through the effective establishment of technology transfer systems allowing the development of local electricity facility engineering and a local electricity facility industry, which are practically nonexistent today.
The Role of Egyptian Media in the Coup

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The following statement expressed by one of Egypt’s most prominent talk show hosts reflects the common narratives on Egyptian media that have dominated public discourse following the military coup that led to the ouster of the Muslim Brotherhood President, Mohammed Morsi. The presenter Ahmed Moussa, known to be vocal in his support for the military, claims to have received exclusive ‘information’ from them, warning his audience: “The free army officers decided that anyone suspected of killing a security member will be killed by them directly in the street. There is no need for courts any more.”

The statement of this talk show host, clearly advocating unlawful killing in the streets, is not a unique feature in Egyptian media today. National Egyptian media shifted from an excess of attack dog journalism under the rule of the deposed Muslim Brotherhood President to an excess of lapdog journalism post coup. State and private media alike are disseminating a uniform message of glorification of the military and exclusion of its opponents, presenting the latter as the ultimate danger to the State that needs not only to be silenced, but also exterminated. In this continuous orchestration of simplistic, propagandist media narratives, there is no room for a representation of the opposing camp – labelled terrorist by the State and the media – nor for any plurality of voices. The case of the Egyptian media after the military coup is reflective of the difficult process of building an independent media system under a political transition, in itself a fragile and volatile process.

This article discusses the role played by traditional national media in supporting the military coup that led to the ouster of the elected government of the Muslim Brotherhood. The article starts with a brief discussion of the role of media in fostering democracy under political transitions followed by an overview of the main features of the Egyptian media landscape before and after the 25 January 2011 revolution. It investigates the role played by Egyptian media, especially prominent talk show hosts, in providing legitimacy to the military-backed regime, with examples from the daily practices of journalists, and concludes with an analysis of the Egyptian media with respect to its cultural and historical context as compared to international transitional experiences.

Media and Democracy

The analysis of the interplay between media and political systems under transitions has been the subject of several debates with a particular focus on the impact of media on the fragile process of democratisation. However, the democratisation of the media sector itself, often governed by a repressive structural and legal arsenal under autocratic regimes,
The case of the Egyptian media after the military coup is reflective of the difficult process of building an independent media system under a political transition, in itself a fragile and volatile process.

remains a major challenge in the context of political transitions. Hallin and Mancini (2004) presented three media models in their analysis of the relation between media and the political sphere: the polarised pluralist model (the Mediterranean countries), the democratic corporatist model (northern and central Europe) and the liberal model (North Atlantic countries); anticipating an international trend towards the third model governed by the commercialisation and privatisation of media, as opposed to one of state interference. However, this analysis is based on a media landscape evolving in stable and democratic Western systems. Emerging media systems demonstrate different dynamics to stable ones, although the polarised model presents common features with media systems emerging in eastern and central Europe (Voltmer, 2008:25).

The complexities of the interplay between media and politics in new democracies render the application of imported models an unrealistic task. Voltmer points out the particularities of each media system and its correlation with national cultural, political and historical elements, as well as the special conditions of its implementation when it is imported from another context (ibid). The notion of political parallelism – one of the dimensions used by Hallin and Mancini to define media systems – as the solid alliance between political groups and the media is relevant to the case of Egyptian media post uprising. However, as pointed out by Voltmer (2008), political parties are not central to political life in countries like Egypt, where these parties are weak and lack popular legitimacy. The notion of professionalism – another dimension used by Hallin and Mancini in defining media systems – is also problematic as there is no commonly accepted definition of professionalism across all media systems and countries.

After the regime change, the coexistence of the old and new models “causes considerable confusion and conflicts among journalists as to their role in the new democratic order” (Voltmer, 2008:27). This confusion is very true in the case of Egyptian journalists stuck between an old-fashioned journalistic model, which has been implemented for decades, and a new – yet to be defined – model where established red lines have fallen. This confusion ended with the victory of entrenched habits, reflected in the outbreak of populist media narratives post military coup in defence of what is perceived by these journalists to be their ‘patriotic’ role and identity (el Issawi, 2014).

The reform of the media system, like the reform of the political system, can only be based on the structure and traditions inherited from the old regime. Arguing against the notion of good and bad systems, Voltmer concludes that “emerging democracies develop unique types of media systems that differ significantly from those in established democracies” (2008:37). This is a thesis demonstrated by the case of the Egyptian media where the legacy of the past overshadowed reform efforts.

Thus, the role of these emerging media systems in promoting or hindering democracy is very much linked to the pre-conditions of the political transition and the nature of the old system and its institutions. Paths to democracy are also not a linear process. Revolutionary ideals can be fought by counter revolutions and the struggle between the old and new regimes can be particularly complex and unpredictable (ibid).

The Egyptian Media Landscape before and after the Uprising

It is not possible within the remit of this short article to present a detailed analysis of the Egyptian media industry. I will focus rather on some of its main features. Egyptian media is known for a long-standing tradition of heavy-handed state intervention. This is reflected in the establishment of a redundant apparatus of state-owned media and a coercive regulatory environment in which journalists are threatened by prison sentences and trials before military courts (el Issawi, 2014).

The re-introduction of private media in the later years of the Mubarak regime provided a newsy and modern media output as well as limited representation of dissenting voices. However, the nature of this private sector, largely owned by business tycoons...
linked to the regime, defies the notion of an ‘independent’ media. The ability of the regime to apply different pressure tools on these media outlets – such as behind-the-scenes control of advertising revenues – further limited the ability of these media outlets to provide counter narratives (Khamis, 2011). The new constitution (January 2014) provides real progress in the protection of freedom of information, such as guaranteeing freedom of expression and opinion, press freedom and media independence and banning censorship and prison sentences for media offences. However, these improvements are at odds with an unprecedented repression campaign, implemented by the military-backed government and designed to silence dissenting voices. According to Reporters Without Borders: "arrests, detention, trials on trumped-up charges – the authorities flout the constitutional guarantees enshrined in article 71 and stop at nothing to silence those who refuse to relay the government’s propaganda" (March 2014).

**Although the new constitution (January 2014) provides real progress in the protection of freedom of information, these improvements are at odds with an unprecedented repression campaign, implemented by the military-backed government and designed to silence dissenting voices**

It is important to note here two main features of the Egyptian media landscape related to the topic discussed in this paper. First, the entrenched self-censorship habits of Egyptian journalists who largely perceive their role as guardians of the regime. This collaborative journalism is at the heart of the *raison d’être* of the state media, often used as a platform for defamation and de-legitimation of political or media opponents under the Mubarak regime. This role shifted to the private media in the current post-coup phase. Second, the lack of defined and established editorial processes inside these newsrooms rendered private media, supposedly independent, unable to counter the intervention of media owners. The independence of state media – recently recognised in the new constitution – is not realistically possible with the heavily bureaucratic structure of state media and the prominent role of the Ministry of Information in controlling this structure.

**Media at the Service of the Coup**

Under political transitions, the ability of media to play the role of a “market place of ideas” is crucial in providing a platform for alternative views, thus empowering a vivid civil society, although possibly aggravating conflicts and creating confusion (Voltmer, 2006:04). The political conflict marking these transitions, causes media professionals to struggle between the two opposite ideals of neutral journalism, presenting all sides of the controversy, and the need for using media for political mobilisation (Voltmer, 2006:06).

This notion of a market place of ideas was accommodated by Egyptian journalists in the immediate aftermath of the uprising. During this time, the margin of representation of dissenting voices witnessed an unprecedented expansion to the extent that they were permitted a platform in state media. This diversity was short-lived as media professionals were less inclined to follow the Western ideals of professional journalism than to satisfy their political affiliation and what they consider to be their national or revolutionary duty.

The political parallelism described by Hallin and Mancini (2004) was reflected in the practice of Egyptian journalists under the rule of the deposed Brotherhood President, where the media transformed into the favoured platform for political lobbying. However, the parallelism between media and politics was a two-way process, where the media played an active role in shaping the political sphere, empowered by the lack of popular legitimacy of the new political actors.

The conflict between the apparatus of civil servants commonly known as the “deep State” and the elected Islamic government took media as one of its main battlefields. The Brotherhood’s alleged attempt to control state media – known as the Brotherhooodisation of media (*akhwanat el iilam*) – was a major factor in this struggle. Media independence from state
control became a major issue for those who considered Brotherhood rule to be a replication of the old regime’s tactic of muzzling the media for its own benefit. Yet, the same angry voices rejoice at the return of the traditional role of Egyptian journalists: a messenger of the regime and its loyal guardian.

Journalists’ self-identification as advocates for the ‘national interest,’ translated into the defence of the regime’s survival, and prevailed over the timorous movement among journalists after the uprising who lobbied for independent and professional journalism.

In the aftermath of the military coup, the wave of populist propaganda swamping national media, state and private, is not only a result of the direct intervention of the military apparatus in media content. This media U-turn, from fiercely attacking Morsi’s presidency to enthusiastically praising the military, has its roots primarily in the perception among these journalists that their role is that of guardians of ‘the State,’ – ‘the regime’ – against its enemies – the regime’s enemies –. Journalists’ self-identification as advocates for the ‘national interest,’ translated into the defence of the regime’s survival, and prevailed over the timorous movement among journalists after the uprising who lobbied for independent and professional journalism. The widespread intimidation and pressure inflicted by the military-backed government is not to be underestimated in forcing journalists back to self-censorship. The scope of state repression regarding any kind of criticism of its policies, which demonstrates “zero tolerance for any form of dissent,” is unprecedented in the country’s history. (Human Rights Watch 2014).

The advocate journalism model is mainly led by the prominent talk show hosts, whose role was crucial in the popularisation of information delivered from the elite to the masses under the Mubarak regime. This advocate role was amplified by the struggle between liberals and Islamists under Brotherhood rule and extended to shaping the political arena. These talk show programmes played a major role in fuelling popular anger against the Brotherhood’s rule by systematically disseminating rumours of an alleged decadence of state institutions under Morsi. Some of these talk show hosts, known for having been vocal against the Brotherhood, were honoured by the military-backed government for their role in supporting the so-called June (2013) ‘revolution,’ which led to the ouster of the Brotherhood President.

In his book entitled *Les nouveaux chiens de garde* [the new watchdogs], Serge Halimi (1997) describes the subtle and complex relationship between the political regime and the media elite in France. The author records the details of this solid alliance between the some thirty leading journalists and the political and economic systems, which includes the blackout of important information, the systematic invitation of the same guests to comment on events and personal relations between prominent media figures and politicians. This organic solidarity among media ‘stars,’ and between them and the political system, makes them the ‘princes’ of their profession, allowing them to publish print editorials, present TV and radio sequences, in national and regional media outlets, as well as publish books, produce films and engage in other artistic expressions. “For them, the sun never sets,” writes Halimi (1997:76).

While the connection between the Egyptian media elite and the regime is accepted by the community of national journalists as normal practice, these leading media figures are no less influential than their French counterparts in stabilising the regime, instead of questioning its practices. However, this function currently stretches to the extent of creating a paranoid environment, with warnings of alleged foreign conspiracies against Egypt. These media campaigns disseminate as ‘information’ some extraordinary rumours that stretch logic and reason and yet are discussed vehemently by media professionals and their audiences as solid facts that need no verification. The examples abound: the daily *al-Wafd* – although a respectable print publication – published a front page headline claiming that the US President Barak Obama is a secret Muslim Brotherhood member. An
News or rumors? It is difficult to answer this question today in assessing the credibility of information disseminated by Egypt’s mainstream media.

advertisement by a mobile phone operator featuring the popular puppet, Abla Fahita, was accused of containing subversive messages calling for terrorism. The debate on the alleged terrorist actions of the puppet swamped talk shows. In the end, the mobile phone company had to deny the allegations that the advert contains a coded message aimed at destabilising the State in a press release (The Economist, Jan 2014). A few months later, an army doctor announced that the military had developed a cure for the virus that causes AIDS, as well as hepatitis C, one of Egypt’s main health threats. The announcement framed in a simplistic manner as well as the low-key competencies of the so-called ‘doctor’ prompted a tough reaction from some prominent Egyptian scientists, who called the so-called achievement a "scandal for Egypt" (Faheem and El-Sheikh, Feb 2014). Yet, national media launched fierce campaigns in praise of the so-called ‘doctor,’ attacking his critics, including those known for being well-respected scientists in the country.

Conclusion

News or rumours? It is difficult to answer this question today in assessing the credibility of information disseminated by Egypt’s mainstream media. Most importantly, those responsible for editorial decision-making in these media are not willing to make this distinction. A few limited exceptions do provide counter narratives, although they are unable to counterbalance the strong wave of propagandist narratives. Egyptian media have returned to their ‘natural’ role: that of a mouthpiece tasked with replicating the regime’s message with no possible input of their own. However, Egyptian journalists are for the most part embracing their old role willingly. The alleged terror threat is an excuse for all kinds of abuses of rights and freedoms. The role of journalists is no longer to decry these abuses but to lessen their impact and scope by presenting them to audiences as ‘necessary measures’ in this particularly fragile phase of the country’s history. The alliance between the Egyptian media elite and the regime is as organic as it is fundamental for the survival of the two parties, and goes much further than the simple political parallelism described by Hallin and Mancini. The leading media stars, mainly from the private sector, are bound to the regime by a complex system of clientelism, making them one of its most efficient components. The uprising did not lead to questioning this established identity of the journalist as guardian of the regime. On the contrary, the complexity of the political transition with its extraordinary developments consolidated this perception. The excessive manipulation of national media, to the extent of using it as a ‘black box’ to de-legitimize any critical voice, including media and revolutionary figures, is proving a powerful tool for applying pressure and hampering any initiative for media and political reform.

Most importantly, this connivance between national media and the new military-backed regime is imposing a blackout on alarming human rights abuses, even when these abuses are committed on a large scale. What happened during the bloody dispersal of pro-Brotherhood demonstrators by security forces in the so-called Rabea al-Adaweya sit-in? (14 August 2013) What about the daily arbitrary arrests in the streets and torture in prisons? What is the story on those ‘honourable citizens,’ as described by the media and regime, whose good deeds entail arresting and sometimes attacking fellow citizens in the street if they suspect they are from the ‘terrorist camp’? What about the operations against terrorism in Sinai? Who are those alleged terrorists? What about the civilian casualties?

The alliance between the Egyptian media elite and the regime is as organic as it is fundamental for the survival of the two parties, and goes much further than the simple political parallelism

Most of these topics are simply ignored by the media. This blackout is imposed by means of the re-
gime’s monitoring tools, with media editors and media professionals themselves convinced these topics are not suitable for debate. Neither does the intimidation spare foreign media: the arrest of journalists from the al-Jazeera network on politicised charges for the ‘crime’ of doing their job (Human Rights Watch, 2014) is a strong message to the community of international media to stop reporting facts from Egypt, in order to leave media narratives as hostages of the regime.

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Women’s rights movements more or less thrived in North Africa¹ prior to what is known as the Arab Spring: the Egyptian movement (1920s), the Moroccan movement (1940s), the Algerian movement (1970s), the Tunisian movement (1980s), and the Mauritanian movement (1980s). These movements basically fought for authority in a space-based patriarchy and managed to feminise the public spheres of power, especially civil society. With all the region’s ups and downs, women’s movements managed to make significant educational, social, political and legal gains. From the end of the 1970s onward, the success of the Iranian revolution (1979), the downfall of the Soviet Union (1991) and the subsequent emergence of the US as the sole superpower led to the emergence of ‘political Islam.’ This gradually resulted in a complex situation where women’s voices started to be categorised as ‘secular’ or ‘Islamic.’ The question to ask at this juncture is: What has become of all this in the aftermath of the uprisings that the media dubbed the ‘Arab Spring’?

In reflecting on the fate of women’s rights some three years after the commencement of the Arab (but also Berber, Coptic, etc.) revolts in North Africa and in the sixth year after a global financial and economic crisis, words from the introductory paragraph of Charles Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities, published in 1859, resonate strangely across time and place:

“It was the best times, it was the worst times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of darkness, it was the spring of hope, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to heaven, we were all going direct the other way.”

Amidst this dilemma, three things come to mind:
1. A paradoxical situation
2. The realisation that North Africa is not the Maghreb and the Maghreb (Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco) is not the Middle East (with Egypt being both North Africa and the Middle East).²
3. Shifting strategies as a response to shifting challenges

A Paradoxical Situation

Two major paradoxes have emerged after the Arab Spring. On the one hand, there was a spectacular street presence of women of all ages, ideologies, ethnicities and social statuses during the political mobilisation phases of the uprisings (this has been well documented by all types of media), but, on the other hand, these women were then excluded from decision-making posts after the uprisings. As mobilisers and political actors during the revolutions, women stunned the world by braving gunfire, successfully manipulating social media, and actively...

¹ North Africa is a broad regional sweep covering the coastal region from Egypt to Mauritania, stretching from the Atlantic to the Suez Canal, and from the Mediterranean across the Sahara Desert. The countries of North Africa are: Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania.
² The expression ‘North Africa’ includes Egypt.
pushing for democratic elections. Their image has been repeatedly used to provide a narrative for the Arab uprisings, yet the outcome for them was not so positive. The governments elected by the people after the revolutions represented women either poorly or not at all. For example, in Egypt, the women who bravely stood up to army-sanctioned ‘virginity tests,’ were absent; the constitutional committee appointed by the Supreme Council of Armed Forces includes no women. Indeed, women won fewer than 10 of the roughly 500 seats, making up only 2% of the first post-Arab Spring parliament in Egypt (compared with the 12% of seats that they held in the previous government). In Tunisia, the October 2011 elections allowed 49 women to be elected to the Constituent Assembly, that is 22% out of 217 seats. However, the backward direction of the political discourse was exemplified by the woman who was allegedly raped by policemen and then, when she filed a complaint, was accused of public indecency. In Libya, which had not had a civil government in four decades, women were used as pawns in complex politics, tainted by tribal and central power interests. In Morocco, women won 67 parliamentary seats (out of 395, that is 17% of the seats), but there was only one woman in the elected government (compared with the previous 2007 government which contained seven women). In addition to all this, women were excluded from the transitional governing bodies, constituent assemblies and committees that rewrote the first draft constitutions. Furthermore, debates on the appropriateness of women as heads of state increased public rhetoric about women’s proper place in the domestic sphere, strident campaigns by Islamists to roll back relatively progressive family law, and, most tragically, increased politically motivated violence against women.

With respect to the second paradox, on the one hand, the political Islamisation of the region is a fact (with the adjectives ‘moderate’ and ‘Salafist’ added to reflect the different doses of Islamisation); yet, what most women’s rights advocates (scholars and activists) gained during the decades that preceded the Arab Spring were also ‘Islamic’ gains: women’s rights advocates in the region fought to improve, and not replace, Sharia (Islamic) laws and they targeted patriarchy not Islam. Moreover, many secular and Islamic feminists (scholars and activists) worked together, showing that Islam had never been a problem so far as women’s rights advocates in the region are concerned.

The Maghreb Is Different from North Africa and the Middle East

One of the major revelations of the Arab Spring is that in matters of women’s rights, the Maghreb is different from the Mashreq (the Middle East). An important indicator of this is that in the post-Arab Spring period, more women were elected/appointed in the Parliament in the Maghreb than in the Middle East. The main reason for this may be formulated in the following terms. As a social movement, the women’s rights movement ‘functions’ in the male-dominated public space and, hence, is bound to either clash or interact with three powerful sources of authority in this space: politics, economy and religion. In Egypt and other Middle Eastern countries such as Yemen or Kuwait, women’s issues have never been positioned as a crucial player in the political games of the public sphere. By contrast, in the Maghreb, especially Tunisia and Morocco, they are. Ever since their independence, the countries of the Maghreb have ‘used’ women’s rights as part of the State’s socio-political dynamics, as a means of modernisation. In post-Arab Spring Tunisia, the relatively high number of women in the Parliament was partly made possible by the 1956 Personal Status Code which protects women’s rights. Indeed, this Code was heavily instrumentalised by women’s NGOs in the recent political campaigns as a shield against extremism and a guarantee of women’s rights. In Morocco, more women had access to the Parliament due to the success of the One Million Signatures to reform the Mudawwana (Family Law) in the early nineties, after which women’s issues became
part and parcel of the ideological wars that opposed secularists to Islamists. The fact that the King is the highest political and religious authority and that the interests of the monarchy coincided with those of women in the face of rampant Islamism, facilitated the strategising between the two and led to various reforms that somehow saved Morocco during the Arab Spring uprisings.

Shifting Strategies

Another characterising feature of the post-Arab Spring uprisings is the dramatic shift of strategies on the part of women’s rights movements. Five such shifts may be singled out:

- First, women’s rights highlighted as a genuine prerequisite for democracy. While women’s rights are sometimes seen as secondary to democratic change, gender equality needs to be presented as an essential prerequisite of true democracy.
- Second, acknowledging the strength of the law and fighting the side-lining of the concept of gender equality as a human right in the implementation of the new constitutions. This means working towards the inclusion of gender equality in every process of democratisation and understanding that gender is not only a symptom but also the backbone of every development strategy, because it is the main engine of economic development.
- Third, the push for more interaction between liberal/secular and Islamic feminists in the region in spite of the fact that Islamic feminists work more from inside Islamic political parties. Avoiding polarisation and seeking a centre where democracy and liberalism are maintained.
- Fourth, the avoidance of blaming religion and understanding that religion becomes very complex when mixed with politics in a region with high female illiteracy and a strong space-based patriarchy.
- Fifth, the use of social media to foster grassroots movements and allow visibility of political action.

Conclusion

What we are witnessing in North Africa right now is the beginning of a process by which democratisation is becoming rooted in the region. Democratisation in the region is very much a process, not a government programme implemented by staunch democrats. This is why maintaining and improving women’s rights in the region is absolutely crucial. It is and will remain the litmus test of any future democracy. It is true that the region is being Islamised, but we need to understand that religious identity and faith are two different (and possibly opposing) concepts in politics. The reason for this is that the religious field in North Africa is becoming increasingly diversified, and hence increasingly less likely to be reconstructed as political ideology. Because of religious diversification, what we are witnessing is a deconstruction of Islam where the aim is not so much a secularisation of society but an ‘autonomisation’ of politics from religion, and of religion from politics. Again women’s rights in the region are crucial to the striking of this very balance.

What we are witnessing is a deconstruction of Islam where the aim is not so much a secularisation of society but an ‘autonomisation’ of politics from religion, and of religion from politics. Again women’s rights in the region are crucial to the striking of this very balance.
Binational: Human Capital at the Service of the Economic Development of the Maghreb

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European-Maghrebi binational are destined to become major actors in economic and cultural cooperation between the North and South shores of the Mediterranean, a cooperation that constitutes a veritable link between Europe and Northern Africa. There is, in fact, a true political will in Maghreb states to foster investment by binational in their Country of origin or the country of origin of their parents, with the aim of reinvigorating and strengthening economic and social development, a will that has grown stronger after the popular revolts and uprisings of the so-called Arab Spring. These events, which have certainly led to political reform and a regime change in Tunisia, have had a serious impact on the economic situation in the region and on the dynamics of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

Binational can accelerate the Maghreb’s development. What, then, are the means being implemented to boost their contributions?

Binational: One Foot on Either Shore

Different diasporas each have their own specific characteristics, which are important to identify in order to act effectively to create a productive link between diaspora members and their countries of origin.

A diaspora consists of “emigrants and their descendants who live outside their country of birth or ancestry, either on a temporary or permanent basis, but still maintain personal, emotional and cultural attachment to their countries of origin.” Binational can be defined as members of the diaspora having both the nationality of their country of residence and that or their country of origin. Their number is difficult to calculate.

According to estimates and depending on the methods of identification – number of generations included in studies, whether or not to take into account naturalised citizens and illegal immigration, which is by definition difficult to measure – there are between 10 and 15 million residents of North African origin in Europe, keeping in mind, moreover, that the figures available per country are likewise variable.

Due to its colonial history, France is the main destination for Maghrebi migrants, followed by Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Germany. Four million Algerians reside in France (2012 estimate), of whom approximately two million are binational (only 710,000 in 2008 according to INSEE, the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies), nearly 1.5 million people from Morocco and some 650,000 from Tunisia, a third of whom are binational.

Remittances

For a long time, the Maghreb gave precedence to regular remittances by migrants to the detriment of

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1 The Arab Maghreb Union consists of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya (currently in a transition phase) and Mauritania. For the purposes of this article we shall only consider Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia.

2 Working definition established by the International Organization for Migration and the Migration Policy Institute (2012).

integration via return, considering emigrants as ‘cash cows.’
The Maghreb is, in fact, the African region receiving the greatest amount of money transfers from its expatriates, who contribute to the development of these countries. And remittances are constantly increasing, sustained by the reduction of money transfer costs:

- Nearly 2 billion euros were sent to Tunisia in 2012, according to the Tunisian Central Bank, that is, 5% of GDP, as compared to 4.3% in 2011;
- Nearly 2 billion euros went to Algeria in 2010, according to the Bank of Algeria;
- Nearly 5 billion euros (2 billion of them from France) were transferred to Morocco in 2012, that is, 7% of the GDP, according to Morocco’s Exchange Office (Office des Changes), effectively constituting the country’s leading source of currency.

In addition to these figures, the funds transferred via informal circuits must also be considered. These funds serve to cover families’ current expenditure and individual investments, essentially in real estate, in the country of origin, or to mitigate the deficiencies of public investment in certain sectors (education, energy, healthcare). They rarely give rise, however, to productive investments.

To palliate this state of affairs, governments are implementing programmes to orient these funds towards the sphere of productive investment and are seeking stronger binational commitment.

### A Human Resource Ready to Seize Opportunities

Binational, bearers of two cultures, are attached to their country of origin, which their parents or they themselves left to escape from precariousness or, for the more privileged, in order to study.

At times attacked and stigmatised in their host country, perceived as responsible for certain ills of society (unemployment, delinquency, terrorism), more and more binational are turning their gazes towards the South shore of the Mediterranean, towards their Maghrebi countries of ancestry. However, this decision is not an easy one for them either. Indeed, it is often the case that in “their country,” they are perceived as “the Other,” becoming the object of envy of some, and/or considered by local professionals more as a threat than a source of enrichment or openness.

It is often the case that in “their country,” they are perceived as “the Other,” becoming the object of envy of some, and/or considered by local professionals more as a threat than a source of enrichment or openness.

### The Adventure of ‘Returning’

Engineers, sales representatives, entrepreneurs – many wish to effect their ‘return to their origins,’ not only to participate in the development of their country through economic activities or via collective projects aiming to generate public assets (water, healthcare, education), but also to make a new start, enjoy better quality of life and make money.

They are aware of the fact that their presence constitutes an opportunity to stimulate cooperation between Europe and the Maghreb and that they represent an added value for the development of business relations between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

Many have already taken the dive, placing their skills and know-how at the service of the development of their countries of origin, in sectors such as information and communication technology, logistics, business services, the agro-food industry and tourism, thus contributing to technology and knowledge transfer.

### The Will to Invest and Invest Themselves

They are mobile and do not hesitate to invest, seeking prospects not only in their countries of origin but also – just as much or more so – exploring other Maghreb countries and beyond to Asia. Their aim is to conquer new markets by taking advantage of low-cost labour, thus participating in intra-regional economic cooperation. They have become actors of the globalised economy.

Many undertake small projects with no assistance from government agencies. These projects contri-
bute to revitalising territories, diversifying their economies and creating employment.

Binational having studied in Europe are in a position to help business in the region and provide governance methods indispensable for their growth. They are assets for the future, actors to be prioritised in bilateral EU-Maghreb relations in the political, economic and social spheres. They can contribute to the reforms necessary (education, the place and role of women in society) and the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean co-development area marked by the increase and regularity of human, commercial and financial flows.

Obstacles to investment and economic development, such as administrative rigidity, corruption, lack of financing offers, shortcomings in institutional democracy or the absence of a common Maghreb market do not affect binational in particular but rather all investors.

Binational, on the other hand, want to invest in their country of origin for the above-stated reasons, whereas investors without any particular attachment will not do so unless the investment is profitable and the constraints are not excessive. Otherwise they will move on to other countries. The binational's commitment is more long-term and the sound development of their business will lead to a modernisation of the country that will eventually attract the other investors.

Note that in Algeria, the "sovereign," 51/49 regulation (in a partnership, the Algerian partner must hold at least 51% of shares) has never been an obstacle to investment by foreigners, and binational are not affected by this measure (the country is ranked 153rd out of 189 in the World Bank’s 2014 "Ease of Doing Business" ratings).

The Maghreb offers undeniable opportunities in terms of business creation, in particular SMEs. It is a region with a highly significant economic potential that represents a market of nearly 80 million inhabitants

By way of example, direct investment from France at the end of 2012 had reached nearly 8.5 billion euros in Morocco, 1.9 billion euros in Algeria and 731 million euros in Tunisia, making France the region's premiere partner.

There is no free trade agreement between the Maghreb countries as a whole (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania). A gulf persists between leaders' statements of intent and the low level of progress with initiatives, intra-Maghreb trade not surpassing 3% of the region's overall trade flow.

Maghrebi integration, however, has become a necessity for the countries in the region to meet the challenges of globalisation and development they are facing. Once again, binational would prove useful here: they constitute a labour pool from which to recruit the future executives who will contribute to the regional unity of the Maghreb.

Support Mechanisms

Entrepreneurship entails risks. To reduce these, binational must have clear information regarding local needs, market situations, the political and economic environment, availability of human resources, available financing, facilities, regulatory mechanisms, the formalities required and the main obstacles to be overcome.

Investment support agencies for binational need to provide such information but only have limited resources, whether they are in France, Italy or Spain.

On the other hand, a number of Euro-Mediterranean platforms to support investors already exist, such as, for instance, Pole Med, via the Euromed@change programme in partnership with Invest Network, a
network of 65 national and regional investment agencies in 22 countries. Maghreb countries have likewise created their own structures to mentor and support entrepreneurs, such as, for instance:

- The Algerian National Agency of Investment Development (ANDI - Agence Nationale de Développement de l’Investissement), engaged in the promotion of productive investments by binational and support for reforms that ‘de-bureaucratise’ investing;
- Invest in Tunisia – The Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA-Tunisia, Agence Tunisienne de Promotion des Investissements Etrangers).

Binational, human capital capable of contributing to the Maghreb’s economic upgrading and accelerating its integration into the global economy, should receive support from both North and South-shore countries.

Effective Networks

In addition, binational have set up effective networks dedicated to business creation in the Maghreb and the transfer of skills, for instance:

- ATUGE, a network of binational of Tunisian origin with degrees from major universities;
- Maroc Entreprendre (Morocco Enterprising), with 10,000 members in Europe, including many binational, which has developed a support programme for business creation called ‘Tremplin Maroc’ (Springboard Morocco).

The densification of professional networks is contributing to the creation of a transnational sphere in the Mediterranean Region.

Binational Should Receive Support from Countries on Both Shores

The European Union should renew and step up ties with the Maghreb in order to promote economic development, balance and stability on the South shore of the “Mare Nostrum” and hence security on both shores. To achieve this, consulting and support services should be stepped up for entrepreneurs, the presence of European financial institutions in the Maghreb should be capitalised on to promote support for binational’s business creation, women’s entrepreneurship should be encouraged and the dissemination of information should be improved in order to optimise the impact of existing mechanisms. For, though this fragment of the Mediterranean’s South shore constitutes an area of prosperity in the making, the challenges and obstacles are many (corruption, cumbersome red tape, etc.). Binational, human capital capable of contributing to the Maghreb’s economic upgrading and accelerating its integration into the global economy, should receive support from both North and South-shore countries. Their visibility remains low, considering their potential. They must, however, be engaged as partners in this development effort. They are not a ‘miracle solution,’ but they are important contributors to the indispensable acceleration of a process that needs to come from within each country.
Mixed Flows at the Borders of Europe: The Case of Lampedusa

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The Central Mediterranean Route: The Largest Maritime Gateway to Europe

In 2013, the central Mediterranean migratory route, which saw approximately 43,000 arrivals, confirmed its status as the leading channel for mixed flows to Europe by sea, with Italy as the primary destination. There are several, well-known reasons that Italy – and, in particular, the Pelagie Islands – is the main destination of trans-Mediterranean migratory flows: the proximity to key countries of origin and transit and, in particular, to the extraordinary migratory hub that Libya has become; the scant appeal of Malta and Cyprus, the other two natural destinations; the professionalism of the smuggling and trafficking rings; and the limitations imposed by the migratory agreements Italy has signed with the countries of the Southern Mediterranean, agreements that, over the years, have failed to take into account their heavy exposure, first, to the fickleness and, now, to the instability of these countries’ governments.

In 2013, some 43,000 people reached the Italian coast. More than half of them (27,000) set out from Libya, although significant increases were registered in arrivals from Egypt (about 9,000), Turkey, Greece and Syria, with landings on the coasts of Calabria and, to a lesser extent, Puglia. This increase in arrivals in 2013, which saw exponential growth in the second half of the year, was partially due to the worsening of the Syrian crisis and the secondary movements of Syrian refugees resulting from the deteriorating conditions for refugees in Egypt following the ouster of President Morsi. The other main countries of origin are the same as in earlier years: the Horn of Africa (nearly 10,000 Eritreans and more than 3,000 Somalis), Nigeria (2,600), Egypt (2,300) and Mali (1,000).

As a result of these geographical origins, about 70% of the people who arrived in 2013 fulfilled the requirements to apply for international protection. Attention should also be drawn to the high number of minors (around 8,000), and, among them, unaccompanied minors (3,818), who undeniably constitute a greater challenge for the Italian reception and protection system.

In this context, Lampedusa has once again emerged as both the main port of entry, having received close to 15,000 arrivals over the year, and a geographical and symbolic crossroads for the contradictions and challenges posed by mixed flows at the EU’s external borders. The increase in arrivals over the course of the year, the dissemination of audiovisual material on the degrading treatment received by migrants in Lampedusa, and, especially, the accident of 3 October (366 dead off the coast of the island), have disturbed consciences and redirected Europe’s gaze towards the burden of despair and death concentrated on its southern borders.

The Debate in Italy

As a result of the October tragedy, which occurred just days after Italy was strongly reprimanded by the

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1 This article was finalised before April 2014 (Editor’s note).
2 According to the classification by Frontex, this route refers to irregular migration from Northern Africa towards Italy and Malta across the Mediterranean Sea.
3 Estimates by the Italian Council for Refugees (CIR).
The increase in arrivals over the course of the year, the dissemination of audiovisual material on the degrading treatment received by migrants in Lampedusa, and, especially, the accident of 3 October, have disturbed consciences and redirected Europe’s gaze towards the burden of despair and death concentrated on its southern borders.

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the key points of the mixed-flow management system have become the subject of intense and extensive debate in both Italian society and politics. There are four main points under discussion: i) the urgent need to reform the reception system, whose macroscopic limits – despite recent improvements – are once again on display in the form of the deplorable conditions at the reception centres and the repeated violations of the dignity of the migrants held there; ii) the need to revise the country’s immigration law, especially the amendments introduced by the so-called “security package”; iii) the need to rethink the cooperation agreements signed with the countries of origin and departure (including Libya) to ensure, once and for all, that they provide for the full respect of migrants’ and refugees’ fundamental rights; and iv) the need to test “humanitarian channels” that enable the safe arrival of refugees and asylum seekers.

However, the measures introduced by the current grand coalition government – made up of political forces with very different views on certain aspects of migratory policy – were limited and, at least in terms of external cooperation, have internally continued in the same line as that followed by the previous executive. The revision of the legislation, the measures to reform the reception system and the rules governing the length of the stay at identification and expulsion centres are all on the agenda for 2014. However, the debate over the existing proposals (reducing the maximum stay at identification and expulsion centres to two months, increasing the number of territorial committees for the recognition of international protection, and reviewing the tender procedures for the management of reception centres) is likely to be hampered by the heterogeneity of the political forces that make up the executive branch, including differences that could be exacerbated by the possibility of new legislative elections.

In terms of migratory cooperation, over 2013, Italy tried to renew its agreements with Libya through a series of initiatives – e.g., the establishment of a High-Level Italo-Libyan Group and the launching of the SAHARA-MED project (to provide training for Libyan authorities and support for the modernisation of migrant detention centres) – which, above and beyond any official intentions, continue to focus on “shutting the tap” in Libya without paying much attention to the treatment meted out to migrants in that country.  

Lampedusa Is Europe

In the wake of the tragedy in Lampedusa, Italy has faced an urgent need to assure Europe of its capacity to reconcile the demands of controlling irregular migration with the even more important obligation of preserving human life at sea. At the same time, as the incoming flows were largely made up of asylum seekers sailing for Italy due only to its geographical location, Italy has requested greater involvement by the EU to handle the crisis of the arrivals.

The first objective has been pursued through the implementation of the military and humanitarian operation Mare Nostrum, a rescue and control system that enabled the interception and rescue of more than 6,000 people in the last quarter of 2013 and that, in the Italian government’s view, should set the guidelines for future actions by Frontex. Launched on 18 October, the operation includes various naval and airforce (helicopter) units and involves a wide range of national authorities involved in the management and control of migratory flows (the navy, coast guard, army, guardia di finanza (Italy’s tax and customs police) and Ministry of the Interior/national police).

Indeed, it should be noted that, while the component involving training of the Libyan security forces has already been initiated, the actions aimed at improving the detention centres have been blocked by Tripoli’s refusal to collaborate with the Italian Council for Refugees – CIR, the body responsible for carrying them out.
The launch of Mare Nostrum has caused some confusion among certain sectors of Italian civil society and certain European governments. The former view the operation’s launch as yet another step towards the militarisation of the Mediterranean and the resumption of a policy, through the cooperation with Libya, aimed exclusively at blocking refugees’ escape routes.

In other segments of Italian society, and also certain Member States, the main criticism has revolved around the operation’s possible unintended consequences. The visibility of the Mare Nostrum unit, mere kilometres off the Libyan coast, could have the effect of encouraging migrants to cross the sea and, thus, of enabling criminal organisations to increase both their customer base and the number of voyages made.

The commitment to dedicate the Council of June 2014 to a general review of the European approach to migration confirms an assumption of responsibility by Europe. Despite all of the foregoing, in light of the great increase in arrivals, Europe’s involvement was limited and essentially took the form of the granting of extraordinary funds (about €30 million) and the participation of Slovenia in the Mare Nostrum operation. The Council meeting in June will make it possible to determine how Europe and the Member States plan to apply the principle of shared responsibility and solidarity in the management of their external borders and how they hope to reconcile the need to control irregular immigration with the rescue and reception of asylum seekers and refugees, above all in those areas of intervention that are the most complicated to pull off (cooperation with third countries, border surveillance and the fight against smuggling and human trafficking). In this regard, it will largely depend on how the debate on the mandate and role of Frontex and Eurosur develops – in particular with regard to the level of autonomy to be assigned to the
agency and the measures to be implemented to harness Eurosur’s full potential when it comes to fundamental rights – and on the level of commitment achieved as a result of the testing of programmes for protected entry and the relocation of refugees within the EU.

Getting Down to Work

In the lead-up to June, Italy should implement various urgent reforms. Given the large number of potential beneficiaries of international protection among those who reach the Italian coasts, the reform of the reception system and the rethinking of the bilateral cooperation approach with the countries of origin and departure are the two main areas of intervention. The implementation of an effective and efficient national system of reception and integration would finally make it possible both to overcome the emergency logic that, from the start, has characterised the Italian response and to better safeguard the fundamental rights of the people the country takes in. This, much more than the image of Lampedusa “overflowing” with refugees, would lend greater authority to Italy’s demand for support from the EU, a justified request, at least in part, given the greater burden involved in managing arrivals by sea compared to arrivals made across land borders. Likewise, without forgetting the control requirement, Italy must resume its cooperation with the countries of origin and departure in accordance with a logic of transparency, within a framework of full respect for international conventions, and under the complete control of Parliament. This new cooperation must be founded on the promotion of legal mobility, support for the reintegration of migrants on their return to their home countries, and participation in resettlement and protected entry programmes for asylum seekers and refugees. Within this framework, the cooperation could be expanded to include the promotion and strengthening of the reception and integration systems in third countries, a measure that is certainly complex and liable to a heavy dose of ambiguity, but that is also increasingly indispensable. These measures would make it possible not only to ensure greater respect for migrants’ fundamental rights, but also not to waste the opportunity offered by the Italian search and rescue unit, whose primary members, i.e., state authorities and fishermen – notwithstanding certain extremely serious events\(^5\) and obstacles\(^6\) – stand out for their level of commitment and dedication to safeguarding human life at sea.

\(^{5}\) We are primarily referring to the events of 2009, when Italy returned numerous migrants of Eritrean and Somalian nationality intercepted at sea to Libya. (See: European Court of Human Rights, Hirs Jamaa and Others v. Italy - ECHR 075 (2012) 23 February 2012.) On other occasions, including the events of 11 October off the coast of Malta, in which hundreds of people lost their lives, the rescue and salvaging mechanism has been called into question by newspapers. (See, for example: Gatti, F. “La verità sul naufragio di Lampedusa,” L’Espresso, 8 November 2013.)

\(^{6}\) The willingness of fishermen to participate in rescue and salvaging operations may be negatively impacted by the possible economic consequences of doing so (suspension of the fishing licence, potential accidents during rescue operations, and the transfer of migrants), as well as the risks it can pose to the crew’s own safety. The establishment of a guarantee fund for fishermen who suffer financial losses as a result of their involvement in rescue operations could help to reduce the weight of these obstacles.
Mobility and Migration from the Southern Mediterranean States to the GCC

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The Middle East is a region of complicated geography, where neighbouring states have markedly different economic resources. Ever since the middle of the last century, the discovery and subsequent exploitation of petroleum resources has acted as the catalyst to spurring dramatic variations in economic success and vitality between neighbouring Arab states. The discovery of oil had a dramatic impact in altering the economic trajectories of the six Member States of the Gulf Cooperation Council. Within a matter of decades Bahrain, Oman, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar went from being amongst the least well-off countries in the Middle East, to becoming some of the richest states in the world.

The economic health of the GCC ever since the 1970s, despite a few sluggish years following the collapse in oil prices in the 1980s, has led to an ever-increasing investment in a range of development projects requiring manpower at all levels. With small local populations unable to sustain the needs of their development agendas, the Gulf states had to begin acquiring labour from elsewhere. For decades now these countries have relied on the import of labour from other, more populous states to meet their domestic needs. These attractive employment conditions in the Gulf have been in stark contrast to the situation in the Arab non-oil countries of the Southern Mediterranean, where large, increasingly educated and young populations have had to contend with stagnant economic development, conflict, and political instability within their own states. The wealthier GCC countries served as a natural regional draw for job seekers from within the Arab world. From about the 1960s onwards, policymakers in Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Jordan and Lebanon began to view labour migration of their citizenry as critical to ensure healthy economic outcomes for their citizens at an individual level, and also for the healthy remittance flows that came back home. Labour migration to the GCC by the people-rich yet resource-poor states of the Arab World and Southern Mediterranean stood at high levels from the 1970s onwards. Within the Arab world migration has occurred as a result of these economic, structural push and pull factors. However, the region has seen more than its fair share of crises, conflict and war, all of which at various times have also impacted on migration trends and patterns. For the Southern Mediterranean states, in most cases there continue to be both the economic and political push factors to send their citizens to the Gulf states, and interest in working in the Gulf has not waned over the past few decades. Yet the number of Arab migrants employed in the Gulf regions today is significantly lower than it was three decades ago.

Data issues continue to plague researchers working on interregional migration, and obtaining accurate and detailed data on the nationality of different migrants to the Gulf is no easy task. However, even in the absence of detailed data, there is general agreement that the national composition of the Gulf’s foreign workforce has altered completely over the course of the past few decades. In the 1960s Arab expatriates made up the bulk of the Gulf’s workforce but over time the percentage of Arabs in the workforce began to shrink significantly. During the early economic surge of the oil era, Egyptians, Palestinians, and Yemenis numerically dominated the foreign
labour force in the GCC. In 1975 the percentage of Arabs in the GCC expatriate workforce was 72%, but by 2009 this figure had dropped to 23%. Today the Gulf expatriate labour force, estimated to be about 17 million, is more Asian-based and international. Although reliable data is not readily available, recent figures suggest that there are about 2.4 million Arab foreign workers present in the GCC, and Arab migrants contribute 33 billion dollars in remittances to their homelands on an annual basis. Currently, the largest cohort amongst the foreign workforce comes from countries outside the Southern Mediterranean, mostly from South and Southeast Asia. Asians are now estimated to constitute more than double the number of Arab expatriates in the GCC’s labour force.

Although reliable data is not readily available, recent figures suggest that there are about 2.4 million Arab foreign workers present in the GCC, and Arab migrants contribute 33 billion dollars in remittances to their homelands on an annual basis.

Scholars have argued that this transition in the national and ethnic composition of the Gulf’s expatriate workforce is the result of both the economic and political interests of the host states. While the Arab labour-sending countries continued to be supportive of the out-migration of their citizens, several decades ago policymakers in the Gulf increasingly sought to move away from a workforce that was primarily non-Gulf Arab. The shift in recruitment policies which favoured Asian labourers over Arabs began in the late 1980s, and not only because Asian workers were cheaper to bring in, but also because socially and politically they were considered to be easier for the GCC states to manage. The authoritarian monarchies of the GCC grew concerned about the potential for non-Gulf Arabs to radicalise the local population through promoting political ideas considered to be destabilising. Arab migrants were considered to bring with them their political agendas that could potentially infect local Arab populations with revolutionary ideas. In the 1950s and 1960s pan-Arabists had hailed the newfound oil wealth in the Gulf as a natural endowment to which all Arabs ought to lay claim; an opinion which is not at all welcomed in the Gulf. Asian migrants were thus preferred over Arabs, as they were not considered to be as much of a social or political threat. Asians could not so easily integrate with or influence the local population due to barriers of language, religion, and cultural affinity. Asian migrants were also seen as being more willing to travel to the Gulf on their own for work contracts, and did so without bringing their families with them. Arab migrants preferred to bring their families, ended up staying for longer and in some cases left a diasporic footprint, which was also not aligned with GCC governments’ interests.

Not only has the number of Arab migrants in the Gulf gone through periodic transitions, but the skills and occupational sectors of Arab expatriates present in the Gulf, has also seen changes over time. In the middle of the last century, most Arab expatriates working in the Gulf were educated and skilled, employed as engineers, doctors, and teachers. In the ensuing decades Arabs began to populate a range of other occupational sectors, including those that were less skilled and lower paying. Despite the transition in the Gulf’s expatriate labour force, the continued employment opportunities provided to Arab migrants is still of vital importance, particularly so as the Middle East is once again in the throes of high levels of instability and conflict. Currently the majority of the non-Gulf Arab migrant community comes from Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Yemen, and Sudan, although we are also seeing a marginal increase in the number of migrants from the Maghreb. Remittances sent by Arab workers in the Gulf to their home states have outpaced trade-related flows, and continue to be critical sources of foreign currency for many of the countries of the Southern Mediterranean.1 Egypt received more than 50% of its remittances in 2007 from its citizens working in the GCC.2

2 Ibid., 32.
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An interesting emerging migratory pattern that we are seeing on the rise across the Arab states is student mobility. Whereas historically it was the old, traditional Arab heavyweights of Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, and Beirut that boasted stellar institutions of erudition and learning that drew Arabs from other parts of the Middle East, today the tide has moved in the other direction. With its intense investment in education over the past few decades, the GCC increasingly draws Arab students from neighbouring states for the purpose of attending university. Further study is needed on the relationship between non-Gulf Arab students who are studying in the GCC, what their longer-term migration strategies are, and how they contribute to the social, economic, and political life of their host state. In many of the GCC countries there is an ongoing discussion on the need to retain skilled migrants and to ensure that those who can contribute to the knowledge economy are encouraged to stay for longer periods of time. These statements of intent, though, are not aligned with migration policies, and we have not yet seen any signs of change. Policy which promotes the flexibility of arrangements and allows Arabs who have studied in a Gulf state to stay on and contribute to the labour market could be of great benefit to both parties.

The migration of Arab women is another important phenomenon that has emerged in recent decades. Whereas, in the past, women were considered to largely be migrating as accompanying spouses or children of male migrants, there is evidence now that Arab women are increasingly migrating independently of their male family members. Jordanian women, for example, are now migrating in equal proportion to their male counterparts, while the number of Lebanese women migrating is now greater than the number of men. Studies examining the mobility of women from the Maghreb shed light on this within the context of migration to Europe, but there is less data on the Gulf region. However, a few small studies indicate that the trend is also visible in the Gulf. A small study on Tunisian women migrating to the GCC through an Arab technical cooperation agreement shows that numbers have been steadily increasing over the years. 118 Tunisian women migrated to the GCC under this cooperation in 2000, and by 2008 this number had increased to 597 women. Data produced by the Office of Tunisians Abroad in 2009, which provides the numbers of Tunisians in select countries, indicate that out of a total of 5,926 Tunisian migrants in Qatar, 2,142 were female.

What some of these micro studies on Arab women’s migration reveal, is that the nature of migration to the Gulf may in fact differ from other potential destinations. A small qualitative study of 15 skilled women migrants from Tunisia suggests that women choose their migration destination based on particular choices and goals. Tunisian women who sought to migrate to the Gulf to take up employment were inclined to migrate for short durations (normally for no longer than a five-year period), and to meet certain specific financial and economic objectives. These women were not looking for long-term settlement in the Gulf, but rather to enhance their financial resources within a limited amount of time. This case study provides evidence that for certain categories of workers – both skilled and highly skilled – the Gulf may provide a form of limited migration which is temporary and embedded within a migrant’s vision of a return to the homeland.

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3 Aicha Et-Tayeb, “The Participation of Female Migrants in the Socio-Economic Development Scene of Two Maghreb Countries: Social Reading of Status and Roles,” A Study on the Dynamics of Arab Expatriate Communities: Promoting Positive Socioeconomic Development and Political Transitions in their Homelands, IOM/League of Arab States:2012, 22.
4 Ibid., 22.
5 Ibid., 28.
6 Ibid., 28.
7 Ibid., 37.
8 Ibid., 36.
The EU Asylum System: Challenges and Shortcomings

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In June 2013, the EU agreed on the remaining legislation establishing the second phase of the Common European Asylum System.1 What impact will this have on the issue of asylum — and will it achieve its intended objectives?

Overview

The starting point for any discussion of asylum is the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees (referred to as the “Geneva Convention” in EU law), along with the 1967 Protocol to that Convention.2 This issue is also affected by other international human rights treaties, in particular the European Convention on Human Rights, which, according to the European Court of Human Rights, bans the return of a person to a state in which there is a real risk of suffering torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment as set out in Article 3 ECHR.3

The Geneva Convention does not address all situations in which persons might need some form of protection from return to their country of origin, so the concept of “subsidiary protection” (i.e. protection outside the scope of that Convention) has been developed. EU law has focused on refugee and subsidiary protection issues, but furthermore there are other forms of protection based on national law and practice, not harmonised by EU law.4 The Court of Justice has confirmed that Member States can establish and retain such non-harmonised forms of protection, provided that there is no confusion with refugee status.5

At the Tampere European Council of 1999, EU leaders decided that the EU should aim to establish a Common European Asylum System (CEAS), starting with a first round of legislation in the “short term” (which became known as the “first phase” of the CEAS), with the intention to establish, “in the longer term,” a “common asylum procedure and a uniform status for those who are granted asylum valid throughout the Union.”6

The first phase of legislation to establish the CEAS was adopted between 2003 and 2005, and consisted of: a Directive on the qualification for and content of refugee and subsidiary protection status (the “qualification Directive”);7 a Directive on procedures for applying for refugee status (the “procedures Directive”);8 a Directive on reception conditions for asylum-seekers (the “reception Directive”);8 and a Regulation setting out rules to allocate responsibility

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2 All Member States have ratified both measures.


for each asylum-seeker to a single Member State (the “Dublin Regulation”). In order to facilitate the application of the latter Regulation, there was also an earlier Regulation establishing “Eurodac,” a system for storing and comparing asylum-seekers’ fingerprints. There is also a Directive providing for a ready-made system of EU-wide “temporary protection” in the event of a mass influx of people, but this Directive has never been used in practice.

The EU set a deadline of 2012 to establish the second phase of the Common European Asylum System, and established the twin objectives of raising the level of protection and reducing the large divergences between Member States’ recognition rates.

Ultimately, the EU set a deadline of 2012 to establish the second phase of the Common European Asylum System, and established the twin objectives of raising the level of protection and reducing the large divergences between Member States’ recognition rates (i.e. the percentages of persons whose application for refugee or subsidiary protection status is successful). Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the objectives agreed in Tampere are now reflected explicitly in Article 78 TFEU, which requires that:

“The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties.”

To that end, the EP and the Council have powers to adopt legislation in many fields of asylum and refugee law. In the event, as noted above, the EU adopted all the legislation to establish the second phase of the CEAS by the summer of 2013. The impact of this legislation, once fully implemented, remains to be seen, but as a whole it provides for further harmonisation of national law and additional protection of human rights, taking a modest but significant step towards raising standards in this field, and potentially reducing the divergences in Member States’ recognition rates somewhat.

Qualification for International Protection

The EU’s asylum legislation raises a large number of issues, including, first of all, issues concerning the definition of refugee and subsidiary protection status. As regards both types of protection, a protection need may arise following the applicant’s departure from the country of origin (known as protection sur place). Also, the “actors of persecution or serious harm” need not be the State, but may also be private parties, if it can be “demonstrated” that the State, or parties controlling the State, is “unable or unwilling” to provide protection against non-state agents. This rule changed the more restrictive interpretation of the Geneva Convention in several Member States, which had traditionally recognised as refugees only those persons fleeing persecution by the State. There is a parallel rule on “actors of protection,” which provides that protection can “only” be provided by states or parties, including international organisations, controlling all or a substantial part of a state’s territory, provided that such bodies are “willing and able to offer protection.” Such protection must be “effective and of a non-tem-

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11 Directive 2001/55, OJ 2001 L 212/12. This Directive was not updated in the second phase of the CEAS.
12 See the Stockholm programme (OJ 2010 C 115).
13 The qualification Directive had to be applied by December 2013, and the Dublin III rules by 1 January 2014. The asylum procedures and reception conditions directives must be applied by July 2015.
16 Art. 6, Directive 2011/95.
porary nature,” and is “generally provided” when the actors of protection “take reasonable steps to prevent the persecution or suffering of serious harm, inter alia, by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution or serious harm, and when the applicant has access to such protection.”

Furthermore, Member States can apply a concept usually known as an “internal flight alternative,” if there is a part of a protection-seeker’s country of origin which is generally safe, and if that person “can safely and legally travel to and gain admittance to that part of the country and can reasonably be expected to settle there,” taking account of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights.

The core definition of a “refugee” is a person who has “a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group.” The EU Directive expands upon both the concept of persecution and the grounds of persecution.

On the first point, in a case concerning members of the Ahmadiyya community, who faced attacks and criminalisation in Pakistan if they professed their beliefs in public, the Court of Justice clarified the concept of “persecution.” Even though these asylum-seekers could possibly have avoided persecution in their country of origin by refraining from proselytising to believers in the dominant religion there, and from otherwise practising their beliefs in public, the Court ruled that such persons should not be expected to refrain from public displays of their religion in their country of origin.

On the second point, the 2011 amendments to the Directive strengthened the rules relating to gender-based persecution.

As for the definition of subsidiary protection, it must be granted where there are “substantial grounds...for believing” that the person concerned faces a “real risk” of “serious harm,” which consists of: (a) the death penalty or execution; or (b) torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or (c) a “serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.”

While the first two criteria are based on the established case law of the European Court of Human Rights (discussed above), the meaning of the third criterion was unclear, particularly since it is quite clearly contradictory: how could a person face an “individual” threat by reason of “indiscriminate violence”? The Court of Justice answered this question in a case about Iraqis who feared violent retaliation because they were linked to the American forces then occupying Iraq.

In the Court’s view, an “individual” threat could include “harm to civilians irrespective of their identity, where the degree of indiscriminate violence characterising the armed conflict taking place...reaches such a high level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian, returned to the relevant country or, as the case may be, to the relevant region, would, solely on account of his presence on the territory of that country or region, face a real risk of being subjected to the serious threat referred to in Article 15(c) of the Directive.”

Once an applicant has been granted refugee or subsidiary protection status, he or she (along with his or

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17 Art. 7, Directive 2011/95. This provision was amended by the 2011 Directive to raise the standards of protection and reduce divergences of interpretation. For instance, some Member States had argued that protection could be provided for by clans: see the Commission’s report on the implementation of Directive 2004/83 (COM (2010) 314, 16 June 2010).

18 Art. 8, Directive 2011/95. More precisely, there must be “no well-founded fear” of persecution and no “real risk of suffering serious harm,” or “access to protection against persecution or serious harm as defined in Article 7.”

19 Again, the 2011 Directive amended this rule in order to raise the standards of protection and reduce divergences of interpretation.

20 See the judgment of that Court in Salah Sheekh v Netherlands (ECHR 2007-I), particularly as regards the ability to travel and settle in the safe part of the country.

21 Art. 2(d), Directive 2011/95, echoing Art. 1A(2) of the Geneva Convention.

22 Arts. 9 and 10, Directive 2011/95.

23 Joined Cases C-71/11 and C-99/11, Y and Z, judgment of 5 Sept. 2012, not yet reported. See also, as regards sexual orientation, the judgment of 7 Nov. 2013 in Cases C-199/12 to 2011/12 X, Y, and Z, where the Court ruled that criminalisation of sexual orientation could constitute persecution, where the law in question was applied in practice.

24 While the 2004 Directive stated, as regards the concept of “particular social group,” that “gender-related aspects can be considered, without by themselves alone creating a presumption,” the 2011 Directive provides that “[g]ender related aspects, including gender identity, shall be given due consideration for the purposes of determining membership of a particular social group or identifying a characteristic of such a group” (emphasis added).

her family members) is entitled to the benefits set out in the qualification Directive, which include a residence permit, access to employment and self-employment, equal treatment with nationals as regards social welfare and health care, and equal treatment with legally resident third-country nationals as regards accommodation.\textsuperscript{27} While the first-phase Directive left Member States with an option to give fewer such rights to beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, the second-phase Directive only permits lower standards for such persons as regards social welfare and residence permits.\textsuperscript{28}

**Reception Conditions for Asylum-seekers**

The Directive on reception conditions regulates such issues as the employment, health care, education, and welfare of asylum-seekers during the process of deciding on their application. The second-phase Directive improves standards as compared to the first-phase Directive, particularly as regards employment, permitting Member States to require an asylum-seeker to wait up to nine months for employment access, whereas the first-phase Directive had permitted a wait of up to twelve months.\textsuperscript{29} It also inserted detailed rules on detention of asylum-seekers into the Directive. These differ somewhat from the rules on detention of irregular migrants in the returns Directive, in that the grounds for detention are different and there is no express time limit on detention. However, the rules on legal safeguards and detention conditions are quite similar.\textsuperscript{30}

**Asylum Procedures**

Next, the rules on asylum procedures address such issues as legal aid, interviews, the right to an effective remedy (in particular, as regards the suspensive effect of appeals), and special procedural rules such as accelerated procedures, the “safe country of origin” concept, and the “safe third country” concept (which allow Member States to presume that some countries of origin or transit are safe for all asylum-seekers). The second-phase Directive improved standards as regards, for instance, setting a six-month time limit (subject to exceptions) to make a first-instance decision on an application, reducing the number of possible cases subject to accelerated procedures, strengthening the right to an effective remedy, and abolishing the option to apply lower standards as regards the “safe country of origin” concept.

**Responsibility for Applications**

Finally, there has been continued controversy concerning the application of the “Dublin” rules on responsibility for asylum applications, in part because the criteria for responsibility shifted the burden of dealing with asylum applications towards the EU’s external eastern and southern land and sea borders, mostly consisting of poorer Member States.
breached Article 3 ECHR (the ban on torture or other inhuman and degrading treatment) due to its low standards on reception conditions (interpreting the ECHR on this point in light of the reception Directive) and asylum procedures, and that Belgium breached Article 3 ECHR by returning an asylum-seeker to Greece despite its knowledge that such breaches were taking place.\textsuperscript{31}

The second phase of the CEAS is a further step towards establishing a “common” policy, with a view to both reducing divergences in national policy and increasing standards of human rights protection.

In turn, the Court of Justice ruled that while the EU rules were based on mutual trust that each Member State would comply with its human rights obligations, it was possible that the CEAS might “experience major operational problems in a given Member State, meaning that there is a substantial risk that asylum seekers may, when transferred to that Member State, be treated in a manner incompatible with their fundamental rights.” But the Dublin system could not be suspended following any breach of those human rights obligations, but rather where there “are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions for asylum applicants,” leading to a breach of the ban on torture or other inhuman and degrading treatment set out in Article 4 of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights. So EU law also prevented sending asylum-seekers to Greece pursuant to the Dublin rules.\textsuperscript{32} While the Commission proposed to amend the Dublin rules to set out a detailed system for suspending its application in such cases, the final amendment to the legislation only transposed the main elements of the Court’s judgment into the text of the revised Regulation.\textsuperscript{33}

Conclusions

The second phase of the CEAS is a further step towards establishing a “common” policy, with a view to both reducing divergences in national policy and increasing standards of human rights protection. Although the second-phase legislation and the case law of the Court of Justice to date both point clearly in the direction of an increasing level of both protection and harmonisation, the EU will still clearly fall short of establishing a “uniform” concept of asylum law, even following the implementation of the second-phase legislation, in light of the possible exceptions from the standard rules and the likelihood of continuing national divergences in their application.

\textsuperscript{31} MSS v Belgium and Greece, judgment of 21 Jan. 2011, not yet reported.

\textsuperscript{32} Joined Cases C-411/10 \textit{NS} and C-493/10 \textit{ME}, judgment of 21 Dec. 2011, not yet reported.

\textsuperscript{33} Art. 3(2), Reg. 604/2013.
Hostility towards the Muslim presence in Europe is a growing concern, not only for populations professing Islam but also for numerous actors – both public and private – concerned about respect for human rights. Even if Europe has an “anti-Muslim” archive, started in the Middle Ages with the advent and rise of Islam, the contemporary period, panic-stricken, among other things, by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and then the 2001 attacks in New York, the 2004 bombings in Madrid and the 2005 bombings in London, has ushered in new expressions of Islamophobia.¹

The different societies comprising the European Union, in particular those along the Mediterranean Sea, have built a singular rapport with the worlds of Islam on the one hand and Muslim populations on the other. Despite the thousands of native Europeans who have converted to Islam, Muslim presence is closely tied to immigration of peoples from Africa, Asia or Turkey, as well as the multi-secular European Islam of the Balkans. Considering Islamophobia in Europe entails keeping in mind these national differences based on history and the dynamics of settlement. For instance, in relations between states, majority groups and Muslim minorities are not systematically influenced by a common colonial history, as in France or Great Britain. Moreover, the sociological composition of Muslim minorities varies from one country or region to another, just as they tend to diversify within each area. The legal and political situation of Muslims living in Europe is likewise highly variable from one country to another, although European Union institutions are contributing to the process of homogenising minorities’ rights and duties. Hence, many Muslims in Malta, for instance, are asylum-seeking immigrants within a highly particular system of social and administrative constraints.

Despite the plurality of regional and national situations and despite the diversity of Muslim populations and their socio-political status, rejection of Islam has spread rapidly since the mid-1990s in the European political sphere, contributing to the significant trend of reorganisation of the ideological and electoral landscape. The majority of nationalist and populist movements of the right and extreme right include a strong anti-Islam component in their discourse, in parallel with the rise of new forms of mobilisation on a supranational level based on the theory of the ‘Islamisation’ of Europe. This theory holds that the Muslims, whose number is supposedly increasing exponentially, have designs and intend to gradually wipe out national cultures. A theory furiously brandished by the most extreme nationalist movements, but likewise shared by established political parties claiming a certain social progressivism. A unifying theory that is contributing to the regeneration of xenophobic movements that were winding down in the 1990s.

Some of these Islamophobic political movements or organisations rely on a popular base whose growth has been significant over the past few years and which is tending to stabilise in various European countries. The Swiss Popular Party, which was behind an initiative for a popular referendum on the construction of minarets in 2009, has become the

The majority of nationalist and populist movements of the right and extreme right include a strong anti-Islam component in their discourse, in parallel with the rise of new forms of mobilisation on a supranational level based on the theory of the ‘Islamisation’ of Europe.

The main political party in the Federal Assembly, holding more than a quarter of the seats, the Freedom Party of Austria has become the third political force in the country, like the National Front (FN) in France, led by Marine Le Pen. Political parties “pioneering” in the struggle against “Islamisation” are Pia Kjærsgaard’s Danish People’s Party and Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV, The Netherlands), and they have managed to prevail on the political front by developing a drastically Islamophobic discourse. Marine Le Pen’s FN, which is in a position of outsider in the political arena, has followed the “Nordic way” through its “denazification” strategy. “To understand Marine’s FN,” explains the sociologist and political analyst Laurent Chambon, “one must realise that Pia Kjærsgaard built the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti) on the ruins of an agonising xenophobe, nationalist party that had suffered many internal divisions. After having given the party a new name and a new structure, Kjærsgaard spent ten years manufacturing a well-oiled, obedient electoral machine. She then succeeded in making it an indispensable coalition partner to the conservative, liberal Danish right for ten years. To do so, she developed various themes that necessarily [recall] Marine [Le Pen]’s FN: no official contact with the racist, homophobic and anti-Semitic extreme right; a party that obeys its leader without dissidence; a discourse focussing on Islam as an ideology threatening to European civilisation; the use ad nauseam of classic nativist nationalist themes; the defence of the welfare State and social gains against freeloaders from abroad; the real people against the system hijacked by the multi-culturalist left; Zionism in reinf-

 Forced concrete. This “Nordic way” is not followed to the letter by the different nationalist movements, but Islamophobia, its ideological and cultural anchor, looks to be there to stay in the other Scandinavian countries. In 2010, for the first time, members of the Democrats of Sweden party were elected to the Riksdag with approximately 6% of the votes. In 2011, the True Fins became Finland’s third party in votes received, and the Norwegian Progress Party took 22.9% of the votes in 2009, making it Norway’s second political force. The Islamisation theory being developed and fostered by these nationalist movements takes different regional forms that adapt it to the cultural and political context. In any case, a common thematic framework can be identified:

- The demographic threat. This postulate, which has been progressively developed since the 1950s, primarily targets non-white populations of countries of the South at a time when industrial growth accompanying the reconstruction of Europe has contributed to widening the gap in standards of living. It is an anxiety that has been growing for half a century due to the ageing of the autochthonous European population.

- The intentional invasion. The growing visibility and institutionalisation of the Muslim presence in Europe are thus described as signs of an intentional strategy of invasion and replacement. The construction of Muslim places of worship or Muslim cultural centres and the development of the Halal market are certainly not analysed as the expression of roots and sustainable integration in the name of freedom of religion and beliefs. Islam, in each of its manifestations, is construed as a public problem.

- The defence of European progress and civilisation. The rise of Islamophobic discourse has allowed European nationalist movements an ideological and rhetorical renewal. Xenophobic, homophobic and anti-Semitic ideas are progressively being supplanted – at least ostensibly – by a progressive rhetoric, as long as it is valid against Muslims. The “new European populism” thus claims to be a guardian of women’s rights,


secularism and homosexual rights, values that are supposedly threatened by an Islam presented as the antithesis of Western progress.

The development of the notion of Islam’s incompatibility underlying these postulates is not unique to nationalist parties and even tends to transcend right-left divisions. Indeed, it is even a specific characteristic of European Islamophobia, illustrated by the regular participation of intellectuals, democratic movements or wholly legitimate democratic governments – opposed, moreover, to racism on the basis of origin or skin colour – in the passionate, irrational construction of a “Muslim problem.” A problem that has suddenly become the object of political consensus, particularly in France, a fact that populist movements are capitalising on.

One could argue that, if Islam poses a problem, it is because of the multiplication of violent acts legitimised by the Muslim religious discourse (1995-1996 attacks in Paris, those in New York and Washington in 2001, Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, etc.) and the changes in the practice of Islam in Europe (multiplication of places of worship, emergence of Salafism, etc.). Although one cannot deny these tangible events, associated, on the one hand, with the evolution of political violence in the world and, on the other, to changes in Muslim religious practices in Europe, one could cite many examples of violent acts or non-Muslim religious practices which are precisely not construed as a public problem (or at least not as much), such as actions by traditionalist Catholics against elective abortion or same-sex marriages, the rise of the African Pentecostal movement in working-class neighbourhoods in France, the over-representation of “separatist” movements among “terrorist” acts registered by Europol, etc.

The construction of a “European Muslim problem” entails a demand for solutions and produces specific effects on the lives of Muslims. Responses vary according to the manner in which the “Muslim problem” is construed in different public spaces, its focal points and national political cultures greatly attached to freedom of conscience and the role of intermediate communities. In other countries, as Italy, for instance, the Muslim problem is expressed more directly, with more xenophobic overtones, etc. The response in France to the headscarf matter was legal, with various laws banning its presence in certain places (public schools for the headscarf, all public spaces for the niqab). More globally, there is no “standard” solution and the different areas of Europe are marked by highly varied forms of rejection and discrimination against Muslim populations of diverse immigrant origins. Numerous national and international surveys allow us to draw the contours of the European experience for Muslim minorities; namely, the existence of a social penalty associated with real or presumed affiliation with Islam.

Measuring the rejection of Islam and of Muslims is not an easy task, insofar as statistical measures or systems are heterogeneous from one country to another. In some countries, Islamophobia is not measured at all. Moreover, each of these instruments has its limits. To sum it up, there are four quantification methods:

- Administrative records based on the action taken by victims, such as court claims or data from institutions dedicated to the protection of minorities;
- Opinion surveys designed to map the political status of Islam and Muslims;
- Situation testing, allowing the statistical establishment of the existence of discrimination in specific social spaces;
- Victimisation surveys, which are general population surveys designed to measure crime and the sense of insecurity by directly addressing individuals and thus helping to overcome the many shortcomings of official records.
On the European level, two types of comparative survey on Islamophobia are viable. International surveys on values and opinions provide a picture of the social and political status of Muslim minorities. These show a solid rejection of Muslims that varies according to the region and country. Thus, according to a Eurobarometer survey in 2010, 66% of those surveyed in France were averse to Muslims, 60% of those surveyed in Belgium were averse, 58% in Sweden, 54% in Denmark, 51% in the Netherlands and finally, half of those surveyed in the United Kingdom; a trend that has been on the rise since 2009, particularly in France and Belgium. A survey carried out by the Pew Research Center in 2008 (Pew Global Attitudes Survey) likewise reveals that hostile attitudes towards Muslims are on the rise, taking different forms in different European countries.²

Besides these opinion polls, a victimisation survey carried out on the European level provides additional information on the ordeals of discrimination. The latter is not easily measured, since it depends on other social and physical markers. In this regard, the preliminary results of the EU-MIDIS (European Union Minorities and Discrimination) Survey are precious. This programme marks a break with the monitoring practices of EU institutions. Since 2001, many reports have pointed out the deficiencies in quantitative evaluation of racism and discrimination in Europe and have proposed the development of specific surveys or the addition of questionnaire modules to existent surveys focussing on racism and discrimination issues. The 2008 EU-MIDIS survey was carried out on 23,500 individuals in the EU’s 27 countries. It allows us to study the discrimination experienced by “minorities” by focussing on two groups in particular in each of the Member States. Discrimination is examined in a multitude of situations: the workplace, accommodations market, contact with healthcare personnel, social services and schools, food venues (restaurants, cafés and bars), textile and clothing shops and access to banking services (opening an account or securing a loan). The experience of Muslims is the object of a publication whose salient points are: one Muslim out of three in Europe declares having experienced an average of eight incidents of discriminatory nature over the past twelve months (34% of men and 26% of women). Moreover, newcomers and non-citizens are declaring greater rejection on the basis of their origin. On the other hand, the report points out that traditional or religious garb (such as the hijab) has no significant impact on experiences of discrimination, although one cannot precisely distinguish the incidence per country for the time being.

The lukewarm attitude displayed by the majority of EU Member States in recognising Islamophobia is not a very encouraging message being sent to Muslims, the majority of whom are also EU citizens.

The place and treatment of minorities in the political construction of Europe is a major issue at a time when the weight of nationalist movements sharing Islamophobic postulates is advancing, even in the European Parliament. The lukewarm attitude displayed by the majority of EU Member States in recognising Islamophobia is not a very encouraging message being sent to Muslims, the majority of whom are also EU citizens. A situation that is even more complicated by the geopolitical context marked by the revolutions in the Arab world and the rise of political movements referring to Islam while using violence against civilians.

² For a detailed analysis of the Pew Research Center’s data, see: www.ru.nl/publish/pages/.../sca201_msc_thesis_michael_savelkoul.pdf.
In early 2014, tensions brewed in Whitechapel, in the East End of London, an area that is at once quintessential of the city and has been home to successive waves of immigrants over the past hundred years or more. According to numerous reports, a ‘British patrol,’ composed of members of a far-right group, made it their business to stand outside the East London Mosque at Whitechapel to drink alcohol and chant slogans in what could only be interpreted as deliberate provocation of the local Muslim population. They claimed to be a response to the Taliban-like ‘Muslim patrol’ that is said to walk the streets in order to ensure that the local Muslim population adheres to religious laws regarding dress and behaviour.1 Inside the mosque and outside, among the wider public, many say that they identify with neither patrol. Both are extremist groups that occupy extreme positions and thereby have more in common with one another than with the majority of the British populace. Nevertheless, the very existence of these two groups must be seen as symbolic, for, when bracketed together as they inevitably are (the one would not exist without the other), they reflect the fact of pluralism in Europe and the challenges that fetter such pluralism in the contemporary global context that has emerged in the wake of 9/11. What is also interesting in this incident is the emergence of tensions between a supposed, but unclear, idea of ‘Britishness,’ versus those of a group that is religiously and ethnically different, although also part and parcel of the variegated cultural landscape of Britain.

The incident in London’s East End is not isolated. Clashes, provocation and dissent between religiously and culturally different groups have characterised many mainstream European concerns. On the one hand, the commitment to pluralism is a touchstone of democracy as envisaged in Europe, especially in the wake of the Second World War and the threats of fascism. On the other hand, democracy – and with it, pluralism – comes undone in the everyday due to the existence of multiple borders that are more economic, legal and political, than they are to do with race, ethnicity or religion per se. As a result, at the heart of plurality in Europe lie major questions regarding tolerance, equality and justice.

The Making of Europe

Of note in the incidents at Whitechapel is the inevitable conjoining of the local and the global. These small histories of the everyday take place within a larger, more complex historical frame, one that is shaped by ideological and economic concerns. Europe, a geopolitical entity formed through imperial ventures, has always been plural. The European project has at its core the germ of empire (a term that instantly brings difference, inequality and violence to the fore); as, ultimately, this was the larger objective that led to the formation of Europe. By no means has Europe ever been devoid of pluralism or diversity, for it is precisely on the premise of the latter that the very idea of Europe has taken shape. Today, the construction of Europe remains an unfinished project that grapples with, and indeed relies on, difference.

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and strives for an ever-clearer definition. To take a historical perspective, the extension of the Roman Empire and its subsequent decline, a key force that lent cohesion to the imagination of Europe, was already an attempt to unify diverse peoples and places under the banner of language, culture and religion. The clashes resulting from the simultaneous expansions of Christianity and Islam led to the Crusades, with the Holy Land as the bone of contention. The Crusades were also among Europe’s early ventures into unknown terrains, blazing a trail for the imperial ventures that were soon to come. In this sense, the making of Europe has always relied on the overriding presence not merely of diversity, but also of conflict. Empires and the colonisation of other continents helped confirm the political and economic might of Europe, thereby sharpening the sense of what it meant. As Kidner, Bucur, Matthisen, Mckee and Weeks state in their book Making Europe: People, Politics and Culture (2007), the making of a European consciousness took shape crucially through the complex crossings of the Roman Empire, the Christian Church, classical tradition and pre- and non-Christian societies. It was greatly enhanced by European colonisations of Asia, Africa and the Americas. Colonisation is key to understanding Europe, as it brought to the fore the question of diversity and difference. Postcolonial migrations to Europe are also important sources of diversity there. The idea of Europe drew cohesion from a shared modernity that emerged as the result of the Enlightenment. It has led to the notion of a shared Western civilisation, which has been shaped, crucially, through and against the idea of the ‘other,’ be this in the form of colonised peoples, slaves, indigenous peoples or cultures that remain connected to the pre-modern or traditional.

Selective Pluralities

The European Union dominates the idea of Europeanness. In contemporary times, no alliance of nations anywhere in the world has paralleled that of the European Union. As a community of nations that collaborate in mutual and shared interests, the EU remains unique in its assertion of rights for its citizens, together with the freedom of circulation of capital, goods and peoples. Whilst inequalities between the different Member States remain palpable, there is nevertheless the guarantee brought by treaties and laws that assure certain basic safeguards, not least of these being over half a century of peace in the wake of centuries of war, and the sheer matter of its size in a globalised context, although overshadowed by the might of the United States. Most importantly, Europe prides itself on its guarantees of democracy. Few would deny that the majority of European citizens enjoy not only the right to vote, the basic touchstone of democracy, but also many other democratic rights, such as freedom of expression, access to a judiciary that safeguards citizens’ rights and, albeit in an increasingly endangered way since the 2008 economic crisis, a basic standard of living that is supported by the State.

The establishment and expansion of the European Union has led to a legal and political citizenship that overrides and exceeds the national. European citizenship remains, for many, more valued than state citizenship. An implicit aspect of such citizenship is the public practice of secularism, whereby religion remains a spiritual and relatively personal pursuit, rather than one espoused overtly by any Member State. Belonging in Europe is a token of membership to a privileged body, one that asserts its power most forcefully at its borders. It is on this matter that Europe flounders in the face of pluralism. For pluralism implies much more than diversity, – that ambiguous term that levels differences and reduces them to a-historical categories –. Pluralism implies a truly political openness that is equitable and just. This is not the case for Europe. ‘Pluralism,’ as practised in Europe, is focused on managing difference in ways that enhance the idea of Europe, itself an imagined geopolitical entity that aims to continue dominating its neighbours. As Etienne Balibar notes in his We, the People of Europe? (2004), the rise of Europe has also led to a European ‘apartheid,’ the reinforcement of external borders as sites of exclusion. Nowhere is this more palpable than in the Mediterranean, a historically, geo-physically conjoined space that has been slit by European powers into a border zone where inequalities, which are at once historical, political and economic, are at their most evident. Here, the boundaries of Europe, culturally and geographically, are part of a shifting, fluid border that both divides and connects Europe from its significant ‘others,’ both Africa and Asia. As David Abulafia states (2011),
the ‘Great Sea’ has been, since Medieval times, a pathway to connections and trade, rendering the two shores of the Mediterranean, as well as its East and West, geographically and irremediably interconnected. Today, as much as ever before, the Mediterranean continues to be a point, not solely of contact, but of crossings. As such, it is Europe’s most porous border, a significant source of European pluralities and a significant challenge to policies that seek to both contain and engage with pluralism in ways that uphold Europe over and above its ‘others.’ It is also the point where Europe bleeds into Africa and Asia, geographically and culturally. Borders are places of control, of demarcation, where the play of power is at its most naked. Borders are where differences are marked out. The Mediterranean is a challenging border zone. For Europe, the Mediterranean is a gateway to challenge, for it is from its southern shores that another perspective on Europe comes into view.

The Plural Question

A key phenomenon in Europe over the past fifty years or more has been the influx of immigrants, most often from the poorer continents of former empires. These minority groups form the testing ground upon which European pluralism meets its challenges. The idea of pluralism is, by definition, fraught with tensions. On the one hand, it encompasses diversity, but, on the other, it most often adopts the route of multiculturalism. In an attempt to cohabit with religious and cultural groups on terms that both offer spaces for difference, but also do not threaten the imagination of Europe, multiculturalism draws borders around ethnic, religious or cultural groups as a way of managing them. As policy and practice, multiculturalism relies on fixed notions of identity, which, in the increasingly mobile and hybridised contexts of today’s world, simply do not adequately reflect mobile and mutating social realities. As a result, numerous borders traverse the European landscape, undoing the project of pluralism even as it is being fashioned. As Tariq Modood states in his book Multiculturalism (2013), at stake in the practices of multiculturalism are questions of inclusion and exclusion, turning integration into a key issue in contemporary Europe.

Border Proliferation

There is little doubt that the proliferation of borders in Europe undermines its commitment to pluralism. This is most acutely apparent in the context of the issue of immigration to Europe, itself a key source of challenges to pluralism and always a major issue of debate at times of elections. Across European states, systems of inclusion and exclusion work to create and maintain (il)legalities, thereby establishing numerous border zones that inevitably impinge on everyday experiences of difference, tolerance, equality and pluralism. Borders may protect the ‘legal,’ but, in so doing, also create the ‘illegal.’ State and security apparatus combine efforts to deal with such (il)legalities, yet as a result produce more of both. With modalities of exclusion at the heart of the European project, pluralism is undermined and, with this, the notion of democracy. The proliferation of borders that are at once legal, political, economic and historical produce what Deleuze and Guattari term ‘microfascisms’ (1987: 214-215). The manifestation of these microfascisms traverse everyday life in Europe today in numerous, very tangible ways – not least as seen by the extremist positions taken up by minority groups in London’s Whitechapel –. Theirs are the everyday voices of contestation, challenging the implementation of democracy in Europe.

References


Humour: A Change Agent in the Arab World

The reactions in the Arab world to the controversial depictions of the Prophet Mohammed by various European cartoonists reinforced the already widespread impression in the West that Arabs are a belligerent and humourless bunch. This is a well-established stereotype in the Western imagination due to the images usually shown on television: bearded men shouting unintelligible threats or cowering women enveloped in yards of billowing fabric. However, while this remains the mainstream impression, new media, in particular, the Internet, are helping to introduce the West to the eclectic Arab sense of humour, which is heir to a rich tradition.

As in any other society, in the Arab world satire has been used to relativise difficult situations and as a natural way to make fun of the other. Indeed, some would argue that humour is what most sets humans apart from other animals.

Humour: A Constant in Arab History

Even in pre-Islamic times, Arab culture produced satirical poems that were used in times of war to ridicule enemy tribes. At that time, humour was so widespread, that whole studies have been conducted to analyse the sense of humour of the Prophet Mohammed and the people he surrounded himself with and how this sarcasm was reflected in the Koran (Kish-tainy, 1985). From the learned poets of the Abbasid court to the popular folklore embodied in the stories about Juha, a sense of humour has remained part of Arab society to the present day. However, just as it does today, Arab humour has faced bitter enemies throughout history, enemies who have been unresponsive to mockery and criticism. According to legend, it was a caustic poem that cost the famous poet Al-Mutanabbi (915-68 AD) his life.

Arab Cartoons: A Key Component of Political Humour

Humour has always offered an outlet for dealing with unjust situations, with the feeling of impotence caused by unfulfilled promises and with despotic regimes that have little regard for the day-to-day activities of their subjects, who, in turn, trade jokes and taunts about their leaders to score everyday Pyrrhic victories. The irreverence that humour allows has made it a political weapon, a vehicle for reflecting popular indignation, and a social change agent. In this regard, political cartoons were an early medium for spreading direct criticism camouflaged as “harmless” comic strips to avoid censorship. From the start, Arab cartoons have dealt with both political and social issues.

Without question, the most influential figure in the world of Arab graphic humour was the Palestinian cartoonist Naji al-Ali, who achieved a previously inconceivable level of popular influence with his cartoons, provoking a great impact in this type of art; an influence that would later tragically cost him his life, in London in 1987.

His most famous character, the Palestinian boy Handala, became an icon, still in use today, of the Palestinian people’s struggle. The school of Arab cartoonists
Without question, the most influential figure in the world of Arab graphic humour was the Palestinian cartoonist Naji al-Ali, who achieved a previously inconceivable level of popular influence with his cartoons influenced by Naji al-Ali seeks to showcase how society suffers under the power of the oppressor (be it Zionist, Arab or international in origin) rather than fly the flag of their homelands against the historical enemy. Indeed, many Arab cartoonists give more importance to the message they wish to convey than to the humour of the cartoon itself, sacrificing laughs for the sake of achieving their goal. It is a dry humour that has arisen from the dramatic situations it reflects. It is the characters that deal with social issues, such as Abu Mahjoob, by the Jordanian cartoonist Emad Hajjaj, that, by ridiculing citizens themselves and stretching stereotypes to the breaking point, manage to elicit a chuckle from readers who recognise themselves in the situations being depicted. The importance of comics is also largely due to the high levels of illiteracy, both real and functional, afflicting Arab societies. A powerful drawing with little text can reach a much broader audience and have a much greater impact than a newspaper article. This capacity to influence, along with the irreverent nature of their art, has made the relationship between Arab cartoonists and Arab authorities quite complex. Many Arab cartoonists have had problems with censorship and the powers that be, such as the Moroc- can artist Khalid Gueddar, who was sentenced to three years in prison, or the Syrian Ali Ferzat, who was beaten and had his fingers broken by thugs from the Syrian regime. The Israeli authorities likewise keep a close eye on the work of Palestinian cartoonists and have no qualms about taking action against them, the most recent case being that of the young cartoonist from the daily Al-Hayat al-Jadida, Mohammad Saba’aneh, who was arrested and held for six months. The porous borders of the Internet allow solidarity networks and advocates of freedom of the press to support cartoonists against government threats. This opening up also facilitates the exchange and dissemination of their work, which is mutually enriching and increases the number of opportunities for them to collaborate with other artists on international projects such as Cartooning for Peace or the Cartoon Movement. The possibilities the Internet affords of reaching a broader audience also entail more social control of the work. So-called social censorship plays an important role when it comes to challenging social taboos, but because humour is largely transgressive and, thus, precisely aims to push the limits of what is expected, it also generates tensions in certain segments of the population, who can now use social media to target authors directly with their aggressive reactions and threats.

New Possibilities for Arab Humour

New technologies have undeniably enabled an explosion of creativity in the world of Arab humour. Until the advent of the Internet, humorous works aimed at large audiences were confined to crude, unsophisticated comedy, punctuated with ridiculous screeches and hammy shouts, the greatest exponents of which were comedic plays and Egyptian sitcoms, many of which were broadcast across the Arab world. Three factors, all deeply indebted to software and film piracy, have facilitated the new boom: young Arabs’ ever-increasing tech savvy, the falling costs of home productions, and access to cultural output from the rest of the world. The biggest do-it-yourself success story is that of Bassem Youssef, the Egyptian heart surgeon turned top comedian in the Arab world. When the revolution broke out in 2011, he was helping as a physician in Tahrir Square. During the uprisings, he combined this work with the creation of humorous home videos that he uploaded to YouTube, in which he breathed new life into the best version of the famous Egyptian sense of humour. His videos went viral, affording him the chance to make the leap to the small screen, where he created the weekly show Al Bernameg (The Programme), modelled on the structure and philosophy of the American programme The Daily Show with Jon Stewart. The wave of freshness, self-confidence and iconoclastic satire of the establishment was hard for most of his targets to stomach. During his Presidency, Mohamed Morsi was the primary focus of the various segments, in which Youssef exercised an unprecedented degree of freedom in the Arab world to mercilessly
criticise the current President. The relationship was not an easy one. Although the authorities tried to shut down the programme several times under the usual pretexts of “insulting the country and Islam” and “endangering national security,” its tremendous popularity and international pressure (including numerous awards and shows of support, such as that proffered by Jon Stewart himself), obliged the President to order the prosecution to drop the charges. Following General Sisi’s coup, the programme continued in the same vein, criticising the country’s new strongmen in yet another show of bravery, given the forcefulness with which the military government has come down on critical journalists. Finally, after receiving various threats, being accused once again of endangering national security, and having to suspend the programme in May during the electoral campaign for the presidential elections, on 2 June, Bassem Youssef announced that he would be pulling the cord on the programme for good, as he was tired of having to change networks and of the constant fear he felt for both his own and his family’s physical safety.

Above and beyond this specific case, former boundaries have clearly been crossed and alternative media have emerged as means of circumventing this type of censorship. In Egypt, many comedy projects now take aim at absolutely every aspect of society, including President Sisi. One such project is the website Asa7by (My Friends), developed by Shady Sedky and Ahmed Mido using minimal resources, which has earned more than six million likes on Facebook with a formula based on annotated photoshopped images. According to its creators, the goal is to keep people on their toes, to make them laugh at absolutely everything, even politically and socially thorny issues, such as sexual harassment. Using a format more similar to Bassem Youssef’s show, the young Ahmed El-Zekairy and Youssef “Joe” Hussen created the Joe Tube channel, which has already garnered more than a million followers. Taking advantage of the “gifts” offered by the military and like-minded television networks, the two put together segments that mock not only General Sisi, but also the Egyptian Mufti, for switching sides following Morsi’s ouster, or in which they laugh at suspected terrorists and radical Islamists.

All of the new satirical programmes are naturally produced in the local dialect. However, the use of dialect is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it allows artists to reach the local audience directly; however, it does so at the expense of the pan-Arab dimension, as some of the jokes, will be lost on audiences from other countries.

The Challenges Facing the New Arab Humour

The size of this audience is especially significant for programmes not produced in the Egyptian dialect, which is understood throughout the Arab world thanks to the historical dominance of Egyptian cinema and television series. All of the new satirical programmes are naturally produced in the local dialect. Although there is still some debate over whether classical Arabic or dialects should be used to create...
classical literature, the issue simply does not come up in relation to these fresher, more spontaneous productions. However, the use of dialect is a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it allows artists to reach the local audience directly; however, it does so at the expense of the pan-Arab dimension, as some of the jokes, based as they are on local vernacular, will be lost on audiences from other countries. The use of dialectical Arabic has likewise gone hand in hand with the growing use of swear words and lewd expressions, which Arab societies, though used to hearing them on the street, are not quite used to hearing in the media, even in a satirical context, much less when a programme is supposed to be family-oriented. Many of these problems have been solved through direct contact between the audience and the artists via social media, giving rise to a candid jargon that, while still lively and innovative, is acceptable in family contexts.

The challenge for all of these artists is to consolidate this recently achieved space for freedom, to continue to defend the healthiness of being able to make fun of any situation or figure, and not to renounce their ability to lampoon even the President of the Republic himself in what has been a clear victory of the Egyptian revolution. As Bassem Youssef said in his farewell press conference "[...] Shutting down the show is a victory, as it means our voice will be heard even louder, since we have not agreed to lower the bar, as others have done, just to keep our jobs" and in so doing, the implication goes, surrendered the freedom we fought so hard to win. Despite this setback, there seems to be no turning back. All that remains to be seen is which media Arab creators will continue to use to perpetuate and broaden the margin of freedom they have already won and, through intelligent satire, to continue fuelling the fire of the social change already underway in Arab societies.

References and links

Cartoon Movement: www.cartoonmovement.com
Cartooning for Peace: www.cartooningforpeace.org
Al Bernameg: www.youtube.com/user/albernameg
Jon Stewart: www.youtube.com/watch?v=LyDOAQNsTrI&feature=youtu.be&t=47s
Asa7by: www.facebook.com/asa7bess
Joe Tube: www.youtube.com/user/JoeTubeVid
"It’s a goat, even though it flies": www.youtube.com/watch?v=SRh4hd9zl-w
"Street Theatre": www.youtube.com/user/Masra7AlShare3?feature=watch
Kharabeesh: www.youtube.com/user/Kharabeesh-Cartoons
Egyptoon: www.youtube.com/channel/UCJlsdBR7KYYAw1CjYN5msvg
Freej: www.freej.ae
Masamir: www.youtube.com/user/nejercom
Bassem Youssef’s press conference: www.youtube.com/watch?v=3DL5Gtp_JcU#t=93
Appendices
MAP A.1 | 5th Euromed Survey of Experts and Actors. Syrian Conflict Scenarios

Results of Question B.2.
To what extent will the following scenarios be affected by the Syrian Conflict?

Results of all respondents

I. Sectarian conflicts will increase
II. Iranian leverage in the region will increase
III. The Gulf’s leverage in the region will increase
IV. The region will be increasingly fragmented as a consequence of the Syrian conflict
V. Spread of radicalism and terrorism
VI. Refugee and migration flows in the region will increase
VII. Changes in the Nation-State model: fragmentation into ethno-religious constituencies

MAP A.2a | Israeli Settlements in the West Bank (2000-2012)

Settlements by population

- Less than 500
- From 500 to 1,000
- From 1,000 to 2,000
- From 2,000 to 5,000
- From 5,000 to 10,000
- From 10,000 to 20,000
- From 20,000 to 40,000
- More than 40,000

- Outposts

East Jerusalem (2000)


*Data until 2005 include Gaza Strip

Own production. Source: Foundation for Middle East Peace (www.fmep.org); B'Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (www.btselem.org); Peace Now (http://peacenow.org.il) and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (www.unocha.org).
MAP A.2b   Israeli Settlements in the West Bank (2000-2012)

Population in West Bank

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1,610,207</td>
<td>2,252,310</td>
<td>192,976</td>
<td>344,779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Population in East Jerusalem

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>333,451</td>
<td>382,041</td>
<td>172,248</td>
<td>198,629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendices
Maps
IE Med.
Mediterranean Yearbook 2014

Population in the West Bank Settlements (1999-2012)

0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 350,000 400,000

*excluding East Jerusalem

Question B4. Please arrange the following countries according to their likelihood of having better prospects for the consolidation of a democratic regime.

Prospects of Democracy

Question B1. In your opinion, how much have the following elements improved or deteriorated in the last three years?

- Better prospects
- Worse prospects

MAP A.5 Mining Production in the Mediterranean (2011)

**MAP A.6 | CO₂ Emissions in the Mediterranean (2011)**

**CO₂ Emissions (millions mt) (2011)**

- Portugal
- Spain
- France
- Italy
- Malta
- Slovenia
- Croatia
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Serbia
- Montenegro
- FYROM
- Albania
- Greece
- Cyprus
- Turkey
- Syria
- Lebanon
- Jordan
- Israel
- Egypt
- Libya
- Tunisia
- Algeria
- Morocco

**CO₂ Emissions per capita (2011)**

- Data unavailable
- Less than 2 mt
- From 2 to 3 mt
- From 3 to 4 mt
- From 4 to 5 mt
- From 5 to 6 mt
- From 6 to 7 mt
- From 7 to 8 mt
- More than 8 mt

**CO₂ Emissions by Fuel of Origin**

- Coal/peat
- Oil
- Gas

**CO₂ Emissions by sector**

- Industry
- Transport
- Residential
- Other

Own production. Source: IEA.
Appendices

MAP A.7 | Women Labour Force Participation Rate (2012)

Women Labour Force Participation Rate

- More than 55%
- From 30% to 40%
- From 50% to 55%
- From 20% to 30%
- From 40% to 50%
- Less than 20%

Labour Force Participation Rate by Sex and Age Group

Youth Unemployment Rate

- More than 50%
- From 40% to 50%
- From 35% to 40%
- From 30% to 35%
- From 25% to 30%
- From 20% to 25%
- From 15% to 20%
- Less than 15%

Youth Unemployment Rate (by sex)

- Male
- Female

Youth population (15-24) in Mediterranean countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>MEN (39,612,264)</th>
<th>WOMEN (38,168,762)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>(4,354,743)</td>
<td>(3,195,863)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employed</td>
<td>(13,683,853)</td>
<td>(5,571,417)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inactive population</td>
<td>(21,573,668)</td>
<td>(29,401,481)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Egypt
- Morocco
- Algeria
- Other North African Countries
- Turkey
- Syria
- Balkans
- Other Middle East Mediterranean Countries
- Italy
- France
- Spain
- Other EU Mediterranean Countries
- Other Middle East Mediterranean Countries

Unemployed: 2,225,000 people
Employed: 1,000,000 people
Inactive: 250,000 people
Other: 10,000 people

MAP A.9 | Life Expectancy at Different Ages (2010)

Life Expectancy at Different Ages*

- Less than 70 years
- From 72.5 to 75 years
- From 77.5 to 80 years
- From 80 to 82.5 years
- From 82.5 to 85 years
- More than 85 years

* In order to facilitate the visual comparison of the data, the equivalent age has been added to each corresponding indicator.
For instance, for life expectancy at age 10, we have added value 10 to compare the data with life expectancy at birth.

MAP A.10 | Cinema

Total Number of National Feature Films Produced

- More than 200
- From 50 to 100
- From 10 to 25
- Less than 5
- Data unavailable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Production Range</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>From 50 to 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>From 10 to 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>More than 200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Screens and Attendance Frequency

- Screens (per 100,000 inhabitants)
- Attendance frequency (per capita)

- Less than 5
- From 5 to 10
- From 10 to 25
- From 25 to 50
- More than 200

Own production. Source: UNESCO.
### Percentage of Exports of Food Items Over Total Exports (2012)

- **More than 40%**
- **From 15% to 20%**
- **From 10% to 15%**
- **From 5% to 10%**
- **Less than 5%**

### Agriculture Production* (Tonnes)

**Agriculture production: main products** (thousand of tonnes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Main Products*</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALBANIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Watermelons</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ALGERIA</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grapes</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>4,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>4,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARUBA</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SPAIN</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>5,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>5,136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grapes</td>
<td>4,653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>1,156</td>
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<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>4,007</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PALESTINE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggplants</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cucumbers &amp; gherkins</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olives</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JORDAN</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggplants</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cucumbers &amp; gherkins</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olives</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISRAEL</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>5,977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables, fresh:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangolds</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grapes</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>4,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>BOSNIA &amp; HERZ.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables, fresh:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangolds</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomatoes</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grapes</td>
<td>465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>4,235</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Not included forage and silage products

** ** not elsewhere specified
MAP A.12 Freedom in the Mediterranean

Freedom Rating 2014 (1=Best; 7=Worst)

- Free
- Partly Free
- Not Free

Evolution of the Components of Freedom Rating (2001-2014)

- Political rights
- Civil liberties

Own production. Source: Freedom House.
Oil Proved Reserves in Mediterranean Countries

Proved Reserves in Mediterranean Countries

Natural Gas Proved Reserves in Mediterranean Countries

Natural Gas Proved Reserves

Natural Gas Production in Mediterranean Countries (2003-13)

Natural Gas Production in Mediterranean Countries (2003-13)

Oil Production in Mediterranean Countries (2003-13)

Oil Production in Mediterranean Countries (2003-13)

Oil Proved Reserves

Oil Proved Reserves

World Total = 1,687.9

World Total = 185.7

Oil Proved Reserves

Oil Proved Reserves

Natural Gas Proved Reserves

Natural Gas Proved Reserves

Proved Reserves in Mediterranean Countries

Proved Reserves in Mediterranean Countries

Natural Gas Proved Reserves

Natural Gas Proved Reserves

Oil Production in Mediterranean Countries (2003-13)

Natural Gas Production in Mediterranean Countries (2003-13)

Natural Gas Production in Mediterranean Countries (2003-13)

Natural Gas Production in Mediterranean Countries (2003-13)

Oil Proved Reserves

Oil Proved Reserves

Natural Gas Proved Reserves

Natural Gas Proved Reserves

Proved Reserves in Mediterranean Countries

Proved Reserves in Mediterranean Countries

Natural Gas Proved Reserves

Natural Gas Proved Reserves

Oil Production in Mediterranean Countries (2003-13)

Natural Gas Production in Mediterranean Countries (2003-13)

Natural Gas Production in Mediterranean Countries (2003-13)

Natural Gas Production in Mediterranean Countries (2003-13)

Oil Proved Reserves

Oil Proved Reserves

Natural Gas Proved Reserves

Natural Gas Proved Reserves

Proved Reserves in Mediterranean Countries

Proved Reserves in Mediterranean Countries

Natural Gas Proved Reserves

Natural Gas Proved Reserves

Oil Production in Mediterranean Countries (2003-13)

Natural Gas Production in Mediterranean Countries (2003-13)

Natural Gas Production in Mediterranean Countries (2003-13)

Natural Gas Production in Mediterranean Countries (2003-13)
MAP A. 14 | Tourism in the Mediterranean

International Tourism, Receipts (2012). In million US$

- More than 55%
- From 45 to 55%
- From 25 to 35%
- From 15 to 25%
- Less than 15%
- Data not available

International Tourism, arrivals 1995-2012

World's Top Tourism Destinations 2012

1. France 83.0
2. United States 66.7
3. China 57.7
4. Spain 57.5
5. Italy 47.7
6. Turkey 35.7

International Tourism in Mediterranean Countries, Receipts (1995-2012)

* Data from 2011

Own production. Source: WB and UNWTO.
MAP A. 15 | Civil War in Syria. Situation in July 2014

UN estimates that at least 93,000 people were killed in the Syrian conflict until June 2013. Other Sources estimate the casualties of the conflict until now as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
<th>Time period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Next Century Foundation</td>
<td>108,871</td>
<td>01/07/12 - 31/05/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Observatory for Human Rights</td>
<td>171,509</td>
<td>15/03/11 - 08/07/14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Center for Documentation of Violations</td>
<td>115,022</td>
<td>15/03/11 - 10/07/14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total number of Refugees: 2,916,232
Registered Refugees: 2,875,362
Estimated Refugees Awaiting Registration: 40,870
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP): 6,520,800

Evolution of Registered Syrian Refugees since December

Distribution of Syrian Refugees by Country

Total number of Refugees: 2,916,232
Registered Refugees: 2,875,362
Estimated Refugees Awaiting Registration: 40,870
Internally Displaced Persons (IDP): 6,520,800

MAP A.16 | International Migrant Stock from South and East Mediterranean Countries (SEMC)

International Migrant Stock (country of origin)

- More than 3 million
- From 3 million to 1 million
- From 1 million to 500,000
- Less than 500,000
- Data unavailable

International Migrant Stock (country of origin). Top countries of destination

MAP A.17 | Fertility Rates in Mediterranean Countries

TFR of Mediterranean countries compared to the world average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Above the world average</th>
<th>Below the world average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More than 1.5</td>
<td>Less than 0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 1.5 to 1</td>
<td>From 0.5 to 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 1 to 0.5</td>
<td>More than 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than 0.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TFR of Mediterranean countries in 1960 and 2012

Own Production. Source: WB.

MAP A.18 | Maritime Transport

Liner shipping connectivity index (2012)

- More than 70
- From 50 to 70
- From 30 to 50
- Less than 5
- Data unavailable

Container port throughput 2012

- TEU= Twenty foot Equivalent Unit
- 100,000 TEU
- 2,000,000 TEU
- 7,500,000 TEU

Merchant fleet by flag of registration 2012

- 1,000 ships
- 100 ships
- 10 ships

Own Production. Source: UNCTAD.
January 2013

Portugal and Greece receive a second aid tranche from the EU and the IMF. In Spain, the ruling People’s Party is involved in a corruption scandal. France carries out a military intervention in Mali and expels the radical Islamists from Ansar el-Dine and MOJWA from Azawad. In Italy, the People of Freedom and the Northern League agree on a coalition for the February elections and the Prime Minister Mario Monti announces that he will lead a centre-right coalition. In Turkey, the negotiations between Ankara and the PKK are endangered by the murder in Paris of three militants from the terrorist organisation. In Syria, there are rising fears that the country’s chemical weapons may fall into the hands of extremist groups. In the north, clashes continue between Islamist rebels and Kurdish militia. Parliamentary elections are held in Jordan. Egypt reshuffles its cabinet in a month which marks the second anniversary of the revolution with new protests, fuelled in part by the court ruling over the deaths at the Port Said football stadium in February 2012. The hostage crisis at the Tigantourine gas plant in Algeria ends with the death of the terrorists from the Masked Men Brigade and dozens of hostages.

Portugal
- On 2 January the President Anibal Cavaco Silva presents the budgets approved by the Constitutional Court for 2013 to decide on the legality of the austerity measures they contain.
- On 16 January the IMF unblocks the sixth tranche of the Portuguese bailout package, 838.8 million euros.

Spain
- On 8 January the Pallerols corruption trial is brought to its conclusion with the admission of the Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC, Christian democrat) that it illegally used European funds in the nineties.
- On 16 January it is revealed that the former treasurer of the People’s Party (PP, centre-right), Luis Barcenas, had 22 million euros in a Swiss bank account, which he emptied when he was charged in 2009 in the Gürtel corruption scandal. On 18 January it is reported that Barcenas and his predecessor, Alvaro Lapuerta, had been handing out illegal monthly bonuses of between 5,000 and 15,000 euros to senior officials of the PP, deepening the general crisis in Spanish politics.
- On 15 January the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) rules in favour of Spain upholding its ban on the Basque Nationalist Action party (ANV) in 2008.
- On 18 January Gozton Vizan Gonzalez, a fugitive since 1991, is arrested in Rio de Janeiro for belonging to ETA’s disbanded Biscay unit.

France
- On 3 January the separatist party Batasuna announces its dissolution in Bayonne.
- On 11 January France carries out a military intervention in Mali responding to the United Nations and Bamako’s call to retake control of Azawad from the hands of extremist Islamist militants. On 30 January the French-Mali Operation frees Kidal, after having done so in Timbuktu and Gao.

- On 13 January hundreds of thousands of people demonstrate in Paris against the legalisation of same-sex marriage.
- On 22 January the Council of Ministers approves the bill to reform Republican Schools, which foresees the recruitment of 60,000 new teachers.

Italy
- On 4 January the Prime Minister Mario Monti announces that he will head the electoral list Civic Choice, With Monti for Italy, in the upcoming February elections.
- On 7 January the People of Freedom (PDL) and the Northern League (PdV) agree to run together in the February elections. Silvio Berlusconi, on the other hand, withdraws his presidential candidacy.
- On 22 January Vittorio Magione, from the Camorra Ferrara-Cacciaquvo clan and one of Italy’s most wanted fugitives, is arrested in Mijas, Spain.

Slovenia
- On 8 January the anti-corruption commission announces that it will investigate all political party leaders after finding irregularities in the accounts of Prime Minister Janez Jansa and the Mayor of Ljubljana Zoran Jankovic.
- On 23 January the Civic List party, which demands the resignation of Janez Jansa, who it accuses of corruption, abandons the government coalition leaving behind a minority government.
- On 23 January a public sector strike against spending cuts, paralyses health and education services.
Croatia
- On 17 January the President Ivo Josipovic calls upon Bosnians who fled from Croatia during the Balkans War to return to their homes.

Montenegro
- On 28 January a demonstration organised by the country’s main trade unions protests against the 3% tax increase on salaries of over 400 euros.

Serbia
- On 21 January Kosovo condemns Serbia’s removal of a monument to the Liberation Army of Presevo, Medveda and Bujanovac, which Belgrade says promotes separatism.

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244
- On 17 January the Serbian and Kosovo Prime Ministers, Ivica Dacic and Hashim Thaci reach a provisional agreement in Brussels on the collection of customs duties.
- On 24 January the Kosovo government assures that it will pay compensation for recent attacks on Serbian graves and monuments.

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
- On 23 January the social democratic opposition announces moves against Nikola Gruevski’s government following a meeting between Gruevski and the social democrat leader Branko Crvenkovski, which ends without an agreement on calling early elections, a demand that came after the approval without consensus of the 2013 budgets in 2012.

Albania
- On 14 January the Socialist Party (PS) accuses the governing Democratic Party (DPS, centre-right) of giving refuge to Peru’s former Foreign Minister Augusto Blacker Miller, wanted by Peru for his participation in the Alberto Fujimori coup in 1992 and who currently controls the Albanian waste management company Apolonia Investments.
- On 17 January the Foreign Minister Edmond Panariti asks Greece to repeal the law under which both countries are technically still in a state of war. The law has been in force since Italian forces attacked Greece from Albania in October 1940.

Greece
- On 1 January Athens metro workers strike in protests against plans for a uniform public-sector wage scale, which would imply 20% wage cuts for metro workers.
- On 16 January the IMF announces the release of 3.24 billion euros of its bailout package after reviewing the public deficit reduction programme undertaken by Greece, where Parliament approves a new tax hike two days earlier to raise an additional 2.5 billion until 2014.
- On 18 January the Parliament approves the creation of a committee to investigate various politicians, including the former Finance Minister Yorgos Paapostantisou, over the disappearance of the so-called Lagarde List, which contains the names of more than 2,000 Greeks with accounts in the British bank HSBC.
- On 22 January the Council of Europe ratifies the credentials of MP Eleni Zaroula, from the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn.
- On 25 January the government issues a civil mobilisation order and approves the use of riot police to end another nine-day metro strike in Athens.

Turkey
- On 3 January the general and former Chief-of-Staff Ismail Hakki Karadayi is arrested in the investigation into the 1997 Post-Modern Coup.
- On 4 January NATO deploys Patriot missiles on the Turkish-Syrian border.
- On 9 January three members of the terrorist organisation the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), are murdered in Paris, jeopardising the talks opened between Turkey and the imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan on the disarmament of the PKK.

Syria
- On 11 January rebel sources confirm they have taken control of the strategic Taftanaz Military Airbase.
- On 15 January over 100 people are killed in Basatin al-Hasawiya, Homs, in an attack led by the army.
- On 22 January at least 56 people are killed in Ras al-Ayn, in clashes between the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Kurdish People’s Protection Units, fighting against both the regime and the Islamist sectors of the FSA, in defence of Kurdish autonomy.
- On 28 January the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROF) asks for the arms embargo on Syria to be lifted to allow it to defend against regime aggression and strengthen its dominion in areas under its control.
- On 30 January Kuwait hosts the UN International Donors Conference for Syria with the aim of raising 1.5 billion dollars.

Jordan
- On 23 January Jordan holds legislative elections. The pro-monarchy candidates win against the Islamist and left-wing opposition, most of whom boycott the elections, claiming they are rigged. This is the first time the Parliament will have the authority to elect the Prime Minister.

Egypt
- On 6 January a partial cabinet reshuffle comes into effect, ordered the previous day by the President Mohamed Morsi. The government renewal affects the ministries of the Interior, Transport, Energy, Local Development, Civil Aviation, Environmental Affairs, Supply, Communication and Parliamentary Affairs.
- On 13 January the Court of Cassation accepts Hosni Mubarak’s appeal and orders the trial to be repeated, in which the deposed Egyptian President and his Interior Minister Habib el-Adly were handed life sentences for the repression of the Egyptian Revolution.
- On 24 January the Black Bloc makes its first appearance in reaction to “the
fascist tyrants, the Muslim Brotherhood."
• On 25 January Egypt commemorates the second anniversary of the revolution with gatherings of crowds in the country’s main cities.
• On 24 January the British Prime Minister announces that talks between the political forces to reshuffle the cabinet have ended without an agreement.
• On 21 January the Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal, confirms the death of 37 hostages of eight different nationalities.

Libya
• On 4 January Mohamed Magariaf, President of the Libyan National Congress (Parliament), escapes unharmed from an attack in Sebha.
• On 15 January Italy temporarily closes its consulate in Benghazi after the city’s Italian consul Guido de Sanctis escapes unharmed from an assassination attempt. On 24 January the United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands tell their citizens to leave the city.
• On 26 January Sheikh Mohamed Ben Othman, member of the Misrata Local Council is murdered. This is the fourth murder in a fortnight of a local authority member. On 28 January a curfew is enforced.

Tunisia
• On 16 and 19 January there is unrest in El Kef over the lack of progress in the improvement of living conditions.
• On 17 January Ettakatol (social democrat) announces that it may leave the government coalition unless its participation in the cabinet is increased and a greater number of political parties take part.
• On 19 January three of the secular opposition parties, Nidaa Tounis, al-Joumhouri and al-Massar contemplate running as a coalition in the next elections.
• On 26 January thousands of police officers and members of the National Guard protest to demand that the Interior Ministry offers better working conditions.
• On 26 January the Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali announces that talks between the political forces to reshuffle the cabinet have ended without an agreement.

Algeria
• On 16 January militia of the pro-Katibat al-Mulathameen (The Masked Brigade), an offshoot of the AQIM and led by the Algerian terrorist Mokhtar Belmokhtar, attack the Tigantourine gas facility, 40 kilometres from In Amenas, demanding an end to the French intervention in Mali and the release of Islamist extremists held prisoner in Algeria. On 17 January, the Algerian army launches an attack in which several of the terrorists and hostages are killed. On 19 January the special forces raid the complex killing all the assailants. On 21 January the Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal, confirms the death of 37 hostages of eight different nationalities.

Morocco
• On 22 January the Justice Ministry announces that it will reform article 475 of the Penal Code, which allows the rapist of a minor to marry his victim.

European Union
• On 1 January Ireland assumes the EU Presidency with fiscal stability, economic recovery and job creation as priorities.
• On 24 January the British Prime Minister David Cameron declares his intention to call a national referendum between 2015 and 2017 to renegotiate the United Kingdom’s relationship with the EU, which could lead to the country leaving the Union.

Arab League
• On 31 January the Arab League and Russia condemn Israel’s attack on a Syrian military research centre, claiming that it constitutes a “clear violation of the sovereignty of an Arab state.”

February 2013

Portugal, Spain and Montenegro adopt new anti-crisis measures. France passes the law legalising same-sex marriage. Italy, Monaco and Cyprus hold elections. The Slovenian government falls. The political crisis in FYROM deepens. Greece has its first general strike of the year. The Free Syrian Army makes important progress in terms of its strategic positioning and steps up its military activity in Damascus. In Egypt, new protests take place and clashes break out in the major cities against the President Mohamed Morsi. In Tunisia, the murder of Chokri Belaid, leader of the Democratic Patriots’ Movement (PPDU) triggers new demonstrations against the government and the dismissal of the Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali.

Portugal
• On 8 February the Parliament adopts the fiscal stability rule outlined in the European Fiscal Compact.
• On 16 February thousands of people from the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (CGTP), the country’s biggest union, gather to demonstrate against the austerity measures.

Spain
• On 15 February the government announces a reform of local government to save 7 billion euros between now and 2015.
• On 20 February judges and public prosecutors protest against the law reform of the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ) law.
• On 26 February the Parliament rejects a motion from Convergence and Union (CIU, right-wing, Catalan nationalist) and the United Left (IU) on a public referendum for Catalan self-determination. 14 members of the Socialists’ Party of Catalonia (PSC), the Catalan federation of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), are fined by their own party for ignoring the PSC’s line to vote in favour, revealing the internal divisions of the PSOE and PSC over the sovereignty issue.
France

- On 12 February the National Assembly passes the law that allows for same-sex marriage and adoption.
- On 26 February France says that it will not negotiate with terrorists over the kidnapping of the Moulin-Fournier family in Cameroon on 19 February. A further eight French people are still held by kidnappers from Islamic terrorist groups in Africa.
- On 26 February Segolene Royal is appointed vice-President of the Public Investment Bank created by the government of Francois Hollande.
- On 23 February, unable to reduce the public deficit to 3% of its GDP, as agreed with Brussels, France announces measures to cut public spending for 2014.

Monaco

- On 10 February Monaco holds a general election in which the Horizon Monaco alliance wins 20 of the 24 seats. The Union Monegasque alliance wins three seats and the new Renaissance party, composed of employees of the Société des Bains de Mer, wins one seat.

Italy

- On 24 - 25 February Italy holds an early general election. In the Chamber of Deputies (lower house) the centre-left Italy Common Good alliance led by Pier-Luigi Bersani’s Democratic Party (PD) wins 345 of the 630 seats. The centre-right alliance led by Silvio Berlusconi’s PDL takes second place with 125 seats. The Five Star Movement of comic Beppe Grillo wins 109 seats and the centrist coalition With Monti for Italy wins 47 seats. In the Senate (upper house), Bersani’s coalition wins 113 of the 315 seats, against Berlusconi’s 116.

Slovenia

- On 27 February after months of citizen demonstrations, the Parliament approves a no-confidence vote over allegations of corruption against the conservative government of Janez Jansa and asks Alenka Bratusek, from Positive Slovenia (PS, centre-left), to form a government.

Croatia

- On 20 February Croatian veterans of the Balkans War protest against the decision to include the Cyrillic transcription on public roads in Vukovar in a climate of rising tensions between Croats and Serbs.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 12 February the House of Representatives (lower house) approves a no-confidence vote against the entity’s government, tabled by the new alliance of parties which holds a parliamentary majority. On 15 February the motion is blocked in the House of Peoples (upper house) after claims by the Bosnian opposition that it endangers the interests of their community.
- On 15 February the Bosnian Appeals Court sentences four Bosnian Serb police officers to a total of 79 years’ imprisonment for the murder of more than 150 civilians in Konjanske Stijene during the Bosnian War.
- On 26 February the House of Peoples of the Federal Parliament approves the return of properties and financial compensation for refugees and displaced persons from the Bosnian War.
- On 27 February the President of the Republika Srpska Milorad Dodik reshuffles the government and appoints Zeljka Cvijanovic as Prime Minister.

Montenegro

- On 8 February the government increases income tax on salaries above the country’s average – 720 euros gross – to reduce the deficit.

Serbia

- On 20 February the Parliament sacks Nata Mesarovic, the President of the Supreme Court of Cassation, following a ruling from the Constitutional Court, which considers the regulation used to appoint Mesarovic to be unconstitutional.
- On 28 February the former Yugoslav Chief-of-Staff Momcilo Perisic is acquitted, in an appeal lodged by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), of the 27-year sentence handed down in September 2011 for war crimes between 1993 and 1995.

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 13 February the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK, centre-right) announces that it will continue giving support to the governing Democratic Party (PDK, social democrat) on issues of national interest.

FYROM

- On 20 February the appointment of the Albanian-Macedonian Talat Xhaferi as Defence Minister is shunned by the Dignity Party, which comprises veterans from the conflict against the Albanian guerrillas in 2001.
- On 24 February the opposition led by the Social Democratic Union (USDM) agrees not to recognise the results of the upcoming local elections in protest against the approval by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE, right-wing) of the controversial budgets for 2013, in December 2012, after expelling the opposition MPs from the Parliament.

Albania

- On 7 February two officers of the Republican Guard are acquitted of the murder of three demonstrators in the anti-government protests in January 2011. On 11 February there is a demonstration in protest against the verdict.
- On 24 February the Chief of Police Dritan Lamaj is murdered in Tirana. This is the third murder of a senior police officer in eight months.

Greece

- On 1 February the Economic Crimes Prosecutor announces the opening of an investigation into New Democracy (ND, centre-right) and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) accused of misusing public funds and fraud after it is reported that they have debts to the value of 250 million euros from loans requested in 2001 and 2002.
• On 1 February four anarchists are arrested accused of robbing 200,000 euros to finance the group Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei.
• On 20 February Greece has its first general strike of the year, called by the GSEE and ADEDY trade unions, to protest against the austerity measures and high levels of unemployment.
• On 26 February the former mayor of Thessaloniki, Dimitris Papageorgopoulos is given a life sentence for embezzling 18 million euros of public funds.

Turkey
• On 1 February two people are killed in an attack outside the US embassy in Ankara by the radical left-wing group Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP/C). On 19 February 167 people linked with the DHKP/C are arrested.
• On 21 February the army bombs 12 hideouts of the PKK terrorist organisation in the Qandil mountains in Iraq.

Cyprus
• On 4 February the President Dimitris Christofias, appoints Spyros Stavrinakis as deputy governor of the central bank, a position reserved by the Constitution for Turkish-Cypriot citizens and which has been vacant for the last 50 years. The government justifies the controversial decision claiming that it needs extra help to cope with the bank’s increased responsibilities following negotiations with Brussels for a bailout package.
• On 5 February a nine-day national builders’ strike ends with unrest in Paphos.
• On 17 February Cyprus holds the first round of its presidential elections. Nicos Anastasiades, the Democratic Alliance (DISY, conservative) candidate, the Democratic Party (DIKO, centrist) and the pro-European Eiroko and Stavros Malas, supported by the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL, communist) reach the second round, held on 24 February, in which Anastasiades wins with 57.4% of the votes.

Syria
• On 9 February Bashar al-Assad re-shuffles the government. The Labour and Social Affairs Ministries are created, led by Hassan Hijazi and Kinda Shmat respectively. Hussein Farzat takes over at the Ministry of Housing, Ahmad Qadri at the Agriculture Ministry, Suleiman Abbas is appointed Oil Minister, Ismail Ismail Finance Minister and Hussein Amous Minister of Public Works.
• On 11 February the FSA confirms that it has taken control of the al-Furat Hydroelectric Dam, the biggest in the country. This major advance adds to the prior success in November 2012, when FSA took control of the Tishrin Dam.
• On 12 February after weeks under siege the Jarrah Military Airbase in Aleppo is captured by the FSA, in a new strategic advance. Opposition sources report tank manoeuvres by the Syrian army in Abbadis Square in Damascus to protect the capital from the increasingly frequent FSA incursions.
• On 17 February the UN and Arab League Special Envoy for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi proposes that the UN host an eventual dialogue between the regime and the opposition.
• On 21 February at least 53 people are killed in an attack close to a building of the Baath Party in Damascus, in the central Shahbandar Square.
• On 25 February the FSA takes control of the nuclear facilities in Deir al-Zor.

Lebanon
• On 20 February the military investigative judge Riad Abou Ghaida calls for the death penalty for former Lebanese minister Michel Samaha, and for the Syrian Chief of Intelligence Ali Mamlouk, for planning terrorist attacks in Lebanon.

Jordan
• On 21 February Jordan announces that it will open a third refugee camp with an initial capacity of 5,000 refugees in Zarqa.

Egypt
• On 1 February thousands of opponents of the President Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood take to the streets in a new Friday of protests in the country’s main cities, demanding that the President resign for betraying the revolutionary goals. New demonstrations and clashes erupt throughout the month.
• On 4 February the Culture Minister Mohamed Saber Arab resigns in protest against the crackdown on the recent demonstrations.
• On 12 February the Egyptian Public Prosecutor orders the arrest of Salafist Mahmoud Shaaban after he calls for leaders of the opposition coalition NSF to be killed in the name of Islam.
• On 19 February the Attorney General orders the arrest of the Salafi preacher Abu Islam for his misogynist sermons.
• On 24 February Mohamed ElBaradei announces that his party al-Dostour (Constitution, liberal) will boycott the parliamentary elections in April.

Libya
• On 7 February representatives of the Tubu and Zuway, the two main groups in Kufra, begin peace negotiations in Tripoli, mediated by the government. On 26 February, however, clashes begin again in Kufra between the two communities.

Tunisia
• On 6 February the opposition leaves the Constituent Assembly hours after the murder of Chokri Belaïd, Secretary General of the Democratic Patriots’ Movement (PPDU, left-wing), a fierce critic of the government and the Salafi League for the Protection of the Revolution. Protests are staged demanding the resignation of the Interior Minister Ali Larayedh. The Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali promises to form a new national unity government composed of technocrats. On 8 February there is a general strike called by the opposition and the Tunisian General Labour Union UGTT, coinciding with Belaïd’s funeral. On 19 February Jebali resigns after failing to gain parliamentary support for his proposal for a new cabinet. Unrest continues in different cities. On 22 February Ennahda proposes Larayedh as the new Prime Minister.

Algeria
• On 15 February the Interior Ministry denies the legalisation of the Salafis...
party the Free Awakening Front, whose founding convention was scheduled for 16 February. The Front had requested its legalisation on 2 January.

- On 24 February the CEO of the hydrocarbon company Sonatrach, Abdelhamid Zerguine, acknowledges cases of corruption in his company. One of the people involved is the former CEO Mohamed Meziane, who has been in prison since 2011.

Morocco

- On 4 February the rapper and activist Mouad Belghouat, who has served sentence since May 2012 for insulting the State’s security service, begins a hunger strike to demand his release.

Mauritania

- On 25 February the police disperse demonstrators from the 25 February Movement who take to the streets in Nouakchott to mark the anniversary of the founding of the movement.

European Union

- On 8 February the European Council of Heads of State and Government reaches an agreement on the European Budget for 2014-2020, which is reduced for the first time.

Arab League

- On 20 February the Secretary General of the Arab League Nabil Elaraby urges Moscow to negotiate with Damascus for a dialogue-based solution to the Syrian conflict.

March 2013

In France, there are changes in the cabinet. The difficulties in forming a government in Italy continue. The elections in Malta bring victory to the Labour Party. In Slovenia the Parliament invests the new government. In Turkey, Abdullah Ocalan calls the PKK to disarm. The EU and IMF agree on the seventh review of Portugal’s bailout package.

Spain

- On 5 March the Chief Prosecutor of Catalonia Martín Rodríguez Sol resigns after proceedings are taken to remove him for showing open support for a Catalanian sovereignty referendum, despite his position.
- On 9 March around a hundred sub-Saharan migrants attempt to jump the Melilla border fence. On 11 March another 50 illegal immigrants storm the fence, some of whom succeed in entering Spanish territory.

France

- On 13 March a Paris criminal court sentences ETA members Garikoitz Aspiazu, Mikel Carrero Sarobe, Aitzol Iriondo and Luis Ignacio Iruretagoyena to 20 years in prison. Another six defendants are given prison sentences of between eight and 18 years.
- On 20 March the European Affairs minister Bernard Cazeneuve is appointed as the Junior Minister for the Budget to replace Jerome Cahuzac, who resigned the previous day after being implicated in an investigation into money laundering and tax fraud. Thierry Rapentin is appointed as the new European Affairs Minister.

Monaco

- On 14 March Jean-Sebastien Fiorucci, former head of the cabinet of Jean-François Robillon, is charged for his involvement in the opinion poll scandal in June 2012, which may have violated the respondents’ confidentiality.

Italy

- On 7 March a Milan court of first instance sentences Silvio Berlusconi to one year in prison for the illegal publication of wiretapped telephone calls, in the Unipol Case.
- On 16 March Piero Grasso (PD) is elected President of the Senate and Laura Boldrini, left-wing environmentalist, President of the Chamber of Deputies.
- On 25 March Marcello Dell’Utri former Senator and co-founder of Forza Italia is sentenced by a Palermo court to seven years in prison for mediating between the Mafia and Berlusconi’s business interests.
- On 26 March the Foreign Minister Giulio Terzi resigns over a disagreement with the cabinet on the extradition to India of two Italian marines. The two men are to stand trial for the death of two fishermen they confused for pirates in the Indian Ocean.

The Vatican

- On 13 March the Archbishop of Buenos Aires Jorge Mario Bergoglio is elected Pope under the name of Francis after the official resignation on 28 February of Benedict XVI, the first of its kind since Gregory XII in 1415.

Malta

- On 9 March the Labour Party (LP) of Joseph Muscat wins the presidential elections with 55% of the votes. On 13 March Muscat announces his new cabinet.

Slovenia

- On 5 March the Parliament approves the labour reform drawn up by the outgoing government, which includes relaxing dismissal regulations
and a cap on temporary workers in companies set at 25%.
- On 20 March the Parliament invests the new government formed by the coalition of Positive Slovenia, the Social Democrats, Civic List and the Democratic Party of Pensioners.

**Croatia**
- On 1 March the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ, conservative, Bosnian nationalist) rules out participating in the Bosnian-Serb coalition, revealed on 12 March.
- On 25 March the ruling Social Democratic Party (SDP) requests that the High Representative of the International Community for Bosnia Valentin Inzko find a solution to the governing crisis in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the entity’s Bosnian members, appealing to their community’s interests, block the appointment of three judges to the Constitutional Court. The Court has been incomplete since 2008, and therefore incapable of making a decision regarding the no-confidence vote, passed by the parties of the government coalition created in May 2012, to dismiss the Bosnian ministers from the previous government coalition.
- On 27 March the ICTY sentences the former Bosnian-Serb senior officials Mico Stanisic and Stojan Zupljanin to 22 years’ imprisonment.

**Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244**
- On 4 March Belgrade and Pristina fail to reach a definitive agreement on the status of the Serbian territories in Northern Kosovo, due to Kosovo’s refusal to grant them autonomy.
- On 14 March a demonstration in Pristina condemns political corruption and rising energy prices and calls for the resignation of the Finance and Interior Ministers Besim Beqaj and Bajram Rexhepi and the executive director of the Kosovo Energy Corporation Arben Gjuka.

**FYROM**
- On 1 March clashes erupt in Skopje during a demonstration against the appointment of the Albanian-Macedonian Tatol Xhaferi as Defence Minister.
- On 8 March ethnic Albanian demonstrators attempt to storm the government headquarters over the government’s anti-Albanian policies.

**Albania**
- On 4 March the President Bujar Nishani, blocks the appointment of the former Prosecutor General Ina Rama as judge at the Appeals Court.

**Greece**
- On 5 March farmers protest in Athens calling for lower taxes and cuts in fuel prices after negotiations with the Agriculture Minister fail to reach a consensus.
- On 5 March the former Minister Akis Tsochatzopoulos (PASOK) is sentenced to eight years in prison and fined 520,000 euros for failing to properly declare his assets between 2006 and 2009.
- On 12 March the offices of the Minister Kostas Giulekas, former Minister Yorgos Orfanos and deputy Environment Minister Stavros Kalafatis (ND) are attacked with explosives in Salonica. These acts add to the shooting attack on the Prime Minister’s office in January and the letter containing threats sent by the Cretan Revolution in February to the Finance Minister.

**Turkey**
- On 19 March two devices explode outside the Ministry of Justice and head-quarters of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Ankara.
- On 21 March, coinciding with the Kurdish new year, Abdullah Ocalan calls for disarmament to allow advances to be made in the talks with Ankara to end almost three decades of PKK terrorist activity.

**Cyprus**
- On 16 March the Eurogroup and IMF agree on a 10 billion-euro bailout package. To cover the remaining 7 billion euros of the country’s debt it is agreed to apply a one-off tax of 9.9% to bank deposits of over 100,000 euros and 6.75% to those under this amount, Russia is asked to extend its bailout loan and Nicosia is forced to increase corporate tax to 12.5%. On 25 March a second agreement leads to the immediate liquidation of the second biggest Cypriot bank, Laiki Bank, with a haircut that will only affect deposits above 100,000 euros and restrictions on the movement of capital, representing the first corralito in the EU. On 28 March bank branches reopen after being closed for 13 days to avoid a mass capital flight.
- On 29 March the media reveals a high number of alleged loan waivers, between 2006 and 2012, to politicians, businessmen and trade unionists by the three main Cypriot Banks. This scandal adds to reports made on 26 March by two former high-level Laiki Bank employees of capital flight to Greece.

**Syria**
- On 4 March the armed opposition takes al-Raqqah, the first provincial capital to fall into rebel hands.
- On 4 March at least 35 Syrian soldiers are killed in an attack in Rabiya, Iraq, for which al-Qaeda claims responsibility.
- On 18 March the NCSROF elects Ghassan Hitto as the Prime Minister of the Syrian opposition.
- On 24 March the NCSROF President and leader of the moderate opposition Moaz al-Khtib resigns, citing a lack of support. The General Assembly of the NCSROF refuses to accept his resignation.
• On 24 March Israel fires a missile at a Syrian military outpost in response to two attacks launched from Syria. The attacks coincide with advances made by the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade, which takes control of several military facilities close to the Golan Heights.

Lebanon
• On 1 March the army is deployed in Sidon to prevent fighting between Salafis and Hezbollah members. Every Friday of the month Salafis demonstrate in Sidon, Beirut and Tripoli against the Syrian regime and the Lebanese Shiite militia.
• On 23 March Najib Mikati and his government resign, unable to reach a parliamentary agreement on an electoral reform that will allow elections to be held in June.

Jordan
• On 10 March Abdullah II orders Abdullah Ensour to form the new government. This is the first time that the head of government has been approved by the Parliament, rather than the King.
• On 27 March the British government loses its appeal at the Special Immigration Appeals Commission to deport the radical preacher Abu Qatada to Jordan.

Egypt
• On 6 March Egypt’s Administrative Court overrules a presidential decree calling for parliamentary elections on 22 April.
• On 6 March the Giza Criminal Court sentences the steel tycoon Ahmed Ezz to 37 years in prison and fines him 227 million euros for corruption.
• On 9 March the Egyptian judiciary confirms the 21 death penalties and five life sentences handed down in January to those responsible for the 70 deaths at the Port Said stadium in February 2012. The ruling fuels the unrest already in the streets.
• On 27 March the Cairo Appeals Court orders the reinstatement of the Attorney General Abdel Meguid Mahmoud, dismissed in November 2012 by presidential decree.

Libya
• On 2 March clashes between militants from Zintan and Zuwarra force the evacuation of the Melita gas and oil facility.
• On 3 March four security agents are injured during the eviction of a group of former revolutionary fighters who have been camped outside the National Congress for the past month demanding financial compensation and medical treatment.
• On 4 March the Mashashiya and Guntrar tribes agree on a ceasefire in Mizdah brokered by the government.
• On 14 March the United Nations extends its mission in Libya, UNSMIL, by a year and eases the arms embargo on the country.
• On 14 March it is reported that Faraj al-Chalabi has been arrested, a Libyan citizen with links to al-Qaeda and the Libyan Islamist Fighting Group, wanted since 1994 for the murder of German nationals in Sirte and since September 2012 for attacking the US consulate in Benghazi.
• On 19 March Libya celebrates its new national day, commemorating the victory of the Revolution. Members of the High Council of Revolutionaries demonstrate in Martyrs’ Square against the government’s inefficiency, the excessive authority of the National Congress and the unsatisfactory break with the deposed regime.

Tunisia
• On 1 March the President Moncef Marzouki extends the state of emergency by three months.
• On 8 March the Prime Minister Ali Larayedh announces the composition of the new government after more than two weeks of negotiations between Ennahda, the Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol. Independent candidates are appointed to head the Interior, Foreign, Defence and Justice Ministries. Ennahda retains just nine of the 30 ministries. On 13 March the Parliament approves the government by an absolute majority.
• On 17 March the Salafi movement Ansar al-Sharia announces its integration into al-Qaeda.

Algeria
• On 14 and 23 March crowds gather for the Dignity Marches in Ouargla and Laghouat respectively, demanding measures against unemployment and recruitment transparency.

Morocco
• On 31 March thousands of people demonstrate in Rabat against the lack of progress in reducing unemployment and inflation.

European Union
• On 4 March Latvia requests entry to the eurozone.
• On 8 March Germany, Finland and the Netherlands veto the entry of Romania and Bulgaria into the Schengen Area.
• On 11 March the ban comes into effect on selling beauty products in the EU that have been tested on animals.
• On 13 March a European Parliament majority rejects the Multiannual Financial Framework approved by the Council in February.
• On 14 March thousands of people protest in Brussels against the austerity measures and rising unemployment caused by the crisis. The demonstration coincides with the European Council of Heads of State and Government.

Arab League
• On 6 March the Arab League agrees to hand Syria’s seat in the organisation to the NCSROF.
• On 26-27 March Doha hosts the 24th Arab League Summit with Syria as the central issue.

April 2013

In Portugal, the government approves fresh cuts. In Italy Giorgio Napolitano is reelected as President and Enrico Letta is appointed Prime Minister. Croatia holds European elections and Montenegro holds presidential elections. Serbia and Kosovo reach an agreement to normalise relations. In Albania, the withdrawal of the Socialist Movement for Integration from the government coalition opens a new political crisis. Turkey reforms its anti-terror laws. Cyprus accesses the EU and IMF financial bailout.
package. In Syria, the initiative to send a United Nations observer mission into the country to investigate the use of chemical weapons is rejected by Damascus and the NCSROF elects George Sabra as its new leader. The Lebanese Parliament elects Tamam Salam as its new Prime Minister. In Egypt a new political crisis opens over the judicial reform law. In the south of Algeria protests take place against the lack of measures to promote development in the area.

Portugal

- On 3 April the government wins a no-confidence vote tabled by the Socialist Party.
- On 4 April the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs Miguel Relvas resigns over irregularities detected in the way in which he obtained his university degree.
- On 5 April the Constitutional Court rejects the removal of the 14th salary, paid to public sector workers and pensioners, and cuts to unemployment and sickness benefits approved by the government. The ruling prompts the cabinet to approve new cuts amounting to 800 million euros on 18 April.
- On 25 April, on the commemoration of the Carnation Revolution, thousands of Portuguese protest against the austerity measures.

Spain

- On 5 April the Justice Minister announces that the Royal Family will be included in the Transparency Law, after the Noos corruption scandal that affected Princess Cristina de Borbon.
- On 25 April a thousand-strong crowd tries to surround the Parliament in protest against the austerity measures and the political elite.
- On 25 April the National Institute of Statistics publishes the unemployment figures for the third quarter of 2013, which reach an all-time high of 27.16% of the active population.

France

- On 15 April the government publishes the asset declarations of its 37 members in reaction to the Cahuzac scandal. On 16 April Cahuzac announced that he is giving up politics and his seat in the Parliament.
- On 21 April two demonstrations take place, one to defend and the other to reject the same-sex marriage bill, two days before its definitive approval in the National Assembly.
- On 26 April ETA members Mikel Karrera Sarobe and Saioa Sanchez are sentenced to life and 28 years’ imprisonment respectively for the murder of two Spanish civil guards in Capbreton in 2007.

Italy

- On 21 April Giorgio Napolitano is reelected President by a large parliamentary majority after five failed attempts to appoint other candidates. The Five Star Movement, whose candidate Stefano Rodota is unsuccessful, describes the reelection as a coup and calls for protests in Rome.
- On 26 April Domenico Trimboli “Pascal” Rodota, one of the most wanted ‘Ndrangheta members, is arrested in Colombia.
- On 27 April Enrico Letta, the PD vice-Secretary and Prime Minister – appointed by Giorgio Napolitano – succeeds in forming a coalition government. The nine ministers include Angelino Alfano as vice-President and Interior Minister, Fabrizio Saccamanni as Finance Minister, Emma Bonino as Foreign Minister, Anna Maria Cancellieri as Justice Minister and Cecile Kyenge as Minister for Integration.

Slovenia

- On 2 April Slovenia ratifies Croatia’s accession to the EU after a bilateral agreement reached on 6 February regarding compensation for Croatian citizens after the collapse of the Ljubljanska Banka in 1990.

Croatia

- On 7 April some 20,000 Croats protest in Zagreb against the introduction of the Cyrillic script in public spaces and areas where more than a third of the population is Serbian.
- On 14 April Croatia holds elections to elect its European MPs. Victory goes to the opposition conservative platform led by the HDZ with 32.86% of the votes – six seats. The coalition led by the governing Social Democratic Party (SDP) wins 32.07% of the votes – five seats –. The Labour Party takes the remaining seat.
- On 17 April the third corruption trial begins against the former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader in which the former Minister Petar Cobankovic and former MP Stjepan Fiolic also stand trial.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 2 April the Parliament of the Republika Srpska approves the issue of its own identity card after the ruling from the Federal Constitutional Court abolished the current federal law on the national identity card on the grounds that it did not include the correct names of the municipalities.
- On 15 April the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation invites Bosnia to become a full member.

Montenegro

- On 7 April Montenegro holds presidential elections in which Filip Vujanovic (Democratic Party of Socialists, DPS) wins for a third term with 51.21% of the votes against the 48.79% of Miodrag Lekic (Democratic Front, DF, conservative).
- On 15 April Montenegro closes the Education and Culture chapter in the EU accession negotiations.

Serbia

- On 10 April the former Environment Minister Oliver Dulic and Zoran Drobnjak, Director General of the state road maintenance company, are accused by the anti-corruption prosecutor’s office of abuse of authority over illegal concessions made to the Nuba Invest company.
- On 12 April thousands of demonstrators protest in Novi Sad against the separatist agenda of the governing coalition in Voivodina.

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 22 April the Serbian government approves the agreement reached on 19
April in Brussels to normalise relations between Belgrade and Pristina. The agreement determines the extent of the Kosovo Serbian municipalities’s autonomy and lays down the commitment not to block their respective European accession processes. Kosovo Serbs reject the agreement deeming it insufficient and decide to create a Regional Assembly, which is not mentioned in the agreement.

- On 29 April five Kosovo doctors are given sentences of up to eight years in prison by a court of the EU Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), in the illegal kidney-trafficking case uncovered in 2008.

FYROM

- On 7 April the VMRO-DPMNE wins in 16 municipalities, including Skopje, in the second round of the municipal elections. In the first round, on 24 March, it had already won in a further 25. On 15 April, at the request of the VMRO-DPMNE, the Administrative Court annuls the victory of two opposition candidates in Centar and Struga. The decision leads the magistrate Isamedin Limani to resign, citing a violation of the separation of powers.

Albania

- On 3 April the Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI) withdraws its three ministers from the coalition government to run in the June elections in coalition with the opposition Socialist Party. On 16 April a parliamentary majority approves the dismissal of Ilirjan Muho, a member of the Electoral Commission proposed by the LSI. On 16-17 April a further two members of the Commission resign in protest against the dismissal.

Greece

- On 4 April the Parliament passes a law to stimulate private investment. It includes the simplification and acceleration of administrative procedures and specific benefits for the tourism sector.
- On 16 April sailors and railway workers strike against the government’s austerity measures, a day after Athens and the troika reach an agreement to implement new cuts to allow the disbursement of the next aid tranche. The cuts include the public sector restructuring bill, adopted on 28 April by the Parliament, which foresees dismissals of 15,000 public sector workers by 2014.

Turkey

- On 11 April the Parliament passes the anti-terrorism law reform in line with ECHR regulations.
- On 25 April Murat Karayilan, military chief of the PKK, announces that the terrorist organisation will begin withdrawing from its bases in Iraq in May.

Cyprus

- On 2 April the Finance Minister Michael Sarris resigns. On 3 April the Labour Minister Harris Georgiades is appointed as the new Finance Minister and Zeta Emilianidou assumes the post of Labour Minister.
- On 19 April the Parliament approves a 21-million-euro economic stimulation plan to create more than 10,000 jobs.
- On 25 April Cyprus relaxes its restrictions on the movement of capital.
- On 30 April the Parliament approves the package of austerity measures demanded by the troika to access the 10-billion-euro financial bailout package authorised by the eurozone finance ministers on 12 April.

Syria

- On 8 April Damascus rejects the UN mission to investigate the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian conflict.
- On 9 April Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of the Iraqi branch of al-Qaeda, announces his fusion with the Salafi al-Nusra Front, integrated into the FSA under the name of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).
- On 23 April the NCSROF appoints George Sabra as the new leader to replace Moaz al-Khatab, who resigned in March.
- On 24 April the Syrian army takes control of the strategic town of Otaiba and blocks a major rebel supply route from Jordan. On 25 April the rebels attempt an offensive in Hama to support the militia fighting in the province, harassed by the Syrian army, which in recent months has made major advances in the control of the Lebanese border, the periphery of Damascus and areas in the north of Syria.
- On 29 April the Prime Minister Wael al-Halqi escapes an attack in Damascus unharmed.

Lebanon

- On 6 April Tammam Salam, the minister linked with Saad Hariri’s Future Movement, is appointed as the new Prime Minister thanks to the agreement reached two days previously between Saad Hariri and the Druze leader Walid Jumblatt. The appointment constitutes an attempt to pull the country out of the institutional deadlock, which makes it impossible to reach a political agreement to reform the election law.

Jordan

- On 10 April the second Syrian refugee camp comes into operation, funded by the United Arab Emirates, in Mrajeeb al-Fhoud.

Egypt

- On 6 April at least five people are killed in new clashes between Christians and Muslims in Khusus. On 7 April fighting breaks out during the funerals of the victims in Cairo.
- On 11 April the Shura Council (upper house) passes the new election law. The People’s Assembly will be composed of 546 seats, two thirds elected from party lists and a third reserved for independent candidates. Parties must include at least one woman, religious slogans and messages are permitted and Egypt is divided into 49 constituencies.
- On 13 April the trial against Hosni Mubarak is adjourned after the judge Mostafa Hassan Abdullah recuses himself from the case, citing embarrassment over the proceedings.
- On 21 April the Justice Minister Ahmed Mekki resigns a day before the Shura Council begins discussions about the judicial reform that foresees lowering the retirement age for judges from 70 to 60. The measure, which will affect around 3,000 judges, is seen by
the opposition and most judges as a way of Islamising the judiciary.

**Libya**
- On 8 April the Prime Minister Ali Zeidan’s advisor Mohamed Ali Ghatous is released, after being kidnapped in Tarjuna on 31 March.
- On 9 April Yahya Abdel Sayed, commander of Ansar al-Sharia is murdered in Sirte.
- On 15 April the Social Affairs Minister approves the fatwa issued by the Grand Mufti Sadeq al-Ghariani, which bans Libyans from marrying foreigners.
- On 23 April the French embassy in Tripoli is destroyed by a car bomb.

**Tunisia**
- On 11 April the police open fire on Salafi demonstrators attempting to storm a police station in Hergla.
- On 11 April Tunisia receives the first retrieval of the assets of former President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and his family held abroad, which amounts to 22 million euros.
- On 16 April a court sentences Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in absentia to five years in prison and to pay 3.5 million euros for corruption and abuse of power.
- On 16 April the Women’s Affairs Minister Sihem Badi survives a no-confidence vote over reports of her poor management of the rape case of a girl in a Tunisian nursery in March.

**Algeria**
- On 1 April several activists begin a hunger strike in Ghardaia to denounce the difficult living conditions of the population and demand the release of 17 demonstrators arrested during the protests on 26 March.
- On 3 April the governor of Medea Brahmi Merad survives an AQIM attack in Mezghena.
- On 7 April the government creates a committee of experts to draw up the draft bill to modify the current Constitution.
- On 13 April around 1,000 people demonstrate in Ghardaia to protest against the high levels of unemployment and the lack of measures taken for socio-economic development.

**Mauritania**
- On 3 April thousands of women march in Nouakchott to demand justice for Penda Sogue, the young woman who was raped, mutilated and murdered on 28 March.
- On 21 April Iribahi Mint Abdel Wedoud becomes the first woman to be appointed President of the National Human Rights Commission.

**European Union**
- On 24 April Switzerland limits the number of long-term residence permits issued to EU citizens, invoking the safeguard clause of the agreements signed with the Union on the free movement of people.
- On 26 April Croatia’s deputy Prime Minister Neven Mimica is appointed European Commissioner for Consumer Protection.

**May 2013**
**Portugal, Italy and Slovenia adopt new austerity and economic recovery measures. In Spain the Council of Ministers passes the controversial state education reform. In France there are protests against the government’s austerity policies and against the same-sex marriage law. In Bosnia, the President of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Zivko Budimir resumes his post and the ICTY sentences the former President of Bosnia’s old Croatian entity Jadranko Prlic to 25 years in prison. Rising levels of xenophobia are cause for alarm in Greece. The EU lifts its arms embargo on the Syrian opposition, and the US and Russia pledge to convene an international conference on Syria. In Egypt, the crisis intensifies between the President and the judiciary. In Libya, the Parliament approves the Isolation Law. In Tunisia, political parties reach an agreement in principle on the future political system. In Morocco, Mohammed VI intervenes to avoid the breakup of the coalition government.**

**Italy**
- On 6 May the seven-time Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti dies in Rome.
- On 8 May the Milan Appeals Court confirms the four-year jail sentence handed down in October 2012 to Silvio Berlusconi in the Mediaset case. The
appeal against the ruling transfers the case to the Supreme Court.

• On 17 May the government adopts a decree-law with new anti-crisis measures, which include the suspension of property tax pending an overall redesign of the Italian taxation system and an end to extra salaries to ministers, deputy ministers and under-secretaries.

• On 27 May the trial begins in a court in Palermo to investigate whether or not the Italian State collaborated with the Mafia to stop the wave of mafia-related violence that shook Italy in the nineties.

Malta

• On 18 May Valletta is designated European Capital of Culture for 2018.

Slovenia

• On 9 May the government adopts a plan to repair the public finances, which includes the reform of the banking sector, a VAT hike, a property and real estate tax and the privatisation of state-owned companies.

• On 20 May the government and the state trade unions reach an agreement to lower the public debt through salary cuts.

• On 24 May the Parliament approves amendments to the Constitution which include tighter laws on calling a national referendum and applying the budgetary Golden rule, which from 2015 will limit the public indebtedness.

Croatia

• On 23 May a court in Zagreb clears the former commander of the Pumas Brigade Tihomir Savoric of murdering four Bosnian Serb civilians in Mrkonjik Grad in 1995.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

• On 17 May the Court of Brcko sentences Monika Karan-Ilic to four years in prison for torture in Luka during the Bosnian War.

• On 23 May the European Parliament decides not to suspend Bosnia as member of the Council of Europe and not to freeze its access to European funds despite the lack of progress in implementing the ECHR’s ruling in 2009 in the Sejdic-Finci case.

• On 27 May the President of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Zivko Budimir resumes his duties. Arrested on 26 April charged with taking bribes, Budimir was freed on 24 May at the request of a Constitutional Court ruling.

• On 29 May the ICTY sentences the former President of Bosnia’s former Croatian State Jadranko Prlic to 25 years in prison for ethnic cleansing between 1992 and 1993.

• On 30 May the federal government passes the electoral law reform and the law that establishes the Foreign Trade Chamber. Both form part of the agreement undersigned in October 2012 between the ruling Social Democratic Party and the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats and receive criticism from the opposition parties, which claim they undermine the authority of federal institutions.

• On 30 May in Sarajevo some 5,000 workers from the Hidrogradnja hydroelectric plant demand improvements in wages and working conditions.

Serbia

• On 30 May the ICTY acquits the former Chief of State Security Jovica Stanisic and commander of the Interior Ministry’s special operations unit Franko Simatovic of war crimes and the forced deportation of Croats and Bosnians from Bosnia between 1991 and 1995.

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244

• On 23 May the former head of the anti-corruption task force Nazmi Mustafi is sentenced to five years in prison and fined 10,000 euros for extortion and the illegal possession of a firearm.

• On 27 May thousands of people protest in Pristina against the arrest of seven former guerrillas of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) accused of war crimes.

FYROM

• On 14 May the Appeals Court confirms the five-year prison sentence for the former Interior Minister Ljube Boskoski for the illegal funding of his party United for Macedonia.

• On 28 May the Lustration Commission announces the opening of an investigation of the former Police Minister Ljubomir Frckovski to clarify whether or not he ordered investigations for ideological reasons.

• On 28 May the Labour Minister Spiro Ristovski is named Education Minister following the resignation of Pance Kralev. Dime Spasov will replace Ristovski in the Labour Ministry. Another noteworthy change is the appointment of Dzeri Naumov as Minister without Portfolio, in charge of attracting foreign investment.

• On 29 May the President George Ivanov cancels the summit of the South-East European Cooperation Process, scheduled for 1-2 June in Ohrid, after Croatia and Albania boycott the summit in reaction to Kosovo’s exclusion, vetoed by Serbia, Greece, Romania, Bosnia and Moldavia.

Albania

• On 30 May the Parliament passes reform laws of the Public Administration, the Supreme Court and the Parliament, demanded by the EU for Albania to obtain candidate status for EU accession.

Greece

• On 13 May the publication of photos of a young Afghan brutally beaten in Athens by a group of xenophobes heightens concerns of rising racism in Greece. The incident adds to that which occurred on 18 April when 30 Bengali labourers were shot at after requesting months of unpaid salaries.

• On 30 May ND rejects the approval of an anti-racist law presented by the Justice Minister Antonis Roupakiotis, from the Democratic Left (Dimar). The decision, supposedly taken to avoid racists being turned into martyrs, opens a new rift in the government coalition.

• On 31 May the eurozone transfers 7.2 billion euros to recapitalise the Greek banks and the IMF announces the release of a further 1.7 billion euros.

Turkey

• On 12 May nine Turkish citizens are arrested for the previous day’s bomb
On 5 May the National Congress (Parliament), under pressure from the armed militia still operating in Libya, approves the Political Isolation Law that prohibits members of the Gaddafi regime to serve in the administration.

On 7 May the Defence Minister Mahmoud al-Barghati decides, at the request of the Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, to withdraw his resignation from the cabinet, presented hours before due to the growing pressure from anti-Gaddafi militia.

On 26 May the Parliament appoints Khalifa al-Sheik the new Interior Minister to replace Ashour Shuail, who resigned citing personal reasons.

On 28 May the President of the National Congress Mohamed Yousef al-Magariaf resigns in protest against the Isolation Law.

The formation of a left-wing alliance.

On 4 May Rachid al-Ghannouchi, the Ennahda leader, announces the agreement reached on the future political system, within the framework of National Dialogue.

On 19 May thousands of supporters of Ansar al-Sharia demonstrate against the government for banning the movement’s third congress in Kairouan.

On 19 May Amina Tyler, member of the Femen collective, who in March published nude protest photographs of herself, is arrested in Kairouan for “committing immoral acts” after painting the word “Femen” on the wall of a mosque.
Member States to sign the International Arms Trade Treaty.
• On 13 May the European Council
  held its regular meeting in Brussels. 
  On 6 June and the ensuing days, 
  the EU gives the green light to begin accession negotiations with Serbia.
• On 28 June the Interior Minister or the former PP treasurer 
  Silvio Berlusconi is sentenced by the Milan Court of first instance to a further seven years in jail and a ban from holding public office in the Rubygate case.

June 2013

In Portugal there is a general strike. In Spain the former treasurer of the ruling party is jailed. The French government adopts measures against the rise in neo-Nazi movements. In Italy local elections are held, the Equal Opportunities Minister resigns and Silvio Berlusconi is convicted in the Mediaset and Rubygate cases. The former Slovenian Prime Minister Janez Jansa is convicted for corruption. In Bosnia, demonstrations continue over the freezing of parliamentary negotiations on the national identity card. The EU authorises the beginning of accession negotiations with Serbia and Kosovo to reach an agreement on accession and stabilisation.

In Greece, the closure of the state broadcaster opens a crisis in the government coalition. In Turkey, citizen protests erupt against the AKP. In Syria, the army advances in its offensive to take back control of the country. In Egypt, the controversial appointments of Islamist governors aggravate the climate of political polarisation.

In Libya, the government fights to strengthen control over its internal security, the army Chief-of-staff resigns and Cyrenaica advances towards self-government.

Portugal

• On 7 June Parliament rectifies the general budgets with fresh cuts to compensate for those that were rejected by the Constitutional Court in April.

Spain

• On 26 June around a hundred sub-Saharan migrants enter Melilla after storming the border fence.

June 2013

France

• On 4 June the National Liberation Front of Corsica announces it will take up arms again to force France to recognise “Corsicans’ national rights.” The announcement comes three days after the eleventh mafia murder in Corsica together with clashes in Bastia between separatists and police.

Italy

• On 8-9 June the second round of the local elections confirms victory for the centre-left in the major cities, an eventuality already predicted from the first round -25-6 May.

Slovenia

• On 5 June the former Prime Minister Janez Jansa is sentenced to two years in prison for accepting bribes in 2006.

Croacia

• On 19 June Croatia and Bosnia sign an agreement on the management of their common border.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

• On 2 June Croatia holds the second round of its local elections, the first of which was held on 19 May. The results give victory to the conservative HDZ, which wins in 10 out of 21 counties and claims mayoralties such as Zagreb and Zadar. The socialists maintain Rijeka and Vukovar and win Split.

Serbia

• On 20 June the government announces new austerity measures in the public sector to save 270 million euros.

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244

• On 7 June the Pristina court convicts three former UÇK guerrillas for war crimes in Likovc/Likovac in 1998 and 1999.

Malta

• On 10 June the Maltese police conclude that there is not sufficient evidence to incriminate the former European Commissioner for Health John Dalli, who resigned in October 2012 after being implicated in a corruption scandal.

Slovenia

• On 5 June the former Prime Minister Janez Jansa is sentenced to two years in prison for accepting bribes in 2006.

• On 21 June the Parliament approves 15 privatisations to avoid a European bailout.
Healthcare Minister, is cleared in a corruption case.
• On 19 June Lulzim Peci, Kosovo’s liaison officer to Serbia, resigns two days after his appointment. The Kosovo representative in Croatia Valdet Sadiku replaces Peci.
• On 28 June the Parliament ratifies the agreement reached with Serbia to normalise bilateral relations with 84 votes against three.
• On 28 June the EU authorises the negotiation of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo.

FYROM
• On 10 June the parliamentary majority of the VMRO-DPMNE passes the controversial Abortion Law, which has been the object of protests outside the Parliament.
• On 25 June the FYROM and Kosovo sign an agreement to open a new Beranovce-Stancic border crossing, putting an end to the diplomatic incident that arose in May when Pristina submitted a formal complaint to Skopje for not having invited Kosovo to the South-East European Cooperation Process summit in Ohrid.

Albania
• On 23 June Albania holds legislative elections. The left-wing coalition led by Edi Rama’s PS wins with 57.7% of the votes against the 39.9% won by the centre-right coalition, led by Sali Berisha’s DP, who announces his resignation as party leader.

Greece
• On 11 June the government announces the closure of the Greek state broadcaster ERT due to excessive debt and lack of transparency. On 13 June thousands protest over the closure of ERT. On 17 June the Council of State suspends the closure. On 21 June DIMAR leaves the government coalition over the failure of negotiations with ND and PASOK to avoid the closure of ERT. On 24 June Antonis Samaras reshuffles the cabinet and PASOK takes over the ministries previously held by DIMAR.

Turkey
• On 1 June mass protests erupt in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir calling for the government’s resignation. The EU criticises the disproportionate use of force to quell protests against plans to redevelop Istanbul’s Gezi Park and which continue throughout the month leaving hundreds injured and thousands under arrest. On 4-5 June the main trade unions and professional organisations stage a strike. On 6 June Erdogan, returning from his tour of the Maghreb, confirms that redevelopment plans will go ahead. On 9 June mass demonstrations against and in favour of the Prime Minister reveal the growing divide between secularists and Islamists. On 14 June, after a meeting with representatives of the demonstrations, the government halts the redevelopment plans pending a court ruling. On 17 June there is a new strike. On 25 June in response to the repression of the protests, the EU freezes accession negotiations.

Syria
• On 5 June the army takes control of al-Qusayr after a three-week offensive.
• On 10 June the army launches Operation Northern Storm on Aleppo. For its part, the FSA takes control of the Menagh Military Airbase, after more than a year under siege.
• On 15 June Egypt breaks diplomatic ties with Damascus and requests that a no-fly zone be declared over Syria.
• On 16 June the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad authorises the deployment of 4,000 troops in Syria.
• On 17 June the G8 summit in Enniskillen approves an additional 1.5 billion dollars in humanitarian aid to Syria and the US and Russian Presidents agree to continue working to organise the Geneva II Peace Conference.
• On 19 June the UNHCR reports that the number of people displaced as a result of the Syrian conflict -1.5 million- is already equal to the global figure in 2012.

Lebanon
• On 2-3 June Hezbollah militants and opponents of the Syrian regime clash in Baalbek and Tripoli.
• On 9 June a Lebanese man is killed in a protest outside the Iranian Embassy in Beirut against Tehran’s support of the Syrian regime.

Jordan
• On 9 June the US army begins military exercises in Jordan with the deployment of 4,500 troops.

Egypt
• On 2 June the Constitutional Court outlaws the Constituent Assembly, responsible for the Constitution approved in December 2012, and the Shura Council, which has held legislative power since the People’s Assembly was banned in June 2012. The controversial reform of the judiciary is thereby frozen, which was under discussion in the Shura.
• On 4 June a criminal court in Cairo sentences 43 employees of four foreign NGOs, 19 of them from the US, to prison terms of between one and five years for illegal fundraising and operating without a license.
• On 16 June Mohamed Morsi appoints 17 new provincial governors with Islamist ideology.
• On 16 June a Misdemeanour court in east Cairo sentences the Salafi cleric Ahmed Abdullah to 11 years in prison for burning a bible outside the US Embassy and his son Islam Abdullah to eight years in prison for blasphemy against Christianity.
• On 18 June the Tourism Minister Hisham Zaazou resigns in protest against the appointment of Adel Mohamed al-Khayyat, associated with the Gamaa Islamiya terrorist group, as the new Luxor governor.
• On 21 June thousands of Islamists support Mohamed Morsi in a demonstration in Cairo, in response to calls from the opposition for his resignation. The Salafy party Al-Nour abstains from taking part.
• On 26, 27 and 30 June clashes break out between government supporters and
on 13 June a Tunisian court sentences the rapper Ala Yaacoub to two years in prison for his song The Police are Dogs.
• On 18 June Ennahda and another six associated parties walk out of the National Conference Against Violence and Terrorism in which 70 parties and 300 civil society groups take part, deeming the debates to be excessively partisan.
• On 25 June the Chief-of-Staff of the Tunisian Armed Forces Rachid Ammar resigns.

Libya
• On 1 June Ahmed Zubeir al-Senussi, President of the Cyrenaica Transitional Council, declares the region’s self-governance.
• On 9 June army Chief-of-Staff Yousef al-Mangoush resigns following clashes in Benghazi the previous day, in which at least 31 people were killed during a demonstration calling for the dissolution of the Libya Shield Brigade.
• On 17 June the Attorney General announces that Saif al-Islam Gaddafi will be tried in Libya along with other senior officials from the Gaddafi regime, despite the International Criminal Court’s rejection on 31 May of Libya’s appeal for Saif al-Islam to be tried by the Libyan judicial system and not the High Court.
• On 25 June Nouri Ali Abu Sahmein is elected President of the National Congress to replace Mohamed Magariaf.
• On 25 and 26 June clashes break out in Tripoli between rival factions, in which at least 10 people are killed and a further 117 injured. The incidents arise following an assault led by the pro-government Zintan militia, working in the Defence Ministry, on the headquarters of the national body set up to guard oil facilities, in protest over the government’s decision to hand control of security of the oil facilities in the south of the country over to Tubu and Tuareg militia.

Tunisia
• On 5 June the trial is held against three activists from the feminist Femen movement arrested on 29 May while protesting against the trial of Amina Tyler. They are released on 26 June.
• On 6 June two soldiers are killed in Jebel Chaambi during an operation launched against Ansar al-Sharia at the end of April, and which ends in more than 40 arrests.
• On 13 June a Tunisian court sentences the rapper Ala Yaacoub to two years in prison for his song The Police are Dogs.
• On 18 June Ennahda and another six associated parties walk out of the National Conference Against Violence and Terrorism in which 70 parties and 300 civil society groups take part, deeming the debates to be excessively partisan.
• On 25 June the Chief-of-Staff of the Tunisian Armed Forces Rachid Ammar resigns.

Algeria
• On 12 June the APS agency releases the first images of the President Abdelaziz Bouteflika convalescing, since he was admitted to hospital in Paris on 27 April after suffering a mini stroke.

Mauritania
• On 20 June the Council of Ministers approves tougher penalties for money laundering and funding terrorism, with prison sentences doubling from 5 to 10 years.

European Union
• On 14 June the Council approves the agreement concluded with the Parliament on 29 May 2013 on Eurosur, the surveillance system of the EU’s external borders.
• On 27-28 June the European Council adopts measures to favour employment, professional mobility, access to credit, investment and financial stability.

Arab League
• On 5 June the Arab League condemns the presence of foreign military forces in Syria.

July 2013

In Portugal the government coalition enters in crisis. In Spain, the government approves the reform of local government. In Italy, the Interior Minister wins a confidence vote. Croatia becomes an EU Member State. New strikes are staged in Greece against government cuts. In Turkey, the anti-government protests continue. In Syria, the army continues its advance to recover control of Homs province supported by the Shiite Hezbollah militia, whose armed wing is now included in the EU list of terrorist organisations. In Egypt, the growing division between supporters and opponents of Islamist Mohamed Morsi ends with his ousting at the hands of the army and the appointment of a new interim government. Libya approves the Constitutional Commission that has to draw up the new constitution. In Tunisia, protests are stepped up against the Islamist government, especially in the wake of the murder of Mohamed al-Brahimi. Morocco enters a new crisis in the government coalition.

Portugal
• On 2 July the Foreign Minister Paulo Portas resigns over the appointment of Maria Luis Albuquerque to replace the Finance Minister Vitor Gaspar, who resigned on 1 July after Portas’ Democratic and Social Centre–People’s Party (CDS-PP), criticised his austerity plans. On 19 July the cabinet wins a fifth confidence motion. On 24 July Paulo Portas becomes deputy Prime Minister and head of Economic and State Reform, Rui Machete (PSD) becomes Foreign Minister and Antonio Pires de Lima and Pedro Mota Soares (CDS-PP) take over, respectively, at the Economy and Social Security and Employment Ministries.

Spain
• On 2 July the former Public Works Minister Magdalena Alvarez and 20 officials from the Government of Andalusia are charged in the ERE corruption case, which affects PSOE.
• On 24 July the Interior Minister announces investments in security in Ceuta and Melilla in light of an increase in assaults on the border.
• On 26 July the government approves the local government reform bill, which is aimed at streamlining the structure of local governments to avoid overlaps and save over 7 billion euros.

France
• On 9 July the National Assembly approves two draft laws aimed at limiting
the number of public posts that can be held by MPs and senators.

Italy

- On 16 July Giuseppe Procaccini, the chief of staff of Interior Minister Angelino Alfano, resigns over the illegal deportation in May of the wife and daughter of the Kazakh dissident Mukhtar Ablyazov. On 19 July Alfano wins a confidence vote tabled for the case.
- On 26 July around a hundred people are arrested in Rome and Calabria in an operation against the Fasciani, Triassi and D’Agati clans of the Ndrangheta Mafia.
- On 27-28 July a total of 536 immigrants are intercepted in Palermo, the Strait of Sicily and Lampedusa. In Lampedusa a further 31 immigrants die when their boat capsizes.

Malta

- On 4 July some 290 immigrants are intercepted by the Maltese coastguard, adding to the 100 intercepted by Italy near Siracusa.

Slovenia

- On 24 July the deadline for claiming government compensation runs out for the “erased,” Yugoslav citizens who were unable to obtain Slovenian citizenship after independence and therefore remain without legal status.

Croatia

- On 1 July Croatia becomes the 28th EU Member State.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 9 July the ICTY annuls the acquittal of Radovan Karadzic, entered in June 2012, accused of genocide in various Bosnian regions. This case will now be added to the charges held against him for the Srebrenica massacre.
- On 10 July 409 victims of Srebrenica are buried at the Potocari Memorial Centre.
- On 19 July the Bosnian MP Semsudin Mehmedovic is arrested for crimes against Bosnian Serbs during the Bosnian War.

Montenegro

- On 29 July the Constitutional Court overturns the agreement between the government and the Democratic Front to give the Serbian and Montenegrin languages equal status in the education system.

Serbia

- On 17 July the Interior Minister Ivica Dacic fires the commander of the gendarmerie Bratislav Djikic.
- On 29 July the ECtHR demands that Serbia looks into thousands of reports of babies who went missing from Yugoslav hospitals in the seventies.

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 11 July the Parliament approves the controversial Amnesty Law that grants amnesty to a large number of crimes committed during the Kosovo conflict.
- On 17 July the Prime Minister Hashim Thaci announces the end of parallel police structures in northern Kosovo.
- On 29 July clashes break out between the EULEX and Kosovo Serb demonstrators in Zvecan.

FYROM

- On 15 July the Criminal Court of Skopje sentences the former Interior Minister Ljube Boskoski to 12 years in prison for covering up mafia crimes in 2001.
- On 17 July the Lustration Commission accuses the writer Bozin Pavlovski of spying for the secret police of communist Yugoslavia, days after another well-known intellectual, Slavko Janevski, suffers the same fate.
- On 25 June the OSCE condemns the pre-trial detention of Tomislav Kezaroski, arrested on 28 May in connection with an article published in 2008.

Albania

- On 23 July the Mayor of Tirana Lu?zim Basha takes over from Sali Berisha at the head of the DPS.

Greece

- On 2 July a day after his appointment, the Health Minister Adonis Georgiadis reinds the controversial Public Health Decree 39A, which allows the police to forcibly arrest people to carry out HIV tests.
- On 10 July the Ministry of Public Radio and Television announces that the state television company will resume broadcasting.
- On 15 July the Parliament lifts immunity from the former Finance Minister George Papaconstantinou over his responsibility in falsifying the Lagarde List.
- On 15 July protests begin against the government’s pending public sector reform, which includes 4,000 direct dismissals, 25% wage cuts for 25,000 public sector workers and widespread layoffs.
- On 29 July the release of the fifth aid tranche -1.72 billion euros- of the Greek bailout package is announced.

Turkey

- On 6 June new clashes erupt between the police and anti-government demonstrators in Gezi Park, which continue throughout the month.

Cyprus

- On 9 July the former Defence Minister Costas Papacostas is found guilty of manslaughter over the blast at a munitions deposit in Larnaca, which left 13 dead in July 2011.
- On 28 July Northern Cyprus holds early legislative elections in which the Republican Turkish Party (left-wing) wins with 38.4% of the votes, ahead of the conservative National Unity Party (27.3%), which held the majority until now.

Syria

- On 6 July the NCSROF elects Ahmad al-Jarba as its new leader.
• On 12 July the FSA announces that it views the commander Kamal Hama- 
mi’s murder two days earlier, at the hands of the al-Qaeda-linked ISIL, as a 
declaration of war.
• On 29 July the army, supported by Hezbollah, takes back control of Kha-
liya, the main rebel base in Homs.
• On 30 July Issa Hisso, leader of the Kurdish Democratic Unity Party (PYD) 
is murdered in Qamishli.

Lebanon

• On 9 July a car bomb blast in Bir al-Abed, a Hezbollah-controlled neigh-
bourhood in south Beirut, leaves at least fifty injured.
• On 22 July the EU includes Hezbollah’s armed wing in its list of terrorist 
organisations.

Jordan

• On 7 July Abu Qatada, leader of al-Qaeda in Europe, arrives in Amman, 
xtradited from the United Kingdom to be tried before the State Security Court.

Egypt

• On 1 July hundreds of demonstra-
tors, the majority from the Tamarrod 
movement, gather in Tahrir Square to 
call for the resignation of Mohamed 
Morsi.
• On 2 July the army gives Morsi a 48-
hour ultimatum to comply with popular 
demands.
• On 2 July the Foreign Minister Mo-
hammed Kamel Amr resigns. This is the 
fifth ministerial resignation since the 
protests began in June.
• On 3 July the Defence Minister Abdul 
Fattah al-Sisi meets with Mohamed El-
Baradei (NSF), Mahmoud Badr (Tama-
rrod), Tawadros II (Coptic patriarch) 
Ahmed al-Tayyeb (Al-Azhar Grand 
Sheikh) and a representative from al-
Nour. At 17:00 the ultimatum runs out, 
the army takes control of the country, 
Mohamed Morsi is arrested and the 
Constitution is suspended.
• On 4 July Adly Mansour, President of 
the Constitutional Court, is declared inter-
im President.
• On 5 July the army declares a State 
of Emergency in the Sinai and Suez after 
a rise in bomb attacks, which continue 
throughout the month.
• On 6 July Adly Mansour dissolves 
the Shura Council and appoints 
Mohamed Ahmed Fareed head of the intel-
ligence service.
• On 6 July Khairat el-Shater, the num-
ber two in the Muslim Brotherhood, is 
arrested in Nasr City.
• On 8 July the Public Prosecutor or-
ders the closure of the Freedom and 
Justice Party headquarters.
• On 8 July Adly Mansour adopts a 
Constitutional Declaration that provides 
for a review of the Constitution by two 
committees of experts. It will then be put 
to a national referendum before the par-
liamentary and presidential elections are 
held in 2014.
• On 9 July Hazem Al Beblawi is ap-
pointed Prime Minister and Mohamed 
ElBaradei vice-President and Foreign 
Minister.
• On 9-10 July Saudi Arabia, United 
Arab Emirates and Kuwait announce aid 
of 5, 3 and 4 billion dollars respectively 
for the new government.
• On 10 July the Public Prosecutor or-
ders the arrest of the Muslim Brother-
hood’s spiritual guide Mohamed Badie, 
the Freedom and Justice Party’s vice-
President Essam el-Erian and a further 
seven members of the organisation, as 
well as two leaders of the Building and 
Development Party – the political wing 
of al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya –.
• On 12 July Ziad Bahaa Eldin is ap-
pointed deputy Prime Minister.
• On 15-16 July violent clashes break 
out near the 6th October Bridge in 
Cairo between Islamist demonstrators 
and security forces, in which at least 
261 are killed, 261 injured and 400 
arrested.
• On 16 July the composition of the 
new cabinet is announced, which does 
not include any Islamists. Abdul Fattah 
al-Sisi, Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces and Defence Minister 
also assumes one of the three vice-
presidencies, the other two being given 
by the International Cooperation Minister 
Ziad Bahaa el-Din and the Higher Edu-
cation Minister Hossam Eisa. The other 35 
ministerial positions include Nabil 
Fahmy (Foreign Affairs); Ahmed Galal 
(Finance); Mohamed Ibrahim (Interior); 
Hisham Zaazou (Tourism); Mounir 
Fakhry Abdel Nour (Industry and For-
eign Trade); Osama Saleh (Investment); 
Mohamed Ibrahim (Antiquities); and 
three women at the head of Information, 
Health and Environment: Dorreya Sharaf 
El-Din, Maha Al-Rabat and Laila Rashed 
Iskander.
• On 26 July a court in Cairo accuses 
Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Broth-
ernood of conspiring with Hamas, Hez-
bolah and the Bedouin militia from the 
Sinai against the security forces, after 
allowing jihadists to enter Egypt and 
organising the mass flight of Islamist 
prisoners, mainly in Wadi el-Natrum, 
from where 11,171 prisoners escaped 
in January 2011, including Morsi himself.

Libya

• On 16 July Air Force Colonel Fathi 
al-Ammami is murdered in Derna.
• On 16 July the National Congress 
approves the creation of the Constitu-
tional Drafting Commission, composed 
of 20 members from Tripolitania, Cyre-
aica and Faizan respectively. Within 
this group, the minority Tuareg and Tubu 
groups have two seats respectively, but 
their members boycott the commission 
and suspend their parliamentary par-
ticipation, claiming that the approval 
criteria of the articles of the Constitution – majority and not by consensus – do 
not guarantee minority rights.
• On 22 July Salem Abu Rouis, mem-
ber of Muammar Gaddafi’s internal se-
curity apparatus in Misrata, is murdered. 
Since the beginning of Ramadan, 14 
officials linked to the Gaddafi regime 
are murdered.
• On 27 July demonstrations in Tripol-
ili and Benghazi denounce the previous 
day’s murder of activist Abdelsalam al-
Mismari in Benghazi, and storm the 
headquarters of the Justice and Devel-
opment Party – the political wing of the 
Muslim Brotherhood –.

Tunisia

• On 9 July General Mohamed Salah 
Hamdi is appointed the new Chief-of-
Staff of the Armed Forces.
• On 25 July Mohamed Brahmi, the 
former Secretary General of the Peo-
ple’s Movement (left-wing) is murdered, 
three days after stepping down from the
post to join the Popular Front, after his party refused to join the Alliance with Ennahda. Thousands of people demonstrate in protest against the murder and the government.

- On 29 July the Prime Minister Ali Laarayedh announces elections in Tunisia for 17 December.
- On 29 July at least eight soldiers are killed in an AQIM ambush on Mount Chaambi.
- On 31 July the Education Minister Salim Labiadh resigns.

Algeria

- On 16 July the President Abdelaziz Bouteflika returns to Algeria after being in hospital in Paris since 27 April.

Morocco

- On 9 July the Istiqal ministers resign citing a lack of agreement with the Freedom and Justice Party.
- On 24 July months of negotiations come to an end between the government, trade unionists and employers to introduce unemployment benefits in 2014.

European Union

- On 1 July the President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz asks the US to confirm information published by Der Spiegel taken from documents leaked by the fugitive and ex-CIA employee Edward Snowden, which reveal that Washington was spying on the EU.
- On 3 July Emily O’Reilly is elected European Ombudsman.
- On 17 July the European Council approves the 2014 budget: 141.8 billion euros in commitments and 134.8 billion in payments, a 6% reduction on the Commission’s proposal.

August 2013

Portugal emerges from the recession. Italy faces a mass influx of immigrants; Silvio Berlusconi receives an irrevocable conviction from the Supreme Court. Serbia reshuffles its cabinet. Serbia and Kosovo reach an agreement to set up permanent border crossings, while the Kosovo Serbs announce they will boycott the municipal elections in November. Greece enters its fifth year of recession. Turkey convicts 250 people over the Ergenekon coup plot. In Syria, the army continues to advance in Hama and Rif Dimashq, while the US announces a one-off military intervention in response to the possible use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime. In neighbouring Lebanon, a new attack on a Hezbollah stronghold in Beirut shows the importance of supporting the Lebanese Shiite militia in the advance of Syrian troops on FSA troops. Jordan reshuffles its cabinet. In Egypt, the political and social crisis deepens, sparked by the ousting of Mohamed Morsi on 3 July, and the international community fears that failure to reach an agreement between the two sides will lead to armed conflict. Also in Tunisia, tensions rise between Islamists and the opposition following the assassinations of two opponents in July. In Libya, tensions grow between nationalists from Cyrenaica and the oil workers who maintain a block on oil exports. Mauritania announces elections for October.

Portugal

- On 16 August according to the financial report for the year’s second quarter published by the European statistics office (Eurostat), Portugal emerges from the recession with a growth rate of 1.1% during that period.

Spain

- On 13-14 August the Secretary General of the PP Maria Dolores de Cospedal and her predecessors, Javier Arenas and Francisco Alvarez Cascos deny having received illegal payments before the National Court, in the investigation of the Barcenas Case, which affects the ruling party.

France

- On 19 August a young man is shot dead in Marseille. This is the 13th time the Mafia has settled accounts in the city in the last year.

Italy

- On 1 August the Supreme Court confirms the four-year jail sentence given to Silvio Berlusconi for tax fraud, although the former Prime Minister will not be jailed as he is over 70 years old. On 28 August Berlusconi announces that he will appeal to the ECHR against the decision.
- On 15 August Italy asks the EU to adapt a collective approach to controlling immigration in Lampedusa, faced with an increase in arrivals – over a thousand in August alone.
- On 8 August the government approves a law decree that provides for harsher penalties for gender-based violence.
- On 8 August the mafia boss Domenico Rancadore is captured in London, charged with various crimes between 1987 and 1995 and wanted by the Italian police since 1994.
- On 28 August the Council of Ministers suspends the property tax, under threat of a PDl withdrawal from the government coalition, and announces fresh cuts to compensate its removal.

Slovenia

- On 25 August the European Commission opens an investigation into the government’s plans to fund a project for a Renault plant in Novo Mesto.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 15 August Israel extradites the Bosnian-Israeli Aleksandar Cvetkovic to Bosnia-Herzegovina, charged with genocide in Srebrenica.
- On 30 August thousands gather in Pale, Republika Srpska, to greet the war criminal Momo Kajsernik after his release.

Montenegro

- On 9 August the Albanian parties FORCA and Civic Initiatives threaten to quit the government coalition if a referendum is not called before the autumn on splitting the Podgorica municipality of Tuzi from the capital. The split would create a new electoral constituency, whose voting intentions may not be favourable to the ruling party.

Serbia

- On 1 August the Yugoslavian flagged airline Jugoslovenski Aerotransport
(JAT) ceases to exist and is replaced by Air Serbia, owned by the Serbian government -51%- and the Emirati Etihad Airways -49%-.

• On 7 August, for the first time in 10 years, the government approves a financial package to ensure the viability of its two state television broadcasters RTS and RTV, both of which suffer revenue shortfalls.

• On 29 August after two months of negotiations between socialists and progressives, the coalition cabinet is restructured with 11 new ministries.

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244

• On 16 August despite pressure from Serbia, the Interim Assembly of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo-Metohija votes unanimously in favour of boycotting Kosovo’s local elections in November.

• On 7 August Serbia and Kosovo agree on the creation of permanent border checkpoints from 2014.

FYROM

• On 25 August the social democrat opposition rejects the government’s offer of early elections to settle the political crisis arising from the incidents in December 2012 during the approval of the 2013 budgets.

• On 25 August Albanians from Oktisi protest against the construction of the Saint Demetrius church, fuelling ethnic tensions in the area.

• On 29 August the police report the arrest of a seventh person accused of murdering five ethnic Macedonians, which, in April 2012, inflamed ethnic tensions in the country.

Albania

• On 15 August the decision of President Bujar Nishani to transfer the property of the old army headquarters to the opposition Democratic Party for the party’s new headquarters opens a crisis between the army and the ruling Socialist Party.

Greece

• On 8 August the Greek Statistics Agency (Elstat) announces unemployment figures for May, which reach record levels of 27.6%, compared with 12% in May 2010, when the country was bailed out by the EU and IMF. On 12 August the GDP figures are released for the second quarter, which show a 4.6% decline compared with the same period in 2012, coinciding with Greece’s entry into its fifth consecutive year of recession.

Turkey

• On 5 August more than 250 people are given sentences of between two and 49 years in prison in the Ergenekon coup plot, uncovered in 2007. A further 15 defendants are given life sentences, including the former Chief of the General Staff Ilker Basbug. Clashes break out in the vicinity of the court following the announcement of the verdicts.

Syria

• On 7 August 62 FSA militants are killed in an army ambush in Adra, near Damascus, as part of the regime’s preparations to launch an offensive on the capital and surrounding areas.

• On 13 August 18 FSA members are killed in fighting with the Syrian army in Hama, the control of which, along with Rif Damascus, is the next objective of the government troops in their advance to recover control of the country.

• On 18 August the UN mission set up to investigate the use of chemical weapons in Syria arrives in the country. The mission on the ground is completed on 31 August.

• On 21 August at least 1,300 people are killed in an army attack in Gougha, near Damascus. The rebels declare that the attack was carried out with chemical weapons.

• On 31 August the US confirms that it will launch a one-off attack on the Syrian regime in response to the use of chemical weapons.

Lebanon

• On 9 August a group calling itself the Imam al-Ridha Visitors kidnap two Turkish Airlines pilots in Beirut to demand the immediate release of a group of Lebanese Shiite pilgrims kidnapped in 2012 in Syria.

• On 16 August a bomb explodes in Beirut’s Ruweiss district, in the Hezbollah stronghold of Dahiyeh. The Brigades of Aisha claim responsibility for the attack which leaves 22 dead and 325 injured.

• On 23 August more than 40 people are killed in a double bomb attack in two mosques in Tripoli.

Jordan

• On 13 August Jordan denies allegations made by the UNHCR declaring there is no organised crime in the Zaatari camp, which accommodates more than 130,000 Syria refugees.

• On 21 August Abdullah II approves Abdullah Ensour’s government reshuffle, which sees five ministerial changes and the creation of eight new ministries.

Egypt

• On 7 August the Egyptian presidency declares that the international diplomatic talks aimed at putting an end to the protest camps against the ousting of Mohamed Morsi are over and issues an ultimatum to the Islamists for them to stop the protests. Coinciding with the announcement, Morsi supporters reiterate their refusal to leave the protest camps and organise new demonstrations.

• On 7 and 9 August the army launches anti-terrorism operations in the Sinai, which claim the lives of at least 64 militants. The fundamentalist group Ansar Beit al-Maqdis attributes the attacks to a combined Egyptian-Israeli operation and threatens retaliation.

• On 13 August the interim government replaces at least 18 of the Islamist provincial governors appointed by Mohamed Morsi.

• On 14 August the police intervene to remove the Islamist demonstrators. At least 638 people are killed. The government declares a state of emergency and enforces a curfew in 11 governorates. The vice-President Mohamed ElBaradei resigns in protest against the police crackdown. At the same time, the international community condemns the violence.
On 16 August the Muslim Brotherhood lead a “Friday of Rage” with mass demonstrations in Cairo and other cities and which ends in clashes with the security forces that leave more than 170 dead. In response to the deaths, the Muslim Brotherhood calls a “Week of Rage” for the following days. On 17-18 August as many as 1,000 arrests are made.

On 17 August it is revealed that the government is debating a proposal presented by the Prime Minister Hazem al-Beblawi to outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood.

On 17 August the Islamist cleric Salwat Hegazi is arrested in Nasr City, Cairo, together with other members of the Muslim Brotherhood. On 20 August Mohamed Badie, Supreme Guide of the Brotherhood, is arrested.

On 20 August the committee set up to amend the Constitution submits the new text to Adly Mansour.

On 22 August Hosni Mubarak is placed under house arrest.

**Libya**

- On 1 August the President of the Libyan National Congress Nouri Abusahmein names General Abdulsalam Jadallah al-Salihine al-Obeidi new Army Chief-of-Staff, amid a surge in political assassinations in Benghazi and the government’s continued failure to end the activity of anti-Gaddafi militia, operating outside of state control.

- On 19 August Sadiq Abdulkarim, member of the National Forces Alliance, is appointed Interior Minister after Mohammed Khalifa Sheikh’s resignation the previous day, citing an “inability to carry out clear changes” in the country’s security situation.

- On 17 August the Cyrenaica Transitional Council issues a threat to the Libyan army that it will step up the interruption of oil production if Tripoli does not agree to creating a federal state in which Cyrenaica has the same autonomy it enjoyed with the 1951 Constitution. This conflict adds to the oil workers’ protests, which have partially paralysed oil production and exports since the end of July.

**Tunisia**

- On 7 August a demonstration outside the National Assembly calls for the government’s resignation six months after the murder of the leftist opposition leader Chokri Belaid. The demonstration is organised around the protest camp set up after the assassination on 25 July of another opposition member Mohamed Brahimi. Government supporters respond by setting up their own camp.

- On 13 August the first round of negotiations, mediated by the Tunisian General Labour Union, between the Ennahda-led Islamist government and the opposition end in failure. The talks aimed to put an end to the political crisis opened by Mohamed Brahmi’s assassination. Meanwhile, more marches are organised by government supporters and the opposition.

- On 19 August new talks between the UGTT, Ennahda and the opposition fail to make any progress.

- On 24 August the government declares Ansar al-Sharia a terrorist organisation and accuses the group of murdering the politicians Chokri Belaid y Mohamed Brahimi.

- On 30 August protests are staged in different cities when it is revealed that one of the 48 Spanish prisoners pardoned by Mohamed VI to mark Throne Day is the paedophile of Iraqi origin Daniel Galvan, who is rearrested on 5 August in Murcia.

- On 7 August the President of the Moroccan Parliament Karim Ghellab, informs the media about a series of new rules of procedure aimed at improving transparency and integrity, in response to citizen demands.

- On 16 August the Interior Ministry announces that an AQIM recruitment cell has been dismantled, which operated in Tiznit, Fez, Meknes and Tawnat.

**Mauritania**

- On 16 August the Interior Ministry announces a “Week of Rage” with mass demonstrations in Cairo and other cities and which ends in clashes with the security forces that leave more than 170 dead. In response to the deaths, the Muslim Brotherhood calls a “Week of Rage” for the following days. On 17-18 August as many as 1,000 arrests are made.

- On 17 August the police round up a group of young men at a demonstration in the town of Taiba Niassene who are believed to be involved in a suspected anti-government protest.

- On 20 August Mauritanian and Niger sign a military cooperation agreement faced with rising terrorist activity in the Sahel.

**European Union**

- On 16 August the Eurostat publishes the economic figures for the second quarter, which reveal that the eurozone has emerged from the recession with a growth of 0.3%, thanks to growth in France of 0.5% and in Germany of 0.7%.

**September 2013**

- Portugal carries out new cuts and holds municipal elections. In Spain, the autonomous Catalonian government asks for a referendum to be held on self-determination in 2014. The French government approves the pension reform. In Italy, the procedure to remove Silvio Berlusconi from the Senate prompts five PdL Ministers to resign. Problems persist in Bosnia’s governance. Montenegro approves the judicial reform. Negotiations continue between Belgrade and Pristina over the status of Kosovo. In Albania, a new government takes over. The Greek authorities arrest several senior figures of Golden Dawn. The Syrian government accepts the plan agreed by Washington and Moscow to destroy its arsenal of chemical weapons and avoid an imminent international military intervention. In Egypt, the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood are outlawed and the process to amend the Constitution continues. In Tunisia, the coalition government resigns in an agreement reached with the opposition to appoint a non-partisan interim government. Algeria reshuffles its cabinet.
Portugal

- On 12 September the Council of Ministers approves cuts of around 10% for public sector worker pensions of over 600 euros a month.
- On 26 September the Constitutional Court rules that nine of the 15 articles from the Labour Code that came into effect in August 2012 are unconstitutional.
- On 29 September the ruling PSD wins 32% of the votes in the local elections and loses Porto, Sintra and Gaia. The opposition PS wins 38% and maintains its mayorality in Lisbon.

Spain

- On 11 September thousands demonstrate for a referendum to be called in 2014 on Catalan self-determination. On 15 September the Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy rejects the referendum request deeming it unconstitutional, but says he is willing to initiate a dialogue to review Catalonia’s relations with the rest of Spain. The European Commission warns that Catalonia’s eventual secession would mean its exit from the EU.
- On 27 September the Council of Ministers approves the budget for 2014 which includes cuts to lower the public debt to below 3% before 2016 and the pension reform.

France

- On 9 September French state schools begin to display, alongside the motto of the Republic and the Declaration of Human and Citizen Rights, the new Secularism Charter, which will be taught to students as the foundation of the country’s values.
- On 18 September the government approves the pension reform bill, which will increase the contribution period required for a full pension from 41.5 to 43 years.
- On 18 and 27 September the police dismantle two Roma camps in Lille and Roubaix in accordance with a court order. The action coincides with the Interior Minister Manuel Valls’ declarations that certain Roma groups are incapable of integration and should be repatriated.
- On 27 September the Finance Minister presents the draft budget for 2014, which foresees a 15-billion-euro saving in public spending.

Italy

- On 14 September a total of 491 illegal immigrants arrive at the Sicilian and Calabrian coasts.
- On 17 September the former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi is sentenced by the Supreme Court to four years in prison – which he is exempt from serving – and to pay a fine of 541 million euros, for bribery in the Fininvest case.
- On 28 September five PdL ministers resign in protest against the trial against Silvio Berlusconi to expel him from the Senate, thereby sparking a crisis in the government coalition.

Slovenia

- On 7 September, to avoid bailing out Slovenia’s banking system, the European Commission temporarily approves Ljubljana’s plans to grant state guarantees to Factor Banka and Probanka.

Croatia

- On 9 September a week of protests in Vukovar against the use of signs in Cyrillic comes to an end.
- On 17 September Josip Bojkovac, the First Minister of Internal Affairs of Croatia, is accused of the death of 21 civilians in 1945, suspected of collaborating with the Ustase.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 5 September the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) announce an agreement to implement ECHR’s decision in the Sejdic-Finci case, which demands constitutional changes to allow citizens who do not belong to the three majority communities to hold political posts.
- On 11 September the two main Bosnian Serb parties – the SNSD and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP) and the Union of a Better Future (SBB), which is in process of dissolution both in the federal government and in the government of the entity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Montenegro

- On 24 September the Parliament approves the judicial reform demanded by Brussels to move forward in the European accession process.

Serbia

- On 19 September the chief of police in Belgrade Stevan Bijelic is dismissed for nepotism and the obstruction of justice in various corruption investigations.

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 8 September Serbia and Kosovo agree the implementation of an autonomous energy supply system for Kosovo, the presence of Serbian energy companies in Kosovo, the issue of its own international dialling code and the organisation of Kosovo municipal elections in November. On 10 September Belgrade agrees to stop funding and dismantle the parallel Kosovo Serb municipal assemblies.
- On 9 September Kosovo bans imports of products from the FYROM in response to Skopje’s renewal of its limits on flour and wheat imports from Kosovo and the introduction of a tax for Kosovo citizens entering the FYROM. On 14 September both countries lift their respective restrictions.
- On 19 September a EULEX customs officer is killed in an armed attack in Ballaban.
- On 18 September the Pristina Court clears the former Transport Minister Fatmir Limaj of charges against him for war crimes in Klecka in 1990.

FYROM

- On 16 September 17 people, including the personal assistant to the Parliament Speaker, are arrested suspected of spying for a foreign government.
- On 20 September the former Interior Minister Tomislav Cokrevski is
accused by the Lustration Commission of ordering the surveillance of right-wing activists in the nineties.

Albania

- On 10 September Ilir Meta, from the Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI), is elected Parliament Speaker.
- On 15 September the coalition government of the Socialist Party and the LSI, led by Edi Rama, comes into power.
- On 18 September the Court of Tirana acquits the former judge Nertian Tabaku of accusations of malpractice for his acquittal in 2010 of a criminal who later murdered a police officer.
- On 19 September the Court of Tirana sentences two Republican Guard officers to one and three years in prison – which they are exempt from serving – for their responsibility in the deaths of demonstrators during the protests in January 2011.

Greece

- On 16 September Greek trade unions begin a week of strikes to protest against the reforms and cuts approved by the Parliament which will lead to thousands of direct dismissals in the public sector and the creation of a labour reserve, set up to pay public sector workers the minimum wage until they either find other work or are dismissed.
- On 18 September a supporter of the neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn is arrested for the murder of the leftist artist Pavlos Fyssas. The arrest prompts unrest in several cities and government moves to ban Golden Dawn.

Turkey

- On 9 September the terrorist organisation PKK announces that it is suspending the withdrawal of its fighters from Turkish soil, accusing the government of paralysing the peace process, although it pledges to respect the ceasefire.
- On 30 September the Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan announces a social reform package that includes the partial lifting of the ban on women using headscarves in public service, reducing the minimum electoral threshold for entering Parliament, allowing education in other languages in private schools and allowing Kurdish place names.

Cyprus

- On 11 September Noble Energy successfully completes the last preliminary test for initiating gas extraction in the Aphrodite gas field in Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone.
- On 12 September teachers demonstrate against the Education Minister’s decision to stop giving permanent contracts to teachers in public schools.
- On 13 September the eurozone approves the disbursement of 1.5 billion euros to save the Cypriot banks. On 16 September the IMF announces the release of a further 84.7 million euros.

Syria

- On 12 September the United Nations says it has received the documents needed for Syria to join the Chemical Weapons Convention.
- On 14 September the NCSROF elects the moderate Islamist Ahmad Toumea as the interim Prime Minister.
- On 16 September the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon presents the final report submitted by the expert commission on the Ghouta attack on 21 August to the Security Council, which concludes that chemical weapons were used.
- On 19 September serious clashes break out in Azaz, on the Turkish border, between the ISIL and the Northern Storm Brigade.
- On 25 September 13 FSA factions reject the authority of the NCSROF and say their organisation will operate under Sharia principles.
- On 27 September the Security Council unanimously approves Resolution 1950 on the destruction of Syria’s chemical arsenal, by virtue of the agreement reached between Washington and Moscow on 14 September and accepted by Damascus.
- On 30 September the UN chemical weapons inspectors complete a second mission, which began on 25 September.

Lebanon

- On 10 September the European Commission announces a package of 58 million euros to help Lebanon cope with the effects of the Syrian crisis.
- On 23 September Hezbollah denies accusations by the NCSROF that it is receiving chemical weapons from Damascus to elude international plans for their destruction.

Egypt

- On 1 September the President Adly Mansour announces the formation of a commission to draft a definitive constitutional reform bill based on the proposal presented by a committee of 10 legal experts.
- On 8 September the Public Prosecutor announces that the Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Badie will be tried for his responsibility in the clashes that followed the military coup on 3 July.
- On 11 September at least six soldiers are killed in two bomb attacks in Rafah, after which Egypt closes its borders with Gaza. At the same time, army operations, which began on 7 September, continue against terrorist targets in the Sinai.
- On 15 September the Kamel Gemiak (Complete your Good Deed) campaign official begins, which intends to collect 30 million signatures to call the vice-Prime Minister and Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to run in the next presidential elections.
- On 17 September the spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood Gehad el-Haddad is arrested in Nasr.
- On 19 September the army takes back control of Kerdasa, the last pro-Mohamed Morsi bastion in Cairo. One of those arrested is Essam el-Erian, vice-Chairman of the Freedom and Justice Party, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood.
- On 23 September the Court for Urgent Matters in Cairo bans all Muslim Brotherhood activities.
- On 30 September the Cairo Appeals Court upholds the one-year jail sentence handed down in April to Hisham Qandil, former Prime Minister to Mohamed Morsi, for failing to implement a
court order in 2011 to renationalise an oil company sold in 2005 to a Saudi investor.

Libya

- On 1 September the authorities in Sirte and the Libyan National Congress call for calm to put an end to the fighting that began in early August when a jihadist group from Derna announced plans to set up in Sirte, after the commander of the al-Farouk Brigade of Ansar al-Sharia died on 4 August in clashes with the Zawiya Martyrs Brigade, affiliated with the army.
- On 19 September around twenty officials from the Muammar el-Gaddafi regime appear before a court in Tripoli for the repression of the 2011 Revolution. Saif al-Islam el-Gaddafi appears before the Zintan Court in the third hearing of the trial against him, which is ongoing since January and which resumes in December.
- On 21 September thousands of Libyans demonstrate in Tripoli and Benghazi to demand improvements in internal security.

Tunisia

- On 28 September the Ennahda government resigns after reaching an agreement with the opposition to start talks to appoint a new non-partisan interim cabinet.

Algeria

- On 11 September the President Abdelaziz Bouteflika announces changes in the cabinet, with Abdelmalek Sellal remaining at its head. Ahmed Gaid Salah is appointed Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces and deputy Defence Minister; the Chairman of the Constitutional Council, Tayeb Belaiz, moves to the Interior Ministry and Ramtane Lamamra assumes the post of Foreign Minister; Tayeb Louh leaves the Labour Ministry to head the Justice Ministry. Mohamed Benmerad will be the new Labour Minister.

Morocco

- On 9 September, Abdelwahed Almoutawakil, leader of the political wing of the Islamist movement Justice and Spirituality, calls various leftist groups and the 20 February Movement to establish a broad front to oppose the current political system.
- On 12 September the Ministry of Justice presents the new charter of principles that will guide the judicial reforms.
- On 24 September thousands of people demonstrate in Rabat, called by Ishtqial, to protest against the government’s decision to peg fuel prices to the global price.

European Union

- On 12 September the European Parliament approves the establishment of a single supervisory mechanism for banks in the eurozone led by the European Central Bank, which will come into effect from September 2014.

October 2013

Portugal announces new cuts in public spending. The ECHR rules against Spain and rejects the use of the Parot doctrine. Italy records mass immigrant arrivals. Croatia changes its legislation to adopt the European Arrest Warrant. Bosnia conducts its first national census since 1991. In Greece, the Golden Dawn leader is remanded in custody. Turkey approves the purchase of a missile defence system from China. Syria initiates its chemical weapons destruction programme overseen by inspectors from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In Egypt, fighting increases between the security forces and Muslim Brotherhood followers. In Libya, Cyrenaica declares itself autonomous. The political crisis continues in Tunisia. In Morocco Mohammed VI approves a government reshuffle.

Portugal

- On 3 October the troika completes a new visit to Portugal, begun on 16 September. The satisfactory results open the way to the release of a new 5-billion-euro tranche of the country’s economic bailout.

Spain

- On 8 October the Belgium and Spanish police arrest ETA member Natividad Jauregui in Ghent, a member of the Biscay Cell and on the run since 1979.
- On 15 October the National Court sentences the three members of the Otazuza Cell from the ETA terrorist organisation to 485 years in prison for the murder of Sergeant-Major Luis Conde de la Cruz in 2008.
- On 16 October police officers Enrique Paines and Jose Maria Ballesson are sentenced to a year and a half in jail for revealing a police network to ETA’s extortion ring in the Faisan Case in 2006.
- On 21 October the ECHR rejects Spain’s appeal against its ruling to oppose applying the Parot Doctrine for ETA member Iines del Rio and opens the door for other prisoners to be eligible for release. On 22 October London’s High Court orders the conditional release of ETA member Antton Trotino, arrested in the United Kingdom in 2012.

France

- On 7 October the judges investigating L’Oreal’s alleged illegal funding of Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidential election campaign decide there is not enough evidence against the former President to prosecute.
- On 17 October clashes break out in Paris during a student demonstration against the deportation of an Armenian and a Kosovar of Roma origin, ordered by the Interior Ministry.

Italy

- On 2 October Enrico Letta’s government wins a confidence vote tabled by Silvio Berlusconi after receiving support from a large number of MPs from his own party, the PdL, including its leader Angelino Alfano.
- On 14 October Italy triples its military deployment in the Mediterranean with Operation Mare Nostrum, to halt the wave of immigrants. In October alone, more than 2,500 immigrants arrive on Italian shores.
On 15 October the Council of Ministers approves the budget for 2014, which foresees tax and public spending cuts of 3.5 billion euros.

On 17 October the former Prime Minister Mario Monti steps down as President of the party Civic Choice over internal divisions regarding the Stability Law approved by the government and opposed by Monti.

On 19 October protest camps are set up in Rome against the government’s austerity measures, which remain for four days.

**Malta**

On 16 October a US ship rescues 128 immigrants in Maltese waters.

**Croatia**

On 4 October the Parliament agrees to change the Perkovic Law passed in June, which limits the application of the European arrest warrant to crimes committed after August 2002, following a warning from the European Commission that it would block Croatia’s Access to the Schengen Area.

On 5 October a police officer is arrested in Vukovar for illegally removing a sign in Cyrillic. Over the following two days, signs in Serbian are illegally removed by radical Croatian nationalists.

On 29 October Mirela Holje, the former social democratic Environment Minister, presents her new environmental party, Croatian Sustainable Development (ORAH).

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

On 3 October the Mostar Court sentences the former member of the Bosnian army Zehrudin Scuk to six years in prison for war crimes in Jablanica in 1993.

On 15 October Bosnia-Herzegovina’s first population census since 1991 comes to completion, which began on 1 October. As well as the controversial inclusion of questions on ethnicity, language, religion and nationality, the census raises concerns of rising tensions because of the light it sheds on the demographic impact of the Bosnian War.

**Montenegro**

On 11 October Montenegrin journalists demonstrate against the rising number of attacks against them and to demand that the authorities provide an effective response.

On 20 October 60 people are arrested in Podgorica in unrest sparked by the country’s first Gay Pride March.

**Serbia**

On 20 October the widow of the Marshal Josef Broz “Tito” Jovanka Broz dies in Belgrade.

**Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244**

On 7 October Serbia and Kosovo agree to allow Serbian politicians to visit Kosovo during the municipal election campaigns.

On 14 October a series of explosions shakes the Serbian sector of Mitrovica without causing any injuries. The attacks are seen as a warning to ethnic Serbs to abstain from participating in the Kosovo local elections on 3 November.

**FYROM**

On 4 October the social democratic opposition accuses the government of not wanting to carry out a national census so it can manipulate the election results, after the cabinet decides not to set aside funds for this purpose. The Albanian parties claim that the government does not want the number of ethnic Albanians living in the country to be made public.

**Albania**

On 2 October the opposition criticises the government’s decision to postpone the application of the civil service reform law by six months, which was due to enter into effect on 1 April and was approved by consensus during the last legislature.

On 10 October the Prime Minister Edi Rama replaces the police chief Hysni Burgaj with the former special forces commander Artan Didi, as part of a wider plan to restructure the police force.

**Greece**

On 3 October Nikolaos Michaloliakos, leader of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party, is remanded in custody for belonging to a criminal organisation and for his involvement in various bombings, assassinations, the most recent being Pavlos Fyssas on 17 September.

On 7 October the government presents the draft budget for 2014 based on a 0.6% rise in GDP, putting an end to six years of recession.

On 8 September the former Prime Minister Akis Tsochatzopoulos is sentenced to 20 years in prison for money laundering and corruption.

On 23 October the Parliament approves an amendment to the law to put a stop to publicly funding parties if their leadership or a fifth of their members are accused of belonging to a criminal organisation.

On 26 October some 1,500 people demonstrate in Athens in support of Golden Dawn. A large-scale police deployment prevents them from coming into contact with a counter-demonstration staged by anti-fascists.

**Turkey**

On 24 October NATO and the US express their concerns over the decision taken by Turkey, a member of the Atlantic Alliance, to purchase a missile defence system from China.

**Syria**

On 1 October inspectors from the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) arrive a day after experts leave the country from the UN mission set up to investigate the use of chemical weapons in the Ghouta massacre in August 2013.

On 11 October the Norwegian Nobel Committee awards the Nobel Peace Prize to the OPCW.

On 16 October the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reports fighting between Islamist factions and the Kurdish People’s Protection Units in Hasaka.
On 17 October violent clashes break out between the army and the Al-Nusra Front and the ISIL over the control of a power plant and the central prison in Aleppo.

On 27 October PKK-linked Kurdish militias launch an offensive in Yarubiya, Hasaka and seize control of the border crossing with Iraq from Islamist militia, blocking Syria’s oil trade route to outside the country.

**Lebanon**

- On 22 October four people are killed in Tripoli during unrest between Sunnis from Bab Tabbaneh and Alawite Shites from Jabal Mohsen, respectively opponents and supporters of the Syrian regime.

**Jordan**

- On 28 October Jordan announces an agreement with the Russian company Rosatom to build two nuclear reactors in Qusayr Amra and put an end to the country’s energy crisis.

**Egypt**

- On 6 October coinciding with the commemoration of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and a gathering of supporters of the army chief Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Tahrir Square, the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy leads new protests throughout the country. The Islamist protests continue throughout October.
- On 9 October the government removes the Muslim Brotherhood from the register of civil society and non-governmental associations.
- On 17 October the army tenders off an Islamist attack in al-Arish. Since the fall of Mohamed Mori, Islamist violence on the peninsula that connects Egypt with Gaza and Israel has been a daily occurrence. As part of its efforts to recover control of the peninsula, the new government has led an intense campaign to destroy the Gaza smuggling tunnels.
- On 20 October four people are killed in gunfire in an attack on a Christian wedding in Giza. On 22 October Coptic demonstrators protest outside the Council of Ministers.

**Libya**

- On 2 October Najib Suleiman al-Hasi and Abd Rabbo Abdul Hamid al-Barasi are appointed respectively Commander-in-Chief of the Cyrenaica Defence Forces and President of the new autonomous government.
- On 5 October, in Tripoli, the US Navy arrests the regional al-Qaeda leader Nazih al-Ruquai -Abu Anas al-Libi. The arrest coincides with that of a prominent ash-Shabaab leader in Somalia, allegedly responsible for the attack on the Westgate shopping centre in Nairobi in September.
- On 10 October the Libyan Prime Minister, Ali Zeidan, is arrested and released shortly after in Tripoli by the Libya Revolutionaries Operations Room.
- On 11 October the International Criminal Court rules that the former chief of intelligence of Muammar Gaddafi, Abdullah al-Senoussi, can be tried in Libya.
- On 23 October the head of Benghazi’s Air Traffic Control Adel al-Towhahi is murdered. This assassination adds to those of Mustapha al-Barghathi, the military police chief, on 18 October and navy colonel Saleh Elhadiri, on 2 October.
- On 24 October Cyrenaica unilaterally declares autonomy.

**Tunisia**

- On 5 October the government and opposition agree on a roadmap to end the current political crisis, which foresees the imminent appointment of a new Prime Minister and the formation of a new, non-partisan cabinet, outlines the deadlines for adopting a new constitution and calls for new elections to be held.
- On 18 October the Interior Ministry reports an anti-terrorism operation launched days before in Gbollat, Beja, which claimed the lives of several members of Ansar al-Sharia, including Lotfi Ezzine, the terrorist connected with the assassinations of Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi.

**Arab League**

- On 20 October the Arab League announces that the international peace
conference for Syria is scheduled for 23 November.
• On 28 October the UN and Arab League Special Envoy to Syria, Lakhdar Brahimi, ends his tour of the Middle East in Damascus to promote the Geneva II peace conference.

November 2013

Spain
• On 14 November the eurozone Finance Ministers welcome Spain and Ireland’s exit from their bailout programmes due to positive trends in both states’ economic recovery.
• On 29 November the Secretary General of Andalucia’s General Workers Union (UGT), Francisco Fernandez, resigns over his alleged systematic misuse of public money for illegal purposes obtained from the Andalusian regional government.
• On 28 November the PP’s parliamentary majority in the lower house definitively approves the controversial education reform law, after receiving the go-ahead from the Senate.

France
• On 6 November Jean-Louis Borloo, President of the Union of Democrats and Independents (UDI), and Francois Bayrou, President of the Democratic Movement (MoDem), announce the merger of both parties in a centre-right coalition.
• On 11 November during the commemoration of the armistice which marked the end of World War I, the President Francois Hollande is booed by demonstrators calling for his resignation over tax hikes. These include the controversial ecotax on lorries, which has sparked social protests, in particularly in Brittany. The Interior Minister Manuel Valls accuses the National Front of being behind the protests which also displayed slogans against same-sex marriage.
• On 15 November the 250 prefects draft a report that warns about the deterioration of France’s social, moral and political state and about the risks of a popular revolt.

Portugal
• On 8 November the IMF announces the approval of the release of a new 1.9-billion-euro tranche to Portugal as part of the economic bailout package.
• On 26 November the conservative majority in the Parliament approves the final document for the 2014 budget, which foresees public spending cuts of 3.9 billion euros, amid heavy worker protests.
• On 8 November the IMF announces the approval of the release of a new 1.9-billion-euro tranche to Portugal as part of the economic bailout package.

Monaco
• On 13 November the government announces the creation of an ombudsman.

Italy
• On 15 November during the Forza Italia national congress, the vice-Chairman, Interior Minister and dauphin of Silvio Berlusconi, Angelino Alfano, leaves the party together with five other ministers from the group, around 30 senators and some 25 deputies, over a disagreement with Berlusconi’s political strategy, which seeks to bring down the coalition government.

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• On 20 November the far-left activist Abdelhakim Dekhar is arrested for the shots fired in the newsrooms of BMWTV and Libération on 15 and 18 November.

Malta
• On 20 November prompted by citizen protests, the government postpones applying the bill approved by the Parliament on 13 November, which will grant Maltese citizenship to anyone at a cost of 650,000 euros.

Slovenia
• On 15 November the Parliament approves the budget for 2014, which foresees severe cuts to stabilise the banking system without requesting external aid.
• On 20 November the Economy Minister Stanko Stepisnik resigns after it is discovered that his ministry has granted subsidies to a company partly owned by the Minister.
**Chronologies**

- On 25 November the Health Minister Tomaz Gantar resigns over his inability to carry out reforms in the health system.

**Croatia**
- On 5 November the Vukovar authorities approve the city’s exclusion from the law on minority rights and bans signs in Cyrillic, due to the damage suffered by the city in the Serbian siege during the war.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**
- On 27 November the President of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Zivko Budimir and the entity’s Justice Minister Zoran Mikulic are accused by the State Prosecutor, together with other senior officials, of approving amnesties in exchange for bribes.
- On 28 November a Bosnian court sentences Zijad Turkovic and Milenko Lakic to forty years in prison and hands sentences of three to 12 years to a further three members of their ring, in the largest trial against organised crime held in Bosnia in 20 years.

**Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244**
- On 3 November Kosovo holds local elections which are violently boycotted by radical Serb and Kosovo Serb activists in majority Serb municipalities, where, on 17 November, the elections are repeated without incident and with just 22.38% turnout.
- On 8 November 15 people linked with the UÇK, including Kosovo’s ambassador to Albania, are accused of war crimes against civilians in Likovac in 1998. On 18 November thousands of Kosovars demonstrate in Pristina to call for their release.

**FYROM**
- On 12 November the FYROM is elected to the UN Human Rights Council, together with Algeria and Morocco.

**Albania**
- On 15 November after days of popular protests, Albania refuses to host the destruction process of Syria’s chemical weapons.

**Greece**
- On 11 November the ND-PASOK coalition government wins a confidence motion tabled by Syriza, the main opposition party, over the police’s eviction on 7 November of the offices of the state broadcaster, formally ERT, now transformed into DT.
- On 16 November the radical leftist group the Militant People’s Revolutionary Forces assumes responsibility for the assassination in Athens on 1 November of two Golden Dawn members.

**Turkey**
- On 4 November the government announces its intention to intervene in university accommodation to prevent male and female students sharing the same living space. Part of Turkish society views the AKP’s interventionist policy in people’s private lives with caution.
- On 5 November Turkey and the EU resume accession negotiations after three and a half years of deadlock.

**Cyprus**
- On 13 November the European Commission approves 100 million euros in aid to the Cypriot economy as part of its draft amendment of the EU budget for 2014.

**Syria**
- On 11 November the PKK-linked Democratic Union Party (PYD) announces in al-Qamishli its intentions to form an interim government in the areas under its control, approve its own constitution and organise elections.
- On 13 November the army takes back control of Hujaıra in an offensive to secure control of the area around the south of Damascus.
- On 18 November the leader of the Aleppo-based Islamist al-Tawhid Brigade Abdelqader Saleh dies from injuries suffered on 14 November in a Syrian air strike.
- On 22 November seven of the main rebel Islamist factions operating in Syria merge to form the Islamic Front.
- On 25 November the UN, Arab League, US and Russia agree to hold the International Peace Conference on Syria, known as Geneva II on 22 January 2014. Both the Syrian government and the NCSROF announce their participation, although with radically different standpoints.
- On 28 November seven rebel militants accused of collaborating with the regime are executed in Atareb, Aleppo, by the ISIL.

**Lebanon**
- On 12 November Saad Ghieh, the leader of the Lebanese Islamic Labor Front, which supports the Syrian regime, is assassinated in Tripoli.
- On 19 November at least 25 people are killed in a bomb attack by the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, outside the Iranian embassy in Beirut.

**Jordan**
- On 3 November Abdullah II once again appeals to the international community for urgent help in dealing with the mass arrival of Syrian refugees.

**Egypt**
- On 4 November the trial begins against the former President Mohamed Morsi and a further 14 leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood. The hearing is adjoined to January 2014, after Morsi refuses to recognise the court.
- On 8 November the government announces parliamentary and presidential elections for the first half of 2014.
- On 12 November the government lifts the state of emergency.
- On 12 November the security forces arrest Bassem Auda in Beheira, the former Supply Minister of Mohamed Morsi.
On 19 November the President Adly Mansour announces that he will not run in the 2014 presidential elections.

On 19 November unrest erupts when thousands of people occupy Tahrir Square to commemorate the clashes in November 2011, which left fifty dead.

On 24 November Adly Mansour ratifies the new Security Law that gives the Interior Minister wider powers to ban any protest that poses a threat to security.

Libya

On 3 November the Libyan General National Congress votes in favour of dissolving the Libya Revolutionary Operations Room over their responsibility in the short-lived kidnapping of the Prime Minister Ali Zeidan, in October.

On 6 November the government announces that it will stop paying rebel groups as of 31 December 2013 if they do not join the security forces. On 16 and 26 November Tripoli and Benghazi begin three-day general strikes to call for the brigades to end their activities. In response, before the end of the month several militias give up their weapons and barracks.

On 9 November the 9 November Movement leads a crowd in Tripoli to demand the renewal of the National General Council and for the current assembly’s mandate not to be extended.

On 10 November Ibrahim Said al-Jadran, President of the autonomous government of Cyrenaica, announces the creation of the Libyan Oil and Gas Corporation.

On 13 November the Amazigh High Council of Libya announces that it will boycott the drafting of a new constitution and the election of members to the Constitutional Committee claiming that its rights are at risk.

Tunisia

On 3 November the government extends the state of emergency by eight months.

On 4 November the national dialogue is suspended after a new and fruitless round of talks between Ennahda and the opposition to elect a new Prime Minister and a caretaker government.

On 12 November the security forces arrest Ansar al-Sharia's number two, Wael Amami, and the spokesperson for the Salafi group, Seifeddine Rais in Kairouan and Sidi Bouzid respectively.

On 21 November the committee for the defence of Chokri Belaid, the leader of the Democratic Patriots' Movement murdered in February, prosecutes the Prime Minister Ali Laarayedh, and the Defence Minister Lotfi Ben Jeddou, accusing them of withholding the results of an investigation that would prove that Belaid was killed by shots fired from a gun belonging to the Ministry.

On 27 November Ennahda's offices in Gafsa are set alight during a general strike against the government’s incapacity to improve living conditions in the governorate.

Algeria

On 7 November 21 people, mostly workers from Naftal, a subsidiary of Sonatrach, are sentenced to between three and six years in prison for fuel trafficking.

On 16 November Abdelaziz Buteflika is announced as the FLN candidate for the 2014 presidential elections.

Morocco

On 11 November the Immigration Minister announces the regularisation of 40,000 immigrants as part of the new immigration policy approved in September.

European Union

On 29 November the summit between the EU and the countries of the Eastern Partnership comes to its conclusion in Vilnius. Only Moldavia and Georgia sign association agreements with Brussels. In the case of Ukraine, the negotiations fail when its President Viktor Yanukovych asks for a greater financial commitment from the EU in exchange for signing the agreement, in a decision that Brussels attributes pressure from Russia to avoid losing its strategic influence over Ukraine, where large-scale pro-European protests take place.

Arab League

On 10 November the Arab League approves Egypt's initiative for the Middle East to be free from weapons of mass destruction.

December 2013

In Italy, the Constitutional Court partially invalidates the electoral law and new citizen protests are staged. Slovenia announces that it will take responsibility for the bailout of its banking system. Bosnia approves the federal budgets for 2014. Ethnic tensions rise in the FYROM. Greece suspends state aid to Golden Dawn. In Turkey, a corruption plot that affects the AKP sparks a political crisis. In Syria, the regime launches a bloody offensive on Aleppo. In Egypt, the Constitutional Committee endorses the new draft constitution and the Muslim Brotherhood is declared a terrorist group. In Tunisia, Mehdi Jomaa is appointed Prime Minister. In Morocco, the parliamentary opposition blocks the approval of the 2014 budget proposal. In Mauritania, the Union for the Republic wins the elections.

Spain

On 20 December the Council of Ministers approves the draft bill that allows abortion only in cases of rape or if there is a physical or mental health risk to the mother.

France

On 9 December France initiates its military intervention in the Central African Republic.

On 17 December Claude Gueant, the former Interior Minister, and Michel Gaudin, the chief of police, are released without charge after being questioned over their involvement in the alleged misuse of public funds between 2002 and 2004.

Italy

On 4 December the Constitutional Court partially invalidates the 2005 electoral law, declaring the closed lists and winner’s bonus system unconstitutional.
On 8 December the mayor of Florence Matteo Renzi is elected the new Secretary General of the Democratic Party.

On 9 December the popular Forconi (pitchfork) movement that emerged in Sicily in 2012, stages several days of protest throughout Italy against austerity measures, globalisation and the EU.

On 11 December the Prime Minister Enrico Letta wins a confidence vote in the Parliament after Forza Italia’s exit from the coalition government.

On 13 December 30 relatives of the mafia boss Matteo Messina Denaro are arrested in Trapani in the largest operation carried out against the Mafia in Sicily in years.

On 18 December the European Commission demands that Italy investigate the living conditions of the Lamпедуса immigrants.

Slovenia

On 12 December Slovenia announces that it will take on the 4.758-billion-euro bailout of its banks without external financial assistance.

Croatia

On 1 December 65% of Croats – with a 38% turnout – vote in favour of the Constitution defining marriage as a union exclusively between a man and a woman.

On 4 December the Parliament adopts the 2014 budget, with a planned deficit of 5.5% of the GDP.

On 5 December the Serbian government submits a formal complaint to the Croatian government regarding the situation of the Serb minority in Vukovar.

On 9 December the former police commander Vladimir Milankovic is sentenced to eight years in jail for war crimes against Serbs in Sisak between 1991 and 1992.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

On 20 December Haris Causevic is sentenced to 45 years in prison for the bomb attack in Bugojno in June 2010.

On 25 December Midhat Osmanovic, member of the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Parliament of the Croatian Bosnian entity, is arrested in Tuzla for attempting to take a bribe.

On 30 December the Federal Parliament urgently adopts the budget for 2014. Its adoption in 2013 will allow Bosnia to access the funds granted by the IMF. However, due to the approval’s delay these funds will be released at a later date, endangering the budgets for the Bosnian Serb and Croatian Bosnian entities, which have approved their respective budgets within the deadlines set by the IMF.

Montenegro

On 26 December a bomb explodes in the offices of the Vjesti newspaper, adding to the attacks in August and November. The attacks come amid repeated reports by journalists of a decline in press freedom in Montenegro.

On 27 December the government announces its support of a proposed legislation to promote the multi-ethnic character of Montenegro and give minorities the freedom to display their own symbols and flags without restrictions.

Serbia

On 17 December the EU Council sets 21 January 2014 as the date for opening Serbia’s accession negotiations.

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244

On 1 December Kosovo holds the second round of its local elections, which have a low turnout but finish without incidents.

On 6 December Serbia and Kosovo agree for the regional police of Northern Kosovo to be commanded by a Serb and for a quota of positions in the Kosovo police force to be reserved for ethnic Serbs.

FYROM

On 9 December the authorities call for calm after a group of Macedonian Albanians damage the statue of Tsar Dusan (Stephen IV of Serbia), recently inaugurated in Skopje, deeming it a symbol of Serbia’s historical occupation of the country. On 20 December new clashes break out between ethnic Albanians and police.

On 25 December the Parliament adopts two laws, by 62 out of 123 votes, which will regulate the media and, according to the opposition and trade unions, represent a major restriction on freedom of expression.

Albania

On 9 December the former Defence Minister Arben Imami is accused of abuse of power and embezzlement of state funds.

Greece

On 7 December the Parliament approves suspending the public funding of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn party.

On 30 December Antonis Kantas, the deputy Armaments Chief at the Defence Ministry between 1997 and 2002, arrested after it was discovered he had 13.7 million euros in a Singapore bank, returns seven million euros to the State.

Turkey

On 3 December Turkey reports it has made 1,100 arrests in 2013 of European citizens heading for Syria to join jihadist groups. On 5 December the European Council Interior Ministers debate formulas to halt this flow.

On 6 December two people are killed in Yuksekova in clashes between the police and separatist demonstrators. In retaliation, the PKK terrorist group captures four Turkish soldiers on 8 December in Lice. On 9 December they are released under the mediation of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).

On 17 December at least 52 people are arrested in Ankara and Istanbul in connection with a major corruption plot. Among the arrested are the tycoon Ali Agaoğlu, the head of the state bank Halkbank Suleyman Aslan, and three sons of the Interior, Economy and City Planning Ministers, who eventually resign on 25 December. Between 18 and
22 December at least 50 senior police officers and prosecutors investigating the case are dismissed by order of the government and on 22 December the Prime Minister denounces a plot to bring down the government. On 26 December Recep Tayyip Erdogan reshuffles his cabinet. The changes include that of the hitherto deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag, who moves to the Justice Ministry and Mevlut Çavusoglu who replaces Egemen Bagis as European Union Minister. On 27 December, amid protests and unrest in the street, three AKP MPs resign in protest over the corruption scandal and rifts with the leadership. The Council of State blocks a government decree on 21 December that violates the principle of the separation of powers by forcing the officers in charge of the investigation to share information with their superiors.

**Cyprus**

- On 5 December the Council of Ministers activates a privatisations programme to raise 1.4 billion euros and which is a requisite for the last tranche of the EU and IMF bailout package.

**Syria**

- On 12 December the US and UK suspend aid to Syria’s armed opposition – 190 million euros – due to the rise in Islamic fundamentalist groups.
- On 12 December the report from the United Nations experts investigating the use of chemical weapons in Syria ascertainsthat there is strong evidence to suggest chemical weapons were used on at least five occasions.
- On 16 December the United Nations launches an appeal for 4.7 billion euros for the humanitarian crisis in Syria, the largest aid appeal the UN has ever made for a single emergency.
- On 15 December the regime begins indiscriminate air strikes of Aleppo using explosive barrel bombs, as part of an offensive to secure control of the whole province, which continues throughout the month.
- On 31 December the war in Syria, nearing the end of its third year, has already claimed the lives of 130,433 people, according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

**Lebanon**

- On 4 December the Hezbollah commander Hassan Hawlo-al-Lakis is murdered in Beirut.
- On 27 December former Lebanese Finance Minister Mohammad Shata is assassinated in Beirut. A week earlier, Shata had asked Iran for help to put an end to Hezbollah’s participation in the Syrian conflict.
- On 29 December the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon calls on Lebanon and Israel to show “maximum restraint” after the border incident during the day, in which two missiles fired from Lebanese territory land in northern Israel, provoking an Israeli military response.
- On 29 December the Saudi Majid bin Muhammad al-Majid, leader of the al-Qaeda-linked Abdullah Azzam Brigades, is arrested in Lebanon on his way to Syria.
- On 30 December the Lebanese army fires anti-aircraft missiles at Syrian warplanes in response to a Syrian air strike on the border town of Arsal.

**Jordan**

- On 28 December Jordan announcesthat it will not consider banning the Muslim Brotherhood or classifying it as a terrorist group.

**Egypt**

- On 1 December the Constitutional Committee concludes its work and endorses the new draft constitution that will be put to a national referendum. The text bans religious parties, protects army powers and allows civilians to be tried in military courts. In the streets, Muslim Brotherhood supporters demonstrating against the new draft constitution are dispersed by security forces.
- On 7 December an appeals court releases 21 women, seven of them minors, sentenced in first instance on 27 November to long jail terms for showing their support for the former Islamist President Mohamed Morsi.
- On 8 December the Salafi party al-Nour announces that it will ask its supporters to vote in favour of the new constitutional text. For its part, the Islamist Independence Party describes any-one who takes part in the referendum as a “sinner.”
- On 9 December the trial begins against Mohamed Badie and a further 14 Muslim Brotherhood leaders. The trial is adjourned to 11 February 2014.
- On 19 December a court in Cairo acquits Mubarak’s last Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq – who fled to the United Arab Emirates –, and Gamal and Alaa Mubarak in a corruption case in which they are accused of purchasing state-owned land below market prices.
- On 21 December the Public Prosecutor announces that Mohamed Morsi and another 132 defendants – members of Hamas, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood – will be tried for raiding prisons and helping prisoners to escape during the 2011 revolution, which overthrew Mubarak. This new trial against Morsi adds to those already opened against him and 35 Brotherhood leaders on 18 December for inciting the murder of demonstrators and spying.
- On 24 December at least 16 people are killed in a bomb attack in Mansoura on the offices of the Dekelia provincial Security Directorate. The attack leads the government on 25 December to declare the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation.
- On 28 December Islamist students attack and set fire to two buildings of the al-Azhar University.
- On 30 December security forces arrest Anas el-Beltagi, son of the Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed el-Beltagi.

**Libya**

- On 2 December two demonstrators are killed in the second consecutive day of protests in Derna against the violence in Libya.
- On 16 December the self-proclaimed autonomous government of Cyrenaica announces a new blockade on the oil supply to the rest of the country to put pressure on Tripoli to recognise greater autonomy and advance towards implementing a federal state model. The blockade, which leaves Tripoli’s service stations without petrol and sparks protests in the capital, adds to blockades carried out in December
by the Amazigh and Tubu minorities on the oil terminals under their control, to demand recognition of their national rights.

**Tunisia**
- On 14 December political parties and the UGTT trade union agree with an absolute majority on the appointment of the hitherto Industry Minister Mehdi Jomaa as the new Prime Minister.
- On 17 December Tunisia commemorates the third anniversary of its Revolution with a large-scale Day of Rage in Sidi Bouzid against the lack of socio-economic improvements. Another demonstration organised by Ansar al-Sharia and the Salafi party Hizb ut-Tahrir calls for the application of sharia law and establishment of an Islamic caliphate.

**Algeria**
- On 5 December Algeria reports the death of the AQIM leader Khalil Ould Addah in a military operation in Tamanrasset.

**Morocco**
- On 19 December the parliamentary opposition in the House of Councillors (upper house) blocks the draft finance act presented by Abdelilah Benkirane’s government.

**Mauritania**
- On 21 December the Union for the Republic party wins in the second round of the parliamentary elections taking 74 of the 147 seats.
- On 31 December Mauritania announces the creation of a special court for crimes of slavery.

**European Union**
- On 2 December the EUROSUR border surveillance system comes into operation.
- On 2 December the EU adopts the 2014-2020 financial framework, following its approval in the European Parliament on 19 November and two and a half years of negotiations.
- On 4 December the Commission announces fines of 1.7 billion euros for eight financial institutions for manipulating the financial markets.
- On 15 December after four weeks of mass protests, thousands gather in Kiev’s Independence Square to call Ukraine to sign the Association Agreement with the EU and for the pro-Russian government of Viktor Yanukovych to resign.

**Gibraltar**
- On 15 January the government of Gibraltar approves legislation to regulate bunkering and ship-to-ship fuel transfers, which have caused numerous spills in the waters of the Bay of Algeciras.
- On 24 May UEFA approves the inclusion of Gibraltar as a full member despite Spanish opposition, given that the colony requested entry in 1997, before the organism’s decision in 2001 to only accept countries recognised as UN Member States.
- On 24 July the work carried out by the British tug Elliott to create an artificial reef that prevents Spanish vessels from fishing in waters of disputed sovereignty leads to yet another diplomatic conflict between the United Kingdom and Spain. In response to this action and to Gibraltar’s territorial expansion into disputed waters, Spain introduces border checks with the aim of intercepting smugglers coming from Gibraltar, which lies outside of the Schengen Area. The high tensions continue throughout August with fishermen protests, Spain’s ban on the supply of Spanish sand and rock to Gibraltar and threats between London and Madrid. The two countries present their respective complaints before the EU, which decides to investigate both the Spanish border checks and the legal grounds of Gibraltar’s territorial expansion.
- On 29 August the Spanish government announces an urgent reform of the Law on Natural Heritage and Biodiversity, which will allow effective sanctions to be imposed on permanent bunkering on the Spanish coastline and, therefore, in the Bay of Algeciras.
- On 25 September an EC mission investigates on-the-ground complaints from the queues at the border crossing between Gibraltar and Spain, which have been caused by Spanish smuggling checks.
- On 16 October the European Commission, in response to the complaint lodged by Spain in June 2012, announces that it will open an investigation into the tax regime of companies in Gibraltar, suspecting that the colony may be breaching community regulations by granting selective aid to certain offshore companies.

**Western Sahara**
- On 23 January the Polisario Front decides to evacuate all non-essential aid workers due to rising fears over the security in Western Sahara, in the wake of the terrorist attack on the oil refinery in Algeria and the conflict in Mali.
- On 30 January Morocco closes the border between Western Sahara and Mauritania over concerns regarding the effects the conflict in Mali could have for security in the area, specifically the entry of jihadist elements in Sahrawi territory.
- On 17 February the Rabat Military Court hands down sentences to 24 Sahrawi activists, arrested during the dismantling of the Gdeim Izik protest camp in November 2010 and charged with the deaths of 11 Moroccan police officers. Eight of them are given life sentences, four are sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment, eight to 25 years and the remaining two to two years in prison, which have already been served.
- On 19 March the UN Special Envoy to Western Sahara Christopher Ross begins a new tour in which he visits Madrid, Rabat, Laayoune, Dakhla and Algiers. The tour comes amid concerns of instability spreading from nearby Mali and after obtaining renewed support from the Group of Friends of Western Sahara, who meet on 15 March.
- On 16 April Morocco rejects, on grounds of impartiality, the draft resolution that the US plans to submit to the UN Security Council at the end of April, which calls the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to include monitoring human rights abuses in the territory. The MINURSO is the only United Nations...
mission that does not include this competence. On 24 April France, Russia and Spain, who oppose the US proposal, persuade Washington to present a new proposal.

- On 9 May the Moroccan police arrest six Sahrawi accused of vandalism in Laayoune, who participated in a separatist march staged on 4 May.

- On 13 September families of the Sahrawi disappeared call Morocco and Spain for accountability after the discovery of two mass graves close to Esmeral containing the remains of Sahrawis who disappeared in 1976.

- On 25 September a young Sahrawi is shot dead by the Moroccan security forces during clashes in the city of Assazon, in the south of Morocco.

- On 19 October five Moroccan police officers are injured in Laayoune in unrest reported during the visit of UN Special Envoy Christopher Ross.

- On 27 December the Polisario Front condemns the fisheries agreement signed between the EU and Morocco on 24 December, which includes territorial waters belonging to Western Sahara. In exchange for signing the agreement, Brussels asks Rabat to provide evidence to show that the Sahrawi population will benefit from the revenues derived from the agreement and that fundamental rights are not violated. However, the Polisario urges Spain and the EU to recant as the agreement supports “Morocco’s illegal occupation of Western Sahara.”

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Chronologies

Chronology of Events in Israel and Palestine

With the potential threat to stability in the Middle East posed by the war in neighbouring Syria, the year begins in Israel with legislative elections in January in which the right-wing coalition formed by Likud (The Consolidation, Conservative Zionist) and Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel Our Government, ultra-nationalist liberal) wins a close-run victory that forces both parties to seek a wider governing coalition. The complex negotiations across a wide spectrum of political options bear no fruit until mid-March, when the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announces the formation of a new coalition government. This includes, besides the Likud – Yisrael Beiteinu alliance, Yesh Atid (There is a Future, centrist secular) and HaBayit HaYehudi (The Jewish Home, ultra-nationalist conservative) as well as Hatnuah (The Movement, social liberal progressive) and led by the former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who will take over as Minister of Justice and lead the peace talks with the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). The peace talks, however, are not the main priority of the new and, as of yet, unstable cabinet, which is more keenly focused on internal issues, such as how to weather Israel’s economic crisis, or the need for government members to agree on the reform bill on compulsory military service, following the Supreme Court’s repeal of the Tal Law in February 2012, which exempted young orthodox Jews from service. Also worthy of mention is the specific case of Avigdor Lieberman, who is forced to step down as Foreign Minister until November when he is cleared of corruption charges by the Israeli Ministry of Justice, in a trial which began in February 2013. On the international panorama, the uncertain drift of the Syrian conflict and its effects on the security of the State of Israel constitute the priority of the new cabinet. To this end, besides the preventative attack launched in May by Israel on a convoy in Syrian territory suspected of transporting Iranian missiles destined for the Bashar al-Assad regime, the security measures adopted by Israel are substantially heightened – including periodic closures of its air space and the permanent activation of the Iron Dome defensive system, especially in the wake of missile attacks from Lebanese territory and the Egyptian Sinai in August, which coincide with the growing possibility of international involvement in Syria. Faced with all of this, and despite the climate of scepticism hanging over the peace talks, the new US Secretary of State John Kerry is able to push ahead with his initiative to reactivate talks just two months after being appointed in February 2013, a year in which the Oslo Accords celebrates its twentieth anniversary. After three months of negotiation initiated in April with the Israeli government and the PNA, on 29 July the talks are resumed, headed by the chief negotiators, Tzipi Livni and Saeb Erekat, with Israel’s announcement that it will release 104 Palestinian prisoners throughout the year who have already served over 20 years in prison. However, despite this goodwill gesture, the Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem continue to constitute a major stumbling block to the peace process, largely due to Likud’s need to please some of its coalition partners -Yisrael Beiteinu and HaBayit HaYehudi-, who demand that the settlements are maintained and even extended. In this regard, the most controversial announcement comes in the middle of August with the authorisation of 1,187 new settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, as well as an expansion of 942 settlements in Gilo (south-east Jerusalem). Despite this and the PNA’s protests, negotiations are still resumed and register their first major crisis in mid-November when the PNA, in reaction to the approval of nearly 24,000 new homes in the West Bank and the E1 area of East Jerusalem, threatens to withdraw from the negotiating table, forcing Benjamin Netanyahu to halt the construction plans authorised by the Housing Ministry. The announcement in December 2013 of a draft law to annex the Jordan Valley, the only border between the West Bank and Jordan, poses a new threat to the reactivation of the talks. This announcement comes at the same time as the release of a further 26 Palestinian prisoners of the 104 promised by Israel and rising tensions in the Palestinian Territories.

January 2013

Israel

- On 10 January a car bomb meant for Nissim Alperon, a member of a well-known organised crime family, explodes in northern Tel Aviv leaving four people injured. Alperon escapes the attack unharmed.
- On 11 January 250 Palestinians encamp in the so-called E1 area, an area of land in the West Bank between Jerusalem and Jericho, publicly earmarked by Israel in December 2012 for the construction of thousands of new settlements. On 13 January Israel dismantles the
On 22 January Israel holds legislative elections in which the current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, leader of the right-wing coalition of Likud (Zionist conservative) and Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu (Ultra-nationalist liberal), wins 33.2% of the vote and 31 seats in the Knesset (Parliament), eleven fewer than it had held until now. The result forces Netanyahou and Lieberman to form a wider coalition. Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid (Centrist religious) comes second with 14.32% and 19 seats. HaAvoda, the Labour Party led by Shelly Yachimovich obtains 13.39% and 15 seats. HaBayit HaYehudi (Ultra-nationalist conservative) rises to fourth place with 9.12% of the vote and 12 seats.

On 30 January Israel unblocks 100 million dollars to be transferred to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) frozen by Israel after the recognition by the UN General Assembly of Palestine as an observer state in November 2012. The measure, authorised by Benjamin Netanyahu, comes in response to the seriousness of the PNA’s financial situation.

**February 2013**

**Israel**

- On 5 February the Bulgarian Interior Minister Tsvetan Tsvetanov assures that two members of Hezbollah were behind the car bomb attack that killed five Israeli tourists in Burgas in July 2012.
- On 14 February the Israeli Justice Ministry acknowledges the existence of Ben Zygier, alias Ben Allen, Ben Burrows, John Doe or Prisoner X. A Mossad agent with dual Australian and Israeli nationality, Zygier committed suicide in an Israeli prison on 15 December 2010 where he was imprisoned, accused of threatening the security of the State. The news is revealed after the gag order is partially lifted and on 17 February a Foreign Affairs and Defence subcommittee of the Israeli Parliament announces the opening of an investigation.
- On 14 February the trial begins in the Jerusalem District Court against the former Foreign Minister and leader of Yisrael Beiteinu, Avigdor Lieberman, for breach of trust and fraud in his appointment of Zeev Ben Arie as ambassador to Latvia, charges that Lieberman denies.
- On 20 February in a surprise joint appearance, Benjamin Netanyahou and the former Foreign Minister and leader of the opposition party Hatnua (Social liberal progressive), Tzipi Livni, announces that Livni will be the Justice Minister in the new cabinet and that she will head the Israeli delegation in the peace negotiations with the Palestinians.

**Palestine**

- On 19 January a young Palestinian man trying to enter Israel from the Beit Yatir camp near Hebron is shot down by the Israeli army.
- On 23 January a Palestinian citizen is killed in the al-Arroub refugee camp in the West Bank in an attack launched by the Israeli army.
- On 23 January a Palestinian citizen dies after being seriously injured in an Israeli attack on the Aida refugee camp, close to Bethlehem.

**Conflicts between the Parties**

- On 24 February the death of the Palestinian prisoner Arafat Jaradat, in Megiddo prison, ignites a wave of unrest in the West Bank. Fearing the beginning of a Third Intifada, Benjamin Netanyahu sends an urgent message to the PNA, which declares Jaradat a martyr for the cause to calm the situation in the PNA-controlled territories. Netanyahu also orders the transfer of 100 million dollars corresponding to tax revenues from January, pending transfer to the PNA and withheld by Israel. The same day, around 4,500 prisoners go on hunger strike in protest against Jaradat’s death.
- On 26 February a missile launched from Gaza strikes Ashkelon, the first since the truce signed in November 2012, giving rise to a series of three-way talks between Hamas, Israel and Egypt. The al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, the armed wing of Fatah, claims responsibility for the attack, which comes in response to the death of the Palestinian prisoner Arafat Jaradat.
March 2013

Israel

• On 2 March the President Simon Peres grants Benjamin Netanyahu two extra weeks to form a government, following the Labour Party’s refusal to form a coalition with Likud and Yisrael Beitenu, which are now relying on a post-electoral alliance with Yair Lapid’s centrist Yech Atid and Naftali Bennett’s ultra-nationalist HaBayit HaYehudi, which together have 31 seats. Both parties ask Netanyahu to ensure that the reform bill regulating military service puts an end to the exemption of ultra-orthodox Jews from the Yeshivas, (educational centres for studying religious texts) provided for by the Tal Law, which was overruled by the Supreme Court in February 2012. This requirement implies the break-up of the alliances held with the ultra-orthodox parties, which allowed Netanyahu to govern in 2009. A coalition without these parties marks the formation of a more centrist cabinet, whose focus would affect extremely sensitive policies, such as negotiations with the Palestinians, the Iranian nuclear issue, settlement policy or measures against immigration.

• On 3 March a bus line for Palestinians only comes into use, created by the Transport Ministry to avoid Palestinians travelling in buses used by Israelis. On 5 March two of the buses from this line that joins Eyal, a town near to Qalqilya, with Tel Aviv, are set on fire in protest against this segregation measure.

• On 14 March Benjamin Netanyahu reaches an agreement to form a government, after two months of complex negotiations. The new cabinet will prioritise the Israel’s economy and internal social issues, relegating negotiations with the PNA to a secondary position, which will be led by the new Justice Minister Tzipi Livni. The decision is aimed at maintaining the governing coalition together, which is formed by the Likud – Yisrael Beitenu alliance, Yesh Atid, HaBayit HaYehudi and Hatnuah. On 18 March the new cabinet is sworn in before the Knesset. Avigdor Lieberman maintains his position as Foreign Minister, a post he will take up once the trial he is undergoing reaches its conclusion. Until that time, Netanyahu himself will take charge of the ministerial post. Moshe Yaalon, from Likud, becomes Defence Minister.

• On 20 March Barack Obama begins his first official visit to Israel as US President. His tour of the Middle East also takes him to Jordan and Palestine.

• On 24 March Israel fires a Tamuz missile at a military post in Syrian territory in response to an attack launched from Syria against a Tsahal (Israeli army) military vehicle in the Golan Heights, the second such attack from Israel’s northeast neighbour in less than 12 hours.

Palestine

• On 6 March the United Nations are forced to cancel the third edition of the Gaza International Marathon, scheduled for 10 April, due to Hamas’ decision to prohibit men and women running together.

• On 12 March Hamas offers amnesties to Israeli collaborators, a crime carrying the death penalty, who are handed over to the Gaza authorities before 11 April. Hamas assures that they will not be detained or interrogated and that their families will receive monthly financial aid.

• On 17 March Israel deploys Ayman Sharawneh, one of the Palestinian prisoners on hunger strike, to the Gaza Strip for a period of 10 years.

Conflicts between the Parties

• On 13 March one Palestinian is killed and eight injured during clashes in Fuar, in the West Bank, between the Israeli army and young Palestinians who were throwing stones at a military patrol.

• On 21 March two rockets fired from the Gaza Strip land in southern Israel, one of them in the city of Sderot. Other rockets launched during the day land in the Gaza Strip, coinciding with the US President Barack Obama’s visit to Israel and Palestine.

April 2013

Israel

• On 9 April the Jerusalem District Court hands out two life sentences and a 141,000-euro fine to Jack Teitel, a terrorist with dual US-Israeli nationality, arrested in 2009 for ten crimes, including the murder of Palestinians.

• On 17 April two Grad rockets fired from the Egyptian Sinai land in Eilat.

• On 21 April the US Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel arrives in Israel to begin his tour of the Middle East. With the Iranian nuclear programme and the war in Syria topping his agenda, Hagel’s visit hopes to reach an arms agreement between Washington and Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel, valued at 10 million dollars.

• On 23 April the government approves the proposal presented by the Jewish Agency for Israel to liberalise access to the Wailing Wall in Jerusalem, extending the prayer time to include a mixed section for men and women.

• On 23 April the Israeli army announces that the Syrian army are using chemical weapons against the armed rebels and the civilian population. The previous day, the Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Yaalon warns that Israel is ready to act if it learns of groups that are hostile towards the State of Israel gaining control of chemical weapons.

• On 25 April an Israeli fighter jet destroys an unmanned plane close to Haifa possibly coming from Lebanon. Hezbollah denies any involvement in the event.

Palestine

• On 1 April Khaled Mashal is unanimously re-elected in Cairo by senior Hamas figures as leader of the movement for the next four years.

• On 2 April the Hamas government passes a law that will enter into force in September under which students over nine years of age must be separated by sex and which bans men from teaching in girls’ schools.

• On 2 April Palestinian Maysara Abu Hamdiya is reported to have died from throat cancer in a hospital in Beersheba. The Hamas militant was a prisoner in Israel’s Soroka prison, where he had been serving a life sentence since 2002 for a failed bomb attack on a cafe in Jerusalem. On 3 April Egypt, Lebanon and the PNA appeal to the International Community to force Israel to respect the rights of Palestinian prisoners held in their jails, alleging that Hamdiya’s death was due to deliberate...
medical negligence. At the same time, some 4,600 Palestinian prisoners in Israel begin a three-day hunger strike in protest.

- On 8 April the UN Agency for Palestinian Refugees (UNRWA) announces the reopening of its food distribution centres in the Gaza Strip. Operations were suspended on 5 April due to violent protests staged by Palestinians over the termination of the UNRWA’s 40-dollar annual aid package until now awarded to 106,000 refugees in Gaza, due to the organisation’s lack of funds for 2013, estimated at 68 million dollars. According to UNRWA spokesperson Adnan Abu Hasna, the centres have been reopened after receiving guarantees from Hamas of the safety of UN staff.

- On 11 April the PNA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad submits his resignation to the President Mahmoud Abbas. In 2012 Fayyad had already expressed his intention to resign from the post he had held since 2007.

**Peace Negotiations**

- On 4 April Haaretz reports the decision of the PNA President Mahmoud Abbas to freeze the unilateral Palestinian initiative to gain membership to various UN agencies, including the International Criminal Court, with the aim of giving leeway to the US Secretary of State John Kerry, who is trying to push forward with a new round of negotiations between Israel and the PNA.

**Conflicts between the Parties**

- On 2 April Israel responds to several missiles fired from Gaza by a Salafist group, with an air strike in the north of the Strip, the first since the truce between Israel and Hamas agreed in November 2012.

- On 3 April two Palestinians are killed at a military checkpoint in Tulkarm, in skirmishes with Israeli soldiers in various places in the West Bank, after the news of that the Palestinian prisoner Maysara Abu Hamdiya has died. On 4 April, the day of Hamdiya’s funeral, violent clashes break out in Ramallah, Hebron and other places in the West Bank and the Islamic Jihad calls for the Third Intifada.

- On 18 April two rockets fired from the Gaza Strip land in southern Israel without causing any damage.

- On 28 April Israel attacks a Hamas training camp and an Islamic Jihad arms deposit in the south of the Gaza Strip, in response to a Grad missile fired the previous night at Sdot Negev, southern Israel, during the Jewish Lag BaOmer holiday. Israel also closes the Kerem Shalom border crossing.

- On 30 April a Palestinian stabs an Israeli settler to death at the Tapuaj border crossing, in the north of the West Bank, and then opens fire with the victim’s weapon on police guarding the crossing. The aggressor is injured in the shoot-out, arrested and taken to Beilinson Hospital in Petah Tikva.

**May 2013**

**Israel**

- On 3 May Israel launches an air strike on Syrian territory that destroys a convoy transporting Fateh-110 missiles from Iran to Damascus to be subsequently transferred to Hezbollah. On 4 May Israel launches a new attack, this time on the national military research centre in Jamraya. At least 42 Syrian soldiers are killed in the attacks. Lebanon condemns the attack for being launched from its air space and Syria describes it as a declaration of war. Syria and the Arab League also ask the UN Security Council to act to halt the Israeli attacks, which are violating the sovereignty of an Arab country, Israel, for its part, closes entry from Lebanon and Syria into its air space for civilian flights and deploys batteries of its defence system on its northern borders.

- On 9 May the Israeli Civil Administration in the West Bank, an independent body of the army and the Defence Ministry approves the construction of 296 homes in the Beit El settlement. The decision is part of the agreement made in 2012 to relocate the settlers evicted from the Ulpana enclave, which was ordered to be dismantled by the Supreme Court.

- On 12 May thousands of people protest in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Hafia against tax increases and austerity measures in public spending presented by the Finance Minister and leader of the centrist Yesh Atid Yair Lapid. On 13 May the Council of Ministers approves the two-year austerity plan, which includes a reduction of 647 million euros in the defence budget, an increase of 1.5 points on income tax, a one-point increase on corporate tax and a one-point rise on VAT, as well as cuts in family benefits.

- On 14 May the Israeli government announces that it will legalise the settlements of Maale Rehavam, Haroeh, Givat Assaf and Mitzpe Lachish, located in Israeli enclaves in the West Bank.

- On 19 May the government committee set up in 2012 by order of Benjamin Netanyahu to investigate the circumstances surrounding Mohamed al-Dura’s death concludes that the death of the child, which symbolised the Second Intifada – from September 2000 to February 2005 – was not caused by shots fired by the Israeli army, as was reported worldwide through images captured by a Palestinian France-2 cameraman.

- On 19 May Israel announces that it will return the land where the Homesh settlement is located, founded in 1978 in the north of the West Bank and evacuated in 2005, to its original Palestinian owners, mostly people living in the Palestinian village of Burkia. After their removal, the land remained under the control of the army, allegedly for security reasons. The decision taken by the State of Israel puts an end to a process opened in 2011 by the Supreme Court at the request of the Palestinian owners.

- On 21 May the Israeli army shoots at targets on the Syrian border in response to shots fired from their northern neighbour against Israeli soldiers in the Golan Heights.

- On 26 May a missile fired from southern Lebanon lands in Israel.

- On 29 May the government-appointed committee comprising six ministers brings a bill before the Ministerial Council. If approved in the Parliament, the bill would mean that, as of 2017, compulsory military service would also apply to the vast majority of students at Jewish seminaries, exempt from military service since the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. The text, which was backed by the Finance Minister Yair Lapid provides for sanctions to be taken against ultra-orthodox Jews who refuse to carry out military service. Among its main opponents is the

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Defence Minister Moshe Yaalon. For its part, the extreme right-wing Yisrael Beiteinu attains a promise from the government to also regulate, within a period of five years, a voluntary civil service for the Arab community, which is also exempt from military service.

**Palestine**

- On 27 May the US Secretary of State John Kerry ends his tour of the Middle East with the official announcement in the closing meeting of the World Economic Forum held on the Jordanian Banks of the Dead Sea, of a new 4-billion-dollar investment plan to bolster the Palestinian economy, particularly the real estate and tourist sectors.

**Peace Negotiations**

- On 8 - 9 May Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas meet in Beijing, with the Chinese President Xi Jinping over China’s offer to conduct mediation between Israel and the PNA and unblock the peace process.
- On 23 May the US Secretary of State John Kerry begins a new round of talks separately with the Israeli and Palestinian negotiators to try to relaunch the peace process.

**Conflicts between the Parties**

- On 15 May, Nakba Day, meaning catastrophe in Arabic, in reference to the creation of Israel in 1948 and the consequent exodus of 760,000 Palestinians, clashes break out between Palestinian demonstrators and the Israeli security forces in front of the Israeli military prison Ofer, close to Ramallah, in Beit Ommar, close to Hebron, in East Jerusalem and in other places in the West Bank. Demonstrations are held in East Jerusalem, Ramallah, Nablus and Hebron, as well as in the Gaza Strip, from where a missile is also fired into southern Israel without causing any damages.

**June 2013**

**Israel**

- On 5 June the judge Nissim Yeshaya resigns over a comment he made during an appeals committee for the trial of a rape of a 13-year-old girl in Jerusalem by four Palestinians, in which he said, “some girls enjoy being raped.”
- On 6 June Austria announces the imminent withdrawal of all its Blue Helmets from the Golan Heights. The withdrawal of 382 Austrian soldiers adds to other withdrawals in recent months from Croatian, Canadian and Japanese soldiers. The decision from Vienna is confirmed the same day as serious clashes break out in the area between Syrian rebels and the Syrian army, which gains control of the Quneitra border crossing, which separates Israel from Syria through the demilitarised zone and constitutes the main supply route for the UN troops deployed in the area.
- On 13 June the Jerusalem Post reports Israel’s plan to authorise the construction of 538 new homes in the Itamar settlement as well as legalising 137 homes already built in the area. It also reports the State’s decision to review plans for the construction of a further 550 settlements in Bruchin.
- On 21 June an Israeli security guard shoots dead a Jewish visitor to the Western Wall in Jerusalem confusing him with a Palestinian militant after the victim shouted “Allah is great.”

**Palestine**

- On 2 June the PNA President Mahmoud Abbas appoints the rector of An-Najah University in Nablus, Rami Hamdallah, as the new Prime Minister to replace Salam Fayyad. The appointment is described as illegal by Hamas. On 20 June Hamdallah submits his resignation due to differences with Mahmoud Abbas over his abilities and the allocation of duties.
- On 20 June Iran announces a reduction in the economic aid given to Hamas in the Gaza Strip because of the latter’s siding with Syrian rebels against the Bashar al-Assad regime, which traditionally has supported Hamas’ cause, whose central headquarters was located in Damascus until 2012. Tehran’s decision comes days after Hamas asks its Lebanese ally, Hezbollah to stop supporting the Syrian regime. With the Damascus-Teheran-Hezbollah-Hamas axis seriously damaged, relations between Hamas and Egypt are also suffering: the Islamist Egyptian government accuses Hamas of repeated illegal incursions and complicity in attacks on Egyptian soldiers in the unstable Sinai.

**July 2013**

**Israel**

- On 7 July the government approves, with 14 votes in favour and four abstentions, the bill that requires young orthodox Jews to carry out compulsory military service as of 2017 and which only exempts 1,800 scholarly-gifted students who may continue to study the Torah.
- On 9 July Haaretz reports that Israel has asked the US not to reduce the military aid it grants Egypt each year, - 1.3 billion dollars - as retribution for the downfall of Mohamed Morsi and which Egypt has benefited from since the signing of the Peace Treaty with Israel in 1979.
- On 15 July thousands of Israeli Arabs demonstrate in different places around the country against the bill to forcefully expropriate between 30,000 and 40,000 Bedouins, the demolition of around 40 villages not recognised by the State and the confiscation of more than 70,000 hectares of land in the Negev.

**Palestine**

- On16 July the Palestinian government asks the World Bank to increase its support of the PNA to ease the effects of the economic crisis in Palestine and reduce the public debt, which has risen to 4.2 billion dollars.

**Peace Negotiations**

- On 19 July after six tours of the Middle East in five months in the post, the
US Secretary of State John Kerry announces that the peace talks, which have been deadlocked since 2010, will resume. Hours later, Israel confirms that it will gradually release 104 Palestinian prisoners in the coming months, who have served more than 20 years in prison. Both Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas announce that any agreement eventually reached in the new round of talks will be put to a national referendum in their respective populations.

- On 29 July John Kerry appoints the former US ambassador to Israel Martin Indyk as the new US Special Envoy to the Middle East.
- On 29 July Israelis and Palestinians resume indirect peace talks in Washington after being deadlocked for almost three years, despite the prevailing climate of scepticism in both camps. This initial contact in the US capital concludes on 30 July with the adoption of a work plan by the chief negotiators Tzipi Livni and Saeb Erekat, to try to reach an agreement within the next nine months. This plan includes all thorny questions: the status of East Jerusalem, Israeli settlements in the West Bank, the return of Palestinian refugees, security issues and border demarcation, although the future status of the Jordan Valley, the only Palestinian border with Jordan, is left to be negotiated separately.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 28 August faced with the prospect of an international intervention in Syria, Israel activates all its Iron Dome and Arrow 2 anti-missile defence shields. The country also activates its military and civil self-defence protocols.

Peace Negotiations

- On 14 August the Israeli Air Force bomb Gaza in response to the prior launch of a rocket from the Strip that landed in southern Israel. None of the attacks causes any damages.
- On 14 August the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas asks the former Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah, who resigned in June over an internal dispute, to form a new government.

September 2013

Israel

- On 3 September two Palestinians burst onto the runways at the Ben Gurion International airport in Tel Aviv in a stolen truck heading towards the terminal 3 building. The security services are able to stop the truck and arrest the two men.
- On 17 September Benjamin Netanyahu presents his roadmap to halt the Iranian nuclear programme, which consists of four fundamental points: halting uranium enrichment, the confiscation of all uranium already enriched by Iran, the closure of the Qom nuclear plant and suspending the alternative enrichment of plutonium. The announcement comes days after the Iranian President Hassan Rouhani offers the closure of the Fordo nuclear plant in exchange for the lifting of sanctions imposed by the US and the EU, an offer that Netanyahu considers insufficient since most centrifuges are not located in the plant in question.

Palestine

- On 20 August a Palestinian man is killed in the Jenin refugee camp during a raid led by the Israeli army to capture an Islamic Jihad leader Bassam Al-Saadi, in which a further two Palestinians and two Israeli soldiers are injured.
- On 26 August following a raid in the Qalandia refugee camp, close to Ramallah, clashes break out between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian demonstrators, in which three Palestinians are killed and at least 15 injured. Hours later, thousands of people gather in Qalandia to attend the funerals of the three men who died, which end in new clashes with Israeli soldiers at a checkpoint.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 14 August the Israeli government agrees to freeze any negotiations or agreements with the EU until the latter clarifies the guidelines that according to a new EC directive approved in June and in force since 19 July “prohibit funding, cooperating with or assisting entities operating within Israeli settlements located in territories considered to be occupied.”
- On 11 August Israel announces the construction of 1,187 new homes in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, in a move to calm the more conservative members of the government coalition, following July’s announcement of the release of 104 Palestinian prisoners.
- On 13 August the Jerusalem City Council, approves the construction of 942 homes in Gilo, East Jerusalem, announced a year ago.
- On 13 August the Israeli Iron Dome defence system intercepts a missile fired from the Sinai at the Israeli city of Eilat.
- On 22 August four missiles are fired from Lebanese territory into northern Israel, which closes its air space following the first attack launched from Lebanon in years. On 23 August Israel bombs a terrorist target close to Beirut in response to the previous day’s attack, for which the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, linked to al-Qaeda, claim responsibility.
- On 28 August faced with the prospect of an international intervention in Syria, Israel activates all its Iron Dome and Arrow 2 anti-missile defence shields. The country also activates its military and civil self-defence protocols.

Peace Negotiations

- On 14 August in the early hours of the morning, Israel releases the first 26 prisoners of the 104 detained under the Oslo Accords, despite the appeal brought before the Supreme Court by the families of the victims of attacks committed or planned by the prisoners.
- On 14 August the Israeli and Palestinian chief negotiators Tzipi Livni and Saeb Erekat, resume peace talks in Jerusalem and Jericho.
- On 26 August, despite Saeb Erekat’s announcement to cancel that day’s meeting with Tzipi Livni to be held in Jericho in protest over the death of three Palestinians in Ramallah, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations finally meet to proceed with the peace negotiations.

- On 26 September the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas speaks be-
fore the United Nations General Assembly to ask the international community to exert all pressure possible for the negotiations between Israel and the PNA to conclude with a definitive peace agreement and to put an end to the expropriation of land in Palestine and the construction of Israeli settlements.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 20 September the Israeli sergeant Tomer Hazan is killed near Qalqilya, the West Bank, at the hands of a Palestinian colleague. Amar was intending to negotiate the exchange of Hazan’s body for the release of his brother, who has served 10 years of a sentence accused of participating in several attacks for the Fatah militia known as Tanzim.
- On 22 September the Israeli soldier Gili Coby is shot dead by a Palestinian sniper close to the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, the West Bank. Both deaths heighten the pressure on the Israeli army to cancel the release process underway of 104 Palestinian prisoners, which constitutes part of the deal with the PNA within the framework of the peace negotiations.

October 2013

Israel

- On 7 October the Israeli army discovers a 2.5 km tunnel next to the Ein HaShlosha kibbutz between the Gaza Strip and Israeli territory, the construction of which is attributed to armed Islamist groups suspected of planning an attack.
- On 9 October the Israeli army shoots into Syrian territory after two mortar bombs land in an Israeli-controlled area in the north of the Golan Heights injuring a soldier.
- On 22 October Israel holds local elections with a turnout of 35.9% of the five and a half million Israelis called to the ballot boxes to elect 191 municipalities. In the capital, Jerusalem, the independent candidate Nir Barkat renews his term beating the ultra-orthodox Moshe Lion. Ron Huldai, the mayor since 1998, wins again in Tel Aviv, beating Nitzan Horowitz (Meretz, left-wing). In Haifa, Yona Yahav (Shinui, liberal-secular) wins a third term. The mayors of Rishon LeZion –Dov Tzur– and Beersheba –Ruvik Danilovich– are also reelected.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 11 October the former Israeli colonel Seraiah Ofer is hacked to death by Palestinian citizens in the north of the Jordan Valley, the West Bank. This is the fourth attack on Israeli citizens in the West Bank in recent weeks.
- On 14 October Swiss forensic experts investigating the cause of death of Yasser Arafat, who died in Paris in 2004, issue a report stating that it is highly likely that the historic PNA President was poisoned with polonium. Experts from the Russian team, however, strongly deny that his death could have been caused by polonium.

November 2013

Israel

- On 6 November Benjamin Netanyahu announces that the former Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman is returning to his post in government after being acquitted by a court in Jerusalem of the corruption charges held against him.
- On 13 November an Israeli soldier is stabbed to death on a bus in Afula in northern Israel by a young Arab-Israeli from Jenin, in retaliation for the imprisonment of one of his family members.

Palestine

- On 11 October the former Israeli cabinet minister Tzura Tzur and Beersheba –Ruvik Danilovich– are also reelected.

Peace Negotiations

- On 27 October despite protests by families of terrorist victims and strong opposition from certain ministers, the government approves the release on 26 October 26 of the 104 Palestinian prisoners that Israel promised to release before the end of the year, within the framework of reopening peace talks with the PNA.

December 2013

Israel

- On 10 December representatives of the Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian government sign an agreement described as historic to connect the Red Sea with the shrinking Dead Sea and fight against the region’s water shortage.
- On 10 December Israel inaugurates a monument in Tel Aviv to the more than 10,000 homosexuals that were murdered during the Holocaust.
- On 15 December, around a hundred sub-Saharan immigrants escape from a holding centre in southern Israel and begin a march on foot to Beersheba and then towards Jerusalem to protest
against the low number of asylum visas issued by Israel and Israel’s new legislation on asylum seekers, which stipulates that illegal immigrants will have to remain in holding centres indefinitely.

- On 23 December Benjamin Netanyahu announces that he will ask Washington for explanations for the “unacceptable” acts of espionage committed four years ago by the US National Security Agency (NSA) against senior officials in the Israeli government, according to new secret documents revealed by the former employee of the NSA Edward Snowden, and disclosed on 20 December by the New York Times. These revelations are of particular relevance to Israel as they could complicate the handling of Jonathan Pollard’s release, an Israeli spy serving a life sentence since 1987 for stealing classified information from the US.

- On 29 December the United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon calls on Lebanon and Israel to show “maximum restraint” following the border incident that broke out during the day, in which two missiles fired from Lebanese territory land in northern Israel, provoking an Israeli military response. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNIFIL, increases its patrols and surveillance on the border following the incident. For its part, the Lebanese army locates a total of four rocket launchers on the outskirts of the town of Khaibat Hasbaya, from where the rockets would have been launched. Israel blames Hezbollah for the attack.

**Peace Negotiations**

- On 21 December the foreign ministers of the Arab League support the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas’ rejection of the security plan to facilitate peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians proposed by the US Secretary of State John Kerry. The Arab countries accuse Kerry of not being an impartial mediator saying that his proposal favours the Israeli expansionist policy and guarantees Israeli military presence in the Jordan Valley when, according to the Palestinians, this item should have been negotiated outside of the peace talks.

- On 30 December Israel proceeds to release 26 more Palestinian prisoners from the total of 104 releases agreed as a goodwill gesture for reactivating the peace negotiations. The PNA President Mahmoud Abbas, who takes part in the act, warns that he will not sign any peace agreement with the Israeli government until all the prisoners are released.

- On 29 December the Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Erekat condemns the approval by the Israeli government’s Ministerial Committee for Legislation of a bill by which Israel formally annexes the Jordan Valley, Palestine’s only international border with Jordan, and accuses Israel of once again showing that it is not interested in a two-state solution.

**Conflicts between the Parties**

- On 18 December the Israeli security forces kill a Palestinian citizen and injure a further six during a raid on the home of a Hamas militant in Jenin, the West Bank, which triggers clashes between the police and various residents.

- On 22 December a police officer is injured in a bomb blast on a bus in Bat Yam, in the south of Tel Aviv.

- On 24 December an employee of the Israeli army is shot dead by the Popular Resistance Committee from the Gaza Strip. In retaliation, the Israeli army launches an attack on the north of Gaza in which a young girl is killed. On 25 December Benjamin Netanyahu holds an urgent meeting for his cabinet and the heads of security for Israel faced with the rising tensions registered both in Gaza and the West Bank in recent days. Several members of the cabinet recommend postponing the release of a further 26 Palestinian prisoners scheduled for 29 December from a total of 104 releases, agreed as a goodwill gesture for the reactivation of the peace negotiations.

- On 26 December two missiles are fired into southern Israel from Gaza without causing any damages. Israel responds by firing two missiles into the strip leaving one person injured.

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Chronology of the Barcelona Process

January

Irish Presidency
1 – Dublin: The Irish Presidency launches its policy programme “for stability, jobs and growth.” The programmes’ main priorities can be summarised as follows: security stability, investing in sustainable jobs and growth and Europe and the world. The Presidency will provide active support for the High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRFASP) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) in the task of strengthening the EU’s external policy effectiveness and coherence with the Union’s Eastern and Southern neighbours, placing particular focus on development, humanitarian policy and climate change, fostering commercial relations and encouraging the development of democratic and peaceful societies in the Union’s neighbourhood.

http://eu2013.ie/media/eupresidency/content/documents/EU-Pres_Prog_A4.pdf

ARLEM
16 – Brussels: Political representatives of cities and regions of the EU and its Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) gather to discuss sustainable development, energy transition and sustainable tourism in the Mediterranean. In the framework of the development of the Mediterranean Solar Plan a need for a stronger involvement of the local and regional authorities is requested in order to secure commitment from local population. The issue of sustainable tourism is also tackled with a series of recommendations for local authorities to foster innovation, reduce waste and pollution and manage human resources in the sector.

EU - Tunisia
17 – Tunis: European Council President Van Rompuy meets with Prime Minister Jebali during his first visit to Tunisia and affirms the EU’s will to strengthen relations with the country following the political agreement on Privileged partnership and the implementation of the new Action Plan. Van Rompuy encourages the democratisation process, particularly in the areas of judicial independence and the role of women and the independence of the media.


Maghreb Integration
18 – Brussels: The European Commissioner for ENP Füle and the SG of the Arab Maghreb Union Ben Yahia, meet to discuss ways of implementing part of the EU’s set of policy proposals of the Joint Communication on supporting closer cooperation and regional integration in the Maghreb. The talks focus on concrete initiatives like energy, private sector development, transport, rural development, agriculture and civil society.


Euromed Heritage
21-23 – Fez: The Euromed Heritage programme holds its closing conference on the theme “Towards a new strategy for cultural heritage in the Mediterranean.” The conference focuses on the achievements of Euromed Heritage and how best to build on them for the future of Mediterranean cultural heritage. The recommendations propose orientations for future strategic changes: part of this vision is an enhanced and better defined role of civil society groups and the private sector, their relationship with the authorities, and the framework within which collaboration among them could occur. With a budget of €17 million, the current phase of the programme, Euromed Heritage 4, has financed 12 projects over the period 2008-2013. The specific objective of this phase is to support Mediterranean populations in the ownership of their cultural heritage at both national and regional levels, by facilitating their access to education and knowledge of their cultural heritage.

www.euromedheritage.net/intern.cfm?enuID=9&subenuID=7&idnews=775

UIM Projects
29 – Barcelona: The Senior Officials of the 43 UIM member states approve three new projects to be coordinated by the UIM. They will contribute to the improvement of the Mediterranean transport networks (by integrating the Jordan railway system with the regional network by establishing effective railway connection with neighbouring countries), the support of business development (through the creation of a the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Development Centre for Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises to support MSMEs’ access to market, finance, and human capital development), as well as the enhancement of training and employability skills of all professionals participating in Higher education programmes and advanced training courses on food security and rural development.
nance of vocational education and training in the Southern Mediterranean countries, giving a particular importance to cooperation between the countries, both north-south and south-south.

ARLEM
18 – Brussels: Local and regional representatives from the EU and MPCs assess the state of decentralisation, territorial organisation and regional development in the 4th plenary session of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM). Technical education, vocational training and the promotion of sustainable tourism in the Mediterranean are others important topics for debate. ARLEM co-presidents present a report on the UfM territorial dimension giving the chance to discuss new outlook for decentralisation and regional developments.


Civil Protection
18-22 – Istanbul: A workshop organised by civil protection programme PPRD South gather 27 experts from the Civil Protection Authorities of 11 Mediterranean and Balkan countries in order to analyse in detail recent disasters which affected the environment in the Euro-Mediterranean region and devise possible preparedness measures to respond to future crises. Participants review the available tools for identifying the possible negative consequences on the environment of a natural or a technological disaster, for assessing the level of risk and putting in place mitigation measures.

http://euromedcp.eu/index.php

Solar plan
19-21 – Barcelona: The Joint Committee of National Experts for the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) gathering more than a hundred experts from twenty Euro-Mediterranean countries, meet to discuss the Draft of the Master Plan, prepared by the UfM Secretariat after 18 months of intensive work and discussion with all the stakeholders (Member States, European Commission, League of Arab States, Financial institutions, Industry, regional and sub-regional platforms, etc.). The Master Plan addresses the following key issues: developing enabling policy and regulatory frameworks; strengthening financial support tools; upgrading transmission infrastructure systems; supporting industrial development and job creation; enhancing capacity development and know-how transfer.

http://ufmsecretariat.org

Urban Development
22 – Barcelona: Experts from UfM partner countries, representatives from the EC, the Arab League, International Financial Institutions (IFIs), as well as numerous institutions working on urban matters, gather on the occasion of the Fourth Senior Officials Experts Meeting of the UfM Euro-Mediterranean Sustainable Urban Development Strategy. During the meeting, the latest version of the “Guidance framework for sustainable Euro-Mediterranean cities and territories” (GF) is discussed and reviewed. The Guidance Framework aims to enable a shared perspective in urban and territorial strategies; specify the core values of a balanced sustainable urban development that respects people and the environment; and offer a basis for discussion for the authorities implementing sustainable development initiatives.

http://ufmsecretariat.org

Migration
27-28 – Paris: The Euromed Migration III project organises a high level peer to peer meeting on the topic of Legal Migration gathering representatives from ENPI South Partner Countries and EU Member States in order to better define common ground on labour migration opportunities and challenges. The meeting uses a blend of plenary and focused working groups throughout the two days in order to better facilitate discussions, brainstorming and debates, allowing to voice South and North perspectives, understand better data matters, while reviewing migration and management tools and related labour market issues. The meeting set out to review expectations and common challenges on labour migration at national, intra- and inter-regional level, to identify key indicators to monitor labour migration
and discuss their use vis-à-vis the furthering of evidence-based labour migration policy development and also to explore and discuss the benefits of available labour and labour migration management tools.

Syria
28 - Brussels: The EU extends all EU sanctions against the Syrian regime for a further three months and amends the arms embargo so as to allow for the provision of non-lethal equipment and technical assistance for the protection of civilians. This decision gives legal effect to an agreement reached at the Foreign Affairs Council of 18 February.


Media
3-4 - Barcelona: Over a hundred representatives of international media bodies, citizen journalists and inter-cultural experts from 30 countries of Europe and the Southern Mediterranean attend the Euro-Mediterranean Media Meeting. Participants and experts debate new challenges and opportunities for cross-cultural reporting in the context of the historical Arab awakening, the impact of the economic crisis on social values in Europe, and ongoing conflicts in the region. The meeting provides an opportunity for the presentation of the first comprehensive Euro-Med mapping exercise, including good practices related to ethical cross-cultural reporting. Among the media organisations present are Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, Al Shark Al Awssat, El País, the BBC, France 24, and Deutsche Welle, in addition to leading media initiatives such as Creative Commons and the Ethical Journalism Network, Panos Institute, Arab media Institute, etc.

http://ufmsecretariat.org/media-for-the-mediterranean/

ENP
19 - Brussels: The “ENP annual package,” is presented by High Representative Ashton and ENP Commissioner Füle. This year’s Package consists of a Joint Communication of the Commission and the High Representative and twelve Country Progress Reports assessing the implementation of the ENP in 2012 in the twelve neighbouring countries with which an ENP Action Plan or an Association Agenda has been agreed; two regional reports reviewing the progress made in 2012 in the implementation of the Eastern Partnership and the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with southern Mediterranean partners; and a report with quantitative indicators of progress toward reform. Despite the current economic crisis in the EU, financial resources in the form of grants and loans allocated to the region have increased. EU cooperation with its Neighbourhood partner countries is stronger and is delivering positive results despite political instability and difficult socio-economic conditions. A press release notes that democratic reforms undertaken in the Southern neighbourhood vary and are not linear, leading to the conclusion that there is
a need for bigger differentiation in the EU response to individual country needs and aspirations.


April

Anna Lindh Forum

4-7 – Marseille: With around 1,500 citizens from 44 countries from across the Mediterranean, the ALF Forum brings together in dialogue youth leaders, civil society at large, non-state actors, parliamentarians and elected officials. Hold under the banner ‘Citizens for the Mediterranean,’ the Forum closes with a number of key points, including: a sustainable action for Syria, the need for ad-hoc visas for cultural leaders working across the region for re-launching the Mediterranean partnership and the launching of the Euro-Med handbook on teaching inter-cultural citizenship in schools and the Euro-Med translation programme, focused on reducing the gap of mutual perceptions. On the margins of the Forum the EP President Schulz welcomes Speakers of the Parliaments of the UfM member countries in the first high-level meeting since the summit of the Heads of State and government of the UfM held in Paris in 2008 and the first regional meeting since the Arab Spring. A declaration approved by over 40 parliamentary presidents supports more democratic legitimacy and participation by UfM citizens. In the area of gender equality, the presidents underline the scale of the challenges of democratic transformation in the southern countries and combating the economic crisis in the northern ones. They also reiterate that human dignity, respect for fundamental rights and gender equality must guide regional cooperation, in the interests of bringing peoples together. The presidents emphasise that mobility partnerships envisaged to ease the free movement of people must be put in place quickly, and call for a common area of professional training, higher education, science and research.


PA-UfM

11-12 – Brussels: Members of the 9th PA-UfM state that the democratic reforms underway in the south and east of the Mediterranean must be carried out by strong parliaments equipped with adequate human resources and infrastructure and call for better representation of women in elected institutions. To achieve parity in the most important decision-making positions, both at parliamentary and government level, they call for the progressive implementation of quotas or other forms of positive action. The Parliamentary Assembly also push for the accelerated implementation of concrete projects of the UfM, namely in the field of renewable energies and environment protection. After holding the presidency of the PA-UfM for a year, the EP has handed it over to Jordan. The new President of the PA calls for contacts with civil societies and for a focus on youth unemployment.

FEMIP

18 – Athens: The 12th FEMIP Conference gathers Ministers of Maritime Affairs of Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, France, Greece, Morocco and Palestine, European Commissioner for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Vice-President of EIB among others. The conference seeks to support the commitment of all to support a blue and sustainable economy in the Mediterranean region and to maximise marine and maritime cooperation across all bordering countries.

www.amiado.com/12thFEMIP_Conference.html

May

Media

3- Dublin: A conference on ‘Media and Intercultural Relations in the Mediterranean region’ organised by ALF on the occasion of World Press Freedom Day, concludes that the Foundation would reinforce its activity with Media and Journalists ‘to promote the potential of media in exposing the common values of citizens and combating wrong perceptions.’ The conference presents a mapping on cross-cultural reporting and suggestions for a sustainable action in the field of Media. The conference also sees the international launch of the 2013 edition of ALF Journalist Award for Reporting across Cultures.

www.pressfreedomday.org/overview

Women entrepreneurs

6 – Barcelona: The UfM launches the new project ‘Young Women as Job Creators’ that will be implemented between May and November 2013 in Morocco, Palestine, Jordan and Spain, in collaboration with partner business-women associations and local universities from the four participating countries. The project’s major aim is to inform, motivate and train up to 10,000 young female university students to become future successful businesswomen and employers. By facilitating their transition from education to work, the project promotes self-employment and entrepreneurship among young women university students who have an interest in starting their own business.

http://ufmsecretariat.org/young-women-as-job-creators-2/

Security

22 – Brussels: The EU today establishes a civilian EU integrated border management assistance mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya) to support capacity building for enhancing the security of Libya’s land, sea and air borders. This is the result of thorough discussions between the EU and the Libyan authorities regarding the country’s needs and priorities on how to improve the management and security of Libyan land and coastline.

Mediterranean Diet

23 – Rome: The project MedDiet, funded under the EU-funded CBCMed, is holding its launching conference on the theme “Mediterranean Diet, a driver of economic development, prosperity and solidarity among the countries of the Mediterranean Basin” The Conference gathers representatives of the project partners as well as of other institutions. Increasing the awareness of consumers, in particular young people, about the importance of preserving healthy food traditions and implementing sustainable initiatives for the safeguard of the Mediterranean Diet are the key objectives of
EU and Israel sign a comprehensive air transport agreement which will gradually open up and integrate their respective markets, develop an aviation area with common rules, offer economic benefits for consumers and new opportunities for the industry. With this agreement, all EU airlines will be able to operate direct flights to Israel from anywhere in the EU, and Israeli carriers will be able to operate flights to airports throughout the EU. This agreement is a further step in creating a wider Common Aviation Area between the EU and its neighbours by 2015. Similar aviation agreements with neighbouring countries have already been signed with the Western Balkan countries, Morocco, Jordan, Georgia and Moldova, and negotiations are ongoing with Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Lebanon, and are planned to soon start with Tunisia.

Mobility Partnership
7 – Luxembourg: The EU and Morocco sign a mobility partnership, the first of this kind, establishing a set of political objectives and provides for a series of initiatives designed to ensure that the movement of persons is managed as effectively as possible. The objective is to improve the information available to qualified Moroccan citizens on employment, education and training opportunities available in the EU and to support the integration of Moroccan citizens who regularly visit an EU Member State. As regards irregular migration, the EU and Morocco will work closely together in order to combat the smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings and to provide assistance for victims of these crimes.

Renewable Energy
10- Rome: launching of the Mediterranean Development of Support schemes for Solar Initiatives and Renewable Energies (MED-DESIRE), a 36-month strategic project which aims to implement a set of actions that seek to remove legal, regulatory, economic and organizational barriers to distributed solar energy generation. The nine involved organisations discuss all planned activities in order to spread energy efficiency across the Mediterranean area in particular through the definition of innovative financial schemes and market stimulation tools.
ARLEM
15 – Bethlehem: Political representatives of cities and regions in the EU and its Mediterranean Partner Countries discuss the local and regional dimension of water policy in the Mediterranean during the 5th meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly’s commission for sustainable development. The commission also discusses sustainable urban mobility in the Mediterranean. http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/arlmen/activities/meetings/Pages/5-th-sudev-meeting.aspx

Logistics
17 – Barcelona: UfM Secretariat launches the LOGISMED Training Activities (LOGISMED-TA) project, which aims at reinforcing the Mediterranean logistics sector. This key project will serve as a vector for development in the Southern Mediterranean countries in view of facilitating transport and strengthening trade flows in the region. The project will be initially launched in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia and will be implemented in ten Mediterranean countries during the period 2013-2018, leading to the creation of five new logistics platforms. http://ufmsecretariat.org/ufm-labelled-project-logismedta-to-contribute-to-the-creation-of-jobs-in-the-region-2/

Syria
24 – Brussels: The EC and the High representative adopt a joint communication, mapping out a comprehensive EU approach in response to the conflict and its consequences both in Syria and its neighbouring countries. The EU response aims to support a political process that brings a sustainable solution to the crisis; prevent regional destabilisation from the spill-over of the conflict in neighbouring countries; address the dramatic humanitarian situation and assist affected populations. The EU has so far mobilised more than €850 million from humanitarian and non-humanitarian budget instruments. The severity of the crisis and human suffering cannot be solved with extra money alone. This is why it is crucial to rapidly find a lasting political solution, which guarantees an end to the violence and leads to an inclusive transitional government. The EU aims at reaching a political solution. http://eeas.europa.eu/Democratic Transition
27-28 – Barcelona: Around 30 experts from think tanks and research centres, as well as government representatives responsible for the economy and social policies from Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, and representatives of employers’ associations and trade unions gather to debate urgent reforms of social and inclusive economic growth policies in southern and eastern Mediterranean countries during a Forum organised by IEMed. Three factors are identified for carrying out successful democratic transitions: maintaining social dialogue with all the actors, reforming labour markets to make them more competitive while improving employability with an education and training reform and, finally, fighting against corruption and increasing transparency. www.imed.org/actualitat-en/noticies/quines-reformes-en-politiques-sociales-a-la-mediterania?set_language=en

Civil Society
27-29 – Tunis: Some 90 participants participate in the final conference of the EU-funded Euromed Civil Society Programme. Representatives of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) from besides European and Tunisian institutions discuss the subject of “Civil and social dialogue in the contexts of transition.” The main topics tackled in the sessions are: civil and social dialogue and the economic, social, political and cultural changes in the new regional context; fundamental freedoms, citizenship and women’s rights; social and economic rights and changes in the Southern Mediterranean Countries; freedom of expression, right to information, knowledge and culture, and the role of the media; participation of civil society in the Euromed process and support policies of the EU; the institutions and mechanisms of civil society and social dialogue. www.euromedcivilsociety.net

July

EU Lithuania Presidency
1 – Vilnius: Three key priorities are outlined in the six-month programme of the Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the EU: credible Europe, Europe in the world and Open Europe. The primary focus will be on further strengthening the financial stability and competitiveness of Europe, as well as the implementation of the Growth Agenda. Further EU integration and strengthening of the Single Market will bring new opportunities to combat unemployment and will make the European economic and social model more solid. The openness of the EU to new members, neighbours and trade partners will not only advance the EU economy, but will also reaffirm the aims of the EU, i.e. to develop a prosperous, peaceful, democratic, free and open Europe. www.eu2013.lt/en/presidency-and-eu/programme-and-priorities

Morocco
1 – Brussels: Discussions on the second round of negotiations for an EU-Morocco Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) advance well on all issues, and it is agreed to integrate the bilateral negotiations on trade in services which have been on-going since 2008 into the broader DCFTA negotiations. The DCFTA will thus include trade in services and investment, government procurement, competition, intellectual property rights and the gradual integration of the Moroccan economy into the EU single market.

Education and Training
1-2 – Turin: Experts from SEMCs meet with European Training Foundation (ETF) staff and international consultants at the first operational meeting of the new EU-funded project Governance for Employability in the Mediterranean (GEMM), which tackles youth and women’s employability in the Mediterranean region. It represents the occasion to officially launch the mapping process to analyse multilevel governance in vocational education and training (VET). The new project aims to build capacities of policy makers and social partners to efficiently provide relevant and high quality VET,
to help the shift to a demand-driven provision of VET, as well as to increase public accountability of the system.

www.etf.europa.eu/web/nse/pages/Employability_Experts_Meet_ETF_to_Work_in_South_East_Mediterranean_EN

**SPRING**

30 – Brussels: The EU adopts a €10 million programme of support to governance in Algeria under the Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth (SPRING) programme. This new programme aims at strengthening the governance institutions in the economic and political fields, including the reinforcement of the rule of law, access to justice, strengthening the fight against corruption, encouraging the participation of all citizens in the development process, and improving the follow-up of public finances management.

**August**

**Migration**

2–Rome: An EU-funded project holds a study tour bringing together officials from Libya, Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan, to improve cooperation and to discuss voluntary return and reintegration of migrants. The tour is organised by the International Organisation for Migration, in the framework of the Regional Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration Programme for Stranded Migrants in Libya and Egypt.

**Solar Plan**

27-28 – Madrid: The closing conference of the EU-funded project on ‘Paving the Way for the Mediterranean Solar Plan’ (PWMSP) gathers all stakeholders and partners of the project. The three year project results are presented and participants reflect on how these results can be used in the future to achieve the objectives of the Mediterranean Solar Plan.

**September**

**Water**

1-3 – Bled: UfM SG Sijilmassi takes part in the Bled Strategic Forum, a platform for high-level strategic dialogue among leaders from private and public sectors on key issues facing the world. The Forum under the theme ‘A changing Europe in a changing World’ holds a special session on the Water challenge in the Mediterranean. SG Sijilmassi explained the activities and projects undertaken in this sector by the UfM namely the Desalination facility for the Gaza Strip and the “Governance & Financing for the Mediterranean Water Sector” project, aimed at increasing efficiency and transparency in the management of the existing water resources.

**Civil Society**

3-4 – Brussels: A Euromed Civil Society Forum on the theme ‘Gender Equality: Review and Prospects of the Istanbul-Marrakech process’ gathers experts and Civil Society members from the Euro-Mediterranean region besides HR Ashton and ENP Commissioner Füle. The EU Commissioner highlights the fact that women in the Southern Mediterranean region continue to be at the forefront of the protest movements since 2011, demanding freedom, equality and justice. He also stresses that women must be able to play their full part in building the futures of their countries besides reaffirming EU commitment to support women’s participation in social and political life, but also at empowering them economically.

**Audiovisual**


www.euromedaudiovisuel.net/p.aspx?lang=en&mid=21&cid=10&i=en&d=1588

**Women**

11-12 – Paris: Ministers in charge of women’s affairs and gender equality from the 43 UfM countries gather for the 3rd UfM Ministerial Conference on Strengthening the Role of Women in Society. They renew their commitments in the priority areas of equal rights between men and women, combatting violence and discrimination. They agreed to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Forum on strengthening the role of women in society to ensure an effective dialogue on women-related policies, legislation and implementation. The Ministers agreed on a series of conclusions in the three priority areas, namely: Equal rights of women and men to participate in the political, economic, civil and social life; Combatting all forms of violence and discrimination against women and girls; Change in attitude and behaviour to attain gender equality with a view to promote women empowerment not only in rights but also in reality. Within the framework of the agreed Euro-Mediterranean forum senior officials/experts will meet at least once a year to review the progress in translating the above commitments in laws and the implementation of measures contained in the Conference’s conclusions. The senior officials/experts will take into account the outcome of the consultations with civil society. Ministers also welcome the projects labelled in the UfM, as presented by the UfM Secretariat Progress report on Women Empowerment and Gender Equality, and encourage Member States, regional and international organisations, and NGOs to submit concrete projects to the UfM labelling process. The next Ministerial Conference on strengthening the role of women in society will take place in 2016.


**Violence**

16 - Beirut: The International Center for Transitional Justice, the Université Saint-Joseph, and the Center for the Study of
the Modern Arab World launch the project entitled “Lebanon’s Legacy of Political Violence: A Mapping of Serious Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, 1975-2008.”, which compiles information on hundreds of incidents of serious human rights violations from 1975 to 2008, and which is aimed at helping to reduce the risk of recurrence of violence in Lebanon.

Women
17 – Rabat: Kick-off meeting of the monitoring mission of the EU support programme to the Government Plan for Equality (GPE). This mission, composed of external experts, is tasked to conduct an objective assessment of the implementation of the GPE. The EU support programme is expected to achieve a better legal protection for women, better representation in decision making; develop the culture of equality.

Employment
17-18 – Tunis: The Mediterranean Economic Conference on “Employment and Territorial Development,” brings together more than 300 participants from 25 UfM countries to address the unemployment and territorial development challenges in the Southern Mediterranean and also to launch the Mediterranean Initiative for Jobs (Med4Jobs) a flagship regional programme developed by the UfM Secretariat to help increase the employability of youth and women in the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean region, leverage job creation and foster a culture of entrepreneurship and private sector development.

Migration
24-25 – Portoroz: EUROMED Migration III project organises the second peer to peer meeting in the topic of Migration and Development. ENPI South partner country representatives from Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine and Tunisia attend the meeting, as well as EU Member States and other international organisations (ICMPD, IOM, EMUNI…). This meeting represents another step in what is a multi-year programme of training events and peer to peer events. It focused on status review of the overall context.

Arab Maghreb Union
27- New York: ENP Commissioner Füle meets the Foreign Ministers of the five Maghreb countries, members of the Arab Maghreb Union on the margins of the UN General Assembly, to discuss developments in the region and ways to strengthen mutual cooperation. EU-Maghreb regional cooperation would focus on four priority areas: political dialogue and security cooperation; agriculture, environment and water resources; industry, infrastructure, trade, investment and technology; human development. It is the first informal political dialogue between countries of the Arab Maghreb Union and the EU, and the participants agree to continue with it in the future and discuss the possibility to hold next ministerial dialogue in the Maghreb.

October
Health
2-4 – Euromed Region: The EU-funded project EpiSouth-Plus holds a simulation exercise to test the capacities of response to an outbreak across many countries in the Euro-Med region. This exercise simulates a public health event of international concern affecting several Episouth countries, with the aim of testing the availability and use of national emergency preparedness and response, testing communication and coordination, identifying needs and assessing availability of stockpiles and funds for facing outbreaks.

Education and Training
6 – Marseille: European Training Foundation’s Policy Leaders’ Forum gathers ministers and senior officials from the Arab States of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean, besides EP representatives and other European institutions. The conference represents an opportunity for policy leaders to share information on concrete policies to address youth employment. Special attention is devoted to measures in the area of VET, active employment policies, and the broader considerations of change management in public policy.

Culture
17 – Vilnius: Eminent academics and policymakers discuss the role of culture in the EU external relations in an informal EU Senior Official meeting. The meeting is intended to discuss how a common history and a common culture can contribute to the European Neighbourhood Policy, deepen mutual trust, and promote intercultural dialogue. At the meeting the intermediate results of the European Commission’s Preparatory Action “Culture in the EU External Relations” is also presented.

Anna Lindh Foundation
23 – London: The 7th edition of the Anna Lindh Mediterranean Journalist Award takes place the very first time in the premises of the Thomson Reuters Foundation. Two of the five Prizes bestowed in recognition of distinguished reporting are from and focus on Syria. The International Jury underlines the crucial impact of reporting on Syria in relation to the wider regional media agenda, and praises the courage of those journalists who continue to risk their lives to expose the reality of the situation on the ground in Syria. The Mediterranean Journalist Award is a leading regional Award which aims at rewarding exceptional journalistic productions, contributing to a better understanding of the diversity of cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean region. It promotes the positive role played by journalists in providing balanced and informed coverage of cultural issues in the region.

ENP
23 – Strasbourg: The European Parliament adopts a resolution on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The EP Resolution calls for a concrete evaluation of the effectiveness of the revised ENP; for greater efforts to use all instruments and policies at the disposal of the Union and for the consistent implementation of the incentive-based and differentiated approaches and of the principle of ‘more for more’ as the cornerstone of the revised ENP.
It also calls, if necessary, for ‘less for less’ for those ENP countries making insufficient efforts to build a deep and sustainable democracy and to undertake the agreed reforms. According to the resolution, MEPs strongly believe that the Parliament should be fully involved in implementing the new ENP and in adjusting EU financial support. With regards to the Southern Neighbourhood, the Resolution recommends that the EU maintain its engagement in supporting transitions in the Southern partner countries, focusing on democratic transformation, partnership with people and civil society, and sustainable and inclusive economic growth. MEPs underline the urgent need to promote projects for sustainable and inclusive socio-economic development and integration in the Maghreb.

www.europarl.europa.eu

Justice
22-24 – Rome: Participants from Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine and Tunisia attend a training seminar on the ‘Resolution of cross-border family conflicts: international, EU and national legislation.’ Topics addressed include the work developed during the first phase of the project on the resolution of cross-border family conflicts, discussion on the issue of domestic and gender violence, and their influence in cross-border family conflicts and different approaches to achieving the best interest of the child. The seminar is addressed by speakers from Germany, Italy and Jordan, together with experts from the project and EU officials.

November

Heritage
1st – Beirut: The Modern Heritage Observatory (MoHO) organises the second regional symposium on modern cultural heritage in the MENA region. The event brings together experts from the MENA region and beyond to discuss and debate crucial issues pertaining to the preservation of modern cultural heritage in the Arab world. It includes four sessions: Four regional heritage institutions: case studies; Training and regional expertise for preservation and archiving; Living archives, living heritage; Advocacy opportunities and strategies for modern heritage preservation.

Civil Society
5-6 – Malta: The Malta Conference addresses the way key actors in the Mediterranean have adapted to the historic changes of the Arab Awakening, with a focus on: (a) the need for new approaches to training for diplomats, government officials and civil society representatives in the region; (b) the evolving media scene and the impact of political and social changes on traditional and new media; (c) communication mechanisms allowing dialogue at all levels across societies in the region; (d) the most suitable models of governance for oversight of the regional dialogues. The output of the Conference will contribute to the preparation of next year’s EU Southern Neighbourhood forum in Brussels which will advance ideas for the creation of mechanisms to facilitate enhanced information flows and closer dialogue, coordination and cooperation across the region

www.annalindhfoundation.org

Democracy
6-7 – Lisbon: Members of civil society with governments, parliaments and local and regional authorities from both shores of the Mediterranean gather at the Lisbon Forum 2013 to assess how inclusive democracy in Southern Mediterranean countries can be consolidated. The Forum is held on the theme “Valuing civil society as actor of governance: Perspectives for the southern Mediterranean,” is organised by the joint EU and CoE. Strengthening democratic reform in the southern Neighbourhood is a joint EU-Council of Europe programme to support partner countries from the southern Mediterranean, engaged in building deep and sustainable democracy.

www.coe.int/t/dg4/nscentre/lisbonforum_EN.asp

Intercultural Dialogue
9-12 – Tunis: The first Euro-Maghreb writers meeting on the theme of “plural identities” gather authors from the EU Member States and from Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Morocco and Mauritania. This event comes in the framework of the EU’s promotion of intercultural dialogue between Europe and the Maghreb countries. This meeting’s mission is also to put the intellectuals of the Mediterranean into contact, encouraging them to reinforce their links in the framework of their works in favour of freedom of expression, in order to promote the creation of a Maghreb writers club.

ETF
11 -13 – Tel Aviv: The European Training Foundation organises the closing workshop of the research project “Vocational education and training (VET) for social inclusion and cohesion – policies and practices.” The event, titled “Mapping of VET Policies and Practices for Social Inclusion and Social Cohesion in the Western Balkans, Turkey and Israel,” is organised jointly with the Israeli Ministries of Economy and Education, and there will be policy makers, vocational school principals, researchers and other experts. The workshop will provide an opportunity to reflect on the results of the project, which include analyses, conclusions and recommendations found in the synthesis report.

UIF
11 -12 – Barcelona: The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and the UIF Secretariat organise the Euro-Mediterranean Summit of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions. It focuses on key challenges affecting the countries of the region, especially those that are currently in a process of political, economic and social transition, and the role that civil society can play in meeting those challenges. Special emphasis is given to: macroeconomic policy and the employment challenge in the north and south of the Mediterranean region; the economic and social situation of women in the Euro-Mediterranean region; mobility and migration: challenges and opportunities; water: a scarce resource in the Mediterranean region. The declaration adopted is sent to the political authorities involved in the Euromed Ministerial Summits as civil society’s contribution to the summits, and disseminated widely among civil society organisations in the region.

http://ufmssecretariat.org
Transport
14 – Brussels: Transport ministers from the Euro-Mediterranean area meet with the aim of establishing a well-connect-ed area for aviation, rail, maritime and road transport. Priority guidelines for a new Regional Transport Action Plan for 2014-2020 are presented, they will contribute to the definition of the multimodal Trans-Mediterranean Transport Network. A Memorandum of Understanding is also signed between the UfM Secretariat and the Group of Transport Ministers of the Western Mediterranean countries (GTMO 5+6), with the aim to achieve certain common objectives in the field of transport through the identification of synergies and definition of concrete forms of collaboration. The next UfM Ministerial Conference on Transport is envisaged to be held in 2016, as stated in the Ministerial Declaration.
http://ufmsecretariat.org

Youth
19-21 – Amman: A seminar on youth and citizenship is organised by the CoE and the European Commission in the framework of the EU-CoE youth-partner- ship, and by the Arab States Regional office of UNFPA, the United Nations Population Fund. It is focused on the role and status of youth organisations, youth movements and engaged young people, as crucial actors in the development and consolidation of inclusive, participatory and pluralistic democracies. Bearing in mind the disparities between and within the European and Southern Mediterranean contexts, as well as the impact of local, regional and national politics on young people (and vice versa), and the development of their democratic citizenship, the seminar is examining the specifities and conditions of active democratic citizenship and youth participation in various environments in which young people live and act. These include communities, schools, universities, work places, civil society and the virtual space.
http://youth-partnership-eu.coe.int

Morocco Action Plan
14 – Brussels: The EC announces the adoption of the second part of the 2013 Action Plan in favour of Morocco. This €166.9 million programme aims at sup-
porting the strategy of gradually bringing Morocco closer to the EU, a strategy that has been implemented by the Moroccan authorities for almost ten years, rewarded since 2008 with the “advanced status” in the partnership between Morocco and the EU. In addition, the 2013 Action Plan proposes to continue EU support to the Moroccan educational strategy launched in 2008.

Migration
19 – Florence: the ETF and researchers from the European University Institute (EUI) kicks-off a new project, which aims to build an inventory of migrant support measures. The project will provide evidence to guide EU policy making with the neighbouring countries in the field of legal migration. The inventory will review migrant support measures implemented throughout the world from the perspective of skills and employment, and assess their cost-effectiveness and impact. The result of the project will be a general critical inventory of support measures as well as reports from country case studies (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Morocco and Tunisia) and a policy brief that will discuss policy implications for the EU.
www.etf.europa.eu

Economic Leaders
20-22 – Barcelona: The Mediterranean Week of Economic Leaders is one of the major economic events in the Mediterranean region. Bringing together businessmen, businesswomen, representatives of multilateral agencies and international institutions. This event is aimed at consolidating and defending the Euro-Mediterranean integration and collaboration as the driving forces behind social and economic development of the region. The aim of the seventh edition is to focus on critical issues for the Mediterranean region like regional integration, city management, women entrepreneurship and also to expand the knowledge of the Islamic Finance, and therefore forums on these matters will be included.
www.medaeconomicweek.org/

Women Entrepreneurship
22 – Barcelona: UfM takes part in the 5th Mediterranean Women Entrepre-
neurs Forum aimed at providing women entrepreneurs in the Mediterranean region with the opportunity to make business contacts in key sectors for the economic development of the region, as well as to explain success stories, share good practices and know-how and to analyse the role of women in the development of the region’s economies. The Forum gathers numerous professional and businesswomen’s associations, business development agencies, civil society organisations, and finance institutions from the Euro-Mediterranean region. UfM SG Sijilmassi closes the forum presenting UfM’s labelled projects and initiatives supporting women’s overall empowerment.
http://ufmsecretariat.org

ALF
25-29 – Marrakesh: The ALF organises the Maghreb Forum “Youth in Local Dialogue” for Dialogue on youth participation in the development and implementation of local policy in the framework of Dawrak – Citizens for Dialogue and with participation of more than 60 civil society representatives and local politicians from Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia. The Forum aims for empowering Civil Society Organisations with the appropriate tools for intercultural dialogue, and supporting the activities of ALF Network in order to create partnerships and activate citizenship participation regarding the return of youth to the political forefront after more than two years of launching social movements in the context of Arab Spring.

Human Rights
26 – Gaza City: The EU and Palestine hold their fifth annual policy dialogue on human rights, good governance and the rule of law in the framework of the ENP. Senior review progress in the sectors of human rights, good governance and rule of law measured against the jointly formulated priorities of the EU-Palestine Action Plan adopted in 2013. The EU commends the Palestinian side for its work on a National Action Plan for human rights and efforts to combat torture and improve access in some detention
centres. The EU praises the efforts made in the good governance sector. The EU also addresses concerns about – inter alia – unlawful arrests and ill treatment, freedom of assembly, freedom of press and equal opportunities for women.

**Human Trafficking**

26-27 – Rabat: The conference on the ‘Fight against human trafficking: international norms and national good practices’ aims to boost the knowledge of representatives from government departments, national institutions and civil society to learn from European practices and experience in the field. It gathers experts from Italy, Portugal, Belgium and representatives of all the stakeholders concerned by the fight against this scourge in Morocco. Since the joint political declaration on the Partnership for Mobility was signed between Morocco and the EU both partners committed themselves to reinforce their cooperation on all the issues related to mobility on both shores of the Mediterranean.

**Youth**

27 – Barcelona: First working meeting towards the elaboration of a Euro-Mediterranean Student Mobility framework initiative gathers more than 30 key experts and stakeholders in the field of youth mobility. The aim of the meeting is to draw lessons from past and ongoing mobility programmes in the Mediterranean region, brainstorm ideas and priority areas for action and discuss the short-term and mid-term goals of this UfM initiative. UfM Secretariat is currently working on a new framework initiative to promote student mobility across the Mediterranean region, with a particular focus on South-South and North-South mobility. The new initiative will be presented to the UfM member states in 2014.


**Women**

29 – Barcelona: The Women’s Rights Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of UfM (PA-UfM) tackles two main topics: the situation of women in armed conflicts and women and job creation. The Committee, chaired by Samira Merai-Friaa, member of the National Constituent Assembly of Tunisia, is an opportunity to further associate women parliamentarians in UfM activities and exchange views on the situation of women in the region. The challenges and difficulties that women are facing on the issues of employment and violence are discussed and illustrated by concrete situations on the ground. The circumstances of women in refugee camps are also particularly debated.

**December**

**Environment**

3-6 – Istanbul: On the occasion of the 18th Ordinary Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of Mediterranean and its Protocols, the UfM Secretariat, along with partners of the H2020 Steering Committee, briefed member states and stakeholders of the convention on the findings of a comprehensive study to protect the Mediterranean Sea from pollution. The event highlights the findings of a study conducted by the UfM Secretariat to identify specific projects to prevent, abate and combat pollution of the Mediterranean Sea. The study contains an updated list of depollution investment projects necessary to meet the depollution requirements

**Migration**

4 – Brussels: The Commission is proposing ways to increase solidarity and mutual support in order to prevent migrants’ death in the Mediterranean after the tragedy of Lampedusa. The actions proposed are the results of the work carried out by the Commission chaired Task-Force for the Mediterranean. The Task Force identifies actions in five main areas: Border surveillance to help save lives; Assistance and solidarity; Fight against trafficking, smuggling and organised crime; Regional protection, resettlement and legal ways to access Europe; Actions in cooperation with third countries. Mobility Partnerships allow to identify more channels for regular migration and to help those countries develop their capacities to offer protection in the region and to respect human rights in their territory. Mobility partnerships also help improve the fighting against the threats posed by smugglers and traffickers, as well as informing about channels available for legal migration.

http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs

FEMIP

10 – Brussels: EIB holds the 13th FEMIP Conference, in partnership with UfM and the Mediterranean Energy Observatory (OME). The theme of the meeting is the promotion of energy efficiency in the EU’s Mediterranean partner countries. The conference brings together some 250 participants including the Energy Ministers of Morocco, Tunisia, Palestine and Turkey, business representatives, experts and professionals, regulators and regulatory institutions financial institutions, academics and representatives of civil society. Some lines of action are identified: an increase in collective awareness of political and technical authorities and of the operators in support of promoting energy efficiency is reckoned; ministers express their determination to extend these developments and specifically to make energy efficiency a priority; the energy transition is a social process.


**Energy**

11 – Brussels: UfM Energy Ministers meeting focuses on strengthening energy cooperation to foster socio-economic development and contribute to the transition to low carbon and energy efficient economies, in order to ensure secure, affordable and sustainable energy supply and enhance energy efficiency in the Mediterranean Basin. The ministerial meeting takes stock of the work done on the Mediterranean Solar Plan, which should exploit the huge potential of the region. Ministers discuss and support the development of a regional electricity market, underlining the need for investments in cross-border electricity connections and transmission infrastructure, as well as for the reform of the regulatory framework. The meeting highlights the importance of private
sector investments in renewable energy, including through public-private partnerships.
http://ec.europa.eu/energy/international/euromed_en.htm

Agadir Agreement
19 – Barcelona: The UfM Secretariat, in coordination with the Agadir Agreement Technical Unit (ATU), organises a workshop to discuss trade development and support for SMEs in the countries that are party to the Agadir Agreement – Jordan, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia. The EU has been funding a support project to the Agadir Agreement which aims to contribute to progress in the realisation of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area and promote economic integration between countries in the region, through consolidating the institutional framework set up under the Agadir Agreement.

Refugees
18 – Brussels: The EU announces the launch of a Regional Development and Protection Programme for refugees and host communities in Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, as part of its long-term development response to the Syrian refugee crisis. The programme will provide a sound understanding that the presence of refugees has on host communities and propose opportunities for development for both refugees and their hosts alike. It will also assess refugees’ potential contribution to the national and local economy of host countries.
Chronologies

Other Cooperation Initiatives in the Mediterranean

1. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

In order to extend security and stability on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, NATO launched the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) in 1994, which aims to promote good relations and mutual understanding among the participating countries. The initial Southern partners adhering to the initiative were Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Egypt and Israel, who were later joined by Jordan in 1995 and Algeria in 2000.

The main principles of the Mediterranean Dialogue are: self-differentiation and non-discrimination, progressiveness in terms of participants and of political and practical dimensions, mutual benefit, and complementarity with other international security organisations. It has both political and practical dimensions. Bilateral political consultations (NATO+1) are regularly held and provide a chance for sharing views on a wide range of issues. Meetings in the NATO+7 format (multilateral format) are usually held after NATO summits and other major NATO events. The practical dimension includes seminars, workshops and practical activities in the field of modernising armed forces, civil emergency planning, border security, crisis management, scientific and environmental cooperation and NATO/PIP military exercises. In 2004, the Dialogue was upgraded to ‘genuine Partnership’ thus entailing an opportunity for MD partners to participate in selected military exercises, improving interoperability, share intelligence and contribute to military operations (Morocco and Israel participated in Operation Active Endeavour and Morocco contributed forces to the stabilisation of Kosovo).

Considering the changes experienced by the MENA region, a more tailored assistance is envisaged through Individual Partnership Cooperation Programmes.

In 2004, during the same summit that reformed the dialogue, NATO launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) after a series of high-level consultations between the NATO Secretary General (SG) and the GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). Four countries have since joined the initiative: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The ICI is based on the premise that the security and stability of the Gulf region is of strategic interest to the Alliance. It essentially promotes practical cooperation on a bilateral basis. This initiative offers a menu of bilateral activities in several areas of cooperation, including: tailored advice on defence transformation, budgeting and planning; military-to-military cooperation to attain interoperability; and participation in NATO PIP exercises and NATO-led operations (in Afghanistan and Libya, where Qatar and the UAE contributed air assets). Since 2004, significant progress has also been made in the political dimension of the initiative with the partner countries. The first NAC+4 meeting was held in November 2008; it was followed by other such meetings in the following years. Additional high-level political consultations took place in the framework of the ICI, in order to discuss ways to deepen the ICI partnership ahead of the NATO Chicago Summit in 2012. Furthermore, issue-specific meetings – such as on anti-piracy, military cooperation or education – have taken place with the participation of Saudi Arabia and Oman.

Public Diplomacy represents an important element of the ICI, which has been regularly underlined by ICI nations. High visibility events gave way to informal discussions on security related issues of common interest. The ICI Ambassadorial Conferences in Kuwait (2006), Bahrain (2008), the United Arab Emirates (2009) and Qatar (2011) focused on discussing and addressing the perception of NATO in the Gulf, as well as ways to develop the NATO-ICI partnership in its two dimensions.

It is worth mentioning the role of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) which gathers parliamentarians from all the 28 Member States of the Alliance and 14 Associates to discuss security and defence issues. The increasing attention to security in the Mediterranean region gave rise to the creation of the Assembly’s Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group (GSM), a forum for cooperation and discussion with parliamentarians from the MENA region focused on political, economic, social and security issues. The GSM was launched in 1996 as a formal mechanism to address regional challenges, and engage leaders from the region in constructive dialogue. The GSM conducts two annual seminars, bringing together parliamentarians from NATO countries and their counterparts in the region to explore specific topics and discuss the annual GSM Report. GSM seminars and reports cover a broad range of issues, including: security-related matters pertaining to the Mediterranean Area, the Middle East, and the Arabian Peninsula; practical security cooperation among NATO
Main Events in 2013

- 29-30 January, NATO HQ, Brussels (Belgium): An Algerian delegation from the Follow-up Committee for the Mediterranean Dialogue, including representatives from several ministries, visits NATO Headquarters for discussions with officials from the Alliance’s International Staff and International Military Staff. The discussions focus on political and practical cooperation between NATO and Algeria in the framework of the MD; the development of an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme between NATO and Algeria; NATO’s scientific cooperation with MD partners; and opportunities for cooperation in the fields of crisis management, civil emergency planning, counter-terrorism, border security, arms control, training and education, energy security and cyber defence.

- 5 March, NATO HQ, Brussels: Morocco’s Minister Delegate for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Mr Amrani is welcomed by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Vershbow. The Deputy SG and Mr. Amrani discuss NATO-Morocco relations and the state of play within the Alliance’s MD.

- 21-22 March, NATO HQ, Brussels: the NATO Political Affairs and Security Policy Division organises a visit to NATO Headquarters for a group of Bahraini diplomats, as part of NATO’s public diplomacy activities under the ICI. Topics discussed include NATO’s new Strategic Concept and NATO’s outreach to the Middle East and the Gulf region; NATO’s military cooperation in the framework of the ICI; NATO-Russia relations, NATO’s operations in Afghanistan and Ocean Shield; NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning and new emerging security challenges.

- 3 April, Marrakech: a NATO Parliamentary Assembly Seminar is organised in collaboration with the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors of Morocco, and supported by the Swiss Government. Entitled “Political and Security Changes in North Africa: Implications for Peace and Cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean and Transatlantic Regions.” The seminar engages parliamentarians from 25 NATO member and partner countries as well as legislators from Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, including in the discussions a number of leading experts, government officials, representatives of international organisations and members of the diplomatic community. Taking stock of the unprecedented change in the Mediterranean and broader Middle East, discussions focus on NATO’s future engagement with the countries in the wider region.

- 11-12 April, NATO HQ, Brussels: A group of Mauritanian officers visits NATO Headquarters for a series of briefings and discussions with officials from the Alliance’s International Staff, and International Military Staff. Topics discussed include NATO’s Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme with Mauritania; military cooperation under the MD; NATO’s role in the fight against terrorism, NATO’s operations; as well as opportunities of cooperation in the areas of civil emergency planning, border security, and training and education.

- 6-10 May, NATO Defence College (NDC), Rome: Hosting of the Generals, Flag Officers and Ambassadors’ Course (GFOAC 2013-1). The Course is attended by Generals, Flag Officers, Ambassadors and other high-ranking civilians from countries within NATO, the Partnership for Peace, the MD and the ICI, as well as by representatives of Global Partners. The programme’s theme is “Leading NATO into the Future,” focusing on the challenges that the Alliance faces in the current shifting international environment and on emerging challenges likely to become increasingly important for NATO members and partner countries. The programme encompasses several aspects of fundamental significance for the Alliance, such as NATO after Chicago, the importance of the transatlantic link and the changing character of warfare.

- 7 May, NATO HQ, Brussels: A group of officials and opinion makers from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia meet as part of NATO’s public diplomacy activities under the ICI. Topics discussed include NATO’s outreach to the Middle East and the Gulf region; NATO’s military cooperation in the framework of the ICI; NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning, NATO’s Operation and NATO’s Armaments Cooperation. The group also holds meetings with the US Deputy Permanent Representative and with the Permanent Representative of Turkey on the North Atlantic Council.

- 5 September, NATO HQ, Brussels: An inter-ministerial delegation from the State of Kuwait visits NATO HQ to present and discuss the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) between NATO and Kuwait. The delegation also receives briefings on NATO’s cooperation with ICI countries and the broader Middle East and on Military Cooperation in the Framework of the ICI, as well as Civil Emergency Planning and Crisis Management.

- 1-4 October, Amman: A NATO military delegation headed by the Chairman of the Military Committee, General Bartels, visits Jordan. Speaking at the Jordan Armed Forces (JAF) General HQ, Gen. Bartels thanks the country for its commitment and support for partnership activities in cooperation with NATO. He commends Jordan’s high level of ambition for cooperation with NATO: practical military-to-military cooperation is at unprecedented levels and besides cooperation in missions it covers exercises, academic exchange and interoperability of forces. Gen. Bartels agrees
with Gen. Al-Zaben to deepening regular consultations between NATO and Jordan on interoperability and exchanging views on the perspectives on the regional security situation. Gen. Bartels also delivers a speech at the JAF’s Royal National Defence College, where the audience, consisting of senior officers and officials from Jordan and the wider region, engage him in discussions on regional developments and challenges, including Syria.

22 October, Dubai: An International Conference is co-organised by NATO’s Political Affairs and Security Policy Division and the American University in the Emirates as part of NATO’s public diplomacy activities with countries invited from the ICI. The conference concerns the lessons learned from NATO’s approach to Gulf Cooperation and future related challenges. Discussions focus on three different panels: regional security cooperation; piracy and maritime cooperation; and NATO’s approach to Gulf cooperation. This two-day conference concludes with remarks summarising the panel discussions and agreements and indicating possible ways and means to improve the ICI as well as the security of the Gulf region.

25 November, Rome (Italy): 10th Joint GSM/ESCTD Annual Seminar. The Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group (GSM) of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (PA) discusses a range of issues affecting Mediterranean states, the broader Middle East, and the Sahel with assembled panels of regional experts. The seminar is hosted by the Italian delegation to the NATO PA and chaired by delegation head, Federica Mogherini. Syria’s civil war and its devastating effects on the region is a central theme, and its central messages resonate throughout the seminar – the increasing burdens from refugee flows, the potential for conflict spill-over, the prospects for Syrian state failure and the attendant security vacuum, the radicalisation of the rebel forces, etc. Middle Eastern parliamentarians repeatedly call for NATO to: alleviate the pressures of refugee flows upon Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey; help negotiate a cease-fire; and, encourage all sides to find a durable political solution to the conflict.

For further information:
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52956.htm
NATO PA Mediterranean Special Group: www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1917

2. Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation in the OSCE

The OSCE has a comprehensive approach to security that encompasses politico-military, economic and environmental, and human aspects. It therefore addresses a wide range of security-related concerns, including arms control, confidence and security-building measures, human rights, national minorities, democratisation, policing strategies, counter-terrorism and economic and environmental activities. All 57 participating states enjoy equal status, and decisions are taken by consensus on a politically, but not legally binding basis. The OSCE maintains special relations with six Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. This relationship goes back to the Helsinki Process and the Helsinki Final Act, which included a Mediterranean chapter stating that security in Europe is closely linked with security in the Mediterranean as a whole. This inter-linkage has been underscored in subsequent OSCE/OSCE documents, such as the Istanbul Charter for European Security and the Maastricht OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the 21st Century. Permanent Council decision 571 decided to explore new avenues of co-operation and interaction and to explore the scope for wider sharing of OSCE norms, principles and commitments.

A number of meetings, conferences and special events provide a broad framework for regular contact: Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation participate as observers in the OSCE Ministerial Council Meetings and hold high-level meetings on the margins with the OSCE Ministerial Troika and the Secretary General. They actively participate in OSCE yearly events, such as: the Annual Security Review Conference, the Economic Forum, the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting and the Annual and Winter Sessions of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. Special side events for the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation are frequently organised on these occasions, while the PA holds an annual Parliamentary Forum on the Mediterranean. Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation are regularly invited as observers in Permanent Council and Forum for Security Co-operation meetings. Following the 1994 Budapest Summit decision, the Contact Group with the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation was established within the framework of the Permanent Council. It is an informal group that meets periodically “to facilitate the interchange of information and the generation of ideas.”

The annual OSCE Mediterranean Seminars provide the opportunity to exchange views and contribute to further developments in the relationship between the OSCE and the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation. The seminars are also attended by international organisations, parliamentarians, academics and NGOs, leading to a cross-fertilisation of ideas and recommendations.

Seminar on Co-operation to Prevent Trafficking in Human Beings in the Mediterranean Region

8 February, Rome (Italy): The principal objective of this seminar is to initiate a dialogue on trafficking in human beings and human rights protection in the context of irregular migration in the Mediterranean region. The seminar takes an innovative approach: while issues related to mixed migration in the region have been dealt with in the framework of people smuggling, the seminar will shed light on the often-hidden exploitation of migrants, examine intersecting issues and highlight the need for the protection of their human rights and the implementation of commitments on human trafficking. The focus will be trafficking for labour exploitation, including domestic servitude.

www.osce.org/node/98654
Mediterranean Contact Group (MGC)

The 2013 Swiss Chairmanship of the MCG works together with Mediterranean Partners to foster an open and interactive dialogue so as to respond to their interests and priorities. Through informal discussions, a list of projects and topics of cooperation is developed as a working tool to identify concrete activities and prioritise their implementation. During the year, six meetings of the MCG are held, as well as a joint meeting with the Asian Partners for Cooperation. Each meeting focuses on a topic proposed by one of the Mediterranean Partners. The six meetings focus on: the promotion of tolerance and non-discrimination; dialogue and mediation in a regional context; combating trafficking in human beings; good governance and the fight against corruption; and challenges in the fight against terrorism. The Annual Joint Meeting of the Asian and Mediterranean Contact Groups focuses on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military aspects of Security, and provides an opportunity to assess the progress achieved in the OSCE partnerships with a view to being more interactive and action-oriented.

- 1 March, Vienna (Austria): MCG meeting on “Promoting Tolerance and Non-Discrimination by Strengthening Interfaith Dialogue,” a topic proposed by Jordan. One of the guest speakers is Father Nabil Haddad, the director of the Jordanian Interfaith Coexistence Centre. During his presentation, Father Haddad describes the rise of religious influence in the Middle East and in Northern Africa. He says the profound changes in the Arab world in the last few years have politicised religion, with political parties of a religious background gaining influence. Father Haddad presents the Jordanian model of co-existence between the different faiths and calls for an alliance to support the moderate religious voices all over the region.
- 19 April, Vienna (Austria): “Dialogue and mediation in a regional context” is the topic chosen for the second meeting, featuring presentations by Mr. Farhane, Director for Multilateral Affairs, the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Morocco; and Mr. Juan Jose Escobar, Ambassador-at-large for Mediterranean Affairs, Spain. The Moroccan-Spanish Group of Friends of Mediation initiative is the result of a United Nations General Assembly resolution on strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution presented by the two Ministers of Foreign Affairs in New York in September 2012. Speaking on behalf of Spain, Mr. Escobar, highlights the potential of mediation in interreligious and intercultural dialogue and the importance of education in this area for all age groups. He also underscores the need to develop a peace infrastructure specifically in the Mediterranean region. The OSCE is invited to the second meeting within the framework of this initiative in Rabat on 8 July 2013. One of the aims of the meeting in Rabat will be to establish a mediation network in the Mediterranean region so as to develop a new approach to national dialogue in countries in transition.
- 15 November, Kiev (Ukraine): The last meeting of the year provides an opportunity for the 2013 OSCE Ukrainian Chairmanship to brief participants on the preparations for the upcoming Ministerial Council Meeting, as well as to discuss the outcome of the 2013 OSCE Mediterranean Conference. The main topic on the agenda is a presentation by the Libyan Ambassador on the subject of Libya’s application to become an OSCE Partner for Co-operation. In conclusion, the participants welcome the incoming Serbian Chairmanship of the Mediterranean Contact Group.

22nd Annual Session of the OSCE PA

29 June - 3 July, Istanbul (Turkey): The Parliamentarians of the OSCE participating states gather for the annual session to assess developments made in security and cooperation and offer their views and recommendations to the OSCE Ministers for the next OSCE Ministerial Council. Concerning the Chapter on Political Affairs and Security and focusing on the Mediterranean region, OSCE participating states stress the interlinkage between the OSCE and the Mediterranean and request an increasing engagement with OSCE MPCs, including by envisaging the possibility of extending the partnership to those Mediterranean countries that observe its principle, and insist on the need to renew the Mediterranean Forum. On the Economic and Environmental Chapters, the OSCE PA invites the OSCE to strengthen cooperation with Mediterranean Partners both in economic and environmental dimensions; finally on the Chapter on Democracy and Human Rights, the OSCE PA shows its concern for the alarming situation and increasing number of refugees and forcibly displaced persons as a result of conflicts and human rights abuses. In a resolution, the Assembly calls upon the OSCE to grant the State of Palestine Mediterranean Partner status and urges the OSCE to initiate a constructive dialogue on peace in the Middle East. In another resolution on the Middle East Area, the OSCE PA expresses its concern for the situation in Syria, urging all states to offer greater assistance to Syrian refugees helping the governments of Turkey and Jordan; they also recommend establishing contacts with the Libyan Government so that it can become a Mediterranean Partner Country.

For further Information:
- Istanbul Session Final Declaration

Regional Conference on the OSCE Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security for the Mediterranean Region

11-13 September, La Valetta (Malta): MEDAC co-organises, together with the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, a conference on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security. The Code of Conduct was adopted in 1994 and is a landmark document for security sector governance and the role of armed forces in democratic societies. It contains key principles and commitments on security relations between states and also on the democratic control of armed forces within a state. The Conference brings together around 50 participants from 20 countries of the Mediterranean region and beyond. While a num-

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ber of regional conferences on the OSCE Code of Conduct have been organised in recent years, this is the first such conference destined specifically for the Mediterranean region and involving the OSCE MPCs. The objectives of this conference are to raise awareness and to present the countries of the Mediterranean Region with the Code of Conduct (including its recent Arabic translation) as a key normative document for security sector governance as well as to engage in discussion and dialogue about its principles and commitments.

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Autumn Meeting – Mediterranean Forum

13-15 October, Budva (Montenegro): In the framework of the OSCE PA Autumn Session, the Mediterranean Forum is held in two sessions under the theme “The Mediterranean: A Union of Civilizations.” The Forum includes a debate on the situation in Syria. President Krivokapić opens the meeting with a call for parliamentarians to ensure that the OSCE’s ongoing Helsinki +40 process incorporates a strong Mediterranean component. He points out that in the Helsinki Final Act, an entire chapter was devoted to the Mediterranean, and since then, the importance of the region for the OSCE has only grown. Jean-Claude Mignon, President of the PA of the Council of Europe (PACE) stresses the need for co-operation and parliamentary dialogue on the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. He says that responsibility must be shared to meet the challenges of refugees, the humanitarian consequences of the war in Syria, and democratic transformations in the southern Mediterranean. Mignon emphasises the opportunity presented for closer co-operation between the PA and PACE to assist the region’s aspiring democracies, noting that both organisations have extensive and complementary experience in these matters. The second session of the Mediterranean Forum debates the situation in Syria. The countries of the Mediterranean are undergoing a process of historic transformation that requires the support of the international partners. In order to have a successful democratic transition, it is necessary to introduce concrete measures and projects that will strengthen democratic institutions, ensure freedom of speech and expression, empower civil society and encourage economic growth. The debate features the participation of members of the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation – including the Palestinian National Council – and many OSCE participating states from across the region. Several delegates agree that the response to the Syrian crisis has so far represented a failure of the international system and call for greater commitment before the situation deteriorates further.

www.oscepa.org/meetings/autumn-meetings/2013-budva

2013 OSCE Mediterranean Conference

28 – 29 October, Monaco: Discussions at the conference highlight the importance of the OSCE Mediterranean Partnership and points to exchanges of best practices as a good way to further interaction between the OSCE and its Partners. Improving women’s participation in public, political and economic life needs to remain a priority, despite the progress already achieved in certain cases. Pursuing closer cooperation in the field of fostering women’s participation in peace mediation and facilitation processes is discussed in this context. Co-operation among international organisations and the involvement of civil society and the business sector is also key to further progress. The second session is devoted to the topic of combating human trafficking. The third session, devoted to combating the financing of terrorism, particularly the payment of ransoms, highlights outstanding challenges, such as ensuring the survival of hostages, the adoption of non-ransom policies and the public understanding of such an approach. During the discussions, both the Partners and the participating states stress their interest in pursuing the exchange of information on the topics of the Conference on a more concrete, practical level, through expert meetings and by pursuing an interactive dialogue in the Mediterranean Contact Group. An effective connection between the discussions which took place at the Conference and the activities in 2014 as follow-up should be pursued. To this effect, a Chair’s perception paper is discussed at the MCG meeting of 15 November 2013. In its capacity as holder of the OSCE Chairmanship in 2014, Switzerland will continue to promote action-oriented activities, also in relation to the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation.

www.osce.org/ec/103342

20th OSCE Ministerial Council

6 December, Kiev (Ukraine): The OSCE Ministerial Council meets once a year towards the end of every term of chairmanship to consider issues relevant to the OSCE and take appropriate decisions. MPCs participate as Observers. Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Kozhara welcomes participants from 57 participating states, 11 Partners for Cooperation and international organisations to the forum. A commitment to address protracted conflicts, stronger OSCE work on energy and environment, increased efforts to address transnational threats, human dimension agreements on religious freedom and Roma, and a reaffirmation of the Helsinki +40 process to map the OSCE’s future path are amongst the results of the 20th OSCE Ministerial Council.

www.osce.org/node/105370/

3. The Arab League

The League of Arab States (LAS), widely known as the Arab League, is a regional inter-governmental organisation that was formed in 1945, grouping 22 Arab countries from the Middle East and North Africa. The Arab League’s aim is to develop closer relations between member states and co-ordinate their political activities with the aim of realising a close collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries. The organisation was officially founded in Cairo at the end of World War II (22 March 1945). Seven countries signed the Pact of the League of Arab States: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan (at that time Transjordan), Syria, Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia and Yemen. They were joined later, as the decolonisation of the region advanced, by Libya (1953), Sudan (1956), Tunisia, Morocco (1958), Kuwait (1961), Algeria (1962), Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, United Arab Emirates (1971), Mauritania (1973), Somalia (1974), the Palestine Liberation Organisation (or PLO, 1976), Djibouti (1977) and Comoros (1993). The permanent headquarters was established in Cairo.

The League of Arab States has long been criticised for its disunity, ineffectiveness and representation of authoritarian regimes. Although a first (ad hoc) EU-Arab League Ministerial meeting (Foreign Affairs) was held in Malta in 2008, EU relations with the League remained limited both in scope and substance for a number of years. However, since the Arab Spring, the Union’s relations with the League have entered a new phase of constructive engagement and cooperation. Recent upheavals in the Arab world have highlighted regional challenges – political, security-related, economic and social. These issues call for regional solutions, in which prominent regional organisations such as the Arab League play a key role. The League’s change in leadership, under the new Secretary-General, Nabil Elaraby, instilled a progressive approach favouring change. In recent years, the Arab League has been particularly proactive on the Libya and Syria files. The League’s approval of NATO’s intervention in Libya and its imposition of sanctions on the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria have helped build consensus among regional actors on the legitimacy of political actions to be taken by the international community within the framework of the United Nations. The EU’s clear objective is to make the ‘new’ Arab League the main channel for a strengthened Euro-Arab relationship. To this end, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton has maintained close political contact with Secretary-General Elaraby, and the EU has actively supported the League’s initiatives on Libya and Syria. Since 2011, a structured, regular political dialogue has developed at Senior Official level. Cooperation in the field of election observation has also been enhanced, with the EU offering training courses for observers from the League’s Secretariat. 2012 marked a turning point for relations between the two partners. On the initiative of the Council’s Cypriot presidency (endorsed by High Representative Ashton), the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC) Ambassadors travelled to Cairo at the end of September 2012 to meet their Arab League counterparts and establish cooperation at ambassadorial level. Furthermore, a second, successful EU-Arab League Foreign Affairs ministerial meeting took place in Cairo in November 2012.

Main Events during 2013

Seminar for Launching the Regional Strategy “Protection of Arab Women: Peace and Security”

• 6-7 February, Cairo (Egypt): The seminar hosts a prominent group of experts specialised in the areas of peace and security, governmental and non-governmental senior representatives at the regional and international levels. The aim of the strategy is to achieve the protection of Arab women against all forms of gender-based violence in times of war and peace and attain their full rights without any form of discrimination during armed conflict. Consequently, governments and regional and international organisations are urged to take further measures towards improving women’s participation during all stages of peace processes, particularly in conflict resolution and post-conflict planning and decision-making positions.

Regional Consultative Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region

• 4-5 June, Cairo (Egypt): The meeting aims at preparing Arab countries to maximise the benefits of their participation in the Second High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development by taking stock of progress in relation to migration and development in the Arab region since 2006, with particular focus on the High-Level Dialogue round-table themes, and by assisting representatives in the development of a common understanding of the next steps to be taken to maximise the contributions of migration to development in the Arab region and to minimise the potential negative impacts for destination and origin countries, as well as for migrants and their families themselves. www.iom.int/files/live/sites/iom/files/What-We-Do/docs/Regional-Consultative-Meeting-on-International-Migration-Final-Declaration-EN.pdf

24th Arab League Summit

• 21-27 March, Doha (Qatar): The 24th Arab League Summit released the Doha Declaration, which welcomes the initiative made by the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani to establish a fund to finance projects that conserve the Arab and Islamic identity of Jerusalem and aid the Palestinian people in facing the policies of the Israeli occupation. The Arab League calls on the international community to work immediately towards achieving fair peace that guarantees Israeli withdrawal from all Palestinian land as well as Arab land in the Golan Heights. The declaration also calls for establishing an independent Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital. It demands that the United Nations Security Council takes all the necessary measures. It also expresses their rejection of having Israeli declare itself a Jewish state. The declaration also condemns illegal Israeli settlement activity taking place on Palestinian land including East Jerusalem, and accuses Israel of trying to change the demographics in those areas. http://arableaguesummit2013.qatarconferences.org/news/news-details-17.html

4. The 5+5 Dialogue

The 5+5 Dialogue was set up on 10 October 1990 during a ministerial meeting in Rome of the ten countries of the Western Mediterranean Basin: five countries from the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Libya and Tunisia) and five members of the European Union (France, Spain, Italy, Portugal...
The 5+5 Dialogue has a flexible and informal nature. Over the years, it has been transformed from a merely political forum to one for strengthened regional and multidisciplinary cooperation in the Western Mediterranean. Its flexibility and informality have enabled a gradual opening up, and the participating ministers and senior officials now meet to discuss an increasing number of issues. Originally just a political compromise between Foreign Ministers, it later expanded to include other spheres, such as Education, the Environment and Renewable Energies, as well as Home Affairs (since 1995), Migration (since 2002), Inter-parliamentary Relations (since 2003), Defence (since 2004), Tourism (since 2006) and Transport (since 2007). Due to its practical and operational nature, it is a forum for the exchange of ideas and the launch of new initiatives. It can also capitalise on its restricted geographical scope, which is limited to the Western Mediterranean. This initiative has encouraged the insertion of Libya and Mauritania in the regional context.

**Main Meetings in 2013**

- 8 - 9 April, Algiers (Algeria): the 15th meeting of the Interior Ministers of the 5+5 Dialogue renews its commitment to fight against terrorism and organised crime especially in the aftermath of the Malian crisis which affected almost all the countries of the region. Ministers underline the need for enhanced cooperation and coordination among security agencies especially on border security, exchange of information on organised crime networks, trafficking of human beings, arms, ammunition and drugs. They also agree to work for a comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism taking into account the rule of law, social justice, the fight against poverty and prevention of conflicts.


- 15 April, Nouakchott (Mauritania): Fourth Meeting of the representative of the Parliaments of the countries of the Western Mediterranean Forum - 5+5 Dialogue. They gather with the assistance of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean and with the participation, as observers, of the Arab Parliament, the Maghreb Consultative Council, the Arab Inter-parliamentary Union and the Parliamentary Assembly of the UfM. They stress the pivotal role of the Parliamentary Dimension of the 5+5 Dialogue in furthering the cooperation required among the countries of the Western Mediterranean to strengthen democratic institutions and deepening integration to make the region less vulnerable to instability. They also call on the Governments of the wider Mediterranean region and the Secretary General of the UN to further increase their efforts to find a political solution that respects the territorial integrity, national unity and the safety of the people of Syria.


- 16 April, Nouakchott (Mauritania): 10th Meeting of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the countries of the Western Mediterranean jointly chaired by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy. In the final declaration, the groundwork for promoting the 5+5 Dialogue over the coming years is approved. Ministers underline the role played by the forum as a political platform for cooperation and dialogue and examines the democratic processes on the southern shores, considering the historic changes taking place in the region that enable the strengthening of values shared by the Member States, such as democracy, rule of law, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and social justice. Participants also tackle the situation in Syria, the crisis in Mali (for which support is given to the military operation currently under way) and peace in the Middle East. Other topics include security, migration, water and the environment, north-south economic cooperation, cultural cooperation and regional integration in North Africa through the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). The final declaration adopted praises the “key role of the UfM to reinforce regional and sub-regional cooperation through concrete projects.” Particularly, ministers mention the relevance of the Business Forum to be organised with the Secretariat of the UfM and the UfM projects in the field of Education.


- 20 September, Rabat (Morocco): 1st Conference of Ministers of Higher Education and Research of the Countries of the Western Mediterranean. The ten Ministers reaffirm the importance of higher education, research and innovation for the economic development of the Euro-Mediterranean region and for youth employment. They discuss practical opportunities to strengthen high-level bilateral and multilateral scientific cooperation, based on the European programme for research and innovation, Horizon 2020 (2014-2020). They also reaffirm their shared priorities: facilitating the transformation of knowledge into innovative products and services, the main lever for competitiveness and growth. Strengthening partnerships between higher education and research institutions will also be facilitated by the rise of European mobility programme “Erasmus plus.” The conference concludes by welcoming the proposal of the Minister to focus the work of the next conference on strengthening the middle and senior management as a factor of growth and employment.

- 23 October, Barcelona (Spain): Economic Forum of the Western Mediterranean. The Foreign Ministers of France, Spain, Portugal, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, as well as the Italian Deputy Foreign Minister, debate in Barcelona how to strengthen economic cooperation in the Western Mediterranean, along with representatives from employers’ associations and a large delegation of businesspeople from these countries. In total, over 300 people participate in the diverse sessions of the forum. It is the first conference on economics of this forum. The Barcelona meeting, opened by the President of the Spanish Government Mariano Rajoy, addresses the following issues: the role of the Western Mediterranean in a globalised economy, the strengthening of cooperation between...
Europe, the Maghreb and Sub-Saharan Africa, urban development and public services, the role of small and medium-sized enterprises, the financing of development policies, and international arbitration in the Mediterranean. The forum is co-organised by the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed), together with the Union for the Mediterranean (UMM), the Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Ministry of Spain and Casa Mediterráneo.

- November 27, Algiers (Algeria): The ten countries bordering the Western Mediterranean Basin hold in Algiers the first conference devoted to setting up "a High-level Segment" that will represent a benchmark for orienting common actions with shared dividends, through which the conditions for long-lasting food security on a regional level will be created as a strategic objective, guaranteeing full access of all the inhabitants of the ten partner countries to the basic foods that are essential to lead a healthy and active life. The planned exchanges will aim to produce a shared approach to food security, which encompasses both economic and social dimensions, as well as political and ethical ones, and takes into account the specific needs at sub-regional and regional levels. The conference is devoted to the reading and adoption of the recommendations produced from expert workshops, held during the conference in Algiers. These include setting up a common strategy, accompanied by tangible measures to ensure food security for the 300 million people living in the ten countries of the Western Mediterranean.

5. Adriatic Ionian Initiative (AII)

The Adriatic and Ionian Initiative (AII) was established at the Summit on Development and Security on the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, held in Ancona (Italy) in 2000 and attended by the Heads of State and Government of Italy, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece and Slovenia. At the end of the Conference, the Foreign Ministers of the participating countries signed the “Ancona Declaration” in order to strengthen regional cooperation to promote political and economic stability, thus creating a solid base for the process of European integration. The Initiative was later extended to Serbia and Montenegro, both of which, following the referendum in Montenegro, remained all participating countries. Following the recent EU approach to support multilateral sub-regional cooperation and the example of the adoption of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea, the AII has started working, since the beginning of 2010, on the idea of a Macro-Region for the Adriatic Ionian Basin, which considers the common historical and cultural heritage, the use of the common sea, the need to protect the marine environment from pollution, the opportunity of sustainable development and growth and the common goal to make this basin an internal sea of the EU. This initiative is supported by all Adriatic Ionian actors at all levels of government. In order to bring it to the attention of the EU authorities, the last Adriatic Ionian Council (the decision-making body of the initiative) was held in 2011 in Brussels at the premises of the Committee of the Regions. The initiative’s Chairmanship rotates every May/June according to an alphabetical criteria. The Serbian Chairmanship ends in May 2012 and Slovenia will take over until May 2013.

Main activities under the Slovenian Chairmanship

One of the main goals of the AII-PS Slovenian Chairmanship is to develop and strengthen relations, in a project directed by local and regional authorities, as well as the three Adriatic Ionian Fora located in Ancona: UniAdrion, the Forum of the Chambers of Commerce and Forum of Cities and Towns. Slovenia advocates cooperation within the AII with a focus on issues related to the sea and coastal regions.

- 14 May, Brdo Pri Kranju (Slovenia): 11th Conference of the Parliament Speakers. The conference is organised by the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia in the framework of the one-year Slovenian chairmanship of the AII. In the conference debate, speakers and other high parliamentary representatives focus on topical issues related to the shaping of macroregions in the EU, with special emphasis on the development of the Adriatic and Ionian macroregion and the contribution by the parliaments in such processes. The delegates decide to establish an ad hoc delegation to the Adriatic Ionian Initiative. The first such meeting takes place in autumn under the Albanian Delegation.

- 20 May, Medjugorje (Bosnia and Herzegovina): 13th Forum of the Adriatic Ionian Chambers of Commerce. On this occasion, a Declaration of Intent is signed by the Executive Secretariats of the Adriatic Ionian civil society Fora (Cities and Towns, Chambers of Commerce, UniAdrion) and the All Permanent Secretariat. Such a Declaration marks the beginning of closer cooperation among them by establishing an “Integrated Secretariat” that will be capable of channelling the needs of civil societies to the eight EU Governments and the European Commission. The new instrument will not add any financial burden for any institutions involved.

- 27 May, Brussels (Belgium): 15th Adriatic Ionian Council: concluding the Slovenian All year of Chairmanship, the representatives of the eight Governments of the AII, chaired by the Slovenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Erjavec, approve the Brussels Declaration 2013. The declaration welcomes the significant progress of regional cooperation in the Adriatic Ionian basin achieved with particular regards to the progress in the process of establishing the “EU Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region.” High level officials of the European Commission inform Ministers about the ongoing procedures and processes that will lead to the final approval of the EUAIAIR by the end of 2014. Furthermore, an “Integrated Secretariat” between the All Permanent Secretariat and the Executive Secretariats of the Adriatic Ionian Fora of civil society is established, and the Regional Cooperation Programme approved last year is put into action.

Main Activities under the Albanian Chairmanship

Albania takes over the All presidency in a very special moment for the relations between Member States and for all relations with the European Union. A discussion started within the European Union on the adoption of an Adriatic-Ionian MacroRegional strategy has reached a crucial stage. At the European Council meeting on December 14, 2012, the Heads of Governments of EU Member States invited the European Commission to approve the proposal for a new Adriatic-Ionian Macroregion strategy in 2014.

- 1-3 September, Bled (Slovenia): All-PS Strategic Forum 2013. Upon invitation by the Slovenian Foreign Minister Erjavec, the All Secretary General attends the 8th BLED Strategic Forum. Ambassador Pigliapoc is a panelist in Panel no.2 which focuses on water in the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa). He highlights the main lines of the Maritime Strategy of the future Adriatic Ionian macroregion as presented by the European Commission in its Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on November 2012, as “a possible example for a collective response to water management through regional cooperation.” The Strategic Forum proves to be a very successful event.


- 7 November, Tirana (Albania): All Round Table on SMEs. The All Round Table on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises under Albanian Chairmanship is an occasion to exchange experiences among participant countries and to discuss possible joint actions on supporting SME innovation, capacity building, and improving business culture among youth.


- 9-11 December, Brindisi (Italy): 15th Plenary Session of the Forum of Adriatic and Ionian Cities. The session was dedicated to “Macrougions and territories: The role and functions of the local communities in cross-border co-operation processes.” The representatives of the Adriatic and Ionian Municipalities gather in Brindisi and try to upgrade their cooperation in order to contribute to the process of establishing the EU-SAIR (EU Strategy for the Adriatic Ionian Region). The priorities of this year’s session are matched to the EUSAIR’s four pillars. On this occasion, the All Secretary General, Ambassador Fabio Pigliapoc is awarded with the International Award Bruno Bravetti “The Adriatic is Not a Barrier.”


6. The Deauville Partnership

The Deauville Partnership provides support for the historic political and economic transitions of the people in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Jordan and Yemen. The Partnership also includes the G8 countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States), the EU and regional partners (Kuwait, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE). The Partnership also includes international financial institutions and organisations. The Islamic Development Bank is the rotating chairman of the IFI platform that includes: the African Development Bank, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, the Arab Monetary Fund, the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Finance Corporation, the International Monetary Fund, the African Development Bank, the OPEC Fund for International Development and the World Bank. There are several other organisations that have been supportive of the Deauville Partnership, including: the Arab League, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development and the United Nations organisations.

The UK’s Presidency of the Deauville Partnership

The UK holds the presidency of the G8 in 2013, which means it also has the Chairmanship of the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition. The aim of the UK presidency is to support job creation and to build opportunities for marginalised groups such as youth and women, which is important for the long-term stability of the region. Eight priority areas are identified to focus on in 2013 which align with a vision of open economies and inclusive growth: Investment, Trade, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), Women’s Economic Participation, European Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) Mandate Expansion, Access to Capital Markets, Asset Recovery and the MENA Transition Fund for Demand-driven Technical Assistance.

Main Events during 2013

- June, London (UK): The UK launches a new mentoring initiative called Forsa to support SME Development in the Arab Countries in transition. Forsa aims to provide entrepreneurs with mentoring support for up to 12 months and to demonstrate to policy makers the power of mentoring. Forsa will provide at least 250 young and/or female entrepreneurs from across the six Arab countries in transition with free business mentoring, where mentors are recruited from countries across the G8 and the MENA region. By providing entrepreneurs with mentors who inspire and encourage them, Forsa will help to unlock the great potential that is still largely untapped in the spirits of young entrepreneurs of the transition countries. This will help to support economic growth and job creation, and change attitudes to entrepreneurship from the ground up.

- 25-26 June, London (UK): The Arab Women’s Conference promotes the role of Arab women in the global and Middle Eastern and North African economies, debates how economic opportunities can be improved for women and will aim to create new economic partnerships. The event brings together private sector and government representatives from across the Deauville Partnership countries which comprise the G8, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen and regional partners, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait.

- 16 September, London (UK): G8 Deauville Partnership Investment conference. The conference focuses on the six Arab countries in transition (Egypt,
Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen). The event provides a forum for those nations to highlight opportunities and explain the steps they are taking to improve the environment for investment in their countries. It covers issues such as financial risk mitigation instruments, access to local labour and supply chains and specific opportunities and challenges in key sectors. Senior representatives from business and government from the transition countries, the G8, regional partners and the International Financial Institutions all participate.

- 10 October, Washington (USA): Deauville Finance Ministers and international financial institutions of the Deauville Partnership for Arab Countries in Transition meet to re-affirm their commitment to support Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen in undertaking economic reforms that will lead to more stable, open and inclusive economies.


7. Arab Maghreb Union

The Arab Maghreb Union was founded in 1989 in Marrakesh by Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania to materialise their shared desire for greater unity among Maghreb countries, based on the links existing between the peoples and their complementarity. The main goals of this union are the free circulation of goods and people, eventually constituting a free trade area, a customs union and a common market, the adoption of common policies in all possible domains as well as fostering the progress and well-being of the people. The main decision-making bodies are the Presidential Council, consisting of Heads of State, the Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers and the Specialised Ministerial Commissions. The Secretariat-General is based in Rabat and the incumbent Secretary-General is the Tunisian, Habib Ben Yahia. Its principal projects are the creation of a Maghrebi investment and foreign trade bank, a Maghrebi university and a Maghrebi academy of sciences. Nonetheless, the AMU is struggling to become fully operative because a number of issues hinder the development of good relations between the Maghrebi partners: the Algerian-Moroccan border, closed since 1994, and the matter of Western Sahara, which embitters relations between Morocco and Algeria, and the international embargo on Libya from the 1990s to 2003. As a consequence, the Council of Heads of State has not met since 1994 and the future of the AMU remains contingent to the normalisation of relations between the partners.

Meetings in 2013

- 9 January, Nouakchott (Mauritania): At the 5th Conference on Maghreb economic integration, AMU member countries decide to bring into being the Maghreb Investment and Foreign Trade Bank with the initial sum of 100 million dollars. The bank will finance development and infrastructure projects such as highways, and will work in the line of promoting new technologies, as well as investing in the energy sector. A monitoring committee will be set up and submit monthly reports on the progress of economic integration in the Maghreb in collaboration with the IMF.
- 10 January, Nouakchott (Mauritania): The AMU launches an investment bank with a capital of $100 million for the financing of infrastructure projects in the region. The investment bank is intended to fund projects in Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania and Morocco. The bank will finance development projects such as highways, the promotion of new technologies and invest in energy.
- 21 April, Rabat (Morocco): Following the Council of Interior Ministers, they adopt the Rabat Declaration for “A Maghreb joint security strategy.” It contains 24 resolutions focusing on the fight against terrorism and organised crime and also aiming at neutralising their financing methods by establishing a partnership with the countries of the Sahel-Saharan region. Finally, a monitoring committee is created in the security domain in order to implement the Rabat Declaration.
- 5 May, Rabat (Morocco): During the 31st session of the Council of Foreign Ministers, participants demonstrate their willingness to find more effective ways to build and upgrade the AMU. The Foreign Ministers also stress the need to achieve economic integration in the Maghreb. Ministers agree to combine their efforts for closer coordination to meet the security challenges that arise mainly from the situation in Mali and the Sahel. Participants also agree on the creation of the Maghreb Council of Religious Affairs. Finally, an agreement has been reached to develop a common vision for dialogue with the European Union and the creation of a coordination mechanism of Maghreb ambassadors in Brussels.
This chapter provides details of the results of presidential and legislative elections that took place in 2012 in independent states, presented in circums-Mediterranean order, the list also includes referenda and those elections held in autonomous entities or in any other relevant territory that are of particular political significance.

**Principality of Monaco**

**Legislative Elections**

10 February 2013

Previous elections: 3 February 2008

Monaco is a constitutional monarchy. It has a unicameral National Council (Conseil National) with 24 seats. 16 members are elected by majority vote in multi-member constituencies and 8 members are elected through an open-list proportional representation system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Horizon Monaco (liberalism, national union)</td>
<td>50.34</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Monégasque (fiscal liberalism, social conservatism, monarchism)</td>
<td>38.99</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renaissance (national protection)</td>
<td>10.67</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 71.3%

**Italy**

**Legislative Elections**

24 February 2013

Previous elections: 13 and 14 April 2008.

Italy is a unitary parliamentary republic with a perfectly bicameral legislature. In the Chamber of Deputies (Camera dei Deputati) 630 members, of which 618 are elected from Italian constituencies and 12 from Italian citizens living abroad, are elected through a closed-list proportional representation system to serve 5-year terms. In the Senate (Senato della Repubblica), 315 members are elected through a closed-list proportional representation system to serve 5-year terms (of which 6 are elected from Italians living abroad), and 4 members are filled ex officio.

### Chamber of Deputies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seggi</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italia. Bene Comune (centre-left) Pier Luigi Bersani</td>
<td>29.55</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partito Democratico (social democracy, Christian left, Centre-Left)</td>
<td>25.42</td>
<td>292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinistra Ecologia Libertà (democratic socialism, eco-socialism, Left)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centro Democratico (centre-trim, social liberalism, Christian left, Centre-left)</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partito Popolare Sudtirolesi (SVP) (regionalism, autonomism, Centre-left)</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coalizione di cento-destra (centre-Right)</strong> Silvio Berlusconi</td>
<td>29.18</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Il Popolo della Liberta’ (liberal conservatism, Christian democracy, Centre-right)</strong></td>
<td>21.56</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lega Nord</strong> (federalism, regionalism, euro scepticism, anti-globalisation, Catch-all-party)</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fratelli d’Italia (national conservatism, Christian democracy, Right)</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Destra (national conservatism, neo-fascism, right-wing populism, Right)</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grande Sud – MPA (regionalism, federalism, conservative, Centre-right)</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIR - Moderati in Revoluzione (Christian democracy, liberalism, Centre-right)</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Partito Pensionali (centrism, conservatism, Centre-right) | 0.16 | -     |
Intesa Popolare (catch-all-party) | 0.07 | -     |
Liberi per una Italia Equa (anti-mafia, Right) | 0 | -     |

Movimento 5 Stelle Beppegrillo.it (populism, anti-establishment, euroscepticism, direct democracy, Catch-all) Giuseppe Piero Grillo | 25.55 | 108   |

Con Monti per l’Italia (centre) Mario Monti | 10.56 | 45    |
Scelta Civica con Monti per l’Italia (liberalism, Euroscepticism, Left) | 8.3 | 37    |

*Seats elected by Italians living abroad: 5 seats to Partito Democratico; 2 to Con Monti per l’Italia; 1 to Il Popolo della Liberta; 2 to Movimento Associativo Italiani All’Estero (political party representing Italians living in South America); 1 to Movimento 5 Stelle Beppegrillo.it; and 1 to Unione Sudamericana Emigrati Italiani (political party representing Italian minorities in South America).

**Senate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italia. Bene Comune (centre-left) Pier Luigi Bersani</td>
<td>31.63</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partito Democratico (social democracy, Christian left, Centre-Left)</td>
<td>27.43</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinistra Ecologia Libertà (democratic socialism, eco-socialism, Left)</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centro Democratico (centrism, social liberalism, Christian left, Centre-left)</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Il Megagono - Lista Crocetta</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partito Socialista Italiano (social democracy, anti-clericalism, Centre-Left)</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Malta has a unicameral Assembly (Il-Kamra Tad-Deputati) with 69 seats. The deputies are elected through a single transferable vote proportional representation system, to serve a 5-year term.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party (social-democrat, Centre-left)</td>
<td>55.20</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Party (Christian-democrat, conservative, Centre-right)</td>
<td>43.63</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Alternative (green politics, Centre-left)</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 91.1%

**Referendum**

1 December 2013

Popular support for a constitutional ban on same-sex marriage. The referendum was a result of a petition by the “In the Name of the Family” Catholic group, which collected over 700,000 signatures in May 2013. Following a vote in the Parliament (Sabor) in November, it was decided that a referendum on the question would be held on 1 December, 2013. ‘Are you in favour of the constitution of the Republic of Malta being amended with a provision stating that marriage is monogamy between a woman and a man?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Miodrag Lekic (Democratic Front)</td>
<td>48.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filip Vujanovic (Democratic Front)</td>
<td>51.21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 61.5%

**Montenegro**

**Presidential Elections**

7 April 2013

Previous elections: 6 April 2008
Montenegro is a Parliamentary Republic in which the President is directly elected to serve a 5 year-term.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Filip Vujanovic (Democratic Front)</td>
<td>51.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miodrag Lekic (Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro)</td>
<td>48.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 61.5%

**Republic of Albania**

**Legislative Elections**

23 June 2013

Previous elections: 28 June 2009
The Albanian republic is a parliamentary democracy. Elections are held every four years to a unicameral 140-seat chamber (Kuvendi i Shqipërisë) through a closed-list proportional representation system. There are 12 multi-member constituencies corresponding to the country’s 12 administrative regions. Within any constituency, parties must meet a threshold of 3%, and pre-election coalitions must meet a threshold of 5%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party of Albania (social-democrat, pro-European, Centre-left)</td>
<td>41.28</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Albania (conservative, Centre-right)</td>
<td>30.52</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Movement for Integration (social-democrat, pro-European, Centre-left)</td>
<td>10.46</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party of Albania (national-conservative, Right)</td>
<td>3.06</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Party for Justice, Integration and Unity (Albanian nationalism, Centre-right)</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Democratic Spirit (liberal-conservative, Centre-right)</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Unity for Human Rights Party (minority politics, Centre)</td>
<td>0.85</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Republic of Cyprus

Presidential Elections

17 February 2013 and 24 February 2013
Previous elections: 24 February 2008
Presidential Republic, the President is elected by absolute majority vote through a two-round system to serve a 5-year term.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>% 1st round</th>
<th>% 2nd round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nikos Anastasiades (Democratic Rally)</td>
<td>45.46</td>
<td>57.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stavros Malas (Progressive Party of working People)</td>
<td>26.91</td>
<td>42.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giorgos Lillikas (Independent)</td>
<td>24.93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 80.9% (1st round) and 75.6% (2nd round)

Northern Cyprus

Legislative Elections

28 July 2013
Previous elections: 19 April 2009
Self-proclaimed and non recognised internationally semi-presidential representative democratic republic with a multi-party system. In the Assembly of the Republic (Cumhuriyet Meclisi) 50 members are elected by proportional representation to serve 5-year terms. Members are elected from 5 electoral districts. There is a 5 percent threshold for gaining representation. Voters in each district may vote for a party list, or for individual candidates. If they vote for individual candidates, their number of votes cannot exceed the number of seats in the district.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republican Turkish Party</td>
<td>38.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Unity Party (Turkish nationalism, conservative, Right)</td>
<td>27.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (conservative, Turkish nationalism, Centre-right)</td>
<td>23.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communal Democracy Party</td>
<td>7.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(social-democrat, union of Cyprus. Centre-left)

United Cyprus Party (socialism, union of Cyprus. Left)

Turnout: 69.6%

Israel

Legislative Elections

22 January 2013
Previous elections: 10 February 2009
Israel is a parliamentary republic with a unicameral legislature (Knesset). Elections are called to elect the 120 members through a closed-list proportional representation system to serve 4-year terms. A party or electoral alliance must pass the election threshold of 2% of the overall vote to be allocated a Knesset seat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Likud Yisrael Beitenu (secularism, nationalism, Zionism, Right)</td>
<td>23.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yesh Atid (liberalism, secularism, economic liberalism, Centre)</td>
<td>14.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Labor Party (social democracy, third way, labour-Zionism, Centre-left)</td>
<td>11.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Jewish Home - National Union (nationalism and religious Zionism, Right)</td>
<td>9.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shas (ultra-orthodox religious party, Right)</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Torah Judaism (ultra-orthodox alliance, Right)</td>
<td>5.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatnuah (liberal political party, Centre-left)</td>
<td>4.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meretz (social-democrat, Left)</td>
<td>4.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Arab List - Arab Movement for Renewal (Israel-Arab interest, secularism, anti-Zionism)</td>
<td>3.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Jewish and Arab socialist party, Left)</td>
<td>2.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Assembly (Arab-nationalism, Left)</td>
<td>2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kadima (liberalism, Centre)</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Israel (nationalism. Far-right)</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whole Nation (secular-religious unity)</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 67.1%

Jordan

Legislative Elections (House of Deputies)

23 January 2013
Previous elections: 9 November 2010

The Arab Kingdom of Jordan has a bicameral National Assembly (Majlis al-Umma) consisting of the Senate (Majlis al-Aayan) with 55 seats and the Chamber of Deputies (Majlis al-Nuwaab) with 150 seats. It was the first Jordanian election to be administered by the Independent Election Commission that was appointed in May 2012. Previous elections had been administered by the Ministry of the Interior.

The seats at the House of Deputies are distributed as follows: 27 seats are elected nationwide via proportional representation from party lists. 108 of the seats are elected from district seats, including 9 district seats reserved for Christian candidates, and 3 for Circassian and Chechen candidates. There are also 9 seats reserved for Bedouin candidates. 15 seats are reserved for women under a quota system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Centre Party</td>
<td>8.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronger Jordan</td>
<td>7.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Homeland</td>
<td>6.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Union Party</td>
<td>4.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Current Party</td>
<td>3.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvation</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour and Professionalism</td>
<td>2.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperation</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignity</td>
<td>2.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified Front</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Unity</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>2.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The People</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People of Determination</td>
<td>1.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Voice</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice of the Nation</td>
<td>1.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Labour</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Quds</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-Bayareq</td>
<td>1.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dawn</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shabab al-Wifaq</td>
<td>1.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>38.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 56.5%
Mauritania
Legislative Elections

23 November 2013 (1st round), 21 December 2013 (2nd round)
Elections were originally scheduled for 1 October, 2011, but they have been repeatedly delayed. In the National Assembly (Al Jamiya Al Wataniya), 106 members are elected in single- and multi-member constituencies to serve 5-year terms and 40 members are elected through a closed-list proportional representation system to serve 5-year terms. In the first round of the elections on November 23, 89 seats were allocated, with the Union for the Republic winning a majority of seats. The runoff elections in single and dual member districts, where no majority was attained, was held on 21 December, where 28 seats were allocated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union for the Republic (centrism, populism. Centre)</td>
<td>21.34</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Rally for Reform and Development (Sunni Islamism, religious conservatism. Right)</td>
<td>13.68</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Progressive Alliance (social-democrat. Centre-left)</td>
<td>7.48</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Wiam</td>
<td>3.83</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for Democracy and Progress</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Party for Democracy and Renewal (black minority interests)</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawab (ba’athism, Arab nationalism)</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Renewal</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout first round: 50.3%

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union for the Republic (centrism, populism. Centre)</td>
<td>55.11</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Rally for Reform and Development (Sunni Islamism, religious conservatism. Right)</td>
<td>13.75</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Wiam</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Progressive Alliance (social-democrat. Centre-left)</td>
<td>4.42</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for Democracy and Progress</td>
<td>3.74</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout second round: 72.5%

Sources
Adam Carr’s Electoral Archive
http://psephos.adam-carr.net
Freedom House
www.freedomhouse.org
IFES Election Guide
www.electionguide.org/index.php
OPEMAM Observatory on Politics and Elections in the Arab and Muslim World
www.observatorioelectoral.es
Parline Database
www.ipu.org/parline-e/partlinesearch.asp
Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
### TABLE A1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Payments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>141.02</td>
<td>92.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>100.58</td>
<td>67.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>184.54</td>
<td>185.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo (Res. 1244 of the UNSC)</td>
<td>182.84</td>
<td>156.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>31.81</td>
<td>27.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>99.32</td>
<td>40.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>86.67</td>
<td>68.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>28.09</td>
<td>24.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>857.44</td>
<td>418.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>186.54</td>
<td>27.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>113.01</td>
<td>50.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>122.08</td>
<td>106.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>9.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territory</td>
<td>217.88</td>
<td>247.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>250.12</td>
<td>92.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>42.99</td>
<td>22.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>132.52</td>
<td>147.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>97.77</td>
<td>46.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>207.00</td>
<td>113.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>67.14</td>
<td>52.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### CHART A1

EU Cooperation 2012

![EU Cooperation 2012 Chart](image-url)
### TABLE A2  European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI): 2007-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Commitments under the ENPI (in millions of euros)</th>
<th>2007-2010</th>
<th>2011-2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td></td>
<td>220</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
<td>558</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td></td>
<td>265</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td>187</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td></td>
<td>654*</td>
<td>580.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td>130</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank and Gaza**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>770.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total ENPI (bilateral)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,321</td>
<td>2,869.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This number does not include the amounts of different governments facilities allocated to Morocco between 2007 and 2010.
** The data for the West Bank and Gaza include the ENPI, Development Programmes, humanitarian aid, UNRWA, PEGASE, Partnership for Peace and the Instrument for Stability.


### TABLE A3  Mediterranean Candidate Countries for Accession

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) 2011</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td></td>
<td>155.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component I. Transition Assistance and Institution Building</td>
<td>39.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component II Cross-border Cooperation</td>
<td>16.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component III Regional Development</td>
<td>57.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component IV Human Resources Development</td>
<td>15.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component V Rural development</td>
<td>25.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td></td>
<td>101.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component I. Transition Assistance and Institution Building</td>
<td>28.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component II Cross-border Cooperation</td>
<td>3.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component III Regional Development</td>
<td>40.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component IV Human Resources Development</td>
<td>10.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component V Rural development</td>
<td>17.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td></td>
<td>34.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component I. Transition Assistance and Institution Building</td>
<td>16.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component II Cross-border Cooperation</td>
<td>4.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component III Regional Development</td>
<td>7.98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component IV Human Resources Development</td>
<td>2.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component V Rural development</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td>779.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component I. Transition Assistance and Institution Building</td>
<td>227.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component II Cross-border Cooperation</td>
<td>2.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component III Regional Development</td>
<td>356.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component IV Human Resources Development</td>
<td>83.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component V Rural development</td>
<td>187.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td></td>
<td>94.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component I. Transition Assistance and Institution Building</td>
<td>85.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component II Cross-border Cooperation</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td></td>
<td>107.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component I. Transition Assistance and Institution Building</td>
<td>102.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component II. Cross-border Cooperation</td>
<td>5.19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kosovo (Res. 1244 of the UNSC)</td>
<td></td>
<td>68.80</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Component I. Transition Assistance and Institution Building</td>
<td>67.00</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Component II Cross-border Cooperation</td>
<td>1.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td></td>
<td>202.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component I. Transition Assistance and Institution Building</td>
<td>190.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component II Cross-border Cooperation</td>
<td>11.47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As potential candidates the following countries will have access to Components III to V when each country receives accreditation to manage assistance itself (under the Decentralised Implementation System)

### TABLE A4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>156.1</td>
<td>93.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>101.8</td>
<td>113.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>860.2</td>
<td>902.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>95.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>107.8</td>
<td>108.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>202.0</td>
<td>208.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo (Res.1244 of the UNSC)</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-beneficiary programme</td>
<td>176.2</td>
<td>177.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE A5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans by Sector</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Croatia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>300.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs and mid-caps</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs and mid-caps</td>
<td>250.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bosnia and Herzegovina</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of two motorway sections totalling 31 km in corridor Vc in Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>206.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>166.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serbia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs and mic-caps</td>
<td>275.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Montenegro</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction and rehabilitation of basic infrastructure damaged by December 2010 floods</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FYROM</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale industrial projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>110.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Albania</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of around 22 km of motorway on new alignment bypassing Fier near coast in central Albania</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and operation of Eurasia tunnel under Bosphorus in Istanbul</td>
<td>2,135.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDI involving development of new, light-weight vehicle interior components in several countries</td>
<td>269.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by local authorities</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of range of flood prevention and protection schemes in various river basins over period 2013-2015</td>
<td>150.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernisation of plant for production of redesigned range of light and medium-sized commercial vehicles in Koçaeli</td>
<td>190.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework loan for financing small and medium-scale renewable energy and energy efficiency projects</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D concerning fixed line, mobile and internet services</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of academic research funding programme and industrial RDI programme implemented via Scientific and Technological Research Council</td>
<td>175.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D aimed at improving performance and broadening home appliance product portfolio</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs and midcaps</td>
<td>1,000.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Morocco</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of seven technology parks under national industrial development plan (2009-2015)</td>
<td>1,004.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of low-cost vehicle manufacturing plant in Melloussa free economic zone, 30 km from port of Tangiers</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of two sulphuric acid production plants in Safi and two low-grade phosphate processing plants in Mea and Halassa near Khouribga</td>
<td>73.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of first phase of solar power complex in Ouarzazate</td>
<td>130.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernisation of wastewater collection networks and construction of treatment plants in 27 small and medium-sized towns throughout country</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity participation in Moroccan generalist equity fund</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading and expansion of all-inclusive Club Med village near Tetouan on northern coast of Morocco</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third phase of national rural roads programme</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reinforcement and extension of electricity transmission infrastructure</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Part-financing of national irrigation water saving programme comprising upgrading of public irrigation systems</td>
<td>180.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of motorway between El Jadida and Safi</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continue)
### TABLE A5  European Investment Bank Loans to Mediterranean Countries in 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans by Sector</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tunisia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of poor urban areas through provision of basic public amenities</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Egypt</strong></td>
<td>245.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension of metro line 3 to serve main transport corridors of greater Cairo area</td>
<td>200.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme of investment in public housing and amenities</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lebanon</strong></td>
<td>140.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enlargement and reconstruction of 10.3 km section of A1 motorway (Beirut-Tripoli) including upgrading of three access roads and two intersections in Beirut</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of renewable energy and energy efficiency projects carried out by private sector companies</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jordan</strong></td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private equity fund for SMEs</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity participation in venture capital fund supporting start-up and expansion investment in SMEs in fields of technology, media and telecommunications</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israel</strong></td>
<td>110.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D and start-up of electric vehicle infrastructure and service scheme</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of combined-cycle gas turbine combined heat and power plant near Sdom (southern part of Dead Sea)</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE A6  EU Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MENA</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq)¹</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>42.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon (Palestinian refugees)</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria (Sahrawi refugees)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>145.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>214.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ To provide life-saving integrated assistance to the people affected by the violence in Syria. Source: [http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2012/me_01000_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/decisions/2012/me_01000_en.pdf)

Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean

### TABLE B1  Breakdown of Net Spanish Official Development Assistance in the Mediterranean Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2011-2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maghreb and Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>3,118,229</td>
<td>1,562,626</td>
<td>-49,89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>21,293,395</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>13,977,302</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>22,142,979</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>7,207,547</td>
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<td>-99,65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>41,349,564</td>
<td>11,656,129</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>53,598,430</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Saharan Refugees</td>
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<td>Syria</td>
<td>7,277,146</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td><strong>Balkans and Turkey</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>5,126,006</td>
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<td>Kosovo (Res.1244 of the UNSC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>23,234,025</td>
<td>1,200,629</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>106,424,974</td>
<td>28,120,719</td>
<td>-73,57</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: AECID, Seguimiento PACI (PACI Follow-ups, i.e. reports on the Annual International Cooperation Plan) for 2012.

### CHART B1  Breakdown of Spanish Development Aid in the Maghreb and the Middle East by Sector (2012)

- Education: 18%
- Health: 4%
- Population and Reproductive Health Programmes/Policies: 4%
- Water Supply and Treatment: 3%
- Governance and Civil Society: 22%
- Non-Sectoral: 29%
- Multi-Sector: 3%
- Productive Sectors: 5%
- Financial Infrastructure and Services: 3%
- Other Social Services and Infrastructure: 9%

Source: AECID, Seguimiento PACI 2012.
Appendices

Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean

Mediterranean Yearbook

2014

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CHART B2

Breakdown of Spanish Development Aid in the Balkans and Turkey by Sector (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-Sectoral</th>
<th>31%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Multi-Sector</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productive Sectors</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Infrastructure and Services</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Social Services and Infrastructure</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply and Treatment</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population and Reproductive Health Programmes/Policies</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance and Civil Society</td>
<td>20%</td>
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Source: AECID, Seguimiento PACI 2012.

TABLE B2

Breakdown of Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean Region by Objective (2012)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maghreb and Middle East</th>
<th>Rural Development and Fight Against Hunger</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Water and Sanitation</th>
<th>Economic Growth for Human Development</th>
<th>Environmental Sustainability, Combating Climate Change and Habitat</th>
<th>Science, Technology and Research for Human Development</th>
<th>Culture and Development</th>
<th>Gender in Development</th>
<th>Migration and Development</th>
<th>Peace-Building</th>
<th>Humanitarian Action</th>
<th>Other Areas</th>
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<td>17,500</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>4,050</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>716,334</td>
<td>321,494</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>181,866</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,071,680</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>33,100</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>300,923</td>
<td>84,207</td>
<td>30,318</td>
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<td>742,804</td>
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<td>16,173</td>
<td>45,017</td>
<td>330,916</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,139,956</td>
<td>7,446,847</td>
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<td>127,740</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>6,853</td>
<td>10,300</td>
<td>4,763</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>74,125</td>
<td>4,976,176</td>
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<td>8,150</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>5,720</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>319,611</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Balkans and Turkey

| Albania                | 0                                        | 0         | 7,636   | 0                   | 0                                    | 0                                                      | 0                                                      | 0                      | 0                      | 0                        | 0              | 0                | 31,911     |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 0                                        | 0         | 21,317  | 0                   | 0                                    | 0                                                      | 0                                                      | 0                      | 0                      | 0                        | 0              | 0                | 37,000     |
| FYROM                  | 0                                        | 0         | 464     | 0                   | 0                                    | 0                                                      | 0                                                      | 0                      | 0                      | 0                        | 0              | 0                | 0          |
| Montenegro             | 0                                        | 0         | 0       | 0                   | 0                                    | 0                                                      | 0                                                      | 0                      | 0                      | 0                        | 0              | 0                | 0          |
| Serbia                 | 0                                        | 0         | 546,817 | 0                   | 0                                    | 0                                                      | 0                                                      | 0                      | 0                      | 0                        | 0              | 0                | 264,408    |
| Kosovo (Res.1244 of the UNSC) | 0     | 0         | 300     | 0                   | 0                                    | 0                                                      | 0                                                      | 0                      | 0                      | 0                        | 0              | 0                | 346,080    |
| Turkey                 | 0                                        | 0         | 897,984 | 0                   | 0                                    | 0                                                      | 0                                                      | 0                      | 0                      | 0                        | 0              | 493,998         | 0          |

Source: AECID, Seguimiento PACI 2013.
### Migrations in the Mediterranean

#### Table C1: Number of Foreigners from MPCs in the European Union by Nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration Source</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Libya</th>
<th>Total EU migrants</th>
<th>Total non-EU migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (2013)*</td>
<td>25,719</td>
<td>201,921</td>
<td>1,3309</td>
<td>4,020</td>
<td>7,341</td>
<td>974</td>
<td>6,272</td>
<td>597</td>
<td>3,572</td>
<td>99,011</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>363,314</td>
<td>927,553</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bulgaria (2013)*</td>
<td>351</td>
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<td>90</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>1,298</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>637</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>8,227</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>9,635</td>
<td>59,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic (2013)*</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>602</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>437</td>
<td>1,114</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>5,174</td>
<td>241,346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>5,253</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>1,591</td>
<td>4,031</td>
<td>1,135</td>
<td>12,183</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>32,068</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>59,836</td>
<td>368,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>93,844</td>
<td>26,813</td>
<td>14,437</td>
<td>44,344</td>
<td>10,312</td>
<td>67,031</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>6,565,927</td>
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<tr>
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<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>291</td>
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<tr>
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<td>897</td>
<td>1,358</td>
<td>11,026</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>2,748</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>6,487</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>31,900</td>
<td>91,113</td>
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<td>1,358</td>
<td>11,026</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>2,748</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>408</td>
<td>6,487</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>31,900</td>
<td>91,113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>740,097</td>
<td>2,724</td>
<td>4,120</td>
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<td>5,307</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>2,191</td>
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<tr>
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<td>9,204</td>
<td>262,864</td>
<td>2,180</td>
<td>3,149,590</td>
<td>5,433,875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>409,641</td>
<td>110,706</td>
<td>105,481</td>
<td>5,776</td>
<td>3,276</td>
<td>7,113</td>
<td>369</td>
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<td>20,557</td>
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<td>726,653</td>
<td>3,881,729</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>42</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>124</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>37</td>
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<td>27,510</td>
<td>3,280</td>
<td>24,743</td>
<td>4,228</td>
<td>4,233</td>
<td>45,085</td>
<td>1,756</td>
<td>129,458</td>
<td>976,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom (2005)*</td>
<td>20,980</td>
<td>23,080</td>
<td>9,032</td>
<td>30,280</td>
<td>10,035</td>
<td>7,311</td>
<td>17,755</td>
<td>5,146</td>
<td>20,786</td>
<td>82,941</td>
<td>20,696</td>
<td>247,333</td>
<td>5,150,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1,611,672</td>
<td>2,587,235</td>
<td>576,224</td>
<td>243,902</td>
<td>152,166</td>
<td>32,789</td>
<td>199,633</td>
<td>13,034</td>
<td>80,354</td>
<td>2,477,461</td>
<td>69,764</td>
<td>8,045,234</td>
<td>33,537,867</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHART C1  Percentage of immigrants from MPCs on Total Immigrants 2013 (top 10 countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2013 Percentage of MPC Immigrants</th>
<th>2013 Percentage of Total Immigrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>42.0%</td>
<td>58.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>63.9%</td>
<td>36.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>71.9%</td>
<td>28.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>72.0%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU average</td>
<td>76.0%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>76.2%</td>
<td>33.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>79.8%</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>81.3%</td>
<td>18.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>81.9%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>83.8%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EU average 24%

- Immigrants from MED countries
- Immigrants from the rest of the world

CHART C2  EU Immigrants from MPCs: from 2004 to 2013

- Total EU immigrants from Euromed countries
- Percentage of immigrants from Euromed countries on total immigrants

EU average 24%
The Euro-Mediterranean
Association Agreements

### TABLE D1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start of Negotiations</th>
<th>Agreement Concluded</th>
<th>Agreement Signed</th>
<th>Entry into Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>May 1996</td>
<td>December 1996</td>
<td>February 1997</td>
<td>July 1997*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>March 1995</td>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>June 1997</td>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td>April 2002</td>
<td>September 2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Interim agreement signed by the EU and the PLO (to the benefit of the Palestinian Authority).

- To enter into force each Association Agreement must be ratified by the European Parliament, the Parliament of the Partner Country and the Parliaments of the 25 Member States of the European Union.
- Until its accession to the EU, Turkey shall be governed by the Customs Union Agreement, which entered into force in January 1996 and is based on the First Generation Agreement of 1963.
- In 2008 the Association Agreement with Syria was revised. It was planned to be ratified on 26 October 2009. However, Syria indefinitely postponed signing the Association Agreement with the European Union. The agreement will enter into force provisionally when it is signed by Syria. The definitive entry into force requires the European Parliament’s evaluation and ratification by the Member States. In December 2011, Syria suspended its adhesion to UfM. During 2012, as a result of the conflict escalation and the pressure from the international community, there has not been progress in the signing and ratification of the Association Agreement.
- Negotiations for a Framework Agreement between the European Union and Libya are currently suspended.

### TABLE D2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start of Negotiations</th>
<th>Agreement Signed</th>
<th>Entry into Force (Interim Agreement)</th>
<th>Entry into Force</th>
<th>Candidate Country</th>
<th>Start of Negotiations</th>
<th>Entry into the EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>November 2005</td>
<td>June 2008</td>
<td>July 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* On 21 May 2006, a referendum was held, which led to Montenegro’s independence from the Federation it had formed with Serbia.

- EU relations with the Western Balkan Countries are regulated by the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). The SAP serves as a framework for the development of various instruments and helps each country to carry out political and economic transition preparing them for a new contractual relationship with the EU: the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs), under which they aim to progress towards closer association with the EU.
- Negotiations with Serbia were interrupted in May 2006 due to lack of progress in cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In early 2007, the new administration in Belgrade launched a plan and constituted a National Council for cooperation with the ICTY, a measure which allowed negotiations to resume on 13 June 2007. In April 2008, the European Union and Serbia signed the agreement. The Interim Agreement will not enter into force until the EU Council considers that Serbia is fully cooperating with the ICTY. In December 2009, the Council unfroze the Interim Agreement,
which entered into force in February 2010. In March 2012 Serbia achieved the status of candidate for EU membership. In September 2013 a Stabilisation and Association Agreement between the EU and Serbia entered into force. In line with the decision of the European Council in June 2013 to open accession negotiations with Serbia, the Council adopted in December 2013 the negotiating framework and agreed to hold the 1st Intergovernmental Conference with Serbia in January 2014.

- After its declaration and the EU’s acknowledgement of Montenegro as a sovereign and independent State, the EU has maintained relations with independent Montenegro. The SAA was signed on 15 October 2007. In January 2008, the entry into force of the Interim Agreement represented progress towards the national ratification process and closer relations with the EU. The SAA entered into force in May 2010. In June 2012 began negotiations for the accession of Montenegro to the EU.

- Three years after the start of negotiations between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005, the SAA was signed and the Interim Agreement took effect. However, despite real progress in collaboration with the ICTY, the Commission still notes numerous dysfunctions in the institutional and judiciary spheres.

- More than seven years after the start of the negotiations, Croatia joined the European Union on 1st July 2013.

- In June 2003, the Thessaloniki European Council decided that all Western Balkan countries be considered as potential candidates for EU accession. Macedonia (2005) and Serbia (2012) have already been granted candidate country status. Albania (2009) has also applied for EU accession. In October 2012, Commission recommended that Albania be granted EU candidate status, subject to completion of key measures in the areas of judicial and public administration reform and revision of the parliamentary rules of procedures. In June 2014, Albania was granted the EU candidate status.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE D3</th>
<th>European Neighbourhood Action Plans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Country</strong></td>
<td><strong>Israel</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adoption by the country</strong></td>
<td>April 2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The ENP Action Plans allow the European Union to maintain a progressive, differentiated policy towards its neighbouring countries based on the different levels of cooperation established.

- An Action Plan, developed after the signing of an Association Agreement, establishes priorities and a timetable for political and economic reform. Action Plans are the operational tools of the legal framework represented by the Association Agreements.

- Progress is analysed each year through evaluation reports. The extent of the progress made determines the levels of cooperation and access to the European Market.

- In 2012 there was no progress made by the two countries which are yet to agree an Action Plan (However on December 2011, Algeria officially indicated its willingness to start exploratory negotiations regarding the elaboration of an Action Plan under the renewed ENP. Two rounds of informal discussions at working level have been held so far).

- In Egypt formal dialogue under the ENP, which had been suspended since January 2011, resumed in February 2013, through an Association Committee.

- ENP Action Plans in Tunisia and Morocco were adopted in 2005 and were come to an end in 2010, but in both cases it was agreed to extent the implementement during the negotiation of the new 2013-2017 Action Plans.

- ENP Action Plans in Israel and Palestine were adopted in 2005 for a period of three years, but in both cases its validity was extended. On 24 October 2012, the EU’s High Representative and Security Policy Catherine Ashton and Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad announced the conclusion of negotiations of a new ENP Action Plan.

- EU-Lebanon Action Plan was adopted in 2007 for a period of five years. In 2012 Lebanon and the EU jointly draft a new ENP Action Plan. The negotiations were concluded in October 2012 and the Action Plan will enter into force after legal procedures are completed in 2013.
Appendices
Signature of Multilateral Treaties and Conventions

432

Signature of Multilateral Treaties
and Conventions
TABLE E1

Multilateral Treaties on Human Rights and Penal Mattersa
Racial
discriminationc

Civil and
political
rightsd

Rights
of the
childh

Crime of
genocidei

International
Criminal Courtj

Financing
of
terrorismk

Date of adoption

1966

1966

1966

1979

1984

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Portugal
Spain
France
Italy
Malta

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Slovenia
Croatia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Serbia
Montenegro

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FYROM
Albania
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Syria
Lebanon
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Israel
Palestine

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Egypt
Libya
Tunisia
Algeria
Morocco

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UN

UN

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UN

UN

UN

Source:

e. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. f. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. g. Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

TABLE E2

Multilateral Treaties on Labour Rights (year of ratification)
Freedom of
association and
collective bargaining
Convention
87a

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2014

Economic, Discrimination
Torture
social and
against
and other
e
f
cultural rights
women
mistreatmentg

Convention
98b

Elimination of
forced or
obligatory labour
Convention
29c

Convention
105d

Elimination of discrimination
in respect of employment
and occupation
Convention
100e

Convention
111f

Abolition of
child labour
Convention
138g

Convention
182h

Rights of
immigrant
workersi,j
1990

Date of adoption

1948

1949

1930

1957

1951

1958

1973

1999

Portugal
Spain
France
Italy
Malta

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Slovenia
Croatia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Serbia
Montenegro

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FYROM
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Cyprus
Turkey

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Syria
Lebanon
Jordan
Israel
Palestine

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ILO

ILO

ILO

ILO

ILO

ILO

ILO

OHCHR

Egypt
Libya
Tunisia
Algeria
Morocco
Source:

1957

1996
2004k
2006k
2007
2004

e. Convention on Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value. f. Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention. g. Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to
Employment. h. Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention. i. Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. j. Ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or
succession. k. Signature.


### TABLE E3 Multilateral Environmental Treaties

| Date of adoption | Climate Change 1992 | Kyoto Protocol1994 | Biological Diversity | Biosafety Protocol | CITES | Deserti- 

### TABLE E4 Multilateral Disarmament Treaties

| Date of adoption | Geneva Protocol | Nuclear weapons | Bacteriological weapons | Conventional weapons | Chemical weapons | Nuclear testing | Antipersonnel mines |
| | | | | | | | |
| | 1925 | 1925 | 1925 | 1925 | 1925 | 1925 | 1925 |
| | 1926 | 1926 | 1926 | 1926 | 1926 | 1926 | 1926 |
| | 1927 | 1927 | 1927 | 1927 | 1927 | 1927 | 1927 |
| | 1928 | 1928 | 1928 | 1928 | 1928 | 1928 | 1928 |
| | 1929 | 1929 | 1929 | 1929 | 1929 | 1929 | 1929 |
| | 1930 | 1930 | 1930 | 1930 | 1930 | 1930 | 1930 |
| | 1931 | 1931 | 1931 | 1931 | 1931 | 1931 | 1931 |
| | 1932 | 1932 | 1932 | 1932 | 1932 | 1932 | 1932 |
| | 1933 | 1933 | 1933 | 1933 | 1933 | 1933 | 1933 |
| | 1934 | 1934 | 1934 | 1934 | 1934 | 1934 | 1934 |
| | 1936 | 1936 | 1936 | 1936 | 1936 | 1936 | 1936 |
| | 1937 | 1937 | 1937 | 1937 | 1937 | 1937 | 1937 |
| | 1938 | 1938 | 1938 | 1938 | 1938 | 1938 | 1938 |
| | 1939 | 1939 | 1939 | 1939 | 1939 | 1939 | 1939 |
| | 1940 | 1940 | 1940 | 1940 | 1940 | 1940 | 1940 |
| | 1941 | 1941 | 1941 | 1941 | 1941 | 1941 | 1941 |
| | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 | 1942 |
| | 1943 | 1943 | 1943 | 1943 | 1943 | 1943 | 1943 |
| | 1944 | 1944 | 1944 | 1944 | 1944 | 1944 | 1944 |
| | 1945 | 1945 | 1945 | 1945 | 1945 | 1945 | 1945 |
| | 1946 | 1946 | 1946 | 1946 | 1946 | 1946 | 1946 |
| | 1948 | 1948 | 1948 | 1948 | 1948 | 1948 | 1948 |
| | 1949 | 1949 | 1949 | 1949 | 1949 | 1949 | 1949 |
| | 1951 | 1951 | 1951 | 1951 | 1951 | 1951 | 1951 |
| | 1957 | 1957 | 1957 | 1957 | 1957 | 1957 | 1957 |
The Mediterranean in Brief

### TABLE F1 Human Development Index (HDI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling</th>
<th>GNI per capita</th>
<th>Human Development Index</th>
<th>Position in HDI Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>PPP $</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>19,907</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>25,947</td>
<td>0.885</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>81.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>30,277</td>
<td>0.893</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>82.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>26,158</td>
<td>0.881</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
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<td>9.9</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>21,184</td>
<td>0.847</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>23,999</td>
<td>0.892</td>
<td>21</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>76.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>15,419</td>
<td>0.805</td>
<td>47</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>75.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>7,713</td>
<td>0.735</td>
<td>81</td>
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<td>Serbia</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>9,533</td>
<td>0.769</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
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<td>10.5</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>10,471</td>
<td>0.791</td>
<td>52</td>
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<td>FYROM</td>
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<td>13.4</td>
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<td>0.740</td>
<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>7,822</td>
<td>0.749</td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>80.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>20,511</td>
<td>0.860</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>23,825</td>
<td>0.848</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13,710</td>
<td>0.722</td>
<td>90</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>76.0</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>4,674</td>
<td>0.648</td>
<td>116</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>12,364</td>
<td>0.745</td>
<td>72</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>5,272</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>26,224</td>
<td>0.900</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>3,359</td>
<td>0.870</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>73.5</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>5,401</td>
<td>0.662</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>13,765</td>
<td>0.769</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>74.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>8,103</td>
<td>0.712</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>7,418</td>
<td>0.713</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>4,384</td>
<td>0.591</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: UNDP.

### CHART F1 Evolution of HDI in some Regions

- Arab States
- East Asia and the Pacific
- Europe and Central Asia
- Latin America and the Caribbean
- South Asia
- Sub-Saharan Africa

Own production. Source: UNDP.
### TABLE F2: Population: Demography

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total population millions 2013</th>
<th>Estimated population for 2050 millions</th>
<th>Crude birth rate per 1,000 inhabitants 2012</th>
<th>Crude death rate per 1,000 inhabitants 2012</th>
<th>Average annual population growth rate % 2012</th>
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*Own production. Source: UNFPA, UNPOP, WB, WB, WB, WB, WB, UNFPA, UNPOP, UNPOP, UNPOP, UNPOP.

*Net annual average of migrants: the annual number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants

*Net number of migrants divided by the average population of the receiving country for the period under consideration.

**Data unavailable**

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### CHART F2: Population in Mediterranean Countries (1950-2013)

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*Own production. Source: UNPOP.*
### TABLE F3 Population: Structure and Distribution

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<th>Population in urban agglomerations of more than 750,000 inhabitants</th>
<th>Location on the Mediterranean coastline</th>
<th>Urban population living in slums</th>
<th>Population density people per km²</th>
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Own production. Source: UNPOP.

### CHART F3 Mediterranean Countries Population Pyramid (2010)

- **North Mediterranean Countries**
- **South and East Mediterranean Countries**

Own production. Source: UNPOP.
### TABLE F4

#### Education and Training of Human Capital

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Own production. Source: UNESCO


#### CHART F4

**Percentage of Female Graduates by Field of Study (2009-2012*)**

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*Latest data available from this period. Own production. Source: UNESCO.
### TABLE F5: Health and Survival

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<th>Under-five mortality ratio per 1,000 live born alive</th>
<th>Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 born alive</th>
<th>People living with HIV/AIDS estimate</th>
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<th>% age 15-49</th>
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Own production. Source: CME.

### CHART F5: Neonatal Mortality Rate (2012)

- **Top 5 Countries with Highest Neonatal Mortality Rate**
  - Sierra Leone
  - Guinea-Bissau
  - Somalia
  - Angola
  - Lesotho

- **Top 5 Countries with Lowest Neonatal Mortality Rate**
  - Singapore
  - Iceland
  - Japan
  - Andorra
  - Luxembourg

Own production. Source: CME.
### TABLE F6 Nutrition and Food Security

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<th>Cereal trade exports mt</th>
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Own production. Source: FAO

¹ Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F6 Cereal Import Dependency Ratio (1990-2009)

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### TABLE F7  Access to Health Resources

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<th>% of women with a husband or partner who report use</th>
<th>Adolescent fertility rate</th>
<th>Total health expenditure</th>
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Own production. Source: WHO. 

- Latest data available from this period. 
- Data unavailable.

### CHART F7  Immunisation. Coverage of Infants with DTP3 Vaccine (1990-2012)

![Immunisation Chart](chart_url)

Own production. Source: WHO.

DTP3: Third dose of diphtheria toxoid, tetanus toxoid and pertussis vaccine. 

*Data from 2009.*
### TABLE F8  Gender: Social Development

| Gender: Social Development | Life expectancy at birth | Adult literacy rate ≥ age 15 | Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio | Year women received right to vote | Year women received right to stand for election | Year first woman elected or appointed to parliament | Seats in parliament held by women%
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<td>73</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>63.9</td>
<td>81.3</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1949 1962 1962</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>57.6</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>1963 1963 1993</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Note:** Own production. Source: WB, UNESCO, IPU.

*Referring to the first year appointed in the current parliamentary system. The date refers to the first year in which a woman was nominated to Parliament. First partial recognition of the right to vote or stand for election. Situation as of 1 February 2014. The values shown are for lower or single chamber. Latest data available from this period. Data of July 2013. Data unavailable.

---

### CHART F8  Seats in Parliament Held by Women (2014)

**Top 5 Countries with Highest percentage of Women in Parliament**

- Rwanda
- Andorra
- Cuba
- Sweden
- South Africa

**Legend:**
- Top 5 Countries with Highest percentage of Women in Parliament

---

Own production. Source: IPU.
### Technology and Communication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Fixed-telephone subscriptions total</th>
<th>Fixed-telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants</th>
<th>Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions total</th>
<th>Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants</th>
<th>Outgoing international calls minutes per capita</th>
<th>Incoming international calls minutes per capita</th>
<th>Proportion of households with computer</th>
<th>Proportion of households with internet access</th>
<th>Proportion of households with internet users</th>
<th>Share of ICT goods of total exports</th>
<th>Share of ICT goods of total imports</th>
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<td>111</td>
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<td>64.0</td>
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<td>Spain</td>
<td>19,574,627</td>
<td>41.87</td>
<td>50,665,099</td>
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<td>119</td>
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<td>72.0</td>
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<td>4.62</td>
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<tr>
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<td>62,260,000</td>
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<td>192</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>81.0</td>
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<td>83.0</td>
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<td>6.22</td>
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<td>58.0</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
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<td>39.8</td>
<td>55.00</td>
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**Source:** ITU. Own production. Source: ITU.

### Fixed-broadband Subscriptions in Mediterranean Countries (2001-2012)

**Source:** ITU.
### TABLE F10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Internal displacement</th>
<th>Refugees by country of asylum</th>
<th>Total armed forces</th>
<th>Conventional arms transfer</th>
<th>Military expenditure</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>thousands</td>
<td>thousands</td>
<td>millions $</td>
<td>millions $</td>
</tr>
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<td>46 12,785</td>
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<td>7,210 32,657</td>
<td>4,784 61,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>326 405</td>
<td>7,210 32,657</td>
<td>4,784 61,228</td>
</tr>
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<td>4,784 61,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>...</td>
<td>... 59.5b 0.6b</td>
</tr>
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<td>...</td>
<td>... 545 1.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>...</td>
<td>... 957 1.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>11 14</td>
<td>203 200 0.9g</td>
<td>... 9,921 2.2</td>
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<tr>
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<td>&gt; 227 66.4</td>
<td>28 16</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>... 9,921 2.2</td>
</tr>
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<td>12 18</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>... 70 1.5</td>
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<td>...</td>
<td>... 127 1.2a</td>
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<td>15 36</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>... 184 1.39h</td>
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<td>13 91</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>... 455a 2.1b</td>
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<td>19,085 2.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>...</td>
<td>... 1,936 4.4</td>
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<td>... 16,032 5.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>...</td>
<td>... 948 2.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>60 4,255 1.7</td>
<td>... 4,255 1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7 103</td>
<td>78 2,903 3.3g</td>
<td>... 2,903 3.3g</td>
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<td>...</td>
<td>... 948 2.0</td>
</tr>
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<td>... 4,064 3.8</td>
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<td>Own production. Source: IDMC UNHCR UNHCR WB SIPRI SIPRI SIPRI SIPRI SIPRI SIPRI SIPRI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

| a. Data refer only to Palestinian refugees under UNHCR mandate. b. Military pensions not included. c. Data from 2008. d. Total exports or imports for the entire period. e. Includes part of the military pensions. f. Data refer to the approved budget, not real spending. g. Excluding paramilitary forces. h. Includes civil defence spending, which usually accounts for about 4.5% of the total. i. Data from 2011. j. Data from 2006. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F10

#### Conventional Arms Imports (2009-13)

**Top 10 Countries with Highest Imports of Conventional Arms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Millions $</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>India</td>
<td>17,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>9,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, South</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>5,500</td>
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</table>

Own production. Source: SIPRI.
### TABLE F11 Economic Structure and Production

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP (millions $)</th>
<th>GDP growth %</th>
<th>Share in GDP by sector</th>
<th>Consumer price index %</th>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>27&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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Own production. Source: IMF, WB. 
<sup>a</sup> Data from 2010. <sup>b</sup> Data from 2011. <sup>c</sup> Data from 2008. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F11 GDP (2012)

![GDP (2012) Chart](chart.png)

Own production. Source: WB.
### TABLE F12  Agriculture

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<th>Agricultural area* (thousands ha)</th>
<th>Arable and permanent crops (thousands ha)</th>
<th>Permanent pasture (thousands ha)</th>
<th>Total area equipped for irrigation (thousands ha)</th>
<th>Land under cereal production (thousands ha)</th>
<th>Cereal production (thousands tm)</th>
<th>Cereal yield (kg / ha)</th>
<th>Fertiliser consumption (thousands kg / ha)</th>
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Own production. Source: FAO.

* Agricultural area is divided into ‘arable land and permanent crops’ and ‘permanent meadows and pastures’.

- | Arable Land and Permanent Crops (2009-2011)*

![Chart](chart_f12.png)

- Fallow land
- Temporary crops
- Temporary meadows and pastures
- Permanent crops

Own production. Source: FAO.

* Latest data available from this period. Data unavailable.
### TABLE F13 Livestock

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<td></td>
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Own production. Source: FAO.

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### CHART F13 Meat Production (2012)

![Meat Production Chart](chart.png)

Own production. Source: FAO.
### TABLE F14  
**Fisheries**

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<th>Total fisheries</th>
<th>Mediterranean and Black Sea catches</th>
<th>Aquaculture production</th>
<th>Trade in fish and derivate products</th>
<th>Annual availability of fish and fish derivatives</th>
<th>Fishery fleeta</th>
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Own production. Source: FAO.  
a. Motorised vessels propelled by engines.  
b. Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F14  
**Evolution of Captures of Bluefin Tuna in the Mediterranean and Black Sea (1980-2012)**

Captures in the Atlantic Ocean (1980-2012)

Own production. Source: FAO.
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</table>

Own production. Source: ILO.

a. Latest data available from this period.

(--) Data unavailable.

CHART F15  

Youth Unemployment (2012)
### TABLE F16 Income Distribution

| Years | Portugal | Spain | France | Italy | Malta | Slovenia | Croatia | Bosnia and Herzegovina | Serbia | Montenegro | FYROM | Albania | Greece | Cyprus | Turkey | Syria | Lebanon | Jordan | Israel | Palestine | Egypt | Libya | Tunisia | Algeria | Morocco |
|-------|----------|-------|--------|-------|-------|----------|---------|------------------------|--------|------------|-------|---------|--------|--------|--------|-------|---------|--------|--------|---------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|-------|
| %     | lowest   | second | third  | fourth | highest |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |        |        |        |         |       |
|       | 20%      | 20%    | 20%    | 20%    | 20%     | 20%      | 20%     | 20%                    | 20%    | 20%        | 20%   | 20%     | 20%    | 20%    | 20%    | 20%   | 20%     | 20%   | 20%   | 20%     | 20%    | 20%   |
|       | %        | %      | %      | %      | %       | %        | %       | %                      | %      | %          | %     | %       | %      | %      | %      | %     | %       | %     | %     | %       | %      | %     |
|       | 7.0      | 12.1   | 16.4   | 22.5   | 42.0    |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 2000     |        |        |        |         |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 8.1      | 12.2   | 16.2   | 21.6   | 42.0    |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 2008     |        |        |        |         |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 6.7      | 11.3   | 16.1   | 22.7   | 43.2    |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 2007     |        |        |        |         |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 8.4      | 13.2   | 17.5   | 22.8   | 38.2    |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 2010     |        |        |        |         |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 8.8      | 13.4   | 17.6   | 23.0   | 37.3    |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 2010     |        |        |        |         |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 4.9      | 9.2    | 14.5   | 22.4   | 49.0    |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 2010     |        |        |        |         |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 5.5      | 10.6   | 15.6   | 22.4   | 46.0    |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 2010     |        |        |        |         |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 7.7      | 11.4   | 15.5   | 21.4   | 43.9    |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 2004     |        |        |        |         |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 7.7      | 11.6   | 15.7   | 21.5   | 43.6    |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 2010     |        |        |        |         |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 5.7      | 10.5   | 15.9   | 23.0   | 44.9    |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 2001     |        |        |        |         |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 7.4      | 11.5   | 15.8   | 21.8   | 43.4    |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 2009     |        |        |        |         |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 4.9      | 9.2    | 13.0   | 21.0   | 40.3    |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 2008     |        |        |        |         |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 13.5     | 16.7   | 16.4   | 22.6   | 42.9    |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 2010     |        |        |        |         |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 6.3      | 9.2    | 14.5   | 21.0   | 45.9    |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 2010     |        |        |        |         |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 6.7      | 11.5   | 16.2   | 22.6   | 42.9    |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 2010     |        |        |        |         |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 6.5      | 10.5   | 14.5   | 20.6   | 47.9    |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 2007     |        |        |        |         |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 7.0      | 12.1   | 16.4   | 22.5   | 42.0    |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 2000     |        |        |        |         |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 8.1      | 12.2   | 16.2   | 21.6   | 42.0    |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |
|       | 2008     |        |        |        |         |          |         |                        |        |            |       |         |        |        |        |       |         |       |       |         |        |       |

**Notes:**
- Own production. Source: WB.
- Data unavailable.

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### CHART F16 Poverty in Selected Mediterranean Countries (2012)

[Poverty chart image]

Top Five Countries with highest Population Below Income Poverty Line - PPP $1.25 a day (%)

- Top Five Countries: Congo, DR, Liberia, Burundi, Madagascar, Malawi.

[Population below line and vulnerable to line data for each country]

**Notes:**
- Own production. Source: UNDP.
### TABLE F17: Gender: Economic Activity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Labour force participation rate ≥ age 15</th>
<th>Employment by economic activity</th>
<th>Gender Inequality Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% women</td>
<td>% men</td>
<td>% of female employment</td>
</tr>
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<td>55.4</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
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<td>59.4</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>59</td>
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</table>

Own production. Source: ILO. *Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F17: Labour Force Participation Rate (2012)

![Labour Force Participation Rate (2012)](chart.png)

Five Countries with Highest Gap between male and female labour force participation rate

- Afghanistan
- Syria
- Palestine
- Saudi Arabia
- Algeria

Own production. Source: ILO.
### TABLE F18 Production and Energy Consumption

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Energy production</th>
<th>Energy use</th>
<th>Energy use per capita</th>
<th>GDP per unit of energy use</th>
<th>Net energy import</th>
<th>Share of total primary energy supply</th>
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<td>millions mt oil eq</td>
<td>millions mt oil eq</td>
<td>kg oil eq</td>
<td>PPP $ per kg oil eq</td>
<td>% of used energy</td>
<td>coal/peat</td>
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</table>

Own production. Source: WB.

a. Negative values indicate that the country is a net exporter.
b. Includes hydroelectric, biofuels and waste and geothermal, solar and wind

(..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F18 Energy Use per capita (2011)

![Energy Use per capita (2011) chart]

Own production. Source: WB.
### TABLE F19
Production, Consumption and Access to Electricity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population with access to electricity</th>
<th>Electricity production</th>
<th>Electricity consumption per capita</th>
<th>Sources of electricity</th>
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<td>billion kWh</td>
<td>%</td>
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<td>289.0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4,689</td>
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<td>15.5</td>
<td>6,806</td>
</tr>
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<td>10.7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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Own production. Source: WB (..) Data unavailable. a. Excluding hydroelectric.

### CHART F19
Evolution of Electricity Production from Renewable Sources, Excluding Hydroelectric in the Mediterranean Countries (1991-2011)

- **USA**
- **Germany**
- **China**
- **India**
- **Med. Countries**
- **Other**

Own production. Source: WB.
### CO₂ Emissions

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<th>Emissions intensity by GDP (kg CO₂ / PPP $)</th>
<th>Industry and construction (%)</th>
<th>Transport (%)</th>
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*Own production. Source: IEA. a. This does not include motorbikes. b. Own production according to IEA data. c. Data from 2010. d. Data from 2009. e. Data from 2007. (..) Data unavailable.

### CO₂ Emissions per capita (2011) (mt)

[CO₂ Emissions per capita chart](#)

Own production. Source: IEA.
# TABLE F21 Water

## Water resources

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<th>as % of total resources</th>
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## Water consumption

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Source: FAO. Latest data available from this period. (...) Data unavailable.

## CHART F21 Total Renewable Water (2012)

- Total renewable surface water
- Total renewable groundwater

Own production. Source: FAO.
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**Note:** Own production. Source: FAO, FAO, FAO, WB, FAO, WB, UICN, UICN, UICN, GFN.

\a For these groups there are still many species that have not been assessed. The figures presented should be interpreted as the number of species known to be threatened within those species that have been as-

\b Data from 2010. c. Data from 2009. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F22

**Trade of Forest Products, Balance (2012)**

**Top Five Countries with the Highest Trade Balance of Forest Products**

- **Canada:** $20,000,000
- **Sweden:** $15,000,000
- **Finland:** $10,000,000
- **Russia:** $5,000,000
- **Brazil:** $0

**Thousands $**

- **Portugal:** 1,966,927
- **Slovenia:** 198,345
- **Croatia:** 170,564
- **Bosnia and Herzegovina:** 159,941
- **Montenegro:** 138,134

**Top Five Countries with the Lowest Trade Balance of Forest Products**

- **Canada:** $-4,817,396
- **Sweden:** $-3,002,540
- **Finland:** $-2,489,507
- **Russia:** $-2,018,038
- **Brazil:** $0

- **Portugal:** $-1,966,927
- **Slovenia:** $-198,345
- **Croatia:** $-170,564
- **Bosnia and Herzegovina:** $-159,941
- **Montenegro:** $-138,134

**Own production. Source:** FAO.
### TABLE F23 International Trade

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Notes:
- Own production. Source: UNCTAD.
- a. From good and services.
- b. Workers remittances, salaries paid and transfer of capital are included.
- c. Own production using UNCTAD data.
- d. Estimated (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F23 Evolution of Trade of Mediterranean Countries (2000-2013)

[Chart showing the evolution of trade (Exports, Imports, Trade Balance) for various countries from 2000 to 2013]
### TABLE F24

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*Own production. Source: UNCTAD.*

### CHART F24

**Exports of Fuels (2012) (% of total exports)**

#### World Exports by Product (2012)

- **All food items**: 18%
- **Agricultural raw materials**: 3%
- **Fuels**: 19%
- **Minerals and metals**: 6%
- **Manufactured products**: 63%
- **Others**: 1%

*Own production. Source: UNCTAD.*
### TABLE F25 Imports

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Own production. Source: UNCTAD.

### CHART F25 Imports of Fuels (2012) (% of total exports)

![Chart showing imports of fuels by product in 2012](chart_f25.png)

World Imports by Product (2012)

- All food items: 9%
- Agricultural raw materials: 3%
- Fuels: 7%
- Minerals and metals: 5%
- Manufactured products: 72%
- Others: 4%

Own production. Source: UNCTAD.
### TABLE F26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Inbound tourists</th>
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<th>International tourism receipts</th>
<th>Tourism expenditure in other countries</th>
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<td>exchange rate %</td>
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Source: UNWTO. Own production using WB data. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F26

International Tourist Arrivals, Change 2010-11 (%)

Own production. Source: OECD.
### TABLE F27 Official Development Assistance (ODA)

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<th>Country</th>
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*Own production. Source: OECD.*

### CHART F27 ODA per capita

[Chart depicting ODA per capita across different regions and years.]
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**External Debt**

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*Own production. Source: WB.

#### CHART F28  
**External Debt (% of exports) 2012**

![Chart showing external debt (% of exports) for various countries including Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Turkey, FYROM, Montenegro, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, and Algeria. The chart illustrates debt as a percentage of exports for different regions, such as Europe & Central Asia, Latin America & Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia & Pacific, Middle East & North Africa, and developing countries only.](chart.png)

*Own production. Source: WB.*
definitions

adolescent fertility rate
number of births per thousand women aged between 15 and 19.

Agricultural land area
Land surface area made up of arable and permanently cultivated lands and by permanent meadows and pastures.

Agricultural population
Persons who depend on agriculture, hunting, fishing or forestry for their subsistence. This category includes all those who carry out an agricultural activity and all this entails without official employment.

Annual population growth rate
Exponential change in the growth of the population during the period indicated.

Aquaculture production
Includes marine, freshwater and diadromous fish, molluscs and crustaceans cultivated in marine, inland or brackish environments.

Arable lands and permanent crops
Agricultural surface area that groups the data on arable or farm land and land used for permanent crops. Arable and farm land is land given over to temporary crops (those giving two yields are only counted once) temporal meadows for cutting or grazing, land dedicated to commercial vegetable gardens or orchards and land temporarily fallow for a period of less than five years. The term does not include land that has been abandoned as a result of migratory cultivation. Land destined for permanent crops refers to land dedicated to crops that occupy the terrain during long periods and that do not need to be replanted after each harvest, such as cacao, coffee and rubber. It includes land occupied by bushes destined to flower production, fruit trees, walnut trees and vineyards, but excludes land planted with trees destined to the production of firewood or wood.

Armed forces
Strategic, land, naval, aerial, command and support forces. It also includes paramilitary forces, such as the gendarmerie, the customs services and the border guard if they are trained in military strategy.

Average annual supply of fish and fish derivatives
Calculated from the disposability of fish and its derivatives for human consumption, divided by the total population within the geographical borders of any given country. Nationals living in other countries are excluded, although foreigners living in the country are included.

Cereal production
The figures for cereal production only refer to harvests of dry grain. Crops harvested for hay, unripe foodstuffs, forage and silage, or are used for grazing, are therefore excluded.

Cereal production yield
The outputs per hectare have been calculated using the data on surface area and production.

Cereal trade
The figures obtained by the FAO, have been supplied by the respective governments in the questionnaires sent out by the FAO.

Children under weight for their age
Percentage of children under five whose weight and height, for their age, is less than twice the standard deviation in comparison with the average for the relevant age group. The population...
of reference is the child population of the USA, which is assumed to be well nourished.

**CO₂ emissions intensity by GDP**
Average quantity of CO₂ emitted per unit of incomes generated by a particular economy.

**Consumer price index**
Reflects changes in the cost, for an average consumer, in the acquisition of a basket of goods and services that can be fixed or can change at specific intervals; for example annually. The Laspeyres formula is normally used.

**Contraceptive prevalence rate**
Percentage of women who are married or in a relationship who report using at least one method of contraception.

**Crude birth rate**
Number of births per year per thousand inhabitants. An estimate is made in the middle of the current year.

**Crude death rate**
Number of deaths per year per thousand inhabitants. An estimate is made in the middle of the current year.

**Current account balance**
The sum of the net exports – exports minus imports – of goods and services, incomes and net transfers.

**Debt service**
The sum of the main payments and interest payments made for long-term debts, interest paid on short-term debts and repayments (redemption and charges) to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

**Desalinated water production**
Amount of water produced by elimination of salt from salt water using a variety of techniques, including inverse osmosis. Most of this water is used for domestic purposes.

**Dietary energy consumption**
Amount of food, in kilocalories per day, available for each person in the population.

**Duration of compulsory education**
Number of years, within a determined age group, that children and young people are legally obliged to attend school.

**Ecological footprint**
Measurement of the use of renewable natural resources by humanity. For a given population it is defined as the total area of biologically productive land and water required to produce the resources consumed, to maintain energy consumption, to make way for infrastructure and to absorb the waste generated by the population. The unit used to measure the ecological footprint is the global hectare and is defined as a hectare of biologically productive space, equal to the world average.

**Electricity consumption per capita**
Refers to the gross production per inhabitant and includes the consumption of auxiliary stations and the losses in the transformers considered an integral part of the central station. It also includes the total electricity produced by pumping stations, without deducting the electricity absorbed by the pumps.

**Electricity production**
Measured in the alternating equipment terminals of electric power stations. Also includes hydroelectric, coal, oil, gas and nuclear energy sources and generation by geothermal, solar, wind, tidal and marine energy, as well as renewable residues and fuels.

**Electricity sources**
Refers to the energy sources used to generate electricity: hydroelectric, coal, oil, gas and nuclear.

**Employed population**
Proportion of the economically active population that is employed. When adding the employed population to the unemployed result is the whole economically active population or labour force.

**Employment by sector**
According to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), the Agriculture category also includes hunting, fishing and forest exploitation; the Industry category includes mining, extraction activities (including oil production), manufacturing, construction and public services (electricity, water and gas); the Services category includes the wholesale and retail trades, restaurants and hotels, transport, storage services, communications, financial services, insurance, real estate, business services, as well as community, social and personal services.

**Employment rate**
Percentage of population in work relative to the total population of working age.

**Energy use**
Energy use refers to use of primary energy before transformation to other end-use fuels, which is equal to indigenous production plus imports and stock changes, minus exports and fuels supplied to ships and aircraft engaged in international transport.

**Energy production**
Primary energy forms – oil, natural gas, coal and its derivatives and renewable fuels and residues – and primary electricity, all converted into equivalents of oil. The renewable fuels and residues refer to solid and liquid biomass, biogas and industrial and municipal residues.

**Expected years of schooling**
Number of years of schooling that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates were to stay the same throughout the child’s life.

**Export/Import concentration index**
The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index is used, in a normalised version, to obtain values between zero and one (maximum concentration). It measures the degree of market concentration and the calculation takes into account the different product groups exported, according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC).

**Exports**
The value of all goods supplied by an economy to the rest of the world. It excludes labour and income in concept of property, as well as transfer payments.
External debt
The sum of the national debt, with public guarantee, private unsecured long-term debt, credit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and short-term debt.

Fertility rate
Number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current age specific fertility rates.

Fertiliser consumption
Amount of vegetable nutrients used per unit of cultivatable land. The fertilisers considered are nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium. Consumption is calculated as production plus imports minus exports, and traditional nutrients (animal and vegetable fertilisers) are not included. The data obtained is the result of dividing the consumption of fertiliser of each country by the surface area of arable and permanently cultivated land.

Fishery fleet
Aggregation of fishing vessels of a particular country.

Fixed telephone subscriptions
Fixed telephone line connecting the subscriber's terminal equipment to the public switched network.

Foreign direct investment
Net direct investment that is made in order to achieve a lasting participation in the management of a business company operating in a country other than that of the investor. It is equal to the sum of the equity capital, the reinvestment of earnings and other long-term and short-term capital.

Forest area
Understood as all land with natural or artificial plots of trees, whether productive or not.

GDP (see Gross Domestic Product)

GDP per capita (see Gross Domestic Product per capita)

GDP growth rate
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.

GDP per unit of energy use
Indicator of energy efficiency. The temporary differences and entire countries partly reflect, structural economic changes, changes in the efficiency of particular sectors and differences in the use of fuels. The GDP has been converted into 2005 international dollars.

Gender inequality index
The Gender Inequality Index (GII) reflects women’s disadvantage in three dimensions—reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market—for as many countries as data of reasonable quality allow. The index shows the loss in human development due to inequality between female and male achievements in these dimensions. It ranges from 0, which indicates that women and men fare equally, to 1, which indicates that women fare as poorly as possible in all measured dimensions.

Gini index
Measure of greater or lesser inequality in the distribution of income and consumption, considering a state of perfectly equal distribution. A value of zero represents perfect equality and a value of one hundred total inequality.

GNI (see Gross National Income)

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
The sum of the added value by all the resident producers in an economy, plus any tax on the product (without taking into account the subsidies). The added value is the net profit of an industry after having summed up all profits and deducted intermediate contributions.

Gross Domestic Product by sector
The contribution of the distinct economic sectors in the GDP is determined according to the added value determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC).

Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita)

Using the official exchange rates to convert the figures in national currency into US dollars does not measure the relative internal acquisition powers of each currency in each country. The International Comparison Project (ICP) of the United Nations and the World Bank develop measures of the GDP on an internationally comparable scale using as conversion factors, the Purchase Power Parities (PPP) in respect to each country.

Gross National Income (GNI)
The sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. The added value of the net profit of an industry after having summed up all profits and deducted international contributions.

HDI (see Human Development Index)

Human Development Index (HDI)
Index elaborated by the United Nations Development Project (UNDP) relating three indicators: income level (per capita GNI), health (life expectancy at birth) and level of education (mean years of education and expected years of schooling).

Immigrants
Refers to the people born outside of a given country at the mid point of the year. The data is given in absolute figures and as a percentage in respect to the population of the receiving country.

Imports
Value of all goods received by an economy from the rest of the world. It excludes labour and income in concept of property, as well as transfer payments.

Inbound tourists by destination country
Number of tourists who travel to a country other than that in which they have their usual residence, for a period not exceeding 12 months and whose main purpose in visiting is other than an activity remunerated from within the country visited.
Infant mortality rate
Shows the number of deaths of infants under one year of age per thousand live births.

Internally displaced people
As a result of armed conflicts or human rights abuses, some 25 million people live as internally displaced population. These people were forced to flee from their homes for fear of losing their lives, but unlike refugees, they were displaced within their country’s borders. Even though internally displaced people are twice as many as refugees, their situation receives less international attention.

International tourism receipts
Income received in a given country from visitors, including payments made to national freight companies for international freight. It also includes the prepayment of goods and services received in the destination country. It can include the income from single day visitors. The percentage it represents in respect to exports is calculated as a ratio of the exports of goods and services.

Internet users
The estimated number of Internet users out of total population. This includes those using the Internet from any device (including mobile phones) in the last 12 months.

Labour force participation rate
The labour force participation rate is defined as the ratio of the labour force to the working-age population, expressed as a percentage. The labour force is the sum of the number of persons employed and the number of persons unemployed.

Land area
Refers to the total surface area minus the surface covered by inland waters. Inland waters are defined in general as rivers and principle lakes.

Land under cereal production
The figures related to cultivated crop surface areas generally refer to the area harvested, although those corresponding to permanent crops can refer to the total planted area. The figures for the cultivated cereal area only refer to harvests of dry grain. Crops harvested for hay, unripe foodstuffs, forage and silage, or used for grazing, are therefore excluded.

Life expectancy at birth
The number of years that a new-born infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.

Literacy rate
Total is the percentage of the population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Generally, ‘literacy’ also encompasses ‘numeracy,’ the ability to make simple arithmetic calculations.

Live animal stock
The data on stock covers all domestic animals regardless of age, location or final purpose. Estimates have been made for countries that have not supplied data, as well as for countries supplying partial statistics.

Live animal trade
Enormous quantities of unregistered animals cross the borders of some countries. In order to obtain more representative international trade figures of live animals, the FAO has incorporated estimates of the unregistered trade.

Long term external debt
Debt that has an original or extended maturity of more than one year. It has three components: public, publicly guaranteed and private non guaranteed debt.

Maternal mortality ratio
Annual number of deaths of women owing to causes related to pregnancy, for every 100,000 live births.

Mean years of schooling
Average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older in their lifetime based on education attainment levels of the population converted into years of schooling based on theoretical durations of each level of education attended.

Mediterranean and the Black Sea catches
Fishing catches for commerce, industry or subsistence (including recreational catches where the data is available). The data refers to the catch by the fleet of a country in the Mediterranean and/or in the Black Sea.

 Military expenditure
Total expenses effected by the Ministry of Defence and other ministries on the recruitment and training of military personnel, as well as the manufacture and acquisition of military supplies and equipment. Military assistance is included in the expenses of the donor country.

Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions
Refers to the subscriptions to a public mobile telephone service and provides access to Public Switched Telephone Network using cellular technology.

Net energy import
Shows the amount of energy use by an economy and to what extent it exceeds its domestic production.

Net enrolment ratio
Number of students enrolled in a level of education who are of the official school age for that level, as a percentage of the total of the population of official school age for that level. The figures are shown for primary and secondary education.

Net migration rate
Net number of migrants divided by the average population of the receiving country within the period considered.

Net number of migrants
The entry of immigrants into a given country minus the outgoing emigrants of the same country.

Official Development Assistance (ODA)
The net payment of donations and loans granted under advantageous financial terms by official boards of partner countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as international organisations, with a view to promoting economic development and wellbeing, including co-operation and technical assistance.

**Oil equivalent**
All the values of energy production and consumption presented in this classification are calculated and published by the International Energy Agency (IEA) which uses the equivalent metric tonne of oil based on the calorific content of the energy products as the unit of measurement. An equivalent metric tonne of oil is defined as $10^7$ kilo calories or 11,628 gigawatts per hour (GWh). This amount of energy is practically equal to the amount of energy contained in a tonne of crude oil.

**Outbound tourists by country of origin**
Number of trips that travellers make to a given country from their normal country of residence, for a period of less than one year, for any other reason than to undertake a paid activity in the country visited.

**Passenger cars**
Road motor vehicles, other than two-wheelers, intended for the carriage of passengers and designed to seat no more than nine people (including the driver).

**Permanent pasture**
Refers to land used permanently (five years or more) for herbaceous fodder, whether cultivated or uncultivated (meadows or uncultivated land for grazing).

**Physicians**
Number of medical doctors (physicians), including generalist and specialist medical practitioners, per 10,000 population

**Population density**
The result of dividing the average annual population of a country by its land surface area expressed in square kilometres.

**Population in urban agglomerations of more than 750,000 inhabitants**
Percentage of the population of a country living in metropolitan areas, that in 2005 had a population of more than 750,000 people.

**Population on the Mediterranean coast**
Estimates of the percentage of the population that lives in the coastal area.

**Population living with HIV/AIDS**
Estimated number of people of any age infected with HIV or AIDS. Includes the whole living infected population at the end of 2003, regardless of whether or not they have developed the disease. It shows the actual figure and the percentage in respect of the population of the country.

**Population using improved drinking-water sources**
The percentage of population using an improved drinking water source. An improved drinking water source, by nature of its construction and design, is likely to protect the source from outside contamination, in particular from faecal matter.

**Population using improved sanitation**
Percentage of population using an improved sanitation facility. An improved sanitation facility is one that likely hygienically separates human excreta from human contact. Improved sanitation facilities include: Flush or pour-flush to piped sewer system, septic tank or pit latrine, ventilated improved pit latrine, pit latrine with slab and composting toilet.

**Population with access to electricity**
Refers to the number of people with access to electricity as a percentage of the total population.

**Prevalence of smoking**
The percentage of men and women who smoke cigarettes. The age range varies between countries, but in general it is 15 years of age or above.

**Primary pupil-teacher ratio**
Number of pupils registered in primary schools divided by the number of teachers in primary schools.

**Proportion of households with a computer**
Number of households which declared to have access to a computer at home. A computer includes: a desktop, portable or handheld computer (e.g. a personal digital assistant). It does not include equipment with some embedded computing abilities such as mobile phones or TV sets.

**Proportion of households with internet access**
Number of households which declared to have access to internet at home. The Internet is a world-wide public computer network. It provides access to a number of communication services including the World Wide Web and carries email, news, entertainment and data files. Access is not assumed to be only via a computer - it may also be by mobile phone, digital TV etc.

**Protected areas**
Areas of land or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biodiversity, natural and associated cultural resources and managed through legal and other instruments. According to The World Conservation Union (IUCN) it includes the total area of all natural reserves, virgin areas, national parks, natural monuments, management areas of habitats and species, as well as protected land and sea areas in each country.

**Public expenditure on education**
Composed of capital expenses (construction, renovation, major repairs and purchase of heavy equipment or vehicles) and running costs (goods and services consumed during the current year and that need to be renewed the following year). It covers expenses such as salaries and rendering of services, contracted or acquired services, books and didactic material, social welfare services, furniture and equipment, minor repairs, fuel, insurance, rent, telecommunications and travel.
Public health expenditure
Refers to the recurring and capital expenses in government budgets (central and local), loans and external concessions (including donations by international agencies and non-governmental organisations) and social or compulsory medical insurance funds.

R & D expenditures
The current and capital expenses of creative and systematic activities that increase the stock of knowledge. Includes basic and applied research and experimental development work that leads to new devices, products or processes.

Refugees
People who have been forced to flee their country for fear of persecution owing to reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinions or membership of determined social groups and who are unable or unwilling to return. The asylum country is the country in which the refugee has requested asylum, but has not yet received a response, or where he or she has been registered as an asylum seeker. The country of origin refers to the nationality of the seeker or to the country in which he or she is a citizen.

Rural population
The estimated population at the mid point of the year in areas defined as rural, as a percentage of the total population of the country.

Scientists and technicians in R&D
Professionals that have received further training to work in any scientific field.

Sectorial distribution of the active population
Showed by the percentages of the workforce employed in the different economic sectors: agriculture, industry and services.

Share of income or consumption
In the questionnaires carried out in homes in diverse countries to determine the distribution of income, they make five divisions (or quintiles) from the lowest to the greatest incomes. The two lower quintiles (40%) are considered the poorest. A relation is also made between the richest 10% and the poorest 10%, in order to establish the degree of inequality in incomes.

Share of ICT goods as percentage of total trade
Share of ICT goods imports and exports as a percentage of total imports and exports for every economy for which this information is available. The list of ICT goods is defined by the OECD, and was revised in 2010. This new list consists of 95 goods defined at the six digit level of the 2007 version of the Harmonised System.

Short-term external debt
Debt owed to non-residents having an original maturity of one year or less and interest arrears on long-term debt.

Surface area
Refers to the extension of the country in its totality, including the surface area occupied by inland waters.

Threatened species
Includes all the species classified by The World Conservation Union (IUCN), as “vulnerable, in danger, or in critical danger,” but excludes all introduced species, species whose status is not sufficiently known, extinguished species and those still without an assigned status.

Total area equipped for irrigation
Area equipped to provide water (via irrigation) to the crops. It includes areas equipped for full and partial control irrigation, equipped lowland areas, pastures, and areas equipped for spate irrigation.

Total catches
Fishing catches for commerce, industry or subsistence (including recreational catches where the data is available). The data refers to the catch by the fleet of a country in any part of the world. Marine fishing is practiced in seas or oceans, while freshwater fishing takes place in rivers, wetlands and inland lakes.

Total health expenditure
Funds mobilised by the system. Sum of general government and private expenditure on health.

Total population
Includes all of the residents of a country or territory with the legal status of citizen, except refugees settled in a country of asylum, who are generally considered as part of the population of their country of origin. Values for 2005 and projections for 2050 are shown.

Tourism expenditure in other countries
The expenditure in other countries of travellers from a given country, including the payments to national freight companies for international freight. It can include the expenses of single day travellers. The percentage it represents in respect of the exports, is calculated as a ratio of the exports of goods and services.

Trade balance
Account that holds the imports and exports of an economy during a certain period of time with the purpose of reflecting the corresponding balance. The negative values indicate a deficit in the trade balance.

Trade in fish and derivative products
Expresses the value associated to the exports and imports of live, fresh, frozen, chilled, dried, salted, smoked and tinned fish and derivative products. Includes fresh and salt water and aquaculture fish, molluscs and crustaceans.

Under-five mortality rate
Probability of death between birth and becoming five years old, expressed per thousand live births.

Unemployment rate
Percentage of the active population without work, but available for and seeking employment.

Urban population living in slums
A place of precarious settlement is a group of individuals who live under the same roof and lack one or more of the following conditions: secure tenure (state protection against illegal eviction), access to drinking water, access to basic healthcare, structural dwelling
quality and sufficient vital space. In accordance with the situation of the city in which the precarious settlement is found, this concept can be locally adapted.

**Water consumption**
Total water used by humans in a year, without taking into account the losses due to evaporation in reservoirs. Includes water from non-renewable underground sources, from rivers coming from other countries and from desalinated plants.

**Water dependency**
Percentage of water available in one country, coming from another.

**Water resources**
Refers to the total renewable resources, covering the watercourses of the country (rivers and underground rain water reserves) and the watercourses originating in other countries.

**Women in parliamentary seats**
Refers to the percentage of seats occupied by women in a lower or single chamber, or in a higher or senate, according to each case. In the case where there are two chambers, the data refers to the weighted average of the participation of women in both chambers.

**Wood fuel production**
Includes wood from trunks and branches, used as fuel for cooking, heating or producing energy.

**Workers’ remittances**
According to the definition of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Balance of Payments Manual, workers’ remittances are goods and financial assets transferred by immigrants living and working in an economy (where they are considered residents) in favour of the residents of their former country of residence. An immigrant must live and work in the new economy for more than one year to be considered a resident there. The transfers made to the immigrants’ own accounts abroad are not considered transfers. Moreover, all those derived from the possession of a business by an immigrant are only considered to be normal transfers to the country of origin.

**Year when women obtained the right to stand for election**
The dates refer to the year when the universal and equal right to stand for election was recognised. In the cases when two years appear, the first refers to the first partial recognition of the right to stand for election.

**Year when women obtained the right to vote**
The dates refer to the year when the universal and equal right to vote was recognised. In the cases when two years appear, the first refers to the first partial recognition of the right to vote.
List of the Organisms Consulted for Drawing Up Tables, Charts and Maps

BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014
bp.com/statisticalreview

CITES, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
www.cites.org

EIB, European Investment Bank
www.eib.org

Europeaid, Development and Cooperation
ec.europa.eu/europeaid

European Commission-Trade
ec.europa.eu/trade

EUROSTAT, Statistical Office of the European Commission
ec.europa.eu/eurostat

FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
www.fao.org

Freedom House
www.freedomhouse.org

IDMC, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
www.internal-displacement.org

IEA, International Energy Agency
www.iea.org

UN Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (IGME), Child Mortality Estimates
www.childmortality.org

ILO, International Labour Organization
www.ilo.org

IOM, International Organization for Migration
www.iom.int
IMF, International Monetary Fund
www.imf.org

IPU, Inter-Parliamentary Union
www.ipu.org

ITU, International Telecommunication Union
www.itu.int

IUCN, World Conservation Union
www.iucn.org

Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM) 8th Edition
www.iolo.org

Med.Cronos
www.iemmed.org

Millennium Development Goals Indicators
http://mdgs.un.org

OECD, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
www.oecd.org

Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive
psephos.adam-carr.net

Plan Bleu
www.planbleu.org

SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
www.sipri.org

Syria Needs Analysis Project (SNAP)
www.acaps.org/en/pages/syria-snap-project

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs
Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin

UNAIDS, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
www.unaids.org

UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
www.unctad.org

UNDP, United Nations Development Programme
www.undp.org

UNEP, United Nations Environment Programme
www.unep.org
UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
www.unesco.org

UNFPA, United Nations Population Fund
www.unfpa.org

UNHCR, United Nations Refugee Agency
www.unhcr.ch

UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response
http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php

UNICEF, United Nations Children’s Fund
www.unicef.org

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)
www.unocha.org

United Nations Treaty Collection
untreaty.un.org

United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN)

UNPOP, United Nations Population Division
www.unpopulation.org

UNSTAT, United Nations Statistics Division
unstats.un.org

UNWTO, World Tourism Organization
www.unwto.org

WB, World Bank
www.worldbank.org

WHO, World Health Organization
www.who.int

WRI, World Resources Institute
www.wri.org

WWF
www.wwf.org
Country Abbreviations in Charts and Maps

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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