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# Table of Contents

## Foreword

**The Mediterranean Yearbook, Ten Years of Reflection**  
Senén Florensa, Executive President, European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) ........................................ 9  
Andreu Bassols, Director General, European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) ........................................ 9

## Keys

**The Civil War in Syria**  
Evolution and Outlook of the Syrian Crisis, *Ignacio Álvarez-Ossorio* .......................................................... 13  
Syria’s Civil War: Geopolitical Implications and Scenarios, *Muriel Asseburg* ...................................................... 18  
The Civil War in Syria: The Variety of Opposition to the Syrian Regime, *Christopher Phillips* ............................ 24

**Transitions in the Arab World**  
Political Transformations in Arab Countries: The Different Evolutions, *Marina Ottaway* ........................................ 30  
Arab Islamists, from Opposition to Power: A Critical Appraisal, *Khalil al-Anani* .................................................. 35  
The Arab Uprisings: Regional Implications and International Responses, *Helle Malmvig* and *Christina Markus Lassen* .............................................................................................. 41  
Constitutional Reforms in Arab Countries in Transition, *Nathalie Bernard-Maugiron* ........................................ 47

**Media and Arab Transitions**  
The Role of the Media in Arab Transitions: How “Cyberactivism” is Revolutionising the Political and Communication Landscapes, *Sahar Khamis* ................................................................. 55  
False Promises? The Social Media and Arab Political Change, *Yves Gonzalez-Quijano* .......................................... 60  
The Challenge of Media Fragmentation and Political Sectarianism after the Arab Spring, *Imad Salamey* and *Muzammil Hussain* .......................................................................................... 64

**Euro-Mediterranean Relations Facing New Challenges**  
Arab Neighbours Need a Common EU Foreign Policy, *Andreu Bassols* ................................................................. 71  
The Effect of the Arab Spring on Euro-Mediterranean Relations, *Timo Behr* ........................................................ 78  
The Euro Crisis and Euro-Mediterranean Relations, *Maria Cristina Paciello* ..................................................... 83

**Dossier**  
Socio-Political Map after the “Arab Awakening”: in Search of a Balance of Powers, *Lurdes Vidal (dir); Moussa Bourekba and Laura Rufalco* ...................................................................................... 91  
Box: Top-Down Fostered Constitutional Reform and Rule of Law, *Moussa Bourekba and Héctor Sánchez Margalef* ................................................................................................................... 95  
Box: Rebuilding the State Apparatus: Security Sector Reform, *Clàudia Rives Casanova* ........................................ 98
Box: Rule of Law and Constitution in Tunisia: the Challenge of Political Consensus, Moussa Bourekba and Héctor Sánchez Margalef ................................................................. 101
Box: Constitution and Rule of Law in Egypt: the Army as Guardian of Reform, Moussa Bourekba and Héctor Sánchez Margalef ........................................................................ 103
Box: Transitional Justice: a Stage in Dismantling Former Regimes, Moussa Bourekba .......................... 107

PANORAMA: THE MEDITERRANEAN YEAR

Country Profiles ........................................................................................................... 123

Geographical Overview

EU’s Mediterranean Countries
Taking Stock: Political and Social Crisis in Mediterranean Europe From Tahrir to Sol: The Unexpected Mediterranean Convergence, Jose Ignacio Torreblanca and Hélène Michou ................................................................. 148
The Future of Greece, Dimitris Katsikas ........................................................................ 154
François Hollande and the Mediterranean Region, Sébastien Abis and Jean-François Costitlière ......................................................................................................................... 159

Western Balkans
The Western Balkans 2012: A Year of Internal Political Conflicts, Kenneth Morrison .......... 163
The Balkans in the Era of Never-Ending Enlargement, Gerald Knaus .......................... 167

Maghreb
First Year of Islamist Government in Morocco: Same Old Power, New Coalition,
Thierry Desrues ........................................................................................................... 170
The Algerian Regime after the Arab Revolts, Lahouari Addi ........................................................................ 174
Is the Tunisian Political Transition in Danger?, Eric Gobe and Larbi Chouikha .................... 177
Libya: The Seeding of a New Democracy, Mansour O. El-Kikhia ......................................... 181

Middle East and Turkey
The Egyptian Transition Arena: Between the Army Leadership, the Muslim Brotherhood and a Society in Full Transformation, Sarah Ben Néfissa ........................................................................ 185
The Situation in Jordan: a General Overview, Anna Sunik .................................................. 189
Israel: Return to the Polls and Regional Uncertainty, Alain Dieckhoff ...................................... 193
When the Syrian Crisis Sheds Light on the Lebanese Crises, Myriam Catusse ...................... 196
The Palestinian National Project Disintegrates with the Separation of Gaza, the Judaisation of Jerusalem and the Jordanisation of the West Bank, Omar Shaban ........................................................................ 200
Turkey in 2012: A General Overview, E. Fuat Keyman and Tuba Kanci ............................ 203

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and Other Actors
The Algerian Position on the European Neighbourhood Policy, Lotfi Boumghar .......................... 207
Euromed Survey 2012: Rethinking Policies for a Changed Mediterranean, Jordi Padilla and Xavier Aragall ................................................................................................................. 210

Strategic Sectors

Security & Politics
Mali and the Sahel: From Crisis to Military Intervention (2013), Pere Vilanova and Paula de Castro ................................................................................................................................. 218
Germany and the Maghreb Countries after the Arab Unrests: New Times, New Dynamics, Isabel Schäfer ......................................................................................................................... 222

Economy and Territory
Islamic Parties in North Africa and the Challenges of Economies in Transition, Adeel Malik ................................................................................................................................. 226
The Effects of the Global Financial Crisis and Combined Transition Factors Associated with the Post-Revolutionary Period: The Case of Tunisia, Sami Mouley ......................................................................................................................... 230
# Table of Contents

## A View from the South on the Mediterranean Region, *Abdeljalil Cherkaoui* .................................................. 235

## Trade Relations among Mediterranean Countries, *Giorgia Giovannetti* .................................................. 238

## Economic Effects of the Arab Revolutions: How Can the Transition Be Fostered and Confidence Restored?, *Henry Marty-Gauquié* .................................................. 244

## The Arab Spring: What Consequences on Foreign Investment? *Emmanuel Noutary* and *Zoé Luçon* .................................................. 251

## Tourism and Development: The Sustainability of a Myth, *Loïc Bourse* .................................................. 256


### Culture & Society

## Situation and Role of Women in the New Context of the Political Transitions in the Arab World, *Sophie Bessis* .................................................. 267

## The Crisis of the Welfare State in Northern Mediterranean Countries, *Manos Matsaganis* .................................................. 270

## Mediterranean Civil Associations at a Crossroads: Challenges and Opportunities, *Stefanos Vallianatos* .................................................. 274

## Turkey, the Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Changing Dynamics of Transit Migration, *Franck Düvell* .................................................. 278

## Border Management in the Euromed Region: Between Upgrade and Collapse, *Arabelle Bernecker-Thiel* .................................................. 282

## Demographic Transitions and Social Changes in the Mediterranean Region, *Barbara Zagaglia* .................................................. 285

## Staging the North African Transition: Theatrical Productions since the Arab Spring, *Cleo Jay* .................................................. 288

## Turkish Drama in the Middle East: Secularism and Cultural Influence, *Ahu Yigit* .................................................. 291

## Soccer and Political Protests in MENA Countries, *James M. Dorsey* .................................................. 295

## Street Art and the Egyptian Revolution, *Lina Khatib* .................................................. 299

### Appendices

#### Maps

Maps .................................................. 303

#### Chronologies

- Chronology of Major Conflicts and Political Events .................................................. 316
- Chronology of Events in Israel and Palestine .................................................. 350
- Chronology of the Barcelona Process .................................................. 359
- Other Cooperation initiatives in the Mediterranean .................................................. 370

#### Mediterranean Electoral Observatory

Mediterranean Electoral Observatory .................................................. 379

#### Cooperation in the Mediterranean

- European Union Cooperation .................................................. 383
- Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean .................................................. 387

#### Migrations in the Mediterranean

Migrations in the Mediterranean .................................................. 389

#### The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements

The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements .................................................. 391

#### Signature of Multilateral Treaties and Conventions

Signature of Multilateral Treaties and Conventions .................................................. 393

#### The Mediterranean in Brief

The Mediterranean in Brief .................................................. 395

#### Definitions

Definitions .................................................. 423

#### List of the Organisms Consulted for Drawing Up Tables, Charts and Maps

List of the Organisms Consulted for Drawing Up Tables, Charts and Maps .................................................. 430

#### Country Abbreviations in Charts and Maps

Country Abbreviations in Charts and Maps .................................................. 433
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acronyms and Abbreviations</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of Tables.</td>
<td>439</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of Charts.</td>
<td>441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index of Maps.</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first edition of the Mediterranean Yearbook was published ten years ago with the intention of offering a plural, diverse and extensive vision of the reality of the Mediterranean area. In our humble opinion, we have accomplished this mission, offering our readers a quality product. Despite being witness to numerous events and transformations over the last decade, most of us would never have imagined the current situation.

The Mediterranean has never been a geopolitically backwater. While its conflicts are high on the international agenda (the Arab-Israeli conflict, the situation in Cyprus, the Balkans, international terrorism), it has also been marked by what seemed to be unalterable features: the immutability of the Arab regimes or the economic growth of the northern shore as a result of European integration; as well as the enormous and growing gap between the economic and social conditions prevailing north and south of our sea.

However, the apparent stability, which concealed the germs of growing imbalances, has disappeared in recent years. On the one hand, the serious economic crisis has broken the economies of southern Europe, forcing a European bailout of Portugal, Cyprus and Greece. On the other, the regimes in the southern Mediterranean have experienced major transformations; the so-called “Arab Spring” marked the beginning of a series of political transitions with uncertain futures. After the turmoil of the revolutions, these countries’ transitions have followed extremely different paths: from the relatively smooth developments in Morocco and Jordan, to those countries suffering the effects of high speed changes, like Egypt and Tunisia, and the armed conflicts of Libya and Syria. The brutal and bloody war in Syria and the crisis of the democratic experience in Egypt are testimony to the gravity of the current moment.

In the short term, developments in these countries is uncertain, as illustrated by events in Egypt with the fall of President Morsi and the, hopefully transitory, implosion of the newly born democratic system. However, in the long run, it is clear that history is following its course and that, despite the steps taken backwards, the democratising wave of modernity will not leave the Arab world out in the cold. This historic process of democratisation codified its value system in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, reaching various country groups in the subsequent decades. These democratic transitions transformed certain countries of the northern Mediterranean in the seventies; Latin America in the eighties; and, after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, transformed the political, economic and social landscape of Central and Eastern Europe in the nineties and 2000s. Not to mention other significant advances in Asia and Africa, the most praiseworthy and emblematic example being that led by Nelson Mandela in South Africa. After the self-immolation of the young Bouazizi in Tunisia at the end of 2010, this citizens’ awakening spread to the entire Arab world. The path these countries have taken may be a long one and in some cases there will still be much suffering. How-
ever there is no doubt in the history’s direction and the Arab world will be no exception. The IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook, with its dedication to following the situation of the Mediterranean area, could not leave these events aside. The “post-Spring” situation is, therefore, the focal point of the themes dealt with throughout and especially in the section Keys, which contains the most relevant events. In keeping with the tradition of the Yearbook the subject is dealt with from different perspectives. A series of articles looks at the dramatic situation in Syria; while another analyses the transitions in Arab countries, both inside the countries themselves and regarding their effects on the regional order. Another subsection of Keys is focused on the role of the media and the new forms of communication in these processes. Lastly, this section containing the most important themes is completed with a series of articles on Euro-Mediterranean relations in the current context, that is to say, both faced with the transitions of the southern Mediterranean countries and the serious economic crisis sweeping through Europe, especially in the Mediterranean countries.

This tenth edition of the Yearbook presents certain new elements; a renewal of some of its content, without losing its identity and defining features. Thus, while maintaining its main sections, certain changes have been introduced. The Dossier section, for example, is no longer a series of articles but rather a single extensive work which looks in detail at a single theme. This time it was decided to use the Dossier to closely follow the political transitions in the Arab countries. Produced by the IEMed’s Arab and Mediterranean World Department, this Dossier offers an analysis of the main actors (political or otherwise) that have been central to the transitions of many of these Mediterranean Arab countries and looks not just at the role of the politicians, but also that of youth, women and the media.

Another change in the Yearbook is the distribution of the articles in the Panorama section into two large subsections. One contains the articles most focused on the development of Mediterranean countries and regional actors, and the other contains transversal articles in which the focus is on a theme, such as security, the economy, population, culture or society. There is also a series of Country Profiles that summarises the main statistics of each country and complements the traditional section The Mediterranean in Brief, providing statistical data which is more complete and direct than before.

Despite the modifications, the Yearbook maintains its identity as a pluralist and transversal product with over 50 authors of diverse origins and perspectives, offering information and a comprehensive analysis of the situation in the Mediterranean area.

We would like to finish this foreword by giving our thanks to all those who have made these ten editions of the Yearbook possible, starting with the CIDOB Foundation, whose collaboration in the first seven editions was key to starting the Project. We would also like to thank the more than 500 authors, who have poured their knowledge into the articles and contributed to the Yearbook’s becoming a work of reference. Thanks to them and the positive response of the professional and specialised public, the Yearbook has become an annual meeting point and reference material in all Ministries, chancelleries, international organisations or research centres or universities of the 43 countries that today make up the Union for the Mediterranean. Also we would, of course, like to thank the different members of the IEMed who have participated in the successive editions of the Yearbook: directors, coordinators, editors, collaborators, interns; as well as the translators, correctors, designers, layout designers, printers and administrative staff. All of these people, through their efforts and work, have made the more than 4,500 pages of the Mediterranean Yearbook possible. We rely on them to continue to fulfil our goal to bring our readers ever closer to the Euro-Mediterranean reality. Lastly, to our readers, who inspire us to seek excellence in every edition, we offer our most sincere thanks.
Keys
The Civil War in Syria

Evolution and Outlook of the Syrian Crisis

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The Syrian crisis has become a tough knot to unravel. The relentless battle that Bashar al-Assad’s regime is waging against the opposition is compounded by the intrigues of the regional powers that have become involved, directly or indirectly, in the conflict, making it that much harder to find a solution. Following the start of the popular mobilisations on 15 March 2011, the Syrian regime bet the house on the so-called “military solution.” In President Assad’s view, it was a struggle to the death that could only have one winner. The human cost of the first two years of the crackdown has been high: 70,000 deaths, one million refugees to neighbouring countries, and another three million internally displaced persons. To halt the rebels’ advance, the regime has not hesitated to use its heavy artillery, shelling entire towns and cities from both ground and air. In addition to the regular troops, it has deployed the shabiha, death squads thought to be responsible for multiple massacres. However, despite its overwhelming military superiority, the regime has continued to lose ground and is on the defensive.

The rebels, in turn, have embarked on a civil war of uncertain duration without first calculating its costs. The opposition remains seriously divided, as evidenced by the recent resignation of Moaz al-Khatib, head of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, and the widespread criticism of the choice of the hitherto unknown Ghassan Hitto, a businessman who has lived in Texas for the last three decades, to head the interim government. Meanwhile, the Free Syrian Army (FSA) does not speak with a single voice or have a common strategy. In all, there are more than a thousand rebel military units, each one fighting its own war.

Some human rights organisations, such as Human Rights Watch, have expressed concern for the war crimes being committed not only by the regime, but also the rebels, including torture and the summary execution of prisoners. Moreover, the last year has witnessed a dangerous radicalisation of the rebels due to their infiltration by hundreds of Arab Islamists seeking to wage their own jihad against the regime, which they consider to be apostate because of the predominance in it of the Alawite minority.

A Badly Wounded Regime

The Syrian crisis has continued to mutate since it first broke out two years ago. What began as an anti-authoritarian uprising became, from the summer of 2011 on, an armed conflict between two clearly distinct sides. Today, it is possible to speak of a medium-intensity civil war with the active involvement of neighbouring countries: Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

Once it became clear that the demonstrators would not be deterred by cosmetic reforms, Assad opted for the “military solution,” which, in turn, convinced the opposition of the need to take up arms to defend the population. The Syrian President proceeded to burn all his bridges. Of the all-encompassing, all-powerful state of yore, all that remains today is a rickety and crumbling façade. The regime’s authority has been heavily eroded, as it has lost control of part of the country. As a result of this weakness, it has

1 This text was finalised before May 2013 (Editor’s note)
been forced to resort to increasingly emphatic means to halt the rebels’ advance. The massacre of defenceless populations has become widespread, as witnessed by the cases of Hula and Deraya (to name just two examples), as has the use of weapons of war (including Scud missiles and MiG-21 fighters) against rebel-controlled neighbourhoods, which has had a staggering cost in terms of human life and has accelerated the exodus of the population.

The climate of chaos has spread through much of the country, with armed militias imposing their own law and organised crime groups engaging in extortion and looting. Moreover, the economic crisis has grown more acute as a result of the sanctions imposed by the US and the EU. The Syrian pound continues to slide and has fallen from 50 to 130 to the dollar. The prices of basic necessities, such as bread and petrol, have doubled or tripled, and most cities are facing shortages.

Moreover, the regime has suffered several major blows in the last year, among others, the assassination of the military leadership responsible for managing the crisis (including the Defence Minister Daoud Rajha, the Deputy Defence Minister Assef Shawkat, and the head of the security forces’ crisis management office Hassan Turkmani) and the defection of key figures (such as Prime Minister Riad Hijab, General Manaf Tlass of the Republican Guard, and the Ambassador to Iraq, Nawaf Fares).

Given this explosive situation, Assad has chosen to use a strategy of “divide and conquer,” trying to open up schisms within the population by manipulating its confessional heterogeneity. In some communities, there is a growing fear that Syria will follow in the footsteps of Iraq and become embroiled in a sectarian war. The car bomb blasts in the Christian neighbourhood of Bab Tuma, the Shiite shrine of Sayyida Zeinab, and the Druse district of the suburb of Jarabulus (all in or around Damascus) seem to confirm these fears. The Alawite minority, which has enjoyed certain advantages for decades, fears persecution should the regime fall. Indeed, the UN’s Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic denounced, on 20 December 2012, the increasingly sectarian nature of the conflict following the massacre of 200 Alawites in the city of Aqраб.

A Fragmented Opposition

One reason for the Syrian regime’s continued survival two years after the start of the uprising is the fragmented nature of the opposition, which has proven incapable of uniting around a common action plan and is divided with regard to what strategy to take. The fragile internal cohesion, lack of resources and dependence on its sponsors are some of the limitations affecting the Syrian National Council (SNC). This weakness is largely due to the systematic persecution suffered by the opposition during the fifty years of Baathist rule.

In response to pressure from the Friends of Syria group, the SNC undertook, through the “National Covenant for a New Syria,” to unify the ranks of the opposition. On 11 November 2012, in Doha, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces was formed, led by Moaz al-Khatib, the former imam of the Umayyad Mosque. Colonel Abdel Jabbar al-Oqaidi was chosen to head the FSA’s Military Council. The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) retained a large share of power and emerged as the backbone of the new formation, recognised as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people by the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League and the members of the Friends of Syria group.

At the military level, the rebel forces, grouped around the FSA, have made significant progress, such as taking much of the provinces of Hama and Idlib and certain neighbourhoods of Aleppo, the country’s second-largest city. They moreover control some border controls with Turkey and Iraq and various military bases. However, the rebels’ advance has been hindered by their inability to coalesce into a united front. Indeed, there are currently more than a thousand militias operating on the ground, some of which do not recognise the FSA’s authority. This atomisation has served as a justification for the international community’s refusal to arm the opposition.

One of the greatest concerns for Western countries is the infiltration of radical Salafi groups. It is a self-fulfilling prophecy, as the regime initially claimed to be fighting al-Qaeda. It is precisely the paralysis of the international community, which was absent from the early stages of the conflict, that has allowed the regime to crush peaceful demonstrations and rebel

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forces with impunity, thereby drawing more people to the cause. The Western arms embargo on the rebels has simply increased their dependence on the Persian Gulf oil monarchies, which not only ship weapons but also aim to have a voice in post-Assad Syria. The influx of jihadist elements could have been prevented if the international community had taken decisive action early on in the uprising, as it did in Libya.

The fragile internal cohesion, lack of resources and dependence on its sponsors are some of the limitations affecting the Syrian National Council. As it stands, a plethora of Salafist groups have a growing influence on the ground, including, among others, Ahrar al-Sham, the Tawhid Brigade, Jamaa Islamiya, Ghuraba al-Sham and the Farouq Brigade. The most notorious by far is the al-Nusra Front, which the Obama Administration has included on its list of terrorist organisations for its alleged ties with al-Qaeda in Iraq. A report by the International Crisis Group noted that “present-day Syria offers Salafis hospitable terrain – violence and sectarianism; disenchantment with the West, secular leaders and pragmatic Islamic figures; as well as access to Gulf Arab funding and jihadi military knowhow.”

Everything seems to suggest that Syria is not the battleground for just one war, but rather for several being fought at the same time. The clash between the regime’s forces and the rebels is certainly the most obvious, but another conflict is also playing out, albeit beneath the surface, between the regional powers that back or oppose Assad. Consequently, the outcome of the Syrian war no longer depends solely on the capacities of each side in the conflict, but also on the strategies adopted by those countries in the region that hope to wield influence in post-Assad Syria and, of course, the degree of engagement the international community is willing to accept. It is precisely this multiplicity of actors and their respective interests in the game that makes it so hard to find a lowest common denominator to end the crisis. As Moaz al-Khatib stated at the Doha talks held from 25 to 26 March 2013, “I am opposed to any type of external interference as it will clearly be aimed at dividing Syria.”

**A Negotiated Solution?**

As Syria slides into the abyss, Western countries are engaging in doublespeak. Though they claim to support the opposition, they maintain an arms embargo that serves only to perpetuate the military superiority of the regime, which is generously supplied by Russia and Iran. Despite the deteriorating situation on the ground, the Obama Administration continues to support a negotiated situation. On 30 June 2012, talks were held in Geneva, attended by both the US and Russia. A transition plan was approved that called for the formation of a national unity government with figures from the opposition and members of the current government, the holding of legislative elections, and the drafting of a new constitution that would give full executive powers to the Prime Minister. The parties in attendance chose a path of “constructive ambiguity,” as they did not specify whether Assad had to first step down for the plan to be implemented. The UN-Arab League envoy, the Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, returned to Geneva on 9 December that year for talks with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and US Deputy Secretary of State William Burns, stressing that “a political process to end the crisis was necessary and still possible.” The Friends of Syria group, meeting for the Marrakesh talks a few days later, likewise endorsed the plan.

In light of these movements, vice President Farouk al-Sharaa, whom many see as the head of an eventual transition government, told the Lebanese newspaper *Al-Akhbar* that, even though the Syrian President still hopes “to achieve a decisive victory before engaging in a political dialogue (...) some in the party and the armed forces have believed from the outset of the crisis, and continue to believe today, that a political solution is the only alternative and that there is no going back to how things were before.” In fact, in early 2013, Assad came out again in favour of a national dialogue. Moaz al-Khatib,

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4 Al-Akhbar, 17 December 2012: www.al-akhbar.com/node/173812
leader of the National Coalition, also called for negotiations, although he was subsequently discredited by his own platform.

Post-Assad Syria

The Baath Party came to power in 1963. In 1970, the “Corrective Movement” was launched, bringing Hafez al-Assad to the presidency. On his death, a hereditary republic was established under the leadership of his son. Since its independence, Syria has known only brief stints of democracy, such as those following the elections of 1954 and 1961. Consequently, doubts regarding the possibility of eventually establishing a multi-party democracy able to ensure territorial unity and safeguard minority rights are well founded.

The future of post-Assad Syria will depend, essentially, on how and when the authoritarian era ends. The civil war in which the country is currently embroiled has now entered its third year, and there is no sign of a light at the end of the tunnel due to the regime’s stubborn belief that it is fighting to ensure its very survival. Nor does a negotiated solution to the crisis seem feasible, as all the potential bridges for dialogue have been burned. Given the technical draw at the military level, the regime’s superior air power has halted the rebel forces’ advances to Damascus, where Assad’s loyalist forces have taken cover while they await the final battle that will determine the outcome of the war.

Unless the relationship between the different forces changes dramatically, we may witness the gradual Lebanonisation of Syria

On 23 March 2013, a group of Alawite opponents of the regime meeting in Cairo asserted, “This revolution is a revolution for all Syrians against dictatorship, despotism and corruption” and that “equating the ruling regime with the Alawite sect is a deadly political and ethical mistake, for the Syrian regime is not an Alawite sectarian regime, nor has it ever been in the Alawites’ service. On the contrary, the Alawite sect was – and still is being – held hostage by the regime.” The communiqué also denounced the sectarian logic used by the government: “The Syrian regime is lying when it claims to be protecting minorities – especially the Alawite minority. It is a lie intended to make Syrians fear potential and imminent Islamic extremism, according to the regime.”

The second threat to Syrian territorial integrity is related to Kurdish nationalist claims. The Syrian Kurdish minority has a long history of persecution and political, social and economic marginalisation, due to the fact that it is the most cohesive non-Arab community in the country and the only one that might pose a threat to the Baathist nationalist project. From the start of the uprising, the Kurdish-majority regions have kept a low profile with regard to mobilisations against the regime and have taken advantage of the power vacuum to establish a considera-
ble degree of autonomy in the province of Hasakah. Much of the Kurdish population believes that the time has come to make up for lost time and claim both their identity-based and national rights.

In fact, the Kurdish parties are calling for the establishment of a federal state, modelled after the one established in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, an idea that is strongly opposed by the Syrian opposition. On 26 July 2012, in the Iraqi town of Erbil, the Democratic Union Party and the Kurdish National Council founded a Kurdish Supreme Council and defence militias, which were deployed on the ground following the withdrawal of the regular troops. This move caused considerable concern among the Syrian opposition, who saw Syrian Kurdistan striking out on its own and distancing itself from the uprisings.

Another big question mark hovering over post-Assad Syria is precisely whether the same mistakes will be made as were made in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, among them, the disbanding of the army and the de-Baathification of the government, measures which only served to exacerbate the sectarianism. In this regard, it should be recalled that the Syrian Baath Party, the "leader of the State and society" according to the Constitution that has been in force for the last forty years, has two and a half million members, that is, one tenth of the country's population. Furthermore, the government employs around one and a half million people, some of whom are sympathetic to the regime. Disbanding the army and dissolving the sole party or government would have devastating effects, as they would cause the immediate collapse of the State, just as occurred in Iraq.

**The Role of the Islamists**

Finally, it remains to be seen how exactly power will be shared once the Baathist regime has fallen and, above all, what role the MB will play in the future government. The organisation has been severely persecuted since 1982, causing its leaders to leave the country and take up residence elsewhere in the Arab world and in Europe. To offset their influence, the regime sponsored an official brand of Islam through its control of the religious institutions and, above all, promoted different Sufi brotherhoods, which have acquired considerable influence over the last decades.

**Disbanding the army and dissolving the sole party or government would have devastating effects, as they would cause the immediate collapse of the State**

Today, the MB holds a predominant position within the Syrian opposition and aspires to play a key role in post-Assad Syria. In its 2012 “Pledge and Charter by the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,” the group came out in favour of the creation of a “modern, civil state with a civil constitution rooted in the will of the Syrian people and (...) drafted by a founding assembly that will be chosen in free and fair elections,” as well as of supporting the emergence of “a democratic, pluralistic State [that operates on the principle of] transition of power” in which all citizens would be equal regardless of religion, sect, ethnicity, school of thought or political orientation. Unlike their 2004 “Political Project for the Future Syria,” the Pledge did not make any reference to sharia as the main source of law.

Although it seems clear that the MB is destined to play a prominent role in post-Assad Syria, it is doubtful whether it will achieve a hegemonic position due to the country’s confessional heterogeneity (25% of the population consists of Alawites, Christians, Druses and Ismailis). Moreover, no single actor has a monopoly on political Islam, given the deep roots of the Sufi brotherhoods. At the same time, it remains to be seen what position will be held by the Salafist groups, which, despite their minimal presence in the country, have increased their influence thanks to their Saudi backing. Should the war escalate, it could strengthen these groups, which aim to impose a theocratic state governed by sharia law and which, moreover, are openly hostile towards Alawites. Nevertheless, Syria is a plural country with a long history of peaceful coexistence between the different religions. It is thus possible that these extremist formulas will not be embraced by the majority of the population.
The Civil War in Syria

Syria’s Civil War: Geopolitical Implications and Scenarios

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In May 2013, the violence in Syria continues to escalate. There is no sign of an end to the conflict and human suffering some two years after a largely peaceful protest movement on the country’s periphery was met with brutal repression. Hollow promises of reform made by the regime had no substance or credibility, and the situation quickly degenerated into an armed uprising. While the rebels have made significant advances and the regime has withdrawn its forces from almost half of the country’s territory, the insurgents and the PYD (Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat or Democratic Union Party, the Syrian version of the PKK, Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or Kurdistan Workers’ Party), who respectively hold parts of these lands, have neither been able to gain complete and sustained control of any of the larger cities nor protect the civilian population in the so-called liberated areas from the regime’s air, artillery and missile assaults.

As a consequence of the fighting, some 70,000 people have been killed, tens of thousands arrested, about a quarter of Syria’s population has fled the violence – either to safer areas inside the country (with some 3.8 million Internally Displaced Persons – IDPs) or outside, mainly to neighbouring countries (with some 1.4 million refugees registered or awaiting registration by the UN, and the actual number probably much higher). Furthermore, the humanitarian situation has worsened significantly, and the fighting has entailed a radicalisation of the insurgents, an influx of foreign fighters and the confessionalisation of the struggle.

Syria’s revolt has developed into a civil war fueled by external actors’ strategic – and at times existential – interests and meddling. International, regional and subnational conflicts are being fought in Syria. Above all, it is the conflict over Iran’s regional role that has stoked the civil war. From the perspective of Arab Gulf states, first and foremostly Saudi Arabia and Qatar, the Syria crisis has offered an opportunity to reverse Tehran’s considerable growth in influence since the 2003 Iraq War and to strengthen their own positions. Some US and Israeli strategists have also seen the Syrian civil war as an opportunity to decisively weaken Iran, hoping that defeat in the Levant would force Tehran to give ground on other issues such as its nuclear programme. They also expect that the Lebanese Hezbollah will be weakened by regime change in Syria, which serves as its main transit route for arms supplies. On the other side, Iran has regarded the power struggle in Syria – much like the international sanctions against the Islamic Republic – as an element of a US and Israel-driven policy of isolation that ultimately seeks regime change in Tehran. The Iranian leadership sees itself at the forefront of a strategic and ideological conflict about nothing less than liberating the region from US and Israeli hegemony. Iran has therefore supported the Syrian regime with military advisers, weapons, financial transfers and energy supplies, while the rebels have received political, financial and logistical support as well as training from Western actors like the United States, Turkey, the United Kingdom and France, and financial and military aid from the Arab Gulf states.

In addition there have been divergent analyses and interests among the permanent members of the UN

* This article was finalised before June 2013 (Editor’s note).
Security Council. Russia and China have effectively supported the Assad regime by shielding it from Council criticism and through trade and, in the case of Russia, arms deliveries. Attitudes towards pro-democracy movements and towards their own Muslim minorities, the row over applying the responsibility to protect principle in Libya, as well as the maintenance of areas of influence have all played a role, preventing unified and effective international efforts from working towards a political solution, as well as decisive international action to stop the bloodshed or protect Syria’s population. In addition, while the alleged use of chemical weapons in spring 2013 has reinvigorated the debate among Western backers of the opposition over arming the rebels and/or imposing a no-fly zone, the US administration and its allies have remained reluctant to do either.

Spill-Over Effects

The repercussions of the degeneration of Syria’s uprising into civil war have been felt strongly across the region, not least due to Syria’s central location and geostrategic importance.\(^1\) The constantly rising number of Syrians fleeing the violence has put an enormous strain on neighbouring countries, particularly Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and Iraq, with regard to providing adequate shelter, health services and supplies. It has also provoked tensions with local populations. In Turkey, for example, the presence of overwhelmingly Sunni refugees and rebels in the area bordering Syria has led to the local Arab Alawite population feeling threatened by the rebels and disadvantaged compared to the refugees. In all host states, distribution conflicts are likely to increase in proportion with the refugee influx.

In addition, fighting has spilled over into Lebanon and Iraq fueling sectarian strife in these already destabilised states, both of which have a history of civil war. Both countries have also been involved in the Syrian conflict, with government and opposition each supporting opposing parties in the conflict, rhetorically, financially and at least partially with combatants, e.g. the Lebanese Hezbollah. There is a real danger that both countries will be severely destabilised by Syria’s civil war – in spring 2013 Iraq is witnessing the worst violence since the US withdrawal – or even drawn into it. Turkey, as a host to the Syrian National Council (SNC) and operations base for the Free Syrian Army (FSA), became a party to Syria’s conflict early on, and has also been affected by hostilities on its border. In reaction, in October 2012 the Turkish Parliament authorised operations in neighbouring countries, and in January 2013, NATO stationed Patriot defence batteries along the border with Syria.

Geopolitical Implications

Ankara has also been afraid that another autonomous Kurdish region (next to the one in Northern Iraq) might be emerging just over the border – boosting separatist aspirations among its own Kurdish population and providing a safe haven for the PKK. Indeed, as the Syrian regime has largely withdrawn its visible presence from Syria’s Kurdish region, structures of self-rule as well as Kurdish militias have been established there. Armed fighting between Syrian rebels and the PYD as well as political differences between Arab and Kurdish representatives of the Syrian opposition have made a far-reaching autonomy or even separation of ‘West Kurdistan’ increasingly probable, and have thus opened the question of regional borders as established in the aftermath of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Against this backdrop and in view of other regional and domestic considerations, Turkey’s government has engaged in talks with imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan and in April 2013 agreed on a ceasefire, a retreat of PKK fighters as well as comprehensive reforms aimed at improving the status of Kurds in Turkey and thus allowing for upgraded relations with Kurds in Iraq and Syria.\(^2\)

In a more general sense, the regional position of the three non-Arab states, Iran, Turkey and Israel, has been strongly affected by the Arab Spring and in

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particular the crisis in Syria, and relations between all three of them have further deteriorated – with Israel and Iran on the verge of war. Iran, which saw its own revolutionary path vindicated by the protests in North Africa, Bahrain and Yemen, interpreted as an 'Islamic Awakening,' has denounced the uprising in Syria as Western and/or Jihadi driven. The Syrian civil war has also undermined the alliance between Iran and the Palestinian Hamas, with the latter resisting Iranian pressure to rally behind Bashar al-Assad and instead moving its headquarters from Damascus to Qatar’s capital, Doha. This has been a severe setback for Tehran’s regional leadership aspirations, in which ‘Palestine’ and the ‘liberation of Jerusalem’ have been central rallying cries.

Armed fighting between Syrian rebels and the PYD as well as political differences between Arab and Kurdish representatives of the Syrian opposition have made a far-reaching autonomy or even separation of ‘West Kurdistan’ increasingly probable

Turkey, which was initially seen by many as the winner of the Arab Spring, considered a model for the compatibility of Islam and democracy, economic development and civil control over the military, has probably suffered most from the economic fallout and geopolitical implications of the Syrian crisis. Observers have been keen to point out the failure of Ankara’s ‘zero problems’ approach. The crisis has deeply strained Ankara’s relations with Iran. In addition, Turkey’s tense relations with Israel have undermined its ability to mediate in the Arab-Israeli conflict and thus to contribute to a stable and prosperous Middle East. And while in spring 2013, due to US Secretary of State John Kerry’s mediation efforts, progress regarding Turkish-Israeli reconciliation and a re-normalisation of relations is underway, and Israeli arms sales to Turkey have resumed, a return to the close strategic alliance as it was before the end of 2008 does not seem close at hand.

Not only has Israel’s regional isolation further increased due to the Arab Spring; Israel has also been confronted with a strongly destabilised neighbourhood. With a wavering Bashar al-Assad, Israel is losing a hostile but reliable neighbour who had ensured a quiet border. Israel has been strongly concerned about spillover effects of the violence raging in Syria, the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian regime, tactical weapons getting into local terrorists’ hands (or being transferred to Hezbollah) and Syria turning into a safe haven for al-Qaeda. While Israel initially acted with restraint and refrained from retaliating against border violations attributed to skirmishes inside Syrian territory, in January and May 2013 its airforce bombed vehicles transporting tactical weapons allegedly bound for Lebanon’s Hezbollah, thereby increasing the risk of regional conflagration. Also, rather than providing a push for conflict settlement on the Arab-Israeli track, the Arab Spring has hardened party positions to this conflict.

With regard to overcoming the geopolitical split of the Palestinian territories though – the main demand of the Palestinian 15 March Movement – the Syrian crisis has actually produced a more favourable environment to progress than before. With Hamas relocating its headquarters to Qatar and distancing itself from Iran and Syria, part of its external backing at least (the Arab states and Turkey) will be working towards Palestinian reconciliation rather than blocking it. However, that does not mean that reconciliation is close by, as the external sponsors of the Palestinian Authority (PA), in particular, the United States, persist in blocking progress and the governments in Gaza City and Ramallah have consolidated their control over their respective territories and shown little appetite for power-sharing.

Sectarian Polarisation

Syria’s civil war has also brought about a massive increase in the sectarian polarisation that had already marked the region in the wake of Iraq’s civil war. The result has been not only an increasingly entrenched perception of the revolt as a Sunni uprising (supported by the Sunni Gulf monarchies and Turkey) against an Alawite regime, its local supporters (Alawites and Christians) and its Shiite allies (Iran, Hezbollah and the Shiite-dominated Iraqi government), but also a geopolitical realignment along sec-
tarian lines that has increasingly come to overarch the Saudi-Iranian rivalry.

As a consequence, the political camps characteristic of the region since the 2003 Iraq war have been shattered – camps mainly defined by their stance towards the West (and Israel), with pro-Western, so-called ‘moderate’ leaders (including Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the PA) on the one side; ‘radical’ regimes and groups allied with Iran, the so-called ‘axis of resistance,’ on the other (comprising Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah); and Turkey and Qatar acting as moderators or balancers. In the wake of the Syria crisis, Turkey and Qatar have located themselves in the Sunni, anti-Iran, anti-Syrian regime camp, thereby not only losing their balancing position but further contributing to sectarian polarisation. In the end, a region that lacks any kind of regional security architecture has become even more polarised, on both the societal and government levels.

The sectarian polarisation does not bode well for the future of Syria nor for the region’s mosaic societies, in particular in the Levant and in Iraq.

However, the geopolitical realignment has not taken place solely along the Sunni-Shia divide; domestic considerations and historical ties have also played a role in this repositioning. Thus, among the Sunnidominated countries, on the one hand Tunisia, Libya and Egypt have fallen into a ‘revolutionary camp,’ when it comes to support for protest movements and rebels in the region. On the other, the conservative Gulf States, while supporting revolutions against unloved rulers in Libya and Syria, have coalesced to repress the uprising in Bahrain, pushed for a stabilising elite pact in Yemen, and shored up fellow kings in Jordan and Morocco with offers of generous support – not least encouraging them (regardless of geography) to apply for GCC membership. In Tunisia and Egypt, these states sought first to maintain the regimes in place and, when that was no longer feasible, started to support conservative, often Salafi forces. However, even Arab Gulf states have not all taken the same approach: while Qatar has been the most prominent supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood’s regional ascendency, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have been wary of the Broth- ers’ increased influence.

It is not yet clear if the regional coalitions that are becoming discernable today will be of a lasting nature nor how the regional balance of power will consolidate in the medium to long term. It does seem clear, however, that the sectarian polarisation does not bode well for the future of Syria nor for the region’s mosaic societies, in particular in the Levant and in Iraq. To a large degree, regional developments in terms of conflict, state borders, alliances and balances of power will depend on how the situation in Syria evolves in the months and years to come.

Scenarios for Syria’s Short to Mid-Term Development

Today, four scenarios for Syria’s short to mid-term development seem to be plausible, albeit with very different probabilities: a negotiated transition; continued fighting and a cementation of the country’s fragmentation; the fall of the regime and sectarian civil war; and the fall of the regime and political transition.3

Scenario 1, “negotiated transition”: After more than two years of fighting, an end to the violence and a transition negotiated between the regime and the opposition would probably lead to the most stable and least violent outcome. However, it is also the most improbable scenario. It would need agreement on three levels: the domestic, the regional, and the international. Due to the zero-sum logic that the parties to the conflict (i.e. regime and opposition forces) are applying, conflicting interests on the regional level (mainly but not exclusively between Saudi Arabia and Iran) as well as the international disagreement (mainly between “the West” and Russia) over the analysis and handling of the conflict, agreement on any of the three levels seems unlikely. Both regime and rebels see themselves in a fight for survival.

that leaves no room for compromise. External supporters of both sides also treat the conflict as a zero-sum game with far-reaching and, for some actors existential, consequences for their own strategic positions, and are therefore determined to prevent any outcome they would regard as disadvantageous.

**Scenario 2, “continued fighting and a cementation of the country’s fragmentation”:** For the period to come, the continuation of fighting and a cementation of the country’s fragmentation, if fragile, seems to be the most probable scenario, as both parties to the conflict are set on prevailing militarily and external supporters continue to arm and supply them. Even if support for the rebels with heavy weapons, training and logistics were increased massively, the regime still has a large arsenal of weaponry to be employed as well as a loyal core and support among parts of the population to lean on. Thus, rather than leading to a quick military solution, such support bears the danger of massively increasing the bloodshed. Rather than the regime collapsing, the consequence may be its retreat to the center of Damascus, to what is often called the “Alawite heartland.” The regime would then control the centre of Damascus, a corridor to the coast via Homs and including the cities of Lattakia and Tartus, and the coastal mountains mainly inhabited by Alawites. That would mean a de facto fragmentation of the country into three areas, with the PYD controlling the Kurdish areas in the north and northeast, and the rebels controlling the rest of the territory. It would hardly be a sustainable situation though. Continued fighting between and within the three parts would be likely, especially in towns and areas with mixed populations and among competing warlords in the making. The spectre of ethnic cleansing would become a concrete threat.

**Scenario 3, “the fall of the regime and sectarian civil war”:** Even if the rebels were successful in bringing down the regime militarily, aided by a massive increase in foreign support (or, unlikely, direct military intervention), the violence is unlikely to halt with the collapse of the regime. Rather, there is a significant risk of continued or even escalated violence afterwards – in the form of acts of vengeance against persons seen as symbols for the regime’s apparatus and those groups in the population considered responsible for the regime’s brutality, first and foremost Alawites; but also in the form of fighting between different rebel groups over local control and between remnants of the regime’s security apparatus and militias and rebels. Such violence bears the danger of escalating into a civil war mainly along sectarian lines, again entailing ethnic cleansing.

**Scenario 4, “the fall of the regime and political transition”:** There is a broad consensus among social and political forces in Syria and the Syrian Diaspora, that the revolution should lead to a democratic, pluralistic and inclusive post-Assad order in a united Syria. However, the effects of the civil war, the radicalisation of certain rebel groups and the influx of, often Jihadi-oriented, foreign fighters, have diminished – and are continuing to diminish – the prospects of these visions prevailing over those held by the different power centres. To make matters worse, the political opposition has struggled to unite and build a credible representative body that is endorsed by the population, local activists and diverse rebel groups, and has an impact on the ground. These difficulties have stemmed not only from ideological divisions and infighting over access to resources among the different groups and personalities, but also from different sponsors of the opposition trying to give their favorites the upper hand. In this context, it seems obvious that those that give most support to the insurgents – Saudi-Arabia and Qatar – and thus add to their standing among the local population (not least because they are in a position to effectively engage in humanitarian relief) are already exerting and will in the future exert more of an influence on the political and social order to come than those largely absent from developments in Syria, such as the Europeans.

**The European Response**

The EU and its Member States have lacked any significant influence on the path that the conflict has
It is true that European diplomats have engaged in efforts first to convince the Syrian leadership to change course and engage in serious reform, and then, from the summer of 2011 onwards, to isolate and weaken the regime through the freezing of cooperation, diplomatic pressure and a series of sanctions. They have also engaged in the Friends of Syria group, established in February 2012 on a US and French initiative, to circumvent the blocked Security Council, to give diplomatic, technical and financial support to the opposition and so-called “non-lethal” aid to the rebels, and to prepare for reconstruction. In addition, some European States have engaged in training the rebels; others have started providing support to local structures in liberated areas. Europeans have also been the largest donor of official humanitarian assistance. Overall, however, European support has been too slow, too bureaucratic and too little to have more than a marginal impact on the ground and to reach those people most in need.

European policies have also been incoherent as EU Member States have not agreed on the question of military intervention and on arming the rebels – thus sending confused and confusing signals.

In addition, European policies – as those of other third parties – have been inconsistent in that there has been a contradiction between a norm-based rhetoric encouraging the Syrian opposition in its ever more militant approach on the one hand (by stating that Assad had to go and by insinuating the establishment of buffer/protection/no-fly zones and the delivery of arms to the rebels, assuming the opposition organised itself according to the West’s vision), and the lack of concrete and effective European support for achieving that objective (against the backdrop of concerns over a regional conflagration and the spectre of a Jihadi safe haven emanating in Syria) on the other.

Conclusions

Europe and its allies and friends are confronted with a tragic dilemma in Syria: while there is no legal basis for arming the rebels and for military intervention – and that is very unlikely to change in the near future –; while it is questionable if, in the absence of a Security Council endorsement, direct or indirect military intervention would be justifiable under the responsibility to protect principle; and while arming the rebels bears the danger of massively increasing the bloodshed, the current approach of the international community de facto sanctions systematic war crimes and the breaking of humanitarian norms. It is also leading to the destruction of Syrian state institutions, as well as the fabric of Syrian society, and poses a serious threat to the stability of the whole region.

In these circumstances, it should be an absolute priority to work against further escalation of violence. This endeavour, however, will not be successful without taking into account the interests of relevant third parties, above all Iran and Russia. At the same time, Europeans should work much more effectively (i.e. less bureaucratically) to alleviate the humanitarian consequences of the conflict in Syria and its neighbouring states and to prepare the conditions for a transition to a stable and inclusive post-Assad order. Instead of pressing the Syrian National Coalition to be representative or producing statements of inclusion and diversity, Europeans should rather give concrete support for the local structures of self-government emerging in the areas not under regime control.
The Civil War in Syria

The Civil War in Syria: The Variety of Opposition to the Syrian Regime

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The Ba’ath regime that has ruled Syria since 1963 and been dominated by Hafez (1970-2000) and Bashar al-Assad (2000-present) has tolerated little opposition. Militant opponents, such as Syria’s branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, were violently crushed and membership outlawed, while rival political parties were banned or co-opted by the regime. Civil society was extremely weak, with trade unions and many religious organisations hollowed out and packed with loyalists. Syrians have been actively depoliticised by government institutions for nearly fifty years, making the uprising against President Assad that broke out in March 2011 all the more unexpected. Yet the decades of repression have taken their toll and as the uprising has evolved into a civil war that now enters its third year, Syria’s opposition has failed to form a united and effective front against Assad. This article considers the state of Syria’s opposition after two years of conflict; both the political and the increasingly powerful armed elements. It examines the divisions between insiders and exiles, over the role of Islam, the use of violence and the various goals of different international backers. It will be shown that, while the Ba’ath regime has proven more resilient and ruthless than other recently toppled Arab dictatorships, the divisions of its opponents have certainly contributed to its survival until now.

The Failure of Political Opposition

From the outbreak of unrest in March 2011, Syria’s political opposition was divided between internal and external players. Hastily formed committees of activists and local notables rather than established opposition groups led the first protests in Deraa and those that followed in Banias, Homs, Hama and beyond. Inspired by similar protests in Egypt and Tunisia and reflecting long-term resentment at the indignity of Assad’s security forces and short-term economic concerns, these committees – the Local Coordination Committees (LCCs) – sprung up all across Syria in a spontaneous and uncoordinated manner. While Assad insisted that protestors were armed to justify his brutal crackdown, most evidence suggests they were peaceful and any violence emanated from the regime’s agent provocateurs, the Shabiha militias. The leaderless nature of these early protests proved both a blessing and a curse for the opposition. On the one hand, with no central organisation or national leaders, the LCCs’ various activities across Syria could withstand the mass detentions, and later executions, of its activists. The first months of the uprising saw thousands detained, yet the protest movement only grew, with Assad unable to locate and eliminate any key leaders that may have posed a threat. On the other hand, from the outset the uprising was parochial and uncoordinated, something that would prove a major obstacle to attempts to channel all opposition into a single, viable movement later on.

The remnants of older opposition groups, many operating from exile abroad, including the Muslim Brotherhood, were as surprised by the uprising as

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the regime itself, and struggled to make themselves relevant to a spontaneous and leaderless movement. In Damascus, largely untouched by early protests, the veteran oppositionists of the short-lived 2000 ‘Damascus Spring,’ created forums similar to those liquidated by Assad a decade before in the hope of offering leadership to the LCCs. Well-intentioned though these democratic and secular efforts were, such as Louay Hussein’s *Building the Syrian State* and Michel Kilo’s *Syrian Democratic Platform*, they attracted little popular support (Sayigh, 2013).

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The same fate may have faced the first major exile group to emerge, the Syrian National Council (SNC), were it not for the considerable support it received from foreign powers. Arab and Western governments were initially reluctant to condemn Assad’s brutality, urging him instead to reform, and then initiating diplomatic and economic sanctions before Barack Obama and several other world leaders eventually called on him to stand down in August 2011. After turning on Assad, foreign governments grew frustrated at the leaderless structure of the LCCs and desired ‘an address’ for the opposition. At the time NATO, with the blessing of the UN and key regional powers Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey, was militarily supporting Libya’s coordinated opposition group, the National Transitional Council (NTC), against Muammar Gaddafi. It was hoped a similarly tight Syrian opposition group might be formed as the first step in defeating Assad. Yet the SNC formed in Istanbul in August 2011 was very different to its Libyan counterpart. It held no territory inside Syria and, though some LCCs and individuals pledged allegiance, it was dominated by exiles. Under pressure from Turkey’s ruling AK Party, it came to be dominated by its allies the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, despite it having a tiny activist base on the ground after decades of persecution (Phillips, 2012). From its inception, internal divisions plagued the SNC, particularly between the Muslim Brotherhood and secularists forced together by external powers, and by a lack of credibility among activists on the ground, who criticised the exiles for being out of touch and hijacking their revolution.

The reasons for the SNC’s failure to unite Syria’s opposition in the way it and its external backers had hoped are manifold. Firstly, it failed to convince other key oppositionists to join it. The dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood put off many secular Damascus Spring veterans, while it refused to work with the newly formed National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCC) that favoured negotiation, claiming it was too close to the regime. More importantly, the SNC proved unable to win the mass support of Syria’s minority communities such as Assad’s own Alawi sect (10% of the population), Christians (10%) and Druze (3%), who largely remained loyal or neutral. Despite a few token appointments, the SNC was perceived as mainly a voice for the Sunni Arab majority (65%), and non-Sunnis feared persecution were they to triumph. When Sunni jihadist militia later emerged using sectarian language, these fears appeared justified. Even Syria’s Kurds (10%), despite their historical persecution by the Ba’ath regime, were deterred by the SNC’s refusal to countenance Kurdish autonomy in a post-Assad Syria and, again, the dominance of the Muslim Brotherhood whom the largely secular Kurds did not trust.

Secondly, the SNC was unable to translate its international support into deliverables on the ground. This became all the more important after autumn 2011 when locally formed armed rebel groups abandoned the peaceful approach of the LCCs and started fighting back. The SNC reacted slowly, endorsing the new violent strategy only after many disputes in February 2012, and it then failed to make itself relevant to the fighters and command their loyalty. It could not secure the armed intervention from its Western backers that had provided Libya’s NTC with domestic legitimacy. While allies in Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Turkey eventually provided some funds and weapons for the SNC in the hope it could become a channel between external backers and armed rebel groups, even these powers eventually recognised the SNC’s impotence and armed militia directly. Finally, it remained plagued by internal divi-
sions, leading to several high profile resignations including veteran activist Haytham al-Manna, spokesperson Bassma Kodmani, and its first President Bourhan Ghalioun. With the SNC proving ineffective, Assad’s international opponents sought to reboot the opposition. Following a proposal by SNC member Riad Seif, a new National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) was formed in Kuwait in November 2012, again encouraged by the US, EU, Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. It addressed some of the SNC’s weaknesses, such as healing the internal-external divide by giving the SNC only a third of its 63 seats while LCC representatives and others made up the rest. Similarly, they elected an independent moderate Islamist, the former Imam of Damascus’ Umayyad mosque, Moaz al-Khatib as President and two secularists, Riad Seif himself and Suheir al-Atassi, as vice-Presidents, to counter claims of domination by the Muslim Brotherhood. Moreover, unlike the SNC, key fighting groups on the ground, including the Free Syrian Army and Aleppo’s Tawhid Brigade, discussed below, immediately announced their support.

While Assad’s forces were reportedly killing civilians from day one, once the opposition started fighting back in organised units capable of causing sustained casualties, in the summer of 2011 Syria’s peaceful uprising was transformed into a civil war. However, familiar problems soon emerged. Despite being offered a third vice presidential position, Syria’s Kurdish groups again refused to join, with the most powerful, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), dismissing it as a Turkish and Qatari proxy. Similarly many armed groups, notably the jihadist Jabhat al-Nusra, refused to recognise it, and even those that did pledge support largely operated independently. The continued inability of the SOC to secure Western weaponry for rebels did not help, appearing as impotent as the SNC. Western governments doubted its ability to control any rebels they armed and were alarmed by the divisions continuing within the coalition. Despite the balanced command structure, members of the LCC still complained that the SNC, and by extension the Muslim Brotherhood, dominated the SOC’s executive. On matters of policy divisions remained, such as when Khatib controversially announced in January 2013 that he would negotiate with the regime under certain conditions, something immediately denounced by many SOC members. The influence of external powers was another source of tension. In March 2013, for example, two key patrons, Qatar and Turkey, pushed a reluctant SOC into appointing a government in exile, theoretically to administer territory in northern Syria now held by rebel fighters, and to take Syria’s seat at an Arab League summit hosted by Qatar that month. The undemocratic nature of the selection process, and the awarding of the premiership to Ghassan Hitto, perceived to be close to the Muslim Brotherhood, Qatar and Turkey, prompted twelve SOC members, including vice-President Atassi, to resign. Days later Khatib himself also quit, officially due to frustration at the West’s continued refusal on arms, but rumours suggested his anger at Qatari interference. While Hitto remained and veteran Christian oppositionist George Sabra replaced Khatib as President, by mid-2013 the high hopes that the SOC could finally provide the much need united and effective opposition had faded fast.

The Ascendency of Armed Groups

The inability for the political opposition to offer effective leadership has owed much to developments on the ground. While Assad’s forces were reportedly killing civilians from day one, once the opposition started fighting back in organised units capable of causing sustained casualties, in the summer of 2011 Syria’s peaceful uprising was transformed into a civil war. Though Assad started with 200,000 troops, defections and casualties had nearly halved this by early 2013. Even so, the remaining government troops remained well-trained and resupplied by Russian and Iranian arms, while up to 20,000 Hezbollah and Iranian Republican Guard fighters were rumoured to have joined them. The armed rebels thus faced a daunting task as the conflict evolved both tactically and ideologically. There now exists in
Syria many different militia with opposing beliefs, loyalties and agendas (Lund, 2012, 2013).

The most high-profile armed group is the Free Syrian Army (FSA), although it is far from being a conventional militia. It is best understood as an umbrella organisation loosely holding together a diverse range of militia with a similar purpose, perhaps akin to the French Resistance, although it does also have an organised core. It was founded in July 2011 by a defected colonel in exile in Turkey, Ri’ad al-Asaad, declaring his intention, by online video messages, to topple Assad by military force. However, though militia quickly formed inside Syria declaring themselves to be members of the FSA, Colonel Asaad exercised very little control from his Turkish base, where the Ankara government initially restricted his movements. Instead, the evolution of the armed opposition followed the same pattern as the LCCs months earlier: spontaneous and local units forming with little centralised control. Consequently, the early clashes between these self-declared FSA units and the regime’s well-armed professional army were one-sided, with crushing defeats meted out to the rebels in Rastan and the Bab Amr district of Homs in late 2011. However the FSA’s numbers and organisation grew nevertheless, with tens of thousands defecting from the Syrian army and new local FSA brigades forming, particularly in the Homs, Hama and Idlib governorates.

By mid-2012 the FSA was enjoying significant success. Aided materially and logistically by allies in Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, through channels over the Lebanese and Turkish borders, rebel units were able to overrun Syrian army bases to capture more sophisticated weapons. In the late summer they were able to launch a major assault on the second city of Aleppo, and by year-end large stretches of northern Syria were in rebel hands. However, the decentralised nature of the FSA proved a problem. As the conflict escalated, the different militia became more overtly Islamist. For some this was a tactic to gain much needed weaponry and support from conservative donors in the Gulf, for others, most of whom were already pious Sunni Muslims, the brutality of the conflict led to radicalisation. Islamism itself was no problem for the mostly Sunni FSA, after all Colonel Asaad aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood-dominated SNC in December 2011. However questions over the type of Islamism a militia adhered to, from moderate (often Muslim Brotherhood) to Salafist to Jihadist created ideological differences that opened further divisions within the already highly localised structure of the FSA. While cooperation continued against the common enemy of Assad’s regime, by late 2012 most groups referred to as the FSA in Western media had little to do with Asaad and his command structure.

The most high-profile armed group is the Free Syrian Army (FSA), although it is far from being a conventional militia. It is best understood as an umbrella organisation loosely holding together a diverse range of militia with a similar purpose.

The absence of a single rebel military leadership, like the failures of the political leadership, alarmed the rebels’ external backers. With outside encouragement, the FSA command structure was therefore reorganised in December 2012 in an attempt to impose some kind of centralised command on the militia. Asaad was sidelined into a figurehead role and the FSA’s Chief of Staff, Salim Idriss, given effective command. Idriss claims to command all armed groups fighting Assad, and certainly enjoys international recognition as the top rebel commander, but analysts estimate he actually only has direct control over around 10,000 fighters. This small well-disciplined body of defectors consists of the ‘moderate rebels’ that the SOC has been pushing to be armed by Western powers fearful of sending weapons to extremists. However, most of the successful fighting against Assad in the past year has been done by other groups, some allied to and occasionally fighting under the name of the FSA, but well out of Idriss’ direct control, and others totally opposing the FSA and its SOC allies. Importantly, the more successful a certain group is, the more young militant Syrians are likely to join them, often depleting the more moderate militia.

The most significant group allied to Idriss is the Jabhat al-Tahrir al-Souriya al-Islamiya (Syrian Islamic Liberation Front - SILF). This is an umbrella group, formed in summer 2012 with a clear Salafist ideology...
and contains some of Syria’s largest and most successful militia, including the Farouq Brigades, originally from Homs, and the Tawhid Brigade, originally from Aleppo. Reportedly, they have approximately 37,000 fighters, aided by some foreign fighters, particularly from Libya, Jordan and Iraq. While some of these commanders sit on the FSA command councils created in December 2012 nominally under Idriss, they are essentially independent. This was seen during the assault on Aleppo in July 2012, when the head of the FSA’s local military council opposed an attack, but was unable to prevent the Tawhid Brigade’s planned assault, and then felt obliged to support it once launched. Early 2013 has seen a continuation of this trend, with well-drilled SILF fighters, particularly the Farouq and Tawhid brigades, enjoying multiple successes capturing regime air bases and border posts. While they still fight under the three-starred Istiqlal originally associated with the FSA (and their political allies the SNC and SOC), today this seems primarily to set them apart from more radical groups operating instead under a black jihadist banner.

The political opposition’s inability to overcome divisions between exiled and internal actors, secularists and Islamists, and between those backed by different foreign powers has caused all attempts to create a viable and effective united political leadership to fail.

Several other powerful radical Islamist armed groups have emerged since mid-2012. One coalition is al-Jabha al-Islamiya al-Souriya (the Syrian Islamic Front – SIF), stricter Salafists than the similarly sounding SILF, and dominated by the Ahrar al-Sham militia. Analysts estimate their militias have 13,000-25,000 fighters. While one member of the coalition, the Haqq Brigade of Homs is within the FSA umbrella, indicating the often-blurred nature of allegiances in this multi-faceted civil war, the other militias have refused association with the FSA and SOC. At an even further extreme jihadist groups have emerged, the most prominent of which, Jubhat al-Nusra (the al-Nusra Front), openly declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda in April 2013 (Benotman and Blake, 2013). Swelled by Iraqis and Syrians who fought for al-Qaeda in Iraq during the Iraqi civil war, al-Nusra has an estimated 5-10,000 fighters, but boasts superior discipline and cohesion than theoretically larger groups. This has brought some stunning victories, including capturing the first governorate capital, Raqqa, in March 2013. Refusing to recognise the SOC, rejecting its pluralist approach in favour of establishing an Islamic State, they have won some support on the ground by distributing aid to wartorn parts of Aleppo and abstaining from the property looting employed by many FSA-affiliated militia. Thus far al-Nusra, SIF and the FSA/SILF alliance have largely cooperated against Assad, but tensions have risen. Clashes between the SILF’s Farouq Brigades and al-Nusra were reported in Raqqa soon after its capture, while the SOC and FSA have complained that the radicalism of the jihadists and Salafists is deterring foreign powers from sending arms to any rebels. Many expect that once Assad falls, or even before, these tensions may boil over into open conflict between the jihadists and other rebel groups.

Further complicating the diverse range of armed fighters are the Kurdish militias. As Assad suffered losses elsewhere he strategically withdrew from Syria’s north-eastern Kurdish region. While the Kurds have long suffered under Ba’athist rule, Assad correctly estimated that the rebels’ Islamism would prove no more appealing to the secular-minded Kurds. As such, while Kurdish militia have formed and filled the power vacuum following the regime’s withdrawal, they have refused to align with any rebel groups. Yet the Kurds are far from united. Dominating the region is the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the Syrian branch of the Turkish-Kurdish separatists, the PKK. Before 2011, this was Syria’s most organised and best-armed Kurdish group and inevitably moved to take control of most military and civil targets after Assad’s forces withdrew. However, it has historically been opposed by many smaller Syrian Kurdish groups that were able to put aside their own differences in 2011 to form the Kurdish National Council (KNC), under the close supervision of the President of Iraq’s Kurdish Regional Government, Massoud Barzani. Barzani has also helped train the Popular Protection Units (YPG),
theoretically a joint PYD-KNC civil force, but effectively the KNC’s militia. Barzani also brokered an agreement in July 2012 between the PYD and KNC to effectively power share in the regions vacated by Assad. However, this truce may not hold, especially if the PYD’s PKK allies resume conflict with Barzani’s key ally, Turkey. Moreover, even if the PYD-KNC truce is sustained, both groups may clash with the rebels or Assad’s troops, should either attempt to reassert central control. The Kurdish region has been relatively peaceful in the first two years of Syria’s civil war, but it seems unlikely to last.

**Conclusion: While Damascus Burns**

In the two years since demonstrations erupted, a peaceful protest movement against President Bashar al-Assad has descended into a vicious civil war that has killed over 100,000 and left more than 3 million displaced. With the opposition failing to provide a united front, but Assad’s forces too weakened to achieve outright victory, it is hard to see either side triumphing and bringing the war to an end any time soon. Moreover, given the fractious nature of the different armed groups operating in Syria today, and the inability for the political opposition to exercise control over them, civil conflict could continue between rebel groups even if Assad is somehow defeated. The collapse of Syria into a failed state looks a distinct possibility.

While Assad and his murderous regime are most responsible for this grim forecast, the opposition shares some blame. The political opposition’s inability to overcome divisions between exiled and internal actors, secularists and Islamists, and between those backed by different foreign powers has caused all attempts to create a viable and effective united political leadership to fail. These divisions have deterred an already reluctant international community from direct military intervention or from sending significant weaponry to the armed rebels. In turn, this inability to unite and attract foreign weaponry has dissuaded the various armed groups fighting in Syria from becoming loyal operatives, and in the absence of this, radical alternatives have thrived.

In fairness, the task facing the opposition has been huge. After decades of suppression, few opposition groups were in a position to lead the spontaneous uprisings that occurred independently in 2011. Moreover, the localised nature of the uprising – because of this history of suppression – gave the opposition, both in its political and armed elements, a decentralised and parochial character that no leader has yet been able to surmount. Nevertheless, the circumstances have required Assad’s opponents to rise to the occasion, which they have largely failed to do. The opposition may have been dealt a very tough hand, but it needs to play its cards far better if it is ever to defeat Assad and, after that, hold Syria together.

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Transitions in the Arab World

Political Transformations in Arab Countries: The Different Evolutions

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In early 2011, a wave of unrest swept through Arab countries, in a chain of events referred to as the Arab Spring. As a result of these events, the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt were overthrown in a matter of weeks with minimal violence. In Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, the tyrant who had dominated the country for decades, lost his position and his life in a war waged by Libyan rebels, with the blessing of the United Nations Security Council and the support of NATO and the Arab League. Not all the uprisings led to regime change. In some, the outcome was ambiguous. The President of Yemen was forced out of office but not entirely out of power in a negotiated solution through the efforts of neighbouring countries. The King of Morocco nipped unrest in the bud by issuing a new Constitution that gave a somewhat greater role to Parliament and government, but without altering the fundamental fact that real power resides in the palace. In other countries, unrest continues but it has not yet led to significant change. In Bahrain, the Gulf monarchies rallied behind the embattled royal family, allowing it to harden its position in the face of two years of unrest predominantly originating from the Shia majority. And in Syria, a two-year war that has left tens of thousands of victims and displaced hundreds of thousands has so far led neither to a military victory by the rebels nor to a negotiated solution.

Underlying all uprisings was widespread popular dissatisfaction with economic conditions – not only poverty but also growing income disparities – and frustration of citizens who had no voice in the running of their countries. But despite the similarity of the grievances, the final outcomes of the uprisings will be as different as the paths of transformation have been, determined by social and political conditions in each country and by choices made by political actors. While all Arab transitions remain as works in progress, and it would be foolhardy to predict the outcome in any country after only two years, it is clear that they are all taking different paths.

Beyond the Islamist Model

An unexpected outcome of the uprisings has been the success of Islamist forces in most of the countries that held elections in 2011 and 2012. In Tunisia, the Ennahda Party won a plurality in the elections and formed a government in alliance with two secular parties. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood and the more radical Salafis gained about 70% of the seats in the Parliament, before it was disbanded by the courts in a highly political decision. Even in Morocco, where real power remains firmly in the hands of the King, the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) won a plurality of seats and formed the new government as prescribed by the new Constitution.

The rapid succession of victories by Islamist parties gave rise to intense speculation that Islamists would be the main beneficiaries of the changes taking place and to equally intense discussion about what “model” such parties would follow. Would it be a benign model such as the one established in Turkey by the AK Party? Or would the Islamist parties seek to transform their countries into Islamic states where laws would be entirely based on Sharia? Even worse, would the new Islamist regimes work with each oth-
er across boundaries to revive a unified Islamic umma under a caliphate?

For Arab citizens on both sides of the Islamist/secular divide, these were crucial issues. While they are not completely settled yet, and will not be for some time, several conclusions can already be drawn. The first is that Islamist victories are not inevitable. The Libyan elections held in July 2012 did not result in an Islamist victory: Libyans are religious and conservative, indeed probably less secular than their neighbours, but the Islamist parties were new and not well organised. Islamist victories in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt were less a triumph of religion over secularism, than the prevailing of good organisation and discipline over loosely structured, squabbling secular parties. A second conclusion is that fears that Islamist parties will try to revive the caliphate to the detriment of the existing Arab nation-states are unfounded. There are certainly radical groups in all countries that hold up the caliphate as their ideal, but politics is securely rooted in the individual states. There is in fact little evidence that Islamist parties even devote much time and effort to communicating with each other across state boundaries.

Finally, Islamist parties are already revealing themselves to be affected by the usual vagaries of political life. Fairly or unfairly, after only a few months in power, Islamists are being blamed for problems that have been festering for decades – like the exorbitant cost of energy and food subsidies, for example. As a result, they will almost certainly lose some support in the next round of elections. There is now a model in the countries where uprisings have taken place, which, if not Islamist, is one of very messy pluralistic politics in societies where the new rules of the game are still not clearly established and accepted.

Tunisia and Egypt: Change through Popular Uprisings

Transformation came to Tunisia and Egypt through mass protests. Demonstrations spreading throughout the country, coupled with the collapse of security forces and the refusal of the military to intervene, led Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali to flee on January 14, 2011 and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to resign a month later. But after the demise of the two Presidents, the paths taken by the two countries diverged drastically. Tunisia followed an orderly, clear process of transition. It formed an interim government led by a veteran politician, Beji Caid Essebsi, who had been in retirement during the Ben Ali years and was therefore not compromised. With the support of the High Authority for the Achievement of the Revolution’s Objectives, Political Reform and Democratic Transition, a motley coalition of parties and civil society groups, Essebsi managed to steer the country toward credible elections for a constituent assembly in October. The constituent assembly was expected not only to write the Constitution but also to serve as a Parliament. The parties had worked to reach an agreement on the transition process, but luck also intervened, because no party gained a large enough majority to govern alone or to impose its Constitution on the country – Ennahda won a plurality of seats, not the majority.

The transition appears deadlocked between a secular opposition that claims to support democracy but rejects democratic competition and Islamist parties that benefit from the democratic process but are not trusted to uphold democratic values.

Nevertheless, the transition to a new political system has not been easy. The writing of the Constitution, with all the compromises it has required has been painfully slow, and urgent socio-economic problems have not been addressed. The economy is beginning to recover, but very slowly. Tensions between secularists and Islamists are high, although the two sides recognise each other’s legitimacy. And there remains the possibility of violence at the hand of Salafist and jihadist groups. But Tunisia is still proceeding on the basis of an agreed plan and making progress. Egyptians, on the other hand, are mired in conflict, and the transition to a new political system has turned into a vicious circle, where no step appears to have been accomplished once and for all: a Parliament was elected and promptly disbanded, a Constitution enacted but not accepted, the interim military government stepped aside after the election
of a President but some Egyptians are signing petitions demanding its reinstatement. Compounding the problem, the economy is in free fall.

After the ousting of Mubarak, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took over for an interim period of unspecified length. The country was divided about the sequencing of parliamentary and presidential elections and whether elections should be held before or after the writing of the Constitution. The SCAF finally opted for parliamentary elections first and presidential elections second. The Constitution would be written by an ad hoc committee chosen by the Parliament after both elections – this raised the possibility that the elected officials would see their powers altered midstream, since the President and the Parliament were elected for full terms.

The process was problematic and the difficulty was compounded by election results that gave the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis 70% of parliamentary seats in Parliament and a few months later gave the presidency to the Muslim Brotherhood, although by a narrow margin. The elections were not rigged – international and domestic observers all agreed on this point – but the outcome was unbalanced. The increasingly alarmed but politically weak secular opposition turned to state institutions still dominated by old regime appointees in an attempt to redress the balance. The Supreme Constitutional Court obliged, ruling in a highly political decision, that the election law was unconstitutional and ordering the lower house of Parliament to be dissolved.

A similarly confused battle took place around the formation of the constituent assembly. The courts rejected the first constituent assembly formed by the Parliament but never ruled on the constitutionality of the second, repeatedly postponing the decision. The constituent assembly thus operated for six months under constant threat of dissolution and with secular members only participating in its deliberations intermittently. Although it managed to produce a Constitution and to submit it to a referendum, the charter is considered illegitimate by the secular opposition.

The original transition plan was confused and poorly thought out. At this point, Egypt is still in the middle of a transition but with no plan at all. The Muslim Brotherhood wants elections for a new Parliament as soon as possible, but it has been thwarted again by the Supreme Constitutional Court’s objections to some aspects of the election law. Elections have, therefore, been put on hold. The secular opposition, as disorganised as ever, wants to postpone elections. Street protests remain an integral part of politics, but the largely peaceful mass demonstrations that led to Mubarak’s overthrow have given way to actions by smaller groups that often degenerate into violence. The transition appears deadlocked between a secular opposition that claims to support democracy but rejects democratic competition and Islamist parties that benefit from the democratic process but are not trusted to uphold democratic values. Calls for the military to take over again are multiplying – a sad conclusion to an uprising that started with great hope in January 2011.

Morocco: the Limits of Transformation from the Top

Beginning on 20 February, 2011 Morocco experienced its own wave of demonstrations. Within two weeks, however, the initiative had passed from the streets to the palace, with the King announcing that a new Constitution would be drafted in order to give the Parliament and the cabinet greater power. Before the end of the year, Morocco had a new Constitution, a new Parliament and a new cabinet headed by the Secretary General of the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), which had won a plurality in the elections.

Palace apologists present this transformation as a course of action freely chosen by the King at his own initiative rather than a response to unrest. The PJD leadership sees the change as the vindication of its choice of a “third way” to reform, namely through cooperation with the regime rather than confrontation. Both the palace and the PJD like to point out that their choices have made Morocco a model of peaceful transformation. Egypt is mired in confusion, Libya has no real central authority, Syria is in the throes of war, and even Tunisia is still struggling to enact a new Constitution, but Morocco is well on its way to constitutional monarchy, they argue.

Perhaps. But for many, and possibly most, Moroccan and outside observers, there are still questions about whether the reforms enacted so far are truly significant and above all whether they will continue. The cabinet has more power under the new Constitution, though the King can take back into his own hand any
issue he deems to have strategic importance. The PJD has made a policy choice never to challenge the King, and the secular parties represented in the Parliament are just as tame. Potential extra-parliamentary opposition groups are dormant: the February 20 Movement that led the 2011 demonstrations is no longer active; a large Islamist movement, al-Adl-wal-Ihsan, has never participated in politics and insists it will not do so in the near future; Salafist groups exist but they have not emerged as a political force; and the widespread socio-economic discontent does not have a focus. There is, therefore, little pressure on either the King or the PJD to act, and without pressure reform appears to be grinding to a halt.

Morocco might still prove to be a model of transformation from the top without crisis and without disruption. Or it may prove to be a model of a regime successfully outmanoeuvring the opposition in the short run and leaving the status quo virtually unchanged, only to run into a crisis in the longer run. The jury is still out.

Libya and Syria: Transformation through Military Conflict

In Libya and Syria, the instrument of political change has been armed conflict. Regime change has taken place in Libya, but in Syria the conflict continues, and the population is paying a high price. Violent conflict may become the major tool of change in other countries in the future, because incumbent regimes are now more likely to respond with force to popular uprisings. Autocratic Presidents in Tunisia and Egypt allowed themselves to be deposed without much resistance, possibly because they were caught by surprise by the scale of the demonstrations and the determination of the participants. In Libya and Syria, however, rulers knew what to expect and quickly mobilised the military. In response, the opposition also moved quickly from peaceful protests to the use of violence. Unfortunately, it is quite possible that the quick turn to violence will become the pattern for the future.

The transformation of Libya through military conflict took place with the support of the international community. The United Nations and the Arab League agreed on the necessity of an international intervention to impose a NATO-led no-fly zone on the country, while Gulf countries supplied arms to the rebels. The fighting on the ground was carried out by Libyan militias organised largely on a local basis — the character of the country, with a relatively small population concentrated in towns separated by vast stretches of empty territory, made this extreme decentralisation inevitable. The war only lasted from February to October 2011, but it has had long-lasting consequences. The system created by Gaddafi was one of personal power and weak institutions, so it did not take long for the State to collapse. It had never been a cohesive State in the first place, but a rather lose amalgam of regions and tribes. The rebels recognised this early on, and made an attempt to set up a National Transitional Council (NTC) with broad representation. But the militias, armed and successful in their fight against Gaddafi, carried more weight than the new and untried civilian institutions. The NTC never succeeded in imposing its authority over the militias, and the General National Congress elected in July 2012 and the weak governments it set up have also failed so far.

Some of the militias are Islamist-oriented and have ties to radical jihadist groups in the region. But the main challenge in the Libyan transformation is less about controlling radical Islamist groups than building a state out of the fragmentation of tribes, regions and militias.

Change is also coming to Syria through civil war, but the conflict that started in early 2011 is proving much longer and bloodier than the one in Libya. The strength of the institutionalised Syrian State, including its military and the scant support for the Syrian rebels by the international community have prolonged the war. Without a no-fly zone imposed on Syria, the military has been able to use its air force against the rebels, killing tens of thousands of civilians and devastating cities in the process, but succeeding in maintaining its control over the country’s core. Although victory for the rebels remains elusive, it is already clear that post-Assad Syria will be plagued by the problem of independent militias and multiple power centres. Efforts by the United States and Gulf countries have led to the establishment of a Syrian National Coalition, which, in theory, is tasked with forming a government in exile, as well as controlling the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and supervising the local councils being set up in the parts of Syria that are no longer under government control. In practice, the coalition has little influence over armed groups and even civilian councils. The most effective fighting forces are radical groups such as Jabat al
Nusra that do not answer to the FSA and do not receive aid from the West. Local councils appear to be organised in ad hoc fashion, on the basis of local conditions, and to differ widely from each other.

The elements of fragmentation that are starting to appear in the areas outside government control, with their patchwork of militias, local councils, even sharia courts, are complicated in Syria by the likelihood of sectarian conflict. To an extent, the war is already being fought along sectarian lines – the Assad regime is dominated by Alawites, a minority that politically if not theologically is considered Shia, and the ranks of the rebels are heavily Sunni – and issues of ethnic cleansing and revenge may well continue to fester even if the Assad regime is overthrown. Military conflict has already been the instrument of transformation in Libya and will probably prove to be the same in Syria. And it is proving a costly one too, not only from a humanitarian point of view, but also because it leaves behind a legacy of fragmentation that will be particularly difficult to overcome.

Yemen: A Negotiated Transition in Slow Motion

Young people in Yemen bravely followed the example of their counterparts elsewhere in the Arab world, taking to the streets and occupying the squares for weeks beginning in February 2011. President Ali Abdullah Saleh resisted. Soon, the initiative passed from the hands of Yemeni protesters and authorities to those of Saudi Arabia and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which saw stability in Yemen essential to their own and tried to convince Saleh to step down and make way for a new government. The goal of the GCC countries was not democracy, but a less controversial government that could ensure stability. Despite Yemen’s dependence on financial support from its richer neighbours, Saleh proved extremely difficult to dislodge. On 23 April, 2011 he agreed to hand power to his vice-President within thirty days, opening the way for new elections. Immediately, he started raising objections and the thirty days passed without change.

On 3 June, however, Saleh was seriously wounded in an explosion within the presidential compound that claimed many casualties. Evacuated to Saudi Arabia for treatment, he did not give up, but returned to Yemen on 22 September, despite Saudi Arabia’s opposition. In November, he reached a new deal with the GCC countries, which again called for the transfer of power to the vice-President and new elections. This time the transfer took place, with vice-President Abdurabu Mansur Hadi dutifully elected to replace Saleh in a one-candidate election in February 2012. Still, Saleh continued to exercise an inordinate amount of influence, not least because control of elite military units remained in the hands of his son and two nephews. He finally left again to seek medical treatment in Saudi Arabia in April 2013, and shortly afterwards his son and nephews were eased out of their positions in the military and rewarded with diplomatic appointments instead.

Yemen, at last, appeared to be inching toward a turnover of leadership, but the country continued to be governed by a complex coalition of political organisations, tribal elements and personalities which could not easily be distinguished from Ali Abdullah Saleh’s ruling apparatus.

Different Paths to Transformation

The initial events of the Arab uprising were dramatic and exciting. The reality of the transitions is quite different, difficult, slow and often confusing. Paths to transitions differ, as undoubtedly the outcomes will; but the process of change appears irreversible.

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Arab Islamists, from Opposition to Power: A Critical Appraisal

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The popular uprisings that toppled Arab autocrats and became widely known as the “Arab Spring” have drastically altered domestic and regional politics. Islamists, once the long-standing victims of Arab regimes, have become the new rulers in Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco, and will likely have significant clout in Libya, Syria, and Yemen in the coming years, too. Yet the crucial question is: to what extent can Islamists fulfil the aspirations of the Arab Spring and will their reign and policies foster or hinder democratic transition in the region?

The aim of this paper is twofold: to examine the changes and transformations that have reshaped Islamist politics in the Arab world over the past two years and to assess the ability of the new Islamist governments to govern effectively and to satisfy their people.

Islamists before the Arab Spring

The rise of Islamist parties after the Arab Spring comes as no surprise. For decades, Islamists used regime repression to build up their networks and image. They shrewdly turned their political malaise into social and political capital, allowing them to recruit new members and increase their social clout among different social strata. Moreover, over time, Islamists became attuned to the rules of the political game. Hence, they routinely participated in elections, built alliances with liberal and secular forces, and, more importantly, leveraged regime repression to broaden their public appeal. In addition, Islamists built strong, nationwide social networks. They capitalised on the disenchantment of the poor and improvised means of securing political gains. For instance, they provided shelter for many of the poor and lower-middle class.

Moreover, Islamism, as a political and religious ideology, portrayed itself as a promise of “salvation,” able to provide a refuge for young Arabs who had been marginalised and alienated by the urbanisation and corrupt policies of the former regimes. Islamism, for many urban and conservative youth, constituted the only emancipator from the “profane” and from temporal politics. Not surprisingly, Islamists are remarkably skilled at turning people’s despair and disenchantment to their advantage in order to enhance their social impact. Islamists also benefited from regime repression in terms of securing sympathy and support outside their core ideological and religious base. However, Islamists are most noticeably invested in their “sacred” promise: establishing an “Islamic State.”1 For decades, they advocated reshaping political structures and societal norms, values, and morals to bring them into line with their religious perceptions and worldview.

Unsurprisingly, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, religion has become one of the most vigorous and visible components of the Arab transition. Therefore, accounts that labelled the Arab uprisings “post-Islamist” revolutions might have been premature.2 It may be

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true that the young people who sparked off the revolutions were mostly non-Islamists. However, Islamists deliberately kept a low profile during the uprisings to avoid regime repression and to diffuse Western fears of their powerful representation. More strikingly, participation in the Arab revolutions was not confined to one Islamist faction. In Egypt, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) took part in the revolution, as did both former jihadists and independent Islamists. In Tunisia, followers of the Ennahda movement took part in the revolution. In Libya, Abdel-Hakim Belhaj, a former jihadist and co-founder of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), led the final assault on Tripoli. Moreover, from a sociological point of view, religion was not far from the surface. Mosques were used to mobilise the masses. Political rallies often started at them after Friday prayers.

From the “Fringes” to the “Centre”

The new Islamist scene in the Arab world is far from monolithic. Rather, it is fluid, dynamic and, most notably, divisive. From Egypt to Morocco, Islamist movements and parties have flourished and plunged into post-revolution politics. For instance, there are some 20 registered and unregistered Islamist parties in Egypt, in addition to dozens more groups, movements, and networks that are still fluid and have no organisational structure. Apparently, the Arab revolutions have removed the political and security barriers that hindered Islamists for years and have allowed their leaders and youth to enter the political landscape. Moreover, the Islamist scene is no longer dominated by veteran Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood and radical groups. It encompasses different movements and parties from the full spectrum of Islamists. Nevertheless, despite the diversity of the Islamist landscape in the Middle East, many commonalities can still be found. In this sense, certain characteristics describe the Islamist scene in general two years after the Arab Spring.

First, Islamists can be divided into three main blocs. The first bloc consists of traditional Islamists and includes the Muslim Brotherhood, the Moroccan Justice and Development Party (PJD), and the Tunisian Ennahda Party. The second bloc encompasses Salafis, including the politicised Salafist movements and their preachers and sheikhs. Finally, there is a Salafi jihadist strain, whose members embrace a more radical and extreme ideology. While there may be other groups and currents representing a mishmash of these three main blocs, they do not play as strong a role in the overall Islamist scene. Perhaps one of the most striking features of the scene in general is the Islamists’ tendency to abandon religious activities for politics – their rush towards politicisation. There are several explanations for this. For example, Islamists are keen to engage in all forms of political activity to abort any attempt to establish a regime that opposes their thought. They are also trying to benefit from the extraordinary political openness following the revolution. At the same time, they are trying to introduce religion into the public sphere and infuse their ideology into politics.

Second, there is a growing tendency among Islamists, including Salafi jihadists, to engage in formal politics, rather than remaining outside it, at least compared to the fragmented and disorganised liberal and secular forces. In addition, Islamists seem keener to accept the rules of the political game, even if their understanding of democracy is structurally defective. Islamists are also able to unite against their opponents, unlike civil groups, which suffer from divisions and rifts.

One of the most striking features is the Islamists’ tendency to abandon religious activities for politics

Third, the past two years have shown the disparity between Islamists’ slogans and their actual policies and platforms. This reflects their lack of political experience, including among those who have engaged in public activity for decades. Despite coming to power, Islamists have shown limited capacity and aptitude in running their countries after the revolutions. Finally, fourth, Islamists tend to dominate the political scene and exclude other forces, a defect symptomatic of their poor understanding of democracy. The long-standing MB suffers from this defect as much as the newer groups, such as the Salafis and former jihadists, in spite of its claims to the contrary over the past two years. This tendency governs both the behaviour and discourse of many Islamists.
From Piety to Politics: The Rise of the Salafis

The startling rise of Salafism (Salafiyya) remains the most visible feature of the new Islamist scene in the Middle East. After decades of eschewing politics for theological and political reasons, Salafi movements and groups rushed into electoral politics enthusiastically. They became keen to form political parties, contest elections, and vie for power. In Egypt, the Salafi parties fared well in the post-revolution parliamentary elections and played a key role in drafting Egypt’s new constitution.

Despite coming to power, Islamists have shown limited capacity and aptitude in running their countries after the revolutions

This notwithstanding, Salafis are far from monolithic. There are different strands, currents, and groups. However, over the past two years, Salafis have sought to position themselves in the public sphere in the Arab world. They have ardently attempted to set the agenda for the political debate in Egypt and elsewhere. Most surprisingly, despite their political inexperience, Salafis fared surprisingly well in the parliamentary elections in Egypt after the revolution. They used their deeply rooted social networks to encourage citizens to vote for their candidates. They also built alliances and coalitions with different political forces. Yet the Salafis, like other political forces, have also experienced several divisions and splits over the past two years. For instance, the main Salafi party in Egypt, which has witnessed many divisions and splits over politics. Moreover, the Salafis’ discourse, strategies, and tactics are changing. Before the Arab Spring, the Salafist discourse was mostly dogmatic, dealing with theological matters of sin and virtue. There was no dialogue, no debate, no need to weigh the “costs and benefits.” Now things are significantly different. Not only do Salafist leaders tend to engage in a more pragmatic discourse, they also seek to share power. Moreover, when the Nour Party entered the electoral fray, it did not promise paradise as a reward for voting for its candidates, but rather pledged to improve the economy, reform education and healthcare, and fight corruption. Some Nour Party candidates may have resorted to “religious rhetoric” in their campaigns, but this tendency cannot be said to have applied across the board, nor did it reach an absolutist level.

The Intra-Islamist Feud

One of the key features of the Islamist scene in the aftermath of the Arab Spring is the number of feuds and disputes due to the unprecedented rise in the degree of competition, polarisation, and conflict within the movement. Egypt offers a unique window into the tensions between Islamist groups, whose relationships are constantly shifting as a result of the political decisions the different factions make at any given time. For instance, the most visible political conflict in Egypt now is not between Islamists and secular forces but rather among just the former. The Muslim Brotherhood, with its Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), and the Salafist Calling (al-Da’wa l-Salafiyya), with its Nour Party, have locked horns over control of the State, society, and public space, and each one struggles to seize as much power as it can. Over the past two years, the Salafists have been keen to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from consolidating its grip on power. This started during the 2011 elections, when the Brotherhood underestimated the political weight of the Salafists and disregarded their political aspirations. However, following the Salafists’ abrupt victory in the elections – they won around 24% of the parliamentary seats – the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to contain them and defuse their political rise, while the latter became even more apprehensive and suspicious of the Brotherhood’s intentions. However, following the Salafists’ abrupt victory in the elections – they won around 24% of the parliamentary seats – the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to contain them and defuse their political rise, while the latter became more politically unruly and aspired to even greater gains.

Emboldened by their political achievement, the Salafists have attempted to block the Brotherhood’s path to power. In a striking move, the Nour Party and its patrons, the Salafi Call, decided not to support Mohamed Morsi during the first round of the presidential elections before once again changing course to support him in the second round under the banner of “protecting the Islamic project.” Furthermore, after Morsi took office, the Salafists became even more apprehensive and suspicious of the Brotherhood’s intentions. They sought both to enhance their political sway in Egyptian politics and to compel the Brotherhood to respect (and accept)
their aspirations to power. For its part, the Muslim Brotherhood has adopted a shrewder, twofold strategy towards the Salafists: to co-opt them and, at the same time, to use them. The bargain, or trade-off, between the two sides was simple: the Salafists would have a much greater role in drafting Egypt’s new constitution, and, in return, they would align themselves with the Brotherhood against secular and liberal forces and resist any external pressure or calls for genuine democratic reforms. It was this bargain that enabled Morsi to survive the street pressure that followed his controversial constitutional declaration and that helped the Brotherhood to pass the constitution. It lasted until the Salafists became aware of the increasing attempts by the Muslim Brotherhood to marginalise and exclude them following the ratification of the constitution.

The crisis between the Brotherhood and the Salafists reveals that power – not religion or ideology – is Islamists’ ultimate goal.

Contrary to what might appear on the surface to be a “holy” alliance against secular and liberal forces, the inherited mistrust and divergence between the Salafists and the Brotherhood is enormous. Over the past few months, the conflict between them has turned into a cat-and-mouse game. Whereas the Salafists have attempted to benefit from the mounting resentment against Morsi and the Brotherhood to achieve more political gains, the Brotherhood has sought to encourage internal divisions among the Salafists. To benefit from the growing feelings of anti-ikhwanism, the Salafists decided to jump on the bandwagon. The Nour Party thus launched a political initiative to end the standoff between the National Salvation Front (NSF), a loose alliance of secular and liberal forces, and Morsi. The step was perceived by the Muslim Brotherhood as an attempt by the Salafists to strengthen their political clout and image before the parliamentary elections scheduled to be held in October 2013. In addition, by escalating the conflict with Morsi, the Salafists are attempting to dismiss the accusation of being subordinates and lackeys to the Muslim Brotherhood. Not surprisingly, Salafi leaders have recently asserted that the Nour Party “will never ally with the Muslim Brotherhood.” Indeed, the crisis between the Brotherhood and the Salafists reveals that power – not religion or ideology – is Islamists’ ultimate goal, and their bid to grab it could usher in a new era of intra-Islamist conflict with unpredictable consequences.

Islamists in Power… Ideology Is Not Enough

Despite the rise of Islamist parties, they are clearly unable to provide viable solutions to the chronic socio-economic problems that plague Arab societies. It is one of the “unintended outcomes” of a transition process, to use Schmitter and Karl’s definition of democratic transition. Moreover, the “lenient” and dubious reaction of Islamist governments towards the mounting influence and role of radical and violent extremists has jeopardised their image and credibility as truly “moderate” and peaceful movements and may undermine their rule if they fail to restrain it. From Morocco to Egypt, the inability of Islamist parties to effectively run the transitions is evident. Their track records over the past two years are poor and depressing, revealing a significant lack of vision and skill in running their countries and in moving away from the old and towards new democratic regimes. Certainly, no one would expect this to happen smoothly or quickly. However, Islamists’ behaviour and actions are not ushering in a new era.

In Egypt, as well as in Tunisia and Morocco, Islamists have not fulfilled their longstanding pledge of prosperity and renaissance (Nahda). So far, they...
have failed to fight corruption, fix the ailing economies, respect human and minority rights, and advance democratic agendas. And the more they fail, the less their credibility and image can be restored. Not surprisingly, many Arab people still take to the streets to express their frustration and disenchantment with the Islamists’ policies. For many, Islamist ideology cannot resolve their problems. Nor can it provide the salvation they aspired to after the many cases of immorality and incompetency.⁷

Apparently, there is a growing sense of desacralisation of Islamist ideology. By this I mean that Islamism, as a religious and political ideology, is increasingly losing its credibility and symbolic power. After two years in power, Islamists’ policies have not facilitated a big change from the old regimes, nor has their ideology preserved its purity and sanctity. Moreover, Islamists’ behaviour has shown that they, like other human beings, are prone to making mistakes and committing sins.⁸ Furthermore, the increasing erosion of Islamists’ credibility coupled with the excessive “Islamisation” of the public sphere could lead to the Islamists’ policies. For many, Islamist parties are ascending, their ideology, “Islamism,” is surprisingly on the decline.

The Brotherhood Quandary

Since taking office, President Mohamed Morsi and the Brotherhood have utterly failed to provide viable solutions to the many problems overwhelming Egyptian society. The growing anti-Brotherhood sentiment only shows how frustrated and despairing many Egyptians have become with the MB’s rule. The MB’s behaviour and attitude over the past few months has alienated non-Islamists and cast doubts on its real commitment towards democratic values. Even in foreign policy, Morsi seems an unconvincing leader and is endangering Egypt’s interests regionally and internationally.¹¹ While the MB may still have support and appeal in some segments of society, it is struggling to expand its territory outside its core religious and social base.¹² Many middle- and upper-middle-class young people feel they have been betrayed by the MB and Morsi.¹³ Even among the poor and suburban youth, the MB is facing increasing frustration.¹⁴ Clearly, the MB’s longstanding patronage policy cannot cover the 77.5% of young Egyptians (from 15 to 29 years old) who do not have jobs and fuel the unrest in the country.¹⁵

Nevertheless, the most pressing question is: why have President Mohammed Morsi and his patron, the Muslim Brotherhood, failed, so far, in running Egypt’s transition? There are two ways to answer this question. The first is short and easy, ascribing this failure to the Brotherhood’s ideology and its hunger for power. The second – which is tougher and more intricate – refers to the ability and readiness of the Muslim Brotherhood, as a social and political agent, to adapt to the new environment and realities that emerged in Egypt after the revolution. It is certainly true that the Brotherhood’s behaviour is baffling and vexing; however, this underscores the fact that the movement is far from rigid or immutable. Therefore, instead of decrying or rebuking Morsi and

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¹¹ http://ahayat.com/Details/473530


the Brotherhood for their many faults, as some “observers” do, it is more useful – albeit for the sake of analysis – to understand and construe why they behave in such a disturbing manner. Likewise, it is highly misleading and inaccurate to argue that the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood over the past few months was unavoidable due to its desperate hunger for power.

Since the Brotherhood was founded in 1928, its members have been trained how to protest, oppose, and challenge political regimes, but not how to govern or rule.

Despite the fact that the Muslim Brotherhood has more professionals, including doctors, lawyers, engineers and teachers, than any other social or political movement in Egypt, it lacks the technocratic and bureaucratic experience and skills that could enable it to govern effectively. Ironically, while the Brotherhood has always been credited for its robust and competent organisational structure, which enabled it to sustain itself for decades, its ability to morph this organisational experience and the associated capabilities into an effective governing body is significantly weak and limited. As a proselytisation movement, the Brotherhood indoctrinates its members to become “preachers” not “statesmen.” For decades, the socialisation and identification process that occurred within the Brotherhood aimed mainly to reshape individuals’ identity to become devout and loyal members, not mere politicians. For the Brotherhood, it was the only way to maintain members’ commitment and solidarity and to ensure its survival in the face of the many attempts of the Mubarak regime to undermine its leadership and activities.

Not surprisingly, after the 25 January uprising it was quite difficult for the Brotherhood to make the needed shift from being the regime’s subject to owning it. In other words, the Brotherhood’s leaders are struggling to become the new policymakers following decades of being targeted. This became more palpable after its useless attempts to infiltrate the State’s bureaucracy revealed its ineptness for governance.

Moreover, since the Brotherhood was founded in 1928, its members have been trained how to protest, oppose, and challenge political regimes, but not how to govern or rule. In addition, the brutal repression and exclusion under Mubarak undermined the Brotherhood’s former hopes of not only sharing power with the former regime, but, more importantly, being included in state institutions. “We were treated as second-class citizens,” a senior Brotherhood leader once told me.

Furthermore, the Brotherhood’s cadres never ran a public institution, whether on a local or national level. They were barred from public office and excluded from having influential posts within the state bureaucracy. Unlike their counterparts in Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), who gained significant governing experience during the 1990s, the Brotherhood’s leaders had no access to provincial and municipal administration in Egypt, which was completely under the control of the former ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and its rotten lackeys in the public sector. In other words, the Brotherhood’s members were never trained to be professional civil servants. The greatest experience they obtained was from running mosques, syndicates and welfare societies, in which their performance and record was remarkable and indisputable. Ironically, those who possess some strategic and administrative skills, such as the Brotherhood’s mastermind Khairat el-Shater, are politically conservative. They embrace a narrow-minded vision that tends to disdain and alienate their opponents. The Muslim Brotherhood’s predicament in power reveals how difficult it is for organisations to move, overnight, from the peripheries of politics to its centre and to make the shift in mindset from ruled to ruler.

To conclude, if the Arab Spring tells us anything after two years of torturous transition, it is that the Islamists will not be able to preserve power and credibility without fulfilling peoples’ aspirations and needs, which may put their future at stake.
The Arab Uprisings: Regional Implications and International Responses

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It has become commonplace to argue that the Arab Spring has turned into the Arab Winter. The instability and conflict in Syria and neighbouring countries, the deep divide between secularists and Islamists, and the return to old autocratic practices in several countries in the region have led many commentators to conclude that the Arab Spring has turned into a winter of regional disorder, sectarian strife and renewed autocracy (see Brumberg & Heydemann, 2013, Friedman, 2013, Cordesmann, 2013).

While these trends are clearly present in the region, this article will argue that the emerging political and strategic landscape is more open-ended and more contradictory than the simplistic “Arab Spring-Arab Winter” metaphor may lead us to believe. Secondly, it will argue that the EU and the US have had difficulties responding to these contradictory developments, partly due to internal political and economic problems, and also because of a reluctance to interfere in home-grown revolutions, thereby leaving the field open to competing regional and international players.

Illiberal Practices, Conflict and Disillusionment

Over the last year, the question has increasingly been raised as to whether the Arab uprisings eventually will lead to the creation of democratic Arab states, or whether we may see a reverse process leading to a restoration of the old autocratic status quo in the region. Since we are only two years into the so-called Arab Spring, and since there are immense differences between the individual Arab countries, any conclusive answer to this question would obviously be premature. Yet it can be argued that there are indications pointing in the direction of renewed autocracy and illiberal practices. In Jordan and Morocco there are signs that the incumbent monarchies are using old tactics of façade democratisation and gradual reform while keeping basic autocratic structures intact, and in the Gulf, the oil-rich monarchies are resorting to old means of buying off domestic discontent and playing regional power politics. In post-revolutionary Egypt and Tunisia, there are some indications pointing to a return to the autocratic measures of the Mubarak and Ben Ali era. In Egypt, for instance, the Brotherhood has backtracked on original promises of power-sharing and seems ready to curb the freedom of internationally funded NGOs and freedom of expression, particularly in the social and cultural domain. Some sections of the secular opposition are also showing signs of being prepared to use illiberal means, such as instigating violence or calling on the army to intervene in political life. In Tunisia,
Islamist extremism led to the tragic assassination of the opposition leader Chokri Belaid, and ever since, the relationship between the secular opposition and the Troika government has been marked by tensions and confrontation. In both Tunisia and Egypt we are seeing a deepening divide between secularists and Islamists as well as stereotyping and fear-mongering on both sides, precluding inclusion and dialogue, both of which are vital elements in democratic transitions.

The situations in both Libya and Syria, although different in many respects, threaten to evolve into state collapse, with severe consequences not only for the states themselves, but also for the stability and delicate political balance in neighbouring countries. The violence in Syria, nurtured by regional powers and the Bashar al-Assad regime’s brutal repression, has radicalised and militarised the opposition, making it next to impossible for peaceful and non-sectarian voices to be heard. At present multiple militias compete for arms and influence, and some of these are informed by highly extremist jihadist ideologies, a far cry from the liberal democratic values that initially informed the protesters in Syria. Neighbouring states are deeply concerned not only with the prospects of the Syrian conflict dragging on for years, but also with the make-up of a post-conflict Syria. There is a real risk that the massive amount of arms that has flooded into Syria may be turned against neighbouring governments, and that rival powers in the Gulf may continue to support their own local militias inside the country even after the fall of the Assad regime, similarly to the way militias in Lebanon traditionally have been sustained by regional powers. While the Syrian conflict erupted as a result of local grievances and was by no means instigated by foreign powers, it is clear today that Syria – in addition to being a tale of a brutal regime cracking down on its own people – has become a regional battleground reflecting the region’s main lines of conflicts between Sunni and Shia, pro-Western and anti-Western, Arab and Iranian, Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi. Caught between these rival regional forces, the issue of democracy itself is easily pushed to the side.

The highly volatile situation in most of the Arab states undergoing transition has evidently also diminished the so-called ‘demonstration effect’ in the region, which initially inspired protesters in Egypt, Libya and Syria to emulate the Tunisian experience. In fact, one may even talk about a negative effect, insofar as the brutal crackdown in Syria may have caused pro-democracy groups elsewhere in the region to hesitate before embarking on protests and demonstrations, just as it has become easier for incumbent authoritarian regimes to slow down the pace of political change, or to put reforms on the back burner all together. Incumbents can now point to the negative consequences of the Arab revolts, and, given the complicated security situation many of these regimes face – an influx of refugees, sectarian grievances, jihadist terrorist groups, rivalries with neighbours –, immediate security concerns can be posed as more expedient than democratic reforms, playing into the old dilemma between stability and democracy. Some government officials in the Gulf even argue that they are now more concerned with the prospects of a so-called ‘Muslim Brotherhood Crescent,’ than with the effects that pro-democracy movements elsewhere in the region may have on their societies. The concern with the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood and its regional backers is also evident from the recent arrest of Egyptians deemed to be affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and from the fighting over the leadership of the Syrian opposition.

While these developments arguably point in a negative direction, it should also be stressed that important positive changes have already occurred in the region. Three main changes will be pointed out here: the emergence of democracy as a norm, the reopening of domestic politics and the normalisation of foreign policy.

**Democracy as an Evolving Regional Norm, Re-Politicisation and Normalisation**

Although we do not predict the emergence of twenty-two democratic Arab states in the near future, one might argue that democracy itself is gradually emerging as a regional norm. Democracy now constitutes a kind of discursive framework that all main political actors must relate to and speak in terms of, comparable to the way that Arab leaders had to speak in terms of Arab unity and nationalism in the fifties and sixties. Thus also Islamist parties, such as
the Ennahda party in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria, are endorsing a democratic-civil state. A recent study by Al-Ahram and the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI) shows that 80% of Tunisians and 90% of Egyptians agree that democracy is the best form of government, regardless of whom they voted for. Islamists and secularists might disagree about the role of religion, but they both believe that the State should function according to democratic principles (Benstead, Lust, Malouche et al. 2013). In other words, when secularist and Islamist parties collide in Tunisia and Egypt, the conflict is not over whether there is to be democracy or not, but over who is democratic, and who is not, each side accusing the other of being non-democratic. This can also be seen at a regional level: two recent significant events in the region – the military intervention in Libya and the expulsion of Syria from the Arab League – have both been carried out with reference to principles of freedom, dignity and democracy. Similarly, when Morsi went to Tehran for the first time in over 30 years to mend relations with Iran, the Egyptian President at the same time urged all countries to support the Syrian people in their “fight against their oppressors...and help the people build a democratic system of rule that reflects the demands of the Syrian people for freedom” (30.08.2012). These verbal endorsements in the regional and domestic arenas obviously give no guarantee that democracy will materialise in the end, just as it is clear that the different political actors have different understandings of what democracy means. But the very fact that democracy has emerged as the preferred discursive framework is markedly different from the situation that reigned in the region only a few years back. Then, it was still common for authoritarian governments and some Islamist groups to argue that democracy was a distinct Western concept unfit for the region, and/or incompatible with Islam; an imposed outside order.

While the joy and enthusiasm protesters shared in 2011 has arguably diminished, public protest itself has survived. A new vibrant political culture is emerging, where the opposition takes to the streets when it disagrees with the policies of its political leaders, where politics is fiercely debated in new networks, associations and political parties, and where new ways are introduced to hold governments accountable. This is most evident in Egypt and Tunisia where the (new) governments are exposed to fierce criticism, debate and ridicule from their opponents at street level, e.g. in the form of demonstrations, strikes, and street art, and in social media, where blogs, twitter, and web-based watchdog groups are flourishing. These new forms of protest do not only serve to show that political life itself has exploded as a result of the Arab uprisings, but also that Arab leaders can be held accountable in new ways. For instance, in Tunisia, Al Bawsala – a new watchdog NGO – has monitored the slow progress of the Tunisian Constituent Assembly, providing documentation for the nature of their work and the widespread non-attendance in the Assembly, causing a public outcry in the country. In Egypt the so-called ‘Morsi Meter’ website has similarly kept track of the President’s election promises, comparing promises with the first 100 days in office. Such means of holding government accountable would obviously have been unthinkable during the reign of Ben Ali and Mubarak, but they also show how Arab leaders are on the verge of, and in some cases already have lost, their traditional sacrosanct status in Arab societies. [This applies not only to Tunisia and Egypt, but also to Syria, where Bashar al-Assad and his inner circle have become objects of intense political satire, being “dethroned” in cartoons, posters, graffiti, and the much-acclaimed Top Goon series, unheard of in a Syrian (and Arab) context prior to the 2011 uprisings.]

With domestic debate being rather limited under authoritarian rule, foreign policy posturing could be used to feign real political discussion. Yet, as the lid now has been taken off the domestic political debate in the Arab states undergoing transition, foreign policy posturing has become less important...
and foreign policy level. Many commentators have argued that Arab governments now have to take public opinion into account when making foreign policy decisions, and that this will pave the way for more radical foreign policy positions on, for example, relations with the West and the Arab-Israeli conflict. But we may in fact see indications of a reverse trend, insofar as the newly elected governments in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya are less preoccupied with foreign policy posturing and more with domestic politics. Arab governments have traditionally used foreign policy as a stage for high rhetoric, in order to divert attention from domestic politics and societal grievances. With domestic debate being rather limited under authoritarian rule, foreign policy posturing could be used to feign real political discussion. Yet, as the lid now has been taken off the domestic political debate in the Arab states undergoing transition, foreign policy posturing has become less important. In Libya, Tunisia and Egypt, issues such as Palestine, Israel and relations with the West have played only a marginal role in the domestic political debate in the aftermath of the uprisings. Certainly the new Islamist governments are cautious of being seen as more independent in their foreign policies than their predecessors – this being less the case for Libya given Gaddafi’s anti-Western positions – but they have until now pursued very pragmatic foreign policies, and are eager to retain relations with the EU and the US. Moreover, whereas regional powers and movements such as Iran, Hezbollah and Hamas before the uprisings were able to mobilise Arab societies around popular causes such as the Palestinian issue and resistance to the West, this has now become more difficult. Iran and Hezbollah have lost popularity as a result of their deep involvement with the Assad regime’s brutal repression in Syria, in addition to Iran’s own crack down on the Green Movement in 2009, and they are less able to exploit the traditional legitimacy gap between Arab governments and societies. This could change should Israel, for instance, launch a military attack on Iran, or if Hezbollah and Israel’s cold war develops into a hot one. But the old resistance axis is less able to use its traditional soft-power tools.

Taken together these trends prove that developments in the region constitute more of a mixed bag than the Arab Spring-Arab Winter metaphor relates. In light of these contradictory trends, it is perhaps also less surprising that the EU and the US have responded rather reactively and cautiously to the Arab uprisings, as will be argued below.

**EU and US Responses to the Arab Uprisings**

Although the Arab uprisings took Europe and the United States by surprise, after some initial confusion the EU and the US sided with the protesters, even though it meant giving up on old allies. Both played an active role in the initial months: President Obama worked the phones and urged President Mubarak to step down, the EU issued a number of declarations with the same purpose, and the EU’s High Representative Catherine Ashton was quickly dispatched to Tunis and Cairo, after Ben Ali and Mubarak fell, to declare the EU’s support. The NATO-led military operation in Libya initiated in March 2011 was largely driven by individual EU Member States, while the United States chose to “lead from behind.”

On the economic side, the willingness to support the countries in transition was equally high. The EU immediately granted emergency funds to Tunisia and accelerated the on-going review of the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). By March 2011, a joint Communication from the High Representative and the EU Commission on the EU’s response was announced, detailing a range of different economic and technical measures to assist the countries in transition, followed by the ENP review in May 2011. A new EU Endowment for Democracy was also proposed, and was finally established in 2013. The United States also pledged considerable funds in President Obama’s speech on 19 May, 2011, in which he presented the American response to the uprisings, mostly focusing on economic develop-

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1 The relatively muted response to the uprising in Bahrain being one notable exception.
ment and trade including the prospect of large debt relief and loans to Egypt and a $2 billion Enterprise Fund for Tunisia and Egypt. However, looking back at the last two years, the ability of the EU and the United States to influence developments has been marginal. Their political and diplomatic role has been limited, and much of the promised assistance either did not materialise or was, to a large extent, a repackaging of old programmes. The question is: why were the original high ambitions not achieved, and why have the EU and the United States reacted so cautiously to the uprisings?

A Newfound Humility, Problems at Home and Old Policies for a Changing Region

Given the historic role of European powers and the US in the Middle East, the extent to which Brussels and Washington reacted with humility to the events unfolding in the region may be somewhat surprising. However, there appears to have been a genuine respect in Western capitals for what the protesters managed to achieve without any outside help, and an urge to let the uprisings remain home-grown. While the scope of the challenges was clear, the actual changes in policy and programmes turned out to be limited. On the EU’s side, the strong internal pressure for a rapid EU response led to a reliance on the existing programmes within the ENP framework rather than a complete rethinking of the EU’s relationship with the region. The continued use of the ENP made sense, assuming that the countries in transition were primarily aiming for democracy and closer ties to Europe, as had been the case for the Central and Eastern European countries twenty years earlier. However the southern Mediterranean Partner States are not looking for membership in the EU, and the motivation to fulfil complicated EU requirements for technical cooperation is therefore not always present.

In the case of the US, quick efforts were similarly made to pull together available resources in a Middle East Response Fund. But the constantly changing situation on the ground and Congress’ fundamental scepticism of the foreign aid issue rendered all new appropriations difficult. Most recently, Congress has turned down a request for a new Middle East Incentive Fund, which was to have been the flagship of US assistance to the region post-Arab Spring. Thus, as is the case for the EU, the US response has to a large extent been characterised by a repackaging of old programmes and limited follow-up on initial promises.

Moreover, despite the initial euphoria and enthusiasm for the uprisings in Western capitals, domestic realities in both Europe and the United States quickly overshadowed events in the region. The catchy slogan for the EU’s efforts – the “3Ms” for Markets, Money and Mobility – was premised on deliverables in which the southern Mediterranean neighbours would have a real interest. But its components are difficult for the EU to deliver on, particularly in times of crisis. As a result, progress on each of the “Ms” has been rather limited. This reflects the reality of the EU where the eurozone crisis does not leave much room for opening markets, allocating new funds, or designing a more open immigration policy. At the same time, while the principle of “more for more” was the criteria for assistance, unity among EU Member States about the toughness in applying this principle has not been obvious. In general, northern European countries have advocated a tough stance and focused on democracy promotion, while some southern Member States have found the conditional approach less important and argued in favour of longer-lasting relationships with the south. This difference is reflected in the lack of support for the new European Endowment for Democracy from the EU’s southern Member States.

Despite the initial euphoria and enthusiasm for the uprisings in Western capitals, domestic realities in both Europe and the United States quickly overshadowed events in the region

Although the circumstances are different, the United States was also affected by a number of factors that impeded the initial ambitious rhetoric. For the

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United States, the Arab uprisings coincided with a time of budget cuts, political paralysis in Congress and a President who has very clearly signalled that the United States should delegate responsibility to regional partners and spend its energy rebuilding at home rather than abroad. In particular, there has been a clear wish from the Obama administration to end the US military engagement in the Middle East. This policy has been translated into a reluctance to become militarily or diplomatically engaged in the region – Syria being the most notable example, along with the US acceptance of the GCC lead in Yemen and the European lead in Libya. Moreover, while there has been a real willingness on the part of the administration to pledge greater funds to the countries in transition, resistance in Congress has been considerable, and only limited parts of the suggested new funding for the region have materialised. In a Congress already sceptical towards spending on foreign assistance in a time of budget cuts, the administration has had great difficulty obtaining Congress approval for assistance to Egypt, in particular, but also to Tunisia and Libya after the attack against the US Embassy in Tunis and the US compound in Benghazi. The rise of Islamist parties, apparent discrimination against Christians and the treatment of foreign NGOs in some transition countries have not rendered the task easier for those who wish for a more robust American economic response to the uprisings, and for now there has only been limited follow-up to the promises made in President Obama’s speech in 2011.

Finally, it is increasingly clear that the Middle East is no longer the “domaine reservé” of Europe and the United States. Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Iran, in particular, are vying for influence among potential new allies in the countries in transition, and several of these regional powers can offer attractive economic assistance and trade relationships for the countries in the region. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, for example, have offered $4 billion and $5 billion respectively in loans and grants to Egypt, much more than the $4.8 billion IMF loan that is currently being negotiated. Moreover, other external powers are trying to exert their influence through political, economic and even military means. Whereas Russia’s interests in the Middle East are well-known, new emerging powers such as China and even Brazil are also looking for opportunities and seeking to play a political role. The disagreement over Syria in the UN Security Council, where Russia and China’s positions are tacitly supported by India and Brazil, illustrates that the latter do not necessarily see eye to eye with Europe and the US when it comes to the appropriate reactions to the Arab uprisings.

**Conclusion**

The roller-coaster developments of the last two years have been difficult for outside actors to navigate. The many contradicting trends in the region have, on the one hand been cause for a cautious and balanced approach; while on the other hand, it is clear that EU and US influence has been reduced as a result. Rather than proactively shaping events or devising new grand strategies, the US and the EU have been reacting to the changing dynamics in the region and mainly revising old policies. This is also a reflection of the fact that in the emerging Middle East, new actors are competing for access and influence, at the same time as the region is gaining greater regional autonomy vis-à-vis outside powers. These developments pose new challenges for the EU and the US. Yet they should not overshadow the fact that the Arab uprisings have already created profound changes in the relationship between state and people and in Arab foreign policy-making; providing the EU and the US with new opportunities for engagement and interaction.

**References**


Transitions in the Arab World

Constitutional Reforms in Arab Countries in Transition

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Over the course of the two years following the Arab Spring, numerous States in the region have engaged in processes of revising their constitutions, sometimes even going as far as drawing up an entirely new text. Even countries not having undertaken processes of transition have often been subject to persistent pressure from opposition movements, who demand they grant — if only symbolically — a certain political liberalisation. The contrast with the past is great, since even though nearly all Arab countries had a constitution or a basic law, with the notorious exception of Libya under Gaddafi, the political authoritarianism characterising the entire region entailed a constitutional inertia that had hardly been broken except to allow a president to aspire to additional terms in office or to modify the provisions governing accession to office.

The transitions underway are characterised by the legal and, more specifically, constitutional dimension that the different actors on the political scene lend this political change. Everywhere, the political imperatives have thus crystallised around the constitutional reference. As the legal text containing the basic principles on which the political and legal order of the State rest, the constitution has become a symbol for all political positions. In an attempt to influence the content of the texts being drawn up or revised, the different political forces in play make use of the legal norms to build or strengthen their political legitimacy.

The ability of the different actors to introduce provisions in accordance with their ideology and conception of society is dependent upon the balance of forces involved. By the same token, the constitutional debate impassions the populations that have overthrown their leaders, who appropriate it by organising protests, public debates, conferences, radio and TV programmes or lengthy analyses in newspapers. The constitutional debate has revolved around the common aspiration of populations for greater democracy. Among the protesters’ demands, the points almost all of them had in common were a call for real separation and balance of powers, the expansion and guarantee of individual liberties, the independence of the judiciary branch, free elections and the struggle against corruption. The monarchies seem to have fared better than the republics in the protest and demands movements. Very few of them were faced with demands for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, let alone a republic, the protesters most often merely demanding a reduction in the sovereign’s powers to the benefit of a potential Prime Minister and the strengthening of the legislative branch, until then devoid of any real power.

Though all the States of the Arab world have been confronted with revolutionary movements and calls for reform, the scope of constitutional changes undertaken or underway is variable, and only some of them have initiated a genuine process of constitutional reform. Some of them have done so at the fall of the preceding regime and have embarked upon the development of a new text (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen). Others have prudently preferred to begin a process of reform to defuse the risks of political rupture (Morocco, Jordan). In the end, the majority have merely conceded superficial reforms (Oman, Qatar,

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Revolutionary Processes and Constitutional Change

Following a revolutionary process having led to the fall of their presidents, certain countries have chosen to break with the preceding regime by abolishing their constitutions and engaging in the process of drawing up a new constitutional text. This is the case in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as Libya and Yemen, who are following or have followed different methods in drawing up their new constitutions.

Different Paces of Progress

Egypt is the farthest along, since it has already adopted and implemented its new constitution. Tunisia has taken a long time to draw up its constitution and its adoption is expected for the autumn of 2013 instead of October 2012. Insofar as Libya and Yemen, who also ousted their presidents, they have merely postulated drafting it. In Libya, a Constitutional Declaration adopted in August of 2011 by the National Transitional Council established a transition period during which an elected assembly, the General National Congress, would appoint a new government and the members of a constituent assembly. The process would conclude with the adoption of the constitution by referendum and the holding of legislative and presidential elections. In March 2012, a constitutional amendment established that the Congress, once elected, would appoint a constituent commission made up of 60 members, with parity between the country’s three main regions (Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, Fezzan). But under pressure from the opposition, on 5 July 2012, that is, two days before the legislative elections were to be held, the National Transitional Council decided to modify the August 2011 Constitutional Declaration such that the constituent assembly would no longer be appointed but elected, according to the criteria to be established by the General National Congress (GNC), with respect for the principle of representation of all components of Libyan society in its cultural and linguistic diversity. Moreover, the assembly would have three months to submit its project. After lengthy debate, on 6 February 2013, the GNC decided not to amend the Constitutional Declaration again but to validate the appointment of Constituent Assembly members by holding an election. The different political forces involved were unable to reach an agreement as to the voting method, so, the GNC designated a committee of three members representing the country’s three main regions, which was entrusted with reaching a consensus.

In Yemen, a National Dialogue Conference bringing together the different political groups has been in session since 18 March 2013 under the auspices of the United Nations in order to draw up a new constitution and prepare legislative and presidential elections, to be held in 2014. Yemen has requested France’s support in the process of drawing up its new constitution.

Similarities in Transition Phase Management

In Egypt, the 1971 Constitution was suspended in February 2011 by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), to which President Mubarak had just transferred his powers, and has never been reinstated. In Tunisia, the decision to suspend the 1959 Constitution did not come until March 2011, after presidential powers had been temporarily attributed to the President of the Chamber of Deputies, as constitutionally stipulated in the case of a definitive vacancy of the office of President of the republic. It was definitively abolished in December 2011 by the constitutional law on the provisional organisation of the government. In both countries, a provisional text has been adopted to regulate the transition period. In Egypt, it was the armed forces that drafted this document, under particularly obscure, chaotic conditions. Hence, after having taken power in the most perfect illegality, since, according to the 1971 Constitution, the President of the Lower House of Parliament should have taken the office of interim President and not the SCAF, the latter appointed a revision committee and on 19 March 2011, submitted a dozen constitutional amendments to referendum vote, essentially relative to electoral processes, which were adopted by an overwhelming majority of 77.2%. But on 30 March 2011, the 1971 Constitution, which had been suspended and just amended,
was replaced by a Constitutional Declaration proclaimed by the SCAF, which included some fifty stipulations from the 1971 Constitution as well as the amended articles that had been adopted by referendum. This document, however, was not submitted to a referendum by the people.

In Tunisia, the preparation of a text designed to govern the transition period was at first – in January 2011 – entrusted to the High Commission for Political Reform and Democratic Transition, a technical body comprised by experts that, renamed as of February 2011 as the “High Commission for the Realisation of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition,” passed a decree-law in March 2011 on the provisional organisation of the government designed to regulate the transition period. Then, in December 2011, the constituent assembly replaced said text by a constitutional law on the provisional organisation of the government, dubbed the “Little Constitution,” which established the organisational principles of the State’s political administration during the transition period.

In Egypt as in Tunisia, the opposition attempted, in vain, to limit the powers of the future constituent assembly by adopting a text of a “supra-constitutional” nature containing a certain number of safeguards. In Egypt, the army, supported by the liberal and left-wing parties, twice attempted – in July and November of 2011 – to impose a declaration of principles establishing guidelines for the future constituent assembly by proclaiming, in particular, the “civilian” nature of the Egyptian State, freedom of religion and gender equality, and guaranteeing the armed forces an important role. But in the face of protest by Islamist parties, the SCAF backed down and cancelled the text. In Tunisia, it was the High Commission that adopted a Republican Pact on 1 July 2011, containing a number of fundamental principles such as Article 1 of the former constitution, relative to the role of Islam, the separation of politics and religion, the freedom of conscience and religion, the principle of the equality of citizens, the preservation of the acquis of Tunisian women in the sphere of personal status or the separation of the legislative and executive branches, and the independence of the judiciary (and prohibiting any normalisation of relations with Israel). However, this text not being adopted by referendum, the constituent assembly considered it had no binding legal effect.

Differences in the Drafting Process of the New Constitutions

Egypt and Tunisia diverged insofar as the stages of the institutional transition process. Should the people or the institutions be changed first? The Egyptian Constitutional Declaration of 30 March 2011 was particularly ambiguous on this point and its interpretation entailed conflicts, at times even violent ones, between the different forces involved. The decision was finally made to hold legislative and then presidential elections before appointing a constituent assembly and drafting a new constitution. Tunisia made an intermediate choice and started with the drafting of a constitution by electing a provisional Parliament and President to exercise power until the adoption of a new constitutional text and the organisation of elections within six months. In any case, both countries chose to entrust the drafting of the constitution to an assembly composed of elected members.

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In Tunisia, the members of the assembly were elected by universal suffrage. Thanks to the parity principle, women obtained approximately a fourth of the seats. In Egypt, the 100 members of the Constituent Assembly were appointed by the Legislative Assembly that had just been elected, but their designation gave rise to heated debate, once again due to the ambiguity of the Constitutional Declaration of 30 March 2011. A first Constituent Assembly with an Islamist majority was elected in March 2012 but declared unconstitutional by the State Council a month later because half its members had been chosen within the Legislative Assembly. The second Constituent Assembly, appointed in June 2012, had more than 60% Islamists and only seven women. A number of pleas of unconstitutionality were filed against this Assembly
with the Supreme Constitutional Court, but President Morsi passed a constitutional decree on 22 November 2012 prohibiting the constitutional judge from examining them. Although the Supreme Court had decided not to abide by this injunction and to meet anyway on 2 December 2012 to make a decision on this matter, Islamist protesters surrounded the Court premises, preventing the judges from entering and meeting there. The Court protested, denouncing such “psychological and material” pressure, and decided to go on strike. Whereas the constitutional decree of 22 November had likewise granted the Constituent Assembly a supplementary period of two months in addition to the initial six established, the constitution was finally adopted in haste on 30 November, submitted to referendum on 15 December 2012 and adopted by a majority of approximately 64% with a turnout of 33%. The drafting process was so controversial that the constitution had hardly been approved before a revision committee was set up to centralise amendment proposals for the text that had just been voted in. In June 2013, the Supreme Constitutional Court finally declared unconstitutional the law organising the Constituent Assembly, but the validity of the constitution was not challenged, due to its approbation by the people in the referendum.

In Tunisia, the Constituent Assembly, which in principle was to have completed its work in a year, i.e. by October 2012, is taking much longer. This difference in pace vis-à-vis Egypt can be attributed in particular to the fact that the Tunisian Constituent Assembly chose to make a clean sweep with the past and draw up an entirely new text, whereas the Egyptian Constituent Assembly was deeply inspired by the 1971 Constitution. Another reason for Tunisia’s delay was that the Tunisian Constituent Assembly has also assumed the functions of a legislative assembly and is thus likewise in charge of drafting legislation and supervising the government’s actions. The last draft of the constitution, which was made public on 1st June 2013, is far from achieving unanimity even within the Constituent Assembly and sixty of its members have signed a declaration expressing their opposition to the draft. The “Little Constitution” establishes that it will be submitted to referendum if it fails to pass by a two-thirds majority in the Constituent Assembly.

Controversies on the Role of Religion and the Status of Women

The rise and coming to power of political forces of an Islamic nature are clearly a particularly important trait of constitutionalism in Egypt and Tunisia, since it is the first time these parties have been offered the opportunity to draft a constitutional text and set down their vision of society.

In Egypt, as in Tunisia, stipulations on the role of religion and the status of women brought tensions to the surface both inside and outside the Constituent Assembly, revealing the absence of consensus in these societies on the definition of a set of common values. While in Egypt a consensus eventually emerged on preserving Article 2 of the 1971 Constitution making Islam the religion of the State and Islamic sharia the main source of legislation, in Tunisia, Ennahda’s proposal to introduce a similar stipulation into the new constitution led to such an uproar that the article was finally removed in March 2012. The current draft constitution retains the formulation of the 1959 Constitution, according to which “Tunisia is a free, independent and sovereign State; its religion is Islam, its language Arabic and its regime a republic.” Though this article was the object of consensus basically due to its ambivalence (is Islam the religion of the State or the nation?), the opposition accused Ennahda of having betrayed their agreement by introducing a new provision, according to which no constitutional revision can undermine “Islam insofar as it is the State religion.”

In Egypt, by the same token, opposition parties accused the Muslim Brotherhood of betraying the general consensus by introducing Article 219, under pressure from the Salafists; an article aiming to define the concept of “the principles of Islamic sharia” making recourse to highly technical notions of theology and traditional Islamic law whose exact meaning only a few insiders are able to grasp. It defines the principles of Islamic sharia as being the scriptural sources of sharia, that is, the Quran and the Sunnah; the principles of Usul and Fiqh, that is, the major principles that can be surmised from the works of specialists in the science of the sources of Fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) and the replies given by Muslim jurists or Ulama; as well as sources recognised by Islamic Schools of Law. By adopting a very broad concept of “the principles of Islamic sharia,” Article
219 aims to bind the legislator and thwart the modernist interpretation of Article 2, passed by the Supreme Constitutional Court. Note that in Libya, the Constitutional Declaration of 3 August 2011 likewise established sharia as the main source of legislation. Egypt has introduced a stipulation on blasphemy in its constitution. Any insults or attacks against God’s messengers are henceforth prohibited; legislators will have to define the concept more precisely and determine the sanction. An analogous stipulation prohibiting violation of the sacred was finally removed from the draft constitution of Tunisia.

In any case, the fact that Islamist parties have agreed to become political parties and run in elections demonstrates that they agree to enter the realm of democratic and constitutional legitimacy.

Stipulations on the status of women have likewise been the object of intense polemics in both countries. In Egypt, the Constituent Assembly took up an article from the 1971 Constitution requiring the State to ensure gender equality, without violation of the rules of Islamic law. In the face of reactions of protest by feminist NGOs, the article was eventually removed. Another article entrusting the State with ensuring the compatibility of women’s duties toward her family with her work that was also in the 1971 Constitution likewise raised major concern but was not removed. In Tunisia, the draft constitution of August 2012 contained an article according to which the State was to ensure the protection of women’s rights under the principle of complementarity to men within the family. Strong protest by the opposition and feminist organisations managed to have this article removed from the draft constitution.

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Granted Constitutional Changes and Reform of the Political System

In the face of popular demand for democratic liberalisation and the risks of political rupture threatening those in power, other countries in the Arab world have succeeded in defusing protest movements by following alternative routes towards democratic transition. They have succeeded in avoiding the escalation of protest to revolution by passing reforms while retaining control of power. This is the case in Morocco and Jordan, where shortly after the onset of demonstrations, the sovereigns adopted safety measures by modifying the constitution. These reforms, of variable scope, have allowed them to consolidate their power while protecting themselves from the fate of the Tunisian and Egyptian leaders. They were granted by the sovereign, who retained control of the entire revision process. Whereas in Jordan, reform was limited to introducing amendments into the constitution in force, in Morocco a new constitutional text replaced the 1996 Constitution.

Constitutional Reforms Granted by Sovereigns

In both Morocco and Jordan, it was the king who took the initiative of revising the constitution and unilaterally appointing the members in charge of drafting a preliminary text, likewise establishing the lines of reform. In Morocco, it was in a speech on 9 March 2011 that King Mohammed VI announced the implementa-
tion of a constitutional reform and appointed a reform commission in charge of drafting a draft in close collaboration with the political parties, labour unions and cultural and scientific associations. On 17 June, the King made public the main details of the draft constitution and a referendum was held on 1 July 2011. A veritable plebiscite for the text as well as for the King, the draft constitution garnered more than 98% of votes in favour, with a turnout of 72%, and was passed into law on 29 July 2011 by the King.

In April 2011, the King of Jordan also announced the appointment of a royal commission in charge of revising the constitution with the aim of re-establishing a balance of powers, allowing parliament to wholly independently carry out its legislative role and supervisory role over the executive branch and strengthening the independence of the judiciary branch. The commission submitted its report in August 2011 and a month later, the two chambers passed some forty or so constitutional amendments.

Democracy Strengthened

In both countries, the powers of the sovereign have diminished to the benefit of the government and Parliament. In Morocco, the king made significant concessions. Hence the new constitution for the first time requires him to choose the head of government from the members of the political party having won the most votes at the elections and no longer allows him to preside over the ordinary sessions of the Council of Government. The head of government gained new prerogatives, including the power to dissolve Parliament, which was previously the exclusive prerogative of the King, and his/her power to appoint officials to civilian or public positions was enhanced. The constitution now distinguishes between the King as Head of State and the King as religious leader (commander of the faithful). The notion of the “sanctity” of the monarch was replaced by that of the “respect” due him. Moreover, the new constitution steps up the power of parliament by expanding the sphere of legislation, even if the executive branch remains the legislator, in principle, and continues to determine the agenda for Parliamentary sessions. A constitutional court has also been created to replace the constitutional council.

In Jordan, a constitutional court has likewise been created, as has an independent electoral commission. Certain powers held by the King have been curbed, in particular his right to pass decree-laws under exceptional circumstances or in case of the absence of Parliament, and he can no longer indefinitely postpone legislative elections. Individuals' rights and liberties have been strengthened and torture of any sort forbidden.

Yet the King Remains at the Core of Institutions

In both Morocco and Jordan, however, the democratisation is of a limited nature and has not affected the core of the King’s powers. The monarch’s status is not really affected by the restructuring of the different institutions and he continues to play a central role in the political regime. The King remains the true holder of power, especially in Jordan, where he retains significant prerogatives, including the right to appoint the Prime Minister, without being constrained to select him or her from the members of the majority party. In Morocco, the King remains the commander of the faithful and a significant actor in the executive branch. The government has had its powers stepped up, but cannot exercise them independently of the sovereign. In both countries, the King retains control of the different levers of power. Though neither of the two countries has truly instituted a constitutional monarchy, where the king would rule without governing, they have at least given the opposition more space. The legitimacy of the monarchy and the King’s place at the core of the institutional edifice were never questioned by the protest movements, which did demand greater political liberalism, but within the framework of the existing monarchic regime.

Constitutional Adjustments of a “Window Dressing” Nature

And finally, other countries in the Arab world have undertaken constitutional adjustments that serve primarily as window dressing, without their having any real democratic effect nor restricting the sovereign’s powers. In the majority of cases, it is the Head of State himself – the sultan, emir or king – who has granted these reforms, without even appointing a committee to flesh them out. Sultan Qaboos of Oman thus passed reforms in October 2011 amending the fundamental law of the sultanate to strengthen the powers of parlia-
ment, which will now be referred bills of law by the Council of Ministers for their examination and revision before they are transmitted to the sultan, will examine the annual budget and proposed development plans and will intervene in the procedure of choosing a successor to the throne if the ruling family cannot reach an agreement. Bahrain ended up making several concessions, though at first it had refused to make any political concessions and responded by armed force in March 2011 to protesters demanding a constitutional monarchy. In a speech to the nation on January 2012, the King called for a constitutional reform in order to balance out the powers by strengthening the authority of parliament and “opening new horizons for [Bahrain’s] democracy.” The chamber of representatives and the consultative council drew up the required amendments, which the King promulgated in May 2012. The chamber of representatives’ power of supervision over the government was increased. Thus it can now pose questions to the ministers and withdraw its confidence from them, in which case the conflict will be submitted before the King, who will choose whether or not to depose the Prime Minister. The chamber can also decide to create an investigative commission. Moreover, before dissolving it, the King will now have to consult the President of the chamber as well as those of the consultative assembly and of the constitutional court, whereas before, only the Prime Minister was consulted. The government is required to obtain the approval of the chamber of representatives on its programme. It will now be the President of the chamber of representatives and not the President of the consultative assembly who will transmit the bills of law that both chambers have approved to the Prime Minister for their promulgation. In August 2012, the constitution was again amended to authorise the members of the chamber to question the ministers in plenary sessions and no longer only during commission meetings. In Qatar, the emir announced in November 2011 that legislative elections to elect two-thirds of the consultative assembly, stipulated by the 2003 Constitution and endlessly postponed since then, would finally be held towards the end of 2013. Insofar as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, they succeeded in buying social peace by granting material advantages funded by oil revenues, again launching social aid and development programmes and raising salaries to ease the pressure without making political concessions.

Syria, though in the midst of civil war, also proceeded to make constitutional amendments. In late 2011, President Bashar al-Assad thus took the initiative to appoint a constitutional commission comprised of loyalists in charge of drafting a new text. The draft was submitted to a referendum in February 2012, while the country was torn by civil war, and officially adopted by an 89% majority with a turnout of 57%. The amendments primarily aimed to introduce a multiparty system by eliminating the stipulation in the 1950 Constitution that made the Baath Party the leader of the State and society, and to limit the president to two seven-year terms (as of 2014), but they maintained the significant prerogatives of the Head of State. The Algerian President also undertook to introduce amendments to the constitution to strengthen democracy and created a constitutional commission in charge of making proposals to the President, but this promise, made in April 2011 and repeated a number of times since then, lacked precision and did not establish a timeline. On 7 April 2013, the President of Algeria appointed the experts of the commission entrusted with developing a constitutional amendment project. The commission’s conclusions “will then be submitted to the high appraisal of the President of the Republic,” who will then decide “the proposal’s final version, which will be subject, according to the nature and importance of the amendments accepted, to the due procedure of constitutional revision.” The absence of the President, for health reasons, since April 2013 will probably put into question this reform process.

**Conclusion**

Though the revision of the constitution can allow a balance of powers to be reinstated, constitutional reform is not always enough in and of itself. The interpretation of the constitution is more decisive than the text itself. Many constitutions in force before the Arab Spring protected human rights on paper, but in practice, these rights were hindered by freedom-restricting laws and were violated on a daily basis. Organic laws, designed to implement the most fundamental stipulations of the constitution, will allow us to determine whether a country is truly undergoing a process of democratic transition. Indeed, the legislation governing political competition and life can be
liberal or restrictive. Heads of State can attempt to control the rules of the electoral game to prevent the rise to power of an opposition political party with an absolute majority. The choice of electoral system, the candidacy conditions and constituency boundaries allow the executive to orient the composition of the parliamentary assembly. Hence in Jordan and Kuwait, the majority of the opposition parties boycotted the last legislative elections in protest against the reform of the electoral system, which they consider prevented what would have been a definite electoral success for them. By establishing the conditions and forms of recognition of new political parties, legislation on political parties can likewise allow those in power to choose their opposition by refusing to recognise political forces that could threaten to take their place. Thus, in Tunisia, it was only in March 2012 that the first Salafist party was recognised. By the same token, the law on the organisation of the judicial branch should provide greater guarantees of the independence of the judiciary, and legislation on the media (including the press) should guarantee equal access for all media. In Morocco, the constitution establishes a constitutional court in charge of examining pleas of unconstitutionality of laws arising during trials before the ordinary courts. But it also stipulates that the specific organisation of the conditions of admissibility of challenges to the constitutional court is governed by an organic law. Everything will thus depend on how liberal or restrictive the content of these criteria of admissibility are.

By the same token, the manner in which the constitutions regarding religion will be implemented is fundamental. Whereas the religious issue has held great significance in constitutional debates, the real influence Islam will exercise as a State religion, or that sharia will have insofar as a source of law will depend on the manner in which the constitutional norms regarding them are interpreted and applied. Conversely, certain countries have modified their political laws before amending the constitution or without touching it altogether. Thus, though Libya has not yet adopted its constitution, new laws have been passed since late 2011 to hold legislative elections, establish an independent electoral commission and eliminate the penalty for belonging to a political party. A law on political parties was also passed in April 2012. By the same token, in September 2011 in Saudi Arabia, the king unilaterally modified the law on the organisation of the Consultative Council, deciding to reserve at least 20% of the 150 seats for women. Upon applying this revision, in January 2013, he appointed 30 women to the Consultative Council. He likewise decided that women can vote and be candidates in municipal elections as of 2015.

Though the constitution is a tool for political change, it remains an essentially symbolic document that requires implementation by both legislators and constitutional judges. The creation in numerous States of real constitutional courts is, in this regard, a particularly significant development and an additional step towards strengthening constitutionalism in countries in the region.

Bibliography


Any observer of the so-called “Arab Spring” or “Arab Awakening,” which refers to the massive wave of political upheaval that has been sweeping many parts of the Arab world since 2011, cannot help but notice the significant role that new media has, and continues to, play in it. This article discusses the role of “cyberactivism,” or the role played by new media in paving the way for political transitions, in the Arab world since 2011. It starts with a brief overview of the transitioning Arab media landscape, before moving on to discuss the potential of cyberactivism in these revolutions, especially how new types of social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, can act as effective tools for supporting the capabilities of the democratic activists by enabling forums for free speech and political networking opportunities; providing a virtual space for assembly; supporting the capability of the protesters to plan, organise, and execute peaceful protests, as well as document these protests and government reactions to them; and providing forums for collaboration between the activists. It also discusses the contribution that cyberactivism has made in fuelling citizen journalism and civic engagement in the Arab world. Finally, it sheds light on some of the limitations of the role of social media in Arab revolutions by adopting a realistic approach that balances online and offline activism and avoids privileging the tools over the actors on the ground or the activists in the real world.

The Transitioning Arab Media Landscape

Before 1990, most media ownership in the Arab world lay largely with governments, and most media functioned under strict government supervision and control. During this era, Arab media were mostly controlled by governments, mainly to keep laypeople largely uninformed and, thus, incapable of effectively participating in ongoing political controversies and rational debates. However, a new media revolution erupted in the Arab world after 1990 inspired by the introduction of both satellite television channels and the Internet (Khamis and Sisler, 2010). In the 1990s, Internet penetration started to spread throughout the Arab world. However, the region generally suffered from being on the low end of the digital divide (Abdulla, 2007, p. 35) and thus faced many challenges, including: a lack of human and economic information and technology (IT) resources, illiteracy and computer illiteracy, a lack of funds for IT research and development, and a lack of solid telecommunication infrastructure (Abdulla, 2007, p. 35).

Ironically, although many Internet websites and blogs are used to defy and resist autocratic governments and dictatorial regimes in the Arab world, a number of these governments took steps to encourage Internet proliferation and accessibility, mainly in order to boost economic development. This provides evidence of the highly ambivalent and complex relationship between media and governments in the Arab world (Khamis and Sisler, 2010).

Overall, it could be said that the introduction of satellite television channels and the Internet represented an important shift from the monolithic, state-controlled and government-owned media pattern to a much more pluralistic and diverse media scene,
where many diverse and competing voices representing different political positions and orientations could be heard at the same time, adding to the richness of ongoing political debates and the formation of a wide array of public opinion trends. This was especially the case since the Internet allows for the dissemination of cultural content in the Arab world (Howard, 2011, p. 163). Much of the user-generated content is transmitted using social media, such as Facebook, the video-sharing portal YouTube, Twitter, and short message service (SMS) or text messaging. These media enable peer-to-peer communication between users and can be linked to each other, allowing users to transmit their ideas and images to large numbers of people. Therefore, it is safe to say that the Internet, in particular, is one of the most important avenues through which public opinion trends are both shaped and reflected in the Arab world today. The significance of the introduction of the Internet stems from the fact that it defies boundaries, challenges government media censorship, and provides an alternative voice to traditional media outlets, which echo official government policies and views. The Internet is also a rapidly growing and expanding medium in the Arab world, especially among youth, which explains how and why young activists relying on Internet-based online communication were able to pave the way for political transitions in this region.

The Potentials of “Cyberactivism” in Arab Transitions

Howard (2011, p. 145) defines cyberactivism as “the act of using the Internet to advance a political cause that is difficult to advance offline,” adding that “the goal of such activism is often to create intellectually and emotionally compelling digital artifacts that tell stories of injustice, interpret history, and advocate for particular political outcomes.” Cyberactivism differs from mobilisation because of the latter’s focus on planning, execution, and facilitation of actions. However, they are closely interrelated, since cyberactivism can help to foster and promote civic engagement, which, in turn, gives rise to various forms of mobilisation (Khamis and Vaughn, 2011). Throughout the transitioning Arab world, from a country as small in size and population as Tunisia to a country as large in size and population as Egypt, cyber activists used new media tools and techniques effectively to express themselves politically, inform others of the abuses, violations, and corruption of their autocratic governments, organise protests and acts of resistance against authoritarian regimes, and ensure that their voices were heard and that their side of the story was told (Khamis and Vaughn, 2011). In other words, new media were deployed actively and effectively as tools for protesters in the Arab world to enhance their agency, organise their actions, coordinate their efforts and capabilities, exercise public will, and amplify their voices of resistance by making sure they simultaneously reached both a national and international audience.

Although many Internet websites and blogs are used to defy and resist dictatorial regimes in the Arab world, a number of these governments took steps to encourage Internet proliferation and accessibility, in order to boost economic development. This provides evidence of the ambivalent and complex relationship between media and governments in the Arab world. One of the most striking characteristics of the Arab transitions’ movements was their loose structure and lack of identifiable leaders. In other words, they were largely grassroots, across-the-board, horizontal movements with a bottom-up, rather than top-down, structure. It can also be said that they were more about “processes” than “persons.” In other words, they were characterised by collective and effective processes of group mobilisation, both online and offline, rather than individual acts of leadership by one or more charismatic persons. That is why they were generally described as “leaderless revolutions.” The fact that these uprisings were largely leaderless is further evidence that they were a genuine expression of the Arab people’s public will. The protests were organised and in large part led by loose networks of young people, most of whom demonstrated signifi-
cant capacity for organisation, discipline, restraint, and integrity, resulting in unique youthful revolutions (Khamis and Vaughn, 2011).

This explains why and how new media were used as effective tools for coordination and organisation in these movements: their ability to reach widely dispersed and highly diverse segments of the population within each country, in addition to vast global audiences across cultural, linguistic and geographic boundaries, aided the process of grassroots mobilisation and paved the way for democratic reform and political transition. The fact that these movements were largely led and orchestrated by youth across different Arab countries also accounts for the significance of the role played by social media, since youth make up almost 70% of the overall population in these transitioning Arab societies and are the segment of society that is most eager for political change, capable of grassroots organisation, and technologically savvy when it comes to mastering new media tools and techniques.

“Cyberactivism” as Fuel for Citizen Journalism and Civic Engagement

One of the significant ways through which new media aided political transformation in the Arab world was through the spread of citizen journalism. The importance of citizen journalism stems from the fact that social media allows citizen journalists who are dissatisfied with the traditional media’s version of events to tell their own stories and that “these patterns of political expression and learning are key to developing democratic discourses” (Howard, 2011, p. 182). Most importantly, this pattern of reporting by ordinary citizens holding handheld devices, such as cell phones and digital cameras, not only reaches a local or domestic audience, but also has the capacity to reach a broad international audience, thanks to the amplifying effect of transnational satellite channels, such as Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya, which disseminate this type of media content globally by asking citizens to send their videos and upload them online.

The value of this widespread coverage by citizen journalists lies not only in the fact that it increases awareness about a regime’s brutality, corruption, excessive use of force against protesters and violations of human rights, but also in that it encourages hesitant or undecided citizens to come out and protest. As Freeland (2011) explains, “opponents of a dictator need to feel that their views are widely shared and that enough of their fellow citizens are willing to join them.” The marriage between satellite television channels and social networking sites has made it easier to let individuals know that their views are shared by enough people to make protesting worthwhile and safe (Freeland, 2011).

Another equally important role played by new media in these revolutions was promoting civic engagement, which refers to the process through which civil society is invited to participate in ongoing political, economic, and social efforts meant to bring about positive social change (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). This played an important role in terms of awakening the largely dormant, unengaged, and marginalised civil societies in the Arab world, thereby facilitating a shift in the role of new media from being mere “safety valves” to becoming effective “mobilisation tools.” This took place through the ability of these new media to act as effective catalysts and accelerators for change in society, thereby filling the gap between online and offline political activism.

The marriage between satellite television channels and social networking sites has made it easier to let individuals know that their views are shared by enough people to make protesting worthwhile and safe.

Additionally, cyberactivism enabled the activists from different Arab countries to become more networked, both online and offline. For example, Egyptian and Tunisian activists exchanged useful knowledge, technical know-how, everyday on-the-ground experiences and practical advice on what, and what not, to do when confronting security forces on the streets during popular protests (Khamis and Vaughn, 2011). Similarly, Syrian activists connected with other political activists abroad and with Syrian opposition leaders in the diaspora to come up with detailed strategies and effective plans to resist the Assad regime (Khamis, Gold and Vaughn, 2012). In brief, so-
cial media empowered activists to associate and share ideas with others globally, enabling collaboration between activists in different Arab countries, as well as between protesters and other Arabs in the diaspora, democracy activists in other countries, and Internet activists worldwide, who assisted them in their struggles.

The Limitations of “Cyberactivism” in Arab Transitions

Despite the significant potential and opportunities offered by new media in the realm of political activism in transitioning Arab societies, we also have to acknowledge the limitations of cyberactivism efforts to bring about the desired results in terms of actual political change on the ground, which always requires the physical presence of large numbers of people out on the street who are willing to face the high risk of personal injury, arrest, or even death. In other words, it can be argued that the phenomenon of cyberactivism is a necessary, but insufficient, factor in bringing about actual political change and that social media should best be viewed as “catalysts” and “accelerators” for political change, and not some sort of “magical tool” able to bring about such change on its own. This makes it especially important to avoid mistakenly calling the Egyptian revolution the “Facebook revolution,” calling the Tunisian revolution the “Twitter revolution,” or calling the Syrian uprising the “YouTube uprising,” since such labels overshadow the role of the activists and protesters on the ground, without whose courage, bravery, sacrifice and even martydom, these revolutions and uprisings would not have been possible.

In analysing the limitations of social media in Arab transitions, it is equally important to acknowledge the fact that they are simply platforms that reflect the political and social dynamics of the societies in which they are being used. In other words, the great roles that these mediated platforms played in grassroots mobilisation, networking, and coordination during these revolutions and uprisings were simply a reflection of the overall sentiment of unity and solidarity that prevailed in these Arab societies in their struggle to oust dictators from office and to overthrow corrupt regimes. However, many of the transitioning Arab societies today are characterised by division rather than unity, fragmentation rather than solidarity, and plurality rather than uniformity.

This is applicable in both countries where the revolutionary efforts resulted in the overthrow of corrupt, autocratic dictators, such as Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, as well as countries where the struggle for freedom, dignity and democracy is still ongoing, such as Syria, Bahrain and Yemen. In the first category, that of post-revolutionary countries, it is becoming more and more evident that it can be easier to oust a dictator from power than to decide what to do next, which is oftentimes the real challenge. This is mainly due to divisions of opinion among various political groups as to how the country should be managed and how its affairs should be run, which makes it harder to reach the type of consensus that was reflected in most online media platforms during these revolutions (Khamis and Vaughn, 2011). In the second category of countries, the struggle for freedom either turned bloody and violent, as in the case of Syria, faced repression and marginalisation at the hands of both the regime and outside forces, as in the case of Bahrain, or did not yield the expected results or desired outcomes, as in the case of Yemen. In every case, the significant challenges faced, the conflicts of interest that prevailed and the insurmountable obstacles posed made it very difficult for any form of media, old or new, to bridge the divides, close the gaps, and cement the differences to bring about unity and reconciliation. This highlights one of the main limitations of new media, which is the fact that they can act as catalysts for political change and social reform only if the overall environment in the country allows for a reasonable degree of consensus-building and is conducive to constructive dialogue and civil discourse, which are essential prerequisites for nation-building. However, in the absence of such an environment and prerequisites, new media alone cannot fill this void and are not capable of generating the needed consensus-building on their own.

Another important factor to bear in mind when discussing the limitations of new media and the process of cyberactivism in bringing about the desired forms of political transformation and transition in the Arab world is the fact that many Arab countries are still suffering from a number of economic, technical, educational and infrastructural constraints and limitations, which hinder the proliferation of new media
technologies on a massive scale and pose challenges with regard to the degree of accessibility, availability, and outreach (Abdulla, 2007). All the above factors combined make it necessary to avoid exaggerating the contributions of new media to the ongoing wave of transitions in the Arab world, whether by ascribing too much power to them in triggering these revolts or assigning too much credit to them in revolutionising the political and communication landscapes before, during and after the uprisings.

**Concluding Thoughts**

In the seesaw battles between the rulers and the ruled that have been taking place in the Arab world since December 2010, balances of both political power and media power have been shifting relentlessly and unpredictably. However, one fact that cannot be denied is that the will and determination of the Arab people to implement changes in their countries by putting an end to dictatorship, autocracy, and corruption have been the main driving forces behind the revolutions and uprisings that have swept the Arab region. However, they have been augmented and accelerated by the deployment of new media, which have acted as catalysts, mobilisers and organisers of political actions on the ground (Khamis, Gold and Vaughn, 2012). This suggests that “technology does not cause political change… but it does provide new capacities and impose new constraints on political actors” (Howard, 2011, p. 12). In other words, it is the political actors themselves who can bring about actual political change, aided by the deployment of new media tools and effective communication strategies.

Therefore, it is crucial to adopt a balanced approach and a realistic perspective in analysing the role of new media in shaping, orchestrating, organising, and amplifying the various efforts undertaken by political activists and protesters in many parts of the Arab world by avoiding the bi-polar extremes of “technological determinism” and “sociological determinism,” which tend to favour the tools at the expense of the actors or vice versa (Khamis, Gold and Vaughn, 2012). Rather, it is mandatory to adopt a middle position that acknowledges the capacities and contributions of both online and offline efforts, as well as various manifestations and forms of activism in the virtual and real worlds.

In fact, it is always the combination and intersection of these myriad complex factors that ultimately dictates how and when political transformation can take place in a given country. Despite the fact that many of the factors that determine the form, direction, speed, and scale of transformation and transition in different Arab countries remain unpredictable, one thing is certain: in all of these countries, the struggle for political transformation has started, and it is not going to stop until the goals of freedom, dignity and democracy have been fully realised. Likewise, the process of cyberactivism, which contributed significantly to these political transitions and transformations, has started, and it, too, will not stop until all these goals have been successfully achieved.

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Before the Arab Spring, discussing Arab media consisted nearly exclusively of describing the exceptional success of Al Jazeera. Since then, however, things have changed; the Qatari network and similar ones in the region no longer draw as much attention and the role they played through the live broadcast of events is at risk of falling into oblivion. The “new media,” on the other hand, have garnered enormous interest, whereas before there was hardly more than a small circle of specialists interested in them. For a long time, the region ranging from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean was considered by the majority of observers as a “digital desert” doomed to remain on the margins of the information revolution. With the only exception, perhaps, of the Islamic Internet (Bunt, 2003, among others), suspected of fostering the dissemination of dangerous ideas.

The Discovery of E-rabia...

Through the Arab Spring, a new image has replaced the former one. Throughout the first half of 2011, from the first demonstrations in Tunisia to the images of Libyan crowds celebrating their liberation on Tripoli’s Green Square in late August, global information actors, alternating with all sorts of discussions by experts who, in many cases, had just converted to a belief in the virtues of the digital world, built a new narrative, in which a premiere role was attributed to information and communication technologies: they had assisted the protesters in organising and gaining the upper hand against the forces of repression, and they had also allowed them to keep informed on the situation at hand while communicating with the rest of the world, which now sympathised with their struggle. Beyond the moment of insurrection, they had put an end to the omnipotence of the police forces by forging – relatively immune from censorship – the networks of a revolution that was thought to be impossible after years of political glaciation imposed by authoritarian regimes. “Facebook to plan the demonstrations, Twitter to co-ordinate them and YouTube to tell the world about it” – this remark by an Egyptian activist in praise of the social media was cited by Philip N. Howard, author of a noted work entitled The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy that had announced an Arab Spring whose sudden appearance nevertheless took the world by surprise.

In complete rupture with mainstream media discourse and its clichés, so often filled with Muslim crowds shouting in anger against the West, the protests of the Arab world have made a new continent emerge, E-rabia (Burris, 2011), with – echoing the romantic image revolving around the figure of Lawrence of Arabia – young rebel figures whose openness to globalised modernity has been attested to by all sorts of social and cultural practices: fans of syncopated music (in Tunisia, for instance, the phenomenon of El General, the “rapper of the revolution”), creators of ironic slogans graffitied in urban spaces, they could not but fraternise, through virtual social networks, with their European counterparts – the indignat youth – and even those in the US, determined to “Occupy Wall Street.” Following the arrival in power of actors who are not only akin to political Islam but also most often largely alien to the uprisings, spirits
quickly came back down to earth. Politically naive, the discourse on the e-revolution also revealed an incorrigible “fascination with technology,” always capable of showing the same enthusiasm for the necessarily emancipating virtues of technological innovation (the transistor radio in the 1950s, then terrestrial hertz-wave TV followed by satellite TV, and now internet and social networks).

In essence, this “cyber-optimist” reading was conceived in the United States, which made the “free circulation of information” a primordial line of official diplomatic action, in particular under the impulse of Hillary Clinton. Just like Jared Cohen and Alex Ross, two young consultants who divide their time between the State Department and the major companies of the digital economy (Google, Facebook...), support NGOs whose mission it is to encourage political activism via internet, in particular in the Arab World, and encourage research centres on the political effects of internet, thanks to generous public funding, often in association with the military industry.2

New technologies and their unpredictable social alchemy offered a ready-made, though not convincing, explanation of this absolutely disconcerting awakening of Arab populations.

Inevitably, such a situation could not but orientate analyses. Or more precisely, “disorientate” them, in the sense that the dimension of digital practices as they appear in Arab societies has to a large extent escaped analysis, which has nearly always been based on quantitative approaches (from the linguistic point of view, for instance, a semantic analysis of Twitter activity, already less operative for Arab than for English, is totally inoperative for messages written in Arabzi, a hybrid language where Arab is written in Latin letters, which fails to be detected by conventional analysis methods). Alien to the cultural codes of “digitalisation” in the Arab world, those who considered social networks the powerhouse for change in the region often did not take into account the local practices that accompanied an activism that had actually been present on internet since the late 1990s and had become a decisive reality in political struggles, at least since 2008, with the call for a general strike launched in Egypt by the April 6 Youth Movement.

Just a few months before the advent of events in his country, an early hacktivist, the Tunisian Sami Ben Gharbia, had, however, discussed this discrepancy between theory and practice, between representation and reality. In a text that drew a lot of attention, he had not hesitated to condemn this “false promise” (Ben Gharbia, 2010) that internet activism could become for Arab activists. According to him, said activism, by gaining visibility in public space, was destined to become part of a political game more complex and more traditional at once, thus losing part of its authenticity and value in the eyes of the populations concerned. A good many other accounts by key players, in Egypt, for instance, followed the same lines and no-one, not even the most die-hard on-line activists, expected to see the Arab world break out in protests of such scope. Ultimately, new technologies and their unpredictable social alchemy offered a ready-made, though not convincing, explanation of this absolutely disconcerting awakening of Arab populations.

The Syrian Example: Truly “Social” Networks?...

Symbols of the success of the protest movements, Egypt and Tunisia nonetheless illustrate the limits of protest via social networking sites, once the thrill of the first victories is over. In these two countries — though we could expand the list to include Bahrain, characterised by a population with a high percentage of digital technology users —, the period of organised political action, once the uprising chapter closed, has revealed the fragility of virtual networks. Capable of producing the spark to ignite the revolt

1 The philosophical criticism developed by Jacques Ellul (Le bluff technologique. Paris: Hachette, 1988) was transferred to the domain of the media in particular by Dominique Wolton (L’autre mondialisation. Paris: Flammarion, 2004).

and propagate the flame of revolution, the social media have fizzled into the background now that ordinary politics have resumed. In Tunisia, for instance, none of the figures who had acquired an undeniable popularity on internet succeeded in winning the elections, and the few digital activists co-opted by the new political authorities, such as Slim Amamou, quickly resigned. But nowhere more than in Syria, particularly ravaged by the strife of an uprising that seems to be leading nowhere, can Arab activists feel betrayed by internet and its “false promises,” to use the expression employed by Sami Ben Gharbia in another context.

Above and beyond the risks of an alteration of concrete forms of involvement to the benefit of a sort of “clickism” where people would limit themselves to offering their support in the form of approving likes, the Syrian experience demonstrates to what extent virtual networks can turn into real death machines, destroying any possibility of political negotiation.

This was not the case at first. On the contrary, the first protests in Damascus beginning in February 2011 were circulating via Facebook – which, by the way, has once again been authorised – as well as through the main social networking applications several weeks later. One could thus consider it a possible gesture of appeasement on behalf of the government, desirous of defusing tensions by opening a window to freedom of expression, locked up as we know for at least four decades now. The subsequent months reveal a more sombre reality, however, already emphasised earlier by such “cyber-pessimists” as Evgeny Morozov. If the Syrian authorities agreed to relax their censorship, it was in order to better track the networks of the uprising, even if they will never admit it. Having learned from the failure, namely in Egypt, of attempts to abruptly shut down internet, they managed to implement more sophisticated policies that show how repressive machines can not only accommodate the existence of an online space for expression, but likewise use it to their benefit, both to quash opposition and to make virtual attacks, carried out primarily by the volunteer brigades of the “Syrian Electronic Army.”

The Syrian conflict also quickly revealed the risks associated with manipulating information circulating on internet. Hence, during the first weeks of the conflict, world opinion was caught up by the stories told by a courageous blogger escaping the pursuit of the regime’s henchmen to deliver her testimony of the repression suffered by the pacific opposition. Unfortunately, it was discovered a short time later that the figure of Amina, the Gay Girl of Damascus, had been entirely concocted in Edinburgh by a US citizen... Beyond the personality of this mythomaniac, whose profile hinted at some quite shadowy areas, it is unfortunately the work of an entire community of citizen-journalists who were suddenly called into question. All the more so since the difficulties of media coverage of the conflict and its internationalisation also embroiled a number of institutional actors in the same trend. Even at Al-Jazeera, presented as a model of professional coverage of events in the region, protests multiplied and there were even resignations to denounce biased coverage, in particular through the use of documents taken as is, directly from social networks.

Since the beginning of the uprisings, the latter have, in fact, played a considerable role, which also raises a good many questions; regarding the very existence of these networks, to begin with, since their rise from a relatively little-developed internet scene at the time of the first protests is so manifestly tied to a wealth of foreign support. Justified by the severe repression exercised by the Syrian regime, this outside assistance likewise raises the question – as it has in other countries in the region – of foreign interference in a domain that has become strategic.

Being a place of confrontation – in the strict sense of the term, since digital flows also allow the detection of targets to be destroyed –, can social networks embody this public agora of the third millennium, this new virtual space in which exchanges strengthen democratic nature? Whatever the outcome of real-world confrontations, there is no denying that the painful Syrian experience challenges these readings. Above and beyond the often-cited
risks of an alteration of concrete forms of involvement to the benefit of a sort of “clickism” where people would limit themselves to offering their support in the form of approving likes, the Syrian experience demonstrates to what extent virtual networks can turn into real death machines, destroying any possibility of political negotiation. In this context of civil war, it is easy to observe how the “domino effect” so dear to theoreticians of the political Web above all fuels the worst violence: black lists of presumed collaborators, which are equivalent to a death sentence; dubious videos that are nonetheless appalling enough to sow terror in people’s hearts... On Facebook, “communities” are formed, though on the basis of the most sectarian affiliations, to carry out debates that are not exchanges but rather anguished and hate-filled monologues.

The Real Digital Promise

After having lent too much credit to their liberating powers, social networks are frightening today for their power of destruction, even more so now that the threats of an “Islamist Winter” have replaced the promises of the Arab Spring. Debates between cyber-pessimists and cyber-optimists are thus far from over in this chaotic time characterising an undeniably difficult transition period. The former are evidently right to point out the limited role of internet once conventional political life resumes, dominated by those who impose a discipline based on vertical hierarchy. Yet one can also agree with the latter when they assert that the direct democracy experienced on a daily basis on virtual social networks is the best weapon against the return of authoritarianism; in sum, this is the real promise of the digital world.

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The ongoing political upheavals in many Middle Eastern and North African countries, popularly termed “the Arab Spring” represent a major challenge to decades of authoritarian rule in one of the last remaining non-democratic state systems in the world. These upheavals also present a major dilemma to movements and parties lobbying to replace their rapidly collapsing authoritarian regimes with democratic institutions and alliances. Many commentators have expressed concerns about the rise of “Islamism” in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and in which ways the newly elected Islamist parties will coordinate with their non-religious, perhaps secular, liberal minorities in places like Egypt, Tunisia, and others. Despite the recently successful revolutions initially sparked by small groups of young, tech-savvy, cosmopolitan protesters, the overwhelming success of Islamist candidates to replace the preceding secular authoritarian rulers has alarmed both Western observers and local minorities. Many commentators have expressed concerns about the rise of “Islamism” in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and in which ways the newly elected Islamist parties will coordinate with their non-religious, perhaps secular, liberal minorities in places like Egypt, Tunisia, and others. Despite the recently successful revolutions initially sparked by small groups of young, tech-savvy, cosmopolitan protesters, the overwhelming success of Islamist candidates to replace the preceding secular authoritarian rulers has alarmed both Western observers and local minorities. Considering that the Arab Spring was initially inspired and powered by the sophisticated use of digital tools and fragmented media spaces in the quick activation and mobilisation of street protests, the intriguing question emerges as to how to factor in the different forms of media use and the impact of the media in the long-term process of democratisation, especially in societies with competing ethnic minorities and political sectarianism.

The importance of safeguarding political minorities in newly established democracies has a far-reaching impact on the long-term process of democratisation. Ethnic and sectarian minority conflicts present a rather different form of political uncertainty, which many newly formed states during the third wave of democratisation were also tasked with addressing. For example, Ted Gurr’s “Minorities at Risk” (1993) examined various communal group conflicts around the world with their respective majorities, while Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” (1993) thesis foreshadowed global differences in political culture as an important dimension in shaping democratisation. Although their observations were established during the collapse and disintegration of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, these concerns are structurally relevant again as societies in the Arab world are in a similar state of flux, responding to the most popular democratic uprisings in recent memory – something we may cautiously title “democracy’s fourth wave.”

The question of minorities’ attitudes towards democratic transition, however, whether viewed anxiously as a coming clash of civilisations, or optimistically, as an end to history, is well pronounced in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Since 2011, political minorities in the MENA region have been confronted with dramatic transformations, widely described as the “Arab Spring” by the optimists, “Arab Revolts” by the vigilant, and “Arab Winter” by pessimists. These different perceptions are strongly shaped by group attitudes toward expected political gains or losses. Minorities’ fears of retaliation have also been sharpened consequently after a period of authoritarian rulers’ manipulation of sectarian rifts for political gain. For example, in 2003 after the collapse of the Iraqi Baath rule due to the US-led invasion, the Iraqi Christians faced a series of targeted attacks. More recently, in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and civil war in Libya, the Tawarek ethnic minority and other pro-Gaddafi tribes have faced assaults and evictions. In Egypt, the sizable minority of
Christian Copts fear persecution amid rising tensions, and mob reprisals, during the nation’s current and uncertain economic future. Thus, throughout the countries affected by the Arab Spring, a variety of minority ethnic and sectarian groups stand by anxiously as their nations rebuild institutions and rewrite constitutions, fearing the rise of majoritarian tyranny. This report examines these issues of ethnic and minority sectarianism vis-à-vis the newly restructured and fragmented media environments that inform Arab publics’ political calculations in the long-term process of democratisation. Digital media tools, like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, blogs, and more were demonstrably significant in the short-term mobilising period during the protest phase, but how does the diversified ecology of media tools, channels and content factor into the long-term period of democratisation and institution building in the Arab region? What are the different understandings of the Arab Spring that are facilitating or alleviating the rise of ethnic sectarianism and political fragmentation? These are important questions to be addressed, but doing so for the region as a whole is beyond reach at this stage. It should be recognised, however, that there are approximately thirty politically active minorities in the Middle East and North Africa (Harff, 1993). These minority groups vary greatly in their level of political power: the Alawis in Syria have successfully accumulated power, while the Shias in Saudi Arabia have not, for example. But transitions in power positions along majority-minority lines can significantly alter groups’ senses of national cohesion and, if not appropriately formulated, undermine their ability to form a peaceful coexistence (Salaméy and Tabar, 2008).

This report sheds light on whether fears and reservations about majoritarian tyranny exist today in the post-Arab Spring context, among local minorities. We also discuss how these political groups currently imagine different pathways towards building pluralistic polities and societies, and most importantly which aspects of the emerging media system correspond with and help shape these aspects of opinion formation. To do so, of the 20+ countries in the Arab world, we focus on the case of Lebanon. Lebanon has been described as “The House of Many Mansions” (Salibi, 2003). Though no single sectarian group is believed to have an absolute demographic presence, it is largely estimated that the population of four million consists of mainly Sunnis, Shias, and Christians, each constituting one third of the population (Central Intelligence Agency, 2012). The Muslim community is represented by the Sunni (27%) and Shia (27%) sects, as well as a minority Druze (5.6%) community which traces its roots to Shia Ismaili heritage. The Christian community is represented by a Catholic Maronite (22.2%) sect, and Orthodox (8%) and Catholic (5%) minorities. These proportions are approximated, as no official census has existed since 1932 for various political and sectarian reasons. Regardless, no one single sectarian community has managed to exercise a majoritarian influence in State-society relations. Lebanon is the best testing ground to examine media use and sectarian politics in the region – it has both a cosmopolitan and sophisticated media-savvy population, but also the most diverse and heated discussions regarding sectarian politics, given its long and bloody civil war.

Based on a rare, detailed, and representative public opinion survey of Lebanese sectarian attitude, we assess the extent to which belonging to a sectarian minority group shapes political attitudes and judgments towards the contemporary revolutionary changes in the Middle East and North Africa. By using the Lebanese case as a starting-point, we engage with a host of key questions: How do different sectarian groups perceive the impact of the “Arab Spring” and how do they forecast the political change that is yet to come? How does their newfound access to a fragmented media ecology, including social networking platforms, satellite cable television, as well as existing media outlets, influence these political calculations? Addressing these questions is important for understanding the sectarian anxiety underlying the long-term democratisation and institution building that is currently playing out in several Arab democracies, including Tunisia and Egypt. Lebanese public opinion, with its diverse sectarian and institutional constituency, can forecast minority-angled answers to such questions during times of duress, transition, and transformation.

Diversified Media Diets and Opinion Polarisation

Considering that most media outlets in Lebanon, in particular, and in the region more generally, are sectarian or politically sponsored, our survey measured
the media’s role in the consolidation of sectarian public attitudes. To assess the potential impact of media use and attention to news coverage, our question batteries measured: television use, newspaper use, internet use, and radio use as the most important source of media content. Because television news is a significant source of political information in Lebanon, and is often divided by partisan and sectarian outlets, we also asked respondents if they use the most-watched news outlets, including: Al Jazeera, Al-Arabia, Al-Manar, Future TV, LBC, MTV, NBN, NTV, and OTV. Lastly, because of the widespread diffusion of digital media and its important role during protest periods, we created a separate “digital media index,” which included uses of: Facebook, Twitter, Blogger, YouTube, and online news sites. Whether respondents relied on modern sources of information and whether they were used by a wide cross-section of Lebanon’s complex sectarian backstop can tell us more about whether new media help to increase, or alleviate, sectarian determinism in the long-term process of democratisation.

In analysing the attributions given for the reasons and causes contributing to the Arab Spring mobilisations, Lebanese public opinion was divided along two dimensions of contributory reasons: the first included widespread poverty, external interference with domestic politics, and newly empowered youth; the other dimension included a lack of political representation, a lack of social inclusion, and the imposition of Sharia law.

Demands associated with the causes of the revolts were divided along five dimensions: the first consisted in the lack of jobs and opportunities; the second, revenge for lost relatives and friends; the third, the formation of a Sharia state; and the fourth, foreign intervention. The fifth dimension, however, was the most robust and included a host of reasons under one category – which we term the “democratisation demands” index – and included: freedom, security, anti-corruption, human rights, multi-party elections, constitutional reform, religious rights, and the overthrow of oppressive regimes as overlapping causes of the popular revolts.

With regard to how the Lebanese public ascribes responsibility for protests in the Arab region, respondents’ judgments diverge between domestic and international actors. Domestic political actors seen as responsible for activating and leading the revolts were divided among four dimensions: first, political parties; second, religious associations and the military; third, foreign agents and expatriates; and lastly, civil society, intellectuals, independents, and youth as a unified composite reflecting civil society actors. This fourth category was the most robust and overlapping category – we refer to this as the “domestic civil society” index because they all belong to a domestic set of actors promoting democratic transition from within states.

Similarly, the role of foreign actors was also divided among four dimensions: first, Iran; second, Israel; third, Russia and China; and lastly, the composite of
the United States, Turkey, the Arab League, the Conference of Islamic States, NATO, the UN, and the EU. This last dimension included actors traditionally understood as coming from Western democracies, emerging democracies, as well as Arab and Islamic regimes. It is important to note, then, that Iran, Israel, and Russia and China are excluded from this overlapping dimension in the perceptions of “foreign influence” therefore suggesting that public opinion separates them discernibly from the rest. This fourth dimension, because it combines foreign states from the “Western world” as well as regional states from the Arab/Muslim world, suggests that the Lebanese public does not necessarily ascribe to the traditional dichotomy proscribed by Samuel Huntington’s famed “clash of civilizations” hypothesis, and instead is critically focused on the foreign influence of neighbouring belligerent states like Iran and Israel in the regional politics of the Middle East.

Overall, the Lebanese public may be making use of new information outlets in “new media” but no differences arise between using Facebook versus Twitter as far as specific digital platforms are concerned. Therefore, new media outlets may be an important new vehicle to access news and learn about politics, but Lebanese citizens do so with little partiality. This gives us evidence to reject popular technologically-deterministic hypotheses that suggested that these revolts were “Twitter revolutions” or “Facebook revolutions” simply because of the immense popularity of these respective platforms. They may have been very important for the process of short-term mobilising, but as platforms for long-term political socialising, citizens see them as one and the same.

In contrast, uses of the diverse television outlets available in Lebanon diverge along two clear dimensions, while other individual outlets are clearly favoured along sectarian lines. The divisions in content differences and political leanings of television stations may also be more divisive than the uses of digital media platforms. It should also be noted that the most-watched TV stations were those that are the least sectarian driven and most affiliated with modern global culture (less politically charged and more focused on entertainment content).

How can these dimensions of public opinion help us better understand ethnic and religious polarisation in divided but multi-sectarian states, like Lebanon? In the second set of analyses, we apply these dimensions of public opinion to closely examine six Lebanese religious sects’ attitudes towards the Arab revolts, as well as identify major fault lines that exist in its public opinion landscape. To provide a comparative context and understanding, we present the findings by sectarian group, so as to provide a composite profile of each community:

The Catholic Maronites differed most significantly from the other five sects by ascribing the lowest levels of importance to newspaper and radio news. Similarly, the Orthodox sect ascribed the lowest levels of importance to television news, particularly news outlets like Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabia, Al-Manar, Future TV, NBN, and OTV – overtly political and partisan news outlets. More than any other Christian sectarian group, the non-Maronite Catholics had the most polarised opinions and media habits – they were the least interested in following the latest news about the MENA revolts, but when they did so, primarily relied on “old” media like the radio and were the least likely to use “new” media like the Internet. They also ascribed the least credit to economic issues like widespread poverty/unemployment, external interference, and the youth bulge as the most important reasons for unrest; and instead perceived

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TV Channel</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
<th>Sectarian Affiliation</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Jazeera</td>
<td>Al-Jazeera</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Hard News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Arabia</td>
<td>Al-Arabia</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Hard News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Manar</td>
<td>Al-Manar</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>Hard News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future TV</td>
<td>Future Television</td>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>Hard News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LBC</td>
<td>Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation</td>
<td>Christian &amp; Mixed</td>
<td>Soft News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTV</td>
<td>Murr Television</td>
<td>Christian &amp; Mixed</td>
<td>Soft News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBN</td>
<td>National Broadcasting Lebanon</td>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>Hard News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTV</td>
<td>New Television</td>
<td>Shia &amp; Mixed</td>
<td>Soft News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTV</td>
<td>Orange Television</td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Hard News</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2: Most Watched TV Channels by Lebanese Viewers**

Media and Arab Transitions
foreign agents and/or foreign expatriates, with particular emphasis on Israel’s involvement, as the prime causes of the protests. They were also the least optimistic about the future political orientations of newly formed MENA states than any other group (fearing a movement towards a military takeover). In addition to being the smallest and perhaps most vulnerable Christian community in Lebanon’s heterogeneous socio-political mix, this was also the oldest cohort by age group, and may provide some additional context to the dominant use of traditional media, concerns about external involvement (e.g. Israel), and little optimism for political liberalisation.

Beyond the three major Christian sects, Lebanon also includes a diversity of Muslim sects that share political, economic and historical relationships with neighbouring societies in the Arab region. In this regard, the Sunni sect featured some prominent points of polarisation, particularly in its approval of newspapers as the most important source of news, as well as the highest levels of “new” media uses, including Facebook, Twitter, Blogger, YouTube, and online news sites. This sect was also the least likely to view LBC, MTV, and NTV – outlets oriented more towards “soft-news” content. In contrast to Catholics, Sunni respondents were the most likely to ascribe widespread economic issues like poverty/unemployment, external interference, and the youth bulge as the core reasons for the unrest. The Sunni sect was the most likely to ascribe “jobs and opportunities” as a reason for the protests, as well as the assorted “democratisation demands” including: freedom, security, anti-corruption, human rights, multi-party elections, constitutional reform, religious rights, and the overthrow of repressive regimes. Demand for political liberalisation and democratisation, then, was a salient feature in Sunni reactions. Not surprisingly, the Sunni contingency was also most likely to credit “civil society” actors as the most active participants during the protests, including: civil society organisations, intellectuals, independents, and youth. Sunnis, on the other hand, were more likely to be receptive to the “hard-news” TV outlets such as the Hezbollah-sponsored Al-Manar station and Amal Movement’s NBN station. Notably, Shia and Sunni respondents differed deeply on which of the major causes of the Arab Spring they found most important. Shia respondents often cite external conspiracy theories as the primary cause of the Arab Spring and attribute secondary reasons for poor economic conditions and the newly empowered but disenfranchised youth. This difference in opinion seems to reflect the impact of the Syrian uprising on the Lebanese respondents’ perceptions of the Arab Spring, where sectarian Shia-Sunni rifts seem most evident. Thus, despite consensus on the general description of the causes of the upheavals, the Shia minority emerges to be most pessimistic about the aftermath, attributing conspiracy theories rather than domestic conditions for the Arab Spring.

Finally, like the Catholic sect, the Druze sect is about the same relatively small size, but in contrast is notably more politically active. The survey data also revealed that Druze respondents followed the events of the Arab Spring more closely than any other sect in the country. High level of attention to the news also seems related with their low approval of the objectivity of the news – they watched the most news, and were the most critical of the coverage. Most astounding, the Druze minority is also more “new” media-savvy than any other (and gives the lowest importance to “old” media like television and newspapers). Politically, they cited a lack of political representation, lack of social inclusion, and imposition of Sharia law as core reasons for the revolts. But in contrast to the Sunni contingency, they also believed “democratisation demands” (freedom, security, anti-corruption, human rights, multi-party elections, constitutional reform, religious rights, and overthrow of repressive regimes) were the least important issues voiced during protests. In terms of the approval of foreign actors’ involvement, the Druze sect was the most internationally inclined, with the highest approval ratings of all countries except Russia, China, Israel, and particularly Iran (lowest of all six groups).

Comparative Sectarianism and the Arab Spring

While descriptive profiles of sectarian divisions may be illuminating, it is difficult to assess the variance and significance of differences in meanings without stronger statistical tests. To understand whether these descriptive differences are meaningfully distant from each other, we must understand how significantly different or distant each sect is from the other. Being able to make stronger statements about polarisation in Lebanese politics requires us to go
beyond description to understand whether seemingly divergent opinion trends, in fact, present an atmosphere for the polarisation of public opinion in reactions to the Arab Spring. To address this, we tested whether or not the overall average opinions for each major battery of questions differed statistically between minority sects. Based on these differences, we can arrive at strong comparative conclusions about the current state of affairs in post-protest Lebanese public opinion.

First, the findings showed major differences between sectarian groups in their media use habits, which importantly shape exposure to different sources of political information and perspectives. The Sunni sect has the highest level of importance towards newspapers (the Maronite sect has the lowest), and the least level of importance towards "soft-news" television networks like LBC, MTV, and NTV. Similarly, the Druze sect has the highest level of importance ascribed to the Internet, while the Catholic sect has the lowest. Each sect described here was significantly or marginally significantly polarised from the other in terms of the types and sources of media used to learn about public and political life during the protest periods.

Second, in terms of perceptions of the causes of the revolts, the Sunni sect felt marginally more strongly than all other groups that failures of economic development, like poverty, external interference, and the youth bulge, were most responsible for the Arab Spring. The fact that these differences were only marginally significant indicates that there is a general consensus building in Lebanon that issues of poverty, dangers of external interferences, and youth discontent may lead to more periods of contention if not properly addressed – this set of concerns seem to unite Lebanese sects more than divide them. Similarly, in terms of the most vocal demands from protesters during the revolts, the Shia sect differed only marginally significantly from all other sects in viewing “foreign support/intervention” as a key demand. However, this may increase to become a more significant divide as current events in Syria slip towards sectarian civil war with a high level of foreign intervention.

Third, in terms of international organisations and external powers shaping the outcomes of the Arab Spring, it is important to note that the Shia sect most strongly approved the roles of Iran, Russia, and China, while Sunni and Druze sects most negatively evaluated their roles. In fact, in the social fabric of Lebanese politics, the Shia sect is most clearly alienated from its neighbouring Muslim communities, rather than from its neighbouring Christians. For example, the Shia sect was significantly more optimistic about the roles of Russia and China than Sunnis. The majority of respondents also pointed to a perceived lack of "freedom" by Arab youth, poor economic opportunities in uprising countries, and the interference of foreign nations as the main causes of the Arab Spring. Notably, Shia Muslim and Sunni Muslim respondents differed deeply on which of the major causes of the Arab Spring they found most important. Sunni Muslims, who share the same sect as the majority of the rebelling population in the Arab Spring, except in Bahrain, emphasised the lack of political freedom. Shia Muslims, in contrast, cited external conspiracy as the primary cause of the Arab Spring. Thus, despite consensus on the general description of the causes of the upheavals, the Shia minority emerges most pessimistic, attributing foreign conspiracy over authentic domestic reasons for the Arab Spring.

Beyond the desire for greater political freedom, economic disparity is also cited as the strongest factor causing the Arab Spring. Economic disparity, according to most respondents, encompasses both a lack of opportunity to find employment and government corruption that impedes the ordinary Arab’s ability to sustain their livelihood. In this regard, the respondents are echoing several respected international organisation’s diagnosis of the economic malaise that is afflicting the region. According to the International Labour Organization’s 2011 report on Global Employment the MENA region has the world’s highest rate of unemployment by region at 10%; with 23% of its youth population unemployed. Transparency International cites corruption caused by authoritarian governments controlling large bureaucracies that crowd out public participation in the economy as a condition that suffocates economic opportunity in the MENA region.

Regarding the neighbouring and international non-Arab states viewed as important actors in the future of democratisation, the predominantly Shia Iran’s role in the Arab uprising was viewed more positively by Lebanese Shia than by Sunni, while mostly Sunni Turkey’s role in the Arab uprising was viewed more positively by Lebanese Sunni than by Maronite
Catholics. In spite of this diversity of opinion, respondents of all sectarian affiliations display a strong dislike for the role of the United States or Israel in the Arab Spring. Continued suspicion of the United States and Israel’s policies in the MENA region united the respondents.

The media and its use appear as a strong shaper and mobiliser of sectarian opinion. Future research will need to investigate the extent to which these differences do in fact contribute towards opinion polarisation between sects. Evidently, minorities’ views toward the prospects and the promises of the Arab Spring are mixed, but are divided along sectarian lines. While conversions are expressed in cross-cutting cleavages rationalising protesters’ demands, sectarian rifts have widened among competing minorities with regards to civil wars and foreign interventions. Both the ‘clash of civilizations’ and ‘democratic waves’ views appear to have been synthesised by minorities’ views toward democratic revolutions in the Arab world.

Acknowledgements

The data for this report was collected via an anonymous administrative phone-based Random Digital Dial (RDD) survey, and included a sample of 324 Lebanese respondents during the month of January 2012, immediately after the 6-9 month “peak” period of the Arab Spring protests. The survey was carried out in Arabic by native speakers at the Lebanese American University (LAU), was certified by the US National Institute of Health (NIH), and approved by the University’s Investigation Research Board (IRB). The data collection measured political attitudes in reference to political life in Lebanon and political development in the broader MENA region.

References


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 3</th>
<th>Which Group Do You Think Was Most Active during the Protests?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Factor 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>0.681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intellectuals</td>
<td>0.675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Society</td>
<td>0.614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>0.582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military/Thuwar</td>
<td>0.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Associations</td>
<td>0.387</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Agents</td>
<td>0.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expatriates</td>
<td>0.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
<td>0.348</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Eigenvalue | 2.020 | 1.38 |
| % of Total Variance | 22.45% | 15.36% |
| Total Variance | 37.81% |
At the end of the 1990s, experts, think-tanks and political scientists were saying that the 21st century would be the Asian Century. However, the first decade of the 21st century, starting with 9/11, then the war in Iraq and ending with the Arab Spring, has been the decade of the Middle East and the Mediterranean.

Whatever the historical value we attach to the Arab Spring, the events that began in Tunisia in December 2010 and continued in many other countries of the Arab world could be considered as the most significant political phenomenon since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Their impact on the daily lives of Arab citizens in terms of bloody conflicts, leadership changes, new freedoms and constitutional reforms, makes them difficult for the international community to ignore.

The Arab Spring has put the long-standing debate on the table again between those who believe that modern history proves that societies move toward democracy and freedom and those who, more sceptically, can hardly see any direction in the events of contemporary history. The former perceive in the Arab uprisings a new wave of democratic transformations that follows those of Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe. The latter point to the unfolding of power shifts in the last 50 years and to the fact that many of these transitions did not result in political systems that could be considered democratic by any accepted international standard.\(^1\)

This controversy, as theoretical as it may seem, carries some weight in EU policy making. From Europe, the Arab Spring is followed with a mixture of hope and fear. When hope prevails, foreign policy tends to be more proactive and interventionist. When fear takes over, the purpose of foreign policy is rather to escape misfortune than to achieve a positive outcome.

The problem is that the southern neighbourhood needs more coherence and consistency, not less. As shown in the 4th Euromed Survey, carried out by the IEMed in early 2013, experts believe that the Mediterranean is becoming increasingly multipolar, subject to the influences and ambitions of a variety of international players. The Arab neighbours need, therefore, a consistent EU common foreign policy to attract them towards democratic models of governance and towards regional integration. This need is even more pressing after the much publicised pivot of US foreign policy focus towards Asia. Relations with Mediterranean countries remain a major challenge for Europe, and nobody can deny that the region is a major strategic priority for Europe.

### Divisive and Decisive Issues

The EU struggles to achieve unity of vision and action in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. This is not surprising. Precisely because the region is strategically important, the chances that divisive issues emerge among EU Member States are higher than in other regions. This is particularly true when the regional dynamics are unpredictable.

In few months in 2011, Europe witnessed how its southern neighbourhood was transformed; how years

\(^1\) Thomas Carothers in his paper “The End of the Transition Paradigm” is maybe one of the most prominent proponents of this view.
of stability were ended by unexpectedly strong popular revolts that managed to oust three Heads of State and resulted in two civil wars, one of them still underway. It also witnessed how the waves of migrants from Tunisia and Libya threatened the correct functioning of the Schengen space and how civil protection mechanisms and humanitarian aid were tested and successfully implemented by the EU. The EU observed Arab upheavals and supported the popular demands for more freedom, justice and dignity. Many in Europe deemed the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt to be the Arab manifestation of the universal aspiration to be ruled by democratically elected leaders and more accountable governments.

In Libya, European countries sided with the rebellion against the regime. France and the UK led the military operation that ousted Colonel Gaddafi. The EU’s quick reaction, with two Communications in March and May 2011, set out an agenda based on the principle of more for more: “The more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will get from the EU.”

Yet, in general, it was difficult for European countries to change the perception that for decades Europe backed authoritarian regimes in the Arab Mediterranean region. France’s support of the Ben Ali regime until the very last days before 14 January 2011 and Europe’s hesitations in Egypt between 25 January and 11 February did nothing to improve Europe’s image or that of any Western country in the Arab public opinion.

The reaction of European countries to the political challenges posed by the Arab Spring and its aftermath has been confronted with the need to make specific decisions on four decisive and divisive issues.

The first of them was the EU position towards the conflict in Libya; the EU’s “baptism by fire” after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The UNSC adopted Resolution 1973 establishing a no-fly zone and authorising “all necessary measures to be taken to protect civilians.” On 19 March 2011, a coalition led by France, the UK and the US, started air strikes against pro-Gaddafi forces and by the end of March NATO assumed command of air operations. The EU was praised for its quick and substantial delivery of aid and for its sanctions regime. However, disagreements among Member States arose regarding the recognition of the National Transitional Council (NTC) and, more importantly, over resolution 1973, when Germany broke ranks with its EU and NATO partners and voted against it.

The political landscape changed radically with the election results in 2011 in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco. The three votes handed the power to parties from the Muslim Brotherhood movement and proved that political Islam was part of the mainstream in Arab politics.

A second issue that is proving to be divisive for the EU is the stance towards Syria and the support of the opposition, in particular the Free Syrian Army. The deferred and conditional lifting of the arms embargo decided by the EU on 27 June 2013 allowed for the continuation of the economic and financial sanctions but left behind some unresolved questions. One of them was the listing of Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation. This was done on 22 July when the military wing of the Shiite organisation was eventually blacklisted, in what was considered to be a reversal of the EU’s past policy, fuelled not only by the terrorist attack in Bulgaria in 2012, but also by the role of this organisation in Syria’s civil war.
A third controversial issue among EU Member States is the positioning towards Islamist parties. The EU and its Member States’ track record when Islamist parties win elections in the Arab world is not very encouraging. The first case in point was the 1992 Algerian crisis and the disruption of the democratic process by the military, where the EU failed to react in any concerted manner. Since then, Algeria became the paradigm through which policy makers analysed the participation of Islamism in politics. A paradigm that implied that Islamist parties were basically a threat to security and their involvement in politics needed to be carefully considered or simply excluded. This line was partially modified as a result of the efforts to engage with “moderate” Islamists from 2003.

The political landscape, of course, changed radically with the election results in 2011 in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco. The three votes handed the power to parties from the Muslim Brotherhood movement and proved, if proof were needed, that political Islam was part of the mainstream in Arab politics. Even then, not everyone felt comfortable dealing with Islamist parties. The attacks in September 2012 on the US embassy in Tunis and the US consulate in Benghazi, where the US ambassador lost his life, opened a new period of distrust between Western countries and Islamist parties.

The military intervention in Egypt that removed President Morsi on 3 July 2013, whose legitimacy went unquestioned internationally, brought the issue again to the top of the diplomatic agenda. Contrary to what happened with Algeria 21 years before, the EU reaction was strong and clear. The conclusions by the Council of Foreign Affairs on 22 July stated that the army should not play a political role in a democracy and called for a democratic drafting process of the constitution (thereby acknowledging that the constitution approved in December 2012 was no longer legitimate), free and fair elections, the end of politically motivated arrests and the release of political prisoners including President Morsi. The key question though lied in the characterisation of what happened in Cairo on 3 July. “Legitimacy,” “coup d’état,” “revolution” and “military intervention to respond to popular demands” were all concepts used or avoided in political declarations and the media. Behind these terminological ambiguities there was something more than an academic discussion. The recognition of the new government, the long-standing US military aid to Egypt and the IMF loan to ease the country’s troubled finances were at stake and depended on whether the power shift was to be considered lawful or unlawful, legitimate or illegitimate, justified or unjustified. Finally, although not directly connected with the Arab upheavals, the recognition of Palestine on 29 November 2012 as an observer in the United Nations also demonstrated the EU’s inability to speak with one voice in one of the major issues related to the Arab Mediterranean region. 14 EU Member States voted in favour of the resolution, 12 abstained, and one voted against (the Czech Republic).

The four contentious issues mentioned above differ in importance and political implications but may lead to a number of conclusions. First, that military intervention is a matter that only few Member States are ready to engage in; second, that those who believe that the EU should act in total harmony and coherence in foreign policy matters ignore, or pretend to ignore, that there are differences of interests and varying degrees to put values into practice on the international scene; and third, that there is still great hesitation about how to tackle political Islam and democratic transitions. On the other hand, as referred by Pol Morillas of the IEMed, “Member States reacted to institutional novelty (after the Lisbon Treaty) by restating their position in the new institutional architecture. Although not seeking to undermine the new structures, they made clear that decision-taking in EU foreign policy still follows intergovernmental rules.”

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5 The paper “Dealing with Political Islam” by Timo Behr offers a full analysis of EU policies regarding political Islam until 2010.
6 See Council conclusions on Egypt of 22 July 2013 and the declaration of 14 July.
7 In this sense it is significant that while the African Union suspended Egypt’s activities at the organisation, the EU did not initiate any measures in the framework of the EU-Egypt Association Agreement. I do not here wish to say the AU was right and the EU was not, only that international organisations neither judge nor act in the same way when faced with the same political realities.
The Policy Split

In addition to the differences that may surface and eventually prevail between Member States in the domain of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU had to confront the split of its policy framework when dealing with the southern Mediterranean. This policy split was the making of the realities emerging after the 2004 enlargement and the materialisation of certain intergovernmental approaches to EU foreign policy formulation.

In November 1995, six years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and in the midst of the process that would conclude in 2004 with the accession of ten new Member States to the European Union, the EU launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the Barcelona Conference. The Conference was the result of EU efforts to demonstrate that the southern Mediterranean continued to be a priority for Europe and of the hopes raised by the Oslo Process to put an end to the Middle East conflict. The Barcelona Process was the “southern” equivalent of the Helsinki conference with the aim of opening up the regimes, many of them authoritarian, and creating a framework of cooperation between Europe and the southern and eastern Mediterranean with the full participation of Israel.

The process initiated in 1995 was successful in developing a web of bilateral agreements between the EU and the Mediterranean partners. All countries, except Syria (and Libya that had observer status), concluded association agreements containing free trade provisions with the EU. But the process failed to develop a strong multilateral cooperation as the Middle East Peace process stalled and virtually disappeared after the second Intifada in 2001 and the war in Southern Lebanon in 2006.

Between 1995 and 2003 Euro-Mediterranean multilateral relations ran parallel with the EU’s bilateral relations with the countries of the region. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was a two-tier process where the EU concluded bilateral association agreements within the multilateral framework of the Barcelona Declaration. The agreements and the Declaration pursued the same objectives and complemented each other.

In 2003, this coherent policy approach was challenged with the introduction of the ENP. In the beginning the idea was to create a policy towards European countries in the east that had not become EU members. The policy was to be called Wider Europe. However, soon it was realised that if the EU wanted to have a coherent policy toward its neighbours it would be necessary to create a framework encompassing the Mediterranean countries too. This policy was called the European Neighbourhood Policy.

This enlargement of the geographical focus had its pros and cons. The pro was that the EU would avoid giving its southern partners the impression that they were left behind by creating a privileged policy framework for Eastern European countries only. The con was that the neighbourhood policy was to cover such a heterogeneous group of partners that it would be difficult to make it really coherent. In addition, the ENP had to tackle a paradox: whereas relations with Mediterranean countries were more advanced with, notably, free trade agreements, relations with Eastern European countries, although less developed, benefited from the “European perspective,” that is, the possibility for some of the eastern partners to become EU members, an opportunity unavailable to the southern Mediterranean.

The ENP intended and still intends to apply a methodology similar to the Enlargement policy which owes its clout to its ability to push reforms that will lead to EU membership. However, what the ENP can offer, at best, is a complex system of medium and long-term incentives tending to favour democratic and market-oriented reforms, but without a perspective of future membership.

The other main feature of the ENP is differentiation, i.e., the possibility to adapt the reform programme embodied in the national action plans (the key and not-legally-binding document of the ENP) to the characteristics of each country and its willingness to agree and implement reforms. This differentiation is more theoretical than real since the often lengthy and unprioritised action plans constitute quite similar documents for the various countries involved.

The common Euromed policy was definitively reversed by the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in

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2008, with exactly the opposite approach: i.e., no reform agenda within a framework of intergovernmental collaboration.

The main novelty of the UfM was the introduction of three institutional measures: (1) to hold summits of Euro-Mediterranean Heads of State and Government every two years; (2) the establishment of a joint secretariat; and (3) that of a co-presidency, one from the North (the EU) and one from the South (a non-EU country).10

Therefore, while the reform agenda was left for the ENP, a sort of real-politick and “project-oriented” approach prevailed in the UfM’s multilateral framework. More than specialisation or division of labour, the different terms of reference of both frameworks reflected the policy shift operated at the end of 2005 and beginning of 2006. Between 2002 and 2005 the priority was to promote reforms in the Arab world. The idea behind this policy was encapsulated in the remark made by the US Secretary of State Rice in Cairo in 2005 when she said that “for 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region, here in the Middle East, and we achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people.”11 Very soon though, from 2006, this policy was gradually reviewed after the difficulties experienced in the democratic processes in Iraq and Afghanistan and the good results of both the “independent” (actually Muslim Brotherhood) candidates in the Egyptian elections and Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2005, and Hamas’ election victory in 2006 in Palestine. The cartoon crisis, orchestrated mainly by the Syrian and Egyptian regimes, also had a significant impact in Europe, together with the absence of Arab Heads of State in the 2005 Barcelona Summit, held under the UK Presidency.

The question now is whether EU interests are better served by keeping these two policy frameworks separated or relatively autonomous from each other, or whether there is a need to make a real effort to merge these policy initiatives into one comprehensive scheme.

The Challenges Ahead

After the Arab Spring and the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone, the ENP and the UfM have been through testing times.

On the one hand, as a result of the crisis, “a more introverted EU is not only less capable of performing well externally; it is also overlooked by other countries.”12 Moreover, as mentioned by the European Policy Scoreboard, with the crisis “Europe does not believe it can afford the more generous approach it took in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989.”13 On the other hand, the major and probably more lasting effect of the process of political emancipation known as the Arab Spring has been and will be the fragmentation of the political landscape in the southern Mediterranean. In the internal politics, this fragmentation becomes a major polarisation between secular and religious camps. At the regional level, the fragmentation translates into a multipolar Mediterranean where the EU competes for influence with Russia, China, Turkey, Iran and the Gulf, together with the traditional and still predominant security role of the US.

To put it in simple terms, for Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Israel and Palestine, their EU neighbourhood is less significant and has less impact than their Middle Eastern Neighbourhood. As expressed by Kristina Kausch: “Brussels’ policies towards the region are based on the implicit assumption that a continued dominant European position in relations with southern Mediterranean partner countries can be taken for granted (...) this view is mistaken.”14 It is true to say, though, that in the Maghreb, Europe’s influence is stronger. Tunisia and Morocco, for example, still look to Europe for their political and economic horizons, even if in the case of the former, polarisation not only means opposite views on the

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10 The first measure is on hold since no summits have been held since the July 2008 inaugural summit in Paris. However the other two measures are now in place with one important improvement, the assumption by EU institutions of the EU co-presidency of the UfM.

11 Speech by the US Secretary of State Rice at the American University of Cairo on 20 June 2005.


13 Brookings Institution, February 2012.

role of religion but also diverging views on the country’s future international orientation. In sum, today the ENP and the UfM are challenged not only by the EU’s relatively diminished reputation and influence, but also by the increased competition for influence from other emerging international players. Yet the unpredictable regional dynamics make it more necessary than ever to produce a stable, coherent and consistent EU policy offer for the region. In the opinion of Paul Salem “the region is among the most disordered in the world and has no cooperative political, security or economic framework.”

And, as it happens, this region is the neighbouring region of Europe to the south of the continent; one in which Europe’s economic interests and security are at stake. From a European perspective, the region clearly and urgently needs a platform of cooperation for the Arab-Mediterranean transitions. This framework should revolve around the centre of gravity and influence of the EU, assuming the EU is willing and able to invest in such a political project and that the Arab countries are sufficiently attracted to it. The UfM, a “political animal” created to respond to other needs, could be the multilateral structure that the EU and the Mediterranean countries can use to shape a collaborative agenda; an agenda in which the EU coherently pursues its objectives in the region. For this to happen, the participant countries need to reinvigorate the regional political process, and this will certainly be facilitated if the Middle East Peace Process negotiations get back on track.

EU Political Capital

The battle of ideas and the competition between social models in the southern Mediterranean are at their highest levels since the beginning of the transitions. It is in these decisive moments when the EU ought to use its political capital in trying to influence political transitions. And this political capital, despite the setbacks of recent years, is not small: First, the web of agreements between the EU and the Mediterranean Partner Countries and the long-standing cooperation with them, including the work done within the ENP and the collective endeavour of the UfM.

The battle of ideas and the competition between social models in the southern Mediterranean are at their highest levels since the beginning of the transitions

Second, the economic presence of the EU and its Member States in the countries of the region. For the majority, the EU is still the main partner, the largest investor, the strongest goods and services supplier and client, and the main source of tourism. Third, the EU is the largest source of funding of non-military cooperation programmes. Fourth, cultural and civil society ties are strong and growing. Fifth, the EU is listened to. Again, as reflected by the replies of southern actors and experts in the Euromed Survey conducted by the IEMed, they would like a more active involvement of the EU in the transitions in the southern Mediterranean.

EU Strategic Objectives

This political capital is now being increasingly used as shown by the mediation work done by the HR/VP Ashton in Egypt, where no other international player has tried as hard as the EU to reconcile the positions of the military, the Muslim Brotherhood and the secular political forces. And it has to be put at the service of the EU’s strategic objectives: In the political area, the EU has a strong interest in helping transitions to proceed smoothly and avoid major setbacks. The EU’s insistence on favouring an inclusive political transition should be seen as a clear message to those in Egypt and elsewhere in the region that there will not be sustainable democracies if political Islam is not included. But it is also a mes-

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16 See the Toulon speech of 2007 on “la Union de la Méditerranée” by the then candidate to the Presidency of the Republic, Mr. Nicolas Sarkozy.
17 Inclusive and inclusivity appears several times in the EU Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on Egypt of 22 July 2013.
sage to Islamist parties that have won elections in recent years thanks to the Arab Spring movements, that a political culture of “the-winner-takes-all” is doomed to fail. As mentioned by Lurdes Vidal in her dossier of this Yearbook, Islamist parties in the Arab world have to complete a double transition: first, a transition from opposition to government; second, a transition from social/religious movements to political parties. Both are important. The second transition is essential since it is the one that would imply the assumption of the principles of modern democracy by political Islam, in other words, that would democratise Islamism.

In the security field, the EU is the most interested international player in the resolution of the remaining regional conflicts. The Middle East conflict is still preventing comprehensive regional cooperation in the Mediterranean. The Western Sahara conflict is avert- ing the much needed development of the Maghreb Union that could become an important partner for the EU and a strong driver of regional integration. But above all, the civil conflict in Syria, with important ramifications in the neighbouring countries and beyond, constitutes a critical threat to regional stability and peace.

In the economic area, the EU’s main interests lie in the macro-economic stabilisation of the countries of the region and in promoting a real, irreversible and verifiable South-South economic integration process. The EU constitutes the world’s major economic and democratic block and no other institution can boast its experience and credibility in this field.

In the cultural area, the EU has been the first to promote a common institution for inter-cultural dialogue (the Anna Lindh Foundation) in the Mediterranean. With a significant Arab and Muslim population, the mounting problem of Islamophobia and the worrying increase of far right parties in Europe, the EU has a keen interest to build bridges of dialogue to pull down the walls of clichés and misunderstandings that still prevail.

And finally, in the area of mobility and migration, there is an urgent need to continue the efforts, especially with Maghreb countries, with the goal of facilitating the former and preventing illegal forms of the latter. This dialogue is a priority for the southern Mediterranean partners, but it is also in the interest of the EU to put aside an issue in which too often it acts and reacts in a defensive manner, raising justified frustrations in the Arab-Mediterranean countries.

**Conclusion**

The Irish political thinker and philosopher Edmund Burke said that the superiority of the British system lay in the fact that it was not the product of conscious planning but developed over a great length of time by a great variety of accidents. In the same vein, the 9 May 1950 Declaration by the then French Foreign Affairs Minister Robert Schuman stated that “L’Europe ne se fera pas d’un coup, ni dans une construction d’ensemble: elle se fera par des réalisations concrètes créant d’abord des solidarités de fait.” Both statements can be applied to the building of EU common foreign policies and structures.

The Mediterranean was never a geopolitical backwater. But today, the conflict potential is moving from the international arena to national politics. This is a sign of normalisation. Traditional regressive and non-democratic powers want to prevent this trend. Bashar al-Assad’s establishment, for example, has an interest in internationalising the Syrian conflict and has succeeded so far in involving other powers to defend his regime. Others have tried and will try to divert pressure and will blame international interventions when confronted with domestic demands for change and democratisation. However, neither national politics nor international relations will be the same after the Arab Spring. Peoples in the southern Mediterranean have been irreversibly empowered and they know it. Europe is adapting to this new environment and European foreign policies and capabilities will also need to rapidly adapt. But Europe has not been and will probably never be a traditional power. Its influence will depend, more than in any other case, on the credibility and the consistency of its external action. If it is able to act based on its values and principles, the same values and principles that were behind the creation of the European project in the 1950s, it will have more chances to succeed in helping to create a stable, peaceful and democratic neighbourhood.
The Effect of the Arab Spring on Euro-Mediterranean Relations

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The Turning of the Tide

Two years after the “Arab Spring” triggered an unprecedented period of political and socio-economic transformations in the Euro-Mediterranean region, the democratic transitions are in crisis. Political reforms have stalled, economic conditions are deteriorating, and utopian enthusiasm has been displaced by bitter divisions. While there is no going back to the status quo ante, the road ahead appears long, winding and treacherous. In Tunisia and Egypt, deep social divisions, street violence, and political mismanagement at the top are threatening to set back political achievements. In Syria, two years of bloody civil war are fuelling a new regional sectarianism. In Libya, the central State has all but collapsed, commanding little residual control over a patchwork of local militias. Elsewhere, top-down reforms bear an uncanny resemblance to earlier periods of “authoritarian upgrading” by promoting only the veneer of democracy. Although excessive pessimism is misplaced and largely a matter of expectations, there is no denying that the transitions have hit a snag.

This creates more than a small measure of uncertainty for the EU’s new Neighbourhood Policy in the Mediterranean, which assumed the presence of willing reformers in order to establish a new partnership with the region. Instead, the EU finds itself again in the uncomfortable position of adjudicating regional reform agendas and weighing them against its own security interests in the region. Consumed by their domestic troubles, governments in the southern and eastern Mediterranean have neither the time nor the political capital to engage in tedious reform debates with their EU partners to secure some elusive long-term benefits. Faced with political uncertainty and a lack of demand, the EU prevaricates, ostensibly waiting for the right political partners to emerge. In the meantime, precious time is being lost. While Euro-Mediterranean relations have pulled out of the deep hole they were in two years ago, they have arguably contributed little to guiding the ongoing transition processes or shaping the post-revolutionary regional order. Instead, all sides appear to be playing a waiting game, standing idly by even as the democratic tide is beginning to turn.

Blurred Lines

Despite the rather confusing and unpredictable situation, it seems possible to identify a number of long-term trends that are likely to shape the future dynamics of Euro-Mediterranean relations. Unsurprisingly, these trends are largely rooted in the changing political and economic context of the southern and eastern Mediterranean. Some of these run counter to the underlying assumptions of the EU’s new Neighbourhood Policy. Others appear to confirm it. However, with many of the underlying factors still in flux, it remains close to impossible to predict how far and in what fashion these trends might reshape Euro-Mediterranean ties.

First, the emergence of “grey democracies,” as identified by Roberto Aliboni (2013), raises a number of difficult questions for the future conduct of Euro-Mediterranean relations and for the EU in particular. In transition countries like Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, but also in “reform countries” like Jordan and Morocco, it is now evident that democratic reforms will be drawn-out and incomplete. Free elections and a
relatively open political process will dovetail with resilient elements of authoritarianism and illiberal practices, such as the curtailment of free-speech or the infringement of individual rights. Moreover, political progress in most of the transitional settings is going to remain erratic and will be driven by a tug of war between street protestors, activist judges, religious and tribal elders, political parties, and external actors. In this fluid and fuzzy situation, locating the centre of political gravity will not always be easy. Consequently, apportioning blame for democratic stalemate or reversal is not going to be a straightforward task, as Egypt’s example shows. This situation is bound to continue as all sides are loath to accept a return to a narrower form of party politics.

This poses some notable difficulties for Euro-Mediterranean relations and the EU’s reform agenda. On the one hand, it severely limits the EU’s ability to use conditionality as a reform tool in the Neighbourhood: which changes represent a backsliding into authoritarian habits and which are part of the normal give-and-take of democratic experimentation and political negotiation? To some extent this evokes the EU’s old democratisation-securitisation dilemma, with the perennial risk being that European decision-makers will once again accept compromises that boost short-term stability. On the other hand, the substance of reforms will increasingly be overshadowed by the question of trust: which domestic actors should the EU trust to implement reforms – the Muslim Brotherhood, the liberal activists, the rebel militias? For Euro-Mediterranean relations at large, the lack of strong political interlocutors with sound political legitimacy from the southern and eastern Mediterranean will deprive the process of some dynamism and postpone difficult decisions.

Second, the crisis of the Arab state is another regional phenomenon that is likely to affect the dynamics of Euro-Mediterranean relations (Gause, 2012). The emergence of strongly centralised Arab states, pursuing a state-driven modernisation process, was the inevitable outcome of the decolonisation period. Shaped by the intellectual currents of the Cold War era, these states adopted a secular nationalism that appeared to provide a home for the region’s different ethnicities, sects and denominations. However, “unable or unwilling to institutionalise legal-rational bureaucratic links to their populations,” Arab states became dependent on neo-patrimonialism as a method of political rule (Dodge, 2012). Consequently, state power has become synonymous with corruption, abuse and political violence in a large part of the Arab world, prompting a retreat of the state following the Arab Spring, a process that has been further hastened by methods of association and communication outside state control.

As a result, the ability of the State to govern has declined. The loosening of the coercive power and identitarian framework provided by the State inevitably activated other identity markers, such as religion, ethnicity and tribe. The growth of Arab civil society and the rise of a new sectarianism are both an inevitable outcome of this process. Mediation between “good” civil society and “bad” sectarianism will be a key challenge for Arab democracies. It will also be one of the factors shaping the dynamics of Euro-Mediterranean relations. With identity politics on the rise, nationalist conflicts, such as the Palestinian occupation, are being supplanted by identity conflicts, such as the Syrian crisis, as a central mobilisation factor. Unless the sectarian genie is going to be put back in the proverbial bottle – a difficult process given the resilience of identity markers and the confusion of regional politics – this is likely to impose a new conflict layer on Euro-Mediterranean relations.

Third, the failure of the region’s economic development model is likely to impose some change on Euro-Mediterranean relations (Galal, 2012). The strategy of controlled liberalisation, encouraged by the European Union and adopted by, amongst others, Egypt and Tunisia, proved favourable in terms of growth, but failed to consider the quality of this growth and its ability to create jobs. Instead, it left a legacy of inequality, high unemployment, regional imbalances, crony capitalism and structural deficits. While some of these defects are the consequences of domestic corruption and mismanagement, a renewed push for trade liberalisation is unlikely to prove sufficient to revive regional economic fortunes and create the millions of jobs required. This is partly due to the fact that tariff liberalisations have reached their limits, given that the opening of agriculture and service markets is going to remain politically sensitive in Europe for the foreseeable future; but it is also because Arab governments are currently too weak to impose the structural and regulatory reforms required by the EU.
Instead there appears to be a growing focus on production, private sector reforms, and regional integration amongst Arab economies – widely seen as essential for boosting growth prospects and encouraging domestic reforms (ILO, 2012). While Euro-Mediterranean trade and economic cooperation will remain crucial, south-south cooperation is likely to play a more prominent role in the recovery. The key role played by Gulf countries such as Qatar in extending emergency credits and investing in transition countries bears this out. Euro-Mediterranean relations, for their part, will have to become an enabler of regional economic cooperation, while sponsoring a new economic paradigm based on competitive, entrepreneurial and inclusive growth (Malik and Awadallah, 2011). In the short run macroeconomic assistance and debt forgiveness will be crucial to balance the huge costs of the transition and preserve the prospects for long-term growth. Delivering on these issues will be a challenge.

Finally, the Arab Spring has led to a redistribution of relative power in the Mediterranean region that is shifting the existing regional balance. While this seems to have initiated a new phase in regional politics, its emerging contours and organisational dynamic remain, as of yet, blurred. As Richard Youngs (2013) has pointed out, it is possible to discern a mixture of new and old security paradigms at play within this emerging regional context. Thus elements of traditional power politics, ideological and sectarian competition, pan-regional non-state actors, and cooperative security institutions all seem to play some role in reshaping regional politics. Whether this nexus of a new sectarianism, great power rivalries and deepening interdependence will lead to the emergence of a form of “religio-interpolarity,” as Youngs hints might be the case, remains to be seen.

For Euro-Mediterranean relations, these shifts in the region’s power-political crusts are having a seismic effect. With regional dynamics in flux, there has been a natural tendency to emphasise ad hoc bilateral interaction over multilateral problem-solving and the role of regional institutions. This has reinforced a pre-Arab Spring trend towards intergovernmental solutions, embodied in the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). One result has been to heighten national divisions on the side of the EU, where reactions to crisis situations have been predominantly driven by national interests, rather than communal values or strategic vision. In the long run this bodes ill for multilateral initiatives and regional institutions. While the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy lacks a broader geopolitical vision to guide its technical initiatives, it is unclear whether the intergovernmental UfM will be able to overcome the more complex conflict dynamics emerging in the region.

Navigating Uncertainty

The EU responded to the various changes brought about by the Arab Spring by launching a major revision of its Neighbourhood Policy in 2011. The core tenets of this new approach were laid out in the Commission’s communication “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” and in the subsequent communication “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood.” Together these documents sketch out a new set of priorities for the ENP that aims to support the groundswell for democratic change in the region (Amirah Fernández & Behr, 2013). These are centred on the creation of “deep democracy,” the building of “people partnerships” and the promotion of “inclusive growth.” Through these measures the EU seeks to foster “sustainable stability” in the region and to infuse Euro-Mediterranean relations with a new dynamism.

The overall effect of this shift in EU strategy has been positive, enabling the release of greater financial and technical assistance, the launching of several innovative new policy initiatives and institutions, the initiation of negotiations over the long-term reduction in trade and regulatory barriers, and the promise of closer sectoral cooperation in certain policy areas (European Commission, 2012). Through these measures, the revised ENP did provide an anchor in a stormy sea of change for those countries able and willing to grasp it. Curiously, it may have had its largest impact amongst the “reformers” like Jordan and Morocco, while being less effective amongst the “revolutionaries,” like Egypt and Tunisia. Be that as it may, now that there are some worrying signs that the regional democratic tide is beginning to turn, the EU’s new strategy is revealing some of its shortcomings.

When the EU’s new Neighbourhood Policy was conceived in 2011, it understandably piggy-backed
on the regional enthusiasm for democratic change. There appeared to be little uncertainty about the direction of this change, given the non-violent, broad-based, and inclusive nature of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings and the general expectations that these would be reproduced across the region. As a result, the ENP was designed to function as an enabler of democratic changes that would unfold in a rather linear fashion across the region. With much of the inclusiveness and certainty of the early days now dissipated, the ENP is failing to unfold its full potential, due to its difficulties in navigating regional uncertainty and articulating a clear regional vision.

Adjustment Problems

This can be seen in the EU’s difficulty in adjusting to some of the emerging trends, identified above, that are twisting and turning regional politics into different directions. The advent of grey democracies – as opposed to liberal democracies or easily identifiable dictatorships – has further blunted the EU’s rather timid attempt at employing democratic conditionality. With the EU’s much hyped “more-for-more” approach limited to its new SPRING programme, which has an overall volume of €540 million for 2011-2013, it is difficult to see how the EU will manage to bring real pressure to bear. The lack of firm metrics and the complexity of suspending assistance in reaction to democratic back peddling further complicate the situation. Confronted with an unclear and confusing situation, the EU has been at a loss about how to react to developments such as President Morsi’s attempt to undercut the Egyptian constitution or the frequent human-rights violations by Libyan militias.

Similarly, the weakness of governments and governance is causing problems for the implementation of the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy. In particular some of the transition countries, like Egypt, have been unable to respond to EU offers of initiating complex trade negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) or to discuss cooperation on sector-specific policies. This has meant that more than two years after the uprisings, two of the so-called “three Ms” promoted by Catherine Ashton remain in a purely conceptual stage – namely markets and mobility. Neither do some of the transition countries appear able or willing to accept the structural reform demands of international financial institutions in return for greater macro-economic assistance. Implementation of new laws and regulations has also been more than patchy, in particular in the case of gender equality and women’s rights, while Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation remains at a low. The EU’s feeble response has been to wait for effective and empowered governments to arrive; not much of a “transitional strategy.” Arguably, the EU responsiveness to the collapse of the Arab development model has been somewhat more pronounced. The long-run prospect of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade, the adoption of new Pan-Euro-Mediterranean rules of origin, the launching of the European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development (ENPARD) and greater support for a deepening of regional cooperation on the level of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Arab League all seem to indicate a realisation that new growth drivers are required, while most new EU measures emphasise the quality of growth. Through the Deauville Partnership and its macroeconomic dialogues, the EU also acknowledges that greater short-term budgetary support and reform in coordination with other actors are required. However, most of these efforts aim at the mid to long term and have been unable to prevent the worsening of economic conditions in the region. The EU’s inability to deliver a significant short-term boost to the region has arguably pushed it to the margins, leaving the field to Gulf countries such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia in order to provide emergency support and fund change.

Finally, despite consistent EU calls for “inclusiveness,” the region has been experiencing growing social divisions that are fuelled by the redistribution of relative power amongst regional actors. This has caused significant problems for the EU’s attempt to engage with a wider set of civil society actors, as well as the EU’s desire to position itself as a more “neutral” actor that has learned from its mistakes. Confronted with growing divisions and mounting vi-

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1 As an indication, financial allocations under SPRING for 2011-2012 were €100 million for Tunisia, €90 million for Egypt and €20 million for Algeria, leaving little room for real leverage.
ence, the EU is increasingly pushed to take sides. However, choosing the “right side” is complex, given the identitarian nature of many of these conflicts. In Syria, the EU’s natural predilection has been to veer towards liberal activists, even though these appear difficult to identify. In Egypt and Tunisia, there are mounting questions over the EU’s decision to support “moderate” Islamist governments following the revolution. As the EU is being swept up in the increasingly sectarian logic of the region, the inclusiveness of its own approach appears to be loosening, which could carry potentially severe long-term consequences.

In sum, the EU’s new Neighbourhood Policy seems ill-prepared for the uncertainties of the post-Arab Spring era. Instead of attempting to “shape” regional change, EU policies are increasingly being moulded by uncontrollable events in the neighbourhood. While this is perhaps inevitable and even logical, it does indicate the inability and unwillingness of the EU to formulate its own vision for the region. The danger is that the growing uncertainty will encourage EU Member States to opt for security-enhancing solutions that run counter to the “sustainable stability” that the ENP seeks to promote. With Europe vacillating and Arab countries weakened and divided, Euro-Mediterranean relations are likely to flounder for the foreseeable future.

**Black Swans Turn Grey**

The Arab Spring has been the ultimate black swan – a low probability event with a dramatic global impact (Taleb, 2010). The EU was ill-prepared for this event, despite the fact that there had been some long-running indications that the Arab Mediterranean region was undergoing a deep transformation. Following the Arab Spring, the EU was quick to adopt the democratic paraphernalia and inclusive nature of the peaceful revolutions as the “new normal” of regional politics. The revised ENP is a clear expression of this. However, by allowing itself to become swept up in the post-revolutionary euphoria, the ENP is now ill at ease with the quickly shifting and more dangerous political terrain of the post-Arab Spring era. This is not to suggest that the region’s democratic transitions are bound to fail; but merely that Euro-Mediterranean relations will be governed by uncertainty in the near future. In order to be able to navigate this uncertainty and shape events, rather than being shaped by them, EU policies and instruments need to become more flexible and adaptive. They also need to be based on a clear geo-strategic vision for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean region. Failure to accept and adjust to greater uncertainty in the neighbourhood runs the risk of black swans turning grey, as unexpected events will hit the ENP with ever-increasing frequency, turning it into an object rather than the subject of change.

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The Euro Crisis and Euro-Mediterranean Relations

Since late 2009, the European Union (EU) has been hit hard by a dramatic sovereign debt crisis that has undermined its internal cohesion, triggered a profound economic recession in the eurozone and worsened European citizens’ living conditions. In the middle of the euro crisis, at the beginning of 2011, an unprecedented wave of popular mobilisations spread to the Southern Mediterranean (SM) region, leading to the fall of three dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. The Arab uprisings have opened a unique opportunity for the EU to develop a new relationship with SM countries. After its timid reaction, the EU indeed responded to the Arab awakening by proposing a renewed strategy for the southern neighbourhood, as described in the joint communications of the High Representative and the Commission of 8 March 2011 (“A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the southern Mediterranean”) and of 25 May 2011 (“A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood”).

In the new documents, acknowledging its previous poor performance and mistakes, the EU shows a major commitment to sustainable political change, focusing on the promotion of “deep democracy,” that is freedom of association and expression, respect for the rule of law, the fight against corruption, security reforms and democratic control over armed forces, as well as supporting a greater role for civil society organisations. In order to persuade SM partner countries to carry out deep political reforms, the EU sets out an incentive-based approach that relies on greater differentiation amongst SM countries according to the principle of “more-for-more” and offers them concrete rewards in three areas: more funding, an increase in the mobility of SM populations and greater access to the EU market.

However, as this article will show, while the Arab uprisings have created extraordinary momentum for rethinking EU-Mediterranean relations, the euro crisis has contributed to hindering the EU’s ability and willingness to play a meaningful and proactive role in fostering genuine political change in the SM region.

EU Foreign Assistance in a Time of Austerity

Financial Aid Not Enough

The economic crisis in the eurozone has primarily challenged the EU’s commitment to deliver more money for the SM region. As a result of fiscal austerity and consequent budget cuts in many European countries, since 2010 the EU official development assistance (ODA) has been steadily falling, reversing the trend seen in the last decade. From 2010 to 2012, the total ODA of the 27 EU Member States decreased from 0.44% to 0.39% of EU GNI, with crisis-struck states like Greece, Spain and Italy, experiencing the sharpest cuts.

Although, following the Arab uprisings, the EU has provided additional financial aid to SM countries, its room for manoeuvre has been seriously constrained by shrinking economic resources. Much of the aid devoted to SM countries has been simply reallocated away from the EU budget for Asia and Latin America (Vaisse and Dennison 2013). Most importantly, the level of financial assistance pledged to the southern neighbourhood has been insufficient to offer serious incentives to undertake real political reforms. Not only do the figures reported below fall clearly short of the Member States’ earlier promises...
for a Marshall Plan, but they disappoint the expectations of post-uprising governments and ordinary citizens confronted with enormous economic and political challenges, as claimed by SM officials on various occasions and recently acknowledged by the European Parliament President himself Martin Schulz.

The new EU aid package allocated to the southern neighbourhood has been increased by €700 million, in addition to the €3.5 billion already programmed for the 2011-2013 period. In spite of the emphasis put on democracy promotion, no substantial reorientation of aid assistance toward greater support for political reform seems to have occurred. The new SPRING program (Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth), which should disburse fund in accordance with a country’s progress in building democracy, is provided with a total amount of only €540 million for the period 2011-2013. Additional funds to foster democracy promotion and support civil society initiatives are limited. Within the framework of the Civil Society Facility (CSF), SM countries have received €12 million for 2011 and another €22 million for the 2012-2013 period; and the European Endowment for Democracy (EED), inaugurated only in January 2013, has so far attracted about €14 million, still a long way off the €100 million annual budget envisaged by the Polish Presidency in 2011. Under the pressure of financial problems, several EU Member States such as France, Italy, Great Britain, Spain and Ireland, have refused to contribute to the EED’s budget.

Financial Support in the Form of Loans

Partly owing to the declining ODA, beyond direct aid, the rest of the EU’s financial support for SM countries is channelled in the form of loans through the European Investment Bank (EIB), which approved €1.7 billion of extra loans in the southern neighbourhood in 2012, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which allocated €1 billion in May 2012 to start operations in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. These funds are substantially geared towards fostering economic development in SM countries by supporting the private sector. However, channelling much of the EU’s foreign assistance through the EIB and the EBRD carries the risk of making the EU’s renewed initiative less effective and attractive to SM countries. EIB activities in developing countries appear to have benefited corrupt elites and multinational companies rather than local populations because, among the many problems, they are badly monitored and lack transparency over spending on loans (Tricarico 2010). Continuing to ignore the deep linkages between political and economic dynamics in SM countries where crony capitalism and corruption are pervasive will certainly reproduce the same inefficiencies and failures of the past.

In response to rising frustration, soaring euroscepticism and diffuse anti-immigration sentiment, several European governments have increasingly taken drastic measures to contain immigration, citing the difficult economic situation as a reason.

Moreover, civil society organisations and public opinion in a number of SM countries have a negative perception of financial aid channelled through loans, as this has increased dependency on foreign countries. Groups such as the Popular Campaign to Drop Egypt’s Debts and the Tunisian Committee for the Abolition of Third World Debt indeed demand debt relief from the EU. The possibility to turn debt relief into an incentive for SM countries to adopt political reforms was disclosed by European governments in a summit held in February 2012, but no concrete step has been taken so far to address the issue.

EU Migration Policy

Soaring Euroscepticism and Spreading Anti-Immigration Sentiment

The euro crisis has also posed serious challenges to the adoption of a renewed migration policy toward SM countries. Unpopular austerity measures, high unemployment levels and economic recession in Europe have fuelled discontent toward national governments and anti-immigrant feelings. Right wing
political parties such as the National Front of Marine Le Pen in France and the Golden Dawn in Greece have made unprecedented electoral gains in the last two years. In the Greek June 2012 elections, the Golden Dawn, which sustains an anti-immigrant programme, won 7% of the vote for the first time in the national Parliament.

In response to rising frustration, soaring euroscepticism and diffuse anti-immigration sentiment, several European governments have increasingly taken drastic measures to contain immigration, citing the difficult economic situation as a reason. In 2012, Greece carried out mass arrests of illegal immigrants, with many of them sent back to their countries of origin. In March 2013, UK Prime Minister David Cameron announced that welfare benefits for recently arrived immigrants would be curtailed. Since 2011, with the arrival of refugees from Tunisia and the massive influx of illegal immigrants across the Greek-Turkish border, several EU Member States have displayed growing resistance to the free movement of people across EU borders, seriously putting into question the Schengen system. The decision taken by EU Interior Ministers in March 2013 to delay the expected Bulgarian and Romanian membership of the visa-free Schengen zone is just one of the most recent episodes.

In a context marked by the economic crisis, EU Member States have tended even more to prioritise national interests in the management of immigration flows. This was clear when, in early 2011, in the wake of the Arab uprisings, a diplomatic dispute arose between France and Italy over the influx of migrants arriving from the southern Mediterranean to Italy. On that occasion, France, Germany, and the UK firmly resisted Italy’s call, shared by other EU Mediterranean States, to help share the burden of these new arrivals. Furthermore, Greece has frequently lamented the lack of solidarity and responsibility-sharing from other European countries to tackle illegal migration crossing the Greek-Turkish border.

*No Chance to Implement a Mutually Beneficial Migration Policy*

Against this backdrop, the chances of an innovative and mutually beneficial migration policy being established between EU and SM countries appear very slim. Negotiations on Mobility Partnerships have indeed proceeded very slowly, with some progress made only in Morocco. The country signed an agreement with the EU in March 2013 that, for the moment, only concedes visa issuance facilitations for certain categories of persons, namely students, researchers, business men and women, and makes the signature of a Mobility Partnership dependent on Morocco’s commitment to accept a readmission agreement with the European Union. As the case of Morocco clearly shows, in the current form proposed by the EU, Mobility Partnerships appear to offer still unattractive possibilities for migration to SM countries as they do not allow mobility for purposes of employment, while at the same time imposing rigid conditionality requiring SM countries to adopt European security policy instruments (Carrera et al. 2012).

Encouraged by growing intra-EU tensions and in response to internal pressures, in 2011 and 2012, southern European countries like Spain, Greece and Italy have continued to prioritise a purely security-focused approach in their bilateral relations in the field of migration with SM countries; i.e. stricter border controls, systematic detention of irregular immigrants and forced returns, even at the cost of serious violations of immigrants’ rights and despite critics from EU institutions (for example, see Paoletti 2012).

**Euro-Mediterranean Economic Relations**

*The Implications of the Euro Crisis for EU Trade Policy*

The euro crisis has contributed to delaying progress in economic integration in the Euro-Mediterranean area. As far as EU Member States are concerned, inward-looking market-protection against non-EU countries is on the rise as shown by a marked increase of export subsidies and invisible forms of protectionism (Youngs 2011). As a way to overcome the internal financial crisis, European countries have been more aggressive in their pursuit of bilateral economic relations with emerging countries such as China, India Japan and Gulf countries, away from EU common approaches (Youngs and Springford 2013). Following the same logic, over 2012, France and Spain have reinvigorated their commercial di-
plomacies with North African countries to advance their specific economic interests. At the end of 2012, French President François Hollande, accompanied by numerous businessmen, visited Algeria, becoming the first French President to do so since 2007, with the sole purpose of strengthening French investment opportunities, while he refrained from commenting on the political situation. The result is that competition among Member States for commercial access to new markets has become fiercer, threatening EU solidarity and common EU Trade policy (Youngs and Springford 2013). In light of these trends, European countries are unlikely to accept a lifting of the protectionist barriers that have so far limited EU market access for SM countries.

The Impact of the Euro Crisis on SM Countries

The euro crisis may have reinforced the perception in SM countries that gains from free trade with the EU are limited, underscoring the risks of heavy dependence on trade exchanges with Europe. Due to EU economic recession, trade between the EU and SM partners, particularly Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco, has slowed down. Given these developments, trade integration in the Euro-Mediterranean area is likely to be seen with increasing scepticism in SM countries. For example, the EU-Tunisia Privileged Partnership that was agreed in November 2012 has been strongly criticised by a number of political and social forces that have warned of the risks in deepening economic relations with the EU in the context of the current crisis.

Faced with dramatic economic problems, SM countries show little interest in trade liberalisation agreements that require partners to accept the EU’s full set of market rules and whose social effects in the coming years are likely to be high, at least initially. Also agricultural trade liberalisation, as currently envisaged by the EU, holds a limited attraction for SM countries. If Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is not drastically reformed by reducing farmer subsidies, the promised liberalisation of trade in agriculture is unlikely to bring about expected gains for SM countries.

In the context of the economic crisis, the reform process of the CAP, which is underway, remains unpredictable. With worsening financial conditions for a number of EU Member States, stronger protection-ism tendencies could prevail partly owing to pressure from the farming lobby. This could lead reform-oriented countries to refrain from a radical revision of the CAP in order to avoid further tensions. In contrast to this, however, the euro crisis could strengthen the front of those countries who support CAP reform (such as the UK, Sweden, Denmark and The Netherlands) in the conviction that a radical change of the EU's Agricultural policy and therefore a substantial revision of the EU budget are necessary steps towards coping with the ongoing economic crisis.

EU Trade Integration Jeopardised

Partly as a result of the above trends, over the past two years, progress in trade negotiations between EU and SM countries has stalled, with the exception of Morocco. Negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) between Morocco and the EU were started at the beginning of 2013, while an agreement on agriculture liberalisation entered into effect in October 2012. Although in November 2012, Tunisia received ‘advanced status,’ the exact details of the agreement, especially on trade liberalisation of service and agriculture, still require further negotiations that have been postponed until the next elections.

Meanwhile, the ongoing crisis in Europe seems to have accelerated a trend already visible in several SM countries in the pre-crisis period, namely the diversification of trade partners outside the EU. Post-uprising countries such as Tunisia and Egypt have deepened economic relations with Gulf countries, particularly Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. In Tunisia, over the last two years, Qatar has become the first foreign investor in the country to supersede France. With Europe facing serious economic hardships, Morocco is also increasingly turning toward Africa in the hope of strengthening economic ties.

The Promotion of “Deep Democracy” in the Context of the Euro Crisis

The Crisis Has Weakened the EU’s Political Will and Ability to Encourage Genuine Political Reform

It seems clear that the euro crisis has contributed, at least in part, to discourage real rethinking and con-
crete action in EU policies toward SM countries, particularly in promoting genuine political reform. In the context of the euro crisis, the EU has become increasingly less interested and capable of taking advantage of the great opportunities opened by the Arab awakening. Since the sovereign debt crisis, EU Member States, particularly southern countries, have increasingly turned their attention toward internal problems and, under the pressure of austerity measures, have been compelled to significantly revise foreign priorities and financial assistance. Moreover, by provoking growing resentment and mistrust among EU Member States, particularly between Northern Europe and Southern Europe, the euro crisis has deepened intra-EU divisions on both internal and external affairs. These contrasts have undermined coherence and unity in EU foreign policy as well as encouraged EU Member States to be even more vigorous in securing their national ambitions in migration policy and trade relations.

Immersed in their own internal problems, hard-pressed by economic recession and more interested in defending their own strategic concerns in external action, many EU Member States have relegated democracy support in SM to second priority. As seen above, the EU has thus failed to deliver an attractive package of incentives in terms of financial assistance, trade and mobility, weakening the relevance of political conditionality.

Inconsistencies in EU Democracy Promotion Efforts

After launching several positive initiatives in the field of democracy promotion, EU Member States have shown a lack of intent in advancing them. As shown above, the institutions specifically tailored to sustain political reforms in SM remain underfunded. The EU’s renewed emphasis on civil society participation has not been accompanied by concrete and genuine changes. In November 2012, Egyptian human rights organisations were prevented by the Foreign Minister from taking part in the first Egyptian-European Task Force, with no reaction from the EU delegation. In the SM countries where, after popular mobilisations, incumbent regimes are still in place, EU funding continues to be channelled toward civil society groups that are co-opted by political rulers. In Tunisia, civil society organisations lament that the signing of the Privileged Partnership with EU was done without the approval of the National Constituent Assembly and dialogue with civil society groups. Overall, negotiations between EU and SM governments have continued to take place behind closed doors, with scarce or no participation from civil society forces.

The EU’s approach to democracy promotion in the SM region is fraught with many other inconsistencies, as shown in the cases of Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Libya (see Vaisse and Dennison 2013). For example, the criteria through which the EU has disbursed incentives to SM countries appear unclear and not always congruent with the more-for-more principle. While this is certainly due to lack of clear benchmarks and monitoring mechanisms, it also reflects the fact that the EU’s strategic interests, for the reasons discussed above, continue to militate against a more proactive support of political reform. As a case in point, the EU has backed and praised the political reform process overseen by the Moroccan King in spite of purely cosmetic political changes. In addition to “more trade,” under the SPRING program the EU has offered Morocco similar financial incentives to those offered to Tunisia, amounting respectively to €80 million and €100 million. Morocco has also benefited from more than half of the €1.7 billion disbursed by the EIB in the SM region in 2012.

With regard to Egypt, a key strategic player in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Syrian crisis, the EU has maintained a wait-and-see approach for almost two years, limiting its action to expressing concern against human rights violations, while refraining from pressing post-uprising authorities to implement reforms in key strategic sectors such as security, justice, and media systems. On 14 November 2012, at the first EU-Egyptian task force, the EU announced its decision to offer Egypt a package of €5 billion of loans and grants. However, only a minimal part of this aid package is made conditional to political reform, namely €90 million from the SPRING program. At the same time, the EU has conditioned the disbursement of €500 million to the signing of a loan programme between the IMF and Egypt, whose approval has been postponed since 2011. By tying the provision of its assistance to the adoption of an IMF package of austerity measures, the EU seems to completely ignore that continuing with the same
economic model pursued over the last two decades cannot but lead to a deepening of those same forms of exclusion that contributed to the outbreak of the Egyptian uprising and to an aggravation of political uncertainty. It also neglects that most Egyptian political and social forces have criticised negotiations between government authorities and the IMF for lacking transparency (for example on the details of the programme tied to the IMF loan) and genuine consultation with civil society groups.

**The EU’s Leverage on SM Countries at Serious Risk**

Since the onset of the crisis, the EU has lost a great deal of credibility and attractiveness, not only among its own citizens but also around the world. To the eyes of SM populations, the euro crisis has come to further undermine the EU’s already compromised credibility. A lack of improvement in EU migration policies is likely to have generated much frustration in North African countries that value greater mobility of national citizens as particularly relevant. Despite the many failures of the past, the EU has re-proposed the usual free trade agenda that, at least up to now, has not delivered SM countries the promised advantages. The EU continues to give the impression that its commitment to promote political reform in the SM region is less motivated by genuine intentions than by geopolitical and economic concerns. The question of political conditionality in the SM region is made complicated by increasing competition of non-European actors such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey that, in the post-uprising phase, have disbursed generous assistance to SM countries, particularly Egypt and Tunisia, with no formal strings attached on political reform.

As the eurozone crisis is far from being solved and competition by non-European actors intensifies, the EU’s leverage to encourage political transformation in SM countries is at serious risk. In the light of the above context and of persistent political uncertainty in the SM region, it remains to be seen whether or not SM partners will be interested in deepening political reforms on the basis of scarce economic incentives that tie them even more closely to a declining Europe, unwilling and incapable of offering a mutually beneficial partnership.

**Bibliography**


Dossier
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Socio-Political Map after the “Arab Awakening”: in Search of a Balance of Powers

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The new political and social context following the “Arab Awakening” has highlighted two elements that are common to the demands of all the countries involved: the will to break with authoritarianism and a demand for improved living conditions for the people. The changes in the public space have produced a new political and social panorama that has shown that, far from being apathetic, Arab societies have taken the reigns regarding their future development. Beyond the differences in how events in the last few years in the Arab world are labelled, the reality is that the magnitude of the protests, their popularity, their initial consequences (the overthrow of the ruling regimes) and the subsequent reforms that the movement has prompted (in Morocco and Jordan, for example), show a clear break from the past. With the initial euphoria over, both in the countries in question and outside, the level of optimism generated at the outset by the unexpected and considerably quick fall of the Tunisian and Egyptian autocrats has gradually diminished. Not just because of repressive actions, in some cases the outbreak of war, resulting from the revolutionary wave (in Libya, Yemen, Syria or Bahrain), but also due to the realisation that the transformation processes were going to be lengthy, complex and replete with nuances. After the “Spring” came the “Islamist winters,” after the “Arab revolutions” came the so-called “Arab regressions” and the analyses of the situation have been tainted by a dose of scepticism. Many have come to question whether it was “worth it” and if in fact “everything was changed in order to change nothing.” Ultimately, this evolution in the interpretation of events reveals the underlying tensions between the expectations that sparked the transition process towards democracy and the possibilities of achieving the established goals, especially because of the immediacy that was demanded. How could the desires of the people marry with the realisation that transitions are slow and complex processes, with their own rhythms and effects that are not likely to be seen until the medium or long term? So, it is important to take stock for a moment and clarify, as far as is possible, what steps, both forward and backward, can be identified within the transition scenario. This is not a definitive overview, but rather an analysis of the events in their own time frame, looking at what has changed and what has resisted change, what has remained and what has been totally renewed by the new actors that are emerging with great force. To this end, it is essential to keep in mind the main aspirations of the movements in question. These aspirations converge in more or less three – or even four – ideals that were chanted repeatedly during the days of the “revolution” and which continue to have great presence in the collective imagination:

\(^1\) With the collaboration of Héctor Sánchez Margalef and Claudia Rives. research assistants of the Department of the Arab and Mediterranean World, IEMed.
aish, hurriya, wa adala iytimaiya / karama insaniya, which means: bread, freedom and social justice / human dignity. These ideals, translated into structural changes, must produce, in the medium and long term, the building blocks for the democratic ideal.

The transformation of the political scene has meant establishing new conditions, new rules under which the new actors can operate

One of the first areas where the change can be seen is in the issue of pluralism and participation of social and political actors. We therefore propose to assess how the political and social map has changed over the last two years and analyse how the relationships between the different pre-existing, new or emerging actors have been structured, and how their interactions determine the way the transitions progress. We cannot limit ourselves to political actors only, since one of the main characteristics of the so-called “Arab Spring” is the empowerment of wider sectors of the population. Evidently, this map is not exhaustive. Producing a map of all the actors and their impact on the transition process would be a titanic task, because of the diversity, multiplicity and the many countries involved. This is why many of the actors and dynamics that intervene in the socio-political development (religious institutions, communities – defined on ethnic, religious or linguistic grounds -, external actors, etc.) do not appear, as priority has been given to the internal actors which in recent times have had greater public relevance.

“Al shaab yurid” (“the people want”) were the demands chanted in Arab streets and squares in 2011. The people, from then on, became political subjects and their will became the legitimacy for building democracy. A new age had thereby dawned, in which the different political and social powers had to find their place.

The New Political Map

The historical changes that have taken effect in recent times in the region have inevitably implied variations in the political and social panorama. The mass protests have allowed a series of actors to emerge, which previously had been subject to enormous pressures or marginalised in the public sphere (intellectuals, journalists, public figures from civil society) or even subject to different degrees of repression or hostilities that, in many cases, had led to their imprisonment or exile, or forced them completely or partially underground (Islamists being the paradigmatic case). The transformation of the political scene has meant establishing new conditions, i.e., new rules under which the new actors can operate. This is the main change and one which allows political and social players to rise as new actors or even as driving forces for the change.

In little more than two years, Arab citizens have gone to the polls on several occasions in electoral processes that could be described as the fairest, freest and most transparent the region has ever known. Some of these have served to elect replacements for the ousted regimes (in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya), and others to show a readiness for democratic reform (as is the case for Morocco or Jordan). In the case of the former, the winning political formations, most of who have never held power, there is a dual aim. On the one hand to consolidate the break from the overthrown regimes; and on the other to pilot a transition period towards a new State.

Islamists: New Actors, Old Faces

The main political actor to benefit from the opening of the public space in the new context is Islamism. This is not a new figure, but rather an old face of social activism and political militancy, which until now has been marginalised, oppressed or underground: the Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. The organisation of elections over the last two and a half years has indicated an unquestionable tendency throughout the countries involved: the rise of the political grouping known as “moderate Islamism,” which rejects violence and accepts the rules of democracy. This rise is represented in Morocco by the victory of the Justice and Development Party (PJD), which won 27.8% of the votes in the legislative elections in November 2011. In Egypt and Tunisia, the pioneering countries of the revolution, the Islamist victory gravitates around 40%: 37.5% of the vote for the Freedom and Justice Party, the po-
political showcase for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and 41.5% for Ennahda in Tunisia.

In contrast, in Libya, the Justice and Construction Party (which arose from the Muslim Brotherhood) has not been so successful: of the 200 seats in the General National Congress (GNC), the Islamist party took just 17, against 39 won by the National Forces Alliance, a non-ideological election coalition led by pro-reformist member of the Gaddafi elite Mahmoud Jibril, the former Prime Minister appointed by the National Transitional Council (NTC) following the outbreak of war in Libya in February 2011.

Unlike its Egyptian and Tunisian counterparts, the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood has maintained a kind of neutral alliance with the monarchy. This allowed it to operate within the social sphere during the ban on political parties, and thereby become the only opposition party, in a Parliament whose majority corresponds systematically to tribal representatives and those loyal to the regime. However, in recent years the capacity for action of the Jordanian Islamists has weakened, despite their adherence to the widespread demands in the region at the outbreak of the Arab revolts: the fight against inflation and corruption and constitutional reform to improve national representation, especially that of Jordanians of Palestinian origin, who are underrepresented by the voting system. Without the intention of overthrowing the monarchy, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) has led a group of opposition parties (left-wing, communists and nationalists) to drive the reform and organise protests since 2011. However, the boycott of the IAF of the January 2013 elections failed to delegitimise the results and instead gave rise to a new Islamist party that could neutralise the contentious position of the IAF and strengthened the controlled reform strategy of the Jordanian monarchy.

Although the Islamists were not initially the driving force behind the demonstrations and protests, they are the indisputable victors of these revolutions thanks to their favourable election results.

The second element is the moral component of the Islamist discourse with strongly religious leanings: in each country these parties hope to lead a more “Islamic” management of public affairs, in other words, conforming to the Islamic principles that call for justice, equality, transparency and human dignity. This element also represents a strong identity. In Tunisia, the aim is to “restore Islam,” in other words, recognise the society’s Islamic identity and break with the last few decades of secularity imposed from above. In Egypt the goal is to defend a “Muslim authenticity” (both against the Army and the Salafists), which breaks with the prominence of the “official Islam,” used by the former leaders. The Moroccan PJD, reliant on its complex relations with the Royal Family, is positioned as a religious bastion against the opposition, accused of westernising and secularising a society in which religion still has a strong presence.

Finally, these formations, when running in elections, have benefited from their image of “regime victims,” especially in the case of Tunisia and Egypt, after being excluded from the political arena. In fact, this exclusion has branded them with a political virginity that has been interpreted as a guarantee of integrity. All this has allowed them to position themselves against a pre-existing opposition weakened by the old regimes and little prepared for electoral competition. Furthermore, the accelerated electoral calendars established for the transition process have played in their favour, as the work on the ground and related with education, health, charity, etc.). This has meant that the social dimension of their work has supported their discourse – which is similar from country to country –, focused around three specific ideas: the total rejection of the old regime, of its leaders and the promise to fight relentlessly against corruption.
the connection with the electorate had already been established beforehand.

The Islamists soon adapted to the new context. After the formation of the respective parties (except in the case of the Moroccan PJD), their politicisation included adopting a new language. If traditionally the central slogan was often “Islam is the solution,” then in the electoral campaigns this was adapted for a new version that was more in keeping with the times: “democracy is the solution.” And it is the democratic exercise of voting that has led them to piloting this complex phase of the transition process, with the added challenge of giving concrete answers to the demands of the population: employment, growth, equality and social justice. However, the political debate has gravitated almost exclusively around the identity of the States and societies, focused on those elements that are more susceptible to generating polarisation (such as the constitutional references to sharia), instead of developing the reforms and policies necessary to satisfy the demands of the population, which has led to growing social unrest.

**Tunisia: Polarisation Despite the Coalition Government**

In Tunisia, Ennahda formed a government coalition with the only two parties that agreed to form an alliance with the Islamists: the Congress for the Republic (CPR), that holds the presidency of the Republic through Moncef Marzouki, and the Ettakatol party which maintains the presidency of the Parliament with Mustapha Ben Jaafar, although it is Ennahda that sets the agenda within the coalition.

Since then, Ennahda has made several unsuccessful attempts to come to some form of consensus with the opposition, which is fiercely against any kind of agreement with the Islamists. Besides pushing forward the transition road map, particularly the drafting of the new Constitution by the Assembly, and acting as the country’s caretaker government, Ennahda has had to face two major challenges with very little room for manoeuvre. On the one hand resuscitate an economy weighed down by mismanagement and severe social inequality and territorial disparities, which were the origin of the revolts. On the other hand, they also have to deal with the issues of security, social instability and the void left by the old regime, made more complicated by the porosity of the country’s borders with Libya and Algeria, the circulation of armed groups from neighbouring countries and the Sahel. Likewise in the country’s interior, the most hostile part of the Salafist movement has taken advantage of the internal instability to lead a campaign of violence.

The lack of democratic tradition and a dangerous dynamic of polarisation have made dialogue between the political parties difficult and weakened their capacity to reach agreements. Strongly divided over two ideological axes – Islamist and secularist – and on the intended societal model, the different discourses have generated social tensions in the country that endanger the achievements of the “revolution.” This polarisation was made evident during the election campaign won by Ennahda, in which many of the parties opted for a highly aggressive strategy with respect to the Islamists. Like in Egypt, both the opposition and the Islamists have had to use issues that tend to divide people as a weapon, such as the place of religion in society and institutions, women’s rights or the primacy of religious law over civil law. Ennahda has been unable to reach an agreement both between the different political formations, and within its coalition or even the party, which on occasion has displayed enormously divergent opinions. The exercise of power is therefore made more complicated thanks to two overlapping tensions. Firstly, are the internal tensions over the differences existing between members who have experienced exile and those who have suffered repression and imprisonment under Ben Ali, some belonging to more moderate sectors and others more extremist. The reality, however, has shown that this dividing line is not so clear, even though the two camps form the base of the same party. Secondly, is the disagreement on whether to take a line based on religious predication and ideology, or be more pragmatic and political than spiritual (Rachid Ghannouchi against Abdelfattah Mourou). The internal differences were made clear when Hamadi Jebali, the former Prime Minister of Ennahda, announced the formation of a technocratic government to lead the country out of the political crisis caused by the assassination of the left-wing leader Chokri Belaïd. The party leader rejected his proposal and opted for a cabinet shuffle prompting Jebali’s resignation and the appointment of party hardliner Ali Laarayedh.
In his speech on 9 March 2011, King Mohammed VI set the groundwork for reform advocating the expansion of the Prime Minister’s and Parliament’s powers, the independence of the Judicial Branch and improved representation for regions. This discourse was followed by the creation of a technical commission that, after one hundred days, proposed a new constitutional text approved by referendum on 1 July 2011. The new constitutional text marks a step towards the consolidation of the Rule of Law: primacy of international conventions ratified by Morocco over domestic law, the constitutionalisation of gender equality and the recognition of cultural and linguistic pluralism. Insofar as the separation of powers, the expansion of the powers of the head of government and of Parliament anticipates unprecedented change in the regime’s configuration. In fact, the King’s obligation to appoint a head of government from the ranks of the winning party in the legislative elections introduces a mechanism to independently regulate the monarch: a relationship of dependency between an entire sector of the executive and the electorate is created. The regulatory mechanism is no longer the King’s exclusive prerogative; there is now also electoral regulation based on universal suffrage.

Beyond these constitutional changes, the core of the constitution remains unchanged: the constitutional architecture gravitates around the King, who enjoys “inviolable” status as Commander of the Faithful and has extensive prerogatives: he chairs the Council of Ministers, controls religious institutions, presides over the Supreme Judicial Council and monopolises the domains of foreign affairs and defence.

As in Morocco, the Jordanian monarch has begun the process of constitutional reform and is supervising it, having appointed a royal commission to write a draft in April 2011. The new text denotes a certain decrease in the monarch’s power to the benefit of Parliament and the Prime Minister and his government: the King does not have the right to pass decree-laws except under exceptional circumstances and legislative elections can no longer be adjourned at will. Moreover, the king’s power of dissolution has been limited: he may now proceed to dissolution only if he receives a written recommendation from the Prime Minister (who will not have the right to take up said position after deposition). And finally, the new electoral law allocates 27 parliamentary seats to national lists, the official aim being to foster the creation of national political parties, as opposed to the tribal solidarities that still structure Parliament. At the same time, the independence of the judiciary is encouraged by the creation of a constitutional court and an independent electoral commission designed to ensure transparency in elections. Nonetheless, the monarch remains the real authority since he retains the right to appoint the Prime Minister regardless of parliamentary majorities. Moreover, the creation of so-called “national” seats has reinforced tribal solidarities and relegated the issue of the under-representation of Jordanians of Palestinian origin to the background.

Consequently, despite changes towards a parliamentarisation of the regime, the privileged, top-down approach used by the monarchs keeps this change within continuity. In both cases, this approach has lent greater importance to universal suffrage and has granted more prerogatives to Parliament and to the government, thus opening a broader space for the expression of opposition. In any case, the King remains a central actor of the regime and retains the bulk of his executive power, validating the schema of an executive monarchy.

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rather than govern alone. The members of this unusual coalition were the conservative nationalist Istiqlal Party (PI), the former communist Party of Progress and Socialism, and the right-wing, royalist and Berber Popular Movement. The monarchy confirmed PJD secretary Abdelilah Benkirane as leader, but at the same time appointed a team of councillors, which was interpreted by some political analysts as a kind of parallel cabinet to oversee government decisions. Moreover, the link between political parties and the Royal Family means that if there is a divergence of interests or rivalries the monarch can influence the coalition and thus have a hand in government action.

The heterogeneous coalition and limitations regarding the government’s room for manoeuvre have hampered the PJD’s reform projects. Some of the economic initiatives, such as fiscal reform, have come up against resistance from government members or the opposition, who accuse their measures of being populist. The conflicts inside the coalition eventually triggered a government crisis in May 2013 over the PI’s threat to withdraw from the coalition. After the sovereign’s direct intervention from France, Chabat temporarily froze his decision. In the end, however, in July the monarch accepted the resignation of the Istiqlal ministers and the majority party was forced to look for another partner in the government or consider early elections, which according to the polls, the PJD would win again.

The current mess inside the government coalition shows, firstly, that the monarchy is still on top of the country’s politics and its actors. However, the “cohabitation” of the PJD and the Palace has not been without its misunderstandings and public opinion swings between disappointment and the perception that, ultimately, the PJD is not the main actor with the authority to drive the changes that a part of the population is demanding.

The FJP in Egypt: Hegemonic Ambitions Limited by Military Rule

In Egypt, the confusion between majority and hegemony has been a constant feature since the electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood’s, Freedom and Justice Party in the parliamentary elections at the end of 2011 and beginning of 2012. The Islamist victory was confirmed in the elections by the Shura Council. Contrary to its promises the Muslim Brotherhood decided to put forward a candidate from their ranks for the presidential election. That meant that with Khairat el-Shater disqualified, Mohamed Morsi went through to the second round after eliminating the competition favourites (Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, former member of the Brotherhood thrown out for running for President despite criticism from the group; Amr Moussa, former Minister of Mubarak considered a reformist, and Hamdeen Sabahi, the Nasserist candidate). In the second round he came up against Ahmed Shafiq, the army’s candidate and seen as the standard bearer for continuity, presented by many as the “enemy of the revolution.” After a tight result and an unexplained wait before announcing the results, which raised suspicions over a pact between the military and the Islamists, Mohamed Morsi was proclaimed the first civilian President of Egypt.

Morsi promised to be the President “of all Egyptians,” and to show this he stepped down from his position in the FJP. However, the first display of the Islamist’s hegemonic ambitions was his refusal to change the text of the constitution. In fact, on the contrary, he opted to maintain its composition based on the parliamentary majority, siding with the Salafists (71% of the People’s Assembly). This sparked tensions not only between the Islamists and the opposition, but also between the army and the Brotherhood.

All political actors have prioritised the short-term decisions and the political elite has failed to resolve the dilemma of how to couple the partisan competition with the need for consensus.

The deadlock between the military and the Brotherhood – the former believing themselves to be the champions of stability and the latter promoting power in the hands of the civilians – confirms these actors’ desire to lead, which brought them progressively closer to confrontation. The attempt at monopolising the power resulted in the constitutional declaration on 22 November 2012, by which President Morsi...
hoped to ensure immunity regarding his decisions, which he considered necessary to “defend the revolu-
tion.” In other words, through this declaration, due
to the lack of a valid constitution, the President was
able to pass laws and decrees without intervention
from the judiciary. In addition, the Constitutional
Court was not allowed to intervene in the process
of drafting the constitution which was in the hands of
the Constitutional Commission, and senior figures
from the old regime were expected to be dealt with
more severely. This was a display of the President’s
determination, who accumulated executive and leg-
islative powers to fight against the “deep State” by
hoarding greater amounts of power.
This allowed Morsi to confront resistance from the
“deep State” (sectors of the army, judiciary, the po-
lice, State institutions, the media, businesses, etc.)
using fairly unorthodox measures. Instead of looking
for support from a revolutionary front that would help
him to fight the pillars of the old regime and the re-
sistance of certain sectors of the state administra-
tion, used to operating with certain autonomy and
based on sectorial interests, the Islamists adopted a
heavy-handed strategy and one of “ikhwanisation” of
the institutions: they put brotherhood-related figures
in key posts of the institutions and administration;
granted legislative powers to the high chamber,
strongly dominated by the Brotherhood due to the
dissolution of the Parliament by the Constitutional
Court; they responded to opposition and media crit-
icism with allegations and charges of “offending the
President” and with the progressive interference of
the state media.
The legitimacy of the ballot boxes was interpreted by
the movement as carte blanche to monopolise the
power without the obligation of accountability, ignor-
ing the fact that a minimum of consensus is essential
to legitimise the process. To this was added the con-
fusion generated between the country’s presidency,
the political party and the religious movement. Due
to the nature itself of the Brotherhood, an extremely
hierarchical organisation, where dissent was un-
common, faith and obedience was rewarded and the
religious and identifying discourse overexploited, the
impression grew of a lack of transparency and pro-
gressive sectarianism of power.
Instead of pushing forward social policies and the
most pressing reforms — like that of the security sec-
tor —, the Islamist government focused on identity
which further deepened the existing social and po-
itical divide. In fact one of the main failings of the
Morsi government was his Naída project, by which
he intended to transform the economy and reach
growth nearing 7% in five years, reduce unemploy-
ment and significantly increase the budget for edu-
cation. However, the project that was the pillar of the
presidential campaign was unsuccessful with unem-
ployment rising and less growth, the result of a lack
of long-term planning and support from international
financial institutions.
This trend to think in in terms of hegemony and ig-
nore the need for inclusion has been a constant fea-
ture of Mohamed Morsi’s mandate. He has been
slow in reacting to public demand and has shown
little readiness to amend the mistakes he has made.
The opposition, however, has tended to follow a
“negative” agenda, apparently focused on the idea
that the government would fail. All political actors
have prioritised the short-term decisions and the po-
litical elite has failed to resolve the dilemma of how
to couple the partisan competition with the need for
consensus.

The straitjacketing of the political
realm before the revolutions explains
the enormous partisan vitality
and the plethora of parties that
proliferated after 2011. This
multitude of political formations
favoured the division of the non-
religious groups in particular, thereby
benefiting the Islamist parties

The widespread demonstrations that took place
throughout Egypt in June and July 2013 have not
only united the anti-Islamist opposition, but also
brought the army back into the political arena. After
the mobilisation of millions of Egyptians on 30 June
and the collection of 22 million signatures demand-
ing the President’s resignation and that presidential
elections be held, the army gave a 48-hour ultima-
tum to “satisfy the demands of the Egyptian people.”
Once the deadline had passed, and despite the last-
minute offer of the President to engage in dialogue
The objective of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) is to return the security apparatus to the hands of state institutions designated by a democratically elected government, i.e., the transformation of the security apparatus by the civil State in order to ensure its functioning according to democratic practices as well as its endorsement and protection of Human Rights. Ultimately, the security sector should be held accountable for its actions and should remain a passive actor in the general political sphere.

The case of SSR in Tunisia is characterised by the need to focus efforts on the transformation of the internal security sector, which mostly includes police and intelligence services, and not so much of the army, which has continued to be a cohort of civilian power. Throughout the Ben Ali era, internal security forces became more prominent and they were characterised by a stem opacity and no state regulation or clear legal framework. Most political parties agree on the need for depoliticising the security sector, however, Ennahda still needs to prove it is willing to attempt such internal reform. Internal resistance to reform shows that there is a need for improvement in matters of transparency, control and accountability in the running of the military, i.e., a democratisation of the civilian control over the security sector. Last but not least, there is a need to strengthen the democratic character of internal security institutions in order to put an end to the abuse of civilians and to ensure their operation under the rule of law.

In Egypt, the role of the armed forces has traditionally been a prominent one and their strength as a political actor is due to both the credit and legitimacy they have earned historically from society and their control over an important portion of the country’s wealth and resources. Their neutral position during the beginning of the uprisings enforced civilian support; however it is important to consider that the SCAF is the institution which has issued most constitutional declarations, both acting according to its interests and claiming a sort of referee-type role in the transitional process. These arguments lead us to mention the extremely privileged and independent role of the military. Factors such as the retirement allowances of former military members, the extent of their influence in the economy whether by resources monopolisation or by ownership of companies and the external military and budget aid coming from the United States obstruct the SSR process. Political and constitutional privileges include a complete autonomy when deciding the military budget and to what ends this budget is proposed, without the supervision of the Parliament, and complete freedom of action in matters of state security. Military institutions block any attempt at supervision or accountability by civil actors in matters of political decision-making, which includes issues related to the financial and administrative management of the country. Although Morsi and the MB believed that the drafting of a new constitution and the reforms were a reasonable start in their attempt at bringing transparency and civilian control over the security sector, the recent coup has proven their failure to do so.

The main problem in the Libyan context, on the other hand, is that the state security apparatus has collapsed along with all state structures, and the mass circulation of weapons during and after the civil war has become a persistent issue. This has resulted in the proliferation of numerous militias which do not respond to any state authority and lack the guidance of a democratically structured security apparatus. These militias act as police forces, but they do so arbitrarily and without accountability in a context in which indiscriminate detention, torture and murder of civilians has occurred repeatedly under their rule.

Regardless of the attempts, the lack of economic resources and experience in SSR and the failure to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate (DDR) militias and armed groups, heavily obstruct any possible success and reinforce the perception that the State will neither be able to ensure their protection nor offer a consistent force to punish the actions of militias and alike. Amongst the countries analysed, Tunisia might have the best chances of SSR, provided consensual political actions are taken in that regard. The success of an SSR in Egypt is highly unlikely due to the power the military sector still holds in the political arena and the case of Libya demands first the DDR of all militias as a first step towards SSR.

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and form a coalition government, the army deposed the President, announced a regime change and a new transition phase began in which once again the military set the agenda: the road map, calendar, new constitutional declaration, etc. With the appointment of a civilian as President of the Republic, unlike the period of government of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) that followed the fall of Hosni Mubarak, on this occasion the army decided to oversee the change, acting as arbiter and taking a questionable backseat in decision-making. This protects the military from the pounding suffered on the front line (which it experienced during the first year of transition led by the SCAF) but without risking losing control or its prerogatives.

The repressive campaign that has followed the removal of Morsi, who is being held by the army in an unknown location, the orders issued to arrest the movement’s leaders, the closure of television channels connected with the movement and the aggressively anti-Islamist discourse, which demonised the movement from all the media and different sectors of the opposition, indicates that the Islamist movement will retreat and may even close in on itself. The group refuses to accept the removal of the President and has taken to the streets in protest and to attract the attention of the international community. Instead of prompting a thorough revision process of the movement and its political activity, or even providing a much needed internal renovation, the attitude of the military and the
Muslim Brotherhood is simply creating a greater social divide and leading to the victimisation of the movement, accentuated further by the massacres of the pro-Morsi demonstrators. The two opposing groups taking to the street has been a call for legitimacy through the number of demonstrators that have mobilised. However, the main result is that the violence is on the rise and the repression is fuelling the thirst for revenge and endangering the social peace.

Non-Islamist Parties and the Opposition Faced with the Challenges of Pluralism

The other side of the coin is that the new oppositions and the movements described as “revolutionary” have not been as successful as they were expected to be. Before the “Arab Spring,” the political sphere was dominated by a single party linked with the Head of State. The Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), founded by Ben Ali, dominated in Tunisia, while Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP) ruled in Egypt. Opposing them there were two kinds of main actors: on one side, the legal opposition parties, who participated in politics without really questioning the system, a condition for their participation; and on the other, a minority of opposition parties that were tolerated on the condition that their influence was limited and they posed no threat to the regime.

The straitjacketing of the political realm before the revolutions explains the enormous partisan vitality and the plethora of parties that proliferated after 2011 (over a hundred in Tunisia and several dozen in Egypt). This multitude of political formations favoured the division of the non-religious groups in particular, thereby benefiting the Islamist parties. Characterised by party discipline and cohesion, the Islamist parties came up against less competition and enjoyed far greater visibility in the run-up to the elections. On the other hand, the old dominant parties, officially dismantled, still maintain many of their members in positions of influence and are regrouping under other names and other political organisations.

The elections revealed the weakness in this political field. In Egypt, while 71% of the Parliament, currently dissolved, was composed of Salafists and members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the opposition consisted of a wide variety of actors, many of whom were divided among themselves. The non-Islamist group that received most votes was Al-Wafd, with 8.2% of the seats, who were, in fact, one of the parties closest to the “feloul,” or remnants of the old regime. In Morocco, the number of PJD seats doubled those obtained by the second election “winner” (the Istiqlal Party), while in Tunisia, Ennahda won over 40% of the seats in the Constituent Assembly, followed by a myriad of opposition parties, the most important of which has 26 seats, compared with Ennahda’s 89.

This fragmentation of the non-Islamist field can be explained by circumstantial and structural elements. Firstly, many of the opposition parties after the Arab Spring are highly personalistic or built around a single figure. Such is the case, for example, in Egypt for Mohamed ElBaradei (al-Dostour), former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Ayman Nour (El Ghad), former opponent of Mubarak, Naguib Sawiris (Free Egyptians Party), the telecommunications magnate and party founder, or the Nasserist Hamdeen Sabahi (al-Karama). In Tunisia, there is a similar situation, with leaders like Najib Chebbi, from the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), Hamma Hammami, from the Worker’s Party, both former opponents of Ben Ali, or Moncef Marzouki, leader of the Congress for the Republic (CPR) and current President.

In fact, this phenomenon of personalisation is not an Arab exception, but rather the mechanism itself of most incipient democracies, or at least of transition processes. The consequence is that the more “political entrepreneurs” that come onto the scene, the greater the probability of creating political parties, which in turn leads to the fragmentation of the political terrain, especially regarding those with non-religious, left-wing or liberal leanings. Furthermore, many of these parties are concentrated in the large urban areas, the arenas for the biggest mobilisations. This has pushed the interior regions and rural areas further into the background, leaving them deprived of representation and with less electoral weight. This is why many of these leaders, around who new or old parties are built, have a significant draw in the cities, where they find support, among intellectuals and the middle and upper classes, but lack a social connection with the rural parts of the country. These areas continue to be ruled by local leaders who are generally linked to the old regime, or
the Islamist parties, which are more conservative and in touch with the rural traditions. Finally, the communication strategies of the new political leaders have focused more on the media and social networks and have neglected the groundwork needed to gain popularity among the working classes and in the rural areas. This has prompted a political class whose influence is limited by its detachment from the “street.”

**The Tunisian Opposition to Conquering the Public Space**

Both in Morocco and Tunisia the election results forced the winning Islamist parties to seek government partners. Ennahda formed a coalition with Ettakatol and the CPR, centre-left secularist parties, but both parties have suffered numerous deserts or even splits because of divergences with respect to joining the coalition (eight Ettakatol members and 14 from CPR). What this has cost the two parties and their leaders will be seen in the next legislative elections that are set to take place following the approval of the new Constitution in autumn 2013.

While the assassination of Chokri Belaïd in February 2013 sparked a serious government crisis that ended with the incorporation of certain technocratic ministers and the replacement of Jebali with Laarayedh, it is yet to be seen what the consequences will be of the murder on 25 July 2013 of Mohamed Brahmi, leader of the Popular Current party and elected member of the National Assembly. The immediate reaction has been a call from the opposition and the trade unions to dissolve the Constituent Assembly and form a Council of Elders, which may further erode the legitimacy of a strongly criticised government and bring uncertainty to a fragile and highly polarised political process. The second option open to the opposition parties to increase their political clout and capacity to influence is the formation of common fronts. In fact, in Tunisia, out of the 144 political parties that emerged after the revolution, today there are just 49.

With the aim of countering the strength of Ennahda, on 6 July 2012 the Nida Tounes group became a political party. Led by Beji Caid Essebsi, this group presents itself as a “catch-all-party,” at the crossroads between secularists, liberals and the traditional left, and with the incorporation of former members of the RCD that, after being excluded from the political scene with the fall of Ben Ali, see this movement as a chance for political rebirth. The party experienced a significant boost in few months, especially due to the presence of Caid Essebsi. This 86-year-old veteran politician was minister on several occasions under the presidency of Habib Bourguiba, was Parliament Speaker under Ben Ali and interim Prime Minister during the post-revolution period. A fervent secularist, his discourse presents the Bourguiba era as Tunisia’s Golden age, because of its opposition to rampant Islamisation. This explains the glorification of the Bourguiba era within the party, focused on women’s rights, education and infrastructure, among other things, in contrast to the constant accusations of incompetence directed at Ennahda.

In fact, for many secularists and liberals this forum is the only way of blocking Ennahda in the next elections. They argue that nearly 60% of the population did not vote for Ennahda in the 2011 elections and that Nida Tounes can capture this share of the vote and unify it. The question is whether the charisma of Essebsi, who has won the hearts and trust of many conservative and centrist Tunisians, can compete with Ennahda, especially bearing in mind Essebsi’s age, which casts doubts over whether he will be able to run as a presidential candidate. This is why the fast rise of Nida Tounes may become a quick fall without its rallying candidate.

The Tunisian political scene is composed around three main poles: conservative, left-wing and centrist, structured by the three dominant parties, Ennahda, the Popular Front and Nida Tounes. The atomisation of Tunisia’s opposition political field is confirmed by the formation of four common fronts:

- Union for Tunisia: formed by Nida Tounes, Al-Jumhuri, Al-Massar, the Socialist Party and the Patriotic and Democratic Labour Party (PTPD);
- Popular Front: unites twelve left-wing, nationalist and green parties and associations, as well as numerous independent intellectuals to oppose the troika and Nida Tounes, under the leadership of Hamma Hammami, Secretary General of the Tunisian Worker’s Party. The murdered politicians Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi also belonged to this coalition;
Tunisia first proceeded to elect a parliament and then a provisional President in order to draw up a new Constitution, which was followed by more elections, the goal being to pursue transition in accordance with the Rule of Law. Thus, the High Commission for the Realisation of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition (a committee of experts and civil society actors) was entrusted with preparing the legal framework for the transition by enacting decrees in compliance with the Rule of Law: it created an independent institution for elections, issued a decree on elections for the Constituent Assembly and a series of decrees ensuring free, plural and transparent elections. In December 2012, the amendments to the first draft constitution were submitted to the Constituent Assembly, whereas the definitive draft was submitted on 1 June 2013. In view of the approval rate required to endorse the final draft of the constitution (two thirds of the Constituent Assembly), it is clear that the aim in Tunisia, in contrast to Egypt, is to draw up a text fostering consensus. Hence the debates on introducing Sharia and the principle of gender “complementarity” into the Constitution – proposals that Ennahda eventually relinquished – have fostered political polarisation and slowed the process of drafting the constitution. The latest draft constitution attempts to clear up polemic aspects: Article 1 stays the same and does not mention Sharia, Article 6 mentions the freedom to practice one’s religion as well as freedom of conscience. Moreover, it stipulates a number of institutional changes: legislative power is entirely transferred to Congress, the State is decentralised through local administration (Article 13) and five bodies have been created and enshrined in the constitution – the latter are in charge of elections, the media, sustainable development, good governance and the struggle against corruption (Articles 123-127).

The signature of numerous charters and international treaties establishing the prevalence of international over national law attests to the changes in the legal framework. In the first place, a decree from 23 March 2011 established the temporary organisation of the authorities while announcing the dissolution of the Tunisian Parliament, the Constitutional Council, the Supreme Court and the majority of the aforesaid institutions that participated in legitimising the former regime, including the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD). By the same token, on the regional level, a number of town and regional councils were also dissolved and replaced by delegations. Simultaneously, in a context marked by the proliferation of new political parties, the idea was to ensure the freedom of association in order to organise the transition under fair political conditions. Two decrees on the organisation of political parties (Decree No. 87, 2011) and associations (Decree No. 88, 2011) guarantee the freedoms of expression and association, subjecting them to compliance with the Rule of Law, rejecting recourse to violence and abiding by transparency. As a consequence, elections were a success insofar as abiding by law: they were free, regular and plural according to the majority of international observers. Thus, the Assembly was able to develop its own procedural rules and even ratify certain laws designed, among other things, to establish the temporary organisation of the authorities (Law of 16 December 2011).

Moreover, the High Commission issued a series of decrees to organise the government and the political framework, including diverse political sensibilities as well as a diversity of civil society actors, and making the Rule of Law the condition sine qua non of their existence. Emerging from this was the creation of various authorities designed to restore citizens’ confidence in their institutions by guaranteeing their independence. Among these are the High Commission (Decree No. 6 from 18 February 2011), the National Fact-Finding Commission on Cases of Embezzlement and Corruption (Decree No. 7, 18 February 2011) and the National Fact-Finding Commission on Abuses Committed during Recent Events (Decree No. 8, 18 February 2011).

The reform process in Tunisia appears to be the most successful and consistent with a participative (bottom-up) approach. First of all, because there is no one actor as central as a monarch or army; secondly, because the new actors have proceeded to progressively dismantle the former regime. In any case, considering the political configuration obliging a series of alliances and given the polarisation of the Tunisian political stage, political consensus on a text is the condition sine qua non for the next Constitution’s success.

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Alliances against the Islamist Hegemony

In Egypt there have been multiple attempts to form political and electoral alliances between the secular and liberal parties. Firstly, with the legislative elections approaching many parties regrouped around coalitions that have significantly varied over recent months, with a significant shuffle of parties and public figures modifying their affiliations. Some political figures have even formed or joined more than one movement at the same time, creating a complex landscape. The National Salvation Front constitutes the main opposition force to the Islamists and has also been the main beneficiary of the mili-
After the presidential elections, the candidates that reached third and fourth place, Hamdeen Sabahi, leader of the Nasserist party Al-Karama, and Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, supported by a throng of young revolutionaries, formed the Popular Current (Al-Tayar Al-Shaabi) and Strong Egypt (Masr Al-Qaweya) respectively. In January 2012 Mohamed ElBaradei established the Constitutional Party (Al-Dostour). With social liberal or social democrat leanings, Al-Dostour has benefited from the infrastructures previously created as support platforms for ElBaradei. Its political programme is centred on rebalancing the relations between the State and its citizens, separating State and government to guarantee the neutrality of the institutions, the defence of individual freedoms and the establishment of an economic order that guarantees a minimum of social justice through a progressive fiscal system.

Strong Egypt, created in November 2012 by former members of the Brotherhood disillusioned by the lack of internal democracy and participation possibilities, defines itself as centre left, with a moderate Islamic vision. Its agenda includes fostering a participative democracy through greater decentralisation, social justice and inclusion through the redistribution of wealth, establishing a minimum wage and restructuring the welfare system and the independence of Egypt’s foreign policy. Its principal line of attack was not so much to oppose Morsi, like the other parties, but rather to oppose the privileges conceded to the army during the 2012 Constitution. The party uses an innovative system of bottom-up structuring (the creation of sectorial organisations, of women or young people), to allow for greater participation in decision-making and the emergence of young leaders. There are two lines of thought in the party, one which is more conservative and linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, and another more liberal, embodied by the young revolutionaries. The division between both became clear when it came to taking a stance for or against the 2012 Constitution. The party uses an innovative system of bottom-up structuring (the creation of sectorial organisations, of women or young people), to allow for greater participation in decision-making and the emergence of young leaders. There are two lines of thought in the party, one which is more conservative and linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, and another more liberal, embodied by the young revolutionaries. The division between both became clear when it came to taking a stance for or against the 2012 Constitution.

The coup d’état in July 2013, that ended Egypt’s Islamist rule, has allowed the NSF to become the centrepiece of this new stage and capitalise on the anti-Islamist offensive. Nevertheless, it is yet to be seen whether the coalition can withstand the possible internal divergences and rivalries and, particularly, whether it can overcome the legitimacy deficit as a consequence of excluding the Muslim Brotherhood.

A New Actor in the Mix: Salafism

If there is an unexpected actor on the current Arab political map it is the politicised version of Salafism. Salafism, initially opposed to political participation, has attracted attention because of the power share it has captured. Its politicisation reveals the strong mobilisation capacity of these movements that are reoccupying a public space that they have not been allowed in for a long time: some opt for violent strategies, others lead campaigns to intervene in the Islamisation of society, and others compete as political parties, form alliances and serve as opposition according to their own political calculations and party interests. In Egypt, Salafists of different origins created their own political parties in 2011. The election results exceeded all expectations and al-Nour, the main Salafist
CONSTITUTION AND RULE OF LAW IN EGYPT: THE ARMY AS GUARDIAN OF REFORM

The reform model adopted by Egypt seems to combine top-down and bottom-up approaches in order to legitimise the entire process. The army has effectively taken charge of the transition process by defining the constitutional timetable. On 23 March 2011, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) issued a constitutional declaration establishing the regulations for the forthcoming elections and temporarily granting itself the power to govern. After the legislative elections in autumn 2011, a committee resulting from the elections was entrusted with drafting the new constitution. The Constitution drawn up on 29 November 2012 was approved by referendum the following month. Largely based on the 1971 Constitution, this new text attempts to break with the “hyper-presidency” effect enshrined by the preceding regime.

In fact, the new constitution places limitations on presidential powers and grants certain competences to Parliament. The President is limited to two four-year terms (Article 133). Moreover, he is required to collaborate closely with Parliament in order to form a new government (Article 139). Above all, the President’s approval is no longer necessary in the case of proceedings to dissolve a government, a Parliamentary majority sufficing (Article 126). Certain prerogatives do remain intact, however. The right to appoint a tenth of the members of the Consultative Assembly (or Shura Council, Article 128), for instance, lends the president a certain influence in the legislative process. Hence we are dealing with a configuration resembling a semi-presidential system whose first objective is to break with an executive branch that encroaches upon the legislative and judicial branches.

In this regard, on the symbolic level, the trial of the former President and his entourage as well as the dissolution of the National Democratic Party (NDP) shows a possible rebalancing of power to the benefit of the judiciary. By the same token, the state of emergency (Law 162/1958) allowing the authorities to carry out operations with no restrictions by the legislative or judiciary branches was lifted in May 2012. In any case, the centrality of the military seems to endure: more than 11,000 civilians must appear in military courts. Indeed, it appears that the army’s central role poses a duality between civilian and military power, insofar as the SCAF claims to serve the nation and has designated the country’s stability as its priority. In this regard, by establishing a tight timetable for transition, the constitutional declaration issued by the SCAF was designed to promote a transition benefiting actors with a significant local presence (the Muslim Brotherhood, dignitaries of the former regime), a guarantee of stability and conservatism. Out of this came a conservative alliance between the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the army against liberal trends. However, a divergence emerged while the constitution was being drafted: whereas the army made an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood with a view to ensure the country’s stability and retain their privileges, the FJP attempted to consolidate civilian power.

This civilian-military power duality is illustrated in certain judicial decisions such as the constitutional declaration of 17 June 2012 exhorting the Supreme Constitutional Court to dissolve Parliament on the grounds of unconstitutionality and granting the SCAF legislative powers until the next legislative elections. In so doing, the President inherited a government without a Parliament, de facto reducing the presidency to an empty shell. The tension persisted due to certain dismissals made by Morsi (Procurator-General Abdel Meguid Mahmoud) as well as a constitutional declaration issued by the president on 22 November 2012 immunising presidential decrees and laws against any court action. Moreover, this declaration prohibited the Supreme Constitutional Court from ruling against the Constitutional Commission in order to accelerate the adoption of the new constitutional text. Finally, said text was approved by the referendum held from 15 to 22 December 2012 by 63.8% of votes, with a low voter turnout (32.9%); a score that reveals the lack of consensus on the new constitution.

The showdown between civilian and military power led to the progressive isolation of Mohammed Morsi, who was facing growing political dissent and popular protest and an unsustainable socioeconomic context, and then to his overthrow by the army on 3 July 2013. The SCAF suspended the new constitution, issued a new constitutional declaration (approved on 8 July 2013) by which the President of the Supreme Constitutional Court acts as interim President of the nation while a committee of experts is tasked with preparing new amendments (Article 128) before being submitted to another referendum. In contrast to the March 2011 declaration, this one grants the interim President the majority of powers (Article 24): legislative powers, domestic and foreign representation of the State, appointment of the government and even the right to pardon.

The reform process in Egypt combines two approaches: on the one hand, an approach initially imposed from above and by the army, aiming to establish the rules of the transition game while retaining significant prerogatives allowing it to supervise the transition; and on the other hand, constitutional reform has been entrusted to those having legitimacy in the eyes of the general population. In any case, the growing rivalries between the different actors (the army, political parties, social movements, etc.) have begun a new process, again launched by the SCAF, thus ensuring the army’s return to the political arena.

Moussa Bourekba and Héctor Sánchez Margalef
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The Salafists compete for the same electorate as the Muslim Brotherhood. Their role in the Constituent Assembly has consisted in putting pressure on the Brotherhood to reflect “more Islam” in the constitutional text, taking them to positions that are difficult to reconcile with the secular opposition and part of the public opinion. Their discourse has focused on the need to implement reforms, which they believe to be necessary especially for their project of social re-Islamisation (like in education), and in the fight against corruption.

In fact, the role of Salafism as a “hinge” party, positioned next to the Islamists or the opposition depending on the given interests, has given it considerable political benefits and ensured it a future place in the country’s politics after the removal of Morsi. The Egyptian “deep State,” fully aware of Egyptian Salafism having already given it wings during the Mubarak era to counter the popularity of the Brotherhood, has known to play the Salafist card once again to its own benefit. The military intervention to bring down the Morsi government had the blessing of al-Nour, which joined the popular mobilisation. The strategy benefits al-Nour because it makes it the only potential target of the Islamist vote once the Brotherhood is out of the running, and it is to the advantage of the army as the presence of al-Nour during this new phase serves to neutralise any accusations of an attempt to repress Islamism on ideological grounds.

Tunisian Salafism had a worse position, victim of a long history of repression under Ben Ali, but unlike the Egyptians, the Tunisian Salafists took to the streets during the revolution and then took up the rhetoric on Islamic identity during the election campaign. Their presence is growing in the working class neighbourhoods, where the radical elements carry out acts of violence, such as the sacking of UGTT offices, the attacks in Manouba University and, especially, the attack on the US Embassy in September 2012, among others. Other factions want to put an end to the violence and instead put pressure on Ennahda to propagate their ideas.

In its relations with the Salafists, Ennahda has implemented three strategies: integration, legalisation and repression. Firstly, it prioritised their integration. In Ghannouchi’s own words, “They are our children; if we abandon them we condemn them to radicalisation.” In 2012 four Salafist parties were legalised, on the condition that they accepted democratic rules: the micro Rahma party (30 July 2012), the Asala party (March 2012), the influential Jabhat al-Islah (Reform Front, May 2012) and the most popular, Hizb ut-Tahrir (Liberation Party). It should be mentioned, however, that some of its members already formed part of the Constituent Assembly as independent candidates. So, Ennahda is pressured by parties that urge it to take a more dogmatic line to avoid people being “disappointed” again with the government’s management.

However, neither integration nor legalisation have succeeded in wiping out the Salafist violence and, in the end, Ennahda has had no choice but to resort to repressive strategies, particularly confronting the Ansar al-Sharia group and charging several jihadist Salafists accused of acts of violence. The clashes between security forces and jihadists on the borders with Algeria have been cause for concern in recent months. These measures have been welcomed by many Tunisians, especially because the signs indicate that Salafists are behind many of the violent acts, including the assassination of Chokri Belaïd and Mohamed Brahmi.

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Tunisian Salafism is evolving and today presents diverse tendencies: that of preaching (almiyya or scientific Salafism), political and violent. Time will tell if the non-violent versions and politicisation of Tunisian Salafism will be able to neutralise its violent arm, fuelled by a youth disillusioned by poor prospects and a pitiful economic situation. The integration of political Salafism and its democratic assimilation, its capacity to provide socioeconomic alternatives that avoid radicalisation, and balance repressive measures all depend on the deactivation of violent Salafism.

In Morocco, the authorities have shown a significant change in attitude since March 2011, by promising to release numerous detained Islamists. Following
the pardons issued in April to 196 prisoners, the PJD won the elections prompting a new wave of releases, including certain prominent members of Moroccan Salafism. In fact, the Movement for Unity and Reform, a Moroccan Salafist association publicly supported the PJD, as this constitutes its hard core, or at least an important base for the party. This means there is neither the competition nor the ambiguity that can be seen in Egypt or in Tunisia between the majority Islamists and Salafists. In fact, in Morocco the relationship works for everyone: through the PJD the Salafists can propagate their ideas and put pressure on the government to avoid any threats to their existence; for its part, the PJD shares the "struggle" against the liberals and both the monarchy and the PJD gain recognition for religious legitimisation thanks to the Salafists.

Therefore, the "Arab Spring" has allowed for an official opening of dialogue with the moderate wing of the Salafist movement (quietest, scientific and non-jihadist), on the condition that it recognises the King as the Commander of the Faithful. This is a key difference with respect to the other Moroccan Islamist movement that enjoys great popularity, Al Adl Wa Al Ihsane, tolerated but not recognised officially for forty years. In fact, recently there has been talk again about the legalisation of the movement of the deceased Sheik Abdesslam Yassine, although this would only be possible if Al Adl Wa Al Ihsane decided to give up its historical position: the rejection both of the role of the Palace in politics and the religious authority of the monarch.

Most importantly will be how the Salafist movements relate with the other political actors and, especially with the majority Islamists, who they can collaborate with or compete with for the same electorate, power share and the monopoly of the religious discourse. On the other hand, it remains to be seen whether the politicisation of Salafism will push Islamism to more dogmatic postures that incorporate Salafist demands or, to the contrary, greater political pragmatism.

The Libyan Exception: Radical Change and Fragmentation

Libya has without doubt seen the most radical political transformation, with all actors striving for a common goal: a change of the political and economic elite. The political panorama is extremely fragmented between former regime leaders and revolutionaries, Islamists and non-Islamists, or even between ethnic minorities and majorities and regional representatives. Furthermore, from the political landscape are emerging numerous non-state actors who are gradually making a name for themselves in politics, such as local councils, tribal forums or revolutionary brigades.

Libya has without doubt seen the most radical political transformation, with all actors striving for a common goal: a change of the political and economic elite

The July 2012 elections, which ended in victory for the National Forces Alliance (NFA), led by Mahmoud Jibril, were seen as a liberal victory. However, the reality is that the true winners were the independent candidates, who accumulated 120 of the 200 seats in the General National Congress. While the NFA won 39 seats, the Islamist Justice and Construction Party (JCP) won 17. However, the divide existing between Islamists and non-Islamists in other countries does not occur here. Libyan society is majority conservative, and issues related to Islamism seem to enjoy wide consensus: all parties, including the NFA accept the inclusion of the sharia as the main source of legislation. In fact, there are few ideological differences between the different parties, which is the result of an absence of political pluralism under Gaddafi, and the only parties to present a national agenda were the Islamists from the JCP, whose influence was important in the field of security and the religious institutions.

Another phenomenon worth highlighting is the presence of Salafism. There are, like in other countries, diverse Salafist tendencies: mainly the political and jihadist. Political Salafism has 27 seats and is represented politically through: the Authenticity Movement (Al-Asalah); revolutionary Salafism, which was active during the war against the regime and linked with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG); and diverse revolutionaries and independent figures led by Abdelhakim Belhadj. The other jihadist Salafism,
which had a significant role during the Libyan revolution has led numerous anti-West attacks (against the convoy of the British Ambassador and the UN Special Envoy, the Red Cross offices in Misrata and Benghazi, the French embassy in Tripoli and, in particular, the attack that killed the American ambassador in Benghazi in September 2012). Even some groups like Ansar al-Sharia have decided to unite with soldiers from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in their fight against the French intervention in Mali.

The other political actors are small parties and independent figures, and likewise those that represent the Berber minorities, which lend themselves to the coalition game. The weight of the independent candidates is of great significance due to their proportion in the Assembly (60% of the seats for individual candidates), since many of them represent local interests, whether these are districts, tribes or families. In the post-civil war context, the dividing line is drawn by participation, or not, in the revolts. The self-proclaimed “revolutionaries” are brigades, Islamists and highly diverse actors that are poorly represented in the GNC. Many of them have positions in the new military and security institutions and attempt to influence in the new political context. This is a poorly unified group, since the local character has a strong influence on the identity and the deployment of the brigades, and the relation between these and the government is increasingly tense. This has led to the government’s open desire to disarm these groups, integrate them into the forces of the regular army and take back control of the prisons that are under their command. The element that these “revolutionary” actors all agree on is the political exclusion of all those related with the Gaddafi regime. To this end, on 5 May 2013 the “political exclusion law” was passed, under pressure from the brigades and revolutionary actors supported by a significant part of the GNC, with the exception of numerous independent members from the country’s south and centre.

The other side is represented by the so-called “counter-revolutionaries,” i.e., the moderates, conservatives and those who collaborated with the old regime or abstained from getting involved during the civil war. Among these are members of the NFA, independent candidates and tribal chiefs who have remained loyal to Gaddafi, especially from Sirte, Bani Walid or the Fezzan region. Some of these pro-Gaddafi actors have been totally marginalised in the transition process, are victims of stigmatisation or even repression in jails that are not under state control.

Mention should be made of the actors that demand greater federalism against the resistance of the elected politicians. With particular presence in Cyrenaica, the federalist tendency enjoys three forms of support: the intellectuals from Benghazi and Derna; certain tribes (Obeidat, Awaqi and Magharba); the classes of officials close to the Berber and Tubus tribes; and minorities, who see decentralisation as an opportunity for recognition of their rights. The insistent demands for political and economic decentralisation due to the region’s oil wealth have met with resistance from the revolutionary brigades and the Islamists, which have a strong presence in this area.

Ultimately, the issues of wealth and power distribution in Libya on national, regional and local scales is a central problem that is yet to be resolved. Likewise, the need for transitional justice is highly evident, since the divisions between the political actors are determined by the lack of reconciliation.

A SOCIAL MAP IN MOVEMENT

In 2002, the civil society organisations registered in the Middle East and North Africa came to 130,000 entities, with major differences between countries based on the different degrees of tolerance of regimes with respect to social activism. With the exception of Libya, where all forms of civil society organisations were totally prohibited, in the other countries the tonic was that relative tolerance combined with an attempt to control the organisations via different instruments. Legislation was one of such instruments, as were control of financing and the infiltration of figures close to the power into key positions within the organisations’ structures. Despite the restrictions, the existence of these organisations allowed the regimes to offer the outside world an image that was more in keeping with the demands for democratisation formulated by external actors, particularly the European Union and the United States. Likewise, organisations that were dedicated to social action, education, health, food, etc., served the State to compensate to some degree for its incapacity to respond in these areas. On occa-
Transitional justice can be defined as a series of approaches and mechanisms implemented to address abuses committed in the past "in order to establish responsibilities, deliver justice and allow reconciliation." Addressing past crimes and abuses through inquiry commissions, through a justice system obliging perpetrators to answer for their actions – constitutes a fundamental stage in the transition process. This is particularly the case with Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, where demands for reparation of acts of violence and wrongdoing (crimes, abuse, torture, imprisonment, etc.) committed under authoritarian regimes have become urgent. Such reparation would include: prosecution of those responsible for mass atrocities, attending to demands for compensation and demonstrating the will to put an end to human rights violations.

In Tunisia, the issue of transitional justice has been deeply politicised. On the morrow of Ben Ali’s departure, a number of inquiry commissions emerged to investigate cases of corruption, abuses and even crimes committed during the uprisings. Since the election of the Constituent Assembly in October 2011, however, this desire for justice has gradually faded. In fact, the political stage being highly polarised, it is extremely difficult to reach a consensus on such subjects and the civil society actors engaged in said justice process are actually neither trained nor prepared: in order to appease the population, a number of trials were conducted in haste or unfairly. In addition, the reform of the judicial branch and the security sector is now an urgent, considerable challenge for the transition. Despite the purge of the Ministry of the Interior, it has not yet been the object of in-depth reform. Moreover, the bill of law on transitional justice, which would create a Truth and Dignity Commission with a compensation fund and establish judge training, has not yet been passed by the Constituent Assembly. Though this bill was, surprisingly, the object of consensus in the Assembly at first, in the absence of a reform of the judicial system and the presence of a majority of judges having served during the Ben Ali era, its implementation will prove complicated. Finally, the bill for the “Law on the Immunisation of the Revolution,” aiming to exclude the dignitaries of the former regime, is likely to increase the politicisation of the question of transitional justice and thus delay its implementation.

Although both Tunisia and Egypt have dissolved the respective Ben Ali and Mubarak political parties, only the members of the former Tunisian regime were excluded from elections for the Constituent Assembly. In Egypt, the majority Islamist Parliament drew up a bill of law on political exclusion but the Supreme Court, inherited from the former regime, declared it unconstitutional. The decision by the Administrative Court confirmed the right of members of the former regime to participate in politics. Moreover, in Tunisia, an ad hoc ministry – the Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice – was tasked with co-ordinating and carrying out transitional justice, whereas in Egypt, it is the SCAF, closely tied to the Mubarak era, that supervises the transition. Nevertheless, in both countries, many legal proceedings and trials have above all targeted Ben Ali or Mubarak and their respective families. With the exception of these highly publicised cases, many cases are being handled extremely slowly, which has led to a sort of disenchantment. Therefore, though military justice has become the first recourse for handling transitional justice cases in Tunisia (thanks to the military courts), in Egypt, military justice has been manipulated. In this regard, Mubarak’s very brief, highly politicised trial, the maintenance of the state of emergency law after the fall of the regime and the prosecution of over 11,000 civilians in military courts are all factors attesting to the SCAF’s political agenda.

Politically dominated by State and non-State actors, Libya has a second handicap complicating the entire process of transitional justice: the absence of a security apparatus. As a consequence, war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by revolutionaries have not been investigated at all, which raises the issue of the judiciary in general and transitional justice in particular. In addition, through the amnesty declared in May 2012, the National Transitional Council (NTC) officially established the impunity of perpetrators of crimes and forced displacements occurring during the uprisings. Also, despite the ensemble of measures taken to “purge” the civil service and political arena of senior government officials having served under Gaddafi, the fact remains that the preferential terms resulting from the power relations at play seem insufficient: due to a radical split between “revolutionaries” and “collaborators,” the process of transitional justice is not being conducted as per the mechanisms observed in the aforementioned countries (commission to inquire into human rights violations, “truth” commissions, etc.). At the same time, armed groups – although considered the initiators of the regime change – are not held legally accountable for the crimes they committed. On the contrary, they enjoy amnesty and various recognitions. In this regard, a more comprehensive approach – reconciling today’s and yesterday’s victims in a less polarised perspective – combined with the establishment of a security apparatus and effective judicial system, would allow transitional justice to be carried out in Libya. It is undeniable that transitional justice is one of the stages of the transition process and a necessary instrument on the road towards instituting the Rule of Law. It rises to the demands made by citizens concerning the acknowledgement of human rights violations and other crimes committed in the past. However, each country is facing structural problems arising from both the power relations at work as well as from the State and juridical structures in place.

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previous regimes. The most emblematic case in this sense is that of the bill relating to NGOs in Egypt, as an attempt to use the law to control the creation and registration of the country’s new civil associations. In fact, the issue of foreign financing of NGOs in Egypt has been a historical motive for attacking these organisations both during the Mubarak years and also under Mohamed Morsi. This was seen on 4 June 2013, when 43 Egyptian and foreign workers belonging to international NGOs were sentenced to up to five years in prison for receiving funds from abroad and, allegedly, contributing to the country’s instability. After the fall of Ben Ali, Tunisia was witness to a proliferation of associations, more than 160 in less than a month, and among the most active are those that protect human rights. Their work consists in reporting any human rights violations, demanding the release of political prisoners and justice for those who were persecuted, tortured or suffered reprisals at the hands of the former regime. Like with other organisations that had previously been illegal, such as the Tunisian Association for the Struggle against Torture, the organisation Lawyers without Borders has worked in Tunisia since 2012 with the aim of dealing with the thousands of claims of human rights violations under Ben Ali.

The mobilisation of citizens has meant a drastic turnaround for the perception of citizens who, for the first time, have acquired a sense of full citizenship

In the Egyptian context, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR), active since 2002, is focused on reporting any government activity that violates the international treaties on human rights and on implementing both social and legal defence practices in cases of corruption and violation of the rule of law. Like the EIPR or the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, many of these organisations have positioned themselves politically during this transition period. After the overthrow of President Mohamed Morsi, for example, they have shown concern regarding certain articles in the July 2013 Constitutional Declaration and have been critical of police action.

Ultimately, the “Arab Spring” has confirmed that civil society has the capacity to promote democratic change. However, the way in which society has become involved in the process of change, the explosion of activism, the vitality of the “Arab street,” is cause to reconsider the focus of this social dynamism in the hierarchical organised structures, like the NGOs, and become aware of a much wider phenomenon, that of “active citizenship.” The mobilisation of citizens is more than an “awakening” of social actors that were previously “dormant;” it has meant a drastic turnaround for the perception of citizens who, for the first time, have acquired a sense of full citizenship. The gags that muffled an active but restricted civil society gave way to multiple actors, causes and movements that became highly active during the transition. These consist of youth, women, the media, trade unions and other groups and individuals that participate in the public debate with a strong sense of appropriation of the process, and a determination to rewrite their own future. The different groups identified do not constitute isolated blocks. The dividing lines are blurred because of the strong interaction between the different groups and because their action is not restricted to a single area of action. Some of these actors are new to the scene, others have a known history in social activism, but in all cases their participation is developing in a new context, under new conditions, and they have much wider repercussions than in the past.

Youth Trapped between “Street Politics” and the Parties

The main actor and factor of the “Arab Awakening,” the youth, today represents the majority of the population of the Middle East and North Africa, where half the population is under 23 years old. This is the best trained Arab generation in history, but they are struggling to find their place in society. These young people have lived under political leaders who are disconnected from their reality, three times their age and whose rhetoric has little meaning. This generation perceives the world in a very different way to their parents. The vast majority have no political project, and no connection with the mobilising ideologies of the past, which now seem ob-
solete, and their social and political clout has been, until very recently, negligible or non-existent. In many cases, disconnected from the traditional hierarchies, whether family-based, religious or socio-political, these young people have ended up asserting themselves by using their skills, taking advantage of the potential of technological tools which have helped them open to the outside, communicate, organise and explore new forms of individual and collective action.

After the undeniable role of youth during the revolts, many of them now feel distanced from the political scene, and in no case have they demobilised. They have taken part in parties and civil society groups, they are active on the Internet, blogs and social networks, they express themselves through art, cinema and music and continue with “street politics” without having yet found a balance between the street and conventional politics.

**Institutionalisation of the Revolutionary Youth**

In a political landscape that is traditionally dominated by middle-aged to older males, the political visibility of the revolutionary youth has been limited. Some of the better-known activists decided to make the leap to politics after the revolts, although with little success. Moreover, the political polarisation and lack of direction of many of the parties has only served to distance them further from the political scene, to continue, in many cases, with social action.

In Egypt, those that were associated with religious movements joined the FJP or al-Nour, while others opted to join the **Coalition of the Youth of the Revolution**, composed of a wide spectrum of parties and movements with different political leanings, and formed by the main activists from 25 January. Focused on pressuring the Military Council, their activity was so firmly based on the street that they were unable to form a social base, which led to their dissolution in July 2012.

Others decided to form their own parties (El-Adl, centrist, Al-Tayyar el-Masry, post-Islamist, Masr El-Horreya and El-Waa’i, liberal). Only El-Adl and Masr El-Horreya won seats (one each) in the Parliament. They were unable to form a sufficient base or mobilise electoral support due to the lack of time, experience, resources and leaders that could attract donations and votes, especially among the older generations. A strong idealist spirit among youth and a social resistance to giving positions of responsibility to young people have prevented them from making any political gains.

Integrating into other political parties like El-Masryeen el-Ahrar, liberal, El-Hizb El-Masry El-Dimuqrati, social democrat, El-Tahalof El-Shaaby, left-wing, or those built around emerging political figures (Baradei, Moussa, Aboul Fotouh or Sabahi), has not been easy due to generational conflicts, especially caused by discrepancies when it comes to taking decisions, hierarchies and a lack of internal participation mechanisms. Other activists are members of grassroots political movements, like the Egyptian Revolutionary Socialists movement, founded in 1995 and largely underground during the Mubarak regime. The role of this group was significant during the organisation of the 2011 protests and they have subsequently been active in reporting any “deviations” in the transition process. Under the slogan “no to Mubarak, the SCAF and the Muslim Brotherhood,” this group has been highly critical of the repression and, above all, in the current turbulence are very active in condemning the return of military power to the political scene.

Among the groups of more politicised youth and those who have gained a more relevant role during the transition are those that existed before the revolution. The **April 6 Youth Movement**, in Egypt, was created in 2008 by a group of young people opposed to the Mubarak government to give support to the workers of Mahalla al-Kubra, an industrial and agricultural city on the Nile Delta. The group is based on an ideology of non-violence and uses the social networks as a means to mobilise and raise awareness. This group took part in the protests for the “Day of Rage,” on 25 January in Egypt and was a key player in the revolts that deposed the dictator. Since then, with its claim of “the revolution continues,” it has been one of the unavoidable social actors and its leaders have been courted by the political class and visited by foreign dignitaries. During the mandate of the SCAF, the 6 April was fiercely criticised, which led part of the group to offer its public support for Mohamed Morsi in the second round of the presidential elections, as a way of rejecting the army’s candidate, Ahmed Shafiq. Despite the differences with the Brotherhood, the April 6 Youth saw in Morsi a candidate that would break from the previous regime, as well as someone they...
could trust to carry out the promises made by the Islamist party of political opening and inclusion of different opposition groups.

One year on from Morsi’s appointment, in view of the deteriorating political and economic situation, the movement has participated actively in anti-Morsi demonstrations and in the Tamarod (Rebel) movement. However, as the campaign against the deposed Islamist movement has gained strength, some members of April 6 are increasingly reluctant to approve of the army’s strategy, which has even led them to ignoring the army’s call to take to the streets to demonstrate against the Muslim Brotherhood, arguing that the presence of both groups in the streets would lead to more violence. There is currently a divide among the leaders, particularly between Ahmed Maher, one of the most visible faces, who openly criticises the anti-democratic nature of the military coup in July 2013 and the anti-Islamist campaign, and Israa Abdel Fattah, who believes that the military intervention has been an opportunity to free the country from Morsi’s authoritarian power.

Regarding its future, it is not clear whether the aim of the movement is to push forward with its non-partisan citizen activism or if, on the contrary, they are preparing the terrain to make the leap to politics as soon as they have a bigger social base and a better knowledge of the country’s political and institutional architecture. It is also yet to be seen whether the group will overcome its internal differences and uphold its independence with respect to the other political and social actors.

The culmination of youth activism against Mohamed Morsi is the formation of Tamarrod (rebel), an amalgamation of civil society groups and organisations, which includes the old Kefaya movement and April 6. By collecting signatures – they claim to have over 20 million – and organising demonstrations on 30 June, the day that marked a year of Morsi rule, the group brought about the fall of the elected President through the military intervention. Despite the dilemmas arising from the army’s actions and the removal of a democratically elected government, part of Tunisian society has seen the Egyptian initiative as a source of inspiration. On 3 July the creation of Tamarrod in Tunisia was announced, with the aim of dissolving the National Constituent Assembly. The mechanisms are the same as that of the preceding case: collecting signatures and organising popular demonstrations. Although its main instigators claim to have collected more than two million signatures in support, which would exceed the number of votes gained by the Troika, this figure is impossible to verify. In reality, it is difficult to believe that this movement could obtain the same result as in Egypt, since in Tunisia, for the time being, there have been no mass demonstrations, and no one knows what stance the Tunisian army would take, and there is no consensus between activists and political formations, with whom they refuse to have any kind of connection.

Youth demands are not all the same, but they are essentially focused on common principles: access to quality education and employment that allows young people to live with dignity, respect for freedom of expression and association, as well as the establishment of a non-repressive government that respects human rights.

In fact, the removal of Morsi in Egypt has created a divide inside of various civil society groups. Like the April 6 movement, the instigators of the Facebook page We are all Khaled Said have also shown differing opinions. This group represents a different kind of action: cyberactivism. Its participation in the public realm has been more individual-based than as a homogeneous group. Faced with the current political crisis, the division between the group’s leaders has become evident on Facebook. While the administrator of the Arabic page, Wael Ghonim, has declared his support for the military coup, the administrator of the English page, who has remained anonymous to avoid reprisals, uses the page to fiercely criticise the military coup. Zahraa Said, sister of Khaled Said, the blogger whose murder at the hands of the police prompted the creation of the page and allegations of police harassment, has completely disassociated herself from the English page.

Youth demands are not all the same, but they are essentially focused on common principles: access
to quality education and employment that allows young people to live with dignity, respect for freedom of expression and association, as well as the establishment of a non-repressive government that respects human rights. In fact, social issues are an important part of the “agenda” of youth groups. Proof of this is the existence of the group Zwela (the poor) in Tunisia, a collective created in 2012 that brings young people together who are dissatisfied by the current social and economic situation. Its aim is to attract attention to the extreme poverty that a large part of Tunisia’s population suffers (around 30%), especially through actions like painting graffiti in public places. Its activity has made it a target for the new government, which has persecuted its members, five of which have been imprisoned for “spreading disinformation harmful to the public order” and “defacing government property.”

Lastly, it is worth noting the development of the February 20 Movement in Morocco. Since its creation in 2011, the group has become involved in human rights defence and the fight against corruption and authoritarianism and, despite the arrest and conviction of its founder for harassing a minor in May 2012, the movement continues to be active and is still taking to the streets to make its demands, which have recently been focused on releasing political prisoners. However, the movement seems to have lost momentum in recent times. The changes made by the Moroccan authorities have managed, in part, to detract legitimacy and visibility from the movement, and the youth that form 20-F are struggling to keep the “revolutionary moment” alive. This is owed partly to the fact that part of the population has given a confidence vote to the reforms, but also to basic organisational problems. Also the network of activists received the initial support of left-wing militants and members of Al Adl Wa Al Ihssane (Justice and Charity), which has now separated with the announcement last December that the Islamist movement was withdrawing its support for 20-F. Nevertheless, the movement still has the potential to fill a void in the Moroccan political and social panorama, channelling secular groups that are not satisfied with the status quo, do not believe in the capacity of the secular political parties (due to the very present crisis in confidence between citizens and political parties in Morocco) and do not identify with the Islamist movements.

From “Street Politics” to Street Violence

A different category of youth groups active in the “Arab Street” is that of the previously depoliticised “ultras” in Egypt. These young people, followers of the country’s biggest football teams, have used their capacity to mobilise and organise to occupy the field of political activism. In this case these are groups of young people, mostly minors, who have had a history of confrontation with the police since the Mubarak years; something that has served them for organising their resistance against the repressive tactics employed by the police against demonstrators, before, during and after the revolution. The ultras refuse to be labelled politically, but they are very active in street combat and in tactics of civil disobedience. Their central demands are focused on the need for a far-reaching reform of the police force, their sworn enemy, who they, like many other activists and opponents, accuse of still using abusive tactics and violating human rights, as had been common practice in the past.

Among the most prominent ultra groups are the fans of Al-Ahly or Zamalek, in the capital. At the outset of the demonstrations, the group of Ahlawies (Ahly fans) positioned themselves as an apolitical group, affirming that their members were free to express political opinions, which is what happened when thousands of ultras filled Tahrir Square and led the fighting against the police and Mubarak supporters. In February 2012, a match between al-Ahly and al-Masry, the team of Port Said, one of the cities that had been favourable towards Mubarak, led to clashes between the fans of each team that left more than seventy fans dead. The subsequent death sentences given to several fans, accusations of police inaction – which according to the fans was deliberate – in breaking up the fighting, and the protests against the police, legal and political action, have led to numerous demonstrations, many violent and resulting in fatalities.

In this more radical segment of youth mobilisation, the new post-revolution panorama has seen the birth of a new group into the Arab world, the Egyptian Black Bloc. This group, allegedly linked with the ultras, appeared during the second anniversary of the revolution in January 2013. Inspired by the European Black Bloc, the anarchist group dress in black and cover their faces during demonstrations, to avoid
being identified. The opacity with respect to the organisation makes it difficult to know its real size and whether there is any kind of organisational structure or concrete leadership behind it. On a Youtube video on 23 January 2013, the group identified its objective as the fight against the Muslim Brotherhood, the Morsi government, corruption and oppression. After their entry into the social sphere, its members were quickly branded as terrorists and their immediate arrest was ordered. Contrary to the beliefs that the movement would quickly disappear, the Black Bloc has continued to participate actively in the demonstrations against Mohamed Morsi and its actions have not always been peaceful. Today, it is still considered to be a terrorist organisation and its members are wanted by the police.

Youth and Social Networks, Vectors of Democratisation?

The analysis of the new dynamics in social movements includes the recognition of the role of the Internet and new technologies as mobilisers and creators of revolutionary attitudes in the revolts. Virtual space has been an exceptional place for meeting and exchanging opinions and plans among specific sectors of the population, especially young people. The virtual environment has therefore favoured the emergence of new social actors, cyber activists, and the break from the monopoly of the state rhetoric, generating a “non-captive” public to the official line. Their potential is evident, not just because of what they have achieved, but also because of the efforts made by different government members to silence them (there are activists like the Egyptian Alaa Abd El-Fattah who have been persecuted first by the Mubarak regime, then under the rule of the SCAF and finally by the Morsi government). Censorship is still present, also in the virtual world, especially regarding certain subjects that are considered taboo, such as criticism of the government, religious dogmas or issues of a sexual nature. Repression does not only come from the hands of the authorities, but also from conservative society, who are very reluctant to allow certain issues to be publicly discussed. On many occasions the Internet and social networks serve as a testing ground for the conventional media to gauge how far they can go. This was the case with the reports of corruption made by cyber activists against certain members of the Tunisian government, and which were later taken up by the traditional media. Ultimately, it is too soon to say whether the activity in cyberspace is becoming a vector of democratisation. Events take place at high speed, and countries in transition are subject to great tensions. However, it is interesting to note some of the initiatives that have arisen during this period as ways of “monitoring” the transition process. As we saw in the previous section, some activists already have a public online dimension for joining the political realm, while others have preferred to focus on activities of “citizen journalism” and on training new activists. Saddled between training and journalism is an initiative whose popularity is on the rise: Mosireen. This group organises training workshops, offers equipment for documenting events and publishes its videos, photos and testimonies online, as well as organising open-air projections so that those who are not connected to the Web can see their work.

Online activism having repercussions on political and social construction will depend largely on the essential connection between these worlds, the real and the virtual.

There are also specific initiatives, like the campaign, “No military trials for Civilians,” that calls for the release of political prisoners and equal justice, or the “Tweet Nadwa,” the twitter meetings led by Alaa Abd El Fattah to take political discussions offline held between actors of different ideologies on Twitter. Other projects arising from the virtual realm have been enormously popular, like the “Morsi Meter,” for overseeing whether or not Morsi’s election promises were being kept, the “Zabatak” web page, dedicated to gathering and reporting corruption cases, or the initiative “Opengovtn” in Tunisia that promotes direct and participative democracy.

The Internet tools have become, in many cases, instruments for supervising those managing public affairs and mechanisms for strengthening civil society. Criticism has soon arrived, however, over the role of social networks during the transition phase. While they have been useful and effective at times, their tendency to
exaggerate has lost them credibility. Although highly effective in mobilising the population, they do not seem so effective in structuring civil society, partly due to their failure to adapt when formulating a coherent political strategy. Moreover, they do little to help people learn to make concessions and form consensus, which are so important at this critical time, but rather tend to strengthen positions and prejudices or push more “neutral” actors into taking up positions on one side or another. Furthermore, the speed of communication that these tools enable also allows negative ideas to be spread more quickly, and the – sometimes camouflaged – interference of actors bent on torpedoing the transition process and contaminating the virtual sphere has strengthened this aspect.

Bloggers are emerging leaders, but as a rule are restricted to a public realm limited by cyberspace; they are potential connectors, often towards the exterior, but many of them have still not managed to connect with their citizens, with those who live their daily lives outside of the virtual environment. As Ahmed Maher, founder of the April 6 Movement confirms, “The Internet media are old, now it is more important to reach the poorer neighbourhoods and increase our dissemination among those who are not connected.” This is the real challenge, to bring the online dynamism out of its virtual surroundings and into the political arena. Online activism having repercussions on political and social construction will depend largely on the essential connection between these worlds, the real and the virtual, and on cyber activists as much as committed political and social actors.

The Media: Trapped in the Balance of Powers

The media landscape in Tunisia after Ben Ali has shown notable changes, specifically a move from restricted and highly uniform content, transmitted by the state media, to a more pluralistic content and the multiplication of private actors after the revolution. To deal with the new media panorama and try to regulate and guarantee freedom in audiovisual, written and electronic media, the INRIC (The National Authority for the Reform of Information and Communication) proposed the creation of the Independent High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HAI-CA), in other words, a regulatory authority present in all democratic governments. The proposal generated a heated debate, but the persistence of a legal vacuum in this respect led Tunisian journalists to organising a general strike of all the media involved (public, private, radio, television, written and electronic press), especially anticipating an attempt by the authorities to control the media, which could lead to their politicisation.

Finally, in June 2013 the situation began to change. Faced with the risk of politicisation, the HAICA dismissed the idea of adopting a joint regulation for all media, and has opted for a distinction to be made between audiovisual media and the written press, an option that seems to have satisfied the demands of the professionals and corresponds to the regulatory systems in other countries. With the goal of ensuring freedom of expression, the written press must regulate itself, thus creating a pressing need for the formation of an independent press council composed of professionals and trade unions. Nevertheless, the Tunisian media keep coming up against structural problems, like the lack of resources or poor professional training. Tunisian journalists are clear on the matter: today there is greater freedom, but not as much as they would like.

In Egypt the period immediately after the revolution was characterised by a relative opening up of the media. However, this was only temporary and did not entail real progress in the quality of media production. The state media are grouped in a conglomerate that is closely controlled by the State, and those responsible for managing these bodies are appointed by the Minister of Information. This has all meant that, after an initial opening, there has been a step backwards in the release of information due to the Islamist government’s attempts to interfere, particularly through the appointment of figures close to the government in the regulatory authorities and in the upper echelons of the main media groups, and also the written press. In this way, the state media have shown a worrying tendency to change their stance based on who is in power, and private media have shielded themselves by taking up offensive or defensive positions depending on their political leanings. The reform of the media sector in Egypt is a real challenge because it implies modernising an oversized sector, which is historically badly managed and with a deep-rooted culture of obedience and a lack of professional standards, making it even more difficult for the media to become free and pluralist,
and not subject to state authority. In fact, the legislative reformulation of the sector until now has not contributed to its reform and in recent months there have been endless conflicts between journalists and media figures and the legal and political authorities. Recent events in Egypt cast even more doubts over the quality and impartiality of the Egyptian media, both public and private. After the military intervention on 3 July 2013, the first act of the military was to close the religious television channels and those connected with the Islamists, especially Misr25, and arrest some of their employees. The team of Al-Jazeera, a channel seen as the main defender of the Brotherhood, was criticised and expelled by press colleagues after the coup, while the other media have led a virulent campaign to demonise the Islamists and glorify patriotism and the army.

The situation of the Arab media shows a paradox between a society demanding greater freedom and governments reluctant to adopt laws that fully protect freedom of press and expression. As a general rule, the situation of the Arab media shows a paradox between a society demanding greater freedom and governments reluctant to adopt laws that fully protect freedom of press and expression. As well as dealing with government restrictions and structural problems, such as insufficient training, a lack of funding and support for investigative journalism, for example, the Arab media now find themselves trapped in the power balance between the different groups that comprise each country's political and social spectrum. The last two years have undeniably seen advances regarding the multiplication of more independent media channels, but it is clear that the freedom of the press and expression is not an irreversible achievement and the media still have not achieved the independence and level of professionalism and quality desirable for creating a pluralist and diverse public space. Ultimately, the evolution of the Arab media will serve as a mirror for assessing the progress of democracy: if the legislative frameworks are adequate and the policies develop to accompany the democratic opening, we will be witness to a flourishing of free and independent press. However, if the new governments continue to reproduce the authoritarian models inherited from the old regimes, the situation will only get worse, meaning that the role played by civil society will be all the more important to avoid the partisan monopolisation of information again.

Women and the Pending Revolution

Although women were active participants in the revolutions, their situation has not improved in line with this involvement. On the contrary, the rise to power of certain political forces with a conservative agenda has engendered the perception that the limited progress in women's rights is in danger. Libya and Egypt are cases in point, where the situation for women seems to be gradually worsening, not just regarding political participation, but also in terms of their access to the public space, particularly due to problems of sexual harassment. This situation has reactivated the feminist struggle, which, more than being focused on political participation, is aiming to prevent a regression in the rights they have won and fight violence against women. Feminist militancy is not new. In the Arab world it began in the 20th century with the national liberation
movements, based on the idea that an improvement in the social situation must unquestionably imply an improvement in conditions for women. However, the priority of the fight against the colonial power meant that the feminist movements progressively disappeared and were unable to recover their strength until the beginning of the 70s. A similar phenomenon seems to be happening today: although women were in the front line against the autocratic regime, the goals of the “revolution” seem to omit the struggle to improve the situation for women.

Thanks to the 1956 Code of Personal Status, a legacy of Bourguiba, Tunisian women are more numerous in universities and participate in the country’s political, economic and cultural life. In Tunisia, “state feminism” has evolved with a strong presence of feminist organisations and grassroots support. The Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATFD) is an example of an association that works to improve the legal status of women. Created in the eighties, this association bases its struggle on the CEDAW and the issue of inequality of inheritance is central to its fight. The Association of Tunisian Women for Research and Development (AFTURD) has made political participation one of its bones of contention.

This strong support for the feminist struggle in Tunisia made militants very suspicious when faced with the possible conservative agenda of the Islamist party, although Ennahda was quick to ensure throughout its election campaign that it would respect the progress made in the area of women’s rights, especially the more equal family code throughout the region. Controversy arose from the draft of the new constitution, the emblem of conflict between conservatives and liberals. In an initial draft constitution, one controversial article stipulated the notion of “complementarity” of men and women: “The state guarantees the protection of women’s rights and gains, following the principle of complementarity with man, their roles being made complete within the family structure, and as man’s partner in developing the country.” This article, supported by Ennahda, caused such a commotion that after several demonstrations it was withdrawn from the text. In the new draft, article 5 affirms equal rights between men and women and avoids any kind of discrimination, while article 7 stipulates the role of the State in protecting women’s rights. However, the Tunisians are not satisfied and demand that the constitutional text incorporate the membership of the country in CEDAW, especially in reference to custody of minors, marriage and inheritance.

In 2011 the transitional government voted in a law that provides for parity between male and female candidates for the elections to the Constituent Assembly. The law, however, failed to increase the number of women in political life. The percentage of women elected (49, 24% of the 218 members) has seen little change and the vast majority of the women members (42 out of 49) belong to the same party, Ennahda.

In Egypt, the 2011 parliamentary elections produced disappointing results with respect to women’s participation in politics. The proportion of women elected fell from 12% to 2%, possibly due to the cancellation of the women’s quota established in 2009. Furthermore, the constitutional text has a decidedly masculine and Islamist tone. The clear fall in female participation in Egyptian political life and the growing pressure exerted by Morsi’s conservative government have pushed many women into joining activist associations and movements.

Apart from the organisations that already existed within the controlled framework of “state feminism,” today there are many highly active organisations that defend women’s rights, many of them grouped under the Network of Women’s Rights Organisations, which includes the New Women Foundation, the Woman and Memory Foundation, the Nadim Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence, the Nazra Woman and Memory Foundation, the Nadim Center for Feminist Studies, the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, and many more.

Another form of activism comes in the form of less coordinated initiatives, like the street art group WOW (Women on Walls) that is dedicated to doing graffiti throughout the country, especially with the campaign “No to sexual harassment.” And evidently a significant amount of online activism has developed. The creation of the website Harassmap is another initiative that fights sexual harassment in Egypt through the creation of an interactive map showing locations where women have been assaulted, with a detailed report on the attack and the attacker. According to the United Nations, Cairo is the second most dangerous capital city for women, not just for sexual harassment in the streets, but also for harassment from the authorities. Proof of the latter are the virginity tests carried out on a group of women arrested during the rule of the SCAF. During the
demonstrations that brought about Morsi’s downfall, at least a hundred women were assaulted in four days. The NGO Tahrir Bodyguard had to ask women to avoid the square and many associations have reported the use of rape as a political weapon to prevent women from participating.

In Libya, on 3 August 2011, the National Transitional Council enacted a Constitutional Declaration that laid the foundations for the transition period. The declaration confirmed that the sharia is the main source of law. The impact of this on conditions for women is the authorisation of polygamy and the revision of laws relating to divorce. At the same time, article 6 of the declaration affirms that all Libyans, regardless of their sex, whether tribal or religious, are equal in the eyes of the law. There is no specific mention of women’s participation in political life and no quotas established ahead of the legislative elections.

The challenges of feminists in Arab countries are therefore two-fold: to fight for the revolution by promoting democracy and placing demands for sexual equality at the centre of the fight for a fairer and freer society.

Finally, it should be mentioned that in the last two years there have been initiatives for the feminist struggle, which are unheard of in the region. These include individual demands like that of Egyptian Aliaa ElMahdy, who was persecuted for publishing a naked photo of herself on her blog, or that of the Tunisian activists linked to the FEMEN movement, like the case of Amina Tyler. Although the cases of Alia, exiled in Sweden, or Amina, have caused great controversy and cannot be considered very representative of Arab feminism, it should be mentioned that there is a perception of greater freedom that clashes with generational differences, with political and social resistance and which, far from being accepted and strengthened, is under permanent negotiation. Despite the visibility women attained during the revolts, this has not led to greater participation in the area of decision making. Women may be more involved in citizen activism than before, but so are a lot of men. What is more, in some countries the changes have been perceived as a threat to the rights women have acquired until now, and there have even been steps backward taken in this regard. Maybe, as happened in the past, the new demands seem to eclipse the importance of the demands made by the feminist groups. The fight for democracy, freedom of expression and improvements in living conditions has again relegated the conditions for women to a secondary position. The challenges of feminists in Arab countries are therefore two-fold: to fight for the revolution by promoting democracy and placing demands for sexual equality at the centre of the fight for a fairer and freer society.

Trade Unions: Essential Actors for a New Social Contract

The trade unions constitute a form of social organisation with its own interests, specific character and a particular relation with politics and power. However, they do share spaces and activities with other social organisations. Although they were not leaders in the 2011 revolts, for example, they did act as key players thanks to their organisational experience, the participation of their activists and their use of strikes before, during and after the revolts.

Like in other cases, the trade unions have had to be merged with the State and the dominant, or only, party. In fact, under the Muammar Gaddafi regime, only a central union was allowed to exist, the General Trade Union Federation of Workers, that all workers had to be affiliated to and was under the total control of the authorities. There was no right to strike and foreign workers, a sixth of the population, had no union representation.

In Egypt, for a long time, the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) was the only body that brought together the workers: affiliation was compulsory and it existed as a workers’ body controlled by the regime. Since the eighties, trade unionism began to register initiatives outside of the official central body. In 1990, the Center of Trade Unions and Workers Services (CTUWS) was created, around which various sectors are structured. Progressively, the workers’ protest movements stepped up their confrontational character until the fall of Mubarak.

After the fall of the regime, the workers came together in an independent movement of the ETUF and created the Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions.
Unions (EFITU) on 30 January 2011, calling for a
general strike to be staged. At the same time, other
organisations began to emerge, like the Egyptian
Democratic Labour Congress (EDLC). In the space
of two years more than a thousand new trade unions
have been created, although still with a limited room
for manoeuvre. Under the rule of the SCAF, new
forms of controlling trade union activity have been
activated, including a law banning strikes, accused of
damaging the economy, which can be punished with
fines or imprisonment. The election of Mohamed
Morsi did not bring about any changes in this area
and there has been a flurry of accusations that work-
ers active in Trade Unionism are suffering persecu-
tion, arbitrary dismissals, violence against them or
even actions directed at penalising them legally. It
comes as no surprise therefore, that the union move-
ments have been active in demanding Morsi’s resig-
nation. Their demands are centred on the right to or-
ganise themselves into new trade unions without
needing prior authorisation from the government and
an end to the arbitrary dissolution of new trade un-
ions that are independent of the ETUF, as well as the
removal of this federation, considered to be a repre-
sentative of the power and not the workers.

There is, therefore, an enormous
sense of citizen appropriation, an
empowerment of the masses that are
not just happy to express themselves,
more or less freely, but consider
themselves authorised to intervene,
exert pressure and, if they see fit,
overthrow a government, even if it has
been democratically elected

In Tunisia, the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT)
was the main union before the revolts, and enjoyed
an ambivalent relationship with the authoritarian re-
gime. Despite its political ties with the dominant
party since 1957, the union has led major clashes
with the government and strikes, such as the union
mobilisations in January 2008 in the Gafsa mining
basin. The UGTT has kept its popular roots and in-
ternal pluralism as its bedrock, which historically has
allowed the trade union to integrate sectors that are
critical of the authorities or even openly against
them.

During the last two years, the trade union has come
under strong internal and external pressures, but has
been able to renew its management bodies, over-
come the risks of internal splits and increase its
membership. Its capacity to position itself against
the political parties – despite a tendency to side with
the left – and its social influence have made it a key
actor in the new Tunisian political context.
In recent months new independent trade unions
have begun to emerge in Tunisia, like the Tunisian
General Confederation of Labour, but it is evident
that, because of its historical weight, its capacity to
mobilise and influence and its inclusive and repre-
sentative profile, the UGTT is a key actor in the tran-
sition process and, especially, in the creation of a
new social contract, which is crucial for the coun-
try’s stability. Since the clashes in December 2012,
the Tunisian government seems to be realising that
there cannot be social or political consensus without
the trade union, with who, as a key player in Tunisian
society, it must reach an understanding.
The trade unions in these countries are facing multi-
ple challenges in the transitional context: to fight for
workers’ rights, for their independence and for the
right to organise themselves without being subject
to government control. In other words, they are rede-
fining their relation with the State and with other po-
itical and social actors, which is not easy in such a
vulnerable and changing context.

Conclusion

The two and a half years that have passed is a short
time to assess whether the transition process will
lead to the establishment of a solid and long-lasting
democracy. These are uncertain times and the tran-
sition process is not irreversible. For democracy to
become a reality, the countries will need to wait, real-
align the enormous expectations generated after the
regime change and manage the turbulence along
the way.

Despite the prevailing pessimism, it should be rec-
ognised that the situation of pluralism has improved.
There are now many more political parties, social
movements, young people, women, organisations,
etc. who have a voice in the process. They have adopted the rule that freedom implies their participation and their right to make demands; a formula they seem unwilling to surrender. There is, therefore, an enormous sense of citizen appropriation, an empowerment of the masses that are not just happy to express themselves, more or less freely, but consider themselves authorised to intervene, exert pressure and, if they see fit, overthrow a government, even if it has been democratically elected. The change in people's perceptions is one of most clearly identifiable out of all the changes that have taken place in the Arab world.

In conditions of greater freedom, society's potential is incalculable. Beyond the structured actors, youth and women are the two actors who, despite playing a key role in the mobilisations, have had least capacity to influence in this phase of the process.

Arab societies have experienced the consequences of a serious generational crisis, in which the political class is still distanced from the revolutionary youth. This is a youth with very clear ideals and with a concept of democracy that supersedes the hierarchical rigidity of the formal political structures. The utopia of the unled, spontaneous and participative revolution has clashed head on with the stagnation of the political class and with a society that is reluctant to surrender any of their power to today's youth, the potential leaders of tomorrow. Faced with the lack of capacity for action within the political sphere, young people resort time and time again to occupying streets and squares as a way of making their voice heard. On many occasions, they have been told that it was time for them to leave the squares and set their sights on Parliament, but the dysfunctional way in which politics is carried out has not favoured the institutionalised expression of the youth demands. Faced with an incapacity to influence through conventional politics, collective action and “street politics” have kept these actors from disappearing from the transition's political panorama and have given them considerable power.

In the case of women, it is clear that without the participation of half of the population it is impossible to create a real democracy. The rhetoric is clear, but the reality casts a pessimistic light: the fight for women's rights has been gobbled up by the goals of the “revolution,” so that it is now very difficult for this collective to make their demands heard. This is largely down to the lack of political representation, but also because of the violence they come up against when they opt for mobilisation and activism on the street.

Nevertheless, all social organisations and groups, youth, women, NGOs, etc. have benefited from a more open public space, although there are still structural problems because of the framework in which they have been operating until now: logistical problems due to the massive influx of people who need their help, funding issues, a lack of communicative capacities and, above all, difficulties building synergies between different groups that work in the same fields.

So, there is a vital need to connect different sectors working simultaneously and often in an uncoordinated way with similar goals. Activism on the ground has to be connected with online activism, coordinating and bringing together efforts to achieve greater effect, and, above all, more definition regarding their actual natures and the roles they are trying to adopt. The media, for its part, is facing monumental challenges in terms of; its reconfiguration within the current context, its redefinition, a more professional approach and forging a structure that fosters the generation of news that is independent, good quality and professional. This is why it is still a long way from becoming the barometer of the democratisation process and overseer of government action.

In the social realm, the trade unions are redefining their nature and their relations with the State and other actors, while fighting to defend workers' rights and maintaining independence within a highly unfavourable economic and social context. The crisis in the economies of the countries undergoing transition has generated a climate of social malaise, with a lack of effective social policies, in a politically unstable context. The construction of a new social contract requires the participation of all the actors involved, and especially of the trade unions.

Despite the prevailing instability, the capacity of the different actors to form relations with one another, and whether those relations can remain positive, will determine the new political and institutional panorama of the region. Until now, the lack of dialogue, consensus and willingness to compromise has weakened positions or endangered the transition process and consequently the goals of the revolution.
On the one hand, the political actors should be subject to their own reformulation, in other words transform from underground movements or exploited parties into political parties with programmes and functional structures, which understand the need for change and constant renovation of the political elite. It is not at all easy for the Islamist groups to pilot this dual transition: on the one hand the transition process towards democracy at state level and, on the other, the transition process of the group itself from an opposition stance, dominated by protest politics in informal contexts (neighbourhoods, mosques, social centres), to the position of legal political party, competing on equal terms and carrying out its political activity within the sphere of the Parliament and government, which is a far more complex arena. In this sense the Islamist groups have been unable to formulate the necessary public policies on a large scale.

There is a vital need to connect different sectors working simultaneously and often in an uncoordinated way with similar goals. Activism on the ground has to be connected with online activism, coordinating and bringing together efforts to achieve greater effect.

On the other hand, the proliferation of new names and old faces in the political world poses a challenge of political co-existence for all involved. In the case of the current fracture between Islamists and secularists both in Egypt and Tunisia, it seems unlikely that a solid democracy will develop without a certain level of understanding between the two groups. If they continue with their zero-sum game logic, it will be difficult to advance in the transition process, as one party cannot be eliminated or excluded without the other party losing legitimacy or representativeness.

The internal political dynamics, the power struggles, the rivalry between actors and the prioritisation of party, group or sectorial interests, to the detriment of the ultimate interests of democracy, have so far prevented the construction of a social pact and an inclusive process. Greater compromise is needed by all actors, to overcome their differences and agree on a model for the State and society that transforms the grassroots legitimacy of the streets and the squares into legitimacy of state institutions and social structures and representative policies. The perception that “democracy is chaos” must be replaced by the logic that freedom and democracy work in everyone’s favour.

Bibliography


LYNCH, Marc. “Twitter Devolutions. How social media is hurting the Arab Spring.” Foreign Policy, n° 7, 2013.


Panorama: The Mediterranean Year
### Country: Albania

**Official Name:** Republic of Albania  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Bujar Nishani  
**Head of Government:** Edi Rama

**Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats):**
- Socialist Party of Albania (PSSH, social democrat) - 66 seats
- Democratic Party of Albania (PDS, conservative) - 49 seats
- Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI, social democrat) - 16 seats
- Party for Justice and Integration (PDI, Albanian Chams minority) - 4 seats
- Republican Party (PR, conservative) - 3 seats
- Unity for Human Rights Party (PBDNJ, Greek minority) - 1 seat
- Christian Democratic Party (PKDSH) - 1 seat

**Population:**
- **Capital:** Tirana (0.42 million)  
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Tirana (0.42), Durrës (0.12), Vlorë (0.08)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>Population density (hab/km²)</th>
<th>Urban population (%)</th>
<th>Average annual population growth rate (%)</th>
<th>Population age &lt;15 (%)</th>
<th>Population age ≥64 (%)</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth (Men/Women years)</th>
<th>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive)</th>
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<td>28,750</td>
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<td>53</td>
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</table>

**Economy:**

**GDP & Debt**
- GDP (millions $): 12,968  
- GDP per capita ($, PPP): 7,847  
- GDP growth (%): 3.0  
- Public Debt (% GDP): 58.6  
- External Debt (millions $): 4,598  
- Inflation Rate (%): 3.5

**FDI**
- Inflows (millions $): 1,031  
- Outflows (millions $): 42

**International tourism**
- Tourist arrivals (000): 2,417  
- Tourism receipts (million $): 1,780

**Migrant remittances**
- Receipts (millions $): 1,221  
- Receipts (in % GDP): 9.5

**Total trade**
- in goods and services (millions $): 6,710  
  - in goods (millions $): 4,461  
  - in services (millions $): 2,249  
- in goods and services (% GDP): 56.0  
- in goods (% GDP): 33.8  
- in services (% GDP): 22.2

**Society**

**Education**
- Adult literacy rate, Men / Women (%): 98.0/95.7  
- Net enrolment rate (primary): ..  
- Gross enrolment rate (secondary): ..  
- Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 44  
- Mean years of schooling: 11.4  
- Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): ..  
- R&D expenditure (% of GDP): 0.15

**Water**
- Water resources (km³): 41.7  
- Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 414  
- Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 39  
- Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 18  
- Desalinated water production (millions m³): 0

**Security**
- Total armed forces (000): 15  
- Military expenditure (% GDP): 1.5

**Economic Sectors**
- Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): 19
- Industry, value added (% of GDP): 16
- Services, value added (% of GDP): 66
- Labour market
  - Labour participation rate, female (%): 49.7
  - Unemployment rate (%): 13.8
  - Youth unemployment rate (%): ..

**Employment in**
- Agriculture (% of total employment): 44.1
- Industry (% of total employment): 19.9
- Services (% of total employment): 36.0

**Energy**
- Production (millions m³ oil eq): 1.6
- Consumption (millions m³ oil eq): 2.1
- Consumption per capita (kg oil eq): 648
- Import (% energy used): 22.0

**Main Trading Partners**

**Import:**
- Italy (32%), Greece (12%), China (6%), Turkey (6%), Germany (5%)

**Export:**
- Italy (51%), Turkey (7%), China (6%), Greece (5%), Spain (5%)

**Development**
- Human Development Index (Value): 0.749
- Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 70

**Health**
- Physicians density (per 10,000): 11.1
- Hospital beds (per 10,000): 24.0
- Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 6.0

**Emissions**
- CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 1.2
- Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 92

**Protected areas**
- Terrestrial (% of total land area): 9.8
- Marine (% of territorial waters): 1.6

**ICT**
- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 96.4
- Households with computer (per 100): 15.6
- Internet users (per 100): 49.0
### ALGERIA

**Official Name:** People's Democratic Republic of Algeria  
**Form of Government:** Semi-presidential republic  
**Head of State:** Abdelaziz Bouteflika  
**Head of Government:** Abdelmalek Sellal

#### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Front (FLN)</td>
<td>221</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Rally for Democracy (RND)</td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Green Algeria Alliance (AVV)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Socialist Forces Front (FFS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
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<tr>
<td>Workers' Party (PT, communist)</td>
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<td>Algerian National Front (FNA)</td>
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<td>Front for Justice and Development (FJD)</td>
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<td>Algerian Popular Movement (MPA)</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>45</td>
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</table>

#### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Algiers (2.92)  
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Oran (0.78); Constantine (0.45)  
- **Area km²:** 2,381,740  
- **Population (millions):** 36.5  
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 15  
- **Urban population (%):** 73  
- **Average annual population growth rate (%):** 1.4  
- **Population age <15 (%):** 27  
- **Population age >64 (%):** 6  
- **Total fertility rate (births per woman):** 2.18  
- **Life expectancy at birth, Men/Women (years):** 72/75  
- **Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 26

#### Economy

**GDP & Debt**

- **GDP (millions $):** 198,768  
- **GDP per capita ($, PPP):** 7,272  
- **GDP growth (%):** 2.5  
- **Public Debt (in % GDP):** 11.1  
- **Public Deficit (in % of GDP):** -0.4  
- **External Debt (millions $):** 3,737  
- **Inflation Rate (%):** 4.5  
- **FDI Inflows (millions $):** 2,571  
- **FDI Outflows (millions $):** 534  
- **Tourist arrivals (000):** 2,070  
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** 323  
- **Migrant remittances Receipts (millions $):** 1,942  
- **Migrant remittances Receipts (in % GDP):** 1.0

#### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total trade</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
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<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>57,361</td>
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<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
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<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>12,594</td>
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#### Education

- **Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):** 81.3/63.9  
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 96  
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 102  
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 32  
- **Mean years of schooling:** 7.6  
- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):** 4.3  
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** 0.07

#### Water

- **Water resources (km³):** 11.7  
- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 182  
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):** 61  
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 17

#### Security

- **Total armed forces (000):** 317  
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 4.5

#### ICT

- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 99.0  
- **Households with computer (per 100):** 20.0  
- **Internet users (per 100):** 14.0

#### Development

- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.713  
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 93

#### Health

- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** 12.1  
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** ..  
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 4.3

#### Emissions

- **CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):** 2.8  
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** 76

#### Protected areas

- **Terrestrial (% of total land area):** 6.3  
- **Marine (% of territorial waters):** 0.3

#### Society

- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 99.0  
- **Households with computer (per 100):** 20.0  
- **Internet users (per 100):** 14.0
**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

**Official Name:** Bosnia and Herzegovina  
**Form of Government:** Federal democratic republic  
**Head of State:** Nebojša Radmanovic (Serb); Bakir Izetbegovic (Bosniak); Zeljko Komšic (Croat)  
**Head of Government:** Vjekoslav Bevanda

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SDP)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Action (SDA, centre-right)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for a Better Future (SBB, centre-right)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian Democratic Party (SDS, Serbian nationalist)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ, Croatian nationalist and conservative)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBH, conservative)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Sarajevo (0.39)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Banja Luka (0.20); Tuzla (0.10)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area (km²)</th>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>Population density (hab/km²)</th>
<th>Average annual population growth rate (%)</th>
<th>Population age &lt;15 (%)</th>
<th>Population age &gt;64 (%)</th>
<th>Total fertility rate (births per woman)</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years)</th>
<th>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>51,210</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>73/78</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economy

**GDP & Debt**
- GDP (millions $): 18,243
- GDP per capita ($, PPP): 8,115
- GDP growth (%): 1.7
- Public Debt (in % GDP): 40.4
- Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -2.6
- External Debt (millions $): 8,807
- Inflation Rate (%): 3.7

**FDI**
- Inflows (millions $): 535
- Outflows (millions $): 20

**International tourism**
- Tourist arrivals (000): 365
- Tourism receipts (million $): 662

**Migrant remittances**
- Receipts (millions $): 1,959
- Receipts (in % GDP): 10.7

**Total trade**
- Imports in goods and services (millions $): 10,169
- Imports in goods (millions $): 9,591
- Imports in services (millions $): 579
- Exports in goods and services (% GDP): 64.8
- Exports in goods (% of total export): 42.3
- Balance in goods and services (millions $): -4,454
- Balance in goods (% of total export): -22.6

**Main Trading Partners**
- **Import:** Croatia (18%), Serbia (13%), Germany (11%), Slovenia (10%), Italy (9%)
- **Export:** Croatia (14%), Slovenia (13%), Italy (12%), Germany (12%), Serbia (12)

### Society

**Education**
- Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 99.5/98.7
- Net enrolment rate (primary): 88
- Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 89
- Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 38
- Mean years of schooling: 8.3
- Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): 5.9
- R&D expenditure (% of GDP): 0.02

**Water**
- Water resources (km³): 37.5
- Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 90
- Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 30
- Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 70
- Desalinated water production (millions m³): 0

**Security**
- Total armed forces (000): 11
- Military expenditure (% GDP): 1.2

### Development
- Human Development Index (Value): 0.735
- Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 81

### Health
- Physicians density (per 10,000): 16.9
- Hospital beds (per 10,000): 35.0
- Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 10.2

### Emissions
- CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 5.3
- Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 119

### Protected areas
- Terrestrial (% of total land area): 0.6
- Marine (% of territorial waters): 0.7

### ICT
- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 84.5
- Households with computer (per 100): 33.7
- Internet users (per 100): 60.0
# CROATIA

**Official Name:** Republic of Croatia  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary constitutional republic  
**Head of State:** Ivo Josipović  
**Head of Government:** Zoran Milanović

## Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kukuriku coalition (KK)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union and allies (HDZ, conservative)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Labourists - Labour Party (HL SR)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Assembly of Slavonija and Baranja (HDSSB)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) (abroad district)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Zagreb (0.69)  
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Split (0.17); Rijeka (0.13)  
- **Area km²:** 56,590  
- **Population (millions):** 4.4  
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 79  
- **Urban population (%):** 58  
- **Average annual population growth rate (%):** -0.3

- **Population age <15 (%):** 15  
- **Population age >64 (%):** 17  
- **Total fertility rate (births per woman):** 1.50  
- **Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):** 74/80  
- **Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 4

## Economy

### GDP & Debt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (millions $)</td>
<td>61,721</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP)</td>
<td>17,850</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP)</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (in % of GDP)</td>
<td>-5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $)</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### FDI

- **Inflows (millions $):** 1,494  
- **Outflows (millions $):** 44

## International Tourism

- **Tourist arrivals (000):** 9,111  
- **Tourism receipts (millions $):** 8,255

### Migrant remittances

- **Receipts (millions $):** 1,262  
- **Receipts (in % GDP):** 2.0

### Trade

- **Imports:** 26,059  
- **Exports:** 26,266  
- **Balance:** 207

- **Imports:** 22,126  
- **Exports:** 13,453  
- **Balance:** -8,674

- **Imports:** 3,933  
- **Exports:** 12,814  
- **Balance:** 8,881

- **Imports:** 41.9  
- **Exports:** 41.8  
- **Balance:** -0.1

### Main Trading Partners

- **Import:** Italy (16%), Germany (13%), Russia (7%), China (7%), Slovenia (8%)  
- **Export:** Italy (16%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (12%), Germany (10%), Slovenia (8%), Austria (6%)

## Society

### Education

- **Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):** 99.5/98.3  
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 87  
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 96  
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 54  
- **Mean years of schooling:** 9.8  
- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):** 4.3  
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** 0.73

### Water

- **Water resources (km²):** 105.5  
- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 143  
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):** 2  
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):** 14  
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 0

### Security

- **Total armed forces (000):** 22  
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 1.7
## Cyprus

**Official Name:** Republic of Cyprus  
**Form of Government:** Presidential constitutional republic  
**Head of State:** Nicos Anastasiades  
**Head of Government:** ..

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (House of Representatives)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Coalition (DISY, conservative)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL, socialist)</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DIKO, liberal)</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Movement of Social Democracy (EDEK)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Party (ERVOKO, centre)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecological and Environmental Movement (ecologist)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area km²:</th>
<th>9,250</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions):</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²):</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%):</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%):</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &lt;15 (%):</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &gt;64 (%):</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fertility rate (births per woman):</td>
<td>1.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, Men/Women (years):</td>
<td>77/82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

| GDP (millions $): | 25,016 |
| GDP per capita ($, PPP): | 27,581 |
| GDP growth (%): | 0.5 |
| Public Debt (in % GDP): | 86.2 |
| Public Deficit (in % of GDP): | -5.6 |
| Inflation Rate (%): | 3.3 |
| Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): | 2 |
| Industry, value added (% of GDP): | 20 |
| Services, value added (% of GDP): | 78 |
| Labour market
  - Labour participation rate, female (%): | 57.1 |
  - Unemployment rate (%): | 6.2 |
  - Youth unemployment rate (%): | 16.6 |

#### FDI

| Inflows (millions $): | 276 |
| Outflows (millions $): | 1,828 |
| Tourist arrivals (000): | 2,173 |

### International tourism

| Tourist receipts (million $): | 2,371 |
| Migrant remittances
  - Receipts (millions $): | 152 |
  - Receipts (in % GDP): | 0.6 |

### Total trade

| In goods and services (millions $): | 11,741 |
| in goods (millions $): | 7,950 |
| in services (millions $): | 3,790 |
| in goods and services (in % GDP): | - |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11,741</td>
<td>10,681</td>
<td>-1,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,950</td>
<td>2,748</td>
<td>-5,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,790</td>
<td>7,933</td>
<td>-4,143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Society

#### Education

| Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): | 99.3/98.1 |
| Net enrolment rate (primary): | 99 |
| Gross enrolment rate (secondary): | 91 |
| Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): | 48 |
| Mean years of schooling: | 9.8 |
| Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): | 7.3 |
| R&D expenditure (% of GDP): | 0.50 |

#### Water

| Water resources (km³): | 0.8 |
| Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): | 165 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): | 86 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): | 3 |
| Desalinated water production (millions m³): | 34 |

#### Security

| Total armed forces (000): | 13 |
| Military expenditure (% GDP): | 2.1 |

### Development

| Human Development Index (Value): | 0.848 |
| Human Development Index (Position in ranking): | 31 |

### Health

| Physicians density (per 10,000): | 27.5 |
| Hospital beds (per 10,000): | 35.0 |
| Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): | 7.4 |

### Emissions

| CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): | 9.0 |
| Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): | 419 |

### Protected areas

| Terrestrial (% of total land area): | 10.5 |
| Marine (% of territorial waters): | 0.6 |

### ICT

| Mobile subscriptions (per 100): | 97.7 |
| Households with computer (per 100): | 63.9 |
| Internet users (per 100): | 57.7 |
**EGYPT**

**Official Name:** Arab Republic of Egypt  
**Form of Government:** Provisional government  
**Head of State:** Adly Mansour  
**Head of Government:** Hazem el Beblawy

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (People's Assembly) (dissolved)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom and Justice Party (Muslim Brotherhood)</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Nour Party (Salafi)</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Wafd Party (nationalist liberal)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (social democrat)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Egyptians Party (social liberal)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building and Development Party (Salafi Islamist)</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Wasat Party (moderate Islamist)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAF Appointed Members</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

| Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): | Cairo (11.17)*  
[including the population of Giza (3.63) and Shubra El-Khema (1.10)]  
| Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): | Alexandria (4.49); Port Said (0.60) |
| Area km²:                                             | 1,001,450 |
| Population (millions):                               | 84.0 |
| Population density (hab/km²):                         | 83 |
| Urban population (%)                                  | 44 |
| Average annual population growth rate (%):           | 1.7 |

### Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP &amp; Debt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (millions $):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (in % of GDP):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflows (millions $):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outflows (millions $):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International tourism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourist arrivals (000):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism receipts (million $):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant remittances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipts (millions $):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipts (in % GDP):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total trade</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External debt (millions $):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public debt (in % GDP):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public deficit (in % of GDP):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External debt (millions $):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economic Sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Sectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry, value added (% of GDP):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services, value added (% of GDP):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Labour market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour participation rate, female (%):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth unemployment rate (%):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Energy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Energy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Production (millions mt oil eq):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption (millions mt oil eq):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import (% energy used):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Main Trading Partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Import</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China (10%), United States (10%), Germany (6%), Italy (5%); Kuwait (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Export</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (9%), India (7%), Saudi Arabia (6%), United States (6%), Spain (5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment rate (primary):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (secondary):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Water</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water resources (km³):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desalinated water production (millions m³):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Water</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water resources (km³):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desalinated water production (millions m³):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total armed forces (000):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure (% GDP):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (Value):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (Position in ranking):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Health</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physicians density (per 10,000):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital beds (per 10,000):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emissions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protected areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial (% of total land area):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine (% of territorial waters):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ICT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobile subscriptions (per 100):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with computer (per 100):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet users (per 100):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### FRANCE

**Official Name:** French Republic  
**Form of Government:** Semi-presidential constitutional republic  
**Head of State:** François Hollande  
**Head of Government:** Jean-Marc Ayrault

#### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (National Assembly)
- Socialist Party (PS, social democrat): 280
- Union for a Popular Movement (UMP, liberal conservative): 194
- Miscellaneous left (DVG): 22
- Miscellaneous right (DVD): 17
- Europe Ecology The Greens (EELV, ecologist): 15
- New Centre (NCE, centre-right, liberal): 12
- Radical Party of the Left (PRG, centre-left, social liberal): 12
- Left Front (FG, anti-liberal left coalition): 10
- Radical Party (centre-right, historical radicals): 6
- Others: 9

#### Population
- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Paris (11.17)  
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Marseille-Aix-en-Provence (1.49); Lyon (1.49); Lille (1.04); Nice-Cannes (0.99); Toulouse (0.93)
- **Area km²:** 549,190
- **Population:** 63.5
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 119
- **Population age <15 (%):** 18
- **Population age >64 (%):** 17
- **Total fertility rate (births per woman):** 1.99
- **Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):** 78/85
- **Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 3

#### Economy
- **GDP & Debt**
  - GDP (millions $): 2,778,085
  - GDP per capita ($, PPP): 35,090
  - GDP growth (%): 1.7
  - Public Debt (in % GDP): 69.1
  - Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -5.2
  - External Debt (millions $): ..
  - Inflation Rate (%): 2.1
- **FDI**
  - Inflows (millions $): 40,945
  - Outflows (millions $): 90,146
- **International tourism**
  - Tourist arrivals (000): 77,648
  - Tourism receipts (million $): 56,282
- **Migrant remittances**
  - Receipts (million $): 16,705
  - Receipts (in % GDP): 0.6
- **Total trade**
  - in goods and services (millions $): 872,621
  - in goods (millions $): 681,618
  - in services (millions $): 191,003
  - in goods and services (% GDP): 29.8
- **Economic Sectors**
  - Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): 2
  - Industry, value added (% of GDP): 19
  - Services, value added (% of GDP): 79
  - Labour market
    - Labour participation rate, female (%): 51.2
    - Unemployment rate (%): 9.3
    - Youth unemployment rate (%): 22.5
  - Employment in
    - Agriculture (% of total employment): 2.9
    - Industry (% of total employment): 22.2
    - Services (% of total employment): 74.5
  - Energy
    - Production (millions mt oil eq): 136.2
    - Consumption (millions mt oil eq): 251.4
    - Consumption per capita (kg oil eq): 3,843
    - Import (% energy used): 46.0
- **Main Trading Partners**
  - Import:
    - Germany (17%), China (8%), Belgium (8%), Italy (7%), Spain (6%)
  - Export:
    - Germany (17%), Italy (8%), Spain (7%), Belgium (7%), United Kingdom (7%)

#### Society
- **Education**
  - Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): ../..
  - Net enrolment rate (primary): 98
  - Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 114
  - Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 58
  - Mean years of schooling: 10.6
  - Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): 5.9
  - R&D expenditure (% of GDP): 2.25
- **Health**
  - Physicians density (per 10,000): 33.8
  - Hospital beds (per 10,000): 66.0
  - Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 11.7
- **CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):** 5.5
- **Emissions**
  - Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 481
- **Protected areas**
  - Terrestrial (% of total land area): 16.5
  - Marine (% of territorial waters): 21.3
- **ICT**
  - Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 94.8
  - Households with computer (per 100): 78.2
  - Internet users (per 100): 79.6

#### Development
- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.893
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 20

#### Water
- Water resources (km³):
  - Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):
    - Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):
    - Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):
    - Desalinated water production (millions m³):
- **Water**
  - 211.0
  - 512
  - 12
  - 69
  - 12
- **Security**
  - Total armed forces (000):
  - Military expenditure (% GDP): 2.3
### GREECE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official Name:</th>
<th>Hellenic Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Form of Government:</td>
<td>Parliamentary constitutional republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of State:</td>
<td>Karolos Papoulias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Government:</td>
<td>Antonis Samaras</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)**
- New Democracy (ND, conservative): 129
- Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA): 71
- Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK): 33
- Independent Greeks (AE, right): 20
- Golden Dawn (XA, far-right xenophobic): 18
- Democratic Left (DIMAR): 17
- Communist Party of Greece (KKE): 12

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Athens (3.41)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Thessaloniki (0.88); Patras (0.21); Heraklion (0.17); Larissa (0.16); Volos (0.14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area km²:</th>
<th>131.960</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions):</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²):</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%):</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%):</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &lt;15 (%):</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &gt;64 (%):</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fertility rate (births per woman):</td>
<td>1.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, Men/Women (years):</td>
<td>79/83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt
- **GDP (millions $):** 290,153
- **GDP per capita ($, PPP):** 25,510
- **GDP growth (%):** -7.1
- **Public Debt (in % GDP):** 170.6
- **Public Deficit (in % of GDP):** -9.4
- **External Debt (millions $):** ..
- **Inflation Rate (%):** 3.1
- **FDI Inflows (millions $):** 1,823
- **FDI Outflows (millions $):** 1,788

#### International tourism
- **Tourist arrivals (000):** 15,007
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** 12,579

#### Migrant remittances
- **Receipts (millions $):** 1,186
- **Receipts (in % GDP):** 0.4

#### Total trade
- **Imports in goods and services (millions $):** 85,462
- **Exports in goods and services (millions $):** 68,123
- **Balance in goods and services (millions $):** -17,339
- **Imports in goods (millions $):** 65,838
- **Exports in goods (millions $):** 27,954
- **Balance in goods (millions $):** -37,884
- **Imports in services (millions $):** 19,624
- **Exports in services (millions $):** 40,168
- **Balance in services (millions $):** 20,545
- **Imports in goods and services (% GDP):** 33.1
- **Exports in goods and services (% GDP):** 25.1
- **Balance in goods and services (% GDP):** -8.1

#### FDI
- **Inflows (millions $):** 1,823
- **Outflows (millions $):** 1,788

#### Energy
- **Production (millions mt oil eq):** 9.5
- **Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):** 2,348
- **Import (% energy used):** 64.0
- **Total Energy Consumption (millions mt oil eq):** 93.6

#### Environment
- **Water resources (km²):** 74.3
- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 841
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):** 89
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):** 2
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 10
- **CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):** 7.5
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** 499
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** 48.0
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 10.8
- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** ..

#### Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Adult literacy rate, Men / Women (%): 98.4/96.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (primary):</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (secondary):</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling:</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Water</th>
<th>Water resources (km²): 74.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):</td>
<td>841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desalinated water production (millions m³):</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Total armed forces (000): 148</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure (% GDP):</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Human Development Index (Value): 0.860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>Physicians density (per 10,000): ..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emissions</td>
<td>CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 106.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protected areas</td>
<td>Terrestrial (% of total land area): 16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Internet users (per 100): 53.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Main Trading Partners**
- **Import:**
  - Germany (11%), Russia (9%), Italy (9%), China (6%), Netherlands (5%)
- **Export:**
  - Italy (9%), Turkey (8%), Germany (8%), Cyprus (6%), Bulgaria (5%)
### ISRAEL

**Official Name:** State of Israel  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary democracy  
**Head of State:** Shimon Peres  
**Head of Government:** Benjamin Netanyahu

#### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

- Likud (neo-conservatives) - Yisrael Beiteinu (far-right ultranationalist): 31 seats
- Shas (ultraorthodox Sephardis): 11 seats
- United Torah Judaism (ultraorthodox Ashkenazis): 7 seats
- Yesh Atid (centre, secular): 19 seats
- Hadash (centre): 15 seats
- Meretz (social democrats, ecologists): 12 seats
- The Jewish Home (religious far-right): 12 seats
- Others: 13 seats

#### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Jerusalem (0.79)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Tel Aviv-Jaffa (3.38) [includes Rishon LeZion (0.23) and Petah Tikva (0.20)]; Haifa (1.05)
- **Area km²:** 22,070
- **Population (millions):** 7.7
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 359
- **Urban population (%):** 92
- **Average annual population growth rate (%):** 1.8
- **Population age <15 (%):** 27
- **Population age >64 (%):** 11
- **Total fertility rate (births per woman):** 2.91
- **Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):** 80/84
- **Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 4

#### Economy

**GDP & Debt**
- **GDP (millions $):** 243,654
- **GDP per capita ($, PPP):** 31,466
- **GDP growth (%):** 4.7
- **Public Debt (in % GDP):** 74.0
- **Public Deficit (in % of GDP):** -4.7
- **External Debt (millions $):** ..
- **Inflation Rate (%):** 3.5
- **FDI**
  - Inflows (millions $): 11,374
  - Outflows (millions $): 2,998

**International tourism**
- Tourist arrivals (000): 2,803
- Tourism receipts (million $): 5,513

**Migrant remittances**
- Receipts (millions $): 1,715
- Receipts (in % GDP): 0.7

**Total trade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>in goods and services (millions $)</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods ($ millions)</td>
<td>91,434</td>
<td>91,024</td>
<td>-410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods ($ millions)</td>
<td>72,026</td>
<td>64,185</td>
<td>-7,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>19,408</td>
<td>26,839</td>
<td>7,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Economic Sectors**
- Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): ..
- Industry, value added (% of GDP): ..
- Services, value added (% of GDP): ..

**Labour market**
- Labour participation rate, female (%): 52.5
- Unemployment rate (%): 6.6
- Youth unemployment rate (%): 13.7

**Employment in**
- Agriculture (% total employment): 1.7
- Industry (% total employment): 20.4
- Services (% total employment): 77.1

**Energy**
- Production (millions mt oil eq): 4.7
- Consumption (millions mt oil eq): 24.3
- Consumption per capita (kg oil eq): 3,133
- Import (% energy used): 81.0

**Main Trading Partners**

| Import: United States (12%), China (7%), Germany (6%), Belgium (6%); Switzerland (5%) | Export: United States (29%), Hong Kong (8%), Belgium (6%), United Kingdom (6%), India (4%) |

#### Society

**Education**
- Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 99.2/98.7
- Net enrolment rate (primary): 97
- Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 102
- Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 62
- Mean years of schooling: 6.0
- Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): 4.4
- R&D expenditure (% of GDP): ..

**Water**
- Water resources (km²): 1.8
- Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 282
- Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 58
- Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 6
- Desalinated water production (millions m³): 140

**Security**
- Total armed forces (000): 185
- Military expenditure (% GDP): 6.2

**Development**
- Human Development Index (Value): 0.900
- Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 16

**Health**
- Physicians density (per 10,000): 31.1
- Hospital beds (per 10,000): 34.0
- Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 7.7

**Emissions**
- CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 8.9
- Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 272

**Protected areas**
- Terrestrial (% of total land area): 17.8
- Marine (% of territorial waters): 0.4

**ICT**
- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 121.7
- Households with computer (per 100): 79.0
- Internet users (per 100): 70.0
### Country Profile: Italy

**Official Name:** Italian Republic  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary constitutional republic  
**Head of State:** Giorgio Napolitano  
**Head of Government:** Enrico Letta

#### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)
- Italy Common Good (IBC, Coalition led by Democratic Party, social democrat): 345 (With Monti for Italy Coalition (centrists))
- Associative Movement Italians Abroad (MAIE): 2
- The People of Freedom (PdL, conservative) - Northern League (LN, regionalists, populist right): 125 (South American Union for Italian Emigrants (USEI))
- Aosta Valley List (centre-left autonomists): 1
- Five Star Movement (M5S, populist movement): 109

#### Population
- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Rome (3.30)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Milan (2.91); Naples (2.37); Torino (1.61); Palermo (0.92); Bergamo (0.78)
- **Area km²:** 301,340
- **Population (millions):** 61.0
- **Population age <15 (%):** 14
- **Population age >64 (%):** 21
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 206
- **Total fertility rate (births per woman):** 1.48
- **Urban population (%):** 68
- **Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):** 80/84
- **Average annual population growth rate (%):** 0.4
- **Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 3

#### Economy

**GDP & Debt**
- **GDP (millions $):** 2,196,334
- **GDP per capita ($, PPP):** 30,422
- **Public Debt (in % GDP):** 120.1
- **Public Deficit (in % of GDP):** -3.7
- **External Debt (millions $):** 47,210
- **FDI Inflows (millions $):** 29,059
- **FDI Outflows (millions $):** 47,210
- **Tourist arrivals (000):** 43,626
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** 40,058
- **Receipts per capita ($):** 6,962
- **Receipts (in % GDP):** 0.3
- **Imports (in goods and services (millions $):** 523,076
- **Exports (in goods and services (millions $):** 502,978
- **Balance (in goods and services (millions $):** -20,098
- **Balance (in goods and services (% GDP):** -1.5

**Economic Sectors**
- **Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):** 2
- **Industry, value added (% of GDP):** 25
- **Services, value added (% of GDP):** 73

**Labour market**
- **Labour participation rate, female (%):** 37.7
- **Unemployment rate (%):** 8.4
- **Youth unemployment rate (%):** 27.8

**FDI**
- **Inflows (millions $):** 29,059
- **Outflows (millions $):** 47,210

**International tourism**
- **Tourist arrivals (000):** 43,626
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** 40,058

**Migrant remittances**
- **Receipts (millions $):** 6,962
- **Receipts (in % GDP):** 0.3

**Total trade**
- **Imports (in goods and services (millions $):** 640,838
- **Exports (in goods and services (millions $):** 608,198
- **Balance (in goods and services (millions $):** -32,640
- **Balance (in goods and services (% GDP):** -1.5

**Main Trading Partners**
- **Import:** Germany (16%), France (8%), China (7%), Netherlands (5%), Spain (5%)
- **Export:** Germany (13%), France (12%), United States (6%), Switzerland (5%), Spain (5%)

#### Society

**Education**
- **Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):** 99.2/98.7
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 97
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 100
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 65
- **Mean years of schooling:** 10.1
- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):** 4.5
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** 1.26

**Health**
- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** 38.0
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** 35.0
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 9.5

**Emissions**
- **CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):** 6.6
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** 602

**ICT**
- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 157.9
- **Households with computer (per 100):** 66.2
- **Internet users (per 100):** 56.8
**JORDAN**

**Official Name:** Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary constitutional monarchy  
**Head of State:** King Abdullah II  
**Head of Government:** Abdullah Ensour

**Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (Chamber of Deputies)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Centrist Party (ICP, Islamist)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Union Party</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stronger Jordan</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>18</td>
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**Population**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):</td>
<td>Amman (1.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):</td>
<td>Zarqa (0.70); Irbid (0.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area km²:</td>
<td>89,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions):</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²):</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%):</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%):</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &lt;15 (%):</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &gt;64 (%):</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fertility rate (births per woman):</td>
<td>2.89</td>
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<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):</td>
<td>72/75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):</td>
<td>18</td>
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**Economy**

**GDP & Debt**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Details</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (millions $):</td>
<td>28,881</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP):</td>
<td>5,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%):</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP):</td>
<td>70.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (in % of GDP):</td>
<td>-6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $):</td>
<td>16,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%):</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI Inflows (millions $):</td>
<td>14,698</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDI Outflows (millions $):</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International tourism Tourist arrivals (000):</td>
<td>4,557</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tourism receipts (million $):</td>
<td>4,390</td>
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<tr>
<td>Migrant remittances Receipts (millions $):</td>
<td>3,554</td>
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<tr>
<td>Migrant remittances Receipts (in % GDP):</td>
<td>11.7</td>
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</table>

**Total trade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $):</td>
<td>21,301 13,145 -8,156</td>
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<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $):</td>
<td>16,826 8,006 -8,819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $):</td>
<td>4,475 5,138 663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP):</td>
<td>73.9 45.6 -28.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Society**

**Education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):</td>
<td>97.7/93.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment rate (primary):</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (secondary):</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling:</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
<td>0.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Water**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water resources (km³):</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desalinated water production (millions m³):</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Security**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total armed forces (000):</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure (% GDP):</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Economic Sectors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry, value added (% of GDP):</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services, value added (% of GDP):</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour market</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour participation rate, female (%):</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%):</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth unemployment rate (%):</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Employment in**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture (% of total employment):</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry (% of total employment):</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services (% of total employment):</td>
<td>79.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production (millions mt oil eq):</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption (millions mt oil eq):</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):</td>
<td>1,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import (% energy used):</td>
<td>96.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Main Trading Partners**

**Import:** Saudi Arabia (23%), China (10%), United States (6%), Italy (5%), Germany (4%)  
**Export:** Iraq (14%), United States (13%), India (13%), Saudi Arabia (8%), Lebanon (4%)
### LEBANON

**Official Name:** Lebanese Republic  
**Form of Government:** Confessionalist parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Michel Suleiman  
**Head of Government:** Tammam Salam (designated)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Change and Reform bloc (Free Patriotic Movement [19]; Lebanese Democratic Party [4]; Marsada [3]; Others [3])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 8 Alliance (Amal Movement [13]; Hezbollah [12]; Syrian Social Nationalist Party [2]; Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party [2])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-Government Independents (Progressive Socialist Party [7]; Glory Movement [2]; Other [1])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 14 Alliance (Future Movement [26]; Lebanese Forces [8]; Kataeb Party [5]; Murr Bloc [2]; Others [6]; Independents [11])</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):</th>
<th>Beirut (2.02)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):</td>
<td>Tripoli (0.19); Sidon (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area km²:</td>
<td>10,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions):</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²):</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%):</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%):</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (&lt;15 %):</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (&gt;64 %):</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fertility rate (births per woman):</td>
<td>1.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth, Men/Women (years):</td>
<td>70/75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economy

| GDP & Debt |
|-----------------|----------------|
| GDP (millions $): | 39,013 |
| GDP per capita ($, PPP): | 15,499 |
| GDP growth (%): | 3.0 |
| Public Debt (in % GDP): | 1375 |
| Public Deficit (in % of GDP): | -6.1 |
| External Debt (millions $): | 23,272 |
| Inflation Rate (%): | 5.0 |
| FDI |
| Inflows (millions $): | 3,200 |
| Outflows (millions $): | 900 |
| International tourism |
| Tourist arrivals (000): | 2,168 |
| Tourism receipts (million $): | 8,184 |
| Migrant remittances |
| Receipts (millions $): | 7,558 |
| Receipts (in % GDP): | 18.3 |

| Total trade |
|-----------------|----------------|
| in goods and services (millions $): | 32,310 |
| in goods (millions $): | 19,304 |
| in services (millions $): | 13,006 |
| in goods and services (% GDP): | 50.4 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25,194</td>
<td>7,116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5,386</td>
<td>-13,919</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19,808</td>
<td>6,802</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.7</td>
<td>-26.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Society

| Education |
|-----------------|----------------|
| Net enrolment rate (primary): | 95 |
| Gross enrolment rate (secondary): | 83 |
| Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): | 58 |
| Mean years of schooling: | 7.9 |
| Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): | 1.6 |
| R&D expenditure (% of GDP): | - |
| Water |
| Water resources (km³): | 4.8 |
| Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): | 317 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): | 60 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): | 11 |
| Desalinated water production (millions m³): | 47 |
| Security |
| Total armed forces (000): | 80 |
| Military expenditure (% GDP): | 4.1 |

| Development |
|-----------------|----------------|
| Human Development Index (Value): | 0.745 |
| Human Development Index (Position in ranking): | 72 |

| Health |
|-----------------|----------------|
| Physicians density (per 10,000): | 35.4 |
| Hospital beds (per 10,000): | 35.0 |
| Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): | 11.5 |

| Emissions |
|-----------------|----------------|
| CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): | 4.4 |
| Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): | - |

| Protected areas |
|-----------------|----------------|
| Terrestrial (% of total land area): | 0.5 |
| Marine (% of territorial waters): | 0.1 |

| ICT |
|-----------------|----------------|
| Mobile subscriptions (per 100): | 78.7 |
| Households with computer (per 100): | 71.5 |
| Internet users (per 100): | 52.0 |
## Libya

**Official Name:** State of Libya  
**Form of Government:** Provisional parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Nouri Abusahmain (President of the General National Congress)  
**Head of Government:** Ali Zeidan  

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (General National Congress)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Forces Alliance (NFA, nationalist and liberal)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Construction Party (JCP, Islamist)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Front Party (NFP, liberal and progressive)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for the Homeland Party (liberal)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Tripoli (2.20)  
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Benghazi (1.00); Misrata (0.35); Zawiya (0.20)  
- **Area km²:** Population age <15 (%): 31  
- **Population (millions):** 6.5  
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 4  
- **Urban population (%):** 78  
- **Average annual population growth rate (%):** 1.1  
- **Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):** 72/78  
- **Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):** 13

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (millions $):</td>
<td>1,759,540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP):</td>
<td>34,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%):</td>
<td>5,904</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (as % of GDP):</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (as % of GDP):</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $):</td>
<td>-16.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%):</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### FDI

| Inflows (millions $):                        | 0         |
| Outflows (millions $):                       | 233       |

#### International tourism

- **Tourist arrivals (000):**  
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** 170

#### Migrant remittances

| Receipts (millions $):                      | 19        |
| Receipts (as % of GDP):                     | 0.1       |

### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>in goods and services (millions $)</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods</td>
<td>15,635</td>
<td>13,016</td>
<td>-2,619</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services</td>
<td>4,435</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-4,405</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Society

#### Education

- **Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):** 95.8/83.3  
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):**  
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 110  
- **Mean years of schooling:** 7.3  
- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):**  
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):**  

#### Water

| Water resources (km³):                      | 0.7       |
| Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):           | 796       |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): | 83        |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):    | 3         |
| Desalinated water production (millions m³): | 18        |

#### Security

- **Total armed forces (000):** 76  
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 3.2

### Economic Sectors

- **Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):** 2  
- **Industry, value added (% of GDP):** 78  
- **Services, value added (% of GDP):** 20  

#### Labor market

- **Labor participation rate, female (%):** 30.4  
- **Unemployment rate (%):**  
- **Youth unemployment rate (%):**  

#### Employment in

- **Agriculture (% of total employment):**  
- **Industry (% of total employment):**  
- **Services (% of total employment):**  

#### Energy

- **Production (millions mt oil eq):** 88.6  
- **Consumption (millions mt oil eq):** 18.1  
- **Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):** 3,013  
- **Import (% energy used):** -362.0

### Main Trading Partners

- **Import:**  
  - Tunisia (11%), Italy (11%), Turkey (10%), China (10%), Egypt (7%)  
- **Export:**  
  - Italy (27%), France (14%), Germany (13%), China (10%), Spain (6%)  

### Development

- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.769  
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 64

### Health

- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** 19.0  
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** 37.0  
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 3.0

### Emissions

- **CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):** 8.1  
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** 225

### Protected areas

- **Terrestrial (% of total land area):** 0.1  
- **Marine (% of territorial waters):** 0.1

### ICT

- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 155.7  
- **Households with computer (per 100):**  
- **Internet users (per 100):** 17.0
# MALTA

**Official Name:** Republic of Malta  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** George Abela  
**Head of Government:** Joseph Muscat

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (House of Representatives)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malta Labour Party (MLP, social democracy)</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Party (NP, centre-right)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):</td>
<td>Valletta (0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):</td>
<td>Birkirkara (0.02); Qormi (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area km²:</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions):</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²):</td>
<td>1,299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%)</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%)</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &lt;15 (%):</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &gt;64 (%):</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fertility rate (births per woman):</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):</td>
<td>80/83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (millions $):</td>
<td>9,123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP):</td>
<td>26,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%):</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP):</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (in % of GDP):</td>
<td>-2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $):</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%)</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflows (millions $):</td>
<td>539</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outflows (millions $):</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourist arrivals (000):</td>
<td>1,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism receipts (million $):</td>
<td>1,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipts (millions $):</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipts (in % GDP):</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### GDP & Debt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry, value added (% of GDP):</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services, value added (% of GDP):</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour participation rate, female (%)</td>
<td>35.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%):</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth unemployment rate (%):</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture (% of total employment):</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Industry (% of total employment):</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Services (% of total employment):</td>
<td>71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production (millions mt oil eq):</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption (millions mt oil eq):</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption per capita (kg oil eq):</td>
<td>2,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Import (% energy used):</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>8,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>5,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>3,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>93.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imports</td>
<td>9,234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exports</td>
<td>4,238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>-1,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>1,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance in services (millions $)</td>
<td>4,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>98.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance in goods (% GDP)</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%)</td>
<td>91.2/93.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment rate (primary):</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (secondary):</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling:</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water resources (km³):</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desalinated water production (millions m³):</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total armed forces (000):</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure (% GDP):</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Environmental indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):</td>
<td>579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Territorial (% of total land area):</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine (% of territorial waters):</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile subscriptions (per 100):</td>
<td>124.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with computer (per 100):</td>
<td>76.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet users (per 100):</td>
<td>69.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## MONTENEGRO

### Official Name: Montenegro  
Form of Government: Parliamentary republic  
Head of State: Filip Vujanović  
Head of Government: Milo Đukanović

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)
- Coalition for a European Montenegro (ECG, centre-left, pro-Europe): 39  
- Democratic Front (centre-right): 20  
- Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro (SNP, social democrat): 9  
- Positive Montenegro (PCG, Social democrats, ecologists): 7  
- Bosniak Party (BS): 3  
- Coalition * Force for unity * (FZJ-FPB): 1  
- Albanian Coalition: 1  
- Croatian Civic Initiative (HGI): 1

### Population
- Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Podgorica (0.16)  
- Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Niksic (0.06); Pljevlja (0.02)  
- Area km²: 13,810  
- Population (millions): 0.6  
- Population density (hab/km²): 47  
- Urban population (%): 63  
- Average annual population growth rate (%): 0.1

### Economy
- GDP (millions $): 4,500  
- GDP per capita ($, PPP): 11,628  
- GDP growth (%): 3.2  
- Public Debt (in % GDP): 46.0  
- Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -5.5  
- External Debt (millions $): 2,053  
- Inflation Rate (%): 3.1

#### Fishing
- Inflows (millions $): 558  
- Outflows (millions $): 17

### International tourism
- Tourist arrivals (000): 1,088  
- Tourism receipts (million $): 713

### Migrant remittances
- Receipts (millions $):  
- Receipts (in % GDP): ..

#### Total trade
- in goods and services (millions $): 2,912  
- in goods (millions $): 2,465  
- in services (millions $): 447  
- in goods and services (% GDP): 66.2

#### Trade in goods
- Imports: 1,830  
- Exports: 654  
- Balance: 1,176

#### Trade in services
- Imports: 1,176  
- Exports: 447  
- Balance: 729

### Society
#### Education
- Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 99.4/97.6  
- Net enrolment rate (primary): 92  
- Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 95  
- Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 48  
- Mean years of schooling: 10.5  
- Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):  
- R&D expenditure (% of GDP): 1.15

#### Water
- Water resources (km²):  
- Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 255  
- Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 1  
- Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 39  
- Desalinated water production (millions m³): ..

#### Security
- Total armed forces (000): 12  
- Military expenditure (% GDP): 1.8

### Development
- Human Development Index (Value): 0.791  
- Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 52

### Health
- Physicians density (per 10,000): 20.3  
- Hospital beds (per 10,000): 40.0  
- Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 9.0

### Emissions
- CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 3.3  
- Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 262

### ICT
- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 185.3  
- Households with computer (per 100): 46.6  
- Internet users (per 100): 40.0

### Main Trading Partners
- Import: Serbia (28%), Greece (8%), Bosnia and Herzegovina (8%), Italy (6%), Germany (6%)  
- Export: Serbia (28%), Hungary (17%), Croatia (10%), Greece (9%), Italy (7%)
### Morocco

**Official Name:** Kingdom of Morocco  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary constitutional monarchy  
**Head of State:** King Mohammed VI  
**Head of Government:** Abdelilah Benkirane

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)</th>
<th>House of Representatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Development Party (PJD, Islamist) 170</td>
<td>Popular Movement (MP, conservative) 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istiqlal Party (Pt, centre-right, nationalist) 60</td>
<td>Constitutional Union (UC, centrist) 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Rally of Independents (RNI, centre-right, liberal) 52</td>
<td>Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS, communist) 18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM, liberal) 47</td>
<td>Labour Party (PT, centre-left) 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Union of People’s Forces (USFP) 39</td>
<td>Others 13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Population

| Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Rabat (1.84)  
| Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Casablanca (3.05); Fez (1.09); Marrakech (0.94); Tangier (0.81); Agadir (0.81) |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area km²: 446,550</th>
<th>Population age &lt;15 (%): 28</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions): 32.6</td>
<td>Population age &gt;64 (%): 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²): 72</td>
<td>Total fertility rate (births per woman): 2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%): 57</td>
<td>Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years): 70/74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%): 1.0</td>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive): 28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Economy

**GDP & Debt**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP (millions $): 9,921</th>
<th>Agricultural, value added (% of GDP): 15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP): 5,075</td>
<td>Industry, value added (% of GDP): 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%): 4.5</td>
<td>Services, value added (% of GDP): 55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP): 54.4</td>
<td>Labour market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -6.8</td>
<td>Labour participation rate, female (%): 25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $): 23,443</td>
<td>Unemployment rate (%): 10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%): 0.9</td>
<td>Youth unemployment rate (%): 21.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FDI**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inflows (millions $): 2,519</th>
<th>Agriculture (% of total employment): 40.9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outflows (millions $): 247</td>
<td>Industry (% of total employment): 21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total: 2,766</td>
<td>Services (% of total employment): 37.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**International tourism**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tourist arrivals (000): 9,288</th>
<th>Energy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tourism receipts (million $): 8,176</td>
<td>Production (millions mt oil eq): 0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant remittances Receipts (million $): 7,081</td>
<td>Consumption per capita (kg oil eq): 517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Receipts (in % GDP): 7.1</td>
<td>Import (% energy used): 95.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>in goods and services (millions $): 45,907</th>
<th>Imports 31,845, Exports 14,063</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $): 37,333</td>
<td>15,946</td>
<td>-21,387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $): 8,574</td>
<td>15,899</td>
<td>7,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP): 48.0</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>-13.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Main Trading Partners**

| Import: France (14%), Spain (11%), United States (9%), United Kingdom (7%), China (7%), Japan (7%) |
| Export: France (21%), Spain (19%), India (7%), Brazil (5%), United States (5%) |

#### Society

**Education**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 71.8/576</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment rate (primary): 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling: 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): 5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D expenditure (% of GDP): 0.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Water**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Water resources (km³): 29.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desalinated water production (millions m³): 7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Security**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total armed forces (000): 246</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure (% GDP): 3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Development**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Human Development Index (Value): 0.591</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Health**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Physicians density (per 10,000): 6.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hospital beds (per 10,000): 11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 5.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Emissions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 1.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Protected areas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terrestrial (% of total land area): 1.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine (% of territorial waters): 1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ICT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 113.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Households with computer (per 100): 39.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet users (per 100): 51.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

Name (UN use): Occupied Palestinian Territories  
Form of Government: De jure parliamentary democracy operating de facto as a semi-presidential system  
Head of State: Mahmoud Abbas  
Head of Government:  

**Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)**  
(Palestinian legislative council has been unable to meet and govern since 2007)  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hamas (Islamist)</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatah (nationalist, socialist)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP, nationalist, Marxist)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Population**  
Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Ramallah (0.08) [Administrative capital]  
Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Gaza City (0.65); Hebron (0.26); Nablus (0.23); Jenin (0.16); Khan Yunis (0.14)  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area (km²):</th>
<th>Population age &lt;15 (%):</th>
<th>Population age &gt;64 (%):</th>
<th>Total fertility rate (births per woman):</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):</th>
<th>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6,020</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4.27</td>
<td>71/75</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Economy**  
GDP & Debt  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP (millions $):</th>
<th>Agriculture, value added (% of GDP):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP):</td>
<td>Industry, value added (% of GDP):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%):</td>
<td>Services, value added (% of GDP):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP):</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (in % of GDP):</td>
<td>Labour participation rate, female (%):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $):</td>
<td>Unemployment rate (%):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%):</td>
<td>Youth unemployment rate (%):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FDI Inflows (millions $):</th>
<th>214</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outflows (millions $):</td>
<td>-20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**International tourism**  
Tourist arrivals (000): 522  
Tourism receipts (million $): 667  

**Migrant remittances**  
Receipts (millions $): 1,198  
Receipts (in % GDP): 16.3  

**Society**  
Education  
| Development |  
|--------------|------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): | 97.9 / 92.6 | Human Development Index (Value): 0.670 |
| Net enrolment rate (primary): | 87 | Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 110 |
| Gross enrolment rate (secondary): | 84 | Health |
| Gross enrolment rate (primary): | 51 | Physicians density (per 10,000): |
| Mean years of schooling: | 8.0 | Hospital beds (per 10,000): |
| Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): | | Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): |
| R&D expenditure (% of GDP): | | |

### World Bank Development Indicators 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Human Development Index (Value):</th>
<th>Human Development Index (Position in ranking):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>0.670</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Water**  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):</th>
<th>Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water resources (km²):</td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desalinated water production (millions m³):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Security**  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Mobile subscriptions (per 100):</th>
<th>Households with computer (per 100):</th>
<th>Internet users (per 100):</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total armed forces (000):</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure (% GDP):</td>
<td></td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>41.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Portugal

**Official Name:** Portuguese Republic  
**Form of Government:** Semi-presidential constitutional republic  
**Head of State:** Aníbal Cavaco Silva  
**Head of Government:** Pedro Passos Coelho

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)  
(Assembly of the Republic)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unity Coalition (CDU, Portuguese)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party - Ecologist Party “The Greens”</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bloc (BE, socialist / Trotskyist / communist)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):</td>
<td>Lisbon (2.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):</td>
<td>Porto (1.37); Vila Nova de Gaia (0.29); Amadora (0.18); Braga (0.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area km²:</td>
<td>92,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions):</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²):</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%):</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%):</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &lt;15 (%):</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &gt;64 (%):</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fertility rate (births per woman):</td>
<td>1.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):</td>
<td>78/84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (millions $):</td>
<td>237,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP):</td>
<td>23,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%):</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP):</td>
<td>108.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (in % of GDP):</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $):</td>
<td>10.344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%):</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Labour market

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (in % of GDP):</td>
<td>-4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour participation rate, female (%):</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment rate (%):</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth unemployment rate (%):</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### International tourism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tourist arrivals (000):</td>
<td>6,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism receipts (million $):</td>
<td>12,969</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### FDI

| Inflows (millions $): | 10,344 |
| Outflows (millions $): | 12,639 |

### Trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $):</td>
<td>94,812</td>
<td>85,744</td>
<td>-9,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $):</td>
<td>79,672</td>
<td>60,006</td>
<td>-19,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $):</td>
<td>15,139</td>
<td>25,738</td>
<td>10,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP):</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>-3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Society

#### Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):</td>
<td>97.0/94.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment rate (primary):</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (secondary):</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling:</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Health

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physicians density (per 10,000):</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital beds (per 10,000):</td>
<td>33.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Emissions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Main Trading Partners

**Import:**
- Spain (31%), Germany (12%), France (7%), Italy (5%), Netherlands (6%)

**Export:**
- Spain (24%), Germany (12%), France (12%), Angola (6%), United Kingdom (5%)

### ICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measure</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobile subscriptions (per 100):</td>
<td>115.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with computer (per 100):</td>
<td>63.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet users (per 100):</td>
<td>55.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**SERBIA**

**Official Name:** Republic of Serbia  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Tomislav Nikolic  
**Head of Government:** Ivica Dacic

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)
- Let’s Get Serbia Moving (heteroclite coalition of nationalist parties) 73  
- A Choice for a Better Life (social-democrats coalition) 67  
- Ivica Dacic’s List (coalition led by the Socialist Party) 44  
- Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS, conservative) 21  
- Others 10  
- Turnover (coalition led by the Liberal Democratic Party) 19  
- United Regions of Serbia (URS, centre-right, regionalist and conservative) 16

### Population
- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Belgrade (1.66)  
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Novi Sad (0.34); Nis (0.26); Kragujevac (0.18); Subotica (0.14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area (km²):</th>
<th>88,360</th>
<th>Population age &lt;15 (%):</th>
<th>18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions):</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>Population age &gt;64 (%):</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²):</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>Total fertility rate (births per woman):</td>
<td>1.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%):</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):</td>
<td>72/77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%):</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt
- GDP (millions $): 43,315  
- GDP per capita ($, PPP): 10,405  
- GDP growth (%): 2.0  
- Public Debt (in % GDP): 50.0  
- Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -4.2  
- External Debt (millions $): 27,316  
- Inflation Rate (%): 11.1

#### FDI
- Inflows (millions $): 2,709  
- Outflows (millions $): 170

### International tourism
- Tourist arrivals (000): 683  
- Tourism receipts (million $): 915

### Migrant remittances
- Receipts (millions $): 3,719  
- Receipts (in % GDP): 7.3

### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>23,119</td>
<td>15,966</td>
<td>-7,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>19,124</td>
<td>11,748</td>
<td>-7,376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>3,995</td>
<td>4,218</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td>36.1</td>
<td>-15.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Society

#### Education
- Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 99.2/96.9  
- Net enrolment rate (primary): 93  
- Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 91  
- Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 50  
- Mean years of schooling: 10.2  
- Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): 4.7  
- R&D expenditure (% of GDP): 0.92

#### Water
- Water resources (km²): 162.0  
- Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 418  
- Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 2  
- Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 82  
- Desalinated water production (millions m³): 0

#### Security
- Total armed forces (000): 28  
- Military expenditure (% GDP): 2.2

### Development
- Human Development Index (Value): 0.769  
- Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 64  

### Health
- Physicians density (per 10,000): 21.1  
- Hospital beds (per 10,000): --  
- Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 10.4

### Emissions
- CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 6.3  
- Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 215

### Protected areas
- Territorial (% of total land area): 6.0  
- Marine (% of territorial waters): --

### ICT
- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 125.4  
- Households with computer (per 100): 50.8  
- Internet users (per 100): 42.2
## SLOVENIA

**Official Name:** Republic of Slovenia  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary constitutional republic  
**Head of State:** Borut Pahor  
**Head of Government:** Alenka Bratušek

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Coalition</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zoran Jankovic’s List - Positive Slovenia (LZJ-PS, Social liberalism)</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS, conservative)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats (SD)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregor Virant’s Civic List (LGV, liberal)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS) (LZJ-PS, Social liberalism)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenian People’s Party (SLS)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Slovenia - Christian People’s Party (NSi)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian and Italian National Community</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Ljubljana (0.27)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Maribor (0.13); Celje (0.06); Kranj (0.05)
- **Area km²:** 20,270
- **Population (millions):** 2.0
- **Population density (hab/km²):** 102
- **Urban population (%):** 50

### Economy

- **GDP & Debt**
  - GDP (millions $): 50,530
  - GDP per capita ($, PPP): 28,436
  - GDP growth (%): -0.2
  - Public Debt (in % GDP): 46.9
  - Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -5.6
  - External Debt (millions $): ..
  - Inflation Rate (%): 1.8
- **FDI**
  - Inflows (millions $): 999
  - Outflows (millions $): 112
- **International tourism**
  - Tourist arrivals (000): ..
  - Tourism receipts (million $): ..
- **Migrant remittances**
  - Receipts (in % GDP): 410
  - In %: 0.8

### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goods and Services</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In goods (millions $)</td>
<td>35,549</td>
<td>36,114</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In goods (millions $)</td>
<td>30,757</td>
<td>29,570</td>
<td>-1,187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In services (millions $)</td>
<td>4,791</td>
<td>6,544</td>
<td>1,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>71.3</td>
<td>72.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Society

- **Education**
  - Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 99.7/99.7
  - Net enrolment rate (primary): 98
  - Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 97
  - Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 86
  - Mean years of schooling: 11.7
  - Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): 5.7
  - R&D expenditure (% of GDP): 2.11
- **Water**
  - Water resources (km³): 31.9
  - Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 463
  - Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 0
  - Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 82
  - Desalinated water production (millions m³): 0
- **Security**
  - Total armed forces (000): 12
  - Military expenditure (% GDP): 1.2

### Main Trading Partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Export</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Italy (15%), Germany (14%), Austria (7%), China (5%), France (4%)</td>
<td>Germany (18%), Italy (10%), Austria (6%), Croatia (6%), France (6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Development

| Human Development Index (Value): | 0.892 |
| Human Development Index (Position in ranking): | 21 |

### Health

| Physicians density (per 10,000): | 25.4 |
| Hospital beds (per 10,000): | 46.0 |
| Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): | 9.0 |

### Emissions

| CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): | 7.5 |
| Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): | 522 |

### Protected areas

| Terrestrial (% of total land area): | 13.2 |
| Marine (% of territorial waters): | 0.7 |

### ICT

| Mobile subscriptions (per 100): | 106.6 |
| Households with computer (per 100): | 74.4 |
| Internet users (per 100): | 72.0 |
### Spain

**Official Name:** Kingdom of Spain  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary constitutional monarchy  
**Head of State:** King Juan Carlos I  
**Head of Government:** Mariano Rajoy

#### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)  
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People’s Party (PP, conservative)</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE, social democrat)</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convergence and Union (CiU, conservative regional)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Left (IU-ICV-CHA, left wing)</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amaiur (left wing independentist regional)</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union, Progress and Democracy (UPD, liberal)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV, conservative regional)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC, independentist regional)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG, left independentist regional)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Madrid (6.57)  
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Barcelona (5.57); Valencia (0.80); Sevilla (0.70); Zaragoza (0.67)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area km²:</th>
<th>505,600</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions):</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²):</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%):</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%):</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Economy

- **GDP (millions $):** 1,479,560  
- **GDP per capita ($, PPP):** 30,478

#### FDI

| Inflows (millions $): | 29,476 |
| Outflows (millions $): | 37,256 |

#### International tourism

| Tourist arrivals (000): | 52,677 |
| Tourism receipts (million $): | 59,042 |

#### Migrant remittances

| Receipts (million $): | 16,705 |
| Receipts (in % GDP): | 0.8 |

#### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $): 454,484</td>
<td>447,128</td>
<td>-7,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $): 359,737</td>
<td>304,335</td>
<td>-55,402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $): 94,747</td>
<td>142,794</td>
<td>48,046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP): 31.1</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Society

- **Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):** 98.8/97.0  
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 100  
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 129  
- **Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):** 83  
- **Mean years of schooling:** 10.4  
- **Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):** 5.0  
- **R&D expenditure (% of GDP):** 1.39

#### Water

| Water resources (km²): | 111.5 |
| Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): | 699 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): | 61 |
| Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): | 22 |
| Desalinated water production (millions m³): | 100 |

#### Security

| Total armed forces (000): | 210 |
| Military expenditure (% GDP): | 0.8 |

#### Development

- **Development: Human Development Index (Value):** 0.885  
- **Development: Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 23

#### Health

- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** 39.6  
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** 32.0  
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 9.6

#### Emissions

- **CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):** 5.8  
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):**

#### Protected areas

- **Terrestrial (% of total land area):** 8.6  
- **Marine (% of territorial waters):** 3.5

#### ICT

- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 113.2  
- **Households with computer (per 100):** 71.5  
- **Internet users (per 100):** 67.6
## SYRIA

### Official Name:
Syrian Arab Republic  
### Form of Government:
Dominant-party semi-presidential State  
### Head of State:
Bashar al-Assad  
### Head of Government:
Wael Nader al-Halqi  

#### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Progressive Front (NFP, coalition led by the Baath Party)</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Front for Change and Liberation (coalition of opponents of the regime)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions)</td>
<td>Damascus (2.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main urban agglomerations (population in millions)</td>
<td>Aleppo (3.16); Homs (1.37); Hamah (0.93); Latakia (0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area km²</td>
<td>185,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions)</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²)</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%)</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (millions $)</td>
<td>59,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($, PPP)</td>
<td>5,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth (%)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Debt (in % GDP)</td>
<td>29.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Deficit (in % of GDP)</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt (millions $)</td>
<td>4,147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation Rate (%)</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### FDI

| Inflows (millions $):                    | 1,059          |
| Outflows (millions $):                   | 0              |

#### International tourism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tourist arrivals (000)</td>
<td>8,546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tourism receipts (million $):</td>
<td>6,308</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Migrant remittances

| Receipts (millions $):             | 1,574        |
| Receipts (in % GDP):               | 2.7          |

#### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>19,409</td>
<td>19,606</td>
<td>-197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>15,876</td>
<td>12,278</td>
<td>3,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>3,533</td>
<td>7,333</td>
<td>-3,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Society

#### Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%)</td>
<td>90.3/77.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net enrolment rate (primary):</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (secondary):</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross enrolment rate (tertiary):</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean years of schooling:</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public expenditure in education (% of GDP):</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Water

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water resources (km³):</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):</td>
<td>867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desalinated water production (millions m³):</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total armed forces (000):</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military expenditure (% GDP):</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (Value):</td>
<td>0.648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index (Position in ranking):</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Health

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physicians density (per 10,000):</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital beds (per 10,000):</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Emissions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Protected areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrestrial (% of total land area):</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine (% of territorial waters):</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### ICT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobile subscriptions (per 100):</td>
<td>63.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Households with computer (per 100):</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet users (per 100):</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**FYROM**

Provisional Reference: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Form of Government: Parliamentary republic
Head of State: Gjorge Ivanov
Head of Government: Nikola Gruevski

Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats) (Assembly of the Republic)
- Coalition: Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization - Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) and allies
- Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and allies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Configuration</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Union for Integration (BDI/DUI, Albanian minority)</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Albanians (PDS/DPA, Albanian minority)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Revival (NDR, centre-left)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Population**

- Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions): Skopje (0.50)
- Main urban agglomerations (population in millions): Bitola (0.12); Kumanovo (0.10)
- Area km²: 2,571
- Population (millions): 2.1
- Population density (hab/km²): 82
- Urban population (%): 59
- Average annual population growth rate (%): 0.2
- Population age <15 (%): 17
- Population age >64 (%): 12
- Total fertility rate (births per woman): 1.40
- Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years): 73/77
- Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive): 9

**Economy**

- GDP (millions $): 10,606
- GDP per capita ($, PPP): 10,444
- GDP growth (%): 3.0
- Public Debt (in % GDP): 28.2
- Public Deficit (in % of GDP): -2.5
- External Debt (millions $): 5,667
- Inflation Rate (%): 3.9

**FDI**

- Inflows (millions $): 422
- Outflows (millions $): 2

**International tourism**

- Tourist arrivals (000): 262
- Tourism receipts (million $): 209

**Migrant remittances**

- Receipts (millions $): 435
- Receipts (in % GDP): 4.3

**Total trade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>6,981</td>
<td>4,788</td>
<td>-2,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>5,998</td>
<td>3,299</td>
<td>-2,699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>1,488</td>
<td>506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>-19.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Society**

**Education**

- Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 98.7/96.0
- Net enrolment rate (primary): 88
- Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 84
- Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 39
- Mean years of schooling: 8.2
- Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): ..
- R&D expenditure (% of GDP): 0.23

**Water**

- Water resources (km³): 6.4
- Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 502
- Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 12
- Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 21
- Desalinated water production (millions m³): 67

**Security**

- Total armed forces (000): 8
- Military expenditure (% GDP): 1.3

**Development**

- Human Development Index (Value): 0.740
- Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 78

**Health**

- Physicians density (per 10,000): 26.2
- Hospital beds (per 10,000): 46.0
- Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 6.6

**Emissions**

- CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 4.0
- Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 138

**Protected areas**

- Terrestrial (% of total land area): 4.9
- Marine (% of territorial waters): ..

**ICT**

- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 107.2
- Households with computer (per 100): 53.6
- Internet users (per 100): 56.7
## TUNISIA

**Official Name:** Republic of Tunisia  
**Form of Government:** Semi-presidential republic  
**Head of State:** Moncef Marzouki  
**Head of Government:** Ali Laarayedh

### Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)  
(National Constituent Assembly)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ennahda (Islamist)</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress for the Republic (social democratic)</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Petition for Freedom, Justice and Development (populist)</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ettakatol (social democratic)</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Democratic Party (social liberal)</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Initiative (Centrist)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Modernist Pole (socialist)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afek Tounes (liberal)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Tunis (0.98)
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Sfax (0.86); Sousse (0.54); Ettadhamen (0.42); Gabès (0.34)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area km²:</th>
<th>163,610</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (millions):</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &lt;15 (%):</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population age &gt;64 (%):</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population density (hab/km²):</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total fertility rate (births per woman):</td>
<td>1.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban population (%):</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years):</td>
<td>73/77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average annual population growth rate (%):</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive):</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economy

#### GDP & Debt

- **GDP (millions $):** 198,768
- **GDP per capita ($, PPP):** 7,272
- **GDP growth (%):** 2.5
- **Public Debt (in % GDP):** 11.1
- **Public Deficit (in % of GDP):** -0.4
- **External Debt (millions $):** 19,215
- **Inflation Rate (%):** 4.5

#### FDI
- **Inflows (millions $):** 1,143
- **Outflows (millions $):** 28

#### International tourism

- **Tourist arrivals (000):** 6,903
- **Tourism receipts (million $):** 3,477

#### Migrant remittances

- **Receipts (millions $):** 1,867
- **Receipts (in % GDP):** 4.0

#### Total trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $)</td>
<td>25,801</td>
<td>22,495</td>
<td>-3,306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $)</td>
<td>22,623</td>
<td>17,876</td>
<td>-4,747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $)</td>
<td>3,178</td>
<td>4,618</td>
<td>1,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP)</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>-7.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Society

#### Education

- **Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%):** 81.4/71.1
- **Net enrolment rate (primary):** 99
- **Gross enrolment rate (secondary):** 93

#### Water

- **Water resources (km³):** 4.6
- **Water withdrawal (m³ per capita):** 296
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture):** 76
- **Water withdrawal by sector (% industry):** 4
- **Desalinated water production (millions m³):** 13

#### Security

- **Total armed forces (000):** 48
- **Military expenditure (% GDP):** 1.6

### Main Trading Partners

**Import:** France (18%), Italy (16%), Germany (7%), China (6%), Russia (6%), Spain (4%)

**Export:** France (31%), Italy (22%), Germany (9%), Libya (4%), Spain (4%)

### Development

- **Human Development Index (Value):** 0.712
- **Human Development Index (Position in ranking):** 94

### Health

- **Physicians density (per 10,000):** 12.2
- **Hospital beds (per 10,000):** 21.0
- **Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP):** 5.7

### Emissions

- **CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita):** 2.1
- **Passenger cars (per 1,000 people):** 87

### Protected areas

- **Terrestrial (% of total land area):** 1.3
- **Marine (% of territorial waters):** 1.2

### ICT

- **Mobile subscriptions (per 100):** 116.9
- **Households with computer (per 100):** 19.1
- **Internet users (per 100):** 38.1
**TURKEY**

**Official Name:** Republic of Turkey  
**Form of Government:** Parliamentary republic  
**Head of State:** Abdullah Gül  
**Head of Government:** Recep Tayyip Erdogan

**Political Parties represented in the current Parliament (seats)**  
- Justice and Development Party (AKP, islamilist, conservative): 327  
- Republican People’s Party (CHP, social democrat, secular): 135  
- Nationalist Movement Party (MHP, Turkish nationalist): 53  
- Peace and Democracy Party (BDP, Democratic socialism, Kurdish): 29  
- Independents: 6

### Population

- **Capital (urban agglomeration population in millions):** Ankara (4.19)  
- **Main urban agglomerations (population in millions):** Istanbul (11.25); Izmir (2.93); Bursa (1.71); Adana (1.46); Gaziantep (1.20); Konya (1.06)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area km²</th>
<th>Population (millions)</th>
<th>Population density (hab/km²)</th>
<th>Urban population (%)</th>
<th>Average annual population growth rate (%)</th>
<th>Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 born alive)</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth. Men/Women (years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>783,560</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>72/76</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Economy

**GDP & Debt**

- **GDP (millions $):** 774,336  
- **GDP per capita ($, PPP):** 14,543  
- **GDP growth (%):** 8.5  
- **Public Debt (in % GDP):** 39.2  
- **Public Deficit (in % of GDP):** -0.4  
- **External Debt (millions $):** 281,762  
- **Inflation Rate (%):** 6.5

- **FDI**
  - Inflows (millions $): 15,876  
  - Outflows (millions $): 2,464

**International tourism**

- Tourist arrivals (000): 31,396  
- Tourism receipts (million $): 24,784

**Migrant remittances**

- Receipts (millions $): 1,087  
- Receipts (in % GDP): 0.1

**Total trade**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Balance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (millions $):</td>
<td>253,573</td>
<td>182,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (millions $):</td>
<td>232,535</td>
<td>143,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (millions $):</td>
<td>21,038</td>
<td>38,940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods and services (% GDP):</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in goods (% GDP):</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in services (% GDP):</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Society**

- **Education**
  - Adult literacy rate. Men / Women (%): 97.9/90.3
  - Net enrolment rate (primary): 99
  - Gross enrolment rate (secondary): 82
  - Gross enrolment rate (tertiary): 55
  - Mean years of schooling: 6.5
  - Public expenditure in education (% of GDP): 2.9
  - R&D expenditure (% of GDP): 0.84

- **Water**
  - Water resources (km³): 211.7
  - Water withdrawal (m³ per capita): 573
  - Water withdrawal by sector (% agriculture): 74
  - Water withdrawal by sector (% industry): 11
  - Desalinated water production (millions m³): 1

- **Security**
  - Total armed forces (000): 61.3
  - Military expenditure (% GDP): 2.3

**Economic Sectors**

- Agriculture, value added (% of GDP): 9
- Industry, value added (% of GDP): 28
- Services, value added (% of GDP): 63
- Labour participation rate, female (%): 28.1
- Unemployment rate (%): 11.9
- Youth unemployment rate (%): 21.7
- Agriculture (% of total employment): 23.7
- Industry (% of total employment): 26.2
- Services (% of total employment): 50.1
- Production (millions mt oil eq): 33.3
- Consumption (millions mt oil eq): 114.2
- Consumption per capita (kg oil eq): 1,551
- Import (% energy used): 71.0

**Main Trading Partners**

| Import: | Russia (10%), Germany (9%), China (9%), United States (7%), Italy (6%) |
| Export: | Germany (10%), Iraq (6%), United Kingdom (6%), Italy (6%), France (5%) |

**Development**

- Human Development Index (Value): 0.722
- Human Development Index (Position in ranking): 90

**Health**

- Physicians density (per 10,000): 17.1
- Hospital beds (per 10,000): 25.0
- Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP): 6.7

**Emissions**

- CO₂ Emissions (mt per capita): 3.7
- Passenger cars (per 1,000 people): 104

**Protected areas**

- Terrestrial (% of total land area): 1.9
- Marine (% of territorial waters): 2.5

**ICT**

- Mobile subscriptions (per 100): 88.7
- Households with computer (per 100): 48.5
- Internet users (per 100): 42.1
Taking Stock: Political and Social Crisis in Mediterranean Europe
From Tahrir to Sol: The Unexpected Mediterranean Convergence

Democracy is on trial. On both sides of the Mediterranean, the political, social, and economic legitimacy of governments and their decisions is increasingly being called into question. In the post-Arab Spring countries of North Africa, gains made by the popular uprisings of 2011 are being threatened by spoilers in the form of institutional captures, non-inclusive transition processes, and regressions in the field of human rights. In the southern European countries, two key elements of the social pact, liberal democracy and the Welfare State, are being threatened both by technocratic or populist takeovers and by the austerity measures imposed from Brussels. In this article we argue that this breakdown in political systems results in an unexpected Mediterranean convergence and points to the opening of a serious democracy deficit. Contrary to the traditional notion of the democracy deficit suffered by EU institutions, this broader definition threatens to encompass a new range of actors, institutions and even Member States. The popular protests and horizontal activism of citizens on both shores of the Mediterranean are a clear reaction to this democracy deficit. For those who consider the two shores distinct – if not incompatible – entities, this unexpected convergence might seem puzzling. But for those who would like to see more cooperation and even a certain rapprochement between them, this new scenario presents an opportunity for dialogue which should not be missed. Rather than finger-pointing or lecturing each other, as has been the tendency in the past, a more humble northern shore and a more self-confident southern shore would find greater political openings for a dialogue of cooperation.

Mare Nostrum, After All

The term “mare nostrum” has been given a new lease of life. Shedding the Roman imperial connotations and the Italian fascist usage made of the term, the democracy deficit and economic crisis present on both sides of the Mediterranean is increasingly binding states and peoples together. The overly positive outlook from both shores at the turn of the century was misleading. Up north, the launch of the Euro in 1999-2002 ushered in a phase of prosperity, political stability and economic convergence. Down south, the end of the civil war in Algeria, the accession of Mohammed VI in Morocco and the reintegration of Gaddafi into the international community following his agreement to give up chemical weapons and settle the PanAm / Lockerbie case, augured a decade of relative stability and growth. On the regional front, governments on both shores were pulled together by the effects of 9/11: the securitisation of bilateral agendas around issues of counter-terrorism, human trafficking and organised crime allowed both parties to sideline democracy and human rights concerns and concentrate on the issues perceived to be more pressing.
We know now that behind this apparent stability, a large number of disequilibria were piling up. On the northern shore, economies were inundated by cheap money resulting from the launching of the euro, which meant that when the financial crisis struck in 2008, countries were massively indebted and were easily pushed out of the financial markets. Meanwhile, in the south, corruption and economic disparity were feeding social frustrations, which ultimately burst in Tunisia and triggered previously unseen uprisings across the Arab world.

Fast-forward to 2012-2013 and we witness another convergence between both shores, this time in terms of social and political turmoil. Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal are suffering severe economic hardships while, at the same time, their national politics appear mired in a crisis of legitimacy due to the social cost of these adjustments. Since the outset of the crisis, no government of the region has survived a popular election. Disaffection with democracy has risen and Euroscepticism has spread. Trust in the EU has plummeted across the continent. Both southern debtors and northern creditors feel like they are victims (Leonard, Torreblanca 2013).

Although these austerity policies may be succeeding in bringing deficits back under control, they are producing neither jobs nor growth, and so are failing to generate support from the general public

At the same time, in the post-revolution countries of northern Africa, democracy is struggling to emerge victorious, trapped between those who resist change or want to introduce mere Lampedusian reforms (let us change everything so everything remains the same) and those who want to use democracy to impose a new social and political model on the rest of the population. Along both shores, citizens are struggling to find the right vehicles to articulate their demands, whether civil-society based (new social movements across MENA and southern Europe) or through traditional channels (new political parties such as the '5-Star Movement' in Italy, or 'Syriza' in Greece).

Two years on from the uprising of the Arab Spring, the indignados movement in Spain, and the Occupy camps that sprang up in hundreds of cities across the globe, the anger and dissatisfaction amongst the youth remains palpable. In some cases this frustration and disenchantment with the political system has led to violent protests, in other cases it has contributed to a reverse ‘brain drain’ and a new emigration drive from southern to northern European countries. Needs across both shores have converged into equally dramatic and pressing demands: growth and jobs, health and education, and political reform. From Tahrir Square in Cairo to Puerta del Sol in Madrid, the most important thing about the mass demonstrations and popular slogans is not what they said in isolation but what they expressed cumulatively: the marches across Europe in support of the Arab uprisings, the common demands between Arab and European activists, and indeed, the often disappointing response of national authorities to these demands which in turn fuelled further discontent. This sort of horizontal activism, based largely on social networks, increasingly characterises an interconnected youth and a global protest movement which, according to some, is here to stay (Mason, 2012).

Europe: in Danger of Losing Its Citizens

If governments continue to fail to respond to popular demands and austerity measures from Brussels-on-high continue to bite, is Europe in danger of losing its own citizens (Torreblanca, 2013)? The latest Eurobarometer figures evince what election results have been hinting at: hit by the crisis, Europeans have lost their confidence in the EU. To an increasing number of citizens in southern European countries, the EU looks like the IMF did in Latin America: a golden strait-jacket that is limiting the space for national politics and emptying their national democracies of content.

On the one hand, although these austerity policies may be succeeding in bringing deficits back under control (though not in reducing debt; in fact they are increasing it), they are producing neither jobs nor growth, and so are failing to generate support from the general public. Furthermore, forcing governments to systematically violate their election promises and to push through the same policies regardless of their political leaning also undermines the
legitimacy of national political institutions. As witnessed in countries that have been bailed out, political systems are wearing out (as in Spain and Portugal) or breaking down (as in Greece and Italy). Meanwhile, on the other hand, the dominant mood in creditor countries, not exactly awash in economic growth themselves, is that the southern Member States represent a burden, eating up scarce resources and impinging on chances of progress for the northern Member States.

As more legislative powers are transferred from national governments to branches of the executive and legislative at an EU level, national politicians find it harder to justify austerity measures at home and interventionist actions from ‘on-high’.

Either way, citizens are witnessing a new type of democracy deficit. Traditionally used to refer to the lack of democratic accountability and legitimacy of Brussels-based institutions compared to the national governments of the EU’s Member States, the term democratic deficit can now also be applied to EU Member States’ institutions. In some cases, governments are starting to rule by decree, staying away from parliaments and media as much as possible; in other cases parliaments are seeing their functions reduced to mere rubber-stamping as key decisions dealing with central issues such as taxation, welfare, labour markets and pensions are removed from their fold. Incumbents who dared to consult their demos, like Papandreou in Greece, or who sought to evade the pressure of the Troika, like Berlusconi in Italy, were shown the door and replaced by technocrats tasked with fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. To the eyes of citizens, governments may come and go, but their politics remain the same, and rarely do they correspond to election pledges. It seems that some States are already on trial: Portugal, Greece, and Cyprus; others await their fate: Spain, Italy, maybe even France. As more legislative powers are transferred from national governments to branches of the executive and legislative at an EU level, national politicians find it harder to justify austerity measures at home and interventionist actions from ‘on-high.’
Critics may turn the argument on its head and claim that compared to an international organisation like the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank or the United Nations, the EU has a democratic surplus. Yet while decision making is arguably more transparent, the people who make these decisions remain unelected and the institutions they head largely unaccountable to the European citizenry. Not to mention the criticism heaped on the EU’s foreign Policy Chief, Catherine Ashton, recently referred to as a “European functionary with accidental powers and no strategic leverage” (Mousavuzadeh 2013). Having saved the euro – or at least having given it some breathing space – the EU must seek to beef up the political legitimacy of its institutions in the lead up to the 2014 elections. With largely distrustful and disaffected populations, this is as important at Brussels level as it is at Member State level.

North Africa: In Danger of Losing the Revolutions

The Arab countries of North Africa, for their part, have suffered not only a democratic deficit but rather a freedom deficit.1 Much ink has been spilled about this in the past under the authoritarian rule of the “Benavie,” the “King of Kings,” and “the Pharaoh.” And the newly elected incumbents have yet to steer a clear course away from these perils. The toxic political atmosphere in Egypt and Tunisia, for instance, is endangering prospects of achieving broad political and social consensus over economic reforms, social justice, and other key legitimating elements of transitions to democracy.

Since the uprisings of 2011, the Middle East’s election calendar has been unusually crowded. Egypt held its first free and fair presidential elections which saw Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party voted into power. Libyans and Tunisians elected a constitutional assembly. At the time of writing, Tunisian politicians had just reached an agreement on the division of powers between President and Parliament, ending a months-old stalemate that had blocked progress on drafting the new constitution.

Yet the worrying backlash against political pluralism in some post-Arab Spring countries causes us to qualify this initial optimism. The protestors may have made it onto the cover of Time, but it is debatable whether any of the protests have actually achieved their aims. This is not to say that toppling dictators is an everyday occurrence, but rather that the gains of a revolution must be safeguarded by institutional mechanisms and reflected in evolving cultural norms. Instead they seem to be subject to multiple spoilers in the form of overly centralised government control, the capture of state institutions by Islamist parties, the marginalisation of women and religious minorities from national decision-making bodies, and opposition movements unable to present a united front.

The Arab Opinion Index report for 2011, amended to include results from questions on both the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, shows that citizens across the Arab world are far from satisfied with the gains made by the uprisings (see Chart 2). When the revolutions of 2011 began, horizontal participation was one of the most salient features. Yet in Egypt, once politics was reduced to a battle between the Muslim Brotherhood-led Parliament and the remnants of the SCAF (Supreme Council of the Armed Forces), the weakness of Egyptian democratic and secular politics was exposed. Even after two years of riots, crises, scandals and crackdowns, Egypt has produced no large liberal or leftist party that has been able to articulate a policy beyond the “anti-Morsi” and “anti-MB” consensus. Horizontalism has faded as domestic squabbles have taken centre stage and traditional top-down leadership has returned in the process of creating the National Salvation Front.

The social and political tensions in Egypt are aggravated by its economic situation. The plunge in tourism, drop in both local and foreign investment, slowing of net exports and drastic decrease of foreign currency reserves do not seem to be reason enough for the government to accept conditions on a $4.8 billion IMF loan still on hold since its initial approval.

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1 First coined by a group of Arab scholars for the UNDP Arab Human Development Report in 2002, a freedom deficit exists when there is “a substantial lag between Arab countries and other regions in terms of participatory government,” where “freedom” is thus synonymous with “democracy.” For more see UNDP, “Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations,” (available at www.arab-hdr.org/publications/other/ahdr/ahdr2002e.pdf)
last November. It is fair to say that Egypt is caught in a Catch-22: it needs cash to prevent instability in the face of unemployment and economic collapse, but it can’t get the cash without signing up to reforms that would themselves cause more short term instability. In this context citizens are increasingly frustrated with President Morsi and his apparent failure to make true on election promises.

In Tunisia, the recent assassination of opposition leader Chokri Belaïd highlighted the increased polarisation of Tunisian political society. His assassination followed a spate of violence by Islamists against symbols of the country’s secular elite. The governing coalition’s leader and head of Tunisia’s largest Islamist party, Rachid Ghannouchi, has denied Ennahda’s involvement in the organised violence. An equally worrying recession is being witnessed in the countries of North Africa in terms of women’s rights. Women who took part in the uprisings have been sidelined from political settlements and constitutional processes in Egypt and Libya. In Libya, women have seen the reinstitution of polygamy; in Egypt, women have lost more than 50 seats in Parliament, with just nine female deputies left. In Tunisia a draft version of the rights and liberties section of the new constitution has defined the role of women within society as “complementary to men within the family and as an associate of men in the development of the country.” This represents a regression from the language of the 1956 constitution which

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2 For more on Egypt’s Catch-22, see Farah Halime, “Egypt, the IMF, and European economic assistance,” ECFR Policy Memo, April 2013 (available at http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR76_egypt_imf_MEMO_AW.pdf)

3 For an excellent overview of domestic policy issues during the President’s first 100 days in office, see the “Morsi Meter,” available at www.morsimeter.com/en

4 Article 3 of the Constitution was recently amended to read: “each party list must include one female candidate.” This represents a backsliding compared to Mubarak’s rule where the law compelled political parties to include female candidates in the first half of their candidate lists. For more see Gamal Essam El-Din, “Egypt’s Shura Council approves new House of Representatives law,” Ahram Online, 11 April 2013.
held women as equal to men. It is essential that rights groups, civil society actors, and a broad range of elected officials across northern African States consolidate the gains of their revolutions before further regressions occur.

**Conclusion**

On both shores economies are stunted and political and social tensions are increasing. The momentum of the popular protest movements seems to be on the decline. But the real changes desired by those who protest are still only achievable by those prepared to wield hierarchical power and organise themselves around political parties, an element rejected by many of those calling for change. This is in fact a striking commonality along both shores: while society wakes up and reconstructs its civic institutions and social movements, its contempt for traditional party politics and representative democracy prevents it from being effectively able to introduce any substantial change. This can lead two ways: to the increase of alienation and frustration resulting in episodic outbursts of street turmoil, or to a new social pact in which a gradual bottom-up takeover results in reform efforts by political institutions desperate to counter their weak legitimacy. In the meantime, the way populations express their domestic grievances will continue to overlap: the mass protests of the North African capitals mirrored in southern European capitals, and the strikes, sit-ins and ‘escraches’ of European States spreading to post-Arab Spring countries where the ability of the demos to hold their governments to account is increasing. Whilst drawing too many parallels may be a dangerous exercise, drawing too few could be even more so. The EU must recognise that it has been presented with a second chance to get its Southern Neighbourhood policy ‘right.’ Having humbly issued a *mea culpa* for its support to Arab autocrats, it should now seek to back up its rhetoric with actions to the same tune. This will require greater interaction and coordination between the traditionally distinct arms of foreign policy of its Member States: the development community, the defence community, and the diplomatic community. A more humble north and a more confident south, buoyed by EU support for short-term job creation and inclusive transition processes, may just prevent the Mediterranean convergence from being so ‘unexpected.’ Otherwise, with the EU aiming for “deep democracy” in its southern Neighbourhood, it risks overlooking its own democracy deficit at home.

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This year will be a crucial one in the ongoing saga of the Greek crisis. In 2013, Greeks will see whether, after six years of economic deterioration and increasing social degradation, they will at last be able to see “the light at the end of the tunnel,” or whether, in view of yet another year of austerity and recession, the relative calm of recent months will give way to a storm.

The Story So Far…

The beginnings of the Greek crisis can be traced back to 2009, when, following the change of government in October, it emerged that the country’s projected fiscal deficit was going to be more than double the figure reported by the outgoing government. This revelation shook the country’s credibility and focused the attention of financial markets on the desperate state of the Greek economy. Markets were increasingly unwilling to lend to Greece at affordable interest rates, a development that eventually forced it to turn to its European partners for financial assistance. The bailout agreement signed on 2 May 2010 provided for a three-year, €110 billion loan by European Member States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The agreement came with strict conditionality in the form of a comprehensive policy programme (memorandum) that would be supervised by the so-called Troika (the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB)).

The policy programme called for harsh austerity measures in order to reduce the fiscal deficit and improve the sustainability of the Greek public debt, which at the end of 2009 stood at €300 billion, or 130% of GDP. Horizontal austerity measures, such as cuts in salaries and pensions and tax hikes, were quickly adopted, allowing the government to claim substantial progress on fiscal consolidation from the first year of the programme (Chart 3).

Despite these early positive signs, it soon became evident that the crisis in Greece would not be easily resolved. First, the structural reform programme, intended to help Greece overhaul an expensive and inefficient public sector and improve its international competitiveness, never really took off, largely due to a strong and well-organised opposition from interest groups that stood to lose from its implementation. On the economic front, the adoption of a front-loaded austerity programme soon led to a deep recession. Economic activity ground to a halt as thousands of companies went bankrupt and unemployment rapidly increased. This undermined the success of the adjustment programme as public revenue fell, despite the introduction of a host of new taxes and substantial increases in indirect tax rates, while public expenses rose due to increased payments for unemployment benefits. Deviations in the programme led to more austerity measures, fuelling a downward economic spiral, which increased unemployment to unprecedented levels (Chart 4).

At the same time, the continued decline in GDP undermined the sustainability of Greek public debt, whose ratio to GDP kept increasing despite the substantial reduction in the fiscal deficit (Chart 5).

In this context, it soon became evident that the bailout programme would fail to meet its targets. Indeed, in February 2012, a second €130 billion bailout agreement was signed, which was accompanied by
a restructuring of the Greek public debt held by private creditors. The private sector involvement (PSI) deal, which called for a voluntary 53.5% haircut in the nominal value of outstanding bonds, reduced Greek public debt by €106 billion. The new bailout deal and the PSI gave a new lease of life to the Greek rescue programme and substantially improved the maturity and interest rate profile of the Greek debt. However, the deal did not really reduce Greek debt, but rather mostly substituted debt owed to private creditors with debt owed to the public sector. Indeed, part of the second loan is a tranche of approximately €50 billion, which the Greek government borrowed for the recapitalisation of Greek banks, which suffered a substantial loss from the haircut on the government bonds they had in their portfolios. This loss added to the troubles of an already ailing Greek banking system, which, due to the
uncertainty surrounding the country’s future, had suffered a flight of deposits to the tune of €70 billion since 2010. In addition, the continuing deterioration of the economy undermined the health of the banks’ loan portfolios, as non-performing loans soared (Chart 6). These problems undermined Greek banks’ ability to provide credit to businesses, which further contributed to the liquidity drought in the economy, worsening the downward economic spiral.

**Change in the Political Scene**

These conditions fuelled frustration and anger among the population. These feelings were openly vented in the elections of 6 May 2012, which fundamentally (and perhaps irrevocably) changed the Greek political map. The once-mighty socialist PASOK, which had come to power in the October 2009 elections, was relegated to third place, falling more than 30 percentage points in the polls. The centre-right New Democracy party did not fare much better, despite having been in the opposition most of this time: although it took first place, it registered its worst electoral result ever. The real winners of the election were parties on the far left and far right, united by their opposition to the bailout agreement and the memorandum. Particularly impressive was the performance of Syriza, a radical left-wing party, which took second place, registering an extraordinary improvement in its share of the vote. Following an impasse in the negotiations to form a coalition government, new elections were called for 17 June. The new elections confirmed the transformation of the Greek political landscape; this time, however, the results offered a way out, as New Democracy, PASOK and the moderate Democratic Left, pressed by the certainty of bankruptcy should the country go to a third round of elections, were able to form a coalition government with a mandate to renegotiate the Greek bailout agreement.

The agreement, in combination with the government’s (and Troika’s) projections for a gradual return to growth beginning in the last quarter of 2013, has led some people to believe that 2013 will be the year that Greece starts to recover.

Throughout the summer and until late October, the new Greek government was engaged in tough negotiations with the Troika over a new €11.5 billion
austerity package (which was eventually raised to €13.5 billion), intended to cover a projected deviation from fiscal adjustment targets in the years 2013 and 2014. The resulting austerity package proved a significant test for the coalition government. Democratic Left, the junior coalition partner, decided to abstain from the vote on the austerity package, due to its disagreement with new interventions in the labour market, while another six MPs from PASOK and one from New Democracy broke party ranks and withheld their support from the new agreement. In the end, the package passed through Parliament with a thin majority of only three votes.

The government hoped that the passage of the new measures would enable a renegotiation of the bailout agreement’s terms and the disbursement of a long-awaited tranche of €31.5 billion, delayed since June. Indeed, following the completion of the negotiation with the Troika, the Member States of the euro zone and the IMF were finally able to reach an agreement at the Eurogroup meeting on 26 November. The agreement fulfilled several of the Greek government’s objectives: release of €34.4 billion and a schedule for payment of the remainder of the 2012 tranches in the first quarter of 2013, extension of the fiscal consolidation programme for two more years, to 2016, and an array of measures (reduction of interest rates, extension of the maturity of loans, deferral of interest payments, and a plan for a Greek debt buy-back on the secondary market) to reduce the size of the Greek public debt to 124% of GDP by 2020.

Prospects for 2013

The November agreement fell short of providing a final resolution for the Greek crisis (by failing, for example, to address comprehensively the long-term sustainability of the Greek debt); nonetheless, it offered the Greek government a medium-term solution that allowed it to present the agreement as a turning point in the crisis. Moreover, the agreement, in combination with the government’s (and Troika’s) projections for a gradual return to growth beginning in the last quarter of 2013, has led some people to believe that 2013 will be the year that Greece starts to recover. Could this be true?

There is some evidence that seems to support this optimistic scenario. First, the disbursement of the large tranche of funds agreed in December has allowed the government to start the gradual repayment of approximately €6 billion of arrears to Greek private-sector suppliers – another cause of the liquidity drought in the Greek economy. From December 2012 to March 2013, the government was able to repay some €1.5 billion. Moreover, the disbursement of the December tranche has furnished the necessary funds for the completion of the recapitalisation of the Greek banking system, which, once concluded, is hoped to lead to the restoration of credit provision to the real economy. This expectation is also supported by the observation that, in recent months, following the elections and the November agreement, some €10 billion of deposits have returned to the banking system. Moreover, the November agreement substantially reduced the probability of a “Grexit,” which in turn dispelled a significant source of uncertainty, creating more favourable conditions for foreign investment in the country. Indeed, in the first months of 2013, companies such as Hewlett Packard, Unilever and SAP have all announced plans to increase their presence in Greece. Finally, there are positive signs for a very good year on the tourism front.

Are these encouraging signs enough to support a positive outlook for the Greek economy and its prospects of exiting the crisis in 2013? It is hard to say. Too many things are still uncertain, chief among them, the progress of the adjustment programme. As noted, the November agreement, although positive for Greece, hinged on the prior completion of a €13.5 billion austerity package between the Greek government and the Troika; measures totalling €9.5 billion are to be implemented in 2013. This is certain to deepen the recession further, although it is still unknown to what degree. Troika projections put the recession at 4.5% for 2013, but all previous projections have been wrong and subsequently revised downwards. Indeed, the recession is almost certain to be worse than expected given the recent deterioration of the crisis in Cyprus. The haircut on deposits in Cypriot banks will hurt many Greek companies and households, which had deposits in Cyprus, while the deep recession expected this
year in Cyprus will also impact the Greek economy, as the two countries have substantial economic and commercial ties.

Greek MPs are under extreme pressure from society and will not support another austerity package. The Greek government must thus overcome all the mitigating factors and somehow make the current programme work.

In addition to the intensity of the recession, other factors also suggest a negative outlook for the programme’s progress. Progress in structural reforms is still unsatisfactory; in addition to political considerations, this is due to the limited administrative capacity of the state apparatus and its ensuing inability to proceed at the required speed with such comprehensive and complex reforms. The problem is actually getting worse, due to a massive wave of early retirements in the public sector, as public servants try to escape the adverse effects on their retirement plans from changes in the pension system. Moreover, Greece’s efforts to regain competitiveness and grow its export base are undermined by the adverse international economic climate; the renewed recession in Europe has slowed down the impressive growth of Greek exports during the first years of the crisis, reducing the potential of exports to contribute to economic recovery.

Finally, one should not forget the political climate in Greece. After five years of austerity and recession, with unemployment rising to 26.4% in December 2012, Greek society is simmering with anger, frustration and desperation. The pressure on the political system to put an end to austerity is immense. The pressure on a politically diverse and fragile governing coalition is even stronger, given the populist rhetoric of parties on both the left and right of the political spectrum. A derailment of the adjustment programme, as a consequence of the aforementioned problems, may necessitate changes, some of which will be very difficult to achieve politically. Even if the governing coalition were somehow to agree to further austerity measures to make up for deviations in the programme, it is highly unlikely that such measures would pass through the Greek Parliament. Greek MPs are under extreme pressure from society and will not support another austerity package. The Greek government must thus overcome all the mitigating factors and somehow make the current programme work. If it does not succeed, the future of Greece will be truly unpredictable. One thing, however, is certain: for better or for worse, 2013 will be a crucial year for Greece.
François Hollande and the Mediterranean Region

In office since May 2012, François Hollande is the second left-wing politician after François Mitterrand to hold the position of President of the 5th Republic. His programme, actions and style differ greatly from that of his predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, who was in power from 2007 to 2012. Though this is particularly true in the realm of internal affairs, it is also the case in matters of diplomacy and foreign relations, especially with regard to the Mediterranean Region. Changes can be observed, which in any case come within a fragile European context and a period marked by new strategic concerns in the Mediterranean.

The French and Europe First and Foremost

President Hollande is dealing with a national situation that can be described as sensitive, to say the least. Public finances are deteriorating and France has not been spared the unemployment problem, a central concern in the Mediterranean Region. The country’s economic recovery is one of Hollande’s priorities. In foreign policy, European issues are pre-eminent. Rescuing the single currency, preserving solidarity between Member States (in particular Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal) and maintaining common policies such as those in the agriculture sphere constitute the main lines of action for Paris. Insofar as the Franco-German pair, so essential for the construction of the European Union, the terms of fiscal austerity to be applied are the object of genuine debate. Beyond European borders, Hollande has above all become known for his action in Mali, when he decided to undertake a military intervention in early 2013 in this Sahel State beset by Islamist terrorism. Taking up his role as commander-in-chief of the armed forces, he managed to grasp the geopolitical gravity of the situation, although the question of the withdrawal of the French troops remains at issue. The intervention lends the Sahel region a prominent strategic role on the French diplomatic agenda. This reclassification is made at the expense of a Mediterranean area where President Hollande seems to have made certain choices of a geographical nature and where France remains sometimes helpless in the face of the ongoing popular uprisings.

Special but Less Multilateral Relations with the Mediterranean Region

The Mediterranean area is a focal point of French foreign policy. It is a constant that goes beyond electoral contingencies and obliges each decision-maker. For French interests, France’s domestic stability and preserving the country’s international influence, the Mediterranean remains indispensable. Even if the proximity of relations has declined over time and certain economic positions are eroding, France remains tied to Mediterranean countries through its geography, commerce, society and culture. The francophone community still finds itself significantly reflected in this region. Many local authorities in

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1 This text was finalised on July 2013.
France have built long-term relations with cities and regions along the Mediterranean shores. Many French companies invest in the area, which is also a growing market in certain consumer segments. Human flows are, moreover, very dense between France and the southern and eastern Mediterranean Countries for family, tourist or professional reasons. On the geopolitical level, Paris played an essential role in the European Union’s proposing the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995. In 2008, France put forth the idea of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Finally, with regards to conflict management, if it is not decisive, France’s voice is still heard even if it may often seem to lag behind the United States, especially in the Middle East.

The Mediterranean area is a focal point of French foreign policy. For French interests, France’s domestic stability and preserving the country’s international influence, the Mediterranean remains indispensable.

Since his accession to the presidency, François Hollande has, naturally, continued this long-standing, passionate and particular relation with the Mediterranean Region. A number of new directions have been undertaken, however. The French President is aware of the disappointment arising from the failure of the UfM launched by Sarkozy. He likewise knows that the Tunisian, Egyptian, Libyan and Syrian revolutions have seriously transformed the geopolitical landscape of a Mediterranean Basin that is more atomised than united, more differentiated than homogeneous. The result is that multilateral action in this socio-politically agitated region has become highly complex. The differences between countries are heightened. Extra-regional actors are dominating trade, as for instance, China; getting involved in the military sphere, as for instance, Russia; or deploying economic and religious diplomacy, as for instance, Qatar or Saudi Arabia. The stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the war in Syria and non-integration of Maghrebi people in France are additional parameters handicapping the development of multilateral relations between Mediterranean States. It is thus not surprising that France, like the EU, lends precedence to the bilateral dimension to conduct its Mediterranean policy. In the spring of 2011, Brussels reactivated its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) by reorienting it towards sectoral priorities while confirming the principle of differentiation. This trend has been identical or nearly identical in French policy.

**Hollande and the Mediterranean Region: The Heart or the Mind?**

Since his election, François Hollande has thus been facing the need to define a French Mediterranean policy that will take into account the acquis, fit within the EU approach and carry new impetus. He must likewise deal with the dividing line in France, extant among both the left and the right, between partisans of an Atlantic/Western alignment, turned towards Washington, and those advocating a De Gaulle-Mitterrand approach, more willing to listen to countries of the south and emerging countries, and who uphold maintaining a certain strategic independence. The President has shown great caution. He knows that the position of France has been disappointing at the time of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, that it’s intervention in Libya had gone too far, that its voluntarism with regards to the Sahel crisis is risky and that France is obliged to support the American’s strategy in the Middle East. To differentiate himself from Sarkozy, the President should not confuse speed with haste. By advocating support to the transitions underway in countries having experienced political upheaval, Hollande is taking a pragmatic approach. Insofar as the new governments established in south Mediterranean countries, he uses a positive, open and confiding tone, though certain sensitive points are closely scrutinised (respect for opposition parties, women’s rights and minority rights). In this manner, France seeks to maintain relations with the ensemble of the political forces in these countries, in particular in Tunisia, a country the French government considers the laboratory of the transitions underway and of democratisation in the Arab world. Concerning the Maghreb, Hollande cultivates good relations with Morocco, where he made a successful
state visit in April 2013. However, he is seeking to rebalance French Policy in Algeria where he went on a state visit in December 2012 while the country quietly supported the French operation in Mali for the first time since its independence. The French President also went to Tunisia on 4 and 5 July 2013, applauding the “transition” and the “movement” in that country, in contrast to the messages delivered to its two Maghrebi neighbours, where Hollande had placed greater emphasis on “stability” and “continuity.” Consolidating French presence and pursuing partnership with Maghrebi countries are even more necessary now that the terrorist threats in the Sahel and the risks associated with the intervention in Mali have become factors.

Improving relations with Ankara and boosting trade with this growing market constitute some of the goals of the current administration, which intends to put into practice the President’s will to promote “economic diplomacy,” a concept with which Mediterranean countries will have to contend henceforth.

On the other hand, France’s silence on Libya persists and contrasts sharply with the posture of his predecessor vis-à-vis Tripoli. Moreover, the further east the pointer moves, the less clear and coherent President Hollande’s actions seem. With regard to Egypt and its turmoil, France displays an expectant attitude. In the case of Syria, bungling predominates, illustrated by the idea of delivering weapons to the insurgents. This operation, fleetingly considered by Paris, was quickly suspended in the spring of 2013. The militarisation and sectarianisation in Syria are sowing a great deal of doubt in France insofar as the outcome of the conflict, which has been ongoing for two years now. Hollande, like so many other European leaders, condemns the violence, dreads the collateral effects in the region (in particular in Lebanon), but proves unable to influence the course of events, which one can assume clearly depends on true consensus among all stakeholders, including Russia, China, Iran, etc. In addition, Paris has the constraint of following American positions on the Middle East after having received Washington’s manifest diplomatic and logistic support in Mali. France could thus be conducted to support an American operation that is far-removed from its own interests. On the Israeli-Palestinian question, the French President is not venturing beyond the perimeter set by the Western line, which consists of expressing the wish to re-establish dialogue between the two parties in order to relaunch the peace process, currently at a standstill. In neglecting certain campaign promises on the recognition of the Palestinian State, Hollande regularly disappoints human rights activists and those who advocate that Paris take a strong position on the Middle East capable of providing an alternative to the current deadlock. In the eastern Mediterranean Basin, relations are warming up with Turkey, though one cannot speak of veritable enthusiasm. Improving relations with Ankara and boosting trade with this growing market constitute some of the goals of the current administration, which intends to put into practice the President’s will to promote “economic diplomacy,” a concept with which Mediterranean countries will have to contend henceforth.

Hollande and the Mediterranean Region: Circumstantial Pragmatism

Despite this growing bilateralisation of French policy in the Mediterranean Region, François Hollande is attempting to nurture the conventional discourse on multilateral co-operation in the region. On 27 August 2012, in that inevitable annual exercise, the President established the framework for French foreign policy in his speech to ambassadors. He recalled the country’s ambition with regard to the Mediterranean, where situations are changing, which in his opinion requires that France adapt and prove itself capable of listening to the different aspirations being expressed. Committed to the mobilisation of the UfM Technical Secretariat’s capabilities, Hollande brandished the leitmotiv of this initiative again in advocating a “Mediterranean of projects” and creating on January 2013 an inter-ministerial delegation for the Mediterranean (DIMed). This is an interesting national signal sent in the direction of partner coun-
President Hollande primarily voiced support for stepped-up co-operation in the western Mediterranean Basin through the 5+5 Dialogue, which certainly represents a complete break with Sarkozy’s policies. The priority lent to relations with the Maghreb was confirmed on 5 and 6 October 2012 in Malta, with his participation in the Heads of State and Government 5+5 Dialogue Summit. Continuing one of the flagship themes of his French programme, he particularly insisted on “youth” and the issues of training, employment and mobility in the Mediterranean Region. Holland, who aims to be realistic, wishes above all to foster synergies to facilitate financing, better utilise extant co-operation instruments and render French initiatives complimentary to the EU’s Mediterranean policy. Conditioned by the waning economic means, perhaps President Hollande’s France has finally realised that the dispersal of efforts is useless and leads nowhere? This highly pragmatic approach has the benefit of being realistic and not multiplying the signal effect in a geopolitical context that does not allow for Euro-Mediterranean co-operation to pick up again for the time being. It is too early to judge Hollande’s actions with regard to the Mediterranean Region. This said, a number of trends can be identified and several certainties emerge. The President wishes to rebuild confidence in the region and restore France’s image, at times deteriorated, before the civil society of certain countries. He is advancing in this direction with his administration, prudently yet professionally. He is making geographical choices by strategic priority. In any case, too much orientation towards the Maghreb could be negatively perceived by certain Middle East States and would be vulnerable to rivalries among the different North African nations, still guided by notorious antagonisms. Suffice it to consider the extreme sensitivity of Sahrawi affairs to perceive the diplomatic dangers on the horizon. The thorny question of the Sahel will also serve as a test to ascertain how far France will go in its expression of influential power in regional affairs, and free itself from so much pressure from the U.S and other pressure related to the strategies of the Persian Gulf countries. And finally, we must consider whether Paris will manage to durably cultivate its multilateral discourse on the Mediterranean policies of an economically weakened Europe that tomorrow will prefer to speak of a “neighbourhood” where it formerly spoke of a “partnership”; for to remain a prominent power, France needs Europe as much as it does the Mediterranean.
The Western Balkans 2012: A Year of Internal Political Conflicts

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While the European Union (EU) has faced very challenging political and fiscal crises of its own, membership of the Union remains a key objective of all the countries of the Western Balkans. Despite a perception in the region that “enlargement fatigue” will slow the process of European integration, Croatia (which will not be addressed here) will join in the summer of 2013 and Montenegro opened membership negotiations in April 2012. The picture is, however, less promising elsewhere, and although the quest for EU membership is largely consensual across the political spectrum (with some exceptions), internal political conflicts have undermined the accession process in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia. To compound this, the states of the Western Balkans have been severely impacted by the global financial crisis. The economic situation in the region remains far from stable as regional governments attempt to forge an economic recovery. It is within this context that the following selective analysis of the key internal developments in those Western Balkan states throughout 2012 is framed.

Following Croatia’s accession, the most likely country to join the EU thereafter is Montenegro. There was also some moderate social and political flux in Montenegro, although the government seems to have overcome the challenges. In October, following a lively election campaign, Milo Djukanovic returned as the country’s Prime Minister, although the coalition led by his Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) failed to win an absolute majority in the parliamentary elections. Nevertheless, it was a welcome victory at the end of a difficult year for the Montenegrin government. At the beginning of 2012, a corruption affair generated by the sale of Montenegrin Telekom compounded pre-existing dissatisfaction among the opposition and among those who argue that Montenegro has become a “private state” controlled by Djukanovic and a number of his associates. Thousands of protesters demonstrated against price rises, perceived corruption, nepotism, and the government’s failure to tackle organised crime. Initially, the protests appeared to be growing and the demands of the protesters shifted from the manifestation of economic discontent toward explicit demands for the government to resign. But the protests began to fizzle out by mid-year as the government announced that membership talks with the EU were about to begin.

In July, the government called early elections, seeking a new mandate that would allow them a new four-year term in which to embark upon EU accession talks. In advance of the elections, the opposition coalition, comprising the Movement for Changes (PzP), the New Serbian Democracy (NOVA) and numerous independent intellectuals, began to crystallise. The coalition was headed by the former Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Miodrag Lekic, who placed criticism of the government’s record on organised crime and corruption at the heart of the campaign. The opposition was, however, unable to end the dominance of the DPS and its governing partner, the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Nevertheless, for the first time since the 2001 election, the DPS and its coalition partners failed to win an absolute majority of seats in Parliament. They subsequently entered into a coalition with Bosnian, Croat and Albanian parties to form a diverse ruling coalition, albeit one that is now led by the “new-old” Prime Minister. Political divisions were more acute in neighbouring Bosnia. The country has, for several years, lurched
from crisis to crisis, and recent developments have done little to suggest that a departure from that trend is imminent. In January 2012, Vjekoslav Bevanda was appointed as Prime Minister after a long impasse in which the country had no state-level government. His upbeat rhetoric soon proved hopelessly optimistic. The first major challenge for the government was to adopt a state budget, but the issue only served to increase pre-existing strains between the predominantly Bosniak parties, the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Party for Democratic Action (SDA). Failure to reach an agreement led to the latter departing the governing coalition. Subsequently, the SDP leader, Zlatko Lagumdzija, sought coalition allies elsewhere. Having marginalised the SDA, he sought to open the door to Fahru-din Radonic’s Alliance for a Better Future (SBB). But this did little to resolve the ongoing political deadlock, either within the Federation or between Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation.

While the European Union has faced very challenging political and fiscal crises of its own, membership of the Union remains a key objective of all the countries of the Western Balkans.

In terms of the latter, Lagumdzija would surprise even his closest allies by reaching an agreement with Milorad Dodik, the leader of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), the largest party in the RS. The two pledged to improve cooperation between Bosnia’s two entities and the functioning of both the government and the economy. Their plans included revision of the electoral law, revision of the administration and the election of state prosecutors. Critics of the deal said it would reduce transparency and undermine the power of Bosnia’s state-level institutions. The country’s main Croa
t parties, who have long argued that the Federation is effectively run by Bosniaks (Muslims) and the RS by the Serbs, supported the deal while demanding that power should be distributed among all three ethnic groups.

In the midst of the internal political conflicts, a report by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) cautioned about the dangers of what they argued was the threat of rising nationalism in the RS. Addressing the UN Security Council in November, the High Representative, Valentin Inzko, stated that he remained concerned by the secessionist rhetoric of the RS leadership, singling out Milorad Dodik as particularly problematic in this regard. Both reports warned that Bosnia was falling further behind other countries in the region in terms of reforms, which, it was argued, would have economic, social and political consequences.

Nationalist rhetoric has also been a defining feature of Albanian politics in the past year. The year 2013 marks the centenary of Albania’s declaration of independence from the Ottoman Empire, and celebrations in advance of this were accompanied by a degree of nationalist rhetoric and jingoism. But this did little more than temporarily conceal the country’s continuing internal problems. Albania’s traditional adversaries – the ruling Democrats (led by Sali Berisha) and the opposition Socialists (led by Edi Rama) – did cooperate on a cross-party parliamentary commission tasked with amending the electoral code. But this consensus had broken down by June, when Parliament was required to elect a new Head of State. While constitutional revisions formalised in 2008 gave the ruling coalition the right to vote in a candidate with a simple majority, Berisha faced pressure both from the EU and the US to select an appropriately consensual candidate. In June, following the collapse of talks between the opposition and government about a suitable candidate, Parliament voted to approve the interior minister, Bujar Nishani, as the new Head of State. Following his inauguration, Nishani moved to approve a request by Berisha and replace the head of the State Security Agency (SHISH), Bahri Shaqiri. The latter had gained respect for his professionalism, particularly for ensuring that SHISH did not fall under the political influence of the ruling Democrats. His relations with Berisha were not, however, very positive. The Albanian Prime Minister had accused him, former President Topi and the General Prosecutor, Ina Rama, of being conspirators in an alleged coup d’état in January 2011. Berisha drew further criticism for his nationalistic rhetoric during the week of celebrations held to mark the independence anniversary on 28 November. Berisha’s appeals to pan-Albanian sentiment angered
some of Albania’s neighbours. The Premier also raised eyebrows by offering a speedy path to citizenship for all the world’s ethnic Albanians.

Domestic issues were also at the heart of the elections in Serbia in May. The elections saw a heavy defeat for Boris Tadic’s Democratic Party (DS). The electorate, tired of what they perceived to be the party’s mismanagement of the economy, corruption and falling living standards, punished it accordingly. Indeed, the incumbent mayor of Belgrade, Dragan Djilas, was the only Democrat who performed well, holding onto his post as mayor. In the wake of the elections, significant horse-trading led to Ivica Dacic, the leader of the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), aligning himself with the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS). Dacic became Prime Minister, while the SNS leader Tomislav Nikolic became President, following his defeat of the incumbent, Boris Tadic, in the run-off. The downfall of the DS was complete following the formation of the new government, comprising the SNS, SPS and the United Regions of Serbia (URS). The elections threw the DS into crisis, with Tadic widely blamed for the defeat.

Within weeks of the creation of the new government, Nikolic resigned as head of the SNS, thereby allowing Aleksandar Vucic to lead the party. Vucic also took one of the deputy Prime Minister posts and the post of Defence Minister. In August, he was also appointed secretary of the Council for National Security, giving him oversight of Serbia’s security services. Thereafter the SNS sought to make good on their pre-election promise to root out corruption. Indeed, Vucic warned those he accused of corruption that no-one would be beyond the law. Numerous high-profile arrests followed, the most spectacular arrest being that of Serbia’s richest businessman, Miroslav Miskovic, owner of the Delta Holding, who was arrested in connection with a number of privatisations that the EU had deemed problematic. The arrests were, seemingly, proof that the new government intended to tackle corruption energetically, though their critics argued that this was merely a cover for what was essentially the settling of political scores.

The Nikolic government’s position on Kosovo and EU membership was, however, rather similar to their predecessors. Serbia obtained EU candidate status under the DS in March and hoped to get a start date for accession talks by the end of 2012. However, normalisation of relations with Kosovo remained the major stumbling block. Determined to acquire a starting date for membership negotiations, Ivica Dacic controversially agreed to meet his Kosovo counterpart, Hashim Thaci, in Brussels in October. The meeting, described by the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security, Catherine Ashton, as “historic,” took place despite Serbia having an arrest warrant out for Thaci. This and subsequent meetings resulted in an agreement to implement an earlier deal on the Kosovo-Serbia border and appoint liaison officers from both sides. Brussels hailed the deal as a significant step forward, but it was not sufficient for Serbia to be permitted to proceed with EU accession talks.

Kosovo finished the year having ended the period of international “supervision” recognised by more than half of all UN Member States. Kosovar leaders and key international allies, such as the US, hailed a “historic milestone” in the modern history of the region, while others were less enthusiastic. Serbia dismissed the decision of the International Steering Group (ISG), which comprises 23 EU Member States, the United States and Turkey, reiterating that its government would never recognise Kosovo, supervised or otherwise. Kosovo also made tentative steps toward EU membership, although it remained the only country in the Western Balkans not to have benefited from any relaxation in the EU visa regime. The EU has assessed that Kosovo’s government have only made moderate progress in combating organised crime and corruption and have made slow progress in resolving the seemingly intractable problems in the northern, Serb-controlled part of the Kosovar territory. A positive move towards resolving the thirteen-year “frozen” conflict in northern Kosovo came, however, with implementation of the Integrated Border Management (IBM) agreement with Serbia. The agreement, initially concluded at the end of 2011 within the framework of the EU-mediated “technical dialogue” between Pristina and Belgrade, came into force just after Prime Minister Thaci’s aforementioned meeting with his Serbian counterpart. Yet talks were often undermined by events elsewhere. At the end of November, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (for the second time) acquitted the former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) commander and former Prime
Minister Ramush Haradinaj. He returned to a hero’s welcome in Kosovo.

Neighbouring Macedonia’s troubled year began with the death of its first President, Kiro Gligorov, who played the key role in the country’s peaceful separation from the former Yugoslavia. His death coincided with a deterioration of inter-ethnic relations within the country he led, relations that had become increasingly strained throughout the previous year. That trouble lay ahead became evident in January in the village of Vevcani (near Struga). Christian participants in a festival held there wore the Muslim veil and mocked the Koran, generating fierce protests from the ethnic Albanian community of Struga. In the violence that followed, a number of churches were set alight. A month later in the predominantly Albanian town of Gostivar, an ethnic Macedonian police officer killed two ethnic Albanians. The circumstances were never fully explained, provoking protests among ethnic Albanians. In March, clashes between Slav Macedonian and ethnic Albanian youths in the centre of the Macedonian capital, Skopje, became increasingly commonplace. Collectively, these incidents increased fears that conflict, such as that the country experienced in 2001, might return. Subsequently, thousands marched through the streets of Skopje calling for ethnic tolerance.

Inter-ethnic relations were further strained after the discovery of the bodies of five ethnic Macedonians, who appeared to have been shot dead, on 12 April near a lake in the environs of Skopje. The murders fuelled already tense ethnic relations, leading to more protests and more violence. Despite the identities of the perpetrators being unknown at this stage, it was widely assumed that the killers were ethnic Albanians. And, indeed, after an extensive police operation, six ethnic Albanians were charged. However, the police announcement that the men were “radical Islamists” brought thousands of ethnic Albanian protestors on to the streets of Skopje, their central claim being that the arrests were politically motivated. In the wake of the murders, tensions ebbed and flowed. In August, Defence Minister Fatmir Besimi (an ethnic Albanian) attended a ceremony in the village of Slupcane to commemorate members of the ethnic Albanian National Liberation Army (NLA) killed during the conflict in 2001 between ethnic Albanian insurgents and the Macedonian government. Although the move generated criticism, no action was taken against Besimi and the matter appeared to be at an end. However, a month later, the governing VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) announced that they would bring into law legislation that would provide benefits to members of the Macedonian armed forces who had taken part in the 2001 conflict. This provoked a crisis in the government coalition with VMRO-DPMNE’s ethnic Albanian coalition partner, the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI). The DUI and the opposition Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA) vowed to do everything to block the law if it was not extended to former NLA fighters. By the end of the year the law still had not been adopted, prompting some opposition parties to accuse the government partners of exploiting nationalist sentiments.

The year’s end saw yet more political crisis. On this occasion, the main opposition Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) proposed more than a thousand amendments to the budget law. The party said it would use all possible methods to stop adoption of the law. It specifically opposed a proposal for Macedonia to take out two new loans in 2013 and demanded restraint in building more monuments (many of which were erected as part of the “Skopje 2014” regeneration project) and other unproductive projects. Following an attempt by the opposition to block the parliamentary session, police ejected a number of MPs from the building. Macedonia appeared to be sliding into a spiral of political crisis with uncertain consequences.

The year 2012 was marked by the progress of Montenegro’s EU bid, despite the social and economic challenges the government face there. Events elsewhere have, however, been marked by the intensification of political conflicts. Bosnia continues to lurch from crisis to crisis, Albanian politics remains defined by the Socialist-Democrat dynamic, Serbia and Kosovo remain at odds (despite the aforementioned EU-backed initiatives) and Macedonia appeared to be sliding toward serious crisis. Paradoxically, the aforementioned events have not rendered progress on EU membership for these countries entirely static, but there remains concern in Brussels over the future trajectory of these conflicts. They are, of course, only one factor in a complex picture, but failure to resolve them will only result in slower progress toward membership of the EU.
On Sunday, 23 June 2013, Albanian voters went to the polls in parliamentary elections. The inhabitants of this small Balkan nation had to choose between dozens of parties organised in two main coalitions. What was striking, however, was that both of these leading coalitions presented a very similar vision of Albania’s long-term future as a member of the European Union (EU). The Alliance for Employment, Prosperity and Integration, led by Sali Berisha, Albanian Prime Minister from 2005 to 2013, used EU flags throughout its election campaign. Its main competitor, the Alliance for a European Albania, led by former Tirana mayor Edi Rama’s Socialist Party, announced its programme in its very name. “European Albania” and “integration” were buzzwords throughout the campaign, suggesting that, as seen from Albania, the EU’s attraction and soft power remain undiminished.

On 19 April 2013, the Serbian and Albanian Prime Ministers came together in Brussels and signed a historic agreement to normalise relations. This came fourteen years after the end of the war that had resulted in Kosovo breaking away from Serbia. Observers noted that this historic agreement was negotiated and signed by Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dacic, who, in an earlier political life, had been the spokesman for the former Serb President Slobodan Milosevic. The Deputy Prime Minister and strongman of the Serbian coalition government Aleksandar Vucic was another interesting party to this diplomatic breakthrough. Vucic had long been a popular figure in the Serbian Radical Party, in the past the most nationalist movement in Serbian politics. He then left the Radical Party with others in 2008. The reason for the split, which had profound consequences for Serbian politics and brought Vucic to power, was the new policy of Vucic and others to embrace, rather than reject, EU integration as a strategic goal for Serbia.

**Remarkable Attraction**

Throughout the Western Balkans, in 2013, issues of EU integration remain at the centre of national politics. Across the region, the European issue has confounded nationalists, created a rare point of consensus for political opponents and constituted an easy answer to an obvious question voters put to leaders: how to overcome the historic backwardness of one of Europe’s poorest regions. The fact that economic and political crises elsewhere on the continent – from Portugal to Greece, from Ireland to Cyprus – have not diminished the attractiveness of the European idea is remarkable.

Croatia became the 28th Member State of the EU in July 2013. Montenegro is deeply engaged in its accession negotiations. There is no debate over the use of the euro as the national currency in either Montenegro or Kosovo today. The very fact that the new European External Action Service is achieving its hitherto biggest diplomatic success anywhere in the Balkans is also an indication of the continuing potency of the promise of enlargement. And yet, a closer look at the reality of the state of EU integration of the Balkans today suggests a more complex, and less reassuring, picture of European influence. The year 2013 has also seen the emergence of a new gap, as the Balkans divide into two groups. On the one hand, we find countries for which the EU does in fact constitute a credible medium-term prospect; on the other hand are countries excluded de facto from this project for the medium and long term. What makes both the
summer 2013 Albanian elections and the Serbia-Kosovo deal significant is the question of whether either Albania or Serbia (or both) can still manage to join the group of credible EU aspirants before that train leaves the station. For now, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia have settled into a political limbo, from which it is becoming increasingly hard to imagine how they will ever break out.

**The Social Costs of Non-Europe**

There is also a strong economic and social dimension to this debate. An analysis of economic trends in the past decade suggests that voters and leaders in the Balkans act rationally when they embrace a European vision. Today, the countries of south-eastern Europe constitute one of the poorest regions on the continent. And yet, within the region there has long been a prosperity gap between those countries that managed to join the EU earlier and those left on the outside (see Table 4). The Balkan states with the least developed relations with the EU are also the poorest: Kosovo, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia (all of which were not yet candidates for EU accession in 2011).

**TABLE 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>GDP per Capita in 2011 (in EU average is 100)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia (candidate)</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro (candidate)</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria (EU)</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (EU)</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia (negotiating)</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (EU)</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


This has profound social consequences. If one examines how many people of working age (15 to 64 decade had seen wars in 1991 (Croatia), 1992-1995 (Bosnia) and 1999 (Kosovo), as well as the collapse of the State in Albania in 1996 and an ethnic uprising in Macedonia in 2001.

Second, in the years since 2003 – when the EU clearly promised a European future to all of the Balkans at the Thessaloniki summit – the economic gap between the region’s wealthiest countries and its poorest ones has grown in absolute terms. The result is an ever greater divergence between two groups of countries. The countries that negotiated accession to the EU (Croatia and Montenegro) or joined it (Bulgaria and Romania) in the last decade were already richer in 2003 than the remaining “Balkan five” – Albania, Bosnia, Macedonia, Serbia and Kosovo; however, they have become even more developed since. Rather than catching up, the laggards are falling further behind (see Table 5).

**TABLE 5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>7,600</td>
<td>15,800</td>
<td>+8,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>13,700</td>
<td>+6,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>8,400</td>
<td>14,400</td>
<td>+6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>18,800</td>
<td>+5,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>11,400</td>
<td>+5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>6,900</td>
<td>11,600</td>
<td>+4,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>9,200</td>
<td>+3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>8,800</td>
<td>+3,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>5,800*</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>+1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-27</td>
<td>24,400</td>
<td>32,600</td>
<td>+8,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**A New Partition of the Western Balkans?**

If current trends continue, and other economic indicators suggest that they will, this development gap will grow ever wider. Here it is instructive to look at export and employment trends. An analysis of the different Balkan economies’ records of producing internationally competitive goods yields a ranking that once again positions the Balkan countries at the end of the queue towards full European integration. The best export performers are Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. The worst performers, exporting very little indeed, are Kosovo and Albania (see Table 6).

This has profound social consequences. If one examines how many people of working age (15 to 64
years old) are actually working, an alarming picture emerges. While all countries in the region are below the EU average, it is again those outside the EU integration process in which the lowest share of the adult population is employed (see Table 7).

| Employment Rate (people aged 15-64 working) (%) |
|-----------------|--------|--------|
| Kosovo*          | 37     |        |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina | 39     |        |
| Albania*         | 42     |        |
| Macedonia        | 44     |        |
| Montenegro       | 46     |        |
| Serbia           | 47     |        |
| Croatia          | 52     |        |
| Greece (EU)      | 56     |        |
| Bulgaria (EU)    | 58     |        |
| Romania (EU)     | 59     |        |
| EU-27            | 64     |        |

*The figure for Kosovo is for 2012; the figure for Albania is for 2010.

The Case for Europe in the Balkans

The arguments for the EU (and the US) to become, and remain, involved in the Balkans over the last two decades have often been negative: images of atrocities and anarchy, fears of further chaos, talk about failed states. Today, however, the success in stabilisation has changed the debate in EU capitals as well. Serbia will not resort to violent means in its struggle over Kosovo. Macedonia is not going to implode in civil war if it does not start accession talks in 2013. Kosovo will not expel its Serb citizens if it does not get visa liberalisation to the EU. Even in Bosnia, nobody expects a return to armed conflict, as most foreign troops have left. And yet it would be foolish to become complacent. The outburst of popular protests in Bulgaria, Turkey and Brazil has shown how quickly frustrations can spill over into the street.

The year 2013 has shown that it is (still) in the Balkans that the EU can best prove the usefulness of the creation of its new foreign-policy machine in leading to a more effective foreign policy. In the 1990s, the Balkans became a laboratory for other interventions elsewhere. Since 2003, EU initiatives here have continued to serve as incubators for policies. EU visa roadmaps for the Balkans, after producing real results and reforms, have been adapted to the conditions of the Eastern Partnership region. The prospect of post-conflict multi-ethnic democracies forging a lasting democratic peace remains a bold vision. So does the vision of European integration helping impoverished societies break out of vicious circles of under-development. This is why the consequences of the April 2013 Serbia-Kosovo deal matter so much: will a European breakthrough for Serbia create a similarly irreversible dynamic there in 2013 to the one that EU integration created for Croatia in 2003? This is also why Albania and the conduct of the 2013 elections mattered so much. Can this NATO member, which has no disputes with its regional neighbours, catch up to Montenegro and Serbia and open EU accession talks soon?

Progress made by Serbia (as an inspiration to Bosnia) and Albania (as an inspiration to its neighbours Kosovo and Macedonia) may yet help to prevent the scenario of a new partition of the Balkans. The biggest challenge to the Balkans in 2013 is to avoid a new trap in which low confidence and expectations translate into hopelessness. As of now, it remains unclear whether this challenge will be met.
First Year of Islamist Government in Morocco: Same Old Power, New Coalition

On 3 January 2012, Abdelilah Benkirane, Secretary General of the Justice and Development Party (PJD), unveiled his government. On 13 December, Abdessalam Yassine, founder of the Justice and Charity movement, considered the most serious opponent of the Moroccan monarchy, passed away. Neither of these events led to catastrophe. The formation of a coalition government, albeit one presided by the Islamist Benkirane, is an unprecedented experience that marks the culmination of the institutional normalisation of a sector of Moroccan Islamism that began twenty years ago. It moreover offers the opportunity to determine the true ideological orientation of the PJD and its management capacity in office. At the same time, this experience puts to the test the division of powers between the Head of Government and the Monarchy one year after the popular demonstrations that led to the reform of the Moroccan Constitution, in which the young members of the Justice and Charity movement played an important role.

The Benkirane Government

The distribution of the portfolios in the governing coalition reflects the electoral results: the PJD is predominant, with 11 ministers, followed by the Istiqlal or Independence Party with 6, and the Popular Movement and the Progress and Socialism Party, which each have 4. However, there are several ministers without partisan profiles whose appointment was the result of their connections with the King. This might seem logical in areas of government such as Religious Affairs or Defence, but it runs contrary to the Constitution adopted in 2011 in the case of the Secretariat General of the Government or the Ministry of Agriculture. In reality, what the make-up of the government reflects is how the King maintained his veto rights when choosing the ministers proposed by Benkirane. Moreover, more than ever before, the Royal Cabinet, has become a genuine “shadow cabinet,” incorporating the men responsible for the most important portfolios in recent years, such as Taieb Fassi-Fihri, Foreign Minister in the outgoing government, or Omar Azziman, head of the Advisory Committee on Regionalisation, not to mention Fouad Ali Al-Himma, a former classmate and trusted confidant of Mohamed VI’s, tasked with handling his relations with the political forces.

Nevertheless, nearly all the PJD’s heavyweights have been rewarded. In addition to the Foreign Ministry, they hold several other key posts, such as Minister of Justice and Liberties, Delegate Minister for the Budget at the Ministry of Economy and Finance, and Minister of Equipment and Transport. This makes them responsible for handling a number of key issues inherited from the previous government, namely: the justice reform, the budget deficit, the promise to find public-sector work for unemployed university graduates, and the construction of a high-speed train. Separately, attention should be called, due to its significance, to the inclusion of just one woman in the government (at the helm of the Ministry of Solidarity, Women, Family and Social Development), a clear backslide in the feminisation of public life and the holding of political office.
Government Action

The actions of the Benkirane Government have primarily been conditioned by the need to prepare the organic laws specifying the implementation of the 2011 Constitution. This has been its main challenge. However, of the 16 organic laws and 20 ordinary laws promised, only the text regarding the appointments of senior officials in the public administration and state companies has been enacted.

The make-up of the government reflects how the King maintained his veto rights when choosing the ministers proposed by Benkirane

The legislative inactivity in this regard should not be interpreted as general legislative lethargy, but rather as the result, depending on the case, of a lack of will or a political inability to tackle core issues related to the development of the new Constitution. In fact, over this period, the government has produced some sixty laws, often related to international conventions and treaties, and has undertaken a series of initiatives to denounce what might be described as “rent situations.” Indeed, the Islamists have trained their sights on two areas: civil servants and people with licences to carry out activities in certain state-controlled economic sectors. Thus, lists have been published of people with licences to transport passengers or operate aggregate quarries, people who are given public accommodations by some ministries, and even the names of the associations receiving public aid from abroad. Likewise, the National Education Ministry’s teaching staff and the Health Ministry’s medical staff have been barred from working at private establishments, and it has been agreed that positions in the civil service will only be awarded by competitive exam. Moreover, it has been established that, as provided for by law, wage withholdings will apply to civil servants on strike, which has raised union hackles.

Faced with this less than stellar list of legislative accomplishments, the government defends its performance arguing that it has also increased the minimum retirement pensions, expanded the health insurance system, lowered the prices of certain drugs, implemented a family solidarity fund and a social cohesion fund, and announced new taxes on large fortunes.

To be fair, the Benkirane government has had to deal with public finances deteriorated by the measures taken to neutralise the first outbreaks of the Moroccan Spring, the crisis in Europe and a lacklustre year for crops. With the increase in oil prices and the announcement of a new fund for the poorest households, some have seen signs of a forthcoming reform of the subsidies to basic staples that so many have called for, but that no one has dared to undertake for fear of the social instability it might cause. The solution to this critical financial situation lay, once again, in royal diplomacy and requests for aid from Western allies (France and the United States) and the Persian Gulf monarchies (United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia), as well as different loans from international financial organisations such as the IMF, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Investment Bank and the Arab Monetary Fund.

While improving the public finances, putting the public sector to work and denouncing certain privileged situations are all positive actions taken by the Benkirane government, this same government and, in particular, some of the ministers from Benkirane’s own party, have become embroiled in multiple controversies involving accusations of Islamic fundamentalism, of a lack of respect for the pluralism of Moroccan society, and of insensitivity to social problems related to women’s rights and civil liberties.

To this end, attention should be called to the draft reform of the Moroccan audiovisual sector submitted by the Minister of Communication, Mustapha El Khalfi, which proposed broadcasting all calls to prayer, Arabising the programming, and pushing back news broadcasts in French and Spanish until late at night. Given the mobilisation of the proponents of French-language programming, the King convened the Minister and the Head of Government for a consultation and tasked a committee he had appointed himself with the reform.

Likewise controversial were the tone-deaf reactions of both the Minister of Justice and Liberties and the Minister of Solidarity, Women, Family &
Social Development to the social outpourings resulting from the suicide of a teenager wed against her will to her alleged rapist. Under Article 475 of the Moroccan Criminal Code, the marriage between an alleged rapist and his victim makes it possible to safeguard the honour of the victim’s family while at the same time absolving the rapist of any legal action. The social mobilisation to abolish this article coincided with the visit of Minister of Justice Mustafa Ramid to the Salafi Sheikh Mohammed Maghraoui, back from a “forced” exile in Saudi Arabia for having recently authorised the marriage of a nine-year-old girl to an adult.

With regard to the balance of power between the government and the Palace, it is worth noting several initiatives taken by the King that clearly show he has no intention of ceasing to intervene whenever he sees fit or of relinquishing certain prerogatives. In some cases, his interventions are reactive, correcting or modifying the government’s action, as in the reform of the television network programming. In others, it is proactive and does not seem to take the opinion of the Head of Government or the relevant Minister into account, such as with the appointment of the President of the Court of Auditors or the members of the Justice Reform Committee.

The message hidden behind these initiatives and snubs is not easy to decipher; however, at the very least they highlight the imbalance of power between the Palace and the Head of Government. Benkirane does not dare to criticise the King; however, he does criticise his advisors, even when he is later forced to retract his words and reiterate his “loyalty” to the sovereign. The Head of Government makes up for this impotence with an active communication policy that contrasts with the silence of his predecessors. Populist rhetoric allows him to convey his displeasure, the constraints he faces, and the failure to re-balance power with the Palace in an effort to address his voters’ frustrated expectations for change. However, in the field of populism, the competition is fierce.

In the religious terrain, he faces competition from Salafi currents and the Justice and Charity movement. With the death of Sheikh Yassine, the staunchest advocate of a path of dissidence with the regime and an alternative to the PJD’s strategy of integration has disappeared. The movement may be weakened by the loss of its elderly and charismatic leader if the alleged tensions at its core between proponents of a Sufi approach and advocates of entering the political game prove to be real. Meanwhile, the PJD caters to Salafist leaders so as to ensure their support, despite growing rumours of the creation of a separate party to represent this current.

With regard to the balance of power between the government and the Palace, it is worth noting several initiatives taken by the King that clearly show he has no intention of ceasing to intervene whenever he sees fit.

In the sphere of official political microcosms, the election, not free of controversy, of Hamid Chabat to head Istiqlal and of Driss Lachgar to head the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) promises a media frenzy that will contribute to the image of a plural and active political life in Moroccan society. In them, Benkirane will face a dual opposition: within his own government, Chabat, who has his eye on the premiership, has called for changes in the composition of the government, while Lachgar claims to be the leading opponent of the Islamists and has called for the reunification of the forces on the left.

A Recurring Response on the Social and Political Front

Throughout the year, several cities have seen seemingly small and innocuous gatherings (the eviction of a family in Tangiers) or protests against the high cost of living (in Taza) end in violent confrontations with the security forces and harsh prison sentences. This repression has also affected the 20 February Movement, which, despite having lost much of its capacity to draw people out onto the streets, continues to denounce symbols of despotism, inequality and the lack of certain freedoms (ceremony of fealty to the King, the budget approved for the Palace) through social media and at one-off events.
Meanwhile, the Minister of Justice and Freedom, who was one of the most fervent defenders of the Salafists detained in relation to the 16 May 2003 terrorist attacks, today denies the existence of political prisoners and does not bat an eye when confronted with abuses against the press. Within this context, the publication of several reports denouncing human rights violations, the use of torture, and the climate of fear in the Western Sahara has further chipped away at the government’s credibility. Likewise, the delay in implementing the regionalisation plan and the failed attempt to separate Christopher Ross as the UN Secretary General’s special envoy have undermined the credibility of the solution of an autonomous Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty.

**Conclusions**

For those who expected a true break with the past, the results of the first year of the Benkirane government can only be described as poor. The reasons for this are divided between those who blame the Palace’s efforts to undermine it, those who attribute it to the party’s lack of governing experience, those who see governmental incompetence, and those who insist it is due to the fundamentalist foundations of the party’s agenda. The controversies that have arisen over the year have spotlighted the difficulties the government has encountered and revealed the impatience of its social base. These controversies, along with the ever-challenging issue of renewing the leadership of the political parties, have helped to project the image of an active democratic life, when, in reality, the truly important portfolios remain under the Palace’s control and show no signs of changing. In short, it seems that the Palace has learned to tolerate the religious populism of the PJD so long as the PJD is functional and acts as a retaining wall against the popular discontent that Morocco’s current social and economic climate continues to cause.
Many observers of the Arab world have asked themselves why Algeria has not experienced revolts after the fall of the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan regimes. Indeed, this is quite remarkable for a country that has so often been shaken by popular protests threatening the regime, destabilised by discontent culminating in the 5 October 1988 riots, which resulted in 500 dead and several hundred wounded. These riots were a turning point in the country’s post-independence political history and shattered the single-party myth, giving way to multiparty politics and freedom of the press after the constitutional reform of 23 February 1989. From February 1989 to January 1992, the country experienced political effervescence, with free public speech and open debates that had never before been seen on television. More than 50 parties had emerged, but after elections, a single party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), had outstripped the National Liberation Front (FLN), in power since independence. In January 1992, the electoral victory of Islamists led to the suspension of the electoral process and the institution of a state of emergency following the eruption of violence. The country was plunged into a bloody conflict that lasted nearly ten years, causing the death of over 100,000 people, 15,000 of which ‘disappeared.’ The democratic transition announced three years earlier had turned into a nightmare for the population, daily enduring the atrocities of an opaque conflict pitting invisible Islamists against security forces with expeditious methods. The Algerian Spring had become a “bloody winter” in only a few months.

From Political Dissent to Social Protest

In October 1998, the Department of Intelligence and Security (Département du renseignement et de la sécurité, DRS) entered a secret agreement with the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) to end hostilities, an agreement rejected by President Lamine Zeroual, who preferred to resign over implementing it. He believed the agreement did not settle the political aspect of confrontation with Islamists. He was replaced by Abdelaziz Bouteflika in April 1999 under the slogan of a return to peace and national reconciliation. A referendum was organised to pass the Civil Concord Law (Charte de la concorde nationale), which served as the legal framework to reintegrate amnestied Islamist prisoners into society and to protect the members of the security forces from possible lawsuits for human rights violations. The amnesty measures taken after Bouteflika’s election put an end to a generalised climate of violence, despite several isolated acts perpetrated by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), whose freedom of action in the mountainous and desert regions suggested it was manipulated by the DRS. The victory over the insurgent Islamists allowed a return to tranquillity, though punctuated by localised riots in medium-sized cities following incidents of police brutality or abuse of authority by agents of the administration. As if dissent had ceased to be “political,” relinquishing overthrowing the regime, to become “social,” demanding that the State fulfil its mission of safeguarding the dignity of its citizens and the consumers’ purchasing power. In the form of riots after the distribution of housing or strikes by different administrative bodies, social dissent has become chronic. Since 2001, pillaging of administrative buildings and roadblocks are recurrent throughout the country, either brought about by disaffected housing applicants or occurring during power outages or after fatal traffic accidents in cities.
Social demands not being put forth by parties nor elected officials, they are expressed in the street in the form of strikes and riots. In 2008-2009, secondary school teachers and university professors engaged in an arm wrestling match with the government, which was forced to give in and meet the demands for salary raises. Everyone was satisfied thanks to the surplus in state reserves, estimated at 150 billion dollars in 2008. In April 2001, the population of Kabylia was shaken by a protest movement that lasted two years. The movement eventually ran out of steam, not having been granted support by political parties to lend it a national dimension. Despite the multiplication of localised social protests, the decade of the 2000s was one of political ebb or demobilisation.

**Purchasing Social Peace with Oil Revenues**

Public opinion considers Bouteflika as the one who brought peace, in a financial context highly favourable to economic activities due to the continuous rise in the price of the oil barrel. Indeed, between 2000 and 2008, it soared from 25 to 147 dollars! Having financial resources like never before, the State has launched major transport infrastructure works (motorways, tramways in cities, etc.) and an ambitious housing programme, allocating a total of 280 billion dollars in the 2004-2014 period. The availability of large sums of money from hydrocarbon exports lends the illusion of economic growth. The swelling of the money supply and the importation of foreign products by the private sector have created opportunities for gaining profit for some, and for amassing fortunes for others through legal activities or recourse to informal commerce. Many Islamists have turned away from political dissent, forgoing confronting the State to dedicate themselves to commerce, by which they seek to acquire the social status that will allow them to gain the respect of the population and the administration’s civil servants, whom they do not hesitate to corrupt. This is how what Patrick Haenni has called “Islamo-business” appeared, flourishing just as well within the framework permitted by law as it does in the informal sector, alternately repressed and tolerated. In large urban centres (Algiers, Oran, Constantine, etc.), informal trade provides revenue to dozens of thousands of youth working in undeclared activities, which mitigates the social effects of unemployment pressure.

**Multiparty Politics with No Electoral Alternation of Ruling Parties**

On the political level, throughout the decade of the 2000s, there were a number of national and local elections won by the two parties in power, the FLN and the National Rally for Democracy (RND), though a few seats were left to either legal Islamist parties or so-called secular parties without popular support. The political field was thus somewhat stabilised, with multiparty politics without elections bringing alternation of ruling parties and where the administration chose elected officials through rigged elections. The Parliament emerging from the 2002, 2007 and 2012 elections has been dominated by FLN and RND party members, who support the government and pass the bills of law proposed by the latter. Several representatives of minority parties (in particular, the Rally for Culture and Democracy – RCD, and the Workers’ Party – PT) have taken the liberty of criticising government policies, which has lent parliamentary debate a democratic aspect. In fact, the electoral offer was fashioned in advance such that the government could be criticised without putting it in danger. A false “civil society” was entirely fabricated to substantiate the idea that the State is struggling against the fundamentalism threatening the population and its freedoms. The political setup was as follows: a political police with carte blanche to hound opponents, parties faithful to the administration that benefit from rigged elections, a government without political authority to run the State, a justice system at the administration’s orders and newspapers subject to extortion through advertising and the supply of printing paper. This political setup has led to the administration’s inefficiency and the generalisation of corruption.

In 2008, the constitution was modified to allow Bouteflika to run for a third term in 2009. He was re-elected as no surprise after a routine electoral campaign. Less than two years later, revolts began in Arab countries, toppling the Tunisian, Egyptian Libyan and Yemeni regimes. These revolts weakened the Algerian regime, whose ambiguous position revealed a certain unease: should the government support the dissent of those populations, whose demands were legitimate, at the price of encouraging them in Algeria? The government avoided appearing as if it approved of said authoritarian regimes because it feared the contagion effect in Algeria.
Effects of the Arab Revolts

In January 2011, at the height of the Tunisian revolt, there was an onset of rioting in large cities in Algeria, quickly extinguished after the announcement of social measures to assist the underprivileged. At the State’s top political level, there was a fear that the riots would spread throughout the country and topple the regime. The government then took emergency measures, among them: continuing subsidies to staple products (bread, coffee, sugar, oil, etc.); granting bank loans to youth through an organism created to this end, the National Agency for Youth Employment Support (ANSEJ); raising civil servant salaries; and expanding consumer credit. Thus discontent was defused, thanks to the State’s budget surplus, estimated at 200 billion dollars in 2011.

In April 2011, Bouteflika addressed the nation in a televised speech to announce structural reforms, aiming to improve the representative capacity of the elected Assemblies, also asserting that his generation, that of the struggle for independence, had to yield its place in the State’s leadership. He promised the revision of the law on political parties to strengthen democracy. The announcements had no effect on the political actors, but they unfettered the public voice, which condemned the government more harshly, accusing it of corruption and incompetence. Throughout 2011, the social front was in ferment, with numerous strikes and other pacific demonstrations, the main demand being a raise in salaries and the distribution of housing to slum inhabitants. Each time a list of housing recipients was posted, riots would break out, whereas the forces of order had received instructions to restore the peace via dialogue and not repression. In any case, the State’s financial well-being allowed it to defuse dissent by substantially increasing salaries and providing new housing for thousands of families. At the risk of relaunching inflation, the salaries of teachers and other public administration officials were raised by between 10 and 50%, with a three-year retroactive effect. Even retirees had their pensions upgraded by 15 to 30%. To include these increases in the national budget, the 2012 law on finances stipulated expenditures of 1,500 billion dinars (i.e. 15 billion euros).

In January 2012, the new law on parties, announced by the President in 2011, was enacted. It was designed to expand the electoral offer, aiming above all to atomise the Islamists. Hence, of the ten authorised parties, four belonged to an Islamist movement: Party for Liberty and Justice, Justice and Development Front, Jil Jadid (The New Generation Party) and the New Algeria Front. The new parties participated in the May 2012 legislative elections with the hope of diminishing the number of MPs of the parties in power, i.e. the FLN and RND. However, the results were as surprising as they were disappointing for those who believed that change was underway. The FLN and RND took the lead as usual, followed by the Green Alliance, a coalition of Islamist parties. The FLN took 45% of the Assembly, with 221 seats, followed by the RND (68 seats) and the Green Alliance (49 seats). Through the May 2012 elections, the regime demonstrated an incapacity to bring about change from the inside. The regime has remained in place, but it is faced with riots and violent protests focussing on social demands. Since the In Amenas gas facility attack in January 2013, the unemployed from southern regions have mobilised, gathering thousands of youth who denounce regionalism, of which they claim to be victims.

Conclusion

Algeria did not experience the “political” revolts occurring in other Arab countries in 2011 for various reasons. The first is associated with the memory of the virulent conflict between the military forces and Islamists in the 1990s. The second reason is that the multiparty system emerging in the wake of the October 1988 riots was a disappointment since it did not lead to electoral alternation of power. The third reason can be sought in the State’s financial readiness to distribute oil revenues to defuse popular protest. And finally, the last reason is that the Algerian regime is not embodied by its President as Mubarak’s Egypt or Ben Ali’s Tunisia were. Since 1992, Algeria has had five presidents: Chadli Bendjedid, Mohamed Boudiaf, Ali Kafi, Lamin Zéroual and Abdelaziz Bouteflika. The Algerians know that ousting the President does not mean changing the regime. Although it is not institutional, power in Algeria is also not embodied in a single person, which prevents discontent from crystallising around a leader.
Is the Tunisian Political Transition in Danger?

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Once it took up the leadership position of the coalition government following the election of a National Constituent Assembly (NCA) on 23 October 2011, the Islamist party Ennahda began progressively taking apart the institutions set up since the first stage of the post-Ben Ali transition process. Since early 2012, Ennahda leaders have demonstrated that they are not greatly in favour of maintaining these structures, whose main figures, members of the “progressive” left, are perceived as political adversaries. Availing itself of its electoral legitimacy from the 23 October 2011 elections, Ennahda and its two “secular” allies in the Tunisian troika – the Congress for the Republic (CPR) and the Ettakatol party – have undertaken to completely revise the system set up by the authorities that, between 14 January and 23 October 2011, initiated the judicial and institutional framework of the transition. In so doing and in refusing to capitalise on the experience acquired by these institutions, those governing would create the conditions for a crisis of confidence among actors of the transition process, fuelled by the deteriorating economic and social situation (rising young graduate unemployment, rampant inflation and falling investments),\(^1\) the absence of a precise political agenda and Ennahda’s temptation to exercise its hegemony on the state apparatus and the media sector. Incapable – or not desirous – of completing the draft of the new constitution within the one-year deadline, the period indicated in the NCA’s writ of election, Ennahda has instilled doubt as to its real political intentions in a sector of the Tunisian population among whom the Islamist party’s victory had already caused agitation.

The development of violence and the deterioration of the security situation, phenomena against which the ruling troika seems strangely passive, are stoking political tension that is contributing to splitting Tunisian society into two diametrically opposed factions: one ‘Islamist’ and the other ‘progressive.’ The political assassination on 6 February 2013 of Chokri Belaïd, one of the emblematic leaders of Tunisia’s far left, the aborted initiative of the former Prime Minister, Hamadi Jebali, to constitute a ‘government of technocrats’ and the controversial ministerial reshuffling of 8 March are not contributing to clearing up the horizon for Tunisia’s political transition, today quite obstructed.

**A Transition that Is Dragging on, or the Progressive Emergence of a Crisis of Confidence**

The accomplishments, whether of the government or the NCA from which it came, are quite sparse and fuel suspicion with regard to the troika’s political intentions, in particular those of its main member, Ennahda. The latter has shown its penchant for controlling the levers of the state apparatus. In

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\(^1\) According to the National Statistics Institute, 33.2% of university graduates are currently unemployed, the inflation reached 6% in the month of January 2013 only, and the investment rate has gone from 8% in 2012 to 6.8% in 2013.
2012, capitalising on the struggle against corruption and asserting its electoral legitimacy, the ruling coalition appointed senior civil servants in accordance with criteria of allegiance much more than skills or competence: eight out of ten of the State’s thousand senior civil servants appointed by the government were from the Islamist party. The secular opposition sees these appointments as the prelude to the institutionalisation of an authoritarian political regime. Indeed, policy with regard to the media is not at all reassuring. Although Decree-Laws 115 and 116 regulating the information industry were published in the Official Bulletin in November 2011, the troika has been particularly reticent to “activate” these legal texts of liberal inspiration on the grounds that they were drawn up in collaboration with a “non-elected government,” in this case that of Béji Caïd Essebsi, during the first stage of the transition. But the success of the 17 October 2012 journalists’ strike (the first in the country’s history) obliged it to allow them to become effective. Also, everything would indicate that frame of reference or meaning of notions such as media independence or human rights are not the same for Ennahda leaders as they are for the so-called “progressive” elites.

The discrepancy between the secular opposition and the adepts of political Islam is growing all the more significant as the work of the NCA lags on, lending the sense to the opposition that the political Islamists are using delaying tactics in order to create the conditions for a definitive takeover of power at the end of the transition process. The fact that the bill of law on the provisional judicial system has not yet been completed due to Ennahda members’ refusal to make it an independent institution lends fuel to the opposition. Though the law on the High Independent Authority for Elections (ISIE) was recently enacted (December 2012), it has been strongly criticised by Kamel Jendoubi. The latter, President of the former ISIE who had organised the 23 October 2011 elections, finds that the text does not lend the future authority the means to ensure honest, transparent elections.

The development of violence and the deterioration of the security situation are stoking political tension that is contributing to splitting Tunisian society into two diametrically opposed factions: one ‘Islamist’ and the other ‘progressive’

The final text of the constitution has not yet been drafted. Moreover, secular intellectuals are not hiding their concern regarding the first drafts of the constitutional text. The “rough draft” of the Constitution drawn up by the six constitutional commissions of the NCA and disseminated in August 2012 contains repressive stipulations limiting freedoms, such as those establishing that the State “protects sacred things” and that it shall “punish any violation of the sacred values of religion.” In addition, the Ennahda refusal to mention the universality of human rights in the preamble has only increased their fears.

Last but not least, the troika, and more particularly its CPR and Ennahda components, plan on excluding their most dangerous political adversaries from hypothetical future elections. The rise of Nida Tounes, a party founded and led by Béji Caïd Essebsi, prompted Ennahda to present a bill of law in November 2012 to the NCA on the so-called political immunisation of the revolution. Said law would ban the former leaders of President Ben Ali’s party, Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), from running for posts or exercising high-level political
or administrative functions for a period of 10 years.\textsuperscript{5} The main goal of the text is to prevent the president of Nida Touns and certain of its senior party members having belonged to the RCD from running in the next elections. It is true that the rise in Béji Caïd Essebsi’s popularity rating in surveys, as well as this movement’s current capacity to attract both the disillusioned from opposition parties and those from the CPR and Ettakatol, make Nida Tounes the Islamist party’s only credible contender. Ultimately, the actions of the government and the NCA have even more deleterious effects because certain components of the troika in power seem to endorse the violent acts of both radical Salafists and the Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution.

The Rise of Political Violence

Violence has taken a firm hold of the Tunisian political arena. It is expressed through the actions of so-called Salafist groups and the behaviour of members of the National League for the Protection of the Revolution. Since Ennahda’s rise to power, Salafist acts of violence have multiplied, experiencing two peaks in 2012. The first took place in June, when the Salafists attacked a painting exhibit in La Marsa, an upscale suburb of Tunis. Riots and confrontations with the forces of order ensued, resulting in the temporary reinstatement of the curfew. But it was above all on 14 September that the Salafist groups attracted attention: to protest against the dissemination of excerpts from the Islamophobic film, “Innocence of Muslims” on YouTube, hundreds of Salafist demonstrators invaded the premises of the US Embassy in Tunis and destroyed the neighbouring American school.

Since the beginning of 2012, parties of the secular opposition such as human rights associations have not ceased to denounce Ennahda’s complaisance towards these Salafists, whom they consider the Islamist party’s armed wing. Some consider Ennahda’s lax attitude the result of a political dilemma: on the one hand, if the movement led by Rached Ghannouchi, itself divided into two trends, condones the Salafist wrongdoings, it will cause concern among those opponents quick to suspect the Islamists of wishing to institute a religious dictatorship; on the other hand, if it carries out a repressive policy, it runs the risk of alienating the sector of its grassroots members sympathetic to the Salafist movement.

But above and beyond this dilemma, there is no denying that political violence is not solely practiced by these radical religious groups. Indeed, 2012 saw the dramatic entrance of the Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution (LPRs) into the Tunisian political arena. Though according to their founder, Mohamed Maalej, their goal is to preserve “the acquis of the revolution” and “strengthen Arab-Muslim identity,” they only go after the troika’s opponents, in particular Nida Tounes, a party accused of being a frame of reference for the henchmen of the former Ben Ali regime. The LPRs are the successors of the Committees for the Protection of Neighbourhoods, informal groups born of the security vacuum created by the sudden departure of President Ben Ali on 14 January 2011. Thereafter they turned into Committees for the Protection of the Revolution and these local organisations, apparently infiltrated by Ennahda militants, received legal cover through the creation of the National League for the Protection of the Revolution on 14 June 2012.\textsuperscript{7} The Committees for the Protection of the Revolution thus became regional leagues affiliated with the National League and not hesitating to disrupt meetings and demonstrations by opposition parties or the main labour union actor, the Tunisian


General Labour Union (UGTT). Their first feat of arms took place on 18 October 2012 in Tataouine, where, with the support of Ennahda and the CPR, they carried out a “cleansing march” to “do away with the enemies of the people and of the revolution.” Directed against Béji Caïd Essebsi’s party, this demonstration ended in the lynching of Lotfi Nagued, the co-ordinator for Nida Tounes in Tataouine.

The bipolarisation of Tunisian society (“Islamists” versus “progressives”) regarding the issues considered non-negotiable by one or the other of the two parties is jeopardising the scenario of a political transition leading to the construction of a democratic regime.

Buoyed by this feat, the Leagues have made “cleansing” the UGTT of its “counter-revolutionary residue” their new war horse: on 4 December, they went after UGTT organisers who were preparing to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the assassination of the historical labour leader, Farhat Hached. Several days later, on 22 December, protesters claiming to be members of the League prevented a Nida Tounes meeting from being held in Djerba. The assassination of Chokri Belaïd on 6 February sparked numerous calls for their dissolution and contributed to suspending declarations of support to the LPRs by certain leaders of Ennahda and the CPR.

Tunisia seems to be less and less able to meet the conditions of a negotiated transition. The bipolarisation of Tunisian society (“Islamists” versus “progressives”) regarding the issues considered non-negotiable by one or the other of the two parties is jeopardising the scenario of a political transition leading to the construction of a democratic regime; all the more so since the strongest political movement on the Tunisian stage, i.e. Ennahda, seems willing to use its capacity to harm the vital interests of its partners/adversaries in order to remain in power. Over the past months, their recourse to “outsiders” (the LPRs and radical Salafists) or at least the indulgence they have displayed towards them has thrown suspicion on the Islamist party’s will to undertake “new commitments to resolve future conflicts” arising between actors of the transition.

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8 Its criticism of the troika, its proposals for national dialogue in order to advance the transition process and its collective actions make the UGTT Ennahda’s main partner/adversary in civil society.
The Revolution

Revolution rarely serve as panaceas for all societies' ills, and in this vein the Libyan revolution is not an exception. The February 2011 revolution spawned by the city of Benghazi, the capital of the eastern province of Cyrenaica, spread like wildfire, engulfing the North African country and toppling the regime of Colonel Gaddifi. Until then, only the Castro brothers in Cuba surpassed the Libyan regime's longevity. Like other revolutions in the so-called “Arab Spring,” the Libyan revolution had no leaders, organisation, or pre-planning. It was a spontaneous revolution undertaken by a city that had been used and abused by a corrupt dictatorship for four decades. Cyrenaica produces 70% of Libya's oil and is the source of much of the country's water resources. Yet the region had the poorest living conditions in the country, made worse by a dilapidated infrastructure, corruption, graft, and a perpetual decay in the quality of life and societal norms.

After forty years of suppressing its people, the Gaddafi regime was unable to contain the anger that arose from a peaceful protest over the whereabouts of Libya’s “Disappeared.” The regime responded by arresting and imprisoning a number of individuals it blamed for organising the demonstration. The response to a second peaceful demonstration, demanding the release of those arrested, was met with bullets killing 253 unarmed civilians.

Removing the regime from Benghazi and Cyrenaica as well as establishing a safe haven for the insur- gency and a spearhead for the revolution was almost instantaneous, and within days the regime's forces were pushed out of the province westwards towards Sirte, Gaddafi's birthplace and stronghold. Gaddafi's one-man rule had weak institutions, which over the years had become very brittle. When called upon to meet the challenges posed by the events of 2011, they failed miserably. This, along with a lack of communication, discipline and organisation among the regime's supporters, can initially be credited with the success of the revolution, more than any military threat posed by unarmed civilians in Benghazi. Indeed, the regime's military response was brutal and would have been genocidal were it not for the military intervention by NATO forces. Gaddafi sent his son, Mutassim, to Benghazi at the head of a huge armoured column with instructions to decimate the city. Although the defenders thwarted two attempts to penetrate their city with improvised weapons, explosives and acts of sacrifice and heroism, they would certainly not have been able to survive such an attack for long. It was the French and American fighter planes that destroyed the column before a third attempt was made, inflicting heavy losses in men and equipment. After the liberation of Benghazi, it was evident that it was only a matter of time before the regime crumbled and Libya would be free from the Gaddafi nightmare.

In less than a year the dictatorship had fallen and the National Transitional Council (NTC) assumed power. They arranged elections for a 200-seat caretaker Parliament entrusted with selecting a new government and writing a new constitution that would be put to the vote in a public referendum. In 2012, Libya celebrated its first free and democratic elections. The secular coalition garnered 40% of the vote and, contrary to the trend of new elections in North Africa, the main religious party received less than 7%. Oth-
er small parties of different orientations also got small numbers of representatives but many of the seats were secured by independents. Women made up 39% of the representatives in the new Libyan Parliament, which is a first in the Middle East, if not in much of the world.

However, setting up interim institutions was the easy part. These institutions are now up and running, but the obstacles to their efficient running are huge. After several attempts, Parliament was able to ratify an interim Prime Minister and a new government, yet it has been paralysed into inaction by the problems it is facing. The government has no army or security force to insure the implementation of its policies. The religious parties, although small in representation, wield a great deal of power through some of the heavily armed religious militias, and they are not interested in democracy or democratic institutions. Until a shift in public opinion takes place, the status quo is optimal for the religious parties, given that there is so much popular opposition to them. But this paralysis is preventing policies from being formulated and implemented. The government is training new recruits, but not fast enough. Moreover, it is not willing to confront this lawlessness with the forces it has for fear of appearing dictatorial.

The difficulty in dealing with Libya today is a miserably divisive and destructive Gaddafi legacy that still has the potential of destroying the little that has thus far been achieved. There are many countries in the democratic world that want to see the Libyan revolution succeed and are willing to offer aid and expertise to help Libyans find the path to democracy. However, the major hindrance to achieving that goal are segments of Libyan society that for a variety of reasons, lack the ability to see themselves surviving or coping in a free democratic milieu structured by democratic institutions to the benefit of all Libyans. This is very evident on the ground and has far-reaching implications for the country’s security, economy, politics, and psychology.

The secular coalition garnered 40% of the vote and, contrary to the trend of new elections in North Africa, the main religious party received less than 7%

Since 1970, Gaddafi spent untold billions of dollars on the purchase of weapons for a variety of uses. The majority of these arms were Soviet made and seemed to provide the regime with a sense of security, but the arsenal was also used beyond Libya’s borders in other parts of Africa and Libyan weapons also found their way into terrorist organisations around the globe. Much of the country’s military arsenal, however, was never used and remained crated until the revolution of 2011. As Gaddafi’s soldiers withdrew from areas they occupied, huge caches of military hardware were left behind. In the absence of a central revolutionary army or government to assume responsibility for them, many of the weapons fell into the hands of newly formed militias. Additionally, arms merchants found the situation in Libya perfect for acquiring new weapons systems and light munitions at one tenth of the normal cost.

Libya, in the initial months after Gaddafi’s demise, became a huge arms bazaar where one could purchase equipment ranging from tanks to shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles. Many of those weapons found their way south to sub-Saharan Africa carried by soldiers who had served in Gaddafi’s “Africa Legion.” Disassembled Russian-made helicopters were loaded onto trucks and sent towards Niger, Chad, Mauritania, Mali and other countries of the Sahel. Libyan weapons also found their way to Egypt and Palestine as well as Syria. And, as late as May 2013, weapons were being sold in open-air markets in Benghazi along with extremely destructive plastic explosives.
Libyan militias fall into three categories: bona fide freedom fighters, religious followers, and thugs. The first are genuine militias representing different cities, which have participated in the revolution, maintained security, and expressed a willingness to disband or be incorporated into the State’s police force or security apparatus. However, until that happens they continue to exert huge influence on the system. Indeed, to the chagrin of Cyrenaica, the militias from Misrata and Zintan have transformed these two cities into autonomous City-States with their own budgets and military forces. Putting them to the test will be the next challenge for the interim government, but it is highly unlikely that this will happen before enough army recruits are ready to assume their duties.

Dealing with the militias will not be easy, but the government is slowly winning the war, training more security forces with the help of NATO members. People are sick of militias and see them as a destabilising agent and dangerous. The second group of militias has a specific goal. They see themselves as guardians of a future Libya, and it is their duty to promote and prepare for a religious state. They take it upon themselves to make arrests and apply Islamic law if they consider it necessary. In essence, they see themselves as a state within a state. The majority of Libyans oppose these militia groups and their techniques, and on two occasions people in Benghazi have gathered to take action against them. The larger of the two followed the death of the American Ambassador Christopher Stevens. More than 50,000 of the city’s inhabitants took to the streets to march against the groups, burning their headquarters and freeing the individuals they detained. Religious militias were also attacked and driven underground in other cities in eastern Libya, but they continue to be a potential headache for any new, fragile secular government. The third group is the most prevalent and its control requires a state with a strong police force and legal institutions. Militias in this group are thugs who dabble in drugs, alcohol, illegal immigrants, arms and other illegal activities. They are heavily armed and do as they please. Libyans have ignored them on the erroneous assumption that they do not pose an imminent threat to the State and can be dealt with in the future if they are still an issue. Moreover, this group has served as a check on the religious militias. Like the religious militias, however, they have become such a dangerous force that the current government has initiated a programme to confront them and terminate their activities. Dealing with the militias will not be easy, but the government is slowly winning the war, training more security forces with the help of NATO members. People are sick of militias and see them as a destabilising agent and dangerous. Popular demonstrations and attacks on militias throughout the country have strengthened the hand of interim Prime Minister Ali Zaidan in dealing with this problem.

Economic Milieu

Gaddafi’s economic policies have been so disorganised, corrupt, and detrimental to the health and welfare of the Libyan economy and people, that forty years of his mismanagement has left the country flirting with economic disaster. Poverty, homelessness, unemployment, misery, and ill health are what Libyans found staring them in the face in 2011. With such high oil revenues and such desperate need, 2011 and 2012 saw greed, graft and opportunism taking hold of Libya’s economy. The government of the Transitional Council sought to acquire legitimacy by buying people off. More than 60 billion dollars were wasted on handouts and useless schemes, including five billion on office furniture for non-existent offices. Indeed the major fear today is of inflation and the inability of Libyans to make ends meet. Every other day, one group or another goes on strike and occupies whatever organisation they work in, demanding more money or privileges. Security concerns and the shortage of labour have brought building activity to a standstill. Foreign companies working in the country are in no hurry to return and complete projects they started before the revolution, until a permanent government that can guarantee their security and the security of their workers is in place. Cities, with the exception of Misrata and Zintan, are in desperate need of infrastructure funds.
to provide services for their inhabitants. The current government is unable to prevent the interim Parliament from allotting huge sums to pet projects or undertaking unplanned programmes with dubious potential outcomes. Graft, nepotism, and opportunism continue to be rampant at all levels of the economy. Yet, all of these pale in comparison to the administrative vacuum that Libya is currently facing. The Isolation Law of April 2013 has banned all individuals who served during the Gaddafi regime in high and medium-ranking positions from public service for a period of ten years. That excludes approximately 300,000 people from government positions. And while the law seems reasonable, excluding so many at this stage will further increase the negative pressure of the administrative vacuum. The country continues to have an incompetent bureaucratic apparatus with employees who do not know the simplest organisational techniques or how an organisation functions.

**Societal Milieu**

During the Libyan monarchy the concept of shame forced Libyans to abide by the law and refrain from doing wrong. Gaddafi’s regime eradicated that concept and replaced it with fear. Today, Libyans have neither shame nor fear and this can be easily seen in their daily interaction. Respect for privacy and private property have vanished. In the absence of a police force and a legal system, there are no taboos. Individuals are robbed at gunpoint, homes are burglarised and forging ownership documents or occupying properties are regular occurrences. The art of debate and give and take is lost. People’s fuses have become short and fights erupt over the most absurd of issues. Holding up traffic by parking in the middle of the road, double parking, throwing garbage in the street, and not abiding by the simplest decent behaviour is a common day occurrence. Gaddafi’s bribe-taking had been frowned upon by society and if it did occur it was usually done in secret. Today it is no longer a hidden exercise and has emerged as a quid pro quo in every activity. Nothing gets done unless someone gets paid. The examples are too many to enumerate but that type of mentality is best exemplified by the anecdote of an airline passenger travelling from Frankfurt to Tripoli. In Germany, he abided by the “No Smoking” signs in the airport for many hours, but upon arriving in Tripoli the passenger stood under a “No Smoking” sign in the airport and lit a cigarette. Asked why in Tripoli and not in Germany his answer was “Libya is Free.” It is precisely this skewed understanding of freedom, where individuals act with civility and dignity beyond their borders and like savages at home, that is causing the problems Libya is currently facing. The majority of Libyans rebel against this legacy and many yearn to be sent out to Europe and other developed countries at government expense, as students, medical patients or trainees to experience civilised behaviour and respect for human rights. Yet, as though they have been programmed to do so, upon their return most revert to being the same as before they left. This is Gaddafi’s legacy, and Libya has a long way to go to overcome it and will certainly not do so in this generation. The best policy a wise government can pursue is to act as a caretaker until the next generation comes through, who will hopefully be more worthy of their country.

**Conclusion**

Libya and Libyan society have many problems to overcome and it is too early to draw conclusions from the revolution. Revolutions take years to show fruition and Libya will be no exception. The country is free from tyranny and there are positives and negatives in the mix. Foremost among the positives is the commitment to democratic rule and equality among all members of society, irrespective of race or gender. It also has few but highly competent individuals who will undoubtedly leave their impact on the new political structure and economy. Furthermore, more than 400,000 Libyans live in diaspora composing a valuable resource for Libya’s transition. Many have already returned and will be able to help the country overcome the Gaddafi legacy and fill part of the political, social, and administrative voids the country is facing. They also carry with them the seeds of civilisation, which given time and proper nurturing will germinate and flourish. Libya is drafting a new constitution to be followed by new elections and a new government. And, while post-Gaddafi Libyans have many shortcomings, their unanimous commitment to democracy and freedom is not one of them.
The legislative elections that were to be held in April 2013 have been postponed following a decision of the High Constitutional Court invalidating the electoral law. Far from gaining general consensus, the new constitution has, quite on the contrary, provoked a severe political crisis associated with the conditions in which it was drafted, its adoption and its contents. Significantly, Tahrir Square is still occupied and the ensemble of the Egyptian governorates are experiencing demonstrations and a variety of social movements. Certain political forces are demanding early presidential elections to replace Mohammed Morsi and the army, which has been seriously discredited since its management of the first stage of the transition and is increasingly perceived as the last resort in the face of the general deterioration of the political, social, economic and security climate as well as a decaying state apparatus.

A Chaotic Transition Process

This situation reflects the impasse of the transition process launched by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) after Mubarak’s departure. Faced with a revolution lacking unitary political leadership, the military leadership at first approached the only actor perceived as capable of holding sway among the protesters in the streets: the Muslim Brotherhood. The transition procedure was established in agreement with the latter.2

The two actors dominating the transition arena chose to entrust the drafting of the country’s new constitution to a constituent assembly whose members were to be chosen by the Parliament elected in early 2012. However, the Islamist political forces, who won over 70% of the seats in the lower chamber, were incapable of reaching a minimum consensus with the country’s other political parties and with its social forces; indeed, on the contrary. The “streets” have turned against them and the traditional actors of resistance to political authoritarianism in Egypt – i.e. judicial and media actors – remain as active as always despite the attempts to silence them.

Mohamed Morsi’s decision on 12 August 2012 to change the army’s leadership and recover the ensemble of his powers was not, however, negatively received by public opinion. A stakeholder and sympathiser of the Mubarak political system despite its rejection of Gamal Mubarak’s succeeding his father, the Army has become discredited through a number of its decisions: criminalising strikes and sit-ins,3 trying civilians in military courts, repressive practices against youth involved in the revolution, the press campaign against human rights organisa-
tions, intents to silence the media, etc. The decision to try Hosni Mubarak and his entourage was only taken under the pressure of street demonstrations. The National Democratic Party was dissolved and the Local Popular Councils eliminated through court rulings. The only positive political measures taken by the army’s leadership have been limited to the relative reform of political parties and the electoral process.

A Constitution Adopted without Consensus

Egypt’s new constitution, adopted in December 2012, is at the heart of the current serious political crisis. In any case, said crisis has called into question the imbalance of powers to the benefit of the executive branch and has led to the limitation of presidential terms to two four-year terms. But the main point of disagreement has to do with certain articles lending religion a more prominent role. The reference to Islamic law already extant in the previous constitution was interpreted liberally by the Supreme Constitutional Court, which limited its scope. The new constitution, on the other hand, specifies the content of Islamic law and lends the Al-Azhar a consultative role to this end. These stipulations are the result of an agreement between the Muslim Brotherhood and the new actors of Egyptian political Islam, i.e. the Salafist forces. It is thus not surprising that the country’s new constitution was rejected by the ensemble of non-Islamist political and social forces as well as by Coptic religious institutions.

But even more than the content of the new constitution, it was the procedures employed in its adoption that triggered the profound crisis Egypt is experiencing. These procedures expressed the will of the Muslim Brotherhood’s governing elite to challenge the traditional independence of the Egyptian judicial system.

Challenging the Judicial Branch’s Independence

The transition procedure established by the army leadership and the senior officials of the Muslim Brotherhood was disrupted by various court rulings, the most significant being the dissolution on 14 June 2012 of the People’s Assembly, dominated by Islamist political forces, via a court decision invalidating the electoral law. On 22 November 2012, Mohamed Morsi’s constitutional declaration immunised his decisions from any court appeals. The aim was to rush the adoption of the new constitution by protecting the second Constituent Assembly in charge of drafting it from any possible dissolution, considering that the first Assembly had been dissolved. The second Assembly, dominated by Islamists, was the object of an appeal on the grounds of unconstitutionality. The Supreme Constitutional Court was to make a ruling on this appeal but the court building was surrounded by Islamist activists who prevented the court officials from meeting and making a decision. The constitution was thus drafted in a rush and adopted by a referendum held on 15 and 20 December 2012. These decisions by Mohamed Morsi had serious implications on the political level.

Recasting the Political and Electoral Arena

First of all, Mohamed Morsi’s coup de force entailed the defection of several non-Islamist personalities who had agreed to join forces with the Muslim Brotherhood in the Constituent Assembly. His decisions widened the division between Islamist forces and so-called secular or liberal forces in the political arena. The latter regrouped under a “National Salvation Front” (NSF) led by Mohamed ElBaradei, Hamdeen Sabahi and Amr Moussa. This coalition demands a reform of the new constitution. The broad
demonstrations against Mohamed Morsi’s decisions in December 2012 at the NSF’s call revealed a certain success of this coalition among the Egyptian population.

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The results of the referendum on the country’s new constitution attest to this. The constitution was voted in by only 63.8% of the voters despite the blatant malfeasance that characterised the referendum. This downward trend of the Muslim Brotherhood’s electoral results is not new. In the presidential elections, Mohamed Morsi only obtained 24.78% of the votes in the first election round. The latter seems to have paid the price of the mixed results of the Muslim Brotherhood’s attitude during this period marked by its contradictory remarks, its silence vis-à-vis the army’s most controversial decisions and, finally and perhaps above all, its handling of the People’s Assembly, which it dominated for some months. Its legislative activity demonstrated that it was more preoccupied with consolidating its political influence than with truly changing the political system inherited from Mubarak. The Muslim Brotherhood has namely refused to adopt the legislation on labour union freedoms that would allow their expansion in companies, and it has followed the position of the army leadership with regard to the proposal of amending the law on the military courts in order to ban them from trying civilians.

In addition to being incapable of retaining certain non-Islamist political forces that were prepared to cooperate with it, the Muslim Brotherhood was also unable to respect the terms of agreement with a sector of the revolutionary youth who had called for people to vote for Morsi in order to undermine the candidacy of Ahmed Shafik, a symbol of the former regime. Mohamed Morsi was supposed to modify the composition of the Constituent Assembly, lending more seats to non-Islamists and appointing a woman and a Copt as vice-President in the case of victory. These young people thus joined in major protests before the presidential palace at the time the constitution was adopted. The violence of the Muslim Brotherhood’s reaction against the revolutionary youth has led to fighting, at times resulting in casualties. As of this point, a shift towards violence can be detected on the part of certain sectors of the revolutionary youth.

Authoritarian Practices and Diverse Fronts of Resistance

The Muslim Brotherhood is also known for its attempts to silence the media by making changes in government newspapers and public television networks. Private newspapers and television networks, on the other hand, have remained out of reach. Together with the judiciary, they constitute one of the main spaces for freedom and political and social dissent, since Islamist forces are hardly present in this milieu. Every day, newspapers and private television talk show programmes analyse and criticise the decisions and attitudes of the new ruling class despite the threats and aggressions they experience, from the Salafist movement in particular. It is thus no surprise that the renewal of the governing body of the journalists’ union gave a landslide victory to an opponent of the Islamist tendency. The decisions of the ruling class also met with unexpected opposition from certain structures and institutions in the face of what was perceived as an attempt at Islamisation of political and administrative structures, namely the appointment of people with affinities or ties to the Muslim Brotherhood to ministries, institutions and local administrative structures. By the same token, despite the

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9 In the referendum held on 11 March 2011, 73% of those who voted said yes.
Attempts to reformulate political authoritarianism by the former army leadership and the new Islamist team in power are actually running up against a society that has changed profoundly, for it has gained a taste for freedom, become politicised and understood that the expression of popular sovereignty does not just amount to putting one’s ballot in the box.

In reality, this situation above all expresses the difficulties that the country’s new leaders are up against in the complicated management of state affairs. They are aggravated by the leaders’ inexperience and above all the inexistence of a clear political programme proposing alternative solutions to social and economic problems, which have grown considerably worse. Hence, the ministries dealing with economic matters have been entrusted to former senior officials of the Mubarak era and the Islamist leaders are currently negotiating with the IMF to obtain a loan whereas before, they had considered such a step contrary to Islam. The Islamic neo-liberalism being established is running up against a society that remains attached to a State guaranteeing social justice and the country’s internal and external security.

The Egyptian transition arena demonstrates how attempts to reformulate political authoritarianism by the former army leadership and the new Islamist team in power are actually running up against a society that has changed profoundly, for it has gained a taste for freedom, become politicised and understood that the expression of popular sovereignty does not just amount to putting one’s ballot in the box. This could be the main acquis of the revolution that began on 25 January 2011. Over the course of ten years, post-Mubarak Egypt will have held no less than five elections. The era of outright ballot box stuffing is over. Today, the enormous problems that have affected elections since Mubarak are being discussed in Egyptian public debate.
The Situation in Jordan: a General Overview

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The Hashemite Kingdom and the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring and the disquietude it brought to the region since its beginnings in 2011 has put heavy pressure on the long-established regimes in the Mediterranean Middle East, although monarchies seemed less affected and threatened by it than their republican neighbours. Still, not every monarchy was given the same odds by observers, and whenever pundits referred to the revolutionary wave spilling into the monar- chies, Jordan was the prime suspect for breakdown in the region – right after Bahrain with its mass uprisings and their violent squashing. This is not surprising, given that since Jordan’s very inception, its demise has been forecast numerous times. In fact, the challenges the Hashemite Kingdom faces today – popular discontent, tribal unrest, a weak economy and the civil war in neighbouring Syria – are serious and erode Jordan’s stability. The elections of 23 January, 2013 and their aftermath, instead of pacifying the domes- tic situation by serving as an outlet for citizens’ dis- satisfaction and reaffirming the popular approval of the King’s “reform path,” became another source of destabilising insecurity. Government and Parliament formation and consolidation is still in process and any political process remains further deadlocked with the failure to enact any meaningful reforms. However, given the “normalisation” of protest activity and Jordan’s geopolitical importance as a stabilising anchor in the region, revolutionary change still seems a highly unlikely outcome.

A Weak Economy at the Epicentre of Middle East Dynamics

Structural prerequisites are of high importance in a country like Jordan, a small country bereft of natural resources and located “between Iraq and a hard place,” almost in the middle of the turbulent Middle East. Naturally, it is one of the first to be affected by any kinds of regional developments, such as those following the Arab Spring that are sweeping through the region. Indeed, protest activity in Jordan was fanned by protests in other Arab countries, as popu- lar discontent on economic and political grounds began to find a voice on a more regular basis as of 2011. However, the regional factor is a two-sided coin, and just as the early successes of Tunisians and Egyptians may have inspired some Jordanian protesters, the Syrian civil war has illustrated the worst possible outcome of an open confrontation between the regime and its population. This factor partly explains why the demands of the opposition are still overwhelmingly phrased in terms of islah – reform – not isqat al-nizam – fall of the regime – and why, while the government may be unpopular and even the King has ceased to be beyond reproach in public discourse, the monarchy as a system is not questioned. On the other hand, the constant influx of Syrian refugees – slowly but surely approaching the half-a-million mark – is putting a heavy strain on Jordan’s already weak economy.

Although Jordan is practically free of natural resources, it exhibits characteristics of a “rentier state,” with foreign aid working as an oil rent substitute. With its help, the extensive social welfare net and the provision of state posts allowing patronage and broad co-optation can be sustained; although buying off the opposition takes a much more humble form in Jordan than in the Gulf States. Jordan began to amass aid rents as its importance grew as a buffer or bulwark State against Israel, revolutionary republics and unstable States in the region, making it important to its neighbours as well as to Western powers. It is one of the most vital US allies in the Arab Middle East, especially since the US’ favourite, Hosni Mubarak, who received an even larger amount of aid money, was ousted in Egypt. Jordan is a regular recipient of large sums of US and GCC foreign aid and also profits from EU payments, like those in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Its importance to the Gulf States in turbulent times was emphasised with the issue of an invitation to join the GCC along with Morocco in 2011. Seen from that angle, the problem of the large numbers of Syrian refugees can be turned into an asset and attract even more foreign funding, just as was the case during the earlier Palestinian and Iraqi refugee waves.

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Still, a spill-over from Syria would be highly destabilising and long-term political and economic planning is becoming even harder for the cash-stripped State. Like an oil rentier, Jordan is dependent on regular payments from abroad which it cannot control, and large sections of the annual budget are planned on the assumption that foreign funds will keep coming. How explosive that dependence could be was drastically demonstrated in November 2012, after the government announced the drop in fuel subsidies as demanded by the IMF, sending gas and petrol prices through the roof. This measure was undertaken to attain an IMF grant, when money promised by Saudi Arabia failed to arrive in time. Following that announcement, riots of an unprecedented scale broke out in all parts of the country, in which rioters set tyres ablaze, stormed two police stations and attempted to storm the Prime Minister’s residence. It was also the first time sustained calls for the fall of the regime were heard. It was a week before the fighting subsided. Although the cuts were not taken back, cash compensations were announced. While this may have calmed the storm for now, further cuts, especially in energy subsidies, are expected this year. What these riots also demonstrated was that the economy is the number one powder keg, even before dissatisfaction over political reform.

**Opposition Protests and Regime Reaction**

In contrast to prominent Arab Spring countries where change did indeed take place, the opposition in Jordan is very fragmented and – possibly with the exception of corruption – has no consensus whatsoever over the most important issues and aims. There is also a high level of distrust between the different groups, especially along the Transjordanian-Palestinian cleavage. Adding to this, there are also loyalist factions independent of the regime who attack what they see as threats to the country; clashes between opposition and loyalist groups often end violently, forcing the riot police to step in. While especially poorer classes are only concerned with the amelioration of the economic situation, others, especially among the urban and young population, lament the deficient political representation and participation rights; most of the rural Transjordanians on the other hand fear that more political participation will strengthen the Palestinian Jordanians, the majority in the country. They also demand an expansion of the social welfare system, while criticising “neoliberalism” which they associate with Palestinian influence. However, in contrast to previous protests, traditionally loyal elements from the Transjordanian tribes also form a significant group among the protesters, subsumed under the term Hirak – movements. The fragmentation of the opposition can mean two con-
tradicory consequences for the regime. Giving in to popular demand can mean many different things, as there is no clear definition of what this constitutes. Doing so may therefore severely limit what the King or the government can and cannot do, as fulfilling the demands of one side means rejecting those of another. At the same time, it also allows more freedom of action, as shifting blame for unpopular decisions away from the monarchy to societal or political groups is made easier.

As the party system is underdeveloped, the party lists also resemble ad-hoc patronage coalitions, more than actual parties with a programme, especially since the only properly organised party, the IAF, has boycotted the elections. The monarchy quickly reacted to the Arab Spring in a number of ways. Regionally, Jordan boosted its involvement in the most tumultuous regions – it was one of the few Arab countries to participate in Operation Unified Protector, the NATO operation that brought Colonel Gaddafi down in Libya; and King Abdullah was the first Arab leader to call on Bashar al-Assad to step down, although Jordan still tries to avoid taking sides in Syria directly to avoid being dragged into the violent conflict on its border. Domestically, the King has initiated a large number of reforms since 2011 and called for early parliamentary elections in 2013. In contrast to the likes of Libya, Syria or Bahrain, no heavy and systematic repression of dissent was employed, although security presence was clearly raised. Instead, the focus lay on a policy of co-optation and slight concessions towards mostly cosmetic political reforms. King Abdullah formed a constitutional court and committees for amending the Constitution and reforming the controversial electoral law, including the formation of an Independent Electoral Commission for the first time. The elections to the Lower House of Parliament in January 2013 were hailed as a milestone by domestic and even some international observers, who described them as clean. They saw the election of more reform-oriented MPs, a record number of 18 women and an “unprecedented” turnout of 56.6% (up 3% from 2010), despite the boycott of the strongest political party in Jordan, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political wing of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood. King Abdullah also issued some “discussion papers” on reform topics and announced that he would no longer directly appoint the Prime Minister, who will from now on be chosen by the Parliament – a change that was indeed enacted after the January elections and led to months-long negotiations. While the Prime Minister has finally been chosen – former PM Abdallah Nsour returned to his office – the negotiation process between the parliamentary blocs was slow and tenacious, since many blocs were mere ad-hoc coalitions without significant coherence, and, to avoid responsibility, did not even name a candidate for Prime Minister. Consequently, the newly reconfirmed Nsour was almost immediately faced with a no-confidence vote, which he marginally won in mid-April. Soon thereafter, an opposition bloc was formed in the Lower House showing that intra-parliamentary strife will probably continue for a while yet.

Change and Continuity

When looking at all these regional, international and domestic developments, it is hard to imagine how little has actually changed in Jordanian politics. Although reforms were numerous, their substance is often left open to question. The most prominent and controversial case is that of the electoral law, which is still based on the “one man-one vote” (sawt wahid) principle dating from 1993. It was originally introduced to prevent events like the surprise landslide victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1989 from happening again and to strengthen the traditional bedrock of the Hashemite monarchy, rural Transjordanians. Essentially a first-past-the-post system, it provides a single non-transferable vote, with candidates competing for a direct vote on the district level while only the majority candidate wins a parliamentary seat. When presented with just one vote for a candidate rather than a party, (Trans-)Jordanians tend to vote along tribal rather than party or programmatic lines. In addition, extensive gerrymandering once again favours rural and tribal areas over urban and Palestinian ones, especially the northern
cities of Amman and Zarqa. Thus, this electoral system produces a heavy tilt towards regime loyalists, with large parts of the opposition as well as the Palestinian Jordanians widely excluded from the electoral process. Although a new ballot has been introduced, giving 27 (of 150 total seats) to party lists, thereby slightly increasing the opposition element in Parliament, the core of the system remains the same. As the party system is underdeveloped, the party lists also resemble ad-hoc patronage coalitions, more than actual parties with a programme, especially since the only properly organised party, the IAF, has boycotted the elections. Coalitions of opposition groups have until now failed to consolidate into parties or party-substitutes and still lack coherence.

The protests, while still ongoing, are no longer attracting mass support, there is no united opposition movement and Jordan is a crucial partner of both the West and the GCC States who all have a vital interest in the stability of the country.

The coexistence of change and continuity is also visible in the parliamentary negotiations. While Parliament formation has never taken so long, indicating real negotiation and bargaining processes, the prime actors – elected to Parliament via the deficient and biased electoral law – are still predominantly established loyalist Transjordanians and do not reflect the variety of demands among the general population. Although the carousel of Prime Ministers might have come to an end after five exchanges since 2011 with the election of the new and old Prime Minister Nsour, his election also signifies continuity as does the appointment of another former PM, Fayez Tarawneh, who, in contrast to Nsour, is known for his staunch conservatism, to Chief of the Royal Court, an institution that is more powerful than Parliament. Another conservative who returned to his old post is Saad Hayel Srour, who was again elected speaker of Parliament. The “new” ministers in the cabinet were also mostly old faces, as the cabinet shuffle was mostly constituted by portfolio changes.

The Hashemite Kingdom – Persistence Against All Odds?

As is apparent from the various sources of grievances and their expressions in regular demonstrations, Jordan is far from being a cradle of stability. In recent weeks, violent clashes at universities form an additional concern with reports that tribal violence at universities has doubled since the regular protesting began. However, at this time, not all odds are against the Kingdom which has already defied many pivotal challenges in its history, against all predictions. The protests, while still ongoing, are no longer attracting mass support, there is no united opposition movement and Jordan is a crucial partner of both the West and the GCC States who all have a vital interest in the stability of the country. While the credibility of the King still hinges on an amelioration of the economic situation and more credible political reforms, the most dangerous part seems to be over – for now.

Other References


The January 2013 Elections

On 22 January 2013, the Israelis held the early legislative elections that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had wished for. While hitherto enjoying a stable political majority (66 MPs out of 120), he decided to make use of his relatively widespread popularity to strengthen his party’s parliamentary presence, particularly before difficult budget decisions. Ultimately, he only partially succeeded in this aim. Certainly, in March 2013, Netanyahu was appointed Prime Minister for the third time, thus becoming the politician to remain at the head of the Israeli government the longest after David Ben Gurion. This political longevity is quite an accomplishment in and of itself, considering the high parliamentary volatility characterising the Israeli democracy. The fact remains, however, that the electoral strategy of strengthening the Likud party failed, and the results held some surprises.

With the elections in perspective, Benjamin Netanyahu had forged an alliance with the Russian-speaking party, Yisrael Beiteinu, headed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Avigdor Lieberman. The aim was to expand their joint constituency. However, the inverse occurred: from 42 seats in the Knesset before elections, they went down to 31. This decline can be attributed to the fact that the electoral union displeased two Likud constituency groups: on the one hand, liberal right voters, because the unified list was undeniably deeply anchored in militant nationalism; and on the other hand, traditionalist voters, who did not at all appreciate the “secular” image of the Russian-speaking party. Suddenly, the Likud had lost centre and right-wing votes, a loss that benefited the centre party Yesh Atid (“There is a Future”), led by the journalist Yair Lapid (19 seats) and Naftali Bennett’s The Jewish Home (12 seats). These two parties were the revelations of the elections.

Though the success of Yair Lapid’s party had been anticipated by surveys, its extent was not. This is most likely due to the mobilisation of the middle class, essentially secular Israelis overwhelmed by the disproportionate load of taxes and military conscription they bear. This is the same middle class that protested massively over the summer of 2011 in the “tent movement” to demand greater social justice, and more particularly the regulation of real estate prices and the reduction of direct taxes.

Besides social concerns, the second motivation that led voters to choose Yesh Atid was the growing sense of injustice in the face of generous exemptions from military service for ultra-orthodox Jews. Whereas secular and nationalist-religious Israelis, if they are men, spend three years serving in the military and then carry out periods in the reserve until they are forty, 55,000 students of the

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1 He has published *Le conflit israéli-arabe* (Armand Colin, 2011) and edited *The Routledge Handbook of Modern Israel* (Routledge, 2013). By the same token, he has also co-edited, together with Frédéric Charillon, the annual publication *Afrique du Nord/Moyen-Orient* published by La Documentation Française.

2 Lieberman resigned from his post in mid-December 2012, after being charged with fraud and embezzlement in a case involving companies in Belarus.
institutes of Talmudic studies are exempt from military obligations by virtue of an old agreement from 1948. This general exemption means that the burden of military service is not shared equally. Moreover, since the exemption requires them to dedicate themselves wholly to the study of the Torah, young ultra-orthodox Jews are not allowed to work but depend on various types of social aid funded by the State budget.

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The second revelation of the elections, The Jewish Home, shares Yesh Atid’s concern for equality. What distinguishes it is its highly nationalist message: it is in favour of the annexation of the entire Zone C (60% of the West Bank territory still under Israeli control), which explains how it garnered a great deal of support in West Bank settlements. In any case, The Jewish Home has managed to expand its following well beyond this ideological constituency by luring voters, even along the Mediterranean coast, who are attracted by the “high-tech entrepreneur” facet of the party’s new leader, Naftali Bennett, from a family of American immigrants.

In view of the election results, Benjamin Netanyahu has formed a coalition government gathering Yesh Atid, The Jewish Home and the centre party Hatnua, led by former Foreign Affairs Minister Tzipi Livni, around the Likud party. Its immediate task will be threefold: start working on enlisting ultra-orthodox Jews; devise an institutional reform to reduce parliamentary fragmentation; implement a budget of austerity. The latter measure will entail budget cuts, including for the defence ministry, so as to check the growth of public deficit (4.2% of the GDP in 2012).

On 14 November 2012, Israel launched Operation Pillar of Defence after further deterioration of the Gaza Strip situation. The launching of this military campaign demonstrated that, four years after Operation Cast Lead, nothing had really been settled between Israel and Hamas. After 1,500 air raids carried out by Israeli aviation against rocket launchers, weapons workshops and official buildings while Hamas launched 1,500 rockets and missiles against Israel (for the first time including Tel Aviv and Jerusalem), the “mini-war” came to a close, eight days later, with a new cease-fire maintaining a fragile status quo.

While Israel was engaged in a military wrestling match with Hamas, a more subdued political struggle was being carried out by Tel Aviv vis-à-vis the Palestinian Authority (PA). In an attempt to break the persistent stalemate, Mahmoud Abbas chose to bring the case of Palestine before the international community, obtaining Palestine’s non-member observer status with the UN (November 2012). This symbolic victory did not, however, change anything in practice, as the Israeli government demonstrated by taking double retaliation, i.e. launching new planning and construction programmes (including in Zone E-1, to the east of Jerusalem), and temporarily freezing the transfer of taxes collected by Israel on behalf of the PA. Through these gestures, Netanyahu wished to indicate that no Palestinian State would see the light without Israel’s consent.

Can we expect a relaunch of negotiations during Barack Obama’s second term? In principle, an American president free from the concern of re-election can afford to be bolder, but it is not certain that Obama will take this path, since he was already deeply involved in the Israeli-Palestinian question at the beginning of his first term without obtaining significant results. During his official visit to the Middle East in March of 2013, he was, moreover, very careful not to announce any action.
plan whatsoever. The only tangible gain is the announcement of the official reconciliation between Tel Aviv and Ankara after a nearly three-year falling out pursuant to the interception by the Israeli navy of a Turkish ship seeking to break the naval blockade on Gaza (nine Turkish activists were killed during the assault). This announced rapprochement clearly owes a great deal to the deep transformations taking place in the region, which are a matter of concern for both Turkey and Israel.

A Disquieting Arab Spring

The end of the Mubarak regime constituted a strategic loss for Israel. Although political disagreements had not been lacking over the thirty years of Mubarak’s presidency, the two countries, tied by an alliance with the United States, shared the same concern for confining the influence of Islamist forces. The revolution in Egypt has had very rapid effects. The deterioration of the security situation on the Sinai Peninsula, a phenomenon that is not new, has accelerated during the chaotic transition stage, under the action of activist groups involving Bedouins and Palestinians. In addition, the pipeline carrying gas to Israel – which covers 40% of the country’s needs – was sabotaged several times, interrupting the gas supply and finally leading to the complete suspension of supplies in April 2012. Finally, the rise to power of Islamist forces in Egypt, symbolised by the election of Mohammed Morsi as President in June 2012, has modified the situation for Hamas in Gaza, which now has a political ally in Cairo. The context has thus undeniably changed for Israel, even if the new Egypt has succeeded in demonstrating pragmatism by maintaining diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. This prudence was also perfectly illustrated by the active role Cairo played in the declaration of the ceasefire after last November’s “mini-war” in Gaza.

Apart from the case of Egypt, the developments in Syria are, of course, a central concern. Under the leadership of the Assads, Syria has often attempted to counter Israel’s regional ambitions. In this regard, the downfall of the regime would represent an undeniable strategic gain in many regards (end of the alliance with Teheran, weakening of Hezbollah). At the same time, Israeli leaders are well aware that the end of Baathist Syria could be accompanied by prolonged chaos, with destabilising regional effects. Syria under the Assads was an obstinate adversary of Israel but understood the power relations quite well and was always careful not to cross certain red lines (in particular on the military level). What will happen tomorrow in the “new Syria”?

The developments in Jordan are likewise followed with attention. The Hashemite Kingdom is, in fact, together with Egypt, the only Arab State to have signed a peace treaty with Israel. Though King Abdullah has managed to date to stem agitation in his kingdom, the extremely limited reforms he has introduced have not appeased the political opposition. A long-term weakening of the monarchy would have very direct negative consequences for Israel, given the close ties between the two banks of the River Jordan.

On the whole, Israeli decision-makers, like a large part of public opinion, do not see the developments in the Middle East in a very positive light. Friendly regimes have been swept away (Egypt) or weakened (Jordan) whereas when fair elections are organised, the Islamists take the day, which inevitably leads to the adoption of a more critical posture towards Israel and a distancing. For Israel, the Arab Spring means greater isolation in the Middle East at a time when the Iranian nuclear question remains unresolved.

3 In April 2013, Israel began tapping the underwater Tamar gas field (whose reserves are estimated at 238 billion cubic metres), putting the country on the road towards energy independence.
Since 2005, the Independence Uprising (intifâda al-istiqlâl) and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, the latter has been in a state of permanent crisis. To such a degree that the phrase “cold civil war” used before the Civil War (1975-1990)¹ is now used regularly by observers. Despite the assertion on the international stage of a so-called doctrine of “dissociation” vis-à-vis the Syrian regime,² expected to prevent Lebanon from becoming the stage for another “war of the others,”³ Lebanese society is increasingly shaken by the wars taking place in Syria. It is disrupted first of all at its borders, of course (400 km of shared borders), where skirmishes and abductions are multiplying, but also by the thousands of Syrian refugees (estimated at 469,970 by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees on 15 May 2013, that is, 10% of the Lebanese population), with the specific problems this increasingly entails for the government:⁴ housing, health and social services, employment / unemployment, not to mention the political and security issues that are being stoked (discourse on deliberate inequalities between religious communities and intensification of mobilisations for or against the Syrian regime, with their share of victims). Yet Lebanese society is also becoming more fragmented from within.⁵ In this regard, it can be said that Lebanese and Syrian societies share certain battlefields rather than that their wars spread to one another (today we evoke too superficially an “importation” of the Syrian conflict to Lebanon, just as a “Lebanisation” of Syria was recently forecast). Syria’s bloody conflict, with no resolution on the horizon in the short term, reveals and exacerbates – much more than it generates per se – the profound difficulties encountered by the Lebanese regime in regulating its internal conflicts other than by dispensing with laws or having recourse to force and violence. In other words, it has pushed to the limits the logic of a consociational democracy, which failed to prevent the civil war lasting from 1975 to 1990 and which, updated by the Taif Agreement (1990), is not folding but continues adapting to date, while indefinitely putting off the essential public policies expected by the country, in a highly fragile economic situation (despite relatively good scores in terms of per capita GDP), extremely poor insofar as social protection and behind in terms of infrastructure, public services and utilities (the case of drastic electricity rationing is the most eloquent example⁶). Lebanon is thus beset by tensions that put the regime to issue. Recourse to various forms of political violence on the one hand, and governance

¹ Charara W., 1976, La paix civile froide, Beirut, Centre d'études arabes [in Arabic].
³ This phrase in reference to the mechanisms of the Lebanese Civil War, by the renowned politician, diplomat and newspaper publisher Ghassan Tueni, who passed away in 2012, has long prospered. Cf. Tueni Gh., Une guerre pour les autres, Paris, Lattès, 1985.
by dispensing with laws as justified by emergencies and the management of everyday affairs on the other render the serious impasses and uncertainties the Lebanese have to deal with on a daily basis more patent, as demonstrated by the upsurge of debate on social and economic issues.

The Ubiquity and Historicity of Political Violence

The wave of yet-unsolved political assassinations and assassination attempts perpetrated in 2005-2006 has been followed over the past few years by other forms of recourse to weapons of varying scope. End of the “pax syriana”: the war in the summer of 2006 between the Israeli army and Hezbolah did indeed, for a time and on the scale of the Arab world, lend the Shiite political party the prestige of its resistance against the Zionist occupant, but it also reactivated in Lebanon the inextricable issue of Hezbollah’s military power, the only party not to be disarmed upon conclusion of the civil war. The street combat in Beirut in May 2008 between paramilitary forces of March 8 Alliance (dominated by Shi’ite Hezbollah) and those of March 14 Alliance (dominated by the Future Movement of the Sunni Hariri clan) rendered the political divide between the country’s Shiite and Sunni Muslims more evident. The violent confrontations over the summer of 2007 between the Lebanese army and the Salafist forces of Fatah al-Islam at the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp in the outskirts of Tripoli mustered the country’s support for its army while exposing the growing power of Jihadi groups in Lebanon. Since 2011, deadly clashes fostered by the Syrian conflict have been intensifying. But their roots are often older. In Tripoli, Lebanon’s second-largest city, the Sunni inhabitants of the Bab al-Tebban neighborhood and the Alawi of the Jabal Mohsen neighborhood, who have been clashing since the 1980s, are now fighting in the name of the Free Syrian Army and the Assad regime, respectively. These bloody clashes, part of a long-term rivalry, are taking on unprecedented scope and reveal a process of radicalisation and militarisation observed in other regions of the country: whereas the partisans of the Salafist Sheikhs Ahmad al-Assir (Sidon) and Salem al-Rafii (North) are calling for a jihad to aid Syrian opposition, the leaders of Hezbollah are displaying the party’s support for the Syrian army more and more openly. While the main Sunni party, the Future Movement, led by Saad Hariri, is overwhelmed by Salafist groups (against the backdrop of regional rivalry between Qatar and Saudi Arabia), Hezbollah is increasingly emerging as the Shiite ally of Iran and an armed support for the Syrian regime, thereby undermining the doctrine of “dissociation.”

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The car bombing assassination of General Wissam al-Hassan in Beirut in October 2012 can also be interpreted as an additional episode of the power relations and settling of political accounts that intensified after the assassination of Rafiq Hariri in 2005. A Tripolitan close to the Hariri Sunni clan (and former head of security and protocol for R. Hariri) but also chief of intelligence services of the Domestic Security Forces, General al-Hassan was leading an active inquiry into the assassination of the former Prime Minister, in collaboration with the Special Tribunal

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7 A dozen attacks from 2005 to 2007 targeted political leaders and journalists.
10 From 20 May to 2 September 2007, the Lebanese army carried out a major offensive, deadly even for its own soldiers, against members of Fatah al-Islam entrenched at the second most populated Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon.
for Lebanon (STL), entrusted by UN Resolution 1757 with trying the criminal acts associated with the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 other people. Since even before it was instituted in June 2007 and began operating in March 2009, the STL has not ceased to divide the Lebanese partisan arena, regarding both its national legitimacy and international legality and its investigations (case of the false witnesses, media leaks, etc.), as well as Lebanon’s contribution to its work: its first indictment, made public in the summer of 2011, convicted four individuals who were “Hezbollah sympathisers” and close to the Syrian regime. Its mandate, which officially expired in February 2012, was tacitly renewed, not without causing revived debate in Lebanon on the absence of discussion of this move. Involved in the dismantling of a Mossad network in Lebanon in 2011-2012, Wissam al-Hassan had above all contributed to the fantastic arrest in August 2012 of Michel Samaha, former minister and MP for North Metn, considered one of the strongmen of the Syrian regime in Lebanon, for having fostered assassination plots for Damascus, with the complicity of General A. Mamlouk, chief of Syrian intelligence services (for which Lebanon issued a warrant of arrest in February 2013).

**Enduring Political Crises**

The same diagnosis can be made of parliamentary and governmental politics. The Syrian crisis accentuates the problems that the Lebanese regime, which is bending but not breaking, cannot or can no longer solve. Certainly, the movement that began in 2011 during the wave of Arab uprisings for the “overthrow of the confessional regime and its symbols” (isqat al-nizam al-ta’ifi wa rumuzih) itself ran out of steam and became divided without managing to mobilise people beyond a certain circle, as if to attest to the strength of the country’s extant political system while others in the region are collapsing. In any case, there has been a breakthrough in 2013 with the registration of the first civil marriage in Lebanon. The fact remains, however, that since 2005, the Lebanese Parliament has not voted on any government budgets. The National Dialogue process reactivated in Doha (May 2008), entrusted to the President of the Republic and primarily designed to discuss Hezbollah and its weapons, was suspended due to diverging positions regarding the STL and Hezbollah military power, as well as the inability to define a common defence policy – a factor that cannot but be exacerbated in the current context. The government led by Tripolitan businessman, Najib Mikati, appointed Prime Minister in June 2011, ended up resigning in April 2013. And the parliamentary elections to be held in June 2013 according to the institutional timetable are, three weeks before the appointed date, still suspended for lack of a preliminary agreement on the electoral law.12 With them, the organisation of new presidential elections by the Parliament is also put off indefinitely, with Michel Sleiman’s term coming to an end. Since Rafiq Hariri’s assassination in February 2005, five administrations have governed, interrupted by long power vacuums during which complex balances of representation in each cabinet have been bitterly negotiated, balances that rapidly break when it comes to defending the contradictory interests of religious communities. It took six months and the confrontations of May 2008, which represented a major warning, for the new President, Michel Sleiman, former commander in chief of the armed forces and constitutionally ineligible, to be elected in May 2008. In other words, since the departure of Syria as arbiter in 2005, the Lebanese political system is stumbling to find a way of institutionally regulating its internal conflicts, in terms of both designating leaders and making political decisions. Thus, even though Najib Mikati’s administration was a “majority” government dominated by the March 8 Alliance, its form of operating did not really differ from preceding “national unity” administrations, since during his term, he reintroduced the right to veto for religious community leaders.13 In fact, it was due to a “veto” from the Future Movement and Sunni leaders that Najib Mikati eventually chose to resign.14 This was accentuated with the debates on the

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14 In this case, the veto consisted of Hezbollah and its allies not wanting General Ashraf Rifi, with affinities to the Hariri clan, to be reinstated as Director-General of Homeland Security Forces (he had reached retirement age).
new electoral law that stagnated throughout 2012, reflecting a radicalisation of community positions: this was the case with the initiative by Greek orthodox leaders, who proposed instituting a single electoral district in Lebanon, in which each individual would vote for representatives of their religious community (certain Christian groups deplore the fact that it is a Muslim constituency that votes in Christian MPs).15

Since the departure of Syria as arbiter in 2005, the Lebanese political system is stumbling to find a way of institutionally regulating its internal conflicts, in terms of both designating leaders and making political decisions.

In this context, public policy endeavours are tentative, often limited to dealing with everyday affairs. The different reform projects (decentralisation, justice, electoral system, transmission of nationality, retirement, etc.) announced since the Taif Agreement remain suspended, despite innovative work by the various Councils of Ministers and Parliament, not to mention active think tanks, including on the international level. This is punctually yet significantly illustrated by the absence of a concerted policy regarding the unprecedented influx of Syrian refugees into the country. In order not to repeat the experience of the Palestinian refugee camps, the Lebanese government is avoiding grouping the refugees together. This policy – which in the short term renders more difficult humanitarian work aimed at the neediest of these refugees, co-ordinated in other countries by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (HCR) – has not to date been supplemented by other emergency arrangements of any magnitude. The consequences of Lebanese public policy’s tentative responsiveness – or the structural and political impediments to response – can be considered on a number of levels: that of the country’s growing economic and social difficulties (in particular, the issue of the constant rise in real estate prices, the difficulty of exporting and importing via the former routes to Arab countries and the decline in tourism); that of the various proselytising activities carried out among Syrian refugees, who are primarily Sunni; and finally, that of the multiplication of mobilisations in Lebanon for or against the Syrian regime.

In this context, however, the most innovative elements in 2012 emerged in the sphere of labour. The social and economic issues shared by all Lebanese regardless of their confession or political sympathies are far from decisively mobilising the country, but things are beginning to move. First of all, though the reform that Minister of Labour Charbel Nahas wished to implement failed (he resigned in February 2012), it momentarily moved public debate away from the eternal issues of weapons and the protection of religious community interests towards reflection on the notion of “social wage,” bringing out the major shortcomings and inequalities generated by the Lebanese economy. Moreover, the country has been the arena of exceptional labour protests in the past few years regarding salaries in the education sector (with an unprecedented coordination of teaching staff from both public and private education) and among employees of the public electricity company, Électricité du Liban, and finally and most surprisingly, there has also been a significant movement among workers of private distribution channels (the Spinneys supermarket chain) after strikes in the banking sector. Although these movements are contained and not easily relayed by labour organisations, they reveal problems other than partisan balance, indicating first of all the generalisation of a sense of social insecurity (in parallel to the political and civil insecurity felt by Lebanese citizens), as well as a timid reorganisation of the sphere of labour.

The Palestinian National Project Disintegrates with the Separation of Gaza, the Judaisation of Jerusalem and the Jordanisation of the West Bank

This is not the first time that the Palestinian national project faces challenges so enormous they may threaten the possibility of fulfilling the goal of establishing an independent Palestinian state on the territories occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem. Yet it seems the danger this time surpasses that of the frozen peace process, the continued Israeli occupation and the building of the Apartheid wall, and that it is doing so at an unprecedented rate. The danger now threatens the unity of the Palestinian territories and the political project itself. Specifically, this danger revolves around the following:

First, indicators and facts on the ground have emerged that point to the separation of Gaza from the rest of the occupied Palestinian territories and are pushing it towards becoming either an independent entity in itself or an entity somehow affiliated with Egypt.

Second, there is discussion once again of the Jordanian option, meaning that the West Bank would revert to Jordanian sovereignty. At a time when we are witnessing indicators that Gaza is drifting away from the Palestinian arena towards Egypt/the Sinai, statements have been made by some Palestinian and Jordanian leaders stressing that the West Bank will necessarily return to the fold of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. Their rationale is that the West Bank was under Jordanian control when it was occupied in 1967, but this type of justification implicitly carries the risk of being applied to the Gaza Strip, since it, in turn, was under Egyptian administration at the time of its occupation in 1967.

Third, the city of Jerusalem has been subject to a systematic process of Judaisation for many years now.

These threats to the national Palestinian project will produce a catastrophic situation in which the Palestinians will become merely groups living in autonomous regions bound only by a common history but with no present or future.

Annexation of the Gaza Strip and Re-annexation of the West Bank

It seems that Israel’s plans to separate the Gaza Strip from the rest of the Palestinian territories have gone beyond the realm of wishful thinking – what Yitzhak Rabin and other Israeli leaders used to dream of – to the phase of actual implementation. Israeli steps seeking to separate the Gaza Strip from the totality of the Palestinian cause have accelerated recently. These moves began with the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005, which shaped – according to several experts – the subsequent practical strategic steps in this direction. Israel followed up on this with a series of daily procedures and practices that all serve the same goal. Accordingly, Israel imposed a severe blockade on the Gaza Strip on the eve of Hamas’s gaining control of the Strip in June 2007. It then declared the Gaza Strip a “hostile entity.” This decision entailed a change in the legal status of the Gaza Strip compared to the rest of the Palestinian territories. These steps resulted in a nearly complete break of commercial relations between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a decrease in the movement of people between the two areas and the creation of a wide gap in the social, economic and cultural realities of the two regions.

Pursuant to this plan, Israeli policy benefits from the state of difference and political division between the Gaza Strip, which is governed by Hamas, and the West Bank, which is partially ruled by the Palestinian Authority.
Authority (PA). The Israeli measures aimed at completely disengaging from and isolating the Gaza Strip were accompanied by a set of procedures and decisions implemented by the Hamas government in Gaza – either intentionally or unintentionally. These procedures and decisions were supported by a number of international institutions and Arab governments, which pushed the Gaza Strip in the same direction. The six years of division have allowed the formation of a reality in the Gaza Strip that is different from that within the West Bank, as well as the creation of a different legal, economic and cultural environment. The tunnel trade between Gaza and Egypt and the emergence of a group dealing in this trade, along with the development of underground trade relations between the two regions and the ensuing increase in the number of beneficiaries of these relations and the political influence thereof, have all made the idea of separation somewhat acceptable. This is taking place in light of regional developments primarily caused by the Arab Spring. Thus, Egypt, essentially Gaza's only neighbour, has come under the rule of Islamists, granting those who dream of separation great hope. Hamas – and the Hamas government – has asked Egypt to open the crossings and its borders with it. Hamas has also requested that Egypt establish a free trade area along the border. This took place within the context of the visit by the Emir of Qatar to Gaza in late October 2012 to announce financial support in the amount of 400 million dollars. This was the first visit conducted to Gaza by an Arab official since 2007. The visit was significant and held a number of important political messages. Some have interpreted it as being the start of the official Arab recognition of the Hamas government in Gaza. While the 400 million dollars announced by the Emir of Qatar was an undoubtedly small sum for the Qatari government, it is still significant for the Hamas government, which suffers from an acute financial crisis that affects its capability to execute the Gaza reconstruction projects as needed. The Emir of Qatar was received ceremoniously. The visit is expected to dispel any reservations that other leaders may have and encourage them to visit Gaza as well. Such visits will surely enhance the desire to separate among some in Gaza or even in the Arab surroundings, and this will undoubtedly assist in the fulfilment of the Israeli dream to separate the Gaza Strip from the remainder of the Palestinian territories. It is worth noting that many Israeli experts and politicians have not refrained from expressing their desire and hopes that the Gaza Strip will separate from the West Bank and be annexed by Egypt. The most prominent such statement was that made by the former Israeli national security adviser Giora Eiland, who demanded that the Israeli leadership let Hamas in Gaza do as it please and assist it in the implementation of economic development projects for Gaza, in order to consolidate the establishment of a Palestinian state in the Strip. According to him, this would be done by taking large swathes of land from the Sinai Peninsula, granting them to the Palestinians and settling the refugees expected to come to Gaza in those lands, which would give the Israeli government the opportunity to focus on consolidating its control over the West Bank.

In light of these indicators, some of which are highly credible, the assurances emanating from the Hamas leaders stating that they do not seek the separation of Gaza and creation of an Islamic emirate are insufficient. The real concern is that what is happening on the ground precedes what politicians are stating. The reality being formed must be confronted with serious work and practical steps. What is required is not statements affirming the unity of Palestinian lands, but rather practical measures to face the reality of separation that is taking shape consciously or unconsciously. Statements alone are not enough.

**What To Do**

The state of stagnation of the Palestinian reconciliation dossier and the policy of “inaction” adopted by the Palestinian Authority and the Western community in general towards the Gaza Strip were short-sighted and premised upon miscalculations. The policy of “inaction” was a gamble on the time factor and Hamas’s inability to remain steadfast and assumed the constancy of regional and international variables and circumstances. This runs contrary to the nature of things, which do not operate in a vacuum and are always changing. The Muslim Brotherhood’s ascension to power in neighbouring Egypt and the accumulation of governance expertise by Hamas created favourable conditions for the idea of separation, reducing the desire among some in Hamas for reconciliation and causing frustration for some in the Palestinian Authority. All this has minimised the pace of work towards reconciliation. Further, it cannot be denied that the
idea of reconciliation and the return of Gaza do not enjoy unanimity within decision-making circles in the Palestinian National Authority. There are those who believe that the Palestinian project would be better without Gaza.

In confronting the stagnation of the Palestinian reconciliation dossier, which has caused widespread desperation and opened a space for the emergence of other visions, it is necessary to revive the collective mind set that came into being in May 2011 upon the signing of the reconciliation agreement between Hamas and the PA in Cairo. At the time, a collective mind set was formed, focused on the resumption of unity and the taking of practical steps on the ground. The idea of Gaza’s separation became remote not only from peoples’ thoughts but also from daily action. Politics does not recognise constancy. If you are not moving, you should not expect the quiescence of the other. One must keep working, moving and offering suggestions, even if there is but a dim hope of results. To this end, the following steps should be taken:

- Revival of the reconciliation dialogues, even if they carry little hope and have come to be viewed by some as boring and not that feasible. The revival of these dialogues will work to push the collective mind set towards the idea of reconciliation and will end the dreams of those seeking separation. It will also create a state of popular and official mobility around this dossier. This, in turn, will reduce the desire of several Arab governments to exploit the stagnation of the reconciliation dossier in order to achieve special gains or private ends.

- Activation of the relationship between the PA in Ramallah and civil society organisations and the private sector through various activities affirming the PA’s presence in the Strip. Special emphasis must be placed on the media dimension of such activities. While the PA did not suspend its support for Gaza, this was not announced and the primary focus was on relief and humanitarian issues. Intellectual and strategic discussions on key strategic matters were not initiated.

- The National Authority should abandon its negativity and direct its criticism towards the Rafah crossing and the demands for Egypt to open its border with Gaza to enable the entry of the necessary material and equipment for the national project. This is related to the ongoing proposal of initiatives. In light of Israel’s reluctance to allow Egypt to introduce the raw materials needed for reconstruction without their having to pass through the Karam Abu Salem crossing; in light of Egypt’s inability to prevent the entry of such material so that, on the one hand, it is not a participant in the blockade and, on the other, it can still abide by the crossings agreement of 2005; and, further, in light of Hamas’s keenness to implement the national project quickly, an initiative is needed to fill the vacuum and prevent Hamas from having to resort to the tunnels once again to bring in raw materials and equipment. One proposal in this context is the creation of a transit zone in the Egyptian Rafah region, where the raw materials allocated to Gaza are kept. This zone would be subject to the control and supervision of the National Authority and the international community in the form of the Quartet (the US, the EU, Russia and the UN). This would be done in a way that removes the pretext(s) used by the tunnel merchants and subjects the process of bringing in raw materials to Palestinian/Arab/international supervision. It would also eliminate any potential embarrassment for Egypt and Qatar and fulfil, to a large extent, the stipulations of the crossing and movement agreement of 2005.

- In order to confront concerns over the emergence of the “Jordanian option,” first proposed by Israel some time ago and recently revived by certain Jordanian-Palestinian leaders, the PA must take a clear and irrevocable stand rejecting this option and re-affirm that the West Bank is an indispensable part of the Palestinian territory.

- As for Jerusalem: taking into consideration the political and legal situation created by Israel in Jerusalem, whereby the PA is prevented from exercising its sovereignty there, work must focus on three points:
  - Continuing to work with Western governments and international organisations to expose Israeli occupation practices in Jerusalem and requesting the assistance of these states and institutions to enable the PA to expand its services to include Jerusalem.
  - Encouraging international and Palestinian NGOs to further develop their programmes in Jerusalem.
  - Requesting that Arab and Western states that have relations with Israel (e.g., Qatar, Egypt, etc.) focus their programmes on Jerusalem.
Turkey in 2012: A General Overview

The Kurdish Question

In mid-2009, the AKP government declared that it was working on steps aimed at solving the Kurdish question. However, by the end of the year, the “Kurdish opening,” or “democratic opening,” had failed, and a nationalist and anti-Kurdish rhetoric became rampant in the political arena, including in the discourse of the ruling AKP. Investigations into the Union of Communities of Kurdistan (KCK), the alleged urban wing of the PKK, began in late 2009 and have expanded since; the resulting arrests have involved politicians affiliated with the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), elected mayors and municipal council members, as well as trade unionists, human rights activists, lawyers and academics. Although it was not openly declared, throughout the period, the National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) continued to hold talks with the PKK culminating in the Oslo Talks. The process was suspended in the second half of 2011 when the talks were leaked to the press.

The Kurdish question became much more acute in 2011 and 2012, as the political process came to a stalemate. The vicious cycle of violence was compounded by the increasing number of violent attacks by the PKK and military operations that, on various occasions, had civilian casualties. The cycle of violence came to resemble the 1990s, when the country was stuck in a bloody war in the southeast and experienced attacks in its major cities. During the course of 2012, the PKK, in addition to engaging in clashes and attacks in the southeast, resorted to violence in a number of provinces in various parts of the country.

As for the long-awaited measures in relation to the use of the Kurdish language in the public sphere,
the legal bans against its use in public life continued to exist in 2012. The courts ruled inconsistently on the use of multiple languages by the municipal authorities. The use of Kurdish during prison visits was also subject to restrictions and inconsistencies. In June 2012, the Prime Minister announced that Kurdish elective courses were to be introduced in public schools from the 2012-2013 academic year onwards. The BDP, which had long demanded the use of mother tongues in public education, did not consider the weekly two-hour elective classes to fulfil their demands. The boycott initiated by the BDP, the regulations regarding the elective language courses, and school administration policies resulted in very low levels of demand for these classes in the new academic year.

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On 12 September, a number of Kurdish prisoners went on a hunger strike. Soon, they were joined by others from both inside and outside the prison, including several prominent members of the BDP; by mid-November, over 700 people were on hunger strike. Their demands included the improvement of the prison conditions of the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and the use of Kurdish in public life (especially the use of mother tongues in education). The government resisted these demands. The strikes lasted for more than two months until Ocalan called for them to end.

Once the strikes were over, the political process seemed to start anew. Around the same dates, the government announced that it was drafting a bill allowing defendants to use their native languages in court, which was adopted by Parliament at the beginning of 2013. On 28 December 2012, the Prime Minister announced the beginning of a new dialogue with Ocalan, marking the beginnings of the “peace process.” The process, which seems promising this time, has steadily continued throughout the first months of 2013 and has been accompanied by a toning down of the nationalist rhetoric in the discourses of the governing party and the redefinition of a nationalism that is not based on ethnicity.

The New Constitution

Turkey’s 1982 Constitution was an undemocratic text solidifying the authoritarian state structure, as well as the bureaucratic and military tutelage. Since its ratification, it has been amended 17 times. The latest amendments took place in 2010 and included major changes to the judiciary system and to fundamental rights and liberties; yet despite all these changes, the undemocratic and authoritarian spirit of the 1982 Constitution, securing state power rather than rights and freedoms, has remained. During the 2011 national election campaigns, many of the major political parties included a new constitutional vision in their party platforms; the AKP declared that working on a new constitution would be its first priority after the elections. The 12 June 2011 elections, with 87% voter turnout, resulted in the AKP’s third consecutive victory, with the party receiving 50% of the national vote. The elections produced a parliament representing 95% of the voting electorate, a suitable platform for constitution-making through a parliamentary-based process, but even with such popular support, the AKP did not have the absolute majority it needed to draft a new constitution unilaterally.

A three-stage process was initiated after the elections to draft the new constitution. The first stage was the creation of a parliamentary commission to be open to societal deliberation. In fact, a new civilian constitution to consolidate democracy and strengthen the culture of living together in diversity requires societal deliberation and participation. The second stage was the drafting of the constitution by the commission. The third stage involved open public discussion of the draft constitution, with the commission making the necessary changes, and sending it to the standing Constitution Committee and the General Assembly for parliamentary approval. An ad-hoc Constitution Conciliation Committee was formed with equal representation (three members each) of the four political parties represented...
in Parliament: the AKP, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the BDP. Unlike the Parliament’s standing committees, the Constitution Conciliation Committee determined its own rules and procedures in a series of meetings from October 2011 onwards. The Committee defined the key elements of its working procedure as (i) conducting a consultation process with the participation of different segments of society, (ii) seeking consensus for all decisions made, and (iii) requiring the Committee’s own approval and the consensus of all political parties for any amendments made to the draft constitution during the Standing Committee and General Assembly deliberations.

In order to prevent and combat violence against women and domestic violence, in March 2012, a comprehensive new law protecting family members and those in relationships other than marriage from violence was introduced.

The Conciliation Committee conducted a consultation process asking civic groups and initiatives, government departments, and individuals to submit written comments and testimonies on its website, by email and by post. Some 68,000 written comments and testimonies had been received by the end of April 2012. The Committee also held 160 hearings, some of which involved representatives of minorities. The second stage – deliberation and drafting of the constitution – started in May 2012. During the writing process, the discussions on contentious issues, i.e. the article on citizenship, were postponed for further discussion. Although the aim was to finish the draft by the end of 2012, in early January 2013, the Committee agreed to proceed with the writing of the constitutional articles.

The Democraisation Initiatives

Although the government seemed to commit itself to further democratisation mainly through its work on the new constitution, a third judicial reform package, the draft studies for which were started in June 2011, was adopted by Parliament in July 2012. The package included amendments to speed up judicial procedures and guarantee procedural rights. It abolished the specially authorised courts, replacing them with regional courts for serious crimes. It prohibited the seizure of written work before publication and eased the restrictions on media reporting of criminal investigations. It redefined bribery and extended its scope as a criminal act. Yet this package left the problems related to the independence, efficiency and impartiality of the judiciary untouched, and it fell short of guaranteeing liberties. The government then started drafting the fourth judicial reform package in the second half of 2012. The package included measures related to violations in the area of human rights, such as expanding freedom of expression and freedom of press, preventing long detention and trial periods, and ensuring fair trial. The draft was presented to the Prime Minister in February 2013 and will be subject to the parliamentary procedure.

Apart from the work on the new constitution and judicial reform packages, a number of other favourable developments took place in 2012. Parliament adopted the law establishing the National Human Rights Institution. The individual application procedure to the Constitutional Court, introduced by the 2010 constitutional amendments and enabling individuals to appeal to the Constitutional Court if other domestic remedies have been exhausted, entered into force in September 2012. In order to prevent and combat violence against women and domestic violence, in March 2012, a comprehensive new law protecting family members and those in relationships other than marriage from violence was introduced. An Ombudsman institution, tasked with examining complaints related to the functioning of the administration on the grounds of the rule of law and human rights, was established.

The new and ongoing trials of coup attempts opened up spaces for democratisation as they questioned torture, unresolved assassinations, political murders, extrajudicial killings, and other undemocratic ways of attaining and keeping state power. The trial of the perpetrators of the 12 September 1980 military coup, namely Kenan Evren, the former head of the army who went on to serve as President, and Tahsin Sahinkaya, the former air force commander, started...
in April 2012. The trial was made possible by the 2010 amendments to the constitution, which ended the immunity of the architects of the coup. This investigation was followed by other inquiries into the military’s interventions in politics, one of them being the investigation of the 28 February 1997 coup. Meanwhile, due process in the Ergenekon case, investigating an alleged deep-state network plotting a series of attacks and provoking a military coup, and the Sledgehammer case, concerning the investigation of an alleged coup plan, continued.

However, due process of law and the results of some of the crucial trials led to disappointment with regard to the usefulness of adjudication for democratisation. The killing of 34 civilians in Uludere, Sirnak province, in a military airstrike on 28 December 2011, became subject to official inquiry when a parliamentary subcommittee was created on 12 January. Throughout 2012, the investigation continued without producing any results. The incident came to be marked by the absence of effective and transparent public inquiry. The five-year court case on the assassination of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink finished on 17 January 2012. The result came as a blow; all of the defendants were acquitted of charges of links to a terrorist organisation, and only one person was convicted on charges of murder.

Due process in the court case investigating the atrocities perpetrated in the 1990s by the Gendarmerie Intelligence Unit (JITEM) was still continuing at the end of 2012, leading to the release of one of the key suspects. The trial started in 2009 and has almost reached the statute of limitations; this, in effect, will leave the inquiry into the extrajudicial killings and missing persons unanswered.

The Syrian Crisis

The socio-political developments in the Arab world in the last couple of years turned into regime transitions in the region with the explosion of civic unrest in Tunisia in December 2010 and its spillover. The authoritarian governments of Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco, Yemen and Libya collapsed like dominoes, and the era came to be known as the “Arab Spring” in relation to the demands for political participation and basic liberties of the people in these countries. Since October 2011, a full-fledged process of upheaval against the Assad regime has also been going on in Syria, resulting in a massive death toll due to its use of violent measures to cling to power.

At the outset of the Arab Spring, Turkish foreign policy aligned itself with the Arab peoples and change; however, the Syrian crisis is steadily ceasing to be seen as part of this larger context and increasingly being interpreted as tension between Turkey and Syria. The diplomatic efforts of the Arab League, the UN and the EU failed, and, in 2012, Turkey found itself in the position of a front-line state for the solution of the crisis. The government backed regime change in Syria and followed an open-border policy towards refugees while at the same time cutting down its diplomatic and economic ties with the country. As of December 2012, there were around 145,000 Syrian refugees in nine different camps in Turkey, and the influx continues.

The ongoing civil war in Syria has also created significant tensions with Turkey because Turkey’s relations with Syria had been booming since 2007. The crisis easily became politicised in the domestic political arena. It has been taken out of the larger context of the Arab Spring and humanitarian problems and used by both the ruling AKP and opposition parties to extract domestic political advantage. The continuing influx of refugees and escalating border tensions have fed the existing polarisation in Turkey.

Bibliography


The Algerian Position on the European Neighbourhood Policy

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Causes of Scepticism and Reasons for Evolution

Algeria and the whole of Europe have always maintained close relations dictated by geographical proximity, cultural affinities and a certain amount of economic interdependence, particularly in the energy sector. The legal framework of these relations has evolved from the May 1976 EEC-Algeria Cooperation Agreement to today’s Association Agreement, signed under the Spanish EU Presidency in Valencia on 19 April 2002 and entering into force on 1 September 2005. In 2004, when the Association Agreement had not yet entered into force because it had not yet been adopted by all parliaments of EU Member States (the last parliament to take this step was that of the Netherlands in June 2005), the EU launched its so-called European Neighbourhood Policy initiative, originally designed for Central and Eastern European countries not intending to enter the EU. This initiative, highly ambitious moreover, as President Romano Prodi summed it up in his renowned phrase, “everything but the institutions,” was met in Algiers with undisguised reserve, as much for reasons inherent to the content of the initiative and the approach adopted as for considerations regarding the Algerian reality.

Reservations Regarding Approach and Content

Algeria’s reservations first had to do with appropriation, since it is incontestable that the European party developed its ENP proposal with no prior consultation with the initiative’s potential beneficiaries. The Algerian government considered such an attitude against the spirit of a partnership that was meant to build relations between the North and South shores of the Mediterranean. The explanations supplied by the EU to justify this attitude were hardly convincing from the Algerian perspective. How could they lend credence to an argument consisting of saying that they were unable to organise consultation because the project designed for Central and Eastern Europe had been extended to the South Mediterranean countries at the last minute? Moreover, the Neighbourhood instrument clearly speaks of sharing European values, which did not fail to evoke the idea of a European hegemony over the ENP.

That goes for the approach. Insofar as the project’s content, Algeria has always refused to hold the view according to which Europe plays the role of doling out “carrot-and-stick” rewards and reprimands. The conditionality underpinning the Neighbourhood Policy appears to many as the expression of a hackneyed view of relations between Europe and the South shore of the Mediterranean in which one party assumes the lovely role of sermonizer and distributor of brownie points to unruly pupils who need to be set back on the right track.

Without rejecting the European initiative, Algiers expressed certain reservations regarding this logic, which intends financial aid and deepening of cooperation to be proportional to the progress made, in particular in the sphere of human rights, but without the latter factor being sufficiently taken into account in the management of migratory flows and the signature of readmission agreements. Such a position is justified, from the Algerian perspective, by the conviction that democratic evolution is above all an internal demand that should be handled domestically, regardless of any international pressure. This attitude can be as-
scribed to the fact that Algeria, for historical reasons associated with its struggle for independence as well as with the combat that it has carried out and continues to carry out against terrorism and its international ramifications, has developed major sensitivity regarding issues of sovereignty and interference. The latest events relating to the attack at the Tiguentourine gas plant have demonstrated that this approach currently remains a determining factor in relations between Algeria and its international environs. It should be noted that voices are being raised within Algeria itself calling for a revision of this concept, which could seem obsolete in a world of interdependence where the concept of border loses its pertinence. Such voices remain marginal, however, among a public opinion and government that are very punctilious on matters of sovereignty.

Algeria, for historical reasons associated with its struggle for independence as well as with the combat that it continues to carry out against terrorism and its international ramifications, has developed major sensitivity regarding issues of sovereignty and interference.

Moreover, the reservations expressed by Algeria regarding conditionality, positive though it may be – “more for more” –, can also be attributed to the fact that Algeria’s financial situation renders it less vulnerable before Europe than some of its neighbouring countries. Certain analysts are tempted to refute this argument by pointing out, and rightly so, Algeria’s acceptance of conditionality, in this case negative conditionality, as contained in the Association Agreements, since the latter can be suspended in case of human rights violations. From a collective psychology perspective, it is easier for Algerians to accept positive conditionality, for they feel, not without reason, that they have won significant acquis insofar as freedoms and they therefore have no complexes in this regard. On the other hand, they find it much more difficult to accept that the driving force of their evolution should come from outside, on a “carrot-stick” policy basis, which can be perceived as humiliating or degrading.

In addition, Algeria considers that the reality of Central and Eastern European countries is far too different from that of South Mediterranean countries for a single inclusive approach to be applied to all of them. This difference can be noted in both the expectations regarding relations with Europe and the perception of those relations.

**Reservations Arising from the Algerian Context**

Considerations relative to the Algerian context have played a substantial role in defining Algeria’s position on the ENP.

- The first simply consists of a problem of timing, not without significant political implications. In fact, the European ENP proposal for Algeria was made when the Association Agreement had not even entered into force. This Agreement has given rise to impassioned debate, then and now, on the opportunity and its implications for the Algerian economy. Both the business community and political actors decried the government’s decision to sign an Association Agreement with the EU, qualifying it as imbalanced, in particular in the component regarding the establishment of a free trade area. To grasp the risk, suffice it to recall that the Algerian economy today is still a mono-export economy, the hydrocarbon share of export revenue being between 97% and 98%, whereas the oil revenue in the national budget is evaluated at 75%. These parameters lent the Association Agreement bad press in Algeria, since the stated business community and political actors did not hesitate to speak of a give-away to the benefit of Europe with nothing in return. Under these conditions, from the perspective of political management, it was difficult, to say the least, to receive another European initiative favourably when the primary aim was to popularise and gain acceptance for the Association Agreement.

- Another domestic factor has conditioned Algeria’s position on the ENP. Algerian diplomacy has always expressed a sort of annoyance at Europe’s tendency to opt for a logic of “sedimentation” of initiatives. Perhaps mistakenly, one gets the im-
pression that Europe, to mask the shortcomings of an initiative or its outright failure, decided to propose a new project, thus inflating the legal framework of cooperation and partnership.

**Reasons for the Evolution of the Algerian Position**

Over the course of 2011, Algerian diplomacy showed signs of evolution concerning its position on the ENP. This evolution led to the initiation, as of 24 January 2012, of preliminary discussions on the adoption of an Action Plan that would formally establish Algeria’s accession to the new Neighbourhood Policy. Indeed, on 25 May 2011, the European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs issued a joint communication entitled “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood.” Algeria has detected significant progress in the new European approach:

- Insofar as appropriation, in contrast to the launching stage of the ENP, the countries to the South, in particular Algeria, were consulted and joined in discussing the new conception of the Neighbourhood Policy;
- Insofar as the Algerian specificity, the European party has expressed willingness to implement an Action Plan taking into account certain Algerian idiosyncrasies, in particular the mono-export structure of its economy;
- Finally, Algerian diplomacy seems to have taken advantage of the opportunity of the new Neighbourhood Policy strategy to send Europe a strong message of openness and, more generally, to express a more decided will to join in integrative political and economic measures. This is all the more true since the Algerian approach cannot be due to financial considerations, because in this respect, the country is quite at ease and does not expect any particular financial support from Europe.

At present, preliminary discussions are still underway and the negotiations to establish an Action Plan are, according to the actors involved, taking place in a favourable climate that heralds forthcoming implementation. Two rounds of discussion have already taken place, with a third round planned for May. In reality, though there has been an undeniable change in Algeria’s position on the ENP, it can in no way be likened to a revolution, since Algeria has already “acted as a neighbour” without officially forming part of the ENP: it has undertaken actions within the logic of the ENP as part of the Association Agreements, though they did not form part of an official action plan.

In conclusion, beyond the vicissitudes associated with the evolution of Algeria’s position on the ENP, the fundamental issue consists of Europe’s capacity to employ the appropriate tools for a true partnership, in particular with regard to South Mediterranean countries, a region where Europe is experiencing increasing competition with emerging countries. Indeed, there is a considerable risk of South Mediterranean countries turning towards new partners with both greater financial means than a Europe in crisis and less demands insofar as conditionality. For countries experiencing full political transition and, for some, economic transition as well, meeting the criteria of “deep democracy” described in the 25 May 2011 communication as “solid and sustainable democracy” cannot but constitute a major challenge. On this basis, the European Union will be hard pressed to assess the progress of each of these countries – often dealing with situations of confusion and that continually oscillate between progress and regression – through follow-up annual reports. By the same token, can financial allocations for recipient countries for 2014 and beyond be determined solely on the basis of respect for the ENP reference criteria when we know that the reduction of EU aid may have serious consequences in certain countries, in the sense that they would create conditions of increased instability and heighten uncertainty concerning political and economic development throughout the Euro-Mediterranean Region?

This dilemma, not new but more acute today, should serve as a good opportunity to consider the definition of a new EU approach to its Neighbourhood, particularly the South Mediterranean Region, an approach that would establish the economy as the focal point, for only conditions of economic growth and development are capable of ensuring stability and the success of democratic transitions. “More for more” should become “more investment & development for more democracy”; any other approach would be risky at best and rash or irresponsible at worst.
This fourth and last edition of the Euromed Survey has been conducted within a totally renewed regional context. Today’s political and social situation, at the outset of this multiannual programme of surveys, was not contemplated by any of the Mediterranean’s actors or experts. Consequently, the kind of issues and themes dealt with in the survey have been adapted to this changing reality with the aim of being able to fully capture the impact these have on Euro-Mediterranean cooperation.

The fieldwork was carried out between early January and early March 2013, when the governments that arose from the Arab revolutions or from the political reform processes had already been managing these countries for several months. The impact of their actions was therefore reflected in the survey questions. The 843 experts and actors that answered the survey were given a questionnaire organised into six different blocks. This article presents a brief summary of the main results. A more complete and exhaustive analysis of the survey can be found in the fourth report on the Euromed Survey. (www.iemed.org/euromedsurvey).

**Main Findings**

One of the principal elements of the findings is that it presents an ambivalent situation, which, despite the difficult evolution of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, both due to the difficulties of its institutional setting, and the changes in the region (revolutions, transitions, new governments, wars), suggests that it is still a valid initiative with recognised potential. The answers provided by experts and actors from the region therefore show that:

- The European Union has a strong capacity to have greater impact than other external and regional actors in the region.
- There is still room for Euro-Mediterranean policies to have positive impacts on cooperation, strategic economic options, commercial partnerships and strengthening democracy and good governance.
- After 4 years, the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is still considered a valid instrument for facing important challenges in the region.

**Prospects of Sustainable Democracy and New Actors**

Regarding the question on the probability of a solid and stable democracy in the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs), the results show that there are three defined country groups. Firstly, Tunisia, Lebanon and Morocco are considered most likely to enjoy a solid and stable democracy. Secondly, the results for Egypt, Jordan and Palestine do not clearly show whether or not these countries will advance towards a more solid democracy. Thirdly, Algeria and Libya are considered unlikely countries for a stable democracy. Lastly, separate mention should be given to Syria, whose hopes for a stable democracy are far below those of the last group of countries, due to the current conflict there.
In comparison with the results of the previous survey (see Chart 7) it should be highlighted that the respondents’ perception of each country has worsened, or, in the best of cases, has remained the same, showing a certain discontent regarding the development of the political situation.

Secondly, the survey asked about the future role of the main Islamist parties, the Salafist parties and the non-Islamist parties. The overall results indicate that the Islamist parties would adopt the most prominent role, followed closely by the non-Islamist parties, while the future role of the Salafist parties would be the least important.

In reference to each of the countries the answers varied considerably (see Chart 8). In countries like Lebanon or Algeria the surveys consider that the non-Islamist parties will play a more important role than the Islamist parties, while in countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, Libya, Palestine or Syria the traditional Islamists are given greater importance than the non-Islamists. In other countries like Morocco or Jordan, both kinds of party are similarly valued. The Salafist parties, however, are only considered actors with a moderate future role in countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Syria or Libya. However, EU respondents attach more importance to the role of Islamist and Salafist parties than do respondents from the MPCs. In these countries, Islamist and non-Islamist parties appear to enjoy almost equal importance.

When asked to prioritise democracy benchmarks, free and fair elections are the first choice of respondents, while a second important priority relates to civil freedoms. The independence of the judiciary has almost the same level of priority as the democratic control of the army.

Although there are important institutional and political changes, no major changes are foreseen in the region’s foreign policy as a consequence of the Arab Spring. However, it should be mentioned that Egypt is thought to maintain its role as an essential broker in the region and, according to respondents, as regards foreign affairs policies, pragmatism will assume greater importance than ideologies.

**Towards a Multipolar Neighbourhood**

The second block of questions is focused on the role that the European Union will have to face with the development of a multipolar neighbourhood, that is to say, the influence that it could continue to have on the SMCs, after the region’s political changes.
According to the respondents, the EU still maintains a strong capacity to have more impact than other external and regional actors in the region. The US and Saudi Arabia, however, are considered to be more influential (see Chart 10).

The survey also examines the EU’s role in the domestic developments of the MPCs; a question also asked in 2011, thereby allowing us to compare responses given when the impacts of the Arab Spring were still recent, with a situation, such as that of late 2012, when democratising processes were more uncertain.

Reponses follow the same trend as in 2011; that is, the prevalent scenario among the responses obtained for each one of the MPCs is to “remain cautious and work on the basis of demands emanating from the MPCs,” a majority option for all countries except the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Syria.

In the case of the Occupied Palestinian Territories, the most notable option, as in 2011, is that which sees the EU as having a more pro-active and interventionist role. In the case of Syria, responses have evolved from seeing this pro-active role as the most...
According to the survey, the influence of the EU in these countries is focused mainly on commercial and economic issues and to a lesser extent on promoting the view that "the EU should make its influence felt to avoid the takeover by extremist parties."
regional integration and political reforms, while its influence as an agent of peace is very limited. The final question of the block was based on the Syrian conflict and asked about the main international actors that could be the key to the conflict’s final resolution. According to the respondents, Turkey and the US, and then Saudi Arabia and Iran will be the key actors in resolving this situation, significantly ahead of the United Nations or the EU.

**Euromed Region**

The third block of the survey deals with questions related with the Euro-Mediterranean integration process and seeks to monitor and assess the regional policies and programmes developed during 2012. On the one hand, the impact of the Arab uprisings on the Euro-Mediterranean integration process has an average assessment of 6.4 on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for negative impact and 10 positive impact. It is notable that 50% of respondents gave a score of 7 and 9, thus assessing it very positively. By country groups, the balance of the average Survey assessment is maintained.

On the mid and long-term role of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), the Survey average is around 5. The percentage of responses around the middle grades (4 to 6) accounts for 50% of responses. In terms of responses by country groups, there is a balance around the Survey average. However, it should be noted that Maghreb and Mediterranean EU countries are slightly above the average, as European non-EU countries give a notably high assessment to the key role of the UfM in the region (6.7).

Respondents show a clear preference for strengthening the role of civil society as a key element of democratic reform and public accountability in MPCs

When classifying the priorities of the Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative on: “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood,” (Money, Market, and Mobility), market access is seen as the first priority, especially for respondents from the EU while for those from the MPCs the three options presented very similar values. Among the cooperation instruments proposed in the Communication of the European Commission
and the High Representative “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean,” respondents show a clear preference for strengthening the role of civil society as a key element of democratic reform and public accountability in MPCs. This is especially the case for respondents from the MPCs, while concluding the neighbourhood agreements is the priority for respondents from the EU.

Lastly, the visibility and impact of the EU’s action towards MPCs receives an average grade of 5 for most respondents, with a slight tendency to consider the impact of the EU’s work in the region to be greater than its visibility. Clearly above the mean are the respondents of Balkan countries members of the UfM, while respondents of Mashreq countries also show a more positive perception of the EU’s impact and visibility in the region.

**Economic and Financial Dimension**

Among the long-term economic strategic priorities of regional governments, participants in the survey consider that MPCs will increase their cooperation with the Gulf Cooperation Council and consolidate their economic ties with China. Deeper economic relations with the EU will be more relevant than the MPCs’ bilateral relations with the United States or their integration in multilateral regional organisations. The following question asked respondents to value the capacity of the Islamist governments in the region in managing socio-economic demands. The responses show a low level of confidence in this regard. Only those questions related to the fight against corruption, wealth distribution and security reach a value nearing 5, while the confidence in the capacity of these governments to respond to issues, like the development of the tourist sector and women’s socio-economic rights is negligible.

Lastly, regarding the impact of the Arab Spring on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the MPCs, respondents thought countries like Turkey, Israel or Morocco have benefited most as they have seen their FDI increase, while Egypt or Syria have seen their capacity to attract FDI slightly lowered.

**Defining Priorities**

During the previous editions of the Survey, a block of questions was dedicated to monitoring and assess-
ing policies and programmes developed at the Euro-Mediterranean level.

This Euromed Survey identifies the priorities of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the fields of migration and mobility, employment, youth and women. On human mobility in the Euro-Mediterranean region, the survey asked about the capacity of certain policies to improve human movements in the region. The policy seen as the most appropriate to improve human movements in the region is the enhancement of the mobility of students, researchers and business people, scoring an average of 8.5. The remaining policies are graded around 7.3 and 7.5 (see Chart 14). It is notable that the results are highly homogenous if compared to the averages by groups of countries, with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries making a consistently positive assessment with minor differences, while the assessment by EU Mediterranean countries and remaining EU countries is lower.

Prospective and Policy Recommendations

The last block of the Survey is composed of two questions referred to as prospective issues regarding Euro-Mediterranean cooperation and assessing the probability of specific hypotheses for the future. It is important to highlight that the results show that Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is still a valid instrument for dealing with some of the most pressing challenges in the region, including the strengthening of democracy in MPCs, enhancing human exchanges and promoting democracy and respect for human rights.

The question that focuses on the effect of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the long term assesses the probability that Euro-Mediterranean cooperation would lead to a series of scenarios. Of the six scenarios proposed the most likely for respondents (although with a relatively low probability [6.0 and 5.9 on average]) are the achievement of greater understanding and respect between cultures and regions in the region or the increase of human exchanges between the two shores. These elements are followed in probability by the strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights in the MPCs and the improvement in living conditions in
the MPCs. Finally, the two options considered most unlikely are the reduction of the development gap between the North and South of the Mediterranean and the capacity of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation to resolve conflicts in the region.

**Euro-Mediterranean cooperation is still a valid instrument for dealing with some of the most pressing challenges in the region, including the strengthening of democracy in MPCs.**

Finally, participants in the Survey remain sceptical about the role of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in bringing the conflicts in the region to an end and the reduction of the development gap between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

The last question of the Survey allows respondents to assess the probability of a series (14) of hypotheses arising for the mid and long-term future. These hypotheses include some of a marked pessimistic nature and others that are more optimistic.

The hypotheses considered most probable by the respondents are precisely those that are of a marked pessimistic nature, which include those that consider that water scarcity in the region will be a source of conflict, that xenophobia will increase in Europe, that clandestine immigration will increase or that social tensions caused by pressures linked to demographics and the employment market, etc. will increase. On the other hand, there are hypotheses that could be considered more optimistic, which include the North-South economic convergence, the emergence of the Mediterranean identity or the increase of women’s participation. These are considered to be less probable.

In conclusion, the results of the survey reveal some of the keys that determine the region’s present and future. Despite the political transformations on the southern shore of the Mediterranean (unimaginable five years ago when the IEMed began this programme), there are still many difficulties that the region must deal with. Although the perception of the future is slightly pessimistic, the results show which elements should be taken into consideration with respect to the construction of a Euro-Mediterranean area of shared security and prosperity.
Mali and the Sahel: From Crisis to Military Intervention (2013)

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The thirteen-month period from January 2012 to February 2013 is crucial to understanding the situation in Mali and, by extension, in the Sahel. The French military intervention in January 2013 was decided suddenly, when the crisis in Mali was precipitated by the rebel forces’ taking of Konna and decision to set course directly for Bamako, which could have fallen in 24 hours. However, the French intervention did not mark the start of the conflict’s “militarisation”; rather it signalled a new phase in a conflict that had already been gradually, but inexorably, moving in that direction, above all in 2012. The key factors are easy to identify, as the different parties made many sudden moves over the year: a) the military coup against President Touré; b) the secession of nearly half of Mali proclaimed by the Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA); c) the ruptures and splintering of four insurgent groups, of which only the MNLA is a “nationalist secessionist” group, while the other three (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), and Ansar Dine) are “al-Qaeda Islamists” and, thus, by definition, transnational; and d) foreign interventions, first by the French and later by troops from different countries of the African Union. This is how things stood in April 2013. However, the situation existed within the framework of a complex process of regional instability whose comprehension requires some analysis of the context, the background, the main actors and the relationships between them, and some of the key strategic issues.

The Sahel region emerged as a geostrategic priority beginning in 2000. This was the result of the return of combatants from Afghanistan, the need to protect US and EU energy interests in the Maghreb and West Africa, and the growing presence of China on the continent. Today, the events of the last few years – from the outbreak of the Arab Springs in 2010 and the fall of the Ben Ali and Gaddafi regimes in Tunisia and Libya to the 2012 Tuareg rebellion and the military intervention in Mali that began in January 2013 – have shown that, from the point of view of security, everything that happens in the Maghreb and West Africa directly or indirectly affects: i) the success of the political transition processes in Maghreb countries; ii) the spread of challenges and threats to regional and international security; and iii) the implications of this lack of security for the international community’s strategic interests.

At the political level, the countries in the region are, for the most part, former French colonies (except for Nigeria, which was a British colony) that have become young and unstable republics plagued by constant coups (Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Nigeria) and internal conflicts (among the urban, rural and nomadic populations and as a result of social exclusion due to ethnic and religious differences).

The Rise of Radical Islamic Movements

The rampant poverty in most countries of the Sahel, the marginal status and exclusion of certain sectors of society, and, above all, the lack of education and professional opportunities for the vast majority of
young people make the region an ideal place for terrorist groups to attract and radicalise new members. The instability in the Sahel has allowed radical groups and al-Qaeda cells associated with the global jihad to reorganise and boost their operating capacity. Their priorities include, among others, the desire to bring down what they consider to be “apostate” regimes, to oppose international interventions in Muslim countries, and to destabilise Western governments and the world economy. The attack on the Algerian gas plant at Tiguentourine on 23 January 2013 proved that, although Algeria is the only country that has been, and remains, capable of combatting the terrorism of AQIM, it is nevertheless still quite vulnerable to regional instability.

AQIM, based in Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger and present in Nigeria, Chad and the Sudan, arose in the 1990s from the ashes of an Islamist protest movement mobilised against the cancellation of the 1991 Algerian elections. Following the outbreak of civil war in 1992, the protest movement formed a military arm called the Armed Islamic Group (GIA from the French), from which the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC from the French) ultimately broke away.

In 2007, Al Qaeda officially confirmed its ties to the GSPC and the name change to AQIM. From that moment on, the newly minted AQIM became al-Qaeda’s fourth armed regional structure, along with the sections in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Afghanistan, and the nationalist Islamist discourse was shelved in favour of advocating a vision of global jihad. Although AQIM initially had its bases in the mountains of eastern Algeria, the Algerian counterterrorism campaigns ultimately forced it to relocate to mobile camps in the lawless areas of the Sahel in Mauritania, northern Mali and Niger. There, its members have integrated themselves into the local communities, by marrying members of the Tuareg tribes and providing social services to populations that have traditionally been neglected by their governments.

MOJWA is an AQIM splinter group formed in January 2012 and allegedly led by the Mauritanian Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou. It claims to have the same objectives as AQIM and also uses abductions as a means of financing its activities. In fact, it has claimed responsibility for the abduction of three Western cooperation workers – including two Spaniards – from the refugee camp in the Tindouf region on 23 October 2011.

The other most active jihadist group in the Sahel is colloquially known as Boko Haram, which means “Western education is sin.” The group’s official name is Jama’afu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad, or “people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s teachings and jihad.” This group was founded in north-eastern Nigeria in 2002 for the purpose of spreading the sharia in the country and fighting corruption.

Organised Crime

Organised crime in the Sahel has always posed a threat to regional and international security, as it is the corridor to Europe for the trafficking of drugs, arms, prostitutes and other humans, as well as other illicit activities, such as money laundering and even the smuggling of nuclear material. However, these types of activities have grown even worse now that the region’s terrorist groups have turned to them to finance their activities.

Migratory Flows and Humanitarian Crisis

The extraordinary and uncontrolled migratory flows affecting Mauritania and the Ceuta and Melilla borders constitute a risk for the interests of both Mediterranean countries and the EU. The reasons for this are threefold: first, the irregular nature of the immigration; second, the possible spread of radical ideologies and terrorist group recruitment cells that it enables; and, third, the problems it can cause in the receiving countries, such as those related to unemployment, crime, healthcare, education, cultural adaptation and xenophobia, among others.
Additionally, the long periods of drought caused by climate change in the Sahel have led states and international agencies working on the ground to sound the alarm regarding some 15 million people in the region who may fall victim to famine. This could lead to massive migratory movements that, when taken in conjunction with the 467,000 people displaced by the conflict in northern Mali (175,211 refugees and 292,648 internally displaced persons, according to data from the UNHCR), entail a critical situation for the region.

**Acceleration of the Crisis**

The biggest and most dangerous threat was the possibility that those political actors with criminal and/or terrorist backgrounds would establish a dynamic of synergy and mutual cooperation, which indeed did beginning in February 2012. However, above all, it was the period from December 2012 to January 2013 – which saw the sudden irruption of militias (with the ensuing rapid territorial conquest) now directly focused on seizing power in Bamako – that marked a turning point in the management of the whole conflict, culminating in the French and international military intervention at the start of 2013.

All of this had, among other things, immediate and direct repercussions for the personal safety of expatriate cooperation agents working for NGOs and for the interests of foreign and local companies in the region, as well as the safety of their employees, with a clear impact on the EU’s vital interests.

The aforementioned attack on the BP-Amenas power plant in Algeria by an AQIM splinter group and its immediate (albeit dramatic) outcome confirm that the situation has entered a stage of acute militarisation of the management of the entire crisis area. Three variables should be taken into account in this “complex of vulnerabilities”:

- **Territoriality:** Armed action has been based on territory, not on state or institutional objectives. The terrorist groups are not so much trying to attack a state, its symbols or its armed forces, or to terrorise the population, as they are trying to take control of a terrain in which the State is absent, nearly devoid of inhabitants, and to capture those who come close to or enter it, thereby increasingly expanding their territorial jurisdiction and becoming more mobile.
- **Internationalisation:** The groups’ members have become international, they deliberately choose interstate spaces and international victims, they interact and collaborate with international networks, and they feed on a global perception and target a global audience.
- **Economic criminality:** These groups have adopted an entrepreneurial view of armed activity and violence. This change has led to a sort of criminal partnership with both the new traffickers (drugs, arms, humans, etc.) and traditional actors and agents of conflict (bandits, smugglers, Tuaregs) in an obviously dangerous mix.

Based on the underlying and cross-cutting threats and factors, and beyond the current phase of active militarisation, the response to the Sahel’s problems requires a comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach, encompassing diplomacy, security and development. Such an approach would include three overlapping types of interventions: *intrastate*, that is, within a single state in the region (territorial); *interstate*, that is, between neighbouring countries (regional); and *external*, meaning interventions by the EU and the US carried out in parallel with the others (global), which, while respecting each state’s independence, would prevent bilateral issues and struggles for regional hegemony from deteriorating the situation further.

With regard to strictly military measures and instruments, it is necessary to create or increase the capacities of the affected states’ own military instruments by means of cooperation on:

a. personnel training activities carried out within the context of military and law enforcement training programmes; unit training; the use of special forces; assistance with local operations (i.e. joint planning and/or supervision and monitoring of the implementation of such operations rather than taking actual command of local forces);

b. equipment handling and technological capacity-building; temporary provision of material and equipment (drones, surveillance aircraft, satellites, border surveillance systems) to ensure specific capacities, such as peacekeeping,
humanitarian assistance, coastal surveillance or maritime interdiction.
c. exchange of information and general or specific intelligence for local operations (from external sources: drones, surveillance aircraft, satellites) and the capacity to obtain and analyse intelligence. Special forces units can be used as a supplementary tool.

Aware of the security problems plaguing the region, the EU developed a Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel during the Spanish Presidency in 2010. It does not focus exclusively on security (the fight against crime and AQIM’s terrorism), but rather also takes aspects of development (infrastructure, job opportunities for young people, local consolidation) into consideration in order to overcome the risk of radicalisation of marginalised populations. In this context, it has conducted technical and political missions over the last three years in the most affected countries in order to assess the situation and identify possible actions so as to develop a broad regional strategy.

Some Conclusions

The main reasons the Sahel has become a danger zone are the weakness of the states and the vast amounts of space. These are the most important factors determining what needs to be done to find a strategic solution. It is critical to take a comprehensive regional approach aimed at preventing a unity of purpose, action and implementation between organised crime groups (drug trafficking, human trafficking, arms trafficking and smuggling), terrorist groups and parts of the local population.

At the regional level, the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) must seek political solutions and intensify cooperation to tackle the region’s challenges. Although due to the conflict in Mali, multilateral bodies such as ECOWAS have indeed taken on an important role in managing the conflict, their ability to succeed will certainly be affected by the limited capacity that their Member States have in operational terms to respond to this type of conflict.

So long as the transition processes in the Maghreb remain unfinished, and the weak governments of the states of the Sahel and the threats to international security continue to exacerbate the already chronic weakness of the countries of the Sahel, the international community will need to play a decisive role, focusing its actions on technical assistance in areas such as: electoral reform, economic growth and diversification, and regional security.

The military action taken by France and its allies is not a long-term plan, nor a solution in itself; however, in the current phase, it is a critical tool for establishing a certain security framework. It must be accompanied by an endorsement from the UN Security Council and more than nominal EU involvement.

Some references

Germany and the Maghreb Countries after the Arab Unrests: New Times, New Dynamics

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The Arab unrests, sparked by the Tunisian revolution in January 2011, have not only drawn the interest of German foreign policy makers for the MENA region, but also of numerous institutions and organisations, as well as prompting new perceptions among the German public opinion and media. This is particularly true for the Maghreb region, and especially for Tunisia, which has been the focus of attention since 2011. Although economic relations have been important for decades and have improved over time, political and societal ties have, on the other hand, been somewhat weak. In the Libyan crisis, Germany did not participate in the military intervention that led to the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, but did give support through the provision of humanitarian aid, medical care for the wounded, and contributions to the reconstruction process. With Algeria, relations have been strengthened and reinforced by Foreign Minister Westerwelle’s visit to Algiers in January 2012, and a counter visit by the Algerian Foreign Minister Mourad Medelci in March 2013. With Morocco, relations are close and particularly intensive in the fields of development cooperation, the environment, climate change and economic and renewable energy cooperation.

Like that of other EU Member States, German foreign policy intends to combine and fuse national and European interests. However, in the Maghreb region it is less motivated by geostrategic or political (security) interests, than it is by economic ones.

With regard to concrete measures, the federal government allocated an additional 100 million euros for the time period 2012-2013 for the transformation process in North Africa.1 The goal is to help counterbalance the socio-economic challenges that all Maghreb countries are currently facing, in one way or another, such as high (youth) unemployment rates, unstable economic situations following the unrests, and the impact of the global financial and economic crisis or increases in food prices.

Getting Closer – Bilateral German-Maghreb Cooperation

Political Dimension

The upheavals encountered numerous positive reactions in German politics. A rapid institutional response was the creation of “transformation partnerships with Tunisia and Egypt” (partly also valid for Jordan, Morocco and Libya) by the Foreign Office in 2011. Their objective is to foster democratic transformation, as well as improve the economic and social situation. In addition, there was a restructuring process of the involved work units in the Foreign Office. This included the appointment of a representative of the German Foreign Minister for the Arab World and a bilateral working group of the Tunisian and German foreign ministries was established, which meets twice a year and is responsible for evaluating the progress of common projects. Besides increased diplomatic activities of the Federal Chancellery and different ministries, the parliamentary committee for German relations with the Maghreb

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countries, also became more active in the wake of the Arab Spring.

Relations between Tunisia and Germany have been stepped up through numerous reciprocal visits since 2011, including several visits by the German Minister of Foreign Affairs to Tunisia (February 2011, January 2012 and March 2013), who signed a “Common Declaration” on 9 January 2012 with Rafik Abdelsalam (Ennahda), the then Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs, paving the way to numerous German-Tunisian cooperation projects in the fields of democracy, rule of law, media, civil society, professional training, education, and cultural cooperation. For the time period 2012-2013, about 60 million euros have been allocated to Tunisia. In March 2012, Hamadi Jebali (Ennahda), the then Tunisian Prime Minister, visited Berlin, followed by the Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki in March 2013. In March 2012, Chancellor Angela Merkel and Hamadi Jebali concluded the introduction of “Governmental Consultations” – an upgrading of the diplomatic relations and a first for German-Maghreb relations. On the basis of these consultations, transformation, security and energy partnerships are being implemented.

The first official governmental consultations between Tunisian and German State Secretaries took place on 12 September 2012 in Berlin, building the basis for deepened German-Tunisian cooperation. Besides the Chancellery, up to nine different ministries (foreign affairs, finance, education and research, development etc.) are involved. The objective is to discuss the ongoing reform process in Tunisia and further cooperation possibilities, particularly with regard to the private economy, support for Tunisia’s integration into the world economy, and the implementation of the EU’s “privileged partnership.” Germany’s support for the Tunisian reform process is bound to the respect of certain principles defined in the Common Declaration (liberal democracy on the basis of the universal values as defined in the UN Charter, republican values of alternation, rule of law, a new constitution, free elections, civil society participation) as well as the ENP principle of positive conditionality (“more for more”).

The intensification of bilateral cooperation mainly concerns three areas: (1) education, university cooperation and vocational training; (2) research and innovation, including in the energy sector; (3) good governance, including anti-corruption measures and judicial cooperation. From the perspective of Germany’s foreign policy, Tunisia stands as the pioneer of the Arab Spring, which is why numerous efforts are dedicated to the Tunisian transformation process.

**Economic Dimension**

In terms of economic relations, the commercial trade balance between Tunisia and Germany is about 2.35 billion euros (exports to Tunisia: 1.13 billion euros, imports from Tunisia: 1.22 billion euros). About 150 German industrial companies and 270 export companies with German capital participation are present in Tunisia, creating and maintaining a significant number of jobs. The Tunisian revolution did not cause many German companies to relocate, and the country continues to be considered a positive economic site, mainly due to its qualified local workforce and low wages. However, international, as well as German, companies fear that the situation regarding the rule of law and transparency of administrative decisions taken by the current Tunisian government might have a negative impact on the investment climate and the general situation for business operations.

In addition, Germany maintains close relations in the energy sector (fossil fuels and renewable energy sources) with Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco. In the field of renewable energy politics, a new dynamic has been developed with Tunisia and Morocco. In January 2012, an energy partnership was concluded with Tunisia, and in July 2012 with Morocco. The objectives are the development of the renewable energies sector and the political backing of the Desertec Initiative.

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German tourism in the Maghreb countries, especially in Tunisia and Morocco, is also an important economic factor (about 520,000 German tourists travel to Tunisia per year, for example), although, in the wake of the Tunisian revolution, this sector has dramatically decreased.

**Cultural and Social Dimension**

The introduction of the transformation partnerships led to a multiplication of German-Tunisian (and German-Egyptian) cooperation projects, coordinated by the leading organisations traditionally active in these fields, such as the GIZ, the Goethe Institute, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and political foundations. These projects include, for instance, shared Master programmes, conferences and training programmes, and there are also plans for the creation of a technical German University in Tunis (following the example of the technical German University in Cairo).

The presence and activities of German political foundations in the Maghreb countries have also increased. The Friedrich Naumann Foundation and the Heinrich Böll Foundation, for example, opened new offices in Tunisia, along with the DAAD organisation. Further civil society projects, organised by twin towns, bilateral friendship associations, NGOs, women, or youth associations underwent new dynamics. All these projects have contributed to increasing mobility (although limited to selected professional groups and individuals) and cultural exchange between the Maghreb countries and Germany since 2011.

**The European Context: Germany in the EU's Mediterranean Policy**

The EU remains the major economic and commercial partner for the Maghreb countries. In addition to the bilateral Free Trade Association Agreements, signed between the EU and all Maghreb countries (except Libya), individual EU Member States have adopted additional bilateral economic agreements with the Maghreb countries. For Tunisia, in recent years, Germany has become its third largest trading partner, behind France and Italy, and its fourth largest investor. Commercial relations have existed for a long time; in the past Germany and Tunisia have signed numerous bilateral agreements. Germany’s relations with France regarding the Maghreb region were not always easy, while today, their policies often run parallel. Although historically German and French relations with the Maghreb are very different, including different forms of actors and networks, or different accents in political strategies, the economic and political interests are similar overall, and both countries are implementing similar cooperation measures.

In order to minimise contingent competition, especially now with Europe going through a major financial and political crisis, the potential of German-French cooperation must be revitalised, not only within the European context, but also in terms of external relations towards the southern and eastern Mediterranean. In terms of multilateral and regional cooperation, after the French-German dissent regarding the Union for the Mediterranean in 2007/2008, and the reintegration of the UfM into the EU context, the UfM could never really diverge politically. At the same time, France is pushing forward a revival of the “5+5 Dialogue.” During the last 5+5 Conference in Malta in October 2012, President François Hollande presented his understanding of the UfM as a pragmatic implementation agency of the ENP, and a “Union of projects (in infrastructure).” The 5+5 Dialogue goes almost unnoticed in Germany; a country which continues to support the UfM Secretariat in Barcelona and has been active in existing Euro-Mediterranean programmes and projects for many years.

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The EU’s “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean”\textsuperscript{7} (March 2012), also supported by the German government, is, however, just a continuation of the principles and programmes of the ENP and UfM.\textsuperscript{8} From a German perspective, the European character of its Mediterranean policy was always in the foreground, including the intention to implement – via the existing institutional multilateral frameworks (EMP, ENP, UfM) – a common European foreign policy towards third countries in the southern and eastern Mediterranean. Given the fact, that the UfM has not been able to function effectively over the past five years, Germany also intensified its bilateral relations with the region, as did many other EU Member States. Germany also contributed support to the reform process of the ENP, resulting in the “New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood” (May 2011),\textsuperscript{9} announcing more European support in the domains of “money, markets and mobility,” individual country approaches and more binding implementation of positive conditionality, which was updated in March 2013.\textsuperscript{10}

As Germany is one of the most important actors in the EU (on the political, economic and financial levels), it also influences the EU’s Mediterranean policies, such as the “privileged partnership” and new ENP Action Plan with Tunisia (Deepened and Comprehensive Free Trade Zone), concluded in November 2012, during the EU-Tunisia Association Council. Finally, Germany is also supportive of the Arab Spring in other international fora and institutions, such as the G8 group, IMF, World Bank and EIB, through different aid programmes aimed at supporting the transformation process in the southern and eastern Mediterranean.

Major objectives of Germany’s Mediterranean policy remain the economic integration of the Mediterranean area and democracy promotion. Like that of many other EU Member States, German foreign policy constantly meanders between an interest-oriented (exports, energy interests) and value-oriented (respect of rule of law and human rights) foreign policy, and the importance given to international and regional institutions. Multilateral and regional cooperation are understood as complementary, and not contradictory, elements of self-interest in the Mediterranean area.

By supporting and backing the EU’s Mediterranean policy, Germany can contribute to addressing current key challenges such as (youth) employment in the Mediterranean region, getting a hold on the financial and economic crisis, and redefining Euro-Mediterranean relations following the Arab unrests, in a constructive and sustainable manner.


The Arab revolts that began in December 2011 were fed by a demand for bread, freedom, and social justice. Youth unemployment and widespread economic discontent were also important contributory factors. Two years after the Arab revolts, however, these objectives remain as distant as ever. In fact, the economic challenges facing the Arab Spring countries have become even more pressing. Unemployment has nearly doubled in both Tunisia and Egypt. Foreign investment has dried up, and tourism revenues, while relatively resilient, remain endangered. Fiscal challenges remain at large: Egypt's fiscal deficit will exceed 11% of GDP this year. While the problems are urgent and present, the policy response is either absent or painfully slow. Both Egypt and Tunisia are governed by coalitions led by Islamic parties: the Brotherhood in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia. This brief note will revisit the economic ideology of these parties and their approach to dealing with their countries’ respective economic challenges.

Economic Ideology

In matters of economic governance, as in politics, the ruling Islamic parties in Egypt and Tunisia seek their inspiration in Islam. Islam is typically viewed as providing answers to all social and economic ills. Specifically, both parties seek to establish an Islamic economic system based on a judicious middle path between laissez-faire capitalism and a socialist economic order. This narrative, based on the ideas of a body of literature known as Islamic economics, gives primacy to both markets and social justice. Islamic economics purports to offer an alternative – a middle ground of sorts – to the two prevailing economic systems of the time, capitalism and socialism. Although the core insights of Islamic economics are not new, having found expression in many earlier writings, in the 1980s, Islamic economics aimed to bring them together under a single consolidated critique of the mainstream economic order. Practically speaking, Islamic economics advocates the need to marry free markets with social justice. Uneconomic restrictions on economic exchange are viewed as anathema to the spirit of Islam. At the same time, both the State and markets should be tailored towards serving the wider public good. However, possible tensions between markets and social justice are not typically well-analysed; nor are the challenges of dealing with the resulting trade-offs.

From Ideas to Practice

Islamic parties in Egypt and Tunisia subscribe to the ideas of Islamic economics. While Islamic economics offers a strong critique of the capitalist system, the mapping from ideas to practice remains weak. Apart from broad guidelines, few concrete alternatives or possible solutions are offered. This is also manifested in the economic discourse of Islamic parties. Beyond the rhetoric in favour of free markets and social justice, the economic narrative of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Ennahda Party remains vacuous. Both parties have criticised crony capitalism, emphasised the need for fiscal reform, and advocated support for a stronger private sector, espe-
cially small and medium enterprises. A large-scale reform of the subsidy system – an essential element of fiscal reforms – is also mentioned in the party manifestos of ruling Islamic parties. Promises have likewise been made to mainstream Islamic finance in national economies.

While Islamic economics offers a strong critique of the capitalist system, the mapping from ideas to practice remains weak. Apart from broad guidelines, few concrete alternatives or possible solutions are offered.

While the goals and objectives are clearly laid out in speeches and public documents, the instruments for achieving them are not well spelled out. There is little clarity on the concrete steps required to address pressing economic challenges. Islamic parties in Egypt and Tunisia have largely failed to inspire a new economic discourse or to issue a fresh blueprint for economic revival. Most items on these parties’ economic agendas are practically indistinguishable from those on the agendas of other mainstream parties. A radical agenda to shift the distribution of economic power is missing from their narrative. In fact, for all practical purposes, their economic programme is consistent with neo-liberal economic reforms associated with the IMF and the World Bank.

Policy Response to Economic Challenges

The economic record of the post-revolution Islamic governments has been mostly disappointing. Genuine economic reform is stalled, while the absence of political stability has worsened the investment climate. At least four aspects of economic management are worth highlighting at the outset:

- Economic reform has been both slow and insufficient. Last year, to qualify for an IMF programme, subsidies on high-end fuel were reduced in Egypt, but this was not followed by subsequent reforms. A planned tax increase was delayed soon after it was announced by President Morsi. There is widespread recognition amongst political stakeholders that a stronger tax effort and a reformed subsidy regime are essential for fiscal sustainability. But neither the people on the street nor the rulers seem ready to bear the social and political costs of fiscal reform. The politics of public finance is admittedly complicated, but Islamic parties have avoided initiating a serious discussion of reform, as well as building coalitions to address complicated economic challenges. The politics of division dominates the politics of consensus. Economic reform continues to be delayed due to political exigencies.
  - Public policy for addressing economic problems has been more reactive than proactive. Government efforts are largely directed at dealing with short-term economic problems. Medium to long-term economic priorities have received scant attention. Given their transitional nature, Islamic governments also have fewer incentives to undertake genuine reforms that may undercut their populist base.
  - Economic policy has been more geared towards provision than production. Consequently, maintenance of the subsidy regime has taken precedence over structural economic reforms that dismantle monopolistic concessions and open the markets to fair competition. Despite the avowed support for small enterprises, the basic incentive structure facing young and aspiring new firms has not changed for the better.
  - Apart from being fiscally unsustainable, the subsidy regime has been seriously challenged by mismanagement and thriving black markets, resulting in acute fuel shortages in Egypt.

In addition to the above, three related aspects of governance have impacted economic management. First, economics has not received the priority it deserves. Islamic governments in both countries have chosen the wrong battles in the transitional period. The narrow struggle for power and the ensuing political instability bode ill for the business environment. Second, the most pressing economic challenges – for instance, revamping the social contract that sustains a precarious subsidy regime – requires
the politics of consensus. Rather than building coalitions, the ruling Islamic parties have deepened their political divisions. Third, where foreign economic support is available (e.g., Egypt), it has intensified the problem of moral hazard by offering free cash and weakening the resolve for economic reform. Some of these issues are discussed in more detail below.

Stuck in the Politics of Transition

The region is stuck in a difficult politics of economic transition, a transition made more difficult by continuing political uncertainty in Egypt and Tunisia. In this charged political climate, in which governments are fire-fighting on a daily basis, it is unsurprising that the business of economic reform has not even started. Slashing public expenditures on subsidies is unlikely to win favour with a jittery electorate that is no longer afraid to protest. Leaders realise that macroeconomic stability and social cohesion can be irreconcilable in the short run. The current impasse on economic reform therefore illustrates a larger point: it is difficult to reform the region’s subsidy and tax regimes without redefining the underlying social contract that has long exchanged welfare distribution for political acquiescence.

The economic record of the post-revolution Islamic governments has been mostly disappointing. Genuine economic reform is stalled, while the absence of political stability has worsened the investment climate.

Therein lies the contradiction. Politics will not solve the challenges of public finance. At the same time, traditional IMF recipes, such as a narrow insistence on subsidy reform, are unlikely to solve the political problem in a country like Egypt, where 40% of average per capita income is allocated to food. Politics is thus a binding constraint. Redefining the social contract is far too risky for any single political leader, or even single country, especially in the absence of economic growth and a favourable investment climate. Global evidence suggests that it is easier to bite the subsidy bullet in an expanding economy, where citizens feel compensated for the loss of public entitlements.

Problems of Moral Hazard

It is also relevant to consider the international context that has influenced the incentives for reform. Repeatedly over the past two years, transitional governments have been saved from economic collapse by blank cheques written by rich Gulf neighbours. Saudi Arabia has extended more than US$3 billion to Yemen; Egypt has received around US$6 billion from Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The UAE has recently pledged a grant of US$2.5 billion to Bahrain. The rich Gulf countries are effectively subsidising public services not only for their own citizens, but also for citizens in neighbouring countries.

Typically, the resource-rich Arab governments have tried to resolve problems by throwing money at them. But cash that does not commit governments to reform is unlikely to solve problems; it only postpones them. An unconditional aid effort can do more harm than good by loosening budget constraints, reducing pressure for economic reform, and exacerbating the issue of moral hazard. Ruling Islamic parties have limited incentive to reform when they know from past experience that they will be bailed out in times of distress. The persistence of adverse incentives for reform underscores the need for fresh thinking on regional development that redefines the relationship not just between citizens and the State, but also between Arab countries themselves. The Arab world needs to revamp its development effort in the face of emerging challenges. This calls not just for a quantitative leap in development spending, but also for streamlining the existing aid effort. While there is no dearth of Arab regional development banks, they have largely failed to act as coordination and commitment devices.

A New Regional Bargain

Large-scale economic revival in Tunisia and Algeria is difficult without a new regional vision that helps national governments bypass their immediate political constraints. In other words, transitional govern-
ments need a regional bargain that buys the political space for economic reform. This requires regional powers to underwrite a growth pact – a Marshall Plan of sorts – that facilitates major new investments for reviving economic activity before serious subsidy reforms are introduced. But, while growth can be ignited through such resource injections, it cannot be sustained without actively contested markets. This requires a dismantling of regional trade barriers, which are more pervasive in North Africa than even sub-Saharan Africa. The growth pact should commit Arab countries to a gradual reform of the subsidy system and a reduction of barriers to cross-border economic exchange.

The most pressing economic challenges – for instance, revamping the social contract that sustains a precarious subsidy regime – requires the politics of consensus.

The regional dimension to prosperity has long been ignored in the Middle East. Weak regional linkages restrict the entry and growth of small firms, making existing firms more dependent on state patronage. There is little hope for Egyptian or Tunisian economies without such regional linkages. For one, unemployment is difficult to tackle without re-opening Libya’s labour market, which has historically absorbed migrants from Tunisia and Egypt. Tunisia, arguably the most hopeful case for reform, is suffering from a crippling investment shortfall that is unlikely to be met by Europe, which is mired in its own fiscal troubles. Capital flows from resource-rich Arab neighbours offer a viable alternative. But, rather than offering blank cheques, the oil-rich Arab countries should channel their financial support through a well-structured programme implemented by a new (or significantly reformed) development institution organised on the lines of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). Such an institution could underwrite the costs of economic transition and, in conjunction with new investment vehicles, such as sovereign wealth funds or Islamic finance, provide funds to credit-starved firms.

Both Ennahda and the Muslim Brotherhood seek inspiration from the Turkish model. After coming to power, both parties have forged closer economic ties with Turkish business associations. They have been less successful in heeding the key lesson from the Turkish experiment, which is the importance of cultivating regional synergies built on linkages and complementarities in production processes.
The revolution of dignity and freedom that broke out on 14 January 2011 in Tunisia is a major historical event that has enshrined the irreversibility of democratic values. But the road out of the ensuing political crisis, which leads past some of the same economic challenges that originated the social revolt, seems for the time being even more uncertain since it overlaps with the latent impact of the latest international economic and financial crisis. It is this circularity that the present paper will attempt to support, recalling in the first section the channels through which the crisis reached the Tunisian economy, and in the second, analysing the effects of the superposition of several destabilising factors associated with the transition period.

The Cartography of Economic Repercussions of the Financial Crisis in Tunisia: A Brief Review

The international economic and financial crisis was significant for its global, systemic dimension and in particular for its unprecedented form of propagation (cf. Mouley, 2011). In the absence of decoupling, this crisis, whose origins fall within the chain reaction of financial sector failures in developed countries, gradually reached Tunisia via a number of mechanisms and transmission channels. It is above all on the level of the real economy that this crisis has produced negative spillover effects (cf. Mouley, 2012, 2013) due to close commercial ties with Europe (Tunisia sends an average of over 75% of its exports there). This is why the growth of exports plunged, going from 12% in 2007 to 1% in 2008 and -22% in the first semester of 2009. The growth of the GDP likewise sharply decelerated in late 2008 and dropped by 1.3% during the first quarter of 2009 from its position in the last quarter of 2008. Due to the economic downturn of Western economies, in particular European ones, which had gone into technical recession, Tunisian economic activity, largely oriented to the outside, has evolved under the effect of the decline in foreign demand in the main export sectors since October 2008. The slowdown of exports is focussed primarily in the textile and clothing sectors (-16.6%) and the mechanical and electrical industries (-12.6%). In contrast, the pace of exports has grown for the chemical industries, associated with a significant rise in phosphate derivative prices on the international market, as well as for foodstuffs (14.5% in 2008 vs. 1% in 2007).

In contrast, on the financial level, the low exposure of the stock market to external shocks and its relative disconnection from other financial markets was enabled by foreign exchange controls on capital accounts. Hence, the limited impact on the Tunisian stock exchange can essentially be ascribed to the low share of foreign investments in market capitalisation. On the monetary level, there was a sparse use of securitisation techniques with extremely low risk of payment defaults. Moreover, Tunisian banks are not internationally oriented and their investment of foreign exchange resources on international financial markets is governed by strict controls and regulations. The introduction of prudential measures (restrictions on foreign borrowing by banks and

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companies, investment ban on foreign capital markets and restrictions on foreign exchange and derivatives) has limited resident banks’ exposure to international financial markets, while non-resident banks are subject to the supervision of the Central Bank of Tunisia (BCT). Generally speaking, bank foreign currency assets account for 8% of their total assets and are primarily comprised of bank deposits, with minor exposure to international debt markets through non-resident banks (0.3% of total bank assets). Insofar as liability, liquidity is maintained primarily by resident deposits. Non-resident deposits, likely to be volatile, represent only 12% of the total. On the whole, therefore, the international financial crisis has not had significant effects on the country’s banking system.

From One Crisis to Another: Tunisia’s New Challenges during the Transition Period

All transition administrations governing during the transition period have faced other factors of vulnerability that have accumulated since the events of 2011. These factors concern a number of dimensions on all levels of the macroeconomic management framework, whether they pertain to unemployment, extreme poverty, regional disparities, the pursuit of monetary and fiscal policies, the need for mobilising foreign financial resources, the quality of institutions, the business climate, etc… Below, we will limit ourselves to discussing certain monetary and financial aspects, with a focus on the banking sector’s global liquidity crunch, its weak points, downgrading of sovereign ratings and the resumption of inflationary pressure.

Global Liquidity Crunch in the Banking Sector

The evolution of the banking system’s global liquidity has been marked during the post-revolutionary period by a further tightening of autonomous liquidity factors, going from +827 million Tunisian dinars (MTD) on average during the 2006-2010 period to -2,040 MDT in 2011. In contrast with the situation of surplus liquidity during the previous period, the dynamic of which began in 2006, the patent tightening of bank liquidity was accentuated by the sharp growth of banknotes and coins in circulation brought about by the hoarding behaviour of households and trade in cash outside of conventional circuits in response to social unrest, as well as by the decline in net foreign assets associated with the decrease in net foreign currency holdings following the downturn in major export sectors (tourism, chemical industries, mining and energy). This situation led to rising trade deficit and hence the deterioration of the overall balance of payments.

On the financial level, the low exposure of the stock market to external shocks and its relative disconnection from other financial markets was enabled by foreign exchange controls on capital accounts.

Weaknesses of the Banking Sector

Despite the efforts made and the programmes implemented to this end, the weaknesses of the banking system have grown. Beyond certain innovative aspects in governance (namely, the establishment of risk management committees as support structures for bank administrative boards), the vulnerabilities of the banking sector remain largely confined to the relative magnitude of non-performing loans, a relatively low level of bank profitability, lack of compliance with certain principles fundamental to both effective banking supervision and financial stability standards and the weakness if not absence of an institutionalised safety mechanism.

Non-Performing Loans

Although the banks are not dependent on foreign financing and their activities are financed in large part by domestic deposits (nearly 80% of bank resources), the share of impaired or non-performing loans remains high with respect to comparators and emerging countries (13% in 2011). Nonetheless, according to the conclusions of the IMF’s latest Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) in 2012, the reclassification of loans authorised for re-
scheduling\(^1\) after the revolution as impaired loans would add at least 5% to the overall ratio of non-performing loans (NPLs), which would put the percentage of unproductive loans at over 18%.\(^2\) It is thus estimated that the level of NPLs in the Tunisian banking sector is currently on the order of 10 billion dinars, in contrast to a preliminary estimate of 7 billion dinars, i.e. 13%.

**Bank Profitability**

Regarding management quality and bank profitability, there is essentially a low average return on bank assets, stagnating in the last period at 1% (compared to an average of 1.8% in MENA economies). The same is true of the performance of bank capital, though experiencing slight improvement over the last period.

**Banking Supervision and Regulation**

Assessment of compliance with the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision indicates appreciation of material non-compliance with certain principles, in particular insofar as deficiencies in bank credit policy (Principles 7 and 8). It is mainly a question of major shortcomings and distortions with regard to conditions for granting loans, risk assessment, insufficient provisions set aside for NPLs, the cumbersome nature of the current system of mortgage guarantees and above all, their overvaluation. At the same time, the process of migrating to the Basel system is not yet complete. Moreover, although current regulations on internal supervision and credit management by banks has recently been reformed as per the BCT’s Circular No. 2011-06 on credit institutions, amending Circular No. 2006-19, the fact remains that the new obligations for internal monitoring and supervision of credit risk seem to be based even more on compliance and not real risk management.

At the same time, the monetary authorities have a clearinghouse based on a credit risk centre set up in 1972, but it is imperative to develop a regulatory framework applicable to other centres capable of offering independent external assessment of corporate borrowers, which would allow improved management of operation risk and improved internal control. Moreover, the supervising authorities are still missing the resource of a central balance sheet data office.

**Other Compliance Deficits**

These primarily consist of delays in compliance with the latest standards of the Financial Stability Board for a sound financial system, based on the standardised international framework established at the April 2009 G20 Summit in London. The same is true of material non-compliance with key criteria and prerequisites for a formal framework targeting inflation. And finally, insofar as a safety system, Tunisia does not yet have an institutionalised safety net such as the function of lender of last resort (LLR) in case of systemic crisis, or a deposit guarantee and insurance system capable of limiting the effects of moral hazard.\(^3\) In addition, the methods for monitoring portfolio quality are inefficient and the means of debt collection inadequate.

**Downgrading of Sovereign Ratings**

In 2011, the main ratings agencies proceeded to downgrade Tunisia’s sovereign rating or place it on a negative watch list. Hence, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), for instance, downgraded the local currency rating from A-/Stable to BBB+, placing it on negative watch, and put the foreign currency rating at BBB, also placing it on negative watch. Moody’s Investors downgraded the sovereign rating from Baa2 to Baa3 and placed it on negative watch. R&I also downgraded the foreign currency rating and placed it on negative watch, revising it from A-/Stable to BBB Negative. Fitch Ratings put the foreign currency rating at BBB, also on negative watch. Nonetheless, Tunisia maintained its investment rank before May 2012, when S&P again lowered

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\(^1\) The volume of rescheduled loans is estimated at over 5 billion dinars, that is, 7.7% of the GDP.

\(^2\) This figure would rise even more if one were to consider loans to public companies, which are never classified as non-performing due to the presumed guarantee of the State.

\(^3\) In this regard, there is no mechanism for managing and/or simulating liquidity crises.
the country’s rating for long-term debt in local and foreign currency by two notches, from BBB(-) to BB, as well as the issuer credit ranking of the BCT from BBB(-) to BB stable, which means that the country is now under the category of speculative loans. Moody’s, on the other hand, in September 2012 (and again in December 2012), maintained a rating of Baa3 with negative watch, whereas Fitch Ratings, in December 2012, downgraded Tunisia’s long-term foreign currency debt rating (Issuer Default Rating or IDR) from ‘BBB-‘ to ‘BB+‘ and the long-term foreign currency IDR from ‘BBB’ to ‘BBB-. Finally, in February 2013, S&P again downgraded Tunisia’s sovereign rating, this time to BB- with a negative outlook. This was immediately followed, in the same period, by Moody’s, which also downgraded the rating, from Baa3 to Ba1 with a negative outlook, relegating the country to the category of speculative, as did Fitch Ratings and R&I, which also downgraded their ratings.

Although the banks are not dependent on foreign financing and their activities are financed in large part by domestic deposits, the share of impaired or non-performing loans remains high with respect to comparators and emerging countries (13% in 2011).

In its latest report in February 2013, S&P particularly noted that, apart from the exacerbation of socio-political risks, the vulnerability of the Tunisian banking sector had reached such unprecedented levels that the agency lowered the ranking for the BCT to the level of the sovereign rating. Generally speaking, the downgrade in ratings was prompted by a number of factors, both economic and socio-political, in particular the undercapitalisation of banks, failure to apply prudential regulations, namely by public banks, the level of bad debts, the latent climate of economic uncertainty, safety net problems, the sluggish pace of reforms and above all, the uncertainty as to when the next elections will be held as well as their results.

The sovereign rating downgrades have also increased the risk of default as measured by the spread on credit default swaps (CDSs). This consequence was foreseeable via the symmetrical and proportional relationship between sovereign downgrades and the costs of mobilising external resources in the form of foreign currency. Hence, Tunisia’s bond spread has risen by 38 basis points, going from 376 BPs before publication of the S&P report to 414 BPs. Note that the spread had already surpassed 121 basis points before the revolution, at 10 January 2011 – when the wave of protests began – and reached 223 basis points by 14 April 2011. Despite the good outcome of the Constituent Assembly elections, the latent climate of economic uncertainty made the spread again begin to climb, first to 257 basis points by 14 November 2011, and then to 376 BPs.

Resumption of Inflationary Pressure

The annual average inflation rate reached 5.6% in 2012, as compared to 3.5% in 2011, primarily in connection with the rise in prices across all product groups, in particular foodstuffs, whose prices had risen by 8.4% by the end of the preceding year. In particular, since June 2012, inflationary pressure has become inertial (permanent or persistent), with growth that can be ascribed to:

- Cyclical factors: rise in prices of raw materials and imported energy;
- Factors that have become structural regarding internal demand: increase in food prices due to the excess demand on the Libyan market and the consequent food contraband to Libya, anti-competitive, speculative practices on the

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4 The year-on-year (YoY) change in the general price index had reached 5.6% in July, as compared to 5.4% over the course of June 2012. In YoY growth, the general consumer price index has thereafter experienced a steady evolution, reaching 5.7% in September, 5.3% by the end of October, 5.5% in November and 5.9% in December 2012 (oscillating at around 6% in January 2013, it returned to 5.8% by the end of February 2013, in association with winter sales).
wholesale and retail markets, errors and absence of control over distribution channels and the proliferation of widespread informal segments.

- As a corollary, the risk of inflationary movement due to the progression of internal demand. The output gap (i.e. the gap between production and potential production) was negative in the post-revolutionary period, going from +1.82 in 2010 to -2.31 in 2011 and -1.95 in 2012. Nonetheless, there was an increase of 0.36 points between 2011 and the third quarter of 2012 (year on year), which means an overall upward trend in aggregate demand.

- Pass-through effects associated with inflation imported through effective nominal depreciation of the exchange rate, in particular pertaining to the euro. An inevitable dynamic, given the scale of the aggravation of the trade and current account deficit since the onset of the transition a little less than two years ago due to the limited effect of the exchange rate on export competitiveness in a transition period that has coincided with a situation of recession in the euro zone. Nevertheless, the BCT has made undeniable efforts to support the exchange rate through intervention in the foreign exchange market to adjust the inflation differential relative to partners.

- Exogenous factors (uncertain business, regulations and investment climate).

- The wage/price spiral due to the successive wage raises following labour union demands during the transition period.

Bibliography


A View from the South on the Mediterranean Region

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The marvellous Mediterranean Region, like other places of passage, has a daily dynamic with influences from around the world. It is a region where a number of civilizations have come together and melded and a slew of historic events have transpired, the ensemble of which makes for a very particular place. Each thing and image of the different facets of the Mediterranean Region requires attentive scrutiny in order to be comprehended and analysed and for its secrets to be revealed. The Mediterranean both separates and unites at once.

It is clear from its genetic make-up that Europe and Africa are the factors most influencing its evolution, for this region has witnessed many transactions of a political, social and economic nature between European countries and their counterparts on the African continent. It has evolved over long periods of crisis in which slave trade was widespread and the pillaging of African riches a right imposed by the colonists.

Immediately after the African continent’s independence, the Mediterranean Sea changed roles. It became the ferryman of nuisance from South to North, which rapidly gave rise to major social crises such as the rise in racism against third-country nationals from the South and the abusive exploitation of foreign labour, particularly in the mining sector.

Today, with the crisis we are experiencing on a global level, the Mediterranean Basin represents a melting pot and anchorage point for a new generation of problems, in particular pollution, issues associated with the elderly and aging, social unrest and political instability. Insofar as migration, it has become a large-scale societal problem particularly affecting the Maghreb. Before, this region was used as an area of transit towards the North, but for some years now it has become a destination in its own right. The situation in these countries now mirrors that of Europe in the 60s and 70s, with all the side effects this produces.

A new economic migration profile is gradually becoming consolidated and this time in the North to South direction. It involves job-seekers and retired elderly people. The latter immigration has been growing for the past few years. Clearly, a European retirement pension allows an elderly couple to live a decent life under better conditions than in their country of origin. Many cities in the South are experiencing this type of immigration. There are even, at times, neighbourhoods of retirees who carry out new socio-economic or cultural activities transferred from abroad which are taking up increasing space in the public sphere.

This new trend will most likely lead to a significant change in relations between countries, which will no doubt establish a new relational framework between them. This change in social, political and economic behaviour will provide new partnership conditions that will take into account the interests of both parties.

To this end, public debate on a new development model has been undertaken on different levels with the aim of identifying the right actions and being able to effect the necessary adjustments and by the same token, deal with the multi-dimensional crisis that is dangerously weakening the political regimes in the region. The forums and symposia held on this topic have reopened debate on alternative support and solidarity that could be provided by a social and solidarity economy (SSE).
Such considerations have been the object of regional gatherings of social and solidarity economy stakeholders. The ESMED (Euro-Mediterranean Social Economy Network), a Mediterranean network established in 2000, has continually reflected on the best paths and means for getting out of the crisis. The 2011 Barcelona ESMED Conference gave rise to a panoply of recommendations on the subject. Other recent organisations such as MedESS and Maghreb-ESS (see boxes) have each attempted to identify paths for progression capable of inspiring policies in the region and fostering economic democracy with sustainable development.

In seeking to attenuate the detrimental effects of capitalism, which has reached its limits, models of development more adapted to human needs are recommended, whereby the human being is the focal point of concern insofar as development. Naturally, the immediate interest is that of easing the tension of public demands brought about by an unemployment rate that goes beyond 30% in some countries, especially among youth (this is the case of Spain).

The social and solidarity economy will certainly find its place in the Mediterranean and will consequently provide the solutions of balance and regulation necessary for this long-awaited social justice.

In a comparison of southern countries concerned in the sphere of the social and solidarity economy, one can observe that Morocco has made commendable efforts in this domain since 2000. It differs from other countries along the South shore by remarkable progress in certain projects related to the development of enterprise in the social and solidarity economy. The Initiative nationale du développement humain (National Initiative for Human Development or INDH), launched in 2005 to combat poverty, and the second pillar of the Green Morocco Plan designed for small-scale farmers both bear witness to the deep involvement of associations and co-operatives.

The situations in Algeria and Tunisia are different and the social economy in these two countries is characterised primarily by mutualist action focusing on social and medical coverage. Insofar as associations, they remain on a modest scale and highly localised. The laws and regulations governing the social economy reveal statutory definitions different from those in the majority of countries. This heterogeneity renders an inter-Maghreb partnership in this area difficult. All the more so since...
each government does not lend a specific reading to the function and utility of this alternative. Some would like to use it as a charitable stopgap instrument while others see it as a tool of choice for ensuring sustainable development capable of harnessing the potential of each territory in order to bring about change and the conditions necessary for inclusive local development.

With regard to the North shore, it ranks higher than the South insofar as the social and solidarity economy, which statistics indicate as healthy. In France, 45% of the adult population belongs to associations according to the Law of 1901. In Europe, there are 248 million members of co-operatives, mutual aid societies or associations that contribute 8% to the GDP. This sector accounts for 6% of employment in Europe. Such data amply demonstrate the importance of social enterprise and its role in the dynamics of the European economy.

This reveals the need to get the two shores to work together and take advantage of one another’s experience to enhance trade in services and products from such co-operatives. To this end, fair trade has a preponderant role to play in creating a new trade dimension between Europe and its former colonies. This co-operation could lend many northern countries the opportunity to wipe the slate clean and foster a more emancipated, fairer citizenship based on solidarity.

Maghreb-ESS is a Maghrebi network of social and solidarity economy founded on 2 March 2013 in Algiers. It was created on the initiative of the Tunisian National Union of Mutual Societies (Union nationale des mutuelles – UNAM), the Moroccan Network for the Social and Solidarity Economy (Réseau marocain de l’économie sociale et solidaire – REMESS) and the Algerian Committee for a Social and Solidarity Economy (Comité algérien de l’économie sociale et solidaire). The Maghreb-ESS has members from these three countries, for the time being. Its founders are working on attracting Libyan and Mauritanian organisations as well. Mohamed Laddada, former medical doctor and president of the Algerian National Health Insurance Fund (Caisse nationale d’assurance santé – CNAS) is the chair of this network.
In the last few years Mediterranean countries have gone through important and far-reaching political transformations. Reforms started (slowly) in the late 1980s – early 1990s, when several countries on the South shore of the Mediterranean\(^1\) undertook three major interrelated policy shifts: a) a step towards greater integration in the world economy, mainly implemented through lowering trade barriers, and re-forming the exchange rate markets; b) a transition from oil-dominated economies to more diversified production and exports; and c) a move away from the public sector towards the market economy, which includes privatising companies. This unfinished agenda, and a discontent for the existing political regimes, linked to the population dynamic, a dramatic situation in the labour market and major changes in world demand after the 2008-2009 financial crisis, resulted in the Arab Spring, which has important implications for the patterns of globalisation.

The region, though increasing its pace of trade integration and reforms with respect to the past, has been lagging behind in the 2000s: it has not been fully taking part in the newly developing global production networks, nor benefited much from the potentials of developments in emerging markets. Growth and integration could also be triggered by regional integration, which started long ago, in 1957, with the Arab Economic Unity agreement\(^2\) but is now falling short of its ambitious goals, despite the recent signing of the Pan-Arab Free Trade Agreement (PAFTA, 1998) and Agadir Agreement (signed by Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia).

Against this backdrop, we briefly describe trade amongst Mediterranean countries, trying to assess to what extent, if any, they have managed to diversify from natural resource-based sectors towards manu-facturing and/or services and whether (and how) growth potential can be enhanced. We also check if trade within the area has a specific sectoral compo-sition. This implies a closer look at the role of natural resource abundance and macroeconomic policies in the region’s economic diversification patterns. For such an assessment it is also crucial to evaluate the impact of the real exchange rate on competitiveness (Sekkat, 2012).

**Trade and Specialisation**

A standard measure of trade openness (imports plus exports as a share of GDP) reported in Table 8

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\(^1\) Countries in the area are grouped differently and in the following, unless otherwise specified, we refer to Middle East North African countries (MENA) including Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine Territories, Syria Tunisia and Yemen. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership includes Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Maghreb includes Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Libya and Mashreq includes Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and the Palestine Territories. The Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) are Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates.

\(^2\) In 1964 Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Syria tried to form an Arab Common Market, and in 1989 Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia formed the Arab Maghreb Union.
The degree of trade openness however varies substantially across countries (Table 9), even though all, excluding Algeria, have increased their openness over the last decade.

Chart 16 shows the developments of MENA exports in the last ten years. Total exports have more than doubled, from less than 100 billion dollars to over 200, with a peak at the beginning of the financial crisis. The crisis triggered a collapse by almost 20%. Furthermore, since the crisis the EU27 has progressively lost its weight as an export destination. Exports towards the EU27 accounted for over 43% of total exports in 2003, and only 30% in 2011. The relevance of more dynamic Asian and MENA markets increased, and this was able to trigger growth. Intra MENA trade jumped from about 7 billion dollars in 2005 to almost 17 in 2011: an impressive increase of 143% in 6 years.
Chart 17 depicts exports of individual countries separately to the EU and other MENA countries. The diversity is significant. In 2011, Jordan and Lebanon exported within the MENA region, rather than to the EU, with more than 10% of total exports carried out with MENA countries. For Egypt, the other countries in the area have constituted a key export market, while Tunisia, on the other hand, maintains the EU as its main destination market. Over time, all countries show a decrease in the export share towards the EU, and a majority an increase in the importance of the MENA region. Egypt significantly shifted exports from the EU towards MENA countries, while for Tunisia, where the EU continues to be the predominant export destination, this was much less the case. Jordan did not reduce its export share toward the EU, but the importance of the MENA region increased significantly.

Despite the recent increase, intra-MENA trade remains a small fraction (5.9% in exports, 5.1% in imports). Exports to the EU\(^3\) are almost ten times more relevant than intra-MENA trade flows and there is an important asymmetry. Although, because of its geographical and cultural proximity, the MENA region represents a natural market for the EU, the area only accounts for 6% of total extra-EU exports. Conversely, despite the recent fall, the EU accounts for 26% of Mashreq countries’ exports and over 57% for Maghreb countries (Mati, 2013). Within the EU, Italy, France and Spain are the most important trade partners.

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Intra-subregional trade (intra-Maghreb and intra-Mashreq) displays diverging patterns. Intra-Maghreb exports (2.5% of total Maghreb exports) are negligible, except for Tunisia. Intra-Mashreq exports are more intense, amounting to 10.4% of the total. The results of various estimated gravity models (see Diop et al, 2013 for a survey) suggest, however, that intra-MENA trade is well below its potential.

Trade patterns are largely shaped by the differences in individual countries. Most are characterised by low diversification of domestic production and exports, but only some are resource-rich. In oil-rich Algeria and Libya, the mining sector has become...
even bigger, in relative terms, over time, suggesting that diversification away from oil has not been achieved. In 2010, mining accounted for over 35% of GDP (up from 28% in 1990), around 85% of merchandise exports, and between 65% and 95% of government revenues. Little export diversification occurred in exports of existing processed and primary industrial products (mainly crude and refined oil) to existing destination markets in Asia, the EU, and within the area. Exports of new products occurred exclusively within the industrial sector and for resource-poor countries (Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia). Export growth was driven by primary, processed industrial goods and consumer goods and was confined to European markets. Diversifying into higher skilled manufacturing may open up more possibilities for boosting exports of new products (“extensive margin”) as opposed to exporting the same products more intensively (“intensive margin”).

Chart 18 shows that exports were still heterogeneous and somewhat dichotomised in 2011: Tunisia, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt concentrated their exports on manufacturing products; while Algeria Iran and Yemen mostly exported fuels. Other activities appear to be marginal, even though agriculture is still relevant in Egypt. Disaggregating further, consumer and primary goods currently account for 64% of total exports (Asia 41%, Latin America 57%) while capital goods for only 6%. These patterns hold back the MENA region’s potential for trade and, indeed, MENA countries trade less with the rest of the world than could be expected. The picture is different if the intra-area trade is considered. A comparison of Charts 18 and 19 supports the view that trade in manufacturing is higher between similar countries, while resource-based trade is likely to occur mostly with Western countries as “North-South” trade. In six cases out of seven, fuels represent a marginal share in intra-trade. In Chart 19, manufacturing activities represent the majority of exports, while Yemen mostly concentrates its intra-area export on agriculture. Algeria seems to be an exception, as it is the only country exporting fuels to other MENA countries.

Chart 20 suggests that MENA countries’ exports are still very concentrated4 and relatively dependent on few products and that not much progress has been made in the last decade. Of course there are some

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4 The diversity index, $D_j = (\sum |h_{ij} - h_i|) / 2$ where $h_{ij}$ is the share of $i$ in total exports of country $j$ and $h_i$, that of the commodity in world exports, signals whether the structure of exports by product of a given country differ from the world average. It ranges from 0 to 1 and if closer to 1 it indicates a bigger difference from the world average.
important differences across countries, with Tunisian and Egyptian exports becoming more similar to the rest of the world over time.

Conclusions

Uncertainty and volatility have characterised recent developments in Mediterranean countries, due partly to the low diversification of their production and exports and partly to commodity price developments. Higher diversification could trigger economies of scale and offer opportunities to reap the benefits of global integration, thereby boosting long-term growth. Also, intra-regional trade could be instrumental in enhancing diversification and growth, especially in a situation where EU demand has decreased substantially and the region may improve its
future integration with emerging markets or within the area. Venables (2011) argues that the proximity of resource-rich and resource-poor countries gives an opportunity to even wealth distribution within the group of countries via regional integration. His suggestion is that resource-rich countries are more likely to experience trade diversion as they are now sourcing imports from the less efficient resource-poor partners.

Trade in manufacturing is higher between similar countries, while resource-based trade is likely to occur mostly with Western countries as “North-South” trade.

But the MENA region is falling short of its ambitious goals. Regional trade integration is still low, despite trade agreements, possibly due to cumbersome clearance procedures, which are more time-consuming than in other regions, with the West Bank and Gaza, Lebanon and Algeria at the bottom of the pile. Also transport costs, which are high in the West Bank and Gaza, Lebanon and Algeria, affect the level of integration. Finally, despite significant tariff reforms, tariffs (about 10% in 2011) remain high.

MENA countries should change their strategy and adopt a more export-oriented policy that favours diversification. Exports are too concentrated in primary commodities and labour-intensive manufacturing, sectors with little technology or knowledge transfer. Also, contrary to 1995, when the Barcelona Process was launched, the future for the MENA region might be brighter through regional integration, rather than integration with the EU.

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5 Most countries have lowered tariffs over the past two decades, often via trade agreements with the European Union and the United States.
Economic Effects of the Arab Revolutions: How Can the Transition Be Fostered and Confidence Restored?

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The historic events in the Mediterranean Region since January 2011 constitute a true message of hope, on both the political and economic levels. Triggered by an educated youth in contact with Western society, these revolutions were considered by Arab public opinion as the reconquest of their dignity and the means of erasing decades of political and social frustration that had accumulated through a sidelining of globalisation and the consequences of 11 September 2001 (Marty-Gauquié, 2011). Nonetheless, like all revolutionary processes, that of the Arab World escaped the control of its instigators: thus, as the “conflict of impatience” generated by these revolutions gave rise to disenchantment and the bulk of voters expressed themselves, certain movements of Islamist orientation gained a hold over the least educated social sectors of the population, as demonstrated by the elections of October 2011 in Tunisia and Morocco and the presidential elections in Egypt in June 2012.

Far from clearly establishing balances that are fluctuating and complex, these elections revealed, on the contrary, that the transition process would be longer and more chaotic than Western opinions would wish. Thus, post-October 2011 Tunisia is organised around a tripartite distribution of power that has induced a sort of political paralysis heightened by the incompetence of part of the newly elected personnel and the ambiguity of how the transition process is being conducted by the State’s main magistrates. Egypt’s situation is likewise particular: economic omnipresence of the army and rapprochement at the time of the first constitutional referendum in March 2011 between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist movements (both massively supported by certain Gulf monarchies) explain a situation of impasse that President Morsi will have a hard time overcoming. Given these situations, two pitfalls should be avoided by both opinion-makers and European economic actors: impatience and rejection.

Review of the Economic Situation after the Global Crisis and Revolutions

It is worth recalling that the financial crisis of 2008 did not spread to the South Mediterranean countries, but they have deeply felt the recession of Western countries, particularly in Europe, upon which they are heavily dependent in terms of trade flows, investment and purchase of services (Reiffers, 2011). The great resilience that southern countries have demonstrated since 2010 proves that they retain a capacity for growth (see Chart 21), although budgetary leeway and foreign exchange reserves have been substantially reduced by the crisis.

The effects of the crisis are compounded by those of the revolutions. In fact, where there has not been massive destruction, as in Libya or Syria, the collapse of exports and foreign investment as well as the crash of entire sectors of economic activity have severely affected competitiveness: there has been balance of payments deterioration, significant budget deficits due to weakening tax revenues and ur-

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1 This article is written in the author’s personal capacity.
2 Between 2010 and 2012, Egypt’s budget deficit went from -8 to -10.5% and that of Tunisia from -1 to -8.5%.
gent social measures, and a sharp rise in unemployment (see Chart 22).

Given this situation and the absence of structural and social policies characterising Arab countries before the revolutions, transition administrations have had massive recourse to compensation measures designed to contain prices of staples (cooking oil, sugar, flour, energy), raise public employee wages and massively recruit the unemployed into the ranks of the public sector. This policy of support to domestic consumption has raised public debt, increased the share of the budget in the GDP and increased the weight of current expenses in the budget, thereby reducing the share dedicated to investment (see Chart 23). In Tunisia and Egypt, this led to a serious recession in 2011-12 (much worse
than the one in 2008-10); nevertheless, the perspectives for 2013 once again indicate a potential for growth some three times greater than that in the European Union (EU).

The economic crisis and the Arab revolutions thus illustrate that there is no automatic link between growth and quality of life or job creation. On the contrary, they reveal that more political and social equity should have been ensured before aspiring to elevated growth rates and regional integration. Hence, the political revolt of 2011 was an expression of protest against four factors:

- First of all, the disastrous effect on public opinion of collusion – whether desired or imposed – between the business world and a political class ever more confiscatory and isolated from the population;
- Secondly, the natural instability produced by opening up too quickly to the world economy unless compensated by serious social and territorial policies ensuring the equilibrium of society;
- In the third place, the practice by autocratic South-shore governments of leaving entire regions out of general economic development for political reasons; such policies have led to the accumulation of pockets of poverty in isolated areas and an acceleration of exodus to peri-urban slums;
- And finally, the accumulation of sentiments of frustration and humiliation felt by youth kept from decision-making and economic integration processes.

The Need for Renewed Growth in the Mediterranean Region

Indeed, the challenges of the post-revolutionary period are many. In the first place, growth must be organised so as to meet the aspirations so strongly expressed by the people. A more inclusive growth ensuring better distribution of wealth and greater territorial balance remains the key to youth employment and the reduction of poverty. At the same time, a more innovative growth (based on renewed educational systems, a selective policy of direct foreign investment and support to business innovation) is essential for enriching the qualitative content of jobs for graduates, whose unemployment rate has continually grown worse over the past ten years (reaching 30 to 46% depending on the country and categories).

Certainly, greater regional integration is still necessary to foster growth and include the economies of the South in the Euro-Mediterranean value chain: South-South integration will encourage trade based on product differentiation and thus the improvement of quality in traditional manufacture; moreover, tech-
nology transfer through partnerships between companies in the North and South will allow moving from a system of relocation to one of co-contracting\(^3\) (or, to use a newly fashionable term, co-location). If well conducted, regional integration would thus eventually offer improved job security in the South and more balanced North-South relations. Yet this goal is necessarily a long-term one, not only because it entails redefining regional co-operation systems, but also because it first requires qualitative improvement of competitiveness in the South.

**Fostering the Transition: Three Stages and a Lever – Democracy**

From the economic standpoint, the transition in the Mediterranean Region calls for targeted aid focusing on three objectives: in the first stage, aid for adjusting public accounts and gradually eliminating the system of compensations; immediately thereafter, stepped-up support to the private economy, the only long-term job creator, in particular through microenterprises and SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises), and strong support to the modernisation of public policy through targeted technical assistance actions;\(^4\) and finally, in the medium term, a substantial increase in repayable aid, oriented as a priority towards job-creating projects, as well as greater services to the population at large and improved territorial balance.

From the political standpoint, the transition is also a process of reconstruction and improving the ethics of society, that is, of defining a *new social contract*. Though growth is obviously necessary to foster options, in and of itself, it is not enough to ensure an evolution that is above all political and whose driving force consists of instilling democracy on all echelons of societal and economic governance. Here the role of civil society is essential: its vigilance and monitoring will allow regulations for production and wealth distribution mechanisms to be defined that respect the needs of the community in all its diversity and ensure greater generational, social and spatial equity.

All of this implies profound societal (education, family, fiscal system, justice...)\(^5\) and political changes (balance of powers, decentralisation, participative dialogue, etc.). To support these choices, which can only be made by the countries themselves, public policy on the major economic sectors (urbanisation, energy, water, transport, the financial sector, development of a concession-based model and public-private partnerships, etc.) should be modernised, an objective towards which the international institutions and European countries can contribute financial and technical support. Indeed, though the people who triggered the transition are first and foremost entitled to conducting it, without rapid reestablishment of economic prosperity and job creation, there can be no political consolidation in countries in transition.

The European Investment Bank (EIB) is already quite active in these domains, as illustrated by its initiatives to promote urban development and public-private partnerships (PPPs) in the South Mediterranean Region (Marty-Gauquié, 2012), and its action together with the World Bank through the Marseille Center for Mediterranean Integration (CMI), which the two banks founded in October 2009 with the support of six governments: France, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon (see: www.cmi-marseille.org).

**From the European Union to the Deauville G8 Summit: An Effective yet Fragile Dynamic**

Weakened by a decade of state deterioration, the rise of populism and a Franco-German axis ceaselessly under reconstruction, since 2005, the EU is having difficulty mobilising on issues that are not endogenous. In fact, since December 2008, the new forms of intra-European co-operation have been structured around the response to the global eco-

\(^3\) As has been undertaken over the past few years in Morocco and Tunisia in the aeronautics and automotive sectors, and more recently, the railway and high-quality handicraft sectors, for instance.

\(^4\) Apart from financing, improving the legislative, fiscal and regulatory framework of enterprises is essential. Note, however, that 18 months after the October 2011 elections, some 65 bills of law containing economic reforms and authorisations of international loans are pending decision by the Tunisian National Constituent Assembly, which remains focused on the constitutional debate to the detriment of economic modernisation.

\(^5\) As is the case in Morocco, which has accelerated social and constitutional reforms under the aegis of Mohamed VI: family and women’s codes, sector plans (Emergence, Green Morocco, etc.) and regional revitalisation policies.
nomic crisis and its corollary, the public debt crisis. Thus, in the face of the Arab revolutions, Europe appeared unprepared and disunited in the first quarter of 2011; and though, by the spring of 2011, it had managed to modernise its offer of support to the countries undergoing the Arab Spring, it can nonetheless go no further. First of all, the effects of the public debt crisis have led many countries (including Germany) to reject Europe’s exposing itself too much in the Mediterranean Region and, moreover, a long-term political offer is impossible to define, the enlargement of the European Union being incompatible with the perceived European public opinion.

Without rapid reestablishment of economic prosperity and job creation, there can be no political consolidation in countries in transition

The G8 Summit in Deauville, held on 26-27 May 2011 under the French EU Presidency, seems to be the most pertinent platform: it reassured the Europeans by bringing in the United States and the Bretton Woods Institutions (including the IMF); this allows President Obama to adapt his Arab policy to a multilateral framework; it also opened debate on the Mediterranean Region to Russia. Thus, the G8 has provided the countries in transition a platform for dialogue – the Deauville Partnership – as an alternative to a divided Europe and a powerless Union for the Mediterranean.

At a meeting in Marseille on 10 September 2011, the G8 Finance Ministers obtained quantified commitments from the IMF and the international financial institutions (IFIs) in response to the four national development plans presented by countries in transition: Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan. In this regard, one must distinguish between aid commitments for economic reconstruction of the four countries, which will amount to $38 billion by the end of 2013, and those for structural adjustment of public accounts which will be supplied by the IMF and the African Monetary Fund (AMF) and may ascend to $35 billion. However, this framework has some weaknesses: in the first place, that of being an intergovernmental initiative based on consensus, driven by political dynamics, whereby President Sarkozy was succeeded by President Obama in January 2012, for whom the Arab world was no longer a priority in an election year. The Partnership thus went from a political dynamic in 2011 to technical governance as of mid-2012, a trend that was accentuated in 2013 under the British G8 Presidency.

The second weakness is that of having taken the audacious step of involving the Gulf States in supporting Arab democracy, which has proven ambiguous in practice since the conservative Gulf monarchies have held diverging positions on the countries in transition; moreover, tension soon appeared between the Gulf States and Russia on the Syrian question.

Tangible Results, though Less than Promised and Unequally Distributed

In any case, the aid to economic development implemented was significant: in late 2011, a list of priority investments and technical assistance measures was established by the IFIs, corresponding to nearly 75% of the aid announced in Marseille. Though there is no aggregated data on the funding actually awarded, for the 2011-2012 period, one can estimate international aid for economic reconstruction granted the four countries in transition at $15-16 billion; which is a significant amount, though less than half of what was planned and above all, very unequally distributed due to political characteristics and the different degrees of democratic progress in each of the countries concerned. Thus Morocco and Tunisia took the lion’s share, with over half of the aid awarded, the main donors being the EIB ($3.3 billion), the World Bank ($3 billion), France ($2.8 billion) and the EU ($2 billion).

Moreover, the IFIs’ technical platform likewise allowed significant progress in the implementation of measures for improving access to credit in countries in transition: US guarantee for loans taken out by the Tunisian government to the amount of $480 million in May 2012; regional guarantee funds for SMEs to the amount of $400 million (of which 150 were subscribed by the EIB and 40 contributed by the EU budget through the Neighbourhood Investment Facility) implemented in October 2012. Finally, a Tran-
The weakness is that of having taken the audacious step of involving the Gulf States in supporting Arab democracy, which has proven ambiguous in practice since the conservative Gulf monarchies have held diverging positions on the countries in transition.

Another factor that should be mentioned is aid for structural adjustment of public accounts (budget and trade deficits, erosion of reserves). Scalded by the social revolts induced by the reform support programmes established by the IMF and the World Bank in the 1980s, the new governments of the countries in democratic transition have naturally expressed strong reticence to calling for IMF support, despite the pressing needs of their economies insofar as foreign cash flow, necessary to compensate for the effects of their Keynesian economic support policies. Hence Egypt and Tunisia have preferred to turn to the solidarity of regional institutions or “friendly countries”; in this regard, Tunisia has enjoyed greater success than Egypt – the former appealed to the African Development Bank and the World Bank in 2011 (twice for $500 million each time), France (£180 million) and the EU (£100 million); this arrangement was renewed in 2012. In contrast, Morocco and Jordan, countries that did not undergo revolutions, have had massive recourse – beyond their quotas – to the IMF since 2011, obtaining credit facilities of $6.2 billion for Morocco (700% of its quota, of which 3.5 billion were immediately available) and $2.06 billion for Jordan (800% of its quota, of which 385 million were immediately available). In any case, budgetary adjustment needs still prove substantial and in August 2012, the Egyptian government opened negotiations for a credit facility of 4.8 billion, whereas IMF support to Tunisia, whose conclusion is scheduled for May 2013, will amount to $1.75 billion.

And finally, in the longer term and in line with the observations made at the Marseille G8 Finance Ministers’ Meeting on the need to facilitate access of countries in transition to developed country markets, two initiatives on trade liberalisation are being developed: first, negotiations on deep and comprehensive free trade agreements (DCFTAs) between the EU, Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan; and second, the implementation of the conclusions of the study on facilitating trade and investment flows in the Mediterranean Region, carried out by the Marseille Center for Mediterranean Integration (CMI) at the request of the G8 Finance Ministers’ Meeting in September 2011.

Which Long-Term Support for the Transitions: the G8 or the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership?

Democratic transition is a long-term process, as demonstrated by the Iberian and Central European experiences. The Spanish transition, for instance, took seven years (1975-1982), relying on exceptional individuals (King Juan Carlos, Adolfo Suárez, Felipe González, Santiago Carrillo), the Moncloa Pact and seven legislative elections to overcome two terrorist movements and a coup d’état!

The Deauville framework has allowed significant progress, such as remobilising Europe to support transition in the South Mediterranean Region. Yet the Arab economies must still weather the double blow of domestic political uncertainty and the crisis in Europe. While confidence is first of all conditioned by the political stabilisation that only the people involved can effect, it likewise depends on the revitali-

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6 In June 2011, Egypt rejected a 3 billion-dollar plan offered by the IMF and the World Bank.
The awakening of the Euro-Mediterranean Region will call for political efforts on both sides of the shared Sea. For it is ultimately a question of closing the sequence of events in this region that began on 11 September 2001 and releasing the significant economic potential of the Arab countries, not only for their well-being and successful inclusion in a global economy, but also to accelerate the sluggish growth of European countries.

If our politicians realise it, the European Union and its Member States have a unique opportunity to restore European “soft power” in full measure in order to establish more productive, legitimate relations with their Arab partners, who have become democratic, more productive and legitimate because they are respectful of mutual knowledge and the region’s specific characteristics.

(Text completed in April 2013)

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The Arab Spring: What Consequences on Foreign Investment?

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From one crisis to another: initially only slightly affected, the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMC) eventually felt the impact of the second round of the global economic crisis that particularly struck the eurozone countries, the main trade partners and premiere investors in the Mediterranean Region. The repercussions of the Arab Spring significantly influenced the evolution of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region in 2011 and 2012.

According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), FDI flows to the SEMC, or the Med-11 (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey) experienced remarkable progress up until 2006 (Chart 24), an exceptional year during which the countries in the region finally attracted a share of world FDI equivalent to their demographic weight (approximately 4%). This peak was reached thanks to a series of mega-projects in the banking, telecom, energy, and construction and public works sectors, essentially initiated by Gulf State investors. Foreign investment in the Med-11 thereafter entered a phase of decline, with a record drop in 2009, as per the global trend in FDI flows.

Since then, recovery is lagging. According to the ANIMA-MIPO observatory, which gathers information on FDI project announcements, the strong revival of foreign investor interest in 2010 was completely cut short the following year by the onset of the Arab Spring. The political transitions shaking the vast majority of Arab Mediterranean countries have, in fact, caused an immediate drop in FDI project announcements: 666 projects were announced in 2011 amounting to 27 billion euros, the lowest level since 2004. Though the number of projects did not rise in 2012, the total amount of FDI funds (37 billion euros) was comparable to that of 2005 (before the peak in 2006) and 2010 (after the financial crisis and before the Arab Spring). In any case, this regional evolution conceals contrasting national situations, significant changes in investment origin and an encouraging trend towards sectoral diversification of FDI projects in the region.

Foreign Investment during the Arab Transitions: Relatively Good Resilience

Foreign investors are far from deserting the region despite the political uncertainty prevailing in many countries, the supply and security problems, and social movements that could have affected the operation of enterprises in 2011 and again in 2012. Hence, in amount of FDI announced, 2012 was the 4th best year of the past decade: with the exception of Syria, all countries registered FDI amounts in keeping with their average performance over the past few years (Chart 25).

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1 In other words, projects announced by an investor in year $n$, which are generally carried out that year or in the following ones. The ANIMA-MIPO data thus differ from those of UNCTAD, which reflect real investment flows after the fact. The former are anticipatory data that have the advantage of being available in real time and provide information on the origin of projects (nationality of the investor, company type), the sectors concerned, etc. For more information, see www.anima.coop/mipo
In the Maghreb, first of all, Algeria experienced a good year in 2012, after two unproductive years: foreign investors seem finally to have adapted to the Law 49-51, which requires them to become associated with local enterprise. Morocco, often considered a country that was spared the unrest shaking the region, likewise experienced an encouraging rise in amounts invested. In Tunisia, the results were commendable, considering the political transition still underway in 2012, essentially thanks to extensions of projects announced by foreign corporations already operating in the country. The political and economic reforms of the coming months will be crucial for continuing to reassure investors and attract them to the “new” Tunisia. And in Libya, investors returned, with a record of 26 partnership projects2

2 Understood as projects where a foreign company approaches a Mediterranean market either through an identified partner or by opening a local branch (these projects are equivalent to UNCTAD’s “non-equity modes of entry”).
announced in 2012, paving the way for future investment projects.

In the Mashreq, the situation was more complex. In Egypt, the number of FDI projects announced did not really rise in comparison to 2011 due to the uncertain political and security situation. In any case, the country did register a record number of partnerships, and the amounts of FDI announced were on the rise again thanks to three mega-announcements of over a billion euros in the telecom and banking sectors. The foreign investment situation did not change significantly in 2012 in Lebanon or Jordan: FDI announcements were consistent with their historical levels, despite the proximity of these two countries to the conflicts shaking the region and the sensitive domestic political contexts. Palestine attracted three FDI projects (launched by the American Google company and the French communications group, Publicis), as well as two partnerships, making 2012 a relatively good year. Finally, no projects were officially announced for Syria in 2012.

And finally, Turkey emerged as an increasingly undisputed regional leader, insofar as recipient country of FDI flows but also as an intra-regional investor: no less than 10 Turkish projects were announced in Mediterranean countries in 2012, three of them in Israel, two in Egypt, two in Algeria and two in Morocco.

Erosion of European Leadership and Rise of Emerging Countries

European companies have been responsible for half of the FDI announcements in the Mediterranean Region since 2003. This was still the case in 2012, but two factors indicate that this leadership is now seriously threatened: the number of European FDI projects announced was at its lowest level since 2005 (Chart 26), and the investment sums announced by Europe were surpassed by that of “other countries” for the first time, in particular the BRIC countries (9.8 and 10.8 billion euros in 2012, respectively; see Chart 27).

This downtrend is most likely cyclical, European companies probably being influenced by the “anxiety attacks” and inaction that has seized European governments and their administrations vis-à-vis the new political leaders in the South Mediterranean. Yet in this period, when the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) are revising their development and governance models, basing them on new, democratic values, such idleness on the part of Europe is both a bad strategic calculation and a poor interpretation of the southern countries’ expectations of their historical partner.

European companies have been responsible for half of the FDI announcements in the Mediterranean Region since 2003. This was still the case in 2012, but two factors indicate that this leadership is now seriously threatened.

At the same time, the Gulf States seemed to demonstrate a will to step up economic and political ties with Islamist governments having recently come into power in northern Africa. After having abandoned the terrain from 2007 to 2011, their investments in 2012 were at the same level as those from Europe, reaching levels more in line with what Mediterranean countries could expect of their Arab neighbours. This vintage year of 2012 also probably marked the end of the financial crisis for the Gulf monarchies.

The Western slowdown also applies to North America: whereas the projects announced by American and Canadian investors had not diminished in 2011, including in Arab countries – illustrating the North American will to acknowledge the revolutions underway – 2012 marked a return to greater restraint. The number of projects announced by the United States decreased in all the countries in the region, particularly in the Mashreq (only three projects announced for Egypt as compared to 13 in 2011, for instance), except for Palestine, and in Tunisia (three announcements, as compared to nine in 2011).

Intra-Med-11 investments also remained very low (6% of the total). One can, however, express the hope that the changes taking place will lead to greater political and economic integration in the region. There were some encouraging signs in this respect in the Maghreb, essentially thanks to the impetus supplied by Tunisia.
Towards More Inclusive FDI Projects?
The Paths of Renewed Partnership with the Mediterranean

Fortunately, the crises seem to have had the consequence of fostering a certain sector rotation of foreign investment projects in 2011 and 2012. The traditional foursome of energy, banking, telecom and construction and public works continued to attract a record share of FDI (65% of the amounts announced in 2012), while a number of industrial sectors gained in attractiveness and became less marginal with respect to “rentier” investments – excellent news for Mediterranean countries. The number of announced FDI projects in software, the automotive sector and pharmaceuticals thus experienced a slow but steady progression, whereas aeronautics and the engineering industry registered a sharp
rise in 2012. The agribusiness and food processing, distribution and business services sectors, which had attracted a record number of projects in 2011, on the other hand, were less popular with investors in 2012, due to the decline in European and American FDI.

It is the arduous task of the southern countries to address the challenges associated with both their political transition and the establishment of a more transparent economic governance, in order to bring Europe back into a dialogue that is currently inoperative and develop a policy adapted to their needs.

The sectors experiencing growth are doubly strategic for the region: they contribute to structuring the industrial fabric of Med-11 countries and are, above all, more effective in terms of job creation. Indeed, the job efficiency ratio of foreign investment projects, developed by ANIMA through the ANIMA-MIPO observatory for the World Bank in 2011, reveals that foreign investment in the Mediterranean Region is concentrated in sectors tending to create relatively little employment (with the exception of the banking sector). This situation constitutes one of the factors accounting for the currently low spillover effect of foreign investment on growth and inclusive development of the Med-11. More than ever, the number one challenge in the region is, in fact, that of job creation. This is true in the South Mediterranean, where the problem of unemployment and particularly lack of quality jobs is a core concern of the population having demanded the political transition. It is likewise true in Europe, where growth is struggling to restart and struggling even harder to create employment.

In the face of this challenge, Europe can no longer ignore the issues blocking the economic vitality of the entire Euro-Mediterranean Region, i.e. the mobility of goods and people that are today's and tomorrow's economy, the education of people in the South, recognition and promotion of Euro-Mediterranean sectoral value chains, shared values and the sustainability and inclusiveness of domestic and foreign investment.

It is on the basis of developing an industrial area on the Euro-Mediterranean scale that a renewed, balanced and politically-focused partnership should be established between Europe and the South Mediterranean. It is the arduous task of the southern countries to address the challenges associated with both their political transition and the establishment of a more transparent economic governance, to clearly establish their economic, industrial and social development strategies in order to bring Europe back into a dialogue that is currently inoperative and develop a policy adapted to their needs.

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With 283 million arrivals and 224 billion euros in receipts in 2011, that is, approximately 30% of international tourism in the world, for the countries along the rim of the Mediterranean tourism is an engine of economic growth and, more metaphorically, of development. Though earlier it constituted an artisan sector based on clientele from the aristocracy and the industrial upper middle class until the first half of the 20th century, the democratisation of the leisure society in Western European countries stimulated by the right to paid holidays, the rise in purchasing power and the modernisation of transport has made it a veritable industry since the 1960s.

The political leaders of countries that are “behind on the development scale” – to use the terms of the Bretton Woods institutions –, such as Spain, Greece and Tunisia, have taken the opportunity to attract foreign currency to their territory and use the sector as an “engine for development.” A wager in part successful, since if we take the example of Spain’s Costa del Sol, the fishing villages of the 1950s along the Mediterranean coast today constitute metropolitan areas highly equipped with infrastructures. But beyond the issue of infrastructures, which we will discuss below, considering how tourism affects the sustainability of the Mediterranean Basin requires basic knowledge of how the industry operates.

Tunisia is a textbook example that powerfully illustrates the characteristics of this industry:

- The copious investments made by the authorities (from 11 billion dinars in 1965 to 376 billion in 2010, i.e. 7,200 billion dinars over the course of 45 years) are “not very profitable” and lead to only very long-term returns on investment, since for every dinar invested, the receipts generated, which went from 7 dinars per overnight stay in 1965 to 100 dinars per overnight stay in 2010, only brought 0.02 dinar (Chart 28 (a) and (b));
- The occupancy rate is low as a result of the strong seasonality effect of tourism, whose peak is attained in July and August, which means the industry functions at half-speed on a year-long scale (Chart 28 (c));
- Though tourism is a major sector for economic growth, representing from 5 to 10% of Tunisia’s GDP in the period studied, it only represents 3% of employment (Chart 28 (d)).

These various characteristics give rise to forms of approaching tourism in Mediterranean that can be defined by a formula considered sacrosanct by political leaders in the Mediterranean Region: economic growth through the tourism industry is only possible if the bed-space capacity of destinations is increased with a view to generating a high absolute value of receipts, and this despite a low occupancy rate.

Tourism in the Mediterranean Basin: A New “El Dorado”?

The rules of the game are clear for countries having focussed on tourism: the profitability of this activity is assessed only according to the absolute value of collected receipts. What significance do these receipts have in national economies? The historical analysis of the portion of a country’s GDP attributable to international tourism receipts shows the strategic orientation of these countries
CHART 28  
**Chronological Analysis of the Development of the Tourism Industry in Tunisia**

**Profitability of Public Investment (a)**

![Graph showing the profitability of public investment over years.](image)

**Revenue Generated per Overnight Stay (b)**

![Graph showing revenue generated per overnight stay over years.](image)

**Increased Capacity in Number of Beds and Beds Occupied (c)**

![Graph showing increased capacity in number of beds and beds occupied over years.](image)

**Share of Tourism in Employment (d)**

![Bar chart showing the share of tourism in employment over years.](image)

Source: Tunisian National Tourism Office (Office nationale de tourisme tunisien, ONTT), 2012.
as well as their dependence on the industry, as for instance, Tunisia, Cyprus and Malta, for whom, since the 1980s, international tourism represents 7%, 9.5% and 26%, respectively. It is important to note the strengthening of development policies due to tourism since the beginning of the 2000s in Morocco (5% in 2000 and 7% in 2010), Egypt (approximately 4% from 2000 to 2010), Lebanon (4% in 2000 and 20% in 2010), Syria (5.5% in 2000 and 11% in 2010), Albania (10.5% in 2000 and 13.5% in 2010) and the countries of former Yugoslavia (13% for Croatia and 5% for Slovenia from 2000 to 2010, and 16% for Montenegro in 2010) (Map 1).

The countries indicated have experienced or are experiencing periods of civil war, such as Lebanon, the countries of former Yugoslavia, Egypt, Tunisia and Syria, or have undergone or are undergoing serious economic crises, such as Albania and Cyprus. This reveals that the option of developing the tourism industry is chosen to revitalise economic growth of countries emerging from crises, provided there was a pre-existing tourism infrastructure. It also reveals that tourism does not secure national economies and that the so-called “development” induced by tourism does not ease social tension. Moreover, the analysis of international tourist arrivals sheds light on the effects of substitution of destinations experiencing a period of unrest, primarily political, for more “tranquil” destinations. Thus, as well as a strong dependence of economies on tourism, there is also cut-throat competition.

### An Unequal Race for Receipts

The weight of tourism in a country’s economy does not necessarily reflect the country’s importance in the overall Mediterranean tourism industry. France, Spain and Italy have each obtained over 20% of tourism receipts since the 1980s, which represents approximately 60% of overall tourism receipts obtained in the Mediterranean Basin. In 2010, these three countries took in some 137 billion dollars (France: $46 billion; Spain: $52 billion; and Italy: $39 billion) whereas the Mediterranean Region as a whole had revenues of 234 billion dollars (Map 2).

Insofar as the remaining breadcrumbs, they were primarily shared by Egypt (which succeeded in collecting 5% of receipts in 2010), Turkey (10.5%) and Greece (5%). The case of Turkey is likewise illustrative of another planning model in which tourism diversifies the economy, explaining this country’s low

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**MAP 1**

Evolution of the Importance of International Tourism (IT) Receipts in National Economies (%)

![Map 1](image_url)

economic dependence on the industry. In any case, approximately 51% to 60% of revenue obtained from package tours organised by foreign tour operators did not flow into the Turkish economy (Ünluonen et al, 2011).

Persistence of the Effects of Peripheral Dependence on the Centre

Obtaining tourism receipts requires attracting a clientele with spending capacity. Thus, in addition to national economies’ dependence on the tourism industry, the industry sector is also dependent on clientele from North Mediterranean countries. In 2010, for countries heavily dependent on tourism, the clientele was composed of over 90% international tourists in some countries (Syria, Tunisia, Cyprus, Montenegro and Croatia) and over 60% in the cases of Egypt and Morocco (Map 3).

Beyond the fact that Spain, France and Italy are less dependent on international tourism, the populations of these countries represent a high proportion of the clientele of tourism-dependent countries, a clientele that also includes people from Germany and the United Kingdom (Chart 29). This phenomenon illustrates the persistence of the effects of the dependence on the centre of regions termed peripheral in the 1960s and the inability to reduce inequalities despite 60 years of co-operation policies and development aid.

Tourism in the Mediterranean Region: Social and Environmental Impacts

Beyond the economic dimension, questioning the sustainability of tourism in the Mediterranean area calls for analysis of its repercussions on society and the environment. Since the Mediterranean tourism industry model is based on raising capacity by increasing the number of beds available in order to increase the probability of generating receipts, this means that the tourist population is added to the resident population, engendering a spike in population density in destination areas, primarily in the summer season. In Torremolinos, Spain, for instance, the population density goes from 3,300 inhabitants/km² to 10,000 inhabitants/km² in the month of August. Map 4 allows us to make an initial observation: with the exception of Ile de France, the populations in Mediterranean countries are concentrated along the coast. The same is true of overnight stays by international tourists.
Consumption and Seasonality

The Profiles of Sustainability in Some Mediterranean Tourist Destinations project,¹ co-ordinated by Plan Bleu and Ioannis Spilanis of the University of the Aegean, has led to the following findings for the destinations studied, i.e. Torremolinos (Spain), Castelsardo and Cabras (Sardinia, Italy), Rovinj (Croatia), Alanya (Turkey), El Alamein, Mersa Matrouh and Siwa Oasis (Egypt), Djerba (Tunisia), Tipaza (Algeria) and the Tetouan coast (Morocco) (see Map 5):

- High daily water consumption by tourism with respect to the resources available leads to insufficient water supply, as in Djerba (Tunisia) and the Matrouh Governorate (Egypt), which entails water transfer policies at high economic and environmental expense;

• The consumption of electricity, to which tourism contributes to the amount of 40% in Torremolinos (Spain) and 21% in Alanya (Turkey), can be multiplied by two (Tetouan coast, Morocco) or three (Djerba, Tunisia) during the summer season (Bourse, 2012);

• Overproduction of solid waste by tourists with respect to solid waste production by residents (in Cabras, Italy, the average annual solid waste produced is 7 kg/tourist/night as compared to 0.5 kg/inhabitant/day for the resident population), compounded by the lack of investment in collection, storage and treatment of solid waste, engenders serious public health problems as well as pollution of soil, potable water resources and the sea (Bourse, 2012).

Social Issues

Managing the development of the tourism industry along the Mediterranean coast demands infrastructure planning that is unfortunately insufficient. This phenomenon becomes even worse because so-called 3S (Sea, Sand and Sun) destinations also attract a great deal of people in search of employment. In Torremolinos, for instance, the figures for the past twenty years show that the immigration rate went from 5.21% in 1991 to 10.25% in 2008 while the population growth rate went from 5.32% in 1991 to 10.68% in 2008. Moreover, the outcome of tourism insofar as its real capacity to create jobs is far from being as ideal as countries declare, from both the perspective of the workforce (as we saw at the beginning of this article in the case of Tunisia) and that of job type, which is closely correlated with seasonality (permanent vs. seasonal). If we then examine the capacity of tourism to redistribute the benefits of growth, the situation remains highly inequitarian and the gaps are growing wider in the majority of cases, as for instance in Alanya, Turkey, where the share of the GDP attributable to the wealthiest sector of the population of Alanya went from 44.4% of the GDP in 1980 to over 56% in 2009 (Tosun and Çaliskan, 2011).

Managing the development of the tourism industry along the Mediterranean coast demands infrastructure planning. This phenomenon becomes even worse because so-called 3S (Sea, Sand and Sun) destinations also attract a great deal of people in search of employment.

In view of these results, the conclusion is unequivocal: tourism does not play the role it should to improve the sustainability of the Mediterranean Basin. Unequal relations between the North and the rest of the Mediterranean Region, but also among North Mediterranean countries, as well as the lack of cooperation between countries to realise the dream of a “Mediterranean destination” must necessarily be corrected to lend tourism the role it could play in improving material living conditions for local populations and the manner of accumulation of wealth in...
each country. This calls for recasting the model for the tourism industry in the Mediterranean Region and implementing initiatives such as that of a quality label and a sustainable tourism observatory developed by Spilanis, as recently done in Greece in a partnership between the Greek government and the World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO).2

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The problems deriving from the phenomenon of climate change, which is slowly but surely besetting our planet, combined with the action of environmentalists and activist organisations, as well as green parties, have contributed to an awareness of the need to combat this phenomenon and have led to deeper discussion on sustainable development and the measures to be undertaken.

At the same time, technologies that exploit natural resources without endangering the environment have begun to be developed and marketed. These technologies, which consist of harnessing the power of the sun and the wind, obviously require significant investment and some of them, moreover, have disadvantages such as the problem of storage and at times, transmission.

Thus, in addition to the issue of the duration of fossil resources in the medium to long terms and the concern for controlling the supply sources and the transmission lines for geostrategic reasons, the struggle against climate change and the issues of environmental protection and sustainable development have also led governments to start to address the matter of developing renewable energy, on both the global and regional levels.

The Universal Framework

It is within the framework of the United Nations following the first UN Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm, 1972) that significant efforts have been undertaken. International conferences on climate change began taking place with major turnouts (Copenhagen, Cancun, Durban, Doha), the Rio+20 Conference (1992) being a point of reference, since the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) aiming to stabilise greenhouse gas emissions was adopted there, entering into effect in 1994. Nonetheless, the results have been very limited in relation to such generalised mobilisation, due to political difficulties and conflicts of interest of certain large countries.

The UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 65/151 declaring 2012 the International Year of Sustainable Energy for All. Global organisations such as the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) were designed to establish international collaboration in the sphere of energy, as well as, to a lesser extent, develop certain initiatives and instruments such as the Energy Charter Treaty.

The Regional Framework: The European Union

The European Union has launched an ambitious policy to struggle against climate change and to this end, adopted significant directives (2009, 2012), which were also applied in the countries along the Adriatic. They establish obligatory national goals, known as the 20-20-20 Climate and Energy Package, with the following targets: reducing CO₂ emissions by 20-30% and, in this context, increasing the proportion of renewable energy, the target being set at 20% of the energy mix, along with decreasing energy consumption by 20%, all of this by the year 2020.

The EU Council of Energy Ministers, in its conclusions from 24 November 2011, proposed a Euro-
Mediterranean energy partnership focusing on electricity and renewable energy within the framework of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP).

In its communications in 2012, the European Commission proposed the creation of an integrated energy market for the South and South-East Mediterranean area, with particular attention to the EU Neighbourhood.

The Euro-Mediterranean Framework

In the more complex Euro-Mediterranean framework, one can see that many States on the other side of the Mediterranean have likewise launched ambitious strategies for developing renewable energy, increasing energy efficiency and attenuating climate change, as for instance Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, among other countries.


Moreover, specific Euro-Mediterranean platforms have been created – associations of national regulators (MEDREG), Mediterranean electricity transmission system operators (MED-TSO) and national energy management agencies (MEDENER) – as well as major industrial initiatives designed to increase own energy production capacities in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs) and the energy transmission systems, such as the Desertec Industrial Initiatives (Dii), the Medgrid project and Renewable Energy Solutions for the Mediterranean (RES4MED).

The New Mediterranean Context

What is the situation today in the Mediterranean Basin? Overwhelming developments and historic changes have modified the Mediterranean landscape. In the North, an unprecedented economic and financial crisis has struck southern Europe. The South is undergoing a complex period of transition: overthrow of regimes that had been in power for decades, institutional changes, elections and countries moving towards democracy, not to mention the civil war persisting in one country in the region. These events have created an institutional and political instability for an indefinite period of time.

The Mediterranean Region, above all Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs), has considerable potential for developing renewable energy.

At the same time, the institutional framework has changed. Euro-Mediterranean co-operation (the Barcelona Process) has turned into the Union for the Mediterranean and a new organism has been created – the Secretariat General – with the specific mission of projects. It is from the perspective of this new institutional and political framework that we must consider renewable energy.


The Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries together with the Middle East countries have 57% of the world’s oil resources and 41% of the world’s natural gas resources, though unequally distributed. On the other hand, the Mediterranean Region, above all Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs), has considerable potential for developing renewable energy (high levels of solar radiation, often exceptional wind conditions, considerable terrain available…), a natural wealth that could allow these countries to both contribute to meeting their rapidly-growing domestic demand and export electricity to Europe.

The demand for electricity (80% of which is generated from fossil fuels and the remainder primarily from hydraulic power) grows by 6-7% per year due to population growth, higher standards of living, urbanisation, industrialisation and other factors. According to the Mediterranean Energy Observatory
(OME) forecasts, this means that demand will triple within 20 years and there will be a need for an additional 200 GW of production capacity by 2030, as compared to our current 120 GW.

In the more complex Euro-Mediterranean framework, one can see that many States on the other side of the Mediterranean have likewise launched ambitious strategies for developing renewable energy, increasing energy efficiency and attenuating climate change.

The production of renewable energy constitutes both a challenge and an opportunity for these countries. In fact, the advantages are many. First of all, they can contribute to the struggle against climate change by creating their own energy sources, creating green energy and decreasing CO₂ emissions, thus protecting the environment, which is also important for MENA countries. Moreover, fostering renewable energy facilitates direct investment and contributes to industrial development, the transfer of know-how and the creation of jobs. Countries also decrease their dependence on fossil fuel by using the riches of nature. And finally, they decrease their dependence on energy imports and therefore reduce their budget expenses in this sphere.

Here we must emphasise the importance of exports. If renewable energy production is increased, not only could countries meet domestic demand, but by creating revenue in foreign currency, they could contribute to funding necessary infrastructure. And EU countries are potential if not certain purchasers.

Of course there are also difficulties. There are administrative, institutional and legislative barriers, political uncertainties and the perception of elevated cost. There is also the problem of infrastructure and interconnections, which are of strategic importance, though the interests of both governments and private operators often diverge.

Yet the positive perspectives are considerable. The development of renewable energy and energy efficiency is a necessity for the Mediterranean Region. In fact, renewable energy, in particular wind and solar energy, can be quickly developed and the costs are decreasing and will probably continue to do so. In certain cases, wind energy is already competitive in relation to fossil fuel energy, and this will doubtless also be the case for photovoltaic solar energy in the next few years. The countries most actively involved are key actors for the development of renewable energy and energy efficiency in the Mediterranean Region (Germany should receive special mention here).

The Role of the Union for the Mediterranean

The UfM, which was founded at the Paris Summit on 13 July 2008, has 43 member countries: the EU Member States and Partner Countries along the Mediterranean shore. In the Paris Declaration, the Heads of State and Government entrusted it with the mission of promoting specific development projects likely to benefit the populations of the region.

More specifically, the Paris Declaration granted the UfM Secretariat the mandate of exploring the feasibility, creation and development of a Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP). In this respect, the Secretariat has worked to develop a (strategic) regional framework, identify pilot projects that could serve as examples and create, together with other stakeholders, financial instruments to mitigate risks. It acts as a catalyst and coordinator, under the political control of member countries, with a view to implement the MSP.

The Secretariat has created work platforms and has brought together all the key actors in the region: the UfM member countries, the European Commission, the international financial institutions, in particular the European Investment Bank (EIB), private associations and industry in order to harmonise the various initiatives put forth by governments and enterprises and ensure their end effectiveness within a comprehensive regulatory framework.

The Mediterranean Solar Plan

The Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) is a highly comprehensive, ambitious project emblematic to the
UfM. The aim is to develop – on a large scale and under sustainable economic conditions – renewable energy and energy efficiency in the Mediterranean Region, and more specifically, in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs).

The main goals of the MSP, which focuses primarily on MENA countries, are as follows:
- By 2020, achieve an installed electrical capacity of 20 GW from renewable sources, primarily wind and solar power, as well as attaining electrical transmission capacity;
- Meet the needs of the local market and export part of the green energy to the EU;
- Improve energy efficiency and promote the control of energy demand;
- Create green jobs and industrial capacity;
- Promote local electricity market integration.

The Secretariat has focused on five pivotal issues, while keeping in mind energy efficiency as well:
- The political and regulatory framework
- Adequate means of financing to mitigate risks
- The physical transmission lines and storage infrastructure
- Industrial development and job creation
- Transfer of know-how and development capacity

It must be borne in mind that energy is the engine for economic activity and thus for development.

The Secretariat presented the draft Master Plan to the UfM member countries so that the final version can be drawn up at a conference of the relevant senior officials under the responsibility of the UfM copresidency (late May 2013, Jordan), with a view to its political endorsement at the ministerial meeting of UfM member countries on energy (December 2013, Brussels). This lies within the context of an ambitious vision: the creation of a Mediterranean Energy Community by 2020. The adoption of the Mediterranean Solar Plan by the ministers will create a strategic regional framework and a roadmap comprising the technical, financial and legal measures necessary to develop renewable energy and energy efficiency in the Mediterranean Region.

This must be viewed not only from a technical-economic perspective, but also and above all from the standpoint of socio-economic repercussions in terms of economic growth, human development, sustainable development, job creation, the struggle against poverty and climate change, and the transfer of know-how and industrial capacity to grasp the importance of one of the most significant political enterprises of our times, as well as the scope of its significance.
Situation and Role of Women in the New Context of the Political Transitions in the Arab World

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What is the role of women in the turmoil gripping the Arab world today? Whereas the Tunisian revolution of 2011 gave an image of a country with gender parity, the war in Libya was a male war, as is the one taking place in Syria today. In Egypt, they were sent back to the home although they had actively participated in the occupation of Tahrir Square in Cairo in February 2011. Indeed, one can measure the progress of democracy in the countries concerned by the role played by women in the protest movements and the fate reserved for them by the new regimes being established. The issue of women is a barometer of the nature of the transitions underway in the Arab world.

Women in the Revolutions

On 14 January 2011 in Tunis, the crowd gathering on Bourguiba Avenue consisted of a mixture of both men and women, some of whom were veiled, marching with the men like everyone else. In the preceding weeks, at the protests that ignited the country, women were on the front lines in all cities, inciting the protesters or marching with them.

In Libya on 15 February 2011, the first protest against the regime was organised by the mothers, wives and sisters of the prisoners massacred in 1996 at the Abu Salim Prison. Then during the war they took care of things behind the scenes, and that is never shown. Since the country’s liberation, they seem to have been chased from the street.

In February 2011 on Tahrir Square, Cairo, there were women everywhere. They were also protesting to demand the departure of Hosni Mubarak, but they were less in number than in Tunis and the majority of them were wearing veils. Gender parity is less accepted in the Egyptian capital.

They were also seen in Syria, where they even organised a brief women’s protest in Damascus in May 2011. The regime repressed them just like it did male protesters. But the war, the sectarianisation of the conflict and the emergence of radical Islamists has rendered them nearly invisible.

In Sanaa and Bahrain, they were also there, but covered in black and strictly separated from the men. Here also, crowds demanded reforms, but not all reforms. Gender equality or at least the end of gender apartheid is not on the agenda of the so-called democratic forces.

On 21 February 2011, a constitutional committee was formed in Egypt to devise a reform of the Constitution. No women were present. One hundred and seventeen women’s and human rights organisations protested, in vain. On 8 March 2011, the first international women’s day after the fall of the dictatorship, a protest took place in Tahrir Square. A group of women and men brandished slogans on gender equality, demanding a constitution guaranteeing the rights and liberties of every citizen, regardless of gender, origin or religious beliefs. Only thirty minutes later, a male counter-protest appeared. They cried: “Go home and make us something to eat,” “The Constitution will not be secular.” Many women were brutalised. The army intervened, taking many of them back to military premises, where they suffered the worst brutality: 18 arrested women have testified to having been tortured, threatened with being reported for prostitution and subjected to physical virginity tests.
In April 2011 in Tunis, the High Commission for the Realisation of the Revolution’s Objectives, Political Reform and Democratic Transition, a sort of transitional parliament entrusted with preparing the elections scheduled for 23 October 2011, adopted an electoral code stipulating that candidate lists had to have gender parity alternating male and female candidates. This was a first in the Arab world. The penalty stipulated was a first in the entire world: any lists not abiding by the gender parity rule would be rejected by the Electoral Commission. However, considering the strong resistance to gender parity, above all in the most traditional areas, only 7% of the 1500 or so heads of candidate lists were women. This said, the proportion of women in the Constituent Assembly is not insignificant, with 27.2% of the seats. Since then, however, the draft Constitution drawn up by an Assembly dominated by Islamists has retracted the parity condition.

In May 2011 in Rabat, under the pressure of feminist movements, the Moroccan government lifted its reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). It likewise ratified the Optional Protocol allowing women who are the victims of rape to file claims before an international court. This decision means that the Sharifian Kingdom will have to introduce equality between men and women into their legislation. Yet the Constitution approved by referendum on 1 July 2011 is contradictory: it stipulates gender equality while continuing to consider Islam as the State religion and does not recognise the primacy of international legislation contradicting the Kingdom’s fundamental principles.

What do these few images and facts that we have singled out indicate? First of all, that women have participated in all the protest movements that have been gripping the Arab world for more than two years, but not in the same manner. And above all, that the transitions underway are far from lending them the same hopes everywhere.

This overview allows us to measure to what point the issue of conditions for women is at the heart of political and societal projects being undertaken today in this part of the world. Yet everywhere, women are attempting to take advantage of the changes underway to improve their situation.

Transitions under Islamist Hegemony against Women?

The current stage of political transitions has seen the arrival of movements emerging from political Islam whose programme is the re-Islamisation of law and society under a variety of forms appropriate to each country’s specificities. In Tunisia the Ennahda (Renewal) party won the elections in October 2011; in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists together took nearly 3/4 of the parliamentary seats in June 2012; in Morocco the Justice and Development Party won the November 2011 elections. In Libya, explicitly Islamist parties did not take the day in elections, but all political parties proclaim their commitment to Sharia.

And here is the first hitch: the reference to religious law is in contradiction with the demand for equality, insofar as it prevents full legal equality between genders. The victory of political Islam and the re-Islamisation of the societal sphere that it seeks and announces comes down everywhere to the strengthening of patriarchal control over the condition of women, the main tool being the religious reference.
The socio-political conditions under which transitions are taking place mean that democratisation, the will to restore Sharia where it had been weakened by processes of secularisation and the female condition are more than ever linked. The destiny of the societies in the region will be a function of the articulation that the political and social actors establish between these three factors. Hence women’s rights and the future of the democratisation process are one and the same subject today on the South shore of the Mediterranean. The choice by governments and elected politicians of a specific hierarchy of norms will determine the nature of developments. We are finally beginning to understand, in this new configuration, that the women issue is a focal point in this stage of history. Are women indeed threatened by the Islamist course taken by the transition processes? Do they risk losing their acquis where the latter are significant, as in Tunisia?

In this country, the Ennahda party, during its political campaign, committed not to revoke Tunisian women’s rights, but since its victory in October 2011, the main leaders have multiplied their alarming declarations. Some publicly state they are in favour of polygamy, forbidden since 1956. All of them preach a return to a moral order respectful of “Islamic values” in their most conservative reading. Customary marriage has been restored to honour although it is prohibited by law. Since then, it has been practiced in Salafist milieus and has engendered quite a number of social dramas.

More seriously, the authorities have not reacted to the violence perpetrated by Salafist groups against women, to aggressions in teaching establishments where some have attempted to impose the wearing of the veil on non-veiled students and teachers, or impose the veiling of little girls as of the age of three at kindergartens. The Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (ATFD), the oldest feminist association in the country, has warned against these attempts at intimidation.

Today, writing the Constitution is the main issue in the battle. Women’s rights organisations want it to make the principle of equality “fully real,” explicitly prohibiting all forms of discrimination based on gender by establishing the primacy of international treaties over national laws. However, the project advocated by the Islamist majority makes no reference to the universality of human rights. Its Article 15 mentions that “Respecting international treaties is an obligation, insofar as they are not contrary to the stipulations in the present Constitution,” which goes against the principle of the primacy of international conventions over local law. And finally, references to the Muslim nature of the State are much clearer than in the preceding Constitution. The majority party has, moreover, stated its intention of not lifting Tunisian reservations to CEDAW, certain articles of which they consider would contravene “Islamic values.”

Civil Society Organisations and the Mobilisation of Women

Everywhere, however, including in the highly conservative Gulf States, women are fighting. In 2006, the Equality without Reservation coalition was created in Rabat, grouping together women’s associations from the ensemble of the Arab world, and has made women’s demands heard in the uprisings underway. The struggle for their rights is a vast programme that generates a great deal of resistance, even among the women “revolutionaries” of Benghazi or Sanaa. But there is no democracy without equality. And equality cannot be divided. The Arab world is changing. Some would like this change to take place without women, and sometimes even against them. This is no longer possible, despite the threats of regression, which should be taken seriously.

1 www.fidh.org/Tunisia-Dignity-Liberty-and
The Crisis of the Welfare State in Northern Mediterranean Countries

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The Great Recession has put Welfare States everywhere under considerable strain. In particular for social protection systems in the northern Mediterranean, relative latecomers in Welfare State building, the current situation represents a severe test of their capacity to play the role they were created for: preventing an economic crisis from turning into a social catastrophe.

The Great Recession

How severe this test has been is there for all to see. In 2013, according to official estimates, the size of the economy has shrunk since 2007 by 5.5% in Spain, 7.4% in Portugal, 7.8% in Italy, and as much as 23.5% in Greece. In the European Union (EU) as a whole, the cumulative contraction over the same period was 1%.

The rise in unemployment has been the most visible effect of the recession. In the EU, the unemployment rate in 2012 had climbed to 10.5%, its highest level for well over a decade. However, in the northern Mediterranean the climb was faster and steeper: in 2012, the number of jobless workers as a share of the workforce was 10.7% in Italy, but had reached 15.9% in Portugal, 24.3% in Greece and 25.0% in Spain (from 8.3% in 2007).

International organisations are predicting a return to positive rates of growth in Europe in the course of 2014. However, the growth that is forecast will be sluggish at best, and may not materialise at all: revising growth estimates downwards has become something of a rule over the last few years. Even when the economy stabilises for good, given previous patterns of “jobless growth,” it may take many years for unemployment rates in Greece, Spain and elsewhere in the northern Mediterranean to fall to the prevailing levels before the Great Recession.

In other words, the social emergency is here to stay.

The Distributional Impact of the Crisis

The Great Recession is widely thought to have caused poverty and inequality to increase. Nevertheless, predicting the distributional impact of a crisis is less straightforward than may appear at first sight. Its effects on family incomes vary substantially, depending not only on the earnings and employment status of workers directly affected, but also on those of other members of the households in which they live, as well as on the capacity of the tax and benefit system to absorb macroeconomic shocks.

Moreover, the distributional impact of a recession may vary depending on the dimension considered: average living standards may decline, but inequality need not rise, whereas the estimated effect on poverty will be less pronounced when the relevant threshold is set as a proportion of average (or median) incomes than when it is held constant in purchasing power terms.

Generally speaking, the distributional effects of a recession take time to materialise. For instance, poverty continued to fall throughout Europe until 2009, while the economy had been in trouble since 2007. On the other hand, income data (whether from national household budget surveys or cross-national statistics like EU-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions [EU-SILC]) tend to become available
two or three years after their reference period. Hence, the latest results currently available refer to the year 2011. In other words, for the time being, official data only cover a limited sub-period of the Great Recession.

**Official Figures on Poverty and Inequality**

Perhaps paradoxically, Eurostat statistics show that the poverty rate in the EU has barely budged at all, from 16.5% in 2007 to 16.9% in 2011. In the northern Mediterranean, the poverty rate in Italy and Portugal was actually lower in 2011 than it had been in 2007, while in Greece and Spain it had gone up to 21.4% and 21.8% respectively.

Part of the explanation is, of course, that poverty is defined with respect to a relative threshold (60% of median income), which in good times goes up, and in bad times down. The assumption behind relative poverty is that people compare their material condition with that of others in the society in which they live. This seems reasonable enough, until we remember that in times of rapid change people also tend to compare their current standard of living with the one they enjoyed in the recent past.

This is why having the poverty threshold anchored at a moment in time can also be useful. As a matter of fact, Eurostat does just that, publishing figures on the proportion of people with an income below 60% of the 2005 median (in real terms). Between 2009 and 2011, in the EU as a whole that proportion went up by 2.1 percentage points, while the magnitude of change in the northern Mediterranean ranged from 0.8 percentage points in Portugal, 2.4 in Italy, through to 6.4 and 6.7 percentage points in Spain and Greece respectively.

Changes in inequality were even less dramatic, whether on the basis of the Gini coefficient or the S80/S20 ratio (showing the income of the richest 20% of population as a multiple of that earned by the poorest 20%). On the whole, relative to 2007, inequality in 2011 seemed to have risen considerably in Spain, slightly in Greece and Italy, and to have actually declined in Portugal (though it was rising even there).

On the basis of the above, one is tempted to conclude that recent changes in the distribution of incomes are much less significant than they are usually made out to be.

**Other evidence**

As a matter of fact, even official statistics provide plenty of cause for concern. According to Eurostat, the proportion of those in arrears on mortgage or rent payments in the EU as a whole has gone up, from 3.8% in 2007 to 4.4% in 2011. In Greece, it has doubled, from 5.5% to 11.0%, while elsewhere in the northern Mediterranean it has fluctuated around the 5% mark. Focusing on households with children and incomes below the poverty line, the share of those affected ranged from around 10% in Spain, 15% in Italy (near the EU average), almost 18% in Portugal, and as much as 30% in Greece.

The amount of medical care that was not given because it was too costly offered another insight to the hardship faced by ordinary people. Among the poorest 20% of the population, that indicator was clearly on the rise in Greece and Italy, standing at 10.2% and 11.3% respectively (in 2011). However, in Portugal it was declining (to 2.2% in 2011), while in Spain it remained consistently under 1% – which was well below the EU average, and an excellent performance by any standard.

While official statistics and other hard data lag behind, impressionistic accounts and soft data paint a starker picture. Civil society organisations, such as Caritas (Leahy et al. 2013), in touch with harsh realities on the ground, are raising the alarm. In countries most affected by the crisis, and that includes all of the northern Mediterranean, low-income families are struggling to make ends meet, as jobs and earnings have been hit by the recession, prices (and taxes) are rising, and access to essential services such as health care is not always what it used to be. The above examples, among many other things, show that it is still too soon for the full implications of the crisis to emerge (let alone to register on the radar of official statistics). They also show that policy responses matter.

**The Welfare State as an Automatic Stabiliser**

Helping individuals cope with job loss and income loss is the "core business" of the Welfare State (Castles 2010): its role is to support those affected with benefits in cash and in kind. As a result, well-functioning systems of social protection increase
spending when the economy goes into recession, and scale it back again as it recovers. In other words, the Welfare State can be an effective “automatic stabiliser” (Basso et al. 2012).

Available data show that, at least in the first stage of the current crisis, European welfare states performed that role quite well. Expenditure on social protection as a share of GDP went up in the EU, from 26.1% in 2007 to 29.4% in 2010 (latest available data). If anything, social spending in the northern Mediterranean increased by even more: to 29.9% in Italy, 29.1% in Greece, 27.0% in Portugal and 25.7% in Spain (even in the latter case, a sharp rise from 20.7% in 2007).

There are signs, however, that more recent policies have begun to roll back social expenditure (Guillén et al. 2012). This could be thought of as something normal, part of the “automatic stabiliser” role of the Welfare State; except for the fact that projections for 2011-2014 (SPC 2013) show that social protection expenditure in all four countries considered here is forecast to decline (or, at best, as in Italy, to level off), even as unemployment is expected to increase (or, at best, as in Greece, to remain at very high levels).

The Welfare State in the Era of Austerity

The contraction in social spending is, of course, directly linked to the fact that northern Mediterranean countries have been subject to an austerity regime, at varying degrees of harshness.

In this context, the Welfare State has been identified as a possible source of fiscal savings. In Italy, Spain and Greece, the age of retirement has been raised and the pension formula has become less generous. Social benefits (especially in Greece and Portugal) were cut, or abolished altogether, while eligibility conditions were made stricter. Cost containment in health care was introduced to eliminate waste and inefficiencies, e.g. as regards spending on pharmaceuticals. However, funding cuts often disrupted services, while co-payments and other user charges raised barriers to access.

As the recession deepened, austerity policies seemed to become harsher. In Greece, under the 2013–2014 spending review, aimed at saving 5% of GDP in 2013 and a further 2.25% of GDP in 2014, massive cuts in social spending and increases in social contributions were identified as a key source of fiscal consolidation, providing 45% and 5% of total savings respectively (Matsaganis 2013). In Portugal, changes affected the guaranteed minimum income programme, one of the greatest innovations in southern European social policy in recent decades: changing eligibility rules (mainly by adopting a less generous equivalence scale), while keeping the minimum threshold unchanged in nominal terms (as in 2008), was estimated to reduce both the number of people claiming benefit and the mean transfer per person, resulting in a 45% reduction in the total cost of transfers under the programme (Rodrigues 2013).

The Future of the Welfare State

Reports of the Welfare State’s imminent dismantle-ment seem greatly exaggerated: after all, this is an
institution absorbing between one quarter and one third of national income in all Europe, including the northern Mediterranean where social spending in recent years rapidly converged to the European average. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the austerity has reduced the supply of social protection, just as the recession has raised the demand for it to historical highs.

Furthermore, even though the “retrenchment” of some social programmes can certainly be viewed as necessary to eliminate inequalities in treatment, and hence to “recalibrate” the Welfare State towards new social risks and in favour of less protected categories, a certain asymmetry can easily be identified. Cuts have been deep and systematic, but reforms that restore equity as well as efficiency have been pursued less consistently, while measures to strengthen the social safety net have been rare (Ascoli & Pavolini 2012).

With the IMF acknowledging the need for policies to encourage growth, enthusiasm for austerity seems to be waning. But countries like Greece stand little chance of returning to the carefree days of “borrow and spend.”

There is little doubt that the austerity has reduced the supply of social protection, just as the recession has raised the demand for it to historical highs.

In any case, the survival of the Welfare State in the northern Mediterranean, as everywhere else, will depend on the capacity of domestic actors to design social policies that can meet the “traditional” needs of the poor, the unemployed, the sick, the old, as well as the “new” needs of youth, women, immigrants, non-standard workers and others; and at the same time to convince taxpayers (and voters) that helping pay for such policies is consistent with the “common good,” and the requirements of a prosperous and dynamic economy.

This is likely to prove far from easy – but is certainly not impossible.

References


The Mediterranean is experiencing a process of structural transformation, which is severely affecting its respective societies. The changes are the result of popular uprisings in the Arab world and of economic and financial crisis in the eurozone, and could be viewed as a failure of both the State and the market – in the way they function – and therefore their respective political systems: the autocratic and corrupt Arab regimes and the ‘generous’ clientelistic, inefficient and corrupt European Welfare State, combined with inadequately monitored mechanisms and banking systems. Yet, these two poles, the State and the market, constitute the borders that determine the space of civil society activism: the critical sphere of voluntary associative life between the citizens and the State, which is separate from the market and beyond family and clan affiliations. Civil associations and activists have therefore emerged as key actors, whether leading the developments, like in Tunisia and Egypt, or responding to the pressures and hardships that their respective societies have been burdened with, like in Greece, Italy and Spain. The new scenario has certainly had a profound effect on these associations. They are facing severe challenges, but, depending on their character and expertise, these can be opportunities to reinforce their role and amend the framework they operate in.

Civil Society in the Mediterranean

Although a Western notion, civil society has found roots and flourished on both sides of the Mediterranean. While societal and historical development has determined the state of civil society, ideational factors, i.e. secular, liberal and religious approaches, influence the debate on its function and role, even with regard to the norms and values that it serves. Indeed, because of their varying historical entanglements with state-making and their contemporary experience with authoritarian regimes (like Greece, Spain and Portugal), the level of activism, organisation and social involvement differs among the southern European countries, and even more widely with those of the North and the countries from the former communist bloc. Not all fields of action are developed equally, such as, for example, the required know-how. Nevertheless, on the European side, civil associations enjoy a secure environment in which to function – provided by the State and protected by a clearly articulated legal framework –, funding mechanisms, access to a diverse media network, a shared conviction about their role in society and, therefore, a regulated channel of communication with the authorities at the local, national and EU level. Nonetheless, and notwithstanding the state of underdevelopment in certain areas, civil associations can be problematic, becoming part of the political establishment itself. In these cases they either serve as a Trojan horse for irrelevant purposes and activities (like in the case of many NGOs), or become organically linked to other establishments (like in the case of labour unions to particular political formations), thereby diminishing their credibility and effectiveness.
In the Middle East, although civil associations were primarily introduced during the colonial era, the Arab nationalist/reformist regimes were not favourable to independent civic activity and they were therefore either banned, severely repressed or brought under tight state control — thereby becoming a tool for autocratic governments. It was only in the late 1970s, under the pretext of economic and political liberalism, that civil associations began to flourish. This impressive proliferation was not evident in all sectors and rarely independent of the State. In fact, they continued to function in a legally insecure environment, with interventionism, harassment and oppression constituting the major obstacles to their effective management. Variations with regard to freedom of association meant that there was an unequal presence of all kinds of associations (including political parties, labour unions and even pro-democratic and human rights institutions), and so civil society remained fairly underdeveloped, inexperienced and localised. It was predominantly comprised of service-oriented and pro-status quo institutions, advocating conservative reforms, and with an overwhelming presence of Islamic organisations. The growing presence of secular associations resulted in a deep polarisation and a lack of coherence, as they did not share the same vision with the Islamists regarding the social and political transformation of their respective societies. They did, however, share access to the media, albeit limited, and potential for growth, through alternative funding, networking capabilities, and alternative communication venues.¹

The role of civil associations in the Arab Spring was vital — either through their active presence, like in Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan, or, indeed, through their absence, like in Libya and Syria

The elections demonstrated the appeal of the Islamic groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Ennahda in Tunisia and the Justice and Development Party in Morocco, over the disorganised secular groupings, who do not enjoy the same nationwide networks as the Islamists. What they do continue to enjoy are the ‘public squares,’ a continued, strong appeal among activists against their governments’ perceived mischief. The result is ongoing mistrust and tension between the two poles with regard to the future of their political systems, in the context of rapidly deteriorating economies, rising unemployment, dried-up investments, but at the same time, high expectations for the current political transition.²

The crisis in the Euromed zone has had a profound effect on the political and social environment: the political and economic systems have been discredited, the ‘Welfare’ State has literary gone bankrupt, unemployment is skyrocketing and the economy is in deep recession. In response, the political elite have resorted to harsh austerity measures, rapid reforms, a restructuring of the public sector and its bureaucracy (including within the EU) and also a revision of the labour market’s framework — hence, civil rights, and in some cases even human rights, were threatened or violated. Regardless of the effectiveness of these measures, this was a top-to-bottom process, where the political system’s performance in communicating the reality, and initiating debate with the various stakeholders, was poor, therefore constituting a certain democratic deficit. Elections did not help, neither did they produce new ideas, hence, the overall result was an angry reaction and riots from

various segments of society, but also polarisation, extremism and xenophobia — immigrants were the first group to be affected by the crisis, thereby triggering reversed migration. Widespread despair took root, jeopardising the social fabric. Finally, although not a direct effect of the crisis, access to public spaces (physical ones, cyberspace and media), is increasingly limited because they are being taken over by powerful private commercial interests; institutions with their own, in many cases, ambiguous agenda.

Challenges and Opportunities

The abovementioned circumstances had a direct effect on how civil associations functioned, generating obstacles, but also opportunities, and laying down the challenge to adapt creatively to the new reality, especially with regard to the following:

- Funding: the process deprived many of vital resources (public funding, sponsorship and donations), especially affecting smaller local associations. Diversity of funding, however, is an option to explore, with European funding remaining consistent and concern over democratisation attracting international donors (in the case of the South). Moreover, they have been able to increase their efficiency and capacity with regards to funding, turn to other business models and explore new innovative ideas to develop sustainable practices.

- Voice range: this is essential for civil associations to communicate their messages and actions to the wider public. The crisis in Europe affected the media’s capability in this area, while in the Middle East, the media is freer to perform this role; although it is still in an evolutionary stage. On both sides, alternative resources, like social media, offer a credible solution, allowing groups to develop their own communications networks, as well as interact extensively with other organisations. Likewise, the cost of relevant personnel (advertising and communications experts) and campaigns is reduced, with the availability of more efficient approaches.

- Engagement with the public: while unemployment created a complex setting, i.e. more available skilled volunteers, but diminishing morale and income, the crisis and the uprisings in North Africa mobilised a wider segment of the population to engage in different ways, increasing the demands for civil associations to provide services and support and take on a more active political role.

- Advocacy: interaction with policy-makers has been reduced, as they are locked into other priorities. The Finance ministry is now entrusted with managing these issues, hence the language of discourse is filled with economic terminology (return on investment, cost-benefit analysis, business plans), which the groups must also adopt. Meanwhile, there is an awareness of civil associations’ usefulness in implementing certain policies and achieving aims in the public sector. So, their role as intermediaries and policy advisors has been reinforced – an asset which threatens to jeopardise their legitimacy if not handled collectively and carefully.

Civil society’s strength depends on: (a) its thematic diversity and its broad geographic allocation; (b) its ability to mobilise a large segment of the population; (c) members acquiring specialised knowledge and vital skills (fund raising, project development, communication capacity), professionalism and effectiveness; and (d) members being active citizens rather than passive voters. To rise up to these challenges, civil associations have to meet certain conditions:

- They need to work collectively, nationally and regionally, applying extensive networking strategies in order to:
  - reach the widest possible constituency.
  - deal more effectively with a complex, competitive and constantly changing environment.

3 For the impact of the crisis in Europe, see Institute for European Studies – Vrije Universiteit Brussel, The Impact of the Crisis on Civil Society Organisations in the E.U. Risks and Opportunities, Brussels, European Economic and Social Committee, January 2013.

4 A number of notions and ideas mentioned here are the result of exchanging opinions with several stakeholders, yet especially with Dr. Richard Shoton, head of the British National Network of the Anna Lindh Foundation.
multiply the body of information, links and contacts, yet also ideas and practices from diverse fields.

- To maintain their credibility, they need to collectively 'clean up their mess,' i.e. develop and apply a code of conduct and mechanisms to block and expose the function of 'fake' institutions that are irrelevant to the cause.

- They must maintain or sufficiently develop the key attributes of civil society, i.e. their autonomy (from the State, enterprises or political formations), the predominance of liberal and democratic norms and values, and a protective and operational legal framework.

- They need to constantly acquire, maintain and disseminate useful skills, professionalism and effectiveness, yet also secure the means for highly specialised knowledge.

- Although idealism is an essential feature of civil associations, to successfully maintain and further promote their role as intermediaries between the State and its citizens, they need to display pragmatism and flexibility, avoiding any ideological rigidity, in both the ideas that are put forward as well as their application.

Undoubtedly this is an opportunity to restructure the relationship between civil associations and policy makers, to reshape the political framework for civil society to perform not only a monitoring role, but also a more productive policy-oriented one. In the absence of creative and credible political formations, they can lead the way to a new 'social contract' for participatory, accountable democratic governance. The circumstances and the perceptions on the role of civil society are to its benefit, so civil associations can rely on the support of key global actors (although they should also work hard to maintain that). However, this is a continuous process and not an end game, and needs continuous evaluation, revision and enrichment if civil associations are to maintain their credibility and their bond to a critical mass and thereby uphold their pivotal role in Mediterranean societies.
For more than two decades, Turkey has enjoyed relative political stability and increasing economic growth. It has also introduced visa-free entry for citizens from many countries. In addition, in April 2013, a new and long-awaited “Law on Foreigners and International Protection” came into force that is characterised by a comparably humane and liberal approach. Finally, Turkey is virtually surrounded by troubled neighbours: the volatile regions of the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. This combination makes the country a logical destination for travellers, migrants and refugees both from these neighbouring countries and from many other parts of the world, including Somalia, Bangladesh and Algeria. Migration and refugee flows are not a new phenomenon in Turkey, but rather date back to Ottoman times (Latif, 2002). In the late 1970s, large numbers of refugees from Iran, many of them Bahá’í, began to arrive in Turkey, and there are now up to 100,000 of them. In 1991, around 460,000 Iraqi Kurds fled to Turkey, though almost all returned within six months. In 1992, 20,000 or so Bosnians and others arrived from the Balkans; they were followed, in 1999, by 18,000 Kosovar refugees. In addition, there are significant communities of Afghans, who number in the tens of thousands, some having relocated from Iran, and smaller groups of Armenians fleeing poverty and Uzbeks and Kyrgyz fleeing persecution. All of this shows that Turkey and its government and society have significant experience dealing with sometimes large-scale influxes of refugees. Meanwhile, the Turkish media, which in other European countries often fuels anxiety if not outright xenophobia, remains relatively prudent. What is most surprising, however, is the incredible social and political resilience shown with regard to these inflows; in most other European countries, they would normally cause a moral panic, but not in Turkey. So far, only a few incidents related to anti-migrant and anti-refugee sentiments have been reported, although the latest terrorist attack in May 2013 has increased anxiety.

Record Levels of Syrian and Other International Refugees

Most recently, in March 2011, when civil war broke out in Syria, the displaced populations fled to various, mostly neighbouring countries, as is usually the case in such conflicts. One of Syria’s neighbours is Turkey, which kept its borders relatively open to these people. In spring 2013, a total of 880,000 international refugees were registered by the UNHCR, although the actual total is assumed to be around 1.1 million; 230,000, or about one quarter, of these were registered in Turkey. Turkish sources cite much higher numbers and estimate that, so far, there are about 400,000 Syrian refugees in the country (UNHCR, 2013). About 190,000 of these refugees have been placed, mostly in tents, in 17 camps, some of which are huge, such as Ceylanpinar, which accommodates 28,000 people. However, the majority have been staying with friends or in rented private accommodation across the country, not least to have access to (irregular) employment. Meanwhile, the government has begun to register this group, too. Refugees have also been reported to be returning in significant numbers. Thus, the overall situation is rather fluid.
In January 2013, 32,900 new refugees were registered. During the first eight months of 2012, around 12,000 asylum seekers of other nationalities arrived, almost twice as many as during the same period the previous year. Turkey is thus once again facing a significant influx of refugees from several crisis regions, including Syria, but also Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq and Somalia, as well as migrants from sub-Saharan countries, the Maghreb and Morocco.

What is most surprising, however, is the incredible social and political resilience shown with regard to these inflows; in most other European countries, they would normally cause a moral panic, but not in Turkey. The Turkish Red Crescent and the Prime Minister’s Disaster and Emergency Management Directorate (AFAD) have provided food, shelter, education (including access to universities) and basic medical services to Syrian refugees. By January 2013, the cost of this aid amounted to €1 billion (Hürriyet, 12/03/2013); by December 2012, the EU had spent €313 million – a third of what Turkey had spent – of which only €25 million went to Turkey to cover a meagre 2.5% of its total costs (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, 24/12/2012), not much considering that Turkey is an EU candidate country. So far, the EU has refused to resettle refugees in the EU to offer relief to Turkey, as several actors have suggested. Only Germany, on 15 March 2013, two years after the mass displacements began, has announced that it would accept 5,000 Syrian refugees, a mere 0.45% of the total or a drop in the ocean. Canada has likewise agreed to resettle 5,000 refugees of other nationalities from Turkey to free resources to tackle the Syrian refugee crisis.

**Changing Transit Migration Routes and Practices in the EU**

Turkey, as Europe’s most southern and eastern outpost, has long been not only a destination country for migrants and refugees but also a major point of departure for people aspiring to move to the EU. Some intend solely to transit through Turkey from the very outset of their journey, while others move on after spending time in Turkey, driven by constraints in the country and drawn by the opportunities in the EU. On the one hand, there is the much lamented geographic limitation of Turkey’s asylum law, which excludes non-European asylum seekers from refugee status in Turkey, the dispersal of asylum seekers to so-called satellite cities, the overcrowded camps (notably, those for Syrian refugees), the long waiting periods and the somewhat unfavourable employment and housing conditions. On the other hand, the proximity to Greece and, thus, the EU, the images of better asylum systems and employment opportunities, and the well-functioning and relatively affordable human-smuggling systems encourage on-migration. Thus, some Turkish conditions function as deterrents to staying in the country, whilst other real or imagined conditions in the EU act as additional incentives to leave.

The specific routes and practices, however, are constantly changing, usually in response to the EU’s, other Mediterranean countries’ and Turkey’s border control politics, but also as a result of the smuggling services on offer. Since other routes through Morocco, Libya and the Ukraine have been successively closed, the transit route through Turkey is now the main route left. Overall, irregular migration fell from 92,000 in 2001 to 44,000 in 2011 (Turkish National Police, 2013). In 2008 and 2009, the Aegean coast was the main point of departure from Turkey, and Izmir was the main hub; from there people moved to the Greek islands, on to Athens and then to other countries. In the second half of 2010, Turkish authorities began to intensify controls, and irregular migration in the Aegean faded out. Instead, migration – and with it, the smuggling operations – shifted to the north-western land border between Turkey and Greece; Istanbul, already the main destination of migrants and refugees, became a hub for these movements. In 2011, however, Turkey reopened an immigration detention and deportation centre in Edirne, partly funded by the EU under a UK-Turkish twinning project. Additionally, in April 2012, at least one major raid was conducted in the border regions, sending strong signals to smugglers that the land route was going
to be tackled. At the same time, in 2012, Greece finished building a 12-kilometre fence on its northeastern land border with Turkey; in July, it also sent an additional 1,800 troops to Thrace ("Operation Aspida") to control its land and river borders with Turkey.

The EU had spent €313 million – a third of what Turkey had spent – of which only €25 million went to Turkey to cover a meagre 2.5% of its total costs, not much considering that Turkey is an EU candidate country.

In summer 2012, the route once again swung back to the Aegean coast. With it came the smuggling services, though on a much smaller scale. There are increasing reports of refugee arrivals on the Greek islands of Rhodes, Symi, Leros, Samos and Lesvos. Whilst according to figures from February 2013, arrests in the Evros region were down 95% from the previous year, from 6,000 in June 2012 to just 65 in January 2013, arrivals on the Greek islands began to rise again from 161 in August 2011 to 397 in August 2012. A smaller route runs from Turkey through Bulgaria and Serbia to Hungary, where it merges with another route of onward migration from Greece to other EU countries. In total, however, irregular entries from Turkey to Greece, which peaked in 2011 at 55,000, were down 50% in the third quarter of 2012 (Frontex, 2012a and b). Finally, according to ad hoc observations, irregular migrants and refugees are also returning to Istanbul in small numbers; this is due to the deterioration of the situation in Greece in combination with the blocking of onward routes.

**Maritime Disasters**

On 6 September 2012, disaster struck a boat carrying 103 refugees that was due to depart from Izmir, Turkey. The boat was bound for the Greek islands of Samos and Lesvos, just opposite Izmir and a mere two to three hours away. According to reports, there were many more people waiting on the beach than places on the boat. A struggle broke out, and the smugglers apparently panicked, locked up the boat and tried to leave. But the boat was thrown onto the rocks and sank. Whilst the people on deck could be rescued, those locked below, some 60 altogether, drowned. This seemed to be the first tragedy of its kind and scale on the Aegean coast since 2010.

One day later, on 7 September, more boats were apprehended by the Turkish coast guard. The first boat, an inflatable dinghy, had left from somewhere in Bozburun near Marmaris and was on its way to the Greek island of Symi. It was allegedly sinking when the coast guard apprehended it. There were 39 people on board, mostly Palestinians, according to different accounts, as well as some Iranians and Afghans, including men, women, one of whom was pregnant, and children. A second boat was apprehended near Didim, south of Izmir. It was carrying 28 people, alleged to be Palestinians, Burmans and two Ivorians. And on 8 September, a boat with 36 people was apprehended by the Turkish coast guard near Kucukkuyu, north of Izmir, in the waters between mainland Turkey and Lesvos, Greece (all figures are taken from various news reports).

**Syrian Refugees Also Seek Entry to the EU**

Syrian refugees are also amongst those crossing over to the EU, or attempting to do so, notably to Greece; in 2012, they were the second largest group. Many seem to have relatives in the EU. Nevertheless, only a tiny proportion, 25,000 or 2.5%, of all Syrian refugees have made it to the EU to apply for asylum. In February 2013, a Greek NGO reporting from Mytilene noted that more and more Syrian refugees were arriving, including a family of 16 refugees, including 11 children, arrested by the coast guard on Lesbos on 3 February, as well as a group of 51 nationals, among them families with children and babies, who arrived on Chios on 24 February. These refugees were often said to be Palestinians from Syria suffering another displacement. Such refugees are normally categorised as “illegal immigrants,” and the Greek police and coast guards, with support from Frontex, the EU border
control agency, try to prevent them from entering. For instance, on 8 December 2012, *The Guardian* reported that one night on the Evros River border, about 100 Syrians along with some other refugees were unlawfully and forcefully returned to Turkey. According to NGO reports from Mytilene, those who are detained in Greece, have reported terrible, humiliating conditions that are an insult to their human dignity.

Most of the victims of the 6 September maritime disaster were also said to be Syrians, primarily families. In March 2013, another nine Syrians from Aleppo, five of them minors, went missing whilst crossing the Aegean from Dikili (Turkey) to Mytilene (Greece). Hence, some who survived the civil war in Syria have died whilst trying to escape to the safety of the EU.

**Syrian and Other Refugees Sandwiched between Turkey and the EU**

To conclude, use of the irregular migration and refugee route in the eastern Mediterranean through Turkey decreased significantly in 2012, mostly due to tightened controls in Greece, but also due to some measures taken in Turkey. At the same time, the influx of Syrian and other refugees to Turkey peaked and the refugee population reached record levels. Turkey hosts several hundred thousand refugees and other persons of concern. Although the country is thus shouldering a significant responsibility, the EU’s contribution to a humane solution is limited. Instead, the EU has preferred to fortify its borders and fund Turkey’s detention facilities. As a consequence, the country has finally become the “buffer State” so often predicted.

**Sources**


Border Management in the Euromed Region: Between Upgrade and Collapse

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Ever since the first revolutionary spark in Sidi Bouzid in Tunisia in December 2010, the Euromed region has been going through turbulent times – with no end in sight. The regime changes in North Africa, the civil war in Syria, and the severe economic crisis in the southern Member States of the European Union had, and have to this day, dramatic consequences on the political, economic and security level of the whole region, which in turn influences migration patterns and routes. It has also brought about a shift in paradigm for the border management of several Mediterranean countries, even though, at first glance, one might be tempted to conclude that not too much has changed in this particular field.

When the European Commission called upon the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) at the end of 2011 to brief a team of EU experts on the border situation in Libya, this task was initially met with some hesitation: the country had been ravaged by war, Gaddafi was history, and a new power, or rather, taking the clan system into account, new powers were in place. How relevant could information collected in 2010\(^1\) possibly be? Still quite relevant, as it turned out: the structural problems were exactly the same as before, including poorly demarcated border lines, overlapping mandates of the border agencies, insufficiently trained and equipped officers, as well as the absence of standard operating procedures, profiling, and any form of operational risk analysis which deserved the name.

The novelty lay elsewhere, as a closer look revealed, namely in the breakdown of communication lines. In the case of Libya this was particularly severe, where personnel changes and the differing allegiances of the responsible ministries further undermined the already limited inter-agency cooperation which had previously existed. Other North African states face this problem, predominantly in their external dimension, where – despite their readily declared willingness to work together – the loss of trusted counterparts and the cessation of international agreements is seriously hampering formal as well as informal cross-border cooperation and information exchange.

Breakdown of Cross-Border Cooperation and Shift of Focus towards Fighting Terrorism in North Africa

The transition in Tunisia could not be more different to the one in Libya – although it also reduced its national border management system to a shadow of its former self. Having already had to cope with modest means in terms of equipment and infrastructure, the situation got significantly worse after the revolution, when numerous cars, buildings and even two radar stations were set on fire. An outsider might consider this collateral damage of the general unrest, but Tunisian border guards attribute it to the machinations of criminal groups, who used the public upheaval to expand their activities and undermine the work of the law enforcement agencies.

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This directly points to the second important development in North Africa in recent years: a substantial increase in organised crime and terrorist activities, facilitated by the hardly controllable desert border of the Sahara and fuelled by the revolutionary unrest in the region, the weakening of governmental authorities in some countries, as well as the massive influx of heavy weapons after the Libyan war. This deterioration of the overall security situation led to a shift in focus from migration control to the fight against terrorism among the border agencies of several North African states.

Middle East: Extremely Permeable and Highly Politicised Borders in a State of Emergency

Border management in the eastern part of the Mediterranean is currently dominated by the civil war in Syria, with its massive cross border movements of Syrians looking for protection in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, as well as the spill-over effects of its military operations. In general, the borders of the Middle East must be described as highly politicised, poorly demarcated, partly contested, partly UN-defined, and at the same time very permeable, all of which turns border management in this region into an extremely challenging task – even outside of an emergency situation.

The loss of trusted counterparts and the cessation of international agreements is seriously hampering formal as well as informal cross-border cooperation and information exchange

If one takes centrally-located Lebanon as an example, one finds its northern and north-eastern border with Syria characterised by “ant-trade,” the regular small-scale smuggling of everyday commodities and consumer goods. Since the border communities depend on this trade for their livelihood, attempts of border agencies to introduce tighter controls are usually met with fierce resistance and sometimes even violence. The eastern border is dominated by the biggest land border crossing point of the Middle East, Masna’a, situated on the trading route between Turkey, Damascus and the port of Beirut. Like most of the other legal crossing points (several illegal ones exist) it is currently still located a few kilometres inland, with some 3,000 people living between the checkpoint and the actual border line. Upgrades in infrastructure, equipment and control procedures are foreseen and highly necessary, because, as one expert puts it: “Why should anybody today go through the trouble of physically smuggling goods like weapons or drugs over the land border, when Masna’a is actually wide open?”

“Wide open” is also the right term to describe other borders in this sub-region, including the situation in the Lebanon’s Bekaa area, where Palestinian camps lie directly at the border line and where it is therefore hard to tell who or what enters on one side of the camp and exits at the other.

EU: Fight of Irregular Migration through Technological Upgrades and Facilitation of Legitimate Travel

The borders of the European Union (EU), with their Schengen regime, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (Frontex), and their capacity to deploy Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABIT) in urgent and exceptional situations, are characterised by uniform procedures, state-of-the-art equipment and overall high standards. Nevertheless the EU is making sizeable efforts to further enhance border controls and step up its fight against irregular migration. Here the European Commission puts particular emphasis on its southern Mediterranean coast, where the “mass influx” of migrants arrived after leaving North Africa during the revolutions of 2011.

An important pillar of these efforts is the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), which not only aims at reducing the number of irregular immigrants entering the EU by enhancing and linking intelligence and surveillance tools, but also at saving more lives at sea by increasing the border agencies’ monitoring and search and rescue capacities. EUROSUR goes hand in hand with a massive investment in technology, including networks and
databases, but also hardware like radar stations and possibly even — though very controversial — unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), aka “drones.”

The European Commission puts particular emphasis on its southern Mediterranean coast, where the “mass influx” of migrants arrived after leaving North Africa during the revolutions of 2011.

Also the Smart Borders Package, which was presented by the European Commission at the beginning of this year, has at its heart the fight against illegal immigration, e.g. through the planned Entry/Exit System (EES), which registers 3rd country nationals when entering and leaving the EU. But at the same time it also supports the second important goal of the border management system of the EU: facilitating the border crossing procedure for legitimate travellers, including those who are not nationals of an EU Member State. To this effect the development of a Registered Traveller Programme (RTP) is foreseen, which will allow certain groups of frequent travellers to enter the EU via simplified border checks.

Very Diverse, but Strongly Interrelated Systems, with a Renewed Focus on International Cooperation

A bird’s eye view of border management in the Euromed region reveals inhomogeneous systems with varying interests and very different challenges to address. Overshadowed by armed conflict and marked by the consequences of the Arab Spring, the systems in North Africa and the Middle East are today significantly more vulnerable than only a few years ago, with an increase in terrorism and organised crime being one of the primary concerns. At the same time the EU, its focus remaining firmly on the fight against irregular migration, is trying to compensate for the loss of control on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea, by heavily investing in technology and working towards an improved coordination and communication among its Member States.

Different as the current situation and circumstances may be, there is however common ground. Changes in the migratory situation in the South or East invariably impact on the North, and an economic downturn in the euro region, for example, could push a Mediterranean state, which so far has predominantly been a country of origin or transit, towards becoming a country of destination. In other words: as far as migration is concerned, the countries of the Euromed region have a common destiny. In practical terms, in the case of border management, this means that the EU wishes for reliable partners who have a functioning border management system in place and can share relevant information in a timely manner. The other states of the region, on the other hand, can profit from the EU’s experience as well as its high technical and operational standards. It is therefore no wonder that the interregional cooperation in the field of border management, which had suffered during the Arab Spring, is high on the international agenda again, and, as the coming years will show, about to be considerably increased.
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The Mediterranean region is made up of countries with a wide range of social and economic conditions and institutions. While there are differences between all the countries, we can distinguish between those of the northern and southern rims, which are also separated by cultural differences. Over the past two years, the world turned its attention to the Southern Mediterranean Countries (SMC), as revolts have spread from western North Africa to the Middle East. Referred to collectively as the “Arab Spring,” these social revolutions aimed to overthrow the establishment and achieve better economic conditions and greater social and civil rights. The political changes that followed have fulfilled the demonstrators’ expectations only in part, as can be seen, for example, in the reactions to the murder of dissident Chokri Belaïd in Tunisia and in the public demonstrations against President Morsi in Egypt.

An examination of the demographic changes that have taken place in recent decades in this part of the Mediterranean can be very helpful in explaining the events described above, as social, institutional, economic, and demographic processes are closely interrelated.

Demographic Transitions in the Major Southern Mediterranean Countries

Significant demographic changes have occurred in the SMCs in recent decades, but these changes represent only a small part of the wider transformations that started in these countries in the 1950s according to the “demographic transition” paradigm. In Europe, the demographic transition began in the early 19th century in some countries, and then it spread to the rest of the continent. The exception was France, where it started even earlier. In the SMCs, the transition started in the 1950s with declines in mortality, and these reductions were followed by decreases in fertility. Particularly interesting are the declining paths of fertility, which — with their different starting points and different rates of progress — were responsible for the very high population growth in these countries.

While it is obvious how increases in longevity arising from medical and socio-sanitary improvements could be implemented in and assimilated by societies, this is not the case for the reduction in family size, which is primarily an individual matter that depends on biological and medical factors only to a very limited extent. If we look at the fertility transitions in five major SMCs — Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey — while using the reduction in the number of births as the key variable in the transition process, we find that Egypt and Turkey, which had similar fertility levels in the first half of the 1950s, with an average number of children per woman (in technical terms, a total fertility rate, or TFR) of 6.37 and 6.30, respectively, were the first to reduce their fertility. However, while Turkey exhibited a continuous decline, the fertility dynamics in Egypt underwent alternating periods of accelerated and moderate decreases. In the Maghreb region, the reductions in fertility took place first in Tunisia, then in Morocco, and finally, in the second half of the 1970s, in Algeria. Today, after an overall process of convergence toward the critical threshold of 2.1 children per woman — i.e., the level...
at which, in low-mortality regimes, generations are just able to replace themselves — the TFR in Tunisia has dropped below that level (1.99 in 2006), and the values in Turkey are only slightly higher (2.17 in 2007). Meanwhile, the total fertility rate has declined to 2.27 (2006) in Algeria, to 2.33 (2005) in Morocco, and to 3.09 (2006) in Egypt. Thus, the TFRs in these countries are converging with the levels observed in the countries of the northern rim. It should be noted that the speed at which these intensity changes have occurred in these countries is rather surprising, given their long-standing resistance to reductions in fertility.

The final important demographic trend that must be considered is the postponement of childbearing, a process which has been unfolding in all of the larger countries of the area, but with very different intensities and timeframes.

This decline was caused in large part by the rapid spread of contraception in the region, as modern birth control methods became almost as widely available in these countries as they are in the European countries of the northern rim. According to the latest available data, birth control methods are currently being used by over 60% of the couples in a stable union in Egypt and in the three countries in the Maghreb region, and by 73% of couples in Turkey. To a greater extent than even in Italy and Spain, the forms of contraception used in these countries are primarily modern, reversible methods for women. In particular, the pill is especially widespread in Algeria and Morocco, while the intrauterine device (IUD) is particularly common in Egypt and Tunisia. However, traditional and male methods continue to be used in Turkey.

When we look at union formation, another important demographic and social factor that directly influences fertility, we can see that, while couples have always legalised their unions by marriage in these countries, the data clearly show a tendency toward later entry into marriage. Unions are formed especially late in Algeria, as only a very small percentage of women between the ages of 15 and 24 (1.8% at ages 15-19 and 16.1% at ages 20-24 in 2002) are married. Algeria is the southern-rim country in which the increase in the singulate mean age at marriage, a measure of the mean age at first marriage, has been the sharpest (rising 8.4 years between 1977 and 2002, to 29.5). The situation is similar in Tunisia, where a trend toward later nuptiality relative to the other countries of the southern rim was identified in the 1970s (the singulate mean age at marriage was 22.6, and only 10.4% of women between the ages of 15 and 19 were married). By contrast, in Morocco, unions were formed particularly early at the beginning of the 1970s (the singulate mean age at marriage was 19.1 years in 1971, and 30.9% of women between the ages of 15 and 19 were married), while today marriages are postponed until much later (in 2004 the singulate mean age at marriage was 26.4 years, and almost 11% of women aged 15-19 and 37% of women aged 20-24 were married).

In Turkey and Egypt, by contrast, women continue to marry earlier: the singulate mean age at marriage has risen only slightly since the 1970s, and today is 23.4 in Turkey and 23.0 in Egypt. In these two countries, 12 women out of 100 between the ages of 15 and 19 are married, as are around half of women between the ages of 20 and 24. However, the changes that have taken place in the institution of marriage appear to be far more profound than it is possible to describe using these data alone, especially if we consider that a rapidly increasing number of women are remaining unmarried.

The final important demographic trend that must be considered is the postponement of childbearing, a process which has been unfolding in all of the larger countries of the area, but with very different intensities and timeframes.

In the early 1970s, most births in these countries occurred before woman reached the age of 30 (on average, more than three children), with a greater frequency between the ages of 25 and 29, except in Turkey where the fertility calendar was set earlier. The rate today is only 1.95 children born to women under the age of 30, except in Egypt, where the rate is higher.

In Algeria, where the timing of fertility is currently much more similar to that of the countries of the northern rim than to that of the other countries in the
region, the process of childbearing postponement has been especially intense, and the changes in the timing of fertility were already evident in the mid-1980s. In Tunisia, fertility is low among women under age 25, and it is concentrated between the ages of 25 and 34, in which group 60.3% of the total fertility rate cumulates. The postponement of births from younger to older ages also seems to have been occurring in Morocco and in Tunisia since the mid-1980s. When a marked increase in the labour supply exceeds the domestic demand for labour because economic growth is too slow, the result is either migratory pressure or high unemployment and low wages, which can cause social instability.

By contrast, changes in the fertility schedules in Egypt and in Turkey, which tend to be similar, did not begin until the 1990s. Thus, childbearing still occurs early in Egypt, and especially in Turkey, where more than 70% of births occur before the age of 30, and over 60% are concentrated between the ages of 20 and 30.

A Wider Look at Societal Changes

When we look at the major SMCs, we can see that, while demographic changes are occurring to different degrees and with different timeframes, the most distinctive characteristics (a reduction in the intensity and the postponement of fertility made possible by efficient contraception) of the “second demographic transition,” the new demographic regime already in place in Europe, have emerged. European countries underwent the first demographic transition and then moved into the second demographic transition, a process that is made possible by the increasing autonomy of individuals, especially women, from the constraints imposed by the family of origin and religious traditions.

In Europe, the modernisation of demographic behaviours had to wait until certain economic and social transformations had occurred. It was not until the 1970s, in the wake of the 1968 revolutions and the passage of legislation on families and civil rights, that the necessary factors for full modernisation were in place.

Younger generations in North Africa, especially in the region of the Maghreb, have, as a result of their geographical and cultural proximity to certain European countries and frequent migrations, embarked on their own social and cultural path, which favoured the assimilation and transformation of new demographic behaviours and anticipated the other societal transformations. The revolts of these young people in the last two years are reminiscent of the 1968 protests of young Europeans, but they are occurring in a much more complex framework, as the political and religious conditions of these countries have created a rigid system strongly opposed to personal autonomy and civil rights.

Finally, we should not forget that such revolts often involve economic demands. These economic concerns must be seen, once again, in the context of the demographic transformations. In the countries of the southern Mediterranean, the demographic transition has led to high population growth and a rapid increase in the working-age population. When a marked increase in the labour supply exceeds the domestic demand for labour because economic growth is too slow, the result is either migratory pressure or high unemployment and low wages, which can cause social instability.

The adjustments in the political, economic, and legislative systems demanded by the young protestors have so far failed to materialise. The achievement of these goals will take some time, but seems inevitable over the longer term.

Bibliography


Staging the North African Transition: Theatrical Productions since the Arab Spring

Although difficult, the period since the 2010 uprisings and the start of the Arab Spring has been fertile for North African culture. Theatre and performance in particular have proved themselves successful at capturing snapshots of a population in the midst of historic changes. A generation of young, daring writers and artists are increasingly turning to the stage as a means to create social dialogue and open spaces of contestation and subversion. Through the prism of performance, the public is able to discuss sensitive issues such as female sexuality, religion and corruption, and to challenge hegemonic discourses on identity and history. A quick look at the cultural agendas for the year 2013 shows the dynamism of a medium whose death has been announced many times. A number of new festivals have been created, and theatre companies are investing new spaces in cultural centres to reach new audiences. In Egypt, the recent National Theatre festival selected a large variety of plays, offering different viewpoints on the political and social situation. In Morocco, the festival ‘Théâtre et Cultures’ was this year held around the themes of tolerance, freedom of expression and women’s rights.

There has traditionally been a trend of ‘engaged art’ in North Africa, and the Arab Spring events have inspired many; as comments Nehad Selaiha, “theatre thrives on conflict, (…) it flourishes most in times of deep crisis and stormy transitional periods when it becomes a force of change” (Selaiha, 2013). However, it is concerning that the dynamism of North African theatre is being framed within a fixed discourse about the Arab Spring rather than as part of a wider movement towards democratisation and liberalisation of speech.

Making History: The Revolution on Stage

Theatre has proved to be a particularly efficient medium to help North Africans come to terms with the events of the Arab Spring. In Egypt, several plays directly represented the uprisings on stage. Sondos Shabayek’s *Tahrir Monologues* created an effective catharsis by using the testimony of a young actor who had been captured by Mubarak’s forces, as well as by inviting the audience to pay tribute to the martyrs of the Revolution. The show thus helped both audience and actors to look back on the chaotic aftermath of Mubarak’s fall, and establish a dialogue with one another, creating a sense of unity in a chaotic context.

Laila Soliman’s series of performances, *No time for art* is also an interesting reflection on revolution and culture. This project started in 2011 and it mirrors Egypt’s transition: the first performances were meant as a call for the International Criminal Court to investigate the death of many young protesters, while the more recent ones criticise the violence of the military system which still rules over Egypt. It also proves that in times of crisis, art can play a crucial role by creating an effect of catharsis, and helping both audience and actors to navigate through the traumatic events of the Arab Spring.

A recent Tunisian play entitled *Macbeth, Leila and Ben: a Bloody Story* (2012), directed by Lofti Achour, reprises the popular Shakespeare play and depicts the Ben Ali era, amid corruption, torture, and greed. The play starts with the question “How many Mac-
baths do we have in the Arab world?” and goes on to document the fall of the regime. It also addresses the widespread disappointment that has surfaced post-Revolution, and asks if anything has changed at all in Tunisia since the fall of Ben Ali. The plays discussed here play a role in providing an independent documentary of the Revolutions from the eyes of the population, rather than through the lens of international media. Therefore, they help North Africans to reclaim their history and place the uprisings within a wider context of resistance, challenging the idea of an Arab ‘apathy.’

Theatre as an Exutory for a Disenfranchised Youth

In spite of the exhilarating demonstrations of 2011-2012, pressing issues remain for the youth: poverty, unemployment and corruption are the main culprits creating frustration and disenchantment. Theatre has become a space where they can safely ‘vent’ their anger, representing their daily lives as a way to raise awareness and create constructive dialogues with society. Throughout North Africa, there is a long tradition of performance addressing political issues and playing a role within the social fabric of the country. Khalid Amine describes storytellers of the past as journalists, historians, and commentators as well as entertainers, and “a means of spacing cultural identity” (2001: 56). Similarly, theatre makers of today, as well as other artists such as musicians in particular, create platforms of free, uncensored expression, allowing an alienated young generation to have a public voice.

The play “Feraoun” (2012) by Algerian playwright Boussahel Abdelmalek tells the story of a fallen dictator who meets a group of disaffected youths, who dream of the West. This encounter makes him realise the depth of the social injustice he contributed to create. The play cleverly discusses the issue of illegal immigration and the hogra (humiliation) felt by youth in their own country, and it is particularly pertinent in Algeria, where the regime has so far remained in place.

Dabateatr is probably one of the most groundbreaking theatre groups in Morocco: with their monthly arts and theatre festival in Rabat, called Daba Citoyen (The citizen of Now), they have established a sustained, regular theatre presence. Their methods also draw heavily on Boal and Brecht with an interactive, didactic approach. L’khbar fi masrah (The news through theatre) is the main attraction of the week long festival. It is an evening of theatre and improvisation inspired by current news, both local and international: the actors thus often address controversial issues such as corruption, sexuality or the elections, and then invite their audience to discuss and debate both on the content of the performances and on the role of theatre within social and political life. Humour is an essential tool here, as it makes it possible to discuss sensitive subjects that otherwise wouldn’t be addressed so openly. The format of L’khbar fi masrah makes it easy for the actors to respond to events in a dynamic and creative way, and to create sites of contestation in which the audience is invited to participate. Aomar Boum comments: “The frustration of the youth is released through the process of the festivalisation of dissent” (2012: 175). At the same time, these shows are co-opted by the authorities to prove their own openness and their respect of human rights; they serve to present North Africa, and Morocco more particularly, as a new haven of freedom and liberalism.

Challenging Hegemonic Identities: The Rise of Women and Cultural Minorities

North African women have always been victims of a double discrimination: they have been unable to access equal rights and opportunities at home, although this situation has improved in the last decade, and they are constantly described as submissive and powerless in international media. This state of affairs prevents them from having a strong public voice, and their creative work is often overlooked. The important role played by women in the protests of recent years has surprised many, but in the last decade the status of women and their visibility in the public sphere has greatly evolved, mainly thanks to the dynamism of civil society and women’s associations. Recent plays such as Dialy (2012) in Morocco, and Laila Soliman’s Spring Awakening (2010) in Egypt, based on Wedekind’s play, have managed to touch upon sensitive issues such as female sexuality, opening up a level of discussion never reached before.
Dialy, by feminist troupe Théâtre Aquarium in particular has created a real controversy because of its bold dialogues and the use of crude words to describe female genitalia. Freely inspired by Eva Ensler’s infamous play The Vagina Monologues, Dialy looks at the way Moroccan women refer to and address their bodies, and how they express themselves sexually. The creators of the play, Naima Zitane (director) and Maha Sano (writer), spent several months interviewing women of different backgrounds and compiled this information into a 30-minute show. The play has a cast of three actresses and discusses the complex relationship of women with their bodies and their right to a free sexual life.

There is also an increased visibility of minority groups, in particular through the use of Amazigh languages. In the wake of Independence, North African States defined their identity around Pan-Arabism, and alienated minority groups which they perceived as a threat. With the fall of the authoritarian regimes in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia, and a more tolerant climate, Amazigh movements throughout North Africa are now calling for recognition of their specific heritage. The 'Amazigh Renaissance,' which started a decade ago, is now blossoming into a real cultural and political force, and there are festivals dedicated to theatre and literature in Amazigh languages throughout North Africa, as well as political parties.

A Blooming Art Scene: Between Resistance and Co-optation

Since the start of the Arab Spring we have witnessed a real liberalisation of speech in North Africa, both on and off stage. The renewed dynamism of the youth, who for the first time have gained awareness of their political power as a collective voice, has benefited a booming art scene, with growing interest from art dealers like Christie’s and Sotheby’s and the organisation of a variety of biennales in the Arab world where North African artists featured prominently. Various festivals also invited a number of North African directors and performers to present their pieces in Europe, such as the Shubbak festival in London that featured performers from the Arab world. The downside of this popularity is that artists were asked to provide commentary to the Arab Spring very quickly, with no time to reflect, as well as create narratives focusing on hope and evolution, rather than a more nuanced reality.

Curator Omar Kholeif writes: “Writers, curators and editors are trying to capture, for better or for worse, the genesis of ‘revolutionary art’ through canon-forming curatorial frames.’ The uprisings thus led to a real co-optation of Arab artists who were given international coverage on the condition that they respond to the Western concept of the Arab Spring.

At the same time, there is no denying that the North African cultural scene has greatly evolved in the last few years: women now have a strong presence in every medium, in particular as theatre writers and directors, positions that were previously dominated by men. Theatre as a genre has been revitalised by its focus on relevant themes and by its social role as a mirror for countries in transition, well beyond the realm of entertainment. The events of the Arab Spring have brought attention to a number of talented artists from the region, and North Africa is under increasing focus from auction houses, collectors and art professionals, and is fast emerging as a lucrative new market.

Bibliography


Until the end of the 1990s, Turkish-Arab relations were often shaped by mutual distrust. Arabs remembered Turkey as the imperial hegemon dominating their lands under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Turks, on the other hand, kept alive memories of World War I, during which the Arabs refused to cooperate and ended up fighting against the Ottoman armies on the side of the Allied Forces. These non-favourable perceptions reflected upon politics. There was little in the way of notable regional co-operation between Turkey and key Arab nations such as Egypt or Syria. The objectives of diplomatic relations were to keep out of one another’s way and to maintain a stable relationship to avoid open confrontation. Most of the time, Turkey did not have a say, nor did it try to have one, in Middle Eastern affairs and conflicts, as long as they did not have immediate impacts upon Turkish interests.

A shift occurred slowly from the late 1990s onwards and accelerated after the AKP’s electoral victory in 2002, ushering in an era of economic and political co-operation. The most notable outcomes from the Turkish perspective have been dramatic increases in trade volumes, which grew as much as sixfold from 2002 to 2011; visa liberalisation with several countries, including Morocco, Tunisia, Lebanon and Jordan; and, among other things, joint cabinet meetings with Syria. All of this has added up to Turkey’s newly proclaimed leadership in the region.

The uncritical tone that dominated the Turkish foreign policy rhetoric of co-operation disappeared with the so-called Arab Spring. Turkish policymakers found themselves obliged to respond to the changes or otherwise face the risk of losing their relevance in the political landscape of the Middle East. Turkey quickly sided with the opposition forces in Egypt and Tunisia and, after some further deliberation, with those of Libya and Syria as well. Other Arab uprisings, such as those in Yemen and Bahrain, did not find their way into the mainstream of Turkish political rhetoric.

Currently, the turmoil of the transitions in Turkey’s neighbourhood makes it premature to estimate the future of the acclaimed Turkish leadership in the Middle East. It cannot be taken for granted that Turkey’s support for regime change in places such as Syria and Egypt will result in close relations with the new regimes, although there are signs that Turkey would have it so.

The political and economic aspects shaping this brief overview of Turkish-Arab relations have been taken up at length elsewhere. The focus here is on the relations in terms of cultural interaction, which is often mentioned in passing but rarely explored in detail.

**Cultural Links: a General Framework**

Turkish–Arab interaction in the realm of culture has often followed the pattern of politics. For a long time, Turks tended to look down on Arab culture as backward and corruptive of their own culture’s authenticity. Arabs, on the other hand, considered Turkish culture and language to be distant. Despite this,
there has long been a level of interaction and curiosity. For instance, in the 1980s, Istanbul and, to an even greater extent, Yalova, the north-western Turkish city famous for its spa resorts, became popular holiday destinations for Arab tourists. Likewise, a number of Turkish singers found audiences among Arabs, especially in Iraq, Syria and Egypt.

It cannot be taken for granted that Turkey’s support for regime change in places such as Syria and Egypt will result in close relations with the new regimes, although there are signs that Turkey would have it so

On the Turkish side, since the 1970s, Arab influence on Turkish music has given rise to a much-contested hybrid genre referred to as arabesk. But contrary to today, there was no grand narrative then placing these distinct interactions within a political framework. In recent years, interactions between the cultures and peoples increased almost exclusively in the direction of Turkish culture. Turkish cultural influence became one of the mainstays of Turkey’s rising profile in the Middle East, and the Turkish government has been emphasising Turkish cultural identity and language through its public diplomacy efforts. Indeed, a cultural institute, the Yunus Emre Foundation, was launched for this purpose in 2007 with Middle Eastern branches in Lebanon, Iran, Syria, Egypt and Jordan. There are also a considerable number of students of Middle Eastern origin studying at Turkish universities and benefiting from Turkish government grants. Yet the most significant cultural recognition Turkey has gained did not result from government-backed efforts. The flagship of Turkish cultural influence in the Middle East is its television series. Turkish television series gained unprecedented popularity from 2008 onwards when the Saudi television company MBC started broadcasting Nour, known as Gümüş in Turkey. The final episode of the show was watched by 85 million viewers throughout the Arabic-speaking world. Since then, several other television series followed up on Nour’s popularity. According to a recent survey, 97% of the Iraqi population watch Turkish dramas.

No other contemporary popular culture item of Turkish origin has drawn a similar amount of interest. Thus, these television series provide fertile ground to investigate Turkish cultural influence throughout the Middle East, especially among the Arabic-speaking public, and to determine the point to which aspects of Turkish culture are found to be appealing in the region and why.

The Appeal of Turkish Drama

The main appeal of Turkish television series seems to be the "modern" lifestyle they present. From the Arab perspective, modernity is especially inherent in certain types of gender relations and gender equality. In these series, women enjoy a freer standing in society compared to most of their Middle Eastern counterparts, take part in professional life and have rather liberal relations with men. Arab women have also expressed strong appreciation for the romantic male characters featured. Further contributing to the series’ appeal is the fact that all of this is presented in a setting of wealth and luxury enjoyed in mansions by the Bosphorus. Yet if the modern lifestyle is the attraction, then why is it the Turkish television series instead of Western ones that are popular? Firstly, growing anti-Western sentiment in the region, especially after the Iraqi invasion, did not do much good for Western popular culture. Secondly, certain cultural codes are mutual to contemporary Arab societies and Turkish society, in contrast to those of Western societies, from which Arab societies diverge more sharply. For instance, both Turkish and Arab cultures are predominantly patriarchal, accommodate close-knit family ties and
share Islam as their religion. This makes the setting more familiar to Arabic-speaking audiences.

The main appeal of Turkish television series seems to be the “modern” lifestyle they present. From the Arab perspective, modernity is especially inherent in certain types of gender relations and gender equality.

Nevertheless, there are also considerable differences between Turkish and Arab societies, the most obvious differences being brought about by the effects of Turkey’s secular regime and its impact on everyday life. The popular Turkish television series emphasise the hitherto unimagined combination of modern lifestyles and an Islamic society. It is notable that other Turkish series, produced by conservative television channels and promoting an Islamic morality, have not garnered any spectacular success in the Middle East.

As for the region’s own productions, formerly popular Syrian television series have fallen from prominence. This is apparently due to the increasingly Islamic content resulting from Saudi funding, which became more prominent with the spread of Arabic-language satellite stations. This funding dictates, for instance, a de facto ban on filming a man and a woman alone. Although still popular, Egyptian dramas also offer little novelty. Nor is Iran, with its emphasis on the Sunni-Shia split that alienates various segments of the Arab societies, a likely source of television entertainment.

Objections to Turkish Cultural Influence

The new Turkish cultural influence among the Arab nations has met with some resistance on two grounds. First, Turkish culture and television series are claimed to be corrupting to the morals of Arabs. A number of fatwas have been issued in Saudi Arabia warning the faithful against the habit of watching them. T-shirts featuring Turkish actresses were declared haram by a Syrian sheikh, and the Saudi Arabian head of the Islamic sharia courts warned that owners of television channels that broadcast these immoral productions can be condemned to death. Turkish television series have also been blamed for a number of other ills, such as traffic jams, increased divorce rates, and decreased work efficiency. Moreover, there has also been a nationalist reaction that has framed the Turkish influence as the embrace of alien Turkish culture at the expense of authentic Arab culture. Yet none of these concerns has put an end to the popularity of Turkish drama.

The Turkish Front

No reading of Turkish cultural influence in the Middle East through television series is complete without a mention of the series’ domestic reception, as this sheds light on disagreements regarding what defines Turkish culture. The Turkish government wants to see Turkish culture become popular throughout the Middle East, but it has had an ambivalent reaction to the popularity of Turkish television series. According to Minister for EU Affairs Egemen Bagis, television series play an important role in introducing contemporary Turkey to the world and have become one of the cornerstones of Turkish soft power. The Turkish government also uses actors and actresses from television series to promote its exports to the Middle East. Nevertheless, other members of the ruling elite have not been as accommodating. During her time in office, the former Minister of Family and Gender Affairs, Selma Aliye Kavaf, commented that these television series are harming Turkish family values due to their depiction of births out of wedlock and extra-

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5 Salamandra, p. 65.
7 Buccianti, Alexandra. “Dubbed Turkish soap operas conquering the Arab world: social liberation or cultural alienation?” Arab Media and Society, p. 25, Spring 2010.
8 Salamandra, p. 54.
marital relations. The Turkish Radio and Television Supreme Council, a public body authorised to inspect the content of broadcasting, often fines series for similar reasons. Overwhelmed by the pressure, producers have been forced to change scripts and happily wed off characters who would otherwise remain in less formal relationships. Yet other observers maintain that the series reinforce and reproduce repressive patriarchal values with their uncritical approach. The image of Turkey and Turkish culture presented through the television series is thus contested both by the Turkish public and policymakers.

**Outcomes for Turkey and Arab Nations**

From the Turkish perspective, the immediate outcome of these television series’ popularity is the Arab publics’ perception of contemporary Turkey as modern. Other tangible outcomes are a heightened interest in Turkish culture and language, as well as a growing number of Arab tourists. From the Arab perspective, the series have created awareness about the effects of a secular regime on everyday life. They have, according to El-Arabia Turkey representative Daniel Abdulfettah, also made Arabs engage in public debate about otherwise controversial issues, such as honour crimes. The less immediate effects on Turkey’s soft power assets are more difficult to single out. Does the interest in Turkish drama series necessarily equate to political power for Turkey? It may create a positive image for Turkey, but a positive image does not necessarily translate into power or buy people’s support. The Arab Spring’s effects on the Turkish cultural influence also remain to be seen. Turkish productions have further strengthened their edge as the unrest has put Arab productions on hold. But the Islamist political parties in Arab governments such as in Egypt and in Tunisia are already putting pressure on immoral forms of art, defining immorality quite broadly and often in relation to religion. At times, attacks against immoral cultural expressions, such as the Tunisian artist Nadia Jelassi’s installations, are approved by considerable segments of these societies.

The immediate outcome of these television series’ popularity is the Arab publics’ perception of contemporary Turkey as modern. Other tangible outcomes are a heightened interest in Turkish culture and language, as well as a growing number of Arab tourists.

Salafist movements are also gaining more visibility throughout Arab nations and raise further worries of not only political but also societal forms of restrictions on freedom of expression. If these trends become more prominent, Turkish culture and television series appreciated for their secular outlook might fall from grace. Turkey would then lose one of the mediums that have been so influential in painting its image in the region. This would be only one of the consequences of such a scenario, but the popularity of Turkish television dramas is nevertheless one of the trends to follow for a comprehensive assessment of the region’s changing dynamics.

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No study, analysis or history of modern society is complete without a focus on the nexus of sport, society, culture, politics and development. The power of this nexus is nowhere more evident than in soccer – the world’s most global cultural practice. Through their everyday involvement in soccer, people – players, managers and fans – define who they are, as well as who they think others are.

This is particularly true in the Middle East and North Africa. Countries like Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Turkey are positioning themselves as global sport hubs to heighten their diplomatic and economic influence and employ soft power to embed themselves at multiple levels in the international community to enhance their security. Similarly, the revolutionary trans-regional impact of sports is significant; witness the social revolution on the West Bank sparked by the defiance of the Palestinian women’s soccer team in playing, in 2011, visiting Women’s Soccer World Champion Japan in the Territories’ two most conservative cities, Hebron and Nablus, where militant Islamists denounced them as whores.

“The study of sports, and football in particular, arguably the most popular form of cultural performance in Egypt and the rest of the Middle East, has much to add to our current understanding of the social, political and cultural history of the region,” said historian Shaun Lopez in a journal article in 2009 lamenting the failure of Middle East scholars to include sports in their research. That gap in scholarship is all the more stunning given “the seminal importance of football and other sports in the region or the central role athletics plays in the formation of national identity in most Middle Eastern and North African countries,” Lopez wrote. In fact, the influence of politics on the region’s soccer is so pervasive that it shapes teams formed by Middle Eastern and North African immigrant communities.

**Autocratic Fathers**

Unlike other regions, such as Latin America, Africa, Europe and Asia, where a significant number of scholars and authors have addressed soccer in its various regional aspects, the Middle East and North Africa has been the subject of only very limited research by a small number of scholars focused on a specific country or territory. Central to an understanding of the importance of soccer to Middle Eastern autocrats, as well as the pitch’s prominent role as a battlefield for greater freedom, social justice, dignity and national, ethnic, religious and gender rights, is the concept of Palestinian-American scholar Hisham Sharabi in which the autocrat projects himself as a father figure who franchises his authority at different levels of society. In many ways, Sharabi’s concept of neo-patriarchism is rooted in the notion of the

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mother and father of a nation that harks back to the Arab struggle for independence in the early 20th century and that positioned leaders as the equivalent of parents entitled to raise their children.\textsuperscript{2} Saad Zaghloul, the leader of the nationalist Wafd Party, and a founder of crowned Cairo Soccer Club Al Ahly SC as a bastion of anti-monarchical, republican sentiment, was Egypt’s father. His wife Safiyya was the country’s mother the year that he was exiled by the British, sparking the 1919 Egyptian revolution.

As a result, like in Franco’s Spain, where soccer’s mass appeal and a lack of cheap alternative entertainment positioned the beautiful game as a lightning rod for dissent, soccer, for much of the past three decades, constituted the only major battleground that rivalled Islam in the creation of alternative public space in a swath of land stretching from the Gulf to the Atlantic coast of Africa. Away from the glare of the international media, soccer provided a venue to release pent-up anger and frustration and struggle for various rights. By the time the Arab popular uprisings erupted in December 2010, soccer had emerged as a key non-religious, non-governmental institution capable of successfully confronting security force-dominated repressive regimes and militant Islamists. Scholars Eduardo P. Archetti and Amilcar G. Romero asserted already two decades ago that “football does not only reflect society or culture but is part of the way that a society models some of its central existential, political and moral issues.”\textsuperscript{3}

\textbf{Arenas of Agitation and Protest}

Soccer stadiums became arenas of political agitation and social protest in soccer-crazy countries like Algeria and Egypt\textsuperscript{4} as repression increased and encompassed not just popular neighbourhoods but stadiums too. “The sport stadia were next to register the heat of social discontent. At every football match, there were riots and youth demonstrations,” wrote Said Chikhi\textsuperscript{5} in his description of a wave of protests that swept Algeria in the late 1980s.

A 2007 diplomatic cable sent by the US embassy in Algiers and disclosed by Wikileaks linked a soccer protest in the desert city of Bou Saada to demonstrations in the western port city of Oran sparked by the publication of a highly contentious list of government housing recipients. The cable warned that “this kind of disturbance has become commonplace, and appears likely to remain so unless the government offers diversions other than soccer and improves the quality of life of its citizens.”

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Mass protests in early 2011 initially suggested that Algeria would join the first wave of Arab nations whose leaders had been toppled. The government quelled the unrest by hiking salaries and social spending on the back of its oil and gas revenues, which have enabled it to build up foreign reserves in excess of $186 billion. The government also benefited from the fact that many Algerians, who vividly recall the violence of the 1990s that left some 100,000 people dead, have become cautious because of the chaos in post-Gaddafi Libya and the civil war in Syria.

As a result, a tacit understanding emerged between Algerian soccer fans and security forces that football supporters could express their grievances as long as


they did so within the confines of the stadiums. An upsurge in soccer-related violence in Algeria in late 2012 serves, however, as a warning that frustration is mounting with the failure of the country’s gerontocracy, in control since independence, to share power with a younger generation, create jobs and address housing problems.

**A High-Stakes Political Cat-and-Mouse Contest**

Attempts by autocratic leaders to employ soccer to improve their tarnished images and detract attention from unpopular policies turned soccer into a high-stakes political cat-and-mouse contest between fans and autocrats and Islamists for control of the pitch and a counterbalance to jihadi employment of soccer as a bonding and recruitment tool. All participants in the game banked on the fact that only soccer could capture the deep-seated emotion, passion and commitment evoked by Islam among a majority of the population in the Middle East and North Africa.

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Soccer fans foreshadowed what may be the most fundamental change underlying the popular revolts against autocratic rule in a swath of land stretching from the Atlantic coast of Africa to the Gulf: a mental shift from subservience and acceptance of the autocratic father to an unprecedented mentality of deciding for oneself and questioning and challenging of authority. It is a shift across the political and social spectrum: liberals resisting religious precepts, children questioning their parents, and young Islamists challenging their ideological elders. “These things take time and they are done through conflict, trouble and confrontation and then they unfold,” said Egyptian author, activist and writer Ezzedine Choukri-Fisheore.6

Often militant, highly politicised, violence-prone soccer fans or ultras shifted their protests from the stadium to the square as a result of the suspension of professional soccer in countries like Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria and Algeria. They frequently played a unique role in helping protesters seeking to rid themselves of the yoke of repressive rule, economic mismanagement and corruption to break through the barrier of fear erected by neo-patriarchal autocrats that had condemned them to silence and passivity until then.7

**The Perfect Playground**

For neo-patriarchal regimes, soccer was the perfect playground. Dictatorial regimes were not simply superimposed on societies gasping for freedom. Arab autocracies may have lacked popular support and credibility, but the repressive reflexes that created barriers of fear were internalised and reproduced at virtually every layer of society. As a result, societal resistance to, as well as fear of, change contributed to their sustainability.

The patriarchal values that dominate soccer, in addition to its popularity, made it the perfect game for neo-patriarchs. Their values reinforced society’s cultural patriarchy as well as soccer’s values: assertion of male superiority in most aspects of life, control or harnessing of female lust and a belief in a masculine God. The protesters, despite their revolutionary spirit, were nevertheless often unable or unwilling to completely shake off the patriarchal values they had internalised. That failure complicated their struggle to not only topple the autocratic father figure but also destroy the regime he had

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established, as manifested, for example, in the street clashes near Cairo’s Tahrir Square in November 2011 during protests demanding an end to the Egyptian military’s rule. “The worst and the most damaging form of the persistence of the ancient regime is when it persists in the very lives, behaviour, habits and decisions of the revolutionaries themselves,” said prominent Syrian intellectual Sadik Al Azm.8

Contentious Street or Electoral Politics?

In breaking through the neo-patriarchal barriers of fear, militant soccer fans extended across the Middle East and North Africa a tradition of close association between soccer and politics that is still evident today in derbies in Amman, Tehran, Riyadh and Cairo, home to the world’s most violent encounter on the pitch.

In post-revolt Middle Eastern nations like Egypt, elected governments and militant soccer fans who played key roles in the toppling of autocrats are struggling with the transition from contentious street to electoral politics. The ultras, one of Egypt’s largest civic groups after the ruling Muslim Brotherhood, face the tough decision, two years after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak and more than a year after 74 fans died in a politically loaded soccer brawl in the Suez Canal city of Port Said, of whether and when to surrender the power of the street.

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That decision is increasingly dependent on the government’s ability to demonstrate seriousness in achieving their successful revolt’s goal. So far, the government’s failure to reform police and security forces, the country’s most despised institutions because of their role as enforcers of the Mubarak-era repression, and hold law enforcement officials accountable for the deaths of more than 200 protesters in the last two years has undermined confidence in it. As a result, Egyptian stadiums remain flashpoints as the country teeters on the brink of economic and political failure.

Further reading

The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, http://mideastsoccer.blogspot.com

Street Art and the Egyptian Revolution

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The 25 January revolution that took place in Egypt in 2011 was not the first of the Arab Spring – the Tunisian one preceded it – yet it was the one with the most impact on the trajectory of revolutions in the region. One could argue that without the Egyptian revolution, there would not have been an “Arab Spring” as we know it: The 25 January revolution was distinct not only because of Egypt’s importance in the politics of the Arab world, but also because it foregrounded forms of political expression that had an impact on political protests across the region (Khatib, 2013). One such form is street art.

Before the 25 January revolution, visual expression in public space in Egypt was largely the domain of the regime. Visual tools of articulating political dissent were limited to demonstrations such as those organised by the Kifaya movement in 2005, when protesters would carry banners and posters criticising the President and the police, making visual expressions of dissident politics fleeting in nature. The Egyptian revolution of 2011 made visual expression a key tool in political protest, catalysing the use of street art in other revolutions that followed in the Arab world, such as in Libya and Syria.

The 25 January revolution, then, changed political dynamics in Egypt as street art emerged as a key form of expression, used for a variety of purposes: expressing political demands; criticising the regime; congratulating the people on the revolution; memorialising the revolution’s martyrs; naming and shaming oppressors; expressing solidarity with other Arab revolutions; and commenting on current affairs. What started with simple stencils of a fist denoting defiance – the earliest form of street art in the Egyptian revolution, with the fist being the symbol of the 6 April activist movement against Mubarak – transformed into a form of visual commentary on political and social developments. Street art has evolved in content and form from stencils and graffiti into large-scale murals, and its presence as topical commentary has entered everyday life in Egypt, so that it has become almost expected to witness new street art emerging whenever the political trajectory in Egypt takes a new turn (Tripp, 2013).

The Days of the Revolution

During the days of the 25 January revolution, street art was mostly used to mock the Mubarak regime and to express citizen demands for change. Simple graffiti began to appear on walls, such as some in Bab el Louk in downtown Cairo that said, “I want to see another president before I die” (Gowaily, 2012). An interesting dimension of such graffiti is that, like the noted example, they were sometimes written in English as a way of appealing to the international community.

However, most graffiti were in Arabic and very local in their cultural references. For example, on Boustan Street in downtown Cairo, a stencil of the great Egyptian singer Oum Koulthoum appeared along with the title of one of her most famous songs, “Patience Has Limits.” Several pieces depicting the ousted President as a pharaoh also appeared. As such, Egyptian street art was a way for Egyptians to reach out to others within their own community by drawing on shared cultural references and heritage. This sense of national belonging was echoed in street art referencing Egypt’s diverse religious land-
scape. As Egypt harbours a spectrum of commitments to religious doctrine, a stencil appeared on Mohamed Mahmoud Street in downtown Cairo affirming the need to transcend categorising Egyptians according to religious expression. This was done through the representation of three women’s heads: the first, on the right, is unveiled; the second wears a headscarf; and the third is covered with a niqab only revealing the eyes. The caption accompanying the stencil proclaimed, “Don’t categorise me.” Similarly, a mural by Freedom Painters in Abbas el Akkad Street in Nasr City referenced the famous ceiling mural in the Sistine Chapel, showing a hand with a tattoo of a cross touching the finger of a hand carrying prayer beads with the words “take care” in English above, the letter “t” made to look like a cross and the letter “c” like a crescent.

Street art during that time was characterised by a sense of optimism about Egypt’s future and of national pride. “Hold your head up, Egyptian” was a slogan seen on many walls across the country, as were statements referencing the most famous slogan of the Arab Spring, “The people want the overthrow of the regime,” such as one appearing on Mansour Mohamed Street in Zamalek that said, “The people overthrew the regime. We won.” It was signed “Tahrir youth.” Thus, street artists were calling for national harmony and a sense of togetherness in Egyptian society as the country looked forward to a brighter future.

The Post-Revolution Period

As Egypt began to witness a number of challenges in the post-revolution period, the mood in street art changed to reflect those challenges. Several stencils and murals appeared commemorating the martyrs of the revolution (Armbrust, 2012), as well as citizens who were still being detained for political activity by the ruling Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). Street art began to criticise the leaders of the SCAF, showing them as a continuation of the old order. Well-known pieces of street art, such as one of SCAF leader Hussein Tantawi’s underwear, lent their creators public recognition and international acclaim, so that for the first time in Egypt’s history, street artists such as Ganzeer, Keizer, Hosni, and Sad Panda became famous. Through their work, Egyptian citizens were attempting to reclaim public space from the regime and, in so doing, reclaim political agency.

A serious challenge faced in Egypt in the post-revolution period concerns the position of women, who have continued to be sexually harassed and assaulted not only by thugs but also by the police. These assaults have been inflicted to terrorise the wider population by targeting women’s honour.

Street artists played an activist role in this context. As the SCAF-controlled media tried to influence the political process through propaganda, street art appeared cautioning people against media messages about maintaining the old order through calls for “stability.” One stencil by Keizer in Mahmoud Bassiouni Street in downtown Cairo showed a man with a television set for a head shooting himself in the head, captioned in English, “Kill your television.” A drawing by Hosni in Tahrir Square also showed a man with a television overtaking his head, rendering him cross-eyed and with his tongue hanging out idiotically. The slogan said, “Join the largest political party in Egypt: The Sofa Party.” Underneath it continued, “Yes to stability. Yes yes yes my darling.”

A serious challenge faced in Egypt in the post-revolution period concerns the position of women, who have continued to be sexually harassed and assaulted not only by thugs but also by the police. These assaults have been inflicted to terrorise the wider population by targeting women’s honour. A well-known incident took place in 2012, when a woman was beaten and dragged down the street in Cairo by the police, causing her abaya to lift revealing her blue bra. Stencils of a blue bra began appearing all over Cairo in solidarity with the woman, such as one on Mohamed Mahmoud Street in downtown Cairo that added to the bra stencil the statement “No to stripping the people,” signed “Long live the revolution.” On the same street, another stencil represented a police officer, Ahmed Adel El Mogy, who became known for sexu-
ally assaulting female detainees by inflicting on them “virginity tests” and whom one woman testified against in court. The stencil was captioned, “Rapist of our daughters’ honour.” In a conservative country where issues such as women’s honour are normally only referred to in hushed tones, these kinds of loud expressions in public space speak to the beginning of a fundamental change in society as social and political taboos start to be broken.

**A New Politics of Resistance**

Street art in Egypt in the context of the revolution became an illustration of the breakdown of the wall of fear and of taboos (Khatib, 2012). Street walls almost replaced newspapers in commenting on the trajectory of the revolution. No sooner had the country faced an emerging challenge than street artists would diligently call public attention to it. In this way, street art played a role in the creation of a new public sphere in Egypt, where awareness about issues concerning citizens is raised, topics previously regarded as taboo are highlighted, and debates about what can be done about them are conducted. Street art also indirectly articulated a “conversation” between the government and the people, as a new government took over from the SCAF but continued to exercise control over freedom of expression. In this “conversation,” street art was used by citizens to defy this control. When the government put up barriers in the street to restrict public movement, street artists painted huge murals over the barriers, such as one on Sheikh Rihan Street in Cairo, where the barrier was cleverly painted by seven artists to depict the illusion of the street as if the barrier did not exist. And whenever the government whitewashed walls to cover murals or graffiti, street artists responded by writing sarcastic comments on those walls, such as “Congratulations on the paint!” Street art, then, has become a prime tool in the new politics of resistance led by Egyptian citizens.

As other revolutions began in the Arab world, Egyptian street artists also expressed their support for those revolutions through their work, speaking of the birth of a new sense of belonging in the region. Gone is the patriarchal, rigid “Arab nationalism” promoted by Arab dictators, and in its place is a new-found pan-Arab solidarity characterised by pluralism and fluidity. Street art is playing an important role in uniting citizens both across and within borders in their continuing struggle for freedom and dignity.

**References**


Appendices
MAP A.1 | Economic Crisis in the EU. Basic Indicators

**Public Debt 2012**
- EU27 Average: 85.3%
- **More than 150%**
- From 110% to 150%
- From 90% to 110%
- **From 80% to 90%**
- **From 60% to 80%**
- **From 40% to 60%**
- **Less than 40%**

**Unemployment Rate. December 2012**
- EU27 Average: 10.7%
- **More than 20%**
- From 15% to 20%
- From 11% to 15%
- **From 10% to 11%**
- **From 7.5% to 10%**
- **From 5% to 7.5%**
- **Less than 5%**

**Public Deficit 2012**
- EU27 Average: 4.0%
- **Deficit greater than -15%**
- From -7.0% to -10%
- From -4.5% to -7.0%
- **From -3.5% to -4.5%**
- **From -3% to -2%**
- **From -2% to 0%**
- **Surplus**

**Annual GDP Growth 2011-2012**
- EU27 Average: -0.6%
- **Less than -5%**
- From -2% to -5%
- From -1% to -2%
- **From 0% to -1%**
- **From 1% to 3%**
- **More than 3%**

Own production. Source: Eurostat, Eurostatistics. Data for short term economic analysis. 05/2013 and Eurostat database, consulted 20/05/13.
MAP A.2 | Syria: Humanitarian Crisis

**Total Number of Refugees**
- **1,557,134**
  - **1,329,357** Registered Refugees
  - **227,777** Estimated Refugees Awaiting Registration

**Evolution of Registered Syrian Refugees since December 2011**

**People in need inside Syria (6.8 million*) by governorate**
- More than 500,000
- From 250,000 to 300,000
- Fewer than 100,000
- From 300,000 to 500,000
- From 100,000 to 250,000

*The Syrian government contests these figures as highly inflated

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In your opinion, in what way will the Arab Spring impact the level of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the region in the next two years (country risk)? (Mean scores on a scale of 0 (less FDI) to 10 (more FDI))

- More than 6.5
- From 6.0 to 6.5
- From 5.5 to 5.5
- From 4.0 to 4.5
- From 4.5 to 5
- Less than 4.0

How do you assess the visibility and impact of the EU’s actions in Mediterranean Partner Countries in 2012?
(Mean scores by origin of survey respondents on a scale of 0 (Very negative) to 10 (Very positive))

What degree of probability do you attribute to the following potential mid- to long-term hypotheses in the Mediterranean?
(Mean scores on a scale of 0 (No probability) to 10 (Very high probability))

- Water scarcity will become a major source of conflicts and social tensions
- Increased level of migration will intensify tensions and xenophobia in Europe
- Irregular migration to Europe will continue to increase
- Population and employment pressures will create dramatic social tensions
- Popular uprisings will increase
- The economic crisis will reduce development prospects for a long period
- The Arab-Israeli conflict will paralyse the EMP
- Environmental deterioration will threaten living conditions and economic activities
- Women will increasingly participate in economic, social and political life
- Increased level of migration will produce pressure for political reforms in the MPCs
- GCC members will facilitate South-South economic cooperation
- Free movement of goods and workers will create an area of shared prosperity
- Increased number of exchanges will give rise to a common Mediterranean identity
- MPCs will sustain their economic growth and converge to EU levels

MAP A.4 | Euromed Survey of Experts and Actors IV. Prospects of Sustainable Democracy and the EU Role

Prospects of sustainable democracy

Question 1. How would you assess the prospects of sustainable democracy in the following countries?
Mean scores on a scale of 0 (Very improbable) to 10 (Very probable)

From 5.5 to 6  
From 4.5 to 5  
From 3.5 to 4  
From 5 to 5.5  
From 4 to 4.5  
Less than 3.5

The EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries

Question 7. What role should the EU play with regard to domestic developments in the MPC? (in %)

I. Remain neutral  
II. Work on the demands of MPCs  
III. Be proactive and interventionist  
IV. Use its influence to avoid takeover by extremist parties

MAP A.5 | Health Expenditure

Health expenditure (as % of GDP)

- More than 11%
- From 10 to 11%
- From 9 to 10%
- From 7 to 9%
- From 5 to 7%
- Less than 5%
- Data not available

Per Capita Total Expenditure on Health (PPP int. $)

- 500
- 2,000
- 3,000
- 4,000

Own production. Source: WHO.

MAP A.6 | Obesity in Mediterranean Countries

Prevalence of obesity
Percentage of defined population with a body mass index (BMI) of 30 kg/m² or higher.

- More than 32%
- From 26 to 29%
- From 20 to 23%
- From 23 to 26%
- Less than 20%

Obesity by sex

Own production. Source: WHO.
MAP A.7 | Trade of Creative Goods. Imports

Imports of creative goods, value
- More than $20 billion
- From $10 billion to $20 billion
- From $5 billion to $10 billion
- From $1 billion to $5 billion
- From $500 million to $1 billion
- From $200 million to $500 million
- From $100 million to $200 million
- Less than $100 million

Imports of creative goods, to Mediterranean countries, % by category
- Art Crafts
- Audiovisuals & New Media
- Design
- Publishing
- Visual Arts

Own production. Source: UNCTAD.

MAP A.8 | Trade of Creative Goods. Exports

Exports of creative goods, value
- More than $20 billion
- From $10 billion to $20 billion
- From $5 billion to $10 billion
- From $1 billion to $5 billion
- From $500 million to $1 billion
- From $200 million to $500 million
- From $100 million to $200 million
- Less than $100 million

Exports of creative goods, from Mediterranean countries, % by category
- Art Crafts
- Audiovisuals & New Media
- Design
- Publishing
- Visual Arts

Own production. Source: UNCTAD.
MAP A.9 | Education

Repetition rates: percentage of repeaters in primary school

- More than 9%
- From 7% to 9%
- From 4% to 7%
- From 2% to 7%
- From 1% to 2%
- Less than 0.5%
- Data unavailable

Out-of-School Indicators

- Percentage of out-of-school children of primary school age
- Percentage of out-of-school children of lower secondary school age

Own production. Source: UNESCO.
Legal Grounds on Which Abortion Is Permitted (2011)
1. To save a woman’s life
2. To preserve a woman’s physical health
3. To preserve a woman’s mental health
4. In case of rape or incest
5. Because of foetal impairment
6. For economic or social reasons
7. On request

Abortion Rate (per 1,000 women aged 15-44) (2007/10)
- More than 14‰
- From 12‰ to 14‰
- From 10‰ to 12‰
- From 8‰ to 10‰
- From 6‰ to 8‰
- Less than 6‰
- Data not available

Mean Age at Childbearing and Total Fertility Rate

Model-based Estimates: Contraceptive Prevalence by Country
MAP A.11 | Traffic of Goods between EU and UMA and Passengers Traffic in the Strait of Gibraltar

Trade in goods EU-15–AMU (in millions of €)
by product class

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Perishable foodstuffs</th>
<th>EU-15–UMA</th>
<th>UMA–EU15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,444.9</td>
<td>1,814.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Non-perishable foodstuffs</td>
<td>1,182.1</td>
<td>595.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Agricultural or industrial commodities</td>
<td>4,549.1</td>
<td>433.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Cements and metal ores</td>
<td>4,947.6</td>
<td>637.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Semi-finished goods</td>
<td>5,305.3</td>
<td>612.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Machinery, equipment, vehicles</td>
<td>15,074.8</td>
<td>5,214.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Manufactured goods and finished chemical products</td>
<td>6,022.4</td>
<td>6,231.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Crude minerals and energy products</td>
<td>4,173.6</td>
<td>39,713.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Chemicals, fertilizers, paper pulp</td>
<td>778.8</td>
<td>1,110.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>43,478.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>56,362.8</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Maritime Traffic in the Strait of Gibraltar 2011 (Passengers)

### Percentage of Women in the Single or Lower Houses of National Parliaments

#### Own production. Source: IPU.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage range</th>
<th>Percentage of Women</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From 0% to 5%</td>
<td>27.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 5% to 10%</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 10% to 15%</td>
<td>36.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 15% to 20%</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 20% to 25%</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 25% to 30%</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 30% to 35%</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 35% to 40%</td>
<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 40% to 45%</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Current World Ranking of the Percentage of Women in National Parliaments (IPU)

- **20th**

Official Development Aid (in USD Million)
- More than 300
- From 50 to 100
- From 10 to 20
- Data not available

Official Development Aid per Capita (in USD)
- Less than 5
- 10
- 20
- 50
- 75
- 100

Data not available

US Official Development Aid by Sectors
- Albania
- Algeria
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Egypt
- Jordan
- Lebanon
- Libya
- Montenegro
- Morocco
- Palestine
- Serbia
- Syria
- FYROM
- Tunisia
- Turkey

MAP A.14 | Elections in Greece (May and June 2012). Results of Pro-Bailout Parties

Electoral Results of Pro-Bailout Parties (New Democracy + PASOK + Democratic Left)

May 2012

- New Democracy (ND): 108
- Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK): 41
- Democratic Left (DIMAR): 19
- Independent Greeks (ANEL): 33
- Golden Dawn (XA): 21
- Syriza Unionist Social Front (SYRIZA): 52
- Communist Party of Greece (KKE): 26

June 2012

- New Democracy (ND): 129
- Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK): 33
- Democratic Left (DIMAR): 17
- Independent Greeks (ANEL): 20
- Golden Dawn (XA): 18
- Syriza Unionist Social Front (SYRIZA): 71
- Communist Party of Greece (KKE): 12

Own production. Source: Ministry of Interior (Greece).
Aquaculture Production in Mediterranean Countries (2011)

- More than 900,000 t
- From 500,000 t to 1,000,000 t
- From 200,000 t to 500,000 t
- From 100,000 t to 200,000 t
- From 1,000 t to 2,000 t
- From 2,000 t to 5,000 t
- From 5,000 t to 25,000 t
- Less than 1,000 t

Aquaculture Production by Area (%)(2011)
- Marine: Atlantic Ocean
- Inland
- Marine: Mediterranean and Black Sea

FAOSTAT Groups

- Crustaceans Fresh
- Demersal Marine Fish Fresh
- Freshwater Diadrom Fresh
- Marine Fish Nes Fresh
- Pelagic Marine Fish Fresh

Main Species Produced

- Penaeus shrimps nei (766 t)
- European seabass (156 t)
- Jacks, crevalles nei (613 t)
- Mediterranean mussel (100,851 t)
- Atlantic bluefin tuna (3,410 t)
- Common prawn (9 t)
- European seabass (118,786 t)
- Rainbow trout (7,697 t)
- Marine fishes nei (4,457 t)
- Japanese carpet shell (35,885 t)

Aquaculture Production in Mediterranean Countries*

- Crustaceans Fresh
- Demersal Marine Fish Fresh
- Freshwater Diadrom Fresh
- Marine Fish Fresh
- Molluscs Excluding Cephalopods Fresh
- Pelagic Marine Fish Fresh

* Excluding marine aquaculture production from other seas and oceans

Nes= not elsewhere specified
Nei= not elsewhere included

Own production. Source: FAO, Fishstat.
Chronologies

Chronology of Major Conflicts and Political Events

January 2012

In Spain, the government submits a budgetary stability bill. France announces aid to halt rising unemployment. In Italy, the Council of Ministers approves a reform plan to relaunch the economy. Greece continues negotiating a reform plan with the EU and the IMF in exchange for more aid, which is widely rejected by its citizens. In Malta, the government defeats a vote of no confidence. In Slovenia, Janez Jansa is appointed Prime Minister. Croatia approves EU accession in a referendum. In Cyprus, two former ministers are prosecuted for their responsibility in the explosion of an arsenal in 2011. In Syria, the uprising against Bashar al-Assad reaches its tenth month. In Egypt, the elections to the lower chamber of Parliament are won by the Islamist Freedom and Justice Party. In Algeria, the Movement of Society for Peace announces that it is leaving the government coalition the same month that 10 new parties are legalised. In Morocco, Mohammed VI appoints the members of the new government. Mauritania adopts a series of constitutional amendments as a result of the national dialogue process.

France

- On 10 January the Minister of Finance François Baroin announces that France will be the first country to apply the Tobin Tax on financial transactions as an anti-crisis measure.
- On 18 January Nicolas Sarkozy announces aid of 1 billion euros to fight unemployment, branded as “insufficient” by unions, which also oppose the rise in VAT announced by the government.
- On 24 January the Senate passes the bill that outlaws denial of the “Armenian genocide” 1915-1917, which since December 2011 has caused a diplomatic crisis with Turkey. On 31 January 141 Members of Parliament appeal against the law to the Constitutional Court.

Italy

- On 10 January Carlo Malinconico, government Undersecretary for the Publishing Sector, resigns following his involvement in the corruption scandal linked to the organisation of the G8 Summit in La Magdalena.
- On 13 January the cruise ship Costa Concordia runs aground off the island of Giglio, Tuscany, causing the deaths of 17 of its 4,000 passengers and the disappearance of another 15. Italy declares a state of emergency in the area, an important natural maritime park, over fears of a spill of 2,380 tonnes of fuel.
- On 20 January the Government passes the economic reform plan that includes the deregulation of sectors such as transport, energy and trade, and cuts in the privileges of certain professional sectors.

Malta

- On 26 January, thanks to the casting vote of the President of the Parliament, the government defeats a vote of no confidence moved by the leader of the Labour Party Joseph Muscat given the internal divisions in the government.

Slovenia

- On 17 January Slovenia and Croatia agree the composition of the arbitration court that will settle the border dispute between the two countries.
- On 25 January Janez Jansa, leader of the Democratic Party (SNS, conservative), obtains the backing of five parties to be elected new Prime Minister after Zoran Jankovic, leader of the social-democratic Positive Slovenia – winner of the elections of December 2011 – lost the inaugural debate on 11 January.

Croatia

- On 22 January Croatia approves EU accession in 2013 in a referendum with 66% of votes in favour and a participation of 44%.

Montenegro

- On 17 January Montenegro adopts the pre-accession economic programme 2012-2014.
- On 31 January, after 10 days of protests against the rise in the price of electricity announced by the govern-
ment, President Igor Luksic receives representatives of public institutions and NGOs to study an agreement.

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 11 January Hashim Rexhepi is acquitted of the five corruption charges made against him in 2010 and which led to his resignation as Governor of the Central Bank.
- On 14 January there are confrontations at the Merdare border crossing with Serbia between Kosovo police and demonstrators of the pro-independence movement Vetevendosje! who are trying to stop the entry of Serbian products into Kosovo.
- On 19 January Kosovo and the European Commission start negotiations for Kosovo to form part of the Schengen zone.
- On 31 January Parliament votes, 83 to 13, in favour of requesting the full independence of Kosovo in late 2012.

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)

- On 17 January Athens and Skopje conclude two days of meetings with the United Nations mediator Matthew Niemetz over the name dispute without making progress.
- On 25 January the Constitutional Court paralyses the implementation of 12 articles of the Lustration Law, which pursues collaborators with the former communist regime.

Albania

- On 16 January the former Prime Minister Ilir Meta is acquitted by the Supreme Court of corruption charges in relation to irregular public contract bidding for a hydroelectric plant.
- On 18 January Parliament approves with the votes of the governing Democratic Party (DPA, liberal-conservative) the formation of an investigative committee to demand the resignation of Kreshnik Spahiu, vice-Chairman of the High Council of Justice, whose post is deemed incompatible with the formation of the nationalist organisation Red and Black Alliance.
- On 23 January the Head of the Republican Guard is arrested, accused of the deaths of four demonstrators during the protests against the government in January 2011.

Greece

- On 17 January a strike by transport, health, education, press and justice personnel against the austerity measures paralyses Attica, coinciding with the visit of the representatives of the troika (EC, ECB and IMF), which in December 2011 urged Athens to reduce the minimum wage.

Turkey

- On 13 January 32 Kurdish activists are arrested in 17 provinces for links with the terrorist organisation PKK.
- On 19 January thousands of people demonstrate in Istanbul commemorating the fifth anniversary of the murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink and demanding justice, two days after the Istanbul Criminal Court rules that there is insufficient evidence to allege that Dink’s murder was the result of the action of a Turkish ultranationalist group.

Cyprus

- On 11 January Cyprus and Israel sign two defence cooperation agreements during the official visit to Israel by the Minister of Defence Demetrios Eliades.
- On 24 January the former Minister of Defence Costas Papacostas and the former Minister of Foreign Affairs Marcos Kyprianou are prosecuted for manslaughter and gross negligence for the explosion of an arsenal that killed 13 people in 2011.
- On 25 January a new round of talks on the reunification of Cyprus, under the auspices of the UN, concludes in New York with limited progress.

Syria

- On 8 January the Arab League observers sent to Syria present a report in Cairo which reflects the climate of violence endured in the country, the difficulties found by the government and opposition groups to carry out their mission, the large number of demonstrators arrested or disappeared, and the major military deployment. After assessing the report, the Arab League contact group for Syria decides to continue with the mission increasing the 165 experts to 200 and requesting aid from the UN to support their tasks. On 10 January the Secretary of the Arab League Nabil al-Arabi condemns the attacks suffered by the members of the observer mission, making the Damascus government responsible for their safety. On 11 January the Arab League announces that it has delayed sending new observers.
- On 15 January Bashar al-Assad announces a general amnesty for all those arrested since the start of the uprisings in March 2011, in addition to the release of 552 prisoners announced on 5 January.
- On 22 January the Arab League contact group for Syria and the Foreign Ministers of the Arab countries meet to assess the report on the observer mission deployed to Syria, agreeing to extend it for one month. The Gulf Cooperation Council countries decide to withdraw their observers.

Jordan

- On 10 January an employee of Amman City Council dies after having set himself on fire the previous day to protest his economic situation.

Egypt

- On 17 January the trial resumes against Hosni Mubarak, six of his advisors, his sons Gamal and Alaa and the former Minister of the Interior Habib al-Adli.
- On 21 January the definitive results of the elections to the People’s Assembly, started on 28 November 2011 and completed on 11 January, confirm the victory of the Democratic Alliance led by the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP, Islamist, linked to the Muslim Brotherhood) with 235 of the 508 seats. It is followed by the Islamist Coalition, led by al-Nour (Salafi), with 124 seats. The Wafd Party (liberal) wins 38 seats, followed by the Egyptian Bloc (liberal-left) with 34.
• On 23 January the new Egyptian Parliament holds its first session, electing as President of the Assembly the current Secretary General of the FJP Mohamed Saad al-Katatni. The Military Junta transfers legislative power to Parliament.
• On 25 January the state of emergency in force since 1981 comes to an end.

**Libya**

• On 10 January in Tripoli the UN and the interim government sign the agreement establishing the presence in the transition process of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL).
• On 22 January Abdelhafiz Ghoga, Vice-President of the National Transitional Council (NTC), announces his resignation after the incidents in Benghazi in January following demonstrations against the continued presence in government institutions of members of the old regime.

**Tunisia**

• On 14 January, on the first anniversary of the Jasmine Revolution, the Ministry of Justice announces the commutation of 122 death sentences to life imprisonment and full amnesty for 3,868 prisoners as well as the granting of parole to another 4,975.
• On 28 January around 12,000 people called by the secular, liberal and centre-left parliamentary opposition demand that the governing Ennahda party and the other Islamist forces respect fundamental liberties and rights in Tunisia.

**Algeria**

• On 1 January the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP, Islamist) announces that it is leaving the government coalition after months of disagreement with the National Liberation Front (FLN, socialist) although it keeps its ministers in the government.
• On 16 January Mourad Dhina, former leader of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and founder of the opposition movement Rachad, wanted by Algeria, is arrested in France.

• On 17 January Mohamed Laid Khelfi, Wali (Governor) of Illizi, is kidnapped in Timeroualine. On 19 January he is released in Libya by the country’s security forces.
• On 24 January the Ministry of the Interior authorises the legalisation of 10 new political parties.

**Morocco**

• On 3 January Mohammed VI appoints the 30 members of the coalition government under President Abdelilah Benkirane, leader of the Justice and Development Party (PJD, Islamist) winner of the November 2011 elections, formed by Istiqlal (nationalist), the People’s Movement (MP, liberal), the Progress and Socialism Party (PPS) and five independents.
• On 15 January Nabila Mounib, of the Unified Socialist Party (PSU), becomes the first woman to be Secretary General of a Moroccan party.
• On 18 January four youths who participated in a two-week rally in front of the Ministry of Education in Rabat set themselves on fire to protest against the large number of unemployed graduates in Morocco. On 23 January the Gendarmerie prevents a group of 120 workers from setting themselves on fire in Ben Guerir to demand their readmission into the state-owned phosphate company OCP.

**Mauritania**

• On 10 January the National Assembly (lower chamber) adopts several constitutional amendments agreed in December 2011 in the national dialogue process, in particular the criminalisation of coups d’état and slavery, recognition of the multicultural character of the country and the formation of an independent electoral commission. The Rally of Democratic Forces (RFD) and the Islamist party Tawasul boycott the vote as they consider the period for debate on reforms that leave all power in the hands of the President to be insufficient and that the National Assembly is illegal as its mandate expired in November 2011 without holding the elections scheduled for October and postponed until March 2012.

**European Union**

• On 1 January Denmark takes over the six-month EU Presidency with budgetary consolidation, economic dynamism, sustainable development, strengthening of information and communication technologies, and security of the external borders as priorities.
• On 17 January the German social-democrat Martin Schulz succeeds the Polish liberal Jerzy Buzek as President of the European Parliament (EP).
• On 30 January the European Council adopts, with the exceptions of the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, the economic and monetary stability treaty that limits the deficit that can be incurred by Member States.

**Arab League**

• On 22 January the Arab League urges the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to transfer his powers to the vice-President of the country and form a government of national unity within a period of two months.

**February 2012**

Spain approves labour market reform. In Italy, Silvio Berlusconi is acquitted in the Mills case. Janez Jansa forms a new government in Slovenia. The Serbian majority of North Kosovo rejects Kosovo institutions in a referendum by 99.74%. Greece’s second bailout is approved by the eurozone in virtue of new austerity measures approved by Athens. Turkey prohibits Israeli cargo planes from flying over its airspace. In Syria, new sanctions, a UN resolution of condemnation, the meeting of the so-called “Friends of Syria” Group or the holding of a constitutional referendum are unable to put an end to the conflict. In Egypt, the elections for the Shura Council (upper chamber) end with a new Islamist victory the same month that bloody confrontations in the Port Said football stadium add fuel to demonstrations against the Military Junta. In Libya, the main threat is still domestic security.
Spain

- On 9 February the National Court judge Baltasar Garzón is sentenced to 11 years’ disqualification by the Supreme Court for perverting the course of justice during his investigation of the Gürtel corruption case. On 27 February the Supreme Court acquits Garzón of the charges of perverting the course of justice in another case, the investigation of crimes by the Franco regime, although it considers that his action was erroneous.
- On 11 February the government passes a structural reform of the labour market which includes, among other measures, making it more flexible through a reduction of compensation for dismissal, clarification of economic causes for dismissals and a limit on linking temporary contracts.
- On 16 February Parliament approves reform of the banking sector, which calls on banks to capitalise 5.2 billion euros to balance their accounts.

France

- On 8 February the former Minister of Labour Eric Woerth is accused of passive influence peddling in the framework of the investigation into the funding of Nicolas Sarkozy’s campaign in 2007, related with the L’Oréal case.
- On 17 February France and the United Kingdom agree the joint development of nuclear energy.
- On 22 February Dominique Strauss-Khan is released without charges after making a statement to the police in Lille on the Carlton case, the third sex scandal in which the former head of the IMF has been involved.
- On 28 February the Constitutional Council rules the law passed by Parliament in December 2011 outlawing denial of the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire as unconstitutional.

Italy

- On 13 February the Turin Court sentences Stephan Schmidheiny, owner of the Swiss construction company Etemit, and his Belgian partner, Jean-Louis de Cartier de Marchienne, to 16 years’ imprisonment for the death of around 3,000 people due to exposure to the asbestos processed by the company in Italy.
- On 14 February the vice-President of the Region of Umbria Orfeo Goracci is accused, among other crimes, of conspiracy and abuse of office.
- On 25 February the Milan Court dismisses the charge of bribery against Silvio Berlusconi made in the Mills case.

Slovenia

- On 10 February 50 of the 90 Members of Parliament give their vote of confidence to the new government of 12 ministers proposed by Prime Minister Janez Jansa.

Croatia

- On 15 February the government, trade unions and employers’ organisation reach an agreement under which 5,000 public employees will be made redundant and salaries and benefits will be cut to save over 500 million euros in 2012.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 3 February Bosnia adopts the law to conduct a census of the population in 2013.
- On 13 February Emir Suljagic, Minister of Education of the Sarajevo Canton, resigns following the death threats received after having proposed the removal of religion as a compulsory subject in school.
- On 13 February the federal government adopts a joint position to approve the 2011 budget, which will provide a basis for adopting that of 2012. Until then, the State had been operating with a temporary budget because of the political crisis in Bosnia.

Montenegro

- On 10 February protestors in Bijelo Polje and Podgorica denounce the increase in the price of electricity.
- On 26 February 10 people are arrested in Podgorica in relation to the burning of vehicles of the newspaper Vijesti that took place in summer 2011.

Serbia

- On 15 February Serbia announces that it will request the extradition of the three members of “Arkan’s Tigers” arrested in Valencia, Spain, on 9 February and accused of assassinating the Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic in 2003.

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 14 and 15 February three Serbian municipalities in North Kosovo reject the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo by 99.74% of the votes in a referendum.
- On 22 February negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina resume in Brussels, concluding in an agreement for Kosovo to attend regional forums under the denomination of “Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244.” At the same time, KFOR reaches an agreement with the municipalities in North Kosovo to cross the Brnjak and Jarinje checkpoints.

Albania

- On 2 February, following an order issued by the Supreme Court, Parliament lifts the immunity of three socialist Members of Parliament suspected of participating in the riots against the government in January 2011.

Greece

- On 7 February the first general strike of the year is held in protest against cuts in public spending requested by the EU and the IMF.
- On 13 February Parliament approves new austerity measures, which enables activation on 20 February of the 1.3 billion euros of the second bailout, while riots continue in the streets.
- On 17 February the Minister of Culture Pavlos Gerulanos resigns after the robbery of 70 pieces from the Museum of Olympia, which comes within the
worrying increase in the crime rate due to the crisis.

**Turkey**

- On 9 February 13 PKK terrorists and a soldier die in confrontations in Hakkari and Bingol. On 14 February another 10 terrorists die in confrontations in Sirknak.
- On 27 February Turkey announces restrictions for Israeli air traffic as a result of the attack on the ship Mavi Marmara in May 2010, in which several Turkish activists died. This is in addition to another similar measure against French flights announced in December 2011 after the French National Assembly passed legislation outlawing the denial of the Armenian genocide during the First World War.

**Cyprus**

- On 2 February Parliament unanimously passes a resolution against UN Envoy Alexander Downer due to the lack of objectivity in his mediation of the Cypriot conflict.
- On 15 February the European Parliament (EP) adopts a joint position to urge Turkey to return Varosha, a sector occupied since the Turkish invasion in 1974, to its legitimate owners.
- On 16 February the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visits Cyprus to activate a strategic partnership between the two countries in energy, trade, tourism, agriculture and research.

**Syria**

- On 3 February an army bombing on Homs kills at least 260 people and injures 500 in one of the bloodiest attacks since the start of the uprisings.
- On 4 February Russia and China veto for the third time a draft resolution, prepared by Morocco and backed by the West and the Arab League, condemning the Syrian regime before the UN Security Council. On 10 February thousands of Syrians protest against Moscow.
- On 16 February the UN General Assembly passes by 137 votes in favour and 12 against – among them Russia, China and Iran – the non-binding resolution drafted by Saudi Arabia and Qatar denouncing human rights violations in Syria and asking for the Arab League roadmap to be implemented and for the UN to send a special envoy to the country.
- On 24 February the former UN General Secretary, Kofi Annan, is appointed as UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy to Syria.
- On 24 February Tunis hosts the meeting of the “Friends of Syria” Group with the participation of the EU and Arab League countries, some countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), USA, China and the Syrian National Council (SNC), which announces the sending of humanitarian aid and proposes the creation of a non-military intervention force.
- On 26 February the referendum called by Bashar al-Assad on the project of a new Constitution is approved by 89.4% of the votes, a result qualified as “not very credible” by the UN.
- On 27 February the EU approves new economic sanctions against Damascus.

**Lebanon**

- On 10 February at least two people die in confrontations in Tripoli between residents of the Sunni neighbourhood of Bab al-Tabbaneh and the Alawi neighbourhood of Jabal Mohsen, forcing a military intervention in the face of fears that the Syrian crisis could spread.

**Jordan**

- On 9 February Mohammed al-Dahabi, former Head of the Intelligence Services, is taken into police custody for 14 days at the request of the Anti-Corruption Office.

**Egypt**

- On 1 February a football match in Port Said between the al-Ahli and the al-Masri teams ends in a pitch battle leaving 74 dead and 300 injured. The Muslim Brotherhood accuses factions of the former regime of inciting the riots and the Military Junta of doing nothing to stop them. This event is followed by several days of violence in demonstrations that demand the transfer of powers from the Military Junta.
- On 5 February the Ministry of Justice takes into police custody 43 workers from diverse NGOs accused of failing to observe Egyptian legislation. The EU supports American condemnation and threatens Egypt with suspension of its economic cooperation.
- On 22 February the elections to the Shura Council (lower chamber) end. The Freedom and Justice Party wins with 58.8% of the votes - 107 seats - while al-Nour comes second with 25.5% - 46 seats.

**Libya**

- On 5 February the first trial against 40 members and supporters of Muammar Gaddafi starts in Benghazi.
- On 13 February the spokesman of the National Transitional Council (NTC), Mohammed al-Harizi, announces the appointment of the members of the new Transitional Justice Committee.
- On 14 February around one hundred Libyan militias announce their grouping into a new federation led by Mokhtar Fernana to increase pressure on the NTC to speed up the reforms demanded by the revolution.
- On 20 February Misrata holds elections to choose its Municipal Council.
- On 22 February the number of dead as a result of the conflict started 10 days before in Kufra between the Arab Zuwaya and the African Tubu is 131.
- On 23 February the former Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril announces the creation of a new coalition, the moderate Islamist National Forces Alliance, which brings together 44 parties, 236 civil organisations and representatives of the Amazigh, Tuareg and Tubu communities.
- On 24 February the NTC establishes a national council to watch over the state of security in Libya and manage the crises related to it.

**Tunisia**

- On 25 February a demonstration in Tunis condemns the attacks that took
place on 20 and 21 February against offices of the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) in several cities and coinciding with the start of a national strike by municipal workers to demand contract improvements.

**Algeria**

- On 6 February a court in Algiers sentences to up to 12 years’ imprisonment the AQIM terrorists who survived the suicide attack in Bouira that killed 12 people in 2008.
- On 21 February 11 AQIM terrorists die in a large-scale security operation in Beni Khalifa which began on 19 February.
- On 25 February Algeria deploys an important humanitarian and security operation on the border with Mali to confront the possible consequences of the Tuareg conflict endured by Azawad for national security.
- On 25 February the three main Algerian Islamist parties – the Society and Peace Movement (MSP), Ennahda and Al-Islam – announce the creation of a coalition to run for the parliamentary elections on 10 May 2012.
- On 26 February the Ministry of the Interior authorises eight new political parties.

**Morocco**

- On 4 February, on the occasion of the celebration of Muhammad’s birth, Mohammed VI pardons three Islamists imprisoned for the Casablanca attacks in 2003.
- On 4 February Morocco announces the dismantling of a terrorist cell linked to the Islamic Liberation Party that might have been planning attacks in the country.

**Mauritania**

- On 6 February Wane Abdoul Birane, coordinator of the “Don’t Touch My Nationality” movement, who condemns the Mauritanian population census which he considers racist against the black population, is arrested in Nouakchott. On 8 February Birane is released, following a demonstration in Nouakchott.

**European Union**

- On 2 February the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism, the successor to the European Financial Stability Facility, is signed.
- On 16 February the EP approves the liberalisation of trade between Morocco and the EU for agricultural and fishery products.

**March 2012**

*Portugal and Spain hold general strikes in protest against the austerity plans of their governments. The Italian government implements an ambitious economic reform programme. Slovenia incorporates a limit on public debt into the Constitution. The Croatian Parliament ratifies EU accession. Serbia achieves candidate status for EU accession while in Kosovo tension over the holding of Serbian elections in May increases. In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia there are episodes of ethnic violence. Greece agrees with its creditors to restructure its debt. Cyprus remodels its government. One year has passed since the start of the uprisings in Syria. In Lebanon, a fifth member of Hezbollah is charged with the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. In Libya, the aspirations of Cyrenaica open the debate on national unity.*

**Portugal**

- On 22 March a general strike takes place in protest at the government’s austerity measures, precarious work and unemployment.

**Spain**

- On 20 March the former President of the Balearic Islands, Jaume Matas, is sentenced to six years’ imprisonment for the Palma Arena corruption case.
- On 25 March Andalusia holds elections in which the People’s Party (PP, conservative) wins although without a big enough majority to govern, leaving the government in the hands of the coalition of socialists and communists. Asturias also holds early elections as the government of Foro Asturias (regionalist) did not manage to approve the annual budget. The pact between the Socialist Party (PSOE), United Left (IU) and Union, Progress and Democracy (UPyD) forms a government.
- On 29 March a general strike called by the two main leftwing unions protests against the government’s cuts to reduce the deficit and February’s labour reform.

**France**

- On 11 March Nicolas Sarkozy threatens that France will leave Schengen if there is no reform to ensure that all countries apply identical border control criteria and he advocates introducing protectionist measures similar to those of the USA.
- On 23 March Mohamed Merah, suspected of links with al-Qaeda and responsible for the murders on 11 March in Toulouse of the soldier Imad Ibn Zater, on 15 March in Montauban of Corporal Abel Chennouf and the soldier Legouad Mohamed and on 19 March of another four people in the Jewish school Ozar Hatorah in Toulouse, dies in a shootout with police.

**Italy**

- On 1 March the Senate approves the government’s ambitious economic plan providing for the liberalisation of numerous sectors.
- On 12 March the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) confirms that Italy entered recession in the fourth quarter of 2011.
- On 23 March the government approves a labour reform that increases flexibility of dismissals, simplifies contracts and provides for benefits for the unemployed.

**Malta**

- On 9 March the Malta Environment and Planning Authority (MEPA) sanctions Enemalta with 177,000 euros and an additional 428 euros for each day that the Marsa Plan, which has exceeded its operation and pollution limits, continues operating.
on 10 March Malta holds elections in 35 of its local councils, in which the Labour Party wins with almost 56% of the votes.

**Croatia**

- On 9 March the Sabor (Parliament) ratifies the EU accession treaty.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

- On 12 March the mandate of the parliamentary commission for the constitutional reform requested in 2009 by the Strasbourg Court on the Sejdic-Finci case expires, without the six main parties having reached an agreement on ethnic minorities having access to high office.
- On 12 March the President of the Republic of Srpska Milorad Dodik threatens a referendum in the Serb-Bosniq entity on belonging to NATO if it approves Bosnian membership.

**Montenegro**

- On 7 March Olivera Lakic, a Vijesti journalist, is brutally beaten in Podgorica in yet another attack against the media investigating corruption cases.
- On 18 March thousands of Montenegrins protest against corruption in Podgorica.

**Serbia**

- On 1 March Serbia becomes a candidate for EU accession.

**Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244**

- On 21 March the acquittal of the former Minister of Transport Fatmir Limaj and another nine former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) results in protests by Serbian victims of the Kosovo conflict.
- On 23 March the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) decides that it cannot be involved in the organisation of Serbian elections in Kosovo to avoid violating UN Security Council Resolution 1244, in response to a Serbian request following threats by Pristina to obstruct elections in its territory.

**FYROM**

- On 1 March 10,000 Macedonian Albanians protest in Gostivar over the murder two days earlier of two youths by a Slav police officer.
- On 8 March 10 people are injured in three episodes of intercommunity violence in Skopje. Since the start of the year the number of people injured by interethnic tension is 38.
- On 14 March a court in Skopje sentences Velija Ramkovski, owner of the defunct television channel A1, to 13 years’ imprisonment for corruption.
- On 23 March the government passes a new Lustration Law draft after the ruling of the Constitutional Court in January that declared the previous text illegal.

**Albania**

- On 9 March the Public Prosecutor’s Officefiles corruption charges against the former Minister of Finance Dritan Prifti and the former Deputy Minister Leonard Beqiri.
- On 14 March eight poll commissioners of the Democratic Party of Albania (PDS, rightwing) are accused of fraud in Dajc during the local elections of May 2011.

**Greece**

- On 9 March the government achieves the support of creditors to undertake the largest debt restructuring in its history.
- On 10 March Yorgos Papandreu resigns as President of the Pahhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). On 18 March Evangelos Venizelos is elected President and candidate for the early elections in April. On 19 March Venizelos is replaced as Minister of Finance by his Deputy Minister Filippos Sachinidis.
- On 21 March Parliament ratifies the eurozone’s and the IMF’s second aid plan for an amount of 1.72 billion euros.

**Turkey**

- On 1 March an attack by the terrorist organisation PKK near the headquarters of the governing AKP in Istanbul injures 16 police officers.
- On 21 March five Turkish police officers die in confrontations with the PKK in Surnak, one day after the death of a police officer during demonstrations to mark the Kurdish New Year.

**Syria**

- On 5 March the Turkish Minister for EU Affairs Egemen Bagis states that if a solution on reunification is not achieved before the Cypriot EU Presidency, Ankara does not rule out a solution based on two independent states or the annexation of the north of the island.
- On 8 March Parliament passes a law that restricts air traffic controllers’ right to strike, whose protests against the cuts paralysed the country the previous month.
- On 19 March Demetris Christofiasremodels his government. The banker Vassos Shiarly replaces Kikis Kazamias, who resigned on 16 March for health reasons, as Minister of Finance. The Minister of the Interior Neoclis Sylkiotis replaces Praxoulla Antoniadou as Minister of Trade and Industry. Eleni Mavrou, former Mayor of Nicosia, becomes Minister of the Interior.

- On 1 March Russia and China accept a non-binding draft declaration by the UN Security Council asking Damascus to allow immediate entry of a UN delegation.
- On 7 March the Minister of Oil and Mineral Resources Abdo Hussameddin deserts and joins the revolution.
- 15 March marks one year since the uprisings with a total of 7,500 deaths and 10,000 displaced people. Thousands of Syrians go onto the streets of the main cities in a new “Day of Rage.” There are also marches supporting Bashar al-Assad.
- On 21 March the UN Security Council ratifies a draft resolution based on Kofi Annan’s Plan that ensures non-external interference and urges the parties to abandon violence, start mediation and not obstruct the supply of humanitarian aid.
Lebanon

- On 2 March the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon announces that a fifth member of Hezbollah might have been accused of participation in the assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005.
- On 4 March the Lebanese government reinforces borders with Syria due to the increasing number of citizens entering the country fleeing bombings. The army blocks access to Beirut where there are protests by supporters and detractors of Bashar al-Assad.
- On 14 March the Ethiopian Alem Dechasa commits suicide to avoid being returned to the man for whom she worked in another of the multiple cases revealing the conditions of slavery endured by domestic female workers.

Jordan

- On 9 March in Amman thousands of demonstrators support the Syrian revolution.

Egypt

- On 24 March there are new riots in Port Said after the decision by an Egyptian court to suspend the local football club, the al-Masri, for two years is made public.
- On 25 March the composition of the Parliamentary Assembly, which will prepare the new Constitution project, is announced. The Assembly is formed by 50 Members of Parliament, of whom 25 belong to the Freedom and Justice Party and 11 to al-Nour. Another 50 members represent the trade unions, the judiciary, religious orders and extra-parliamentary political movements.
- On 31 March the Muslim Brotherhood, despite their initial intention of not running in the presidential elections, announces the candidacy of their number two, Khairat al-Shater.

Libya

- On 5 March Mustafa Abdul Jalil is re-elected President of the National Transitional Council (NTC).
- On 6 March 3,000 tribal representatives of Cyrenaica support a declaration of autonomy and the recovery of the federal system prior to Gaddafi. On the same day, the creation of a Regional Transitional Council is announced, led by the former founding member of the NTC, Ahmed al-Senussi. On 9 March there are marches against federalism and division in several cities.
- On 13 March the National Reconciliation Conference, promoted by Prime Minister Abderrahim al-Kib, begins in Zliten.
- On 16 March Abdullah al-Senussi, Head of Muammar Gaddafi’s Military Intelligence, is arrested at Nouakchott airport.
- On 25 March the death of a member of the Bussif tribe unleashes confrontations in Sebha between local groups and the Tubu community. On 31 March fighting ends with a total of 147 deaths.

Tunisia

- On 1 March Rachid Ghannouchi announces that he will not run for the presidency of Ennahda in the congress in July.
- On 20 March, on the commemoration of the 56th anniversary of Tunisian independence, 30,000 people in Tunis call for a secular state, while a meeting is held in El Menzah in which diverse Islamic forces call for the new Constitution to be based on the sharia. On 24 March in Tunis, 15,000 people call for a secular state. On 26 March, to avoid a social fracture, Ennahda announces it will maintain Article 1 of the 1959 Constitution establishing that “Tunisia is a free, sovereign and independent State. Its religion is Islam, its language Arabic and its type of government is the Republic.”
- On 31 March President Moncef Marzouki announces that the state of emergency will remain in force until late April.

Algeria

- On 7 March three Islamist forces – the Movement for Society and Peace, Ennahda and Al-Islah – sign the Green Algeria Alliance to run for elections in May.
- On 10 March the congress of the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD, Berber nationalist) elects Mohcine Belabbas as its new leader, replacing Said Sadi.
- On 14 March an Algerian court sentences death in absentia the AQIM leaders Abdelmalek Droukdel and Bouderbala Fatah and 14 other terrorists for the attacks on 11 April 2007 that resulted in 24 deaths and 222 injured.

Morocco

- On 12 March there are riots in imzouren where the police disperse a demonstration marching to Beni Bouayach, where there had been different protests by unemployed Rifis and pro-independence campaigners.

Mauritania

- On 2 March Ely Ould Mokhtar, a Mauritanian gendarme kidnapped by AQIM in December 2011, and the Italian aid worker Rossella Urru, kidnapped in Tindouf in October 2011, are released in Mali after Nouakchott had freed the AQIM member Abderrahman Ould Amadou al-Azawadi.
- On 12 March the Coordinator of the Democratic Opposition (COD) heads a demonstration in Nouakchott to call for the end of the military government, the resignation of Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, a definitive date for parliamentary elections and loyalty to Islamic tradition. The Mauritanian parliamentary elections, initially scheduled for 16 October 2011, were postponed in August 2011 until 31 March 2012, when the COD joined the National Dialogue process backed by the government.

European Union

- On 2 March the European Council adopts the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance that provides for tough sanctions against the countries that do not respect Community discipline.
- On 8 March the 27 Ministers of Justice and the Interior discuss measures to improve cooperation with the EFTA countries on border security and agree measures to increase coordination and
solidarity among the Schengen countries, the European Asylum Policy and the joint response to possible migration crises.

Arab League

• On 28 March the Arab League agrees in its annual summit, held in Baghdad, to back Kofi Annan’s peace plan. On 29 March Bashar al-Assad announces that he accepts Kofi Annan’s plan to find a solution to the Syrian conflict.

April 2012

Spain approves tough measures to cut public spending. Italy and Slovenia introduce the constitutional limitation on public debt. Interethnic tension increases in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as well as between Serbia and Kosovo. Greece calls early elections for 6 May. In Turkey the trial against the survivors of the 1980 coup begins. In Syria, the acceptance of Kofi Annan’s peace plan and the deployment of new international observers do not halt the violence in the country. The Jordanian government resigns. In Egypt, the cancellation of three candidacies for the presidential elections and the readmission of Ahmed Shafiq’s candidacy for election intensify the tension between Parliament, demonstrators and the army. The episodes of tribal violence continue in Libya.

Portugal

• On 13 April Portugal becomes the first country to ratify in Parliament the Fiscal Compact approved by the European Council on 2 March.

Spain

• On 3 April the government submits to Parliament the 2012 general budget that provides for large cuts in public spending and tax increases to deal with the debt interest and maintain the pension and unemployment systems. They include a partial tax amnesty and the removal of fiscal deductions for large companies.

• On 13 April the government approves a new plan to fight tax fraud which includes the prohibition on paying invoices higher than 2,500 euros in cash and the obligation to declare accounts abroad.

• On 16 April the Argentinian government announces it has introduced into Parliament a bill by which 51% of the shares of YPF, subsidiary of the Spanish multinational Repsol, are expropriated, thereby causing a diplomatic crisis between Madrid and Buenos Aires.

• On 17 April the Bank of Spain announces that Spain has gone into recession.

• On 20 April the government approves new austerity measures concerning health and education to reduce 10 billion euros of deficit annually.

• On 24 April the Seville Court judging the corruption case concerning a layoff fund set up by the Andalusia government, remands the former councillor of Employment of the Andalusia Regional Government, Antonio Fernández, in custody.

France

• On 4 April the French police arrest 13 suspects for belonging to radical Islamist groups, in addition to the other 17 arrests made on 29 March for belonging to the illegal group Forsane Alizza (Knights of Pride).

• On 22 April the first round of the presidential elections places the socialist François Hollande in the lead with 28.2% of the votes, followed by Nicolas Sarkozy, with 27%. Marine Le Pen’s National Front (FN, extreme right) wins 18.6% of the votes.

Monaco

• On 3 April Jean-François Robillon, of the Union of Monégasques (UDM), is re-elected President of the National Council (Parliament) with 14 votes in favour and 6 abstentions.

Italy

• On 3 April the Italian police search the headquarters of the Northern League as part of the investigations by the Naples Public Prosecutor’s Office into alleged crimes of corruption and association with the ‘Ndrangheta (Calabrese mafia) of the treasurer Francesco Belsito. On 5 April Umberto Bossi resigns as Secretary General of the party leaving control to the National Secretary of the party, Roberto Calderoli, former Minister of the Interior, Roberto Maroni, and the Member of Parliament Emmanuela Dal Lago. On 9 April Bossi’s son, Renzo, resigns as councillor of Lombardy.

• On 17 April the Senate adopts by absolute majority the inclusion in the Constitution of the “golden rule,” which limits public debt.

Slovenia

• On 11 April the Slovenian Parliament approves the introduction into the Constitution of a limit on public debt.

Croatia

• On 12 April the government prohibits the holding in Zagreb of the annual march by European extreme right supporters.

• On 17 April the European Parliament welcomes the 12 new Croatian Members of Parliament as observers.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

• On 27 April the Bosnian government adopts the general budget for 2012 but without agreements on approving a reduction in public deficit through cuts in civil servants’ salaries.

• On 30 April Rasema Handanovic becomes the first Muslim woman charged for war crimes in the Bosnian conflict after having been found guilty of the deaths of 26 Croats in Trusina.

Montenegro

• On 29 April Montenegro becomes a member of the World Trade Organisation.

Serbia

• On 3 April Boris Tadic announces his resignation so that the early presidential elections can coincide with the
parliamentary and municipal elections of 6 May.

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 7 April a Kosovo Albanian dies in Mitrovica after a bomb explodes. The incident, one month before the Serbian elections, increases tension in North Kosovo along with "tit-for-tat" arrests of police officers, trade unionists, former UÇK members and electoral officers carried out by Belgrade and Pristina since March. On 25 April a demonstration in Pristina by Kosovo Albanians from Mitrovica calls for the end of the "climate of terror" in the northern territories.
- On 30 April Belgrade and Pristina reach an agreement to enable the holding of the Serbian parliamentary elections, also in Kosovo territory.

FYROM

- On 12 April the discovery of the corpses of five Macedonian Slavic youths from Radisani, Skopje, supposedly executed, increases ethnic tension. On 16 April a demonstration condemning the murders ends in police riots.

Albania

- On 9 April Fatmir Kajolli, municipal councillor in Fier, is arrested at the request of Italy, accused of drug trafficking.

Greece

- On 9 April a bomb explodes at the Ministry of Administrative Reform, an attack attributed to anarchist organisations.
- On 11 April the former Minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos is arrested, accused of corruption and money laundering.

Turkey

- On 4 April at the Ankara Criminal Court the historic trial starts against Kenan Evren and Tahsin Sahinkaya, the last survivors of the Military Junta that prompted the 1980 coup.
- On 28 April the Cypriot President appoints the economist Panicos Demetriades as new Governor of the Central Bank.

Cyprus

- On 4 April at the Ankara Criminal Court the historic trial starts against Kenan Evren and Tahsin Sahinkaya, the last survivors of the Military Junta that prompted the 1980 coup.

Syria

- On 1 April Istanbul hosts the 2nd "Friends of Syria" Conference, in which 83 countries recognise the Syrian National Council (SNC) as representative of the Syrian people. Working groups on the sanctions against Damascus and to monitor the transition process are created and the Conference insists on the establishment of defined terms to apply the Annan Plan.
- On 10 April the deadline given to Damascus by the UN and the Arab League to implement Kofi Annan's peace plan ends, although the army and the SLA continue their actions. On 12 April the ceasefire comes into force in Syria although attacks continue.
- On 13 April Syria accepts the presence of international observers. On 14 April the UN Security Council approves the version amended by Russia of the draft resolution submitted by the US, France and the United Kingdom authorising the deployment of international observers to Syria included in the Annan Plan. On 21 April UN Security Council Resolution 2042 establishes the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS).
- On 24 April the EU approves new sanctions against Damascus that include the prohibition on exporting luxury items to Syria as well as technology that may be used to continue the repression.
- On 26 April a missile attributed to the army by the Local Coordination Committees hits a building in Hama causing the deaths of dozens of people. This event, the persistence of violence in the region and a series of attacks in Damascus and Banias on 27 April question the effectiveness of the Annan Plan.

Jordan

- On 7 April Awn al-Khasawneh’s government approves the draft of the new Electoral Law. The text provides for a mixed electoral system, which combines an open proportional list on the provincial level with an open proportional list on the national level, increasing the number of seats from 120 to 138, of which the female proportion moves from 12 to 15.
- On 26 April Prime Minister Awn al-Khasawneh and his government resign six months after having been appointed due to the difficulties in getting a programme of reforms that meets the social demands off the ground. On the same day, Abdullah II asks the former Prime Minister Fayez Tarauneh to form a new government.

Egypt

- On 10 April an administrative court in Cairo invalidates the Constituent Assembly that will prepare the draft of the new Constitution, ruling in favour of the liberal deputies that boycotted it as they consider that the Assembly does not represent all social sectors.
- On 13 April thousands of people demonstrate in Tahrir Square against Omar Suleimian running in the presidential elections.
- On 14 April the Electoral Commission disqualifies as possible candidate for the presidency Salafi Hazem Abu Ismail as he was unable to prove that his mother did not obtain American nationality in 2006 thereby contravening Egyptian electoral law that impedes non-Egyptians and Egyptians with parents of another nationality from being President. It also invalidates the candidacies of Mubarak’s former vice-President Omar Suleimian as he did not have the minimum number of signatures and the Freedom and Justice Party’s Khairat al-Shater as he had previously been sentenced by an Egyptian court. On 20 April a mass rally “Friday of the No to the Constitution Written Under Military Control” is held.
- On 23 April, after a weekend of protests, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces ratifies the law passed by Parliament on 12 April prohibiting high officials of Mubarak’s regime from running in the presidential elections.
- On 25 April the Electoral Commission revokes its decision to disqualify Ahmed Shafiq’s candidacy in the pres-
identical elections after he submitted an appeal against the Commission's report of 24 April, in which he alleges that his registration as a candidate was prior to the passing of the law that prohibits members of the National Democratic Party (NDP) from running for election.

Libya

- On 1 April confrontations erupt in Zuwara between former Arab combatants against Gaddafi from al-Jumail and Regdaline and members of the local Amazigh people. On 3 April the government announces 14 deaths and 80 injured in Zuwara and Regdaline and the deployment of 200 soldiers to pacify the area.
- On 8 April the Minister of Justice Ali Ashour affirms that Tripoli will not hand over Saif al-Islam Gaddafi to the International Criminal Court and that he will be judged by Libyan justice.
- On 20 April the death of a member of the Tubu community shot by members of the Zuwaya community unleashes a new spiral of violence in Kufra that causes 12 new deaths. On 21 April the Kufra military council achieves a truce between the parties.
- On 25 April the President of the NTC Mustafa Abdul Jalil removes from office the Director of the Electoral Commission Uthman Gajiji. Some hours before, Prime Minister Abderrahim al-Kib had accused the NTC of obstructing the reforms to be undertaken to meet the objectives of the revolution, especially the holding of elections in June.

Tunisia

- On 9 April a demonstration in commemoration of Martyrs' Day in Tunis condemning the ban decreed by the government on demonstrating after the riots that took place in a protest on 25 March calling for a secular state degenerates into violent confrontations. On 11 April the government lifts the ban.
- On 14 and 15 April there are confrontations between unemployed youths and police in Om Laarayes after the Gafsa Phosphate Company announced that it had contracted new employees.

Algeria

- On 9 April the AQIM member Belhous Adou Ben Yaya is sentenced by the Algiers Court to 20 years' imprisonment for being a member of Mokhtar "Laouar" Belmokhtar's terrorist cell.
- On 11 April Ahmed Ben Bella, the first President of independent Algeria, dies in Algeria.
- On 14 April the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA) releases a video featuring seven Algerian diplomats kidnapped in early April in Gao, northern Mali, and urges Algerians to start negotiations. On 15 April the pro-independence National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) offers to mediate.

Morocco

- On 9 April three people are arrested in Meknes accused of planning attacks on government offices.

Mauritania

- On 18 April the police arrest 40 youths who participated in a demonstration against the government of Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz called by the Mauritanian Youth Movement (MJM).

European Union

- On 1 April the European Citizen’s Initiative, provided for by the Treaty of Lisbon and which enables seven citizens from seven different Member States to submit legislative proposals backed by one million citizens, comes into force.

May 2012

In France, François Hollande is elected new President of the Republic. Italy suffers several earthquakes and in the elections held in several Italian towns the People of Freedom experiences a major defeat. In Malta, the Minister of the Interior resigns and the government manages to pass the Budget Law. In Bosnia the budget for 2012 is approved, the trial against Ratko Mladic begins and the Office of the High Representative in Brcko closes. In Serbia, the Progressive Party wins in the parliamentary and presidential elections. In Greece, Panagiotis Pikrammenos is appointed interim President. In Syria, there is fear over the drift towards civil war and a contagion effect in Lebanon, where there are new confrontations. Jordan passes the Political Party Law the same month in which the new government takes office. Egypt holds the first round of presidential elections. Algeria holds parliamentary elections, in which the governing National Liberation Front (FLN) wins. In Mauritania, protests calling for democratic reforms continue.

Portugal

- On 11 May Parliament approves a reform making the labour market more flexible.
- On 17 May Portugal adopts the reform of the energy sector to save between 170 and 190 million euros annually.

Spain

- On 3 May the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland authorises the extradition to Spain of the ETA member José Ignacio de Juana Chaos, who had fled
two years earlier and whose whereabouts had been unknown.

- On 9 May the government announces the nationalisation of the Banco Financiero y de Ahorros (BFA), parent company of Bankia, the third largest Spanish financial group, which in 2011 had losses of 2.979 billion euros.
- 15 May marks one year since the March 15 Movement with rallies at the Puerta del Sol in Madrid and in other Spanish cities calling for a regeneration of political life and demonstrating against the cuts in public spending.

France

- On 6 May France holds the second round of the presidential elections, in which the Socialist Party candidate François Hollande wins with 51.9% of the votes over President Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP).
- On 16 May the new Prime Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault takes office and forms a government with Laurent Fabius as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Manuel Valls as Minister of the Interior and Pierre Moscovici as Minister of Finance.

Italy

- On 6 and 7 May Italy holds local elections in 941 towns with disastrous results for the People of Freedom (PDL, centre-right) and the Northern League (Padan nationalist, centre-right) and with notably good results in Genoa and Parma for Five Stars, the “anti-political” movement led by the comedian Beppe Grillo. On 20 and 21 May the second round of the municipal elections is held. The Democratic Party (PD, social-democrat) comes first in the main towns.
- On 20 May an earthquake of 5.9 on the Richter scale in Emilia-Romagna kills at least seven people. On 29 May new earthquakes in Emilia-Romagna result in the deaths of another 17 people. Around 8,000 people lose their homes.

Malta

- On 6 May 88 immigrants reach Rivi- era Bay in the third arrival of boats to Malta in 10 days.

- On 9 May Parliament passes the budget for 2012 and the new Finance Law thanks to the favourable vote of Franco Debono, deputy of the governing Nationalist Party (conservative) but highly critical of it.
- On 30 May the Minister of the Interior Carmelo Mifsud Bonici resigns after losing a vote of no confidence moved by the Labour Party members and backed by Franco Debono.

Slovenia

- On 11 May the largest operation against organised crime carried out in Slovenia ends in 60 arrests for arms and drugs trafficking.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 10 May Parliament approves a cut in the budget for 2012 to reduce public deficit.

FYROM

- On 2 May five Macedonian Albanian citizens are arrested for having murdered five Macedonian Slavs in April. On 4 and 11 May thousands of Macedonian Albanians protest against the arrests.
- On 20 May the NATO summit, held in Chicago, postpones the membership of the country until the name issue is resolved with Greece.

Albania

- On 10 May Parliament unanimously approves the legislation submitted by a commission of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) into an alleged organ-trafficking network of Serbian victims operated on in Albania during the Kosovo conflict.

Greece

- On 6 May Greece holds early legisla
tive elections that break with four decades of the two-party system of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and New Democracy (ND, centre-right), which between them fail to win an absolute majority faced with
the remaining parties opposed to the austerity measures requested by Brussels. Antonis Samaras’ ND is the most voted party with 18.8% and 108 deputies, followed by Alexis Tsipras’ communist coalition Syriza, with 16.8% and 52 deputies, and Evangelos Venizelos’ PASOK with 13.1% and 41 seats. The Greek Communist Party wins 26 seats while Independent Greeks (centre) with 33 seats, Golden Dawn (neo-Nazi) with 21 seats and Democratic Left with 19 seats all enter Parliament for the first time. After successive fruitless attempts to form a government, President Papoulias calls new elections for June and appoints as Interim President Panagiotis Pikrammenos President of the Council of State.

- On 9 May the eurozone countries freeze 1 billion euros of the Greek bailout until the political crisis is resolved.
- On 21 May New Democracy and Democratic Alliance (centre) announce their fusion to strengthen a pro-European centre-right front.
- On 28 May the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) releases 18 billion euros to recapitalise the four main Greek banks.

Turkey

- On 15 May the People’s Democratic Congress (HDK), a bloc of pro-Kurdish and leftwing organisations established in October 2011 based on the movement Work, Freedom and Democracy, is constituted as a political party, whose majority partner is the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP).
- On 25 May a bomb attack by the PKK in a police station in Pinarbasi kills three people.

Cyprus

- On 14 May Demetris Christofias announces he will not run for re-election in 2013 due to the stagnation of the reunification negotiations.

Syria

- On 7 May Syria holds legislative elections which are boycotted by the opposition, while violence continues in the country on a daily basis.
- On 10 May two bomb attacks by the Jihadist Al-Nusra Front kill at least 70 people and injure another 375 in Damascus.
- On 14 May the Syrian National Council (SNC) announces that it will not take part in the talks under the auspices of the Arab League to overcome the fragmentation existing within the opposition, scheduled for 16 and 17 May in Cairo. The Arab League postpones the talks.
- On 23 May Bourhan Ghalioun resigns as President of the SNC.
- On 25 May at least 108 civilians die under artillery fire by the army over Hula. The SNC presses the UN Security Council to meet urgently.

Lebanon

- On 6 May around one thousand Lebanese citizens protest in Beirut calling for a secular state.
- On 13, 14 and 15 May there are confrontations in Tripoli between the Sunni and Alawite communities after the arrest of the Sunni cleric Shadi al-Moulawi, accused of providing aid to Syrian refugees considered terrorists.
- On 20 May the death at a military checkpoint in Halba of the Sunni Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Wahid, opposed to the Syrian regime, intensifies the riots in Tripoli. On 21 May the riots extend to Beirut with shots exchanged by members of the Arab Movement Party of Shaker Berjawi, previously opposed to but now allied with Hezbollah, and Sunni opponents of the Syrian regime.
- On 22 May the kidnapping in the Syrian town of Azaz of Lebanese pilgrims on their way back from Iraq unearths riots in Beqaa and in the Shiite neighbourhoods of Beirut. On 25 May mediation by the former Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri achieves their release.

Jordan

- On 2 May Fayez Taraneh’s government takes office. Twelve ministers from the previous cabinet keep their posts. On 4 May mass demonstrations call for the resignation of the government.
- On 9 May Parliament passes the new Political Party Law that prohibits parties of a religious nature, prevents their funding by foreign sources and maintains the supervision of their activities by the Ministry of the Interior.

Egypt

- On 2 May the security forces manage to contain the spiral of violence that since 29 April has ravaged the Cairo district of Abbasiya against the military authorities and with a total of 22 deaths and over 270 injured. On 4 May a Friday of protest brings together thousands of Egyptians in Tahrir Square and Abbasiya.
- On 23 and 24 May in the first round of the presidential elections Mohamed Morsi (Freedom and Justice Party) wins 24.78% of the votes and Mubarak’s former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq wins 23.66%, going on to the second round.
- On 31 May, when the Emergency Laws in force since 1981 expire, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces announces that they will not be renewed.

Libya

- On 2 May the National Transitional Council (NTC) passes Law 36 appointing a state representative for all Muammar Gaddafi’s assets; Law 37 providing for Criminalisation of the Glorification of the Dictator; Law 38 guaranteeing impunity for all actions carried out by insurgents with the end of the triumph of the revolution; and Law 29 prohibiting the parties that contradict what is provided for by the transitional constitutional law, incite violence and hatred or are of a military nature.
- On 19 May Benghazi holds elections for its local council, the first since 1964.
- On 21 May Mahmoudi al-Baghdadi, Gaddafi’s former Prime Minister, begins a hunger strike in Tunis to avoid being extradited to Libya.
- On 28 May the President of the NTC Mustafa Abdul Jalil announces the possible delay of the constituent elections scheduled for 19 June.
**Tunisia**

- On 1 May the Sfax Court of Justice passes the first sentence against two police officers for the death of a demonstrator during the revolution, sentencing them to 20 years’ imprisonment and to pay compensation of 40,000 euros.

**Algeria**

- On 10 May Algeria holds legislative elections with low participation (42.9%). The governing National Liberation Front (FLN) wins with 220 seats, followed by the Democratic National Assembly (RND, liberal) with 68 seats and the Green Alliance (Islamist), with 48 seats. On 21 May, after the meeting of the recently created Political Front for the Protection of Democracy, 14 Algerian parties announce that they will boycott the Parliament emerging from a “mass electoral fraud.”

**Morocco**

- On 8 May Mohammed VI appoints the 40 magistrates of the “High Authority for National Dialogue on Justice Reform” responsible for the reform of the civil and penal codes and for designing measures to ensure the independence of the Judicial Power one day after 1,800 magistrates sign a petition calling for urgent judicial reforms.

**Mauritania**

- On 9 May thousands of people demonstrate in Nouakchott called by the Coordination of Democratic Opposition (COD), in the first protest by this opposition movement authorised by the government.
- On 12 May members and sympathisers of the Initiative for the Resurgence of Abolitionism (IRA) and the movement “Don’t Touch My Nationality” demonstrate in Nouakchott to demand the release of the anti-slavery leader Biram Ould Dah Abeid.
- On 16 May the leader of the COD Fadel Ould El Mochtar is arrested along with other demonstrators in a new anti-government protest in front of the Parliament.

**European Union**

- On 14 May the eurozone Ministers of Economy express their commitment to guaranteeing that Greece, which is in its fifth year of recession, will stay in the euro. On 15 May the EU Ministers of Economy and Finance adopt an agreement for the recapitalisation of banks and investment companies.

**June 2012**

**Portugal**

- On 4 June the government announces that it will receive the 4 billion euros of the following phase of its bailout after having passed the fourth EU and IMF quarterly examination.
- On 25 June Pedro Passos Coelho’s government defeats a vote of no confidence moved by the Communist Party thanks to the votes of the conservative parliamentary parties.

**Spain**

- On 9 June Spain announces its request to the eurozone for a loan to recapitalise its banking system of 6.2 billion euros from the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) through the issuance of public debt backed by the eurozone.
- On 28 June Parliament approves the austere budget for 2012 that endeavour to reduce the deficit from 8.9% to 5.3% of GDP through a reduction of government spending and an increase in income, corporation and tobacco taxes.

**France**

- On 10 June France holds the first round of the legislative elections, in which the Socialist Party (PS) wins. With an abstention of 44.3%, on 17 June the second round gives an absolute majority to the PS, with a total of 280 seats out of the 577. With the seats of the Greens – 17 –, the left independent candidates – 22 – and the Left Radical Party – 12 –, the presidential majority is absolute with 331 seats. The parliamentary right goes into opposition with a total of 229 deputies comprising 194 seats of the Union for a People’s Movement (UMP), the 15 of the rightwing independent candidates, the 12 of the New Centre, the 6 of the Radical Party and the 2 of the Centrist Alliance. The National Front (extreme-right) wins two seats.

**Monaco**

- On 12 June Albert II announces the relaunch of Monaco’s Territorial Enlargement Plan, paralysed since 2008, regaining five hectares from the sea.

**Italy**

- On 15 June the government announces the privatisation of 3 public companies to obtain around 10 billion euros and to reduce the public debt that exceeds 120% of GDP, implement a public buildings fund, reduce high officials by 10% and the number of civil servants by 10%, and reactivate the infrastructures with tax exemptions.
- On 27 June Parliament approves the reform of the labour market tending to greater flexibility, reduction of precarious work and helping youth employment.
Malta

- On 4 June the government of the Nationalist Party defeats a vote of no confidence moved by the Labour Party thanks to the vote of its unruly deputy Franco Debono.
- On 18 June Malta’s Permanent Representative to the EU Richard Cachia Caruana resigns as he loses a vote of no confidence in Parliament following a Wikileaks cable that revealed negotiations in 2008 by Cachia Caruana to reactivate Maltese membership of NATO’s Partnership for Peace, bypassing parliamentary procedure.

Slovenia

- On 27 June the government adopts a second package of economic reactivation measures that include regional development, simplification of procedures for domestic investment and attraction of direct foreign investment.

Croatia

- On 20 June UEFA announces disciplinary proceedings against the Croatian Federation of Football for racist behaviour of several Croatian supporters during EURO 2012.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 15 June a new government coalition in the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation between the governing Social-Democrat Party (SDP), the Union for a Better Future (SBB, centre-right) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ, centre-right), leaves the Democratic Action Party (SDA, centre-right, Bosnian nationalist) outside the government.
- On 26 May Prime Minister Vjekoslav Bevanda removes from office the Minister of Security Fuad Kasumovic, all members of the SDA, at the request of the SDP.
- On 30 June the EU Police Mission in Bosnia, operative since 2003, ends as the country is considered to have achieved sufficient stability.

Montenegro

- On 28 June the European Council approves the opening of negotiations for the accession of Montenegro.

Serbia

- On 11 June the new Serbian President Tomislav Nikolic’s inauguration is boycotted by the Heads of State of the bordering countries following Nikolic’s declarations that the massacre of Srebrenica cannot be called genocide.
- On 20 June three high officials of the security services are sentenced to a total of 22 years’ imprisonment for the assassination attempt on Vuk Draskovic, leader of the opposition against Slobodan Milosevic, in Budva in 2000.

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 1 June the prohibition of Serbian number plates for Kosovo vehicles comes into force.
- On 5 June the EU extends until 14 June 2014 the mandate of the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX).
- On 28 June in Pristina Kosovo Albanian citizens attack Kosovo Serbians who were about to peacefully participate in the commemoration of the Kosovo Polje Battle in 1389, injuring 16 children. The UN Secretary General criticises the passivity of the Kosovo police.

FYROM

- On 13 June the authorities close the television channel A2 as it does not meet the necessary requisites for its licence, in a controversial decision adopted one year after the closure of its sister channel A1, also critical of the government.

Albania

- On 11 June in a fourth attempt and despite the socialist opposition, Parliament manages to appoint the current Minister of the Interior Bujar Nishani as the new President.

Greece

- On 17 June Greece holds legislative elections again, which are won by New Democracy (ND) with 29.66% of the votes – 129 seats – followed by Syriza (leftwing) with 26.89% – 71 seats – and PASOK with 12.29% – 33 seats. On 20 June the leader of ND Antonis Samaras forms a government and becomes the new Prime Minister.
- On 25 June, before being sworn in, the new Minister of Finance Vassilis Rapanos resigns for health reasons and is replaced by Manis Stournaras.

Turkey

- On 12 June Recep Tayyip Erdogan announces that Turkey will allow teaching in Kurdish from the following school year.
- On 16 June 13 inmates from a prison in Sanliurfa, where many members of the terrorist organisation PKK are serving their sentence, die in a fire following a riot.

Cyprus

- On 25 June Cyprus requests a loan from the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) for its banking system, seriously damaged by exposure to the Greek crisis and in need of 1.8 billion euros before the end of the month.

Syria

- On 4 June Sami al-Kurdi, spokesman of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), announces the return to armed activity after the ultimatum given to the Syrian government to stop violence runs out. Al-Kurdi also requests the imposition of an air exclusion zone and the deployment of an international peacekeeping force.
- On 5 June Syria declares personae non gratae the ambassadors of the US, the United Kingdom, France, Spain, Italy, Turkey and Switzerland and several diplomats from Germany, Belgium, Canada and Bulgaria in response to the expulsion of Syrian diplomats by these countries in late May after the massacre of Hula.
On 5 June there are serious confrontations in Latakia between the army and the FSA which result in at least 25 deaths.

On 6 June the UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy to Syria, Kofi Annan, admits at the UN Security Council the failure of the Peace Plan for Syria and proposes the creation of an international contact group.

On 9 June the Syrian National Council (SNC) elects the Kurdish Abdel Basit Seida, head of its Human Rights Department, as new President.

On 16 June the UN suspends the deployment of international observers to Syria due to the impossibility of them carrying out their tasks under minimum safety conditions. The SNC again calls for the Security Council to adopt an urgent resolution to intervene in Syria.

On 23 June Bashar al-Assad approves the appointment of the new government led by Riyad Hijab, former Minister of Agriculture, and which has ministers from the reformist wing of the regime, among them the new Minister for National Reconciliation Ali Haidar.

Lebanon

On 3 June at least 12 people die in Tripoli in fighting between Sunnis and Alawis.

On 19 June two Palestinians from the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in Lebanon are shot and killed by the Lebanese army as a response to an attack by a group of Palestinians attending the funeral of a refugee who had died the day before when Lebanese soldiers tried to stop a fight between two residents in the camp.

Egypt

On 2 June the Cairo Criminal Court sentences Hosni Mubarak and his former Minister of the Interior Habib al-Adly to life imprisonment for their responsibility in the deaths of 850 demonstrators during the Egyptian revolution. However, both are acquitted of the charges of corruption and misappropriation of public funds, as are Mubarak’s sons, Gamal and Alaa. These acquittals provoke riots and a large rally in Tahrir Square on 5 June, which also protests against the candidacy of Ahmed Shafiq.

On 14 June the Constitutional Court declares illegal the Political Isolation Law passed by Parliament in April, which would permit the annulment of the presidential candidacy of Ahmed Shafiq. In another legal ruling, it annuls the composition of the two chambers of Parliament as it considers that the allocation of seats violated the Law. This second ruling means that legislative power returns to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) until new elections are held.

On 17 June, after the closing of the polling stations, the SCAF announces the passing of new amendments to the constitutional project limiting presidential powers.

On 24 June the results of the presidential elections of 16 and 17 June are announced, with the Islamist Mohamed Morsi winning 51.73% of the votes and the former Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq winning 48.27%.

On 26 June an Egyptian court suspends the government decree that enabled the military intelligence and police to arrest civilians without a court order, passed by the interim government three days before the presidential elections.

Libya

On 4 June an armed group breaks into Tripoli airport to force the government to provide information on the whereabouts of a member of the group who went missing on 1 June. Some hours later, government troops regain control of the airport.

On 6 June a bomb claimed by the Brigade of Sheik Omar Abdul Rahman, linked to AQIM, explodes in the American consulate in Benghazi. Government sources believe that the attack is a reprisal for the death two days earlier in Pakistan of the Libyan Abu Yahya al-Libi, number two of al-Qaeda in this country.

On 7 June a delegation of the International Criminal Court is arrested by the Libyan authorities when they were about to visit Saif al-Islam Gaddafi in Zintan.

On 10 June new tribal confrontations in Kufra result in at least 11 deaths and 50 injured.

On 24 June Tunisia hands over Gaddafi’s former Prime Minister Mahmoud al-Baghdadi to Libya.

Tunisia

On 10 June two AQIM terrorists are sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for the murder in May 2011 of two Tunisian soldiers.

On 11 and 12 June riots take place in Tunis and other cities when Salafi groups attempt to set on fire a police station and private businesses for activities “contrary to Islamic law.” The security forces arrest at least 86 people.

On 13 June Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali is sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment in absentia for responsibility in the deaths in January 2011 of four demonstrators in Ouardanine.

On 16 June the former Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi announces the creation of the Call for Tunisia movement.

Algeria

On 15 June two police officers die when around fifty AQIM terrorists attack a police station in Ouargifs, Tizi Ouzou.

On 28 June an Algiers court sentences the leader of AQIM Abdelmalek Droukdel and six other terrorists to death in absentia for multiple murders between 1993 and 1996.

Mauritania

On 10 June the former Mauritanian Commissioner for Human Rights Mohamed Lemine Ould Dadde is sentenced to three years’ imprisonment and payment of a fine of 200,000 euros for misappropriation of funds.

European Union

On 1 June Ireland, the only country that holds a referendum on the EU Treaty of Stability, Coordination and Governance signed in March, approves the agreement by 60%, which must be ratified by 12 of the 17 eurozone countries.

On 7 and 8 June the European Justice and Home Affairs Council agrees
the application in the Schengen zone of joint regulations in relation to the temporary reintroduction of controls, in a controversial decision that excludes the Commission and Parliament from the decision-making process.

- On 28 and 29 June the European Council of Heads of State and Government commits to an agreement on growth and employment.

**Arab League**

- On 2 June the ministers of the Arab League who met in Doha request the mediator of their organisation and UN Kofi Annan to establish a deadline for the fulfilment of his peace plan in Syria.

**July 2012**

Portugal, Spain and France adopt new austerity measures. In Italy, a historic trial ends with the closing of the Ilva steel plant. In Bosnia, changes in the government coalition cause a dispute over the formation of the Council of Ministers. The Montenegrin Minister of Foreign Affairs resigns. The Serbian Constitutional Court declares part of a law granting autonomy to Vojvodina illegal. In Kosovo, several cases of corruption provoke resignations in the government. Albania passes the new Electoral Law. Cyprus takes over the EU Presidency. In Syria, crucial battles are unleashed over the control of Damascus and Aleppo. Trenseh is the setting of the worst massacre since the start of the conflict, the first desertions by ambassadors take place and the Minister of Defence dies in an attack while the divisions within the International Community impede any progress in solving the conflict. Tension increases in the neighbouring Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon due to the growing number of Syrian refugees and the fear that the crisis may spread. In Egypt, the Constitutional Court orders the dissolution of Parliament and President Morsi asks the Islamist Hisham Qandil to form the new government. Libya holds its first democratic elections. In Tunisia, the former President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali is once again sentenced in absentia and the Minister of Finance resigns.

**Portugal**

- On 5 July the Constitutional Court declares the suppression of salary bonuses for civil servants and pensioners decreed by the government in October 2011 illegal.
- On 11 and 12 July Portuguese doctors strike over cuts in health and the new hourly contract that the government is planning to introduce.

**Spain**

- On 11 July the government announces new measures to reduce the deficit by 6.5 billion euros in two years by eliminating the Christmas bonus for public employees, increasing VAT by 2%, reducing unemployment benefits, reducing the number of councillors by 30% and eliminating tax deductions for house purchases.
- On 19 and 20 July four members of the terrorist group First of October Anti-fascist Resistance Groups (GRAPO) are arrested in Seville, Cadiz and Caceres in relation to the kidnapping and murder of the businessman Pablo Cordón in 1995.
- On 24 July Catalonia joins the autonomous liquidity fund, as did Valencia and Murcia which in the same month also requested the state bailout due to the instability of their debt.

**France**

- On 3 July the government announces numerous measures to reduce the deficit in five years, including a fiscal reform that suppresses exemptions for the Solidarity Tax on Wealth (ISF), large inheritances and national insurance contributions for overtime in companies with over 20 workers and eliminates the VAT rise planned for October. It is also announces an increase of contracts in the education sector and security forces.

**Italy**

- On 11 July Vittorio Grilli becomes Minister of Economy, until then a responsibility assumed by the Prime Minister himself Mario Monti.
- On 27 July a Taranto court orders the closing of Ilva, the largest European steel manufacturer, sentencing to prison 8 of its managers for not having controlled the alarming levels of pollution that might have caused 11,000 deaths over the last 7 years. The ruling is contested by successive workers’ demonstrations while the government announces that it will appeal against the sentence.

**Slovenia**

- On 2 July the government agrees with the Belgian bank KBC on the recapitalisation of Nova Ljubljanska Banka, the largest bank in the country, with 381 million euros.

**Croatia**

- On 10 July the Minister of Transport announces that the national railway will cut 2,700 jobs before the end of the year to prepare the entry of the sector into the community market.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

- On 19 July the Democratic Action Party (SDA, social-democrat) prevents the government from dismissing its three ministers after the breakup of the government coalition in May alleging that it undermines the national interests of the Bosnian community, which would be underrepresented in the Council of Ministers.

**Montenegro**

- On 2 July the Minister of Foreign Affairs and European Integration Milan Rocen resigns as he considers that he has fulfilled his mission of putting Montenegro on the path to EU accession. On 18 July Parliament appoints Nebojsa Kaludjerovic as his replacement.

**Serbia**

- On 10 July the Constitutional Court declares several provisions of the law granting autonomy to Vojvodina unconstitutional, including those permitting
the region to open diplomatic representations abroad and others that name Novi Sad as its capital.

- On 10 July the Socialist Party (SPS), the Progressive Party (SNS) and United Regions of Serbia (URS) sign an agreement to form a government.

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 7 July Milovan Jevtic, Kosovo Serbian councillor in Talinovac, and his wife are shot and killed two days after a Kosovo Albanian citizen is sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment for the murder of another Serbian citizen.
- On 9 July the Deputy Prime Minister Bujar Bukoshi and the Deputy Minister of Finance Astrit Haraqija, both investigated for corruption, resign. Moreover, Hajredin Kuci, former Minister of Justice, resumes his post 18 days after he resigned once Parliament had rejected a reform of two articles of the penal code that obliged journalists to reveal their sources to the authorities.
- On 31 July 8 Kosovo judges are accused by the Public Prosecutor’s Office of misappropriation of funds.

FYROM

- On 19 July the Democratic Party of Albania (PDS) announces that it is joining the bloc of opposition to Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski led by the Social-Democrat Party.

Albania

- On 19 July Parliament adopts by 127 votes of the 140 deputies present the new Electoral Law that should put an end to the climate of constant dispute between the two majority parties and which is one of the requisites for advancing in the EU accession process.

Greece

- On 9 July Parliament approves the government plan to increase privatisation and attract investments to avoid further cuts in public spending.

Turkey

- On 22 July a soldier dies and 8 others are injured in an assault by the PKK against a military checkpoint in Hakkari.

Cyprus

- On 19 July the UN Security Council extends the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) until 31 January 2013.

Syria

- On 1 July the Syrian National Council (SNC) rejects the proposal by the Action Group for Syria, which met the previous day in Geneva, to form a transitional governing body with the participation of opposition and government. On 2 and 3 July, under the auspices of the Arab League, around 200 representatives of different opposition groups meet in Cairo with major differences over the future of the Baath Party, the Kurdish question or the role of the SNC.
- On 2 July Bashar al-Assad enacts the Law passed by the People’s Assembly on 28 June which allows for harsher sentences for terrorism.
- On 11 July Nawaf al-Fares, Syrian ambassador to Iraq, becomes the first high level diplomat to desert.
- On 13 July at least 200 civilians die in Trenseh, province of Hama, in the largest massacre of civilians by the regime since the start of the uprising.

Lebanon

- On 25 July the Minister of Foreign Affairs Adnan Mansour asks the Syrian ambassador to Lebanon for Damascus to stop all violations of Lebanese sovereignty once and for all. On 26 July at least four missiles launched from Syria hit Kawacha, Rabadia, Arida and Sayeidat Monye.
- On 31 July Electricité du Liban (EDL) announces that the country will be blacked out due to the strike by temporary workers who after weeks of protests decide to take over the headquarters of EDL to request permanent contracts and improvements in working conditions.

Jordan

- On 1 July riots begin in the city of Salt when youths protesting against political arrests, the level of unemployment and the lack of democracy attack members of the security forces with stones.
- On 10 July the government announces the construction in the north of the country of refugee camps for the more than 130,000 people who have fled from Syria.

Egypt

- On 8 July the Supreme Administrative Court submits to the Constitutional Court a petition for the Shura Council to be dissolved for irregularities in its composition.
- On 9 July President Mohamed Morsi issues a decree ordering the National Assembly to resume its sessions despite having been dissolved on 15 June by the Constitutional Court. Moreover, he establishes the holding of new legislative elections...
within 60 days following the approval of the new Constitution to be prepared by the Assembly.

• On 10 July Parliament holds its first session – boycotted by the Wafd Party (liberal) and the Egyptian Bloc (left, secularist) – since its dissolution in June, challenging the ruling of the Constitutional Court. The session decides to refer the dispute with the Constitutional Court to the Court of Cassation and not to hold any more sessions until it makes its ruling.

• On 19 July Omar Suleiman dies suddenly during a medical check-up in Cleveland, the victim of the cancer he was suffering.

• On 24 July Mohamed Morsi asks the current Minister of Irrigation, the Islamist Hisham Qandil, to form a new government.

Libya

• On 2 July the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces the release of the four delegates of the International Criminal Court (ICC) imprisoned in June in Zintan accused of filtering documentation to Saif al-Islam Gaddafi.

• On 7 July with a participation of 62%, Libya holds its first parliamentary elections to elect the 200 deputies that will form the Constituent Assembly of Egypt – 100 from Tripolitania, 60 from Cyrenaica and 40 from Fezzan. The National Forces Alliance of the former Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril wins 39 of the 80 seats reserved for political parties, followed by the Islamist Justice and Construction Party, with 17 seats, and the National Front, with 3 seats.

Tunisia

• On 12 July the governing party, Ennahda, holds its first national congress in 24 years with the aim of consolidating as a moderate Islamist option capable of providing an effective response to the socioeconomic needs of the country.

• On 13 July the government rejects for the second time the petition to legalise the party of Salafi ideology Hizb ut-Tahrir.

• On 16 July the former President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali announces through his lawyer, the Lebanese Akram Azoury, his intention to immediately renounce all the goods he still possesses in Switzerland and surrender them to the Tunisian State.

• On 18 July, with 110 votes out of 217, the National Assembly approves the proposal submitted on 26 June by President Moncef Marzouki to remove from office the Governor of the Central Bank Mustafa Kamel Nabli due to the serious disagreements between him and the government on the independence of the Central Bank.

• On 18 July a Tunisian court increases the list of sentences passed against Zine al-Abidine Ben-Ali as it condemns him to life imprisonment in absentia for the death of demonstrators during the Tunisian revolution. The same court hands down sentences of 20 years' imprisonment for the former Head of Security Ali Seriati and 15 years' imprisonment for the former Minister of the Interior Rafik Belhaj Kacem. Forty other former high officials receive sentences ranging from five to 20 years' imprisonment.

• On 19 July Beji Caid Essebsi, leader of Call for Tunisia, and Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, President of the Republican Party, agree a joint strategy on the 2013 legislative elections. The leader of the Democratic and Social Party Ahmed Ibrahim also attends the meeting.

Algeria

• On 9 July around 5,000 communal guards march from Blida to Algiers to demand the payment of their overdue salaries and the possibility of joining the police and gendarmerie following the government’s plans announced in March 2011 to dissolve the paramilitary body.

Morocco

• On 2 July the government launches a process of national dialogue on the state of prisons with the participation of Parliament, government institutions and NGOs given the reports by Amnesty International of "torture and physical abuse" in Moroccan prisons.

• On 11 July a police officer dies under the weight of around 100 Sub-Saharan immigrants who were trying to get to Spain through the Ferjana pass. After the incident, the police carry out searches and make arrests in Nador and Oujda.

Mauritania

• On 15 and 22 July there are serious riots during the protests carried out since 12 June in Gueule Moghirein, Akinjout, by the workers of Copper Mines of Mauritania to demand salary increases.

European Union

• On 1 July Cyprus takes over the sixth-month EU Presidency with the priorities of fostering growth policies based on social cohesion and solidarity, the Multiannual Financial Framework for the period 2014-2020, balancing opposed interests in the Common Agricultural Policy and creating a joint asylum system.

• On 1 July the European Stability Mechanism comes into force replacing the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), with more capital and greater stability in the long term.

• On 11 July the European Council decides that, from 1 January 2014, the French overseas department of Mayotte will become an ultra-peripheral region of the EU.

August 2012

Portugal approves a rescue fund for the Azores. Spain approves the reform of the banking sector. The Italian Parliament approves new economic cuts. Greece seeks to negotiate a deferment of the deadlines to satisfy the payment of the debt and stagger the cuts demanded by the troika. Turkey increases its military deployment on the Syrian border due to the lack of control by Damascus of the zones controlled by Kurdish nationalists and the endless influx of refugees from the Syrian conflict. In Syria Prime Minister Riad Farid Hijab resigns. Kofi Annan also resigns
as UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy and is replaced by the Algerian Lakhdar Brahimi due to the lack of consensus within the International Community and the exhaustion of the diplomatic channels to stop a conflict that threatens to spread to neighbouring Lebanon, where confrontations between communities hit Tripoli again. In Egypt the new government of Hisham Qandil takes office, President Mohamed Morsi pushes Marshall Tantawi and the Chief of Staff Sami Annan into retirement, and troops are sent to the Sinai to regain control of the region. In Libya, the National Transitional Council hands over power to Parliament. The rise of Salafism and the prevailing values of the revolution are an issue of concern in Tunisia.

Portugal

• On 20 August the government grants a bailout of 135 million euros to the Azores to refinance the autonomous region’s debt.

Spain

• On 31 August the government approves the reform of the banking system that provides for the public supervision of the banking entities with funds below 9% of capital and the creation of a bad bank to which toxic real-estate assets will be transferred for later sale.

France

• On 8 August the police dismantle two Gypsy camps in Lille, in a controversial action considered by diverse NGOs as continuing the policy of the previous government.
• On 13 August there are violent riots between the police and around 100 youths in the north of Amiens, following police control during a burial.
• On 27 August the ETA member and person responsible for international relations of Segi Arturo Villanueva Artega who fled in 2003, is arrested in Urrugne. His arrest follows that of Iñaki Imaz Manduate, on the run since the break up in 2007 of the Urederra Commando on 5 August in Hendaye.

Italy

• On 7 August Parliament passes the bill approved by the government on 6 July and endorsed by the Senate on 31 July revising public spending with cuts of 2.6 billion euros from 2012 to 2014.
• On 19 August an unemployed man from Turin commits suicide by setting himself on fire due to his desperate situation. A case that, along with another that took place on 11 August in front of the Italian Parliament, completes the around thirty suicides recorded in 2012 in Italy as a result of the economic crisis.

Slovenia

• On 31 August the government announces the fall of the Slovenian GDP during the second quarter of 3.2% in comparison to the same period in 2011, a much greater fall than expected and that, along with a rise in the debt over the course of 10 years to 6.9%, makes it likely that Slovenia will request a bailout.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

• On 7 August the President of the Srpska Republic Milorad Dodik rejects participation in the federal government until the Minister of Foreign Affairs Zlatko Lagumdžija resigns as he had supported a resolution against Syria in the UN Security Council without consulting all the members of the government, violating the Constitution.

Serbia

• On 4 August Parliament approves measures that delimit the independence of the Central Bank. On 6 August Jorgovanka Tabakovic, close to President Nikolic, is appointed new Governor of the Central Bank.

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244

• On 21 August the Head of the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Farid Zarif calls on the Security Council to approve measures that help resume dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, at a standstill since the start of agreement in early March.
• On 23 August Kosovo Serbian demonstrators impede the passage of convoys of the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) with barricades in Zupce.

FYROM

• On 22 August the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) threatens to leave the government coalition if Parliament adopts the bill granting compensations for the 2001 conflict to the army members but not to the Albanian National Liberation Army (UÇK).
• On 16 August President Ivanov orders an investigation of the Minister of Defence Fatmir Besimi and other members of the government who attended a tribute to the UÇK.

Greece

• On 3 August the Ministry of the Interior launches the operation Zeus Xenios against irregular immigration, which during the weekend results in the arrest of 6,000 people without identity papers.
• On 22 August Prime Minister Antonis Samaras begins negotiations for the deferral of cuts (from 2014 to 2016) in exchange for a renewed guarantee of support. This follows a 14 August debt sale of 4.063 billion euros in treasury notes at 4.43%, the largest debt placement since the approval of the second bailout. The sale funds the 3.2 billion euros of debt maturing on 20 August, which is owed to the European Central Bank.

Turkey

• On 1 and 2 August in Semdinli and Diyarbakir there are confrontations between the army and the terrorist organisation PKK after weeks of confrontations which coincide with the crisis of power in Syrian Kurdistan, resulting in dozens of deaths.
• On 20 August a car bomb attributed to the PKK causes eight deaths in Gaziantep.
• On 27 August Turkey closes its border to the 7,000 Syrian refugees wait-
ing to cross until two new camps are created in Hatay and Gaziantep with a capacity for 10,000 people.

Cyprus

- On 2 August the rating agency Standard & Poor’s calculates the cost of reflowing the Cypriot economy at 11 billion euros, approximately 60% of the GDP.

Syria

- On 2 August the army bombs al-Yarmuk, the largest Palestinian refugee camp in Syria, killing 21 people.
- On 3 August the UN General Assembly adopts a draft resolution submitted by the Arab group condemning the violations of human rights by the government and the opposition and denounces the ineffectiveness of the Security Council.
- On 6 August the desertion of Prime Minister Riad Farid Hijab is revealed. On 8 August the former Minister of Health Wael Nader al-Halqi, a Sunni and born in Dara, is appointed new Prime Minister.
- On 7 August the army launches an offensive with 20,000 soldiers in Aleppo against rebels, mostly in Salaheddine.
- On 9 August Teheran hosts a conference on Syria which is attended by representatives from 29 countries and constitutes an alternative to the Conference of Friends of Syria promoted by the West and the Gulf Cooperation Council.
- From 13 to 16 August Mecca hosts the conference of the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation that agrees to expel Syria but with the opposition of Iran. Egypt launches a proposal to create a contact group for Syria made up of Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran.
- On 16 August the UN Security Council decides to conclude the observation mission in Syria.
- On 20 August Barack Obama warns Damascus against the use of chemical weapons, which could lead to a possible American intervention.
- On 28 August a car bomb explodes in the mostly Druze and Christian neighbourhood of Yarmana, southern Damascus, causing at least 12 deaths.

Lebanon

- On 9 August the former Minister of Information Michel Samaha is arrested and accused of planning attacks in Akkar, northern Lebanon, to incite sectarian fighting following Syrian instructions.
- On 20 August the Public Prosecutor of Damascus Marwan al-Luji announces that he intends to summon around thirty Lebanese politicians to give evidence under the charge of providing refuge, weapons and funding to the Syrian opposition in Lebanon. The possible summons includes the former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, the leader of the Christian Lebanese Forces Samir Geagea and the Head of the Socialist Progressive Party, the Druze Walid Jumblatt.
- On 21 August in Tripoli five people die in fresh fighting between Sunnis and Alawis. On 23 August the death toll reaches 17. On 24 August the death of the Sunni Sheikh Khaled al-Baradei fuels the fighting.

Jordan

- On 28 August Jordan announces plans to open a new reception centre for refugees funded by the United Arab Emirates due to overcrowding of the Zaatarai camp.

Egypt

- On 1 August the composition of the new markedly technocrat government of Hisham Qandil is announced. The new cabinet includes seven members of the previous interim government in decisive posts such as Foreign Affairs – Mohamed Kamel Ali Amr, Finance – Montaz Saed Abu al-Nour and Defence – Marshall Hussein Tantawi. The reformist judge Mahmoud Mekki is appointed Head of the vice-Presidency.
- On 5 August 16 Egyptian police officers die on the border with the Gaza Strip and Israel in an attack by a Jihadist commando that sought to infiltrate Israel. Egypt closes its border with Gaza and launches the Eagle Operation, the largest military campaign in the Sinai since the signing of peace with Israel in 1979. The seriousness of the situation means that on 8 August Mohamed Morsi removes the Head of the Secret Services Muwafi from office. Other important changes made by the President after the incidents are the appointment of Mohamed Ahmed Zaki as Head of the Republican Guard, the dismissal of the Governor of the province of Northern Sinai, the appointment of the former Ambassador to Libya Mohamed Fathi Rifa’a al-Tahtawi as Head of the Presidential Cabinet and the appointment of Maged Mostafa Kamel at the head of Central Security.
- On 12 August Mohamed Morsi revokes the constitutional declaration with which on 17 June 2012 the SCAF sought to limit presidential powers. He also announces the retirement of the Chief of Staff Sami Annan and of Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi.

Libya

- On 8 August the President of the National Transitional Council (NTC) Mustafa Abdul Jalil officially returns power to the People’s Congress (Constituent Assembly), elected in July. On 9 August Mohamed Magariaf, leader of the National Front, is elected President of the National Assembly.
- On 10 August General Mohamed Hadia al-Feitouri is assassinated, within the series of attacks against members of Muammar Gaddafi’s regime that have taken place in Benghazi since early summer.
- On 16 August the National Congress passes its first law, prohibiting citizens with dual nationality and those married to someone without Libyan nationality from occupying high offices.
- On 19 August in Tripoli two people die after the explosion of three car bombs. On 19 August 32 people are arrested for their presumed involvement in the first car bomb attack after the fall of Gaddafi.
• On 5 August the police disperse a demonstration against the government announcement to institute economic compensations for over 12,000 political prisoners during the mandate of Ben Ali, a measure considered excessive given the serious economic and social problems.
• On 9 August five people are injured and two others are arrested in riots that took place during a demonstration in Sidi Bouzid organised by the December 17 Front and with the participation of the Republic Party, the Party of Tunisian Workers and al-Watan against the Ennahda government.
• On 13 August, on the anniversary of the enactment of the 1956 Personal Status Code that abolished polygamy and repudiation, thousands of people demand that equal rights for women be included in the new Constitution after it is revealed that in Article 28 the term “equality” is replaced by “complementarity within the family.”
• On 14 August around 2,000 people participate in the general strike called in Sidi Bouzid by the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) to demand greater social and economic reforms.
• On 16 August in Bizerta a meeting of the Tunisian League for Tolerance during the Al-Aqsa Festival is attacked by a group of 200 Salafists in an incident that takes place within the context of the growing aggressions by fundamentalists against public, cultural and festive events.
• On 17 August the military trial scheduled for that day for charges of slander against President Moncef Marzouki’s former Communication Advisor Ayoub Massoudi, who the previous day the Tunisian court had prohibited from leaving the country, is postponed until 22 August. Massoudi, outside the government since June and critical of the government’s management of the protests in Sidi Bouzid, denounces it as a political trial. On 30 August the court lifts the prohibition against Massoudi leaving the country, and his defence attempts to have it referred to a civil court.

Morocco
• On 22 August in Rabat riot police disperse a demonstration called by the February 20 Movement to call for the abolition of the ceremony of loyalty to the King, held the previous day.

Mauritania
• On 1 August the new two-year fishing agreement between Mauritania and the EU, signed in Nouakchott on 26 July, comes into force.
• On 3 August a group of demonstrators called “No to the Loss of Morality” marches through Nouakchott to call for the imposition of the sharia in Mauritania.
• On 6 August President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz responds to the demonstrations led by the Coordination of the Democratic Opposition (COD) and that have called for his resignation every week since May by pointing out that his election was democratic and that he is determined to serve out his mandate, which expires in 2014.

European Union
• On 29 August François Hollande and Angela Merkel agree the constitution of a “working group” to lead the necessary reforms in the Economic and Monetary Union to confront the debt crisis.

Arab League
• On 2 August Kofi Annan resigns as UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy to Syria. On 14 August the former Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lakhdar Brahimi is elected new Special Envoy.

September 2012
Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Monaco are the setting for demonstrations against cuts. In Italy, the resignation of Lazio’s governor worsens the crisis of the People of Freedom Party. Kosovo gains full sovereignty. In Syria, confrontations continue over the control of Damascus and Aleppo. The state of tension experienced by Lebanon worsens with the people’s protests against the video “Innocence of Muslims” produced and directed by the US resident Copt Bakoula Nassely Bakoula and considered offensive by Islamist sectors of the Arab world. The protests to diplomatic delegations of the USA and other Western countries in different Islamic countries reach dramatic levels with the assault on the US consulate in Benghazi in which Ambassador Christopher Stevens dies. In Egypt, the military intervention continues in Sinai and there are new judicial actions against important members of the Mubarak regime. In Libya, Mustafa Abu Shagour is the newly-elected Prime Minister. In Algeria, the composition of the new government is announced.

Portugal
• On 15 September thousands of Portuguese demonstrate against the new austerity measures after Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho announced, on 7 September, a cut in all public and private salaries through increased national insurance contributions from 11% to 18%. The measure aims to reduce the public deficit without eliminating the bonus for civil servants and pensioners who receive more than 1,000 euros per month, declared illegal by the Constitutional Court in June.

Spain
• On 20 September the socialist Mayor of Orense and the PP Mayor of Boqueixon, Galicia, are arrested along with another 11 people in Galicia, Asturias and Madrid within the Pokemon anti-corruption operation.
• On 24 September Catalonia calls early elections for 25 November and threatens a referendum on independence after the autonomous government’s failure in its bid to collect and manage all taxes through its own Inland Revenue, a request that Madrid considers unacceptable in the current crisis situation.
• On 25 September the peaceful rally “Surround the Congress” against...
the spending cut measures of the government, whose resignation they demand, and the political class who they accuse of “Hijacking democracy” and of whom they demand the development of a new Constitution, ends in riots, 35 arrests and dozens of injuries, after which a group of demonstrators attempts to storm the Parliament.

**France**

- On 10 September seven bombs attributed to the Corsica Liberation National Front explode in different supermarkets on the French island.
- On 12 September Harlem Désir is elected new Secretary General of the Socialist Party, replacing Martine Aubry, who resigned from the position in August.
- On 30 September thousands of French people demonstrate in Paris against the Hollande government’s spending cuts policy.

**Monaco**

- On 19 September a one day strike called by the Monegasque Workers’ Union protests against the reform proposed by the government to reduce pensions and increase the retirement age. On 26 September the National Council unanimously passes the 1947 Retirement Law reform.

**Italy**

- On 10 September in Rome a demonstration by employees of the plant in Portovesme, Sardinia, owned by the American steel works Aldecoa results in 14 casualties in riots near the Ministry of Economic Development, where a meeting is being held between the company, the unions and the government to find alternatives to the closure of the plant.
- On 22 September the Governor of Lazio Renata Polverini resigns in the midst of the misappropriation of public funds scandal, which shakes the People of Freedom Party in the region and endangers Silvio Berlusconi’s options to return to the presidency of the government.
- On 22 September at the end of a meeting with Mario Monti, the managers of Fiat announce a commitment to maintain its industrial presence in Italy.

**Malta**

- On 12 September Malta and Italy sign a series of cooperation agreements in sensitive areas such as delimitation of the continental shelf, exploration of oil resources and immigration.

**Slovenia**

- On 20 September Slovenia warns that it will veto Croatian EU accession if first there is no resolution of the dispute over the 160 million euros deposited before the disappearance of Yugoslavia and reclaimed by 130,000 Croats from the defunct Slovenian Ljubljanska Banka.

**Serbia**

- On 21 September the Belgrade High Court sentences 11 ex-guerrillas of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UÇK) to a total of 116 years' imprisonment for war crimes committed in 1999 in Kosovo.

**Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244**

- On 10 September Kosovo achieves full sovereignty when the International Steering Group for Kosovo decides to end the supervised independence of the country.

**Albania**

- On 20 September Parliament passes a constitutional amendment that limits the immunity of politicians, Members of Parliament and judges.

**Greece**

- On 8 September thousands of Greeks protest in Thessaloniki against the government’s austerity measures.
- On 24 September the President of the Parliament Vangelis Meimarakis temporarily resigns after it is revealed that he is being investigated along with two other former ministers for the alleged laundering of 10.2 billion euros.
- On 26 September in Athens a mass demonstration on the occasion of the general strike against Antonis Samaras’ government ends in riots and around 50 arrests.
- On 27 September the government coalition – ND, PASOK and Dimar – reaches an agreement to save the 11.5 billion euros demanded by the troika through public spending cuts and another 2 billion through new fundraising.

**Turkey**

- On 6 September at least sixty immigrants die in a shipwreck off the Aegean-Turkish coast.
- On 11 September one person dies in a suicide attack on a police station in Sultangazi, Istanbul, for which the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party claims responsibility.
- On 16 September at least eight police officers die in the explosion of a mine on the road in Karliova, province of Bingol.
- On 25 September seven people die in an attack by the PKK against an army armoured vehicle in Tunceli.

**Syria**

- On 3 September a bomb attack in the mostly Druze and Christian neighbourhood of Yarmana, following another on 28 August, kills at least five people.
- On 16 September Iran officially confirms that there are troops of the Revolutionary Guard in Syrian territory offering non-military aid but that it “could become militarily involved if the country is attacked.”
- On 18 September Bushra al-Assad, sister of the Syrian President, leaves the country with her children for Dubai amidst growing disagreements within the power faced with the fear that the repression exercised by Bashar al-Assad would end up involving the whole Alawi sect.
- On 19 and 20 September at least 28 Palestinian refugees from the Yarmuk camp, Damascus, die during an attack by the army against opponents of the Free Syrian Army (FSA).
• On 20 September the USA condemns the possible use by Iran of civilian planes to carry armaments to the Syrian regime through Iraqi airspace and urges Iraq to take measures.
• On 26 September the Islamist group Ansar al-Islam, part of the FSA, claims responsibility for a suicide attack with two car bombs perpetrated hours earlier against the headquarters of the General Staff in Abu Rumaneh, Damascus.
• On 26 September over 300 people die in Syria in the bloodiest day since the start of the uprisings.
• On 27 September the fighting over control of Aleppo becomes more intense, reaching “unprecedented” levels according to the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights.

Lebanon

• On 13 September the USA imposes sanctions on the leader of Hezbollah Hassan Nasrallah, accusing him together with another two members of the organisation of helping the Syrian government in the repression of the protests.
• On 17 September Hassan Nasrallah takes part in a mass march in Beirut against the video “Innocence of Muslims”, a low-budget production that ridicules the figure of Mohammad unleashing a wave of protests in the Muslim world. On 19 September thousands of Hezbollah followers demonstrate again in Beirut against the USA, against this film and against France for the caricatures of Allah and Mohammad published by the satirical weekly Charlie Hebdo.

Jordan

• On 1 September Jordan asks the International Community for 700 million dollars in urgent aid to help the more than 177,000 Syrian refugees in Jordan.
• On 12 September Abdullah II accuses Israel of impeding the development of a civil nuclear programme even though Jordan’s energy dependency is one of the main stumbling blocks to its economic progress. The declarations come in the context of continuous protests led by the Muslim Brotherhood against the rise in the price of fuel.

Egypt

• On 9 September the Public Prosecutor’s Office refers to the Military Prosecutor’s Office two complaints made by the April 6 Movement against the former Minister of Defence Marshall Hussein Tantawi and the former Chief of Staff Sami Annan for his involvement in the death of demonstrators since the outbreak of the Egyptian revolution. A third complaint had been made by the Prosecutor’s Office against Anan for illicit gains.
• On 11 September an Egyptian court rules preventive detention for the last Mubarak Prime Minister and candidate defeated in the Egyptian presidential elections Ahmed Shafiq, currently in the United Arab Emirates. The Egyptian justice ministry accuses Shafiq of illicit gains and falsification of official documents when in 1993 he sold 40,000 square metres of land in Ismailia to Hosni Mubarak’s sons for less than market price.
• On 11 September a group of demonstrators bursts into the US embassy in Cairo and burns the American flag replacing it with a black standard with the verse “Allah is the only God and Mohammad is his prophet” in protest at the broadcast of the video “Innocence of Muslims,” condemned by the Coptic Orthodox Church and considered offensive by Islamic fundamentalists. On 18 September the Public Prosecutor Abdelmeguid Mahmoud asks for seven Coptic Christians living in the USA, among them Nakoula Basseye Nakoula, producer of “Innocence of Muslims,” and the American pastor Terry Jones to be taken into custody for his involvement in the production and distribution of the film.

Libya

• On 2 and 10 September the colonels of the Gaddafi regime Juma al-Kadiki and Badr Khamis al-Obeidi die in two attacks.
• On 4 September Mauritania extradites to Libya Abdullah al-Senussi, Head of the Secret Services of the Gaddafi regime.
• On 11 September the US ambassador to Libya Christopher Stevens and another three embassy employees die during the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi by a group of demonstrators in protest at the broadcast of the video “Innocence of Muslims” on the occasion of the commemoration of the 11 September terrorist attacks.
• On 12 September Mustafa Abu Shagour is elected new Prime Minister of Libya beating Mahmud Jibril in a second parliamentary round by 96 votes to 94.
• On 17 September, following the assault on the US consulate in Benghazi, the Minister of the Interior Faiz Abu Aal removes from office the Head of the Local High Security Commission Wanis al-Qaddafi, the Deputy Minister of the Interior for Cyrenaica Wanis al-Shaf, and the Head of National Security for Benghazi Hussein Bou Hmida.
• On 24 September Libya takes control of the two largest militias still operating in Benghazi.

Tunisia

• On 8 September in Kasserine a demonstration demands compensation for the victims of the Tunisian uprising.
• On 10 September the Qatari authorities decide to expel Sakher El Maiyliya to Hosni Mubarak’s sons for less than market price.
• On 17 September hundreds of Islamist protesters congregate in front of the American Embassy to protest against the video “Innocence of Muslims.” Three demonstrators die in police riots. On 23 September Hassen Brik, an important member of Ansar al-Sharia, is arrested in connection with the incidents.

Algeria

• On 3 September the Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika appoints as Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal, Minister of Hydraulic Resources, replacing Ahmed Ouyahia, who resigned. On 4 September the names of the members of the new government are announced. Continuing in their posts are the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Mourad Me-
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Italy

- On 11 October the arrest of the capo of the ‘Ndrangheta Domenico Condello, a fugitive since 1992, is announced.
- On 15 October Pietro Ribisi, capo of the Mafia, commits suicide in the Carinola prison, Sicily, where he was serving life imprisonment for the murders of the judge Antonio Saetta and his son in 1988.
- On 22 October a controversial sentence by the Ministry of Justice sentences seven scientists to six years’ imprisonment for minimising the danger of a big earthquake six days before the major earthquake in L’Aquila which in April 2009 caused 309 deaths.
- On 26 October the Ministry of Justice sentences Silvio Berlusconi to four years’ imprisonment, subject to appeal, for tax fraud in the Mediaset case.
- On 28 October Sicily holds regional elections which involve a historic victory for the Democratic Party with 30.5% of the votes.
- On 31 October the government adopts a decree that suppresses dozens of provinces to make savings in political and administrative costs.

Malta

- On 16 October the European Commissioner for Health and Consumer Policy, the Maltese John Dalli, resigns after becoming involved in accusations of trading in influence by favouring Maltese tobacco producers. On 21 October Tonio Borg replaces Dalli.

Slovenia

- On 4 October the government passes the budget bill 2013–2014 which provides for spending cuts and an increase in VAT to reduce the deficit to below 3% of GDP.

Croatia

- On 11 October in Zagreb mass protests reject the cuts in salaries by the government in the education and health sectors.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 7 October Bosnia holds local elections, in which the Democratic Action Party triumphs in 34 municipalities followed by the Serbian Democratic Party, which wins in 27.

Montenegro

- On 14 October Montenegro holds early parliamentary elections, which are won by the governing coalition European Montenegro led by the Democratic Party of Socialists although losing its absolute majority.

Serbia

- On 4 October the European Commission condemns the government decision to move the gay pride march of 6 October in Belgrade from the streets to a sports centre for security reasons.
- On 4 October the Ministry of Finance and the Vojvodina authorities reach a preliminary agreement on financing the autonomous province.
- On 9 October Parliament revokes the immunity of Oliver Dulic (Democratic Party), accused by the Public Prosecutor’s Office of corruption during his time as Minister of the Environment.

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 17 October there are confrontations between police and demonstrators protesting against the privatisation of the Kosovo electricity grid for an amount of 26.3 million euros.
- On 19 October the Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dacic and Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi have talks for the first time to reactivate negotiations backed by the EU after three months of paralysis.

FYROM

- On 4 October Athens sends to Skopje a draft bilateral memorandum seeking to stimulate the stagnated negotiations on the name issue.
- On 6 October the government defeats a vote of no confidence moved by the social-democrat opposition.

Albania

- On 15 October eight former prisoners from the communist era warn that they will continue their hunger strike of 23 days until they die if the State does not compensate them for their imprisonment.

Greece

- On 4 October the PASOK confirms the suicide of the former Secretary of State Leonidas Tzannis, who had appeared on a list of Greek politicians investigated for corruption.
- On 17 October EU and IMF experts leave Greece without having reached an agreement with Athens about new cuts on the same day that two days of strike begin in the country. On 24 October Athens and the troika reach an agreement that includes measures to make the labour market more flexible.

Turkey

- On 18 October in Istanbul the trial for offences against Islam begins against the pianist Fazıl Say, which on the same day is postponed until 18 February 2013.
- On 29 October, Republic Day, a march in Ankara by thousands of secularist demonstrators backed by the Kemalist opposition is dispersed by the police to avoid the demonstrators entering the Ataturk Mausoleum.

Cyprus

- On 10 October the government approves a fund of 300 million euros for the creation of employment and stimulation of the energy and construction sectors.
- On 28 October three people are arrested accused of planning to assas-
• On 3 October 48 people die in a chain of attacks in Aleppo.
• On 3 October Turkey bombards Syrian territory in retaliation for the launch of missiles against the Turkish town of Akçakale, causing the deaths of five civilians. On the same day, NATO meets at the request of Turkey to analyse the posture of the Atlantic Alliance in the Syrian conflict.
• On 10 October the Turkish Air Force compels a Syrian plane flying from Moscow to Damascus to land in Ankara, alleging that it was carrying “non-civilian” cargo.
• On 14 October Turkey closes its airspace to Syrian civil flights in retaliation for a similar measure adopted by Damascus the previous day.
• On 16 October Turkey announces an agreement with Iran to promote the ceasefire in Syria and announces the intention to create three tripartite initiatives with Egypt, Russia and Saudi Arabia to resolve the Syrian crisis.
• On 23 October Bashar al-Assad issues a general amnesty for all prisoners not charged with “terrorism.”
• On 24 October Bashar al-Assad and the Free Syrian Army agree to recognise the ceasefire proposed by the UN-Arab League Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi on the occasion of the Aid el-Kebir Festival. The truce does not manage to stop the violence.
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Syria

Egypt

• On 8 October Mohamed Morsi announces the pardon of political prisoners held since the start of the revolution.
• On 10 October important figures of the Mubarak regime are acquitted of the charges against them for the attack on demonstrators in Tahrir Square in February 2011, known as the Battle of the Camel.
• On 12 and 20 October thousands of demonstrators in Tahrir Square protest against the swing to conservatism by the Freedom and Justice Party government.
• On 20 October the former President of the People’s Assembly (lower chamber) Mohamed Saad al-Katatni is elected new President of the Freedom and Justice Party.

Libya

• On 7 October the National Congress passes a no confidence motion against Prime Minister Mustafa Abu Shagour, after rejecting his government’s proposal. On 13 October Members of Parliament elect the diplomat Ali Zeidan as the new Prime Minister.
• On 16 October Captain Adel Baqramawi becomes the 15th high ranking official to be assassinated in Benghazi in 2012.
• On 20 October fighting in Bani Walid, submerged in violence since the start of the month, claims at least 26 lives. The deaths include Khamsi Gaddafi, son of Muammar Gaddafi.
• On 31 October the National Congress approves Ali Zeidan’s government.

Tunisia

• On 6 October Ennahda sympathisers march through Sidi Bouzid one day after the police broke up an anti-government demonstration that demanded the resignation of Governor Mohamed Najib Mansouri, who on 7 October is replaced by the then Governor of Kebili Amara Tijani.
• On 14 October the government calls presidential and legislative elections for 23 June 2013.
• On 18 October Lufti Nagued, Regional Secretary of Nida Tunis, a party created by the former Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi, dies beaten by members of a Revolution Protection Committee.
• On 23 October the government submits to Parliament the draft Constitution establishing a semi-presidential republic inspired by the French and Portuguese models in which the President would be elected by universal suffrage and Parliament would be responsible for forming the government.
• On 24 October the number two of the Salafi Ansar al-Sharia movement Abu Ayub is sentenced to one year in prison for his involvement in the attack on the American embassy in Tunis.

Algeria

Morocco

• On 1 October the Moroccan Ministry of Justice reduces from 15 to 12 years’ imprisonment the sentence of the Belgian-Moroccan Ali Aarrass, arrested in the Spanish city of Melilla in April 2008 for supplying arms to AQIM.
• On 6 October 8,000 magistrates demonstrate in Rabat demanding reforms to guarantee the independence of judicial power.
• On 16 October Bashir Benshaib, activist of the February 20 Movement, is sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment for participating in an unauthorised demonstration in March, among other charges.

Mauritania

• On 14 October President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz is injured in an accidental shooting by a soldier.
European Union

- On 8 October the European Stability Mechanism officially comes into force.
- On 10 October the European Commission publishes the annual reports on the progress of the accession candidate countries. It recommends the status of candidate for the FYROM as soon as the question of the name is resolved and for Albania as soon as the country approves the judicial and administrative reform. It warns Turkey of the deficient state of fundamental rights and notes the lack of progress in the Cypriot question. Montenegro must carry out justice reforms and the fight against corruption and organised crime, human rights and security. For Serbia and Kosovo it recommends the normalisation of relations to advance in the accession process.
- On 18 and 19 October the European Council agrees to establish a single supervisory mechanism for banks from 2013.

November 2012

In Spain and Portugal, there is a general strike. Portugal approves its budget for 2013. In Spain, Catalonia holds decisive autonomous elections. In France, the UMP holds primary elections. Italy approves the budget for 2013. In Croatia, the Deputy Prime Minister resigns and the former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader is sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. In Bosnia, the government is remodelled after the change of the government coalition. The Hague Court acquits former Kossovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj. Greece and the troika agree on unlocking a new bailout package and an additional deadline for the reduction of the public deficit. Turkey strengthens the military deployment on its southern border and asks NATO for a preventive deployment of missiles given the escalation of tension with Syria, where the civil war has reached its eighteenth month and the opposition agrees on a restructuring to overcome its internal divisions. Lebanon experiences new periods of tension between Sunnis and Shiites. There are further protests in Jordan. Egypt suffers a new institutional crisis. Tunisia achieves an advanced status in its relations with the EU. Algeria holds local elections.

Portugal

- On 27 November Parliament approves the budget for 2013 which involves, among other measures, tax increases of 30%, an additional tax of 3.5% on all incomes, and cuts in pensions, unemployment benefit and sickness leave.

Spain

- On 14 November there is a general strike in Spain and Portugal against the cuts in public spending by their respective governments.
- On 17 November Cadiz hosts the 22nd Ibero-American Summit, which adopts a commitment to solidarity between the two shores of the Atlantic over the economic crisis sweeping Spain and Portugal.
- On 25 November Catalonia hold early elections with a participation of 70%, called by the governing Convergència i Unió (CiU, pro-independence conservative) with the debate on independence from Spain as the background. CiU wins with 50 of the 135 seats, 12 fewer than in the previous elections.

France

- On 7 November the Council of Ministers passes the gay marriage bill.
- On 18 November the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) holds primary elections to choose its new leader, in which Jean-François Copé, outgoing Secretary General, wins over the former Prime Minister François Fillon, who denounces irregularities in the count and on 27 November announces the creation of Rassemblement-UMP (Rally-UMP), a parliamentary group split from the UMP, until new primary elections are held.
- On 28 November the Senate rejects the budget for 2013, which includes 2.4 billion euros in tax rises.

Monaco

- On 15 November workers at SBM, the main shareholder of the Casino of Monte Carlo, announce the creation of Renaissance, a new party to protect the interests of workers.

Italy

- On 22 November the lower chamber of the Italian Parliament adopts the budget bill 2013 in a revised version of the original bill submitted by the government on 10 October.

Malta

- On 28 November Francis Zammit Dimed is appointed successor to Tonio Borg as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Croatia

- On 14 November Deputy Prime Minister Radimir Cacic resigns after a Hungarian court sentences him to 22 months’ imprisonment for the death of two people in a car accident in January 2010.
- On 16 November the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia acquits the former Croatian Generals Ante Gotovina and Mladen Markac, accused of war crimes against Serbians in Croatia in 1995.
- On 20 November the former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader is sentenced by the Zagreb Court to 10 years’ imprisonment for the Hypo Alpe Adria Bank and MOL corruption cases.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 14 November the UN Security Council extends for one year the mandate of the EUFOR-ALTHEA mission, which supervises the implementation of the Dayton Agreements.
- On 28 November workers at SBM, the main shareholder of the Casino of Monte Carlo, announce the creation of Renaissance, a new party to protect the interests of workers.
by the Hague Court of Appeal of the charges of crimes against humanity during the Kosovo conflict.

**Albania**

- On 23 November a Tirana court sentences to 15 years’ imprisonment Ilir Kimbaro, former agent of the Intelligence Services, for the kidnapping, torture and murder of the Macedonian Albanian businessman Remzi Hoxha in 1995, in a conspiracy to assassinate the former Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov.
- On 28 November Albania celebrates the centenary of its independence from the Ottoman Empire.

**Greece**

- On 1 November the journalist Kostenas Vaxevanis is acquitted of the charges for having published a list of 2,059 supposed tax evaders.
- On 6 November a 48-hour general strike begins against new cuts agreed by Athens and the troika to reduce 1.8 billion euros in public spending in three years in exchange for receiving 3.15 billion to avoid bankruptcy. On 7 November Parliament passes structural reforms that mean cuts of 1.8 billion euros until 2016. On 11 November Parliament passes the budget for 2013, with reductions of around 9.5 billion euros.
- On 16 November Greece manages to pay back 5 billion euros of debt to its creditors saving itself from bankruptcy.
- On 26 November the eurogroup agrees on forming the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROF), a joint opposition bloc that must form an interim government of national unity after the fall of the regime.
- On 8 November confrontations in the Palestinian refugee camp in Yarmouk, Damascus, between militia soldiers of the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a group loyal to the regime, end with the deaths of 10 Palestinians.

**Turkey**

- On 12 November five Kurdish nationalist Members of Parliament and the Mayor of Diyarbakir join the hunger strike held since September by around 700 Kurdish prisoners to demand the release of the leader of the PKK terrorist organisation Abdullah Ocalan and the possibility of using the Kurdish language in schools and in judicial proceedings. On 18 November the prisoners end the hunger strike at the request of Ocalan.
- On 20 November Turkey formally requests from NATO the deployment of Patriot missiles on its border with Syria given the repeated attacks against Turkish territory.
- On 25 November the FSA affirms it has gained control of the Marj al-Sultan base, near Damascus airport.
Lebanon

- On 11 November the confrontations between Sunni followers of the Salafi leader Ahmad al-Assir and members of Hezbollah near the Palestinian refugee camp of Ein el-Helweh, Sidon, result in at least four deaths and seven injured. The incidents are caused by some Hezbollah promational banners placed by the Shites for the Ashura Festival.

Jordan

- On 13 November the radical Palestinian Jordanian cleric Abu Qatada, serving a sentence in the Long Lartin prison since 2006, is released on bail by British authorities after having won an appeal to avoid his deportation requested by Amman for terrorism, alleging that in Jordan he would not receive a fair trial.
- On 14 November around 20 people are arrested by the security forces in protests with the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood over the increase in the price of fuel and the withdrawal of subsidies on oil derivatives to reduce the public deficit.

Egypt

- On 22 November Mohamed Morsi issues a constitutional declaration that stipulates that no authority can revoke any presidential decision until the election of a new Parliament or dissolve the parliamentary organs. The announcement unleashes new protests from the sectors that accuse Morsi of wanting to monopolise power and there are attacks on government offices and Muslim Brotherhood offices. On 24 November the Supreme Council of Justice urges Morsi to annul the constitutional declaration and Egypt’s Judges’ Club agrees the suspension of all judicial activity until the declaration is withdrawn.
- On 29 November the Constituent Assembly, dominated by the Islamists, approves the draft of a new Constitution submitting it to the President for ratification, after which within a period of one month a people’s referendum must be called on the new constitutional text. Thousands of Egyptians protest against Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood, the presidential declaration and the accelerated approval of the constitutional draft.

Libya

- On 2 November a demonstration in Benghazi calls for more economic autonomy for Cyrenaica, declares its support for the recently appointed government of Prime Minister Ali Zeidan and demands a return to the spirit of the 1951 Constitution.
- On 21 November the Head of the Benghazi Police Faraj al-Deirsy is murdered.
- On 26 November the Commission of Integrity and Patriotism of Libya definitively approves 24 of the 31 ministers of the new government, 21 of whom were sworn into office on the 14 November.

Tunisia

- On 6 November in Tunis hundreds of Salafis demand the release of around 900 detainees held since January 2011. The same day, Bilel Chaouachi, Ansar al-Sharia’s spokesman, is arrested, accused of inciting violence.
- On 19 November Tunisia and the EU sign the Advanced Status agreement in Brussels.
- On 25 November a demonstration in Tunis organised by the Civil Alliance against Violence and for Freedoms condemns the rise in Salafi violence and demands gender equality and completion of the new Constitution draft.
- On 27, 28 and 29 November protests in Siliana demand the removal of the governor, social and economic improvements, and the release of 14 prisoners arrested during the uprising.

Algeria

- On 29 November Algeria holds municipal elections. The governing National Liberation Front (FLN) achieves a predictable victory, followed by its partner in the government coalition, the National Rally for Democracy (RND). The Islamist coalition Green Algeria Alliance obtains poor results.

Morocco

- On 18 November the security forces prevent a demonstration in front of the Parliament called by the February 20 Movement and the extra-parliamentary left against the Royal Household’s allowances.
- On 27 November there are riots in Tangier after members of the Salafia Jihadia movement demonstrate outside the police headquarters to demand the release of Salafi prisoners.

Mauritania

- On 20 November Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz announces his return to Mauritania on 24 November from France, where he is convalescing from the accidental shooting in October. On 21 November in Nouakchott thousands of demonstrators demand his resignation, condemn the power vacuum created during his absence and demand the start of a real transition period.
- On 29 November the Council of Ministers passes a bill which penalises attempted coups.

Arab League

- On 13 November the Arab League recognises the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCJROF) as legitimate representative of the Syrian people, a decision shared by France, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

December 2012

Portugal privatises its airport infrastructures. Spain approves the budget for 2013. In France, the Constitutional Council strikes down the tax rate of 75% on large fortunes set out in the budget for 2013. The Italian and Maltese Prime Ministers tender their resignations over the difficulties in passing their budgets for 2013. In Slovenia,
Borut Pahor is elected new President and there are citizen protests against corruption and the economic crisis. The Bosnian Serbian former General Zdravko Tolimir is sentenced to life imprisonment for the Srebrenica massacre. In Montenegro the government takes office. Serbia and Kosovo agree on the joint management of their borders. Greece alleviates fears of bankruptcy and its exit from the euro after the definitive approval by the eurozone of an additional 4.37 billion euros. The civil war goes on in Syria with the growing concern over the control of Damascus’ great chemical arsenal, the suspension of the tasks of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS), the authorisation of the deployment of Patriot missiles on the Turkish-Syrian border, important new desertions in the ranks of the regime and the recognition by 114 states of the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROF). The instability in Lebanon continues due to the spread of the Syrian conflict. In Egypt, the passing of the new Constitution draft by more than 60% in a referendum increases social tension. The Libyan Military Prosecutor’s Office accuses former President of the National Transitional Council Mustafa Abdul Jalil of abuse of power and of undermining national unity.

Portugal
- On 27 December Portugal sells the management of the national airport company, ANA, and that of the main air terminals for 50 years to the French group Vinci, for 3.08 billion euros, the greatest privatisation carried out within the bailout of 7.8 billion euros granted by the EU and the IMF.
- On 31 December President Anival Cavaco Silva announces the state budget for 2013, which involves a major increase in taxes as well as the dismissal of thousands of civil servants and a reform of pensions.

Spain
- On 9 December thousands of employees and patients of the Madrid health service demonstrate in the capital for the second time after the 29 November march against the decision by the Autonomous Community to privatise part of its public health service.
- On 12 December the judicial sector protests against the budget efficiency measures bill in the Justice Administration that includes the introduction of fees for appeals and major budget and staffing cuts.
- On 20 December Parliament approves its budget for 2013, which includes cuts amounting to 3.9 billion euros.

France
- On 11 December the ETA member Alex Acarregui is sentenced by the Paris Correctional Court to eight years’ imprisonment for belonging to ETA.
- On 20 December the Belgian authorities reject the nationality application of the magnate Bernard Arnault, owner of the business emporium LVMH, to avoid the enormous tax increases on large fortunes passed by the Élysée in September; a decision emulated by the actor Gérard Depardieu, in the process of acquiring Russian citizenship. On 29 December, the Constitutional Council declares unconstitutional the 75% tax on incomes above one million euros included in the 2013 budget.

Italy
- On 2 December Pierluigi Bersani is re-elected candidate of the Democratic Party (PD, centre-left) for the 2013 elections, defeating the Mayor of Florence Matteo Renzi in the second round of the party primaries, whose first round was held on 25 November.
- On 8 December Prime Minister Mario Monti informs President Giorgio Napolitano of his intention to resign as soon as the Budget Law is passed due to the decision by the People of Freedom Party (PDL, rightwing) not to second the budget bill. Monti’s decision, official on 21 December, is also motivated by Silvio Berlusconi’s announcement to stand as PDL candidate in the 2013 elections. On 23 December Monti announces that he will not stand as candidate given his position as senator for life but does express his willingness to head the next government if so asked by the Parliament that emerges from the elections.

Malta
- On 10 December Parliament rejects the budget for 2013 presented by the government of Lawrence Gonzi, who the next day tenders his resignation and proposes the dissolution of Parliament in order to hold general elections on 9 March 2013.

Slovenia
- On 2 December the former Prime Minister Borut Pahor is elected President with 67.44% of the votes, beating Danilo Turk in the second round of the presidential elections, whose first round was held on 11 November.
- On 4 December Parliament unanimously adopts the increase in retirement age from 63 to 65 years.
- On 6 December the Mayor of Maribor Franc Kangler announces his resignation following demonstrations and riots over the mass privatisation policy undertaken since 1997 and denounces corrupt practices in the town council in a context of severe economic crisis, which spreads the protests against clientelism and corruption to other cities such as Ljubljana, Kranj, Celje and Trbovlje.
- On 6 December Parliament adopts the austere budgets for 2013 and 2014 with the objective of reducing the deficit to below 3% of GDP.

Bosnia and Herzegovina
- On 12 December the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sentences to life imprisonment the former Bosnian Serbian General Zdravko Tolimir for the genocide of Muslims in Srebrenica in 1995.

Montenegro
- On 4 December Parliament swears in the new government led by Milo Djukanovic.
• On 19 December Montenegro opens and closes its first chapter on Science and Research in the accession negotiations.

Serbia

• On 4 December the Serbian Ambassador to NATO Branislav Milinkovic commits suicide in Brussels airport when awaiting an official delegation from his country.  
• On 12 December the magnate Miroslav Miskovic, owner of the Delta Holding group, is arrested under suspicion of illegal gains in the road network privatisation processes, a case in which around twenty Serbian politicians could be involved according to the government.

Kosovo under UN Security Council Resolution 1244

• On 6 December Serbia reaches an agreement with the municipalities of Mitrovica, with a Serbian majority, on the management of the four border crossings between Serbia and Kosovo which will have the status of neutrality, a demand by the Kosovo Serbs following the agreement between Belgrade and Priština on 4 December to jointly manage their common border.

FYROM

• On 14 December President Gjorge Ivanov regrets in his annual speech to Parliament the decision of the European Council in October to again postpone the accession negotiations due to a new veto by Greece over the name issue supported by Bulgaria, which accuses Skopje of appropriating part of Bulgarian history.  
• On 24 December Members of Parliament in the governing coalition approve the budget for 2013 that includes a debt of 230 million euros through a loan from the World Bank minutes after expelling the opposition Members of Parliament led by the social-democrats, opposed to this budget. Thus begins a week of riots in the streets of Skopje between supporters and detractors of the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE).

Greece

• On 13 December the eurozone Ministers of Finance authorise the unlocking of 4.37 billion euros agreed in November to prevent Greece from going bankrupt and leaving the euro.

Turkey

• On 31 December Turkey confirms for the first time that for months it has been in talks with the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan for the terrorist organisation to definitively stop violence.

Cyprus

• On 11 December a demonstration breaks into the Parliament to protest against new austerity measures being considered by the government and the legislative in the framework of the negotiations with the troika of the loan to avoid Cypriot bankruptcy and which could amount to 14 billion euros, 80% of national GDP.

Syria

• On 3 December the UN announces the withdrawal of its non-essential personnel and suspension of the Observer Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) given the increase in violence.  
• On 4 December NATO authorises the deployment requested by Turkey of Patriot missiles on the Turkish-Syrian border.  
• On 12 December Marrakesh hosts the 4th Conference of Friends of the Syrian People, in which 114 states recognise the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROF) as legitimate representative of the Syrian people. In relation to the possibility of using chemical weapons against civilians, the Conference warns Damascus with a “firm response.”  
• On 25 December the Israeli newspaper Yediot Aharonot reports that given the possibility of international intervention, the Syrian regime might have acquired arms and munitions valued at over 2 billion euros, an amount comparable to the total Syrian investments in armament since the Yom Kippur War in 1973.

• On 26 and 27 December General Abdelaziz Jassim al-Shalal, Head of the Military Police, and the Public Prosecutor of Aleppo, Ahmed al-Nuaimi, desert the regime.

Lebanon

• On 4 and 5 December there is new fighting between Sunnis and Alawis in Tripoli, in which at least four people die after the disappearance on 30 November of 20 Lebanese who were fighting the Syrian regime in Tel Kalaj.

Jordan

• On 12 December Jordan and Kuwait sign an agreement for the Emirate to allocate 695 million dollars to development projects in Jordan, which forms part of the aid for the Hashemite Kingdom approved by the Gulf Cooperation Council - 5 billion dollars in five years.

Egypt

• On 2 December the Constitutional Court postpones the ruling expected on the legality of the Constituent Assembly and the Shura Council after thousands of supporters of President Morsi surround the headquarters of the high court.  
• On 8 December, pressured by the mass opposition in the streets led by the April 6 Movement and the National Salvation Front, which brings together most of the secular, liberal and leftwing political opposition, Mohamed Morsi withdraws the presidential declaration that would have awarded him near absolute power. In contrast, he decides to continue with the referendum on the new Constitution.  
• On 15 and 22 December the referendum on the new Constitution is held with 62.69% voting in favour, after which on 26 December President Morsi calls on the different po-
Mediterranean Yearbook 2013

Political powers of the country to participate in a national dialogue process.

**Libya**
- On 9 December the Ministry of the Interior announces the disbandment on 31 December of the Supreme Security Council, created in September 2011 by the National Transitional Council (NTC) to protect Tripoli. Moreover, the government announces that within one month it will stop paying all combatants that have not signed security contracts with the Ministry of the Interior.
- On 11 December the Military Prosecutor’s Office accuses the former President of the NTC Mustafa Abdul Jalil of abuse of power and of undermining national unity during his mandate and in relation with the death, in July 2011, of General Abdel Fatah Younes in circumstances that are still unclear. After being interrogated, Abdel Jalil is released on bail and forbidden to leave the country until the trial is held on 20 February 2013.
- On 17 December Libya announces the temporary closure of its borders with Algeria, Niger, Chad and Sudan given the increased instability within the country.
- On 28 December around 2,000 people demonstrate in Benghazi demanding that the militias that still operate outside the security forces surrender their weapons or join them.

**Tunisia**
- On 1 December the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) reaches an agreement with the government to end the protests that in the last five days have resulted in over 300 injured in Siliana. According to the agreement, the Governor Ahmed Ezzine Mahjoubi will be dismissed.
- On 17 December the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT) reaches an agreement with the government to end the protests that in the last five days have resulted in over 300 injured in Siliana. According to the agreement, the Governor Ahmed Ezzine Mahjoubi will be dismissed.
- On 29 December around 30 people taking part in an unauthorised demonstration in Marrakesh over the increased price of water and electricity are arrested in riots originating from the demonstration.

**European Union**
- On 6 December the European Council and Parliament conclude an agreement passing the community budget for 2013 that includes the EP’s request to add 6 billion euros to the budget for 2012 to avoid non-payments in several of its programmes.
- On 10 December in Oslo the Presidents of the European Council, Commission and Parliament receive the Nobel Peace Prize 2012, awarded to the EU.
- On 10 and 11 December the 27 ministers in charge of competitiveness issues agree the Single European Patent.
- On 13 December the 27 Ministers of Economy and Finance lay the foundations to establish a Single Supervisory Mechanism for the banking sector.
- On 13 and 14 December the European Council of Heads of State and Government agrees the creation of a common strategy to conclude the Economic and Monetary Union and greater development of the Common Security and Defence Policy.

**Algeria**
- On 16 December the Algerian security forces capture in Cheurfa, Bouira, the AQIM number two Salah Gasmii, alias Salah Abu Mohamed.

**Morocco**
- On 28 December a court in Rabat sentences to one years’ imprisonment Driss Bouterrada, member of the February 20 Movement, arrested on 10 December accused of possession and trafficking of narcotics.
- On 29 December around 30 people taking part in an unauthorised demonstration in Marrakesh over the increased price of water and electricity are arrested in riots originating from the demonstration.

**Gibraltar**
- On 24 January the Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel García-Margallo announces a change in the Spanish policy on Gibraltar linking cooperation with the colony to advances in talks on sovereignty and demanding symmetry of the Tripartite Forum with the inclusion of Andalusia.
- On 16 May Queen Sofia of Spain cancels her participation in the 60th anniversary of the crowning of Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom as a reaction to the announcement that the Earl and Countess of Wessex will visit Gibraltar in June and the Gibraltar government’s decision, adopted in March, to prohibit Spanish fishermen from working in waters that Gibraltar claims as its own, contravening the 1999 Fishing Agreement.
- On 8 May, after three months of tension and meetings in the waters of Algeciras Bay and fruitless meetings, talks are resumed between Gibraltar representatives and the fishing associations. The lack of progress in negotiations means that the fishermen mark 30 July as the deadline to reach an agreement. Once this deadline is passed, the fishermen return to work protected by the Guardia Civil and the harassment resumes.
- On 3 August an agreement is reached allowing Cadiz fishermen to fish Spanish territorial waters surrounding Gibraltar. On 17 August Madrid sends a formal complaint to London over the unilateral breaking by Gibraltar of this agreement alleging environmental reasons. On 9 September Spain announces, in the interest of the environmental protection pursued by Gibraltar, the establishment of a Special Conservation Area of 26,641.82 hectares around Gibraltar, encompassing the waters under dispute and prohibiting practices harmful to the environment such as bunkering, filling of open coastal waters and emptying tanks, all practised regularly by the colony. Moreover, on 18 September Spain announces that the Guardia Civil will continue to accompany the Spanish fleet in Algeciras Bay and that the government will study other measures if the hostilities against Spanish fishermen do not cease.
Western Sahara

- On 11 March in Manhasset, New York, the ninth round of extra-official negotiations begins between Morocco and the Polisario Front, without notable agreements.
- On 9 April the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon urges Morocco and the Polisario Front to prepare a census of Tindouf refugees and recommends that the UN Security Council should extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2013.
- On 17 May Morocco withdraws its trust in UN Special Envoy for Western Sahara Christopher Ross considering that his work has not achieved any real progress and that the Western Sahara Autonomy Plan is being sidelined by the UN.
- On 15 June Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber is appointed new Head of MINURSO.
- On 13 December the European Parliament passes a resolution demanding from Morocco the release of Saharawi political prisoners.

- On 19 December the United Nations General Assembly adopts a resolution to resume talks with Rabat and the Polisario Front.

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2012 begins with the arrest of the Palestinian Parliament Speaker, by Israeli soldiers, against the backdrop of a prolonged stalemate in peace talks, which lasts throughout the year, and with an increase in the region’s instability due to the contagion effect of the Syrian conflict and tensions between Israel and Iran over Tehran’s refusal to halt its nuclear programme. In Palestine, Mahmoud Abbas is elected interim President until elections are held, a solution accepted by Fatah and Hamas within a process of national reconciliation. With respect to the conflicts between the parties, in March the ceasefire in effect in Gaza since August 2011 is broken, following an increase in the violence between the Tsahal (Israeli army) and the Islamic Jihad, putting Hamas in a difficult position between supporting the Islamic Jihad but wanting to avoid armed conflict with Israel. Tensions in Gaza are further intensified after June, with cross-border attacks, as well as attacks against Israel launched from the Sinai Peninsula, which remains uncontrolled since the revolution in Egypt. In this context, the new Egyptian President, winner of the July elections, Mohamed Morsi, following a serious border incident at the beginning of August in which 16 Egyptian police officers are killed, decides to put Operation Eagle into action. This, the largest military deployment in the Sinai since peace with Israel in 1979, is aimed at recovering control of security on the Peninsula that borders Gaza and Israel. This intervention is especially significant at a time when Israel has all security alerts activated following the conflict opened in Syria, the consequent increase in tensions in Lebanon and Jordan, the traumatic power change in Egypt, governed by an Islamist Parliament and President, and the lack of progress to halt the Iranian nuclear programme, as well as the threats from Tehran to close the Ormuz Straits to traffic if international sanctions are upheld. Israeli policy towards the region is characterised in 2012 by constant allusions to the possibility of an armed conflict with Iran or the construction of separation fences on the Lebanese and Egyptian borders. In terms of its home policy, authorisation and construction of new settlements continue throughout the year, superseding those that were dismantled by court order and which represent one of the main reasons for the deadlock in negotiations with the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), further aggravated by the impasse in Jordanian and especially Egyptian mediation due to their respective political situations. In May, following the resignation of the opposition Kadima leader Tzipi Livni, Israel faces the constitution of a government of national unity between the Likud and Kadima, after the controversial agreement reached by the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and the new opposition leader, Shaul Mofaz. However, this agreement, which avoids early elections being called, in a context of social protests against the political system and the cost of living, comes to an end in July with the departure of Kadima from the coalition due to a disagreement over the controversial Tal Law that provides for favourable treatment for ultra-orthodox Jews regarding military service. Thus, at the beginning of October Benjamin Netanyahu finally announces early elections to be held in January 2013. Coinciding with the start of the Israeli pre-election campaign, the year ends with the worst escalation of violence between Gaza and Israel since Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009. Eight days of Hamas attacks, countered by Israel’s Operation Pillar of Defense, which causes close to 200 victims and leaves over 1,000 Palestinians injured, finally end on 21 December with an Egyptian and US-brokered truce. Another cause for contention, this time with the PNA, arises on 29 November with the recognition by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) of Palestine’s observer State status.

January 2012

Israel

• On 8 January the government approves free education for children three years old and older, one of the demands of the social justice movement, which since the summer of 2011 has been protesting against the increases in the cost of living in Israel.

• On 9 January Noam Shalit, father of Gilad Shalit, the Israeli soldier released in October 2011 by Hamas after five years in captivity, announces his intention to run in the Labour Party’s primary elections.

• On 12 January the Supreme Court declares the Citizenship Law, approved in 2003, constitutional. The law restricts the possibility of residing in Israel for citizens married to Palestinian nationals.

Palestine

• On 19 January the Speaker of the Palestinian Legislative Council (Parlia-
ment) and member of Hamas, Aziz Duwaik, is arrested at a military checkpoint in Jaba, the West Bank, adding to the 23 MPs of the Islamist movement currently imprisoned in Israel. The Israeli army denies knowledge of the arrest, announced by the Palestinian news agency Wafa. Hamas calls the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to suspend all negotiation attempts with Israel, in protest against the arrest.

**Peace Negotiations**

- On 25 January the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas announces that the round of preliminary talks held with Israel throughout January, under Jordanian auspices, has ended without any advances. The announcement coincides with the deadline set by the International Quartet (US, EU, Russia and UN) for the parties to come to an initial agreement to resuming formal negotiations.

**Conflicts between the parties**

- On 18 January a Palestinian man is killed and three others injured in an attack by the Israeli army in Abu Safiyah, northern Gaza, on a militia group attempting to plant explosives near the security fence.

**February 2012**

**Israel**

- On 2 February the Defence Minister Ehud Barak declares that Israel might consider taking military action against Iran if Tehran does not meet demands made by the US and EU – which on 23 January imposed an unprecedented oil embargo on Iran – to halt its nuclear programme. Iran threatens to respond decisively to any attack and by closing the Strait of Hormuz. On 4 February Iran initiates manoeuvres in the Strait, which is a thoroughfare for a fifth of the world’s oil traffic. The US steps up its naval presence in the area.
- On 5 February an explosion in el-Arish, Sinai, cuts the gas supply to Israel and Jordan. This is the twelfth act of sabotage carried out on the pipeline that supplies Egyptian gas to both countries since the fall of Hosni Mubarak.
- On 12 February the six-day general strike called by the trade union Histadrut comes to an end after an agreement is reached between the Finance Minister and union representatives, in protest over the poor pay conditions of thousands of public workers contracted through recruitment agencies.
- On 12 February Israel closes the Temple Mount to tourists throughout the day allowing entry only to Muslim worshippers to avoid conflicts between these and a group of ultra-orthodox Jews calling for the “cleansing” of the Temple Mount, and the “expulsion of the enemies of Israel.”
- On 13 February two bomb attacks are carried out on Israeli diplomats, one in New Delhi, injuring eight people, and another failed attempt in Tbilisi. On 14 February a further two failed attacks take place in Bangkok. Israel accuses Iran and Hezbollah for both attacks, while Tehran and the Shiite militia group accuse Mossad of planning the attacks.
- On 19 February several Iranian warships cross the Suez Canal to enter the Mediterranean with the intention of “showing the power of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” This is the second occasion since 1979 that Iranian warships have crossed the Canal, the first having taken place in February 2011. Israel and the US condemn Tehran’s continual “provocation.”
- On 21 February Khader Adnan, the former spokesperson of the Islamic Jihad, ends a 66-day hunger strike, after his lawyers and the Minister of Justice reach an agreement for his release on 17 April. Hours later, the Supreme Court convenes an urgent meeting to study Adnan’s appeal, who is currently being held under administrative detention without specific charges and therefore demands to either stand trial or be released.
- On 22 February the Supreme Court ruled against the government and Parliament renewing the Tal Law, which exempts young ultra-orthodox Jews from military service, describing the law as unconstitutional and discriminatory.
- On 22 February the Defence Minister approves the construction of 695 homes in Israeli settlements in Shilo and Binyamin, the West Bank.
- On 28 February the Israeli army closes two Palestinian television stations that are members of the International Telecommunication Union, Watan TV and al-Quds Educational TV, which broadcast from Ramallah, alleging that both were “pirate stations,” an accusation denied by the Palestinian Telecommunications Minister.

**Palestine**

- On 6 February the President of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), Mahmoud Abbas, is elected interim President in Doha until the presidential and legislative elections set for May. The decision is proposed by the Emir of Qatar, the country mediating the Palestinian reconciliation process, and agreed upon by Hamas.
- On 22 - 23 February Fatah and Hamas leaders meet in Cairo to move forwards in applying the Palestinian reconciliation agreement.

**Peace Negotiations**

- On 2 February the convoy of the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, is attacked during his visit to Gaza by protesters accusing him of being biased towards Israel. During his visit, Ban Ki-moon asks Israel to soften its embargo on Gaza.

**March 2012**

**Israel**

- On 6 March, after meeting with Barack Obama, Benjamin Netanyahu declares at the annual assembly of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the main Jewish lobby in the US, that Israel is facing a serious threat to its survival because of the Iranian nuclear programme.
- On 6 March the Indian journalist, Mohamed Qasim, is arrested in New Delhi, accused of being involved in the attack on 13 February on Israeli diplomats in the Indian capital.
- On 24 March a demonstration against an eventual Israeli attack on Iran
takes place in Tel Aviv, amid growing tensions between both countries over Tehran’s refusal to halt its nuclear programme.

- On 25 March the Supreme Court rejects a state request to postpone the removal of a settlement in Migron, the West Bank, until 2015 and maintains the 31 March as the deadline for its dismantlement.
- On 27 March the former Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz wins 61.7% of the vote to become leader of the opposition Kadima party (centrist), led until now by the former Foreign Affairs Minister, Tzipi Livni.

**Palestine**

- On 22 March the UN Human Rights Council authorises the creation of a commission to study the impact of the illegal Israeli settlements on the Palestinian population and on the standoff in the peace talks, in a decision condemned by Israel and the US.

**Peace Negotiations**

- On 7 March a round of negotiations closes between the PNA and Jordan aimed at raising support to re-activate peace talks with Israel, with the PNA’s reaffirmation that it will not initiate a rapprochement if Israel does not previously halt the expansion of its settlements in the West Bank.

**Conflicts between the parties**

- On 8 March a Palestinian minor is killed in Yatta, south of Hebron, during an Israeli military operation to arrest suspects for actions carried out against Israel.
- On 9 March in Gaza an Israeli army helicopter attacks the car carrying Sheikh Zuhair al-Qaisi, leader of the Popular Resistance Committees, killing both the Sheikh and his assistant, Mahmoud Ahmed al-Hanini. The attack according to Tsa’hal (Israeli army) was aimed at hampering preparations for an attack on the Egyptian border. Israel also accuses Hamas of failing to control security in Gaza. Hamas accuses Israel of violating the ceasefire in effect since August 2011. By 11 March, the ensuing spiral of violence has killed 10 Islamic Jihad militants, six members of the Popular Resistance Committees and two Palestinian civilians. The Islamic Jihad retaliates by launching around a hundred missiles from Gaza at targets in southern Israel. On 12 March the cross-border fire continues killing five people in Gaza. On the same day, Egyptian mediation achieves a ceasefire from 01.00 hours on 13 March, although some rockets continue to be launched from Gaza. The Islamic Jihad warns that it will only respect the truce if Israel ends its attacks on Palestinian leaders in Gaza. For its part, Israel warns that if terrorist plans or actions continue against Israel in Gaza, it will take fresh measures and accuses Iran of supporting the Islamic Jihad. On 14 March a Grad missile launched from Gaza lands in Netivot, southern Israel, endangering the truce announced by Egypt on 12 March.
- On 30 March to mark “Land Day,” which commemorates the death of six Palestinians on 30 March 1976 while protesting against the expropriation of Arab-Israeli land, a “Million Man March to Jerusalem” is organised that passes the borders between Israel and PNA-controlled territories and which in Ramallah ends with clashes between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli soldiers leaving 30 injured. In Gaza, Israeli troops open fire on demonstrators trying to cross the Israeli border, leaving one dead. In Qalandia attacks by demonstrators on the Israeli army leave one of the protest organisers, MP Mustafa Barghouti, wounded. Deir Hanna, northern Israel, sees the largest of the demonstrations.
- On 15 April 50 pro-Palestinian activists are arrested on their arrival at Ben Gurion international airport in Tel Aviv. Despite warnings from Israel that they would be denied entry, the activists had decided to travel there to participate in a day of protest called by 25 Palestinian NGOs from different cities in the West Bank. Hundreds of other activists from different European cities are held at their place of origin after airlines cancel their tickets in reaction to the Israeli warning.
- On 22 April the Egyptian Natural Gas Holding Company, EGAS, announces its definitive cancellation of the supply contract with Israel alleging that the country has breached its contract by failing to pay for four month’s supply of gas. The accusation is denied by Jerusalem, which accuses Egypt of non-compliance with the Camp David Accords, which ensure gas supply from Egypt to Israel, and claims that the interruptions in the supply are due to Egypt’s failure to prevent sabotage attempts on the Sinai pipeline.
- On 23 April the Israeli government legalises the settlements of Bruchin and Rechelim – north of the West Bank – and Sansana – near Hebron –, set up in 1990. This is the first time new settlements have been created since 1990.
- On 29 April the Council of Ministers approves the construction of new temporary homes in a settlement of Kokhav Yaakov, for 150 settlers that are to be evicted from Migron before August by order of the Supreme Court.
- On 30 April Israel begins the construction of a two-kilometre long, 10-metre high separation wall along the Lebanese border to protect the border town of Metula.

**April 2012**

**Israel**

- On 8 April following the publication of the poem, *What Must Be Said*, in which Israel is described as a danger to world peace, Israel declares its author, the Literature Nobel Laureate Günter Grass, a persona non grata. Grass, in 2006, admitted to being enlisted in his youth in the Waffen-SS, the elite body of the German Nazi regime.
international community to guarantee 1.1 billion dollars in Palestinian aid in 2012.

- On 17 April 1,350 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails begin a hunger strike for Prisoners Day demanding the right to family visits for prisoners from Gaza, an end to solitary confinement and administrative arrests, and improvements in living conditions. Support protests take place in Gaza and the West Bank. On 29 April Ahmed Saadat, Secretary General for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a participant in the strike, is admitted to the medical wing of Ramle prison, as a preventative measure.

- On 27 April Hamas refuses to hold Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections until negotiations are concluded to form a unity government with Fatah, which remain frozen despite agreements in April 2011 and February of this year.

- On 30 April the cofounder and senior member of Hamas, Mahmoud al-Zahar, declares that the Gaza Strip’s governing group is in talks with the Islamic Jihad for unity between both groups.

**Peace Negotiations**

- On 17 April the PNA delivers a letter through its Chief Negotiator Saeb Erekat to Benjamin Netanyahu outlining Palestinian demands to resume peace negotiations, which include an immediate halt of settlement construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and the recognition of the 1967 borders with land swaps as the basis for the two-state solution.

**May 2012**

**Israel**

- 1 May the former Foreign Affairs Minister Tzipi Livni steps down as an MP for Kadima (centrist) in the Knesset (Parliament).

- On 8 May the two largest Israeli parties, the governing Likud and the opposition Kadima sign an historic agreement to form a government of national unity with the Kadima leader Shaul Mofaz as deputy Prime Minister, leading to the cancellation of the early elections approved by the Council of Ministers the previous day. The new executive will agree on the replacement of the Tal Law, which exempts ultra-orthodox Jews from compulsory military service, and the reform of the electoral system to modify the overrepresentation of small parties and “ensure the country's stability.”

- On 12 May thousands of citizens demonstrate in Tel Aviv against the rise in the cost of living and social inequalities.

- On 23 May a demonstration in the south of Tel Aviv against illegal immigration ends with clashes with police and 17 arrests. According to the city Mayor Ron Huldai, up to 15% of its 400,000 inhabitants are illegal.

- On 23-24 May Baghdad hosts an international meeting between Iran, the US, UK, France, Russia, China, Germany and the EU to discuss the Iranian nuclear programme, which fails to reach an agreement of principle that satisfies the diametrically opposing stances of Tehran and Jerusalem.

**Palestine**

- On 2 May the historic Fatah leader and governor of Jenin Qadoura Moussa dies after being gunned down in his home the previous day. On 6 May Talal Dweikat succeeds Moussa at the head of the Jenin government. On 11 May, in the Israeli-controlled C Area of the West Bank, Palestinian police arrest Nizar Ghawadreh, suspected of murdering Governor Moussa. Ghawadreh’s brother was killed in April in clashes with the Palestinian police in Bir al-Basha, Jenin. On 13 May it is reported that the former chief of the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades Zakaria Zubaidi has been arrested in connection with the crime.

- On 14 May the Egyptian mediation between the Israeli authorities and the nearly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners on hunger strike since 17 April reaches an agreement in Shikma prison that puts an end to the strike that caused Hamas and Islamic Jihad representatives to threaten Israel with violent action should a single prisoner die of starvation. In exchange for a halt in terrorist activities, the Gaza prisoners are allowed family visits and the use of solitary confinement is banned.

- On 20 May Fatah and Hamas reach an agreement in Cairo to start preparations to hold Palestinian elections in Gaza and the West Bank and to form an interim government of national unity.

- On 31 May Israel delivers the bodies of 91 Palestinians killed in attacks on Israel since 1967 to the PNA.

**Peace Negotiations**

- On 12 May Isaac Molho, Special Envoy of Benjamin Netanyahu, arrives in Ramallah to meet with Mahmoud Abbas and deliver a letter in response to that sent to the Israeli government by the PNA outlining Palestine’s conditions for resuming the peace process on 17 April.

**Conflicts between the parties**

- On 15 May Palestinians demonstrate for Nakba (catastrophe) Day, which commemorates the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. The biggest demonstrations take place in Ramallah, Qalandia, the Ofer military prison and Gaza. There are very few incidents in comparison to the violent protests in 2011: in the district of Issawiya, East Jerusalem, clashes break out between Palestinian demonstrators and the Israeli army. In Gaza a missile is fired into southern Israel without causing any damages.

- On 19 May clashes erupt between settlers from the Yitzhar settlement and inhabitants of the neighbouring Palestinian village Asira Al-Qibliya, in the north of the West Bank. The Palestinian government asks Israel to arrest and try the Jewish settlers, who it accuses of starting the violence. The PNA also condemns the passive role of the Israeli soldiers in the incident, documented in a video of the clashes recorded by the Israeli NGO B’Tselem.

**June 2012**

**Israel**

- On 3 June a new immigration law comes into effect which punishes illegal
immigrants with up to three years’ imprisonment. At the same time, the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu orders the acceleration of the deportation of nearly 25,000 irregular immigrants from Ethiopia, South Sudan, Ghana and the Ivory Coast, faced with a sharp rise in African arrivals, whose population in Israel has reached 60,000.

- On 3 June two Eritreans are injured after their home is deliberately set on fire in Jerusalem.
- On 6 June the Parliament votes down a regulation bill with 69 votes to 22, by which the extreme right intended to block a court ruling to demolish five illegal homes in the Beit El settlement. Benjamin Netanyahu had threatened to dismiss government members voting in favour of the law.
- On 8 June an Israeli court authorises the deportation of 1,500 irregular immigrants from South Sudan rejecting an appeal from various NGOs claiming that deportation would endanger the lives of the African citizens in question.
- On 8 June the Defence Minister announces that between 20,000 and 25,000 tents will be erected in different holding centres for accommodating irregular immigrants from Africa.
- On 17 June the government initiates the repatriation of South Sudanese irregular immigrants with an initial flight carrying 120 “voluntary” deportees, who in return are compensated with 1,000 euros and the return ticket to their country of origin.

**Palestine**

- On 29 June UNESCO declares the Church of the Nativity and parts of the old city of Bethlehem as World Heritage Sites.

**Conflicts between the parties**

- On 1 June a gunfight at the Kissufim border crossing, between Israel and Gaza, close to the Ein HaShlosha kibbutz ends with the death of an Israeli soldier and a Palestinian militant, after the latter cuts a hole in the security fence.
- On 17 June a night attack by the Israeli army on positions of the armed wing of Hamas, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, in northern Gaza leaves five injured. On 18 June two Palestinians are killed in a fresh attack in Beit Hanoun, Gaza.
- On 18 June the death of an Israeli in a Jihadist attack from the Egyptian Sinai, triggers a spiral of violence between the Gaza Strip and Israel. Israel retaliates with an offensive launched on Gaza in which six Palestinian militants are killed. On 20 June Hamas claims responsibility for launching more than 50 rockets from Gaza into southern Israel. The Israeli army responds with airstrikes on seven targets in Gaza. On 21 June in the early hours of the morning, Palestinian militants fire seven rockets at Ashkelon, Ashkelon and other places in the Negev.
- On 23 June a ceasefire enters into effect agreed by Jerusalem and Hamas, which momentarily eases tensions in the area.

**July 2012**

**Israel**

- On 1 July in the Tel Aviv District Court the trial begins against the former Prime Minister, former Mayor of Jerusalem and former Minister of Trade and Industry, Ehud Olmert, the former Mayor of Jerusalem, Uri Lupolianski and another 11 public figures and real estate developers, over the Holyland case, which the Public Prosecutor says could be the biggest corruption case in the country’s history.
- On 10 July Olmert is cleared by the Jerusalem District Court in the Rishon Tours and Talansky corruption trials but is found guilty of breach of trust in a fourth case, the so-called Investment Centre affair.
- On 14 July a demonstrator sets himself alight during a protest in Tel Aviv condemning the excessive rise in the cost of living in Israel. Protests are also staged in Jerusalem, Haifa and Beer-Sheba.
- On 15 July Hillary Clinton arrives in Tel Aviv from Cairo on her tour of the Middle East. One of the US Secretary of State’s highest priorities is to dissuade Israel from taking any unilateral offensive action against Iran over its refusal to halt its nuclear programme.
- On 17 July Kadima announces its departure from the government coalition after failing to reach an agreement with Likud over the differential treatment of ultra-orthodox Jews regarding military service. Following the High Court’s decision in February to overrule the renewal of the controversial Tal Law, which exempts ultra-orthodox Jews from Israel’s compulsory military service, Benjamin Netanyahu drafted a proposal to appease the more conservative members of the coalition delaying this collective’s entry until they are 23 years of age. However, Kadima demands that ultra-orthodox Jews perform military service under the same conditions as the rest of the population.
- On 23 July police save a citizen from self-immolation during a protest by the Israeli social justice movement in Ofakim, a day after a disabled man did the same and was admitted to hospital in Yehud.
- On 31 July Israel and the PNA reach an agreement in Jerusalem to fight together against tax evasion and illegal trade.

**Palestine**

- On 2 July police announce the arrest in an operation carried out by the Palestinian security forces in June of 200 people, including security agents, for trafficking and illegal possession of weapons in the West Bank, part of which was connected with the attack on the home of the Jenin Governor Qadoura Moussa, who died as a result of the attack.
- On 4 July Al-Jazeera publishes a report that reopens the debate on the causes of Yasser Arafat’s death on 11 November 2004, in the Percy military hospital, France. The news follows an investigation carried out by the Institute of Radiation Physics at the University Hospital of Lausanne that found traces of polonium 210, the substance used in 2006 to poison the former Russian spy Alexander Litvinenko in London, in body fluid samples of the former PNA President. On 15 July the press reports that Yasser Arafat’s widow, Suha Arafat, intends to press charges against a French court against persons unknown for poisoning.
- On 10 July the PNA calls local elections in Gaza and the West Bank set for 20 October.
On 14 - 15 July clashes with police break out in Ramallah during a demonstration against a meeting scheduled to take place between the Israeli vice-President Shaul Mofaz and the PNA President Mahmoud Abbas.

On 16 July 40 Palestinians from Gaza visit family members in prison in Israel in the first visit authorised by Israel since 2007. This is one of the central demands of the Palestinian prisoners, who were on hunger strike for 27 days during April and May.

On 17 July the Hamas authorities in Gaza hang three Palestinians found guilty of premeditated murder.

On 23 July the Hamas authorities in Gaza announce Egypt’s decision to facilitate entry and exit between Gaza and Egypt after approving visa-free travel for Palestinian citizens.

**Conflicts between the parties**

- On 12 July a Hamas member is killed in Gaza during an Israeli airstrike.

**August 2012**

**Israel**

- On 1 August, during his Middle East tour, the US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta declares at a press conference in Ashkelon, together with his Israeli counterpart Ehud Barak, that Iran must negotiate acceptable limits on its nuclear programme or face the possibility of military action if all diplomatic options fail.

**Conflicts between the parties**

- On 5 August 16 Egyptian police officers are killed on the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip in an attack by an armed Jihadist group attempting to infiltrate into Israel. Eight terrorists were killed according to the Israeli Defence Ministry. The President Mohamed Morsi holds an urgent meeting with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces to assess the incident, condemned by Hamas. After the meeting, Egypt closes its border with Gaza indefinitely and prepares to launch a military campaign in the Sinai to strengthen security in the region.

- On 5 August the Israeli army shoots at two Palestinians on a motorcycle in the Gaza Strip who belonged to a Popular Resistance Committee, killing both of them. Shortly after the incident, several rockets are launched into southern Israel without causing any damages.

**September 2012**

**Israel**

- On 2 September two days before the deadline set by the Supreme Court, the 300 inhabitants of the West Bank Migron settlement are evacuated to the neighbouring settlement of Ofra under heightened security, thereby putting an end to a six-year legal dispute.

- On 5 September Benjamin Netanyahu abruptly dissolves the presidential security cabinet during a meeting on the Iranian nuclear programme accusing its members of leaking confidential information. The decision follows the appearance hours earlier of an edition of the newspaper Yedioth Ahronoth with information relating to the deliberations and disagreements of the cabinet in its meeting the previous day.

- On 21 September an armed group on the border between Israel and Egypt shoots at an Israeli patrol carrying out construction work on the security fence running between the two States, leaving one Israeli soldier and three Egyptian militants dead.

**Palestine**

- On 7 September and preceding days mass demonstrations are staged in the West Bank against the 5% increase in fuel prices.

- On 8 September Mahmoud Abbas announces that the PNA will request entry to the UN at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 27 September in a fresh attempt for recognition, which, unlike in 2011, will not be presented before the Security Council, where a US veto is guaranteed.

- On 13 September dozens of protesters gather to demonstrate in Gaza’s Rimal district, against the appearance of the video entitled *Innocence of Muslims*, which ridicules the prophet Mohammed and triggers a wave of protests among Islamic conservative sectors in various countries. The international bodies present in Gaza temporarily close their offices as a measure of precaution.

- On 17 September a Gaza court hands down life sentences to two Islamic fundamentalists and ten one-year sentences to two others, all of whom are members of the terrorist group Tawhid wal Jihad, for the murder of the Italian aid worker Vittorio Arrigoni in April 2010.

- On 27 September Mahmoud Abbas announces at the UNGA that he will submit a request for the Palestinian Territories to be given observer State status in the UN, Abbas’s request for symbolic recognition, which is far more moderate than last year’s when the Palestinian leader requested full UN Member-State status, serves to affirm that the PNA’s intentions are not to delegitimise the State of Israel, but rather to lay claim to Palestine’s right to be recognised as a State in its own right.

**Conflicts between the parties**

- On 6 September three Palestinians, identified by Israel as terrorists attempting to launch missiles into southern Israel, are killed in an Israeli airstrike on the Gaza Strip.

- On 9 September two rockets launched from Gaza land in Netivot and Beersheba.

**October 2012**

**Israel**

- On 9 October Benjamin Netanyahu calls early elections for February 2013 following the departure of Kadima from the national unity government, thereby weakening the chances of a parliamentary approval of the austerity budget for 2013.

- On 21 October Israel and the US begin a five-day joint military exercise known as Austere Challenge 12, the largest in the history of either country. The operations coincide with the Turning Point 6 drill, the largest in Israeli history, for dealing with the possible situ-
ation of an earthquake measuring 7.1 on the Richter scale.

- On 25 October Benjamin Netanyahu announces that his Likud party will run in the early 2013 elections together with Yisrael Beiteinu, the party of Foreign Affairs Minister Avigdor Lieberman. The new joint list of the Israeli right, Likud Beiteinu, will increase Netanyahu’s re-election chances.

**Palestine**

- On 21 October the West Bank holds municipal elections with a 54.8% turnout. Hamas decides to boycott the elections and bans them in Gaza announcing that it will not recognise the results in the West Bank, where Fatah, without competition from its rival, wins in the biggest towns.
- On 23 October the Emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani, arrives in Gaza, in the first visit by a Head of State to the Strip since Hamas took power in 2007. The visit receives criticism from Fatah in the West Bank, claiming that the act serves to deepen the Palestinian divide.

**Conflicts between the parties**

- On 5 October clashes break out in the Old City of Jerusalem between police and Palestinian demonstrators throwing stones at police vehicles parked near the Temple Mount.
- On 8 October around twenty missiles are launched from the Gaza Strip at Ofakim, in southern Israel, in response to the previous day’s Israeli bombardment in Rafah that killed one civilian and injured several others.
- On 13 October the Jordanian Hisham al-Saiedini, one of the founding members of the Mujahedeen Shura council and military chief of the Tawhid Wal Jihad, the largest Salafist group in Gaza, is killed together with another militant in an Israeli airstrike in Jabaliya.
- On 22 October the Israeli air force attacks a training ground in northern Gaza killing two members of Hamas and the Popular Resistance Committee, in response to earlier rocket launches at a military patrol near the Nir Am Kibutz, in southern Israel. On 23 October eight missiles are fired from Gaza into southern Israel. Israel’s response to the attack leaves four Palestinian militants dead. On 24 October more than 60 rocket launches from Gaza injure five people in an attack on Ashkelon. Damages are minimised by the Iron Dome defence system. Israel responds with two air-strikes in the north of the Strip which kill two Palestinians.

**November 2012**

**Israel**

- On 5 November Israel announces plans for the construction of 1,213 new homes in Ramot and Pisgat Zeev, in Jerusalem.
- On 6 November the trial in absentia begins in a court in Istanbul against four Israeli military commanders for the 2010 attack on the Freedom Flotilla as it was attempting to break the Gaza blockade, in which nine Turkish activists were killed.
- On 11 November a missile launched from Syria reaches an Israeli military base in the Golan Heights without causing any casualties. Israel heightens its surveillance on the border and the Tsa-hal (Israeli army) responds with warning shots against a Syrian artillery battery. This is the first time since the end of the 1973 Yom Kippur war that Israel has fired into Syrian territory, having registered eight similar incidents since the outbreak of the Syrian revolution.
- On 14 November in reaction to the new unilateral attempts of the PNA to be recognised as an observer State of the UN at the General Assembly on 29 November, Israel threatens to retaliate with a number of acts ranging from freezing the transference of tax revenue to the Palestinian authorities to the full or partial cancellation of the 1993 Oslo Accords and even the dismantling and banning of the PNA itself. Israel also assesses the possibility of offering the PNA incentives if they backtrack, such as an agreement to recognise a Palestinian State with temporary borders until there is no longer a divide between Hamas and Fatah or Palestine holds joint elections.
- On 24 November Israel increases the fishing limit in Gaza from three to six miles, as part of the truce agreement reached with Hamas on 21 November following eight days of violence.
- On 25 November Likud holds primaries to elect its party members from 97 candidates that will run in the elections on 22 January 2013 in joint lists with Yisrael Beiteinu.
- On 26 November Ehud Barak, the Defence Minister and leader of Atzamaut, a breakaway party from the Labour Party, announces he is leaving political life for personal reasons.
- On 25 November Israel successfully tests the new missile interception system David’s Sling, capable of stopping medium and long-range launches in a 125-kilometre radius.
- On 27 November the former Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni announces her return to politics, which she left in May after losing the leadership of Kadima, with the creation of a new political party called Hatnua (Movement), which she will lead in the January 2013 elections. One of the main aims of the new centre-left party will be to achieve peace with the Palestinians.
- On 29 November the government authorises the construction of 3,000 new homes in Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, after the UNGA grants Palestine observer State status. Israel also decides to authorise the construction project in E1 Area to connect Jerusalem and the Maale Adumim settlement, which was vetoed by the US 20 years ago and would separate Ramallah from Bethlehem.

**Palestine**

- On 12 November the President of the PNA Mahmoud Abbas announces before the Arab League that Palestine will go ahead with its request at the UNGA on 29 November to be accepted as a non-member observer State despite warnings from Israel and the US.
- On 13 November work begins to open the tomb of Yasser Arafat in Ramallah, as part of an investigation launched by French prosecutors in August to determine the real causes of his death in a French military hospital on 11 November 2004.
- On 29 November the UNGA recognises Palestine as an observer State...
with 138 votes in favour, nine against and 41 abstentions. This is a symbolic victory over Israeli and US diplomacy but does not mean recognition of full membership in the UN.

Conflicts between the parties

- On 5 November a Palestinian is shot dead by Israeli soldiers after failing to obey orders to stop as he approached the fence that separates Ghana from Israel to the east of the Bureij refugee camp.
- On 10 November a new wave of cross-border attacks between Israel and the Gaza Strip increases tensions in the area. Between 70 and 90 launchers from Gaza into southern Israel, which injure four Israeli soldiers, are answered with an attack on seven targets in the Strip killing six Palestinians, one of them a member of the Islamic Jihad. On 12 November the Chief of the Israeli Armed Forces Benny Gantz meets with the country’s military high command to analyse a large-scale response to the Gaza attacks. On the same day, 15 Israeli rocket launches bolster the country’s response. Hamas, while appealing to the Egyptian mediation, ceases its attacks; although other Palestinian factions continue. On 14 November Ahmed Jabari, head of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of Hamas, is killed by an Israeli rocket in an offensive launched by Israel to destroy the Hamas and Islamic Jihad positions in the Gaza Strip. With at least 13 dead and hundreds injured the escalation of violence between Gaza and Israel reaches its worst levels since Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009. In response, on 15 November, for the first time since the Gulf War in 1991, a rocket hits Tel Aviv as part of an offensive of 150 missiles launched by Hamas against cities in southern Israel, in which three people are killed. On the same day, Israel launches Operation Pillar of Defense and announces the mobilisation of thousands of army reserves as well as preparations for a possible ground offensive on Gaza. Three senior Hamas members are killed in Khan Yunis in one of the Israeli attacks. Israel bombards different points of the Gaza Strip throughout the night of 15-16 November hours before the Egyptian Prime Minister Hesham Qandil’s visit to the territory to support the Palestinian cause. On 16 November a second Palestinian missile lands in Tel Aviv as part of a fresh offensive on different cities, forcing Qandil to hurriedly leave the Strip. The Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi assures that efforts will be made to halt the Israeli aggression against Gaza on the same day that a mass demonstration in Alexandria demands measures to be taken against Israel. On the same day, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades launch two missiles at Jerusalem that reach the capital, landing close to the Gush Etzion settlement. Hamas also claims to have shot down an Israeli fighter plane. On 16 November two Hamas leaders, Ahmed Abu Yalal and Jaled Shaer, are killed in one of the bombing raids of Operation Pillar of Defense. On 17 November multiple Israeli airstrikes hit, among other targets, the office of the Prime Minister of Gaza and movement leader Ismail Haniya, as well as the al-Marazi and Rafah refugee camps, leaving eight dead. Dozens of missiles are fired at Gaza from Israel’s major cities, which are intercepted by the Iron Dome defence system and include two Iranian-manufactured Fajr-5 missiles aimed at Tel Aviv. In view of the gravity of the situation, diplomatic contacts are intensified in an attempt to reach a truce. On 18 November the Hamas supreme leader Khaled Mashal travels from exile in Qatar to Cairo to try to formulate a truce agreement with the Arab States and Turkey, at an emergency meeting called by the Arab League in the Egyptian capital, where it is announced that a delegation will be sent to Gaza in the coming days. Likewise, the French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius travels to Jerusalem and Tel Aviv to meet with Benjamin Netanyahu, Avigdor Lieberman, Ehud Barak and Mahmoud Abbas. Meanwhile, Operation Pillar of Defense increases its intensity, with attacks by the Israeli navy on several points of the Gaza coastline. Among the day’s 29 victims is Tamer al-Hamri, the leader of the Islamic Jihad. On 20 November Mohamed Morsi announces that the Egyptian, Qatari and Turkish mediators have achieved an agreement in principle to halt the Israeli attacks, and Hamas spokesperson Ayman Taha announces that Israel and the Palestinian militia in Gaza have agreed a brokered truce that will enter into effect at midnight; however the Israeli attacks continue and a Hamas missile hits the Palestinian area of Jerusalem and the Jewish Gush Etzion settlement. Parallel to this, the UN Security Council prepares a text condemning the hostilities, opposed by Washington, which claims that the document refutes Israel’s right to defend itself, while Moscow accuses the US of being an obstacle to international consensus. On 21 November at least seven Palestinians and seven Israelis are killed in another day of cross-border attacks. On 21 November a bomb explodes on a bus in the centre of Tel Aviv leaving 32 injured in an attack celebrated by the Hamas television station, al-Aqsa, two of whose reporters are killed in the same day in an Israeli attack on a Gaza press office. Hours later, Shin Bet agents (internal security), the police and the Israeli Defense Forces arrest various residents of Beit Lakia, a town near to Ramallah, for their alleged connection with the attack in Tel Aviv. Among the arrested, who admitted having ties with Hamas or the Islamic Jihad, is an Arab-Israeli citizen born in Beit Lakia but resident in Tayibe, in the centre of Israel. On the same day, the Egyptian and US Foreign Ministers, Mohamed Kamel Amr and Hillary Clinton, announce the truce in Cairo, which should enter into effect at midnight and includes an agreement between Israel and Hamas to stop all violence in the area within 24 hours, after which Egyptian-brokered negotiations will commence between the parties. On 23 November a Palestinian is killed approaching the fence that separates Israel and Gaza by a shot fired from the Israeli side. The incident endangers the truce and Hamas says that it will condemn the attack before the Egyptian mediators.

December 2012

Israel

- On 2 December Israel confirms that it will block the transfer of taxes corresponding to November – 92 million
euros – which in virtue of the Paris Agreement – an economic protocol of the Oslo Accords – the Israeli State collects for the PNA, and will use it to reduce the Palestinian debt to public companies and Israeli bodies, which amounts to more than 200 million euros. The measure constitutes a new Israeli response to the PNA’s unilateral decision to request recognition as an observer State at the UNGA, which Israel sees as a violation of the Oslo Accords. Benjamin Netanyahu assures that a Palestinian State will not be created without a prior agreement guaranteeing the absolute security of all Israelis and Israel’s legitimate right to exist as a State and to have Jerusalem as its capital.

- On 3 December the Israeli ambassadors in Spain, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden and Denmark are summoned by those countries’ Foreign Ministers to explain the measures adopted by Israel after the acceptance of Palestine as an observer State by the UNGA.
- On 11 December Israeli soldiers raid the offices of three Palestinian NGOs in Ramallah, the Women’s Union, the Palestinian NGO Network and Addameer.
- On 13 December the Public Prosecution announces its ruling to charge the Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman with breach of trust and fraud in connection with the irregular appointment of his successor Zeev Ben Arie, as ambassador in Belarus. On 16 December Lieberman submits his resignation thereby waiving his immunity with the intention of settling a trial that he hopes will be quick and over by the legislative elections on 22 January 2013.
- On 19 December the Jerusalem City Council approves a plan to construct 2,612 homes in Givat Hamatos, south Jerusalem, beyond the Green Line, which add to the 1,500 approved on 17 December in Ramat Shlomo, East Jerusalem.
- On 26 December Israeli state radio confirms the news published by the Arab newspaper al-Quds al-Arabi and Yedioth Aharonot, according to which the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently travelled in secret to Amman to meet with King Abdullah of Jordan and military and secret service advisors from both countries over the Syrian crisis and the mutual concern over Syria’s control of chemical weapons.
- On 30 December the Attorney General Yehuda Weinstein officially indicts the former minister and leader of the Yisrael Beiteinu party Avigdor Lieberman for abusing his authority by appointing an Israeli diplomat as Ambassador to Latvia. Years before the diplomat had delivered a confidential dossier to Lieberman, an MP at the time, containing information regarding the police investigation that linked him with a case of alleged corruption and fraud.
- On 31 December Israel raises the 2007 embargo on construction materials in Gaza.

**Palestine**

- On 2 December an explosion in Deir el-Balah, Gaza, attributed to an Israeli missile, leaves four people injured. Israel denies any connection with the attack.
- On 8 December Khaled Meshal, Hamas leader in exile, promises the end of Israel assuring that he will never recognise it as a State, in a speech in Gaza during the 25th anniversary of the founding of the Islamist group. The declarations made by Meshal, who is visiting Gaza for the first time, are condemned by the vast majority of Israeli parties and media from diverse ideologies for tacitly closing all chances of negotiation and presenting a direct threat to Israeli security.
- On 9 December the Foreign Ministers of the Arab League, meeting in Doha, pledge their assistance to the PNA with a monthly payment of a hundred million dollars as compensation for funds withheld by Israel.

**Conflicts between the parties**

- On 12 December an Israeli border policewoman kills a Palestinian teenager after he threatened a fellow officer with a toy gun, in Hebron. The incident sparks clashes between Palestinian demonstrators and the Israeli security forces in villages near the Cave of the Patriarchs.

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January

**EU Danish Presidency**
1 – Brussels: According to the programme the EU Danish Presidency will support relations with the EU’s neighbours and implement the revised Neighbourhood Strategy promoting better coherence in the EU’s efforts in southern and eastern neighbourhood regions. In particular in the light of developments in the southern neighbouring countries, the Danish Presidency will prioritise discussions on additional trade liberalisation and migration aspects within the framework of the revised EU Global Approach to Migration. [http://eu2012.dk/](http://eu2012.dk/)

**Arab Spring**
17 – Strasbourg: The EU and Council of Europe join forces in a €4.8 million programme for strengthening democratic reform in the southern Mediterranean. The joint programme supports democratic reforms, the independence and efficiency of the judiciary and good governance. It also targets corruption and human trafficking and aims to promote human rights and democratic values. Complementarity and coherence with other EU initiatives (such as the SPRING programme or the future European Endowment for Democracy) will also be ensured.

**ENP - Morocco**
18 – Rabat: The progress of reforms as well as a range of bilateral issues are at the top of the agenda for the EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement and ENP Füle in the first high-level visit to the country by an EU official since the November elections and the appointment of the new government headed by Benkirane. During his visit, the Commissioner signs two financing agreements in the framework of the Neighbourhood Investment Facility. The first relates to the Ouarzazate Solar Power Plant for a total of €30 million of EU funding, and the second relates to the Drinking Water Efficiency Programme for a total of €7 million of EU funding. His talks focus on important dossiers of EU-Morocco relations, such as the agreement on liberalising trade in agricultural products; preparations for a new Action Plan towards “advanced status”; the preparation of negotiations on a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA); negotiations to liberalise trade in services; and the dialogue on a mobility partnership.

**EU - Syria**
23 – Brussels: EU Foreign Ministers tighten the EU’s restrictive measures against those responsible for human rights violations in Syria, adding 22 people and eight entities financially supporting the regime to the list of those subject to an asset freeze and a ban from entering the EU. In the Council’s conclusions, Foreign Ministers also welcome the League of Arab States’ decision to extend its observation mission and to reinforce its capacity to report independently on the situation in Syria. In response to the widespread human rights violations, the EU has gradually imposed a comprehensive set of restrictive measures on Syria, including an arms embargo, a ban on the import of Syrian crude oil and on fresh investment in the Syrian petrol sector.

**Refugees**
25 – Gaza City: EU and UNRWA sign a €55.4 million agreement. The EU contribution is the largest single donation to UNRWA’s core budget, which supports the Agency’s regular activities in education, health, relief and social services and camp improvement. The grant will fund these essential services to Palestinian refugees throughout Gaza, the West Bank, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

**ARLEM**
30 – Bari: Euromed regions and cities meet at the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM) focused on climate change, renewable energies, cultural heritage and the role of small and medium enterprises in the development of Euromed economies. A year after the start of the Arab Spring, the discussion and adoption of a report on “The territorial dimension of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM),” drafted by the ARLEM co-Presidents, provides the chance to exchange views and expertise on the implementation of partnerships and joint projects among regions and cities of the three shores of the Mediterranean. Discussions also focus on the new cooperation opportunities brought about by the recent evolution of several Mediterranean countries toward regionalisation and devolution of powers to local authorities. [http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/arlem/](http://cor.europa.eu/en/activities/arlem/)

**Solar Plan**
30 – Barcelona: The Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfMS) and the industrial consortium Medgrid sign a Memorandum of Understanding by which Medgrid will support the UfMS in the implementation of the Mediterra-
nean Solar Plan (MSP), aimed at the large-scale development of renewable energy and energy efficiency. The two entities will share their experts and analysts and will participate in each other’s working groups, especially concerning finance, infrastructures and projects of common interest. 

www.ufmsecretariat.org

February

EU - Tunisia
2 – Brussels: After talks with the new Tunisian PM Jebali, European Commission (EC) President Barroso stresses that the EU is determined to support the country’s reform process and to move towards a privileged partnership (advanced status). In the joint declaration Barroso hails the special relationship between the two sides. The declaration spells out clear priorities for cooperation, including in particular: the resumption of negotiations to finalise a privileged partnership; the resumption of trade liberalisation talks, the opening of negotiations aiming at signing a DCFTA between Tunisia and the EU; the resumption of the dialogue on mobility, migration and security, aimed at the agreement of a Mobility Partnership. 


EU - Lebanon
6-9 – Brussels: The EU and Lebanese government hold sub-committee meetings focusing on three main areas: social and migration policies; justice, freedom and security; and human rights, democracy and governance. The meetings underscored Lebanon’s commitment to advance the implementation of reforms jointly agreed in the Lebanon-EU action plan. The topics of human rights, democracy and governance are especially relevant at a time when the EU is revising its ENP to ensure a greater linkage between further EU assistance and a commitment amongst neighbourhood countries to implement reforms related to ‘deep democracy.’

Youth
7-10 – Lyon: A set of nine recommendations for youth policy across the Euro-Mediterranean area is drawn up by 150 civil society representatives, decision-makers and experts from both shores of the Mediterranean at a conference organised by the Youth in Action programme. The recommendations seek to promote human security and development, employability and entrepreneurship through non-formal education and access to information society and knowledge economy. The conference ‘From indignation to contribution’ is organised by EU-funded SALTO-YOUTH and Euromed Youth IV programmes and the University of Lyon 2.

www.euromedyouth.net/Nine-recommendations-for-youth

Infrastructure
10 – Brussels: During the last UfM Senior Officials meeting, the UfM Member States adopt the Trans-Maghreb Motorway Axis project which will contribute to a closer integration between the countries of the Mediterranean. The project is for the Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian national motorway networks to provide a corridor from Agadir (Morocco) to Ras Jadir (Tunisian-Libyan border), which will make transport connections faster, cheaper and more efficient to the benefit of citizens and businesses.

www.ufmsecretariat.org

UfM Secretariat
10 – Brussels: The UfM Senior Officials meeting adopts by consensus the nomination of Moroccan Fathallah Si-jilmassi as Secretary General of the UfM, succeeding his compatriot Youssef Amrani, who stood down in January after being appointed as Minister-Delegate at the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

EU-Morocco
14 – Brussels: The European Parliament (EP) votes in favour of a Protocol which provides a legal basis for Morocco’s participation in EU programmes. This participation will allow Morocco to become more familiar with EU policies and support its gradual efforts to transpose the EU acquis. The Protocol will enable Morocco’s full participation in seven Union programmes in the areas of customs, energy, entrepreneurship, ICT policy, consumer policy, air traffic management, research and health.

www.europarl.europa.eu

Agriculture and Fishery
16 – Brussels: The EP gives its consent to liberalise EU-Morocco trade in agricultural and fishery products. The agreement will lift 55% of tariffs on Moroccan agricultural and fishery products (rising from 33%) and 70% of tariffs on EU agricultural and fishery products within 10 years (rising from 1%). It includes safeguards by allowing only moderate increases to quotas of certain products, such as tomatoes, strawberries, cucumbers and garlic. The deal also stipulates that Moroccan imports should meet European sanitary standards. A significant minority of MEPs oppose the inclusion of the disputed Western Sahara region in the deal as being incompatible with international law.

www.europarl.europa.eu

EU-Jordan
22 – Dead Sea: The first meeting of the EU-Jordan Task Force, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Jordanian Prime Minister. The EU is determined to accompany Jordan on its process of democratic reforms towards a just and inclusive society with democratic rights, social justice and economic opportunity as key features. The EU-Jordan Task Force was set up to help address the challenges Jordan is facing in its political and economic reform process. It also aims to coordinate more efficiently the support of the EU, of its Member States and a number of European and international bodies.

Syria
27 – Brussels: The Council decides to reinforce restrictive measures against the Syrian regime following an EU foreign affairs meeting because of the regime’s continued use of violence against civilians. Trade in gold, precious metals and diamonds with Syrian public bodies and the central bank is no longer permitted. Cargo flights operated by Syrian carriers will not have access to EU airports; the assets of the Syrian central bank within the EU will be frozen. The Council welcomes the appointment of
former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, as the Joint Special Envoy of the UN and League of Arab States on the Syrian crisis.

www.consilium.europa.eu

March

UfM Co-Presidency

Brussels: France hands over the Northern Co-Presidency of the UfM to the EU, following a decision at a European Foreign Ministers meeting. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy takes over the co-Presidency for meetings of Foreign Ministers. The EC will assume the co-Presidency for Ministerial Meetings concerning matters in areas of exclusive EU competence, and will do so in cooperation with the Member State holding the rotating presidency of the EU Council in other meetings. The EU External Action Service (EEAS) will take over the UfM’s Northern Co-Presidency for Senior Official Meetings

http://register.consilium.europa.eu

Arab Spring

2 – Brussels: One year from the start of the Arab Spring, European Heads of State and Government in the European Council (EC) spell out their commitment to the democratic transformation in the EU’s southern Neighbourhood. European leaders recognise the Syrian National Council as a legitimate representative of Syrians and warn of a new round of sanctions against the regime.

www.consilium.europa.eu

Industry Cooperation

8-9 – Tunis: EC vice-President Tajani travels to Tunisia to accelerate the preparations leading to negotiations on EU market access agreements with Southern Mediterranean Countries (SMCs). The visit will reinforce partnerships to allow industry and SMEs to fully exploit the potential for commercial relations between Tunisia and the EU. Tunisia’s considerable progress in aligning the legislative system and infrastructure quality with those of the EU could soon enable full access to the Single Market for those products that meet requirements. This will be negotiated within the scope of an Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA).

http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/single-market-goods/international-aspects

FEMIP

8 – Tunis: The European Investment Bank (EIB), in collaboration with the Republic of Tunisia, hosts the 10th FEMIP Conference on the theme “Mediterranean SMEs: Ready to break new ground.” The event gathers representatives of banks and leading companies, fund managers, SME entrepreneurs and managers, academics in management/entrepreneurial education, researchers, SME associations and public officials.

It addresses three main themes: the access to diverse and competitive sources of financing as a primary obstacle to the development of the private sector; the promotion of entrepreneurship and management education as a condition to ensure growth; and the enhancement of the international competitiveness of Mediterranean enterprises by repositioning them in the global market.

www.eib.org/projects/regions/med

Youth

14 – Cairo: More than 300 people, mostly youths, take part in a debate on the topic of “Creativity between Freedom of Speech and Censorship,” organised by the Young Arab Voices programme, supported by the Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF). The debate has been highly animated and touched on a number of topics, including creativity in science and arts and the need for fair legislation to protect freedom of speech.

The purpose of the programme is to train young people in debating skills and facilitate youth participation in new processes of democratic transition and reform.

www.euromedalex.org

EU-Algeria

19-20 – Algiers: EU support for reforms and strengthening bilateral cooperation are the main topics during the visit of the Commissioner for Enlargement and ENP Füle. During his talks with Algerian counterparts the Commissioner outlines the support which the EU is ready to provide for the reform efforts based on the principles of the reviewed ENP, including the ‘more for more’ principle. He also meets representatives of civil society, underlining the importance the EU attaches to discussions with non-governmental stakeholders, including civil society organisations, the private sector and trade unions. Algeria announced its willingness to start exploratory negotiations for the elaboration of an ENP Action Plan in December 2011, and the government recently invited the EU to observe the legislative elections on 10 May. This will be the first time EU observers are present during elections in the country.

http://ec.europa.eu/commision_2010-2014/fule

Aviation

22 – Tel Aviv: Israel and the EU finalise negotiations on a comprehensive aviation agreement. As well as gradually opening up the respective markets, the agreement also aims to integrate Israel into a wider Common Aviation Area with the EU. Israel will implement regulatory requirements and standards equivalent to EU aviation rules in areas such as aviation safety, environment, and consumer protection. Similar comprehensive aviation agreements with neighbouring countries have already been negotiated with the Western Balkan countries, Morocco and Jordan.

http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/international Aviation /

UfM Parliamentary Assembly

24-25 – Rabat: A political solution to the conflict in Syria, a resumption of the Middle East peace process and support for the transition to democracy in countries on the Mediterranean’s southern shore are the key issues in the 8th Parliamentary Assembly of the UfM. The European Parliament will now chair this Assembly for a year. This meeting is the first to bring together MEPs and MPs newly elected on the Mediterranean’s southern shore since the “Arab Spring.”

www.europarl.europa.eu

COPEAM

29 March-1 April – Marrakesh: The 19th annual Conference of COPEAM (Permanent Conference of the Mediter-
A training seminar to discuss ways of countering the threat posed by cyberterrorism is held in the framework of the EU-funded Euromed Police III project. It hosts 28 delegates from Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia. The themes include: analysing how terrorist groups use the Internet or social networks, in order, to spread their propaganda and carry out recruitment; and explaining investigation techniques liable to detect such activities while complying with legal requirements.

www.euromed-police3.eu/

**ALF**

**25-28 – Alexandria:** Writers, journalists, artists and cultural activists gather for the third edition of the literary encounters "Ecrire la Méditerranée," organised by ALF in collaboration with the French Institute of Egypt. The programme includes a series on conferences, roundtable debates, film screenings, and exhibitions with the purpose of exploring the new cultural dynamics initiated by youth in the Mediterranean area. Topics covered include: the potential of arts in changing societies, the contribution of women to contemporary literature in the Mediterranean, and the role of youth in reinventing democracy.


**April**

**Research and Innovation**

**2-3 – Barcelona:** Some 350 top-level scientists and policy-makers from more than 30 countries around the Euro-Mediterranean region launch a new partnership in research and innovation. The aim of the conference, the first of its kind, is to map out a pathway to establishing a Common Research and Innovation Agenda, aimed at addressing the major societal challenges affecting the region, notably in the field of energy, water, food, transport and health. Participants say that the new partnership should be based on the principles of co-ownership, mutual interest and shared benefit.

http://ec.europa.eu/research

**Euromed Police**

**16-20 – Madrid:** A training seminar to discuss ways of countering the threat posed by cyberterrorism is held in the framework of the EU-funded Euromed Police III project. It hosts 28 delegates from Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia. The themes include: analysing how terrorist groups use the Internet or social networks, in order, to spread their propaganda and carry out recruitment; and explaining investigation techniques liable to detect such activities while complying with legal requirements.

www.euromed-police3.eu/

**May**

**EU-Israel**

**2 – Jerusalem:** The EU-Israel Association Committee takes place at the level of senior officials. The Committee reviews the implementation of the EU-Israel Action Plan starting with an exchange of views on political issues including the Middle East Peace Process, Iran, the situation in the Arab world, human rights, combating terrorism, combating anti-Semitism, shared values and cooperation in the UN and international organisations. It also reviews the main conclusions of other sub-committees: economic and financial matters; social affairs, migration and health; customs cooperation and taxation; agriculture and fisheries; internal market; industry, trade and services; justice and legal matters; transport, energy and environmental research; innovation, information society, education and culture.

**Vocational Training**

**7-11 – Casablanca:** Trade union officials and representatives of employers’ organisations from Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon visit Morocco to study the country’s approach to social partnership in the governing, policy making and delivery of Vocational Education and Training (VET). The visit is organised by the European Training Foundation (ETF) as part of its regional effort to support social partners’ engagement in VET. During the visit, the participants learn how their hosts develop and implement policies in the area of VET.

**Invest In Med**

**10 – Brussels:** The EP calls for the launch of the second stage of the Invest In Med Project. It adopts a motion which highlights the fact that the Arab Spring and its call for a democratic ideal and the freedom of peoples, constitutes the most important political change ever in the EU neighbourhood. The EP also mentions the economic opportunities in the MENA region, particularly concerning natural resources. It reaffirms its support to update the sectoral agreements and the creation of bilateral EU Chambers of Commerce and reiterates the need for diversification for the economies of South Mediterranean Countries (SMC), especially in order to attract foreign investors.

**Euro-Med Diplomats**

**11-14 – Malta:** Diplomats from most of the 27 EU Member States and the Mediterranean Partner countries and UfM partner states, including first time participants from Libya, attend the 32nd Euro-Mediterranean Information and Training Seminar. It is a unique opportunity to reflect upon and openly discuss the historic transformation sweeping across the southern Mediterranean. Particular attention is dedicated to identifying the progress registered in the implementation of the UfM agenda and EU’s policy decisions towards the Mediterranean since the start of the Arab Spring. Academic specialists and other professionals from Europe and the Mediterranean present a series of lectures on developments pertaining to the political, security, economic, financial, and sociocultural and human dimensions of contemporary Euro-Mediterranean relations.

**ENP**

15 – Brussels: The External Relations Chief Ashton and Enlargement and Neighbourhood Commissioner Füle present the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) 2012 package, during which progress from last year is presented, along with a number of documents, including a road map for the east and the south, as well as country progress reports. Both officials underline the three principles that have guided the review: that the EU should focus its support on those countries and governments most committed to political and economic reform; “mutual accountability,” i.e. that the EU should live up to its side of the bargain in response to those who live up to their side; and that the EU should reach out directly to populations, civil society and opposition groups, especially when governments block reform and refuse to engage with their people.


**Transport**

16-17 – Tunis/Rabat: UfMS delegation headed by Deputy SG Alpogan conducts a mission to Tunisia and Morocco in an effort to raise awareness for two key UfM labelled projects: one on the completion of the central section of the Trans-Maghreb Motorway Axis; and the other on the development of a network of Euro-Mediterranean logistics platforms (LOGISMEDA). The UfM Delegation meets the Tunisian and Moroccan Ministers of Transport who agree on providing financial contribution to the LOGISMEDA project. Regarding the Trans-Maghreb Motorway Axis project, Morocco is ready to launch the next phases of design and construction.

**Solar Plan**

18-19 – London: The UfM SG, Sijilmassi, holds discussions with Senior Executives from the EBRD to develop synergies and further involve the Bank in UfM projects, at the margins of the annual summit of the EBRD. The UfM SG presents to an audience of business leaders and delegates of the Bank the main features of the Mediterranean Solar Plan’s Master Plan and holds bilateral meetings and contacts at the highest level with representatives of multilateral and bilateral financial institutions and development agencies. Discussions include collaboration with the International Financial Institutions’ Platform of the financial pillar of the G8 Deauville Partnership, particularly in the fields of private sector development, support to SMEs and job creation.

**Human rights**

24 – Amman: The 7th round of the Human Rights, Governance and Democracy Subcommittee between Jordan and the EU focuses on the ongoing process of reforms-related legislation and on the human rights matters linked to the implementation of the ENP EU-Jordan Action Plan.

**Migration**

30 – Brussels: The EU-funded EuroMed Migration III project holds its regional opening conference, setting out a series of activities that the project aims to pursue. The project seeks to foster cooperation on migration issues between SMCs and EU Member States, as well as between SMCs themselves, and to help partner countries find solutions to the various forms of migration. The conference is attended by, among others, representatives from eight Southern Mediterranean Countries, 17 EU Member States, FRONTEX, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), the ETF, the EC and the EEAS.

**Agriculture**

31 May-1 June – Brussels: Senior agricultural officials from ENP partner countries discuss the modernisation of the agricultural sector in their countries at a Conference on the European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture & Rural Development (ENPARD). ENPARD is a new policy initiative which recognises the potential importance of agriculture in terms of food security, sustainable production and rural employment. The objective of the conference is to present the programme’s vision and approach to high-level officials in charge of agriculture, rural development and international cooperation from all the ENP partner countries.


**Committee of Region**

11 – Rabat: A delegation of the Committee of the Regions (CoR) attends high-level meetings with Moroccan ministries and the ARLEM Bureau. The discussions focus on finding ways to better support the democratic decentralisation of powers in the Arab Spring area and how to strengthen the regional dimension of the Euromed partnership. The meetings address issues ranging from the rules related to the election of regions’ Presidents and Assemblies to defining regional competences in different policy areas, and from the vital questions related to regions’
own resources, fiscal reform and equalisation, to the relations between the public and private sectors and the promotion of new investments. The challenges and options of the ongoing regionalisation process were also among the priority issues in the meetings between Bresso (CoR President) and top level representatives of Moroccan national and regional government.

Civil Society
11-13 – Beirut: The “Civil Society” Regional Programme ENPI-South organises in collaboration with ANND (Arab NGO Network for Development) the Regional Seminar on “European – Southern Mediterranean Relations: Discussing Policies and Partnership to Support Economic and Social Rights and the Role of Civil Society.” The participants to the Seminar are representatives of civil society organisations of SMCs, representatives of International, Regional and Sub-Regional networks and organisations of the associative field, namely associations for the protection of human rights, workers trade unions, students and journalists associations, etc., women and youth associations and lawyers and judges associations.

www.euromedcivilsociety.net

Energy
12 – Istanbul: The Association of Mediterranean Regulators for Electricity and Gas (MEDREG) holds its 13th General Assembly meeting approving the new MEDREG Action Plan for the period 2012-2014, which includes a long-term strategic vision to 2015-2020 in view of supporting a possible creation of a Mediterranean Energy Community as its ultimate goal by 2020. The Electricity Group, which focuses on both internal and regional electricity market developments, presents a report on a master plan for the establishment of an integrated Mediterranean electricity market.

www.medreg-regulators.org

Youth
25 June-1 July – Tunis: A week of activities takes place around the theme of youth work and youth policy in the wake of the Arab Spring. The event brings together participants from the Euromed Youth Programme countries and from EU Member States. The series of meetings and visits is co-organised by the Tunisian Ministry of Sport and Youth, SALTO Euromed, and Support Unit for the EuroMed Youth IV Programme, among others. The activities offer an opportunity to discover, reflect and share experiences about youth work in society and to create partnerships for cooperation. The programme tackles topics such as the place and role of youth in the revolution, the current situation of youth and its needs, and the reality of youth work in Tunisia.

www.euromedivoth.net

UIM
28 – Barcelona: At the UIM Senior Officials meeting Jordan expresses its willingness to assume the southern co-presidency of the UIM. The Jordanian announcement is welcomed unanimously by all the representatives. The meeting is also attended by the vice-President of the EIB who confirms the readiness of the EIB to provide €500 million with the aim of supporting mature UIM projects. During the meeting, the UIM Secretariat presents three new projects: Skills for Success: Employability Skills for Women; Creation of a Euro Mediterranean University in Fez; and Overcoming Governance Challenges to the Mobilisation of Financing for the Mediterranean Water Sector. Furthermore, a progress report on the projects underway is presented: the LOGISMEDTA and Trans-Maghreb Highway; the Gaza Desalination Project; and the Mediterranean Solar Plan.

July

EU Cyprus Presidency
1 – Brussels: Four key priorities are outlined in the six-month programme of the Cypriot Presidency of the Council of the EU: Europe in the world, closer to its neighbours; alongside an efficient and sustainable Europe; a better performing and growth economy; and a Europe, more relevant to its citizens, with solidarity and social cohesion. The four priorities are based on the 18-month Trio Programme, prepared in close cooperation with Poland and Denmark. In external relations, the programme stresses that the Cypriot Presidency will support the High Representative’s efforts in ENP, notably its southern dimension, where the EU has committed to supporting the democratic transformation of its southern partners.


Higher Education
2-3 – Brussels: Ministers and senior officials from SMCs gather to assess the challenges they face in higher education and to see how the EU can strengthen its cooperation in the future. In response to the events of the Arab Spring, the EC has significantly increased funding for the southern Mediterranean through its international higher education programmes: Tempus and Erasmus Mundus. The objectives of the dialogue with SMCs on higher education policies and programmes are: to provide a regional platform for policy dialogue on education, higher education, vocational education and training and youth issues; to share good practice and experience; to support partners in their modernisation and reform of higher education systems and promote their voluntary convergence towards the Bologna Process and the European Research and Higher Education Area. The new policy dialogue covers Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and the occupied Palestinian territories.

Enterprise
10-11 – Brussels: The EC and its Mediterranean partners review progress and plan the next steps in implementing the 2011-2012 work programme on Euro-Mediterranean Industrial cooperation, besides discussing the 2013-2014 work programme and the adaptation of the Charter for Enterprise focusing on SMEs and job creation. The first day concludes with a session on the EU’s support to private sector development in Mediterranean neighbour countries. Among the topics addressed on the second day of the meeting is the survey on sustainable enterprise development, activities of the EIB in Mediterranean neighbour countries and future priorities
in Euro-Mediterranean industrial cooperation:
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international

Euromed Police
11 – Madrid: The first conference of the General Directors of Police and Security forces of EU and ENPI South countries is held in the framework of the Euromed Police III Project on the “Fight against Drug-Trafficking and Money-Laundering.” Seven delegations from the ENPI South countries, as well as delegations from 20 EU countries, Europol and Interpol take part in this meeting. The main features of the conclusions are: a statement of the tendencies of drug-trafficking in the regional area; a statement of good practices to be shared and extended (on efficient security controls in airports, quick exchange of operational information).

Libya
13 – Brussels: The EC adopts a decision, which officially adds Libya to the list of countries participating in the activities of its regional cooperation projects and programmes designed for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The ENPI Regulation of 2006 included Libya as an eligible country. However, the Regional Strategy Document (2007-2013) and the Regional Indicative Programme 2007-2010 and 2010-2013 didn’t include Libya due to the political circumstances.

CBC
17-18 – Rome: More than 450 representatives of institutions, governments, local authorities, the business sector and civil society of both EU Member States and SMCs gather for the mid-term conference of the EU-funded Cross-border Cooperation Mediterranean Sea Basin Programme (CBC-Med). Participants in the conference analyse the results achieved by the Programme and reaffirm its importance as a tool to enhance cooperation in the Mediterranean region. The EU response to far-reaching changes in the Mediterranean area and new perspectives for the ENP; the inclusion of countries that did not take part in the Programme so far (namely Algeria, Libya and Morocco); and the increase of funds dedicated to the Programme are the main issues under view.
www.enpicbcm.eu

Research and Innovation
20 – Nicosia: EU Research Ministers affirm their commitment to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in research and innovation, as well as the readiness of their countries to engage in the preparation of a joint research programme for the Euro-Mediterranean region. They also express their willingness to work towards simplification of research programmes in order to reduce the administrative burden and ease access to participants.

August

Youth
28-29 – Tunis: One hundred and twenty policy-makers, experts, researchers, youth organisations and young people from Europe and the southern Mediterranean participate in the symposium “Arab Spring: Youth Participation for the Promotion of Peace, Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,” organised jointly by the EC and the Council of Europe (CoE). EU representatives underline young people’s role in the democratic development of post-revolutionary Arab countries and call for the development of national youth policies, youth research and support of civil society and in particular of youth organisations.
http://youth-partnership-eu.coe.int/youth-partnership/euromed/Tunisia1.html

September

Media
18 – Brussels: New funding of €9 million for the media and civil society is approved by the EC to support free, independent and high quality journalism through the development of training programmes and institutions for media professionals. Ensuring freedom of expression and of the media is one of the key priorities of the joint EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan and a cornerstone of democracy. This programme represents an additional concrete example of the EU’s commitment to support a close partner country such as Jordan in its endeavours to reinforce fundamental freedoms. The new package will also help to set up a Civil Society Fund (CSF).

World Bank
20 – Barcelona: UIMS Sijilmassi and UIM representatives hold talks with Jonathan Walters, Director of Regional Programmes in the MENA region at the WB. The aim of the meeting is to look into the new opportunities that can result from concrete cooperation between the two institutions. The working sessions focus on projects in the technical areas of water, transport, energy and SMEs, as well as social issues like job creation and employability for women and young people. Support for regional and sub-regional integration and initiatives designed to aid economic transition were also discussed as issues of common interest.

ETF
25-27 – Dead Sea: The regional conference of the ETF “New Challenges for Skills Development in the Arab States of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean” gathers nine ministers of education and employment from Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, the occupied Palestinian territories and Tunisia, and several senior policymakers from both sides of the Mediterranean. They discuss different approaches to tackling the employment crisis and the role of education and training in the region’s new social and economic context. The data and analysis come from the UIM Employability Review and the latest round of the Torino Process. The new reports provide several policy recommendations on how to improve youth employability through, among other things, enhancing vocational education and training, and more efficient labour market policies.
www.etf.europa.eu

Agriculture
87 – La Valletta: At the invitation of the Maltese Authorities, the Ministers of
Agriculture of CIHEAM countries hold their 9th Meeting to discuss food security and price volatility in the Mediterranean region. The occasion allows participants to exchange ideas and experiences regarding actions to be undertaken to improve food security and move towards resilience and stability in a region that is especially vulnerable to the effects of global price volatility. 


**ALF**

27-29 – Luxembourg: The IndignaCtion Forum, supported by the ALF, gathers around 70 young prominent participants of the Arab Spring and European Indignant movements from 20 European and Arab countries. It serves as a platform to exchange ideas and for meetings, debates etc. The Forum ends with a joint declaration affirming the commitment to establish a common networking platform. The IndignaCtion Forum provides spaces for mutual knowledge and dialogue, allowing exchanges among the participants about their experiences on the ground. Open space sessions allow people to discuss topics chosen by them, and envision initiatives and projects.

**October**

EU-Tunisia

2 – Brussels: EU Foreign Policy Chief Ashton meets Tunisian PM Jebali. The topics on the agenda include: the consolidation of democracy, freedom and human rights. The Tunisian PM also meets the EP’s Foreign Affairs Committee whose members assure him that the Parliament would do everything possible to support the democratisation process in his country. The meeting addressed a number of issues, from the timeline for drafting a new constitution, the preparatory phases of the new political context on the southern shore and the economic crisis in the north. They call for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation initiatives in youth employability, job creation or higher education and research. This seminar represents a fundamental step in a series of consultations that the UIM is developing to improve dialogue and cooperation with major Euro-Mediterranean stakeholders.

www.iemed.org/llista_activitats/the-multilateral-track

**Heritage**

8-10 – Sidi Bou Said: A set of seminars is organised in the framework of the Mare Nostrum project, funded under the Euromed Heritage IV programme. Mare Nostrum’s partners from Lebanon, Greece, Malta, Italy and Tunisia, will meet with ministers and key stakeholders in Tunis to discuss integration and sign agreements and road maps for the future of the Mare Nostrum legacy in Tunisia. Mare Nostrum is aimed at providing a sustainable mechanism for the protection and management of cultural heritage resources in the targeted countries, raising public awareness of cultural heritage.

Media

11-12 – Nicosia: The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) holds a civil society seminar that focuses on Media freedom in the Euro-Mediterranean. The sessions focus on how media freedom can reshape Arab societies; the challenges facing a new media landscape in post-Arabuprising countries; and the way forward.

www.eesc.europa.eu

Vocational Education and Training

15-16 – Istanbul: Employers, trade unionists and public authorities in charge of vocational education and training (VET) from eight SEM countries gather under the aegis of the ETF to take stock of almost two years of activities in a regional project on social partnership in VET in Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. The three countries have different traditions and structures of social dialogue. But there is one common element: real cooperation between the labour market and government is not always easy. The participants stress the need for tailored support from the ETF to different target groups, as countries have different educational and legal structures.

www.etf.europa.eu

EESC Summit

17-19 – Amman: The Summit of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) focuses on key challenges affecting the countries of the region, especially those that are currently in a process of political, economic and social transition, and the role that civil society can play in meeting these challenges. The Summit brings together some 150-200 participants from a range of economic and social councils, representatives of employers, trade unions, other economic and social interests groups and NGOs.
November

EU-Algeria
6 – Algiers: Three financing agreements for a total of €58 million are signed between the EU and Algeria to enhance the protection of cultural heritage, support for reform in the transport sector and support for youth employment. In a meeting with President Bouteflika, EU High Representative Ashton underlines the importance of support for SMEs across the country, which she described as the backbone of the economy. They also talk about human rights and the further development of the political structures, as well as the challenges in Mali and Sahel.
www.consilium.europa.eu

Migration
6-9 – Turin: First training session on the topic of legal migration in the framework of the Euromed Migration III project attended by representatives of Southern Mediterranean Partner Countries, from Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and the Palestinian Authority. This session is the first stage in what will be a two-year programme of four training events in legal migration. This first training was focused on labour migration issues.
www.icmpd.org/Legal-Migration-Training-November-2012.2367.0.html

Libya
7 – Tripoli: More than 70 newly elected Libyan MPs attend the opening session of a five-week long Introduction Programme organised by the EU as part of its support to the General National Congress (GNC). Over the coming weeks, a wide range of high profile European experts, including former Prime Ministers, active politicians and officials from other European parliaments, will deliver several training courses covering the main functions of a parliament and the constitutionalisation process. The support for the GNC is one of the components of the EU Public Administration Facility for Libya.

ENP
12 – Brussels: The EC allocates €6 million to ensure the swift launch of the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) conceived in the framework of the renewed ENP and aiming at helping political parties, non-registered NGOs, trade unions and other social partners in an effort to promote deep and sustainable democracy as well as respect for human rights and the rule of law. The EED will aim to help actors of change and emerging players who face obstacles to accessing EU funding. Such actors may include: journalists, bloggers, non-registered NGOs, political movements (including those in exile or from the diaspora), especially when these actors are operating in highly uncertain political contexts.

EU-Palestine
24 – Ramallah: EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Ashton and Palestinian Prime Minister Fayyad announce the conclusion of negotiations between the EU and PA on a new ENP Action Plan. The EU and the PA outline a number of commitments to deepen bilateral relations in preparation for an Association Agreement between the EU and the future state of Palestine. These include: ensuring sustainable PA finances and economic development throughout the occupied Palestinian territory; and supporting the political, economic, social and cultural rights of the Palestinian population in East Jerusalem. The Action Plan also provides the framework for an EU-PA work programme across a wide variety of sectors including justice and home affairs, economic cooperation, trade-related issues, energy, water and transport.
national training targeted at young people. In order to help provide policy recommendations for the EU-Egypt Task Force, the EC has also organised a Business and Tourism forum. The Forum mobilises more than 150 European business representatives and tourism stakeholders, to engage in debate and to network with the Egyptian business and tourism community. They propose action points to help get Egypt’s economy and tourism sector back on track. Both sides are aware of the pivotal role the tourism sector has traditionally played in the Egyptian economy.

http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/promoting-neighbourhood

Entrepreneurship
14-16 – Brussels: The ETF, the EU agency that supports EU neighbouring countries reform their education, training and labour market systems, holds a conference on entrepreneurship training whose recommendations will be taken up by the ETF in 2013. The event focuses on good practice in promoting entrepreneurship and enterprise skills and is attended by entrepreneurship trainers and policymakers from the EU and some 30 neighbouring countries. The 12 training providers, who will present their work, operate across three themes: training for youth start-ups, skills for the internationalisation of SMEs and training for female entrepreneurs.

www.etf.europa.eu

MEDREG
15 – Lisbon: The Association of Mediterranean Energy Regulators (MEDREG) holds its 14th General Assembly which is an opportunity to review the current state of the activities of the Ad-hoc Working Groups and Task Forces. It discusses the work of the Gas Working Group regarding the creation of a transparency template on data collection for the MEDREG website. The Electricity Working Group presents a survey on benchmarking and performance evaluation on the quality of supply within distribution grids in the Mediterranean Basin. It also addresses the implementation of actions concerning the process of electricity markets’ integration in Maghreb countries.

EU-Tunisia Association Council
19 – Brussels: The EU and Tunisia agree a new Action Plan defining a political agreement on a Privileged Partnership during the first Association Council since the Tunisian revolution of January 2011. The new Action Plan defines the common priorities guiding bilateral cooperation, and provides the strategic framework for the EU’s support to reforms and the democratic process in Tunisia. EU Commissioner Füle outlines four concrete points of assistance: Privileged Partnership and a New Action Plan (delivered on that occasion) and negotiations of trade agreements, a new agreement in the aviation area to boost tourism and a mobility partnership. The last three points will be discussed in future meetings.

www.consilium.europa.eu

Euromed Police
19-23 – Bucharest: 30 delegates from eight SMCs attend the fifth training seminar organised by the EU-funded project Euromed Police III on the fight against trafficking in human beings. The results of the seminar are: a complete statement of the various types of trafficking in human beings (THB); and an analysis of the modus operandi of traffickers, the origin of victims and the legal framework in the EU. Euromed Police III aims to enhance the professional capacities of the police/security services of the SMCs and develop international police cooperation between EU Member States and SMCs, as well as between SMCs.

Euromed-UM
24 – Fes: In accordance with the statute of the Euro-Mediterranean University (Euromed-UM) adopted by the General Constituent Assembly, the Euromed-UM is called to train executives to meet the requirement of excellence, promote understanding between cultures and people, as well as disseminate knowledge and culture in general and, more specifically, scientific, technical and technological culture. It also aims to provide education, diversify training and adapt to changing needs and knowledge, particularly in the areas of Mediterranean history, cultural heritage and civilisations, political and economic sciences and law, solar energy and related fields in materials engineering.

Enterprises
26 – Rabat: EC vice-President Tajani, responsible for Industry and Entrepreneurship, travels to Morocco accompanied by a delegation composed of representatives of 38 European companies and industry associations from 10 Member States. This visit is part of the new series of “Missions for Growth” to help European enterprises, in particular SMEs, to better profit from fast growing emerging international markets. Discussions with Moroccan Ministers and high representatives emphasise the need for more integrated markets, through the improvement of technical infrastructure and common rules aligned with those of the EU.

FEMIP
26 – Marseille: The 11th FEMIP Conference is held on the theme of sustainable tourism addressing the issue of Ecotourism as a potential suitable response to market trends and the market’s potential. Small business leaders, key planners and financial partners in the tourism industry gather for the event. EIB vice-President Philippe de Fontaine Vive states that considering the difficulties of the countries involved in the transition process, tourism is a key growth and employment sector for the future of these countries. The EIB and Association of the Mediterranean Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASCAME) renew their partnership signing an agreement to share responsibilities and resources to sustain the private sector.

www.eib.org/projects/regions/med

EU-Tunisia
28 – Brussels: The EU approves a financial assistance programme for Tunisia providing €68 million to support far-reaching reforms in the economic and social sectors and in the field of good governance. Special attention is given to economic recovery with actions especially targeting the more disadvantaged regions and social groups, such as unemployed graduates and the poorest families. The Programme also plans actions to improve the business
environment and the Tunisian economy’s competitiveness. In the field of economy and in the framework of an EU-Tunisia Task Force follow-up, an Economic Consultative Council for investments between the European Union and Tunisia is also launched. Its main missions will be to: generate proposals to improve the business environment; explore new opportunities for European companies in the country; and reinforce industrial cooperation and the role of the SMEs.

Neighbourhood Civil Society
30 – Brussels: The EC adopts the second phase of the Neighbourhood Civil Society Facility to enhance involvement of civil society organisations in the European Neighbourhood area, with a budget allocation of €45.3 million for 2012-2013. The goal is to support civil society organisations in the European Neighbourhood area in the policy dialogue with partner governments; to strengthen civil society’s role in fostering public accountability; and support their increased role in national reform processes and local development.

December

Health
5-7 – Rome: The EU-funded project EpiSouth-Plus holds its first project in order to present the current status of the project’s activities and discuss future developments and strategies. Almost 150 participants discuss, among other issues, the challenges for coordinated action at regional level; the integration between laboratory and epidemiological surveillance; the early warning systems and epidemic intelligence. The EpiSouth-Plus network focuses on increasing health security in the Mediterranean Area and southeast Europe by enhancing and strengthening preparedness to common health threats and bio-security risks at national and regional levels.

www.episouthnetwork.org

EU-Algeria
6 – Brussels: The EU-Algeria Association Council meeting provides further evidence of the new dynamic of bilateral relations between Algeria and the EU. The EU reaffirmed its readiness to support this process, in particular through the further negotiation of a first Action Plan in the framework of the ENP. The Association Council also expressed its satisfaction with the conclusion of the consultations on dismantling tariffs for industrial products. The meeting also provides an opportunity to discuss many regional issues of common interest, such as regional integration, the Euro-Mediterranean Union, the Euro-Arab and Euro-African dialogues, Libya, Syria, the Sahel and the Middle East Peace Process. On the same day the EC adopts two new cooperation programmes to support Algeria’s reform and modernisation, worth a total of €45 million. The first programme will support diversification of the economy and in particular the promising sector of fishing and aquaculture, while the second will focus on supporting the modernisation of public administration.

Human rights
10 – Brussels: As part of its SPRING initiative, the EC adopts a €2.8 million programme to support the action of two key institutions in the protection and promotion of human rights. EU priorities, i.e. strengthening the rule of law and respect of human rights, are also two of the main commitments made by the Moroccan government in the Action Plan for the implementation of the Advanced Status jointly negotiated with the EU. Cooperation between Morocco and the EU to strengthen democracy and respect of human rights is part of an established dynamic.

Energy
13 – Paphos: At the Ministerial Conference on "Energy Cooperation between the EU and countries of the south-eastern Mediterranean region" EU Member States and countries from the south-eastern Mediterranean unanimously adopt a Joint Declaration calling for their cooperation to be strengthened on safety and environmental protection from offshore oil and gas activities, while also recognising the important role that the SEM countries can play in enhancing the energy supply of the EU due to the recent discoveries of natural gas.

Maghreb Integration
19 – Brussels: The EU issues a set of policy proposals to support the five countries of the Maghreb in their efforts towards closer cooperation and deeper regional integration. They come in a Joint Communication issued by High Representative Ashton and the European Commission, developed in further response to the transformation of the countries of the southern Mediterranean. Although rich in development potential and joined by common cultural and linguistic ties, the Maghreb (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) is one of the least integrated regions in the world. Studies have repeatedly shown that the removal of barriers in the region could have significant economic benefits and help in common efforts to combat instability and address a number of regional challenges.


UfM-Algeria
22-24 – Algiers: The Algerian authorities have confirmed their strong support to the development of UfM activities at regional and sub-regional levels following a two-day working visit of the UfM Secretary General Sijilmassi. During the visit, Sijilmassi had extensive talks with Prime Minister Sellal and Foreign Affairs Minister Medelci regarding the perspectives of enhancing relations between Algeria and the UfM. The energy, transport, water, and economy sectors constitute the focus of the discussions. Decisions are taken to follow up these meetings with visits from UfM sectorial delegations in order to ensure the quick implementation of the next steps.
Chronologies

Other Cooperation Initiatives in the Mediterranean

1. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

At the end of the Cold War, NATO started to rethink its role and mission and realised that the best way to prevent possible threats to its members was to extend security and stability beyond its borders. To this end, in 1994 NATO launched the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), targeting the southern shore of the Mediterranean. In June 2004, the Alliance re-booted its cooperation with Arab countries by launching the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), aimed at Gulf countries, and by upgrading the MD to a “genuine Partnership.”

The MD started in late 1994 with five countries: Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Egypt and Israel. They were joined by Jordan (1995) and Algeria (2000). Its aims are to contribute to stability and security in the region, to prevent misunderstanding and to promote relations between the participating countries. It is based on the principles of self-differentiation and non-discrimination, mutual benefit, and complementarity with other international security organisations. It has both political and practical dimensions. Bilateral political consultations (NATO+1) are regularly held and provide a chance for sharing views on a wide range of issues. Meetings in the NATO+7 format are usually held after NATO summits and other major NATO events. The practical dimension includes seminars, workshops and practical activities in the field of modernising armed forces, civil emergency planning, border security, crisis management, scientific and environmental cooperation and NATO/PIP military exercises. In 2004 the Dialogue was upgraded to “genuine Partnership” thus entailing an opportunity for MD partners to participate in selected military exercises, improving interoperability, share intelligence and contribute to military operations (Morocco and Israel participated in Operation Active Endeavour and Morocco contributed forces to the stabilisation of Kosovo). Consider the changes experienced by the MENA region, a more tailored assistance is envisaged through Individual Partnership Cooperation Programmes. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) is a new initiative aimed at promoting essentially practical cooperation on a bilateral basis, with interested countries in the broader region of the Middle East. After a series of high-level consultations between the NATO Secretary General (SG) and the GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) the ICI was launched at the NATO Istanbul Summit in 2004. Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar joined the Initiative in 2005, and the UAE joined shortly after. It offers a menu of bilateral activities in several areas of cooperation, including: tailored advice on defence transformation, budgeting and planning; military-to-military cooperation to attain interoperability; and participation in NATO PIP exercises and NATO-led operations (in Afghanistan and in Libya, where Qatar and the UAE contributed air assets). Since the Initiative’s launch, its political dimension has been enhanced and its public diplomacy activities have been strengthened.

Another initiative carried out by NATO is the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) which gathers parliamentarians from all the 28 Member States of the Alliance and Associates to discuss security and defence issues. The increasing attention to security in the Mediterranean region gave rise to the creation of the Assembly’s Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group (GSM), a forum for cooperation and discussion with parliamentarians from the MENA region focused on political, economic, social and security issues. The GSM was launched in 1996 as a formal mechanism to address regional challenges, and engage leaders from the region in constructive dialogue. The GSM conducts two annual seminars, bringing together parliamentarians from NATO countries and their counterparts in the region, to explore specific topics and discuss the annual GSM Report. GSM seminars and reports cover a broad range of issues, including: security-related matters pertaining to the Mediterranean Area, the Middle East, and the Arabian Peninsula; practical security cooperation among NATO member countries and their partners; developments in MD and ICI partnerships; the dynamics of political change in the region and its potential economic, social, and security implications; religion and cultural forces; and common challenges including: energy security, migration, the environment and economic development. In 2005 the Standing Committee created the new status of Mediterranean Associate Members, opening the door for increased cooperation with MENA parliaments. The new status was soon granted to Morocco, Algeria, Israel and Jordan. Reflecting the increased strategic importance of the Gulf region and...
following the launch of NATO’s ICI in 2004, the NATO PA has also started establishing links with parliamentary institutions and advisory councils in countries of the Gulf region. Invitations to Mediterranean seminars are also extended on an ad hoc basis to Cyprus, Malta, and other parliaments in North Africa and the Middle East (such as Palestine).

Chronology of the Main Events: January 2012 – December 2012

- 14 February, NATO HQ, Brussels: Permanent representatives of NATO meet with senior officials from ICI countries Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The seminar serves to discuss objectives: peace, security and stability; the way to solve security challenges and threats; the situation and security challenges in the MENA region; maritime security, energy security, and cyber security.
- 1 March, NATO HQ, Brussels: NATO SG Rasmussen welcomes the Qatari Prime Minister to discuss Partnership in view of the NATO Chicago Summit in May. During the meeting, the NATO SG underlines the role played by the country in the 2011 Libyan crisis and the Alliance’s will to make partnerships even more effective.
- 3-4 April NATO HQ, Brussels: Bahraini diplomats visit NATO Headquarters. The topics discussed on the occasion include NATO’s history and current issues, NATO’s new Strategic Concept and NATO’s outreach to the Middle East and the Gulf region. This includes NATO’s military cooperation in the framework of the ICI; NATO-Russian relations; NATO’s operations in Libya and Afghanistan; and the emerging security challenges.
- 11-13 April, Marseille (France): Parliamentarians from 20 NATO member countries, representatives from seven partners in the Southern Mediterranean and the Middle East and delegations from partner parliaments in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Afghanistan participate in a meeting co-organised by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and French Parliament. Countries like Egypt, Libya and Tunisia are undergoing political and economic transitions while other governments are resisting change or have employed violence to quell popular protests. EU, US and NATO officials highlight the need for a nuanced approach, taking into account the differences among countries of the region. NATO is likely to continue its approach combining multilateral frameworks provided by the MD and ICI but also bilateral relationships with individual countries in the region.
- 17 April, NATO HQ, Brussels: The NATO SG Rasmussen holds talks with King Abdullah II of Jordan during his official visit to NATO HQ. They use this meeting to review NATO-Jordanian cooperation in the framework of the MD as both Jordan and the 28 Alliance members face the same security challenges (terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and failed states). Jordan is one of the most active partners in the MD partnership and has an ambitious Individual Cooperation Programme aimed at enhancing cooperation in such areas as military-to-military ties, language training and emergency planning. The Jordanian Armed Forces benefits from two Trust Fund projects aimed at improving its operational and technical capacities. The country contributed to NATO-led missions in Afghanistan, the Balkans and, more recently, Libya.
- 20 May, Chicago (USA): in the NATO Chicago Summit Final Declaration, the Alliance takes stock of the unprecedented change in the Mediterranean and broader Middle East and support the aspirations of the people of the region for democracy, individual liberty and rule of law. The Libya crisis illustrated the benefit of regular consultation between the Alliance and regional organisations (the GCC and League of Arab States). The Alliance affirms its readiness to provide assistance to Libya on a case-by-case basis in areas where NATO can add value and welcomes Libya’s stated interest to deepen relations with the Alliance. The MD helps to strengthen mutual understanding, interoperability, political dialogue and practical cooperation. Concerning the ICI, NATO welcomes Kuwait’s offer to host an ICI Regional Centre, and ICI and MD partners are encouraged to be proactive in exploiting the opportunities offered by their partnership with NATO.
- 18 June NATO HQ, Brussels: The Saudi Foreign Affairs Minister visits NATO HQ to meet with the NATO SG Rasmussen. Discussions focus on political dialogue and practical cooperation in the ICI context, where Saudi Arabia is considered a key player. The bilateral structure of the Initiative allows NATO to tailor cooperation to its partners’ specific security needs and to hold regular political consultations with them.
- 21 June, Amman (Jordan): Deputy SG Versonhov meets the Minister of Foreign Affairs Nasser Judeh and Prince Al-Hussain. Topics discussed include the achievements in the implementation of the NATO-Jordan Individual Cooperation Programme in different areas, from political consultations to practical cooperation. The areas of potentially enhanced cooperation are: military interoperability, education and training, civil emergency planning and trust funds to eliminate obsolete munitions and unexploded ordnance for the safety of the civilian population. During the visit the Ambassador delivers a keynote address on “NATO in the New Global Security Era” at a public diplomacy conference attended by diplomats, academics and representatives of regional think tanks.
- 26-27 September, NATO HQ, Brussels: The NATO-Morocco Working Group, consisting of high-level representatives from Moroccan Ministries and the Royal Armed Forces, visits NATO HQ for a series of discussions and briefings with the Alliance’s officials. Discussions include NATO’s Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme; military cooperation under the MD; NATO’s role in the fight against terrorism; and NATO-Morocco cooperation under the Science for Peace and Security Programme. They also discuss the different opportunities of cooperation in crisis management and civil emergency planning.
- 8-10 October, Catania (Italy): Parliamentarians from NATO, and Associate and Mediterranean Partner countries gather for a seminar surveying the economic, strategic and political situation in the MENA region. The seminar focuses on the deep changes sweep-
and it is driven by an open and interactive dialogue with Mediterranean Partners so as to respond to their interests and priorities. Through informal discussions, a list of potential projects and topics of cooperation is developed as a working tool to identify concrete activities and prioritise their implementation. In the course of the year six meetings are held where the Partners actively contribute with regular presentations on the situation and developments in their respective countries and regions thus contributing to enhance mutual knowledge. The OSCE’s three dimensions are tackled on different occasions, along with the interest expressed by Libyan deputy Foreign Minister in exploring the possibility for Libya to become an OSCE Partner for Cooperation. A couple of meetings are devoted to preparing the 2012 OSCE Mediterranean Conference and to assess its outcomes. The annual joint meeting of the Asian and Mediterranean contact groups focuses on “Regional Organisations as Contributors to Comprehensive Security” and provides the opportunity to assess the progress achieved in the OSCE Partnerships with a view to be more interactive and action-oriented.

www.osce.org/mc/97787

Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC)

26 - 28 June 2012, Vienna (Austria): This year’s ASRC theme is “Building the Security Community – Taking Stock and Looking Forward: A Building Blocks Approach.” A special working session is devoted to OSCE Partners for Cooperation (Mediterranean and Asian) to discuss the OSCE’s potential to promote stability and security in its surrounding areas (through intensified political consultations, strengthened practical cooperation and best practice sharing) and assess recent developments in the Middle East and Afghanistan.

www.osce.org/cio/91484

21st Annual Session of the OSCE PA

6 July Monaco (Monaco): The Mediterranean Forum takes place in the frame-
work of the OSCE PA Annual Session and is held under the theme “The OSCE Mediterranean partnership in a changing region: the impact of elections since the events of 2011.” The Ukraine Chair of the Mediterranean Contact Group says that its mission is to serve as a platform for sharing experiences and good practices in the areas of preventing or settling conflicts, developing confidence building measures and promoting democratic institutions. In this sense he encourages the OSCE MPC to take into account OSCE assistance in supporting democratic transition in the MENA region. For the first time Libyan officials are invited by the host country to participate in the Forum and call for international assistance to handle the country’s challenges: border security, containing internal divisions, advancing judicial cooperation and holding democratic elections. In the debate Mediterranean delegates ask for further privileges within the PA and discuss the possibility of extending the partnership to the Palestinian Authority and Libya. They also express their concern regarding the unstable situation in Syria.


**2012 OSCE Mediterranean Conference**

30-31 October, Roma (Italy): Following the priorities expressed by Mediterranean Partners in preparation for the event, the agenda of the meeting is focused on “Economic Cooperation with Mediterranean Partners in the Democratic Transition Processes and Political Reforms.” The conference is the Partnership’s most important annual event and participants include the representatives from OSCE Member States, six Mediterranean partners and representatives from Libya and the Palestinian Authority as well as from financial institutions and international organisations such as the World Bank and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The issues tackled range from how to enhance MPCs’ economies through OSCE best practices, how to promote dialogue, developing cooperation on sustainable energy, addressing transnational threats to security and enhancing women’s participation in public life. This year, the Mediterranean Conference is characterised by an interactive exchange of views, the adoption of a more focused and operational approach through the implementation of concrete projects in the economic and social development areas. Among the specific proposals is the celebration of a seminar on human-trafficking and a specialist workshop on sustainable energy to share good practices.

www.osce.org/ec/98692

**OSCE Ministerial Council**

6 -7 December, Dublin (Ireland): The Irish OSCE Chairmanship hosts the 19th Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council (central decision-making and governing body of the OSCE) gathering Foreign Ministers and officials of the 57 OSCE participating States, Asian and Mediterranean partners and a number of NGO and civil society representatives, who have developed a set of recommendations on racism, xenophobia and human rights to be given to the participants of the OSCE Ministerial Council. Participants hold talks on the OSCE’s three dimensions: politico-military; economic and environmental; and human. Among the main decisions is the adoption of a road map to reinvigorate the organisation as the 40th anniversary of Helsinki Final Act in 2015 approaches. In response to the 2011 Vilnius Ministerial Council’s call for renewed attention to OSCE Partners for cooperation, the OSCE Secretary General (SG) initiates a process of informal consultations with both partners to engage in political dialogue with high-level representatives. Another occasion to tackle important issues with partners is the OSCE Ministerial Troika meeting with Mediterranean Partners at the Dublin Conference. The OSCE SG supports more practical cooperation and high level political dialogue and informs about projects to be implemented in 2013 on anti-terrorism, combating human-trafficking, sustainable energy and partner participation in the Helsinki +40 process. The incoming Swiss Chair of the Mediterranean Contact Group states that Switzerland hopes to consolidate the partnership with civil society and other international organisations such as the League of Arab States and EBRD. Special attention will be given to areas such as: border management, transnational threats, the fight against human trafficking, democratic elections and empowering populations.

www.osce.org/event/mc_2012

3. **The 5+5 Dialogue**

The 5+5 Dialogue was set up on 10 October 1990 during a ministerial meeting in Rome of the ten countries of the Western Mediterranean Basin: five countries from the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Libya and Tunisia) and five members of the European Union (France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Malta). The 5+5 Dialogue has a flexible and informal nature. Over the years, it has been transformed from a merely political forum to one for strengthened regional and multidisciplinary cooperation in the Western Mediterranean. Its flexibility and informality have enabled a gradual opening up, and the participating ministers and senior officials now meet to discuss an increasing number of issues. Originally just a politic compromise between Foreign Ministers, it later expanded to include other spheres, such as education, the environment and renewable energies, as well as home affairs (since 1995), migration (since 2002), inter-parliamentary relations (since 2003), defence (since 2004), tourism (since 2006) and transport (since 2007). Due to its practical and operational nature, it is an ideal forum for the exchange of ideas and the launch of new initiatives. It can also capitalise on its restricted geographical scope, which is limited to the Western Mediterranean. This initiative has encouraged the insertion of Libya and Mauritania in the regional context.
Main meetings in 2012

• 6-7 February, Algiers (Algeria): The Western Mediterranean expert seminar on agricultural cooperation gathers experts from the 10 countries of the 5+5 Dialogue to adopt a series of recommendations on strengthening cooperation in agriculture and food security to be presented to their respective Agriculture Ministers. They recommend optimising agricultural production, increasing the food supply, monitoring prices and developing a regional mapping of supply and demand in order to strengthen complementarity in the trade of agricultural products.

www.ensa.dz/IMG/pdf/Recommandations_finalesDu_seminaire_securite_alimentaire_dans_les_pays_5_5_Algier_6_et_7_fev_2012.pdf

• 21 February, Roma (Italy): The 9th meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 5+5 Dialogue is held under Italian and Tunisian co-chairmanship. The Foreign Ministers of the Western Mediterranean Dialogue countries participate in the meeting as well as a number of observers: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) Secretary General Ben Yahia, ENP European Commissioner Füle, UfM Deputy Secretary General (SG) and vice-President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (PAM). In terms of political issues the main topics tackled are: the democratic process in the region (participants express satisfaction for the ongoing changes in the countries of the southern shore and stress the need to provide the necessary support for the success of this process, which depends on the resumption of economic development and the creation of employment); the war in Syria (ministers condemn the repression against the Syrian population and express their concern on the worsening of the humanitarian situation while supporting the initiative of the Arab League); the Peace Process in the Middle East (referring to the previous meeting in Tunis in 2008, ministers reiterate the urgency to implement a two-state solution, a resumption of peace talks while considering all Israeli settlements in the occupied territories a violation of international law). Economic issues are also discussed: the financial and economic crisis (participants recognise that a collective response is necessary, which involves the international community, as well as a reform of the global financial markets); strengthening Euro-Mediterranean economic cooperation (ministers welcome the resumption of the southern regional integration process through AMU institutions and call for support for SMEs in the region); migration and development (a global and comprehensive approach on circular mobility is required and the importance of remittances for growth is recognised). Participants also call for a consolidation and deepening of the Dialogue with a series of proposals that touch on a wide range of aspects: holding an annual Foreign Ministers meeting; strengthening the fight against terrorism, organised crime and illegal trafficking (in view of the new challenges posed by the Sahel region to the 5+5 countries); exploring the possibility of an early warning mechanism for potential risks in the Western Mediterranean; calling for a follow-up committee of the 5+5 Environment and Renewable energy conference held in 2010; calling for regional cooperation in the areas of Higher Education and Scientific Research; expressing their will to open the 5+5 Dialogue to representatives of civil society and other frameworks such as interparliamentary dimensions, Chambers of Commerce, Employers Associations and local communities; stressing the strategic role of tourism in the economies of the Western Mediterranean and calling for a common approach to boost this sector; intensifying high-level political meetings to monitor the follow-up of the conclusions of the conference. The next meeting will be held in Mauritania and co-chaired by Italy. On the occasion of the 5+5 conference, the meeting is enlarged to the FOROMED dimension later in the afternoon, involving Egypt, Greece, Turkey, the Arab league and the UfM.

www.esteri.it/MAE/approfondimenti/2012/20120220_Conclusiones_des_Co_Presidencies.pdf

• 12 March, Algiers (Algeria): The 7th Conference of the Group of Transport Ministers of the Western Mediterranean gathers the Transport Ministers of the 5+5 countries as well as senior civil servants from France, Malta and Mauritania and the AMU Secretary General, UfM Deputy SG and a representative of the European Commission. Since the Group of Transport Ministers of the Western Mediterranean (GTMO 5+5) was created in 1995, its main mission has been to encourage cooperation in the transport sector in the region and to contribute actively to strengthening the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This Conference has two main objectives: transferring the presidency from Italy to Algeria, and ratifying the Activity Report. The Italian Activity Report emphasises the work done to intensify Euro-Mediterranean cooperation through the stimulation of existing relations and the search for new ways to cooperate. In this regard, the UfM’s labelling of the project “Completion of the Central Section of the Trans-Maghreb Motorway Axis” reflects the good institutional relations between the GTMO 5+5 and the different institutions for cooperation in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Numerous studies and activities in the work areas were carried out during the year. Algeria’s main priorities are: developing the motorway project within the UfM label, completing the Trans-Maghreb Motorway and implementing logistic platforms to promote trade between the countries of the Western Mediterranean. The next conference will be held no later than 2014 in Portugal to assess the implementation of the decision and transfer the presidency to Portugal.

www.cetmo.org/pdf/Conclusions%202012.pdf

• 5-6 October La Valletta (Malta): The 2nd Summit of the Heads of State and Government (HoSG) of the 5+5 Dialogue declares its support for the strengthening of the integration process between Maghreb countries and condemns violence committed by the Syrian government. At the 5+5 Summit some representatives of European and regional institutions (the President of the EC, ENP Commissioner, AMU SG, UfM SG, PAM SG and Arab League representatives) participate as observ-
ers. In the conclusions the HoSG call for an increased collaboration with regional formations, for ensuring regular sectoral meetings (also on new thematic areas like employment, investments, trade and energy, among others) and encouraging the participation of civil society and parliamentarians. In terms of security issues they call for addressing terrorism, organised crime, illicit trafficking and threats coming from the Sahel region. On economic issues they affirm the need to support SMEs in the region and intensify cooperation on transport and tourism. The forum places special emphasis on education and youth, which is considered a fundamental element for development in the Mediterranean, stressing the importance of youth mobility within the region. To this end they call for the organisation of a Youth Conference of the Western Mediterranean. On the topic of migration, the participants express their concern for the respect of fundamental rights and dignity of migrants. The HoSG invite the Foreign Affairs Ministers to ensure a follow-up of the conference conclusions.


- 10 December, Rabat (Morocco): The 8th Meeting of the 5+5 Defence initiative is held under the Moroccan Presidency. Defence Ministers gather to discuss issues such as the importance of cooperation and multilateral activities for the stability and security of the area, the need to strengthen maritime and air security and the fight against clandestine immigration and arms trafficking. They also approve the Annual Cooperation Plan for 2013.

4. FOROMED

The 16th session of the Mediterranean Forum (Foromed) gathering Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Tunisia, takes place in Rome on the occasion of the Foreign Affairs Ministerial Conference of the 5+5 Dialogue. The last Foromed meeting took place in 2008 and discussions were focused on the birth of the UIM. Libya and Mauritania attend the meeting as guests of the Chair, while other European and regional initiatives representatives attend as observers (ENP Commissioner, UIM SG and AMU SG, among others). It is conceived as an informal forum for brainstorming and engaging in free and open discussion. Ministers review the ongoing transitions in the region, underlining the role played by civil society. They stress the need to urgently give answers to the needs expressed by the Mediterranean peoples and in this sense stress the importance of regional integration of the two shores of the Mediterranean in order to enhance employment opportunities and a sustainable economic system. Ministers welcome the renewed Southern Neighbourhood Policy and the assistance provided by the Deauville Partnership. Tackling the key issue of migration is considered a common concern and requires a global approach. They also call for the revitalisation of the UIM and strengthening of other complementary fora in the field of security (NATO, OSCE and Arab League). Ministers exchange views on human dimensions of cooperation including Higher education, professional training, human mobility and interreligious dialogue. On Syria and the Middle East Peace process the same views as expressed in the 5+5 Ministerial conference are supported. Morocco will hold the next presidency of the Mediterranean Forum.

www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Sala_Stampa/ArchivioNotizie/Approversimenti/2012/02/20120220_chairfor.htm

5. Adriatic Ionian Initiative (All)

The Adriatic and Ionian Initiative (All) was established at the Summit on Development and Security on the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, held in Ancona (Italy) in 2000 and attended by the Heads of State and Government of Italy, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece and Slovenia. At the end of the Conference, the Foreign Ministers of the participating Countries signed the “Ancona Declaration” in order to strengthen regional cooperation to promote political and economic stability, thus creating a solid base for the process of European integration. The Initiative was later extended to Serbia and Montenegro, both of which, following the referendum in Montenegro, remained All Participating Countries. Following the recent EU approach to support multilateral sub-regional cooperation and the example of the adoption of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea, the All has started working, since the beginning of 2010, on the idea of a Macro-Region for the Adriatic Ionian Basin, which considers the common historical and cultural heritage, the use of the common sea, the need to protect the marine environment from pollution, the opportunity of sustainable development and growth and the common goal to make this basin an internal sea of the EU. This initiative is supported by all Adriatic Ionian actors at all levels of government. In order to bring it to the attention of the EU authorities, the last Adriatic Ionian Council (the decision-making body of the initiative) was held in 2011 in Brussels at the premises of the Committee of the Regions. The initiative’s Chairmanship rotates every May/June according to an alphabetical criteria. The Serbian Chairmanship ends in May 2012 and Slovenia will take over until May 2013.

Main events under the Serbian Chairmanship

The Serbian Chairmanship’s main objectives are focused on strengthening good neighbourly relations, stability and prosperity of the All Participating Countries and developing closer relations between the West Balkans region and the EU.

- 14 February, Athens (Greece): The Workshop of the Stakeholders of the Macro-region focuses on ways to support the EU Strategy for the Adriatic Ionian Region. Some of the topics discussed are management projects to improve the environment; transport conditions on the coastal area of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas; strategies to benefit from cross-border cooperation; and a maritime strategy for the Adriatic Ionian region.

- 22 March, Belgrade (Serbia): A round table is held on environmental
Cooperation. Participants, All Member States and international organisations, as well as the representatives of Serbia’s business and civil sectors, meet under the framework “On the Road to Rio +20” (UN Conference on Sustainable Development), supported by the UNEP, UNP and OSCE. Attendees present their plans for the transition to the Green Economy and the Summit on Sustainable Development.

- 26 April, Belgrade (Serbia): At the 10th Conference of the Speakers of the All Parliaments the main topic tackled is the strengthening and improvement of regional cooperation in the Adriatic-Balkan basin, with the aim of accelerating the process of European integration. It is decided to further deepen the cooperation among the parliaments of the All particularly through the establishment of parliametary delegations to the All.

- 28 April, Belgrade (Serbia): Meeting of the All Ministers of Agriculture. Representatives of the All Participating States discuss the future course of reforms for agriculture and rural development and opportunities of regional cooperation.

- 30 April, Belgrade (Serbia): The 14th All Council meeting concludes the Serbian Presidency. The meeting is attended by representatives of All Participating States, representatives of the Regional Initiatives and the EU. Participants express their satisfaction on the progress of the Western Balkan States in their respective EU integration processes and discuss the current situation in the region. The Belgrade Declaration is adopted with the wish that the European Council approves the mandate to the European Commission for the start-up of the action plan of the strategy this year.

Main events under the Slovenian Chairmanship

One of the main goals of the All-PS Slovenian Chairmanship is to develop and strengthen relations, in a project directed by local and regional authorities, as well as the three Adriatic Ionian Fora located in Ancona: UniAdrion, the Forum of the Chambers of Commerce, and Forum of Cities and Towns. Slovenia advocates cooperation within the All with a focus on issues related to the sea and the coastal region.

- 6-8 June, Brindisi (Italy): The 12th Adriatic Ionian Forum of Chambers of Commerce is organised into six different round tables: the environment, agriculture, female entrepreneurship, fishing, transport and tourism. The main focus of this year’s edition is “The Role of the Forum for the establishment of the Adriatic Ionian Macro-Region.”

- 12-13 June, Trieste (Italy): In the second “Workshop on Maritime Affairs in the Adriatic Ionian Macro-Region” stakeholders present their proposals on how to benefit from maritime activities in terms of employment, sustainable growth, accessibility and better quality of life in coastal area, and discuss “blue growth,” sustainable and secure maritime transport, protection of the marine environment and fisheries.

- 22 November, Ancona (Italy): The 2nd Committee of Senior officials focuses on the latest update of the construction process of the Adriatic Ionian Macro-Region. The representatives of the All Governments are informed about the high-level meeting between Commissioner Hahn and the eight All Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The eight All Countries give their full commitment, while Commissioner Hahn expresses his appreciation for their efforts towards the shared objective of reaching the common goal of attaining approval of the EU Strategy for the Adriatic Ionian Macro-Region by 2014. Senior Officials approve the Regional Cooperation Programme 2012. The representatives of the three Adriatic Ionian Fora for civil society (Chambers of Commerce, Universities and Cities) also participate in the meeting informing the Senior Officials of the latest updates of their international activities and supporting the Adriatic Ionian Macro-Region.

- 30 November, Brussels (Belgium): The EC adopts a maritime strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Seas that will boost smart, sustainable and inclusive growth in the region. The strategy rests on four pillars: a stronger blue economy, a healthier marine environment, a safer maritime space, and responsible fishing activities. The vision behind the initiative: making the sea a central space of innovation, economic opportunities and prosperity for all the countries around it. Certain priority areas are identified, for example: stimulating the creation of maritime clusters and research networks; increasing skills and mobility of the workforce; optimising transport links by developing an integrated, demand-based, low-carbon maritime transportation network; and supporting the sustainable development of coastal and maritime tourism. The strategy will be implemented in 2013 through an Action Plan to be jointly developed with the region’s stakeholders. The new strategy is part of the overall Integrated Maritime Policy of the EU, which already includes maritime strategies for the Baltic and the Atlantic Seas. It could be the first building block of a wider macro-regional strategy that the Adriatic and Ionian countries are willing to develop.

For further information:
Adriatic Ionian Initiative (All)
http://www.aii-ps.org/
6. The Deauville Partnership

The Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition (PACT) is launched in 2008 during the G8 meeting in Deauville, France. It is an international effort to support the Arab countries undergoing transitions towards “free, democratic, tolerant societies.” It includes five transitioning countries (Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco and Libya), the G-8 countries, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Turkey and ten international financial Institutions (IFIs). During 2012 Yemen also joined the Partnership. The transitioning countries have moved towards democracy and economic development. However they face growing economic challenges that in some cases delay their political transition. The Partnership aims to be a platform through which the international community can engage in helping these transitioning countries to achieve their objectives. The four key priorities areas identified by the G8 countries are: stabilisation (promoting economic stabilisation is necessary to pursue reform), job creation, participation/governance (support with reforms that support transparency, accountability, governance) and integration (opening up their economies to increase their trade and investment with the G8 and each other).

Main meetings in 2012

- 11-12 April, Dead Sea (Jordan): representatives of the Deauville Partnership countries and IFIs gather to launch the trade, investment and integration pillar in order to improve the environment for trade, foster SMEs and attract investments.
- 20 April, Washington (USA): Meeting of Finance Ministers and key IFIs to advance in the work of the Partnership. They welcome steps taken by the Partnership countries to implement home-grown reforms and programmes to restore growth and confidence while protecting the most vulnerable groups. The Partnership agrees to explore a new transition fund that will provide grants, technical assistance and knowledge exchange to help countries to develop home-grown reforms. Participants also agree to launch a new initiative to help countries regain access to private capital: the Capital Market Access Initiative.
- 24 April, Paris (France): Meeting of Partnership members on the Governance Pillar. Participants reach agreement on a number of concrete steps focusing on open governance and corruption (to foster the rule of law and enhance citizen confidence in democratic institutions), asset recovery, improving the business climate for SMEs and international exchanges (Partnership countries will support exchanges and training programmes).
- 18 July, Rome (Italy): the Partnership countries gather to discuss policies on SMEs, in order to develop and promote them. Given the challenges related to reforming the regulatory environment and access to finance, multilateral institutions will help to provide arrangements, useful advice and solid start-up to sustain SMEs.
- 28 September, New York (USA): Foreign Ministers of the Deauville PACT meet on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly to review the ongoing progress in the Partnership and affirm their multilateral commitment to the political and economic transitions in Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia, while supporting the reform actions being taken by these countries.
- 12 October, Tokyo (Japan): Finance Minister and regional and international financial institutions meet on the margins of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund Annual Meeting. They all welcome Yemen to the Partnership and discuss the economic challenges facing the new Yemeni government. At the meeting the Partnership launches a new Transition Fund to provide countries with technical assistance to undertake policy reforms to build more inclusive and transparent economies. They also assess the efforts carried out: the Capital Market Access Initiative, Asset Recovery and the expansion of the EBRD to the Middle East and North Africa (decided in 2011 but whose first investment in the region was approved in September 2012).

7. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)

The Arab Maghreb Union was founded in 1989 in Marrakesh by Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania to materialise their shared desire for greater unity among Maghreb countries, based on the links existing between the peoples and their complementarity. The main goals of this union are the free circulation of goods and people, eventually constituting a free trade area, a customs union and a common market, the adoption of common policies in all possible domains as well as fostering the progress and well-being of the people. The main decision-making bodies are the Presidential Council, consisting of Heads of State, the Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers and the Specialised Ministerial Commissions. The Secretariat-General is based in Rabat and the incumbent Secretary-General is the Tunisian, Habib Ben Yahia. Its principal projects are the creation of a Maghrebi investment and foreign trade bank, a Maghrebi university and a Maghrebi academy of sciences. Nonetheless, the AMU is struggling to become fully operative because a number of issues hinder the development of good relations between the Maghrebi partners: the Algerian-Moroccan border, closed since 1994, and the matter of Western Sahara, which embitter relations between Morocco and Algeria, and the international embargo on Libya from the 1990s to 2003. As a consequence, the Council of Heads of State has not met since 1994 and the future of the AMU remains contingent to the normalisation of relations between the partners.

Meetings in 2012

- 18 February, Rabat (Morocco): The 30th Session of the Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers convenes in Rabat in the hope of relaunching the AMU, which has been at a stand-still for years. This will to revitalise the Union
and establish greater cohesion among Maghrebi countries falls within the broader context of the political upheaval experienced in the Maghreb since 2011. The Ministers decide to hold a Summit of Heads of State before year’s end in Tunisia, a first since 1994, without, however, setting a specific date. The decision to convene a meeting in Algiers to discuss security matters is taken. The Ministers indicate their wish to intensify consultations with a view to the 5+5 Dialogue meeting to be held in Italy in the next few days. The sensitive issues that had paralysed the organisation are deliberately avoided. In any case, the proposal by the head of Moroccan diplomacy, Saad-Eddine El Othmani, to change the organisation’s name to Maghreb Union, justified by the fact that the Maghreb is composed of Arabs and Imazighen, is rejected by the Tunisian, Libyan and Algerian ministers.

- 9 July, Algiers (Algeria): The Meeting of Foreign Affairs Ministers programmed at the 30th Session to address security matters focuses on the need for co-operation and, for the first time, reflects a common security strategy, primarily in response to the aggravated security situation in the Maghreb, affected by the crisis in Mali. The head of Libyan diplomacy hopes to see his counterparts co-operate by extraditing Libyan criminals having taken refuge in their countries. Algeria proposes holding such a security affairs meeting on an annual basis.

- 9 September, Nouakchott (Mauritania): Maghrebi Ministers of Religious Affairs meet for the first time on the topic of “Moderate Sunni Islam and its Role in the Cultural Immunity of Maghrebi Societies,” at a time when a wave of protests has broken out against the film, *Innocence of Muslims,* and the caricatures in the French newspaper, *Charlie Hebdo* The participants advocate the implementation of a common security strategy in order to struggle against Islamist extremism. They likewise call on Ulemas to preach moderation and condemn extremism.

- 17 December, Brussels (Belgium): A joint communication by the European Commission and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy declares their support for stepping up co-operation and regional integration in the Maghreb. The Commission and High Representative welcome the new impetus of Maghrebi countries towards greater co-operation and suggest the EU’s contribution via a series of proposals in a number of fundamental areas such as security, the struggle against unemployment, a solidarity-based economy, trade, energy, environment, etc. The communication invites the EU and the AMU to initiate a high-level dialogue on these proposals and establish contacts with civil society and the business world.


- 26 December, Rabat (Morocco): The 13th meeting of the Ministerial Commission on Human Resources closes the year, once again without the Summit of AMU Heads of State being held, though it had been announced. The primary aim of this commission is to address the situation of AMU institutions and organisms having to do with human resources. The Maghrebi Ministers of Education, accompanied by the head of the Moroccan government, Abdelilah Benkirane, announce the forthcoming creation of the Maghrebi University and the Maghrebi Academy of Sciences.
This chapter provides details of the results of presidential and legislative elections that took place in 2012 in independent states, presented in circum-Mediterranean order. The list also includes referenda and those elections held in autonomous entities or in any other relevant territory that are of particular political significance.

**France**

**Presidential Elections**

22 April 2012 and 6 May 2012

Previous elections: 22 April 2007 and 6 May 2007

Semi-presidential Republic. Two-round elections for a five-year presidential term, renewable once only.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>% 1st round</th>
<th>% 2nd round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>François Hollande (Socialist Party)</td>
<td>28.63</td>
<td>51.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas Sarkozy (Union for a Popular Movement)</td>
<td>27.18</td>
<td>48.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Le Pen (National Front)</td>
<td>17.90</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Luc Mélenchon (Left Front)</td>
<td>11.10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>François Bayrou (Democratic Movement)</td>
<td>9.13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eva Joly (Europe Ecology – The Greens)</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (Arise the Republic)</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippe Poutou (New Anti-capitalist Party)</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathalie Arthaud (Workers’ Struggle)</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacques Cheminade (Solidarity and Progress)</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 79.48% (1st round) and 80.35% (2nd round)

**Legislative Elections**

10 June 2012 and 17 June 2012

Previous elections: 10 June 2007 and 17 June 2007

Bicameral legislature. The Senate has 348 seats elected by indirect universal suffrage for a nine-year term, a third of which are renewed every three years. The 577 seats of the National Assembly (Assemblée Nationale) are elected for a five-year term, each from a single-seat constituency. The election consists of two rounds: the total number of seats is provided after both rounds.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% 1st round</th>
<th>% 2nd round</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party (PS, social democrat)</td>
<td>29.35</td>
<td>40.91</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for a Popular Movement (UMP, liberal conservatism)</td>
<td>27.12</td>
<td>37.95</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Front (FN, nationalist, far-right)</td>
<td>13.60</td>
<td>3.66</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Front (FG, anti-liberal left coalition)</td>
<td>6.91</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe Ecology - The Greens (EELV, ecologist)</td>
<td>5.46</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other right (DVD)</td>
<td>3.51</td>
<td>1.82</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other left (DVG)</td>
<td>3.40</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Centre (NCE, centre-right, liberal)</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centre for France (CEN)</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Party of the Left (PRG, centre-left, social liberal)</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical Party (centre-right, historical radicalism)</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>1.35</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrist Alliance (ALL)</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regionalists</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other far-right</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 72.22% (1st round) and 55.40% (2nd round)

**Slovenia**

**Presidential Elections**

11 November 2012 and 2 December 2012

Previous elections: 21 October 2007 and 11 November 2007

Parliamentary Republic. Two-round elections are held to choose a President for a five-year term.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>% 1st round</th>
<th>% 2nd round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Borut Pahor (Social democrats, SD)</td>
<td>39.98</td>
<td>67.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danilo Türk (Independent)</td>
<td>35.86</td>
<td>32.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milan Zver (Slovenian Democratic Party, SDS)</td>
<td>24.16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 47.72% (1st round) and 41.99% (2nd round)

**Croatia**

**Referendum**

22 January 2012

Referendum on Croatia’s EU accession. Croatia has been a candidate country for EU membership since 2004.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% Yes</th>
<th>% No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>66.67</td>
<td>33.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 43.50%

**Serbia**

**Legislative Elections**

6 May 2012

Previous elections: 11 May 2008

Presidential Republic with unicameral legislature: the National Assembly of Serbia (Narodna Skupstina Srbije). Elections are called to elect the 250 mem-
Members of the Assembly based on a system of proportional representation for a four-year term and a single nationwide constituency. The minimum threshold to win a seat is 5% of the total number of votes, except for parties representing coalitions of ethnic minorities.

### Montenegro

**Legislative Elections**

14 October 2012

Previous elections: 29 March 2009

Montenegro has a unicameral Assembly (Skupstina) with 81 seats. The deputies are elected through a party-list proportional representation system to serve a four-year term within a single nationwide constituency. There is a 3% threshold to gain representation. For the lists representing the Croatian minority, in the event that none surpasses the 3% threshold but the most successful obtains no less than 0.35% of valid votes, then it is entitled to one seat. Early elections.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Montenegro
| Democratic Front (centre-right) | 46.33 39 |
| Democratic Front (centre-right) | 23.19 20 |
| Socialists’s Party of Montenegro (SNP, social democrats) | 11.24 9 |
| Positive Montenegro (PCG, Social democrats, ecologists) | 8.37 7 |
| Bosniak Party (BS) | 4.24 3 |
| Coalition for a European Montenegro (ECG, centre-left, pro-Europe) | | |
| Democratic Front (centre-right) | | |
| Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro (SNP, social democrats) | | |
| Positive Montenegro (PCG, Social democrats, ecologists) | | |
| Bosniak Party (BS) | | |
| Coalition for a European Montenegro (ECG, centre-left, pro-Europe) | | |
| Democratic Front (centre-right) | | |
| Socialist People’s Party of Montenegro (SNP, social democrats) | | |
| Positive Montenegro (PCG, Social democrats, ecologists) | | |
| Bosniak Party (BS) | | |

Turnout: 57.86%

### Greece

**Legislative Elections**

6 May 2012

Previous elections: 4 October 2009

Parliamentary Republic with a unicameral legislature. Early elections are called to elect the 300 members of the Parliament (Vouli ton Ellinon) against the backdrop of the Greek debt crisis. The challenge is to form a government to implement the European rescue package. Candidates are elected through a proportional representation system to serve a four-year term. There are 56 constituencies for 288 seats (48 multi-member constituencies and 8 single-member constituencies) and one multi-member nationwide constituency for 12 seats.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Greece
| New Democracy (ND, centre-right) | 18.85 108 |
| Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) | 16.78 52 |
| Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) | 13.18 41 |
| Independent Greeks (AE, xenophobic) | 10.61 33 |
| Communist Party of Greece (KKE) | 8.48 26 |
| Golden Dawn (XA, far-right, xenophobic) | 6.97 21 |
| Democratic Left (DIMAR) | 6.11 19 |

Turnout: 70.66%

17 June 2012

Previous elections: 6 May 2012

Following the legislative elections held on 6 May 2012, which disrupted the Greek political landscape, the winning parties failed to form a new government to implement the austerity plan. In order to put an end to the political crisis, the Greeks are called to vote for a second time. The new election results in a majority in favour of the European rescue plan.
Syria

Referendum

26 February 2012

The referendum concerns the approval of a new Constitution. The main modifications, compared to the previous text, include a limit of two seven-year terms to serve as President and political pluralism, with the suppression of Article 8, which made the Baath Party’s political monopoly official. The Syrian National Council, gathering the main opposition groups, called for a boycott of the referendum, which was held despite the civil war context. The referendum could not be carried out in several cities under rebel control.

Turnout: 57.41%

Legislative Elections

7 May 2012

Previous elections: 22 April 2007

Semi-presidential Republic where the unicameral legislative branch is exercised by the People’s Council of Syria (Majlis Al-Shaab), with 250 seats. The members of the Council are chosen for a four-year term by means of proportional representation from 15 multi-seat constituencies. The elections were to be held by April 2011, but did not take place because of the protests against the regime and were postponed to 2012. They followed the approval of a new constitution that allows political pluralism. The election takes place while the opposition in rebellion call for a boycott. Only 5.2 million of the 10.1 million voters are registered on the electoral list. Some irregularities are denounced by independent and opposition candidates. New ballots are held in some constituencies which suffered electoral fraud.

Turnout: 51.26%

Egypt

Legislative Elections

29 January 2012 and 14 February 2012

Previous elections: 1 June 2010 and 8 June 2010

Egypt has a bicameral Parliament consisting of the Advisory Council (Majlis al-Shura) with 270 seats and the People’s Assembly (Majlis al-Shab) with 518 seats. In the Advisory Council, two rounds of voting see 180 members elected directly to serve six-year terms, while 90 members are appointed by the President, also to serve 6-year terms. Among these 180 seats, 120 are elected through a proportional representation system and 60 are elected through a majority system.

Turnout: 13.83%

Referendum

15 December 2012 and 22 December 2012

The referendum concerns the new Constitution approved by the Constituent Assembly. The new text includes limiting the presidency to two four-year terms, mentions that leaders of the National Democratic Party (NDP) are forbidden from standing for election for 10 years, stipulates that the Minister of Defence is chosen from the armed forces, that the principles of the Sharia are the main sources of legislation, that freedom of creed is guaranteed as much as freedom of speech, but with restrictions in other areas. Several political parties opposed to the Muslim Brotherhood call for voters to oppose the Constitution.

Turnout: 32.86%

Libya

Legislative Elections

7 July 2012

Previous elections: 1 – 4 March 2009

During its transitional period Libya has a unicameral Parliament: the General National Congress substitutes the General People’s Congress of the former Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. 200 representatives are elected through a direct and mixed system (the first direct elections in Libya since 1964) in 13 constituencies. 120 seats are reserved for independent candidates. The Congress was commissioned to elect a government to succeed the National Transitional Coun-
cil (NTC) and to pave the way for legislative elections in 2013.

### Parties % Seats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Forces Alliance (NFA, nationalist and liberal)</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Construction Party (JCP, Islamist)</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Front Party (NFP, liberal and progressive)</td>
<td>4.08</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for the Homeland Party (liberal)</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Centrist Party</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadi Al-Hayah Rally</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Umma Assembly</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authenticity and Renewal Rally</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party for Development And Welfare</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wisdom Party</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authenticity and Progress</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan National Democratic Party</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Parties Alliance</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Message</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centrist Youth Party</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hope</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labaika National Party</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libyan Party for Liberty and Development</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Foundation</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation and Prosperity</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party of Wadi ash-Shati</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>120</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 62%

### Algeria Legislative Elections

10 May 2012

Previous elections: 17 May 2007

Semi-presidential republic. Bicameral legislature. 462 seats to be filled in the People’s National Assembly (al-Majlis al-Sha’abi al-Watani/Assemblée Populaire Nationale) for five-year terms by means of proportional representation and from multi-seat constituencies. 8 seats are reserved for Algerians living abroad. 17 new parties recently legalised by the Interior Minister take part in the elections.

### Parties % Seats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Front (FLN)</td>
<td>17.35</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Rally for Democracy (RND)</td>
<td>6.86</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Algeria Alliance (AVV, Islamist coalition)</td>
<td>6.22</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Forces Front (FFS, social democrats)</td>
<td>2.47</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>8.79</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers’ Party (PT, communists)</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian National Front (FNA, nationalism and conservatism)</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front for Justice and Development (FJD, Addala, Islamist)</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian Popular Movement (MPA, democrats)</td>
<td>2.17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Fedir El Jadid Party (PF, “New Dawn”, nationalist)</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Front (FC, Islamist)</td>
<td>2.28</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party for Solidarity and Development (PNSD, centrist)</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AHD 54 (nationalist)</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Republican Alliance (ANR, nationalism and conservatism)</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Front for Social Justice (FNJS, nationalist)</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Democratic and Social Forces (UFDS, democrats)</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian Rally (RA, nationalist)</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Patriotic Rally (RPR)</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Hope Movement (MNE)</td>
<td>1.56</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Moustakbel Front (FM, “Future”, centrist)</td>
<td>2.29</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Karama Party (“Dignity”, conservatism)</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement of Free Citizens (MCL)</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Youth (PJ, young democrats)</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian Light Party (PED, democrats)</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Algerian Renewal (PRA, liberal)</td>
<td>1.46</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Front (FND)</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Front of Independents for Understanding (FNIC)</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El-Infitah Movement (MEI, “Opening”, progressive)</td>
<td>1.52</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout 43.14%

### Sources

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www.freedomhouse.org

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www.electionguide.org/index.php

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www.keesings.com

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www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp
### TABLE A1

**Official Aid to Mediterranean Countries Financed under the European Commission Budget and the European Development Fund (EDF) in 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(in millions of euros)</th>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Payments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>147.87</td>
<td>99.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>117.16</td>
<td>57.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>192.26</td>
<td>188.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo (Res.1244 of the UNSC)</td>
<td>230.27</td>
<td>219.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>31.50</td>
<td>17.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>97.53</td>
<td>52.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>86.01</td>
<td>62.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>28.00</td>
<td>48.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>779.90</td>
<td>313.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>26.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>58.92</td>
<td>39.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>111.00</td>
<td>80.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>4.37</td>
<td>8.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territory</td>
<td>377.29</td>
<td>287.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>131.60</td>
<td>48.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>33.19</td>
<td>35.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>147.46</td>
<td>130.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>67.00</td>
<td>57.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>156.60</td>
<td>152.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>66.00</td>
<td>52.18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### CHART A1

**EU Cooperation 2011**

### TABLE A2 European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI): 2007-2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Commitments under the ENPI (in millions of euros)</th>
<th>2007-2010</th>
<th>2011-2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td></td>
<td>220</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
<td>558</td>
<td>449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td></td>
<td>265</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td>187</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td></td>
<td>654*</td>
<td>580.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td>130</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank and Gaza**</td>
<td></td>
<td>770.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total ENPI (Bilateral)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>2,321</td>
<td>2,869.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This number does not include the amounts of different government facilities allocated to Morocco between 2007 and 2010.
**The data for the West Bank and Gaza include the ENPI, Development Programmes, humanitarian aid, UNRWA, PEGASE, Partnership for Peace and the Instrument for Stability.


### TABLE A3 Mediterranean Candidate Countries for Accession

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) 2011</th>
<th>(in millions of euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Croatia</strong></td>
<td>156.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component I. Transition Assistance and Institution Building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice, Home Affairs and Fundamental Rights</td>
<td>19.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration Reform</td>
<td>3.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment, Climate Change and Transport</td>
<td>5.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Rural Development</td>
<td>4.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting programmes</td>
<td>7.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component II Cross-border Cooperation</td>
<td>15.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component III Regional Development</td>
<td>58.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component IV Human Resources Development</td>
<td>16.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component V Rural Development</td>
<td>26.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FYROM</strong></td>
<td>98.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component I. Transition Assistance and Institution Building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration Reform</td>
<td>4.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice, Home Affairs and Fundamental Rights</td>
<td>3.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector Development</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Rural Development</td>
<td>2.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Development</td>
<td>4.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support and Other Activities</td>
<td>12.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component II Cross-border Cooperation</td>
<td>5.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component III Regional Development</td>
<td>39.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component IV Human Resources Development</td>
<td>8.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component V Rural Development</td>
<td>16.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>779.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component I. Transition Assistance and Institution Building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice, Home Affairs and Fundamental Rights</td>
<td>101.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>1.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Development</td>
<td>63.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment and Climate Change</td>
<td>25.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector Development</td>
<td>15.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and Rural Development</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support and Other Activities</td>
<td>17.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component II Cross-border Cooperation</td>
<td>5.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component III Regional Development</td>
<td>293.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component IV Human Resources Development</td>
<td>77.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component V Rural Development</td>
<td>172.50</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### TABLE A4  Provisions for Aid under the IPA for 2012 and 2013 (Candidate and Potential Candidate Countries)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>156.1</td>
<td>93.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>101.8</td>
<td>113.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>860.2</td>
<td>902.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>95.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>107.8</td>
<td>108.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>202.0</td>
<td>208.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo (Res.1244 of the UNSC)</td>
<td>68.8</td>
<td>71.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-beneficiary programme</td>
<td>176.2</td>
<td>177.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE A5  European Investment Bank Loans to Mediterranean Countries in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans by Sector</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Croatia</strong></td>
<td>305.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of community infrastructure in coastal areas</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of 13 km motorway section in Corridor</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in small-scale water and sanitation projects throughout Croatia (2009-2014)</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading schemes in fields of transport, urban renewal, energy, health, education and environmental protection in thirteen mainland provinces of Croatia</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>70.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs and mid-caps</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bosnia and Herzegovina</strong></td>
<td>170.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency reconstruction of flood protection facilities along Sava river and tributaries</td>
<td>55.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconstruction of Banja Luka clinical centre and construction of hospital in Bijeljina</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serbia</strong></td>
<td>710.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refurbishment and expansion of car plant in Kragujevac</td>
<td>500.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refurbishment, rebuilding and new construction of judiciary facilities throughout country</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lease financing of small and medium-scale infrastructure projects</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs and mid-caps</td>
<td>150.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Montenegro</strong></td>
<td>18.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of railway infrastructure on main line crossing Montenegro and acquisition of rolling stock</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FYROM</strong></td>
<td>125.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of motorway section between Demir Kapija and Smokvica in the south of the country in Corridor X (TEN)</td>
<td>65.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Albania</strong></td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>2,042.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework loan for financing renewable energy and energy efficiency projects in Turkey</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of gas-fired combined-cycle power plan in Samsun province (eastern Turkey)</td>
<td>300.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subscription to private equity fund targeting renewable projects</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework loan to cofinancing small and medium-scale renewable energy and energy efficiency projects</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework loan for financing eligible renewable energy and energy efficiency projects</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of Irmak-Karabük-Zonguldak rail line and installation of signalling system</td>
<td>145.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of electrified high-speed line between Ankara and Istanbul</td>
<td>400.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading and expansion of mobile telecommunications networks in Romania and Turkey through rollout of reinforced mobile broadband services</td>
<td>150.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDI involving automotive metal applications in Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary and Turkey</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity investment in fund financing sustainable infrastruture</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afforestation, erosion control, rangeland rehabilitation and forest fire-fighting activities</td>
<td>150.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>548.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs and mid-caps</td>
<td>75.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continue)
### European Investment Bank Loans to Mediterranean Countries in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans by Sector</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Morocco</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of two sulphuric acid production plants in Safi and two low-grade phosphate processing plants in Mea and Hassa near Khouribga</td>
<td>200.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tunisia</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernisation of country’s primary road network</td>
<td>163.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of sulphuric and phosphoric acid production complex to increase output of triple superphosphate fertiliser plant in Mdhilla</td>
<td>140.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Egypt</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Installation of combined-cycle gas turbine at Giza North power plant north-west of Cairo</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lebanon</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jordan</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of phosphoric acid production complex in Eshidiya</td>
<td>81.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israel</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of reverse-osmosis sea water desalination plant in Sorek (south of Tel Aviv)</td>
<td>142.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of reverse-osmosis sea water desalination plant in Ashdod (south of Tel Aviv)</td>
<td>120.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### EU Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO)

#### Funding Decisions in Mediterranean Areas in 2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MENA</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa (Libyan crisis)</td>
<td>60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara (Sahrawi refugees)</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>120.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean

TABLE B1  Breakdown of Net Spanish Official Development Assistance in the Mediterranean Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2010-2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>€</td>
<td>€</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb and Middle East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>7,194,239</td>
<td>-439,702</td>
<td>-106.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>5,467,611</td>
<td>11,683,416</td>
<td>113.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>6,957,326</td>
<td>5,090,228</td>
<td>-26.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>17,662,286</td>
<td>17,798,190</td>
<td>0.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>170,389</td>
<td>7,073,272</td>
<td>4,051.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>68,394,333</td>
<td>26,488,495</td>
<td>-61.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>73,683,764</td>
<td>45,394,655</td>
<td>-38.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Saharan Refugees</td>
<td>22,049,065</td>
<td>16,304,389</td>
<td>-26.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>4,593,488</td>
<td>2,741,713</td>
<td>-40.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>119,313,725</td>
<td>59,591,406</td>
<td>-50.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>325,486,226</td>
<td>191,726,062</td>
<td>-41.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkans and Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>3,637,951</td>
<td>-384,076</td>
<td>-110.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>15,256,157</td>
<td>26,180,421</td>
<td>41.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>333,067</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>266,335</td>
<td>39,096</td>
<td>-85.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>3,404,608</td>
<td>9,410</td>
<td>-99.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>331,971</td>
<td>-1,713,978</td>
<td>-516.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo (Res.1244 of the UNSC)</td>
<td>55,556</td>
<td>526,168</td>
<td>847.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>42,250,291</td>
<td>3,463,678</td>
<td>-91.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>65,535,936</td>
<td>28,120,719</td>
<td>-57.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AECID, Seguimiento PACI (PACI Follow-ups, i.e. reports on the Annual International Cooperation Plan) for 2011.

CHART B1  Breakdown of Spanish Development Aid in the Maghreb and the Middle East by Sector (2011)

- Financial Infrastructure and Services 29%
- Productive Sectors 11%
- Multi-Sector 5%
- Non-Sectoral 13%
- Education 12%
- Health 7%
- Population and Reproductive Health Programmes/Policies 1%
- Water Supply and Treatment 2%
- Governance and Civil Society 14%
- Other Social Services and Infrastructure 6%

Source: AECID, Seguimiento PACI 2011.
**Appendices**

Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean

### CHART B2

**Breakdown of Spanish Development Aid in the Balkans and Turkey by Sector (2011)**

- **Financial Infrastructure and Services**: 80%
- **Productive Sectors**: 0%
- **Non-Sectoral**: 1%
- **Education**: 4%
- **Health**: 0%
- **Population and Reproductive Health Programmes/Policies**: 0%
- **Water Supply and Treatment**: 11%
- **Governance and Civil Society**: 2%
- **Other Social Services and Infrastructure**: 2%

**Source**: AECID, Seguimiento PACI 2011.

### TABLE B2

**Breakdown of Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean Region by Objective (2011)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Maghreb and Middle East</th>
<th>Balkans and Turkey</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Governance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Development and Fight Against Hunger</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and Sanitation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Growth for Human Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Sustainability, Combating Climate Change and Habitat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science, Technology and Research for Human Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture and Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender in Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration and Development</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace-Building</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Action</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Areas</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Maghreb and Middle East**

- **Algeria**: 337,433, 555,560, 1,541,713, 87,205, 0, 508,920, 319,591, 230,700, 625,292, 129,104, 0, 0, 10,107, 1,832,863
- **Egypt**: 1,366,541, 0, 1,400,837, 140,850, 0, 3,561,202, 9,500, 352,017, 557,565, 1,559,325, 0, 0, 100,000, 3,087,546
- **Jordan**: 2,366,454, 725,508, 658,416, 0, 0, 746,771, 0, 45,191, 321,892, 241,767, 0, 0, 283,437
- **Lebanon**: 847,618, 0, 2,196,480, 183,119, 0, 0, 1,783,757, 0, 349,426, 521,659, 0, 0, 1,135,675, 305,974
- **Libya**: 5,982, 0, 0, 0, 0, 268,642, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6,611,648, 187,000
- **Morocco**: 5,765,529, 121,160, 1,088,135, 1,994,250, 134,770, 6,329,997, 494,163, 653,938, 2,233,801, 860,547, 0, 0, 37,700, 15,351,638
- **Palestine**: 6,734,406, 3,594,120, 2,101,500, 1,948,550, 1,196,101, 100,500, 398,624, 4,470, 110,000, 241,767, 0, 0, 20,426,428, 4,046,052, 4,491,136
- **Western Saharan Refugees**: 50,000, 626,000, 614,324, 1,505,588, 37,740, 216,063, 0, 373,784, 47,798, 0, 0, 7,884,761, 5,521,905
- **Syria**: 65,982, 727,941, 744,066, 115,000, 0, 0, 268,642, 0, 0, 288,515, 0, 0, 510,000, 21,567
- **Tunisia**: 370,321, 48,160, 897,759, 167,390, 64,321, 3,182,359, 206,186, 130,100, 258,633, 9,104, 0, 0, 227,767, 56,232,032

**Balkans and Turkey**

- **Albania**: 0, 0, 126,681, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 70,000, 0, 0, 0, 0, 319,243
- **Bosnia and Herzegovina**: 0, 0, 174,094, 0, 0, 1,000,000, 0, 0, 80,000, 0, 0, 0, 0, 25,687,631
- **Croatia**: 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
- **FYROM**: 0, 0, 25,346, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 13,750
- **Montenegro**: 0, 0, 9,410, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
- **Serbia**: 2,005, 0, 945,456, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 143,577
- **Kosovo (Serbia)**: 0, 0, 4,286, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 521,903
- **Turkey**: 1,258, 0, 1,126,751, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 365,104, 0, 0, 0, 64,400, 3,542,466

**Source**: AECID, Seguimiento PACI 2011.
### TABLE C1

Number of Foreigners from MPCs in the European Union by Nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Total Euromed</th>
<th>Other Foreigners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (2012)*</td>
<td>8,199</td>
<td>80,524</td>
<td>3,597</td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>1,503</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1,583</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>1,504</td>
<td>39,861</td>
<td>138,080</td>
<td>836,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria (2012)*</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>3,541</td>
<td>735</td>
<td>1,755</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>509</td>
<td>5,549</td>
<td>12,872</td>
<td>94,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic (2012)*</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>1,387</td>
<td>5,415</td>
<td>418,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (2012)*</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>5,491</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>1,505</td>
<td>1,887</td>
<td>1,157</td>
<td>13,236</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,693</td>
<td>33,986</td>
<td>60,801</td>
<td>422,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (2012)*</td>
<td>22,477</td>
<td>110,254</td>
<td>38,974</td>
<td>20,273</td>
<td>49,174</td>
<td>11,181</td>
<td>62,845</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17,094</td>
<td>2,819,326</td>
<td>3,153,600</td>
<td>7,604,461</td>
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<tr>
<td>Estonia (2000)</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>1,387</td>
<td>5,415</td>
<td>418,876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland (2010)*</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>1,698</td>
<td>384,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (2012)*</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>565</td>
<td>19,710</td>
<td>11,973</td>
<td>1,023</td>
<td>1,571</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>352</td>
<td>1,973</td>
<td>39,157</td>
<td>1,093,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (2010)*</td>
<td>57,667</td>
<td>740,819</td>
<td>1,946</td>
<td>3,086</td>
<td>2,425</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>1,364</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,897</td>
<td>2,590</td>
<td>812,892</td>
<td>4,850,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (2012)*</td>
<td>894,248</td>
<td>809,316</td>
<td>313,283</td>
<td>25,451</td>
<td>15,465</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>43,752</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>6,649</td>
<td>273,345</td>
<td>1,901,152</td>
<td>4,783,690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (2012)*</td>
<td>28,036</td>
<td>483,987</td>
<td>115,093</td>
<td>85,762</td>
<td>4,255</td>
<td>3,095</td>
<td>4,345</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>2,742</td>
<td>18,653</td>
<td>726,455</td>
<td>3,736,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus (2001)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>705</td>
<td>1,436</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3,469</td>
<td>121,531</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia (2010)*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>391,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania (2008)*</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>42,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg (2006)</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>1,303</td>
<td>204,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary (2010)*</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>507</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>1,701</td>
<td>5,256</td>
<td>194,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta (2008)*</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>197</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>14,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (2012)*</td>
<td>1,226</td>
<td>172,868</td>
<td>1,205</td>
<td>11,673</td>
<td>1,538</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>201,453</td>
<td>392,522</td>
<td>1,360,347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria (2012)*</td>
<td>1,133</td>
<td>1,691</td>
<td>3,240</td>
<td>13,073</td>
<td>2,914</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>1,617</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>162,284</td>
<td>189,102</td>
<td>1,121,116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland (2010)*</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>1,481</td>
<td>43,883</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal (2010)*</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>1,934</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>3,231</td>
<td>454,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania (2012)*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,284</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>709</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>2,250</td>
<td>5,573</td>
<td>25,781</td>
</tr>
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<td>Slovenia (2010)*</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>81,976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia (2012)*</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>129,613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland (2012)*</td>
<td>827</td>
<td>2,090</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>983</td>
<td>492</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>836</td>
<td>6,214</td>
<td>13,178</td>
<td>212,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden (2010)*</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>1,981</td>
<td>1,179</td>
<td>1,175</td>
<td>3,422</td>
<td>1,458</td>
<td>2,543</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>10,840</td>
<td>23,848</td>
<td>566,627</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom (2008)*</td>
<td>7,482</td>
<td>5,797</td>
<td>1,054</td>
<td>3,514</td>
<td>7,834</td>
<td>4,912</td>
<td>36,093</td>
<td>66,688</td>
<td>2,999,389</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 1,025,720 | 2,539,076 | 483,210 | 190,400 | 103,261 | 25,868 | 2,938 | 45,987 | 3,619,559 | 7,700,318 | 32,280,940

## TABLE C2

**Emigrant People from Mediterranean Countries Living in OECD Countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Emigrant population (thousands)</th>
<th>15-24</th>
<th>25-64</th>
<th>65+</th>
<th>Low-educated</th>
<th>Highly educated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1,461.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>70.3</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>51.7</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>358.8</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>51.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>79.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>43.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>383.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>83.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>22.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2,262.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>147.9</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>30.9</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>513.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>74.0</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Employment-population ratio (%)</th>
<th>Unemployment rate (%)</th>
<th>Total employed (thousands)</th>
<th>Distribution of employment by qualification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>52.8</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>579.4</td>
<td>Unskilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>191.7</td>
<td>Skilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>Unskilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>190.9</td>
<td>Skilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>Unskilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>1,106.2</td>
<td>Skilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>Unskilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>56.4</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>224.4</td>
<td>Skilled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


## TABLE C3

**Desire to Emigrate, 2008-10: Persons Who Would Move Permanently, If They Had the Opportunity to Do So (%)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>15-24</th>
<th>Highly educated</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements

TABLE D1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start of Negotiations</th>
<th>Agreement Concluded</th>
<th>Agreement Signed</th>
<th>Entry into Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>May 1996</td>
<td>December 1996</td>
<td>February 1997</td>
<td>July 1997*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>March 1995</td>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>June 1997</td>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td>April 2002</td>
<td>September 2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Interim agreement signed by the EU and the PLO (to the benefit of the Palestinian Authority).

- To enter into force each Association Agreement must be ratified by the European Parliament, the Parliament of the Partner Country and the Parliaments of the 25 Member States of the European Union.
- Until its accession to the EU, Turkey shall be governed by the Customs Union Agreement, which entered into force in January 1996 and is based on the First Generation Agreement of 1963.
- In 2008 the Association Agreement with Syria was revised. It was planned to be ratified on 26 October 2009. However, Syria indefinitely postponed signing the Association Agreement with the European Union. The agreement will enter into force provisionally when it is signed by Syria. The definitive entry into force requires the European Parliament’s evaluation and ratification by the Member States. In December 2011, Syria suspended its adhesion to UfM. During 2012, as a result of the conflict escalation and the pressure from the international community, there has not been progress in the signing and ratification of the Association Agreement.

TABLE D2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start of Negotiations</th>
<th>Agreement Signed</th>
<th>Entry into Force (Interim Agreement)</th>
<th>Entry into Force</th>
<th>Candidate Country</th>
<th>Start of Negotiations</th>
<th>Entry into the EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>November 2005</td>
<td>June 2008</td>
<td>July 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*On 21 May 2006, a referendum was held, which led to Montenegro’s independence from the Federation it had formed with Serbia.

- EU relations with the Western Balkan countries are regulated by the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). The SAP serves as a framework for the development of various instruments and helps each country to carry out political and economic transition preparing them for a new contractual relationship with the EU: the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs), under which they aim to progress towards closer association with the EU.
Negotiations with Serbia were interrupted in May 2006 due to lack of progress in cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In early 2007, the new administration in Belgrade launched a plan and constituted a National Council for cooperation with the ICTY, a measure which allowed negotiations to resume on 13 June 2007. In April 2008, the European Union and Serbia signed the agreement. The Interim Agreement will not enter into force until the EU Council considers that Serbia is fully cooperating with the ICTY. In December 2009, the Council unfroze the Interim Agreement, which entered into force in February 2010. The SAA came into force in January 2011. In March 2012 Serbia achieved the status of candidate for EU membership.

After its declaration and the EU’s acknowledgement of Montenegro as a sovereign and independent State, the EU has maintained relations with independent Montenegro. The SAA was signed on 15 October 2007. In January 2008, the entry into force of the Interim Agreement represented progress towards the national ratification process and closer relations with the EU. The SAA entered into force in May 2010. In June 2012 began negotiations for the accession of Montenegro to the EU.

Three years after the start of negotiations between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005, the SAA was signed and the Interim Agreement took effect. However, despite real progress in collaboration with the ICTY, the Commission still notes numerous dysfunctions in the institutional and judiciary spheres.

More than seven years after the start of the negotiations, Croatia joined the European Union on 1 July 2013.

In June 2003, the Thessaloniki European Council decided that all Western Balkan countries be considered as potential candidates for EU accession. Macedonia (2005) and Serbia (2012) have already been granted candidate country status. Albania (2009) has also applied for EU accession.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE D3</th>
<th>European Neighbourhood Action Plans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ENP Action Plans allow the European Union to maintain a progressive, differentiated policy towards its neighbouring countries based on the different levels of cooperation established.

An Action Plan, developed after the signing of an Association Agreement, establishes priorities and a timetable for political and economic reform. Action Plans are the operational tools of the legal framework represented by the Association Agreements.

Progress is analysed each year through evaluation reports. The extent of the progress made determines the levels of cooperation and access to the European Market.

In 2012 there was no progress made by the two countries which are yet to agree an Action Plan (However on December 2011, Algeria officially indicated its willingness to start exploratory negotiations regarding the elaboration of an Action Plan under the renewed ENP. Two rounds of informal discussions at working level have been held so far).

In Egypt formal dialogue under the ENP, which had been suspended since January 2011, resumed in February 2013, through an Association Committee.

ENP Action Plans in Tunisia and Morocco were adopted in 2005 and were brought to an end in 2010, but in both cases it was agreed to extend the implementementation during the negotiation of the new 2013-2017 Action Plans.

ENP Action Plans in Israel and Palestine were adopted in 2005 for a period of three years, but in both cases their validity was extended. On 24 October 2012, the EU’s High Representative and Security Policy Catherine Ashton and Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad announced the conclusion of negotiations of a new ENP Action Plan.

EU-Lebanon Action Plan was adopted in 2007 for a period of five years. In 2012 Lebanon and the EU jointly draft a new ENP Action Plan. The negotiations were concluded in October 2012 and the Action Plan will enter into force after legal procedures are completed in 2013.
Signature of Multilateral Treaties and Conventions

### TABLE E1 Multilateral Treaties on Human Rights and Penal Matters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of adoption</th>
<th>Racial discrimination</th>
<th>Civil and political rights</th>
<th>Economic, social and cultural rights</th>
<th>Discrimination against women</th>
<th>Torture and other mistreatment</th>
<th>Rights of the child</th>
<th>Crime of genocide</th>
<th>International Criminal Court</th>
<th>Financing of terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: ILO, OHCHR

### TABLE E2 Multilateral Treaties on Labour Rights (year of ratification)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of adoption</th>
<th>Freedom of association and collective bargaining</th>
<th>Elimination of forced or obligatory labour</th>
<th>Elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation</th>
<th>Abolition of child labour</th>
<th>Rights of immigrant workers</th>
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<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Convention 87°</td>
<td>Convention 98°</td>
<td>Convention 29°</td>
<td>Convention 108°</td>
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</table>

Source: ILO, OHCHR
Appendices
Signature of Multilateral Treaties and Conventions

394

TABLE E3

Multilateral Environmental Treatiesj

Persistent
Organic
Pollutantsg
2001
2004
2004
2004
2001k
2001k

Ozone
Layerh
1985
1988
1988
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2005
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1988
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1992
1995

1993
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1995
1998
1995

Climate
Changea
1992
1993
1993
1994
1994
1994

Kyoto
Protocolb
1997
2002
2002
2002
2002
2001

Biological
Diversityc
1992
1993
1993
1994
1994
2000

Biosafety
Protocold
2000
2004
2002
2003
2004
2007

Slovenia
Croatia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Serbia
Montenegro

1995
1996
2000
2001
2006

2002
2007
2007
2007
2007

1996
1996
2002
2002
2006

Macedonia
Albania
Greece
Cyprus
Turkey

1998
1994
1994
1997
2004

2004
2005
2002
1999
2009

Syria
Lebanon
Jordan
Israel
Palestine

1996
1994
1993
1996

Egypt
Libya
Tunisia
Algeria
Morocco

1994
1999
1993
1993
1995

Date of adoption

Portugal
Spain
France
Italy
Malta

Source:
UN
UN
UN
UN
CITES
UN
UN
UN
WRI

TABLE E4

Multilateral Disarmament Treatiesa
Geneva
Protocolc

Nuclear
weaponsd

Bacteriological
weaponse

Conventional
weaponsf

Chemical
weaponsg

Nuclear
testingh

Antipersonnel
minesi

Date of adoption

1925

1968

1972

1980

1992

1996

1997

Portugal
Spain
France
Italy
Malta

1930
1929
1926
1928
1970

1977
1987
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1975
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1998
1999
2001

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1998
1999
2001

Slovenia
Croatia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Serbia
Montenegro

2008
2006

1992
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1994
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1992
1988
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1994
1994
1998
1997

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2003
1999
2003
2000

1998
2000
2003
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2003

1995
1995

2008
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1993b

2008
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1996b

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1996b
2004
2004
2003
2000
UN

FYROM
Albania
Greece
Cyprus
Turkey

IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2013

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1980
1986
1978
1979
1989

Deserti­
ficationf
1994
1996
1996
1997
1997
1998

Control of
Hazardous
Wastes and
their
Disposali
1989
1994
1994
1991
1994
2000

2006

1989
1931
1966
1929

Syria
Lebanon
Jordan
Israel
Palestine

1968
1969
1977
1969

1968
1970
1970

1972b
1975
1975

Egypt
Libya
Tunisia
Algeria
Morocco

1928
1971
1967
1992
1970

1981
1975
1970
1995
1970

1972b
1982
1973
2001
2002

1981b

2002

2004
1997
1995
1995

UN

UN

UN

UN

UN

Source:

1987

1999
2001
UN

a. Ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or succession. b. Signature. c. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.


### TABLE F1  Human Development Index (HDI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling</th>
<th>GNI per capita</th>
<th>Human Development Index</th>
<th>Position in HDI Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>16.4</td>
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<td>16.1</td>
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<td>100</td>
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<td>13,765</td>
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<td>64</td>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
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<td>4,384</td>
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</table>

*Own production. Source: UNDP.*

### CHART F1  Human Development Index Components (2012)

- **Europe and Central Asia**
- **Latin America and the Caribbean**
- **East Asia and the Pacific**
- **Arab States**
- **South Asia**
- **Sub-Saharan Africa**

- **GNI per capita (PPP $)**
  - 25,000
  - 20,000
  - 15,000
  - 10,000
  - 5,000

*Own production. Source: UNDP.*
### TABLE F2: Population: Demography

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Estimated population for 2050</th>
<th>Crude birth rate per 1,000 inhabitants</th>
<th>Crude death rate per 1,000 inhabitants</th>
<th>Average annual population growth rate %</th>
<th>Total fertility rate</th>
<th>Immigrants</th>
<th>% of total population</th>
<th>Net number of migrants</th>
<th>Net migration rate per 1,000 inhabitants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-0.8</td>
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<td>1.46</td>
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* Own production. Source: UNPOP.

**Notes:**

- Estimated population for 2050.

- Net migration rate: net annual average of migrants divided by the average population of the receiving country for the period under consideration.

- Data unavailable.

### CHART F2: Dependency Ratio* (2010)

[Dependency Ratio Chart]

*Dependency ratio (ratio of population aged 0-14 and 65+ per 100 population 15-64). Child dependency ratio (ratio of population aged 0-14 per 100 population 15-64). Old-age dependency ratio (ratio of population aged 65+ per 100 population 15-64).
### TABLE F3  
**Population: Structure and Distribution**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population age composition</th>
<th>Rural population</th>
<th>Population in urban agglomerations of more than 750,000 inhabitants</th>
<th>Urban population located on the Mediterranean coastline</th>
<th>Population living in slums</th>
<th>Population density</th>
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</table>

Own production. Source: WB, UNPOP, Bleu Plan, MDG, WB.  
* Each colour corresponds to the population of an urban agglomeration. In parenthesis number of urban agglomerations with 750,000 inhabitants or more in the country.

### CHART F3  
**Population of Urban Agglomerations with 750,000 Inhabitants or More in 2011, by Country**

Part of population in urban agglomerations of more than 750,000 inhabitant that live in Mediterranean coast urban agglomerations

- Mediterranean Coastal
- In land or other sea coast

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thousands</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Portugal</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
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<td>(6)</td>
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<td>(2)</td>
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<td>(1)</td>
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Own production. Source: UNPOP, World Urbanization Prospects, the 2011 Revision.
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Own production. Source: UNESCO. a. Latest data available from this period. b. Only scientists. (..) Data unavailable.

<table>
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<tr>
<td>as % of GDP</td>
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<tr>
<td>[Graph showing public expenditure on education by region]</td>
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Own production. Source: UNESCO. a. Latest data available from this period.
**TABLE F5  Health and Survival**

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<th>Infant mortality rate per 1,000 born alive</th>
<th>Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 born alive</th>
<th>People living with HIV/AIDS</th>
<th>Prevalence of smoking</th>
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Own production. Source: WB WB WB UNAIDS UNAIDS WB WB WB

(—) Data unavailable.

**CHART F5  Mortality Rate under Five (per 1,000 born alive) (2011)**

Own production. Source: WB.
### TABLE F6  Nutrition and Food Security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dietary energy consumption kcal/person/day</th>
<th>Cereal trade imports</th>
<th>Cereal trade exports</th>
<th>Children under weight for their age % children &lt; age 5</th>
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Own production. Source: FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO WHO

a. Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F6  Alcohol Consumption among Adults Aged ≥15 Years (2008) (litres of pure alcohol per person per year)

#### Top 5 countries in alcohol consumption

- Moldova
- Belarus
- Ukraine
- Estonia
- Czech Republic

### Access to Health Resources

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Physicians per 10,000 population</th>
<th>Population using improved drinking-water sources %</th>
<th>Population using improved sanitation %</th>
<th>Births attended by skilled health personnel</th>
<th>% of women with a husband or partner who report use %</th>
<th>Contraceptive prevalence rate %</th>
<th>Adolescent fertility rate births per 1,000 women ages 15-19</th>
<th>Total health expenditure % of GDP</th>
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*Own production. Source: WHO.*

\(\text{a}\) Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

### Health Workforce (2005/12)

[Chart showing health workforce distribution across different regions]

*Own production. Source: WHO.*
### TABLE F8 Gender: Social Development

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<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Adult literacy rate ≥ age 15</th>
<th>Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio</th>
<th>Year women received right to vote</th>
<th>Year women received right to stand for election</th>
<th>Year first woman elected or appointed to parliament</th>
<th>Seats in parliament held by women%</th>
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*Own production. Source: WB, UNESCO.*

---

**CHART F8 Gender Parity Index for Gross Enrolment Ratio, Tertiary (2010)**

[Diagram showing gender parity index for various countries, with a clear distinction between regions like North America and Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, and different sub-regions such as Arab States, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Sub-Saharan Africa.]
### TABLE F9  Technology and Communication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fixed-telephone subscriptions</th>
<th>Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions</th>
<th>Outgoing international calls</th>
<th>Incoming international calls</th>
<th>Proportion of households with</th>
<th>Share of ICT goods of total trade</th>
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<td>per 100 inhabitants</td>
<td>total</td>
<td>per 100 inhabitants</td>
<td>minutes per capita</td>
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*Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F9  Evolution of Telephone Subscriptions in the Mediterranean Countries

![Graph showing the evolution of telephone subscriptions in the Mediterranean countries from 2000 to 2011.](chart.png)

- Fixed-telephone subscriptions
- Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions

Own production. Source: ITU.
### TABLE F10  Security and Military Expenditure

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<th>Internally displaced people by country of asylum</th>
<th>Refugees by country of origin</th>
<th>Total armed forces</th>
<th>Conventional arms transfer</th>
<th>Military expenditure</th>
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Own production. Source: IDMC UNHCR UNHCR WB SIPRI SIPRI SIPRI SIPRI SIPRI

a. Data refer only to Palestinian refugees under UNHCR mandate. b. Military pensions not included. c. Data from 2008. d. Total exports or imports for the entire period. e. Includes part of the military pensions. f. Data refer to the approved budget, not real spending. g. Excluding paramilitary forces. h. Includes civil defence spending, which usually accounts for about 4.5% of the total. i. Data from 2011. j. Data unavailable.

### CHART F10  Armed Forces Personnel (% of total labor force) (2011)

![Armed Forces Personnel Chart](image-url)
### TABLE F11  Economic Structure and Production

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### CHART F11  GDP Growth (2011)

![GDP Growth Chart](chart.png)

Own production. Source: WB.
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Own production. Source: FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO WB FAO

a. Agricultural area is divided into ‘arable land and permanent crops’ and ‘permanent meadows and pastures’. b. Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F12: Cereals Production (by type of cereal) 2011

- Maize
- Others
- Rice, paddy
- Barley
- Wheat

Own production. Source: FAO
### TABLE F13: Livestock

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### CHART F13: Live Animals Imports (2010)

![Bar chart showing live animal imports by country](chart)

Own production. Source FAO.
### Table F14: Fisheries

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<th></th>
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Own production. Source: FAO. (..) Data unavailable.

### Chart F14: Aquaculture Production (1986-2011) in Mediterranean Countries

Own production. Source: FAO.
### TABLE F15: Employment and Unemployment

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<th>Employment by economic sector</th>
<th>Unemployment rate %</th>
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### CHART F15: Employment-to-population Ratio (%) by Sex 2010

![Chart showing employment-to-population ratio by sex](image-url)

**Countries with the major differences between the ratios of male and female**

- United Arab Emirates
- Saudi Arabia
- Syria
- Pakistan
- Afghanistan

Own production. Source: ILO.
### TABLE F16  Income Distribution

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<th>third 20%</th>
<th>fourth 20%</th>
<th>highest 20%</th>
<th>Richest 10% to poorest 10%</th>
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Own production. Source: WB (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F16  Multidimensional Poverty Headcount (2002/11)*

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Own production. Source: UNDP

* The Multidimensional Poverty looks at overlapping deprivations in health, education and standard of living. ** Latest data available from this period.
### Table F17: Gender: Economic Activity

#### Labour force participation rate ≥ age 15

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<th>Women %</th>
<th>Men %</th>
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### Chart F17: Gender Inequality Index (2012)

- **Sub-Saharan Africa**: World average 0.463
- **South Asia**: World average 0.463
- **Arab States**: World average 0.463
- **Latin America and the Caribbean**: World average 0.463
- **East Asia and the Pacific**: World average 0.463
- **Europa and Central Asia**: World average 0.463

Own production. Source: UNDP. Between brackets the position in the global ranking of 186 countries.
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Energy production millions mt oil eq</th>
<th>Energy use millions mt oil eq</th>
<th>Energy use per capita</th>
<th>GDP per unit of energy use</th>
<th>Net energy import % of used energy</th>
<th>Share of total primary energy supply</th>
<th>Other</th>
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Additional notes:
- **Energy production** and **energy use** are presented in millions of metric tons of oil equivalent (mt油 eq).
- **Energy use per capita** is given in kg oil eq.
- **GDP per unit of energy use** is presented in PPP $ per kg oil eq.
- **Net energy import** is expressed as a percentage of used energy.
- **Coal/peat** and **oil** percentages are given.
- **Natural gas** and **nuclear** contributions are also noted.

**Source:** WB, IEA.

**Note:** Negative values indicate that the country is a net exporter. Includes hydroelectric, biofuels and waste and geothermal, solar and wind. Data unavailable.

**CHART F18**

Share of Biofuels and Waste in Total Primary Energy Supply (2009)

**Source:** WB.
## TABLE F19: Production, Consumption and Access to Electricity

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Own production. Source: WB.

Excluding hydroelectric. (*) Data unavailable.

## CHART F19: Evolution of Electricity Production in the Mediterranean Countries by Source

Electricity production
- From coal sources [Mediterranean countries]
- From oil [Mediterranean countries]
- From natural gas [Mediterranean countries]
- From hydroelectric [Mediterranean countries]
- From nuclear [World]
- From renewable* [World]

Own production. Source: WB.

*Excluding hydroelectric
### TABLE F20: CO₂ Emissions

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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<td></td>
<td>millions mt</td>
<td>mt</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>kg CO₂ / PPP $</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: IEA.

- Latest data available from this period.
- This does not include motorcycles.
- Own production according to IEA data.
- (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F20: CO₂ Emissions in Mediterranean Countries (1971-2010)

[Graph showing CO₂ emissions in Mediterranean Countries (1971-2010)]

Own production. Source: IEA.
### TABLE F21  Water

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
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<th>Desalinated water production</th>
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<td></td>
<td>nationals</td>
<td>coming from other countries</td>
<td>water-dependency per capita</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>km&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>km&lt;sup&gt;3&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>3.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<td>15.6</td>
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<td>0.8</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
<td>57.9</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>8.7</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: FAO. Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F21  Long-term Average Precipitation in Depth (2011)

**Top 5 Countries with Highest Precipitation**
- Sao Tome and Principe
- Papua New Guinea
- Solomon Islands
- Costa Rica
- Malaysia

**Top 5 Countries with Lowest Precipitation**
- United Arab Emirates
- Qatar
- Libya
- Saudi Arabia
- Egypt

Own production. Source: FAO.
### TABLE F22  Environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National protected areas</th>
<th>Threatened species</th>
<th>Ecological footprint</th>
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<td>Total area</td>
<td>Forest area</td>
<td>Wood fuel production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thousands</td>
<td>thousands</td>
<td>thousands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ha</td>
<td>ha</td>
<td>m³</td>
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Own production. Source: FAO, FAO, UICN, UICN, UICN, GFN.  
[a] For these groups there are still many species that have not been assessed. The figures presented should be interpreted as the number of species known to be threatened within those species that have been assessed to date. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F22  Threatened Species (Mammals and Birds) 2012

[Graph showing the number of threatened species (Mammals and Birds) for different countries, with Turkey, Syria, and Israel having the highest numbers, and Egypt and Libya having the lowest.]

Own production. Source: UICN.
### TABLE F23  International Trade

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Exports million $</th>
<th>Imports million $</th>
<th>Coverage ratio</th>
<th>Trade balance million $</th>
<th>Current account balance million $</th>
<th>Workers’ remittances million $</th>
<th>% of exports of workers’ remittances</th>
<th>Foreign direct investment inflows million $</th>
<th>Foreign direct investment outflows million $</th>
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Own production. Source: UNCTAD.

Footnotes:
- a. From good and services.
- b. Workers remittances, salaries paid and transfer of capital are included.
- c. Own production using UNCTAD data.
- d. Estimated. (..) Data unavailable

### CHART F23  Migrant Remittances 2011 (as % of GDP)

![Migrant Remittances 2011 Chart]

Own production. Source: UNCTAD.
### TABLE F24

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<th>Minerals and Metals</th>
<th>Manufactured Products</th>
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Own production. Source: UNCTAD.

### CHART F24

Exports of Food Items (2011) (% of total exports)

Food Exports by Economy (%)

- Developed economies
- Transition economies
- Developing economies

Own production. Source: UNCTAD.

According to UNCTAD classification.
### TABLE F25  Imports

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<th>Imports</th>
<th>All food items</th>
<th>Agricultural raw materials</th>
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*Own production. Source: UNCTAD.*

### CHART F25  Imports of Food Items (2011) (% of total imports)

[Chart showing imports of food items by economy]
### TABLE F26

Tourism in the Mediterranean

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<th>Tourism expenditure in other countries</th>
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<td>31.9</td>
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<td>17.9</td>
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OWN production. Source: UNWTO

(* Own production using WB data. (...) Data unavailable

### CHART F26

International Tourism (2010)
### TABLE F27 Official Development Assistance (ODA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Official development assistance by donor countries</th>
<th>Official development assistance in recipient countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>millions $</td>
<td>% of GNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>708</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4,173</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>12,997</td>
<td>0.46</td>
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<td>Italy</td>
<td>4,326</td>
<td>0.20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.27</td>
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<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
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<td>Morocco</td>
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</table>

Own production. Source: OECD. OECD data. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F27 Official Development Assistance of Mediterranean Donor Countries (2003-2011)

Chart showing the official development assistance of Mediterranean donor countries from 2003 to 2011. The chart includes data for France, Italy, Spain, and other countries, with a focus on the trend over the years.
TABLE F28  
External Debt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>External debt</th>
<th></th>
<th>% of GNI</th>
<th></th>
<th>$ per capita</th>
<th></th>
<th>Long-term debt</th>
<th></th>
<th>Short-term debt</th>
<th></th>
<th>Debt service</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>--</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>10,729</td>
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<td>2,859</td>
<td>8,655</td>
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<td>1,803</td>
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<td>1,846</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>Cyprus</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Libya</td>
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<td>9.9</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: WB.

* Own production using WB data. (…) Data unavailable.

CHART F28  
Interest Payments on External Debt (2011)

[Graph showing interest payments as a percentage of GNI for various countries, with Lebanon having the highest at 3.8% and Algeria having the lowest at 0.06%.]

Own production. Source: WB.
Definitions

Adolescent fertility rate
Number of births per thousand women aged between 15 and 19.

Agricultural land area
Land surface area made up of arable and permanently cultivated lands and by permanent meadows and pastures.

Agricultural population
Persons who depend on agriculture, hunting, fishing or forestry for their subsistence. This category includes all those who carry out an agricultural activity and all this entails without official employment.

Alcohol consumption
Total (sum of recorded and unrecorded) amount of alcohol consumed per adult (15+ years) over a calendar year, in litres of pure alcohol. Recorded alcohol consumption refers to official statistics (production, import, export, and sales or taxation data), while the unrecorded alcohol consumption refers to alcohol which is not taxed and is outside the usual system of governmental control. When the number of yearly tourists is greater than or equal to the number of inhabitants, the tourist consumption is deducted from the country’s recorded consumption.

Annual population growth rate
Exponential change in the growth of the population during the period indicated.

Aquaculture production
Includes marine, freshwater and diadromous fish, molluscs and crustaceans cultivated in marine, inland or brackish environments.

Arable lands and permanent crops
Agricultural surface area that groups the data on arable or farm land and land used for permanent crops. Arable and farm land is land given over to temporary crops (those giving two yields are only counted once) temporal meadows for cutting or grazing, land dedicated to commercial vegetable gardens or orchards and land temporarily fallow for a period of less than five years. The term does not include land that has been abandoned as a result of migratory cultivation. Land destined for permanent crops refers to land dedicated to crops that occupy the terrain during long periods and that do not need to be replanted after each harvest, such as cacao, coffee and rubber. It includes land occupied by bushes destined to flower production, fruit trees, walnut trees and vineyards, but excludes land planted with trees destined to the production of firewood or wood.

Armed forces
Strategic, land, naval, aerial, command and support forces. It also includes paramilitary forces, such as the gendarmerie, the customs services and the border guard if they are trained in military strategy.

Average annual supply of fish and fish derivatives
Calculated from the availability of fish and its derivatives for human consumption, divided by the total population within the geographical borders of any given country. Nationals living in other countries are excluded, although foreigners living in the country are included.

Births attended by skilled health personnel
Percentage of births attended by health personnel (physicians, nurses and midwives) that are trained in the care, supervision and counselling of women during pregnancy, birthgiving and puerperium, and who can also deliver babies and assist them on their own.

Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions
The emissions of carbon dioxide produced in the burning of all fossil fuels used by a country.

Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions by sector
Shows the proportion of carbon dioxide emissions produced by the burning of fossil fuels in the sectors of transport, industry and electricity production. The transport sector includes emissions produced by all forms of transport by road, rail and air, including agricultural vehicles travelling by road. International journeys by boat or aeroplane are excluded. The industrial and construction sector includes emissions produced by all types of industry and construction. The electricity sector includes emissions produced by the generation of electricity for public use, including thermal power stations.

Cereal production
The figures for cereal production only refer to harvests of dry grain. Crops harvested for hay, unripe foodstuffs, forage and silage, or are used for grazing, are therefore excluded.

Cereal production yield
The outputs per hectare have been calculated using the data on surface area and production.
Cereal trade
The figures obtained by the FAO, have been supplied by the respective governments in the questionnaires sent out by the FAO.

Children under weight for their age
Percentage of children under five whose weight and height, for their age, is less than twice the standard deviation in comparison with the average for the relevant age group. The population of reference is the child population of the USA, which is assumed to be well nourished.

CO₂ emissions intensity by GDP
Average quantity of CO₂ emitted per unit of incomes generated by a particular economy.

Consumer price index
Reflects changes in the cost, for an average consumer, in the acquisition of a basket of goods and services that can be fixed or can change at specific intervals; for example annually. The Laspeyres formula is normally used.

Contraceptive prevalence rate
Percentage of women who are married or in a relationship who report using at least one method of contraception.

Crude birth rate
Number of births per year per thousand inhabitants. An estimate is made in the middle of the current year.

Crude death rate
Number of deaths per year per thousand inhabitants. An estimate is made in the middle of the current year.

Current account balance
The sum of the net exports – exports minus imports – of goods and services, incomes and net transfers.

Debt service
The sum of the main payments and interest payments made for long-term debts, interest paid on short-term debts and repayments (redemption and charges) to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Desalinated water production
Amount of water produced by elimination of salt from salt water using a variety of techniques, including inverse osmosis. Most of this water is used for domestic purposes.

Dietary energy consumption
Amount of food, in kilocalories per day, available for each person in the population.

Duration of compulsory education
Number of years, within a determined age group, that children and young people are legally obliged to attend school.

Ecological footprint
Measurement of the use of renewable natural resources by humanity. For a given population it is defined as the total area of biologically productive land and water required to produce the resources consumed, to maintain energy consumption, to make way for infrastructures and to absorb the waste generated by the population. The unit used to measure the ecological footprint is the global hectare and is defined as a hectare of biologically productive space, equal to the world average.

Electricity consumption per capita
Refers to the gross production per inhabitant and includes the consumption of auxiliary stations and the losses in the transformers considered an integral part of the central station. It also includes the total electricity produced by pumping stations, without deducting the electricity absorbed by the pumps.

Electricity production
Measured in the alternating equipment terminals of electric power stations. Also includes hydroelectric, coal, oil, gas and nuclear energy sources and generation by geothermal, solar, wind, tidal and marine energy, as well as renewable residues and fuels.

Electricity sources
Refers to the energy sources used to generate electricity: hydroelectric, coal, oil, gas and nuclear.

Employed population
Proportion of the economically active population that is employed. When adding the employed population to the unemployed the result is the whole economically active population or labour force.

Employment by sector
According to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), the Agriculture category also includes hunting, fishing and forest exploitation; the Industry category includes mining, extraction activities (including oil production), manufacturing, construction and public services (electricity, water and gas); the Services category includes the wholesale and retail trades, restaurants and hotels, transport, storage services, communications, financial services, insurance, real estate, business services, as well as community, social and personal services.

Employment rate
Percentage of population in work relative to the total population of working age.

Energy production
Primary energy forms – oil, natural gas, coal and its derivatives and renewable fuels and residues – and primary electricity, all converted into equivalents of oil. The renewable fuels and residues refer to solid and liquid biomass, biogas and industrial and municipal residues.

Energy use
Energy use refers to use of primary energy before transformation to other end-use fuels, which is equal to indigenous production plus imports and stock changes, minus exports and fuels supplied to ships and aircraft engaged in international transport.

Expected years of schooling
Number of years of schooling that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates were to stay the same throughout the child’s life.

Export/Import concentration index
The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index is used, in a normalised version, to obtain
values between zero and one (maximum concentration). It measures the degree of market concentration and the calculation takes into account the different product groups exported, according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC).

Exports
The value of all goods supplied by an economy to the rest of the world. It excludes labour and income in concept of property, as well as transfer payments.

External debt
The sum of the national debt, with public guarantee, private unsecured long-term debt, credit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and short-term debt.

Fertility rate
Number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current age specific fertility rates.

Fertilizer consumption
Amount of vegetable nutrients used per unit of cultivatable land. The fertilisers considered are nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium. Consumption is calculated as production plus imports minus exports, and traditional nutrients (animal and vegetable fertilisers) are not included. The data obtained is the result of dividing the consumption of fertiliser of each country by the surface area of arable and permanently cultivated land.

Fishery fleet
Aggregation of fishing vessels of a particular country.

Fixed telephone subscriptions
Fixed telephone line connecting the subscriber’s terminal equipment to the public switched network.

Foreign direct investment
Net direct investment that is made in order to achieve a lasting participation in the management of a business company operating in a country other than that of the investor. It is equal to the sum of the equity capital, the reinvestment of earnings and other long-term and short-term capital.

Forest area
Understood as all land with natural or artificial plots of trees, whether productive or not.

GDP (see Gross Domestic Product)

GDP per capita (see Gross Domestic Product per capita)

GDP growth rate
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.

GDP per unit of energy use
Indicator of energy efficiency. The temporary differences and entire countries partly reflect, structural economic changes, changes in the efficiency of particular sectors and differences in the use of fuels. The GDP has been converted into 2005 international dollars.

Gender inequality index
The Gender Inequality Index (GII) reflects women’s disadvantage in three dimensions—reproductive health, empowerment and the labour market—for as many countries as data of reasonable quality allow. The index shows the loss in human development due to inequality between female and male achievements in these dimensions. It ranges from 0, which indicates that women and men fare equally, to 1, which indicates that women fare as poorly as possible in all measured dimensions.

Gender parity index
Ratio of female to male values of a given indicator. The GPI measures progress towards gender parity in education participation and/or learning opportunities available for girls in relation to those available to boys.

Gini index
Measure of greater or lesser inequality in the distribution of income and consumption, considering a state of perfectly equal distribution. A value of zero represents perfect equality and a value of one hundred total inequality.

GNI (see Gross National Income)

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
The sum of the added value by all the resident producers in an economy, plus any tax on the product (without taking into account the subsidies). The added value is the net profit of an industry after adding together all the profits and subtracting the intermediate contributions.

Gross Domestic Product by sector
The contribution of the distinct economic sectors in the GDP is determined according to the added value determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC).

Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita)
Using the official exchange rates to convert the figures in national currency into US dollars does not measure the relative internal acquisition powers of each currency in each country. The International Comparison Project (ICP) of the United Nations and the World Bank develop measures of the GDP on an internationally comparable scale using as conversion factors, the Purchase Power Parities (PPP) with respect to each country.

Gross National Income (GNI)
The sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. The added value of the net profit of an industry after having summed up all profits and deducted international contributions.

HDI (see Human Development Index)

Human Development Index (HDI)
Index elaborated by the United Nations Development Project (UNDP) relating three indicators: income level (per capita GNI), health (life expectancy at birth) and level of education (mean years of education).
Definitions

**IEMed. Mediterranean Yearbook 2013**

**Appendices**

**The estimated number of Internet users**

Internet users

Internet users are defined as those using the Internet from any device (including mobile phones) in the last 12 months.

**Labour force participation rate**

The labour force participation rate is defined as the ratio of the labour force to the working-age population, expressed as a percentage. The labour force is the sum of the number of persons employed and the number of persons unemployed.

**Land area**

Refers to the total surface area minus the surface covered by inland waters. Inland waters are defined in general as rivers and principle lakes.

**Land under cereal production**

The figures related to cultivated crop surface areas generally refer to the area harvested, although those corresponding to permanent crops can refer to the total planted area. The figures for the cultivated cereal area only refer to harvests of dry grain. Crops harvested for hay, unripe foodstuffs, forage and silage, or used for grazing, are therefore excluded.

**Life expectancy at birth**

The number of years that a newborn infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.

**Literacy rate**

Total is the percentage of the population age 15 and above who can, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their everyday life. Generally, ‘literacy’ also encompasses ‘numeracy,’ the ability to make simple arithmetic calculations.

**Live animal stock**

The data on stock covers all domestic animals regardless of age, location or final purpose. Estimates have been made for countries that have not supplied data, as well as for countries supplying partial statistics.

**Live animal trade**

Enormous quantities of unregistered animals cross the borders of some countries. In order to obtain more representative international trade figures of live animals, the FAO has incorporated estimates of unregistered trade.

**Long-term external debt**

Debt that has an original or extended maturity of more than one year. It has three components: public, publicly guaranteed and private non guaranteed debt.

**Maternal mortality ratio**

Annual number of deaths of women owing to causes related to pregnancy, for every 100,000 live births.

**Mean years of schooling**

Average number of years of education received by people aged 25 and older in their lifetime based on education attainment levels of the population converted into years of schooling based on theoretical durations of each level of education attended.

**Mediterranean and Black Sea catches**

Fishing catches for commerce, industry or subsistence (including recreational catches where the data is available). The data refers to the catch by the fleet of a country in the Mediterranean and/or in the Black Sea.

**Military expenditure**

Total expenses effected by the Ministry of Defence and other ministries on the acquisition of military supplies and equipment. Military assistance is included in the expenses of the donor country.

**Mobile cellular telephone subscriptions**

Refers to the subscriptions to a public mobile telephone service and provides access to Public Switched Telephone Network using cellular technology.

**Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)**

The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) identifies multiple deprivations at the individual level in health, education and...
standard of living. It uses micro data from household surveys, and—unlike the Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index—all the indicators needed to construct the measure must come from the same survey. Each person in a given household is classified as poor or non-poor depending on the number of deprivations his or her household experiences. These data are then aggregated into the national measure of poverty.

Net energy import
Shows the amount of energy use by an economy and to what extent it exceeds its domestic production.

Net enrolment ratio
Number of students enrolled in a level of education who are of the official school age for that level, as a percentage of the total of the population of official school age for that level. The figures are shown for primary and secondary education.

Net migration rate
Net number of migrants divided by the average population of the receiving country within the period considered.

Net number of migrants
The entry of immigrants into a given country minus the outgoing emigrants of the same country.

Official Development Assistance (ODA)
The net payment of donations and loans granted under advantageous financial terms by official boards of partner countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as international organisations, with a view to promoting economic development and wellbeing, including co-operation and technical assistance.

Oil equivalent
All the values of energy production and consumption presented in this classification are calculated and published by the International Energy Agency (IEA) which uses the equivalent metric tonne of oil based on the calorific content of the energy products as the unit of measurement. An equivalent metric tonne of oil is defined as $10^7$ kilo calories or 11,628 gigawatts per hour (GWh). This amount of energy is practically equal to the amount of energy contained in a tonne of crude oil.

Outbound tourists by country of origin
Number of trips that travellers make to a given country from their normal country of residence, for a period of less than one year, for any other reason than to undertake a paid activity in the country visited.

Passenger cars
Road motor vehicles, other than two-wheelers, intended for the carriage of passengers and designed to seat no more than nine people (including the driver).

Permanent pasture
Refers to land used permanently (five years or more) for herbaceous fodder, whether cultivated or uncultivated (meadows or uncultivated land for grazing).

Physicians
Number of medical doctors (physicians), including generalist and specialist medical practitioners, per 10,000 population

Population density
The result of dividing the average annual population of a country by its land surface area expressed in square kilometres.

Population dependency ratio
Age-dependency ratios are a measure of the age structure of the population. They relate the number of individuals that are likely to be "dependent" on the support of others for their daily living—youths and the elderly—to the number of those individuals who are capable of providing such support.

Population in urban agglomeration of more than 750,000 inhabitants
Percentage of the population of a country living in metropolitan areas, that in 2005 had a population of more than 750,000 people.

Population on the Mediterranean coast
Estimates of the percentage of the population that lives in the coastal area.

Population living with HIV/AIDS
Estimated number of people of any age infected with HIV or AIDS. Includes the whole living infected population at the end of 2003, regardless of whether or not they have developed the disease. It shows the actual figure and the percentage in respect of the population of the country.

Population using improved drinking-water sources
The percentage of population using an improved drinking water source. An improved drinking water source, by nature of its construction and design, is likely to protect the source from outside contamination, in particular from faecal matter.

Population using improved sanitation
Percentage of population using an improved sanitation facility. An improved sanitation facility is one that likely hygienically separates human excreta from human contact. Improved sanitation facilities include: Flush or pour-flush to piped sewer system, septic tank or pit latrine, ventilated improved pit latrine, pit latrine with slab and composting toilet.

Population with access to electricity
Refers to the number of people with access to electricity as a percentage of the total population.

Prevalence of smoking
The percentage of men and women who smoke cigarettes. The age range varies between countries, but in general it is 15 years of age or above.

Primary pupil-teacher ratio
Number of pupils registered in primary schools divided by the number of teachers in primary schools.
Proportion of households with a computer
Number of households which declared to have access to a computer at home. A computer includes: a desktop, portable or handheld computer (e.g. a personal digital assistant). It does not include equipment with some embedded computing abilities such as mobile phones or TV sets.

Proportion of households with internet access
Number of households which declared to have access to Internet at home. The Internet is a world-wide public computer network. It provides access to a number of communication services including the World Wide Web and carries email, news, entertainment and data files. Access is not assumed to be only via a computer - it may also be by mobile phone, digital TV etc.

Protected areas
Areas of land or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biodiversity, natural and associated cultural resources and managed through legal and other instruments. According to The World Conservation Union (IUCN) it includes the total area of all natural reserves, virgin areas, national parks, natural monuments, management areas of habitats and species, as well as protected land and sea areas in each country.

Public expenditure on education
Composed of capital expenses (construction, renovation, major repairs and purchase of heavy equipment or vehicles) and running costs (goods and services consumed during the current year and that need to be renewed the following year). It covers expenses such as salaries and rendering of services, contracted or acquired services, books and didactic material, social welfare services, furniture and equipment, minor repairs, fuel, insurance, rent, telecommunications and travel.

Public health expenditure
Refers to the recurring and capital expenses in government budgets (central and local), loans and external concessions (including donations by international agencies and non-governmental organisations) and social or compulsory medical insurance funds.

R & D expenditures
The current and capital expenses of creative and systematic activities that increase the stock of knowledge. Includes basic and applied research and experimental development work that leads to new devices, products or processes.

Refugees
People who have been forced to flee their country for fear of persecution owing to reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinions or membership of determined social groups and who are unable or unwilling to return. The asylum country is the country in which the refugee has requested asylum, but has not yet received a response, or where he or she has been registered as an asylum seeker. The country of origin refers to the nationality of the seeker or to the country in which he or she is a citizen.

Rural population
The estimated population at the mid point of the year in areas defined as rural, as a percentage of the total population of the country.

Scientists and technicians in R&D
Professionals that have received further training to work in any scientific field.

Sectoral distribution of the active population
Shown by the percentages of the workforce employed in the different economic sectors: agriculture, industry and services.

Share of income or consumption
In the questionnaires carried out in homes in diverse countries to determine the distribution of income, they make five divisions (or quintiles) from the lowest to the greatest incomes. The two lower quintiles (40%) are considered the poorest. A relation is also made between the richest 10% and the poorest 10%, in order to establish the degree of inequality in incomes.

Share of ICT goods as percentage of total trade
Share of ICT goods imports and exports as a percentage of total imports and exports for every economy for which this information is available. The list of ICT goods is defined by the OECD, and was revised in 2010. This new list consists of 95 goods defined at the 6 digit level of the 2007 version of the Harmonised System.

Short-term external debt
Debt owed to non-residents having an original maturity of one year or less and interest arrears on long-term debt.

Surface area
Refers to the extension of the country in its totality, including the surface area occupied by inland waters.

Threatened species
Includes all the species classified by The World Conservation Union (IUCN), as “vulnerable, in danger, or in critical danger,” but excludes all introduced species, species whose status is not sufficiently known, extinguished species and those still without an assigned status.

Total area equipped for irrigation
Area equipped to provide water (via irrigation) to the crops. It includes areas equipped for full and partial control irrigation, equipped lowland areas, pastures, and areas equipped for spate irrigation.

Total catches
Fishing catches for commerce, industry or subsistence (including recreational catches where the data is available). The data refers to the catch by the fleet of a country in any part of the world. Marine fishing is practiced in seas or oceans, while freshwater fishing takes place in rivers, wetlands and inland lakes.

Total health expenditure
Funds mobilised by the system. Sum of general government and private expenditure on health.

Total population
Includes all of the residents of a country or territory with the legal status of citi-
 zen, except refugees settled in a country of asylum, who are generally considered as part of the population of their country of origin. Values for 2005 and projections for 2050 are shown.

Tourism expenditure in other countries
The expenditure in other countries of travellers from a given country, including the payments to national freight companies for international freight. It can include the expenses of single day travellers. The percentage it represents in respect of the exports, is calculated as a ratio of the exports of goods and services.

Tourists' overnight stays
Number of nights that non-resident tourists spend within the country visited, regardless of the type of tourist establishment.

Trade balance
Account that holds the imports and exports of an economy during a certain period of time with the purpose of reflecting the corresponding balance. Negative values indicate a deficit in the trade balance.

Trade in fish and derivative products
Expresses the value associated to the exports and imports of live, fresh, frozen, chilled, dried, salted, smoked and tinned fish and derivative products. Includes fresh and salt water and aquaculture fish, molluscs and crustaceans.

Under-five mortality rate
Probability of death between birth and becoming five years old, expressed per thousand live births.

Unemployment rate
Percentage of the active population without work, but available for and seeking employment.

Urban population living in slums
A place of precarious settlement is a group of individuals who live under the same roof and lack one or more of the following conditions: secure tenure (State protection against illegal eviction), access to drinking water, access to basic healthcare, structural dwelling quality and sufficient vital space. In accordance with the situation of the city in which the precarious settlement is found, this concept can be locally adapted.

Water consumption
Total water used by humans in a year, without taking into account the losses due to evaporation in reservoirs. Includes water from non renewable underground sources, from rivers coming from other countries and from desalinated plants.

Water dependency
Percentage of water available in one country, coming from another.

Water resources
Refers to the total renewable resources, covering the watercourses of the country (rivers and underground rain water reserves) and the watercourses originating in other countries.

Women in parliamentary seats
Refers to the percentage of seats occupied by women in a lower or single chamber, or in a higher or senate, according to each case. In the case where there are two chambers, the data refers to the weighted average of the participation of women in both chambers.

Wood fuel production
Includes wood from trunks and branches, used as fuel for cooking, heating or producing energy.

Workers' remittances
According to the definition of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Balance of Payments Manual, workers' remittances are goods and financial assets transferred by immigrants living and working in an economy (where they are considered residents) in favour of the residents of their former country of residence. An immigrant must live and work in the new economy for more than one year to be considered a resident there. The transfers made to the immigrants own accounts abroad are not considered transfers. Moreover, all those derived from the possession of a business by an immigrant are only considered to be normal transfers to the country of origin.

Year when women obtained the right to stand for election
The dates refer to the year when the universal and equal right to stand for election was recognised. In the cases when two years appear, the first refers to the first partial recognition of the right to stand for election.

Year when women obtained the right to vote
The dates refer to the year when the universal and equal right to vote was recognised. In the cases when two years appear, the first refers to the first partial recognition of the right to vote.
List of the Organisms Consulted for Drawing Up Tables, Charts and Maps

CITES, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
www.cites.org

EIB, European Investment Bank
www.eib.org

Europeaid, Development and Cooperation
ec.europa.eu/europeaid

European Commission-Trade
ec.europa.eu/trade

EUROSTAT, Statistical Office of the European Commission
ec.europa.eu/eurostat

FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
www.fao.org

IDMC, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
www.internal-displacement.org

IEA, International Energy Agency
www.iea.org

ILO, International Labour Organization
www.ilo.org

IOM, International Organization for Migration
www.iom.int

IMF, International Monetary Fund
www.imf.org

IPU, Inter-Parliamentary Union
www.ipu.org

ITU, International Telecommunication Union
www.itu.int
IUCN, World Conservation Union
www.iucn.org

Med.Cronos
www.iemed.org

Millennium Development Goals Indicators
http://mdgs.un.org

OECD, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
www.oecd.org

Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive
psephos.adam-carr.net

Plan Bleu
www.planbleu.org

SEDEG-SNED, Observatorio estadístico del Estrecho de Gibraltar
www.secegsa.gob.es / www.sned.gov.ma/

SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
www.sipri.org

UNAIDS, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
www.unaids.org

UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
www.unctad.org

UNDP, United Nations Development Programme
www.undp.org

UNEP, United Nations Environment Programme
www.unep.org

UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
www.unesco.org

UNFPA, United Nations Population Fund
www.unfpa.org

UNHCR, United Nations Refugee Agency
www.unhcr.ch

UNICEF, United Nations Children’s Fund
www.unicef.org

United Nations Treaty Collection
untreaty.un.org
United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN)

UNPOP, United Nations Population Division
www.unpopulation.org

UNSTAT, United Nations Statistics Division
unstats.un.org

UNWTO, World Tourism Organization
www.unwto.org

WB, World Bank
www.worldbank.org

WHO, World Health Organization
www.who.int

WRI, World Resources Institute
www.wri.org

WWF
www.wwf.org
## Country Abbreviations in Charts and Maps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Abbreviations</th>
<th>Country Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AL</td>
<td>Albania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>Austria</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>Belgium</td>
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<td>MK</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>Netherlands</td>
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<td>PL</td>
<td>Poland</td>
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<td>PS</td>
<td>Palestinian Territory, Occupied</td>
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<td>PT</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>SY</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Acronyms and Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Association Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>AECID</td>
<td>Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>AFAD</td>
<td>Disaster and Emergency Management Directorate (TR)</td>
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<td>AFD</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>AFESD</td>
<td>Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development</td>
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<td>AFTURD</td>
<td>Association of Tunisian Women for Research and Development</td>
</tr>
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<td>AII</td>
<td>Adriatic-Ionic Initiative</td>
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<td>AIPAC</td>
<td>American Israel Public Affairs Committee</td>
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<td>AIS</td>
<td>Islamic Salvation Army</td>
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<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (TR)</td>
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<td>AL</td>
<td>Arab League</td>
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<td>ALF</td>
<td>Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMF</td>
<td>African Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<td>ANSEJ</td>
<td>National Agency for Youth Employment Support (DZ)</td>
</tr>
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<td>AQIM</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASRC</td>
<td>Annual Security Review Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATFD</td>
<td>Tunisian Association of Democratic Women</td>
</tr>
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<td>BCT</td>
<td>Central Bank of Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>Peace and Democracy Party (TR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
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<td>CDS</td>
<td>Credit Default Swap</td>
</tr>
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<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
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<td>CHP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party (TR)</td>
</tr>
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<td>CPR</td>
<td>Congress for the Republic (TN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Civil Society Facility</td>
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<td>CTWUS</td>
<td>Center of Trade Unions and Workers Services</td>
</tr>
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<td>DAAD</td>
<td>German Academic Exchange Service</td>
</tr>
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<td>DCFTA</td>
<td>Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>Disarm, demobilise and reintegrate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFTA</td>
<td>Deep Free Trade Agreement</td>
</tr>
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<td>DII</td>
<td>Desertec Industrial Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPA</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Albanians</td>
</tr>
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<td>DPS</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party of Montenegro (ME)</td>
</tr>
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<td>DRS</td>
<td>Department of Intelligence and Security (DZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Democratic Party (CS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DUI</td>
<td>Democratic Union for Integration (MK)</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>ECB</td>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDLC</td>
<td>Egyptian Democratic Labour Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EED</td>
<td>European Endowment for Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EES</td>
<td>Entry-Exit System</td>
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<td>EFITU</td>
<td>Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions</td>
</tr>
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<td>EFSF</td>
<td>European Financial Stability Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIPR</td>
<td>Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPARD</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Programme for Agriculture and Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESMED</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Social Economy Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETUF</td>
<td>Egyptian Trade Union Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROMED</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROSTAT</td>
<td>Statistical Office of the EU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROSUR</td>
<td>European Border Surveillance System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-SILC</td>
<td>EU-Statistics on Income and Living Conditions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIS</td>
<td>Islamic Salvation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FJP</td>
<td>Freedom and Justice Party (EG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLN</td>
<td>National Liberation Front (DZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSA</td>
<td>Free Syrian Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSAP</td>
<td>Financial Sector Assessment Programmes (FSA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Cooperation Council for Arab States of the Gulf/Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
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<td>GIA</td>
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<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit</td>
</tr>
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<td>GNC</td>
<td>General National Congress (LY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat</td>
</tr>
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<td>Independent High Authority for Audiovisual Communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Islamic Action Front (JO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>International Border Management</td>
</tr>
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<td>International Centre for Migration Policy Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Internally Displaced Persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>International Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INRIC</td>
<td>The National Authority for the Reform of Information and Communication (TN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPU</td>
<td>Inter-Parliamentary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRENA</td>
<td>International Renewable Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IsDB</td>
<td>Islamic Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISG</td>
<td>International Steering Group for Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISIE</td>
<td>High Independent Authority for Elections (TN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>The World Conservation Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IUD</td>
<td>Intrauterine Device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>Justice and Construction Party (LY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JITEM</td>
<td>Gendarmerie Intelligence Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KCK</td>
<td>Union of Communities of Kurdistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KNC</td>
<td>Kurdish National Council (SY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCCs</td>
<td>Local Coordination Committees (SY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIFG</td>
<td>Libyan Islamic Fighting Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLR</td>
<td>Lender of Last Resort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPRs</td>
<td>Leagues for the Protection of the Revolution (TN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MB</td>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>Mediterranean Dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDGs</td>
<td>Millennium Development Goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDENER</td>
<td>Mediterranean Association of National Agencies for Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDREG</td>
<td>Association of the Mediterranean Regulators for Electricity and Gas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med-TSO</td>
<td>Mediterranean Transmission System Operators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHP</td>
<td>Nationalist Movement Party (TR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIPO</td>
<td>Mediterranean Investment Project Observatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIT</td>
<td>National Intelligence Organisation (TR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNLA</td>
<td>National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOWJA</td>
<td>Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPCs</td>
<td>Mediterranean Partner Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSP</td>
<td>Mediterranean Solar Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTD</td>
<td>Million Tunisian Dinars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUJWA</td>
<td>Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Constituent Assembly (TN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCC</td>
<td>National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (SY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>New Democracy (GR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Democratic Party (EG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFA</td>
<td>National Forces Alliance (LY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLA</td>
<td>National Liberation Army (AL)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOVA</td>
<td>New Serbian Democracy (Serbia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPLs</td>
<td>Non-Performing Loans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSF</td>
<td>National Salvation Front (EG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Transitional Council (LY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Representative (BA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OME</td>
<td>Mediterranean Energy Observatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAFTA</td>
<td>Pan-Arab Free Trade Area/agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>Panhellenic Socialist Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDN</td>
<td>National Democratic Party (EG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PI</td>
<td>Istiqlal Party (MA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJD</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (MA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party (TR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PM</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Purchasing Power Parity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Private Sector Initiative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PT</td>
<td>Workers’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTDP</td>
<td>Patriotic and Democratic Labour Party (TN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PYD</td>
<td>Democratic Union Party (SY)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PzP</td>
<td>Movement for Changes (ME)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RABIT</td>
<td>Rapid Border Intervention Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCD</td>
<td>Democratic Constitutional Rally (TN and DZ)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RES4MED</td>
<td>Renewable Energy Solutions For the Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RND</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>SHISH</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>SOC</td>
<td>National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SY)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
</tr>
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<td>STL</td>
<td>Special Tribunal for Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFR</td>
<td>Total Fertility Rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acronyms and Abbreviations

UfM  Union for the Mediterranean
UGTT Tunisian General Labour Union
UN United Nations
UNAIDS Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNWTO World Tourism Organization
URS United Region of Serbia
USA United States of America
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USFP Socialist Union of Popular Forces
VMRO-DPMNE Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity
WB World Bank
WDI World Development Indicators
YPG Popular Protection Unit (SY)
Index of Tables

Table 1. Confessional Representation in Parliament (2005) ........................................ 66
Table 2. Most Watched TV Channels by Lebanese Viewers ......................................... 67
Table 3. Which Group Do you Think Was Most Active during the Protests? .......... 70
Table 4. Comparison of GDP per Capita in 2011 .................................................. 168
Table 5. Gross National Income (GNI) per Capita 2003-2011 (PPP-adjusted, in international USD) .................................................. 168
Table 6. Annual Export of Goods and Services per Capita (current USD). ............. 169
Table 7. Employment Rate (%). .............................................................................. 169
Table 8 Measures of Openness, 2010 ................................................................. 239
Table 9. Degree of Openness, Selected Countries and Years .................................. 239

APPENDICES

Table A1. Official Aid to Mediterranean Countries Financed under the European Commission Budget and the European Development Fund (EDF) in 2011 ........................................ 383
Table A2. European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI): 2007-2013 ........................................ 384
Table A3. Mediterranean Candidate Countries for Accession .................................. 384
Table A4. Provisions for Aid under the IPA for 2012 and 2013 (Candidate and Potential Candidate Countries) .................................................. 385
Table A5. European Investment Bank Loans to Mediterranean Countries in 2011 ........ 385
Table A6. EU Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO). ........................................... 386
Table B1. Breakdown of Net Spanish Official Development Assistance in the Mediterranean Region .................................................. 387
Table B2. Breakdown of Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean Region by Objective (2011) ................................................................. 388
Table C1. Number of Foreigners from MPCs in the European Union by Nationality ........ 389
Table C2. Emigrant People from Mediterranean Countries Living in OECD countries .................................................. 390
Table C3. Desire to Emigrate, 2008-10: Persons Who Would Move Permanently, if They Had the Opportunity to Do So (%) .................................................. 390
Table D1. Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements ......................................... 391
Table D2. Stabilisation and Association Agreements and EU Accession Process of the of Western Balkan Countries .................................................. 391
Table D3. European Neighbourhood Action Plans .................................................. 392
Table E1. Multilateral Treaties on Human Rights and Penal Matters ................. 393
Table E2. Multilateral Treaties on Labour Rights (year of ratification) .................. 393
Table E3. Multilateral Environmental Treaties ....................................................... 394
Table E4. Multilateral Disarmament Treaties .......................................................... 394
Table F1. Human Development Index (HDI). ......................................................... 395
<p>| Table F2. | Population: Demography | 396 |
| Table F3. | Population: Structure and Distribution | 397 |
| Table F4. | Education and Training of Human Capital | 398 |
| Table F5. | Health and Survival | 399 |
| Table F6. | Nutrition and Food Security | 400 |
| Table F7. | Access to Health Resources | 401 |
| Table F8. | Gender: Social Development | 402 |
| Table F9. | Technology and Communication | 403 |
| Table F10. | Security and Military Expenditure | 404 |
| Table F11. | Economic Structure and Production | 405 |
| Table F12. | Agriculture | 406 |
| Table F13. | Livestock | 407 |
| Table F14. | Fisheries | 408 |
| Table F15. | Employment and Unemployment | 409 |
| Table F16. | Income Distribution | 410 |
| Table F17. | Gender: Economic Activity | 411 |
| Table F18. | Production and Energy Consumption | 412 |
| Table F19. | Production, Consumption and Access to Electricity | 413 |
| Table F20. | CO₂ Emissions | 414 |
| Table F21. | Water | 415 |
| Table F22. | Environment | 416 |
| Table F23. | International Trade | 417 |
| Table F24. | Exports | 418 |
| Table F25. | Imports | 419 |
| Table F26. | Tourism in the Mediterranean | 420 |
| Table F27. | Official Development Assistance (ODA) | 421 |
| Table F28. | External Debt | 422 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chart</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Trust in the EU vs Trust in National Institutions</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>The Level of Citizens’ Confidence in Their Main Public Institutions</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(The Overall Average of Surveyed Communities)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>General Government Budget Balance - Greece (deficit (-)/surplus (+), % GDP, 2007-2012)</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Unemployment and GDP Growth (2007-2012)</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Non-performing Loans (% Total Loans, 2007-2012)</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Assessing the Prospects of Deep and Sustainable Democracy in the</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Following Countries, Comparing 2011 and 2012 Results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Role of Mainstream Islamist Parties in the Future Mediterranean Landscape</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Role of Parties in the Future Mediterranean Landscape</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Assessing the EU’s Future Role in MPCs Compared to Other External</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and Regional Actors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Assessment of the EU’s Role with Regard to Domestic Developments</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>in the Mediterranean Partner Countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Impact of the Arab Spring on the Euro-Mediterranean Integration</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Process (in %)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Assessing the Capacity of the New Islamist Governments to Address the Socio-Economic Demands</td>
<td>215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Policies that Can Improve the Management of Human Mobility in the Euro-Mediterranean Region</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Degree of Probability Attributed to the Following Mid to Long-Term Hypotheses in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>MENA Exports to the Rest of the World, the EU and within the MENA Area</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Share of Trade with EU and Other MENA Countries of Total Exports</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Share of Sector in MENA Region Exports to the Rest of the World (2011), Selected Countries</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Intra-Mena Trade by Sector</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Export Diversity Index, Selected Countries and Years</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Growth in Mediterranean Partner Countries as Compared to the EU-27 and Emerging Economies (%)</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Overall Unemployment Rates in Mediterranean Partner Countries (%)</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Current Expenses in Mediterranean Partner Country Budgets in 2011 (in % of GDP)</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendices

Chart 24. Evolution of Investment Amounts and Number of FDI Projects Announced (in millions of euros) ............................................... 252

Chart 25. Monetary Amounts of FDI Projects Announced by Country (in millions of euros) ............................................... 252

Chart 26. Origin of Announced FDI Projects (number of projects) ............................................... 254

Chart 27. Origin of Announced FDI Amounts (in millions of euros) ............................................... 254

Chart 28. Chronological Analysis of the Development of the Tourism Industry in Tunisia . . .. 257

Chart 29. Composition of Tourism in Croatia, Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco by Nationality in 2010 (%) ............................................... 260

Chart 30. Demographic Evolution of the City of Torremolinos, Spain ............................................... 262

APPENDICES

Chart A1. EU Cooperation 2011. .............................................. 383

Chart B1. Breakdown of Spanish Development Aid in the Maghreb and the Middle East by Sector (2011) ............................................... 387

Chart B2. Breakdown of Spanish Development Aid in the Balkans and Turkey by Sector (2011) . . .. 388

Chart F1. Human Development Index Components (2012). ............................................... 395

Chart F2. Dependency Ratio (2010) ............................................... 396

Chart F3. Population of Urban Agglomerations with 750,000 Inhabitants or More in 2011, by Country. ............................................... 397


Chart F5. Mortality Rate under Five (per 1,000 born alive) (2011) ............................................... 399

Chart F6. Alcohol Consumption among Adults Aged ≥15 Years (2008). ............................................... 400

Chart F7. Health Workforce (2005/12) ............................................... 401


Chart F9. Evolution of Telephone Subscriptions in the Mediterranean Countries . . .. 403

Chart F10. Armed Forces Personnel (% of total labor force) (2011) ............................................... 404

Chart F11. GDP Growth (2011). ............................................... 405

Chart F12. Cereal Production (by type of cereal) 2011 ............................................... 406


Chart F15. Employment-to-Population Ratio (%) by Sex 2010 . . .. 409


Chart F17. Gender Inequality Index (2012) ............................................... 411


Chart F19. Evolution of Electricity Production in the Mediterranean Countries by Source . . .. 413

Chart F20. CO₂ Emissions in Mediterranean Countries (1971-2010). ............................................... 414

Chart F21. Long-term Average Precipitation in Depth (2011) ............................................... 415

Chart F22. Threatened Species (Mammals and Birds) 2012. ............................................... 416

Chart F23. Migrant Remittances 2011 (as % of GDP). ............................................... 417

Chart F24. Exports of Food Items (2011) (% of total exports) ............................................... 418

Chart F25. Imports of Food Items (2011) (% of total imports) ............................................... 419


Chart F28. Interest Payments on External Debt (2011) ............................................... 422
# Index of Maps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Map</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Map 1</td>
<td>Evolution of the Importance of International Tourism (IT) Receipts in National Economies (%)</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 2</td>
<td>Evolution of the Distribution of International Tourism (IT) Receipts (%)</td>
<td>259</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 3</td>
<td>Percentage of International Tourism (IT) in Overall Tourism in 2010 (%)</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 4</td>
<td>Population Densities in Regions of Mediterranean Countries in 2010 (inhab/km²)</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Map 5</td>
<td>Distribution of Overnight Stays in Regions of Mediterranean Countries in 2010 (%)</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## APPENDICES

| Map A.1 | Economic crisis in the EU. Basic Indicators                                           | 303  |
| Map A.2 | Syria: Humanitarian Crisis                                                           | 304  |
| Map A.3 | Euromed Survey of Experts and Actors IV. Prospects and Visibility                    | 305  |
| Map A.4 | Euromed Survey of Experts and Actors IV. Prospects of Sustainable Democracy and the EU Role | 306  |
| Map A.5 | Health Expenditure                                                                  | 307  |
| Map A.6 | Obesity in Mediterranean Countries                                                   | 307  |
| Map A.7 | Trade of Creative Goods. Imports                                                     | 308  |
| Map A.8 | Trade of Creative Goods. Exports                                                     | 308  |
| Map A.9 | Education                                                                          | 309  |
| Map A.10| Demographic Indicators (Marriage, Fertility, Contraception and abortion Policies) in the Mediterranean | 310  |
| Map A.11| Traffic of Goods between EU and UMA and Passenger Traffic in the Strait of Gibraltar | 311  |
| Map A.12| Women in Mediterranean Parliaments                                                   | 312  |
| Map A.14| Elections in Greece (May and June 2012). Results of Pro-Bailout Parties               | 314  |
| Map A.15| Aquaculture Production in Mediterranean Countries (2011)                             | 315  |
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The handbook for good eco-publishing. Good practices guidelines for eco-publishing and eco-design in the publishing sector
Greening Books, 2013
El Tinter SAL

### Environmental Management - Environmental certificates of the companies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design and Printing</th>
<th>EMAS</th>
<th>EMAS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Tinter SAL</td>
<td>ISO 14001</td>
<td>ISO 14006</td>
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</tbody>
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### Materials - Papers - Environmental certificates of papers used

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paper Type</th>
<th>Paper Certification</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gemini 300g 52x70</td>
<td>TCF, FSC mixed sources</td>
<td>Paper Totally Chlorine Free; Paper made of a mixture of fibres from FSC® certified forests, controlled sources and/or recycled material</td>
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<tr>
<td>Creator vol 100 g</td>
<td>TCF, FSC mixed sources</td>
<td>Paper Totally Chlorine Free; Paper made of a mixture of fibres from FSC® certified forests, controlled sources and/or recycled material</td>
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</tbody>
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### Good Practices - Verified good environmental practices of the companies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company</th>
<th>Practices</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El Tinter SAL</td>
<td>- Design, printing -</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minimum paper weight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Size of page adapted to paper format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ink made with vegetable oils</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Use of stochastic screening plates</td>
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### Ecological Rucksack - Calculation of the ecological rucksack of one unit of the publication

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Mass (g)</th>
<th>Carbon footprint (g CO₂ eq.)</th>
<th>Waste production (g)</th>
<th>Water consumption (L)</th>
<th>Energy consumption (MJ)</th>
<th>Raw materials consumption (g)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Publication mass</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>644</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>345</td>
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</table>

**Savings**: 25  1  1  17

*Saved environmental impact compared to a similar common publication.*