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Today, the Mediterranean is undoubtedly the focus of the international community. The Arab transitions, conflict in Syria, economic crisis and future of Europe, as well as other issues, have clearly marked the current international panorama. This, however, has merely served to increase the volume and complexity of the information we have on this part of our planet. For nine editions, the IEMed has tackled this complexity with the IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook. Med.2012, a tool which enables its readers to better understand the workings of this changing region.

With this publication, the IEMed offers a compendium of information and analysis which is essential to understanding the changing reality of a strategic region for Europe and the world. This edition of the Yearbook comprises over 55 articles by actors, experts, academics and journalists from both shores of the Mediterranean, chronologies that outline the major events and a compilation of statistics on the key socio-economic indicators of Euro-Mediterranean countries. A selection of maps that are essential for clarifying the positions of each country completes the publication.

The articles contained in the Yearbook are arranged into three main sections. Keys deals with the major issues; those considered essential for understanding what is at stake in the region. The Dossier presents a collection of articles that look in detail at a single, relevant theme from an array of different standpoints. The section this year looks at the awakening of civil society in the Mediterranean. Finally Panorama reviews the current Euro-Mediterranean situation through a range of subjects such as security, economic relations or conflict in the Middle East.

In this, the ninth edition, the Yearbook’s section on major issues (Keys) inevitably begins with articles dedicated to the Arab transitions. The effervescence of revolution has given way to the long and complicated path of transition towards stable and free democracies, which is why, as well as including more general articles, this section also focuses separately on the paradigmatic cases of Tunisia and Egypt. Furthermore, it analyses the role of political Islam in these transitions, which has proved itself to be not only a key actor, but also an extremely diverse one. Although these articles offer a thorough political analysis of the transitions, it is evident that the complexity of this subject can not be tackled from this standpoint alone. The Arab transitions are therefore the focus of a large part of the articles in the Panorama section, dedicated to more specific thematic or geographic areas, which is also the case to a large extent with this edition’s Dossier, dedicated to the awakening of civil society in the Mediterranean.

The economies of the northern shore of the Mediterranean have also unwillingly become the focus of the international community. The global financial crisis has thrived in Europe’s Mediterranean countries. The grave economic situation does not only affect these countries, but has also jeopardised the future of the euro as a common European currency. Faced with these perspectives, the Yearbook has dealt with the economic crisis from three standpoints: the po-
As in previous editions, the articles in the *Panorama* section complete the overview of the major events and issues of recent months in the Mediterranean space. Aimed at maximising the coverage of key topics, the Yearbook presents an extensive selection of articles that cover aspects such as: the challenges of security in the Mediterranean; constitutional reforms currently being implemented; elections in countries on the northern shore; civil conflict in Syria; youth unemployment; the situation of the tourism sector; gas potential of the eastern Mediterranean; trade of cereals in Arab countries; Euro-Mediterranean air transport; the crisis of the Schengen space; and the impact of social networks in Arab countries. The articles are followed by the second part of the Yearbook that comprises the *Appendices*, where maps, chronologies, charts and statistical tables provide readers with all the information necessary to complete and complement the analytical and opinion articles. The publication thereby becomes a tool that seeks to provide its readers with the keys for understanding the complexity of the Mediterranean area.

In a difficult context, the ninth edition of the IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook, Med.2012 represents the capacity and commitment of the IEMed to offer its readers a reference product of information and analysis of today’s Mediterranean reality with a strong international perspective. Above all, the publication aims to satisfy the needs of all those who wish to understand the reality of the Euro-Mediterranean space.
Perspectives
A New Drive for Relations in the Mediterranean

Fathallah Sijilmassi
Secretary General
Union for the Mediterranean, Barcelona

The Mediterranean today is subject to the structural developments resulting from the political transitions in the south and a crisis from which Europe is yet to emerge. Those of us who hope for peaceful and prosperous Mediterranean relations have the responsibility that both processes are channelled towards greater levels of cooperation, exchanges and solidarity. Those of us who are committed to the Mediterranean cause have the challenge of turning the events of today into a qualitative leap forward in relations and not a step back.

It is in this context that the Union for the Mediterranean must find its place. We are opening a new phase in the organisation’s young life, a phase characterised by its institutional stability, now that Jordan and the EU have assumed the southern and northern co-presidency, respectively. In this new phase, the European Commission and the External Action Service play a central role, allowing the UfM to become a privileged instrument of regional cooperation for the EU in the framework of the Neighbourhood Policy, and thereby also guaranteeing the necessary sense of belonging for countries both in the North and the South. We are witnessing increased activism among our southern partners, who see in us a great opportunity to return to growth and consolidate their transitions.

The Secretariat is currently focused on work areas such as energy, water, education, transport, business development and civil society. We are ready to set in motion our first projects in the coming months; projects destined to distribute water to the people of Gaza, to create a new Euro-Mediterranean University in the city of Fez or to complete the sections that are missing from the motorway that crosses the Maghreb. We want to make a serious and dedicated contribution to building this horizon of possibilities, which are so necessary for a greater understanding to develop between the two shores.

It would be fair to say that in this task we are not alone, and I am proud to affirm that the UfM has been able to put into action coordination mechanisms with other actors also operating in the region, whether that be the 5+5 Dialogue, the Arab League or the Arab Maghreb Union. We have also established important links with the European Investment Bank, and with the group of international financial institutions that operate in the region and are destined to play a central role today in finding the path to recovery, growth and job creation. We hope to be able to complement all those instruments that will help breathe new life into our relations. Together we have the tools needed to make this possible.

I believe I express the feelings of many of the region’s citizens when I say that the Mediterranean cause is worth it and that today it is more vital than ever. It is precisely in these moments of change and transformation that the future of our region and the ties that bring its cultures and nations together are at stake. It is right now that we must be capable of laying out all our ambitions, which need the backing of a firm political component.

Only by joining efforts will be capable of responding to the expectations of the region’s many young people, to whom we have the duty of offering a future. Employment, development and a way out of the crisis are the fundamental pillars on which we must base this new phase we are beginning.
Keys
The Revolutionary Consensus

The Tunisian revolution of January 2011 was primarily a social revolution whose roots went back to the economic and social difficulties that had given rise to significant protests in 2008 in the Gafsa region. Three years later, the same causes gave rise to violent protests in the centre of the country before spreading to the ensemble of regions and becoming a major political crisis. The Tunisian uprising of December 2010 and January 2011 illustrates the mobilisation of all social categories. Beginning in Sidi Bouzid, a small city in the centre of Tunisia, the movement arose after the self-immolation of a young street vendor on 17 December 2010. On the morrow, local union activists joined the uprising. The movement spread to nearby municipalities where protesters attacked police barracks, offices of the party in power, i.e. the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD), and Administration buildings. The government then attempted to quell the revolt via tear gas bombs and truncheons, but as of 24 December, the police had the order to shoot real bullets at the protesters.

Cyber-activists active since the late 1990s, passed on information about the self-immolation of the young Mohamed Bouazizi, who was struggling between life and death at the hospital for severe burn victims in Tunis, and about police repression and crack-downs against protesters occurring in different places. Facebook, which has two and a half million users in this country of ten million inhabitants, together with mobile phones, played a significant role in spreading information and mobilising protesters. Beginning on 26 December 2010, many protests took place before local offices of the national trade union, UGTT (Tunisian General Labour Union). The trade union decided to participate in the revolt and organised a rotating strike accompanied by a protest, each regional office carrying out a day of strike. On 12 January it was the city of Sfax that organised a huge protest march with 100,000 participants, and on 14 January, it was Tunis’ turn to organise one.

From all walks of life, all age groups and all social strata, the demonstrators were protesting against the regime’s repressive practices, corruption and lack of freedom. The primary slogan resounding as of December – “work is an inalienable right, band of crooks!” – was already meant to rally all those suffering from unemployment and who considered the Head of State’s entourage a real caste that had seized both economic networks and power.

The gap between the Tunisians’ demand and the Presidential supply inflamed the movement. In a last speech delivered on 13 January, the Head of State was far from mentioning his immediate departure. He made promises for 2014, affirmed he had been mistaken on the breadth of the crisis and proposed reforms. A manifest sign of confusion, Ben Ali’s promises concerned very different domains ranging from the reduction of staple food prices to internet censure, as well as the promise of real democracy. But this tardy mea culpa, which revealed the scope of the Head of State’s weakness, had the effect of irritating the Tunisians and uniting them in anger against a president not lacking in imagination to keep himself in power. The pathetic image of a decrepit power with its leader down revealed a reversal of the order of things. Ben Ali seemed quite alone, devoid of support from his traditional allies: the police was overwhelmed, the members of the RCD were invisible and the army refused to fire against a
population with whom it would soon fraternise. On the morrow, on the evening of that famous 14 January when the President was to leave the capital, he gave a sense of having obeyed this population so long crushed under the weight of the authoritarianism of a personal power and a police State that seemed to subdue it.

Yet these masses united by rage and the expression of a radical rejection of the regime had neither father nor religion nor ideology. From 17 December, when Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself, to 14 January, the traditional left-wing or Islamist ideologies were not expressed. The compact masses occupying the streets were undivided. In reality, the novelty of this revolution resides in the connection between iconic Bouazizi, the young street vendor in which everyone recognised themselves, and the imaginary of the internet users. It was this meeting of two public spaces – the real and the virtual – that triggered a civil disobedience movement structured around various slogans and watchwords, the most eloquent certainly being “the people want....” The introduction of the people as a free, autonomous entity addressing the elite reversed the usual discourse, where over the course of half a century, Tunisians saw the elite speak to the people.

Establishing Provisional Institutions

On the morrow of Ben Ali’s departure, three types of threats weighed upon the revolutionary process. Certain observers believed at the time that the army, which had power within its reach, would seize it. Others believed that the former beneficiaries of the Ben Ali regime were liable to organise a counter-revolution. Finally, the process could also derail due to lack of institutions and actors capable of effecting the transition. To prevent an institutional void, on 15 January, by virtue of Article 57, the Constitutional Council appointed Fouad Mebazaa, the President of the National Assembly, as interim President of the Republic for a period of 60 days. On 17 January, the first national unity government was formed by Mohamed Bouazizi, Prime Minister under Ben Ali since 1999 and one of the RCD’s party officials since 2002.

This Administration retained former ministers under Ben Ali, but the Prime Minister also appointed opposition politicians such as Najib Chebbi, Chair of the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), as Minister of Regional and Local Development and Ahmed Brahimi of the Ettajdid Party (former communist party) as Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, and offered Doctor Mustapha Ben Jaafar of the Ettakatol Party the position of Public Health Minister. The latter refused the post to express his disagreement with the presence of former RCD ministers. On 18 January, the UGTT decided to leave the government for the same reasons. Two conflicting positions appeared: those who believed the revolution should wipe the slate clean and those who, like Najib Chebbi and Ahmed Brahimi, ascribed their presence in government to the fear of an institutional vacuum. The second Ghanouchi Administration included many technocrats. For this administration, the transition was to be effected by way of a presidential election organised in a few months, even before revising the Constitution. But the project was thwarted by an opposition front by the name of 14 January Front, which was against maintaining the existing constitutional framework. Composed of actors from the Tunisian left and labour unionists, this Front demanded the dissolution of all institutions inherited from the former regime, such as the Parliament, Senate and the Supreme Council of Magistrates. They called for an election of a Constituent Assembly within a year. They were quickly joined by 28 associations and political parties. In reality, these first two administrations had a difficult task, for they needed to go from a government using fear and repression to dominate to a government of legitimacy. This change needed to be not only institutional but also symbolic, and the presence of a former minister under Ben Ali at the head of the government was not a symbol of rupture. More generally, the debate revolved around two key questions: must there be a break with the past, or should one work in continuity, accepting the political actors and institutions to avoid a political vacuum and chaos?

As of March 2011, the reference to the Bourguiba regime partially and temporarily filled the institutional vacuum. When the second Ghanouchi administration was deposed, it was the turn of Béji Caïd Essebsi, a former minister under Bourguiba, to lead the government. Ben Ali’s political personnel seemed too compromised to be legitimate. This third provisional government organised the transition, demonstrating pragmatism and marking its distance with the Ben Ali era.
Two conflicting positions appeared: those who believed the revolution should wipe the slate clean and those who, like Najib Chebbi and Ahmed Brahim, ascribed their presence in government to the fear of an institutional vacuum.

Prime Minister Caïd Essebsi suspended the Constitution of 1959 and acted firmly against the stir of protest resurfacing at the Kasbah, i.e. the government square. He fused the National Council for the Protection of the Revolution and the National Commission for Political Reform to create the Higher Authority for the Realisation of the Objectives of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition. In fact, the Authority’s name was highly symbolic insofar as it combined three key terms: revolution, reform and transition. It also represented the end of the dichotomy between the revolutionary and legalist rationales. Yet the change affected the very functions of the Higher Authority. Although it had no decision-making power, the Higher Authority, presided by the lawyer Yadh Ben Achour, became the true driving force of the transition. It operated on two different levels: a Council of Experts for the Higher Authority composed of jurists and a second Council composed of labour union, political and association personnel, as well as legal entities, which examined, ratified or rejected the texts submitted by the Council of Experts. The texts accepted and voted in by majority by the Council of Experts were then sent to the provisional government, then the President of the Republic. Thus, executive power resided in the hands of the government and the Presidency of the Republic. But in drawing up these texts, the Higher Authority acted as a provisional legislative power and, to a certain extent, a parliament.

On 12 April 2011, the Higher Authority unanimously adopted a new electoral law. This law stipulated elections by proportional representation by largest remainder method and respecting gender parity. This electoral method, which tends to favour small parties, prevented major parties from becoming preponderant at the Assembly. The importance of its mission exposed it to sharp criticism. Certain critics reproached it for its lack of representativeness, pointing out the fact that not all sensibilities were included in it. But its legitimacy was likewise questioned because its members were appointed and not elected. For certain parties, this Higher Authority was progressively becoming a parliament, thus usurping the powers of the Constituent Assembly.

Building Democracy

The first period of the transition, which began with the departure of President Ben Ali on 14 January 2011, was consolidated by the elections on 23 October 2011. This historic vote had the task of electing the 217 members of the new Constituent Assembly. A true political turning point, this election ended half a century of manipulated elections. It was carefully prepared beforehand through an electoral law passed by consensus by the different, authorised political parties. A central element in the transition process, the electoral law was developed by civil society actors that had been formerly marginalised and often repressed for their struggle for human rights and Rule of Law. These symbolic figures opted for a likewise symbolic rupture with the past insofar as electoral practices as well as the voter lists available to the Ministry of the Interior. Everything was built from scratch and new ballot boxes were ordered for the elections – a landmark event of the post-revolution transition.

The results of the elections meant a complete reconfiguration of the political landscape. The Islamist Ennahda party took the elections with 41.47% of the votes, thus obtaining 89 seats in the Constituent Assembly. Moncef Marzouki’s Congress for the Republic (CPR, left-wing nationalist) won 30 seats and Ettakatol, presided by Mustapha Ben Jaafar (social democratic) won 20. The surprise was Aridha Chaabia (Popular Petition), a party established by a wealthy Tunisian businessman residing in London, which took fourth place.

These results show that the Tunisians did not really vote for platforms but for those who embodied a rupture with the past. The victory of the three parties gaining seats in the Assembly illustrates the birth of a new centre whose actors are bearers of a double message: respect for democratic rules and advancement of the Arab-Muslim tradition and identity.

Yet considering the architecture of the electoral law, this centre formed by three parties was to govern as part of a wholly unprecedented coalition. This troika is naturally not unified – indeed, far from it – but its
parts are constrained to work together. Fissures quickly appeared in the exercise of government, first between the three parties and then within each party. In the Constituent Assembly, the leaders of the three parties share political functions during the transitional period that will lead Tunisians to other elections whose results are as yet unknown: Moncef Marzouki is President of the Republic, Hamadi Jebali Prime Minister and Ben Jaafar President of the Assembly.

The difficulty of working jointly to govern the country and draft a constitution is exacerbated by the constant tensions that often turn to conflicts between two highly differentiated segments of Tunisian society. Though there are two camps effectively in conflict since President Ben Ali’s departure, the dividing lines are not clear-cut. The “modernist” camp includes left-wing and extreme left-wing parties, but also women’s rights associations. The opposing, Islamist camp includes the Ennahda party, of course, but also the movement existing within this party constituting a sort of underlying, more diversified base that not only comprises Islamist associations and the Hizb al-Tahrir Salafists but also others.

The “modernists”, who define themselves as liberals, actively defend progressive and feminist values. In opposition to them, the Islamists advocate a modernity rooted in Islam and individual freedom limited not only by the freedom of others but also and above all by religious moral and virtue. The two positions are another’s negative.

At the beginning of 2012, the Second Tunisian Republic started off in a totally transformed political landscape whose contours may seem difficult to grasp for Tunisians. An Assembly in charge of drafting the Constitution of the Second Tunisian Republic was elected by universal suffrage. The leaders of CPR and Ettakatol, having accepted the posts to which they were elected, left gaps difficult to fill in their respective parties, which quickly fissured under the effect of massive disaffiliation of members who were not very happy about the alliance of their party with the Islamists in the troika. These two troika parties were thus weakened, strengthening the hegemony of the Islamist Ennahda party, whose charismatic leader, Rashid Ghanouchi, had strategically declined a post. Regularly consulted on political, social and religious issues, he plays the role of a “sage,” which embodies the politician’s centre of gravity.

Hence, several months after the elections of 23 October, the political transition continues, though on a less stable note. It is true that the election winners, the Islamists, are having difficulty turning their electoral victory into a margin for political manoeuvre. They are legitimate and repeatedly state the fact, but they have no political experience and have difficulty going from an “opposition party” that evolved underground to a party of the masses governing the country.

Moreover, the transition, and even more so, elections, have revealed the existence of two Tunisias. The first primarily voted for the Islamists because for them, they embody a rupture with the Ben Ali period, but also integrity. It is a more conservative Tunisia that believes that the change will come from moralising political life. The second Tunisia is more westernised. It is anxious to safeguard the reforms of the Bourguiba era insofar as women’s rights, education and public health.

The winter of 2012 was punctuated by tensions between the two camps, whether at universities, in the streets or between Ennahda and the national trade union, UGTT. Imbued with the modernity of the Nation-State, the ideology of the modernist elite and its own history and emancipating sensibility, the UGTT is considered close to the ideals of the modernists, yet it is not a political party. It intends to influence the course of the history being forged by defending workers and the unemployed.

These standoffs between modernists and conservatives have crystallised around the media, the Islamists having the sensation that the latter do not reflect their electoral victory and their position in the political arena.

These conflicts, which may seem typical in periods of democratic construction, are taking place with the underlying factor of an acute social and economic crisis. The social crisis originating the revolution is not over. Even worse, it has become aggravated as factories close and under the effects of the scarcity of foreign and national investors. The system can only be relaunched once confidence between governors and governed is restored and in a secure environment. The signs of fracture between different projects for society complicate matters, and the rupture between past and present seems more and more difficult to define. The content of this rupture is not clear to anyone. What should be salvaged from the past and what corresponds to the famous “values of the revolution” so oft cited by all? Though there has been a demand for rupture by the civil society, there has, however, been no real institutional rupture and the transition has gone rather smoothly because the rupture was neither straightforward nor complete.
Political reform in Egypt is not a new issue. In fact, a large number of Egyptian documents, even governmental ones, shows that reform has always been high on the agenda. The difference between the Egypt of pre- and post- January 25 2011 is that reform is now real, at the top of the agenda, indeed a sine qua non for Egypt’s post-revolution transition – hopefully a transition toward democracy.

A former student who went to study for her PhD in the US wrote me two letters, one four years after the other. Unintentionally, her two letters carry significance with regard to this paper on political reform. In her first letter, in 2008, she expressed frustration with her graduate political science program. Such a program, she asserted, focuses too much on ‘democracy theory’ and especially electoral behaviour, with its statistical tables, public opinion surveys and rational choice assumptions. Her second letter arrived three weeks ago and was a volte-face from the first. I could see that her absorption of the political analysis toolkit has advanced enormously as she moves towards finishing her PhD thesis. But more importantly, her two letters carry significance with regard to this paper on political reform. In her first letter, in 2008, she expressed frustration with her graduate political science program. Such a program, she asserted, focuses too much on ‘democracy theory’ and especially electoral behaviour, with its statistical tables, public opinion surveys and rational choice assumptions. Her second letter arrived three weeks ago and was a volte-face from the first. I could see that her absorption of the political analysis toolkit has advanced enormously as she moves towards finishing her PhD thesis. But more importantly, it is the situation on the ground in Egypt and the Middle East as a whole that pushed her to reconsider and see her studies of democracy and elections as relevant. Even before the path-breaking presidential debate in Egypt on 10 May– a first in the region – she came to see the immediate application of what she had previously considered abstract ‘democracy theory’ and ‘electoral behaviour.’ In this respect, the 25 January Revolution has been a milestone, a consequential event separating the ‘before’ and the ‘after.’ But the road to political reform is still long and full of challenges, and even occasional setbacks.

This paper is organised in two parts. The first part situates the political reform objective in its present context; one that shapes both the functioning of this process and determines its outcome. The longer second part centres on the general debate and the political reform agenda. Three principal items of this agenda are singled out:
(a) The type of political system in the making; (b) The role of civil society organisations and evolving state-society relations; and (c) The role of SCAF, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces – the actual holder of political power – and the problem of civil-military relations. The paper’s general conclusion pulls the threads together and raises questions regarding the future of political reform in the post-Arab Spring context.

The Revolutionary Context of Present Political Reform

At the time of writing, thirteen months after Mubarak’s fall, Egypt has gone through four cabinets, with several reshuffles, a total of 42 ministers, and four major bloody clashes which bore signs of civil war (e.g. Maspero, Mohamed Mahmoud, Port Said Football, and Abbasiyya). The clashes left almost three hundred dead, more than two thousand injured and led to hundreds of arrests and considerable material damage, including a fire that destroyed the Scientific Complex building containing the famous work Description de l’Égypte, prepared in the late eighteenth century by the scientists that accompanied Napoleon on his famous French Expedition to Egypt. Many have started to find the price of the 25 January Revolution too high financially and in terms of their daily security. Others, however, believe the fight for the expected political reform is very much worth the time, energy and material already paid, as Egypt “in-
initiates a new history" for itself and perhaps for the region. The anatomy of the “political reform in the making” supports this view.

As mentioned above, political reform is at present at the top of the agenda in Egypt and all over the region as a result of the new context of a tsunami of mass protests. These protests have, to date, brought down four regimes in: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen. Other regimes are fighting for their survival, such as Syria and Bahrain. Even those regimes not suffering from civil wars – such as Morocco, Algeria, Jordan or Saudi Arabia – have started to feel the heat and are now seeing the writing on the wall. While Morocco, for instance, presented a full-fledged plan for constitutional reform, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, on his return from medical treatment in the US, offered his people a grant of $36 billion for housing and employment. Similarly, Jordan’s King Abdullah has changed his cabinet many times in the last few months and Algeria’s Bouteflika declared his intention NOT to be a candidate in the coming presidential elections. Let us not forget, Mubarak declared his NON-candidacy for presidential elections only in the heat of mass protests and just a few days before he was forced to step down completely.

Because of its demographic and cultural weight as a pivotal state, events in Egypt constitute a landscape of the Arab world as a whole and have a snowball effect across the region. The 10 May presidential debate is an example. Millions of Arabs, from Yemen and Bahrain to Algeria and the Sudan, invaded coffee shops to watch the debate alive. Coffee shops overcharged for their beverages, a common practice reserved for major football matches. Briefly, what happens in Egypt has a significance that goes beyond its borders. It has a regional spill-over, a contagious effect. This is why the analysis of reform experiences in Egypt – both successes and setbacks – certainly informs us on this country, but could also help us to understand reform prospects in the region as a whole, especially in the context of the heated upheavals.

Main Components of the Political Reform Agenda

Though the reform agenda is overcrowded, it all echoes Nkrumah’s words: “seek thee the political kingdom and the rest will follow.” The primacy of the political aspect (i.e. the number of presidential mandates, integrity of parliamentary elections, sharing of political power instead of a monopoly by the governing NDP…) had become an issue long before Mubarak’s fall, and might even have been a contributing factor. In my own small personal library, a sample of books and articles on Egypt in the last ten years shows eleven books and as many as 55 articles in academic journals, not counting hundreds of media reports and articles. Much of this writing was produced by professors or academics worried about the evolution of Egypt's political system, although some analyses even came from members of the influential Policies Committee of the governing National Democratic Party (NDP). This committee was headed by the President’s son, Gamal and, rather than serving as a shadow cabinet, was indeed deemed to be the real governing power in Egypt. Though the present agenda integrates some of these past elements (e.g. the presidential term and duration), it prioritises three basic elements:

The Type of Political System in Egypt

Traditionally, the Egyptian political system gave power to the Head of State, with a gesture of consideration to the Parliament and parliamentarians. Parliamentary participation manifested itself, officially, during the monarchy, but disappeared in the republican system. The result is that power became concentrated in the hands of the President and his cronies. He became the new Pharaoh. Before Mubarak, Nasser held the power for sixteen years and then Sadat for eleven. They left their posts only when they died. Mubarak stayed for almost thirty years, and was ready to continue for another mandate even at the age of 83. The debate now aims to limit the President’s mandate to two six-year terms, impose the nomination of at least one vice-President and limit the President’s extensive powers. A minority view wants to go as far as establishing a parliamentary system where the President could govern but not rule. However, in the present political debate, this view cannot prevail. Rather the emphasis is on limiting presidential mandates to two-terms and making the President accountable and his rule much more transparent. Though there is an attempt to counterbalance presidential omnipresence and powers, Egypt’s dominant political culture and its traditions are not ready to marginalise the President.
parliamentary or in-between – are other major aspects that have to be considered. These include major issues such as the separation of powers, including an independent legislative and justice system. Though not yet explicitly detailed in the constitutional debate, the political reform plan should also include unbiased, if not completely independent, media. Though overlooked, this last point has been crucial in maintaining governmental control – if not repression – of citizens. Governmental control meant that the media carried the President’s news (or that of members of his party and family) as top items, even if he were receiving season’s greetings from members of his own cabinet. The media acted as the right arm of the executive power, its machine of brainwashing and ‘soft violence.’ This history of media control is why there is a call at present to simply abolish the Ministry of Information and National Guidance. A caveat is relevant here: we should not imagine that the privatisation of mass media – which occurred during the last few years of Mubarak’s regime – is the solution. Experience shows that those who established their own satellite stations were cronies of the regime, or at least its collaborators – voluntarily or not. In addition, private owners have their own agenda and media outlets are bound to reflect this, unless constitutional rules are explicit and enforced regarding ‘independent’ media. All these issues are the subject of debate as Egypt goes through the process of drafting its constitution. The system is malfunctioning under a ‘temporary’ document of ‘constitutional principles’ hurriedly prepared and voted for a month after Mubarak’s downfall, in March 2011. Though the composition of the committee tasked with writing it was itself the subject of controversy, the document was approved with 78% of the popular vote. It is supposed to be the basis of the new constitution drafted by a 100-member constituent panel, but the composition of the latter has also been fiercely debated. The Parliament, with its two-thirds Islamist majority, took upon itself to set up this panel from within its ranks, angering other political forces which accused the Islamists of ‘hijacking’ the constitution’s drafting process. Moreover, some members who were invited to participate ended up boycotting the first meeting and many insisted that the constituent panel had to reflect “all shades of Egyptian society” and not power relations within the People’s Assembly. In this state of deadlock, SCAF intervened and sent everybody back to square one: to negotiate the composition of the panel with at least 50% of its membership from outside the People’s Assembly. This debate over the composition of the constituent panel shows the state of state-society relations and the need for its ordering in the new revolutionary context. The controversy over the constituent panel, its paralysis, and then SCAF’s response show where real power lies at present in Egypt, which will be addressed once we have dealt with the more general state-society relations. It brings to the fore the issue of civil-military relations as a principle basis of political reform.

Role of Civil Society Organisations and State-Society Relations

Even if the form of governance is still in transition, one thing is clear: state-society relations have been fundamentally reconstructed, in both conception and practice. Tahrir Square has gone from a place of mass demonstration to foretell a new political microcosm of different state-society relations. There is no longer the possibility of governance purely by command: order from above and obedience from below. In fact, in some instances we are reaching the other extreme of an absence of authoritative decisions and guidelines. The political vacuum has been filled by a multitude of strikes, sit-ins, traffic blocks, highway blocks and even encroachments on public and private property. These excesses might be a reflection of attempts by ‘counter-revolutionary’ forces to abort the revolutionary process. But the excesses also reflect the fluid context and attempt to put state-society relations on a new footing after a long period of repression – what I call the pressure cooker hypothesis – with its lid finally blown off. At the intersection of these state-society relations is the role and function of civil society organisations (CSOs).

Though quantitatively Egypt’s CSOs have prospered over the last 30 years or so, reaching approximately 24,600 organisations by 2007 (Kandil in Kornay 2010, 49), their impact has been much less than their quantity would lead us to believe. Part of the explanation of this quantitative/qualitative gap is inherent to the context and mode of functioning of these CSOs. The major obstacle to CSOs’ effectiveness is the government’s restrictive policies and intent to control. In the wake of the 25 January revolution, this is no longer the case. In fact, Tahrir Square and its impact could not have
happened without a new breed of CSOs. These appeared outside the mainstream of traditional political parties and even well-established (or co-opted) CSOs. For instance, the Kefaya movement that prospered after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and especially on the occasion of (pseudo-)constitutional amendments in 2004, is a good example. Its middle-aged leadership served as a training arena for young activists. But these activists soon went on to establish their own organisations: e.g., 6th of April or We are all Khaled Said – a reference to a young activist arrested and killed by police in Alexandria in 2009. These youthful CSOs were the nerve-centre that mobilised the protest movements that finally brought down Mubarak. This new breed of CSOs permeate today's talk shows and have given rise to many presidential candidates' campaigns, from the moderate Islamist Abdel-Moneim Abu-El-Fotouh, to new and younger revolutionary candidates such as Hamdeen Sabahi or Khaled Ali. They are fuelling the establishment with a new political party, Al-Dostour, founded by Nobel-Prize winner Mohamed El-Baradei (former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA).

Many more profited from the disappearance of restrictions to establish themselves. However, the government's control habits are dying hard, and they reappeared vigorously regarding the, often foreign-based, financing of the CSOs. Foreign financing, especially by US organisations such as Freedom House, was magnified and linked to the “penetration of Egypt” and “threats to national security.” Media campaigns multiplied, headed by the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation (a remnant of the Mubarak days) and fuelled by insinuations from SCAF. A few of these US organisations' headquarters were invaded by police and some of their personnel were detained pending their trials. All of these events occurred amidst rising tensions over the rights and duties of CSOs in the new Egypt, which were being threatened by “foreign plots and national agents.”

Suddenly, these foreign agents were released and allowed to leave Egypt on a special US plane. This incident – known in the local media as ‘foreign financing’ – does show the confusion regarding the role of CSOs. In many cases, the public mind still associates many of them with the ‘outside,’ mainly because most of their financing is foreign-based and still lacks full transparency. The basic role of CSOs and state-society relations is still unclear, and awaits the presidential elections and the institution of a new civilian President.

In the meantime, it was SCAF who decided that foreign agents from CSOs could leave the country. SCAF was mainly mindful of relations with the US, but its actions also show where the real powers to make decisions lie in today's Egypt.

**Civil-Military Relations**

In July of this year, Egypt will be celebrating the 60th anniversary of the 1952 coup that transformed Egypt from a hereditary monarchy to a republic. For many, these last sixty years showed that Egypt, to different degrees, is a militarised society. Egypt's four presidents were all from the military.

After the 1967 debacle and the military's attempt to rehabilitate itself and take over from Nasser, Egyptian presidents attempted to restrict the army's 'involvement in politics' and protected their power from military encroachment. The 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty gave the different presidents the occasion to 'professionalise' the army and make it “lean and clean.” With both Sadat (1970-1981) and Mubarak (1981-2011), the internal security apparatus saw its power rise at the expense of the army. In the six-year period 2005-2011, official budget expenditure on the army rose by 63.0%, but rose in the police by three times as much: 181.2% (Ministry of Finance, official budget: different years). Finally, it was the army, through its twenty-member Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), that ousted Mubarak, and took power on February 11 2011.

Since then, events show that SCAF is in the driving seat – almost solely – appointing cabinets and even directing the police. For instance, on August 7 2011, the head of SCAF “Field Marshal Tantawi swore in 15 new governors, 11 of whom were new to the post – the new governors were appointed rather than elected – many of them were military figures and/or members of the old regime and none of them were young, female or Copts” (Wikipedia, downloaded 26/1/2012).

Some analysts suspect that the army’s intention to keep power goes beyond the transition period and that it is actually busy planning future control – not necessarily of civilian authority but over and above it. General Mamdouh Shahin, a member of SCAF, declared in May 2011 that under the new constitution, Egypt's military should be given “some kind of insur-
ance ... so that it is not subject to the whim of a president.” Another reflection of the military’s intention to protect their complete autonomy, even their primacy, is the Sellami Document (former vice-premier) of late 2011 on “the Future of the Political System.” The controversy that ensued the leaking of the document revealed that the army insisted not only on keeping its budget away from civilian control, but also wanted to enjoy veto power in issues not necessarily of a military nature. In response to the protest, SCAF has declared repeatedly that it intends to transfer power as soon as the presidential elections are decided – probably by June 2012. In fact, and failing exceptional circumstances, SCAF will keep its promise – willingly or not.

The problem, however, for Egypt’s political reform and its future system is not SCAF’s formal transfer of political power. The real issue is the military’s intention to be the supreme king-maker. It reflects a conviction of itself as “the embodiment of national will” and Egypt’s salvation with a concomitant anti-transparency mind-set, mode of governance by command, and insistence on keeping even its non-military activities/privileges out of any civilian supervision/control. For instance, it is no longer a secret that the military is practically an economic empire. In 2009, it earned some 1.8 billion Egyptian pounds (almost $300 million) and sales in the military production sector reached 3.6 billion pounds (or $600 million) (Al-Ahram, Oct. 29, 2009). The military also controls a significant share of the real estate sector. Moreover, their ‘vast empire’ touches other key economic areas, including food stuffs (subsidised bread production lines and baking ovens; various types of red and white meat; recycling of biodegradable and non-biodegradable waste – 118 facilities); and the supply of refined gas and fuel via ‘Wataneyya’ gas stations (ICG: 2012).

In December 2011, to help the government out of an acute financial crisis, it lent it $1 billion. One can only guess at the true extent of the military’s assets if they can dispense with a loan of this magnitude.

In addition to the ‘power of the gun,’ which is a characteristic of all military organisations, these economic resources are huge elements of power, especially in the fluid context shaping the future of the transition. These power resources – military and economic – could be translated into solid control of what we could call ‘deep Egypt’: the country’s governing bureaucracy and sub-national institutions. Recently, Foreign Policy Magazine called it “The Egyptian Re-

Indeed, the monopoly of such political and economic resources – and their supervision or transparency – could make civil-military relations and the security sector reform the top items on the political reform agenda.

At the time of writing, the first round of presidential elections has just come to an end but without official results announced yet. Unofficial results, however, foresee the second round – in June – between two front runners. One is from the Muslim Brotherhood, in fact the head of its political party: Freedom and Justice, and the other is from the old regime, in fact he was the last Prime Minister of Mubarak and his former student at the Air Force Academy. Egyptians are facing a dilemma, for it looks for the pessimists as if the 25 January Revolution never took place. Though exaggerated, this view could only be refuted if the process of political reform, now very much at the top of the agenda, succeeds in being carried through.

The Egyptians’ dilemma, notwithstanding what is positive for the prospects of political reform, is that for the first time in 60 years the people in the street feel that their choice makes a difference. Talk shows and Cairo Salon discussions indicate this ‘feeling of ownership’; that they can actually shape their country’s future. They also proved their political involvement in last February’s parliamentary elections by bringing in as many as 81.2% who had never been MPs before.

However, many believe that the new parliament, with more than a two-thirds Islamist majority, is indeed a change, but in the wrong direction. For instance, rather than a step toward gender equality, there are proposals for its regression. Moreover, the new parliamentary majority is attempting to monopolise the emerging political process rather than share it, even changing their former promises along the road with a new Islamist presidential candidate as front-runner. Political expediency is being replaced by political domination.

The proverbial man and woman of the street also reformed the system by forcing those competing for
the top position – presidential candidates – to appeal to the layman through a presidential debate. This appeal to ‘popular vote,’ instead of guaranteeing its +90% beforehand, is a first in Egypt and even the Arab world. A change in Egyptians’ socialisation and culture has already been initiated: the President is no longer a pharaoh or semi-god that does not have to appeal to his ‘subjects.’ Such restructuring of political culture is an important prerequisite of any real process of political reform.

These competing outcomes of embryonic political reform show that Egypt is indeed at an important intersection. Though the outcome of political reform is not yet clear, the analysis of the process itself could tell us who the main actors are, their agenda and their means to shape the outcome in the post-January 25 context.

**Conclusion**

In part one, this paper began its analysis by situating the political reform objective in its present context; one that shapes both the functioning of this process and determines its outcome. The longer part two focused on the general debate and the political reform agenda. Three principal items of this agenda were singled out: 1) the type of political system in the making; 2) the role of civil society organisations and evolving state-society relations; and 3) the role of SCAF, the Supreme Council of Military Forces – the current holder of political power – and the problem of civil-military relations. The paper analysed different views and interactions among the different political forces, old and new. So, what conclusions can be drawn?

Because the outcome of political reform is still incomplete, this paper focused on the ‘process in the making.’ Such an approach made the analysis much more dynamic and closer to what is occurring ‘on the street.’ The outcome of the present political reform process will be influenced, if not determined, by the post-January 25 revolutionary context, which not only has led to a plethora of new political forces, but also to these forces meeting one another without restrictions. It is part of what I call the pressure-cooker lid being blown off.

Because of this tense period in Egypt, it is easy to be disappointed and frustrated with the slow pace of reform and even pessimistic about its future outcome. But the paper argues that, although Egypt’s process of political reform will be long and challenging, it is on the right track. It has already racked up some achievements, for instance by specifying the crucial agenda items and demonstrating how the process could proceed. Moreover, the political arena is now full of new political forces which have a stake in their country’s future and are active in promoting and carrying out this agenda. There is a new sense of belonging on the part of the man/woman on the street. This last aspect is a prerequisite for any balanced State-society relations and workable social contract, the very essence of political reform.

The importance of these initial achievements is that they inform us about the assets/liabilities of the map of political reform and its process. Such mapping and its process are key for the future of Egypt and, given the geo-cultural/demographic weight of this country, for the Arab region as a whole.

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The year 2011 certainly made a lasting impression, constituting a turning point in the Arab-Muslim world, victim of many decades of immobility in governance. Deprived of political participation and economic well-being, the “Arab streets,” from Tunis to Sana’a, as well as Tripoli, Damascus and Cairo, have let their anger explode, causing a surge of protest – a major tsunami – sweeping away the hereditary, clannish dictatorships that were considered rock-solid one by one. However, the enthusiasm and hopes associated with this wave of revolt called the Arab Spring soon gave way to numerous questions and even a certain disillusionment largely linked to the progress of Islamists at the polls, placing 2012 under the sign of uncertainty.

The “green landslide” of the first free legislative elections, which consolidated the rise to power of Islamist circles springing from the rubble of the fallen authoritarian regimes, has left a number of observers sceptical about the real outcome of this nearly unprecedented wave of protest. Whereas the majority of arenas of protest have just inaugurated Year II of the Arab Spring, some now refer to an “Islamist Autumn” to describe the electoral success by Ennahda in Tunisia, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists in Egypt, not to mention the prominent position that will most certainly go to Islamist parties in Libya – where legislative elections are due to be held in mid-2013 – as well as in Syria, where the crisis and the fierce repression by the Bashar al-Assad regime are only contributing to radicalising protest. How can it be that Islamist movements or parties, whose place in the groundswell of protest had been secondary, have nevertheless succeeded in taking the upper hand at elections? Are we to dread such an outcome of the Arab revolts, which in any case, does not seem to surprise the most discerning observers? For it is clear that the emergence of the new Islamist powers seems to have distressed certain commentators who had been convinced that the Arab-Muslim world would undeniably move towards a mode of democratic governance directly patterned on the Western model, or other commentators who follow a culturalist approach according to which Islam is supposedly incompatible with democracy.

From the Twitter Generation to the Resurgence of Islamist Movements: “A Premium for the Oppressed”

Yet it is Arab youth – comprising nearly two thirds of the population in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) area – who are responsible for the first fruits of the winds of revolt that swept the entire region over the course of 2011. The “baby-boomers,” those young unemployed university graduates, let their anger explode, flooding the streets to immortalise the famous slogan “Erhal!” (“Get out!”), addressed at immutable dictatorships, thus breaking with the years of immobility and submission that had prevailed among older generations. Mastering information and communication technology, including social networks such as Facebook, YouTube or Twitter, those “weapons of mass subversion” that make each protester a real photojournalist capable of bypassing censorship and denouncing repression, the urbanised elite youth open to globalisation have undoubtedly been the main vehicle for the Arab revolutions. Thus, early on in the uprisings, there was no indication of a rise of Islamist movements, which were relegated to the background in the protests.
gans chanted by the demonstrators focussed on both democratic and socio-economic demands. The usual Islamist themes based on hostility to the “Great Satan,” and more broadly on a rejection of the West – a discourse fostered by autocrats with the aim of deflecting the population’s discontent towards the outside – were completely overshadowed by the protesters, prompting many observers to describe the Arab Spring as “post-Islamist revolutions.”

Torn since the early 20th century between religious power and autocratic regimes, the Arab world was finally breaking this “vicious circle” and moving towards a third alternative symbolised by young people’s aspirations to liberty.

But it was too hasty and demonstrated a certain naïveté to declare the death of political Islam in the wake of the Arab Spring. Spontaneous and devoid of any ideological basis, the wave of protest that struck the dictators of the region warrants the name of an “Arab Tsunami,” insofar as the revolutions we have witnessed are far from being a completed process with a single purpose. In other words, once the authoritarian regimes were overthrown, the process of democratic transition, which will take much longer, quickly revealed the lack of organisation among the main actors of the revolutions, for the political sphere had been completely blocked by decades of dictatorships. Evidence of this was the plethora of political parties constituted before the first legislative elections in both Tunisia and Egypt, all claiming more or less the same secular, liberal ideology and whose forces would eventually be dispersed in the face of the much more structured Islamist parties.

For though the former dictatorships had managed to silence any dissenting voices within civil society by establishing a police state, they had, however, been unable to destroy the decades-long passive resistance of religious movements. Fiercely opposed by Ben Ali in Tunisia, forced into servitude under the Mubarak regime in Egypt, subject to bloody repression during the reign of Gaddafi in Libya or Assad – father and son – in Syria, Islamist movements have long been prime targets of authoritarian republics that had imposed a form of secularism by force. Indeed, let us recall that the powers that had emerged in the post-colonial era of the 1950s and 60s, marked by the advent of Arab nationalism – the “Ummah Arabiya” (Arab Community) as opposed to the “Ummah Islamiya” (Islamic Community) –, had built all their legitimacy, both in the eyes of the West and among their own populations, by presenting themselves as ramparts against the rise of radical Islamism.

Yet the successive defeats of the Arab regimes in conflicts with Israel (1948, 1967 and 1973) led Egypt and Jordan in particular to cease all forms of direct military confrontation with the Hebrew State by endorsing peace agreements that have greatly weakened their legitimacy in the eyes of the “Arab streets,” remaining sensitive to the Palestinian cause. This unifying, emotionally-charged trump card was recovered by the Islamist movement, contributing to further discredit dictators in the region, accused of giving up the struggle against Israel and of complicity with “American imperialism.”

**Torn between religious power and autocratic regimes, the Arab world was finally breaking this “vicious circle” and moving towards a third alternative symbolised by young people’s aspirations to liberty**

This new climate emerging in the late 1970s allowed Islamist parties, and primarily the Muslim Brotherhood, to increase their popularity among the population, presenting themselves once again as the only alternative to regimes designated in radical Islamist doctrine as “the near enemy,” in parallel to “the distant enemy,” a term reserved for America and its allies. Note also that at the regional level, this ideological shift within the Arab world coincided with the Islamic revolution in Iran. The irresistible rise of the Shiite ayatollah regime established by Khomeini succeeded in reappropriating itself of the mobilising theme of the struggle against Israel, thus promoting the export of its theocratic model. The rise of the Islamist Palestinian Hamas – thenceforth supported by the Tehran regime to the detriment of the Palestinian Authority, embodied by Yasser Arafat, who was the expression of Arab nationalism that was losing ground in the Israeli-Arab conflict – is certainly one of the most iconic illustrations of this paradigm shift in the Arab world, which would gradually pave the way for Islamist movements.

Thus, for decades of brutal repression, the Islamists managed to maintain a capacity for mobilising the population as well as a perfectly structured hierarchy.
using mosques and “Friday sermons” which allowed them to sustain real networks, in particular through charitable organisations, and thus perpetuate their existence as political-religious movements. It is also this same organisational ability that led Islamist parties to victory at legislative elections following the Arab Spring. For the millions of Muslims who turned out to vote in Tunis, Cairo and Rabat, these movements – which are far from being uniform, as we will see below, but whose common point is the religious factor as a main unifying force – have embodied the only immediate alternative in the Arab world since then, which will undoubtedly need to build a third track in the longer term. In addition, the extremely high illiteracy rate in certain countries of the region, particularly Egypt, undoubtedly contributed to the overwhelming vote in favour of Islamists and its more radical branches embodied by Salafism.

The “green landslide” consecrating the rise to power of the Islamists was apparently only the confirmation of a long-term predominance that authoritarian regimes had disguised through censorship of the political arena. Evidence of this is a survey taken in early 2010, that is, several months before the onset of the protests, by the NGO Pew Research Center, which indicated that an overwhelming majority of people in the MENA region declared themselves favourable to a preponderant position for Islam in the public political sphere. This electoral victory is a sort of “premium for the oppressed” of the former regimes, in benefit of those who probably suffered the most during the many years of bloody repression. More prevalent in rural areas than the secular parties emerging from the urbanised elite, the anchorage of Islamists among the working class has proven a determining factor that was underestimated by observers.

To speak of a single political Islam emerging from the “Arab tsunami,” whose aftershocks are still being felt in the arenas of the transition that is underway, would consist of denying the specificities of each of the societies in the Arab-Muslim region, from the Maghreb to the Arabian-Persian Gulf, not to mention the Near or Middle East. Although they share a certain moral conservatism, Islamist parties can be divided into two major trends today: the more moderate Muslim Brotherhood, and to their right, the Salafists, who advocate a rigorous Sunni Islam doctrine. While it seems perfectly legitimate to draw a distinction between these two trends, one must however emphasise that their political border remains porous at times. Like the parties – both left and right-wing – in European politics, who may have to flirt with more extreme factions for electoral reasons, the Muslim Brotherhood is sometimes forced to endorse certain Salafist discourse due to their high popularity among the lower classes, as is particularly the case in Egypt.

Emerging from the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the pan-Islamist organisation established in Egypt at the beginning of the 20th century before spreading to the rest of the Arab world, the category of moderate Islamist party presently constitutes the main, dominant force on the new political stage emerging from the Arab Spring uprisings. These movements, represented by Ennahda in Tunisia, the Justice and Development Party (PJD) in Morocco and the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in Egypt, have all chosen the Turkish AKP model, borrowing terms referring to the notions of “development”, “justice” and “freedom” for their names. Moreover, everything would lead to believe that these same movements will rise to power in Libya, and even in Syria, should the uprising against Bashar al-Assad’s Alawi regime be successful.

Radical Islamism versus “Real Islamism”: the Apology of the Turkish Model

To speak of a single political Islam emerging from the “Arab tsunami,” would consist of denying the specificities of each of the societies in the Arab-Muslim region, from the Maghreb to the Arabian-Persian Gulf, not to mention the Near or Middle East.

The ensemble of these moderate Islamist parties have chosen to follow the democratic model and the principle of plurality in the political sphere. Such an orientation is also related to the fact that in many cases, they won recent legislative elections only by a small margin, requiring them to coexist with other liberal, secular and/or progressive parties. Moreover, they are in favour of economic liberalism, demon-
strating a certain capacity to compromise insofar as respect for religious dogma with a view to the requirements of good economic governance, which takes the form of “RealIslamism” at a time when these countries need to recover from several months of protests that have paralysed and ruined their economy.

Thus, in the face of economic realities, the different Muslim Brotherhoods cannot switch to a form of radicalism that would devastate tourism (establishment of a “morality police,” prohibition of the sale of alcohol, etc.) or a great many other service sectors requiring the full integration of women into the labour market (banking, finance, retail and so on). At present, political Islam is well aware that it will have to make many concessions to meet the demands of good economic governance.

These Islamist parties are in favour of economic liberalism, demonstrating a certain capacity to compromise insofar as respect for religious dogma with a view to the requirements of good economic governance.

On the geostrategic level, the evolution of the “post-Arab Spring” Islamist movement is accompanied by a strategic reversal effected by the United States in the wake of the major geopolitical changes arising from this regional “tsunami.” Indeed, though the Europeans remain sceptical with regard to the preponderance of Islamist parties, the latter are becoming Washington’s new partners in the region. For decades on end, American diplomacy, backed by Western governments, had endorsed secular authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, considering them an invaluable defence against the “Islamic threat.” But in the face of the increasingly challenged legitimacy of these autocrats who eventually monopolised all of the wealth of their countries, the United States has now chosen to change partners in moving towards Islamist parties, whose pragmatism has led the US Administration to “de-demonise” political Islam.

Qatar’s role is thus a key element in the relationship between the Islamic powers emerging from the Arab Spring and the Western camp in general. The tiny yet wealthy oil emirate has largely financed the electoral campaigns of these Muslim Brotherhood-related movements, undoubtedly contributing to their success. Responsible for “taming” them and orienting them towards an Islamism open to economic liberalism and devoid of any anti-Western ideology, Qatar seeks to establish itself as a new centre of 21st-century Islamism at the expense of Saudi Arabia. Yet in this terrain, the Emirate comes into direct competition with the powerful Wahhabi kingdom, which in turn favours financing the more radical Salafist movements emerging from the lower classes.

For, to the right of the Muslim Brotherhood movements, the Salafist parties, although a minority force, still wish to assert their presence and steal “market shares” from these new Islamist powers accused of “complacency” vis-à-vis the West. This is evinced by the Salafists’ surprising electoral results in Egypt, where they had made the unprecedented choice of joining the game of the polls, an attitude that contrasts with years of boycotting the formal political arena whose legitimacy they had never acknowledged. Advocating the introduction of Sharia – i.e. Islamic law as the sole mode of governance – the Salafists differ from other parties in their more belligerent discourse against the West and by violent action, as was the case in Tunisia when they stormed a television station last October to protest against the broadcasting of the film “Persepolis.”

For moderate Islamist parties, anxious to reassure their international partners, their ability to neutralise Salafist ideology will primarily depend on their temptation to flirt with these extremes in order to recover the part of their constituency that has been “led astray.” For only economic development and social progress can free Arab-Muslim societies of the most radical ideologies.

**Islamist Movements Will Not Govern Alone**

Though the Arab Springs have led to the emergence of a transnational Islamist dynamic comprised by parties sharing a common ideology and the experience of repression in the era of the dictatorships, our analytical framework in this phase of democratic transition must certainly take into account the particularities and local issues, which differ from one country to another. The re-
result of varying national experiences, Islamist movements have evolved in distinct political circumstances and particular contexts. In other words, the Islamist rise to power after the wave of protests is far from homogeneous, since these parties must currently interact with other players, election results not always resulting in a clear-cut majority.

Hence, after the Tunisian legislative elections of October 2011, the Ennahda party was compelled to make an alliance and share power with the two main left-wing parties, Congress for the Republic (CPR), led by Moncef Marzouki – elected President of the Republic – and the Ettakatol party headed by Mustapha Ben Jaafar, appointed leader of Parliament. Moreover, pressure from its partners and the continuation of the street demonstrations in Tunisia have forced Ennahda to abandon its plans for an Islamic Constitution.

In Morocco, despite the clear victory of the PJD led by Benkirane, the Islamists must govern within a monarchic system in which the major decisions are not made in Parliament but at the Royal Palace. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood must coexist with the military institution that continues to hold the country’s reins. And finally, in Libya’s National Transitional Council (NTC), there is tension between Islamists and secularists, foreshadowing a future coexistence of these two main camps.

The same is true on the economic level. For in contrast to the Turkish AKP, with which it claims similarities and which has its roots in the provincial merchant middle class, the Muslim Brotherhood parties have very little anchorage in the capitalist classes, who most often have ties to the former regimes. In order to ensure good economic governance, an element crucial for the continuity of their power, Islamists must make allies among business stakeholders, though the latter are far from subscribing to their ideas.

The Islamist rise to power after the wave of protests is far from homogeneous, since these parties must currently interact with other players, election results not always resulting in a clear-cut majority.

Finally, today, in an Arab world still fully undergoing change, it seems difficult to judge parties that are continually evolving at high speed. The latter were elected by a majority of voters, not only for religious reasons, but also for their promises to break with the modes of governance of the ousted dictatorships. Hence, if they drifted into radicalism, compromising individual liberties, women’s emancipation or political and religious pluralism, the Islamists would run the risk of being considered a dictatorial power themselves, which would again be sanctioned by demonstrators or at the polls. Meanwhile, after several decades of deadlock in the political arena, secular parties will certainly need to become more structured, thus serving as a more efficient alternative in issues of a socio-economic order, which remain a priority for the entire population of the Arab world. Some already consider that the failure of the Islamists in bringing about economic recovery in Egypt and Tunisia signals their political defeat. Though it has long experience in the ranks of the opposition, political Islam remains a novice in the exercise of power.
A topical event par excellence, the Arab Spring is so in all regards. From the start, the media were present not only to carry out their prime mission of informing, but likewise, in some cases, to accompany the revolts, encourage them and even expand their dimensions and breadth. The media even became one of the imperatives of the spreading dissent. Suffice it to cite the role played by the Al-Jazeera television network during the revolts in the Arab world. A source of information but also of mobilisation, the Qatari television channel became a key factor in the development of events in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria and everywhere where voices were raised against the regimes in place.

The phenomenon is not only Arab, but worldwide, since the Arab Spring has become a preferred subject on television news programmes, news magazines and talk shows, particularly in the West.

**The Media, the Arab Spring, and “Fast Thinkers”: The Runoff between the End of the Fundamentalist Era and the Surprise of the Islamist Triumph**

The corollary of this craze for the Arab Spring was the emergence of a category of self-proclaimed specialists, “fast thinkers” of sorts that became indispensable for TV hosts lacking reliable sources of knowledge and analyses. Under these conditions, the images broadcast by television networks had become the main source of information and therefore of analysis on TV programmes, hence the hasty and erroneous conclusions on the nature of events, their development and the actors involved. One of the errors of these analyses and commentaries, with the arrival of the first images of the popular revolts, was certainly the announcement of the decline or even the end of the Islamist era. By emphasising the absence of anti-Western slogans or references to Israel on protest banners, the Western media and its analysts of the time focused on the fundamental role of social networks in mobilising youth, the role of pro-modernity youth in fostering the protest movements, on the slogans used and on the gender balance of protest participants. All of these elements, though true, led “fast thinkers” to consider Islamist movements “dead” and speak of a new era of changes with modernising or even universalist overtones in the Arab-Islamic world. They simply forgot that this was but part of the picture and that in the other part of the picture, ignored by the media in the wake of the “revolutionary” effervescence, Islamist movements occupied a preponderant position, and that if they were not visible at the start of events it was because they did not want to be, becoming visible at the point when they felt it politically opportune.

In the second stage, the surprise of seeing the Islamists reap the fruit of the Arab revolts, namely at elections, replaced the enthusiasm that had accompanied the onset of the uprisings. The inspiration for analyses and commentary remained the same: the images broadcast by the different media stations. Commentators and analysts were surprised to see different Islamist forces emerge as events developed, or to see them slowly gaining the forefront, and above all largely win elections, this time transparent and democratic ones.

Whether in the first stage or the second one, there
was a certain penury of analysis and an increasingly obvious ignorance of the West regarding the Arab-Islamic world. Of course, this judgement must be relativised, yet the existence of certain true Western specialists on the Arab-Islamic sphere, curiously absent from the media, does not prevent us from missing the days of the pioneers of Western Arabic and Islamic studies, as, for instance, L. Massignon, H. Laoust, L. Gardet, G.E. Von Grunebaum, J.P. Charnay, W.C. Smith, J. Berque, M. Robinson, etc.

A Few Obvious Facts on Islamisms

Five obvious facts seem to me primordial when discussing today’s Islamist phenomenon. The first concerns the plural nature of Islamism. Islamism is not a monolithic movement; on the contrary, it consists of different trends whose contradictions are often deeper than those existing between certain Islamist and non-Islamist movements. Not taking this into account amounts to an abuse of language as inadequate as it is confusing.

Islamisms are the product of specific contexts and are influenced in return by these contexts. The environment where these Islamisms emerged and evolve has a great impact on their nature. These differences are not only due to the doctrinal vulgates of one or another trend, but also to the impacts of their places of emergence and development and the choice of these doctrinal vulgates; whereby the readings made of them are the product of these circumstances as well as of the behaviour of the different Islamist actors in their contexts.

The second obvious fact has to do with the characteristic that distinguishes new Islamist scholars from their forerunners, the ulemas of yore. It concerns the extreme modernity of the new scholars. This aspect has already been pointed out by numerous specialists of political Islam. A product of modern education, adopting forms of organisation arising from the same register, implementing the latest in communication and propaganda, the new Muslim scholar is the product of his time and not a relic of the past, even if on the doctrinal level a common foundation unites the two types of scholars and even if the political positions of scholars, regardless of age differences, can be reduced to several typical ideal stances.

The third obvious fact has to do with the anchorage of Islamism in today’s Muslim societies. Astonishment is always expressed at the weakness of non-Islamist ideological factions vis-à-vis Islamist ones, in particular during the last rounds of elections in the Arab world, but it is often forgotten that Islamist ideology is different from other ideologies, taking its main force from the continuity between it and the deeply Islamic nature of today’s Muslim societies. The return to religion, which in this case is a recovery of religiosity and cult practices, since religion has never been absent from these societies, constitutes the main asset of triumphant Islamism.

There was a certain penury of analysis and an increasingly obvious ignorance of the West regarding the Arab-Islamic world

The fourth obvious fact regards the astonishment accompanying the triumph of Islamisms, namely during recent electoral processes in the Arab world. Such astonishment reveals a failure to realise that these elections, for once transparent and democratic, did not but put into figures a reality that had previously been concealed by authoritarian regimes. Repression on the one hand and the electoral masquerades on the other had long concealed this reality. In this regard, on the altar of political realism, the free world had sacrificed victims of abuses that included the liberal and democratic factions just as much as Islamists. The victory of the latter in free and transparent elections today is a must for any democratic process worthy of the name.

The fifth and final obvious fact seems to me to relate to the relation between the Arab Spring and the current emergence of Islamism in the different countries of the Arab world. Although the Arab Spring is not responsible for the emergence of Islamisms or for strengthening them, it has, however, allowed them the opportunity of reviving their movements and appearing in broad daylight. The liberalisation of the political arena has provided an opportunity for advance and expression for Islamist movements previously fettered by the regimes in power. It is a liberalisation that benefits all movements in favour of it, but in the first place Islamist ones, for the reasons indicated above.
Islamism, from Dissent to Power: The Case of Morocco

The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in Egypt, the Ennahda Party in Tunisia and the Justice and Development Party (PJD) in Morocco are Islamist parties that have come into power through the Arab Spring. Seen from the West, in particular by the “fast thinkers,” this was an enormous surprise, when there had previously been extensive speculation about the absence of bearded men and Islamist slogans at protests. Only appearances were taken into account, the more complex reality being utterly disregarded. Islamism is a multifarious movement – its forms are many and its actions varied. Management of the Islamist phenomenon by States is likewise varied, oscillating between political and security approaches. The case of Morocco is instructive in this regard. Today, Morocco is undergoing religious reorganisation, essentially around power and the social model to be built. In fact, Islam has always played a role in politics in Muslim Morocco. As a basis for the legitimacy of power or as a form of dissent against the established social and political order, the reference to religion has never been absent from the political arena. Often present in an implicit and conventional manner at times of coolness and political calm, but also manifestly boisterous at times of political effervescence. Islam in Morocco takes a number of ideological forms: State fundamentalism, reformist Salafism, Wahhabi Salafism, reformist fundamentalism, fundamentalist Islamism and Jihadi Salafism. Directly affected by the State’s religious policy and the reaffirmation of the King’s religious status, Islamists express contradictory opinions, revealing their divergence of positions regarding the monarchy and the nature of the State. Due to lack of space, we will only discuss the case of the Justice and Development Party (PJD), which was recently voted into power, namely in the legislative elections of 25 November 2011.

From Chabiba Islamiya to the PJD, or When Fundamentalism Gives Way to Reformism

Chabiba Islamiya (Islamist Youth), the forerunner of the PJD, the party now heading the Moroccan government, was first a fundamentalist movement founded in 1969 and a legal association authorised in 1972.

As a basis for the legitimacy of power or as a form of dissent against the established social and political order, the reference to religion has never been absent from the political arena

The assassination of the Socialist Party leader, Omar Benjelloun, in 1975 by members of Chabiba Islamiya ended the association’s legal existence. Other Islamist organisations would later appear, joined by former members of Chabiba. Among these were:

- Al-Mujahidun Movement, based abroad, which advocated violent action. It was attributed the attack against Hotel Asni in Marrakech in 1994;
- Al-Badil al-Hadari, whose posts of President of Honour, President and Vice-President were held by Ibrahim Kamal, Mustapha Moatassim and Rgala, respectively;
- Al-Jama’a al-Islamiya;
- Al-Haraka min Ajli al-Ummah (Movement for the Islamic Community), led by Mohamed El Marouani.

These Islamist groups opted for the creation of either religious associations or political parties. Al-Badil al-Hadari and Al-Haraka min Ajli al-Ummah, which were organised as political parties, are banned today. Their leaders, first imprisoned with regard to the so-called Belliraj affair, are now free via royal amnesty. Belliraj is a former member of Chabiba Islamiya living in Belgium and suspected of leading a terrorist organisation.

Abdallah Moti fled Morocco after the assassination of the socialist leader, Omar Benjelloun. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in absentia in 1980. He left behind him a web of militant Islamists, some of whom gave up violence to become progressively integrated into the reformist Islamist landscape. In 1981, Abdelilah Benkirane (current Head of Government), Abdallah Baha (current Minister of State), Mohammed Yatim (current Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives) and Saad-Eddine al-
Othmani (current Minister of Foreign Affairs) definitively broke with Chabiba Islamiya, of which they had been former members, and formed the association Jama’a Islamiya (the Islamic Community). In 1992, in reaction to events in Algeria, Jama’a Islamiya changed its name to Al-Islah wa Attajadid (Reform and Renewal). The year 1996 opened the last stage in the history of the movement, when some of the Jama’a officers joined the Popular Constitutional and Democratic Movement (MPCD) party, then led by Doctor Abdelkrim Alkhatib. After the failure of several attempts to create an independent Islamist party, their membership was confirmed at the MPDC convention in June 1996. Several months later, after its union with the Movement for an Islamic Future, headed by Ahmed Raissouni, the Al-Islah wa Attajadid association changed its name to Al-Islah wa Tawhid (Unity and Reform Movement, MUR).

The victory of the Islamists in free and transparent elections today is a must for any democratic process worthy of the name.

Following the 1997 elections, the new balance of power in the MPDC resulted in the party’s being renamed Justice and Development Party (PJD). The party’s varied participation in electoral processes eventually lent it a normalcy that made it one of the main political forces in the Kingdom.

The PJD/MUR movement’s double structure has allowed its actors to carry out religious action through the MUR and, at the same time, political action through the PJD. The new political situation created following the events of 16 May 2003 (terrorist attacks in Casablanca) led the movement to turn towards a sort of specialisation of its senior party members, some becoming more active in religious affairs while others occupied the niche of political action through the PJD.

Insofar as the nature of the political regime, PJD and MUR leaders assert that question should not even be posed, since Islam, as established by the Constitution, is the State religion and the head of state is a Commander of the Faithful. The form of confessional State being thus confirmed by law, the content must be promoted through religious preaching within society and political action in the institutions, in a strategy where the appropriation of the traditional principles of monarchic legitimacy also serves to legitimise the political action of Islamists in a political sphere called upon to separate from the religious sphere. Integration in this sphere requires allegiance to the monarchy and commitment to the Islamic identity of the State, the main themes in the discourse of integrated Islamists, particularly after the 16 May events.

With regard to this matter arose the issues of the relationship between politics and religion and of the nature of the State, an issue that King Hassan II seems to have settled during his long reign (1961-1999). Indeed, in a speech delivered before the members of the regional ulema councils on 2 February 1980, King Hassan II stated in this regard: “it is true that the government and the ulemas constitute one and the same family. Religion and worldly affairs intertwine. The day when the Muslim State separates religion and the earthly world, that day, if ever it should arrive, would justify our celebrating in advance the funeral of such a State.”

King Mohammed VI confirmed this conception of the State the day after he rose to the throne. The issue of religion, however, again arose, but this time more shrilly, following the events of 16 May 2003 and the emergence into broad daylight of terrorist fundamentalism on the country’s political stage. The King again had to redefine the politics-religion relationship and the function of Commander of the Faithful in a non-secular State. Three speeches by King Mohammed VI, delivered on 29 May 2003, 30 April 2004 and 30 July 2004, essentially focused on the religious question and the relationship between politics and religion. “A clear separation,” stated the King, “must be made between religion and politics, considering the sacred nature of the dogma conveyed by religion, which should be exempt from any discord or dissension by its very nature, whence the need to counter any instrumental use of religion to political ends.”

1 Royal Speech of 30 April 2004
2 Throne Speech of 30 July 2004
Translated into practical terms, this maxim consists in the assertion of a monopoly of the State in religious affairs. The principle of the Commandership of the Faithful legitimises this assertion by lending it a doctrinal basis in the Muslim theory of power.

Integration of Islamists in the Political Arena

The Islamists participated in the legislative elections of 14 November 1997, which resulted in parliamentary seats being won by members of this movement. With nine MPs, under the aegis of a long-standing party, the Popular Constitutional and Democratic Movement (MPCD), so-called moderate Moroccan Islamists entered the House of Representatives with the blessing of the authorities, who had opted for the political normalisation of this movement. Far from reflecting the real weight of Islamist movements in the Moroccan political arena, these elections nonetheless revealed Islamist intentions to gain power. The path was opened for their access to parliament through these elections. With representation limited to nine MPs, they were immediately subject to an "entrance exam" during that legislature. Sanctioned by a good mark, the normalisation of the Islamist movement would be confirmed in the September 2002 legislative elections. With 42 MPs, among them six women, in the Assembly of Representatives in the new legislature, the PJD became the third political force in the country after the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) and the Istiqlal party. Received and interpreted as a spectacular breakthrough by the Islamist movement, this score is, in fact, the expression of a political fact already long-standing in Morocco, which the country’s official political map, as drawn until then by the administration in power, had not revealed. The following (2007 and 2011) legislative elections confirmed the real weight of legalist Islamists in Morocco’s current political landscape.

The PJD’s performance at elections, in particular those of 25 November 2011, have made it the country’s top party today. As such, it is currently leading a real shift in government.

It is not enough to integrate Islamist movements into the legal political sphere to prevent the birth and development of fundamentalism, or even the most radical Islamist terrorism.

Aimed at the main organisations of political Islam, the strategy of Islamist integration in the legal political sphere has only been partially successful. The Al-adl wa Al-Ihsan movement remains impervious to this appeal. The terrorist attacks of 16 May 2003 and those following relativised the impact of this strategy. Events have demonstrated, in fact, that it is not enough to integrate Islamist movements into the legal political sphere to prevent the birth and development of fundamentalism, or even the most radical Islamist terrorism.
Miguel Ángel Moratinos
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Spain

It is impossible to talk about diplomacy or international relations without mentioning the Mediterranean. In fact, the origin of today’s diplomatic tools and instruments can be traced back to that part of the Levant, in present-day Syria, where a cuneiform tablet was discovered inscribed with a text referring to a protocol between the kingdoms of Ebla (Syria) and Hamazi (modern-day Iran). What a paradox, then, to “rediscover” the Mediterranean 2,500 years later and find Syria and Iran once again standing centre stage in the theatre of contemporary diplomacy. It is the very embodiment of the “eternal return”! Of course, the tablets are not the only evidence of the history of diplomacy and its ties to the Mediterranean. Classical Greek and Roman antiquity and the splendour of the city-states of the Italian Renaissance are likewise proof of the leading role the Mediterranean has played in the spheres of geostrategy and diplomacy. Indeed, the region’s many contributions to the development of international activity go well beyond the scope of this article, which is chiefly focused on the recent past, present and future of the Mediterranean.

True, the Mare Nostrum faded from the international scene in the 19th century, and it was not until the formal independence of the coastal Arab states following WWII that its historical prominence was partially restored. However, the period of East-West bipolarity once again relegated it to a secondary role and to passing references to the presence of the US Navy’s Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Navy’s efforts to counter it. “The Mediterranean, that forgotten sea,” as I have often noted in the past, did not become a meeting point until the tail end of the Soviet-American rivalry, when Mikhail Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush met off the coast of Malta in what would ultimately be the beginning of the end of the Cold War.

It was not until Europe’s timid awakening that the region once again became a focus of attention and the countries of the European Union took a new and critical interest in it. The awakening was not easy. Unsurprisingly, it was the southern countries that made the first attempts to develop a new policy towards the region. In the 1990s, France, Italy and Spain undertook a review of the Mediterranean policy. This gave rise to the “5+5” Dialogue and other proposals for the Western Mediterranean. The different initiatives of the “Latin Arc” countries helped to raise the awareness of the other European countries. A few years later, following an unsuccessful attempt by the then Italian Foreign Minister Gianni De Michelis to establish a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) similar to the Helsinki Act for the countries of the East, the geographical and thematic framework of the Mediterranean initiatives was broadened. The European Union was to be present in its entirety, without excluding anyone, including, logically, Israel.

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the strengthening of the instruments and policies towards Central and Eastern Europe also showed that the “South” could not be excluded from the new European neighbourhood architecture. Hence, the Barcelona Process, a “revolutionary” diplomatic process in terms of both its ambition and the driving concept behind it, was born. For the first time, a global approach was to be taken to the Euro-Mediterranean reality and efforts were made to address all the region’s challenges, whether political or security-related, economic or financial, or, for the first time, human or cultural.

The desire to initiate “a process” was unanimous;
everyone was aware of the difficulties we faced and the need to gain time to create this Euro-Mediterranean space. The Barcelona Declaration was the expression of the political will and constituent commitment to jointly create a framework of peaceful coexistence and shared prosperity. The favourable climate of peace in the Middle East and the hope that the Arab-Israeli conflict would soon be resolved helped pave the way for it. When Arab-Israeli tensions flared back up and the process stagnated, it thus fell captive to the logic of obstruction and intransigence so common in the Middle East.

In 2011, the improbable became possible. The fall of President Ben Ali and the beginning of the so-called "Arab Spring" changed the region's strategic framework.

The “Barcelona Process” had its high points and low points, but, looking back, I believe it can fairly be said that the highs outweighed the lows. None of its proposals or actions had negative consequences. All of its efforts were aimed at easing tensions and proposing solutions. True, greater political conviction and determination were needed, but the overall results were hardly negative.

Building on the legacy of the “Barcelona Process,” the Summit of Euro-Mediterranean Heads of State and Government laid out the broad lines of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in Paris in June 2008. Former French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s initial proposal was marked by an exaggerated voluntarism, which was later abandoned at the first signs of crisis. However, the idea itself was sound: let us forge a political union based on a meeting at the highest level of the heads of state and government every two years to strategically analyse the region’s future. Only one such meeting was held. The more urgent it became for the heads of state and government to meet in order to tackle the crisis in the Middle East, the longer the meeting was postponed. The courage and political commitment required to take control of the region’s future were lacking. The UfM was also intended to carry out specific projects related to infrastructure, solar power, the environment, cooperation, etc. Unfortunately, these projects never got off the ground.

To ensure institutional continuity, a Secretary General of the Union for the Mediterranean was set up in Barcelona, a key project that has not been allocated the necessary and appropriate resources. It took over from the “Barcelona Process” with an improved institutional format, new members and additional objectives, while retaining its main lines of action: political and security-related, economic and trade-related, social and cultural, and justice and interior affairs. The general guidelines of the “Barcelona Process” continued to set the course of Euro-Mediterranean policy, the overall objective of which, as laid down in the 1995 Declaration, of “turning the Mediterranean Basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures.”

In this context, in 2011, the improbable became possible. The fall of President Ben Ali and the beginning of the so-called “Arab Spring” changed the region’s strategic framework. For all these reasons, I believe it is once again time to redefine Euro-Mediterranean relations. The aforementioned Arab Spring offers us a new opportunity, but, above all, it obliges us to thoroughly review past policy. It is time to consider a new framework of relations.

The newly re-earned “independence” of certain Arab countries, the revolutions in the countries of North Africa and the transformation of their societies, requires us to recognise the political legitimacy of the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Indeed, the main factor that once impeded the advancement and deepening of the Barcelona Process was the lack of democratic and political legitimacy of the southern countries. Today, however, this factor has changed, and for the first time we have valid and representative interlocutors. Consequently, we must approach the relations in a completely different way, both formally and substantively.

At the formal level, we must do away with the North’s aspiration to lead, for it is the “South” that must define and offer its vision of the future of these relations. Thus, it would only be appropriate for the actors from North Africa and those with the greatest legitimacy to be the first to call for the reconstruction of the Euro-Mediterranean space. One potentially attractive idea that might fit with this new reality would be to call a “Euro-Mediterranean Convention.”
The Tunisian authorities could call the convention, as it was Tunisia that had the strength and courage to illuminate the path to democracy and the end of authoritarian regimes. It would also mean wiping the slate clean and inviting all relevant actors to participate: politicians, members of parliament, civil society, businesspeople, NGOs, journalists, representatives from the world of culture and the arts, etc. The convention could last some six months and conclude with the adoption of a text establishing the main guidelines for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The proposals could address political, security, economic, financial, social and human issues.

Indeed, the main factor that once impeded the advancement and deepening of the Barcelona Process was the lack of democratic and political legitimacy of the southern countries.

A strong Euro-Mediterranean policy would open the door to support and action to resolve existing political crises: the conflict in the Middle East, the Western Sahara question, Cyprus, etc. It would moreover make it possible to address 21st-century security issues, such as the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, arms control and disarmament agreements, terrorism, organised crime, corruption, illegal immigration, drug trafficking, etc.

To promote and encourage the emergence of a shared area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean, it is more necessary than ever to engage in a multilateral political dialogue, aimed at producing verifiable progress in the areas of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the exchange of good practice in those spheres. In the wake of the “Arab Spring,” the Mediterranean can and should become a space of democratic integration and respect for the principles of the rule of law, regardless of how its various political, judicial, economic and socio-cultural systems are organised. We can make it a global model of respect for state sovereignty, territorial integrity and the equal rights of peoples. We have the capacity to open the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership up to active participation by civil society and to strengthen cooperation between regional and local authorities.

With regard to economic and financial issues, the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) is not enough. Nor is expanding the powers of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), since, in my view, what is needed is a Mediterranean Bank, a separate financial institution with public and private capital and resources from the European Union, the United States of America, the Persian Gulf, China, Japan, etc. The new bank could be set up as a partnership rather than under the sole authority of Brussels. The interest of the EIB or EBRD is not enough: in all these years no firm decision was ever made regarding an operating structure to finance strategic projects in the region nor was financial cooperation increased. The six major projects forming the core of the UfM initiative (depollution of the sea, land and maritime highways, civil protection, the Mediterranean Solar Plan, a cooperation network for research and higher education, and business development) require not only dialogue and political will, but also financial support and the necessary and essential public-private cooperation, as a driving force for the new Euro-Mediterranean reality.

Financial stimulus is needed to effectively promote sustainable and balanced socioeconomic development that will allow us to achieve the goal of an “area of shared prosperity.” Progress on tax issues might enable the creation of a free trade area (FTA) that would gradually eliminate customs barriers to trade in manufactured goods. Free trade should be encouraged, customs laws and procedures should be harmonised, and questionable technical obstacles to trade in services and agricultural products should be removed. Modernising agriculture in the countries on the south shore would make it possible to promote complementarities in the primary sector and even explore the possibility of promoting a common agricultural policy, a Euro-Mediterranean CAP. The aspiration to create an FTA might also contribute to the real and effective consolidation of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). Much has been made of the “cost of the non-Maghreb,” and certainly politicians, diplomats and technical experts are aware that such a Union would promote development in the region and serve as a catalyst for positive change throughout the Euro-Mediterranean region and in the international community as a whole.

The Mediterranean Business Development Initiative
should be launched to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), the strengthening of which is essential to job creation, social stability and economic integration, as well as to facilitating the transfer of technology and innovation. What was once an innovative UfM project is no less applicable today, as it would provide SMEs with crucial support, which would in turn have a clear impact on economic development in the South and on the empowerment of women within the make-up of the economic model of the Euro-Mediterranean region.

For this model to be sustainable and viable, the region must design an energy mix and strengthen multilateral cooperation in this area, and not just on fossil fuels. An “energy partnership” might be considered to promote clean energies and make this mix coherent. Thus, interest must be maintained in the Mediterranean Solar Plan and the creation and improvement of the power grids connecting the two shores. The plan set the goal of reaching 20 GW of new renewable energy production capacity in order to achieve 20% clean energy consumption and to reduce dependence on hydrocarbons and emissions. Euro-Mediterranean cooperation has the capacity to develop human resources in conditions of equality and to promote exchanges between civil societies and mutual understanding between cultures. Accordingly, the Barcelona Declaration took into consideration the importance of intercultural and interreligious dialogue, as well as the role of the media in knowledge and understanding of cultures. We must promote progress in this direction in order to implement the resulting mutual knowledge, which can be furthered through cultural exchanges, language learning and educational programmes that contribute to social development and respect for fundamental civil and social rights. To this end, we have the Alliance of Civilisations, its national plans, and the programmes of agencies and foundations that, like UNESCO, Anna Lindh, Casa Árabe, Casa Mediterráneo, the IEMed or the Toledo International Centre for Peace, to name but a few, work to make the Mediterranean a place of knowledge, meeting and exchange.

Obstacles to the mobility of citizens may thwart the aspirations of the Euro-Mediterranean community, as they lead to mistrust and suspicion and encourage protectionist tendencies and exacerbate nationalism and radicalism. A great “mobility pact” should thus be sought in the Mediterranean and migratory flows must be managed efficiently and securely. Such a proposal was put forward on 10 and 11 July 2006 at the Euro-African Conference on Migration and Development in Rabat. The participants pledged to take a comprehensive approach to immigration that took into consideration the needs and concerns of sending, receiving and transit countries and that encompassed everything from the defence of human rights to the commitment to programmes for social and economic development. The co-sponsors of the conference, Morocco and Spain, believed that Europe and Africa had enough experience in migration and that it was time to find the delicate balance between mobility and security. Just as the European Union liberalised visas for researchers, businesspeople, students, artists, etc., from the East, the Euro-Mediterranean region should strive to reach an agreement that would enable the fluid transit of people.

The future of the Euro-Mediterranean region may be a faithful reflection of the geostrategic changes expected in the 21st century. Indeed, it is an open book from which we can learn the lessons of the past and in which we can record the present, with civic will and political determination, and imagine future pages devoted to collaboration and cohesion.
The Arab Economies in the Face of Crisis: Assessment and Perspectives since the Tunisian Revolution

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The sudden changes experienced by Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries surprised all observers. The surprise was even greater since these countries had relatively better withstood the crisis than the ensemble of other world regions. Behind the appearances and good macroeconomic performances, all the countries in the region suffered the same symptoms, thus explaining the unexpected spread of the revolutions and the demands for democracy.

These economies are characterised by a polarisation into just a few sectors, some of the weakest employment rates in the world, a rentier management of resources and corruption conducted and organised by the clan oligarchies in power, with or without military involvement. And above all, the considerable rise in educational levels since decolonisation has resulted in underemployment of graduates and abnormally high qualified labour expatriation rates.

This article analyses the nature of the economic systems in these countries, the similarities in their internal and external functioning and new regional perspectives on the horizon since the Arab revolutions.

Apparent Resilience to the Crisis and Good Macroeconomic Performances

The countries in the region weathered the 2008 global subprime crisis. First of all, the Maghreb countries and Egypt were poorly integrated into international financial markets, which allowed them to considerably limit the financial spread of the crisis. The crisis was transmitted via three channels, however: a decline in migrant remittances, a drop in export revenues and rising prices, particularly of staple foods. In any case, the hardships were more limited in oil and gas-exporting countries, whose foreign exchange reserves allowed direct intervention on the price of staple foods, among other things, and the maintenance of public expenditure. Governments with financial capacity maintained prices of foodstuffs via direct subsidies, created youth jobs in the administration or fostered consumer credit operations and entrepreneurial projects.

After the second half of the 2000s, governments learned to manage the crises by implementing effective countercyclical policies nearly across the board that proved more or less successful: extension of fiscal incentives to investment, magnitude of interest rate reduction needed to maintain economic activity, etc. (Abdih et al, 2010). Although Egypt’s macroeconomic policy was not marked by effectiveness, its performance in the sphere of governance was noted in World Bank ratings.

Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Oman and Saudi Arabia were thus rated among the ten countries in the world having experienced the greatest increase in human development index from 1970 to 2010.1 Rapid progress made by countries in the region in health and education were highlighted. Life expectancy in Northern Africa went from 51 to 71 years of age between 1970 and 2010. The percentage of children being schooled went from 37% to 70% in the same period in Northern Africa. The lower birth rates in Arab countries went hand in hand with marriages at a later age and women’s increased, though still low, labour force participation rate (Kateb, 2010). On average, the populations of Arab countries experienced an annual growth rate of approximately 1 to 2%, whereas the

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1 In 1970, Tunisia had a lower life expectancy than Congo and Morocco, and a child schooling rate lower than Malawi.
working age population rose by 3% each year, the employment demand by 4% and the number of university graduates by 6 to 8% (Fargues, 2011).

The Shared Scourges of Arab Countries

In the majority of Arab countries, there is a series of similarities or shared scourges that would explain the simultaneous spread of revolutionary change under diverse forms in all of them: a polarisation of Arab economies in few sectors, rentier management of resources (including non-natural resources), extremely low employment rates associated with abnormally high expatriation rates of qualified labour and systems of corruption and predation that have grown worse. A last point in common deserves particular attention: a single external pact between Arab States and Western powers that delayed these (r)evolutions.

Polarisation of the Economy Excludes Qualified Labour

The countries in the region share the same defect: a very low diversification of the economy, which is concentrated in three or four sectors associated with the primary industries or low-added-value manufacturing industries. Algeria, whose foreign revenue continues to depend 98% on oil and natural gas, has even experienced a decline in the manufacturing sector while agriculture has been sacrificed. The rentier nature of the regional economy is often associated with the existence of a large oil and gas industry with revenue more or less redistributed throughout the remainder of the economy. In fact, such an approach is not enough to characterise the Algerian production system. The latter is based on the coexistence of three key sectors that have very weak real links between them but that are financially related.

The public mono-export sector (oil and gas) originates nearly all foreign revenue. Contributing a third of the GDP, originating two thirds of the budgetary revenues and 98% of export revenue, this sector is a supplier of liquidities, in particular during periods when oil prices are on the rise. It powers import sectors in consumer and capital goods (for the hydrocarbon and petrochemical industries), in part through the public banking system.

The import sector supplies an international business sector that includes a small amount of processing (food processing industry) and assembly (electric, electronic, textile) activities. This sector accounts for a large part of informal activity and imports are financed partially through informal exchange rates and through national networks in developed countries, primarily France. Short and medium-term bank loans serve as support to import activity. Formal activity and the informal sector are thus closely inter-related. This second import sector spills over into a third sector: services, petty trade, construction and non-tradable goods in general. The desired diversification of the productive system is having trouble getting under way. We are even witnessing a decline in manufacturing to benefit the mining – phosphate and iron – and the construction and public works sectors.

The dependence of the Algerian economy on exports and volatile oil and gas revenues causes periods of excess liquidity. Symmetrically, as revenues shrink, liquidity constraints cause cash flow problems for banks.

The Libyan economy resembles the Algerian economy on a smaller scale: oil revenues account for nearly all foreign currency inflows and over half of the GDP. Its low population and oil revenue make Libya the country with the highest GDP per inhabitant on the African continent. This, however, says nothing of the distribution of this wealth between the Libyans on the one hand and the clans that continue to structure the country on the other. The 2000s were marked by a very high GDP growth rate.

The Tunisian economy, which benefits less from natural resources than its Libyan or Algerian neighbours, likewise has an economy structurally concentrated in certain sectors. Coastal mass tourism – intensive in low qualified labour or qualified (educated) but un-
deremployed and underpaid labour – represents a majority of the added value. The export sectors handling subcontracted garment assembly segments in the textile and clothing industry have had very little secondary effects on the rest of the economy, nor product recovery effects on capital goods and intermediate goods. In business support services (IT, call centres, etc.), the same path has been taken, using the classic advantages in terms of wage costs without professionalisation of manpower or using overqualified university graduates.

There is also a small amount of agriculture and non-tradable services, whereas there are no direct investments from these countries due to their limited domestic markets. Delocalisation has most often taken place in the form of assembly subcontracting by European SMEs.

The Moroccan economy is somewhat more diversified than the others. Nonetheless, it is structurally dependent on certain natural resources, volatile agricultural revenue and migrant remittances, which continue to represent nearly 10% of Morocco’s GDP.

The Egyptian economy focuses essentially on mass tourism, oil, metals and agriculture. Tourism is the premiere activity responsible for foreign exchange inflows, followed by migrant remittances. Political shocks and uncertainties have rendered these revenues volatile and fragile.

All in all, sectoral and spatial polarisations of the economy and overall performance can go hand in hand and, obviously, conceal the real shortcomings of the economies in the region.

Low Employment Rates, Graduate Elite Adrift

In all Southern and Eastern Mediterranean economies, the elevated unemployment levels, in particular among youth, the low participation of youth and women in the labour market (although on the rise in the case of women) together with the existence of a significant informal sector result in one of the lowest formal employment rates in the world (less than 40%). At the same time, we are witnessing a considerable growth in the number of graduates from institutions of higher education and enrolment rates in universities and other institutions of higher learning. This massification of higher education is a response to the frustrated demand for education by populations during the colonial period. Decolonisation and the populations’ aspiration to an education combined with demographic growth were automatically accompanied by a rise in the secondary and higher education enrolment rates. But the crisis, which struck the non-oil exporting countries harder than the others, has led to a drop in expenditure on education and a crisis of the educational system. The annual increase in the number of students has reached 10 – 15% in Algeria, Morocco and Syria.

There are actually two categories of elite in the Arab countries. The first category of elite, limited in number, consists of people associated with the ruling class, whose families send their children to foreign schools and universities in order to gain access to qualified jobs.

The second category, comprising the mass of higher education graduates, generally from poor or middle-class families, makes up the majority. The mass unemployment among these young graduates, even those having taken selective courses of study, is even greater for youth from small cities or rural areas, where the labour market is greatly limited, and where they cannot have access even to the underemployment offered in urban centres due to the exorbitant cost of housing. As if under house arrest, they find themselves under the material and moral control of their parents.

Abnormally High Qualified Worker Expatriation Rates

In the case of Arab economies, a more marked brain drain can be observed than in other comparable regions in terms of per capita income. The expatriation rate of people with a higher education degree is greater than 10%, as compared to 8.3% in Latin America and 7.1% in East Asia. The main flows linked to highly qualified labour migration come from Northern Africa, and more precisely, from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to France and Belgium, and more recently also to Spain and Italy. North America is increasingly attracting the most highly qualified. The “new migrants” of the 1990s and 2000s – young men and women qualified as “Harragas” – seem to feel little attachment to their countries of origin and do not express the desire to return (Miotti, 2010).

3 A term of Maghreb Arab origin meaning “those who burn” (i.e. their papers, referring to their identity documents).
The Tunisian revolution has consolidated the rupture of this implicit internal pact according to which the political elite had a protected place on the qualified labour market and the educated elite stemming from the poor and middle classes were relegated to underemployment and a difficult home situation or expatriation, at times combined with underemployment abroad.

Corruption and Drain on Economies

Institutional stagnation and widespread corruption erode “capabilities”, to cite Amartya Sen, as well as trust. This ends up reducing efficiency and detracting from the productivity of work. There is a corruption ceiling attained by these countries beyond which their efficiency to produce trust insofar as a social practice substituting Rule of Law disappears, replaced by aspects of erosion of trust and “capabilities.” Monetary poverty is limited by remittances (sent by émigrés) and the organisation of social networks through family solidarity and government support in the form of keeping staple product prices low or granting employment with the Administration. But the implicit social contract that underlies this solidarity fosters clientelist practices that tend to tie individuals to the owners of the portions of political or administrative power. Finally, progress on formal regulations is blocked and traditional operating practices continue to prevail (Ould-Aoudia, 2006). In fact, an external pact has long delayed the changes underway. Throughout the 1990s, this pact tied the ruling classes in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean to EU States, first and foremost France.

Implosion of the System of Euro-Mediterranean Relations

The Arab revolutions have caused an implosion of the internal social contract among the elite, but also of the external pact between Arab States and Western powers. The States in the region all — bilaterally and not cooperatively — signed trade liberalisation agreements with the European Union that were unfavourable to them. Neither agricultural products nor trade in services were included in the agreements, which were limited to manufactured goods for which Southern Mediterranean countries had low export capacities. The motivation for these States generally lay in the search for legitimisation of international policy at the risk of economically losing in an asymmetrical free trade agreement to their detriment. The decrease in export revenue, associated with the absence of competitiveness of their manufactured products on European markets on the one hand, and the maintenance of barriers against agricultural products on the other, could only be compensated by revenue from tourism, migrant remittances and direct foreign investment, too low in any case. In exchange for the EU’s political recognition, encouraged de facto through the signature of these agreements, Southern States committed to conduct a repressive emigration policy against their citizens and those of Sub-Saharan Africa in transit through these countries. The commitment of signing countries to readmit their citizens when they are deported from Europe and restrict the right of their citizens to emigrate in exchange for marginal development aid clearly means that Europe is delegating its policy of repressing immigration to Southern Mediterranean States, in particular the Maghreb.

Clearly, neither the European Commission through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), nor France through the embryonic Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), can continue in the logic of legitimising the ruling classes of Southern Mediterranean States. At the same time, regional processes already underway in the South may be accelerated.

New Regional South-South Perspectives

The transaction costs at the borders of the different Middle East and North African (MENA) countries are higher than between each of them and the EU. Due to high tariff and non-tariff barriers between the MENA countries, the markets in the region are greatly fragmented and bilaterally oriented towards Europe. The low diversification of Maghreb partner countries can be ascribed in part to an absence of the will to build a real regional market, despite the implementation of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) agreement, whose effects are analysed.

In the case of enlargement agreements with the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs), there was a clear advantage to the benefit of the CEECs, which kept a certain number of barriers to EU countries while the latter committed from the outset to fully open their borders to the former.
Intra-regional trade represented but 10% of the commerce in MENA countries in 2007. However, the situation differs greatly from one country to another: Syria, Lebanon and even Jordan send over half of their exports to countries in the region. For seven other States, in contrast, in particular in the Eastern Mediterranean, only 10% to 20% of their overall exports go to countries in the region. For all others, and especially Maghreb countries, the proportion of exports to the MENA region does not surpass 8% of their overall exports. Trade volumes between MENA countries are significantly lower than what one would expect from their economic, cultural and geographical characteristics. According to recent estimates, these countries carry out 86% less trade than their characteristics would allow (Bhattacharya, 2009).

This market compartmentalisation in MENA countries explains to a great extent the low inflow of direct foreign investment (FDI) apart from oil and gas. Stagnation induced by economic policy or structural factors curbs trade and economic growth in general, which should be two to three points higher than its current level.

Therefore, the GAFTA free trade agreement, concluded by 14 Arab countries at the Cairo Arab Summit in 1996⁵ and currently including 17 of the 22 Arab countries, has already produced interesting effects. From 1997 to 2009, GAFTA markedly increased intra-regional trade (after deducting the effects of trade diversion); indeed, by 26.6% (Abedini, 2008). Yet non-tariff barriers between the Member States remain significant (evaluated at 30% in tariff equivalent). Trade in services and the free circulation of skilled labour at the regional level should reinforce this integration agreement.

Also worth considering is the new geopolitical space opened by Turkey’s “eviction” from the prospects of integration into the EU. Since EU governments proposed substituting an Association Agreement for the prospect of accession to the EU, Turkey has re-deployed its geostrategic efforts in the region. Moreover, its economically advanced situation and technology and work productivity levels, higher than the average in Southern European countries, could allow Turkey to play the role of relay country contributing foreign direct investment and technologies appropriate to a regional zone sharing institutions and with a common religion. Finally, regional integration led by Turkey could help the Arab Maghreb Union, which always runs up against the political difficulties of the Algeria-Morocco pair, to overcome its “stand-by” situation.

Already a strong demand for trade with Turkey can be observed in the Maghreb countries, even if the Turkish supply is still below its potential. Although Turkish trade remains focused towards Europe, its direct investment in the services sector, construction and industry is on the rise in the Maghreb. Entrepreneurs in these countries identify with their Turkish counterparts, whose technological and managerial offer is perceived as better adapted to local needs. Finally, with the current crisis of the European Monetary Union, a more integrated North-South Mediterranean area could result from the double process of divergence between Southern European countries and those of the core euro zone on the one hand, and the growing role that Turkey will play in the regional dynamic in the Southern Mediterranean on the other hand. Also, the current period of political changes throughout the region (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya) and the acceleration of reform in the other countries, independent of the institutional nature of the political regimes to be established, is propitious to the acceleration of regional construction that would also allow renegotiation of the free trade agreement with the EU on a new basis.

**Conclusion**

The new perspectives of regional integration between Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries, including Turkey, should be the basis for re-examination and re-evaluation of EU Association Agreements on a multilateral basis within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Southern countries should renegotiate with the EU the content of the free trade agreement but in a multilateral and not bilateral manner. Issues such as the free circulation of skilled labour, the liberation of services sector trade and taking into account agricultural interests of countries in the region should be on the negotiating table.

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⁵ United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Morocco, Sudan, Oman, Qatar, Lebanon, Iraq, Bahrain and Libya, later joined by Jordan, Palestine, Yemen and Algeria. Completion was planned for 01-01-2007 at the latest, but the Amman Arab Summit of 2001 accelerated the period of application to arrive at zero tariffs by 01/01/2005.
In a post-revolutionary perspective, MENA countries should develop regional integration, relying on the GAFTA. Together, they should renegotiate the free trade agreement with the EU, demanding both the opening of EU agricultural markets and temporary asymmetry to the benefit of MENA countries. Clauses should be included relating to the participation of Southern Mediterranean countries in EU research and innovation programmes (calls for proposals). Likewise, rentier behaviour should be banished on the qualified labour market, systematically developing calls for proposals for each qualified opening and justifying each recruitment by indicating the CVs of both the selected and the rejected candidates on the public or private employer’s website.

It is important that businesses and governments in Southern countries negotiate co-contracting or OEM (Original Equipment Services) contracts adapted to services stipulating the use of local managers in the co-contracting subsidiaries (they should not accept being subcontractors and relegating graduates to positions in call centres). The education policy should make better use of technical subjects and social sciences directed towards the professional services sector as a whole. A policy of collective services adapted to territorial needs should ensure complete access to transport and telecommunications infrastructures. Public infrastructures should be financed on a clear basis using subscription operations eliminating full State subsidisation, which is a source of clientelism and corruption as well as low durability.

These proposals, which can be elaborated upon, are a response to the challenges of Arab economies in transition towards democracy. They do not exclude additional measures more specifically targeting industry and other sectors of the economy.

Bibliography


For some years now Europe has been producing only dire news, and since early 2010 the euro crisis has gone from bad to worse. Despite significant efforts aimed at improving European governance, the creation of a rescue fund for the euro area, and a sovereign default (Greece), in mid-2012, uncertainty remains extremely high and financial turbulence still dominates market conditions.

Oddly enough, this picture combines with fundamentals in the euro area as a whole that look sound, especially if compared to the US. The average sovereign debt relative to GDP in the euro area is less than 90%, while it is more than 100% in the US. The budget deficit is also smaller in the euro area: in the US, it reached almost 10% of GDP in 2011, while it was about 4% in the euro area. Moreover, unlike the US, which has run a large current account deficit for decades, the euro area has, since its creation, always had a balanced current account or small surpluses.

The latest indicators suggest that, unlike in the US, there are enough savings within the European Monetary Union to finance the public deficits of all euro-area Member States. This in turn means that, unlike in the US, there are enough domestic resources within the euro area to solve its debt problem without the need to rely on the external financing so often advocated in calls for IMF and foreign investors’ support.

In spite of the relative strength of these fundamentals and a long series of meetings of heads of state and finance ministers, Europe’s policymakers have failed to solve the euro debt crisis and to convince markets of the value of their approach and commitments.

Against this background, two key questions remain unanswered. First, how can this be explained? Second, will the crisis offer other opportunities to improve the governance of the European Union and the European Monetary Union?

The Long Road to Improving Governance in the Euro Area

The original design of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), as established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, contained three key elements regarding the Union’s governance. The first was an independent central bank (the European Central Bank) committed to achieving and maintaining price stability. The second was the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), essentially an intergovernmental agreement within the framework of the EU’s legal system that was supposed to limit fiscal deficits through an “excessive deficit procedure.” The last, only recently fully recognised, was the “no bailout,” or rather “no co-responsibility,” clause (Art. 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). The treaty also touched on other aspects of economic governance (e.g. making reference to the concept of economic policy as a common concern), but they remained mostly on paper as in reality Member States did not see any need to coordinate their economic policies.

The idea of an independent ECB always enjoyed a broad consensus amongst both economists and policymakers based on a common understanding that decades of high inflation had not brought more growth and, ultimately, a central bank can only achieve price stability. In contrast, the second element of the treaty, namely, the Stability and Growth
Pact (SGP), did not enjoy the same consensus amongst academics or policymakers. In the 1990s, an extensive debate took place regarding the logic of the Maastricht threshold values of 3% of GDP for the budget deficit and 60% for debt, and in 2003 even the core countries conspired to weaken the limits set by the SGP.

The third element was only in the background and remained untested until recently. Contrary to a widespread misconception, the so-called “no bailout” clause included in Article 125 of the treaty does not prohibit bailouts. It merely states that the EU cannot take on the liabilities of its Member States and that Member States do not guarantee each other’s obligations. At the time of the negotiations of the Maastricht Treaty, Germany had strongly insisted on the inclusion of the clause to ensure protection against fiscal profligacy, but, after being forced to agree to a large bailout, it recently discovered that the clause was not able to provide the protection it had sought.

Faced with this reality, German policymakers have been trying to achieve a single objective: to ensure lower fiscal deficits across the Union. This is indeed the ultimate purpose of the Fiscal Compact Treaty, under which euro-area Member States agree to adopt stricter rules to limit fiscal deficits. Will the Fiscal Compact work where the Stability Pact failed? Will it be enough to solve the euro-area crisis? The most likely answer to both questions is “no” for two reasons. First, the approach assumes that the euro crisis is simply a fiscal crisis. As this is not true, it will not solve the crisis. Second, as will be argued in more detail in the following two sections, the problem of fiscal indiscipline was not due to a lack of rules, which already existed, but rather to the failure to enforce the SGP. Not much has changed on this front under the Fiscal Compact.

The Experience with the Original Fiscal Rules

The “original” SGP already contained a commitment to balanced budgets over the cycle. Had it been implemented, it would have led to a continuous reduction of the debt-to-GDP ratio. Alas, it was not. The provision in the SGP to balance budgets over the cycle was non-binding and widely ignored. On average, fiscal deficits were close to the 3% threshold over the cycle, but all large euro-area Member States, including Germany, ran budget deficits in excess of this target in the first years of the euro’s existence. In 2003, the Commission’s proposal to apply the excessive deficit procedure, including fines, to France and Germany was defeated in the Council. In the crucial vote, the large countries (France, Germany and Italy) colluded to reach a qualified majority to “hold the procedure in abeyance.”

This experience is very telling in light of the fact that the new Fiscal Compact is supposed to radically strengthen the enforcement of the fiscal rules by applying the “reverse qualified majority” principle, whereby a proposal of the Commission within the excessive deficit procedure is considered approved unless it is opposed by a qualified majority.

In 2005, the SGP was officially amended to improve its economic rationale and thus ownership. The reaction in academia was mixed: according to some, the SGP was “softened”; according to others, it was “improved.” In hindsight, this very lack of consensus amongst the experts on the merits of “binding rules for fiscal policy” helped to make the change in the SGP widely acceptable, if not necessary. This is likely to happen again.

In fact, shortly after the SGP was made less stringent, the upturn in the business cycle allowed most governments to reduce their deficits to below the 3% threshold, seemingly vindicating the official position according to which the “improved” Stability Pact had led to more responsible fiscal policy. In reality, deficits adjusted for the cycle improved very little even towards the peak of the boom in 2006-07, and when the crisis hit, deficits were allowed to increase again. Overall, individual euro-area countries never fully met the rules they made for themselves, yet on average the euro area remained relatively conservative in fiscal terms compared to the US and the UK. In this limited sense, the Maastricht provisions against excessive deficits did have some influence. But, as often happens, averages can hide significant differences. While the average deficit for the euro area as a whole appeared modest by the standards of other large, advanced countries, one euro-area Member State, Greece, clearly violated all the rules for years. It is thus understandable that some policymakers, Germany in particular, believe tighter fiscal rules are essential for the survival of the euro. However, two things should be kept in mind.

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First, the track record of the SGP proves that writing rules alone is not enough. The rules must be enforced. In this regard, the experience of the SGP suggests that how new rules will be applied in future will depend on the degree of consensus on the need for them. Second, it should be recognised that the mounting evidence that the Greek fiscal numbers did not add up was never acted upon while it was politically inconvenient to do so. Only when financial markets stopped providing financing at favourable rates was the Greek profligacy recognised, but by then it was too late to avert the catastrophe.

The Prospects for the New Fiscal Rules

The treaty embedding the so-called Fiscal Compact has a long title – Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union – but deeper inspection suggests it is rather short on new content. This new treaty is reminiscent of the Stability and Growth Pact in several ways. Like the SGP, the main purpose of the Fiscal Compact is to avoid fiscal profligacy; the difference, at least on paper, is that the system of enforcement remains at the national level, where fiscal sovereignty lies. In addition, as before, once the commitment to fiscal discipline was broadly achieved and the new treaty signed, the policy debate started to shift to growth and, just as how, in 1990, the Stability Pact was changed to the Stability and Growth Pact, many are now advocating a growth pact. While this makes a lot of sense, there is a great temptation to see it simply as history repeating itself.

The only really substantive binding provision of the Fiscal Compact is that each of the 25 signatory Member States undertakes to introduce permanently in its national legal system, preferably at the constitutional level, within one year of the treaty coming into force, rules that limit their annual structural deficit to 0.5% of GDP. If a Member State fails to take these steps, the European Commission is required to take it before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In case of non-compliance with the ECJ verdict, the Court could fine the Member State with a penalty capped at 0.1% of GDP. Hence, the pact concerns only the broad rules that Member States have to follow in setting up their balanced-budget laws, not the implementation of these national rules. The treaty thus does not grant new powers to interfere in the conduct of national fiscal policy to the Court of Justice or the Commission.

The main value of the Fiscal Compact is that the political statement it contains provides political cover for the German government in its efforts to sell the euro rescue operations to a sceptical domestic audience. The treaty also contains some sweeping non-binding provisions on economic policy coordination, reaffirming good intentions on structural reforms and instituting regular meetings of the heads of state of the euro area (at least twice a year), although they will remain informal. Quite a lot of debate has arisen over the fact that several non-euro EU Member States have signed the Fiscal Compact. In fact, this does not entail any obligations for them. Their signature is simply a political statement, allowing them to participate in most of the euro-area summits without any real influence on the decision-making process. Beyond specific provisions, the main value of the Fiscal Compact is that the political statement it contains provides political cover for the German government in its efforts to sell the euro rescue operations to a sceptical domestic audience. However, it is uncertain that the Fiscal Compact was really needed for this purpose. German public opinion has remained much more constructive on the euro than widely assumed (Gros and Roth, 2011), and even before the Fiscal Compact all votes in the Bundestag resulted in very large majorities in favour of all euro-area rescue operations, even when they contained significant fiscal risks for Germany.

Overall, in judging the value of this treaty, two factors should be kept in mind. First, of the four large euro-area countries, three have already introduced national debt brakes at the constitutional level: Germany, where they are already operational, and Spain and Italy, which have adopted them. The uncertainty

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3 Member States with a total debt exceeding 60% of their GDP must run a structural deficit of no greater than 0.5% of GDP, while Member States with a lower debt-to-GDP ratio can run up slightly less restrictive deficits of up to 1% of GDP.
is mostly regarding France, where it has been agreed that the French constitution will not be changed even if the treaty is implemented. This suggests that the treaty’s added value is limited.

Second, the prominence of the notion of structural deficit in the Fiscal Compact may be a source of uncertainty. This variable is often referred to by economists as a “known unknown”: it can be estimated but not observed directly. Indeed, the structural deficit is computed by adjusting the actual deficit (as determined by Eurostat) by a factor encompassing a measure of the impact of the business cycle on the budget deficit. Alas, it is very difficult to measure this factor, let alone do so in a timely fashion. The Commission and Eurostat change their estimates of the structural deficit considerably over time. The question becomes: what if, due to a revision of the estimates, a country were to become non-compliant with the constitutional rule? What should be done then?

All in all, the Fiscal Compact may be of some use in that it ultimately forces all 25 Member States to adopt stronger national fiscal frameworks at home. However, it will probably still make only a marginal difference as some, perhaps even most, countries would have done so anyway, adopting such a framework under pressure from the markets.

There are two main risks associated with the Fiscal Compact. The first is that it has been oversold. It constitutes neither a first step towards fiscal union nor significantly better European economic governance, but it is nevertheless likely that the ratification process (e.g. the referendum in Ireland) and the subsequent process of its implementation in some countries (e.g. France) will receive a lot of attention and create a distorted impression of its importance.

The second is that it could exacerbate divisions within the Union. Given the very difficult economic situation in some countries, the implementation of further austerity measures in order to comply with the EU rules is very costly (several governments have fallen across Europe on austerity measures), but debtor countries have been required to commit to austerity in exchange for vital financial support from creditor countries. As austerity alone not only seems incapable of overcoming the crisis, but also likely to deepen the recession, opposition to it and hostility towards creditor countries risk increasing and worsening divisions.

### Competing Policies and Institutions

The euro debt crisis has been exposing weaknesses in the EU framework across a number of fronts, most prominently in the distribution of resources. Differences among Member States are bound to arise even more when one group depends on the other for financial support. The endless discussions about the EU’s budget provide repeated reminders of the fact that redistribution across Member States remains the most divisive issue for the EU. The crisis has significantly increased the amount of the resources in question, which suggests that divisions could increase as well.

In the “Community” method, the Commission plays a central role: it has the monopoly (or sole right) of initiative. However, this traditional prerogative has been irrelevant for the euro crisis, as the Commission does not have control over financial resources. The Commission has been de facto sidelined by the euro-area summits of heads of state ably presided by the President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy. This new formation of the European Council appears to have become important, but it is debatable to what extent it has actually shaped events, as major decisions have usually been taken only when the financial markets have been close to collapse.

Moreover, the crisis has skewed the power balance among Member States to such an extent that the traditional notions of decision-making (i.e. simple

### TABLE 1

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<td>Net support for the EMU and</td>
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Notes: Information in parentheses indicates the population surveyed. EC= European Commission; EP= European Parliament; ECB= European Central Bank; EA = euro area.

Sources: Roth et al. (2011).
majority, qualified majority and unanimity) have become meaningless as nothing important can be decided without the consent of the key creditor country, Germany. In essence, the countries in need of financial assistance have to submit to a dictatorship of their creditors that is formally intermediated by the European Council and the Commission.

The treatment of debtor and creditor countries has become asymmetric with regard to the mechanisms for mutual surveillance. While the performance of the debtor countries is carefully screened, creditor countries seem free to do whatever they deem appropriate since their economies are relatively strong. In this regard, it will be interesting to see how the situation will evolve in the Netherlands. The expectation is that some sort of compromise will be reached. Extra measures towards consolidation will be required but nothing too strong so as not to impair a fundamentally sound economy.

Unlike in the US, there are enough domestic resources within the euro area to solve its debt problem without the need to rely on the external financing so often advocated in calls for IMF and foreign investors’ support.

Table 1 shows how public opinion has become disenchanted with European integration in general. The regular Eurobarometer surveys show that trust in the EU institutions (Commission, Parliament) has strongly declined, although in most cases it remains higher than the trust citizens accord their own national institutions. Support for European integration in general has also strongly declined, and the only bright spot is that, surprisingly, support for the euro has declined very little and remains higher than it was at the start of the EMU.

Unfortunately, trust in the EU institutions has fallen most in those countries that have received the most help and have had to undertake the most draconian adjustment measures.

A tighter fiscal union might be one outcome of the euro crisis, but even if it were to materialise it would be the result of necessity, rather than of enthusiasm for deeper integration. A fiscal union that was pushed by the debtor countries to get easier access to financing, and grudgingly accepted by the creditor countries to limit the cost of rescue operations, is unlikely to work well and even less likely to offer an attractive example of the benefits of deeper integration.

Conclusions

The official reading is that the euro crisis is not a crisis of the euro but of the public debt of certain profligate euro-area Member States. Dealing with this crisis, and preventing future ones, thus only requires a new, tighter framework for fiscal policy – which will be delivered by the Fiscal Compact. However, financial markets are definitely not impressed by the magnitude of this change. Italy, Spain and other countries still have to pay very high risk premiums, while Greece teeters on the brink of a total collapse. It is thus clear that this approach captures only part of the problem, and European governance focusing only on fiscal discipline is likely to get nowhere.

Unfortunately, at this stage damage control seems to remain the only achievable goal. The broad picture that is slowly emerging is that the fiscal authorities (within the European Financial Stability Facility) should handle the adjustment programmes, while the ECB should become a lender of last resort for sovereigns under speculative attack.

References


Since 2010, the euro zone (EZ) has suffered a sovereign debt crisis. Although its effects have been felt by all countries that share the single currency, due to their high level of financial interdependence, the crisis has hit those in the south hardest, i.e. the countries of the Mediterranean Basin (and Portugal). All eyes have turned to Greece, Spain and Italy (and to a lesser extent Ireland) where demands are being made for cuts and reforms to be undertaken. In dealing with its solvency problem, Greece (after many delays) has opted for restructuring its government debt, thereby becoming the first developed country in history to (partially) default on its sovereign debt. Greece is also the primary source of contagion to other countries, since the gravity of its situation is far greater than any of its fellow members. A Greek euro exit, therefore, is not out of the question, and whether this happens or not, the country will have to face up to a lost decade.

Although at the time of writing Italy and Spain have not had to receive financial aid, there are concerns over their economies which lie elsewhere: these are such large countries that should they need a bailout, this could exhaust the current resources of the euro zone and International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) stabilisation funds. Furthermore, if they had to restructure their debt it would endanger the very existence of the euro. This is why other EU members have been forcing them (Spain since 2010 and Italy since 2011) to balance their public accounts and undertake very unpopular structural reforms. Furthermore, in the case of Italy (like Greece), the pressure has led leaders to step down and reforms are being implemented by technocratic governments that do not enjoy democratic legitimacy (although in many cases, particularly in Italy, they do have the support of their citizens).

While severe reforms are being undertaken in its southern countries, the EZ, today led by Germany, advances slowly towards better economic governance, which aims to repair the incomplete institutional architecture of the single currency. For the time being the path is one of coordinated fiscal austerity, rather than fiscal and political Union. However, if the reforms take effect and Germany and the European Central Bank (ECB) see the Mediterranean economies of the euro becoming more orthodox and competitive, it is possible that their position may soften and they may offer greater concessions (fresh injections of liquidity to help banks, reactivation of investment and depreciation of the euro, greater resources for the rescue fund and, further down the line, eurobonds and a proper federal budget for the EU). In any case, the EZ has fallen on hard times and its future is being determined by the experiences of its Mediterranean members.

This article analyses the European response to the euro crisis and the role played by the Mediterranean countries. After outlining the steps taken at community level to ensure the stability of the single currency and guarantee its survival, the impact of the euro crisis in Greece, Spain and Italy is analysed.

**Saving the Euro**

The euro came into being in 1999 with incomplete governance. While its monetary pillars were robust, the coordination of the different fiscal policies that coexisted at its centre were based on fragile commitments; excessive emphasis was given to prevent-
ing inflation as almost the sole criteria of both monetary policy and the ECB’s action guidelines; and the decision-making mechanisms were neither very agile nor transparent, allowing certain States to avoid sanctions when they did not comply with the agreed criteria. Furthermore, the EZ’s financial regulation lacked the necessary pan-European dimension, its international role was unclear and there was no crisis resolution mechanism or rescue fund for countries or financial institutions with liquidity problems. But, since the euro was a political project, these economic deficiencies went unheeded. Like on so many occasions in the history of European integration, its creators adopted a functionalist approach: they thought that once the single currency was created, the necessary steps would be taken to improve and complete its governance. In a way they were right. The global financial crisis that erupted in 2008 and the current debt crisis that has swept the euro zone since 2010 are forcing improvements in its governance. At the beginning of 2012, the most pressing issue is still that of breaking the hellish cycle in which public debt and the European banks feed one another. This calls for a definitive solution to the Greek issue, to halt the contagion effect of Greece’s controlled default on other countries and to recapitalise the banks. Since 2010, each time that the financial markets have increased pressure on the sovereign debt of the EZ’s periphery countries, the EU has been able to reach agreements that have gained it time. However, technical solutions such as expanding the rescue fund or using its resources to cover part of the debt of the likes of Italy or Spain, will not easily resolve the underlying political problem of deciding if the EZ is heading towards fiscal union, and defining the role of the ECB, which to date has not acted consistently as a lender of last resort for the States. Regulations have already been approved, throughout 2011, to avoid macroeconomic imbalances within the EZ and reinforce financial regulation. Likewise, at the request of Germany, in 2012 a new Fiscal Agreement was approved, which has taken the form of a 25-state intergovernmental treaty – the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic refused to sign it. According to this agreement, all countries must incorporate the golden rule into their national legislation, which requires a balance between revenue and public spending throughout the cycle – something which Germany and Spain have already achieved – setting the structural public deficit ceiling at 0.5% above GDP. Furthermore, the budgets and the structural reform policies will be overseen by the Commission, which could veto the annual public accounts if the countries are receiving financial aid from the European rescue fund. So in actual fact, everything that has been decided in recent European summits goes no further than to take seriously what was already decided in June 1997 in the Stability and Growth Pact. Moreover, what has been agreed now implies the same problems as the pact made fifteen years ago: all measures aimed at achieving stability, with no allusion to “growth.” While greater efforts towards achieving stability are welcomed, it is of much greater importance that the EU also creates growth directly. Otherwise, following a recipe of almost exclusive austerity could increase unemployment and social unrest and intensify problems in the financial sector, even causing citizens from certain southern countries (starting with Greece) to contemplate whether it is worth remaining in the euro.

The Mediterranean Countries and the Euro Crisis

Greece, Spain and Italy are in the spotlight of international markets and European institutions because their future economic development will determine the progress of the euro (Ireland and Portugal are also focuses of attention, but the former is fast improving its competitiveness and the latter, although still suffering serious problems regarding growth, deficit and debt, could receive a second bailout without significantly damaging the lending capacity of the European rescue fund and that of the IMF). If the Mediterranean countries manage to reduce their deficits, stabilising levels of debt (preferably without recourse to partial defaults of said debts), reduce their risk premiums, relaunch their exports and generate growth, the euro zone would remain stabilised, and would come out stronger thanks to the improvement in its economic governance, outlined above. However, since they can no longer devalue their currencies, which would have been recession policy before the arrival of the euro, the Mediterranean countries must carry out severe cuts. And since these measures are deeply unpopular, they may not be undertaken, thereby endangering the integrity and future of the Monetary Union.
Greece

Greece is a special case within the euro. Possibly, if it were not a member of the EZ, the collective problems of the Monetary Union would be far less serious, since a large part of Europe’s financial instability since 2010 owes to the contagion effect Greece (that represents less than 2% of the EZ’s GDP) has had on other countries. During the years before the financial crisis, Greece lied about its public accounts, accumulated the highest levels of debt and deficit of the EZ, lost a lot of competitiveness and permitted significant levels of corruption. Since it received its first bailout in 2010, the world has seen its economy steadily weakened year after year, while the authorities have shown themselves to be incapable of meeting the commitments made with the Troika (European Commission, ECB and IMF). The continued decline of its GDP and its incapacity to reduce its deficit and stabilise its levels of public debt (forcing it, in 2012, to partially default on its payment commitments with the aim of taking the GDP/debt ratio to 120% in 2020, which is believed to be sustainable, although it may not be) responds both to the vicious circle generated by the cuts and low growth, and the State’s incapacity to implement the necessary reforms. This makes Greece a unique case, since its institutional problems appear to be extremely serious for the State have to control the economy; a situation which is not happening in any other developed country.

The severity of the Greek case has given the country cause to consider leaving the euro. However, since the European Treaties do not contemplate a country’s expulsion from the Monetary Union, as long as Greece continues to tighten its belt, funds will eventually be released for future rescues if need be. Alternatively, the Greek government could decide that it would prefer not to accept the conditions demanded of it and opt for a massive default on its debt, which would undoubtedly be followed by a euro exit. This would spark a currency crisis, with a significant devaluation of the new drachma with respect to the euro, thus allowing Greece to adjust its real salaries accordingly, making exports much more competitive and opening the road to recovery. Simultaneously, there would be a collapse in its financial system and a banking crisis, which would be accompanied by a capital outflow that would force an Argentinean style corralito. The country would be left without any sources of external financing, which would send it back into the dark ages financially, making it much harder to initiate short-term growth. The most probable outcome, therefore, is that the authorities continue to try to avoid this apocalyptic scenario, as long as the “people on the street” allow it to.

Spain and Italy

Spain and Italy are similar to one another in certain significant aspects and are very different cases to Greece. Neither has needed to be rescued (yet). Additionally, both have carried out major fiscal adjustments and structural reforms which have allowed them to calm the nervousness of investors in the short term and spur growth in their economies in the long term (in Spain under governments with strong electoral support and in Italy under the Presidency of Mario Monti, a technocrat without democratic legitimacy). The other shared characteristic is their size. Italy represents 17% of the EZ and Spain 11% (respectively they are the third and fourth economies of the Monetary Union), which makes them systemic countries, whose difficulties could lead to contagion within the Union serious enough to reach Belgium and France, seen as part of the euro’s core. This is the scenario which must be avoided, since failing to do so may endanger the viability of the euro.

Despite their similarities, both countries have different problems. The level of Italian debt (120% above GDP) is much greater than that of Spain (70%), but the public deficit of Spain (8.5% of GDP in 2011) more than doubles that of Italy (it should be noted though, that Italy has the advantage that most of its debt is in the hands of its residents, which would enable it to undertake a “disguised” partial default on its debt through taxation, which Spain cannot do since it largely depends on non-taxable foreign capital). Also, while both countries have lost competitiveness, with price levels in recent years higher than those of their EZ business partners, Italy has a large export base (particularly in the north) and its “country brand” is more solid.

The aim of both countries is to stabilise their financial situation and improve their growth prospects, which is the only formula to dissipate doubts concerning their capacity to deal with their debts and deficits. However, the speed of the fiscal adjustment demanded by their EU partners is leading both countries, particularly Spain, into the vicious circle that Greece is stuck in, where the cuts intensify the re-
cession, reduce tax revenue and then force fresh cuts. The good news is that the three-year loans at 1% that the ECB began to offer European banks in December 2011 safeguard the banks, allowing the States to avoid generating fresh debt to bailout their financial institutions. The ECB, however, has also made it clear that it will not act as a lender of last resort for the States, so speculative attacks on the Italian or Spanish debt may reappear.

In any case, the need for a financial rescue should not be ruled out, and – as is particularly the case for Italy – they may even be forced to restructure part of their debt. The question to which no one has the answer is whether or not this will mean the end of the EZ. In all likelihood, once the new Fiscal Compact is signed, Germany will agree to increase the resources of the EZ’s permanent rescue fund. Furthermore, the IMF could channel additional resources towards the EZ, contributed by emerging countries in exchange for greater power in the institution. This means that while generating financial instability, an eventual rescue would probably not break the euro. It would be another matter altogether if Italy or Spain partially defaulted on their debts. This situation would constitute the acid test for the single currency. If the euro were able to survive debt restructuring in one of its systemic countries, it could be said that it has passed the acid test. But to know if this is the case – and we hope never to have to put it to the test – we will have to wait sometime yet.

**Conclusion**

The agreements adopted by the EU in recent months to defend the euro and strengthen economic coordination within the EU – essentially through fiscal stability – are a step towards preserving the single currency, improving its economic governance and increasing European integration. However, under the German leadership, all emphasis has been placed on stability, without regard to growth. During the euro’s first ten years, thanks to the boom years, the lack of a European policy on growth was not so serious. However in the current economic climate, it is far more important that the EU also stimulates growth directly, especially in the southern countries, which can only stabilise and reduce their debts if they begin to grow. Otherwise, following a recipe of almost exclusive austerity could increase unemployment and social unrest and intensify problems in the financial sector, even causing citizens from certain southern countries (starting with Greece) to contemplate whether it is worth remaining in the euro.

In the medium and long term the euro crisis may advance the federalisation process which, for pro-Europeans, would mean a happy ending to this turbulent period for the Union. But for the citizens, this greater European integration may not be very attractive, both for its lack of democracy and transparency, and because it represents a particular ideological tendency, which places fiscal austerity and social cuts (aimed at increasing competitiveness) as supreme values, resorting to the use of fiscal policy as a stabiliser of the economic cycle.

The key to clarifying where Europe is heading will be in the development of the EZ’s Mediterranean economies during 2012 and 2013. Greece will continue to be an ongoing source of instability, but the Union is equipped with sufficient instruments to be able to manage the financial contagion. Even so, if Greece decides to abandon the single currency, it is impossible to predict how the markets would react. Italy and Spain are, for the moment, solvent economies with problems of liquidity. But if their growth prospects do not improve in the medium term and if the ECB continues to refuse to act as its lender of last resort (it already does so for their banking systems, but not for the States), a financial bailout, or even a debt restructuring, is a possible eventuality. If that moment arrives, the EZ would find itself once again on the edge of the abyss.

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Turkey’s Role in the Mediterranean Following the Arab Uprisings

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The suicide of Mohamed Bouazizi, a Tunisian street vendor, in December 2010, and the occupation the next month of Tahrir Square in Cairo by protesters, followed by the fall of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and of Hosni Mubarak, the Tunisian and Egyptian dictators, transformed international perceptions of their countries. The policies towards this region previously pursued by European countries, the United States, Russia, Turkey, Israel and others quickly needed recalibrating. All had been to different degrees complicit with the ancien régimes. Turkey was the most fleet-footed in adapting to new realities. After examining briefly the reaction of key international actors, this paper focuses on the evolution of Turkish policy in response to changed political circumstances in North Africa and the Middle East. The Arab uprisings led to Turkey’s re-emergence as an important geostrategic actor and relegated to a secondary position other sources of concern related to Turkey, for example over media freedoms, the rift with Israel or the failure of the Cyprus settlement talks. Turkey’s rapprochement with the Obama administration is particularly striking, reflecting its role as a regional shock absorber, notably with regard to Syria, and its renewed commitment to NATO, through the missile defence shield. The Turkish government has been relatively free of internal and external constraints in distancing itself from former allies in the region and reaching out to emerging political forces. The question remains whether Turkey’s nascent regional leadership role can be maintained and whether it will prove a complement or an alternative to links with Europe, still its main trading partner, investor and source of technology. Turkey’s rapprochement with the United States is essentially with the administration, while voices in Congress and in the wider public are more critical of its human rights record, rift with Israel and failure to come to terms with Cyprus and Armenia. Overall, however, Turkey has manoeuvred adroitly following the uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East, quickly adapting to changed circumstances and identifying new partners. Its main challenges now are to help restore regional stability, to prevent a spillover of sectarian tensions into Turkey, and to manage its relations with Russia, China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United States and Europe, despite marked divergences over developments in the region.

Europe’s Reaction to the Arab Uprisings

With the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, relations between southern European countries and their former colonies across the Mediterranean based on economic interests and historical ties no longer appeared tenable. The days when Colonel Gaddafi was received with pomp in Rome, Paris or Brussels were over. The overlapping frameworks of the Barcelona Process, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and the “Union for the Mediterranean” required immediate re-examination. The EU had engaged with the region’s previous governments in the negotiation of “action plans,” offering financial assistance, market access, and participation in EU programmes in exchange for human rights and governance reforms. In the event, these action plans remained largely dead letters. EU Member States enjoyed close links with Arab regimes, to the point that President Mubarak became co-president of the largely symbolic Union for the Mediterranean, set up on the insistence of French President Nicholas Sarkozy.
The EU took several weeks to evaluate the implications of the uprisings and then adapted its policy framework to offer “more” assistance to those North African countries that did “more” to move towards democratic forms of government. The EU’s vocabulary and approach strongly reflected its support for “transition” in Central and Eastern Europe. It was not, however, apparent that the diverse political forces unleashed by the uprisings necessarily sought to bring their countries’ political systems into line with European norms, standards and values. The Arab uprisings reinforced awareness in Europe of Turkey’s key geopolitical role in North Africa and the Middle East. This has refocused attention from setbacks in Turkey’s EU accession negotiations and internal reform process to its geostrategic role and given greater importance to the EU’s “political dialogue” with Turkey. However, both sides need to show a higher degree of shared purpose if this dialogue is to yield concrete results.

**The United States**

The United States, after a bout of ill-starred democracy promotion under the banner of the Bush administration’s Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative, oscillated between diplomatic realism, symbolised by the $1.3 billion of military aid annually granted to Egypt, and appeals for reform, notably in President Obama’s June 2009 Cairo speech, which claimed that American values were compatible with tolerant forms of Islam.

Initially the Obama administration adopted a cautious approach during demonstrations against President Mubarak in Cairo, fearing that his overthrow could affect regional stability and, especially, the peace treaty with Israel. As Mubarak’s position became untenable, the uprisings were seen as demonstrating the fallacy of the “Arab exception” and validating the administration’s commitment to the universality of human rights. At the same time, Washington was concerned about the impact of the Arab uprisings on oil prices and economic recovery, about its relations with Arab governments in a state of flux, about NATO’s role in the region, and about the significance of the rise of political Islam.

The United States was content for the Arab League and Europe to take the lead in orchestrating the international response to the uprisings in North Africa. In the case of Libya, the United States found a prudent balance between diplomatic and military support for implementing “the right to protect” and encouraging European states to play the principal role. Overall, the Arab uprisings have strengthened relations between Washington and Ankara, especially as Turkey has absorbed much of the international fallout from the armed uprising in Syria and its violent repression by the Assad regime.

**Russia**

Russia views uprisings in the Arab world both in terms of possible spillover to the North Caucasus and Central Asia and in geopolitical terms. In practice, spillover to these contrasting regions has proved minimal and Russia quickly accommodated itself to new regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. More generally, however, Russia views uprisings in the Arab world with misgiving. It is sceptical about the establishment of democracy, dislikes the rise to power of governments imbued with Islam, and fears that the overall effect will be a tilt in the region away from Syria and Iran, which it views as allies, towards Saudi Arabia, which propagates Sunni Islam abroad and is close to the United States.

The armed conflict in Libya, which led to the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1973, NATO’s subsequent intervention and the fall of the Gaddafi regime, posed a major challenge to Russia. After much negotiation, it abstained in the Security Council, thus facilitating NATO’s intervention. But as the NATO operation wore on and was perceived as aiming at regime change, Moscow became increasingly critical. This experience set the scene for Russia’s much sharper reaction to events in Syria.

A collapse of the Assad regime would deprive Russia of an ally and, possibly, of its naval base at the Syrian port of Tartus. It would weaken Iran and further destabilise Lebanon and probably Jordan. Russia has continued to ship arms to Syria and is wary of any move towards Western military intervention. Russian representatives have explicitly ruled out any repetition of “the Libyan model” in Syria and advocate “peaceful resolution” through the plan put forward by Kofi Annan on behalf of the Arab League and the UN. After difficult negotiations, Russia voted in favour of the UN Security Council Resolution establishing the UN Supervision Mission in Syria in April 2012.

Turkey’s critical stance towards the Assad regime and position as a front-line state has led to divergences
with Russia. If the violence and outpouring of refugees continue, however, Moscow will come under pressure to reassess its position. There may well be a growing understanding in Moscow for Turkey’s position and at least a partial convergence of views.

**The Israeli Position**

Israel and Turkey, for different reasons, have long pursued pragmatic policies towards the countries of the region. Israel’s peace treaties with Jordan and Egypt provide the regional pillars of its security strategy. Peace with Egypt, however cold, has allowed Israel to concentrate on other issues. Security cooperation with Jordan is close. Israel seeks to preserve its political and economic ties with Morocco, which have come under strain since the two Palestinian intifadas and the Arab uprisings.

Alarm in Israel at the possible loss of one of these pillars, with Mubarak’s overthrow, somewhat abated when it appeared that the Muslim Brotherhood, which won the 2011/2012 parliamentary elections, would not, in the short term at least, press for abrogation of the peace treaty with Israel. Nonetheless, Israel was concerned about the breakdown of law and order, especially in the Sinai Peninsula, which led to frequent terrorist attacks on the gas pipeline to Israel and Jordan, and the inept firing of Grad-type Katyusha rockets at Israel’s Red Sea port of Eilat. In April 2012, Egypt’s partly state-owned Natural Gas Holding Company cut off gas supplies to Israel in a decision that seems to have been based on both commercial and political considerations.

Since the rift in Israel’s relations with Turkey, following Operation Cast Lead in Gaza in the winter of 2008/2009 and the flotilla incident in May 2010, Israel has reinforced its links with Cyprus and Greece, which may become a new political alignment in the Mediterranean region with far-reaching implications. However, this need not be a zero-sum game as Israel would be one of the major beneficiaries if Turkey’s efforts to restore stability to Syria succeed. Turkey’s role in Syria has distanced Ankara from Teheran and contributed to its rapprochement with Washington.

More broadly, Israel would benefit if Turkey manages to play a moderating role in the region and effectively counters Iranian and Saudi influence. A reconciliation between Israel and Turkey in the short run seems unlikely, but developments in the region may well in time lead Ankara and Jerusalem to reappraise their relations.

**Turkey’s Pragmatic Neighbourhood Policy**

The Turkish governments headed by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, since 2002, have made a virtue of pragmatism in policy towards neighbouring countries, in contrast with the schoolmasterly approach taken by the EU. In the years before the Arab uprisings, Turkey pursued a policy in the Middle East and North Africa that promoted trade and investment, as well as Turkey’s own role as a mediator and facilitator, eschewing political conditionality. The slogan “zero problems with neighbours” expressed the aspiration behind this policy.

It led to a considerable expansion of trade with Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and other states in the Middle East. Visa obligations for travellers from neighbouring states were abolished and free trade agreements concluded, leading to a flourishing cross-border trade. Turkey’s pragmatic relations with neighbouring countries brought considerable benefits to Turkish business, especially the rising class of Anatolian entrepreneurs close to the AK party. On the fall of the Gaddafi regime there were $15-$17 billion in Libyan contracts outstanding with Turkish companies and some 25,000 Turkish citizens present in the country. With the outbreak of civil strife, Turkey undertook a major operation to evacuate its citizens.

Trade with Muslim countries rose from 12 to 20% of Turkey’s total trade during the past decade. Thus Turkey’s own “neighbourhood policy” seemed at first to have paid off in business terms. However it put Turkish companies and citizens in a vulnerable position when Ankara’s political partners in the region were overthrown and violent conflict broke out in Libya and Syria.

**Close Relations with the Anciens Régimes**

Before the Arab uprisings, Ankara showed little squeamishness about the regimes with which it developed close political and commercial ties. As recently as December 2011, Prime Minister Erdogan accepted the Gaddafi International Prize for Human Rights in a ceremony in Libya. Early in 2011, Mr Erdogan addressed President Bashar Hafez al-Assad in Damascus as “my brother.” In February 2011, Turkish President Abdullah Gül visited Teheran during the violent repression of protest rallies in which one person was killed and dozens wounded. In re-
marks during the visit, he made only the most elliptical references to these events. This “good neighbour” policy brought concrete economic benefits and earned plaudits from the international community for its contribution to regional stability. Turkey intervened with Iran on several occasions to obtain the release of imprisoned American, French and British citizens. It brokered talks between Syria and Israel, until the rift with Israel following “Operation Cast Lead” in the winter of 2008/2009 and the flotilla incident in May 2010. Ankara has also sought to mediate on the Iranian nuclear question. However, Turkey’s complicity with the ancien régimes rankled with sections of Arab opinion following the uprisings.

**Turkey’s Response to the Uprisings in North Africa**

The overthrow of President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, and later President Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, coupled with military intervention in Libya under a NATO umbrella and the uprising and repression in Syria posed a major challenge to Turkey. Turkey’s initial reaction to the events leading up to these momentous changes was cautious. Tunisia was outside the usual focus of Turkish attention, and at first the government viewed the protest movement with prudence. After initial hesitation, Turkey welcomed Ben Ali’s ouster and engaged in particular with Rached Ghannouchi, leader of the Ennahda party, which won the October 2011 elections.

The protests leading to Mubarak’s resignation in February 2011 raised more fundamental issues for Turkey. Despite rivalry with Cairo, the spectacle of a long-standing leader of a major Muslim country being challenged by popular demonstrations was scarcely attractive to a Prime Minister who himself increasingly bridled at domestic dissent. Mr Erdogan was the first international leader to call on Mubarak to heed the will of the people and to give way to a democratic form of government. This earned him credibility with the demonstrators and increased Turkey’s popularity in North Africa.

The outbreak of civil war in Libya, Gaddafi’s threats against the people of Benghazi, the Arab League’s call for a no-fly zone, the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 in March, and NATO’s subsequent decision to engage in military measures to enforce the resolution caught Ankara off guard. These events occurred just four months after Mr Erdogan accepted the Gaddafi human rights prize and while 25,000 Turkish citizens were working in Libya under multi-billion-dollar contracts that Turkish companies had concluded with the regime. Nonetheless, Mr Erdogan came round to the NATO operation, and Turkey sent naval vessels to Libyan waters and engaged in a large-scale operation to evacuate Turkish workers. Turkey’s conversion to the NATO operation did not prevent demonstrators from burning the Turkish flag in Benghazi. By May, Mr Erdogan called for Gaddafi to leave office and put forward proposals on bringing the civil war to an end.

The Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were visibly gratified by the praise that was heaped on Turkey by Rached Ghannouchi, leader of Tunisia’s Ennahda party, and other proponents of change. There was no mistaking a certain triumphant tone in official Turkish pronouncements. Turkish self-confidence and popularity in the Arab world were boosted by Ankara’s demand for an apology from Israel over the Gaza flotilla incident and the downgrading of Turkish diplomatic relations with Israel. Buoyed by these developments, Mr Erdogan set out for a visit to Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, in September 2011, accompanied by 200 businesspeople. He was met by public adulation but by a more measured response from military leaders in Cairo. They ruled out his proposed visit to Gaza and did not echo his heightened rhetoric over the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Representatives of the Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party, an emanation of the Muslim Brotherhood, which subsequently won the parliamentary election, expressed respect for Turkey but rejected the idea that an outside power should lay down principles on which Egypt’s future constitutional order should be based. Clearly they did not appreciate Mr Erdogan’s emphasis on secularism in remarks before his arrival in Egypt. The Turkish delegation made some progress in resurrecting Turkey’s $15-17 billion projects in Libya and in securing new commercial arrangements.

There is considerable scope for Turkey to develop its political and economic relations with North Africa. Turkey can share its experience in finding a balance between democracy with an Islamist tinge and secular institutions. Trade, tourism and investment could provide a focus for deeper relations. Overall, Turkey
is well placed to exercise a certain stabilising influence in North Africa, though its immediate preoccupation is with the situation in Syria.

**Syria**

While Turkey’s ambition to play a regional leadership role has, on balance, been comforted by developments in North Africa, the brutal repression of uprisings in Syria has posed a far greater challenge. Following decades of conflict over territory, water, and Syrian support for the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Mr Erdogan engineered a major rapprochement with the Assad regime. Turkey developed close links with Syria, bringing major economic benefits especially to the border province of Gaziantep, which became a major centre for cross-border business with Syria.

The uprising against the Assad regime led to a sharp decline in this flourishing business across Turkey’s 877-kilometre border with Syria. As the violence in Syria spread, Turkey imposed trade sanctions, which had a severe impact on the economic situation in border regions. Turkey faced an increasing flow of refugees. In April 2012, shots fired across the border killed two refugees and injured many others, including a Turkish policeman. Ankara demanded an end to the violence and gave its support to the January 2012 Arab League plan for political transition in Syria and to the subsequent United Nations ceasefire observer mission.

However, these international initiatives failed to stem the violence. Speculation grew about the establishment of a humanitarian corridor into Turkey, a buffer zone within Syria and arming the Syrian opposition. Turkey rejected such moves, which could draw it into confrontation with the Syrian army. By April 2012, some 25,000 Syrian citizens had taken refuge in Turkey, leading Ankara to demand an end to the violence and international support in coping with the refugee flow.

Turkey’s role in absorbing the fallout from Syria’s civil strife and in pressuring Mr Assad to cease military operations earned it appreciation from the United States and Europe. But the situation remains extremely fragile and the outcome uncertain. The risk of fragmentation of the Syrian state and continued instability there is a major preoccupation in Ankara.

### Turkey’s Re-Emergence as a Geostategic Actor

The Turkish government has been remarkably successful in turning its “neighbourhood” policy around, following the Arab uprisings, without paying any price in terms of domestic or international opinion. At home, this owes much to the low salience of foreign policy among the Turkish public and the weakness of the opposition. Even under new leadership, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), the country’s main centre-left opposition party, has been unable to mount an effective challenge to the government. As a party that became increasingly nationalist under its previous leader, the CHP has been unable or unwilling to take political advantage of the effective failure of the government’s previous “zero problems with neighbours” policy.

By swiftly switching its commitment to the new forces emerging in the region, Turkey has become, potentially, an exporter of stability, reducing the burden on the United States and Europe. This chimes well with an administration in Washington preoccupied with domestic politics and seeking to avoid overreach around the world. It chimes well, too, in Europe, with governments seeking to contain the Syrian imbroglio in the midst of the sovereign debt crisis. By contrast, Turkey’s stance sharpened rivalry with Iran and Saudi Arabia and led to divergences with Russia.

Government leaders in Ankara have rebuffed talk of the Turkish model guiding the uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East. And indeed, Turkey’s Ottoman past, its long period of imposed secularism and political domination by the “deep state,” the ethnic composition of its population and Sunni pre-eminence mean that its “model” is not directly applicable elsewhere. The Turkish model evolved over more than a century, beginning with reforms under the country’s Ottoman rulers and continuing for the past ninety years following the Kemalist revolution. Nonetheless, Turkey’s image as a relatively wealthy, open, Western-oriented state with a predominantly Muslim population appeals to many proponents of political change in the Arab countries. Overall, recent developments in the Arab world have sealed Turkey’s re-emergence as a geostategic actor with a key role in bolstering regional stability.
Cultivating and maintaining good neighbourly relations has always been one of the primary objectives of many governments in Turkey. Parties, governments even the military had posited similar policies under various names such as the “peace belt around Turkey policy”, “good neighbourhood policy” etc., and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) followed suit. The AKP’s party programme as well as its manifesto for the 2002 Elections implied that good neighbourly relations would be one of the priorities of the party’s foreign policy. However, it was a year later when the Prime Minister Erdogan’s Chief Adviser Ahmet Davutoğlu articulated the Zero Problems with the Neighbours policy in February 2004 as one of the four leading principles of the AKP government’s foreign policy. The named given to this policy suggested that it would eradicate all the problems that Turkey was trying to overcome in its neighbourhood. The policy received widespread attention from the international public that was already scrutinising the foreign affairs of the AKP, the party with Islamist credentials that was able to rise to power a mere 18 months after its foundation. It promised to follow a more “cooperative track” with its neighbouring countries through the development of “economic interdependence”\(^1\). The steady improvement in relations with Syria and Iran in the first half of the 2000s attested to the policy’s success. Zero Problems with the Neighbours was presented and perceived as one of the hallmarks of the party’s foreign policy.

Notwithstanding the facilitating role that the changing security discourse played in defusing tensions between Turkey and some of its neighbours, the policy failed to deliver what it was supposed to do when regional circumstances transpired to be less than conducive to such alignments. Due to the regional dynamics prevailing in the Caucasus, the policy had already failed to produce concrete results in the context of the Armenian opening. The Syrian leg of Zero Problems with the Neighbours ground to a halt as soon as the contributing factors disappeared. Almost simultaneously, Ankara’s relations with Baghdad began to display signs of deterioration. However, in contrast to what has occurred in the Middle East, the policy still bears fruit in the Balkans and South Europe where the conjuncture seems to be relevant. This article argues that rather than the Arab uprisings, the new strategic configuration that emerged after the US withdrawal from Iraq undermined the basis on which the policy of Zero Problems with the Neighbours functioned.

Before going into the details regarding Zero Problems with the Neighbours, it should be reiterated that similar policies had already been articulated by previous governments before the AKP came to power.\(^2\) The governments of the late 1990s tried to prioritise trust, dialogue and cooperation with the neighbours. Although under different names, similar policies aimed at improving relations with neighbours preceded the introduction of Zero Problems with the Neighbours. Good neighbourhood policies with Russia, Iran, Syria and Bulgaria were already launched and led to the conclusion of various economic and political agreements. Faced with international pressure for its interference in the internal af-

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\(^2\) Nur Bilge Criss, “Parameters of Turkish Foreign Policy under the AKP”, in Mustafa Aydin, (ed.) Turkish Foreign Problems: Old Problems, New Parameters, Madrid: UNISCI, 2010, p. 32.
fairs of Lebanon, the Assad regime was eager to improve its relations with Ankara and readily reciprocated its overtures. In stark contrast to the constant tension throughout the 1990s, the exchange of high-level visits with Syria was already underway and the military training agreement in July 2002 was signed before the AKP came to power. Bilateral relations with Iran were also improving in the early 2000s. In July 2002, much to America’s annoyance, President Ahmet Necdet Sezer visited Iran where he received a warm welcome. Sezer became the first Turkish President to visit the Azeri regions of Iran. Ankara’s rapprochement with Moscow had gained momentum after the Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin’s visit to Turkey in December 1997. Following an agreement for the construction of an underwater natural gas pipeline through the Black Sea, dubbed Blue Stream, Russia became Turkey’s main energy supplier. Economic interdependence in Turkish-Russian relations was in full swing before the AKP came to power. The new mood was articulated by Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz’s declaration that Turkey would “cooperate rather than compete with its great neighbour.” Ankara suspended its support for Chechens fighting for independence, and so did Russians with the PKK. Improvement in relations with Ankara’s most troublesome neighbour, Greece, was already underway. After Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK’s leader was apprehended in the Greek Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, the two neighbours shelved some bilateral issues of mutual concern and established various multi-dimensional dialogue mechanisms such as exploratory talks on the Aegean problems.

Having been conceived by Ahmet Davutoğlu, the policy of “Zero Problems with the Neighbours” was first articulated in the daily Radikal in February 2004. When Davutoğlu elaborated on the concept in January 2008, he underscored that it was one of the five “Principles of Turkey’s New Foreign Policy” that governed AKP’s foreign policy since it had come to power. The AKP considerably desecuritised Ankara’s foreign policy discourse based on cooperation rather than competition. It was obvious that Zero Problems with the Neighbours was in line with the AKP’s holistic rhetoric reflecting its ideological propensities to develop cultural and historical ties with Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbours. In his analysis, he highlighted relations with Syria and Georgia branding them “the most striking examples of Turkey’s success in the region.” Turkey and Syria signed more than fifty agreements and lifted visa requirements. The “intense economic interdependence” was emphasised as the major mechanism through which Turkey could have cultivated “a substantial trust in its relations with its neighbours,” and thus, the “zero problem policy” could have been implemented “without creating any fear of imperial expansion.” Using the Arabic words borrowed in Turkish, he declared that the two neighbours share a “common destiny, common history, and common future.” On another occasion he also pointed out that Turkey was applying the EU model towards the Middle East with Syria being the pilot project. The policy was given further publicity in the aftermath of Davutoglu’s appointment as Foreign Minister in May 2009, when three more so called methodological principles were added. The first was a “visionary approach to the issues instead of the ‘crisis oriented’ attitude that dominated foreign policy during the entire Cold War period.” The second principle aimed to base Turkish foreign policy on a “consistent and systematic framework around the world.” The last methodological principle was the adoption of a new discourse and diplomatic style relying on Turkey’s soft power in the region. In addition to the methodological principles, there were five operational principles guiding Turkey’s foreign policy-making process. They were the balance between security and democracy, zero problems with the neighbours, proactive and pre-emptive peace diplo-
The Zero Problems with the Neighbours policy was hailed as the leading principle of Turkey’s foreign policy by the AKP until as late as April 2011. For the approaching June 2011 elections, the party’s manifesto gave plaudits to the principle as one of the major achievements that the party fulfilled: “We made friends, not enemies. We fulfilled Mustafa Kemal’s motto “Peace at home, peace abroad,” which used to be so far from the reality and turned Turkey into a country which makes friends, not enemies. We attached as much importance to peace abroad as we did to peace at home. While our country’s foreign policy used to be run on the basis of the assumption that Turkey is surrounded by enemies, we turned this imagination and psychology into the policy of Zero Problems with the Neighbours. We solved problems that were thought to be insoluble, formed friendships people thought could not be formed.”

A close examination of the domestic political circumstances under which the first AKP government had to function reveals that the Zero Problems with the Neighbours Policy was first and foremost geared towards contributing to the demilitarisation of the political regime as well as to the desecuritisation of the dominant political discourse. When it came to power in 2002, in order to consolidate its position vis-à-vis the military, the AKP had to demilitarise the foreign and security policy-making process. In order to facilitate this transformation, while the EU reforms for democratisation were given full support, the AKP deliberately avoided any policy options with a potential to trigger a military escalation with the neighbours. Furthermore, the policy was in line with the European Union’s neighbourhood policy. In the meantime, the AKP governments felt it necessary to avoid any conflict with its neighbours because such a contingency might delay Turkey’s accession on the grounds that its neighbourhood was still perilous. With EU accession in mind, as an expert observed, Turkey wanted to treat its Middle Eastern neighbours a la Europe. Under such domestic circumstances, the Zero Problems with the Neighbours Policy became one of the key components of the new policy orientation.

However, beyond the domestic political context, the international conjecture was also conducive to the successful implementation of the policy. The regional power configuration set by the US invasion of Iraq created the necessary conditions for the successful implementation of the policy of Zero Problems with the Neighbours. The invasion that brought a US military presence next to Iran and Syria had made Turkey’s good neighbourliness more valuable in the eyes of the two neighbouring countries. In fact, for fear of being the next US target, both countries were already making many good will gestures to win hearts and minds in Ankara. Both Syria and Iran began to display more constructive attitudes towards Turkey’s demands. For example, it was only with a US invasion looming overhead that Iranian authorities discontinued their support for the PKK and started to cooperate with Ankara within the framework of the Turkey-Iran High Security Commission, which had been established in 1998, yet remained dysfunctional. When the PEJAK, the Kurdish separatist organisation with close organisational ties to the PKK, began to operate in Iran, the Turkey-Iran High Security Commission met regularly leading to the conclusion of a security cooperation agreement in 2004 in which Iran eventually agreed to brand the PKK a terrorist organisation. On the Syrian side, Damascus also welcomed the policy of Zero Problems with the Neighbours. The rapprochement with Syria gained further momentum when the US occupation became imminent. After the al Qaeda bombings in Istanbul in November 2004, it became evident that Turkish-Syrian security cooperation encompassed issues other than fighting the PKK. In January 2005, President Bashar Assad became the first Syrian President to visit Turkey since Syria gained independence in 1946. In the wake of the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in

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February 2005, Assad used the rapprochement to break free of the international isolation over Syria’s alleged involvement, and Turkey helped to get Assad off the hook.

The major mechanism for the policy was economic cooperation and interdependence. For its implementation, the AKP governments instigated official contacts with neighbouring countries at all levels and devised various frames of cooperation to increase mutual trade with them. To this end, their neighbours’ visa requirements were lifted or liberalised. In order to complement the policy of Zero Problems with the Neighbours, the AKP governments attached special importance to softening the official foreign policy discourse. The discourse used in official documents such as the National Security Document was desecuritised by cleansing all clauses which implied animosity towards the neighbours.

The change of discourse was palpable in the language used in the context of Turkish-Greek relations. In the Cyprus issue, the changing rhetoric was striking. The first AKP government made it clear that they would seek to reach a political solution in Cyprus. Despite the high political risks involved, Prime Minister Erdogan supported the United Nation’s Comprehensive Settlement Plan known as the Annan Plan and encouraged Turkish Cypriots to endorse it. Turkey steadily improved its relations with Bulgaria, and, in the aftermath of the latter’s membership to NATO, the former opponents of the Cold War became allies. The AKP governments attached a great deal of importance to maintaining good neighbourly relations with Russia. A special body, the High Level Cooperation Council was established and bilateral relations attained the level of “enhanced multi-dimensional partnership.” Ankara pursued active policies with a view to resolving regional problems in the Caucasus through peaceful means and by promoting regional cooperation. In order to create an environment of dialogue and trust in the region, Ankara proposed the “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform.” Ankara preserved its good relations with Azerbaijan and Georgia. However, despite arduous efforts, the policy of Zero Problems with the Neighbours failed to produce concrete results in Ankara’s relations with Yerevan. The two protocols, aimed at removing the obstacles to building good neighbourly relations with Armenia, were not endorsed by the parliaments. It was once again evident that without the Russian endorsement, such initiatives were doomed to fail.

The AKP governments paid special attention to bolstering relations with Tehran. The relations encompassed intensive political consultations on sensitive issues including Iran’s nuclear programme, the increasing volume of bilateral trade and building natural gas pipelines, which turned Turkey into a sort of energy hub in the Eastern Mediterranean. After reaching unprecedented levels, the trade volume was perceived as one of the most successful outcomes of the Zero Problems with the Neighbours policy. However, while Ankara’s rapprochement with Iran initially complicated its relations with its Western allies, its consent to host anti-ballistic missile radars in eastern Turkey provoked a reaction within the Iranian security establishment, which regarded the decision as a token of hostility. In addition to the new power configuration that emerged in the wake of the US withdrawal from Iraq, the radar issue and the way Turkey deals with the crisis in Syria loom large in the foreseeable future of the Zero Problems with the Neighbours policy.

Even before they come to power, the AKP got tangled with a wide range of problems emanating from Iraq. The AKP governments tried to cultivate friendly relations with all political actors operating in Iraq, first and foremost with the Iraqi Kurds. Due to the internal power struggle, the first AKP governments were unable to deal with the problems of northern Iraq. Only after the 2005 elections in Iraqi Kurdistan did it become clear that the official policy initiated by the military had collapsed. The AKP government recognised and improved its relations with the regional government of Kurdistan in Iraq. However, the changing landscape seen in the wake of the US withdrawal from Iraq seems to undermine the policy of Zero Problems with the Neighbours, at least in the context of Iraq.

It was extremely ironic that despite Davutoglu branding Syria and Georgia as the “most striking examples” of Turkey’s Zero Problems with the Neighbours policy, it was in these countries where the policy did
not live up to expectations. Turkey could do nothing, but stand by and watch when Russian troops wreaked havoc in Georgia. In the case of Syria, in spite of the rhetoric of brotherhood between the two leaders, Ankara was unable to elicit a constructive response from the Assad regime with regard to changing its attitude towards the insurgents. In a matter of weeks the AKP government abandoned what it hoped to secure in Syria after almost a decade of zero problem policy with the Assad regime. The domestic and regional contexts played a decisive role in the sustainability and initial success of the Zero Problems with the Neighbours policy. While the domestic imperatives led the AKP governments to desecuritise Turkey’s foreign affairs, regional context was also conducive to maintaining such a policy. To begin with, it was evident that the policy of Zero Problems with the Neighbours was in line with the AKP’s holistic rhetoric reflecting its ideological propensities to develop cultural and historical ties with Turkey’s Middle Eastern neighbours. Like the EU reforms that demilitarised foreign and security policy-making, the policy of Zero Problems with the Neighbours helped the AKP to consolidate its position vis-à-vis the military. Similar to the domestic context, the regional context also helped to bolster the policy of Zero Problems with the Neighbours. The invasion of Iraq that brought the US military right next to Iran and Syria made Turkey’s cooperation more valuable. Therefore, for a comprehensive analysis of the policy, one should take into account the external economies that arose as a result of the US invasion. The policy should also be evaluated as a concept. Zero Problems with the Neighbours created a number of illusions. The first was the way in which the principle was shown to be a deliberate policy initiated and successfully executed by the AKP governments in a way that no other party had been able to do before. This illusion led many to overlook the fact that similar policies had been followed by previous governments only under different names. The other illusion was that Zero Problems with the Neighbours proved to be successful thanks to the AKP’s determination to improve relations with the neighbours, which had not been a central issue for previous governments. With this in mind, one can easily ignore the structural catalysts that provided the necessary conditions for the fulfilment of the policy. It is also worth looking at the name chosen for the policy: Zero Problems with the Neighbours. The degree of certainty that the word zero alluded to left one with the impression that the party had invented a technically perfect – or as an observer noted, “algebraic” – solution to political problems that other governments had failed to produce. This also attributes a divine omnipotence to the concept’s creator. The word zero also has the more subtle connotation that the policy promises a politically trouble-free end result. Together with the aforementioned allusions, the wording evokes a heavenly world where citizens have no cause for complaint. The other word worth analysing is problem. Together with zero, the word problem suggests that Zero Problems with the Neighbours offers clear-cut solutions to complex problems. As a long-term strategy, the policy was good for promoting peaceful bilateral relations. However, the strategy failed for two reasons: the new balance of power in Baghdad in the wake of the US disengagement from Iraq put a proverbial spanner in the strategy. Relatively speaking, the US withdrawal has strengthened Iran’s overall position in the Gulf area. The new power configuration in Baghdad also meant Syria’s emancipation from the pressure that was emanating from the US military presence in Iraq. This has made both Iran and Syria less receptive and more reactive to Turkish policies, which has been seen in the occasional threats from Tehran following Ankara’s decision to join NATO’s anti-ballistic missile systems. It is more plausible, therefore, to argue that Zero Problems with the Neighbours as a long-term strategy could only pay dividends if regional circumstances remained favourable.

21 Taha Özhan, “Zero Problems and Problems”, Hürriyet Daily News, 24 November 2011. Özhan argued that “they fail to understand that considering the “zero problems policy” as an algebraic argument is as absurd as declaring the end of “history and politics.” “Zero problems” is an “expectation” for reaching an idealized goal while negative and positive foreign policy relations – which tend to change from time to time – are the dynamic steps to be taken toward reaching this goal.”
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Framing EU-South Mediterranean Relations after the Arab Spring

“Dignity” was one of the words that featured in the chants of the protestors who toppled their regimes at the beginning of 2011 in Tunisia and Egypt; political pluralism and empowerment and freedom of expression and association were amongst the many demands. The EU has addressed these challenges to authoritarianism by claiming to change its mode of engagement and to establish priorities that reflect the demands of each country. At the same time it has reviewed its long-term programmatic policies, such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), with a strong focus on revisiting the guidelines and principles of conditionality – the key means for engagement.

It is questionable whether the focus on conditionality is appropriate. Not only is it notoriously hard for the EU to deliver on the conditions it sets, but the premises upon which conditionality is based do not reflect the post-Arab Spring context as they rely on asymmetrical relations between the EU and North Africa and the Middle East and on the assumption that the European model is attractive and relevant to these societies. If the EU is committed to changing the nature of its relations with its southern neighbours, it needs to think more deeply about how to establish an equal dialogue with the Arab world based on the realities of interdependence and on common interests.

Conditionality Revisited

The core of the EU’s response to changes in North Africa and the Middle East can be found in the 2011 “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity,” the ENP review, and certain decisions about financial allocations towards the region, all of which focus strongly on redefining conditionality. This process of revision will not be exhausted with the ENP. The EU’s institutions have also taken over the European co-presidency of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), and some revision of the multilateral initiatives to manage relations in the new and heterogeneous regional context can be expected. But the focus in 2011 was on the ENP and on the system of conditionality governing it.

“Deep democracy” has become the overall aim of revised EU conditionality (free and fair elections; freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and media; the rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and the right to a fair trial; the fight against corruption; and security and law enforcement sector reform and the establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces). The means to achieve this is to offer a more attractive package of incentives in terms of assistance, trade and mobility to those who embark on a reform path – “more for more.” Another pillar of the revised ENP includes a Civil Society Facility (CSF) that will be available regardless of government-to-government relations and thus will not be subject to the conditional method.

Additional incentives (known as the “3 Ms” – more money, market access and mobility) are on offer only to those countries moving on a concrete path of reform. The European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI) has increased its resources to €6.9 billion. The SPRING programme (Support for Partnership, Reforms and Inclusive Growth) com-
plements this with additional funds of €65 million in 2011 and €285 million in 2012. Support will be tai-
tailed to the needs of each country, based on an as-
seessment of the country’s progress in building de-
mocracy and applying the “more for more” principle. Tun-
isia and Egypt, for example, are to receive addi-
tional financial resources (€160 million and €449
million for 2011-2013 respectively).

Additional incentives (known as
the “3 Ms” – more money, market
access and mobility) are on offer
only to those countries moving on
a concrete path of reform

A Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement
(DCFTA) is the long-term incentive on offer by the
EU, an upgrade compared to the previous Associa-
tion Agreements (AA). DCFTAs will be offered only
to those countries moving towards “deep democra-
cy,” while the AAs will remain in place for those
countries still unwilling to reform. In December 2011
the EU Foreign Ministers agreed to start negotia-
tions for DCFTAs with Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco and
Jordan. Given that half of the exports of these coun-
tries goes to Europe, DCFTAs can indeed be con-
sidered an appetising incentive.

However, the timeframe for negotiating them will be
long: it took about fifteen years for nearly all the EMP
partners to negotiate AAs, due to numerous techni-
cal and political obstacles that forced the EMP to
repeatedly delay the original aim of creating a Free
Trade Area. DCFTAs are thus long-term objectives,
even if Morocco and Tunisia’s advancement in bilat-
eral economic relations might make the prospect
more tangible for them. The Commission has com-
mitted to work on lifting the protectionist barriers
that have so far limited market access for the coun-
tries in North Africa and the Middle East; indeed, an
agreement for a partial liberalisation of trade in agri-
culture and fisheries with Morocco was approved
last February.

“Mobility partnerships” are the final leg of this “more
for more” package, intended to make population
movement easier for some citizens from the region.
Given the emigration pressures in these countries,
augmented by the economic downturns resulting
from the Arab Spring, and the demands on the part
of Europe to cooperate in preventing irregular migra-
tion, incentives in the field of mobility and migration
management are clearly an important area. Tunisia
and Morocco have been designated as the first
countries to benefit from these advantages.

Even in this field many points remain to be clarified.
First of all, compared to the visa facilitation and liber-
alisation prospects offered to the countries of East-
ern Europe, mobility partnerships are a far weaker
offer. Only some EU Member States will use them
bilateral, presumably with countries with which
they enjoy special relations, contacts and proximity.
Also, it is unclear how many citizens will be eligible,
or which categories. Usually, mobility partnerships
are limited to rather small groups, such as groups of
academics, cultural representatives, etc. Finally,
there are indications that strings will be attached.
Third countries’ citizens will be offered legal chan-
nels to the EU Member States if their governments
cooperate in preventing and reducing irregular mi-
gration. The question will be how to identify the
benchmarks for an incentive-specific type of condi-
tionality. In light of the tensions in the Schengen sys-
tem and in the European public debate over migra-
tion issues, it cannot be ruled out that the
requirements put on the countries in North Africa
and the Middle East will be demanding (Pascouau:
2012).

The two Communications on the Partnership for De-
mocracy and Shared Prosperity and the ENP review
focus mostly on the positive side of conditionality,
while negative tools are explained only by reference
to the sanctioning regime that has been progres-
sively put in place in an attempt to curb the repres-
sion of the uprising in Syria. An unpublished letter
sent to the national Foreign Ministers in February
2012 and forwarded to the European Parliament is
more comprehensive and answers many of the
questions regarding the “middle ground” – in other
words, the departing point for the “more for more”
principle to be applied and the other side of the coin:
“less for less.” This also reflects the ways in which
the EU intends to strengthen its differentiated rela-
tions with the countries in the region.

As things stand today, the countries that remain
stable and choose not to embark on reforms will
remain at pre-Arab Spring levels of relations with
the EU. In other words, the EU does not want them
to be negatively affected by the changing relations
with the other countries. If the commitment towards
political reform is absent, the EU should use en-
engagement “at some level” through existing tools, such as the ENP Action Plans, and should try to draw countries into more institutionalised relations with the EU. Libya is one country with no formal agreements with the EU, as a Framework Agreement was in the process of being discussed when the events of the Arab Spring changed the situation. Algeria, too, is not yet party to the ENP. Negative measures, from suspending talks or cooperation to suspending assistance or agreements and the full range of sanctions, would thus be limited to grave and persistent cases of violations of basic rights, as in the Syrian example.

Compared to the visa facilitation and liberalisation prospects offered to the countries of Eastern Europe, mobility partnerships are a far weaker offer. Only some EU Member States will use them bilaterally.

This greater differentiation is supposed to be accompanied by a search for policies more capable of addressing local situations than in the past. The EU-Tunisia Task Force, which met for the first time in September 2011, was the first example of an EU attempt to put political dialogue on a different footing, to bring together different stakeholders relevant to EU-Tunisia relations, including other international donors, and to take into account the requirements and needs of Tunisia rather than follow the EU’s tools-based approach. Another task force between the EU and Jordan was also created, following the announcement in Amman of a set of constitutional reforms. A second generation of ENP Action Plans currently being developed, the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) in Brussels, the strengthened EU Delegations in the region, and the recent introduction of human rights strategy papers could all be useful tools to enhance the EU’s understanding of local conditions and tailor its policies accordingly. Aid, too, will be guided by greater differentiation between countries with the aim of developing more tailor-made approaches to assistance. Furthermore, conditionality will be monitored more strongly with regard to direct budget support, which makes up about half of the EU’s assistance to North African and Middle Eastern governments, by strengthening the evaluation and monitoring system, including through dialogue with partners.

One important shift is towards a more vigorous engagement with civil society, regardless of the state of relations with the government. The Civil Society Facility (CSF) and the European Endowment for Democracy (EED) represent an attempt to reach out towards forgotten, marginalised or new political actors in the region and a departure from paying lip service to the previous regimes’ policies towards organised society.

Problems of Conditionality

The initiatives developed over the past year show that the EU has been engaged in a general process of sharpening both ends of the conditionality spectrum, taking existing policies and types of relations as its starting point. The exercise of addressing some of the pitfalls of past practices and developing new methods was needed in itself and is producing results that may have the potential to modify the EU’s forms of engagement with the rest of the Arab world.

However, this instrument-led approach does not necessarily address the key problems nor is it always understandable to partners. There are doubts regarding conditionality that need to be raised. Firstly, there is something paradoxical in the fact that these new forms of positive conditionality are to be applied to the countries that have been undergoing radical change, such as Tunisia, or have been making the greatest efforts at reform from above, for example Morocco. In contrast with the EU’s past dealings with authoritarian rulers or with its relations with “status quo” countries such as Algeria, the EU is now demanding reform from countries that are already reforming. For example, the EU sent an Election Monitoring Observation Mission to monitor the elections in Tunisia in October 2011 and in Algeria in May 2012, initiatives with only one precedent in the region (the Palestinian elections in 2006). While positive conditionality has been clarified and given the ultimate aim of supporting the democratisation of the country, the negative tools are limited just to responding with sanctions to severe and persistent cases of basic human rights abuses, such as regime-led killings of civilians. But the conditionality
regime to be applied to countries that are less willing to submit to it remains unclear. Secondly, to be of interest, the incentives need to be delivered. The EU’s track record has not been spotless, a problem compounded when the Member States are needed to lift protectionist barriers, spend more resources on the Arab countries, or expand the quotas of immigrants allowed to enter Europe from the region. The irony of the “more for more” approach is that neither the High Representative nor the Commission is responsible for delivering these incentives: all three fields are ones in which the Member States are the decision-makers. The new positive tools of the EU’s renewed conditionality thus suffer from a credibility problem before they can even be implemented. Without the endorsement of the Member States, the whole “new” response to the Arab Spring would crumble.

Even if the incentives are delivered, not all countries will find them of interest. Energy-exporting countries, such as Algeria and Libya, have had limited engagement with the EU also because of the unattractiveness of what is on offer. Trade relations are tilted in favour of these countries, which are the only net exporters in the region towards the EU. Indeed, no part of the review of the ENP addresses the question of how to engage with or have an impact on countries that are reluctant to forge or uninterested in stronger relations with the EU. This applies to Syria and to other countries in the Levant, where European influence is weaker and internal politics complex.

With the aim of putting the relationship on a somewhat more equal footing, the new policies introduce the notion of “mutual accountability,” whereby the EU, too, can be made to keep its promises. But whereas the EU has tools and procedures to use negative conditionality should it want to (even if, in practice, it rarely does so), there are no mechanisms for the EU’s partners to hold it similarly accountable for delivering on its promises. It is also questionable whether the focus on conditionality is relevant in itself. Sovereignty has always been an important principle in the post-colonial Arab world, seen as part of national identity, and the notion of “dignity” – personal and national – has been a recurring theme in revolutionary North Africa and the Middle East.

The more democratic the new governments, the more assertive they are likely to be about their identity, their relations with Europe and their position in the world – with positions that might not be to the liking of European capitals. This has been evident in relations with Egypt, where the EU and the US hope to ensure that Cairo will maintain constructive relations with Israel and continue its role in the Israeli-Arab conflict, even as Egypt itself has been increasingly suspicious of the role of external actors, which it accuses of interference. Indeed, much of the post-Arab Spring EU rhetoric has emphasised the modesty of the EU’s positioning and its “listening mode” towards the new emerging actors. In Ashton’s words, “Our response […] is built on the need to acknowledge past mistakes and listen without imposing. We are doing exactly that and it requires perseverance and sustained commitment. Success should translate into what I have called ‘deep Democracy’” (Ashton, 2011). This partly reflects a *mea culpa* on the part of EU institutions for failing to grasp the dynamics in the Arab world and for the complicity of European governments in supporting the regimes in the region. So far this modest ambition has translated to reactive political positioning following developments and requests coming from the countries. But how to square this with the revision of conditionality?

**Conclusions: Rethinking Political Conditionality?**

Major efforts have been made to fine-tune the mechanisms through which conditionality can be applied, to clarify the principles upon which it is based, the expectations from processes of political reform, the recognition that democracy cannot come about overnight, and the offer of a mix of incentives. But the new guidelines on the use of political conditionality do not reflect a deeper analysis of whether the EU has the conditions of leverage, influence, incentives and relevance needed to exercise it. Translating a concept developed in different contexts (development cooperation and enlargement) into foreign policy raises the question of whether conditionality is the “right” approach for North Africa and the Middle East. Two arguments need to be examined.

On the one hand, political conditionality has few and limited chances of bringing about change because of its problems of delivery and implementation. Conditionality requires an asymmetry of leverage and influence tilted in favour of the EU. However, EU influence in the region is by no means comparable to that of a traditional relationship between donor and benefi-
ciary, nor to the case of EU enlargement. Even assuming the EU could agree on a few common political goals, it continues to be reluctant to use its economic weight to achieve them. Also, the EU’s attraction and influence in the region vary enormously from country to country. Against a backdrop of Europe’s global decline and changing power dynamics in the region, with other actors, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, trying to acquire a more important role and other global powers, such as China and Japan, securing economic ties, the EU does not seem likely to strengthen its influence in the years to come. Furthermore, Islamist-influenced governments are likely to broaden their views on international relations, looking for partnership and cooperation beyond the traditional allies in the North and West (Kausch, 2012), and will need to be accountable to their electorates. Beyond the issue of conditionality, the EU and the US will need to find ways to manage the likelihood that the more democratic the countries in the region become, the less pro-Western they may be.

On the other hand, few countries can live in isolation: internal developments do have an impact on third countries, making it legitimate for the EU to be concerned with political dynamics, especially in neighbouring countries with which it has closer human, cultural and economic ties than is generally assumed. In democracies, external assistance does require accountability to national parliaments and auditing bodies. Indeed, all international actors put some conditions on their external policies and expect certain results from them. The EU would be chastised by European public opinion were it to repeat policies resembling those that supported Ben Ali and Mubarak. In many ways, the revision of conditionality seems to reflect an internal demand for a redefinition of “ethical” standards for engagement, following the exposure of contradictions in the EU’s relations with dictators. There is no clear-cut answer to these dilemmas. But they do suggest that one priority should be to rethink the types of relations between the two shores, and not just the forms, methods and tools for exercising political conditionality. A more equal relationship could be a first step, moving away from the enduring “unacknowledged cultural legacy of colonialism” (Halliday 2005) and understanding the national “dignity” that moved so many in North Africa and the Middle East to get rid of their perennial leaders. Interdependence, rather than conditionality based on an asymmetry of power, and reference to universal principles, rather than to standards of democracy, make it legitimate to support them abroad, notwithstanding the accusations of double standards that the EU often encounters. And identifying common interests and concerns that reflect the demands of the people in this common Mediterranean space may be a way to establish a new dialogue with a changing Arab world.

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The Mediterranean has changed. After over 50 years of regime stability in the region, a wave of revolutions and evolutions has shaken a geopolitical and cultural ensemble that seemed immutable. The magnitude of these changes has surprised all analysts. This is the confirmation of a reality that is no longer in doubt: the Arab world truly exists as a single political area. What happens in one Arab country inevitably has an impact on other Arab countries. The construction of a single discourse since the pan-Arab nationalism of the 1950s, in particular with the struggle for the liberation of Palestine, has created a political entity that has been evolving according to a relatively coherent rhythm. The autocratic regimes that had fostered a nationalist view of reality upon which to base their historical legitimacy after decolonisation could not suspect that the political space they were building would facilitate the transmission of revolutionary ideas fifty years later, in 2011. This is the first lesson to be gleaned from the Arab revolutions. In the opposite direction to the muezzins, who make their calls to prayer from the east towards the west, the Arab awakening spread from the Arab west in Tunisia to Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen. An awakening in the form of revolutions, protests, uprisings or, unfortunately, also in the form of bloody confrontations that can degenerate into civil war, as in Syria.

The second lesson is much more important. It has to do with the surprising fragility of political regimes considered very solid until then. Indeed, it is precisely the most authoritarian countries, those equipped with the most extensive and so-to-speak most efficient State security apparatuses that were affected by the revolts and were hardest hit by social protest. It became evident that these regimes were structurally enormously fragile. Their security apparatuses were extremely sophisticated because said regimes lacked the popular legitimacy necessary to rise to the considerable challenges of their societies, which were experiencing transformation and ferment. The breeding ground for the revolutions was the growing delegitimisation of States that were at once economically corrupt, politically closed and socially, increasingly inegalitarian. This fragility is a lesson to be drawn for countries in the region, but also for actors from outside the region, Europe and the United States, for instance, who had the most authoritarian of these political regimes among their allies without bothering to apply the principles and values presiding their own democratic political systems to their foreign policy. We will discuss this matter later in this paper.

The third lesson, still provisional, of what is happening in the Arab world concerns the direction of political change where elections have been held. Those who carried out the revolution are not the winners of the revolution. In fact, everything would seem to indicate that those benefiting from the dissatisfaction demonstrated in the Arab streets are Islamist parties and movements that, as is known, were not behind the revolts. Years of underground or semi-underground opposition; years of firmness and criticism of secular regimes; years of patiently building cooptation and social assistance networks have borne fruit. The question now is how long the promises of honesty and transparency in conducting public affairs will allow the winning parties to meet the expectations of youth, who expect improvement of their quality of life and their job perspectives. The Islamist parties know this: they enjoy an enormous capital of democratic legitimacy and citizen confidence, but
this capital could run out if they are unable to change things in the field. And it is an extremely unstable field: overpopulated cities lacking essential infrastructures; neglected, poor rural areas; little or poorly trained youth without hope of finding a decent job, marrying and starting a family, and who are caught between strict moral codes of conduct imposed by religion and a lack of opportunities for social and personal development.

These lessons are yet provisional and uncertain. They coexist alongside other lessons, some of them still invisible, that will emerge in the forthcoming months and years and will certainly demonstrate, once more, the ignorance of those attempting to explain the realities of a complex Arab world, subject to multiple, unforeseeable factors and actors. But once our ignorance and the uncertainty of our judgements has been asserted and confirmed, we should be in the position to make an analysis of Europe’s options regarding the changes, evolutions and revolutions in the Arab world, and particularly in the Mediterranean Arab world.

Europe has always had two complexes vis-à-vis the Arab world since the independence of the countries in the region: a guilt complex and a superiority complex. The end of European colonisation of the Mediterranean (by France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) generally coincided with the beginning of the construction of post-war Europe. Since the 1960s, Europe has approached relations with Arab countries from a dual perspective. On the one hand, the sense of having dominated, exploited and subjugated these countries, towards which it has contracted a historical debt. On the other hand, the perception that these countries, as well described by Edward Said in his book, Orientalism, were the image of a certain archaism, an example of political, social and economic backwardness. A sense of guilt for an often ruthless colonial history; and a sense of superiority because since their independence, Europe has considered it needed to aid in the modernisation of these “backward” countries, a backwardness that needed to be remedied through European ideas of governance, education and industrialisation.

Moreover, as Europe was gradually establishing an institutional system to unify a continent devastated by fratricidal war (Treaty of Paris in 1951, Treaty of Rome in 1957), the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs) were beginning or completing their decolonisation and independence processes (Morocco and Tunisia in 1956; war in Algeria from 1954 to 1962; Suez Crisis of 1956; birth of the Egyptian Republic in 1953). That is, while Europe moved towards the establishment of supranational institutions to move beyond the terrible conflicts brought about by expansionist nationalisms, the Arab world, to a great extent heir to 19th-century European political culture, was preparing to build Nation-States.

We will not analyse the history of Euro-Arab and Euro-Mediterranean relations since the 1950s, but in order to comprehend the political choices that Europe must make in order to meet the challenges posed by the Arab Spring, I do feel it necessary to examine the recent evolution of these relations since a decisive date, a key event that has strongly marked these relations: 11 September 2001.

Indeed, the 10 years from 2001 to 2011 were witness to the contradictory approach adopted by the Western world and Europe in their strategic relations with the Mediterranean Arab world: the need to foster changes, aid and promote reforms, but also the need to keep regimes in place as faithful allies in the struggle against terrorism, in the guarantee of power supplies, and in border patrolling to reduce illegal immigration. This hesitation between a “regime-change” policy and a “regime-keeping” one determined European approaches in this ten-year period in which the Middle-East conflict experienced two major crises: the war in Lebanon in 2006 and the Israeli military operation in Gaza in January 2009. Two initiatives put forth by the United States and Europe illustrate the will to reform Arab countries: the Broader Middle East and North Africa initiative, formally adopted by the G8 at the 2004 Sea Island Summit, and the European Neighbourhood Policy, formulated in a European Commission Communication in March 2003 and implemented through the Neighbourhood Action Plans concluded as of 2005 with many South Mediterranean countries.

If we had to choose a statement, a phrase that summed up this will to promote changes and in-depth reforms, we would most certainly cite the famous speech by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice at the American University in Cairo in June 2005. She effectively condensed the concerns of the United States with regard to the Arab world into a few words when she asserted that “for 60 years, the United States pursued stability at the expense of democracy in the Middle East – and we achieved neither.” She thus expressed the conclusion that the US neoconservatives had reached: democracy
could be a means of consolidating security in the region since authoritarian regimes had not succeeded in doing so.

Yet this reforming vision, which predominated in discourse from 2001 to 2005, ran out of steam precisely as of 2005. Two factors contributed to this: first of all, the results of elections in Lebanon (excellent results for Hezbollah in 2005), Palestine (victory of Hamas in 2007), Iraq (victory of Shi’ite Islamist parties in 2005) and Egypt (significant results for pro-Islamist independents in the 2005 legislative elections); and secondly, the aggravation of the conflicts in the Middle East (2006 and 2009) and Iraq. These two factors seem to have led the United States towards a return to a more realistic view of international relations, aware that the potential for conflict in the Middle East and the whole of the Arab world demanded prudent policies. Afghanistan, Iraq and Palestine remained open fronts that have proven intractable in many regards; it was not a good idea to encourage the emergence of other sources of instability through democratic processes that would have given the floor to the adversaries of the West. The controversy of the cartoons appearing in a Danish newspaper in 2005 also inflamed spirits in many countries in the region. The intelligent manipulation by the authoritarian regimes of Egypt, Syria and Libya set off alarm bells in a Huntingtonian confrontation that served to strengthen the position of dictators in the region. They created a problem and put themselves forth as the only ones capable of providing a solution. Europe faced a difficult choice between freedom of expression as a fundamental right and human and trade security. The supposedly secular authoritarian regimes won the wrestling match and imposed their viewpoint. Then began a new stage of Realpolitik vis-à-vis authoritarian regimes.

It is in this context that in February 2007, candidate Nicolas Sarkozy delivered a speech in Toulon in which he put forth a new vision of Euro-Mediterranean relations. This was the genesis of the Union for the Mediterranean, which led to the Paris Summit of 7 July 2008. This summit also represented the expression of respect for the political choices of the regimes in power in the South Mediterranean, and their being accepted as partners in building cooperation based on concrete projects. The reform objectives of the European Neighbourhood Policy were mentioned, but they were not the focal point of debate or of the declaration adopted by the Heads of State and Government. Thus began a stage dominated by pragmatism and institutionalisation. This multilateral framework, henceforth represented by the Union for the Mediterranean, does not tackle issues of reform, governance or human rights. It was, however, immediately subject to the vagaries of developments in the Middle East conflict. The institutional structure of joint representation with the establishment of an Egyptian co-presidency allowed the Arab countries to block dialogue after Israeli military intervention in Gaza beginning on 27 December 2008. It was not until March 2010 that the joint Secretariat of the UfM was set up in Barcelona. The Secretariat’s operational debut in October 2010 preceded the onset of the Arab revolutions by several months. The Union for the Mediterranean, home of the will to cooperate with a certain number of regimes, was immediately faced with a significant change of spokespersons in the South Mediterranean.

Many also consider that the European Neighbourhood Policy launched in 2003 is discredited. Neighbourhood Action Plans were concluded with countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, whose will to introduce reforms was more than questionable. Advanced Status was even considered for Tunisia. On the whole, European policies in the Mediterranean were considered partial failures. The Barcelona Process, with the introduction of free trade, had succeeded in putting in place important reforms on the economic level, but beyond the economic sphere results were poor. An excellent initiative in collective cultural diplomacy such as the Anna Lindh Foundation allowed all Euro-Mediterranean Partners to work together and develop projects with civil society. The European Investment Bank (EIB), with its Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP), became the main investor in the region. The European Commission, with over 900 million euros per year, carried out cooperation projects in all the countries in the region as well as regional projects by supporting networks such as FEMISE (Forum Euroméditerranéen des Instituts de Sciences Économiques), EuroMeSCo (a political think-tank), EMWIS (a network of water experts), ANIMA (investment network) or the Euromed Heritage project, concerning the promotion and conservation of cultural heritage in the Mediterranean. There were many concrete achievements, though they are considered insufficient or hardly visible in the face of the region’s political immobility and the nearly complete lack of substantial political reform.

The ten years since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were thus the years of the security
paradigm of “war on terrorism,” oscillating between the demand for reforms and the recognition of the fact that the regimes in power were better able to effect the struggle against jihadi terrorist organisations, in particular Al Qaeda. From 2001 to 2005, the first approach took precedence. As of 2005, the Western powers gradually adopted prudent, wait-and-see attitudes, or in some cases, positions of implicit or explicit support to the regimes in the region. President Obama’s 2009 Cairo speech already contained little reference to democracy and human rights. The “Arab exception,” the cultural and political relativism that accepted respect for cultural and religious traditions to explain that liberal democracy was not applicable to the Arab world, was accepted as a lesser evil. In the face of this situation, there was a single exception to the policy of respectful non-intervention: in 2009, the contested election results in Iran giving the victory to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad received the complete attention of the media and the full support of Western governments. However, this was far from the Mediterranean and well beyond the Arab world.

And it was in such a geopolitical environment, in a small, remote city of inland Tunisia, where a young man of 26 years of age immolated himself. It was Saturday, 17 December 2010. This act, at first concealed, then underestimated by the regime, was the seed of a wave of revolts in the inland areas of the country. And we know the rest. In three months, the wave of protests spread through the entire Arab world in the Mediterranean and beyond. Since then, the political map of the Arab world has changed radically, and with it, the European policy roadmap in the region. The South Mediterranean emerges today as a region in full evolution. Post-revolutionary, reformist or repressed political transitions comprise a much more open, fluid, unforeseen and unforeseeable political landscape than the one in 2010. European policies must thus evolve in order to make the appropriate response to a new paradigm that illustrates a region in full evolution; a more fragmented region, one where the potential for internal conflict is higher and more immediate than the former pre-eminence of international conflicts; a region where new political leaders are or are about to be Islamist; in sum, a region thoroughly, dramatically shaken up, completely transformed by the consequences of poorly analysed internal dynamics and not by international intervention as was the case in Iraq or Afghanistan.

What was and what could be the response of the European Union to such regional evolution?

European Institutions (the European External Action Service and the European Commission) published two communiqués in February and May 2011 establishing the principle of the EU’s support to the democratic transitions through a triple offer that, according to Catherine Ashton, could be summed up as “the 3 Ms,” i.e. “Money, Market and Mobility” (more money, greater access to European markets and greater mobility for people to move in Europe). It is not surprising that Europe focuses on these three domains since it is precisely in these domains that it can make concrete offers through its economic cooperation and development policy, its commercial policy covering industrial and agricultural products as well as services, and its mobility policy and policy on Schengen area visas.

These three dimensions, above all the latter two, concerning market access and mobility, aim to consolidate the position of Europe as an area to which neighbouring countries to the East and South can aspire to accede; ultimately, the European Union wishes to position itself as a centre of gravity for the Mediterranean and Eastern Europe.

However, Europe knows that it is competing with two other emerging actors: Turkey and the Gulf States. On the one hand, the Turkish economic power, which represents the success of a liberal economic model governed by moderate Islamists; and on the other hand, the economic power of the Gulf States, exporters of petrodollars, with a social and religious conservatism highly attractive to countries seeking to consolidate their identities following the enormous social upheavals of these past 40 years of urbanisation, secularisation and contraction of the family towards a nuclear family model. This competition is, of course, much stronger in the Middle East than in the Maghreb, but it is still a factor throughout the region. There is a perception that Europe is not a model to follow because it lost part of its credibility during the Arab Spring. Europe, experiencing crisis, is considered to have lost its power and will to act in the region.

What Should Europe Do? What Vision Should it Have? What Strategic Choices Should it Consider?

There are no easy answers to this question, but we all know that Europe should be capable of conceiving a platform, a framework, a structure capable of welcom-
ing and at the same time encouraging and attracting the emerging Mediterranean democracies. This task could be essential. If we analyse the evolution of Eastern Europe – the part having acceded to the European Union in 2004 as opposed to the Europe that has remained outside its borders, more vulnerable to Russian influence – we quickly realise the importance of the European Union as a welcoming framework wielding the gentle power of attraction of democracy and stability. It is clear that the European Union cannot allow the South Mediterranean Countries to join its institutions, but this should not prevent it from developing a framework or common platform for work and cooperation capable of offering these countries a political horizon. A European Neighbourhood Policy strengthened by the conclusion of the Neighbourhood agreements stipulated in the Lisbon Treaty is one of the options available. A community of democratic States as proposed in 2005 by EuroMeSCo, the Euro-Mediterranean network of think tanks, would be another possibility. The idea would be that Europe undertake to maintain special relations involving concrete benefits in terms of proximity, participation and access with countries respecting criteria of democracy and human rights according to the first two Copenhagen criteria, i.e. the establishment of stable institutions guaranteeing Rule of Law, democracy, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities and the implementation of a market economy. The difficulty of setting up a regional initiative involving a special relationship with Europe resides in defining the contours of the European offer, as was also the case with the European Neighbourhood Policy; in other words, the content of an offer by the European Union that would go beyond an Association Agreement but would exclude a country’s accession to European Institutions.

Conclusions

The three key concepts here are access, participation and solidarity. The aim would be to define an area similar to the European Economic Area (EEA), which, with a configuration adapted to the development needs of Mediterranean countries, could become a Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area or, to continue in the logic of neighbourhood policy, a Neighbourhood Economic Area. The European Economic Area, of a multilateral nature, is the highest level of integration attained by the EU with non-Member States. It covers the free circulation of goods, services, capital and people. It likewise includes common regulations in the spheres of competition, environment, social policy, consumer protection, statistics and commercial law, as well as policies on research and education. The countries of the European Economic Area are excluded from the EU’s foreign relations policy (CFSP and ESDP), common agricultural, fishing and transport policy, regional policy, justice and domestic affairs, and fiscal and monetary policy. An adaptation of this range of freedoms and participation would probably be necessary to meet the specific needs of Mediterranean countries. It would also be important to preserve the multilateral nature – as is the case with the EEA – of the initiative between the European Union and non-Member States within the Euro-Mediterranean Area, and the Union for the Mediterranean seems the most appropriate framework to accomplish this. This would involve a long-term perspective for the gradual, conditional creation of an area of access (access to the market and human mobility) and participation (in certain institutions and certain policies), but also of solidarity (the development levels of certain countries in the South necessarily call for development policies which EEA countries such as Norway or Iceland do not require). This triple dimension of access to the EU area, participation in certain common policies and institutions and solidarity through concrete, substantial cooperation policies should constitute the base structure of close-knit relations with Mediterranean countries respecting democratic principles and the market economy. The other matter is, clearly, whether the EU is ready to make an effort in this triple dimension and place a substantial offer on the table at a time when it has to handle a large-scale internal crisis in the Mediterranean. It is of the utmost importance to devise a Mediterranean strategy, to have the courage and the historic vision necessary to identify and meet the medium and long-term challenges in the region. It is up to the politicians and the EU Institutions to recognise this and act accordingly.
Dossier:
The Awakening of the Civil Society in the Mediterranean
Turmoil is probably the best characterisation of Mediterranean societies in 2011, when historic political and economic events swept across the region. The political turmoil of the Arab world was both unexpected and welcome, with a number of countries finally moving away from sclerotic authoritarian forms of government and towards more pluralistic and inclusive political systems. The Arab youth taking to the streets to voice their dissatisfaction and hatred for the ruling elites became an inspiration for many on the northern shore of the Mediterranean to protest against the austerity measures and economic policies pursued by their respective governments. Thus, from the “indignados” in Spain promoting a new way of “doing politics” to the violent Greek demonstrations and from the Tunisian youth demanding “dignity, bread and freedom” to ordinary Syrian citizens defying Bashar al-Assad’s security services, societies are awakening across the region due to the severe nature of the political and economic crises they face. Notwithstanding the significant popular mobilisation in established democracies to demand a new social contract to face the worst economic crisis since the 1929 depression, there is no doubt that the Arab Spring constitutes the most important event of 2011 and a defining history-changing moment.

However uncertain the outcome of the Arab Spring might be, the changes that took place over 2011 across the Middle East and North Africa seemed to signal to many the awakening of civil society in the face of political authoritarianism in a repeat of what occurred in Eastern Europe in 1989. It follows that the issue of civil society activism as a crucial ingredient of democratisation has resurfaced strongly after a decade of criticism of both the concept from a theoretical perspective and its practical validity in authoritarian systems. It is in the context of what can be termed an inter-paradigm debate that the question of civil society will be analysed in this contribution to explain the extent to which the Arab Spring is the product of civil activism.

The Inter-Paradigm Debate and Civil Society

Until the late 1990s, the dominant approach to studying Arab politics was democratisation or transition. This meant that scholars and policymakers interpreted events in the region as steps, either forward or backward, on the straight line that inevitably takes countries from authoritarian rule towards the establishment of a liberal-democratic system. Heavily influenced by the transitions in Eastern Europe and Latin America, the paradigm of democratisation was applied to the Middle East and North Africa, where a number of liberal political and economic reforms were indeed being carried out throughout the 1990s. When reforms seemed successful, they were hailed as a step towards the inevitable democratic change that was just around the corner. When reforms failed, they were considered a temporary setback that would in time be rectified so that the country could progress towards democratisation. Over time it became apparent, however, that the
concepts and expectations of the democratisation literature did not really correlate with the reality on the ground, where authoritarianism was simply being restructured rather than abandoned. Thus, taking their cue from an influential 2002 article by Carothers, who argued that the transition paradigm had ended, scholars of the Arab world focused their attention on the mechanisms that allowed authoritarianism to survive by, paradoxically, introducing apparently liberal reforms.

In this context, both the critiques of the theoretical assumptions of transitology and the empirical evidence showed that the transition paradigm had lost its explanatory power. As mentioned, in the Middle East and North Africa authoritarian rule prevailed, and it became important to attempt to explain the different ways in which such systems had become so resilient and seemingly impenetrable to genuine democratic change. By the early 2000s, the paradigm of authoritarian persistence had begun to replace the democratisation paradigm when it came to explaining political events in the Arab world. Now, the surprising events of the Arab Spring seem to have swung the pendulum back in favour of democratisation insofar as authoritarian rule in the region no longer appears as resilient as it was made out to be. It should be noted, however, that it might be too early for the democratisation literature to dismiss the insights of the paradigm of authoritarian persistence for three reasons. First, it is more than likely that authoritarianism will remain a regional feature for the foreseeable future, particularly in the Gulf. Second, the direction of the political changes taking place in Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Yemen and Libya is extremely unclear, and, while Tunisia has embarked on a process that has led to the creation of a relatively stable pluralistic political system, the same cannot be said for all the other countries. Finally, remaining stuck in a semi-authoritarian limbo is as likely a scenario for many Arab countries as democratisation or authoritarian retraction is. In any case, both paradigms are now used, and the inter-paradigm debate simply shows that both approaches offer significant shortcomings and powerful insights. The more general inter-paradigm debate has had profound consequences on the crucial assumptions of both approaches, and civil society has not escaped the resulting increased scrutiny.

The democratisation paradigm gave significant importance to the role of civil activism in regime change, and praise for the role of civil society in setting off the Arab Spring has been widespread since. Increasing civil society activism has always been seen as a necessary component of the challenge that needed to be mounted against authoritarian rule, and, as far back as 2000, Laith Kubba proclaimed that the "awakening of civil society" would lead Arabs to the "promised land" of democratisation just as it had done for Eastern Europe in the 1980s. Specific criticism of this normative liberal and, to some, naive conceptualisation of civil society accompanied the more general criticism of the democratisation literature. When examining the role of civil society activism, the paradigm of authoritarian persistence argued that it was a very problematic concept from a theoretical and definitional point of view and that its practical application was also much more complex and nuanced than the simplistic dichotomy of a "good" civil society versus a "bad" authoritarian state. In fact, numerous new studies on civil society in general and on civil activism in the Arab world in particular countered the liberal assumptions of transitology. Thus, rather than fostering democratisation, the growth of civil society is perceived to be, at best, ineffective in challenging authoritarianism or, at worst, a mechanism that reproduces authoritarian patterns and that ultimately serves to strengthen authoritarian rule.

Civil Society and the Arab Spring

The Arab Spring and the societal revolt against political authoritarianism have brought the assumptions and insights of both paradigms back to centre stage, but they face a number of significant problems in explaining how civil society might have contributed to the changes taking place in the region. Democratisation studies focused strongly on the presence and activism of liberal-oriented civil society associations struggling for human rights and democracy to argue that they would be able to awaken society and challenge authoritarianism. More significantly, some scholars argued that it was important to include Islamist groups in the definition of civil society and that they were equal participants in the bottom-up effort to counter authoritarian political rule through their many charitable and politicised associations. While superficially it may appear that the Arab Spring vindicates such an approach, it should be emphasised that traditional and long-standing opposition civil society groups, including Islamists, were notably absent from the anti-regime demonstrations, particularly in
Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria. In fact, it can be argued that such associations and groups, which purportedly represented civil activism at its finest, were as surprised as the regimes in place by the extent and determination of the initial anti-regime protests. This applies equally to both the liberal and Islamist sectors of civil society. The case of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood is quite telling in this respect insofar as the leaders of the association, probably the largest civil society actor in Egypt, were very reluctant to encourage its members to join the early demonstrators and to offer their logistical skills to the uprising. The Brotherhood decided to join in a good few days after the beginning of the protests and seemed to do so because of the pressure brought to bear by its younger members, who were eager to participate. Referring to the Tunisian uprising, the journalist Béchir Ben Yahmed wrote in an editorial for *La Jeune Afrique* that “no party, no union, no politician gave the impetus for this popular uprising nor were they in any way involved,” highlighting how minor the involvement of organised civil society groups of all ideological tendencies was. This does not mean that members of traditional civil society groups did not protest: quite the opposite is true. However, their involvement was in a personal capacity rather than out of an official position of the association or associations they belonged to. It follows that democratisation studies might have correctly identified the “power of society” to revolt against authoritarianism as a crucial ingredient for democratic political change, but they failed to identify the actual actors that were able to bring the change about or, at least, initiate it. The sham liberalisation of the authoritarian regimes had, if only rhetorically, allowed for the pluralisation of relations between themselves and wider society, leading to the growth of new civil actors hidden from the mainstream.

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For their part, scholars of authoritarian resilience had correctly accounted for the mechanisms that prevented traditional civil society groups loosely qualified as being in opposition to the regimes in place from mounting a significant challenge. With a mixture of repression, co-optation and divide-and-conquer strategies, regimes had virtually emptied civil society activism of its counter-power abilities. The vast majority of civil society groups had accepted to play by the rules of the regime and largely reproduced the same authoritarian mechanisms of the regimes in their dealings with it and with each other. Again, this was true of both the liberal and Islamist sectors of society. By focusing overwhelmingly on traditional civil society groups and hierarchical and structured organised forms of activism, the paradigm of authoritarian resilience failed to analyse how Arab societies were going through significant changes that were not being captured by traditional associational life. This failure is encapsulated in the manner in which “upgraded authoritarianism” was thought to work. There is no doubt that Heydemann’s work on upgrading authoritarianism in the Arab world provides useful analytical insights on the mechanisms that allowed authoritarian regimes to strengthen their hold on power throughout the 1990s and 2000s while seemingly introducing liberal reforms, including the liberalisation of associational life. Where upgraded authoritarianism fails is in its inability to conceive of its unintended consequences. While traditional civil society groups were allowed more space to operate by the regimes in place and were unwittingly used to strengthen authoritarianism, these mechanisms of co-optation and “virtual liberalism” generated different and alternative dynamics of activism that remained somewhat hidden, and it is from these new spaces of activism that the Arab Spring sprang.

**New Spaces of Activism**

When one accepts that traditional civil society actors have had their role as triggers of political change confiscated, it becomes necessary to examine where the societal rebellion against authoritarianism came from. In order to do this, it is important to broaden the definition of civil society not only by recognising that it should not have an exclusively liberal-normative connotation, but also, more importantly, by realising that it is not solely about formal hierarchical structures and organisations. Civil society activism is more than non-governmental organisations. As Challand recently wrote, “I choose the phrase ‘counter-power of civil society’ to describe the ongoing developments [in the Arab world] because I believe...”
that there is more to civil society than its organised form. There is more to civil society than NGOs and the developmental approach which imagines that the key to progress is when donors, the UN or rich countries, give aid to boost non-state actors, in particular NGOs, in the developing south." In this respect the concept of “activated citizenship,” although admittedly fluid and only recently introduced in studies of civil society activism under authoritarian constraints, could potentially be useful insofar as it highlights how classic civil society activism with its emphasis on formal organisations and structures is unable to capture the complexity of how society “expresses” itself. It indicates that engagement with significant political, social and economic issues does not only occur through formal structures and that in authoritarian systems individual citizens with little open access can mobilise on their own and then use their social networks, both on- and offline, to live a reality of opposition, as illustrated by Bayat.

Classic civil society activism with its emphasis on formal organisations and structures is unable to capture the complexity of how society “expresses” itself

Thus, there are plenty of other modes of engagement that can emerge to challenge authoritarian rule, ranging from individual writings to mass participation to non-political events to artistic expression. All of these modes of engagement can then be activated when specific events or “triggers,” such as the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, occur. A considerable degree of civil engagement and activism in different forms from the traditional ones was taking place before the spark occurred, and this testifies to society’s vitality, even under the repressive authoritarian measures of the regimes in power.

The Main Features of the Arab Spring

When one looks at the main features of the initial impetus for the Arab Spring, three elements stand out and provide an explanation as to why and how wider society confronted authoritarianism outside the expected parameters of civil activism.

The first element is the youth factor. The Arab Spring is very much the product of the rebellion of young Arabs frustrated with the state of their country and the lack of opportunities for a better future. The youth factor is particularly significant because older generation activists, particularly in the secular sector of society, had been scathing in their condemnation of the youth, which had seemed to them only to care about consumerism or personal religious piety and to have little interest in politics and civil activism. In many ways, the youth of the Arab world had been written off as potential actors of change because of their apparent “apolitical” interests. Furthermore, those who did take an active interest in civil activism were very often doing so outside traditional party affiliations and outside long-established civil society groups, privileging the creation of their own ad hoc committees with variable membership. For instance, in an investigative report on civil activism in Morocco, La Jeune Afrique notes that “whereas the older generation of militants fought for democracy and political freedoms, [the new generation of militants] fights for the rights of every individual to act according to his or her own free will.” It is these new activists, seemingly apolitical and focused on individualistic issues, who were able to mobilise the rest of their peers, and this mobilisation succeeded precisely because it was apparently apolitical and non-ideological. During the demonstrations in Tunis, Cairo, Benghazi, Alexandria, Damascus, Sana and Algiers, the absence of ideological slogans and chants was noticeable. There were no calls for socialism or US-style liberal-democracy, but simply for the dictators to go and for the arrival of some sort of change. The Arab youth felt disconnected not only from the regimes and their authoritarian and corrupt practices, but also from the tired and older opposition leaders who had compromised with the regime or been absent from the public scene. Not even the Islamist slogans of the past, such as “Islam is the solution,” appeared on the streets. The Islamist alternative as conceived before the Arab Spring and institutionalised in traditional Islamist groupings could not energise a younger generation.

This new, seemingly apolitical youth-driven brand of activism had three paradoxical advantages over the traditional one. Whereas most politicised activists who were members of political parties or partisan civil society groups had failed for decades to create sustainable and effective anti-regime coalitions, the new unaffiliated activists were much more ideologi-
cally flexible and therefore capable of creating efficient coalitions and involving a greater number of people precisely because there were no ideological battles to be fought. The difficulties of coalition-building in the Arab world due to ideological differences, particularly between Islamists and secularists but also as a result of conflicts within each camp, are well documented and have long undermined efforts to challenge authoritarianism, allowing regimes to exploit such divergences and adopt divide-and-conquer strategies to remain in power. In the lead-up to and during the demonstrations, there were no ideological conflicts to overcome, and young people from different social classes, from non-political backgrounds and with widely diverging political and religious beliefs, if they had any at all, came together in the name of very simple objectives that everyone could support: dignity, bread and freedom. Divisions on how to realise the objectives of the uprising would be left for the aftermath of their victory. The second advantage of the absence of political affiliation was the creation of a diffuse leadership. It is quite telling that the Arab Spring, unlike the Polish or Czechoslovakian uprisings of the 1980s, does not have recognised and recognisable leaders. While prominent young people were behind the organisation of the early protests and the mobilisation efforts in each Arab country throughout the uprisings, their leadership was very much lacking in hierarchy and was marked by a high degree of decentralisation, with new voices being added constantly. This diffuse leadership stands in stark contrast to the past, when anti-colonial or nationalist struggles were highly dependent on a charismatic leader capable of mobilising people through the power of his rhetoric and message. Nothing of the sort occurred during the Arab Spring, when, in fact, the paternalism of old opposition leaders attempting to ride the wave of the revolution was wholly rejected in all the squares across the region. The third advantage of the absence of political affiliation has been the practical impossibility for the security forces to utilise repression effectively by arresting, “disappearing” or physically eliminating an easily identifiable leadership: such a leadership simply was not there. Thus, the mobilisation of a seemingly apolitical youth that was not affiliated with any specific political movement or civil society group and was disconnected from rigid ideological debates and programmes succeeded where older activists had failed for decades, leading to the temporary triumph of “apolitical” society, as recently noted by Dalmasso.

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The second element is related to the means through which mobilisation and activism took place. While the Arab uprisings are not “Twitter revolutions” insofar as street mobilisation and face-to-face social networks were crucial, there is little doubt about the importance of online activism both before and during the actual uprisings. Again, this type of activism was not believed to be particularly significant before the uprisings, yet people in the region had taken to the web with great enthusiasm to discuss all sorts of matters as it seemed to be the only open space available to them to discuss social, economic and political issues. The regimes obviously policed the Internet and social media precisely because they felt they were threatening and would not likely have bothered with them if they had thought they were harmless. The important point here is that the closure of all free spaces of discussion and confrontation and the inability of most civil society groups to effect genuine change led a significant number of individuals to discuss, vent and offer solutions through new technologies and social media. This individual activated citizenship might have been uncoordinated and confusing for some time, but when coupled with offline street mobilisation, it provided three vital advantages for demonstrators. First, it enabled a very rapid exchange of information among activists, who could communicate online and establish meeting points and activities to be undertaken in real time with none of the delays that prevented more formal and hierarchical organisations from acting quickly. In many ways, social media and new technologies were the perfect means for politically unaffiliated youth acting first in concert without ever having really developed offline social trust. The second advantage resides in the ability activists had to counter the regime’s propaganda, particularly when it came to the external consumption of news. Authoritarian regimes had always managed to survive thanks in
part to their ability to curtail unofficial and unsanctioned discourses about the reality on the ground. New technologies and social media instead allowed counter-discourses to emerge and be disseminated, fundamentally undermining the monopoly on truth that the regimes counted on. Despite the shutdowns, blockages and filters that the security services put in place, the flow of information seemed to be constant, with activists finding ways to get around obstacles. Finally, the third advantage lay in the consolidation of a transnational Arab public opinion, which enabled the quick spread of contagious ideas and means of mobilisation across the region. Thus, while a nuanced judgement is required regarding the revolutionary role of social media and new technologies, they were an important element in popularising a type of activism based on individual contributions to online debates that has hitherto been under-examined. Bloggers became the new security threat, and, while their writings might not have been as widely distributed or read, the sheer amount of information helped to keep the uprising going, as did the repression. Once the wall of fear crumbled, even the repression seemed to be an incentive to continue with the protests rather than a deterrent.

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The third element was the revival of trade unionism, which was a surprising twist the Arab Spring had to offer in terms of activism. In a recent analysis, Samir Aita argued that the social and economic inequalities created in the Arab world over the last two decades by the liberalisation of the economy according to neo-liberal doctrine are the root causes of the uprisings and the desire for change and that this factor has been, and remains, more important than political and democratic demands. While one need not agree entirely with Aita’s view regarding the minor role of political demands in the uprisings, there is no doubt that socio-economic demands have been central to the Arab Spring or that they re-energised trade unionism, which could no longer be satisfied with economic concessions as penury and declining living standards were no longer perceived to be a purely managerial issue, but rather a clear systemic and political one. Two important points need to be made in this respect. First, trade union activism against declining living standards, worsening pay conditions and managers’ corruption and mismanagement had been a feature of Arab politics for some years before the uprising. Tunisian workers in Gafsa and Egyptian ones in Malhalla had been protesting and demonstrating to defend workers’ rights for a number of years, and this was the case across the region, from Algeria to Jordan. This indicates that the groundwork of political contestation had already been laid before December 2010 but was largely ignored by numerous scholars and policymakers because it seemed to be simply a very manageable and confused reaction from the “losers” of globalisation due to the absence of clear political affiliations on the part of the workers that could be seen as threatening for the regimes’ stability. This attitude proved to be mistaken insofar as socio-economic demands were actually linked to the necessity for wider political changes and were then picked up by younger activists and students, thereby creating a bridge between two different social groups. The Arab Spring can probably trace its success to this connection. Second, it should be kept in mind that the revitalisation of trade unionism is largely due to local activists at the coalface of workers’ increased disaffection with the system rather than to the national bosses of the unions, who had been compromised by co-optation. In Tunisia, the early mobilisation was thus centred around the local branches of the UGTT. These three key features of the activism of the Arab Spring are necessarily interconnected and highlight the distance between it and traditional civil society activism.

Conclusion

Rather than offering empirical confirmation of the power of civil society to bring about democratic change in authoritarian contexts, the Arab Spring calls for a profound rethinking of the definition, normative conceptualisation and concrete application of the term. In particular, the overwhelming focus on hierarchical organised structures such as non-governmental organisations should be revisited in light of
new spaces of activism that were created during the age of upgraded authoritarianism. This does not mean that activated citizenship or individual engagement alone explain the Arab Spring as, without a broader structure in place, mobilisation on the scale seen during the Arab Spring could not have occurred. For example, the experience and structures put in place by local union activists in the strikes of the mid-2000s in both Egypt and Tunisia or the online activities against specific governmental policies or police brutality served as the groundwork for coordinating the much broader mass mobilisation of 2011. The point is simply that structures are necessary, but the ones that were crucial during the Arab Spring were not the ones that traditional civil society groups had in place. It follows that there are three aspects in particular that need to be better thought out.

First, the arrival on the scene of new actors such as individual bloggers or revitalised trade unionism challenges received notions of what constitutes civil society, as the focus on traditional actors nominally engaged in favour of democracy and human rights proved to be misplaced in light of their inability to effect change. In this respect, it is interesting to note that it is in wider society, where less formal and looser ties between politically unaffiliated youths are formed, that one finds democratising potential. Such potential thus has to rely on specific resources to be successful and, during the Arab Spring, such resources were available in the guise of the extent of the popular protests and their superior morality due to their peaceful nature. In addition, the participation of a middle class growing tired of the predatory behaviour of capitalists linked to the regime provided the material resources to sustain the movement; where such a decision by the middle to join in the protests is absent or minoritarian, failure is in the cards. Second, the means through which activism takes place today have enhanced the role of activated citizens who might find no audience for quite some time, but, when the timing proves right, are immediately connected to other like-minded people leading to the formation of ad hoc structures with no hierarchy and a diffuse leadership that can act quickly and escape state control because of its fluidity. This has changed activism itself and not only its means of engagement. Finally, there is the need to reassess the importance of socio-economic issues and how they can create a type of activism that spills over into politics. The re-energising of trade unionism has made scholars and policymakers rediscover a type of activism that seemed destined to the sin bin of history and that instead proved to be decisive in provoking political change.

The societal rebellion against authoritarian rule in the Arab world has looked very different from those that took place in Eastern Europe and Latin America in the 1980s and indicates a real change in civil activism that needs to be accounted for. It is this activism that will keep watch on the political developments in a changing Arab world in which political parties’ activists are beginning to replace the revolutionary youth. The Arab Spring is by no means the death knell of traditional activism as the post-revolutionary situation in Tunisia and Egypt suggests, with the proliferation of non-governmental associations and groups intent on promoting their objectives, but it is incumbent on the scholarly community and on policymakers to rethink activism so as to include new forms and new actors, particularly when analysing similarly authoritarian contexts.

**Bibliography**


Today, no-one can question the degree and importance of women’s participation in the process of change in Northern Africa and the Middle East, in what was at first called the Arab Spring but later became known as the Arab Awakening. Women dared to defy all taboos and conservative mindsets by taking to the streets to protest and fight against the corruption and tyranny of authoritarian regimes. Whether in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain or Yemen, they were present throughout the process, making themselves visible on all levels. They filled all spaces, making it difficult to ignore their presence. Young women thus also dared to defy the Arab tradition according to which a young woman should not spend the night away from her family by daring to spend many a night camped out in the protest areas. “My parents attempted to lock me in the house to prevent me from taking part in the protests, but they didn’t succeed. I simply had to take part.” This statement has been recurrent among interviewed young women, whether from Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, Yemen or elsewhere. Yasmin Galal, a 24-year-old woman participating in the Tahrir Square protests for the 18 days preceding Mubarak’s departure, proudly recounts that she and other women did not leave the scene where the confrontations with the forces of order took place even for an instant. Even at the point when the clashes were the most violent. “We stood our ground just like the male protesters. Yes, at the moments of confrontations, the men would move forward to fight whereas we would remain further back. But there were also many young women who dared to move to the front line during fighting with the police.” Other women present on Tahrir Square were not spared the violence of the forces of order, as was the case with Mona Prince, a writer of fiction and university professor. She told how she had been flung to the ground by a police officer during the protests and was kicked repeatedly in the stomach. “Not satisfied to see me nearly fainting, he made sure to put his boot on my face, pressing my head against the ground, and began insulting me.” An activist to the bone, Mona was also one of those women who, like Bothaina Kamel, expressed the intention of running as a presidential candidate in the Egyptian elections. “I know I don’t have much chance of becoming president. But by attempting to run I hope to raise some awareness on the paternalist and discriminatory nature of our society, as well as the problems women face here.” Unfortunately, neither Mona Prince nor Bothaina Kamel succeeded in obtaining the 30,000 signatures from eligible voters necessary for officially launching their candidacy. Whether in Northern Africa, the Gulf States, Yemen or elsewhere, women managed to prove to the world and their male compatriots that they would not be absent from this page in the history of the region, since they decided to become stakeholders in the construction of the democratic process. From the start, through their presence in the protests, they wished to send the world a message indicating that the defence of their rights is also intrinsic to this process. “There is no democracy possible without women having political representation proportional to their number,” exclaimed Mona Prince. “We make up half the population.” In the field, their representativeness was unquestionable. They were there before the entire planet, young and old, mothers, wives, from cities and rural areas, they came from all walks of life, from the lower classes, often illiterate, to the middle class and educated. Whether with a more modern appearance, without the veil and wearing jeans, as in Tunisia or Egypt, or covered from head to foot in more conservative societies as in Bahrain or Yemen, they were there, explaining their points of view and positions to the cameras and the media of the entire world, as well as recounting the
plight of living under the despotism and injustice imposed by the regimes of their respective countries. Moreover, by showing their commitment and willingness to participate in the process of change, they demonstrated that a leader could emerge from among their ranks. Perhaps the most renowned example is that of Tawakkol Karman, a remarkable 32-year-old human rights activist and former leader of student movements in Yemen, thus having the baggage of a courageous history of confrontations with corruption and tyranny in her country. Tawakkol was granted the Nobel Peace Prize in 2011 together with two African women leaders, demonstrating that the world has recognised the role of women in the Arab Spring.

**The Dilemma: Democracy versus Women’s Rights**

Yet as the irony of fate would have it, despite the changes produced by the Arab Spring, by rendering the governments of countries such as Tunisia, Libya or Egypt more democratic, or at least more representative of the movements existing in their societies, it contributed nothing to improving the status of women. As we well know, for several decades, these societies had been dominated by increasingly stronger and more widespread Islamist movements, financed in part by money from the Gulf States or institutions having a strong penchant for the Wahhabi movement. And the positions of these groups towards women’s rights and the role of women in society are well known. Therefore, despite their presence in the streets and all the efforts of Arab women to attain positive changes for their countries and the situation of women there, immediately after the revolutions, the latter have only met with an increasingly adverse situation.

Indeed, the fundamental dilemma that has surfaced with the transformations caused by the Arab Spring is related to the results of the establishment of a more democratic order. This was well expressed through the question posed by Shadi Hamid, Director of Research at the Brookings Doha Center: “What if the majority of Arabs do not want to be liberal?” In fact, we can see that this is exactly what happened in the first parliamentary elections held in Egypt and Tunisia. In other words, we have witnessed how in these countries, Islamist movements have won significant majorities in their respective parliaments. In Egypt, for instance, the Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood combined took 70% of the seats, and women obtained only 2% of seats. However, as Hamid well stated, it is these very women who have contributed in large part to this situation by voting for Islamists, given that they represent half of the electorate. He also showed how, in the case of Tunisia, where a quota system was established obliging parties to alternate male and female candidates on their electoral lists, women obtained a higher percentage of seats in Parliament, but despite this, the great majority of candidates elected belonged to the Islamist Al Nahda party. Hamid added that, though the same quota system was used in Egypt, 90% of the women elected to Parliament were representatives of the ultra-conservative Al Nour party. Hence we can draw the conclusion that, whether we like it or not, the societies themselves reject the values of liberal parties that defend women’s rights, values which are far from being those of the majority of the population.

Yasmin Galal, who has worked for years in an NGO providing support to Egyptian women in rural areas, explains this phenomenon: “when we speak to vulnerable women and explain to them that they are oppressed or that they should demand their rights, they look at us as if we came from another planet. It is absolutely impossible to communicate with them if we use this language. For the majority of them, for instance, it is clearly preferable to remain in a marriage in which they are beaten every day by their husbands than to divorce them.” The reality is that conservatism and patriarchal values are just as rooted among women as among men. Azza El Garf, for instance, one of the eight female representatives elected to the Egyptian Parliament, in this case for the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party, has made numerous declarations against granting women greater freedom. She clearly declared herself against the Khulea, a law passed in 2000 allowing a women to leave a marriage if she gives up all her rights derived therefrom, by qualifying it as a law encouraging divorce and therefore against family unity. El Garf likewise made extremely controversial comments on the law prohibiting genital mutilation of girls, asserting that such a law was unnecessary.

**The Scourge of Patriarchy**

In fact, beyond the ideologies of groups advocating political Islam, the very idea that there would now be greater room for the expression of opinions and the realisation of political tendencies made the patriarchal spirit so strongly rooted in these societies from time
immemorial re-emerge. The truth is that the oppression of women in the Arab-Muslim world has very deep roots in such institutions as patriarchy, religion, imperialism, race relations, the different social classes, etc. It is impossible to observe the situation of women in Arab and Muslim countries without noticing that the militarist structures upon which these societies are built reinforce patriarchy. And the latter obviously reproduces, propagates and even institutionalises the subordination of women.

As we well know, the phenomenon of democracy and the exercise of fundamental freedoms such as the freedom of expression are practices that have not yet been fully assimilated in the Arab world, a region having experienced only despotism and tyranny for centuries. It is obvious that the fact that these peoples live constantly subject to authoritarianism is likewise reflected in male-female relations, creating a hierarchy of subordination inside families themselves, where women and children must naturally submit to the patriarch. In addition, there is clear discrimination between girls and boys as of a certain age. Traditionally, we know that it is a world in which women are not encouraged to play a leading role. Very early on, girls are taught to have an attitude of deference and submission towards the men of the family. They are sometimes even encouraged not to show their intelligence during discussions with male partners and above all, not to have a critical attitude towards them. "From a very young age, we are taught that we have very different roles in society. The role of the woman is to become a wife and mother, while that of the man is to develop his skills in order to be able to work and one day maintain his family," says Yasmin sharply, and she continues: "And our societies reproduce the dynamic that we experience within the family. That is, they are extremely patriarchal and paternalistic." For Yasmin, this paternalism existed even in the Arab Spring political protests, where we saw how men and women remained supportive of one another during confrontations, especially during the most violent ones with the dictators’ police forces. "In fact, despite the spirit of solidarity between men and women on Tahrir Square, at no time did one feel that men and women were considered equal," asserted Yasmin Galal, explaining that "it is true that on Tahrir Square, girls and women felt safe and did not experience harassment. But this did not happen because we were considered equals. On the contrary, it was so because the male protesters thought they had to protect the women against the attacks by the police forces. This was another way of expressing their paternalism."

But beyond this "friendly paternalism" mentioned above by Yasmin, the patriarchy prevailing in the Arab world constantly turns against women, attempting to punish them in the most heinous, severe manners whenever they dare to defy or question the rules and hierarchies, demanding a change in the status quo. During the Arab uprisings, there were many shameful examples of this. In Egypt, for instance, on 8 March 2011, when activists from feminist groups arrived at Tahrir Square with their posters and banners, they were surrounded, insulted and attacked by throngs of men who seemed to reject the idea of seeing them protest or demand their rights. That day on Tahrir Square, there were at least a dozen small protest groups representing different groups or categories of society, such as workers or trade unions. But only the protests by women were attacked, the women being physically harassed and yelled at, with slogans such as: "Go back to the kitchen, since that’s where you belong!"

The End of the Silence

Worse than that, on 9 March 2011, this same Tahrir Square was the stage of renewed violence against women, this time through the heinous "virginity tests." On that day, a group of 18 feminist activists was arrested by the Egyptian army and brought to the Cairo Museum. They had remained on the square the day after 8 March to continue to demand gender equality. Among the activists detained, the first to have the courage to recount her ordeal was Salwa El Hosseini, a 20-year-old hairdresser. "We were handcuffed, beaten with sticks and pipes, subjected to electrical shocks in the chest and legs and called prostitutes," she recounted. Later, she was forced to completely undress in front of the officers present on the premises and was subjected to a "virginity test" by a man (later it became known that it was an officer) in uniform. Samira Ibrahim was also among these young women. A 25-year-old, she was subject to the same humiliations as Salwa and the others. The difference is that she had the courage to bring charges against these thugs, having received the support of her father, a former opponent of the Mubarak regime as a member of Gamaa al-Islamiyya, a radical Islamist movement. Receiving no support from political parties, organisms or the media at first, she reported being immediately subject to intimidations and anonymous phone calls threatening her with death. Numerous public figures,
including those supporting the revolution, at first asked Samira to withdraw her charges. She refused, determined not to flinch at the threats.

Yet Samira, supported at first by a handful of activists, gradually succeeded in mobilising public opinion in her favour all over the world. The result is that, despite the repeated denials of the Egyptian army, which has not officially acknowledged practicing virginity tests, she succeeded in having this type of test declared illegal by the High Administrative Court on 27 December 2011. A first victory in court for Samira, which was unfortunately followed by a defeat, for the officer that had abused her was acquitted by the military court to which her case was referred and that tried the officer. Samira was unable to obtain legal or financial compensation in Egypt, but she is determined to take her case before an international court. Moreover, on the moral and public levels, she has certainly emerged victorious. Thus, on 17 April 2012, Times Magazine included her in its list of the 100 most influential people of the year. “It takes a strong person to stand up for what is right in the face of ostracism and public scrutiny. Samira represents the model of how to stand up to fear, and the impact she has made reaches far beyond Egypt. It takes just one woman to speak out, and thousands of others around the world will listen and feel inspired to act,” wrote Charlize Theron.

Elsewhere, in Libya, for instance, Iman El Obeidi, another woman who was the victim of sexual abuse under Gaddafi’s dictatorial regime, also had the courage to break the silence, placing her life in danger to tell the world about the torture and abuse she had endured. This 32-year-old woman from the city of Tobruk was detained at a road block due to her accent, which showed she was from the same region as the rebels. She was allegedly held for two days and raped by some fifteen men, who also beat her and defecated and urinated on her.

A lively, extremely determined woman, Iman used a great deal of courage and intelligence to successfully cross the security checkpoints and enter the hotel in Tripoli where international journalists were meeting. The cameras of the ensemble of media on the premises managed to record the account she gave of what she had had to endure. The cameras also recorded disturbing scenes of how the hotel staff (apparently working for the Libyan security service) immobilised her and covered her head with a black hood to prevent her from continuing to speak, scenes that speak for themselves insofar as the barriers and obstacles faced by any woman having decided to break the taboos and defend their honour in public. Yet despite the dimension of the challenges that the young Egyptian activists or Iman El Obeidi have had to face, their cries and appeals have been heard and have had repercussions throughout the world. This has shown the governments in power in their respective countries that from now on, the atrocities committed against women with government consent will be denounced.

**Perspectives**

In light of this complex scenario brought about by the changes in the Arab world, the fundamental question that arises is how these changes will continue to affect women’s status. If we believe that patriarchy and the subordination of women are the result of hierarchies produced by the authoritarianism imposed on populations in the region for centuries, we can at least expect that the dynamic of male-female relations will gradually change with the advent of an order where respect for fundamental freedoms prevails. Contrary to authoritarianism, democracy makes room for questioning the status quo and struggling against injustice. The obstacles to such change are still many, of course. Archaic mindsets and customs as well as conservatism are still extremely strong and could interrupt the process of change at any time, again imposing the age-old logic of hierarchies.

In any case, progress towards a new order will depend on women themselves. Today, it is up to them to choose whether to accept the current state of things or continue to struggle for their rights and dignity. One can clearly see that women such as Salwa, Samira or Iman have made the choice to speak of the humiliations they suffered (where so many others in the same situation remain silent), insisting that this subject be openly discussed and condemned by society. They are fighting against the silence, denial and refusal to speak about a real problem of society with a view to publicly acknowledging its existence and only thus being able to change the situation. What we need at this point are therefore other agents of change like these three young women. A famous young Egyptian columnist, Bilal Fadl, recently writing about his reaction to the phenomenon of harassment and violence against women, which seems to have increased immediately after the Arab Spring, appealed to women to raise their voices and speak out to defend their dignity and their place in society. For as he well said, “if you do not do this yourselves, no-one will do it for you.”
The 25 January Egyptian revolution that was triggered under the slogan “Bread, Freedom and Human Dignity” (Eish, horeya, karama insaneya) came just after a decade of two principal waves of protest movements that invaded the country, changing its political map and introducing new social pressures. These protest cycles were divided into two main categories. The first cycle was purely political, it lasted from 2004 till 2006 and was embodied by the creation of the Egyptian Movement for Change called Kefaya (Enough). It expressed itself through several waves of large street demonstrations with the rallying slogan: “La lel tamdid, la lel Thawris”, which meant: “No to the continuation [of Mubarak rule] and No to the inheritance [of authority by his son].” Despite the movement’s inspiring and innovative appearance, it was largely elitist and therefore failed to acquire a significant social base. So, it came of no surprise to see the emergence of a second cycle of protests that began in 2005-2006, which were mainly of a social nature. These protests were strictly related to certain sectors or categories within Egyptian society, such as workers, civil servants, teachers, bus drivers, etc. They were simply expressing demands of an economic and financial nature (such as increased social welfare and wages), which were becoming all the more pressing with the policies of increased economic liberalisation. This cycle actually began with The Mısır Spinning and Weaving Company located in the industrial city of El Mahalla El-Kobra, north of Cairo. A massive strike was staged which brought 24,000 workers to a halt for three consecutive days. Lively protests with chants, drums and placards communicated the strikers’ determination to the authorities. Workers gathered shouting: “Two months, two months!” (In reference to the two months of bonus wages they should have received but did not). These strikes were renewed in the company in 2007 and 2008. This mobilisation of labour has had a domino effect on social protests, which have increased dramatically from 2006 until 2010. The snowballing protests spread from factory to factory, mill to mill, one here, another there, until they practically became a general phenomenon in Egypt. The number of social mobilisations has increased from 266 in 2006, to 614 in 2007, and to 630 in 2008. In 2009, we witnessed around 609 protests. After the explosion of the 25 January uprising, the social protests did not falter; on the contrary they have increased at a greater rate than before. On some days, nearly 200 of these protests have been recorded. From 12 to 14 February (following President Mubarak’s resignation on 11 February) there were between 40 to 60 protests per day, which took place in different regions across the country. In the above-described framework, this article attempts to answer the following question: How has the changing political context following 25 January influenced the features and the form of social protests in Egypt? In order to answer this question, this paper is divided into three main parts:

- The first part emphasises the features of social protest movements in the last five years prior to the Revolution and which have emerged out of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), although hostile to their interests. It demonstrates that those movements, due to the political context, were only focused on economic demands.
They were highly depoliticised since they refused to be linked to political forces with an agenda different from theirs. Moreover, they were very isolated from each other. This part proves that, to some extent, those features formed part of the survival strategy of these movements in the context of the Mubarak regime.

- The second part analyses the form their explosion took during the 25 January events, focusing on the developments within the protests.
- The third part looks at the evolution of the social protests in the context of the political changes the country witnessed after 25 January. On the one hand it shows that they are no longer completely isolated from political forces, with which they now share the same objective: achieving the goals of the revolution. On the other hand, it demonstrates that social protests are beginning to take the shape of “institutions” rather than “movements,” through the foundation of new trade unions that are independent of the official syndicate ETUF. Although previously isolated, today they are trying to regroup into a new trade union federation.


Social protests had three major features that were directly influenced by the political context they emerged in:

1. Emergence from any Institutional Framework (e.g. the Egyptian Trade Union Federation)

None of the social protests that erupted from 2005 to 2006 were organised through a trade union organisation. The Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) – the official trade union federation – has even aggressively criticised those social protests, taking a clear pro-government position. This was obvious during the negotiations that were held with the Mahalla workers in September 2007, to end their strike. The workers were negotiating their demands with a government delegation that included the ETUF President. This reaction actually proved that the ETUF acted as a representative of the interests of the Egyptian regime and not those of the workers.

Although the regime could tolerate their economic demands, it could not tolerate those claims turning into political demands. These were the rules of the game

2. Anti-politicisation

Social protest movements focused on micro-economic social demands that never went beyond financial rights, improvement of work conditions, and the provision of proper healthcare, etc. In other words, none of the protest movements had any political dimension. Moreover, they never aimed to change the overall political equation. Their main strategy was to put pressure on the government to achieve their economic demands without opposing the regime’s overall economic policies. This was due to three main reasons:

a. The Mubarak Regime Strategy: Mubarak’s regime established a clear separation between what could be described as the social and political spheres. It considered any link between them as a red line that should not be crossed. Political parties were allowed to organise conferences and seminars criticising the regime, but only on the condition that there be no social base. At the same time, workers’ movements were allowed to lay claim to their violated economic rights and vocalise criticisms toward government policies at sit-ins and demonstrations, but in return they were not to cross into social demands, if they wanted to avoid repression. Social protests were well aware of this: although the regime could tolerate their economic demands, it could not tolerate those claims turning into political demands. These were the rules of the game.

b. Absence of Linkage between Social Protests and Political Forces: Labour movements refused categorically to connect with any of the opposition political forces, rejecting any attempt to politicise their demands. It is worth noting that Kamal Abu-Eita the leader of the Tax Collectors Union affiliated to the “El- Karama” party took great care to avoid any politicisation
of the “social protest” movement he leads. His famous slogan was: “It doesn't matter whether or not Mubarak stays in power. What matters for us is our wage increase.” As already mentioned, the regime has managed to impose upon these movements a kind of obliged depoliticisation. However, this assumption is not sufficient for a complete analysis. An alliance between both sides was also absent because of the very absence of the political opposition. Due to their own structural deficiency and anti-democratic attitudes, political parties were weak and unable to establish structural linkage. Consequently, social protest movements found that any alliance with them would not only be meaningless, but also harmful, since the regime would probably react with repression. This was proved by the strike on 6 April 2008, when for the first time, young Egyptian cyber activists tried to call for a nationwide strike in solidarity with the labour strikes in Mahalla, expressing outrage over economic grievances alongside the core political demand: ending authoritarian repression of opposition groups. However, this propaganda not only led to the involvement of the state-security apparatus, who transformed the city into a military barracks, but also urged the ETUF chairman, to force the labour leaders to sign a document in which they agreed to dissolve the strike. In other words, if the labour movement with its economic claims fostered national mobilisation, the latter only stifled the labour demands, since it relied on the latter to achieve a political agenda. The labour movement, therefore, did its best to distance itself from political forces. Its justification was that opposition forces had inappropriately taken advantage of the strike – originally motivated by economic grievances – by converting it into a political demonstration that served the interests of opposition groups, but not the workers themselves.

c. A Leader’s Style of Social Protest: This political regime has generated a type of leader known as “leadership of services.” Their legitimacy as leaders does not come from their potential to achieve the workers’ demands in the long term, by pushing the regime to establish structural revisions to its economic policies. On the contrary, it comes from their capacity to make promises which can be quickly fulfilled, but with partial gains for the workers. This is what Sayed Habib one of Mahalla labour leaders has confirmed: “Our role is to achieve our colleagues’ economic demands. A good leader is therefore one who achieves concrete and rapid gains for the workers.” These leaders were clearly able to speak the language of both the regime and the workers. The latter needs only to achieve concrete and rapid material gains, while the regime, for its part, would only accept the economic demands that require no structural revisions. Most of these movement leaders, therefore, seemed to be implicitly allied to the regime, like political parties, to maintain the political status-quo.

3. The Absence of Structural Linkage between Social Protest Movements

The social protest movements mostly emerged as isolated islands with no structural connections. Certainly, a number of solidarity strikes with Mahalla workers were held, for example, by other textile workers in Kafr El-Dawar and Tanta (cities near Mahalla El-Kobra) in September 2007. Nevertheless, these solidarity protests were not the result of the formation of an expanded social movement with structural connections between several labour movements. Since 2008, the increase of the national wage to 1,200 Egyptian pounds was the most significant demand for almost all Egyptian workers.

Even if social protests were unable to change the government’s overall policies, they created a favourable internal dynamic for political change, thereby paving the way for a mass movement to emerge

However, this was not followed by the building of coalitions between these isolated movements, which could certainly explain their incapacity to force the government to meet this demand. This situation is completely different, for example, from Poland at the end of the seventies, where the structural linkage between a number of labour move-
ments spurred the formation of the famous social movement Solidarinosc (Solidarity), which became the motor of change in Poland.

Finally, it is fair to mention that even if social protests were unable to change the government’s overall policies, they created a favourable internal dynamic for political change, thereby paving the way for a mass movement to emerge: (i) social protests have created a new group of credible leaders that are representative of the workers and which have succeeded in replacing traditional leaders. This set the scene for the latter’s total dismissal following the 25 January Revolution. New trade unions were then formed that are independent from the pro-governmental oriented one; (ii) social protest has succeeded in breaking social taboos, since protests were not only held inside workplaces, but also in front of decision-making organisations such as the Council of Ministers, People’s Assembly and the Shura Council; (iii) they spread the belief in the power of coalitions and movements to put pressure on the regime. This was particularly understood by youth movements that – based on this belief – generated the 25 January Revolution.

The 25 January Revolution and the Evolution of Social Protests

The inclusion of social protest in the mass demonstrations of 25 January was a step toward their increased openness. Through the mass movement dynamics they evolved in two major phases.

The First Phase from 25 January to 7 February – Participation on an Individual Basis

The 25 January mass movement was characterised from its beginnings by its popular support, since it involved all sectors of the population, including workers. Undoubtedly, most workers participated in the demonstrations on an individual basis, as normal citizens and not as members of a particular social protest movement. It is worth noting here that workers and employees all demonstrated under the common slogan: “People want to topple the regime,” dismissing all other categorical slogans, such as those related to benefits and allowances for certain sectors. However, this situation changed significantly once they returned to work on 8 February, a fact that leads us to the second phase.

The Second Phase from 7 to 11 February – the Civil Disobedience Phase

The second phase started as life had almost gone back to normal on 7 and 8 February when demonstrations decreased and the masses began to leave Cairo’s Tahrir Square. However, in that time a number of workers and employees, across many sectors, began to strike, refusing to work until their rights were duly recognised. They organised several protests across the country, which left the economy paralysed, along with the main state facilities, thus evolving into the arena of civil disobedience. With these protests increasing in numbers and spreading geographically, the political scene fully changed in favour of the revolution. According to the Al-Masry Al-Youm newspaper, the situation escalated from a few protests on 7 February in several governorates, to 20 protests on 8 February in 9 governorates, to 35 protests on 10 February in 14 governorates, and to 65 protests on 11 February, on the day the President stepped down. The participating sectors in these social protests were widely varied including farmers, employees and workers from different companies and factories in both the private and public sector. The demands were focused on better living conditions, higher wages and salaries and settlements of all unpaid financial debts; all of which were demands that had been made since 2006.

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The prevailing revolutionary spirit has clearly influenced the workers that participated – as mentioned above – “individually”, in line with the revolution’s dynamics. This was made evident by the slogans used by the Egyptian Telecommunications employees, the driving force of the social protests wave that began on 7 and 8 February. Their slogans began by following a strictly economic logic and then moved towards a more political one. Now, political slogans, similar to those of Tahrir Square, are openly used by the strikers, the most popular being:
“People want the regime to step down.” On 9 February, the public transport drivers followed the same direction during their strike, in which they released a statement declaring their solidarity with the revolutionaries in Tahrir and asking for Mubarak’s departure. On 11 February (the day Mubarak resigned), Cairo and other governorates witnessed a new wave of demonstrations. Hundreds of thousands of Egyptian workers threatened to join the Tahrir demonstrators and declared their full support for the revolution’s demands.

It would be fair to say, therefore, that the engagement of social protest movements in the revolution’s dynamics transformed their strictly economic demands into more political ones increasing their – hitherto partial – influence on the political equation. It cannot be denied, however, that the economic demands were the driving force of their involvement in the mass demonstrations; demands that reflect their need for social justice, one of the revolution’s most central goals.

Social Protests after the 25 January Revolution: Toward a New Framework of Action?

One year after the revolution and since assuming power last February, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has rarely articulated a clear vision or agenda to deal with Egypt’s deteriorating economic conditions and the demands of its workers. For example, it has still failed to implement the minimum wage limits demanded by workers since 2007. Instead, the old regime’s strategy has prevailed, in which labour demands were treated as a security matter that should be controlled and contained, and not as a social grievance that could best be resolved through creating a new social contract, thereby guaranteeing economic opportunity and a dignified life. The continuation of the Mubarak regime’s heavy-handed approach to the labour movement could be illustrated by the former Prime Minister Essam Sharaf’s government legislation that outlawed the countrywide strikes that followed the revolution. This law has certainly done nothing to suppress the strikes, since repression is never a solution for legitimate grievances.

However, it is important to note that social protests have benefited from the political context’s partial change. The freedom of assembly achieved after 25 January pushed protest movements to evolve toward further institutionalisation, greater coordination and finally toward a closer connection with political forces, as outlined below.

**Formation of Independent Trade Unions and the Trade Union Federation**

Why have thousands of workers, since 2006, chosen to express themselves through protest movements outside of any institutional framework? In fact, workers felt that the institution that was supposedly representing their interests under Mubarak’s rule, the state-run Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF), was actually defending the interests of the regime. That is why after 25 January, social protest leaders that had solid social bases and sufficient credibility understood the need to institutionalise their movement’s demands. The way forward was the establishment of new trade unions independent from the official one. And these have been formed at lightning speed and right across all sectors of the economy, including farmers, private-sector workers, public transport drivers, employees, etc. Moreover, if the idea of building networks among social protest movements was absent during the old regime, networks today are constantly arising between newly established trade unions. In this climate, union leaders announced Egypt’s first independent federation of trade unions in March 2011: the Egyptian Federation for Independent Trade Unions, established as an independent alternative to the state-controlled ETUF. It currently represents more than 112 new trade unions. The Egyptian Democratic Labour Congress (EDLC), another umbrella group representing around 246 new trade unions, has also been set up.

The old regime’s strategy has prevailed, in which labour demands were treated as a security matter that should be controlled and contained, and not as a social grievance that could best be resolved through creating a new social contract.

However, despite the formation of all these organisations, which genuinely represent the workers, the
draft law that would legalise independent trade unions has not yet been approved by either the SCAF or the Parliament (elected 2 months ago). This vital draft legislation was presented to the cabinet by the Minister of Manpower Ahmed El-Borei almost eight months ago. The legislative body of the cabinet finished discussing it and then submitted it to the SCAF four months ago, but the final legislation has never been issued. These actions are clearly marginalising the labour movement by preventing it from unifying under an independent federation that could represent and negotiate on behalf of workers. This is a particularly dangerous situation since in periods of transition to democracy a new social contract acceptable to both workers and the state has to be established. It is worth looking to the examples of Spain and Portugal, which during their own democratic transitions witnessed hundreds of social protests similar to those Egypt is seeing today. Unlike Portugal, where sustained demonstrations had a destabilising effect on the transition, Spain's government was able to maintain its legitimacy by negotiating with politicians, parties and trade unions to draw up a plan for managing the economy throughout the transition. By accommodating workers' demands with the consensus agreement known as the "Moncloa Pact," Spain's leaders kept the democratic transition on track. The first step for resolving Egypt's social protest crisis in the Egyptian context could therefore be concretised by the issuance of the new trade union law, as this law would legalise and empower the credible representation that the workers are seeking. The second step would be to negotiate a new social contract with the new trade unions; a new pact that could pave the way for social justice and, at least partially, fulfil social protest demands.

Toward a New Relationship with Political Forces?

A lack of cooperation and even hostility between labour activists and political forces was a characteristic of the Mubarak era, and the regime had every interest in keeping these two opposition blocs divided and weak. This situation is starting to change with social protests and political forces now sharing the same target: to achieve the revolution's goals, even if each side has a different point of view. This new relation between labour and political forces was clearly demonstrated on the day that commemorated the revolution on 25 January 2012. On the eve of this day, labour movements had embraced calls by youth movements and revolutionary groups calling for demonstrations. The main demand was for an end to the military rule and achieving the revolution's unfulfilled objectives. It is interesting to note that labour activists are among the most frustrated groups in Egypt at present. To date, none of their core demands have been met, foremost among them: a new minimum wage law and the issuing of the long-awaited draft law on trade unions. The Egyptian Federation for Independent Trade Unions has confirmed that many of its member groups will participate in the mass demonstrations. EDLC has explicitly declared its participation in a statement published on its official Facebook page: "Workers with revolutionaries together continue the duties of the revolution."

Watching this new flurry of activity, one can argue that we are indeed watching a new and unprecedented transformation in the relationship between social protests and political forces. To confirm this change let us look back. From 2006 labour movements had categorically refused to coordinate with any of the opposition political forces, resisting efforts to politicise the demands of workers. After all, as mentioned previously, the government was willing to acknowledge and at least pretend to accommodate economic demands, but reacted with repression when it appeared that labour demands had the potential to morph into political ones. The refusal of labour movements to join the political forces' calls for a national strike on the 6 April 2008 confirms this fact.

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has been advanced as the guarantee of this relation’s continuity. In this frame, both EDLC and the Egyptian Federation for Independent Trade Unions council administration declared their symbolic support for youth and political forces’ calls for nationwide civil disobedience. However, most unions present under the umbrella of both institutions (the Tax Collectors Trade Union and Tourism Trade Union in the Egyptian Federation for Independent Trade Unions for instance) and refused to join the calls. Only university students went on strike, while most workers reported to their jobs as usual. Workers were thus dissuaded from participating by a simple cost-benefit analysis. Like in the 6 April 2008 strike, on the 11 February 2011 the risk of repression from the military was simply too high compared with the potential payoff of “civil disobedience,” which was viewed as unlikely to yield immediate and concrete benefits for workers. Moreover, some sectors, such as the tax collectors, felt that participating in the campaign would do serious damage to Egypt’s economy, and were unwilling to take the risk in exchange for the short-term gains and concessions that a strike might bring. Nevertheless, while there are evident similarities between the two strikes, there is one clear difference that was not seen during the Mubarak era, and which establishes the new framework for relations between political forces and social protest: the willingness of the labour leaders to express support for the demands of political groups and recognise that they are sharing common goals. While workers are still resistant to being “used” by revolutionary groups, they are increasingly sympathetic to the latter’s cause and view the current undemocratic status quo as politically and economically unsustainable.

Concluding Remarks

- The labour movement’s participation in the last days of the revolution was decisive in toppling the Mubarak regime. However, one year after the revolution, the labour movement which had clearly evolved after the 25 January Revolution in terms of institutionalisation and its relation with political forces, now feels frustrated, since its main demand of social justice, has not yet been fulfilled. The continuation of the same economic policies that neglect social justice concerns will undoubtedly lead to an increase in social protests, particularly in view of that fact that on one hand, right-wing Islamist and civil forces are the ones who are mainly represented in the Parliament and on the other hand, the current government lacks labour representatives who can advocate for the interests of workers through political and institutional channels. In the absence of a clear mechanism for exerting influence over public policy, frustrated labour activists could easily take their demands back to the streets.

Egypt desperately needs a new social contract to protect both the political rights of citizens and the economic rights of workers. That is why issuing a new trade union law is now a necessary step toward achieving a representative democracy and social justice

- Egypt desperately needs a new social contract to protect both the political rights of citizens and the economic rights of workers. That is why issuing a new trade union law is now a necessary step toward achieving a representative democracy and social justice. Negotiating the demands of new and legalised trade unions is an urgent step that has to be taken by the authorities in this regard. Any further delay is not only hindering the establishment of this new social contract, but also increasing the strain on Egypt’s already fragile economy and jeopardising the success of the transition process as a whole.
In an interview with the BBC on 23 December 2011, the British historian Eric Hobsbawm noted that 2011 reminded him of 1848, the quintessential revolutionary year in Europe. In the 19th century, it was the working class that led the wave of change, whereas today it is the middle class. However, both cases offer proof that the population – the people – can mobilise, demonstrate and, in so doing, promote sweeping political, social and economic transformations. In the same vein, in an article published in the Spanish newspaper La Vanguardia on 30 December 2011, Andy Robinson underscored how the social mobilisations of the so-called Arab Spring had helped to combat one of the historical dilemmas of collective action – the fear of being left to stand alone – and to turn the average citizen into an empowered political activist with the capacity to organise.

Building on these premises, this article does not aim to provide an account of the revolutionary wave that swept countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Algeria and Morocco in 2011, albeit in different ways and to different extents. Instead, it will examine the events from two perspectives: the power of social mobilisation and the goal – less circumstantial now – of constructing citizenship. In contrast with the fatalism and fear that result from isolation and solitude, the capacity to unite makes us citizens and, thus, allows us to restore our individual dignity and channel collective wills. Is that what caused the revolutionary tsunami of 2011? Obviously, it is still too soon to tell, but we can nevertheless try to address this question and, thus, open a space for reflection.

A Historic Uprising

On 17 December 2010, the 26-year-old Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself after the police confiscated the fruit cart he used to make a living and feed his family. It was an act of both desperation and dignity. Thus began, in Tunisia, a wave of revolutionary movements that swept across North Africa and the Middle East. The depth and breadth of the process took most observers by surprise, due to both its internal strength and its ability to catch on first across the Mediterranean and, then, across the Atlantic. Once the initial surprise subsided, however, the experience was examined through the prism of the past, present and future.

At first glance, as noted by Hobsbawm, the Arab Spring was reminiscent of the revolutionary movements of 1848, but also of the turmoil of the 1960s in the United States and Europe and the processes of democratisation that took place in Latin America in the 1990s. These historical references help to interpret certain key factors, but they must not be allowed to obscure the fact that the uprisings of 2011 also unfolded under highly specific and diverse circumstances. They were revolutionary movements that arose to combat situations of political and social repression and, above all, to topple dictatorial regimes. In fact, in 2011, four of these dictators fled their countries or were executed: Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who had ruled Tunisia for twenty-three years; Hosni Mubarak, who had ruled Egypt for thirty years; Ali Abdallah Salih, who had held power in Yemen for thirty-three years; and Muammar Gaddafi, who had been president of Libya for forty-three years.

This notwithstanding, the Arab Spring has proven to be quite contagious, inspiring similar movements in the international context. As Mohamed Aidor, a representative of the Comisiones Obreras (Worker
Commissions, CC OO) trade union in Madrid, acknowledged, “Tunisia was the big surprise; everything else followed in its wake.” In other words, uprisings related to the past and unfolding in the present have also been able to project themselves into the future and, above all, to articulate certain frustrations and concerns that, in addition to reflecting the situations of specific countries, have given voice to working and middle classes around the world. The Arab mobilisations may have constituted a revolt against the oppression of specific entrenched dictatorships, but they also triggered a global backlash against the concentration of power in economic, financial and political elites.

This knock-on effect has not only put hope for change on the global agenda but also, perhaps even more importantly, has given hope to the people calling for this change. The uprisings have generated power, have capacitated and given confidence to a population that now sees itself as an active player in the transformation of its world. Social mobilisations affect the people who participate in them. They turn them into citizens who feel engaged and sufficiently empowered to stage a revolt. That is perhaps the most significant effect of any revolution. And it is one that, obviously, has a bearing on the future.

The Reasons for the (Un)expected Uprising

A discussion of the specific causes of each case goes beyond the scope of this paper; however, we can identify some of the shared reasons for this (un)expected uprising. First, most analysts agree that the impact of three decades of clearly neo-liberal positions and actions was an important factor. In Tunisia, for example, Bourguiba’s 1956 model of authoritarian capitalism paved the way for the liberal restructuring carried out by Ben Ali from 1987 on. In Egypt, the reforms undertaken by Mubarak beginning in the 1980s had similar goals.

The neo-liberal policies of those years not only imposed a specific ideological discourse but also resulted in an ever more polarised and, thus, tense and confrontational social reality. Their impact on the increasingly subjugated and depressed populations can be seen in the Human Development Index and other poverty indicators. Once again, the case of Egypt is instructive. In the 1990s, some 40% of Egyptians were living below the absolute poverty line (i.e., on less than two dollars a day). It is a country in which 3% of the population accounts for more than 50% of all consumption and in which the dynamics of polarisation only intensified over this period.

The uprisings, therefore, did not come out of nowhere, but rather stemmed from an experience that combined repression and a lack of civil and political liberties with a sharp social imbalance and the practical difficulties of everyday survival. Individual citizens and society at large were subjected to a prolonged and persistent process of chipping away at their material and moral conditions. The present was wretched, and there was no future to speak of; thus, the unexpectedness of the uprising was due more to the blindness intrinsic to the certainty of the status quo than to any actual analysis of the reality. The ingredients were all there, even though many people did not wish to see them. The uprising may have broken out by surprise, but that does not mean that there was no underlying dynamic, that the initial spark, the small flame that had been smouldering for years, could not have been detected.

The case of Egypt illustrates this idea quite nicely and shows that the “day of rage,” in January 2011, was not a sporadic event but rather the culmination of at least a decade of protests and public awareness processes. In fact, the early 21st century saw the emergence of a solidarity movement with the second Intifada that, shortly thereafter, was strengthened by the protests against the war in Iraq. At the same time, the first decade of the new century was rife with movements calling for both civil and labour liberties and rights. The year 2004 saw the organisation of the fledgling pro-democracy movement Kefaya, while a 2006 strike in Mahalla culminated in the uprising of 2008. Over a period of ten years of labour protests, more than 200,000 workers were mobilised and some 3,000 illegal strikes were called. Thus, the subsequent “April 6 Movement,” organised over the new social networks and largely led by ur-
ban university students, did not grow out of barren earth but rather soil nourished by years of labour struggles and democratic demands. It is this fertile ground that explains the uprising’s power. This was the underlying wave that became the tsunami that triggered the process of mass demonstrations. A set of policies and a social reality combined with the seeds of a revolution, which ultimately sprouted under an alliance of workers and urban youth. The result, of course, was a revolutionary action that led to the partial collapse of the regime and, above all, the restoration of individual and collective dignity. Could this process have been foreseen? Certainly, with the benefit of hindsight, it was more foreseeable than we might have realised at the time.

Finally, this suspect surprise can also be viewed as yet another feature shared with the revolts and movements that subsequently caught on in certain Western countries. In a piece published in the Spanish daily *El País* on 30 December 2011, Sami Nair wrote:

“These two major events, the Arab revolution and the crisis in Europe, only seem to be separate. In both cases, the same cry has been raised: respect for the right to dignity in an Arab world subject to military and police dictatorships, and respect for social dignity in a Europe subject to the dictatorship of the financial markets and the fecklessness of its political elites. What comes after 2011 will inevitably transpire in the echo of that cry of hope.”

**An Uprising with Multiple Actors**

As noted above, the Arab Spring clearly had many actors: workers, the middle class, university students, women, etc. However, the tensions inherent to this mix have played out under the common standard of the demand for a process of modernisation and democratisation, the defence of social justice and the need to express and overcome a sense of individual frustration and a lack of collective prospects.

This notwithstanding, in the context of these diverse groups, educated urban youth have featured prominently, while workers have been relegated to the sidelines. The Mahalla workers may have been the first to mobilise and the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) may have been the first to articulate social demands, but both were quickly pushed off the front pages by the crowds gathering in the squares. These crowds marked both the emergence of new groups of actors and the first experiments with new forms of protest.

Thus, first, in keeping with postmodern logic, the actors were fragmented and individualised. It was the crowd itself that led the charge, without the types of mediation and leadership characteristic of more classical mobilisations. The protests were not led by trade unions or traditional social institutions, but rather anonymous individuals. This shaped the movement and gave it special strength, particularly given that the traditional mediating structures – both political and social – are currently undergoing a deep crisis of representation. The Arab Spring has shown that citizens can mobilise, and that their mobilisations can have a significant impact even in the absence of intermediaries. In other words, it is possible to act directly. This lesson spread quickly, and it soon made its way across the Mediterranean.

Second, in addition to the substitution of traditional mediating organisations, the mobilisations were leaderless. Or, at least, they lacked clear and visible leaders. Experience dictates that the effectiveness of a protest movement is tied to its having a top-down structure whereby a hierarchical leadership issues instructions and guides the actions of a group that would otherwise become disperse and unfocused. In the late 19th century, the French psychologist Le Bon wrote that masses are fit for action but cannot think and that they thus need some form of leadership to prevent them from becoming a mob.

In this regard, it is worth noting not only that in the Arab Spring it was the crowd itself that played the leading role, but also that the crowd did not require any sort of leadership to help it think, to guide it or to focus its proposals. In the academic jargon, we would say that these proposals have become a form of networking. Networks are horizontal structures devoid of relationships of dependence and independence; in other words, actors neither follow the instructions of a higher authority nor work in isolation. Instead, networks operate through relationships of interdependence in which each actor knows that it needs the others to achieve its goals but also understands that no single actor can impose its action strategy on the rest.

In such situations, coordination is not explicit and, thus, vertical leadership and mediating structures are not needed. Rather, coordination arises from shared objectives, mutual trust and the existence of
low-level leaders that articulate without overseeing. In many of the squares in which the Arab Spring played out, the collective action could be characterised thus: a group of individuals who needed each other to achieve shared goals and, above all, to generate confidence in both themselves and others with regard to their capacity for transformation. In networks, individuals are not executing agents but agents of change. This conceptual statement resonates with many of the uprisings examined here and has imbued them with strength and energy. Finally, it has been postulated that the possibility of eliminating the intermediary structures, of operating directly as a network without vertical leadership, is closely related to the use of new technologies, to the fact that this was an uprising 2.0. The use of the Internet and of social networks like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube was what determined both the characteristics of the movement and who would emerge as its main actors. These tools made it possible to operate individually and as a network, while at the same time assigning leading roles to those people already used to a 2.0 lifestyle and relations. Upon closer analysis of the who and how of the 2011 revolts, the impact of these networks seems clear, although whether the central role they played has made the revolts “technodependent” or not is still up for debate. This dependence could give rise to biases when deciding whether or not to include certain social actors, and, above all, in the terminology of Zygmunt Bauman, it could make the movement too fluid and, thus, difficult to contain and channel. Indeed, the movement’s fluidity is one of its main assets, but only insofar as it resists becoming shallow and steeped in the type of porous reality that would ultimately water it down. Only time will tell whether the Arab Spring has staying power or whether its own fluidity will dissipate and dilute it.

An Uprising to Construct Citizenship

In terms of content, it is worth noting how, in addition to the social and economic demands, the protesters were seeking the recognition of individual rights. Indeed, many authors have referred to the Arab Spring as an uprising to restore dignity, to shake off the fear of living under the yoke and to become recognised and engaged citizens. That is why this paper calls it an “uprising to construct citizenship.” In Western countries, recognition of citizenship rights has been used to analyse the dynamics of progress over the last three centuries. Thus, in keeping with Marshall’s argument, the French and American revolutions made the 18th century the century of the struggle for civil rights; the 19th century was the century of the struggle for political rights; and the 20th century saw the construction of the welfare states that would foster social rights. In other words, civic, political and social citizenship were the three main revolutionary milestones of a world based on the recognition of individual rights and the importance of ensuring that each and every individual can lead a life of dignity and fulfilment. Viewed from the outside, the Arab Spring in many ways seems to have packed the goals of three centuries of struggles and revolts into just a few weeks or months. First, the people gathering in the squares demanded that their liberties be recognised and that they thus be able to enjoy fully what we call civil rights. Given the authoritarian and often oppressive regimes against which they were rebelling, that was and still is the primary demand. Second, the Arab Spring has also been defined as a democratic revolution. The mobilised populations demanded political rights insofar as they sought to regain the power that had been usurped and illegitimately exercised by political and military elites. Finally, the social polarisation, the misery of many families and the lack of economic prospects crystallised in a third demand, namely, for social justice and collective rights. In short, restoring personal dignity requires creating citizens endowed with civil, political and social rights.

In the previous section, we saw how new forms of revolt have crossed the Mediterranean, leaping from the southern to the northern shore. Now we are seeing how the goals attained in the north through extensive historical processes have served as the foundation for the demands of the uprisings of the south. In this exchange of ideas and experiences, it is important to remember the enormous resistance that arises to this struggle for citizenship, to the demand for dignity that permeates the claims of the Arab Spring. To this end, in his splendid book The Rhetoric of Reaction, Hirschman reminds us that each of the three waves of revolutionary progress identified by Marshall was accompanied by strong reactions aimed at halting progress on the citizenship-building process. The counter-revolutionaries of the 18th century, the critical discourses of democracy that proliferated in the 19th century, and the neo-liberal positions that questioned the welfare
state in the 20th century were all political forces of the first order. The Arab uprisings must not underestimate the power of this resistance and, thus, must be prepared for a long and complex struggle.

An Unfinished Uprising

One year on – which is still too soon – the Arab Spring is clearly an unfinished and open-ended uprising. Contrary to some predictions, the movement has managed to survive; however, it faces significant challenges. In the case of some especially rocky regimes, such as Syria’s, these challenges are very basic, but there is also the more generic challenge of deepening and strengthening the social, political and economic transformations that lay at the core of the revolt. The role of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and of Ennahda in Tunisia also raises significant doubts, at least with regard to the demands of some key groups of actors, such as workers, the middle class or women. Nor is it clear what format and level of institutionalisation the grassroots mobilisations should now take on.

In short, the questions and contradictions are myriad, but the perception that things will never be the same, that there is no turning back, cannot be emphasised enough. That is the first great success of the movements and uprisings of 2011. In this regard, in the online article Las revoluciones árabes de 2011 [The Arab Revolutions of 2011], J. M. Antentas wrote:

“Along with the expansion of basic freedoms in Tunisia and Egypt and the fall of Gaddafi, the main accomplishment of the ‘Arab Spring’ is the faith it has restored in action and collective power, putting an end to the feelings of powerlessness and manipulation felt by most the population and workers.”

This faith is one of the uprisings’ main legacies, albeit a vulnerable one that could quickly fade away if visible and significant progress is not made. In any case, even today this faith in the power of the revolutionary movement, or, if you prefer, in the perception – hitherto entirely absent – that collective action is not only possible but also potentially useful and effective, can still be seen. This faith was one of the pillars of the movement and one of the aspects exported by the Arab Spring, first across the Mediterranean and, later, the Atlantic. The Arab uprisings sparked an international wave of protests, and they did so by showing that it was possible. The demands of this wave have been multiple and diverse, but all have shared, at least to a certain extent, a new culture of protest.

Thus, new formats have been assayed and the initiative has been regained in a context that goes beyond the realities of the Arab countries in which the mobilisations first arose. However, we must not forget the specific characteristics of those countries. The deficits of civil, political and social citizenship in them are glaring and hardly comparable to the situations found on the northern shore of the Mediterranean, where protests can often become a goal in themselves, inadvertently eroding the dramatic content of the initial demands. In some Western circles, the new protest culture is already being viewed as a triumph of marketing, which could distort the meaning of the revolt. Notwithstanding these doubts and contradictions, there is no denying that 2011 was an exceptional year, a period in which certain ties that bound us to the past have been broken and in which cracks have been opened allowing us to glimpse the potential of the future. To borrow the terminology of Sami Nair, at the core of this transformation lies a shift from the political, bureaucratic and military elites to the people. Thus, the uprisings have contributed, as noted above, to the construction of citizenship and civil society, thereby facilitating access to modernity. To quote Nair:

“[This shift] is in keeping with a contemporary and modern rhetoric: that of the rights of peoples to control their own destinies vis-à-vis their own state powers. That is why the rights of man, the ardent demand for citizenship and freedom of thought have been at the centre of the uprisings.”

In other words, the revolution is, above all, democratic, but it will not stop there; it cannot control the forces of social transformation that sparked it. The uprising is not yet over and the jury is still out on its actual results, but it has begun to generate an awareness of citizenship. Once the engine of civil, political and social rights has been started, the process of transformation becomes a complex but inexorable journey.
Hundreds of thousands of Israelis took to the streets in the summer of 2011 to protest the government’s socioeconomic policy. This wave of protests, which came to be known as “the tent protest,” focused initially on demanding implementable affordable-housing solutions for all Israel’s residents. But it expanded quickly to include other important issues related to the cost of living, education, and medical care, as well as substandard or totally lacking public infrastructure. Within a few days, demonstrations were organised in various social sectors. These included a demonstration by young mothers, dubbed “the stroller protest,” against the high direct and indirect costs of rearing children. The protesters as a whole were expressing their dissatisfaction with how the government had responded to their immediate distress, and they demanded a change in Israel’s social and economic agenda.

Although quite a few older people took part in these demonstrations, the protest was primarily about the future of young people in Israel. Many hoped that the generational protests of the 1960s, which took place in many Western countries but bypassed Israel at the time, had finally reached Israel, inspired by the protests in the Arab world. The joining together of the struggles of various sectors – including students, medical apprentices, and young intellectuals – strengthened the feeling that the protest was becoming generational, of a generation protesting against its parents, who had turned a welfare state into a free-market state. Whereas the parents’ generation succeeded in amassing capital in the course of their working years, the younger generation believes that education and hard work are no longer enough to allow one to live with dignity. Indeed, the struggles of the adjunct instructors against the tenured professors, like those of the medical residents, for a fairer distribution of the burden between them and the senior experts, were clear signs of a generational protest. The fact that the protesters’ outcry was initially directed against landlords and high rental costs likewise highlighted the generational character of the protest.

The protest had two main stages. The first and spontaneous stage consisted of young people who were struggling to cope with many hardships in the big city. The striking characteristics of this stage were the frustration generated by the young people’s realisation that they would not be able to fulfil their dreams within the foreseeable future and the very emotional outburst against the small number of tycoons who control the country’s economy and have close ties to the government. In the second stage, more organised and established civil-society groups were mobilised. They tried to formulate a new, alternative socioeconomic agenda through discussions and dialogue with various groups and by creating a more professional discourse, with the mediation of academic experts dedicated to equality and distributive and social justice.

Some commentators suggest that the protest erupted last summer because of the Arab Spring and because of the global economic crisis, which indirectly affected NGOs and civil society in Israel. Others seek the causes in local political developments and the crisis of democracy in Israel. But even if there is no causal connection between the protests elsewhere, especially in Spain and in the Arab world, and the protests in Israel, in today’s global and wired society people whose frustrations have local characteristics and causes may draw inspiration from parallel protests, especially from how they are presented...
in the new media. The use of social media in public protests began in the first half of 2011 with a series of large demonstrations in Arab countries in the Middle East. But the use of social media is not the only similarity between the protests in Israel and the Middle East. The two waves of protest grew out of a rise in the cost of living, were organised by young people who were employed, and demanded not only economic changes but also changes in the form of government. But in Israel, this was also the first broad public boycott aimed at food manufacturers. The so-called “cottage cheese protest,” which focused on the high price of cottage cheese, had wide resonance and led to the lowering of prices. This achievement generated the feeling that the public had the power to bring about change and that the elite, which had far too much power, could no longer expect the public to sit quiet. In short, the causes of the protest in Israel are local; they are linked primarily to the gaps between expectations and ability, frustration at the absence of socioeconomic alternatives, and the lack of justice in the distribution of resources, as well as a growing feeling that the Knesset, Israel’s parliament, has become the enemy of the people and of democracy.

The Immediate Causes of the Protest

In the first stage, the protest began as a Facebook group, which led to the setting up of a tent on Rothschild Boulevard in Tel Aviv. The boulevard rapidly became a large tent city, and then tent cities sprang up in other Israeli cities. The intention of the young people who set up the tents was to arouse public debate about the high cost of housing and the high cost of living and about social justice in Israel. Affordable housing was the sole concrete demand at this stage. Hundreds of thousands of people participated in several mass demonstrations throughout the country.

It should be noted that this was not the first protest linked to the housing crunch in Israel. In 2002–2003 protesters in need of affordable permanent housing set up tents in Kikar Hamedina (State Square), one of the most expensive squares in central Tel Aviv. But the dissonance between the tents with their hungry, unemployed inhabitants and the wealthy residents of Tel Aviv in the houses surrounding the square failed to generate an active and broad movement for change. The protest, called the “Bread Square demonstration,” was eventually broken up by court injunctions. But in 2007 housing prices began to rise substantially, especially in the Dan Bloc, and even more so in central Tel Aviv. Data from the Central Bureau of Statistics show that in the last six years (from 2005 to 2011), rental prices in the urban centre of the country rose by an average of 49%.

Knesset members were not completely indifferent to the housing crunch. The Knesset Finance Committee discussed the housing crisis and its records point an accusing finger at various governments for their failure in this regard, caused by the lack of long-term, multi-systemic strategic planning. In March 2011, shortly before the eruption of the wave of protests, the government headed by Benjamin Netanyahu presented a plan that would establish committees for national housing, to ease the housing crunch by accelerating the approval process for apartment blocks. But, many young people saw this proposal as growing out of the government’s old agenda, which benefits developers and tycoons.

It is noteworthy that the central tent city, on Rothschild Boulevard in Tel Aviv, was set up opposite where the People’s Council – the state of Israel’s first Parliament – was established in 1948. With a touch of humour, the protesters hung signs that changed the name of the street to “If I were Rothschild,” which is the Hebrew version of the famous song “If I were a rich man” from the musical Fiddler on the Roof. Other signs explained the struggle by means of scores, as one might see on a soccer pitch: “The people = 1; Bibi = 0." It was a play on words suggesting that the people had an advantage but also that they were united. And it gave Bibi – Prime Minister Netanyahu – the unflattering attribution of “zero,” which in Hebrew means “a nobody.” As stated above, the choice of Rothschild Boulevard as the location of the protest’s headquarters was not coincidental. To a great extent, like many other protests in the eastern and southern Mediterranean basin, the tent protest began as a civil, democratic process aimed at wresting sovereignty from the government and the institutions that supposedly represent the people and restoring it to the people.

In Israel, the protest expressed the public’s dissatisfaction with a political system that grants power not to the people but rather to sectoral parties – and often to the rabbis that head them – which are loyal only to their constituents. The young protesters felt that something was wrong in the democratic process, in which parliament is supposed to represent...
both the needs of its constituents and the general
good. The political games played in the Knesset did
not allow for economic and diplomatic alternatives,
but only for different parties that competed with
each other for seats. Thus the public felt that the
political system did not represent its interests and
wishes. Moreover, it seemed that instead of dealing
with social problems, in recent years the Knesset
had tried to badger the public and constrain it by
means of fear and a McCarthy-like style. To some
extent, the protesters were signalling that in a de-
mocracy the elected officials were supposed to rep-
resent the general good and to conduct a substan-
tive dialogue with their constituents after they were
elected.

Indeed, the nationalistic security discourse that has
become more strident in the Knesset in recent years
has pushed aside democratic principles. Among
those principles is the idea of equality and of basic
human rights, including socioeconomic rights, which
cannot be abrogated, even by a “democratic” pro-
cess, that is, by means of a majority of votes in the
Knesset. The identification of certain political views
regarding the fate of the occupied Palestinian terri-
tories in Judea and Samaria with the socioeconomic
views of the Israeli left caused an automatic linkage
and automatic rejection of every demand for social
change. To a great extent, the tent protest denoted
the limits of cynicism and of the cooperation politi-
cians could expect in an era of McCarthy-like moves
and the perpetuation of inequality. Perhaps it also
denoted the limits of indifference of the masses.

However, after the initial euphoria that the protest
generated, the demonstrators discovered that al-
though they had restored to many Israelis the hope
that they had the power to change things and even
the feeling of social solidarity that many had thought
was irretrievably lost, and although their demands
based on social justice were very attractive, they had
to formulate a strategy and clear demands. At this
point, many people representing the established
civil society came to the aid of the young demonstra-
tors. In neighbouring countries, in Egypt, for exam-
ple, a similar process took place. There, too, mem-
bers of the established civil society, such as the
Muslim Brotherhood, joined the young demonstra-
tors and together they succeeded in bringing about
change. But that is the extent of the similarity be-
tween the two cases.

The underlying assumption of the Israeli protesters’
leaders was that the only tool that the Knesset and
especially the government had was the security dis-
course and the ability to sow fear and divisiveness.
Consequently, they chose to separate the discus-
sion of distributive and economic equality from the
debate over the state of democracy in Israel and the
implications for society of the occupation of the Pal-
estinian territories. In the short run, this strategy
proved effective, but it failed in the long run. After all,
the series of antidemocratic bills is linked to the gov-
ernment’s economic policy.

The nationalistic security discourse that has become more
strident in the Knesset in recent years has pushed aside democratic
principles. Among those principles is the idea of equality
and of basic human rights, including socioeconomic rights.

In the second stage of the protest, well-known aca-
demics and NGOs that deal with issues of social
justice joined in and formulated documents that ex-
plained the failures of the government’s socioeco-
nomic policy. These documents show that inequality
in Israel is one of the greatest in the world and the
greatest among the OECD countries. The highest
salaries are five times the salaries of those who earn
10% more than the average. These documents also
reveal the protesters’ view of the effect of the gov-
ernments’ social policies in recent years on the na-
ture of the challenges facing Israeli society:

- Differences in income that are among the great-
est in the Western world: For example, the dif-
ference between the salaries of workers with 10
years’ or more experience and those with less
than 10 years’ experience has been about 50%
for the last decade. The difference between the
salaries of workers with more than 12 years of
schooling and those with less than 12 years
rose from 66% in 1998 to 80% in 2009.
- Lack of infrastructure: The government does not
invest sufficiently in infrastructure in Israel. The
lack of infrastructure for alternative transporta-
tion isolates the residents of the periphery, ren-
dering them unable to extricate themselves from
the poverty that has been imposed on them.
• Inequality in access to medical care: Even in the area of medical care there is a clear paucity of government investment. The public medical services in Israel suffer from structural difficulties deriving from the lack of resources that are necessary for the system to function. Government support of the medical care system dropped from 67% in 1998 to 59% in 2010. The rise in individuals’ costs for medical care has pushed thousands of households below the poverty line. Also, there are huge differences between the centre and the periphery in the quality of medical care. These differences are manifested in the number of doctors and beds and the availability of expensive, life-saving equipment.

• Differences in education: One of the main demands of the participants in the tent protest with regard to education was the implementation of the compulsory education law from birth. Many women remain at home today for financial reasons and cannot afford to pay for preschool education for their children (up to age five). Similarly, there are great differences within Israel’s education system that parallel the class differences. The results of global tests in the sciences show a worrisome decline in the achievement of Israeli children.

• Employment: The differences in education are the primary reason for salary differences in Israel. Salary differences between workers with more than 12 years of schooling and those with less than 12 years of schooling grew over the last decade from 66% in 1998 to 80% in 2009. Salary differences between men and women are 35%.

The protest focused on shoring up the foundations of the welfare state through a larger government investment in public education, the strengthening and broadening of public medical care, and the provision of more generous aid to weak population sectors. The protesters sought a dramatic elimination of the pyramidal structure of companies in Israel, the creation of a barrier between the ownership of real corporations and financial corporations. They also sought to limit widespread employment through manpower companies.

Another data point is that, in contrast to most Western countries, Israel’s public civil spending dropped in relation to its GNP over the past five years. At the same time, defence spending in relation to the GNP remained almost unchanged. However, the protesters’ big problem was that while they were pointing out the structural weaknesses of Israel’s economy, it remained strong in comparison to the economies of the rest of the world, in terms of both unemployment and growth. Israel’s economic strength stood out against the backdrop of global economic crisis. Despite this relative strength of the economy, the plight of the workers in Israel and the lack of infrastructure in education, medical care, and transportation, as well as the unjust distribution of the national duties (military service and taxes), were at the heart of the public debate that the protest generated. But it is possible that the protest erupted when it did because of other factors. Among them was the feeling that negotiations with the Palestinians had reached a dead end. The frustration over this and the fact that the topic had for all practical purposes dropped off the government’s agenda made room on the national agenda for civil issues.

Among the burning civil issues was the religious-secular rift that continues to roil the country. Young people who have served in the army and taxpayers have long felt that they have been the victims of highway robbery by the shameless religious parties, the tycoons, and the real estate magnates. And indeed, the religious-secular rift and the housing crunch fed the flames and led to the emotional outburst. In addition, established civil society organisations, which had long been under heavy pressure from the Knesset, saw this as an opportunity to demarcate the limits of permissible criticism and to shift from a defensive posture to one of attack. For them this was an opportunity to legitimise their activity by appearing as supporters of the poor and of young people and not only as supporters of the minorities in Israel.

The Government's Response to the Protest

In response to the protest, Israel’s government announced a series of steps that would be taken to relieve the housing crunch. The Prime Minister also set up a committee headed by Professor Manuel Trajtenberg, with the aim of examining the protesters’ economic and social demands, primarily regarding the high cost of living and the gap between the social classes, and proposing solutions. The committee included members selected from the public, academic, and private sectors. The committee dealt with proposals in five areas: a change in priorities...
that would reduce the burden on Israeli citizens, a change in the structure of taxes, an increase in the accessibility of social services, an increase in competition in the economy, and the creation of implementable steps to lower housing prices. In response to the establishment of the committee, the leaders of the protest established an alternative committee. The two committees had similar goals: increased socioeconomic equality and increased public involvement in the economic and social debate. However, that was the extent of agreement between them.

The differences between the two committees’ proposals derive from their differing views of the public sector. The Trajtenberg committee’s document expresses doubt regarding the importance and the efficiency of the public sector and therefore hesitates to enlarge it. The alternative committee sees the public sector as an important tool for redressing the failures of the market and improving the distribution of income. The protesters’ reports express a belief in social solidarity and thus a belief that higher taxes should be imposed on the wealthy so as to create a more just society.

These ideological differences are manifested also in how the documents relate to the main topic on which the public dispute has focused until now: limiting the budget and public spending. The Trajtenberg report is not willing to increase public spending.

**Outcome of the Protest**

The protest brought hundreds of thousands of people to the streets, but its achievements were few. The inevitable failure of the protest might have been foreseen. After all, although the activists were very careful not to identify with Israel’s left-wing parties and rejected any partisan affiliation, it became clear from the beginning of the struggle that this was not enough. The religious right wing and the settlers within it set themselves up as the clear enemies of the protest. In contrast to the sceptical veteran protesters, who were Mizrahi Jews and who saw the students as superficial children of rich people who were protesting because they were temporarily unable to take a summer break in the cheap resorts in Turkey, the religious right tried to label them as wild-eyed communists who were a danger to Israel’s security. The welfare approach, identified with the left, had become taboo among many on the religious right, even though most of them had similar economic and social problems. And thus, while the protest activists willingly passed up the opportunity to float an important discussion on the principle of democracy in Israel, they did not succeed in avoiding political labelling. The demand for social justice – which should have related to all sectors of the population, including Arabs, who because of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict have a problem protesting on other issues – became a slogan. To a great extent the protesters lost their moral advantage because their strategy ignored the fact that without democracy there could be no right to demonstrate and that it was democracy that made possible the very existence of the struggle for social justice.

The result of refraining from a serious public discussion of the implications for Israel of the McCarthyism that had spread through the Knesset and of the lack of a diplomatic initiative to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is not only a moral failure on the part of the protesters. In practice, it perpetuates the legitimation of the complex parliamentary puzzle that requires submission to the dictates of sectoral parties and continues the suppression of the rights of the Arab minority.

The protesters failed to convince the governmental institutions that their social approach must change radically. The proposals remained mainly on paper as a utopian alternative. Also, the fact that some of the leaders of the protest decided to become candidates in the coming elections as part of existing parties suggests that an opportunity was missed. Even worse, it suggests that the entire Knesset has become a single bloc that rubber-stamps government policy. It is doubtful whether this protest will have any substantial effect on the elections, on Israeli political culture, or on how the important current problems are dealt with. But the protesters succeeded in one thing. They introduced into the language of the younger generation concepts that had not been heard in Israel for years, including social justice and the equitable distribution of resources. They opened the door to many public discussions and introduced a refreshing spirit to activism at various levels. The social protest caught the public’s attention and the interest of decision-makers, but at the moment it seems that that will not be translated into the creation of a new socioeconomic agenda for Israel. Thus, the protest will go down in history as a missed opportunity.
The Awakening of the Civil Society in the Mediterranean

Youth, those Anti-Heroes of the Arab Spring

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The Role of Youth as Civil Society Actors During the Arab Spring and Democratic Transitions

This article follows up on two studies on youth policies in Tunisia and Morocco published by the European Commission in 2009. The great unease and tension among the youth of these countries at that time had been widely discussed and there was already talk of a youth torn between "rebellion and submission," a situation premonitory of the events of 2010 and 2011.

The aim here, a year later, is to define the place of youth in the South Mediterranean countries, their place in society, in terms of social and political force. We will also emphasise the terms “civil society” and “democratic transition,” for all too often, concepts and analyses from North Mediterranean countries are hastily transposed, in general, with those from the West, comprised of democratic States with parliamentary and pluralist traditions wholly different to South and East Mediterranean States.

The geographic ensemble of the Mediterranean Basin is criss-crossed by tensions and often also misunderstandings between societies on the North and South shores, such that the events that continue to disrupt the established order of the Arab States are read and analysed in Northern countries based on frames of reference often at variance with reality. It seems necessary to us in this article to review all of these concepts and delve into the complex situation of these young people, who have taken and continue to take the forefront at protests and revolts, who surf the social networks and “put the yeast in the dough without always being able to enjoy the bread.”

A Tangle of Events

On 17 December 2010, young Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself in the town of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisia, after the confiscation of his vegetable cart by the police. Less than a month later, on 14 January 2011, Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, who had been in power since 7 November 1987, fled the country, driven out by the cries of “clear out!” chanted by the crowds for weeks on end. Only a month later, on 11 February, it was the turn of the Egyptian rais, Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, to leave, toppled by unprecedented popular protests. In the same period, Yemen, Jordan, Bahrain, Libya, Syria – all of these States were caught up in the same revolutionary fever. In Algeria, the government attempted to stifle the attempts at revolt by purchasing peace via the distribution of petrodollars and stepping up military pressure. The Moroccan monarchy was quick to offer an early reform of its constitution which limited the political prerogatives of the King without undermining his immense economic privileges. By the end of the summer of 2011, Libya, with the intervention of NATO forces, freed itself from Muammar Gaddafi’s yoke after extremely violent armed confrontation. In March of that year, the Bahraini population was crushed by military forces supported by the forces of the oil monarchies panicked by the risk of contagion in their States. The Syrians continue to face, in blood and tears, the fierce repression of Bashar al-Assad’s troops. We do not

1 www.salto-youth.net/downloads/4-17-1871/09-EuroMedJeunesse-Etude_TUNISIA.pdf?
2 www.salto-youth.net/downloads/4-17-1867/06-EuroMedJeunesse-Etude_MOROCCO.pdf?
yet know the outcome of this conflict, which has taken the form of a civil war, but what is certain is that the regime is discredited by now. This leads us to the following assessment: in less than ten months, the geopolitics of Maghreb, Mashreq and Middle East countries and Gulf States has been either shattered or altered by “revolutions” as sudden as they were unexpected, breaking the image of immobility of Arab societies often circulated by the West and allowing them to “make history.”

**Arab Societies Were Experiencing “Social Fatigue”**

In the face of these historic changes whose determining factors we do not fully know or control, it is worth remembering how these Arab societies were experiencing a kind of “social fatigue” because of the political, economic and societal factors that contributed to “anesthetise” and even paralyse them. A sort of “cartelisation” of power coupled with tighter security progressively gained ground within State regimes. Nothing portended a renewal of leaders in this frozen plebiscitary system at any time soon. Groups monopolising violent coercion played – and in some cases still play – a considerable role in society.

“The phenomenon of multiplication of armed forces and police is a common feature in many authoritarian states in which the process of institutionalisation remains incomplete. The duplication and sometimes the escalation between armed forces and police, armed forces and intelligence services, State armed forces and State militias and State and private armed forces reveal the regime’s mistrust of its military and security agents.” (Elisabeth Picard, *Armée et sécurité au cœur de l’autoritarisme*).

Recall to what degree Western post-11 September anti-terrorism policies had contributed to strengthening the security complex, a strengthening up that was done at the expense of States’ responsibilities in the social, educational and health spheres. These societies were imbued with fear of repression in all its forms. It was this fear that gave youth the strength to form a “bloc” and advance while regimes expected their retreat.

The security priority in these States had favoured the reduction of their sovereign functions, which were taken up by many NGOs, trade associations or guilds and civil society organisations that stepped in to assuage the collapse of the political regulation of society.

Is it the concentration of power and misuse of common property for the benefit of a few that have contributed to this geographic area, including oil-producing States, being the only area on the planet to have made little progress in recent decades, as evinced by the reports of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)? The figures are staggering: one in five people live on less than two dollars a day. The current period is characterised by significant absolute poverty levels, which are even growing in some States, such as Egypt, where it affects nearly one fifth of the population, and Yemen, with nearly 50% of the population in the category of absolute poverty. The (official) unemployment rate is approaching 20%, 23% of those over 15 are illiterate and more than 17% of the population is functionally illiterate despite the sharp rise in overall literacy, not to mention the high maternal death rate and the underrepresentation of women in the political sphere (parliaments have only 8% women MPs as opposed to a world average of 18%).

We can assert that individuals of these societies, in particular young people, were in a position of “sub-citizens,” which explains why the first word to be chanted at demonstrations was “dignity”

Add to this state of affairs a demographic context that makes public policy difficult in these States: 65% of the population is under 25 years of age and the average age of the population has just reached 22 (as compared to a global average of 28 years of age), despite a sharp, rapid decline in fertility rate in the Maghreb (the rate has gone from six children born per woman in the 1980s to just over two now). All of these factors profoundly modify intergenerational relations and the organisation of society. They shed light on the internal conflicts that endure in these societies, conflicts largely underestimated by Westerners, who are moved by security imperatives, anxieties relating to Islam and economic interests and display a rather condescending attitude towards them.

In light of these observations, we can assert, as Václav Havel does in his political essay “The Power of the Powerless,” that individuals of these societies, in particular young people, were in a position of “sub-
citizens,” which explains why the first word to be chanted at demonstrations was “dignity.”

What “Civil Society” Are We Talking About?

Before discussing the organisation of civil society, we must first refer to a form of dissent through the affirmation of the individual and the desire to maintain social ties in truth and transparency despite everything. Although comparison doesn’t prove anything, Václav Havel’s words on the Prague Spring in “The Power of the Powerless” resound cannily: “Today it is difficult to ascertain when and by which sinuous paths a particular act or genuine attitude influenced a given milieu and how the virus of truth gradually spread through the tissues of life within the lie and began attacking it. One thing, however, seems clear: the attempt at political reform was not the cause of society’s awakening but rather the end result.” It is the young, those active forces of the States, in contrast to politicians considered “professionals” of policy, who take to the streets and squares and who are the expression of the body social as opposed to the body politic. These young people are seeking a social and economic life organised according to the logic of civil society, following a line that would find its dynamic within itself rather than in the role of the State. Václav Havel speaks of “real life” as opposed to lies and the corruption prevailing in authoritarian regimes. “Our revolution is civil – neither violent nor religious” was the slogan wielded by activists on Tahrir Square. It is according to this civil society approach that we will examine the role of youth in societies during the Arab Spring.

“Plural” Youth, All of Them Victims of Downward Social Mobility

First of all, we should consider the place of youth in Arab societies at the time events spontaneously broke out, though it would be more pertinent to speak of a “lack of a place” for youth. “We are, without being nor having,” stated a young Tunisian student on the eve of hostilities during an interview. These 15 to 24-year-olds comprise nearly a quarter of the population, yet they are fewer than at the time of the “bread riots” (IMF riots) and the apogee of radical Islamism in the late 1980s; as the demographer, Philippe Fargues, observed 25 years ago following demographic transition, “the 20-30 age group has never comprised a proportion as high as today’s among the population over 20, and most probably never will again.” In fact, in Arab countries, the most massive arrival of youth on the labour market is history. We must thus partially rule out the motif of the demographic explosion as a factor in the Arab Spring and turn towards social and economic insights. Young people are still far too numerous for the labour market’s absorption capacity, which is why the unemployment rates for this age group (15-24 years of age) are very high, reaching 30% in Egypt and 32% in Morocco, with major geographic disparities in inland areas. In December 2010, young Mohamed Bouazizi’s immolation in Sidi Bouzid, where two thirds of the population in the region is unemployed, is symptomatic of the sentiment of despair among youth in many Arab countries. What can be said of the situation of young university graduates? If we consider Tunisia again, 60,000 higher education graduates arrive on the labour market every year, while several dozen millions are already registered with the National Employment and Independent Work Agency (ANETI). According to a study done by Carnegie Middle East, these young graduates experience higher unemployment rates than average for the active population in general. Whereas 13.3% of the population lacks formal employment, qualified youth represent 21.1% of the unemployed. In Algeria, a country that lives off its oil income, young unemployed university graduates are twice as numerous as in other countries with the same per capita income level.

One can speak of a sentiment of despair among these young graduates who had nurtured aspirations of upward mobility through investment in higher education and now share a sentiment of downward mobility due to the dearth of opportunities on the national employment market. In the Gulf monarchies, youth has also experienced downward social mobility, partially due to the real estate boom of the 2000s and the rise in the price of housing. Strong intergenerational tension is generated between these youth, “stuck” at their parents’ homes due to lack of financial independence until they are 30 or older, and their parents, who do not understand and resent these “spoiled” children who remain in their charge. This disappointment primarily affects the middle classes, but events following the death of Mohamed Bouazizi allowed contact between disadvantaged youth from both urban and rural areas and primarily young, urban, downwardly mobile intellectuals. Then an unexpected alliance came about.
in the Arab States between the various components of this “plural” youth, who shared this sense of downward mobility and exclusion.

Though the youth of Tunisia are not the same as those of Bahrain, Syria or Morocco, they do share certain common features, highly publicised in the media on the North shore of the Mediterranean, with an emphasis on the role of young women in the Arab Spring.

Who Are These Young Women Involved in the Arab Spring?

Television networks the world over showed varied, emblematic figures. There were images of young women sporting veils and black niqabs, waving flags with an attitude of victory during popular protests. There were also images of heroines at the head of the revolt like the one pictured in *Le Monde Magazine* on 5 February 2011, which featured a full-page photo of a young woman, alone before a police cordon, with the caption “COURAGE. On 26 January in Cairo, this young woman urged protesters to advance towards a police cordon.” There were also young women who were not religious and proud of it, such as Nadia El Fani, appearing on television. The former represent what the West fears, the latter, the hope for a shift of this youth towards the standards of globalisation: young female bloggers, symbolising women’s struggles against dictatorship and the patriarchy, heroines of the defence of human rights in the Arab world. These two positions, which are quite real, nevertheless remain stereotypical portrayals of the political engagement of young women in the region. Such reductionist readings should be avoided, as for instance, when female political engagement is seen as the prolongation of and/or reaction to male domination, as in the first case, or when young Arab women are considered the only real actors in the Arab Spring, relegating men to the role of followers, as in the second case. In the Western perspective, she can only be either submissive or rebellious, a position widely adopted in representations of young Maghrebi women in France – recall the “neither whores nor submissive” movement.

In fact, women’s engagement in politics did not wait for the Arab Spring and has often emerged for less heroic but also deeper causes such as generalising schooling for girls, lowering the fertility rate and progressively integrating part of these young people on the wage labour market. A growing minority has taken on responsibilities in civil society or political posts, namely elective offices or important posts within party structures. The West’s astonishment at the strong female presence in the protest movements of Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain is due above all to its ignorance of the phenomenon of progressive politicisation of young Arab women and of their place in the public sphere today, an ignorance heightened by a certain complacency among their Western counterparts, in particular young female journalists.

“In France, one can hardly imagine,” states Sonia Dayan-Herzbrun, “that since the turn of the 20th century, there could have been militant feminism in regions of the Near East that sought to both free themselves from the hold of a moribund Ottoman Empire and a European colonisation with many faces. As soon as the issue of women arises in what it has become customary to call the Arab world, Orientalist prejudices and stereotypes abound.”

The very beginning of feminism in the Arab world was rather the doing of men expressing a certain “feminism in the masculine,” as the Tunisian sociologist, Leila Labidi, puts it. They were Muslim reformists who had been advocating the emancipation of women under Sharia law since the 1930s and who greatly inspired the Tunisian Personal Status Code proclaimed in 1956, which remains the most liberal and egalitarian in the entire Arab world, even if this “State feminism” is not enough for the young women who have been taking to the streets in Tunisia for over a year now.

Today, the complexity of understanding the place of women and their political role in Arab societies has been heightened by the manipulation of the feminine issue under authoritarian regimes in the Maghreb and Mashreq, as well as in the conservative regimes of Saudi Arabia, Morocco and Kuwait, in particular since the 11 September 2001 attacks. All these States have implemented a sort of State feminism in favour of women’s rights. They have encouraged women’s NGOs working to promote women in the public sphere and developed an arsenal of measures providing an illusion of democratic progress in the eyes of their Western backers. The most emblematic example is the proclamation of the *Mudawwana* (family code) by Mohamed VI in February 2004, a sort of “Islamic feminism of State” declaring the emancipation of women through a liberal reading of religious texts (*ijtihad*) without questioning the basis of patriarchal society. This State feminism can also be used to
struggle against Islamists, declared “enemies of women,” whereas a few years earlier, the King had encouraged the population’s “Muslim fibre.”

The complexity of understanding the place of women and their political role in Arab societies has been heightened by the manipulation of the feminine issue under authoritarian regimes in the Maghreb and Mashreq

Feminist movements have always objected to this manipulation of the feminist cause by authoritarian regimes. Today, Arab feminist discourse criticises a patriarchy no longer conceived as male domination but rather as a social, political, economic and societal patriarchy that prevents both men and women from advancing in life. We are no longer really in a dominant (men) – dominated (women) relation but rather in a power-aspiration to freedom relation.

Young women, like their male counterparts, wish to free themselves of family and social pressure, which has become increasingly restrictive with the erosion of the traditional family model, the urban housing crisis and this group’s major difficulties in finding work. There is even talk of a “Malthusian poverty” (Montenay, 2009). This expression sums up the generational conflict issue of all of these youth “stuck” at their parents’ homes and subject to prolonged celibacy.

What about Youth’s Relation to Islam in Arab States?

On this issue, once again, one must proceed with caution and take into account the complexity of the matter. The same generational divide can be found in Islamism with the opposition of the “old white-beards” to the “young black-beards” as well as to the young beardless. Though the leadership of political organisations remains in the hands of older men, excluding youth and women from party responsibilities, they have shown mistrust of or aloofness from “spontaneous” protest movements beyond their control, in contrast to the youth in their parties, who have joined protests against regimes, more in tune with the slogans and expectations of their generation than with their elders. The following statements by Patrick Haenni on intergenerational strife within the Muslim Brotherhood can certainly be applied to the Arab world in general: “The demands of the new generation are: greater transparency, less authoritarianism, recognition of youth, promotion of networking, desire for democracy, rejection of the major catch phrases. These six points are all at odds with the leadership’s positions. What the Muslim Brotherhood did not understand, at least initially, was that the mobilisation of their youth was as much a desire to overthrow the corrupt political regime as a questioning of how the institution they were involved in was functioning. Where they call for transparency, the Brothers maintain the culture of secrecy. Where they think networks, their leaders think pyramidal organisation. Where they think freedom of action, their elders think authority and hierarchy. Where they think democracy, part of the leadership does not necessarily lend this term the same definition.”

It is this socio-political divide between age groups that constitutes the common element among the Arab Spring youth. Young Islamist demands are similar to those of other Arab youth. Like them, they reject paternalist, authoritarian methods; they condemn dictators just as much as the leaders of their own movements or parties. It is the young people’s expression of “the leader’s disgrace,” according to Michel Camau. This factor should play a major role in post-revolutionary transitions.

These Young Arabs: Actors of Subversion Rather Than Revolution

One of the common characteristics of the great majority of these youth is the use of pacific and/or legal forms of action with a high protest potential and showing major defiance towards the established institutions and regimes in power. The occupation of public squares has been a common denominator in all the Arab revolts, to the point where these squares have become a political actor in their own right, serving as the exclusive voice of the people.

Another characteristic of the Arab revolts is the role played by social networks, and not only the social networks of educated youth, such as Facebook and Twit-
ter, which depend on the population’s computer ownership and access to internet connections (less than 10% of the population in Egypt owns a computer and has an internet connection, and the percentage of mobile phone ownership is even lower) and highly differentiated uses of these means of communication. These new means exist in parallel to older networks that have long structured social interaction in Arab countries despite the control and pressure exerted by the regime in power, such as labour unions like the General Union of Tunisian Workers (Union Générale des Travailleurs Tunisiens, UGTT), universities or solidarity networks such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, one of the most powerful solidarity networks, targeted by Mubarak.

Another singular approach used in the revolts relates to everyday life: local engagement and cultural passions with no apparent public or political end. This series of practices, qualified as “infra-politics,” which youth in Arab countries have been effecting for years, has grown exponentially since a year ago and seems to be leading towards a form of secularisation of Islamism, a sort of “post-Islamism” (Gilles Kepel).

Mark Levine has identified the signs of this “post-Islamism” by analysing heavy metal music. Reda Zine, a Moroccan in this genre, explained to Levine, “We play heavy metal because our lives are heavy metal, that is, oppressive, in struggle against censure, the verdicts of the authorities and the power of the religious establishment. Remember the role of graffiti like the huge stencilled piece by Alaa Abdel Fattah on the walls of an Egyptian military hospital, which he embellished with this furious slogan ‘You can kill us, but you will never be able to govern us,’ or the Moroccan rapper, L7a9d, imprisoned for his lyrics, in which he demanded his ‘rights right now’ and for having declared that he preferred “long live the people” to “long live the king.”

**What Is Left Today?**

Certainly, a year later, part of this youth has the feeling of having been little understood or not at all. The need for a return to order was expressed at the polls with the rise to power of the Islamists, but nothing will ever be the same. Several highly significant examples support this observation.

For the first time in the history of Egyptian universities, the deans were elected by the faculty and not designated by the presidents as had previously been the custom. The largest Sunni university in Egypt, Al-Azhar University, has just added the following four freedoms to its charter: freedom of expression, freedom of artistic creation, freedom of religion and freedom of research. In Libya, the National Transitional Council (NTC) has announced the modification of the electoral law governing the election of the Constituent Assembly. The former electoral law had established a quota of 10% for female MPs, but under pressure from civil society, it has now been set at 50%.

Certainly, the voice of youth has been greatly excluded at elections and repression is often fierce, but nonetheless, nothing will ever be the same. To borrow a phrase from Václav Havel, thanks to youth, “the future is once again open.”

**Bibliography**


Panorama: The Mediterranean Year
The field work for the third edition of the Euromed Survey was carried out between December 2011 and January 2012. Some 695 actors and experts responded. In light of the uprisings sweeping the region, the thematic dossier was devoted to the impact of the Arab Spring on Euro-Mediterranean relations. In addition, an assessment was conducted of Euromed political and security cooperation policies, as provided for in the original four-year plan for the survey.

An extensive review of the survey results can be found in the third survey report (www.iemed.org/publicaciones-en/historic-de-publicaciones/enquesta-euromed?set_language=en). This paper offers a preview of the results with regard to three key aspects of Euro-Mediterranean relations. First, it will look at the overall assessment of the evolution of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, including both the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Second, it will examine the possible impact of the Arab uprisings on Euro-Mediterranean relations, i.e., which actors stand to gain specific clout, what the EU’s new role will be, and what new prospects have opened up for Euromed relations in general. Third and finally, it will analyse the assessment of the political and security cooperation basket, which, although influenced by the political changes in the South, is also indicative of the evolution of one of the Barcelona Process’s main assets.

When asked to provide a global assessment of the EU’s initiatives towards its southern neighbours, respondents gave an average score of 4.9 on a scale of 0 to 10, in other words, a neutral response. The percentage breakdown by score follows a normal distribution curve (see Chart 2), with the largest number of respondents giving scores falling somewhere in the middle. In short, the respondents seemed to take an indifferent view of the EU’s initiatives towards its neighbours in the South, finding them neither good nor bad.

In contrast, the average score awarded specifically to the results achieved by the UfM in 2011 was an indisputably negative 3.8, with some 48% of respondents rating it less than 4, clear proof that the UfM has failed to perform up to even minimum standards. This is down from an average score of 4.5 on the same question in the previous survey. The score was no doubt influenced by the uncertainty surrounding the figure of the UfM Secretary General. When asked to rate the potential role of the UfM Secretariat in the context of the new Euro-Mediterranean institutional architecture, respondents were more positive, giving an average score of 5.2. By geographical area, the lowest average scores were given by respondents from non-Mediterranean EU countries (4.7) and the Maghreb (4.9), while respondents from Mediterranean EU countries and the Mashreq gave higher scores (5.4).

This notwithstanding, compared to the overall score from 2010, the perception of the Secretariat’s role is less positive, falling from 6.0 to 5.2. Likewise, the average scores by geographical area were notably lower than in 2010, suggesting that the Secretariat may yet lose its status as a key institution in the Euro-Mediterranean process in the eyes of actors and experts.
The final two questions in this section of the survey dealt with the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In the first question, respondents were asked to offer a global assessment of the ENP in 2011. The average score was 4.9, quite similar to that for the first question (global assessment of EU initiatives) and higher than the score given to the UfM. Additionally, the differences between geographical areas followed the same pattern, with respondents from the Maghreb giving the lowest scores. By institution type, the experts were once again the group to hold the most negative view of the ENP.
Finally, respondents as a whole gave an average score of 6.8 to the need to create a new financial instrument exclusively for the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs). This score would have been even higher had it not been for the non-Mediterranean European respondents, who gave the need an average score of 5.4, as compared to the other groups, all of which rated it higher than 7. By institution type, civil society members and experts, together with respondents with economic and sociocultural backgrounds, gave the highest scores.

The Arab Uprisings

The Role of International Actors in the Region

Significant differences can be seen in how different groups of actors viewed the responses of different international actors to the uprisings on the southern shore. Thus, only two actors received an average score of more than 5 – Turkey (5.9) and the European Union (5.4) – while, of the rest, only the US and the Arab League received average scores of more than 4 (4.9 and 4.4, respectively). The remaining actors received negative scores from the respondents as a whole: GCC (3.7); Saudi Arabia (3); China (2.9); Russia (2.8); and Iran (2.2).

The Future Role of the EU in the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs)

However, the assessment changed when respondents were asked whether, in future, the EU would have a greater or lesser impact than other actors on Mediterranean regional development. The results for all respondents as a whole suggest that the EU will have less influence than the US (41%) and Turkey (45%), a similar level of influence to the Arab League and Saudi Arabia (48% and 52%, respectively), and more influence than China (64%), Iran (68%) and Russia (74%).

Also of note was the little influence that Arab countries themselves attributed to the Arab League, which received its lowest scores in the Mashreq and the Maghreb (only 26% and 32% of respondents in these countries, respectively, believed that it will be more influential than the EU). The influence assigned to Turkey also varied considerably depending on where respondents were from: it received its lowest ratings from respondents from the Maghreb, 56% of whom believe that the EU will have more influence, while respondents from the Mashreq and Turks themselves placed it on a level with the EU (almost 50% for both options). In contrast, 57% of respondents from Mediterranean EU countries believe that Turkey will have more influence than the EU, and this figure rose to

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**CHART 3**

Progress and Achievements of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Union for the Mediterranean and the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011

- **What is your global assessment of the EU’s initiatives towards its southern neighbours in 2011?**
  - Score: 4.9

- **What is your global assessment of the results achieved by the Union for the Mediterranean in 2011?**
  - Score: 5.2

- **Do you expect the Secretariat to play a key, moderate or negligible role in the new Euro-Mediterranean institutional architecture in the near future?**
  - Score: 4.9

- **What is your global assessment of the results of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011?**
  - Score: 4.9

- **To what extent do you consider it necessary to create a new specific financial instrument devoted to the southern Mediterranean Partners only?**
  - Score: 6.8

**Source:** Compiled by the IEMed based on the results of the 3rd Euromed Survey.
70% among respondents from non-Mediterranean EU countries, far more than the figure for the US. As for the rest of the actors, it is worth noting that Turkish respondents gave much higher scores than anyone else to the influence of Russia and Iran, while China was rated highest by respondents from the Maghreb, although always behind the EU.

**Impact of the Uprisings on Euro-Mediterranean Relations**

The survey also aimed to measure the future impact of the uprisings on Euro-Mediterranean relations through the degree of probability attributed by respondents to three future scenarios (Chart
6). On the whole, respondents felt that the most likely scenario was an accelerated pace of reform (5.6), followed by the consolidation of a truly Euro-Mediterranean community (5.1) and, finally, fragmentation (4.7).

A comparison of the average scores given by respondents from MPCs and from EU Member States shows an inverse trend with regard to the two least likely scenarios: while respondents from the MPCs had a similar distribution to that of survey respondents as a whole, albeit with slightly more pronounced differences (5.4 for consolidation and 4.4 for fragmentation), Europeans consider both scenarios to be almost equally likely, rating the former 4.8 and the latter 4.9.

The Role of the EU in the Countries of the South

As for what role the EU should play in domestic developments in the MPCs, in nearly all cases the most popular response was for the EU to act cautiously and only at the request of the country in question. This trend was broken in the cases of Palestine and Syria, where a bare majority wanted the EU to play a pro-active and interventionist role.

As can be seen in Chart 7, the MPCs can be divided into three groups based on the results. The first group consists of countries in which the breakdown of scenarios closely mirrors the one discussed above (Morocco, Jordan, Lebanon, Algeria and Tunisia). The second group consists of Egypt and Libya, where support for the neutrality scenario was weaker and one third of respondents preferred a scenario in which the EU exerted greater influence to act against extremist parties. Finally, Syria and Palestine yielded similar breakdowns in which, as noted above, the majority of the respondents chose the interventionist scenario.

Notwithstanding the above, when respondents’ answers are viewed in relation to their own countries, appreciable differences can be seen with regard to the overall responses. Thus, countries with similar overall breakdowns cease to have them when the focus shifts to the responses of the nationals of the country in question.

The EU’s Political Response

One of the thorniest aspects of the EU’s relations with the MPCs is the issue of what policy it should follow in response to reproachable behaviour by MPC governments. To shed light on this point, the survey asked how the EU should react to: a) the failure to introduce democratic reforms; b) repressive
actions taken against popular movements; and c) repressive measures taken against women’s rights and gender equality.

One common feature was the low percentage of respondents who chose the option whereby the EU should remain neutral, whereas, in the case of a fail-
In response to implement democratisation measures, nearly 70% of respondents thought the EU should respond with positive conditionality. However, an analysis of the policy responses to repressive measures shows a balance between measures to promote and support reforms (positive conditionality) and restrictive measures and sanctions (negative conditionality). The question also included another possible measure, which drew considerable support. With regard to the repression of popular movements, in addition to positive conditionality (26%) and negative conditionality (27%), the option of seeking international sanctions was offered and it emerged as the most often chosen (31%).

As for the question regarding countries that take repressive measures against women’s rights, the third option (in addition to positive conditionality (34%) and negative conditionality (30%)) referred to direct support by the EU for NGOs and individuals committed to defending women’s rights in the relevant countries.

Euromed Policies on Political and Security Cooperation

Before analysing the assessment of the Partnership’s first basket, it is necessary to note the possible influence of the Arab Spring on the participants in the survey. The fervour of the uprisings stands in stark contrast to the intrinsic slowness of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, causing respondents to have a more negative perception than they might otherwise have had.

The average score given to the achievement of the general objective of the first basket (Political and Security Basket) of the 1995 Barcelona declaration – establishing an area of peace and stability – was 3.3, showing that much remains to be done before this objective can be considered fulfilled. It is particularly telling that some 60% of respondents gave a score of between 0 and 3.

A breakdown of the scores given to this measure by region shows minimal differences, except in the case

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1 Positive conditionality on the basis of the “more for more” approach: “The more and the faster a country progresses in its internal reforms, the more support it will receive from the EU” and vice versa.

2 The EU should use negative conditionality (restrictive measures to sanction the country: freezing of political dialogue, restrictive financial measures, suspension of the implementation of EU agreements, use of assistance primarily to “support non-state actors for measures aimed at promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms and supporting the democratisation process in partner countries,” etc.)
of non-EU European countries, which gave it an average score of 4.8. Respondents from the Mashreq, Mediterranean EU countries, Israel and Turkey gave slightly higher-than-average scores. Respondents from non-Mediterranean EU countries and the Maghreb were somewhat more critical.

To obtain a detailed assessment of the progress made on the objectives of the “Political and Security basket of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration,” a filter question was used to select only those respondents who considered themselves to have a clear perception of them. Thus, in total, only 37% of the respondents answered this block of questions. Consequently, due caution must be taken when analysing any subsequent breakdown of their responses (the entire sub-sample consisted of only 259 people).

Of the objectives proposed in 1995 for the Partnership in the area of political and security cooperation, 70% of respondents considered that the most progress had been made on Strengthen cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism. At the opposite end of the spectrum, not only did most respondents (55%) consider that no progress had been made on the objective Create a Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, but some even believed there had been a regression (36%).

The rest of the objectives fall into two groups, those with a positive score, that is, on which more than 50% of respondents believed progress has been made (Strengthen cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism, Fight organised crime and drug trafficking and Strengthen political dialogue) and those with a higher percentage of negative responses (no progress or regression) than positive ones (Promote regional security, Respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, Respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and Develop the rule of law and democracy).

This section of the survey also sought to assess the progress made on the priorities defined in the Political and Security Partnership within the framework of the 2005 Five-Year Work Programme. To this end, attention should first be drawn to the general lack of familiarity with this issue, with about 20% of the respondents, who were chosen from a public of Euro-Mediterranean policy experts and actors, answering Don’t know. This suggests an ongoing need to increase the visibility of the Euro-Mediterranean action programmes and priorities. As for the results themselves, it is telling that, according to the respondents, progress has been made on only two priorities, Foster the role of civil society (61%) and Extend political pluralism and participation by citizens (57%).

The 2009 edition of the survey also asked about progress on these priorities. The assessment of the progress made on those priorities aimed at expand-
ing political and citizenship rights has substantially improved (see Chart 12).

As for the priorities related to participation by civil society, improved civil rights, and gender equality, the assessment of the first two has slightly improved, while respondents considered that there had been a regression on *Increase the participation of women in decision-making*, implying a need to focus on strengthening measures geared towards enhancing gender equality. These differences between the 2009 and 2011 results seem to underscore the influence of the Arab uprisings on the perception of progress or regression with regard to political and security priorities.
Finally, the survey also sought to assess what progress, if any, has been made on the programmes, projects, confidence-building measures, networks and support mechanisms carried out with funding from the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). The most salient aspect of the responses was the widespread lack of knowledge of the programmes. When asked to assess the progress made on them, in all but one case more than 50% of the respondents answered Don’t Know. The only programme known to most respondents (73%) was support for the Middle East peace process. Although the programmes in question are quite specific and, when unsure of the progress made on them, respondents always had the option of simply answering Don’t Know, the extent of the actors’ and experts’ unfamiliarity with them highlights the need to improve the channels for publicising Euro-Mediterranean programmes in general.

Among respondents who were familiar with them, the programmes fell into three distinct groups. The first comprises those programmes that most respondents believe have progressed, such as the EuroMeSCo network, the seminars for diplomats and the “Euromed Police” programme. The second consists of those programmes on which opinions were quite evenly split, including the disaster prevention programme (PPRD South) and the Governance Facility. Finally, the third consists of those programmes that respondents considered had not progressed at all. This group includes the Euromed Justice I and II programmes, which 59% of respondents claimed had made no progress or had even experienced a regression. The aforementioned support programme for peace merits special mention. Although it is the most well-known programme, it is also the most poorly regarded, with only 12% of respondents believing that progress has been made on it and the overwhelming majority divided between those who believe that no progress has been made (55%) and those who believe there has been a regression (33%).

The third Euromed survey conducted by the IEMed highlights the complexity of Euro-Mediterranean relations and the difficulty of raising awareness of Euro-Mediterranean policies in turbulent times. The Arab uprisings have determined the policy of Mediterranean countries and, thus, for better or for worse, influenced the responses to the survey, with regard to both questions directly concerning the revolts and questions referring to Mediterranean policy in general.

The ardour of the uprisings contrasts sharply with the sluggishness of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. However, the construction of a new future in the Mediterranean Partner Countries will undeniably require Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in the political sphere, and it is thus more necessary than ever to understand how the key actors and experts assess these policies and the future of the Mediterranean region as a whole.

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NATO’s Intervention in Libya: Assessment and Implications

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NATO’s intervention in Libya has raised much controversy and been subject to opposite assessments. While many analysts, and NATO itself, refer to Operation Unified Protector in Libya as an undeniable success and even a template for future NATO operations, others accuse the Alliance of stretching its United Nations mandate in favour of a preset goal aimed at regime change. Moreover, assessing NATO’s effective engagement in Libya has inevitably triggered comparisons with the parallel case of Syria, which involves a similar humanitarian disaster but has triggered less international and regional enthusiasm for intervention. Importantly, further criticism blames NATO’s operation for the current state of chaos and insecurity in post-Gaddafi Libya. However, one should be careful when assessing NATO’s operation in a manner that balances the successful military operation with the naturally predictable need to act in post-Gaddafi Libya. The following lines attempt to provide an assessment of the intervention in Libya and to sensibly consider its implications for the current and future security situation in the Mediterranean.

A Success Story

When NATO took over the operation in Libya on 27 March 2011, a perfect legal and political context was in place. The pillars of this ideal context were threefold. First, an internationally recognised humanitarian disaster was unfolding in which former Libyan President Muammar Gaddafi was launching a brutal onslaught against Libyan protestors. Crucially, this disaster was taking place in a unique political context, represented by the public revolts sweeping the Arab region against what had long been perceived to be unshakable dictatorships. Second, the Arab League, which by then had already suspended Libya’s membership, issued an unprecedented call asking the international community to intervene to protect the Libyan people. Third, UN Security Council Resolution 1973 authorised Member States, acting nationally or through regional organisations, “to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat.” The resolution provided for the protection of civilians, the imposition of a no-fly zone, enforcement of an arms embargo, a ban on flights, and the freezing of assets. Over and above this perfect context, the decision of four Arab partner countries, namely, Qatar, Jordan, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates, to join NATO’s efforts in Libya, as well as the decision of the United States not to take the lead, added much to the broader perception of the legitimacy of the intervention.

Throughout Operation Unified Protector, NATO appeared keen to work on its image crisis and polish its reputation in the Arab region, where it has been forging two forums for dialogue and partnerships: the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) with North African countries since 1994 and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) with the Gulf States since 2004. It was, hence, eager to pull out of Libya as soon as the Libyan opposition, represented by the National Transitional Council, had taken control of the country and once the protesters had captured and killed Gaddafi. Even if the operation was not a fast one, the facts that it saved tens of thousands of civilian lives, immediately terminated after achieving its objectives, had a relatively low cost compared to previous operations, and did not lead to a single casualty on
Despite the Criticism, A Success Nonetheless!

In contrast with this outlook, NATO’s intervention in Libya has also received heavy criticism, including charges that the Alliance intentionally expanded its UN mandate, siding with the Libyan protestors with the aim of achieving regime change rather than merely protecting civilians. African leaders, especially, have been particularly loud in accusing NATO of completely disregarding the African Union Road Map for Libya with this aim. Many observers have gone further still and blamed NATO’s intervention for the now torn Libya and the fact that it remains trapped in unceasing violence. However, it must be stressed that those who accuse NATO of mission-creep aimed at regime change are ignoring the key, unconcealed fact that the Libyan people themselves demanded regime change and that the Libyan National Transitional Council itself did not accept the African Union’s Road Map. The public uprising sparked in Libya on 17 February, following the success of similar uprisings in Tunisia and in Egypt to topple Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s and Hosni Mubarak’s regimes respectively, aimed to topple Gaddafi’s regime. In response, Gaddafi brutally fought the Libyan people, including with the help of mercenaries from a number of friendly African countries. Thus, were it not for NATO’s intervention, Libya would most likely still be undergoing even more violent scenarios comparable to the parallel case of Syria.

The Inevitable Comparisons with Syria

The parallel case of Syria, where Bashar al-Assad has also been fighting anti-regime protestors, is inevitably compared to Libya. Critics are further questioning why the international community responded briskly and forcefully in oil-rich Libya but has failed to take a similar attitude towards Syria. There is no doubt that international intervention for humanitarian reasons has often been selective, and international history stands as a trusted witness. The perplexing silence that prevailed regionally and internationally and met the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council’s campaign to crack down on the public up-rising in Bahrain is a recent and relevant example. There is likewise no doubt that European countries, in particular, have more direct interests in Libya than in Syria. Gaddafi’s Libya long enjoyed a geostrategic and political significance among European powers, especially Italy, not only for its oil resources but also for its commitment and efforts to restrain illegal migration. In addition, Libya’s geographical proximity to Europe and its central location on the southern Mediterranean shore in an area relatively free of regional political complications compared to Syria were also factors that positively influenced military calculations regarding the potential for success of an operation in Libya.

Nonetheless, to be fair and balanced, the ideal conditions for intervention fulfilled in the case of Libya seem to be lacking in the case of Syria. With the exception of the equally recognised humanitarian disaster in Syria, there is no UN Security Council resolution for Syria – and it was Russia and China who blocked it, not European powers or the United States – and there is no similar call from the Arab League for intervention.

Implications of NATO’s Operation for Mediterranean Security

Despite its success, NATO’s operation in Libya elicits many reflections and has several implications for the current and future security situation in the Mediterranean. One reflection regards the future role of Europe in Mediterranean security in light of the general impression that European powers took the lead in NATO’s operation. A second reflection regards the implications of what seems to be unfinished business in Libya, due to the continued violence in the country and the apparent lack of stability.

Europe Takes the Lead?

One of the most important issues in the experience of NATO’s engagement in Libya is the unexpected contribution of European powers compared to what was labelled the “supporting role” of the United States. Particularly, the high-profile roles of Britain and France stimulated an international perception of Europe taking the lead in a NATO operation in the Mediterranean. Critically, the Mediterranean is an area that is actually home to a high level of competition between NATO and the EU and one that Euro-
peans deem more relevant to their security, political, and economic interests than do their allies on the other side of the Atlantic.

The EU should work earnestly to unify the voices of its Member States and to turn its promises into actions in its Southern neighbourhood

Several facts suggest that the role of the United States was not really marginal and that Europe was significantly divided over Libya. First, the United States provided critical military assistance, including 97% of the Tomahawk missiles used to attack Libyan air defences at the start of the operation and 75% of the aerial refuelling used throughout the operation. It also intervened to sell NATO critical equipment after the latter ran out of precision-guided bombs, supplied NATO with key targeting and intelligence assets, such as unmanned drones, and offered it expertise when it became disappointingly clear that its European allies lacked the required know-how to provide their aircraft with proper targeting information and the US commanders in Europe dispatched around 100 military personnel to the NATO Targeting Centre. It was indeed embarrassing for Europe when NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen declared that “the operation has made visible that the Europeans lack a number of essential military capabilities.” Second, the futile struggle for consensus among EU capitals on how to react to the situation in Libya greatly undermined the actual existence of a Common European Foreign and Security Policy. Yet despite these facts, one important outcome of Operation Unified Protector is that European powers — albeit through NATO rather than the EU — effectively took the lead in Libya. The implications of this are mainly threefold. First, Europe will have to seriously consider enhancing its military capabilities if it earnestly wishes to provide for its own security. This will entail a serious reconsideration of Member States’ budget allocations for defence and a review of the cuts that many have undertaken to date. Second, Europe cannot adopt a “wait and see” or cautious approach towards revolutionary events in the Mediterranean. The EU should instead work earnestly to unify the voices of its Member States and to turn its promises into actions in its Southern neighbourhood. That will necessitate a serious effort to revitalise the weak new European Neighbourhood Policy launched by the EU in May 2011, alleged to represent a fundamental review of its traditionally ill-thought-out democracy promotion policy in the Arab region. Third, the EU, and particularly those Member States that enthusiastically contributed to NATO’s operation in Libya, must be aware of the responsibility that lies on their shoulders for what seems to be unfinished business in the country.

Unfinished Business: The Responsibility to Help a still Fragile and Unstable Country

Indeed, NATO’s military operation in Libya was a success insofar as it achieved its goals. It was also a success in terms of its accomplishments in light of NATO’s focal expertise and comparative advantage in military operations. However, the fact that NATO’s operation cannot be blamed for the chaos, insecurity and fragility of post-Gaddafi Libya — all expected outcomes in a country in transition with its specific demographic characteristics and political culture, weak institutions, and long history of misrule and repression — does not negate the equal reality that the international community in general, and those powers that intervened in Libya in particular, still have a moral responsibility to help Libya with its transition to a better future. In pragmatic terms, not only is there a moral obligation, but, more importantly, it is in Europe’s best interests to have a stable and more democratic Libya on the other shore of the Mediterranean. In addition, Europe, which took the lead in NATO’s military operation, should be most concerned with helping Libya so as to prevent troubled internal dynamics in the country from poisoning the operation’s success.

In practical terms, the EU enjoys a comparative advantage over NATO in post-conflict reconstruction and in managing civil-military relations. The distinguished expertise of the EU in these policy areas, accumulated and refined in several rule-of-law missions and civilian operations worldwide, is apt to be put to use in post-Gaddafi Libya. Furthermore, it would notably enhance Europe’s profile in the region if the EU could work as a catalyst for a concerted international effort, with significant contributions from Arab and African countries and organisations, aimed at assisting the Libyan transition.
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On 21 January 2011, Osama bin Laden aired a particularly threatening message directed against France, demanding it immediately withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. The aggressiveness of this message is all the more remarkable, considering that the leader of al-Qaeda generally reserved such violence for a demonised “America” accused of all the ills of Islam. In any case, bin Laden did not have a word to say on the fall of President Ben Ali, overthrown in Tunisia a week earlier by a popular uprising in which Islamists played no role. There was a staggering discrepancy between the al-Qaeda leader’s discourse, hammering home demands regarding the Indian subcontinent, and the reality of the Arab world, which had entered a revolutionary phase of historical significance.

No-one knew at the time that this speech was to be bin Laden’s last. On the night of the 1st to the 2nd May 2011, the leader of al-Qaeda was killed by an American commando unit after storming his hideout in Abbottabad, northern Pakistan. The disappearance of the most wanted person on the planet long mobilised the Western media, whereas it was quickly displaced in the Arab media by other, more pressing developments. As a young Tunisian stated at the time: “Ben Ali, bin Laden, they’re history.”

The (primarily digital) documents seized in Abbottabad prove that bin Laden, far from being a symbolic figure, continued to supervise the planning of al-Qaeda terrorism until his death. The rigorous security mechanism that had protected him for so long entailed that Ayman al-Zawahiri, though his tried deputy, was not involved in all of “Emir” bin Laden’s decisions (“emir” in this case meaning “commander”). Moreover, the founder of al-Qaeda remained the undisputed leader, since any membership, whether individual or collective, involved an unconditional oath of allegiance to “Sheikh Osama.”

To facilitate this transition, central al-Qaeda created an unprecedented structure, the General Command, which made bin Laden’s death official and validated its own existence through this proclamation (before this, there was only the Consultative Council at the summit of al-Qaeda, a poorly named institution since it functioned as the organisation’s executive body). Despite this clever maneouvre, it was not until 16 June 2011 that the General Command announced that Ayman al-Zawahiri was indeed the new leader of al-Qaeda. Even taking into account the heavy constraints of being a clandestine organisation, this month-and-a-half-long delay demonstrates that the promotion of al-Qaeda’s second-in-line to the position of leader raised many issues.

In fact, only the Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda has pledged allegiance to al-Zawahiri, and this via the voice of its own “emir,” Nasser al-Wuhayshi, on 26 July 2011. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have limited themselves to singing the praises of al-Zawahiri through the intervention of intermediate officers. These statements...
of deference are a far cry from the formal oaths required by Jihadi protocol. Al-Zawahiri has thus lost the direct authority exercised by bin Laden over AQI since 2004 and over AQIM since 2007. This contraction of al-Qaeda around its first circle and its Yemeni branch is not compensated by the ostentatious rallying of the Pakistani Talibans (Tehrik e-Taliban Pakistan/TPP) around al-Zawahiri, nor by that of the Somali al-Shabaab, for these two movements are too anchored in their respective arenas to fully integrate global Jihad. The same can be said of the group recently emerging in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, Ansar al-Jihad (Partisans of Jihad), whose emphatic declaration of allegiance to al-Zawahiri on 23 January 2012 is part of an active media campaign.

Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Yemeni Formula

Since 2009, the Yemeni branch of al-Qaeda amalgamates the Saudi networks that have chosen to retire towards the South to escape the repression of the Arabian kingdom. Called al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), it embraced a revolutionary discourse against President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had been in power in Sana’a since 1978 and at the head of a unified Yemen since 1990. Confronted with unprecedented protest beginning in February 2011, the Yemeni dictator did not cease to raise the spectre of al-Qaeda to justify his remaining in power.

The disappearance of the most wanted person on the planet long mobilised the Western media, whereas it was quickly displaced in the Arab media by other, more pressing developments

Thus, on 30 September 2011, he facilitated a fatal American raid against Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-Yemeni imam highly active in AQAP propaganda. Washington appreciated this move all the more since al-Awlaki had been suspected of carrying out or planning different attacks on US territory. The Yemeni opposition, on the other hand, denounced the manipulation of the Jihad menace by Saleh and his regime. It accused the regime of conning laxness towards AQAP’s takeover of cities in the southern province of Abyan. This process of duplicity was accentuated with AQAP’s occupation of the town of Radda, 170 km south of Sana’a, on 14 January 2012. Shortly before this, Saleh had signed an agreement to step down, and protesters denounced him for postponing its application in the name of the struggle against AQAP. However, the Yemeni President eventually did agree to step down, leaving his allies at the head of the intelligence services. The paradox is that AQAP, aggrandised through its media-hyped confrontation with the Saleh regime, ranks in reality as but a second-rate militia in revolutionary Yemen.

The Anti-Shiite Obsession of al-Qaeda in Iraq

In June 2006, bin Laden and al-Zawahiri had appointed an Egyptian jihadi, Abu Hamza al-Muhajer, as the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), but he was killed in April 2010 by the Iraqi army. The proclaimed “caliph” of the “Islamic State of Iraq,” Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, of Iraqi nationality, was killed in the same raid. Since then, AQI has distanced itself from central al-Qaeda to return to local issues: for it, the conflict with the Administration of Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, as well as with the so-called “Awakening” (Sahwa) Sunni militias, who are United States allies, is implacable. This purely Iraqi orientation of AQI is assumed by its "emir," Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali (also known as Abu Doha or Abu Bakr al-Husseini al-Baghdadi).

The succession of bin Laden thus requires a delicate process of renewal of allegiance, which is proving uneven and complex

The AQI terror, far from subsiding with the perspective of American retreat, intensified as of August 2011, with two waves of particularly bloody attacks: on 22 December 2011 (63 dead) and 5 January 2012 (73 dead). The departure of the US contingent, taking place as planned at the end of
2011, leaves the question of Sunni participation in Iraqi power open, with an increasingly confessional approach by Prime Minister Maliki to the benefit of his own Shiite party. It is in this context of community polarisation that AQI aims to become the armed branch of Sunni dissent. Although the AQI Emir may pay tribute to bin Laden or al-Zawahiri, he can now only do so as the independent head of the most dreaded militia in Iraq.

The Divisions of the “Islamic Maghreb”

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was constituted when Abdelmalek Droukdal’s Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) became part of al-Qaeda in 2007. In early 2011, its members numbered some five hundred jihadis, half of whom are part of the guerrilla of Kabylia led by Droukdal, while the rest live as nomads in the Sahara region, in the katiba (battalion) led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar (in the west) or the one headed by Abdelhamid Abou Zeid (in the east), both officially subordinate to Droukdal. Despite its grandiloquent statements, AQIM remained entirely passive during the Tunisian revolution. Moreover, its condemnation of NATO’s “infidel” intervention in Libya placed it at odds with the anti-Gaddafi insurrection (though the Libyan despot continued to accuse the rebels of being in bin Laden’s pay in a crude manoeuvre to discredit them).

AQIM would nonetheless take advantage of the civil war in Libya by taking over (together with a good many other criminal groups) part of the weapons looted from the Gaddafi regime’s arsenals then sold by various traffickers throughout the region. The exact nature of the surface-to-air missiles smuggled to the Saharan katibas is still the object of debate by specialised analysts, but it has been confirmed that a new generation explosive device reached the north Algerian jihadi cells. This explosive was used on 26 August 2011 in the spectacular suicide bombing against the Cherchell Military Academy (at least 11 dead). The Algerian army, thus challenged, takes up the offensive again (namely, with the death by ambush of the AQIM treasurer, Adel Bourai, on 28 September 2011), whereas the jihadi chiefs were tried in absentia one after another in Algeria.

The competition between the kidnappers increased in autumn 2011, reaching areas previously untouched by this scourge

It is in the Sahel that the AQIM threat seems most worrisome, for the flight of Gaddafi’s African auxiliary forces has attracted a certain number of them to the ranks of the jihadis. The terrorist escalation is likewise aggravated by the rivalry between Belmokhtar and Abou Zeid, the latter having attempted to use his connections to central al-Qaeda against the former. Droukdal’s refusal to swear allegiance to al-Zawahiri on behalf of AQIM has played into the hands of Belmokhtar, who is gaining power in the region and beyond (his katiba is making ties with the Boko Haram Islamist militia in Nigeria). The escalation between the two katiba leaders also means an all-out hunt of Western foreign nationals: Abou Zeid is holding four French hostages, abducted in northern Niger in October 2010, and was behind the abduction of an Italian tourist in southern Algeria in February 2011; Belmokhtar, who in January 2011 had attempted to seize two French hostages in Niger (who died during transfer), took over two hostages in June 2011, namely a Briton and an Italian who had been kidnapped by Boko Haram in Nigeria.

The competition between the kidnappers increased in autumn 2011, reaching areas previously untouched by this scourge. One Italian and two Spanish aid workers were captured on 23 October 2011 in a Sahrawi refugee camp in western Algeria; two
French geologists were captured on 23 November 2011 in north-western Mali on the eve of the kidnapping of three European tourists in Timbuktu (a German national was killed in the course of the attack). Whereas the Mauritanian and Nigerian armies have successfully focused on methodically pushing back the jihadis, northern Mali is looking more and more like the region’s “soft underbelly”: both Abou Zeid and Belmokhtar have established their more or less itinerant bases there, their hostages are certainly held there, while the Malian army’s inability to cover the area is exacerbated by the revival of the Tuareg insurrection, relaunched in January 2012. The disconnection between Droukdal and al-Zawahiri, however, deprives this novel form of “gangster-jihadism” of global perspective and none of the States in the region are at real risk of destabilisation.

The democratic uprising in the Arab world has effectively closed the “11 September Decade,” during which the threat of al-Qaeda constantly hung over Western societies.

Bin Laden had so come to embody the globalised dynamics of “global jihad” that his death could not but deal it a terrible, if not fatal, blow. Already, al-Qaeda has lost, together with its charismatic founder, the hierarchical structure that lent it formidable operational coherence: only al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have become independent. These groups continue to “talk global,” while they are increasingly “acting local.”

This phenomenon of “glocal” (combination of “global” and “local”) terrorism is a source of legitimate anxiety, fuelled by the kidnappings of Western nationals in the Sahel and the deadly escalation of violence by Boko Haram in Nigeria. Yet the democratic uprising in the Arab world has effectively closed the “11 September Decade,” during which the threat of al-Qaeda constantly hung over Western societies. It was a Norwegian racist, Anders Breivik, and not an infiltrated jihadi, who brought horror and carnage to his country on 22 July 2011, perpetrating the bloodiest terrorist massacre in Europe since the London attacks six years earlier, which bore the mark of al-Qaeda.

Bibliography


The year 2011 was undoubtedly marked by the popular uprisings that affected three of the five countries of North Africa. The overthrow of the old regimes represents a historic rupture with the long winter of authoritarian stability and a change of paradigm perceptible on various levels:

- Local, within the very political decision-making centres where the nature of powers is undergoing change;
- National, with a blurring of hierarchies between urban centres of power and marginalised peripheries;
- Sub-regional, with the resurgence of protest in outlying territories;
- And regional, with impact of the security vacuum on neighbouring countries.

In addition, there is a new front of instability instigated by the Libyan crisis and its regional repercussions that foreign intervention forces did not anticipate and which has reopened old conflicts that had been relegated to the ash heap of history.

By modifying the geopolitical map of the Mediterranean Maghreb and the Sahel, the fall and elimination of Gaddafi shook the former strategic balance, caused psychological shock among the numerous communities remaining loyal to the Libyan Guide and generated profound socio-economic repercussions. Considering the articulation of domestic crises and strategic issues, the centre-periphery problem has resurfaced with force and will weigh upon future developments, both in Libya and neighbouring countries.

The region, already weakened by a number of security challenges such as drug, arms and human trafficking and the intensification of kidnappings and terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), is now facing new threats associated with the instability born of the Arab Spring, particularly in the area where the Sahara meets the Sahel.

These are:

- The reactivation of several foci of conflict in cross-border areas by the reappearance on the political arena of communities who contest the old ideological frameworks in which they have been confined and take the opportunity to demand the resolution of crises blocked by States in the region and the International Community;
- The expansion of the area of instability to the whole of North Africa and the Sahel (and up to Western Africa) through the multiplication of flows and agents of the criminal industry, and the strengthening of local and international jihadi networks on the continental level.

Reactivation of Frozen Conflicts

Thanks to the Libyan uprising and the Arab Spring, we are witnessing the reaffirmation of “ethnic” identities, the re-emergence of territorial issues and demands for political representation and social justice. The Arab revolutions have had unexpected effects on communities far from the focal points of the uprisings, which have long remained invisible. Hence in outlying areas, old conflicts resurface through the mobilisation of floating populations wishing to participate in the process of general emancipation.
The other cause of reactivation of frozen conflicts has to do with the role and influence of the Libyan leader in the Sahara. Using the different national minorities in Libya and neighbouring territories, Colonel Gaddafi was an agent of both destabilisation and pacification for many populations, in particular the Tuareg and the Tubu peoples.

The Tuareg Question

Since 2007, the Tuareg area occupied by AQIM has become an increasingly insecure zone. The uprising of Tuaregs beginning in January 2012, though it differs from previous rebellions in its intensity, territorial hold, composition and human (some thousand combatants) and material resources (Libyan weapons), is remarkable for the issue at stake, which is no longer economic development but self-determination. Resulting from the fusion of various political factions including many Libyan Tuaregs, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) also has the goal of eliminating drug traffickers and AQIM combatants.

The Arab revolutions have had unexpected effects on communities far from the focal points of the uprisings, which have long remained invisible

The assaults on the cities of Ménaka, Kidal, Léré, Andéramboukan and Aguelhok between the 18th and 26th January 2012, then the storming of Tessalit in March, demonstrate the determination of the rebels, under the leadership of former Tuareg generals from the Libyan army. The summary executions of nearly a hundred Malian military personnel are the work of Ansar Dine (Defenders of Faith), an Islamic faction led by Iyad Ag Ghaly (a relative of Emir Abdelkrim Targui) and interested in exacerbating the violence and keeping the region under tension. This armed conflict threatens Mali’s stability and territorial integrity and compromises the elections due to be held in April 2012.

The Tubu Question

Gaddafi had entrusted the Tubu with managing border areas to stop the monopoly of trafficking and cross-border contraband. Near oil fields and aquifers and established in the area between southern Libya, northern Chad and eastern Niger, the Tubu wish to negotiate their strategic position in exchange for recognition of their language, rights and political weight through the management of reunified southern Libya (now divided between Fezzan and Cyrenaica). They demand representation in one of the three key ministries, i.e. those of Oil, Foreign Affairs and the Interior. A sign of local rivalries for the control of criminal proceeds at the borders between Chad, Sudan and Egypt, deadly armed confrontations between the Tubu and the Zuwaya tribe in February 2012 illustrate the degree of tension reigning in outlying areas of Libya and radiating to the northwest of Chad, likewise affected by the problem of illicit flows, since it lies on the drug trafficking route between northern Mali and Europe via Egypt and Libya.

The Sahrawi Question

Condemned to oblivion for nearly 40 years by regional and international actors, the Sahrawi living in refugee camps are the forgotten ones of history. After the defection and return to Morocco and northern Mauritania of a great number of its senior officials, the Polisario Front is the object of growing contention among Sahrawi youth at the Tindouf camps in Algeria. In 2004, an internal split deprived it of its monopoly on representation. The main reason for dissent revolves around the issue of the rights and living conditions of the refugees, used as pawns by the leaders. Resulting from the scission, the Khat al-Shahid Polisario Front (Way of the Martyr Polisario Front) movement has emerged as the representative of part of the Sahrawi public opinion, both internally and abroad. Recent demonstrations by the “Sahrawi Revolutionary Youth” movement, chanting “Erhal” (get out) against the re-election of Mohamed Abdelaziz, in power for 35 years, illustrate not only the rise of a generation who no longer sees eye to eye with the old guard but also the effect of the Arab Spring on a youth ready to rise up against the corruption and tribalism of the Polisario Front leaders. The political issue represented by the Western Sahara area is aggravated by the security issue associated with the participation of organisation members in arms and drug trafficking and in kidnappings, and with the fact that the Polisario refugee camps have become places of recruitment for AQIM.
The Multiplication of Pockets of Insecurity

Lacking a State and economic alternatives and living under harsh climatic conditions, the Saharan-Saharan regions have become lawless areas where all sorts of trafficking prospers: Latin American cocaine in transit towards Europe, arms, oil or cigarette smuggling or trafficking of clandestine migrant workers en route towards the Gulf States and Europe. Criminal and terrorist networks, in turn, have an interest in perpetuating the instability conducive to the development of their activities, for it ensures greater opacity of the environment in which they operate. The Libyan crisis thus offers an unexpected opportunity for new destabilising intentions, as shown by the emergence of the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), which has claimed authorship of the kidnapping of three European humanitarian aid workers from the Polisario refugee camp in Rabouni and the suicide bombing against a police brigade in Tamanrasset in early March 2012.

The Sinai Peninsula

Quick to rebel against the Mubarak regime in January 2011, the Sinai Bedouins, heavily armed, gained their independence from Cairo by attacking Egyptian police and military personnel. Since the fall of the Rais, combatants associated with al-Qaeda have made the peninsula a haven and a base for attacks, namely against Israel, leading to an expansion of criminal activities and networks of terrorists who are adepts of the Salafist doctrine. Excluded from the financial windfall of tourism, the Bedouins have become specialised in all sorts of trafficking towards Israel and the Gaza Strip, in particular of arms from Libya’s looted arsenals. The Egyptian gas pipeline leading to Israel and Jordan has suffered five sabotages in six months, reducing supply by 80%. In late July 2011, dozens of Bedouins stormed the police barracks of El Arish. The attacks perpetrated the following month in southern Israel demonstrated that Egypt no longer controls this portion of its territory. On 31 January 2012, the Al-Tawhid wal Guihad group took 25 Chinese workers from a cement factory hostage in exchange for the liberation of five of their members accused of attacks against tourist sites between 2004 and 2006. In early February 2012, 19 police officers were kidnapped after a Bedouin was killed in an exchange of fire with the police. On 3 February it was the turn of two American tourists and their Egyptian guide to be abducted while they were en route to the Saint Catherine Monastery.

The Libyan Breach

The war in Libya has made weapons flow in great numbers in North Africa as well as the Sahel. The proliferation of heavy arms combined with the porosity of borders has introduced a new threat for Libya as well as the entire region. The numerous arsenals without surveillance, accessible to all sorts of racketeers, smugglers and mercenaries, harbour a rich diversity of arms: Kalashnikov assault rifles, rockets, mines, shells, chemical weapons, SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles, of which Libya has a stock of 20,000 units, and Russian SA-24 missiles, among the latest generation aerial missiles capable of shooting down fighter jets. These arsenals have also benefited some of the rebel factions who recognise neither the authority nor the legitimacy of the National Transitional Council (CNT) and make it the counterparty in order to challenge the government and weigh upon its political choices. Moreover, the implication of militias in the generalisation of torture and atrocities against certain populations is a disturbing sign of the fragmentation of “revolutionary” Libya and its “Iraqisation.”

The proliferation of heavy arms combined with the porosity of borders has introduced a new threat for Libya as well as the entire region

Despite the efforts of the CNT to keep the country unified, the signs of Libyan fragmentation are multiplying:

- In Misrata, where the first local elections were held in February without the CNT’s approval, the Zintan militia, holding Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam prisoner, exercises armed control over the city and presents itself as a power against Tripoli;
- In Cyrenaica, where Sheikh Ahmed Zubair al-Senussi, cousin of the king overthrown by Gaddafi in 1969, launched an appeal in March for autonomy of eastern Libyan on the federalist model in effect from 1951 to 1963.

Moreover, many heavily armed Gaddafi loyalists, together with their children, have taken refuge in
neighbouring countries. The presence of dignitaries of the former regime in Algeria and Niger remains a challenge for the region, insofar as a union between loyalists and relatives of the former dictator could eventually compromise the already difficult process of stabilisation and unification and offer dissidents the opportunity to lead a coordinated strategy of maintaining regional tension.

**Terrorist Connexions on the Rise**

The Arab Spring has offered local terrorist groups the opportunity of gaining ideological influence and material strength and it has allowed al-Qaeda to consider repositioning itself on the African continent. The collapse of the Libyan security flank and the setbacks of al-Qaeda in Asia are two factors conducive to a new centrality for the Maghreb, the Sahel and West Africa via:

- A continental extension of jihadism through AQIM’s connections in the Sahel, Boko Haram in Nigeria and al-Shabaab in Somalia, essentially consisting of operational collaboration, sharing training and tactics, thanks, among other factors, to personal relations between former Afghanistan combatants;
- A strategic reshuffling of certain al-Qaeda networks in the Maghreb and the Sahel to compensate for their weakening on the Asian front after the elimination of several of the organisation’s leaders and recovering international visibility by seeking to participate in the upheavals underway. The transfer to Libya of certain of its prominent figures demonstrates the will to exploit the advantages and opportunities offered by North Africa and the Sahel, and probably eventually West Africa as well.

**Conclusion**

The expansion of the spheres of vulnerability and the multiplication of foci of tension and instability from the Mediterranean shore to those of the Gulf of Guinea, whether through political protest or intensification of criminal activities and strengthening of terrorist networks, is part of the set of challenges arising from the Arab Spring. The accumulation of multifaceted threats combines with the weakness of economies to produce a deterioration of the security situation and a prolongation of the transitional processes that are struggling to consolidate the legitimacy of new States. In 2011, Gaddafi’s fall caused the abrupt discontinuation of Libyan assistance to entire subregions that had until then depended on investments and financial flows from Libyan companies. This change in the situation weakened territories that are home to communities in chronic rebellion and aggravated the latent food insecurity. Over the past year there has been a drastic decline in standard of living in many households of Mediterranean countries after the reflux of thousands of Sub-Saharan workers displaced by the fighting and instability, unemployed and persecuted by the Libyans. Ten thousand people are now threatened by famine following a prolonged drought and bad harvests and the total grain shortage by the end of 2011 was 25% higher than the previous year, heralding a long-term food crisis in Mali, Niger, Mauritania, Chad and Burkina Faso. And finally, fleeing the fighting between the MNLA and the armed forces, the migration of many hundreds of thousands of Malians to Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, Burkina Faso and as far as Guinea aggravates the precariousness of populations subject to the stress of violence and represents an economic challenge for these States, hardly prepared for humanitarian crises.

The regional reconfigurations will continue to fluctuate until Libya regains stability. Moreover, Tripoli will need a stable, consolidated geopolitical environment. Pragmatic diplomacy will allow it to transform its former enemies into future neighbours and defuse intra-regional tensions born of the hostile positioning of certain countries towards the CNT. The action plan for border security adopted in Tripoli in March 2012 by the ensemble of Mediterranean and Sahelian countries will most likely only be the first stage in a cooperation strategy covering spheres as crucial as resolution of the internal and sub-regional crises underway.

The centre-periphery issue will resurface time and again in the form of more or less violent protest until leaders formulate and implement economic and social programmes specifically aimed at these areas of exclusion, and until they choose to better distribute investment flows, which are thus far acting as a “bloodstream” only to urban centres of power to the detriment of remote peripheral areas. Such a choice would ensure a rebalancing of African and Mediterranean geopolitical pursuits in this strategic region.
Governance and New Political Actors

Governance in the Southern Mediterranean after the Arab Spring: Drawing Up a New Social Contract

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There has been much concern in the recent past regarding instability in the Southern Mediterranean region and its implications for Europe. There is good reason for this concern and for a sense of responsibility for violations of human rights that were tolerated for decades – so long as they were committed by people like Ben Ali, who was called “the West’s favourite dictator.” The democratic transition being attempted in the Southern Mediterranean can provide Europe with a genuinely stable partner that would have to be treated as an equal and given an opportunity to develop its own democratic culture. Understanding the origins of the contestation movement in the Arab region and the demands for social justice and accountable governance would better equip Europe to avoid repeating past behaviours, which appear to have been short-sighted and inconsistent with core values of human rights.

This article draws heavily on the work done in preparation for the recently released Arab Development Challenges Report 2011. The reader can refer to that report for further elaboration of most of the points made in this article.

The Arab Social Contract

The political economy regime that has dominated the Arab region is one of rentier states in which there is no mutual accountability between citizens and the State and the State is free to shape political life as it sees fit. The State has maintained its power by directly accessing resources, be it through economic or political rents. Oil has played an important role in this equation, as has state control over environmental assets, including urban land and politically conditioned aid. The State has engaged in patronage politics through buying the allegiance of key traditional and modern power brokers by distributing part of the rent it collects to its power base, typically a mixture of tribes, clans and the military that forms the nucleus of a crony capitalist class. The population has tolerated the loss of political freedom in exchange for the provision of certain services and exemption from taxation.

The citizens who have lived under this social contract have had no institutional means of expressing discontent with the system or of holding their governments accountable. With very few exceptions, elections, where they have taken place at all, have been neither free nor fair. Voter turnout has generally been low, and those parliamentarians elected through this process have had little incentive to represent the interests of their constituencies. Vehicles for citizen participation in the political process, such as genuine political parties, civil society organisations, media, trade unions and professional associations, have been either tightly regulated or banned altogether.

In essence, this typical social contract has enabled many Arab States to ignore the aspirations of their citizens by following a non-developmental path, in sharp contrast to the practice of benevolent authoritarian regimes in East Asia. This has been reflected in a power structure that concentrates authority in a small circle and prevents the rotation of power.

Political Economy of Rent

Arab States have typically maintained their power through direct access to funds needed to finance the state machinery, thanks to economic or political
rents. While oil has played an important role in this equation for the major oil exporting countries, even the diversified economies in the Arab region have not been immune to this rentier approach. The State has been able to enjoy rents because of its control over assets, including urban and agricultural land and economic opportunities. In some cases, this has been supplemented by state control of and access to politically conditioned aid, the bulk of it military- and security-related.

The State has bought the allegiance of key traditional and modern power brokers by distributing part of the rent it collects to them. The State has seen no need to raise resources through taxation, as reflected by the low share of direct taxes in public revenues in the region.

With some notable exceptions, States in the region have also had dependency relationships with external powers. This has allowed them to justify the curtailment of basic freedoms and violations of human rights in the interest of stability. Given the region’s geostrategic location, external powers have been concerned with having assured access to resources that are produced and or pass through the region. A vibrant political structure in this context would have risked opening debates about the terms on which such resources and strategic positions are used by external actors, and, hence, totalitarian systems proved convenient to the powers that be.

The above-noted features of the political economy of Arab development have led to two mutually reinforcing processes: the lack of public accountability of the State and an ever-increasing concentration of political and economic power in the hands of a small politically connected elite. This situation has led to the co-existence of certain outward appearances of a modern State with a convoluted tribal/feudal structure in which traditional forms of authority and justice are allowed to co-exist with and as extensions of a modern State.

Drivers and Manifestations of Exclusion

The economic structure that underpins this political system is based on extractive industries that generate few jobs directly and a bloated and non-productive tertiary sector, dominated in many cases by a public sector through which rents collected by the State are distributed to certain population segments. The typically large public sectors in many Arab countries, rather than being instruments of a capable and responsible State to deliver essential productive and social services needed to support socio-economic development, are used to repay certain elements of society for their allegiance to the system. They are thus characterised by unclear functions and non-transparent selection and promotion criteria, which lead to insufficient quality and quantity of staff at the service-delivery stage, combined with excess capacity in administrative support functions and multiple security services. The service sectors also typically include a large trade sector, which is heavily dependent on imports and controlled by a few politically well-connected major traders who enjoy monopoly rents and large numbers of small traders who eke out a living in an overcrowded retail sector.

The lack of accountability for the use of public assets extends to the way environmental assets are utilised in the Arab region. When taken into account in calculating actual wealth creation in the region, the resulting mining of environmental assets means that the region is mortgaging the prosperity of its future generations, in particular by allowing unsustain able levels of water offtake. These practices, in addition to generating problems for future generations, deprive the poorer segments of society of regular access to safe water and basic food items. They also threaten the livelihoods of population groups that depend on maintaining a symbiotic relationship with their natural environment, notably nomadic groups.

The political establishment in the Arab region, in addition to subverting the normal evolution process of traditional structures such as tribes and clans, has engineered conditions that militate against the emergence and consolidation of genuine labour unions and professional associations. Such entities are typically infiltrated by the political elite and turned into tools of op-
pression. They have thus been unable to act as part of a larger civil society and hold authorities to account for their actions. Hence, normal modes of social contestation have not been effective, and grievances, rather than being resolved early on, thereby solidifying social cohesion, are allowed to simmer, placing extra stress on the stability of social structures.

The extent to which the economic and power structures in the region exclude people is evident in the size of the informal sector – which perpetuates the double vicious cycles of poverty and denial of socio-economic and political rights. The vast majority of the poor in the Arab region make their living in the informal sector, with limited security of access to land and other resources. They run unregistered businesses and often occupy land to which they have no formal title.

**Origins and Evolution of Socio-economic Strains**

This social contract has come under pressure ever since the late 1970s due to the increasing inability of the State to co-opt the educated youth into what used to be, in the 1950s and 1960s, a well-paid civil service that acted as a mechanism for upward social mobility. Since 1980, the public service in many countries has not been able to absorb the ever-increasing numbers of graduates produced by the educational system. In addition, those lucky enough to still have public sector jobs have seen their real incomes decline. The system of large-scale subsidies offered on a range of essential goods has also become difficult to maintain, leading to bread riots in a number of countries in the 1970s and 1980s.

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The lack of universal social protection coverage and equitable access to property and justice has exacerbated the social and economic exclusion of wide segments of the region’s population. Even the generous fuel subsidies, which account for the bulk of what passes as social assistance in many countries, tend to disproportionately benefit the better-off segments of the population.

While many of the countries in the region have appeared stable, with long-serving rulers, that stability has largely relied on patronage and oppression, rather than on a healthy social contract between the State and citizens. The system has reinforced the drive for quick returns on private sector investments (such as in up-scale real estate), rather than on the longer-term and job-creating investments required to absorb a more educated labour force. This process has led to a premature deindustrialisation of the region without a compensating move to high-value-added services.

**Key Socio-economic and Governance Challenges**

Social exclusion has clearly risen over the past two decades in most Arab countries, and inequality in wealth is certain to have grown significantly, too. An increasingly visible concentration of wealth, notably in terms of land, has intensified the sense of exclusion, despite the reduction in the rate of absolute poverty. Meanwhile, many urban poor cluster in areas without sanitation, recreational facilities, reliable electricity and other services. This phenomenon is reflected in the alarmingly high rate of slum dwellers in urban areas of the region.

The continuous rise and persistence of unemployment, particularly among youth, driven in large part by the demographic transition, with its unprecedented increase in the working-age population, is a key challenge facing Arab countries. Youth are the largest demographic category in the Arab region, with those under twenty-five years of age accounting for half the area’s population.

The youth-led contestation movement in the region is partially due to the realisation that existing systems have failed to address the ever more long-term and persistent problem of youth unemployment. Economic and social policies have not provided acceptable minimum standards of economic and social rights. States have seriously limited civil and political rights, in particular the rights of assembly, organisation and collective bargaining. This has left both the employed and unemployed without sufficient legal and social protection.

The governance failures that prevent the operation of genuine labour unions create a situation whereby
the benefits of any investments made are disproportionately appropriated by politically well-connected businessmen. In addition, the reality of a fragile stability built on patronage and oppression, as opposed to a healthy social contract between the State and citizens, means that businesses are not interested in long-term investments that can create quality jobs for an ever more educated labour force. The investments that take place are mostly of a speculative nature and aim to obtain quick returns. The sense of insecurity that is created by the acute awareness of the business community of the potentially explosive social context generated by rising inequality leads to capital flight. This capital flight is further aggravated by the high share of ill-gotten wealth in many Arab countries, as evidenced by reports of huge assets owned by former Presidents Ben Ali and Mubarak and their families, most of which are held in known safe heavens for black money.

Move Towards Capable and Responsive States

The Arab region has come to a fork in the path. It is increasingly clear that business and development as usual have proven themselves incapable of dealing with the many socio-economic, political and environmental challenges facing the region.

While many of the countries in the region have appeared stable, with long-serving rulers, that stability has largely relied on patronage and oppression, rather than on a healthy social contract between the State and citizens

The region’s problems have resulted from the interplay of political and socio-economic factors, with non-representative or non-inclusive and participatory polities reinforcing and being reinforced by rentier and semi-rentier economies. Hence, any solution has to simultaneously operate on political and socio-economic factors and their interplay.

The Arab street is demanding a new societal bargain based on: (i) legitimate leadership through free and fair elections in an environment of freedom of expression and organisation; (ii) policies of inclusion and equity that are informed by partnerships between the State and society; (iii) social monitoring of policies and strict control of corruption, buttressed by freedom of information; and (iv) redress of violations of fundamental human rights under the vigilant eye of an independent judiciary and an unbiased and professional media.

A new developmental compact in the Arab region should build on the symbiotic relationship between truly representative political and economic systems that promote productive investment and set in motion a virtuous cycle of inclusive markets and political systems. The negative effects of corruption on the optimal use of public resources and productive private investment need to be redressed through a system of checks and balances that ensures societal control over the use of public assets, including their use to facilitate legitimate private sector activities. As the voiceless regain their voice, social stability and cohesion will be reinforced, thereby strengthening national identity and security. The funds currently allocated to internal security can thus be diverted to investments in human capabilities.

Conclusion

The tough developmental choices needed in the Arab region can only be made by a responsive and accountable government that represents the needs and aspirations of the many, not the few. Accountability of government makes policies more transparent and effective. However, no policy pleases everyone all the time. Hence, minimising social conflict around tough choices is important for the effective implementation of policies. The inclusive participation of social and political institutions that mobilise and articulate collective interests (be they political parties, labour unions, professional associations, or civil society advocacy groups) ultimately enhances the ability of States to defuse social conflict.

A transformed region that invests more in its people and uses its natural resources more wisely would be able to regain its central place at the crossroads of humanity as a beacon of hope and progress. It would also deal more effectively with its fragile environment and situation of water scarcity, which have already disrupted the livelihoods of many in some of the poorer parts of the region and threaten others if no urgent action is taken to resolve them.
Before 2011 and the social uprisings against authoritarian rule, armies in the Arab world were said to be crucial institutions of authoritarian regimes. This vital role, however, was not clearly defined and Arab armies remained black boxes difficult to open, until their return to the limelight in 2011. Although the central element that shook regimes was the mass mobilisations in public spaces and their domino effect across the Arab world, armies have played an essential role, either refusing to shoot at protesters, thereby playing the role of midwife to the transitions, or remaining loyal and taking part in repression, and hence allowing the survival of incumbent regimes.

From Background Actors to Forefront
Political Actors amidst Mobilisations

Arab polities were ruled by authoritarian regimes, whose main features were: the exclusive control of executive positions by a small elite, which might hail from the military; the co-optation of new elites, in the form of economic elites from the 1990s and 2000s that promised modernisation and reform, crony entrepreneurs, new technocrats, etc.; and a strategy of managing/silencing all social demands with particular emphasis on the use of fear, whether effective (repression) or symbolic (stemming from the potential use of repression). Day-to-day authoritarian governance was based on the crucial role of the Interior Ministry and its many security services or mukhabarat. Authoritarian Arab regimes were much more like “securitocracies” (mukhabarat states) than military regimes in the strict sense – with the general staff ruling the country.

The military is said to be the backbone of such authoritarian regimes. Although there were military interventions on behalf of regimes, this has mostly been the exception rather than the rule. The military has maintained a “quietist” posture in Arab regimes, remaining loyal, but drawing a fine but essential line between the military as an integral part of the regime – and some officers played crucial roles in some regimes – and the military as an institution of the State. The army has positioned itself as a symbol and a guardian of the State, displaying a firm nationalism and taking action in emergency situations. Regimes displayed numerous “coup-proofing” and control devices within the military, offering rapid promotions to command positions, favouring alleged loyalists and keeping a close watch on promotions in the officers corps. In Tunisia or in the Gulf, the small size of the military was an insurance for the regime against military interference. This was a long-term trend in the Gulf that was compensated by US protection and the outsourcing of many security functions to Pakistani or Jordanian individuals (mercenaries) or entire units, organised in planned rotations. In Libya, the Gaddafi regime has striven for 42 years to destroy the army, in order to control it and annihilate any possibility of an officer manoeuvring the army to rival its own power networks – as the young colonel had done in 1969 with a handful of “free officers,” mirroring the Nasserist model.

The flip side of “quietist” armies for regimes is keeping these strong corporatist actors satisfied. By closely observing what is happening inside their armies, regimes have been very careful to look after both the military’s corporate requirements, such as large budgets or modernisation and social welfare programmes, and the private interests of their officer
corps. The military in all cases has been wedded to the status quo. In some cases, as exemplified by Egypt (but also in some ways in Jordan and Saudi Arabia), the military has engaged in substantial economic activities, building a military economy in Egypt with military for-profit enterprises, military ventures in reclaiming land and tourist projects, etc. But the military has remained a closed and secretive actor, keeping its distance from the day-to-day practices of authoritarian rule and displaying a kind of strictly controlled, expanded professional autonomy.

In other cases, such as Bahrain, Yemen and Syria, regimes have made major structural adjustments inside the officer corps, said to be a move aimed at bringing the armed forces into politics. In Bahrain there is a Sunni bias (either directly through the recruitment of Sunni officers, or indirectly with adjunct foreign Sunni forces); in Yemen following reunification the Northern hegemony has strong presence in the Yemeni armed forces, with a special role for the Saleh family and tribal elements (Hashed confederation, Ahmar family); and in Syria there is the unwritten rule that every combat unit should be under the command, officially or less directly, of an Alawite officer (often with close links to the President or his family).

The thunderstorm of 2011 in the “calm” landscape of authoritarian rule took the form of mass social mobilisations in public spaces. While terminally ill regimes remained in politics, societies, particularly the far more numerous younger generations, became active and opened to the outside world using new information and communication technologies. This situation was a kind of “stress test” for regimes and their security services. Rage among the population and its subsequent mobilisation was fuelled by repression and the widespread circulation of images of the wounded or dead on YouTube and Facebook. Security services, consisting of police and heavily armed anti-riot units, attempted to violently quell mass demonstrations with live ammunition and snipers, and were overwhelmed by the numbers of protesters. Regimes decided to step up the repression and try to involve the military to help deal with the situation.

The thunderstorm of 2011 in the “calm” landscape of authoritarian rule took the form of mass social mobilisations in public spaces

In Tunisia, the Chief of Staff refused to shoot at protesters. The small, legalist army, that resented the role of the corrupt Executive and its hugely expanded police and security forces, took action to protect public infrastructures, but refused to exert repression. It thereby quickly pushed Ben Ali towards the exit and ended up with the power in its own hands.

In Egypt, however, the huge Egyptian military and founder of the new regime in 1952, passed from Nasser to Sadat and then to Mubarak, would certainly have a say in any regime change. With chaos mounting, police disappearing before mass demonstrations, and tanks and troops being deployed, the army was the de facto ruler. The military leadership to whom Mubarak once belonged remained ambiguous for a time to give the President every opportunity to stay in power. But with protesters remaining mobilised (and shouting “the army and the people are one hand”) and threatening to flock to the presidential palace, the army acknowledged the “legitimate demands” of the protesters and ousted President Mubarak. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) took power.

In Libya, the weak military fell apart on the first days of the uprising, with some units joining rebels in Benghazi and others remaining loyal to the Gaddafi regime. The latter units were special brigades and paramilitary militia (inside or outside the army), under the direct control of Gaddafi’s sons, members of the Gaddaf tribe or close allies.

Arms Thrown Unwillingly into Politics

The variations observed in the military reactions to the regimes’ call for repression raised questions regarding the military “will” to enter into this situation. It has been asked of the military in the past – in Egypt (albeit lightly) in 1986 and in 1997, in Jordan in 1996 and 1998, and repression has been deployed on numerous occasions in Saudi Arabia in the petrol-rich Shiite region. The difference in 2011 was the level of social mobilisations through peaceful mass demonstrations. Using life-threatening violence would have tarnished the military’s image, pushing it into a situation of authoritarian day-to-day policing – something the military is always reluctant to be involved in – and would have endangered discipline, creating rifts between the rank and file and high officers or even among the officers themselves.
In other cases, where the relations of the military with regimes are much more “organic” (where regimes have engineered the officer corps to link the military to the regime through bonds of family, confession, or ethnicity), the military leadership is more likely to consider using force against unarmed civilians in the name of regime survival. In Bahrain, the military, whose officers and rank and file are predominantly Sunni, was engaged in repression against mass mobilisations, presented by the regime as Shiite demonstrations (in a country with a majority Shiite population and a Sunni ruling dynasty). In Yemen, the security apparatus was also engaged in repression, but with mobilisations keeping apace and demonstrators confronting repression predominantly with non-violence. This led to the deployment of more and more army units — and not just special units close to President Saleh and his family. Subsequent fractures within the army led to heavyweights of the Saleh regime siding with demonstrators, such as general Ali Mohsen, the key commander of an armoured division, and the Ahmar family, whose combatants were essential in the 1994 reunification war against Southern dissidence. In the early days of the Syrian uprising, the regime relied on elite units, said to be wholly staffed by Alawite loyalists, and paramilitary Alawite militia (shabihha). However as revolution spread to more and more cities, the regime turned to a broader swath of the military, sparking defections by Sunni officers or by the rank and file (mainly Sunni conscripts, due to demographic reasons), which went on to form the nucleus of the Syrian Free Officers, and then the Free Syrian Army (FSA).

Arms in Transitional Settings

The essential problem in 2012 is the abyssal political void left by the authoritarian rule and the latter’s ability to fracture, enfeeble, and disintegrate the political capabilities (parties, associations, etc.) of any given society. There are three models of transition in motion in the Arab world, each one implicating the military in one sense or another.

First, there is the model of the reinstitutionalisation of politics, with important variations and difficulties across cases. In Tunisia, the tradition of civil society (activists, jurists, trade unionists, human rights activists, university teachers, journalists, etc.) and state bureaucracy (which although corrupt, was not eliminated by the authoritarian powers, thus raising the question of “cleaning” the administrative apparatus of elements from the former regime that are still largely in place) has been able to quickly reestablish institutions and channel the transition through parliamentary elections and constitutional processes. Obstacles and pitfalls remain prominent, yet the proper conduct of the transitional (civilian) authorities and commissions of the landmark elections of October 23, 2011 signals an important step towards the rebirth of an organised political life taking precedence over the street politics that toppled the Ben Ali regime. And the military has indicated its strong willingness to return to the barracks whatever the results of elections: it has played a crucial logistical role in securing electoral processes, but has refrained from any political appetite, maintaining a strong apolitical and legalist role under the guidance of its Chief of Staff (who is nearing his retirement in 2012, but whose successor will not be very different).

In Egypt, however, the military holds the power through the SCAF — which maintains a certain corporatist coherence, though there are divergent views inside it and rumblings from lower-ranking officers regarding the SCAF’s behaviour. The SCAF acts in a very paternalistic way, but has regularly indicated that it will not stay in power, but rather return power to a civilian-elected government, although without offering much room for manoeuvre for a civilian political system to emerge. This context, where the military holds (transitional) power until a civilian-led political system emerges, is a new challenge. The military did not rule under Mubarak — this was the responsibility of the Executive, the Ministry of Interior and its repressive apparatus. The military had been depoliticised and was fundamentally a background pillar of the regime that remained in the shadows. Since 2011, however, the military has been brought fully into the limelight. The SCAF is concerned above all with a return to stability and normalcy that may allow it to return back to the shadows far away from politics. The generation of officers in power in the SCAF are not particularly geared towards politics: they are the product of decades of authoritarian rule that entailed a mixture of professionalism based on performance, modernisation and a strong corporate identity, along with cronyism, patrimonialism, preferential treatment of some high officers close to the
regime, and a strict apolitical stance. They are not, therefore, the most likely of actors to fully understand the importance of change in the Egyptian polity. The military leadership – like other (civilian) actors in Egypt now vying for power – knows that it is at a kind of crossroads, a critical juncture, where the rules of the game/system are to be redefined for the future. Now, though, it has no clear roadmap, and wields an iron fist whenever it feels threatened. The military is eager to maintain an influential role, albeit behind the scenes, in the Egyptian system. It therefore has to negotiate (or impose) its level of autonomy and its future role in Egypt with emerging civilian actors, as illustrated by the debates on civilian actors overseeing the army. Debates are tense (at the time of writing) with a loaded agenda for 2012: constitution writing and presidential elections.

The essential problem in 2012 is the abyssal political void left by the authoritarian rule and the latter’s ability to fracture, enfeeble, and disintegrate the political capabilities (parties, associations, etc.) of any given society.

The key to moving forwards in a highly volatile transition is moderation. It must be seen as a learning process for the competing actors, namely learning how to cooperate and accept others by exchanging words and arguments, and not bullets and violence. Involved in this process are: the military on the one hand, which holds the power and retains some legitimacy (the famous slogan in January 2011, “the military and the people are one hand”, al-jaisch wa al-chaab ayad wahida) but is strongly criticized for its day-to-day governance of the country; the revolutionary forces and liberals on the other hand, who have instigated and led the revolutionary movement, but lost parliamentary elections in November 2011-January 2012, though they retain a potential to mobilise people in a country whose socio-economic problems have not been addressed by the provisional government and its military backers (SCAF); and, finally; the Muslim Brothers who have a strong hand in electoral and constitutional processes (rivaling the Salafists from the Al-Nour Party). Secondly, there is the Libyan case, where the State’s lack of a monopoly of force is a fundamental problem – until March 2012, the Ministry of Defence had no funding to rebuild a nucleus of armed forces, due to the transitional authorities’ inability to make decisions. The crux of the problem is related to the way the Gaddafi regime was toppled. The international protective umbrella put forward by Security Council Resolution 1973 helped resolve Libya’s protracted conflict between the Gaddafi regime and the National Transitional Council (NTC). The agenda shifted from the initial “responsibility to protect” (and the NATO imposition of a no-fly zone) toward a mainly “offshore” intervention bordering on “regime change” – no massive foreign (especially Western) intervention on the ground was envisioned after the precedents of Iraq and Afghanistan, but NATO aerial bombings, the use of special forces from Britain, France, Jordan, Qatar and UAE, and arms deliveries and funding were essential elements to tip the balance towards the Libyan rebels. Hence, the “military logic” on the ground has gained a strong say over the “political logic.” The early-constituted NTC was an important focal point for the Libyan February 17 uprising and performed well in terms of gaining broad international recognition and funding, but it never acted as a government or a unified political wing for the social Libyan rebellion against authoritarian rule. The “military logic” was based on fragmented local rebellions and ad hoc military groupings. The end-result is a fragmentation of the security field with 125,000 to 150,000 young revolutionary Libyans (thuwwar) in arms and groups consisting of dozens to a few hundred militia operating in the country – with a process of dissolution and reconsolidation based on local dynamics and a few groupings (the National Army in Benghazi, the Tripoli Military Council, the Western Military Council, based in Zintan, the Misratan Military Council, etc). Some fighting has occurred since the end of the Gaddafi regime and the concerns of civil war have been raised by senior Libyan officials at the beginning of 2012. Libya’s situation, however, is different from that of Somalia, where the country is at risk of destruction and plunder by the militia. In Libya there are countervailing forces to the destructive potential of the “military logic” based on fragmented militia. There is a desire among young Libyans, who constitute a large majority of the population, to rebuild the country. They are demanding responsibility, based on the idea that ordi-
nary people are able to pick up the pieces left by the collapse of the Gaddafi regime, rebuild their country (even from scratch) and find the solution to Libya’s problems. Militia in Libya assume local security, most of them have no ideological agenda but are locally affiliated. The challenge for new Libyan authorities is to rebuild a genuine monopoly of force (demilitarisation, demobilisation, disarmament) with the rebuilding of a central military and police force. And the challenges that Libya face are almost unique in the sense that for four decades Gaddafi systematically ensured that there would not be a single military force (and no central government).

In 2012, a lot depends on the military. It must either adopt the role of guardian or be reconfigured, in those cases where it has fallen apart, for transitions in the Arab world to progress toward the consolidation of new systems following the social uprisings against authoritarian rule in 2011.

Thirdly, there are cases where the predominantly peaceful social uprising against authoritarian rule gives way to a “mutually-damaging stalemate” between a mobilised society that is still protesting in the streets and a resilient regime benefiting from a loyal army’s willingness to exert repression. In these cases, the military is the central focus, and the opposition must aim to increase defections (inshiqaq) in the security apparatus and fragment the coercive/repressive power of the regime – this strategy is also premised on a fierce propaganda war between both sides. The “military logic” becomes essential, and there is a risk that it might veer towards civil war if the regime manages to hold onto its security apparatus.

In Yemen, an assassination attempt in June 2011 forced President Saleh to leave the country and spend some time in Saudi Arabia, while the President’s sons and nephews continued to exert power in his absence. Subsequently, amidst Saleh’s procrastinations to stay in power, a mutually-damaging stalemate arose between two armed power centres: the remnants of Saleh’s security forces controlled by the Saleh family on the one hand, and defected army units, tribesmen loyal to the Ahmar family and Islah-controlled militia on the other. Violent clashes and a context of persistent, peaceful social mobilisations against Saleh rule in Yemeni cities paved the way to a compromise between Yemeni political forces as a way out of continued conflict. Saleh belatedly signed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) plan (with Western backing) for political transition, opening a process that led to a power-transfer with his vice-President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, elected as President in February 2012. Yet, the restoration of the fractured security sector, especially the army, remains one of the most important and controversial issues in post-Saleh Yemen. Saleh spent 34 years building his networks and combining the tribes and the State in the army apparatus, and his absence has created a lawlessness which has allowed Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) to gain footholds in the country.

In Syria, where the opposition is relying on the gradual strengthening of the FSA through defectors, and the regime is trying to preserve coherence in the security forces and their potential for repression, “military logic” has not given way (at the time of writing) to a political solution. Negotiations between the two sides are not on the agenda, due to a mutual lack of confidence, and neither is an international intervention along the lines of the Libyan model (see above), which was blocked in the Security Council by Russian and Chinese vetoes in February 2012. This situation has led to an increased militarisation of the popular uprising, which maintains some of its initial features of peaceful mass social mobilisations, and a looming threat of civil war. The conflict is taking on an increasingly sectarian taint and there are increasing regional interventions in favour of one side or another (Iran, Hezbollah vs. Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey). The military in the Arab world is once again at the centre of political dynamics, but not like in the army-led coup d’états of the 1950s and 1960s. In 2012, a lot depends on the military. It must either adopt the role of guardian or be reconfigured, in those cases where it has fallen apart, for transitions in the Arab world to progress toward the consolidation of new systems following the social uprisings against authoritarian rule in 2011.
The peoples of the Middle East and North Africa (the MENA region) ousted dictators who had been thought impossible to overthrow. The youth took to the streets and demanded equity, freedom and democracy. As the interdependence of the two shores of the Mediterranean is undeniable, following and sustaining the democratic process on the southern shore to the greatest extent possible must be one of the highest priorities of the Euromed Partnership. Prosperity and democracy on the northern shore of the Mediterranean cannot be stable as long as the closest neighbours in the South are still striving vainly to achieve those goals.

The upheavals and revolts for more economic justice and political participation in the Arab world will not bear fruit if they are not consolidated with constitutional reforms. The transformation of the demands into law is what will give them the chance to be satisfied.

The Arab Spring led to different results. In Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, the revolts culminated in the overthrow of dictators and a change in regime. In other parts of the southern Mediterranean, the revolts spurred the governing elite to calm people with subsidies and specific economic aid or by introducing reforms in the regime.

In Jordan and Morocco, the kings sought to pre-empt the discontent in the streets by amending the old constitutions. In Tunisia and Egypt, where the change was to be radical, it was decided to draft new ones. Of course, drafting a new constitution is a long process. The specific conditions of these four countries – monarchies and republics respectively – may explain the different outcomes of their popular revolts.

Monarchies have proved more stable in the context of the general popular discontent throughout the Arab world. No king has been forced to abdicate. The Gulf rulers could rely on their oil wealth to mitigate demands with subsidies and employment packages. The Moroccan and Jordanian monarchies do not have such resources to quieten the voices calling for fair wealth sharing and political accountability. Nevertheless, the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan and the Alawite monarchy in Morocco enjoy a solid legitimacy. While the overthrown dictators in the republics of Tunisia and Egypt represented only themselves, the Jordan and Moroccan monarchs are backed by ancient dynasties stemming from the Prophet of Islam, Mohammed. According to the Moroccan Constitution, the Moroccan ruler is the “commander of the believers” (amir al-m’uminin in Arabic), the highest religious authority in the country. This is one of the most important reasons why none of the protest movements has dared to demand the deposition of the monarchs or the abolition of the monarchy and establishment of a republic.

Alongside this solid legitimacy, the monarchies also benefited from the divisions in their respective societies and political arenas. The Hashemite dynasty used the gap between the Transjordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin to foster the loyalty of each group to the monarch. Tribal rivalries in Jordan and the competition between political parties in Morocco granted the respective monarchs the role of arbitrator between the opposing sides.
For these two reasons the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchs benefited from a shield of legitimacy. They were able to remain in power, and it was not difficult for them to pledge to liberalise political life in their countries.

In the aftermath of the ousting of the heads of state in Tunisia and Egypt and the waves of popular protests in Morocco and Jordan, the kings of both countries immediately took measures to quieten the protestors without radically changing political life or the exercise of power in their countries. The change would occur within the continuity of the political traditions of each monarchy. In contrast, in Tunisia and Egypt, the radical outcome of the protests called for radical consequences.

In the aftermath of the ousting of the heads of state in Tunisia and Egypt and the waves of popular protests in Morocco and Jordan, the kings of both countries immediately took measures to quieten the protestors without radically changing political life or the exercise of power in their countries.

Whereas the monarchs in Morocco and Jordan conceded certain amendments to the old constitutions to their subjects, the protestors and the new political activists in the republics of Tunisia and Egypt demanded more radical change in the form of the drafting of a new constitution to achieve the objectives that had sparked the revolution.

The Amendments to the Old Constitutions Conceded in Jordan and Morocco

Top-Down Constitutional Reforms

The kings of both Morocco and Jordan addressed their peoples and heralded a series of amendments to the constitutions of their respective countries. In his address to the nation on 9 March 2011, King Mohammed VI of Morocco announced considerable amendments to the Constitution of 1996. The amendments echoed some of the demands of the demonstrations for political and economic reforms that had been taking place since 20 February that year. It is, however, significant that the king did not make any explicit reference to the protests. Probably he wanted to give the reforms a top-down character and to insinuate that a monarch acts freely and does not bow to popular pressure. Similarly, King Abdullah II of Jordan included a pledge of constitutional reform within the framework of his determination to introduce sweeping reforms ever since he acceded to the throne. Both monarchs established committees for the review of the Constitution. They appointed their members and tasked them with submitting to them suggestions for amendments. These reform initiatives have been criticised, for instance by the February 20 movement in Morocco, as being top-down and not emanating from the people and their political representatives. The people were not involved in the constitutional process. Both royal committees for constitutional amendments completed their task quickly. Both kings unveiled the suggested reforms. The suggestions of the Moroccan committee were put to a referendum and were approved by the Moroccan people on 1 July 2011. In accordance with the regulations governing constitutional revision, the recommendations of the Jordanian Royal Committee of Constitutional Review were submitted for the approval of the legislature. They were passed by both houses of Parliament in late September 2011.

Timid Constitutional Reforms

In Morocco, the constitutional reform aimed to reduce the powers of the king in favour of elected bodies. According to the amendment, the Moroccan king has to select the Prime Minister from the political party with most seats in Parliament. As president of the government, the Prime Minister is the chief of the executive branch. However, the king still has exclusive jurisdiction in matters of religion, security and strategic policy. The ambiguity of this wording leaves the king with considerable power in national politics. Moreover the domain of Parliament has been expanded. In Jordan, the king’s powers were kept intact. Some limitations were imposed on the government in favour of Parliament. For instance, the ability to issue temporary laws during parliamentary holidays has been reduced. Furthermore, the ability of the government to dissolve Parliament without re-
signing itself has also been reduced. In both Morocco and Jordan, further steps were taken to consolidate the rule of law. A constitutional court will be established in Jordan to monitor the constitutionality of laws and regulations. Moreover, an independent body has been created to supervise the elections, which had hitherto been controlled by the Minister of the Interior. This step may restore the credibility of elections in Jordan, which has been weakened over the last decade. The protection of human rights has also been reinforced, especially through the criminalisation of any infringement of rights and public freedoms. Unfortunately, the prohibition of discrimination still does not include gender alongside race, language and religion, although many women’s rights activists vehemently demanded its inclusion. In Morocco, the preamble of the Constitution reaffirms the country’s commitment to universally recognised human rights. In the cultural arena, the Moroccan Constitution boldly recognises Amazigh, the Berber language, as an official language alongside Arabic.

The constitutional reforms in Morocco and Jordan succeeded in bringing more stability to political life and to the streets in the short run. But they must be followed by the corresponding practice. Elected Moroccan political parties must exercise their new powers self-confidently. The new election supervision body in Jordan must do a good job so that people can again trust state institutions and the pledge of democratisation.

**Long Processes to Draft New Constitutions in Tunisia and Egypt**

The revolts in Tunisia and Egypt ended in the outing of their presidents. The demonstrations pushed for regime change. Changing the constitutional order proved to be very difficult and complex. The political scene was set ablaze with vehement debates not only about the content of the new constitutions but also the process of drafting and adopting them. More than a year after the toppling of the former heads of state, the constitutions have not been drafted. Nor has the date of their adoption been determined. The debates about the new constitutions are highly important in the schools of Tunisian and Egyptian democracy. Is it not the essence of democracy to reveal contradictions in society, and should we not try to integrate these contradictions peacefully in the form of compromises?

**The Process of Drafting the Constitution in Tunisia**

Shortly after Ben Ali was ousted from power, the Tunisian Constitution of 1959 was suspended. It had clearly been an instrument of the repressive and anti-democratic regimes of both Ben Ali and Bourguiba before him. The new Tunisian Constitution will be drafted and adopted by a constituent assembly. A commission was established – the Commission for the Realisation of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition – composed of representatives of civil society and the major political parties. This commission was intended to function as a parliament and to adopt the legal documents necessary for the organisation of the election of the members of the constituent assembly and the democratic transition in general. The new Constitution was to have been drafted within one year of the election of the constituent assembly. After the promulgation of the new Constitution, parliamentary elections were to be held. The election of 23 October 2011 saw the victory of the moderate Islamist party Ennahda (41% of the seats). They entered a coalition with two secular parties (the Congress for the Republic and the Democratic Forum for Labour and Liberties). The constituent assembly lost a lot of time building the coalition and the government and promised to finish drafting the Constitution in a year but refused to provide for this timetable in an official document. This has been criticised by the other parties in the assembly and by political activists outside it. The constituent assembly is currently working on drafting the new Constitution. The most heavily debated issue in and outside the assembly has been the status of religion and of Islam and the Sharia (Islamic law) in Article 1 of the Constitution. Secular parties and political activists feared that Ennahda might make a big push for the inclusion of the Sharia in the Constitution as the source of legislation. After some hesitation, Ennahda officially declared that it would keep the current version of Article 1, which provides that Islam is the religion of Tunisia without declaring the Sharia to be a source of law.

**The Process of Drafting the Constitution in Egypt**

After the popular uprising and the toppling of Mubarak, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces took power. In contrast with the process in Tunisia, it was decided to hold parliamentary and presidential elections first, before the new Constitution was
drafted. A referendum was held on 19 March 2011 on the amendment of several provisions of the Constitution of 1971. Under the revised articles, the power of the President of the Republic to declare a state of emergency is limited and requires the approval of a parliamentary majority. The term of the presidency has been reduced to four years with a two-term limit. The whole election process is subject to judicial supervision. After the election, Parliament was to appoint a 100-member constituent panel to draft the new Constitution. According to the final results of the parliamentary elections in late January 2012, the Islamists were the winners. The Freedom and Justice Party, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the hard-line Salafist Nour Party together hold about 70% of the seats in the Egyptian Parliament. Dominating Parliament, they established a constituent panel that reflected its composition. Some 60 panel members are affiliated with these parties. Secular parties and other political factions rejected this composition. Twenty of the appointed members quit the panel, including the representatives of Al-Azhar and the Coptic Church. In late April 2012, a court ruled against the composition of the constituent panel and ordered the suspension of its work. The constitutional process is suffering a crisis, since several secular parties are threatening to establish a parallel constituent panel to draft a new Constitution. Their main argument is that the new Constitution should be drafted by a panel reflecting the interests of all Egyptians, including minorities, and not be dominated by a parliamentary majority.

In Tunisia and Egypt, the change was radical and the process of drafting new constitutions has proved to be long and risky. One might ask whether the Moroccan and Jordanian alternative of slowly and progressively introducing reforms to the regime is more conducive to stability and security. However, the Egyptian and Tunisian solutions may also be the only way to allow people to learn democracy and to guarantee real and enduring security to the entire Mediterranean region.

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Only time will tell which of the two ways of change is more beneficial to the people and the region as a whole.

References


The issue of minority rights has cropped up in Euro-Mediterranean relations relatively recently. In fact, this problem had, in the end, been discarded from the November 1995 Barcelona Declaration, demonstrating to what point the issue is sensitive and delicate, not only at the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPC) level but also in the European Union. The issue was, however, taken into consideration in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the latter being based directly on the pre-accession process, although there is no denying that the approach followed still suffers from a lack of coherence.

We have already had the occasion of effecting a systematic analysis of the stipulations insofar as specifically minority rights in the ENP or the pre-accession strategy. One could thus refer to this study, which we consider an acquis, for the present analysis, which essentially focuses on the developments taking place over the past two years.

In fact, the IEMed Yearbook format is not the right place for a detailed technical analysis, but it is appropriate for an analysis that allows light to be shed on a major strategic issue and, we hope, sparks a serious debate on a topic that has largely remained taboo in Euro-Mediterranean relations, after the fashion of issues such as corruption (see the criteria for “deep and sustainable democracy” below, however). Indeed, it is time to stop practicing the policy of the ostrich as large-scale inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions emerge.

The Evolution of European Legislation and the Reticence of Certain Member States

Without entering into a complex analysis, we should, however, consider a certain number of factors. Firstly, all the types of minorities are of course present in the Mediterranean Region (cultural, ethnic, foreign, national, linguistic, religious, etc.). One of the major problems is that, on the international law level, there is no legally binding definition yet of what the notion of “minority” includes.

Secondly, and also on the legal level, we should stress that the Treaty of Lisbon, which emerged from a draft constitutional treaty, constitutes a major step forward. Indeed, according to Article 2 of the TEU:

“The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.”

The Charter of Fundamental Rights, which, as you will recall, was an integral part of the Constitutional Treaty and to which the Lisbon Treaty directly refers, indicating that it has the same legal value as a
treaty, should also be considered. According to Article 21 on Non-Discrimination: “1. Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership in a national minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.” Article 22, on Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Diversity, stipulates that the European Union “shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.” The European Commission has long hidden behind the argument of human rights protection, which supposedly encompasses the protection of minorities, but it must be understood that minority rights are specific rights. This matter is thus unresolved, for certain Member States, for instance France, remain particularly impervious to the issue of respect for minority rights, in particular those of national minorities.

Scope and Complexity of the Minority Issue in Mediterranean Partner Countries and Beyond the Immediate EU Neighbourhood

The current tension between Shiites and Sunnis on the Arabian Peninsula (in particular Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates) but also in Syria and Lebanon as well as in Iraq, or between Muslims and Coptic Christians in Egypt demonstrate that the issue of minorities, in particular religious ones, is currently a matter of serious concern. We should also consider the Berber, Druze, Kurdish or Sahrawi minorities, not to mention less known minorities such as Arab Israels or certain religious communities. The list is endless and one can see that this issue is very important and will become increasingly more so. Intolerance and discrimination benefit extremist movements or certain political parties that make it their stock in trade, whether in the MPCs or in EU Member States. These issues have always been eminently political but today are tending to take on a truly geopolitical dimension, for they are often transnational problems. Globalisation makes it increasingly difficult to ignore discriminatory treatment of communities that are at times highly isolated, whether politically or geographically.

Events in Libya, Egypt and Syria are unfortunately but the first warning signs of very deep tension or even open conflict that could rapidly spread to other regions

In any case, these issues should be addressed with the greatest care, for one cannot dissociate the issue of minorities from that of identities, nationalities and multiple citizenships. Certain balances can only be called into question gradually and in a spirit of dialogue and mutual understanding, both on the level of the European Union and the MPCs. The wave of revolts and revolutions breaking on the Arab world today are and will be catalysts of inter-ethnic and inter-religious tensions. Events in Libya, Egypt and Syria are unfortunately but the first warning signs of very deep tension or even open conflict that could rapidly spread to other regions. The question of the Tuaregs, who had found protection in Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya and some radical groups of which have become allied to the jihadis present in the Sahel area to conquer part of Mali, Lebanon’s conta-
region by the Syrian conflict or the manipulation of the conflict between Turkey and the PKK are but a few examples from among many.

The New “Deep and Sustainable Democracy” Criteria as Instituted in the Revised European Neighbourhood Policy of May 2011

In the Joint Communication of the European Commission and the High Representative, “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood,” containing elements for a revision of the ENP, the issue of minorities is explicitly mentioned only once. The document stipulates that: “Civil society plays a pivotal role in advancing women’s rights, greater social justice and respect for minorities […]”. The EU will support this greater political role for non-state actors through a partnership with societies, helping [civil society organisations or] CSOs to develop their advocacy capacity, their ability to monitor reform and their role in implementing and evaluating EU programmes. In-country EU Delegations will seek to bring partner countries’ governments and civil society together in a structured dialogue on key areas of our co-operation. EU funding for such actions could be delivered through the establishment of a dedicated Civil Society Facility for the neighbourhood.”

One of the fundamental aspects of this revision of the ENP is the introduction of what is now known as the new criteria for building “deep and sustainable democracy,” which partially echo the Copenhagen Criteria. The Communication effectively stipulates that “several elements are common to building deep and sustainable democracy and require a strong and lasting commitment on the part of governments. They include:

- Free and fair elections;
- Freedom of association, expression and assembly and a free press and media;
- The rule of law administered by an independent judiciary and right to a fair trial;
- Fighting against corruption;
- Security and law enforcement sector reform (including the police) and the establishment of democratic control over armed and security forces.

[...] They are the main benchmarks against which the EU will assess progress and adapt levels of support.”

It should be kept in mind that the Copenhagen Criteria state that candidate countries must have achieved the following in order to gain access to the EU:

i) Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
ii) The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union;
iii) The ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic & monetary union.

Hence the absence of any reference to “respect for and protection of minorities” in the criteria for “deep and sustainable democracy” is striking, since respect for the specific rights of minorities is generally considered one of the best indicators of respect for human rights in general. In other words, I deem a “Mediterraneanisation” of the Copenhagen Criteria would be appropriate.

The absence of any reference to “respect for and protection of minorities” in the criteria for “deep and sustainable democracy” is striking, since respect for the specific rights of minorities is one of the best indicators of respect for human rights in general

This does not mean, however, that the European Commission and the High Representative have not taken this issue into account in their evaluations. Indeed, as the Communication from May 2012 entitled “Delivering on a New European Neighbourhood Policy” indicates: “There is increased respect for minority rights in Armenia and Morocco. However, torture and degrading and in-

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humane treatment continue to be perpetrated by security forces in a number of countries. Similarly, discrimination on grounds of religion or belief, ethnic origin and sexual orientation remains widespread and trafficking in human beings continues to be a serious problem in many countries. This considered, a global strategy in this sphere should quickly be implemented, though we are still quite far from achieving this.

It is high time to launch a serene debate on these issues, both on the EU level and within the framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations.

The preceding communication, dated May 2011, also indicates that there should be "a strong commitment to promoting gender equality, in line with the major role once again played by women in recent events in the South, fighting against all forms of discrimination, respecting freedom of religion and protecting the rights of refugees and beneficiaries of international protection. Reinforced human rights dialogues will allow monitoring of commitments in this area, including addressing cases of human rights violations. Boosting cooperation with the Council of Europe could also help in promoting compliance." It is thus interesting to note also that we are witnessing a certain "Europeanisation" of Euro-Mediterranean relations.

That leaves but one conclusion: it is high time to launch a serene debate on these issues, both on the EU level and within the framework of Euro-Mediterranean relations. It is a matter that should be addressed with the utmost seriousness and first and foremost in the academic sphere; the politicisation of such an issue represents a major risk that we cannot afford to take in such a difficult context.

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11 COM(2011) 303, op. cit. p. 6. One can also refer to my above-mentioned analysis that systematically refers to issues associated with minority rights appearing in ENP documents.
Elections in Spain: A Political Change in the Framework of a Major International Crisis

William Chislett

Spain’s early general election on 20 November marked a turning point in the political landscape. The Socialists were trounced by the conservative Popular Party (PP), in their worst-ever electoral defeat since the country returned to democracy after the death of General Franco in 1975, and the PP achieved its best-ever result.

The main reason for the Socialists’ defeat was the depth of Spain’s economic and financial crisis and the mishandling of it by the government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate of 22.6% at the time of the election, which was not due to be held until March 2012, was the same as it was when the PP last took power in 1996 and more than double the rate (10.4%) when Zapatero first took office in 2004. The PP, led by Mariano Rajoy, increased its number of seats in the lower house of parliament from 154 in 2008 to 186, giving it the second largest absolute majority in the 350-seat Congress since 1977, after the Socialists’ victory of 202 seats in 1982, while the Socialists, under the veteran politician Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, dropped from 169 to 110 seats (see Table 2). Voter turnout was 71.7%, down from 75.8% in 2008. Zapatero did not run for a third term.

This was the third time Rajoy had led the PP into an election, after being defeated in 2008 and 2004. His party is firmly in control not only at the central government level, but also regionally and locally, as it also won a resounding victory in the May municipal and regional elections. As a result of those elections, the PP control 11 of the 17 regional governments and three of the four biggest cities (Madrid, Valencia and Seville).

The Socialists lost 4.3 million votes in the general election, but the PP only gained 560,000. The Socialists also lost votes in all of Spain’s 17 autonomous regions, including Andalusia, their fiefdom, while the PP gained votes in all of them except in Asturias, Navarra and the Basque Country. Because of the way the d’Hondt system, or highest average method, works, the PP won 32 more seats and the Socialists lost 59. Voters deserted the Socialists mainly for the hard-line United Left (IU) of Cayo Lara, which increased its number of seats from two to 11 (+720,000 votes), and the Progress and Democratic Union (UPyD) of Rosa Díez, which won five seats (+840,000 votes), four more than in 2008.

The Socialists’ vote, as a proportion of the total population, was 20.3%, slightly lower than the 20.7% gained by the PP in the watershed election of 1982, when the Socialists came to power for the first time after the death of General Franco in 1975 and ruled until 1996.

The other big winner was Amaiur, a left-wing Basque nationalist coalition, which entered parliament with seven seats, two more than the more moderate Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), which lost one seat. The Catalan Convergence and Union (CiU), the other main regional party, won 16 seats, six more than in 2008.

Like the terrorist group ETA, Amaiur wants independence for the Basque country. Amaiur was formed shortly before ETA announced an end to its more than 50-year conflict in which 829 people died, although the group has yet to lay down its arms. Among ETA’s most spectacular attacks was
The assassination in 1973 of Franco’s prime minister, Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, The best-ever results for the so-called izquierda abertzale in a general election underscored the depth of support for its cause without resorting to political violence.

Basque independence groups last won representation in Spain’s national parliament in 1996, when Herri Batasuna (HB) won two seats in the assembly, although it did not take them up because the party refused to swear allegiance to the Spanish constitution. HB was subsequently banned.

The PP’s electoral slogan “Join the change” (strikingly reminiscent of the Socialists’ slogan in 1982, “For change”) caught the mood of the electorate, while the Socialists’ slogan “Fight for what you want” failed to convince enough voters that the PP was bent on dismantling the welfare system, as the Socialists claimed. Just as in 1982, voters wanted not just a change of government but also a deeper transformation of society.

The two main parties captured between them the lowest proportion of votes since 1993. Their combined share of the total vote was 73.3%, 10 points lower than in 2008 (see Table 3), while in terms of parliamentary representation the PP and the Socialists captured 84.6% of the seats between them, down from 92.3% in 2008, the largest number in Spain’s post-Franco democracy, and similar to that in 1996 (84.9%). The parliament in Madrid is the most fragmented since 1986, with 13 parties represented.

The reduced combined strength of the PP and the Socialists reflected, to some extent, the disenchantment with the political establishment, highlighted by the protests of the so-called indignados (the indignant ones), who burst unannounced on the political scene in May 2011. This loose movement brought together jobless youths, pensioners, students, anti-capitalists and electoral-reform campaigners. Opinion surveys showed that politicians were increasingly regarded as part of the problem and not part of the solution as they should be viewed.

The most noteworthy results for these two parties were in the region of Castilla-La Mancha, which the Socialists lost to the PP in the May 2011 regional elections after 28 years. The Socialists suffered one of their largest regional defeats and the PP one of their biggest regional victories (with 56% of the votes) in Castilla-La Mancha.

One of the main reasons for the Socialists’ unprecedented defeat was the loss of support among those most ideologically close to it and among young voters. The first group tended to move leftwards, as

### Table 2

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<td>0.2</td>
<td>1 (Na Bai)</td>
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<td>0.24</td>
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*Basque leftist coalition in favour of independence for the Basque Country. Source: Interior Ministry.

### Table 3

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Socialists</th>
<th>Popular Party</th>
<th>Combined share</th>
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<td>1989</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>73.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interior Ministry.
they were angry with the government’s economic policies to tackle the crisis, and vote for the United Left (essentially the revamped communist party) or the centrist Progress and Democratic Union (its leader, Rosa Díez, is a former Socialist and was a minister in the Basque regional government during the 1990s) or abstain from voting.

One of the main reasons for the Socialists’ unprecedented defeat was the loss of support among those most ideologically close to it and among young voters

Young voters (under the age of 24) and those between 30 and 44, who were aged between 19 and a little over 30 in the year 2000 when Zapatero became secretary general of the Socialists and entered political life with him, moved to the left and to the right of the Socialists. These are the two groups whose confidence the Socialists need to recover if they are to win the next general election, scheduled for 2015.

According to the sociologist José Ignacio Wert, who is the Education, Culture and Sports Minister in the national government of the PP, around one million Socialist voters in 2008 voted for the PP in 2011 (about 15% of the votes the Socialists obtained in 2008). The PP has a stronger record in managing the economy.

The Socialists and United Left (the two leftist parties with votes spread around the country as opposed to Amaiur and the Catalan Republican Left (ERC), whose votes are concentrated in their respective regions) obtained 35.6% of total valid votes, the lowest proportion since the return to democracy after 1975 (see Table 4).

With youth unemployment (under the age of 24) at close to 50%, more than double that for the EU-27 and compared to an overall jobless rate of 23% in Spain, young Spanish adults have borne a large part of the brunt of the economic crisis. The Socialists’ programme for the 2008 general election contained a populist pledge to create two million jobs so as to secure full employment within four years. Far from achieving this, the number of unemployed more than doubled between 2008 and 2011 to more than 5 million.

The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012 ranked the Spanish labour market the 119th most efficient out of a total of 140 countries. When the economy is growing quickly, Spain has a very strong job creation capacity – the country created 40% of new jobs in the euro zone in the 15 years up to 2007, many of them linked to the construction sector – but in a downturn it destroys jobs like no other country in the EU.

The three main reasons for job destruction, or, viewed another way, the failure to create jobs on a sustained basis, none of which were seriously tackled by Zapatero or his predecessor, José María Aznar, when he was the PP Prime Minister between 1996 and 2004, are an economic model excessively based on the labour-intensive construction sector, a labour market split between insiders (those with permanent jobs whose firing costs are relatively expensive by international standards) and outsiders (the very large number on temporary contracts) and an education system that has deteriorated and hampers the pressing need to move toward a more knowledge-based economy. Close to 30% of those aged between 18 and 24 left school at 16 with few or no qualifications, mainly lured during the economic boom by the ever-expanding construction sector. That sector has collapsed (in 2011 there were an estimated 750,000 unsold new homes) and many of those who lost their jobs are qualified for little else.

Zapatero’s decision not to run for a third term and for Rubalcaba (nine years older at 60), first Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister, to be the Socialists’ candidate did not have the desired effect. All opinion polls before the elections showed the PP winning by a big margin. The Socialists hoped, however, that their defeat would not be as massive as it was. Rubalcaba was the best-viewed minister in monthly surveys of politicians conducted by the government-run Cen-

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<td>34.2</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party/United Left</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
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<td>10.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined share</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>47.6</td>
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<td>48.1</td>
<td>39.7</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Interior Ministry.
tre for Sociological Research (CIS), ahead of Zapatero and even of Rajoy, and hence was the party’s best bet for limiting the extent of its electoral defeat. But he, too, was tainted by the economic crisis.

The Socialists paid a high price for overseeing an economy that carried on booming when they took office in 2004 from the PP, but which gradually sank into its worst recession in 50 years in 2009 as the government responded with measures belatedly. This was the background against which the Socialists elected their new leader in February 2012. Rubalcaba competed against Carme Chacón, a 40-year-old female former Defence Minister, and scraped to victory by just 22 of the 955 votes cast at a primary election in Seville. Rubalcaba obtained 51.1% of the votes and Chacón 48.8%. His victory was as slim as that of Zapatero’s at the party’s congress in the year 2000 when he was elected secretary general with 41.7% of the votes compared to 40.8% won by José Bono. At that election, there were also two other candidates.

Both Rubalcaba and Chacón were clearly identified with the failures of the previous Socialist government. Chacón, in particular, sought to distance herself, backed by a group of prominent Socialists in a platform called Mucho PSOE por hacer, which recognised the party’s errors and criticised the former government. Another group, called Yo sí estuve allí, made up of former senior members of the government, vindicated the government’s achievements. Rubalcaba represented the old guard of the party – he was an Education and then Presidency Minister in the third and fourth governments of Felipe González – while the much younger and less experienced Chacón represented a fresher face. She was said to be the choice of Zapatero to lead the Socialists into the next general election in 2015. In simplistic terms, the choice at the primary election for the party’s secretary general was between Felipismo and Zapaterismo, and, given the parlous state of the economy after eight years of Zapatero, it is not surprising that Socialist party delegates voted for what was regarded as the more experienced pair of hands, albeit by a tiny margin. Whether Rubalcaba will lead the Socialists into the 2015 election remains to be seen.

The PP received a surprising setback in March 2012 when it failed to dislodge the Socialists from Andalusia, the most populous of the 17 regions (8.4 million inhabitants), which the Socialists have governed since 1978 (see Table 5). The PP won 50 of the 109 seats (47 en 2008) in the regional parliament, five short of the absolute majority it needed. The Socialists won 47 seats (9 less) and the United Left 12 (double), making it possible for them to carry on ruling in a coalition government. The PP received 420,000 fewer votes in Andalusia than it did in the November 2011 general election, despite the many corruption scandals affecting the Socialists in that region, their internal divisions and the highest unemployment rate in Spain (31%). The left’s victory showed that the government’s reforms were beginning to meet resistance, while the large fall in voter turnout (from 72.6% in 2008 to 62.2%) suggested discontent with the whole political class. Rajoy’s strategy of not announcing further reforms and austerity measures until after the elections in Andalusia, in order not to alienate voters, failed, while the Socialists’ tactic of not having the elections in Andalusia at the same time as the general elections triumphed and animated the party.

The PP also received a blow in the regional elections in Asturias, where it did not win sufficient seats to oust the Foro of Francisco Álvarez Cascos, a dissident former PP minister, whom it looked as if it would have to support. The Socialists also did not obtain an absolute majority, although they won the most seats. The results of these two elections will make the central government’s drastic spending cuts even more difficult to implement.

Bibliography


WERT, José Ignacio. “Los españoles ante el cambio.” FAES, March 2012.
We have all come to refer to it simply as the “Greek Crisis,” but it is a long-term, multi-actor national drama with important, even perilous, consequences for the EU and the euro zone. In this concise article, written shortly after the elections of May 2012, we begin with a somewhat impressionistic description of the dimensions of the crisis, then move on to examine the specific repercussions for Greek politics, and, finally, offer an assessment of both the outcome of the elections and possible directions going forward.

Crisis Data

Even the most cursory look at the data suggests that, by early 2010, the socioeconomic circumstances in Greece had already entered a cycle of hard-to-reverse deterioration. According to Eurostat, Greek GDP declined 6.9% in 2011 and is forecast to dip another 4.7% in 2012, marking the fifth consecutive year of recession (EC, Spring 2012 Forecast). The IMF reports that GDP per capita in constant prices is expected to fall from €16,113 in 2007 to €13,216 in 2012 – a whopping 18% drop in just five years. The country is unattractive to investment: the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index ranks Greece 90th amongst its worldwide competitors in 2012, down from 47th in 2007. The Heritage Foundation/Wall Street Journal’s Index of Economic Freedom paints a similar picture, ranking Greece 119th, down from 73rd in two years’ time, while the IFC/World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index ranks Greece 100th (out of 183) in 2012. Numbers on the social front are even gloomier: the unemployment rate is projected to rise to well over 21% in 2012, up from an already disheartening 8.3% back in 2007: this amounts to a loss of 700,000 jobs in five years and more than a million unemployed Greeks in total, all in a population of just 11 million – an overwhelming burden, shouldered mainly by the youth.

If numbers are half the truth, the other half is the Greek state’s underperformance on the institutional and administrative levels. The Economist’s Intelligence Unit reports a drop of 10 places (from 22nd to 32nd) on its Index of Democracy between 2008 and 2011, relegating the country to the category of “flawed democracies.” Reinforcing these findings, Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index conveys an appalling message, ranking Greece 80th in 2011, on a par with many Latin American countries and even below many sub-Saharan African ones. This is down from 56th in 2007, which was already considered a disgrace for a country that fancies itself a member of the developed world. Finally, widespread social anomic, graphically captured in the news images of a burning Athens that travelled across the globe, is an unmistakable sign of a state that is failing to apply the rule of law and constitutionalism.

Political Repercussions

Even so, the picture presented so far is only the tip of the iceberg, for, below it, everything seems to be in transition in Greece’s hitherto well-established political and party systems. However, before looking at what is being dismantled as a result of the crisis, let us review the milestones of the Greek drama so far. Following the resignation of the New Democracy (ND) government back in September 2009, snap elections
were called for October, which were easily won by the socialist PASOK under George Papandreou’s leadership on a promise of continued public spending. After a few crucial months in denial, the cat was out of the bag and into the streets: there was something terribly wrong with Greek debt dynamics, and public deficit figures were routinely manipulated. In February 2010, an estimated 5% deficit for 2009 was revised to 12.7% (the official Eurostat figure now stands at 15.6%), spawning worldwide fears of a hard landing. While foreign officials were dragging their feet and Greek politicians were indulging in exercises of self-delusion, Prime Minister Papandreou officially asked for EU/IMF intervention and, on 27 April 2010, Greek bonds were downgraded to junk status. On 1 May, a bailout loan of €110 billion was agreed on the condition of harsh austerity measures, spurring indignation, strikes, protests and riots throughout the country. As the economy plunged headlong into deep recession, the need for a second €130 billion rescue package was agreed on 21 July. However, the government was disintegrating and had to resign on 10 November in favour of a coalition government under the former vice-president of the European Central Bank, Lucas Papademos. The new government pressed on with implementing the agreements and managed to successfully conclude the procedure for a private debt write-off of more than €100 billion (entailing a 53.5% loss in face value for bondholders) by March 2012 that signified the end of its mission and the start of the pre-election period.

In the period between the elections of 2009 and those of 2012, the tectonic plates of Greek politics shifted considerably, paving the way for historical developments. Here are the most important changes.

The first and perhaps most obvious change concerns the very stability of the country’s political system, which, at least since 1981, had been characterised by a simple two-party format. For three decades, the centre-right ND and centre-left PASOK were able to alternate in office with impressive regularity and, therefore, to share the spoils of controlling the state and its resources. Yet, as the crisis shook up the old party system, eventually forcing PASOK and ND to cohabitate in a coalition government led by a technocrat, the former two-party format suddenly seemed defunct.

Related to the decline of two-party politics is, second, the discrediting and disrepute of the entire political class that served under it and is now held responsible for the crisis. As indicated for instance in a 2011 Public Issue Barometer (Athens, April 2011), more than 60% of Greek society held negative views of the leaders of all major parties, whether left, centre, or right. These negative views, however, soon morphed into occasionally ugly physical animosity towards politicians, ranging from physical attacks against lawmakers on their way to Parliament to mobs storming and ravaging their offices or disrupting their public meetings. Along similar lines, a third important development is Greece has been the virtual obliteration of the scions of the traditional political families that had, with few interludes, administered the land since WWII. The earliest victim of this trend was Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis, nephew of the late Constantine Karamanlis, founder of the post-authoritarian Greek republic. The latest victim was the Papandreou family, with George Papandreou stepping down as Prime Minister in November 2011 and resigning as party leader in March 2012. Meanwhile, Dora Bakoyannis, a political heavyweight and daughter of former Prime Minister Costas Mitsotakis, was forced to leave ND and create her own splinter party, which failed to top the 3% threshold to enter Parliament.

A fourth victim of the crisis has been the Greeks’ trust in Europe, which is currently giving way to both bewilderment and misgivings. As recent Eurobarometer surveys show, in contrast to the not-too-distant past, such feelings are now particularly strong in Greece. Thus, while in mid-2007 as many as 63% of Greeks claimed to trust the EU compared to a European average of 57%, by late 2011 only 29% of Greeks did as opposed to an EU average of 34% (Eurobarometers 67 and 76). Similarly, while a strong majority of Greek citizens used to agree that the country benefited from its membership in the EU (75% compared to an EU average of 59%, Eurobarometer 67), this opinion is now held by a 47% minority (compared to an average of 52%, Eurobarometer 75).

Finally, and perhaps most consequential of all, is the wave of Greeks now seeking a better future abroad, thus turning Greece once again into a country of emigrants. As employment prospects, as well as the general economic outlook, appear grim, many talented youth are moving to richer countries in the West, where they can benefit from higher wages and a more stable financial and working environment. The consequences of this haemorrhage of precious human capital are considerable in at least two ways, since apart from further shrinking the Greek market they also signify the loss of its most innovative and creative individuals around whom a framework for the return to growth could potentially be constructed.
The May 2012 Elections

The changes underway since the beginning of the crisis clearly impacted the outcome of the elections of 6 May 2012. Although many had predicted a major upset in domestic politics, no one was prepared for a complete realignment of the country’s political and party system. The traditionally dominant ND and PASOK, which both backed harsh austerity measures in exchange for the continuation of Greece’s loan agreement with the Troika, failed to get enough votes to form a majority in government. ND came in first with a dismal 18.9% of the vote, and PASOK all but collapsed. The big winners were the anti-austerity forces on both the left and the right of the political spectrum, which harvested a rich protest vote.

The electoral outcome has a number of characteristics that both help to understand the Greek predicament and offer valuable clues as to what comes next. First, the most decisive factor in the outcome was society’s collective anger rather than the differing ideologies or policies of the participating parties. Citizens voted overwhelmingly against austerity and punished mainstream parties for years of economic mismanagement. In a very real sense, therefore, the outcome of the election constitutes a popular rejection of the terms of the foreign loan agreement signed between Greece and its foreign creditors.

The second characteristic of the electoral outcome is the extreme fragmentation it has wrought in the Greek party system. As the two-party system went out with a bang, a multitude of smaller parties managed to attract all the floating voters of the broken system. However, because the electorate showed a strong tendency to flee the centre, most of these parties are located near either the far left or far right of the electoral competition space.

On the far left, besides the orthodox (i.e. Stalinist) Communist Party of Greece, one finds the biggest winner of the electoral contest, Syriza, a protest movement transformed into a party consisting of several components bearing such names as the Communist Organisation of Greece, the Internationalist Workers’ Left, Red, and even Rosa [Luxembourg]. On the right are the Independent Greeks, a nativist nationalist party founded by Panos Kammenos, a former ND deputy with a knack for conspiracy theories, and, most worryingly, Golden Dawn, a Greek Nazi group. The latter was able to win the hearts and minds of...
many Greeks by handing out food and clothing to the needy, offering protection against anomie and growing crime rates in many neighbourhoods of Athens, and campaigning against immigration.

Electoral Aftermath

The ranks of the extremes were filled by devouring the membership of the political centre. Has the new situation come to stay or will it prove to be another flash in the pan? In other words, have electoral habits changed forever? Until the spectacular breakdown of the two-party system, swing voters aside, Greeks used to vote more or less along clientelistic and rent-seeking lines. The two parties had a firm hold on the state apparatus and were eager to dole out favours upon assuming power in order to solidify support. This situation changed abruptly with the introduction of the Memorandum of Understanding and its strict financial requirements. When the spending spree came to a halt, rent-seekers felt the danger of losing their rents as part of the commitments conceded by the Greek government in return for bailout funds. State coffers were suddenly empty and clientelistic networks realised that their resources were depleted.

This explains a fair share of the resulting dealignment, its dynamics visible in the decisions and stances of trade unions, professional associations, state-fed media tycoons and other guilds that used to reap the fruits of the old system. These groups were now determined to stand behind any political force that promised to protect the status quo and freeze the destabilising reforms. So much for the rational part of the equation; the remainder can be assessed by observing the psychology of the average citizen-voter.

Greeks are helplessly watching their standard of living deteriorate and are having a hard time coming to grips with the harsh reality. They are fed up with recession and unemployment and believe that there must be an easier way out than the long and winding path of memorandums, bailouts and austerity measures presented by the elites as their only choice. They are in a state of cognitive dissonance in which their view of what is wrong contrasts with the hard facts. Unable or unwilling to locate the origins of the crisis within the confines of the good old days, when everything seemed to work fine for decades, they assume that someone or something else has to be the culprit. They consider their situation unfair; they have been done wrong, and so they will only support the person who pledges to undo the wrongdoings and restore justice to the nation by punishing those who are really guilty, not the hard-working “people.”

Populists came to the rescue and met this demand for an explanatory narrative, taking popular grievances and moulding them into an interpretive framework whereby elites, both foreign and domestic, have double-crossed the people in order to satisfy their narrow personal interests. This framework takes on different hues depending on the ideological origins of the political entrepreneur putting it forward. Left-wing populists insert allusions to welfarism and wealth inequality; populists on the right embroider their rhetoric with national or religious themes. Both sides end up identifying the same enemies. The outcome is clear: an anti-systemic drive across the board that funnels a sense of being under siege and leaves the political centre bereft of constituents, filling the ranks of the extremes and undermining political liberalism. From there, it is all downhill.

Postscript

The foregoing was written shortly after the May 2012 elections. In the more recent elections in June, in the face of the country’s collapse and as collective fear tussled with collective anger throughout the population, ND managed to regain some of its former strength and finish first. At the same time, the leftist Syriza emerged as a major opposition party and now faces the dilemma of whether to stick to its former radical tactics or present a more moderate face. It is now also clear that Golden Dawn is here to stay and that its entry into Parliament in May was not a political fad. At the time of this writing, Greece seems to hang in the balance, with a weak coalition government faced with enormous problems that must act in an increasingly insecure European environment. Whether or not it succeeds will soon become clear.

<table>
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<th>TABLE 7</th>
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<td>New Democracy (Centre Right)</td>
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Italy today is an isolated, ageing and relatively impoverished country with no common horizon. The crisis that we have faced since the fall of the "Wall Street wall" is not only economic but also, above all, social and cultural. The ties that bind our nation together are being put to a harsh test: an "every man for himself" mindset prevails. Institutions have been largely discredited, starting with political parties. If we take a look beyond the peninsula, we will discover that we are quite alone. Our main Atlantic and European partners are suffering the consequences of the same crisis afflicting us, and we are regarded as important only because other countries risk becoming involved in the same vicious cycle of sovereign debt in which Italy is now stuck. The structural aspect of Italian fragility emerged following the end of the Cold War, when Italy lost its international standing. Previously, we had been a pivotal country. Not only did we stand at the enemy’s doorstep – the gates of Gorizia separated us from the Warsaw Pact – but we were also home to the largest communist party in the West (the Italian Communist Party, or PCI). In a sense, the “Iron Curtain” both brushed our external borders (Gorizia) and divided us internally (in the form of the PCI). This made Italy a strategic asset in the bipolar context. With the suicide of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the PCI, we were left with only our face value, without any additional geo-strategic, political or ideological significance. In NATO, having lost our bearings, we played a minor role, trying to make ourselves useful to the Americans whenever we could (Kosovo, Afghanistan, Libya), without receiving anything in return.

Over the course of these last twenty years, we have also gradually lost our second external point of reference: Europe. Until 1990, the European Economic Community was the geo-economic face of NATO, just as Comecon was for the Warsaw Pact. Following German reunification, the enlargement to the east and the introduction of the euro, a new stage was begun under the standard of the “European Union.” That name is misleading, since, in reality, ever since we renamed ourselves “Union,” we have been more divided than ever. However, there are three main differences: we are no longer united against the Soviet enemy; America has other priorities; and we have adopted a currency without a sovereign, which has divided the Union into euro countries and countries with national currencies. Today, as a result of the crisis, we may witness the evaporation of the euro zone itself, a construction that has proven to be unsteady and incapable of ameliorating the consequences of the global storm that broke over the American financial sector four years ago and that probably harbours even graver consequences yet.

In the Western European crisis, Italy could, in principle, turn to a special resource: the Mediterranean. This, however, is where the paradox lies. Although Italy is physically a Mediterranean country, with nearly nine thousand kilometres of coastline overlooking the *mare nostrum*, it is in no way Mediterranean in a geopolitical, cultural or economic sense. This often neglected aspect of the Italian crisis bears further examination. Although undeniably rooted in history, it also has a recent geopolitical dimension, dating back to the post-WWII years, when we bet it all on the West and Europe, shrugging off our Mediterranean identity. Indeed, in the name of a counterproductive ideological Europeanism, we cursed it.
The Anti-Mediterranean Curse

The anti-Mediterranean facet of our pro-Europe fervour is an especially dangerous legacy for Italy. It largely derives from the political culture of the ruling class during the First Republic (1946-1992). Our great Europeanists, particularly (but not exclusively) the secular ones, such as Ugo La Malfa, presented the need for Europe as a means of binding ourselves to the major economic – and, to a lesser extent, political – powers of continental Europe, thereby averting the risk of “ending up in Africa.”

This idea of setting Europe against the Mediterranean partially reflected the geopolitical and economic situation of the second half of the 20th century, the Cold War and the presence on Mediterranean shores of countries that could not be trusted or were allied with the Soviet Union, that is, the enemy. It also reflected a geostrategic framework: the Mediterranean had become an American sea, patrolled by the US Navy, which considered it the linchpin of its southern defence system against the Warsaw Pact. In addition, this pro-Europe, anti-Mediterranean ideology contributed to a widespread sentiment that lingers on today. Think, for example, of the campaign for the euro in the 1990s, when it was necessary to determine which countries could belong to the seemingly miraculous area of the European “single currency.” There was talk then, in some of the northern countries, of nations that were “euro” by vocation, headed up by Germany, as opposed to the so-called Club Med countries, which consisted of Italy, Greece, Spain and even Portugal, which does not have an inch of Mediterranean coastline but, for some strange reason, was nevertheless included in the group. These countries were identified as having a Mediterranean culture and a rather weak notion of currency, rendering them unsuitable to participate in the same currency as the Germans and their virtuous partners.

This argument, which pitted “true” Europeans against “fake” ones, that is, Mediterranean ones, is once again being made today. The 1990s acronym “PIGS” or “PIIGS” (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain) – not exactly a flattering term – has been dragged back out and dusted off to refer to those countries in no condition to administer the European currency according to clear rules. Reading between the lines of Chancellor Merkel’s discourse, these countries should prepare for an eventual exit from the euro. Moreover, should they fail to do it themselves – beginning with Greece – the other countries will force them to do so.

This division between a “virtuous” Europe and a “vicious” one, between a “true” Europe and a “Mediterranean” one, is manifest in the financial flows that, following the Cold War, streamed from Brussels to the most disadvantaged countries in Europe and the Euro-Mediterranean region. The flows being channelled from Western Europeans to the former Soviet space are immeasurably larger than those sent to the Mediterranean shores and, in particular, the African one. If we stop to examine the tragicomic case of the “Barcelona Process,” launched in 1995 to make the Euromed region more homogeneous and better connected by shrinking the distance between the northern and southern shore, which was to have culminated in the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area by 2010, we see, first, the yawning gap that separates European rhetoric from European praxis and, second, and above all, how hard it is to conceive of the Mediterranean as our – that is, Europe’s – true priority. One cannot blame the Danes or Belgians for considering the Mediterranean only as an afterthought. A Dane’s “Mediterranean” is obviously more likely to be the Baltic. Likewise, a Turk or a Romanian can be forgiven for giving more importance to the Black Sea, another miniature “Mediterranean.” What is less understandable is that geographically and historically Mediterranean countries such as ours also neglect the region, almost as if they were not a part of it. Indeed, some even consider it a region of dangers and threats, especially since 11 September: in this view, terrorism and migration are the most salient features of a Mediterranean to be avoided.

The financial flows being channelled from Western Europeans to the former Soviet space are immeasurably larger than those sent to the Mediterranean shores

We thus forget that the vast majority of illegal immigrants who manage to enter Italy do not come from the South, from the Strait of Sicily, or from Libya, where the media and government focus their attention, but rather from the East. Most of our undocu-
mented immigrants are people who enter Italy on a regular visa that later expires, at which point they become irregular. Due to the colour of their skin and the fact that their origin is ostensibly more similar to ours than that of a Tunisian or Egyptian, these people are viewed less negatively than immigrants from the so-called “Fourth Shore” – who, many Italians feel, among other things, have the added defect of cultivating Islam, the religion of the perpetrators of the attacks against the Twin Towers.

**Italy’s Reaction Must Begin with the Mediterranean or Not Begin at All**

I have given a few examples of the growing amnesia – Mediterranean amnesia – afflicting both Italy and Europe, as well as of the construction of an anti-Mediterranean component within the pro-Europe ideology. Given that every geopolitical entity – and Europe is no exception – is built in opposition to something else, that is, is defined by what it is not, one way to achieve this negative construction is by setting Europe and the Mediterranean on opposite sides of the equation.

In this framework, the “Arab Spring” (a Western coinage) has revealed our country’s weakness. Not only did the wars and uprisings of the Middle East take us by surprise, in some cases they swept away some of Italy’s supposed historical friends: Ben Ali, Mubarak, Gaddafi. We even participated in the intervention in Libya, not to defend our interests, but because we thought that in doing so we would be able to share in the post-war spoils that would result from the regime change sought in Tripoli by Sarkozy and Cameron. Today, Libya is in a state of chaos and the spoils have not been shared. It is small comfort for us and, to a different extent, for the French and the British.

Still, there remains a need to rediscover the Mediterranean as a geopolitical and economic asset for Italy. If we examine the role of the Mediterranean over the last twenty years, since the end of the Cold War, from a geo-economic point of view, i.e. essentially in terms of trade, we see that, until the crisis of two years ago, trade relations in the region were developing at a considerable rate. The crisis has now drastically reduced trade. However, we can expect it to grow again, rebuilding on the foundations laid until 2007, which the crisis has largely eroded. This expectation is based on the fact that, in the Mediterranean, the drivers of this growth have not changed and have solid foundations.

What are the growth drivers? Essentially, the emergence of the Asian economies, in particular, China, South Korea, Japan, India, Thailand and Vietnam, as “the world’s factory.” Large East Asian countries need to access the European market, which, in percentage terms, accounts for approximately one fourth of the global market. To tap this vast market, they must cross the Mediterranean, passing through the Suez Canal and, eventually, continuing West past Gibraltar to the Americas. It is a structural fact: the Mediterranean is the market for Asian trade.

In total, some 80% of world trade is carried out by sea, and approximately 30% goes through the Mediterranean. This circuit makes our sea a bridge between East and West. It is a strategic geo-economic area, and our country lies at the centre. Which is why we should be the heart of the system. Only we are not. We are not for the aforementioned cultural and political reasons, which, however, are not set in stone.

The “Arab Spring” has revealed our country’s weakness. Not only did the wars and uprisings of the Middle East take us by surprise, in some cases they swept away some of Italy’s supposed historical friends: Ben Ali, Mubarak, Gaddafi

This gives rise to a priority for Italians. We know that, in terms of shipping times, our ports offer an advantage of approximately one week over the northern European terminals (Rotterdam, Hamburg, Le Havre, etc.). There must be a compelling reason, then, in terms of costs and benefits, to ship goods to ports outside the Mediterranean rather than to ours, as, unfortunately, happens. The problem is the weakness of our port and dry port systems, that is, the lack of adequate links between our ports and the main markets: motorways, railways, everything that enables, or should enable, the delivery of the unloaded containers to consumers. From this point of view, the northern ports (in France, Germany and the Netherlands) are much better equipped and better connected to the main markets of their countries or
the rest of Europe, with fast, well-designed railway systems, motorways, river transport systems and canals, which are quite highly developed in that part of Europe.

Another handicap that we often strive to ignore when discussing our ports, particularly those in the south – the case of Gioia Tauro being the most extreme – is the fact that they lie in geopolitical regions not controlled by the State. Although they are officially located in Italian territory, in reality they are controlled by the Camorra, the ‘Ndrangheta and other organised crime groups. This is a major drawback, first, because a region plagued by legal uncertainty holds little appeal for Italian and foreign investors alike and, second, because these criminal organisations almost always seem to be more powerful than the State and thus able to administer or compromise the operation of the ports. For example, in Gioia Tauro, local criminals organised a pseudo-union replete with red flags to prevent the port from falling into outside hands. Another more recent event reported by the press was the case of Taranto, which was a cultural problem, a problem of ignorance. In that city, the director of one of the largest maritime transport companies in the world, a Chinese man, asked to meet with the mayor because he wished to invest in the port. The mayor did not even deign to receive him, because he did not know who he was. Most likely, the Chinese director thought that Taranto’s location and abundance of motorways would make it an ideal hub for the transport of goods to Milan and Berlin.

If we continue on this path, we will never overcome the major economic and political challenge facing our country in the coming decades: the competition for Asian trade in the Mediterranean. Ports such as Genova, Taranto, Gioia Tauro, Trieste or Ancona must be prepared to participate in a radial port system comprised of both large ports, true trade hubs, and smaller, conveniently linked secondary ones. This will be necessary to compete with Barcelona, Valencia and the new ports springing up on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, such as Tanger Med, in the Strait of Gibraltar, a terminal that could quickly catch up to the terminals of the “Northern Range” (Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg) in terms of infrastructure, size and potential.

The Battle of the Euro

Before refashioning our Mediterranean dimension, we must emerge unscathed from the battle of the euro. Moreover, we must do it at a critical juncture, not just for our economy but also our politics. We are the only Western democracy without parties as such. Those that currently exist are either remnants of the First Republic, personal parties (Berlusconi’s People of Freedom party, insofar as he still controls it, Di Pietro’s Italy of Values, etc.), or new “populist” formations, such as Beppe Grillo’s Five Star Movement.

After the fall of the First Republic and the era of uncertainty marked by the victories (and losses) of Silvio Berlusconi, today Italy is governed by a government invented by the President of the Republic Giorgio Napolitano, led by Mario Monti, a European commissioner, supported by the main political parties of the centre-right and centre-left, and primarily made up of technocrats. This is the executive with which we confront traditional European political governments in the battle of the euro.

Paradoxically, our weakness is also our strength. As the third-largest economy in Europe, and the ninth-largest in the world, Italy is, quite simply, too big to fail. It is in the interest of Germany and France, but also of the US, China and Brazil, to ensure that Rome does not go bankrupt. That would inevitably lead to the fall of the euro zone, with devastating effects for geopolitical and economic balance that would reach far beyond the Old Continent.

However, our government does not seem to have a specific plan to save Italy, aside from the one dictated by the European Central Bank. That plan, an austerity plan, will only exacerbate the crisis in an effort to put our public finances in order. It is a notoriously disastrous plan in the same vein as the “Washington Consensus.” Clearly, saving Italy and, thus, the euro zone, will require at least euro bonds and perhaps a true European State able to re-establish the sovereignty of the euro. To help him attain this goal, which the Germans continue to resist, Monti can count on the support of Obama and, in Europe, especially on that of the new French president, Hollande. The question is whether that will be enough to persuade Berlin (and Brussels) that, sooner or later, austerity alone will sink us all, pulling us towards the same sad fate as Greece.
A quick survey of North Africa would allow the countries to be placed into two categories. The first would be the countries where the Arab Spring sounded the death knell for regimes deemed immovable (Tunisia, Libya and Egypt). In the second category we could place the leaders who promulgated limited reforms of the strictly controlled, top-down type (Morocco and Algeria).

The Algerian regime is not only subject to new regional pressure, but has been experiencing for years the demands of a population that, over the course of twenty years, has tasted the freedom arising from the political opening up of 1989, suffered the tragedies of terrorism and counter-terrorism of the 1990s and accumulated political-economic frustrations that the return to peace has paradoxically exacerbated. Why has this pressure, indeed, quite real, not yet shaken the foundations of the system? What are the resources behind the resilience of the Algerian regime?

Algeria under Pressure

Algeria is under both internal and external pressure. Let us consider the former before going on to discuss the impact of the Arab revolts on the increased pressure on Algeria.

Social Ferment

Breaking out at the point when the revolts in Tunisia had reached their height, the January 2011 riots attracted the attention of the national and above all international media, which saw them as the beginning of the Arab Spring in Algeria. Nothing came of them and the social movement stopped just as quickly as it had begun. Why? The first reason is undoubtedly related to the nature of these social movements in Algeria. Those who believed in a snowball effect failed to note the redundant and ultimately trivial nature of the riots, to the point where they were compared, not without irony, to a national sport: there was rioting in 30 wilayas in 2002, and in all 48 in 2011. In 2010, the police identified 10,000 social movements throughout the country. The figures in 2012 will certainly be even more impressive. These riots are spectacular prima facie, yet short-lived, of low intensity and geographically limited. They can arise on the least pretext, as a football match, the distribution of housing, a power outage or even a revoked driving licence.

To better understand this reiterated recourse to the riot, one must appreciate the true intensity of the strong sense of injustice imbuing a population perfectly informed of the fact that Algeria is a rich country (182 billion dollars in reserve funds in February 2012), whereas the repercussions on the quality of life are not sufficiently felt. True, the State is investing in huge projects to improve the infrastructure necessary for economic recovery, but the additional costs accumulated, primarily due to corruption, fuel anger.

Moreover, the results in terms of unemployment, training and improvement of health, schooling and

higher education remain below the promises made. By way of example, the government committed to creating 250,000 jobs from 2007 to 2012, but only half of them have come into being. Overall unemployment is not dramatically high (less than 10% according to official statistics), but among graduates it has risen to nearly 18%. Even worse, precariousness is clearly on the rise, insofar as indefinite contracts have fallen from 65% to 49%, while fixed-term contracts have gone from 35% to 50% and the informal sector has literally doubled. Youth who cannot find work, in particular graduates, are citizens who will lose their sense of values, fail to integrate into society, lose confidence in the future and look for an escape route. Violence, delinquency, extremism or hargha (illegal emigration) are some.

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Despite the strong police control of cities (one police officer per 180 inhabitants), the authorities tend to handle situations of tension by imposing a certain degree of restraint on riot police. A restraint that is, after all, quite comprehensible given that the number and frequency of riots renders the option of repression too risky. The other factor for avoiding confrontation is the absence of political continuity. As indicated by the sociologists Amel Boubekeur and Abdel Nasser Djabi, both strikes and riots are driven by pragmatic, socio-economic demands without a trace of political or ideological connotations. What’s worse, parties’ attempts to appropriate themselves of these movements fail miserably, as if protesters were wary of the impact that political parties could have. Have Algerians adopted a culture of apolitical protest?

Political Stagnation

In contrast to socio-economic life, political life seems frozen, suspended in time and space for ten years now. The cause? A great number of factors, among which we shall cite the monopoly exercised by the Presidential Alliance. Comprised of the National Liberation Front (FLN, formerly the sole party), the National Rally for Democracy (RND, founded in 1997 to fill the political void) and the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP, ex-Hamas), the Alliance has de facto effectively ended the game, both on the arithmetical and the ideological levels. Indeed, these being the three most important parties with seats in parliament, nothing can be done without them or against them. Moreover, they represent “nationalist” and Islamist movements, which are the most mobilising ideological trends. This political immobility is certainly not unfamiliar with either the latent or overt tensions that have accompanied an alliance often considered unnatural. First of all, the inevitable rivalries between the FLN and the RND have endured, the two parties investing in and supported by the same constituency. The control of the symbolic posts, in particular the presidency, has also fuelled tension, since neither RND nor MSP put candidates into the running: the RND by its own choice, while the MSP was prevented in 1999, thereafter supporting the successive re-elections of the incumbent president. In addition, there were internal party crises due to rivalries in leadership, political choices or obtaining a position on the electoral lists. The Presidential Speech of April 2011, the announced reforms and the perspectives of change at the head of the State fuelled political rivalries and eventually sounded the death knell for the Alliance. Political immobility is also the responsibility of the political parties, which are nearly invisible beyond elections. They are characterised by unsophisticated programmes, discourse limited to criticism without offering alternatives, ostentatious clientelism, all-round cooptation and absence of change-over within parties claiming to be democratic. Only the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) created a buzz of interest when it announced, at its national convention, that Said Saadi was leaving the presidency of the party he had founded. This is worth mentioning because the RCD is the first party of democratic persuasion to exercise change-over within its ranks.

Incidence in which the political and autocratic system has been called into question are so rare that they are worth mentioning. At the State summit level, there were the declarations made by Minister of the Interior Dahou Ould Kablia acknowledging that Abban Ramdan, an emblematic figure of the War of Independence, had been assassinated by his com-
panions, that those who had negotiated, directed and concluded the Evian Accords had been wrongly prevented from governing and finally, that Algeria had lost 40 years of development and democratisation due to the conflict between “those who were nourished by the teats of socialism and those who sought pragmatic, liberal and rational governance.”

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This is an unprecedented criticism of the system established at independence and a desecration of the War of Independence. Is regional pressure there for a reason?

Regional Pressure

Once the surprise effect had passed, the major powers realigned their position and took up a line of support for the changes in Egypt, Libya and Syria while welcoming reforms initiated in Morocco and the resignation of Yemen’s Head of State. In this extremely unstable context, Algeria maintains a single discourse, transmitting a single message: non-interference in the domestic affairs of countries experiencing strong internal instability, respect for their sovereignty and preservation of their territorial integrity. In the face of successive crises, Algeria advocates the same solution: inclusive political dialogue and managing the crisis in a regional context (the Arab League or the African Union). These positions have brought Algeria the worst criticism. Accused of supporting dictatorships, lending a hand to dictators and ignoring peoples’ legitimate demands, it is the object of hostile campaigns, to which it responds, relegated to a defensive, reactive position. When the war in Libya was at its height, Algeria found itself nearly cornered, holding a determined opposition to any foreign intervention, arguing that such escalation would considerably aggravate the tribal hostilities and historic regional divisions, fuelled by Muammar Gaddafi over the course of 40 years. Moreover, the configuration of the land and the geopolitical environment are conducive to the exportation of the conflict, since it is a region impossible to control that has long been susceptible to the influence of the man who had wished to become king of Africa and who did not hesitate to blow up civil airplanes without fear of retaliation.

Although shared by the African Union, Brazil and India, to cite but States directly involved in the Libyan conflict, Algeria’s position is censured based on the premise that it reflects the fears of an authoritarian regime and not reasons of State. But are these two motives as contradictory as one is led to believe? When the Libyan revolution reached its first anniversary, Cyrenaica unilaterally declared the autonomy of that richest of Libyan regions. At the same time, the first regional initiatives aiming to minimise the heightened risks of destabilisation included Algeria. Also, what seems like a posteriori acknowledgement of the arguments it put forth from the start of the revolts tends to confirm the hypothesis that it is not so much the content of Algeria’s position that should have been questioned, but rather its form. Hence the centralisation of decision-making, the gaps in terms of communication and the illegible, reactive and defensive nature of Algerian policy are clearly problematic. It is thus legitimate to assume that if Algeria had completed its democratic transition, its positions on the Libyan (and Syrian) situation would have been discussed and judged according to developments and the risks to its national security instead of simply being rejected as alibis of a regime on the defensive. Can the reforms passed change that fact?

Algeria’s Resilience

Through ten years of high-intensity terrorism, ten years of stabilisation and political immobility, then
one year of the Arab Spring, Algeria has maintained the political status quo. How and why?

**Diversion through Legislative Adjustments**

No doubt realising that political stagnation on the one hand and social ferment on the other was too fragile a balance to maintain, the policymakers decided to make a gesture. A set of laws were passed promoting political and collective freedoms. In the sphere of political freedoms, the parliament adopted a new law on parties and a new electoral code, as well as a quota system aiming to foster the role of women in elected offices.

This legislation was given a very lukewarm reception. Indeed, in the law on parties, Article 4 stands out for its ambiguity insofar as it prohibits anyone responsible for exploiting religion having led to the national tragedy from founding a party, taking part in its founding or forming part of its governing bodies, whereas individuals having participated in terrorist actions and having acknowledged their responsibility are free to do so. Can a political position, radical though it may be, be more deplorable than the use of violence? Knowing that neither the law nor morals nor ethics can condone such treatment of the issue, the government was quick to clarify that the situation of the reformed terrorists would be studied on a case by case basis.

Insofar as the electoral law, to general public satisfaction, it has replaced agents of the Administration with election judges, but has kept “floor-crossing” and the possibility of individuals in office standing as candidates in elections. The President’s draft laws prescribed that ministers who were candidates step down from office three months before elections and that an elected officer could not switch political parties during his or her term in office, to which FLN and RND were opposed, standing to lose the most from these prescriptions. With regard to the anxiously awaited law on information, it is no less ambiguous.

The government grasped the potentially dangerous nature of the situation and took quick countermeasures. Economic measures came first, with the multiplication and increase in subsidies for staples.

These legislative adjustments have not only disappointed supporters of progressive, controlled change within the regime itself, but have also raised questions on the nature of relations within the government, since the proposals put forth by the President were emptied of meaning by the parties constituting the Presidential Alliance. Was this why, two months before the legislative elections, the Head of State prohibited the FLN ministers and local party leaders from standing for parliamentary election? In any case, the aim of passing these laws and of their timing seems to be to occupy public opinion and reduce the risks of change to simple legislative adjustments.

**The Depoliticisation Effect of Income Distribution**

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5 Centre national de l’informatique et des statistiques (CNIS), Direction Générale des Douanes, Liberté, 15 February 2012. The figures for the first semester are available at the CNIS website at www.douane.gov.dz/pdf/r_periodique/1er%20SEMESTRE%202011.pdf
The psychological impact of the quantitative increase in Islamist actors is heightened by the spectacular victories of Islamists in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, and the trend will most likely repeat itself in Libya as well.

In addition to raising wages in a great many sectors and raising the minimum wage and pensions, the government cleared certain companies of debt and increased credits to young entrepreneurs. In total, the social transfers will amount to nearly 1,500 billion dinars (approximately €1.5 billion), that is, 10% of the national budget. The direct impact was immediate, since the per capita GDP went from $1,801 in 2000 to $4,798 in 2011. It will reach $4,987 by 2012, $5,179 by 2013 and $5,388 by 2014. In any case, economists contest this policy to buy social peace and consider it a waste of State resources and an encouragement of inflation to the detriment of productive investments. Employers are rebelling against the obligation to raise their pay scale to the level of that of civil servants, whereas policymakers advocate government support to the most disadvantaged.

The Dissuasive Effect of Fear

On the basis of a historical determinism, conscious for some and unconscious for others, the Arab revolts have revived the worse fears in Algeria regarding the risk of sliding back into high-intensity violence. The scars of the terrorism of the 1990s having had neither the time nor the opportunity to heal, the revolts have a tendency to cause, in public opinion, including among youth, the perpetuation of the status quo. The authorities do not hesitate to exploit this trauma, at the least opportunity recalling that uncontrolled change would be equivalent to playing with fire. Two arguments have allowed the calculated, interested official discourse to reach its target. The first is the absence, in contrast to Egypt and Tunisia, of intermediary civil structures capable of organising social protest, of optimising it, turning it into a source of proposals and preventing any violent tendencies. The persistence of the “micorevolts” is a consequence of this absence. The authorities know this well, for it is they who have issued the licences to the over 80,000 civil society organisations. On the other hand, no-one knows the real potential of the Islamists. The head of the FLN, Abdelaziz Belkhadem, a conservative who is considered to have Islamist sympathies, foresees an Islamist victory of 35 to 40%. In the face of a “democratic” trend, always so divided, three Islamist parties have decided to run in the elections with joint lists in order to optimise their results. There are also the Islamist parties recently fostered within the framework of reforms. The psychological impact of the quantitative increase in Islamist actors is heightened by the spectacular victories of Islamists in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, and the trend will most likely repeat itself in Libya as well. All of these factors are used in official discourse to stoke fears of a dramatic regression. However, the real situation is more complex. Algeria’s “green” or Islamist coalition consists of three parties, the MSP, Ennahda and El

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4 Annually, 20% of the State’s expenditure goes to support for housing, families, pensions, health, war veterans and the destitute and other disadvantaged groups. Support for families alone represents over a quarter of the social transfers for 2011, with DA 302.2 billion, of which DA 93 billion went to supporting the price of milk and wheat and DA 78 billion to access to water and electricity. Transfers allocated to the housing sector, amounting to DA 282.7 billion, accounted for 23.5% of overall transfers, whereas over 18% of transfers went to support for health, with DA 220.6 billion, the majority of which (DA 218.5 billion) went to public health establishments. United Nations Commission for Social Development, Press Release of the UN Information Center in Algiers, 14 February 2011: www.dz.undp.org/omd/dossiers_presse/Revue_presse140211.pdf


6 Ali Boukrami, Secretary of State for Statistics.

7 These are Abdullah Djaballah’s Front for Justice and Development (FJD), Abdelmajid Menasra’s Front for National Change (FCN), Mohamed Said’s Party for Freedom and Justice (PLJ) and Djamel Benabdeslam’s New Algeria Front (FAN).
Islah, involved in the political arena since their creation. The MSP is the most deeply involved, since it has been a stakeholder in the executive branch since it first supported Abdelaziz Bouteflika in 1999 and some of its ministers have been involved in scandals. Not all Islamists, however, are in favour of participating, as the leaders of the dissolved Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) have refused to see their followers join their rivals and have called a boycott.

The second major argument used in official discourse to stoke fear is supplied by the situations of civil war in Libya and potentially in Syria – the thousands of civilian victims, the shift towards militarisation of protest and the risk of foreign intervention. The Algerian system’s capacity for resilience has various sources: financial, security and historical. But like oil, these are non-renewable resources and will eventually run out.

There is also the case of Bahrain and Yemen, where the International Community has more or less opted for the preservation of the status quo. The famous speech of “double standards” and “Western hypocrisy” was merrily pronounced, much to the chagrin of those who expected a relaunch of democratic transition in Algeria thanks to the regional context.

Conclusion

The Algerian system’s capacity for resilience has various sources: financial, security and historical. But like oil, these are non-renewable resources and will eventually run out. The double legitimacy – revolutionary and antiterrorist – will eventually be eroded, by time in the case of the former, and by the controversial effects of national reconciliation in the case of the latter. With regard to the financial resources upon which the influence of the neo-patrimonial system partially depends, they are as volatile as the financial markets. What’s worse, they put Algeria in a situation of temporary affluence and chronic vulnerability. Since independence, the Algerian system has been based on power relations and balances of power between domestic and foreign, civilian and military, East and West, secular and religious, liberalism and state control. However, abuse of power and regional changes have been rendering these balances increasingly fragile and their sharp break would be highly dangerous, for both those wishing to perpetuate the status quo and those wishing to replace it with real democratic change. For all of these reasons, the question is to ascertain, not whether there will be change, but how it will come about and to the benefit of whom.

Bibliography


The Libyan Revolution and the Rise of Local Power Centres

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Among the Arab Spring’s diverse developments, the Libyan revolution took a singular course. No other country in the region saw the state apparatus split and a rebel leadership emerge that successfully laid claim to representing the State. The complete breakdown of the Libyan regime is unique in the context of the Arab Spring. Contrary to developments in neighbouring States, there is almost no continuity between the regime’s executive institutions and those of the transitional authorities.

A defining aspect of the Libyan revolution was the emergence of local power centres in the wake of the State’s collapse. As Libya moves towards elections to a General Assembly, scheduled for June 2012, cities, tribes and militias are vying for influence at the local and national levels. Broader, nationwide coalitions and forces have yet to emerge. The National Transitional Council (NTC) and its government are facing a crisis of legitimacy: they are largely detached from the local forces shaping events on the ground and unable to control them. The challenges facing Libya are more fundamental than in most other countries of the region: as elsewhere, both the domestic balance of power and the rules of the game are being renegotiated. But in Libya, the additional challenge amounts to nothing less than building an entirely new State.

The NTC and the Revolutionary Forces

The “17 February Revolution” was triggered primarily by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. On 15 February 2011, a small group of protesters in Benghazi demanded justice for the victims of a 1996 prison massacre. The same day, youth in the towns of Bayda and Darna (Green Mountains) and Zintan (Nafusa Mountains) set government buildings on fire and called for the regime’s demise. Within days, the unrest also spread to the capital Tripoli and other cities in the north-west.

Two developments were decisive for the revolt to escalate into a revolution. The first was the regime’s violent response to the protests. The more protesters were killed by the security forces, the more quickly political, military and tribal leaders joined the revolt to protect their families and cities. Whatever initial demands protesters may have had, they became irrelevant once regime forces had killed hundreds of people. Civilians armed themselves, and whole army units defected. The reason for this development lay in the strength of local, family and tribal loyalties, as well as the weakness of state institutions. As a result, the country found itself in a state of civil war within two weeks of the protests erupting. The second key development was the establishment of the NTC in Benghazi in early March. With the NTC, an elitist leadership comprising a coalition of regime defectors and dissidents placed itself at the head of an initially unorganised uprising.

From the outset, the political leadership and the forces that led the revolution on the ground were united only by their goal to topple the regime. Within the NTC, its Executive Office and its diplomatic representatives abroad, the clearest divide ran between former senior regime officials and longstanding members of the exiled opposition. But neither camp was by any means homogenous. The former included close Gaddafi aides and senior military officers, former Gaddafi confidants who had seen exile or imprisonment, and technocrats and reformers who had only briefly occupied top positions (such as NTC...
chairman Mustafa Abdul Jalil or the head of its Executive Office, Mahmoud Jibril). Long-time members of the exiled opposition dominated the other main group in the NTC. They included many representatives of the aristocratic and bourgeois families who played a leading role under the monarchy, but were marginalised under Gaddafi (Lacher, 2011). They were joined by former members of the exiled opposition from less prominent backgrounds (such as Oil and Finance Minister Ali Tarhouni), as well as representatives of the educated elite – university professors and lawyers – who had remained in Libya throughout Gaddafi’s rule, such as NTC vice-chairman Abdel Hafiz Ghoga. Across all social divides, Libyans from the north-east were strongly overrepresented in the NTC and its Executive Office until the fall of Tripoli in August 2011.

The most significant rift, however, emerged between this elitist leadership and the forces leading the revolutionary struggle on the ground. The NTC largely (and successfully) focused on obtaining international recognition, while investing much less effort in coordinating and supporting local revolutionary forces. In the Cyrenaica, the eastern Oases, the Nafusa Mountains and Misrata, a growing number of revolutionary brigades formed on the basis of individual tribes or cities. In Misrata and Benghazi, dozens of different groups emerged. Led by tribal notables, businessmen or defected army officers, the revolutionary brigades were mainly recruited among civilians. The initial goal of most brigades that formed outside the Cyrenaica was to protect their cities. The loyalties of these brigades lay first and foremost with their own tribes and cities. Several brigades that fought on the eastern front were recruited from people close to the defunct Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which had led an insurgency against the regime during the 1990s and had a strong local base in the north-eastern cities of Darnah and Bayda. As the conflict evolved, local military councils emerged to coordinate this plethora of militias, with varying degrees of success.

The NTC completely failed to control these developments. In the east, the brigades refused to submit to the command structures of the defected army units. Some brigades were loosely tied to the NTC’s Defence and Interior Ministries, while others operated entirely independently. In Misrata and the Nafusa Mountains, the NTC had even less influence, provided little support, and only belatedly tried to establish closer relations (ICG, 2011). Local actors even established separate foreign relations: local brigades in Misrata and the Nafusa Mountains, as well as individual militia leaders such as Abdel Hakim Belhadj (a former LIFG leader), received backing from Qatar. The NTC’s loss of control over the military forces leading the revolution was first highlighted by the murder of the defected army units’ Chief of Staff, General Abdel Fattah Younes, in July 2011. Although the details remain murky, Younes was apparently assassinated by members of a revolutionary brigade.

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The struggle of individual cities and tribes against the regime gave rise to the dynamics that continue to define the Libyan transition: the emergence of local power centres, tensions between the revolutionary base and the political leadership, as well as rivalries between armed groups from different tribes and cities.

The NTC's Weakness and Growing Rivalries after the Regime's Collapse

After the fall of Tripoli in late August 2011, the defeat of the regime’s remnants in Sirte and Bani Walid, and the proclamation of Libya’s liberation on 23 October, the NTC entered a crisis of legitimacy. Short of funds, reluctant to press for the release of frozen Libyan assets in the absence of adequate control structures, and having taken over a collapsed state apparatus, the NTC failed to quickly get the administration and economy working again. Militia leaders and the influential cleric Ali Sallabi harshly criticised the role of former regime officials or liberal figures such as Mahmoud Jibril or Ali Tarhouni on the NTC and its Executive Office.

The transitional government formed, after much wrangling, in mid-November 2011 saw the departure of many previously prominent players. Like Prime Min-
ister Abdel Rahim al-Kib, most new ministers were technocrats without a prominent political background. Significantly, though, the influence of local power centres and brigades was reflected in the appointments of Osama al-Juwali and Fawzi Abdel Aal as Defence and Interior Ministers respectively. Both had played a leading role in the struggle in their home towns of Zintan and Misrata, which emerged as military heavyweights during the civil war. Moreover, between August and December 2011, the NTC significantly broadened its membership, asking local councils to name representatives for the NTC based on a formula that sought to ensure that all regions and towns were adequately represented. Yet, these developments failed to close the gap between the NTC and the revolutionary forces, both civil and military. Suspicion grew of the transitional government’s use of public funds. In December, protests erupted in Benghazi, Tripoli and other cities, targeting the NTC and its government as ineffective, opaque and unaccountable. The targets of popular resentment also widened to include some of the local councils, most of which, like the NTC, were self-appointed. In Misrata, local elections were held in February 2012, after the local council had become the target of popular resentment. This triggered similar spontaneous initiatives for local elections in other major cities.

With the fall of the regime, the revolutionary forces attained the goal that had held their heterogeneous coalition together. Power struggles intensified thereafter, in which the main actors were proponents of individual cities or tribes. Militia leaders from Misrata and Zintan began demanding greater political influence soon after Tripoli had fallen (Haimzadeh, 2011). Several tribes and cities protested against their alleged marginalisation in the transitional government. Local power brokers in Benghazi and Misrata began lobbying for the relocation of important ministries and parts of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) to their cities.

In addition, local actors were increasingly using their military weight to exert influence. In Tripoli, dozens of militias from the capital and other cities had been competing with each other since late August 2011. In addition to the Tripoli Military Council headed by Belhadj, militias from Zintan and Misrata kept a strong presence. Repeated clashes in the capital demonstrated the NTC’s inability to impose its authority. While some of these clashes had a political dimension, most were spontaneous incidents triggered essentially by indiscipline and hot-headedness among revolutionary brigades. However, militias from Zintan and Misrata also used their presence in the capital to search for people they suspected of having participated in wartime atrocities, leading to cases of torture, disappearances and killings (Amnesty International, 2012).

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Outside Tripoli, serious conflicts developed between armed local actors. Between November 2011 and March 2012, heavy fighting erupted in several regions, including between Warshefana and Zawiya militias, between Mashashiya and Zintan, between Asabea and Gharyan, between Tobu and Zuwayya militias in Kufra, and between a revolutionary brigade and the tribal establishment in Bani Walid. Among the most common triggers for such conflicts were attempts by one group to arrest or disarm members of another community. Many of these conflicts were therefore directly related to the NTC’s slowness in advancing transitional justice. Another common feature was attempts by one party to label their adversaries as “Gaddafi loyalists,” which often occurred when the conflict involved tribal constituencies that had played a key role in the former regime’s security apparatus. Resentment also grew among the inhabitants of Sirte and Bani Walid – mainly Warfalla and Gaddadfa – whose cities had been severely destroyed and ransacked during their capture by revolutionary brigades from Misrata and Tripoli. Since both tribes had dominated Gaddafi’s security apparatus, many of their members had been captured by revolutionary forces. In sum, the civil war had laid the groundwork for new conflicts that the NTC was unable to contain.

Outlook: Local Power Centres and National Political Forces

According to the NTC’s Constitutional Declaration of August 2011, which lays out the timetable for the transition, elections to a General Assembly are to
take place within eight months of Libya’s declaration of liberation, i.e. by 23 June 2012. The assembly is to appoint a provisional government and a constituent committee, which will have four months to produce a draft constitution, according to an amended timeframe adopted in March 2012. New elections are to be held seven months after the constitution has been adopted by referendum.

The NTC and its government are in a position of weakness, raising serious questions about their ability to tackle the acute challenges facing the country: the disarmament and demobilisation of revolutionary brigades and other armed groups, the establishment of a new army and security apparatus, and advancing transitional justice. There is much to suggest that local actors will continue to play a key role during the transition and will be reluctant to relinquish their newly acquired power to the central government (Hüsken, 2012). Many revolutionary brigades refuse to hand in their weapons before national institutions can provide security and a fully legitimate government has taken office. But even once these conditions have been met, some cities or tribes – or individual players in local power centres – could maintain their militias, in order to exert political influence when needed.

The transitional process could also provide opportunities for local actors to transform their military weight into political power. According to the electoral law adopted in early February 2012, three-fifths of the General Assembly’s 200 representatives are to be elected on the basis of local constituencies, while the remainder will enter the assembly through national party lists. Local and tribal interests will therefore feature strongly in both electoral campaigning and post-election politics. The transition is set to proceed under a loose, fractious coalition of competing local interests rather than a coherent central leadership. Local actors could also seek to push through a decentralised model of governance and budget allocation in the constitution-making process, in order to cement their power.

The dominance of local power centres means that initiatives for autonomy in Libya’s north-east, and for a federal political system, are unlikely to gain traction. Participants at a conference in Benghazi in March 2012 decided to establish a regional council that would govern the Cyrenaica autonomously. However, the conference triggered a major backlash from key actors in the north-east, including local councils, militias, tribal leaders and political parties, all of whom refused to recognise the new council. The autonomy initiative therefore has little chance of succeeding.

As of March 2012, nationwide political forces are only beginning to organise. Even the various Islamist currents, which have the greatest potential to emerge as national forces, have yet to develop into well-defined parties; the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood co-founded a party in early March. However, the transformation of Libya’s political landscape has only just begun. The weak central government is less likely than newly emerging national political forces to challenge local actors’ power. The backroom politics of local tribal elites could quickly end up frustrating the predominantly young members of revolutionary brigades, who could represent an important constituency for national movements.

In the meantime, however, the predominance of local power centres also prevents conflicts and power struggles from widening into larger-scale confrontations. To date, the parties to local conflicts have not attempted to form regional or national coalitions. Interests and patterns of mobilisation rooted in the local level are likely to prevent Libya from descending into another civil war.

Bibliography


Due to the breadth of the upheavals in the Arab world over the past months, it has been said and written everywhere that the latter will "never be the same," without, however, the least idea of what it could really become, as the situations remain highly complex and fluctuating.

Insofar as the Maghrebi arena in particular, attention should be placed on the two countries having experienced a change in regime, for the situations in Tunisia on the one hand and Libya on the other shed light on the political and social dynamics underway in a Maghreb that has changed profoundly over the past year. Analysis and critical thought reveal the real issues and the most significant characteristics that best reflect the transitions underway.

The uprisings leading to Ben Ali’s departure in January 2011 and the Western intervention that led to Gaddafi’s downfall and execution in October 2011 inaugurated a new and complex historical stage whose future evolutions we are still far from understanding. Nevertheless, numerous indicators do allow us to consider the unity or risks of division or even implosion of Libya as well as the re-Islamisation or even Salafisation of Tunisia.

**Leadership Weakness**

After over seven months of bombardments, the deaths of thousands of civilians, the destruction of a large part of Libyan infrastructures, the regional and tribal rivalries channelled under Gaddafi’s dictatorship took the upper hand and the Islamists, combated under his regime, are now at the forefront. The presence of militant radical Islamist groups, unnoticed at the beginning of the uprising, proved a determining factor and is today key. A great number of Libyan jihadi Salafists have returned from Afghanistan, Iraq and Yemen to fight alongside the civilian population that initially rose up against Gaddafi; the Islamists freed from prison several months earlier by Saif El-Islam found in the insurrection the unexpected opportunity to liquidate a regime that had fiercely combated them. Today, the NTC is at the head of a country battered by the violence and fighting of a civil war, a country profoundly divided into tribes and clans, in which organised militia and armies control different parts of the territory, including the major cities of Tripoli and Benghazi.

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1 The cost of this war amounted to 300 million euros for France, 300 million pounds (i.e. 343 million euros) for the United Kingdom and 500 million dollars (approximately 395 million euros) for the United States. *Le Figaro international*, 21 October 2011.
The emergence of multiple political actors and various decision-making centres undeniably weakens an NTC that seems more and more like a creation of Western powers and a body far from reflecting the country’s diversity or its majority ideological orientation, some not hesitating to accuse it of extreme secularism. grown strong from the seizure of large quantities of arms taken from Gaddafi’s arsenals and those that foreign powers placed at their disposal during the conflict, the militias are now engaging in combat and fighting together against an NTC that is quickly losing ground.

The latter, which has not succeeded in disarming the militias, is encountering the greatest difficulty in channelling the influence of the katiba (battalions): whether that of Ismail Sallabi or of Abdelhakim Belhaj.

Weakened and questioned by the Islamists on the one hand, and by the Arab-speaking Imazighen (Berbers) of Zentan and the Amazigh-speaking Imazighen (Berbers) of Zouara and Djebel Nefoussa on the other, all of them determined to play the role that had always been denied them by the former regime, the NTC seems to have neither the military means nor the political will to enter into conflict with these groups, and its president, weakened and powerless, no longer rules out the possibility of civil war. Moreover, clashes between groups of ex-rebels defending local or regional interests took place in Tripoli in January 2012, causing five deaths and over a dozen wounded.

For the NTC, which must define the orientations of the new Libya and start drawing up a Constitution and organising elections for 2012, the task is difficult and the construction of a national consensus is proving impossible in such a context. Given the struggle for power between militias and the rivalries between tribes – the Warfalla are divided, the Tubu and Zuwaya in conflict – the risk of civil war and the rupture of Libya’s territorial integrity cannot be ruled out.

The Risks of Territorial Implosion

Due to the many dissensions and rivalries between tribal groups and between these groups and the NTC, the risk of territorial implosion can no longer be ruled out. Moreover, the Transitional Council was not able to prevent Cyrenaica’s declaration of autonomy. It was proclaimed on 6 March 2012 by the Congress of the People of Cyrenaica, which considers itself wronged by the NTC and which has recognised as its leader Ahmed Zubair al-Sanussi, a relative of King Idris I overthrown in 1969 by Colonel Gaddafi and member of the Sanussi Brotherhood.

A number of reasons led to this decision and shed light on the situation in Libya: apart from the fact that it reflects the NTC’s lack of legitimacy, this decision is likewise revealing of the religious conflicts in Sunni Libya, or more precisely, conflicts on religious practices; Cyrenaica, a conservative stronghold, wanted to overcome the obstacles set up by the Salafist and Wahhabi Islamists of Tripolitania to its traditional and customary practices; Cyrenaica, a conservative stronghold, wanted to overcome the obstacles set up by the Salafist and Wahhabi Islamists of Tripolitania to its traditional and customary practices, in particular the cult to the saints or Marabouts. Yet Cyrenaica’s desire for autonomy, a region that spans the country from north to south and has important mineral resources and oil and gas pipelines and terminals, likewise reveals rivalries for control of oilfields, pipelines and oil terminals on the Mediterranean.

Add to this scenario the rebellion of the Tuaregs, who supposedly have ties with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), whom the Libyan chaos has allowed to replenish with weapons and members, not to mention the migrant flow and arms traffic of all sorts, all elements that could accentuate territorial and political destabilisation in the region. Yet a partition of Libya would nonetheless be a serious sign and a dangerous precedent for all the Arab countries in revolt and whose borders were arbitrarily defined by occupying powers. It would also constitute an equally destabilising factor insofar as the territorial integrity of certain African States such as Chad or Niger, faced with armed rebellions.

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2 Despite the declarations of NTC Chairman Mustapha Abdeljalil, former Minister of Justice under Gaddafi, on the incontrovertible role of Sharia during the celebration of Libyan Liberation Day: “Any law contradicting the precepts of Islam shall be considered illegal. The law governing marriage and divorce is illegal and will be repealed because it contradicts Sharia.”

3 Bengazi strongman who fought in Misrata at the head of the 17th February Brigade and advocates the advent of Sharia.

4 Head of the Tripoli Military Council and former Al-Qaeda jihadi imprisoned for 6 years, he is one of the Islamists freed after negotiations led by Saif al Islam.

5 A division of Libya similar to that of Yugoslavia would have serious consequences on the entire region by multiplying the areas of autonomous governance, as well as on relations between neighbours in the Maghreb, Sahel and Middle East.

6 In addition to its tribal and territorial divisions, Libya is also split among rival brotherhoods, with two main –Sufi– groups, Senussi and Tijani, associated with Algeria.
In the face of this situation, Western powers are strangely silent: France, Great Britain and the United States, allied in Libya, did not want to see that the uprising in Libya was fostered, organised and directed by Islamists from the start, and today seem more concerned with the economic repercussions than the country’s political situation.7 Only Qatar, the Arab guarantee against NATO intervention, is attempting to influence the Libyan military terrain, as it has done in the financial and political sphere, and it continues to be involved in post-Gaddafi Libya by supporting the Salafists and former jihadis. This role as sponsor of political Islam irritates the authorities in Tripoli, who suspect it of being behind the schemes to divide the country sought by certain Libyan groups and promoted by Western plans, thus lending greater feasibility to the country’s risk of rupture.

Tunisia: The New Forces Present

Tunisia is at present the only country of the Arab Spring whose revolution has led to a democratic process which has taken place according to the most honourable criteria and within the established timeframe. Whereas the other countries of the Arab Spring are still experiencing situations of chaos, repression, upholding of the established order, worrisome silence or troubling wait-and-see attitudes, Tunisia elected a Constituent Assembly that is working on drafting the new Constitution. A major national debate has begun on the country’s orientation and future personality, and efforts are being made on all sides to take the country out of the terrible economic crisis into which the Arab Spring has plunged it. Given the political and economic context, it is not surprising that the situation remains fluctuating, uncertain and worrisome.

The Singularity of the Tunisian Transition

After rioting that lasted several weeks, resulted in 300 deaths and caused the downfall of the Ben Ali regime, a relatively well-organised democratisation process was launched and has been working to date in a satisfactory manner. The elections held last 23 October, in an open and transparent manner according to observers, allowed the establishment of a Constituent Assembly dominated by the Islamist party, Ennahda, which won the majority of votes in the elections. From the start of the Arab Spring, and whereas Libya underwent foreign intervention, Syria is sinking into civil war and Egypt and Yemen did not experience the revolutionary process through to its end, Tunisia continues to distinguish itself by its orderly, pacific transition, in which the debate on the country’s future is the main focus and covers all political and social issues. Hence Tunisia, the most secular of the Arab-Muslim countries, has witnessed the rise to power of the Tunisian Islamists who, we must recall, played no role whatsoever in the outbreak of the revolts in December 2010 - January 2011 and did not but discreetly accompany the popular determination that led to President Ben Ali’s departure. Nevertheless, with a profound rooting in the country and benefiting from hidden financial support, they quickly orchestrated the triumphal return of Rachid Ghannouchi, head of the Ennahda party, from his long exile in London, and deployed an active electoral campaign in which their status as the eternal opponents weighed heavily. Their success at the polls placed them at the head of the Tunisian political scene, although theoretically, the government is composed of a tripartite coalition with two other parties that are secular and liberal. But Tunisia, which is struggling to cope with the collapse of tourism,8 a situation that has led thousands of youth to unemployment and precariousness, is faced with a severe economic and financial crisis. After the drop in foreign investments,9 Tunisia has met with the greatest difficulty in attracting new investors, recovering those that have left and convincing those that are hesitating. This economic situation, described by some as disastrous, contributes to social malaise and accentuates the feeling of insecurity.

Despite the difficulties and progress that is at times chaotic, Tunisia, whence came the first shockwave, has succeeded in setting up an elected Parliament and a legitimate government, thus instituting the

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8 The tourism sector registered a 33% decline in revenue in 2011, according to the Director General of the Tunisian National Tourism Office, 9 February 2012.
9 There was a drop of 29.2% in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2011, according to the Foreign Investment Promotion Agency (FIPA), 3 February 2012.
most successful transition model of the Arab Spring. Yet the Islamists of Ennahda are not the only actors of this transition. Indeed, whereas the liberal parties are divided and marginalised, only the Salafists seem to be taking the fore, capable of imposing the agenda and the terms of debate.

Towards a Planned Salafisation?

Describing itself as a moderate Islamist party modelled on the Turkish AKP party, Ennahda has sought to be reassuring, promising not to undermine civil liberties but to protect them. Yet the party is increasingly obliged to compromise with the Salafists, whose influence is being increasingly felt in the public and political spheres. Indeed, numbering few and obliged to hide under the Ben Ali regime, the Tunisian Salafists today are growing more and more active, recruiting members from all walks of life. Determined not to remain on the margins of society, they have gradually taken over public space, taken control of hundreds of mosques and created numerous Koranic schools. Considering it their duty to change Tunisian society by leading it towards Islam and strengthening Muslim faith and beliefs, they attempt to impose religious conduct, not hesitating to resort to threats and verbal or physical violence. With the goal of moralising, that is, Salafising public life, violent, spectacular actions have been undertaken in the past few months – attacks against brothels in a number of Tunisian cities, attacks against a cinema theatre in Tunis, protests against a television station and occupation of the universities in Sousse and Tunis –, building a social climate of mistrust, apprehension and fear. The aim is to influence the debate on the Constitution and impose the establishment of Sharia as the sole source of legislation. Moreover, the Salafists are literally occupying the terrain, with recurrent protests, taking control of public spaces to establish codes of conduct or laws in keeping with radical Islam. They seem to be engaged in a real battle with the government and everything would indicate that they are winning. Indeed, to date, the police and the authorities have proven powerless, leading some to accuse the government of approval, complacency or sympathy towards the Salafists, as if the authorities were allowing the Salafists to impose a programme that they do not believe they could afford to openly establish themselves and can only reveal tangentially. This was the case when the Prime Minister raised the idea of a sixth caliphate or when the new Minister of Higher Education’s first decision was to create a degree in Islamic Finance. Rachid Ghannouchi also confirmed his party’s spirit of conciliation and accommodation with regard to the Salafists when he qualified them as “an intellectual movement with which we must engage in dialogue.” It would seem that nothing could hinder Salafist activism, to the great concern of the Secular and Liberal proponents, who are witnessing how their revolution, begun without a party, programme or leader, is now being taken over by the Salafists, who are ready to use it against them. And likewise to the greatest concern of Tunisian women, the main actors of the uprising, who had hoped to gain more rights and equality and are witnessing how their revolution is being monopolised by the very ones who deny them their rights and liberties.

Conclusion

Whereas Algeria has to date been spared the winds of revolution that have been shaking the Arab world for over a year now and Morocco, under the aegis of the King, has undertaken constitutional reforms in accordance with the Justice and Development Party (PJD) that won the legislative elections of November 2011, guaranteeing the regime’s stability and the monarchy’s permanency for the time being, Tunisia and Libya, the two countries that experienced real upheavals, continue to follow their own dynamics and define the issues of the new Maghreb. Thus, the Arab Spring has given rise to the Islamism that the dictators had fought against and prohibited. This new factor is modifying the balance of powers in the Maghreb, relegating Algeria, nearly overwhelmed by the events, to the rank of observer and allowing Tunisia to dream of a new foreign policy orientation.

In addition to the social and economic challenges that the region has been experiencing for decades and that the Arab Spring has aggravated, there is also the challenge of democratisation, whose outcome no one can predict, and the new security challenges that the Libyan context has engendered, which will not fail to affect all Mediterranean countries.

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10 On 16 December, over 5000 people joined a protest in Tunis demanding the application of Sharia.
11 Earlier, in August, the first Koranic school of Tunisia opened in Sidi Al-Bokri on the road to Bizerte, some twenty kilometres from the capital.
12 The initiative to relaunch the Arab Maghreb Union, hosting the Friends of Syria Conference, President Marzouki’s trip through Africa, etc.
2012 is as good (or bad) a year as any other to take stock of what is commonly known as the “Peace Process,” and what in actual fact ought to be called the “Failed Peace Talks,” which date back to either 1947 or 1948. 1947 is the first point of reference, since it was in November of this year, under the historic Resolution 181 of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), that the UN voted in favour of dividing the territory of historical Palestine into two states; a Jewish one and an Arab/Palestinian one. This was fruit of the Peel Commission report, ordered by the recently created global body, after ruling out a single multi-faith and multi-ethnic state, which was as reasonable theoretically as it was unviable in practice. That is where it all began. The second point of reference is May 1948. This date marks the “creation of the State of Israel” on a vast common area, following the withdrawal of the United Kingdom and its troops. The UK had been administrating the territory under the mandate of the (de-funct) League of Nations since the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War. The following point is worth clarifying here, whatever today’s different political standpoints regarding the conflict may be: in November 1947 the recently created UN, which aspired to be a kind of “world government,” proposed two states, and a separate international administration for Jerusalem, the so-called Corpus Separatum, which would be under the sovereignty of neither state.

The question, which is still valid today, is why one of these parties (the Jewish community) accepted, and the other (the Palestinian community) refused. It should also be noted that in that same year the “Cold War” erupted with all its force. So, when the Lebanese Camilla Chamoun (Lebanon was a full member of the UN) proposed a federal or confederal alternative, the United States and the Soviet Union did all they could – both within and outside of the UN – for Resolution 181 to be approved: two states, and that would be that. So, thirty-three states voted in favour (the United States, the Soviet Union and their respective allies), thirteen against (the Arab states plus India, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece and … Cuba!), and ten abstained, led by the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia. In other words, right at the start of the Cold War there was a majority bipolar consensus in favour of the two states. The question that is asked time and time again, is now a hypothesis which cannot be proved, and one of political relevance. If the Palestinians had accepted, would the following sixty-five years have witnessed the same sequence of events? The hypothesis is valid because of another equally relevant consideration. If the solution to the conflict in its current state could be based on “who was there first” or, to put it another way, “who was right or who was dealt an injustice in 1947,” there would be no problem, but that is not the case. In the last sixty-five years there have been several wars between the states (or between Israel and some or several of the surrounding Arab states): 1949, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982 and 2006; there have been two Intifadas, between 1987 and today; and there have been multiple “peace plans,” “peace initiatives” etc., etc. There have been various negotiations between the State of Israel and Arab states, and some have culminated in peace treaties: for example with Egypt, Jordan or Morocco. It has become a non-belligerent state with other Arab states over the years, and even with the Arab League. And with some, like Syria or Lebanon, technically it maintains a “ceasefire” or an agreement to cease hostilities, but without any kind of political
agreement. But there has been only one politically productive peace negotiation between Palestinians and Israelis (and which offered hope for a positive outcome): the “Oslo Accords,” signed in September 1993 in Washington, in what is now a historic photo with Clinton and Arafat on one side and Rabin on the other. That process lasted until its sudden collapse in September 2000 and the outbreak of the Second Intifada. Despite its failure, it hailed the return of the Palestinian leadership to part of Palestine, and the creation of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA).

So let us not be too liberal with the term “peace process,” and instead highlight when negotiations have been effective and when they have not. This is essential if we are to connect the two ends of the timeline of events and compare them. In 1947/1948, the situation regarding both sides’ expectations (the Jewish and Palestinian sides) was symmetrical regarding “what they did not have”: neither of the parties had a state, both parties aspired to having one, a territory of limited surface area was at stake, and resources (such as water) were also limited. Resolution 181 allocated 56% of the territory (but that included the vast, unpopulated Negev desert) for Israel, which at the time had a population of 498,000 Jews and 325,000 Palestinians; and 44% of the territory to the Palestinian State, with a population of 807,000 Palestinians and 10,000 Jews. If you do the maths, that is some 500,000 Jews and 1,100,000 Palestinians in total. Jerusalem, which according to the resolution was under direct international administration, under the UN, then had 100,000 Jews and around 120,000 Palestinians. Those figures are fuel for at least another six decades of dispute.

But while in 1947 the situation between the parties was symmetrical in terms of “what they did not have,” today it is totally different. The asymmetry is so tipped in Israel’s favour, that the actors in question (the two sides, relevant international and regional actors, the United Nations and the European Union) have a notably different framework of action. And here is where the realpolitik appears in its barest form, assuming that in situations of this nature politics is a competition for power; and even more so in the case of international conflicts. Is this situation fair? Not at first glance. On this basis, is the conflict likely to change its course and reinstate justice, or at least some kind of equity? Not necessarily. Not without an above-average political will and ability, which is not an applicable parameter today, in 2012. How did we get here? To answer this, we need to take into account several factors, as well as the aforementioned final asymmetry.

The first factor is that between 1947 and 2012, the conflict has ultimately become bilateral between Israel and Palestine; the disputes between Israel and the surrounding Arab states – except Syria, where today there is also a bilateral dispute between two states, over a border dispute in the Golan Heights – are underway, or have at least been shelved next to one another. That could be an advantage or a drawback, depending on the circumstances, but it further accentuates the asymmetry of power in Israel’s favour.

So let us not be too liberal with the term “peace process,” and instead highlight when negotiations have been effective and when they have not

A second factor is that, since 1947 until today, the world, or rather the World Political System, has changed. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which began and developed in a bipolar world and under the logic of the Cold War, has progressed over the last twenty years in a post-bipolar and post-Cold War world. And in this second stage, in the post-bipolar world, the relative influence that the bipolar system used to have regarding the power balance in Middle Eastern conflicts, has simply vanished. For proof of this, look no further than the role Russia is playing, which is as shocking as it is isolated, in the popular uprising in Syria. It will not be an alleged (and non-existent) “neo-bipolar” world that has an effect on the Israeli government.

A third factor to take into account is that the post-bipolar world of the last twenty years, this alleged “new world order” that emerged from the demise of the Soviet Union and generated as many hopes around the world in its beginnings, as it did disappointments (Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan), has since become the worst possible framework for the situation. From order to disorder, from hope to disappointment, these twenty years encompass three very significant successive phases in the Israeli-Palestinian situation. The first, between 1993 and 2000, was a long process of negotiation, which,
with all its ups and downs, represented the only comparative attempt at reaching a definitive agreement — which, incidentally, was for two states and, at its most generous, offered the Palestinians more or less 60% of what the 1947 Partition plan had allocated them. The message was clear: there will be no more proposals like that made in 1947, or at Camp David in September 2000 (96% of the current West Bank and Gaza). The second stage, the extremely violent Second Intifada, (with five times the number of casualties as the First Intifada and also over a five-year period) marks the darkest moment of the conflict. The third stage, from 2005 until today, combines a wide range of factors. The so-called “International Community” (IC) has demanded that the Palestinians put an end to terrorism and hold democratic elections, which took place in 2005 and 2006. These elections were the most open and competitive of all the Arab world (together with some of those that have been held in Lebanon, and more recently, in Tunisia and Egypt). In 2005 Mahmoud Abbas won the presidential elections, and in 2006 Hamas were clear winners for parliament. Everyone knew the result, and the IC, with its entirely irrational logic, reached the conclusion that since Hamas had won, it would not recognise the results. How has Israel been able to hold three successive truces with Hamas, with the latter on the international lists of terrorist organisations (including the European Union’s)? Because they have been negotiated directly and/or with pre and post-Mubarak Egyptian mediation. So in the last six years, the conditions for halting (or, as Israel admitted, substantially decreasing) acts of terrorism or resistance (depending on the viewpoint) have been fulfilled, and parallel to the construction of the unilateral separation wall. The outbreaks of war have reappeared on isolated occasions (with operations against Gaza such as “Cast Lead” in 2008, or the assault on the international humanitarian aid flotilla in 2010, which incidentally was in international waters), and one element that has undoubtedly continued to grow is the expansion and construction of the settlements, throughout the West Bank and in the Jerusalem belt. The fourth factor concerns the settlement construction, and has been dubbed the issue’s “litmus test.” One thing to bear in mind here is that between 2001 and 2008 the Bush administration played a key role within the structural framework of 9/11 and its global consequences. If those eight years are superimposed onto the sequence described above, it is easier to understand the increase in the aforementioned asymmetry between Israel and Palestine. The “litmus test” was the change from the Bush administration to the Obama administration, Obama’s bold attempt (with his speech in Cairo at the beginning of his term) to reorder relations between the Arab and Muslim world and the US, and how his efforts ran aground precisely over the settlements issue. For every declaration made by Obama or Hillary Clinton, for every official visit to Israel, even of the vice-President Biden, the response of the Israeli government has been to order more settlements, even inside of Jerusalem’s Arab quarter; and we are talking about thousands of new flats, houses, apartments and infrastructures. The “litmus test” lies in the fact that by the third time this had occurred, everyone understood that when it comes to the US and Israel, the hierarchy of power, the supremacy of the strongest over the weakest, is not what it seems; instead the opposite is the case. Israel determines US policy with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and not vice versa. And to further complicate matters, in the US the conflict is much more a part of domestic than it is foreign policy, while in Israel it is solely and exclusively domestic policy.

One element that has undoubtedly continued to grow is the expansion and construction of the settlements

The fifth factor is more simple to outline: it is the sad list of alleged “peace processes,” which have not even reached the condition of “negotiation processes,” practically none of which has even been seriously considered by one or the other (or either) of the two sides. So in ten years we have been witness to an extreme case of “if we say that we are going to negotiate, in the end something will happen,” even if what happens is inadvertent, or down to the alignment of the planets. Starting with the failure of the Oslo Accords that followed the outbreak of the Second Intifada (September-October 2000), the list includes:

- The “Taba summit” (January 2001), which was a last-ditch attempt to relaunch what was agreed at Camp David in July of the previous year. The election of Sharon as Prime Minister in February
2001, however, put an end to an option that was already out of the question due to the ongoing Intifada. Needless to say, a few months later the events of 9/11 provided the perfect excuse to bury the remains of the defunct Camp David peace process.

- The Beirut Peace Plan, or the “Arab initiative” (of the Arab League at the request of Saudi Arabia) of 2002, which revived some of the traditional proposals of the previous thirty years: the return to the 1967 borders, mutual recognition, etc, etc, etc. This was no more than a mere statement, which Israel did not even respond to.
- The “Quartet” and the “Roadmap” of 2003/2004. This initiative will go down in history as a model and paradigm of false negotiation, from start to finish. Mahmoud Abbas and Ariel Sharon having breakfast in Camp David with George W. Bush as host; the photo is not a reconstruction of Camp David 1993, with Clinton, Arafat and Rabin. The proof: what happened in the following six years in both cases. What was most extravagant about the “Quartet” was its motley composition, which seemed to be designed to prevent it from reaching any common position, and above all, if that were to happen, to impose it by force (not necessarily military). It consisted of the United States, Russia, the United Nations and the European Union, which right from the beginning vetoed the presence of Arafat, who had to delegate his recently appointed Prime Minister, Mahmoud Abbas.
- One of the derivatives of the “Quartet” and its Roadmap was the appointment of a “special envoy.” There is not much to say about the first of these, Mr. Wolfhenson, former President of the World Bank, but in 2007, Tony Blair accepted the position. Over the years his overall performance could be perfectly summed up by his total inefficiency and lack of dedication in all but one area, which was covered extensively by the press in 2010 and 2011: his controversial connections, through his position, with the Middle Eastern business world (see: Courrier International N° 1091, Sept/Oct 2011; El Pais, pag 8, 9 October 2011).
- There is also the Annapolis Conference in November 2007, which committed itself to delivering a Palestinian state in a period of one year. An agreement was reached in Annapolis to present a resolution regarding the matter before the UN Security Council, which was not even acknowledged by the Israeli opposition (weeks after the Conference came to an end).
- In the meantime, in 2008, for example, Hamas and Israel reached a bilateral agreement that lasted seven months, until the Israeli operation “Cast Lead,” in December 2008/January 2009.

Israel determines US policy with regard to the Israeli-Palestinian issue, and not vice versa

The conclusion is quite simple. In September 2011 the PNA decided to submit its request before the United Nations for full membership, while at the same time it looked for bilateral support from a considerable number of states, which in September 2011 stood at one hundred and thirty. But everyone knows about UN procedures. To be admitted as a full-member State, you need a favourable vote from the Security Council (which means without a veto from any of the five permanent members) and afterwards two thirds of the votes in the General Assembly. So since the UNSC does not have official decision times in its regulations, the request will remain where it is until further notice. For the time being and as meagre compensation, before the end of 2011 Palestine was accepted as a member of UNESCO. And for the time being, in 2012, sixty-five years after Resolution 181, that is how it stands.
The Origins of the Revolt

The revolutions in the Arab world have had many latent causes, but in all of them, specific events sparked the fire of revolt. In Syria, apparently it was enough for the regime to repress several protests against the arrest of a number of adolescents from Daraa who had painted graffiti against the regime for the spark to be lit. It was 15 March 2011, not unreasonably called the “Day of Dignity” by protesters. The regime’s defensive reaction to the first protests only caused protests to proliferate throughout the territory, rising in number of participants and elevating the tone of demands.

The daily trickle of deaths, injuries and arrests rose exponentially with the siege of Daraa, the onset of military-type operations in this and other cities and the actions of the Shabiha, the pro-regime brigades that have sown terror among the population.

The regime’s strategy has played out on various fronts since then. On the one hand is the repression against protesters and the action of the Shabiha. On the other hand, the government is making full use of the propaganda machine to create a vision belying the popular and pacific dimensions of the protests.

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The Specificities of the Syrian Context

Although it follows the path of the Arab revolts preceding it, Syria’s revolution displays unique characteristics due to the country’s social composition, the nature of its political, economic and military power and the regional context.

The Syrian population is enormously diverse. Arabs are the majority (80%), but there is a significant Kurdish community (15%) and other, less numerous minorities such as Assyrians, Armenians, Circassians and Turkmen. Insofar as religions, living together in Syria are Sunni Muslims (70-75%), Shiites, Alawi (12%, although some indicate their number as 20%), Druze (1-3%), Ismaili (1-3%) and Christians (10%). In addition, there are Palestinian refugees (2.3%) and Iraqi refugees (some 1 million or more, who are returning to Iraq due to the conflict). Depending on how one looks at it, all the minorities together can add up to 40% of the population, so that on the whole they are no longer so “minority”.

Syrian diversity has served to foster a culturalist reading of the conflict, although the roots of the conflict should not be sought in enmity between confessions but in political contention and, ultimately, in the struggle for power. Diversity is a key factor insofar as the regime has manipulated it through a policy of sectarianisation that has prevented unified collective action.
To a certain extent, the regime has co-opted specific sectors of these minority communities and made them accomplices and hostages to their survival. However, the organic cohesion of this circle of power would not be possible without the support of certain sectors of the Sunni entrepreneurial and commercial middle class in large cities, who have benefited from the economic privileges that their relations with the government in power has brought them. Until the summer of 2012, this framework of political-economic networks had protected the Damascus and Aleppo metropolises from massive expressions of discontent, since this is where economic growth and wellbeing is concentrated, in clear contrast to a rural environment excluded from progress and suffering from the droughts of the past few years. This economic argument explains the strong rural, decentralised nature of the Syrian revolution.

Diversity is a key factor insofar as the regime has manipulated it through a policy of sectarianisation that has prevented unified collective action. In contrast to Tunisia and Egypt, where there was a more or less independent worker movement and a nascent civil society network, in Syria the Assad family’s Alawi clan spread its dominion over all elements of society and the State (labour unions, educational institutions, associations, etc.), making Syria the first hereditary republic or yumlaka - from yumhuriyya (republic) and mamlaka (kingdom). The hegemony of the family clan and the major Alawi presence in the military has saved the regime for months from desertions and has allowed it to conduct a policy of repression against the population in the name of the “stability” – i.e. survival – of the regime and its loyalists.

From a geostrategic point of view, Syria is located in a region of enormous vulnerability and political instability. The fragility of neighbouring Iraq can be added to that of Lebanon, a country with which it has maintained a complex relationship of intervention and influence through the Lebanese Hezbollah militia. A major ally to Iran, Syria constitutes the cornerstone of what has ostentatiously been called the “Shiite crescent” and maintains its confrontation with Israel through the Lebanese militia. Although direct conflicts between both countries have been highly sporadic over the past few decades, the enmity against Israel has allowed Syria to call itself the champion of the Arab cause and the anti-imperialist struggle.

The Regime’s Promises, Devoid of Credibility

To retain a certain legitimacy and international credit for its capacity for reform, promises did not take long to arrive, although the path of repression continues relentlessly, making those words empty. After the President’s speech on 30 March 2011 came concessions to conservative Islamism and the nationalisation of 100,000 Kurds in the Al-Hasakah Governorate. Nonetheless, the prospects for change have no credibility in the eyes of a population that feels it has torn down the walls of fear.

In his third public speech, Assad committed to undertake a reform process, such that after local elections, a constitutional referendum was held in February 2012 and parliamentary elections were announced for May. The revised constitution eases restrictions on the creation of new political parties, limits the presidency to two, seven-year terms in office and ends the monopoly of the Ba’ath party on Syrian politics and society, making way for a multi-party system.

Both the referendum and the elections took place in a climate of generalised violence. The amendments adopted were merely cosmetic and had no impact on the distribution of power. None of the new parties running in the elections enjoyed credibility and, although this reform process is much more than any Syrian would have dared to imagine before March 2011, the revolution has reached the point of no return.

From Pacific Revolt to Civil(?) War

The Syrian revolt was originally a pacific, non-violent movement. Its social composition, the nature of its demands and the use of demonstrations as the main mechanism for expressing dissent demonstrate that it is not rooted in a conscious initial strategy or concrete ideological preferences. Nonetheless, the repressive tactic employed by the regime has decisively contributed to radicalisation. Perhaps the revolt would not have been able to withstand the repression without the protection of the deserters from the armed forces, who have progressively organised to
form the Free Syrian Army (FSA), a non-coordinated organisation which has also been joined by personnel from the civilian sphere and external militias. It is difficult to date the start of the revolt’s militarisation, but possibly in the summer of 2011, when repression by the regime rocketed. At that time, the armed opposition groups started to organise to protect demonstrations and rebel areas and began to fight the Shabiha and security forces. Supplied by the clandestine inflow of arms, the armed opposition began to adopt guerrilla tactics and also began displaying more ideological biases and even a distancing with certain sectors wishing to keep the insurrection peaceful.

The definitive turning point in the degree of violence was symbolised by the Bab Amro bombing in Homs, where in early 2012, the regime deployed its elite units to recover territory that had escaped from its control.

The battles for Damascus and Aleppo, the capture of several border positions and the multiple points of revolt show a regime against the ropes

Moreover, the massacres, the responsibility for which is uncertain and which follow patterns of sectarian violence, seem to be inexorably leading to civil war. Syria is displaying untenable levels of violence with the massacres of civilians – among them many children – in May in Al Huleh, June in Qubair and July in Treimseh. The responsibility for said massacres is still pending investigation. Activists accuse the pro-regime militias of perpetrating them but the regime continues to deny any responsibility.

In the summer of 2012, the confrontation was officially declared a civil war by the United Nations, the regime itself and the International Red Cross, among others, due to the massacres of civilians and the scope of confrontations. Nonetheless, the activists and certain analysts refuse to accept this qualification, as they consider that it continues to be a struggle of the people against the regime and not a war between two factions of the population.

In July 2012, the rebels’ guerrilla tactics put the army in check at its most loyal strongholds, Damascus and Aleppo, and managed to inflict a blow to the heart of the military leadership in an attack killing the Minister of Defence, among others. The battles for Damascus and Aleppo, the capture of several border positions and the multiple points of revolt show a regime against the ropes.

By late July, the seventeen months of revolt had taken a human toll of 19,000 lives, according to the Syrian Human Rights Observatory, and according to the UN, there are over 150,000 refugees and some million and a half displaced people.

A Divided Political Opposition

Fifty years of repressive measures, of subjecting the opposition to mutual mistrust, forced silence, exile and discredit have resulted in a fragmented opposition. Omar Dahi classified it into five groups on the Syria Comment Blog: supporters of the traditional opposition (socialists, Nasserists and communists); dissident intellectuals; youth movements (including the Local Coordination Committees that have served as engines of the revolution and which other sectors have joined); a disperse group of conservative Muslims; and finally, armed Salafist groups that represent a minority but whose presence has given rise to enormous reticence among the international community. The differences lie in such fundamental matters as recourse to armed struggle, the acceptance of foreign intervention or a predisposition towards dialogue or making a pact with certain sectors of the regime. There are, however, no clear dividing lines and within a single group positions have veered.

The foundation of the opposition consists of the tan-siqiya, coordination groups comprised of young activists that spread information (some 400 groups) and meet as Local Coordination Committees. They are the spinal column of the revolution. These groups include representatives of a wide variety of citizen tendencies, and although the activists assert that protests are spontaneous and not directed, there is a certain organisational structure.

The National Coordination Committee (NCC), created in mid-September 2011 and based in Damascus, is a coalition including political parties, youth movements, Kurdish parties and independent activists. Opposed to foreign intervention and more inclined towards dialogue, it has insurmountable differences and a declared rivalry with the Syrian National Council, the other political opposition organisation. The Syrian National Council (SNC), established in
October 2011, is the most internationally-recognised opposition group. It includes members of the Damascus Declaration group, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Local Coordination Committees, the National Bloc, the Kurdish Bloc (many of whom eventually left the Council), the Assyrian Bloc and independent activists. Although when it was established, it was committed to the non-violent nature of the revolution, the SNC eventually created a military command in supposed coordination with the FSA and calling for international intervention. In-fighting and rivalries have considerably undermined its power base and capacity, and disagreements and desertions have been constant.

Another cause of discrepancy between opposition groups are international affinities. Foreign support can influence the results of the conflict and could eventually determine the international alignment of a post-Assad Syria. Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, USA, France, Iran and Russia are deeply involved in the struggle for the future of Syria, not to mention Lebanese factions, Kurdish militia and Islamist groups of all sorts.

In the words of certain activists not allied with the SNC, the latter has clearly accommodated itself to this proxy war by accepting the backing of the West, Turkey and the Gulf States.

Despite expressed intentions, international support has acted as a factor of dissent rather than cohesion among the Syrian opposition.

An Inoperative International Community and the Risk of a Proxy War

Over the past year, the most recent regional and international conflicts have found echoes in Syria: the rivalry between Sunnis (Saudi Arabia) and Shiites (Iran) and the risk of sectarian war and its possible spread to other countries in the region. To explain what has been happening there, terms such as “Lebanisation” or “Iraqisation” have been used, and the situation has even been compared to the Balkan Wars or the Cold War.

Action by the International Community has alternated between sanctions and diplomacy. Sanctions have primarily come from the EU and the US, and have served to put pressure and an economic stranglehold on the regime, although they also end up having an impact on the civilian population. Diplomatic gestures – removal of ambassadors, expulsion of Syrian diplomatic missions or the suspension of membership in the Arab League in November 2011 – have been slow measures of pressure, generally in reaction to a sense of international indignation requiring a response.

The United Nations and the Arab League issued their first statement of condemnation in August 2011, but it was not until November that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) made its first attempt at a condemnatory resolution, vetoed by Russia and China. In the face of this failure, the Arab League reached an agreement with the Syrian regime for it to end repression, release political prisoners, allow journalists access and enter into dialogue with the opposition. The agreement established an observer mission that was to monitor the ceasing of repression during the month of December. In January 2012, the mission began to crumble as some of its members left, considering it a “farce.” The Arab League’s action plan then went to the hands of the UNSC, which attempted to pass a toned-down, negotiated resolution that was finally not approved due to Russia and China’s vetoes.

The following step arrived through the meetings of the so-called “Friends of Syria” in Tunis, then Istanbul and Paris, in which Syrian allies such as Russia did not participate. Symbolic but not very effective, they accentuated the recognition of the SNC as the legitimate opposition and approved the appointment of Kofi Annan as UN and Arab League envoy to mediate in the conflict.

Annan first focused on achieving a ceasing of violence and not a political solution to the conflict. He thus presented his six-point plan: ceasefire; a political process to meet the people’s “aspirations”; release of prisoners; the sending of aid; free movement for journalists; and the right to protest. The international community supports the initiative, although it was born amid scepticism, since the Syrian regime does not seem eager for military withdrawal. It has, however, lent the regime time to pursue its strategy of repression.

Despite the deployment of 300 observers, failure is becoming more and more patent with every passing day. The military repression continues, the massacres confirm the trend towards greater violence and de-legitimise Annan’s initiative. In late July, Geneva hosted a meeting where world powers agreed on the formation of a transition government, although what Assad’s future was to be was not clear. Faced with this situation of helplessness, various countries have admitted that they are aiding the rebel army, some with arms, others with funding and yet others
with communications tools, while Russia continues to send arms to the regime. The repressive tactic has been closely linked with the regime’s sense of immunity, for at no time has foreign military intervention like the one in Libya appeared plausible. No international actor seems willing to have a new Iraq, aware that Syria is not Libya and the implications of intervention are unforeseeable.

In any case, Assad could not have withstood so many months of revolt or international pressure without the help of steadfast allies. Ferocious detractors of international interference in a country’s internal affairs, neither Russia nor China are satisfied with the results of the intervention in Libya. Moreover, Russia is not willing to lose its positions in the region, whether in the form of business and arms contracts, or its naval port enclave of Tartus – it’s foothold in the Mediterranean. Iran has reached Hezbollah through Syria, influenced the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and deepened its confrontation with Israel. Indeed, it is no small matter that over the preceding few months, the Iranian nuclear issue has re-emerged, or even that the war drums were beating between Israel and Iran at some point. Losing Syria would only make Iran weaker and more vulnerable in a hostile regional setting.

Turkey has been obliged to give up its zero problems policy and has had to deal with the Syrian quagmire. Being the great victor of the so-called “Arab revolution” and presented as a model of Islamic democracy, the crisis in Syria has put Turkey in a complex dilemma as it pressures the government, supports the rebels, responds to the refugee crisis, organises the opposition and at the same time, attempts to prevent Syria from becoming a new Iraq and the Kurdish question from implicating Turkey. The Syrian crisis is certainly a playing field in which the different actors are vying for their interests, and the fall of the Assad regime could bring drastic change to the regional balance of power. All regional and international actors have, in one way or another, attempted to maintain their positions, strengthen their alliances and ensure themselves a beneficial relationship with Syria, whether with the current regime or a future government.

The Regime Begins to Fissure in the Face of an Uncertain, Fearful Future

The beginning of Ramadan coincided with a rebel offensive that has put the regime against the ropes at its political and economic heartland. Assad has responded by deploying military fighter planes to bombard neighbourhoods and territories taken by the rebels and assuring that he will not hesitate to use his arsenal of chemical and biological weapons against any external aggression. The presence of these weapons increases the danger of escalation into large-scale regional conflict, especially now that opinions in favour of international intervention are again being heard, an intervention that is, however, unlikely to occur.

Even so, the regime is beginning to crumble. Desertions among loyalists and the security forces and the seizure of border control points by the rebels are factors that are beginning to be felt. It is impossible to predict when the regime will fall, since Assad’s army is powerful and it has not yet deployed its full potential for firepower, which means that the humanitarian crisis can grow much worse.

At this stage, although international powers managed to agree to a consensual transition, the “Yemen-style” solution or “soft landing” could arrive too late; the opposition does not seem willing to accept a solution involving continuity, even if Assad does leave. The future is being played out on the military flank – the end of the regime will come if it loses the trust of the loyal forces through which it can retain power and protect its clientelist privileges.

The issue is to avoid an institutional vacuum, territorial fragmentation and the thirst for revenge, and control the armed militias that are acting with no control. We shall see whether the opposition, so disparate to date, will be able to unite to form a political front, whether regional and international powers are capable of playing a positive role for once and for all, and whether a social consensus can be reached to avoid civil confrontation and bring together the wills to build a new order protecting the rights of the entire Syrian population. In his column, Thomas L. Friedman has recently mentioned the need for a “Syrian Mandela.” He may possibly exist – there are politicians, activists and other personalities of great value and integrity among the opposition. This person must simply be able to garner the necessary support and – a factor with is extremely complex considering the political experience in the region – be able to act free of foreign intervention that would distort the construction of a democratic future for all Syrians.
The Fragile Balance in Lebanon: Domestic Tension and Foreign Pressure

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Since the beginning of 2011, the Lebanese have been experiencing one event after another combining domestic tensions and outside pressure. Against a background of heightened political crisis with regard to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) leading to the suspension of meetings of the Council of Ministers and the Committee for National Dialogue, eleven ministers resigned on 12 January 2011, thus causing the collapse of the "national unity government" presided by Saad Hariri. On 24 January 2011, following the obligatory parliamentary consultations led by the President of the Republic for the appointment of a new Prime Minister, Najib Mikati was entrusted with forming a new cabinet, thus indicating a change involving the political majority emerging from the 2009 legislative elections. It was not until 13 June 2011, after 145 days of negotiations, that this businessman from the Lebanese city of Tripoli, who had entered the political arena over the course of the past decade as an independent Sunni, succeeded in forming his cabinet. Composed of thirty ministers all belonging to the new "political majority," he thus broke with the principle of national unity government after the 14 March Coalition refused to participate in the future government. This governmental composition has put many Western diplomats and policymakers on their guard: the new government should not renege on Lebanon's international engagements, in particular those concerning the STL and Resolution 1701, as well as the United Nations Interim Force (UNIFIL) in southern Lebanon, a target of several attacks over the past few months. During this long period of domestic negotiation, Arab regimes fell under pressure from protesters and a revolt broke out in Syria whose first repercussions were felt directly on the Lebanese arena as of mid-March 2011.

In this context, everything led to believe that this new government, considered that of the 8 March Coalition and an ally of the Syrian regime, was about to collapse under the effect of the Syrian crisis and its direct projection onto Lebanon's confessional territories. But it is clear today that the government succeeded in handling the situation, creating an unprecedented regional configuration that places Lebanon, both politically and socially, before challenges of a new order.

This article will analyse recent events on the Lebanese political stage through the prism of these external challenges. It emphasises the resilience of the major trends of the Lebanese political system in the

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1 The aim of this tribunal is to try the assassins of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and the crimes of the same nature occurring as a consequence. Since its establishment in May 2007 by the United Nations Security Council, this tribunal has been a source of major political rift in Lebanon.

2 The matter of developing a national defence strategy is one of the main subjects of discord among the top political leaders, who have been discussing it since 2008 within the framework of a National Dialogue Committee, under the aegis of the President of the Republic.

3 The resigning ministers all belonged to the 8 March Coalition: they caused the government to collapse because, according to the constitution, if over a third of its members designated by its constituting decree are no longer in office, the government is considered as having resigned.

4 The last legislative elections, which took place in 2009, witnessed arduous competition between the two political coalitions. The 14 March Coalition, multi-denominational and primarily dominated by the Future Movement (Sunni), the Lebanese Forces (Maronite) and the Progressive Socialist Party (Druze), won the elections over the 8 March Coalition, multi-denominational and primarily dominated by Hezbollah (Shiite), the Amal Movement (Shiite) and the Free Patriotic Movement (Maronite). The Progressive Socialist Party and Sunni politicians from Tripoli (Najib Mikati, Mohammad Safadi, Ahmad Karam), who had been members of the 14 March Coalition, went over to the 8 March Coalition in 2011 to constitute a new political majority and form the government.

5 At the time of writing: April 2012.
face of the following concomitant factors: aggravat-
ed political polarisation, the repercussions of the
Syrian revolt on the domestic stage and Lebanese
mobilisations to “overthrow the sectarian regime.”
Though an analysis of these events ultimately shows
that the internal role or function of the Lebanese
sectarian political system and its mode of consen-
sual government are still valid, for the ensemble of
Lebanese actors and their regional and international
sponsors, it nevertheless reveals the limits of this
system insofar as a model for managing pluralism in
highly diverse South Mediterranean societies.

Majority Government and Consensual
Governance

Though the composition of the government in 2011
showed a change insofar as the balance of power,
i.e. a governing majority and an opposition minority,
the exercise of executive power and the main deci-
sions taken since then reconfirm certain structuring
factors of power that prevailed well before the ap-
lication of the 1990 Ta’if reforms. On the one hand,
they demonstrate that the spirit of consensus is es-
sential for any form of government in Lebanon,
whether it be of the majority or national unity type.
On the other hand, they emphasise the polycentric
nature of power when state institutions do not have
the monopoly over the legitimate political order and
decision-making. Indeed, in the name of the consti-
tutional principle of “living together,” Article 65 of the
Ta’if Constitution designates fourteen basic national
issues requiring the approval of two thirds of the
members of the Council of Ministers in order to be
adopted. This veto or blocking minority principle
serves, in consensual democracies, to eliminate the
risk that a majority segment be de facto marginalised
or excluded from decision-making. Under Syrian
control between 1990 and 2005, one or another of
the three Lebanese Presidents (of the Republic, of
Parliament and of the Council), were alternately
granted or prohibited the right to veto by the Syrian
regime, while a blocking third or blocking minority
was prevented from forming in the Council of Minis-
ters or Parliament. In so doing, Syria assumed the
role of arbiter and gained the last word on all impor-
tant decisions with the aim of serving its own inter-
ests. After the withdrawal of the Syrian army from
Lebanon in April 2005 and until January 2011, the
competition and the tension between the parties re-
volved around the principle of a blocking minority in
the Council of Ministers as a guarantee to the Parlia-
mentary minority. Thus, all governments constituted
during this period respected the principle of “nation-
al unity government,” linking the “majority” with the
“opposition” in the Council of Ministers.

The spirit of consensus is
essential for any form of
government in Lebanon, whether
it be of the majority or national
unity type

Although Prime Minister Mikati’s “majority govern-
ment” does not respect the principle of a “blocking
third” and granting of seats to the opposition, his ad-
ministration has, however, reinstated the power of
the right to veto, thus returning to the consensual
mode of governance, which, in the exercise of pow-
er, takes into account the interests of all groups in
Parliament. All the decisions and measures taken by
the Mikati administration to the present attest to this,
for they take into account the interests of the differ-
ent segments and forces active in Lebanese society.
They also respect Lebanon’s international commit-
ments and the will of the “major international deci-
sion-makers” insofar as the strategic choices to be
adopted by Lebanese actors, whether they be geo-
graphically close (Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Qatar,
etc.) or farther away (the United States, France, the
United Nations, etc.). Among the main contentious
issues dividing the two coalitions – 14 March and 8
March – were the following: the STL and related
matters, i.e. false witnesses, the indictment, funding
and the renewal of its mandate; the issue of the
public expenditure effected “in an anti-constitutional
manner” by the administrations presided by Fouad
Siniora (one of the main leaders of the Future Move-
ment and the 14 March Coalition) from 2005 to
2009; the issue of the senior officials considered by

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6 For further information on these matters, cf. Nidal Jurdi, 2011, “Falling Between the Cracks: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon’s Jurisdictional
Gaps as Obstacles to Achieving Justice and Public Legitimacy," Journal of International Law and Policy, University of Californian, Davis.
the 8 March Coalition as working for the Future Movement and the 14 March Coalition; the matter of the national defence strategy and the fate of the Hezbollah weapons. None of these issues has been settled by this administration in a manner detrimental to the interests of either of the two political poles:

- In the absence of agreement between the two antagonistic poles on the issue to be placed on the agenda of the National Dialogue Committee – the national defence strategy for the 14 March Coalition vs. the issue of the “false witnesses” for the 8 March Coalition –, this committee’s work was simply suspended in November 2010 and indefinitely postponed.
- Concerning the STL, the indictment was made public in late July 2011, charging four members of Hezbollah. The suspects have not been arrested, since at this point they cannot be found, and no further conflict relating to this matter has arisen between the Shiites and the Sunnis in Lebanon.
- Faced with the 8 March Coalition’s refusal to allow the Council of Ministers to authorise the government to pay its part in funding the STL for 2011 (to the sum of 32 million dollars), an extra-governmental compromise was reached, saving face for all parties. At the end of November 2011, Prime Minister Mikati declared that Lebanon had paid the amount of its contribution to the STL from the funds of the High Relief Commission, an organism attached to his office.7 Thus Lebanon honoured its international commitments as well as its commitments to its own (Sunni) community and its electorate. The 8 March Coalition did not have to yield, and the 14 March Coalition considers its interests protected and the State of Lebanon’s commitment to the STL confirmed.
- Despite the exacerbation of political debate with the expiration of the STL mandate in March 2012, the latter was finally extended for three years, according to internal United Nations procedures, with no jolts on the domestic political scene.
- The two other contentious issues, that of the senior officials and that of public expenditure between 2005 and 2009, were also handled along the lines of consensual compromise. The government led by the 8 March Coalition neither dismissed nor tried anyone: the officials are still in office, and bills of law are being discussed in order to find a constitutional solution to the “anti-constitutional” expenditure of preceding administrations led by the Future Movement.

This form of government is thus above all grounded in the management of successive crises through extra-institutional compromise and the search for a lowest common denominator and far from the establishment of new public policies. Beyond certain temporary aspects, it represents a return to the main characteristics of the Lebanese consociational system. Whether they are in the ruling party or the opposition, community leaders still have the power to veto major decisions. This form of governance, which has been progressively established since 2005 – after the withdrawal of the Syrian army, the return from exile of General Michel Aoun and the release of Samir Geagea, leader of Lebanese Forces, from prison –, is being consolidated today through the exercise of majority government.

Lebanon in the Face of the Syrian Revolt: Dissociation or Dislocation?

The Lebanese government’s reaction to the Syrian crisis can also be deciphered according to the same analytical framework, with two original elements worthy of discussion.

The first element is illustrated through the development of a new concept called “dissociation,” applied by Lebanese policymakers in regional and international forums with regard to the Syrian crisis. This concept overrides the concepts and notions in use at earlier times to qualify Lebanese foreign policy: “neutrality” during the pre-war period, “concomitance of the respective Lebanese and Syrian processes and their common destiny” under Syrian control from 1990 to 2005, and “positive neutrality” as of 2005. The concept of “dissociation” consists in abstaining from voting in certain regional or international authorities in which Lebanon participates in decision-making. Abstaining allows Lebanon not to block the vote,

7 Several days later, in mid-December 2011, it turned out that it was the Association of Banks in Lebanon, a private organisation, that transferred to the government the sum paid to the STL from the High Relief Commission funds.
especially when, according to certain regulations, taking a decision is conditioned by the absence of any votes against it. “Dissociation” was adopted by Lebanon six times: twice with regard to Iran at the United Nations Security Council, to which Lebanon was elected a non-permanent member, between 2010 and 2011 (in June 2010, for instance, Lebanon abstained from voting on Resolution 1929 to impose new sanctions on Iran), and four times with regard to Syria, at the UN Security Council (in August 2011, regarding the presidential declaration on Syria, and 4 October 2011, during the vote on a draft resolution condemning the violence and repression in Syria) and at the Arab League (in January 2012, for instance, regarding the plan for transfer of power in Syria proposed by the League).

In light of these two elements – i.e. dissociation with and delimitation of the conflict – and through its consensual form of governance, Lebanon has succeeded, though within certain limits and on the short term, in not importing the Syrian crisis in its violent dimension.

The second element appears in the capacity of the two political coalitions to establish an implicit threshold, not to be crossed in their support to the regime or to the opposition in Syria, and to respect it, despite certain episodic security slips, with the aim of preventing the conflict’s generalisation on the domestic scene. Since March 2011, Lebanon has been living to the rhythm of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations, for or against the Syrian regime. Though demonstrations have taken place in a non-violent manner, violent, bloody clashes fuelled by the Syrian crisis did occur twice in the Lebanese city of Tripoli: in July 2011 and in February 2012, between the Bab al-Tebbaneh district, of primarily Sunni composition, and the Jabal Mohnsen district, primarily Alawi. The Lebanese army managed to contain these confrontations and prevent the conflict from propagating beyond this terrain of “multi-dimensional geography,” which is but a microcosm of the national political geography. Governmental policy regarding the Syrian problem has the support of the highest Christian and Muslim religious authorities. The new Patriarch of the Maronite Church, Bechara Rai, elected on 15 March 2011, is concerned about a confessional tendency emerging in popular uprisings in Arab Countries, above all in Syria, and its impact on the fate of Eastern Christian minorities. Patriarch Rai has not ceased repeating this position, which is in the spirit of the Synod dedicated by the Vatican to the situation of Eastern Christians held in October 2010, on his numerous visits abroad and before Western and Arab Heads of State. The same approach has characterised the discourse at the different Islamic-Christian summits taking place in Lebanon (on 12 May 2011 and 15 March 2012), which have rejected violence and appealed to dialogue and the peaceful coexistence of the different communities, abstaining from openly taking sides in the conflict underway in Syria. These declarations do not quite manage to eclipse the criticism made by a number of Lebanese Sunni religious dignitaries against the Bashar el-Assad regime and Lebanese government policy. In fact, the near majority of protests taking place in Lebanon against the Syrian regime are led by sheikhs and take place on the esplanades of mosques, especially in the coastal Sunni cities of Tripoli and Sidon. That said, the position of the religious establishment, whether Christian or Muslim, is one of considerable support to the policy followed by the Najib Mikati administration, offering him a sort of “legitimisation” that he uses to strengthen his position on the domestic and, above all, the international arenas. The idea endorsed by the Lebanese government of keeping the country isolated from events in Syria has

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8 These two neighbourhoods, among the poorest in Lebanon, have been experiencing conflicts since at least 1983, consisting of a combination of sectarian and political conflicts. Today it is one of the areas where there is confrontation between the Future Movement and Hezbollah.

9 Such as the virulent Sheikh Ahmad el-Assir, who organises meetings and protests in different regions of Lebanon, one of which in downtown Beirut on 4 March 2012. His criticism is not limited to the Syrian regime; he also attacks Hezbollah and its secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah. This sheikh has made rivers of ink flow in Lebanon, and the press wonder “how, at 44 years of age, this imam of a small mosque, from the suburbs of Sidon, has become the Lebanese symbol of the triumphant Islamism of the Arab revolutions?” cf. www.magazine.com.lb/index.asp?ArrowIndex=0&HId=6&IssueNum=2835&Category=1&DesId=10524&DescFlag=1.
progressively gained ground among some of the “major external decision-makers.”

Thus, the repeated pressure exerted on the Lebanese government at the start of the crisis by certain ambassadors and Western and Arab emissaries for it to condemn the Bashar al-Assad regime, apply the different sanctions imposed on the latter, and organise Syrian refugee camps on Lebanese territory and humanitarian corridors, have lost their virulence today. This has resulted, for instance, in the Lebanese government’s applying the international financial sanctions established against Syria following a firm request by the United States to the Lebanese political and financial authorities in late March 2012, during the visit of the US Treasury Under Secretary, David S. Cohen. Nonetheless, Lebanon maintains a considerable margin in the application of economic and commercial sanctions, for matters of the very survival of the Lebanese economy, closely tied to that of Syria. It should be noted that the situation is very fragile in Lebanon and financial sanctions are a source of concern, as the Lebanese economy mainly relies on the banking sector for its survival. Moreover, with regard to the matter of refugees, the government has decided not to take them officially under their care, leaving the matter in the hands of the UN organisations working in Lebanon or Sunni religious organisations with ties to the Future Movement. Along the same lines, it refuses to create humanitarian corridors and to allow the use of Lebanese airports. At the same time, at the Syrian government’s request, the Lebanese government is deploying its army along the entire northern border to stop the arms traffic and the circulation of combatants between the two countries. Ironically, beginning in 2004, it had been the Syrian regime that had refused the demarcation of this northern border of Lebanon and the reinforcement of border guard posts in the region.

In light of these two elements – i.e. dissociation with and delimitation of the conflict – and through its consensual form of governance, Lebanon has succeeded, though within certain limits and on the short term, in not importing the Syrian crisis in its violent dimension, despite the density and complexity of Syrian-Lebanese relations. Managing to prevent such conflict in a country where, throughout its history, sectarian community segments have developed their own foreign policy and have always served as the cogwheels in all sorts of regional conflicts, is a major challenge. The policy of dissociation is the result of an implicit political consensus among the top Lebanese policymakers, representing the whole of the Lebanese political spectrum. Likewise, it is well known that the Lebanese army’s capacity to intervene in a decisive manner in certain types of conflicts in Lebanon does not only depend on its repressive force but also on accords between the top Lebanese and “external” policymakers. This policy has allowed the different Lebanese parties to express themselves and position themselves freely regarding the Syrian crisis without their stances committing the government.

In an unprecedented development, Lebanon has managed to define a political line of its own based on national interest regarding a foreign policy issue without it being entirely dictated by a dominant foreign actor or by international resolutions.

This allows Hezbollah a great margin for manoeuvring, such that it can use its strategic alliance with the Syrian regime and maintain its privileged ties, as it does the 14 March Coalition, such that...
it can openly proclaim full alliance with the Syrian opposition. In an unprecedented development, Lebanon has managed to define a political line of its own based on national interest regarding a foreign policy issue without it being entirely dictated by a dominant foreign actor or by international resolutions. Are these the premises for a national foreign policy that are paradoxically germinating through Lebanon’s approach to the crisis in Syria, the country that subordinated it throughout the two countries’ shared history, the elements constituting the Lebanese State, political sovereignty, territorial integrity and the monopoly of violence? Or perhaps these are but elementary mechanisms of survival and self-protection that will rapidly dissolve the moment Syria slips into civil war?

Aborted Mobilisations and the Survival of the System

In the atmosphere of the Arab Spring and popular uprisings, Lebanese youth summoned people through Facebook to a protest “to overthrow the sectarian regime” on Sunday, 27 February 2011. Individuals and civil society organisations responded to the call, some 2,500 people gathering to demonstrate in the streets of Beirut, chanting slogans against the sectarian regime, corruption and clientelism. These protests multiplied from one Sunday to the next in Beirut and other areas. The height was reached on 20 March 2011 in Beirut, with approximately 25,000 protesters, before the mobilisation ran out of steam under the weight of various constraints, but above all due to the society’s major segmentation and the rigidity of political polarisation. The divisions in internal politics quickly spread to the protest movement, with political parties transferring their conflicts to the demonstrators and their slogans and placards. The outbreak of the Syrian revolt was another element of discord among protesters which they were unable to overcome. All of these factors weighed down the protest, which collapsed before reaching the steps of Parliament at Nejmeh Square because the square had been cut off by order of Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berry, who, by the way, continually demands the system’s secularisation, or “deconfessionalisation.”

To what extent could this system – with its endemic crises, where the idea of “national,” “civil” and “individual” citizenship is sacrificed to the benefit of confessional communities and their representatives – serve as a model for managing the diversity of the South Mediterranean’s plural societies?

Indeed, in the face of such challenges, potentially undermining the system’s structuring framework, all the dominant confessional community elites have united, going beyond their differences to protect the foundations that ensure their control over all aspects of the country’s political, social and economic life. Since the end of the war in 1990, these elites have thus succeeded in blocking all structural reforms, such as those relating to the electoral system, decentralisation, the right of Lebanese women to grant their nationality to their children, a transitional justice system and the fate of the disappeared during the war, the fiscal system, salaries, the health and education systems, etc. The Lebanese political system consists of sharing the power and major functions of the State among the confessional elites, and entirely entrusting confessional community institutions with managing personal status (marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc.). To what extent could this system – with its endemic crises, where the idea of “national,” “civil” and “individual” citizenship is sacrificed to the benefit of confessional communities and their representatives – serve as a model for managing the diversity of the South Mediterranean’s plural societies?

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14 This is the case, for instance, with UN Resolution 1559 (September 2004) proposed by France and the United States, which makes declarations and demands, not only regarding Lebanese security and political affairs, but also on certain aspects of the country’s foreign policy. Cf. http://globaladvocacy.com/resolution_onu_1559.html
Over the course of the past fifty years, Cyprus has become a byword for an intractable ethnic conflict. Most of the time, the Cyprus Problem is little more than a source of irritation for various international policymakers. Sometimes, it becomes front-page news. Having last made the headlines in 2004, when a major attempt by the United Nations to bring about the island’s reunification was defeated by Greek Cypriot voters, the island is starting to creep up the international agenda once again in 2012. The likely collapse of the latest round of UN-sponsored peace talks and the forthcoming Cypriot Presidency of the EU look likely to lead to further tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the discovery of natural gas off the south coast of Cyprus could yet spark a new conflict in the region.

Yet Another Peace Process Appears Likely to Collapse

Despite the best efforts of the United Nations, it seems likely that yet another attempt to resolve the Cyprus problem is about to come to a messy conclusion. After four years of intensive efforts to bridge the gaps between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, it appears as though the two communities have managed to defeat the latest in a long line of international diplomats sent to try to solve what has now become widely regarded as one of the world’s most intractable ethnic conflicts. While both sides will eagerly blame each other for the stalemate, in reality it is hard to pin the blame for the failure of the talks on one side or the other. In truth, neither has seemed that interested in reaching an agreement to reunify the divided island. Although they both claim that they are willing to accept a bizonal-bicommunal federal settlement, as agreed by the UN Security Council, neither is particularly keen on the idea. The Turkish Cypriots would prefer to keep their own state. Failing this, they are aiming for a very loose confederal arrangement. Meanwhile, the best outcome for the Greek Cypriots would be a unitary state in which the Turkish Cypriots have strong minority rights. This will not happen. They have therefore reconciled themselves to a tight federation, in which they would be able to control as much as possible. The task for mediators has been to try to find a balance between the two second-best options. It has been a frustrating and thankless task. Over the years, the two communities have become masters at retaining the status quo. They are more than capable of ensuring that they are not saddled with a solution they do not want.

However, this repeated obstructionism has come at a price for both sides. For the Greek Cypriots, the continued division of the island means that few of the 160,000 people who were displaced when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974, following a Greek military coup on the island, will ever get their property back. Moreover, as a result of the steady influx of mainland Turkish citizens into the north of the island, the demographic structure of the Turkish Cypriot community has now changed. Indeed, today it is well accepted that the Turkish Cypriots are now a minority in the north of the island. Given that it is highly unlikely that many of these settlers will be required to leave, it is no longer the case that, following a solution, Greek and Turkish Cypriots will be sitting alongside one another in the Parliament, cabinet and civil service. There are likely to be many mainland Turks in state institutions as well. For many Greek Cypriots, the thought of reunifying Cyprus under these condi-
tions is unacceptable. In private, but also increasingly in public, many are now questioning whether reunification is really that desirable. For some, the prospect of a formal negotiated division is the logical answer. For most, a perpetuation of the current status quo is more palatable. Having spent almost three decades trying to prevent the international recognition of the self-proclaimed “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC), few Greek Cypriots are now willing to just give up and reward Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots with their own state on the island.

**Few Alternatives to Reunification**

Meanwhile, the Turkish Cypriots are also facing the consequences of their intransigence. Their unilateral declaration of independence, in 1983, has left them economically, politically and culturally isolated on the world stage. After thirty years, many are now asking just how much longer the situation can last. Some have suggested that if – or when – the current talks break down, efforts should be directed towards a Plan B. The problem is that they have few alternatives to reunification. For instance, efforts to try to persuade more countries to recognise the TRNC are unlikely to produce results. UN Security Council Resolution 541 (1983) expressly calls on States not to recognise the Turkish Cypriot State. Moreover, when Cyprus acceded to the European Union (EU), in May 2004, it did so as a single entity. The *acquis communautaire*, the EU’s body of laws, may be suspended in the north of the island. However, the north is still legally regarded as a part of the EU. As a result, any country recognising the unilaterally declared independence of the TRNC would automatically be raising the real prospect of punitive action by the EU. A few countries may be willing to take the risk – but not many. Recognition therefore seems unlikely.

Another option that has been raised more recently is the possibility that Turkey may annex the north of the island. In fact, this is not a new threat. It was used many times by Turkish politicians in the 1990s in order to try to dissuade the EU from opening accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus. At that time it was a bluff. It still is. The stark reality is that any attempt to annex northern Cyprus will automatically end whatever residual hopes there may be that Turkey could join the EU. Quite apart from the fact that Nicosia would veto any further negotiations with Turkey, it seems as though many other EU members would happily seize such an opportunity to close the door to Turkish membership once and for all. Any move to lay formal legal claim to the north would have devastating consequences for Turkish-EU relations. Ankara knows this full well.

In truth, the problem facing the Turkish Government is that there is no feasible Plan B if the talks fall through. For as long as it harbours any hopes of wanting to join the EU, Turkey knows that the only real options are the perpetuation of the current status quo or a formal agreement with the Greek Cypriots. The problem is, as already noted, that the Greek Cypriots have little inclination to reach any agreement. Moreover, there is little external pressure that can be put on them. Now that Cyprus is in the EU, and has joined the euro, they have achieved their key foreign policy goals. Not surprisingly, the frustration at this state of affairs is already showing in Ankara.

**The stark reality is that any attempt to annex northern Cyprus will automatically end whatever residual hopes there may be that Turkey could join the EU**

The Turkish government has said that if there is no solution by the time Cyprus takes over the rotating presidency of the EU, in July 2012, it will break off contacts with the Council – although it will retain links to the European Commission – until the end of the year. In times past, this may have been a source of concern in EU circles. Now, though, few seem to care that much. With the EU facing far more serious problems, enlargement has dropped down the list of priorities. More to the point, many of the States that are most hostile to the thought of Turkish membership would be absolutely delighted to see Turkey isolate itself in this way. Even Turkey’s friends are growing increasingly frustrated at the way that Ankara makes matters difficult for itself. For example, the EU has frequently called on Turkey to normalise its relations with the Republic of Cyprus. A first step in this process would be to open Turkish ports and airports to Cyprus flagged vessels and planes. Ankara has refused. This has had a knock-on effect in terms of its EU accession negotiations with many EU
States believing that Turkey cannot be trusted to keep its word. At this stage, there is very little sympathy for Turkey in EU circles. As a result, it seems almost certain that Turkish-EU relations will deteriorate even further.

The Discovery of Natural Gas

However, the tensions between Turkey and the EU over Cyprus may yet be overshadowed by far more serious issues. Over the course of the last few years, speculation grew that there may well be significant quantities of natural gas off the south coast of Cyprus. In December 2011 these suspicions were confirmed. Exploratory drilling in one of the thirteen offshore blocks established by the Cypriot government indicated that there was anywhere up to 8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. It remains to be seen how much will be found in the others. Suddenly, Cyprus appears to be facing a very bright economic future – a particularly welcome development given the financial problems that it has been facing alongside many of the other southern members of the euro zone. This has not gone down well in Ankara, or amongst the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish government has insisted that the Greek Cypriot administration has no right to exploit these resources without the Turkish Cypriots. Such views have received little sympathy elsewhere. Both the United States and the EU have repeatedly stressed that the Republic of Cyprus is perfectly within its sovereign rights to exploit any resources it finds within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Unhappy with this, Turkey has continued to voice its objections and has even raised the possibility that it may take military steps to prevent Nicosia from pressing ahead with its attempts to exploit its newfound energy deposits. For the meantime, such threats should not be given too much credibility. Again, any attempt to use force against Cyprus will automatically lead to a strong diplomatic response from the EU. At the very least, it will again reconfirm the view held by many in Europe that Turkey is wholly unsuited to membership of a union that is founded on the very principle that no matter how serious the dispute, force, or the threat of force, will not be used to resolve the issue. Still, there is always the danger that posturing could lead to a conflict. While Turkey may have no intention of starting a conflict, accidents can happen when armed forces come into close proximity with one another at times of political tension. Even the act of sending warships to harass drilling platforms could have unforeseen, and unfortunate, consequences.

Next Steps in the Search for a Solution

In addition to the possibility that the discovery of natural gas may lead to further tension, if not conflict, in the Eastern Mediterranean, it could well have a profound effect on efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem. As already noted, many Greek Cypriots are sceptical about, if not wholly opposed to, some form of reunification based on a loose federation. As the numerical majority, they have long believed that a solution should give them the greater share of power on the island. The discovery of natural gas is likely to lead to a hardening of such attitudes. It was difficult enough for many Greek Cypriots to accept reunification when it meant sharing political power with the Turkish Cypriots. It will be that much more difficult to accept this when it also means sharing what could be very significant energy revenues.

The possibility that the Greek Cypriots may soon be earning significant revenues from natural gas makes the prospect of reuniting the island more enticing that it has ever been

However, the discovery of natural gas may also in fact give the Greek Cypriots the greatest leverage they have ever had to pursue a settlement on their terms. It is little secret that many Turkish Cypriots are becoming alarmed at the direction the north is taking. Quite apart from the influx of Turkish settlers, which has made the Turkish Cypriots a minority in their own land, tensions have been growing with Turkey. Isolated from the rest of the world, the TRNC is reliant on handouts from the Turkish State. In an age of austerity, Ankara has called on the Turkish Cypriots to cut back their expenditure. This is a source of resentment amongst many Turkish Cypriots and has led to several high-profile disagreements between the Turkish Cypriot administration and its paymasters in Ankara. Against this backdrop, the possibility that the Greek
Cypriots may soon be earning significant revenues from natural gas makes the prospect of reuniting the island more enticing that it has ever been. Rather than be a subsidised province of Turkey, the Turkish Cypriots have an opportunity to be a major part of a new energy-rich Cypriot State. The trouble is that the Greek Cypriots know this. This gives them a degree of strength that they have rarely enjoyed in the negotiations in the past. If the Turkish Cypriots want a share of those revenues they are going to have to make more concessions than they have been willing to accept in the past. Given the alternatives, or lack of alternatives, this may just have to be something that the Turkish Cypriots will need to accept. But it will hardly be a disaster. Any solution will still be based on a federation. It may just be that the federal model that is accepted will give the Greek Cypriots more power than may have been the case even a few years ago.

**Conclusion**

The year 2012 may yet be a crucial one in the Eastern Mediterranean. Certainly, as things stand, there are grounds for pessimism. This may be the year we see yet another collapse of talks between the two communities in Cyprus, as well as yet another crisis in the relations between Turkey and the EU. At the same time, the discovery of natural gas may yet prompt further tensions between Nicosia and Ankara. Although highly unlikely, this could spark some sort of armed confrontation. And yet, looking ahead, there are also grounds to be optimistic. While the discovery of energy reserves may make the Greek Cypriots even less inclined to reach a solution than they have been in the past, it need not be the case.

If the Turkish Cypriots are prepared to give way to the Greek Cypriots on several key issues in return for political equality and a share in the gas revenues, they could have a far brighter future than the one on offer at the moment. Likewise, Turkey would also stand to gain. At the very least, it will have removed one of the more significant obstacles to its EU accession. In fact, the benefits of a Cyprus solution would be felt across the whole region. The picture may look bleak at the moment, but there may yet be grounds for hope.

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These are tough times for South Eastern Europe. Prospects for further EU enlargement look distant. Against the background of the economic and fiscal crisis, opinion and decision makers in many aspiring countries think that there is also an "enlargement crisis." Indeed, most of these countries are being hindered on their way to EU membership by factors that have nothing or very little to do with technical accession criteria.

First there is Kosovo. Given that five EU Member States do not recognise it as an independent state, it is unclear if Kosovo has an accession perspective at all. In March 2012 the European Commission launched a so-called feasibility study for a Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), which is a first step on the long way to EU membership. However, even in the case that Kosovo meets the conditions, it is not clear if the non-recognisers will consent to the signing of such an agreement.

Then there is Macedonia, blocked from opening accession negotiations by Greece over a dispute over the country’s name. Turkey’s negotiations are stalling as 18 chapters are blocked by the Council, France and Cyprus over a variety of issues. Bosnia and Herzegovina is still exposed to international oversight by the Office of the High Representative (OHR), which has the power to dismiss elected officials and impose legislation. This inherently anti-democratic structure complicates any further steps towards EU membership. And then there is Serbia which has been subject to increasing pressure to adopt a more pragmatic and cooperative stand towards Kosovo.

Besides Croatia, set to join in mid-2013 after having concluded accession negotiations in 2011, only Montenegro and Albania can move forward without being held back by political obstacles unrelated to formal accession criteria. While Montenegro will most likely open accession negotiations in mid-2012 (though a formal decision still needs to be taken in June), Albania is virtually blocking itself due to its political polarisation and resulting infighting.

But not everything is gloom. Every previous enlargement round had its non-technical interferences and difficult moments. The first expansion was blocked twice by Charles de Gaulle, refusing to let the UK join the Community. Ireland and Denmark were collateral damage. Even the prosperous and stable countries of the 4th enlargement, Austria, Finland and Sweden, had their negotiations put on hold for a year from June 1992 to May 1993 due to the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by Danish voters. In the run up to the 5th enlargement round, Italy blocked Slovenia from signing an association agreement over a dispute about properties expropriated after the Second World War. Moreover, it is uncertain whether the decision for a big-bang enlargement would have been taken in December 2002 were it not for the skill and courage of the Danish EU presidency at the time.

More importantly, there are recent success stories that show that the accession process can also work under the current circumstances. One is the visa liberalisation process that has made it possible for most Balkan citizens to travel to the Schengen area without a visa; another is the story of Croatia’s transformation.

**Visa Liberalisation and the Virtues of a Meritocratic and Transparent Process**

Already at the Thessaloniki Summit in June 2003 the EU promised steps towards the abolition of visas
for people from the Western Balkans. It took five years until the Commission in 2008 finally presented “visa roadmaps” for all Western Balkan countries (except Croatia whose citizens already enjoyed visa-free travel and Kosovo which was excluded from the process). These roadmaps set out some 50 conditions for each country to meet in order to have the visa requirement lifted. Mostly part of the justice and home affairs acquis, they included issues from document security and border management to asylum procedures and fighting trafficking. This was EU conditionality at its best: clear criteria, a tangible reward, continuous and transparent monitoring, and a competitive element between the countries that were part of this process, making it easier for NGOs and media to put pressure on their respective governments to enact the required reforms.

Barely a year later Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia had met the conditions and their citizens were granted visa-free access to the Schengen area in December 2009. But the process proved even more effective with the initial laggards, Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Once the leaders of these countries realised visa-free travel did not depend on a political decision in Brussels, but on enacting serious reforms, they made an impressive effort to catch up. Albanians and Bosnians were granted visa-free travel a year later.

This process clearly shows that EU conditionality can work successfully in the Western Balkans, even in countries with complicated constitutional and political structures such as Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Croatia and its Heroes of Retreat

Croatia’s image differs from that of the rest of the Western Balkans. For many this country was always closer to Slovenia than to Serbia or Bosnia and Herzegovina, destined for EU accession without major hurdles. But a look at Croatia’s last two decades defies this image. Croatia is the first country of the region that has turned full circle, from a place that occupied centre-stage in the violent disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia in the 1990s to a country at the doorstep of EU membership. Croatia witnessed war, with all its social, economic and political consequences. Pictures of the bombardment of Dubrovnik and the fall of the city of Vukovar travelled the world. The country witnessed ethnic cleansing and major war crimes. A third of Croatia was occupied while it itself supported separatist forces in neighbouring Bosnia and Herzegovina. The economic foundations of Franjo Tudjman’s regime were built on crony capitalism and shady insider privatisation. Tudjman’s democratic credentials were dubious at best, leaving Croatia internationally isolated when he died in late 1999.

This process clearly shows that EU conditionality can work successfully in the Western Balkans, even in countries with complicated constitutional and political structures such as Bosnia and Herzegovina.

When Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic extradited Slobodan Milosevic to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 2001, his Croatian counterpart Ivica Racan avoided delivering Croatian generals Mirko Norac, Ante Gotovina and Janko Bobetko. This led some observers to speculate that Serbia might overtake Croatia. While this thought appears strangely naïve from today’s perspective, it makes clear how much Croatia has changed over the last decade – much more than any other country in the region. The reason for this is not that Croatia had more friends inside the EU. Croatia’s success is built on a series of courageous decisions of Croatian political leaders who seized opportunities at key moments, taking considerable political risks.

A first example is Stipe Mesic, elected Croatian President after Tudjman’s death in early 2000. He made clear at the outset that he supported Croatia’s membership of the EU and NATO, and was willing to do what was required to reach these goals, including cooperation with the ICTY. He started, together with the new Social Democrat Prime Minister Ivica Racan, to demolish Tudjman’s legacy, which had prevented Croatia from being accepted as a Western-style democracy. When, on 28 September 2000, 12 generals signed an open letter demanding an end to the prosecution of wartime heroes, the media speculated about an impending putsch. In probably the boldest move of his two mandates, Mesic – who as President was also supreme commander of the army – forcibly retired the generals in question.
Even more important was the role of Ivo Sanader, the new leader of Tudjman’s party, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). Under Sanader’s leadership the HDZ returned to power on a nationalist platform in late 2003. Once in power, however, his government turned its back on Tudjman’s legacy on all major issues that had kept Croatia isolated in the 1990s. Sanader intensified cooperation with the ICTY. He handed over all indictees still wanted by the tribunal, including senior generals. He included a Croatian Serb party in his coalition government and continued to support Bosnia and Herzegovina’s territorial integrity. And he made EU integration the overriding priority for his government. In 2005 Croatia opened accession talks. In 2009 it joined NATO.

Sanader’s successor as Prime Minister, Jadranka Kosor (also HDZ), faced a different strategic choice. The EU insisted on serious reform of the judicial system. After she took office in mid-2009, Kosor accepted these demands and laws and rules were changed to empower prosecutors. A spectacular series of arrests and trials began, including of her predecessor Ivo Sanader, a former deputy Prime Minister, ministers, head of government agencies and directors of public companies. This was one reason HDZ lost control. But it was also the crucial factor that enabled Kosor to sign the accession treaty in late 2011: these trials had convinced sceptics in the EU that change in the judiciary was real. Kosor also accepted what was a very difficult compromise politically, regarding a border dispute with neighbouring Slovenia, which – as a EU Member State – had blocked Croatia’s accession negotiations for nearly a year.

This leaves a series of questions: Why did a government led by the HDZ cooperate with an international criminal court that concluded that Croatia’s founding President and first leader of the HDZ, Franjo Tudjman, had been at the helm of a “criminal enterprise?” Why did HDZ-led governments create conditions in which independent prosecutors indicted a former HDZ Prime Minister, HDZ deputy Prime Minister, HDZ Minister of Defence, HDZ Party Treasurer, and a large number of HDZ-connected managers in public companies?

In 1989 Hans Magnus Enzensberger coined the term “hero of retreat,” as opposed to heroes of victory. Such heroes are characterised by renunciation, reduction, dismantling. As examples Enzensberger mentions General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Mikhail Gorbatchev, and Adolfo Suarez (who as a former Francoist put Spain on the path to democracy).

Some of Croatia’s political leaders of the past decade can also be described as heroes of retreat. Mesic had belonged to Tudjman’s inner circle until 1994, when he broke with him over Croatia’s role in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2001, Sanader told a rally attended by over a hundred thousand people that “We will not give up our Croatian generals” (to the ICTY). Kosor broke with her former mentor Sanader and started a process which – she must have been aware – could (and eventually did) leave her party in shambles.

All of them made, at key moments, politically risky decisions, turning away from former convictions or political positions. Whatever their weaknesses, without them Croatia would not be in line to join the EU next year.

The Problem of “Enlargement Fatigue”

There are a few lessons and implications from these two stories.

First, the EU accession process works: the story of Croatia and the successful visa liberalisation process show that the accession process and EU conditionality work (even in countries with complicated and/or weak administrative structures).

Second, the process continues: despite the economic and fiscal crisis, and the European soul-searching it triggered, the Enlargement Process has proven astonishingly robust, with Croatia finishing negotiations in 2011, Serbia receiving candidate status in March 2012 and Montenegro most likely to officially start negotiations in mid-2012. Although formally not related to the accession process, the visa liberalisation process has allowed citizens of all Balkan countries – except Kosovo – to gain visa-free travel to the Schengen area in 2009 and 2010, an achievement few would have thought possible a few years earlier.

Third, looking at the challenges of the process, “Enlargement Fatigue” is not a helpful concept. What the countries of South Eastern Europe are facing is a series of specific problems which need to be overcome individually. This will require some courage and political risk-taking. Turkey could unblock eight negotiation chapters with the stroke of a pen, by implementing the Ankara protocol, allowing Cypriot ships access to Turkish ports. While there are un-
derstandable arguments for Ankara’s position of insisting that the EU delivers its promised aid to Northern Cyprus first, the unblocking of these chapters could fill the negotiation process with a new dynamic. While unpopular, the step seems a calculable political risk for the leadership in Ankara to take.

Bosnia’s leaders could submit an application for EU membership (defying advice to the contrary – as Croatia and Macedonia have done previously). Only if this happens will the EU be forced to take a clear position of what is required for the next steps and what the country needs to achieve before accession negotiations can start.

Despite the economic and fiscal crisis, and the European soul-searching it triggered, the Enlargement Process has proven astonishingly robust, with Croatia finishing negotiations in 2011 and Serbia receiving candidate status in March 2012.

Also the Serbian leadership could remove the remaining key factor that continuously slows down Serbia’s steps towards EU membership by normalising its relations with Kosovo. There is an interesting lesson from Croatia here. In 2005 the EU insisted that full cooperation with the ICTY was required before being allowed to start negotiations. This proved to be of great help to Croatia eventually. Once the issue was dealt with, it disappeared from the domestic political arena. A sustainable solution for Kosovo would be beneficial for Serbia, avoiding the issue returning to the political agenda every few months, diverting attention from the important challenges faced by a country trying to catch up. The ambiguous signals sent out from the EU so far have not done Serbia a big service. This reflects the lack of a unified position on Kosovo among EU Member States. But it is already obvious today that Serbia will not be able to become an EU member without changing its Kosovo policy. The opposition of one single EU Member State will be enough. It is clear that partition is ruled out, that Serbia has to implement a pragmatic solution for the border, and that it has to stop hindering Kosovo’s participation in international organisations. At the very end, if Serbia wants to enter the EU, it will have to offer recognition or something very close to it.

What does all this mean for the EU and in particular for those in the EU who want to support further EU Enlargement in South Eastern Europe? There is no denying that the EU’s credibility in the region has suffered, due to the series of blockages that have nothing to do with accession criteria. This in turn has weakened EU soft power and EU influence in the region. So it is imperative now to stick to the meritocratic principle that was a key factor in the success of the 5th Enlargement round and to reward progress. Montenegro needs to be allowed to start accession talks in June. The same should go for Serbia, if it fulfils the criteria. A serious, EU-led initiative to address the Greek-Macedonian name dispute would also be very helpful and send a clear signal that the EU is committed to the region. With regard to Kosovo, the Commission’s efforts to allow Kosovo to move towards a real accession process, even without recognition by all EU Member States, should be supported and further options explored.

An additional and easy measure would be to invite all Western Balkan countries, and not only the candidate countries Macedonia and Serbia, as observers to the first part of Montenegro’s screening process. Without any major costs, this would be a signal that the EU is serious about further enlargement in the region. It would also be motivating for the tens of thousands of civil servants who will have to work on this process and give them a clear idea of what will be expected of them in the years to come.
Understanding the democratisation process in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia is of key importance for the European integration of these countries and their stabilisation, after the violent conflicts in the 1990s. The Western Balkans remain of key importance for the Mediterranean, because they link South Eastern Europe with Asia, and their political development over the last 20 years has been at the centre of world affairs, from the violent break-up of socialist Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, to NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and the unilateral independence of the former Serbian province in 2008. Lately, they have been used as successful examples of democratic revolutions, citing the end of Slobodan Milosevic as Serbian President in 2000 as a result of mass demonstrations and Croatia’s consolidation as a democratic country after 1999 as examples for the changing political systems in North Africa and the Arab world (Bieber 2011).

The Political Development of the Western Balkans Since the Early 1990s

The major social and political changes in Eastern Europe in the second half of the 1980s also had an impact on Yugoslavia. The country witnessed an economic crisis that was followed by a political crisis, following Slobodan Milosevic’s rise to power in Serbia. In the late 1980s, discussions among the Yugoslav elites focused on the future of the federal states. Two camps could be identified. One was represented by Slovenes and Croats and argued for further decentralisation of decision-making to overcome the economic crisis and ensure stability. The other camp, including Milosevic and his allies in Montenegro and the two Serbian autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, argued for more centralisation to overcome the economic crisis. Because no agreement was reached by 1990, Slovenia and Croatia opted for independence and Macedonia and Bosnia followed their example. The result was the outbreak of violence, first in Slovenia and Croatia and later in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Yugoslavia ceased to exist in 1991, but the political situation in the area remained unclear until 1995, when the Dayton Peace Agreement ended the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia. As a result of this agreement, five states eventually established themselves on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. These were Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslavia (now consisting of Serbia and Montenegro) and Macedonia. In 2006, Montenegro declared its independence and Kosovo, which had been administered by the United Nations (UN) since 1999, followed in 2008. Today, there are seven successor states of the former Yugoslavia – although Kosovo is not a member of the UN.

Since the violent break-up of the country, the successor states have developed very differently. While Slovenia established a democratic government relatively quickly and joined the European Union (EU) in 2004, the other successor states found it much harder to establish democracy and recover from the break-up and the war. Croatia remained under the authoritarian regime of Franjo Tudjman until he died in 1999, and his Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) lost the elections in 2000. In the same year Slobodan Milosevic had to step down as President of Yugoslavia (Zakoek 2008). While Croatia was able to consolidate democracy and engage in a deeper dialogue and accession negotiations with the EU...
relatively smoothly, Serbia’s transition to democracy is proving to be much slower and more complex. Bosnia remained a contested country after the war and although international actors remained present in the country, major reforms were only implemented after 2000, through impositions by international representatives. Macedonia remained on the sidelines of the Western Balkans. Until 1993 its very existence continued to be questioned by Greece and Bulgaria, and in 2000 and 2001 violent unrest broke out between Albanian separatists and Macedonian security forces. While this did not result in a full-scale war, the country remains fragile and interethnic relations remain critical. The ongoing name dispute with Greece has not helped to consolidate the state or advance Macedonia’s progress towards EU integration. Montenegro, which became independent in 2006, has undergone a significant process of stabilisation and consolidation and was awarded EU candidate status in December 2011, only five years after the country’s independence. Kosovo, which declared its independence unilaterally from Serbia in 2008, struggles to gain international recognition and internal control over all of its territory. While an initial agreement was reached between Serbia and Kosovo in February 2012, on border controls and Kosovo’s representation in regional organisations, the country remains structurally weak and dependent on international assistance.

Explaining the Lack of Democratic Progress and Consolidation in the Western Balkans

There are a number of reasons for the stagnation of democratisation in the Western Balkans. Three shall be discussed in this section, namely the importance of historical legacies, the lack of consolidated statehood in a number of countries and the problematic role of international actors in the successor states of the former Yugoslavia.

Historical legacies play a key role in the process of state-building and democratisation (Linz and Stepan 1996). It has been argued that one of the reasons why the countries in Eastern and Central Europe consolidated democracy relatively quickly was the importance of historical legacies, namely experiences of democratic governance after 1918 (Offe 1997). The countries of the former Yugoslavia never had these advantages. While the first Yugoslavia, created after World War I in 1918, held free elections regularly, the political system itself was characterised by a dominance of Serbia in the new State, and after 1928 the Serbian monarch established a royal dictatorship. The political conflict in the first Yugoslavia, as in the later years of socialist Yugoslavia after World War II focused on the relationship that the different peoples in the State had with one another and with the State. While the first Yugoslavia was characterised by the dominance of Serbs in the administrative and political system, the second Yugoslavia focused much more on a “balance of power” model, particularly after the Constitutions of 1963 and 1974 (Ramet 1992). The political discussions focused on inter-ethnic relations, national equality and power-sharing. There were no developments towards a pluralist party system among the traditional left-right spectrum, so it came as no surprise when nationalist parties won the first free elections in all Yugoslav republics in 1990. Until today many states lack a party system that focuses on the traditional separation between conservatism, liberalism and socialism/social democracy. Instead, the Bosnian party system remains dominated by nationalist parties exclusively representing Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), Serbs and Croats. In Serbia, there is a sharp contrast between radical-conservative forces and more moderate parties, particularly the Democratic Party (DS) of President Boris Tadic. However, it is only very recently that these parties have slowly positioned themselves on a left-right spectrum, and they all remain united on the central political issue, namely the status of Kosovo. In Montenegro, the party system has also been developed along the ethnic divide, with the Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (DPS) of Milo Djukanovic mainly representing Montenegrins and the main opposition parties representing Serbs in Montenegro. These nationalist parties have often focused on reaping benefits for themselves. Discrimination of other ethnic groups and minorities has been a key feature in a number of countries and was attributed as one of the primary reasons for the violence in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, and in Macedonia in 2001. The dominance of ethnic parties also represents another key feature of the political systems in the Western Balkans. Many states remain internally and externally contested. Bosnia and Herzegovina continue to stagnate and the representatives of the Bosnian Serbs have threatened to initiate a referendum on the independence of the Republika Srpska (the Serb dominated entity in Bosnia) on numerous oc-
casions. At the same time, Bosnian Croats have established forms of illegal self-governance in 2000 and again in 2011, because they feel that they are discriminated within the Bosnian state. In Kosovo tensions remain high in the north, where local Serbs have established road blocks and barricades to avoid any representatives of the Kosovo government, security services and the international community to enter the region. The Serbs in Northern Kosovo demand their re-integration into Serbia and do not recognise Kosovo as an independent state. They are supported by Serbia, which also rejects Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence.

Democratic governance in multinational societies requires a willingness to live together and to come to consensual decisions. However, because of a history of interethnic violence and the results of recent wars in the region this willingness does not exist.

Lately, however, there have been some important moves by the Serbian government to come to an agreement with Kosovo, although the Serbian representatives abstain from recognising Kosovo officially. In Macedonia there has been a new rise in ethnic tensions between ethnic Macedonians and Macedonian Albanians. This is connected to the continued name dispute between Macedonia and Greece, which has resulted in Greece vetoing Macedonia’s entry into NATO and blocking any chances of Macedonia advancing in its EU integration process. Macedonian Albanians are more and more frustrated with the Macedonian government and its increasingly nationalist rhetoric. They have been arguing for a renegotiation of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement for some time and demand the recognition of territorial autonomy for Albanians in Macedonia, which the Framework Agreement explicitly denied them. Because these states are not consolidated and remain internally and externally contested, politics remains focused on interethnic issues and is seen as a zero-sum game. Additionally, it is important to point out that Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia apply different forms of power-sharing in their institutional settings, which prolongs decision-making and increases the number of veto players in the system (Bieber and Keil 2010). Democratic governance in multinational societies requires a willingness to live together and to come to consensual decisions. However, because of a history of interethnic violence and the results of recent wars in the region this willingness does not exist. Consequently, we could conclude that there is a lack of a democratic political culture in many countries of the Western Balkans.

This lack of a political culture that favours democratic decisions, tolerance and compromises is furthermore demonstrated by the ambivalent role of international actors in the region. International actors, particularly representatives of the EU and the US play a key role in decision-making and conflict resolution in a number of countries. President Tadic and his party the DS have the support of the EU and have won the Serbian elections in 2008, primarily because they were able to lay claim to advances in the EU integration process as their success. However, this has led to a situation in which Tadic has become the most important actor in the Serbian political system, and he has changed the balance in the parliamentary system. In Bosnia and Kosovo, there are international representatives who can control legislation, veto it and dismiss local officials if they obstruct the guidelines of the international community. Particularly in the years after 2000, this has been used extensively in Bosnia to centralise the State and strengthen Bosnia’s major institutions. However, this has led to a culture of dependency, in which local actors fail to agree on any decisions, because they rely on international actors to take these decisions for them. Since the international community stopped its intervention in Bosnian affairs in 2006, the country has been at a standstill. While international actors have abstained from massive intervention in Kosovo, the country’s politicians continue to rely on international support because they lack legitimacy and a monopoly of power throughout Kosovo’s territory. EU representatives also play a key role in Macedonia, where they are the main mediators between Macedonian and Albanian parties. These interventions of international actors, however, have not strengthened the states or the democratic forces in the countries. Instead, new cultures of dependency, changing power-relations and undemocratic impositions have been counter-productive for
the development of democratic governance structures and a democratic political culture.

**The Future of the Western Balkans: War, State-Building and the EU**

Since democratic governance, respect for the rule of law and minority protection are fundamental elements of the EU's accession criteria, it can be argued that further integration of the countries of the Western Balkans will automatically lead to a strengthening of democratic governance. However, the development of a democratic political culture is a long process. Indeed, Croatia’s integration process demonstrates how EU accession can serve as a tool to further democratisation. Nevertheless, developments in Romania (corruption) and Hungary (press freedom) demonstrate that even the more stable democracies in Central and Eastern Europe have been challenged of late. The key to the strengthening of democracy in the region of the former Yugoslavia is a focus on a critical civil society, which holds politicians accountable and offers political education and political alternatives to the population. Civil society organisations should therefore be at the centre of EU assistance and should be directly involved in the EU integration process of these countries. Furthermore, key conflicts, such as the situation between Serbia and Kosovo, Bosnia’s constitutional crisis and the Macedonian-Greek name dispute need to be solved as quickly as possible. The European Union and other international actors can play a productive role in the solution of these conflicts, but they must reach agreements that are accepted by all sides involved. This will ensure the sustainability of these agreements and their implementation. If the democratic consolidation of the Western Balkans, indeed Europe’s backyard, fails, this could have severe consequences for the Mediterranean and the wider world.

**References**


Further Reading


The problem of the integration of youth (15-24 years of age) into the labour market in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs) has grown worse over the past ten years or so to become a trigger for the revolt movements of the Arab Spring. Indeed, it is no coincidence that this wave of protest was started by the self-immolation of a young Tunisian university graduate after an altercation with a police officer regarding his “informal” economic activity as a street vendor. The persistence and aggravation of difficulties in entering the labour market for young people over the course of the past decade have generated profound malaise between youth, in particular university graduates, and society. The existing social cohesion was unable to withstand the deterioration of living conditions for youth after their long-term exclusion from the labour market. This economic exclusion was moreover reinforced by a more acute sense of social and political exclusion. In fact, greater contact with the world through the media and in particular information and communication technology (ICT) has modified the aspirations of young generations in the SEMCs on the functioning of society and the role they could play in it. As a result, the generation gap vis-à-vis adults and the authorities, still anchored in traditional patterns, rapidly grew to the point of fracture in Tunisia and Egypt.

Although the majority of SEMCs have undergone demographic transition, people under 25 years of age account for nearly half the population in 2010, that is, a proportion twice as high as in the North Mediterranean countries (26%). Though the significant weight of youth represents an advantage for these countries in the long term, it likewise represents a source of major challenges on the labour market. In fact, although more reliable over the preceding decades, demographic growth will continue to weigh on the labour market. According to UN forecasts, the population of the ensemble of SEMCs will grow by a quarter by 2030. Youth will then number some 70 million individuals, as compared to today’s 55 million. This prospect would entail that the labour market somehow be capable of absorbing these additional millions of individuals in the forthcoming two decades. In addition to this demographic effect, there will most certainly also be an economic activity rate effect. Indeed, the SEMCs have one of the most reliable activity rates in the world (see Chart 14). These findings are primarily associated with an activity rate of less than 25% for women in the majority of SEMCs, as opposed to an average of 52% worldwide. With the rise in school enrolment rate and average education level (see Chart 17), we should observe a significant rise in women’s activity rates in the region. In Turkey, for instance, women’s activity rate is 15% for those whose education level is lower than secondary school, whereas it rises to 75% for those with an educational level beyond secondary school. By projecting population dynamics, Blanc (2011) estimates that the SEMCs would need to create a minimum of 34 million new jobs by 2030 just to maintain the unemployment and economic activity rates at their current levels. If the goal is to supply
jobs for all newcomers onto the labour market, this figure would be triple as high. The challenge is not only quantitative but also qualitative, insofar as handling the rapid rise in number of higher education graduates observed in the SEMCs.

**An Increasingly Educated Youth**

The new generation of SEMC youth displays the particularity of having a relatively high level of education. In fact, after having dedicated a great deal of resources to primary and secondary education from 1960 to 1990, the SEMCs witnessed a sharp increase in youth in higher education (post-baccalauréate) since the mid-1990s. For certain countries such as Tunisia, these numbers have risen fourfold, going from 100,000 students to over 400,000 in 2010. In Algeria, the progression has been just as significant, the number of students rising from 300,000 in 1995 to over 1.1 million in 2010. With relation to the overall population, the number of students in the SEMCs (except Morocco) is now attaining ratios comparable to those of North Mediterranean countries, i.e. from 3,200 to 4,000 students per 100,000 inhabitants. This rise in number of higher education students means a significantly numerous arrival of graduates on the labour market. Thus, in Egypt and Turkey, more than 400,000 new graduates arrive on the labour market each year. In Algeria, the figure is 150,000 and in Tunisia and Morocco, some 70,000. Thus the economies of these countries need to supply jobs corresponding with the qualifications and expectations of these new graduates, both in terms of salary and working conditions, at pain of seeing their situation on the labour market deteriorate even more.

**Young Graduates in the Face of Mass Unemployment**

With the exception of Israel, the situation of youth on the labour market is critical for the ensemble of countries in the Mediterranean Basin with unemployment rates of between 20% and 45% (see Chart 15). Nonetheless, due to their greater demographic weight, in the SEMCs (except Israel), youth represent from a third to 60% of the unemployed (Chart 16) while they represent from 17% to 20% in North Mediterranean countries. The ratio tends to increase with the financial crisis, which hits youth particularly hard and which increases structural problems concerning the transition from the educational system to the labour market. This situation of mass unemployment for youth constitutes the main
An Unsettling Relationship between Education and Youth Unemployment

The problem of youth unemployment in the SEMCs, in particular among university graduates, is not cyclical but structural, though it has been aggra-
vated by the actual crisis. In fact, the sustained growth of the skilled labour supply in the SEMCs has met with a labour demand that is not as dynamic. As a consequence, the unemployment rate of young university graduates has increased over the 1st decade of 2000 in the majority of the SEMCs. A growing relationship between unemployment rate and education level can be observed (Chart 17). These findings are all the more worrisome as they may jeopardise the individual and collective incentives for investing in human capital. Indeed, on the individual level, if a degree is no longer an assurance for getting a job and at a higher wage, investing in human capital will no longer be profitable. On the macroeconomic level, public expenditure in education will no longer be appropriate if they do not generate the positive effects expected (innovation, greater adaptation to technological progress) over long-term growth. In contrast, in countries on the European shore of the Mediterranean, there is certainly a negative relationship between education level and unemployment rate. In Spain, the unemployment of individuals having only a primary education level is double that of individuals with higher education. Another case in point is France, where the unemployment rate of graduates of higher education is three times lower than that of individuals with only a primary education level.

Why the High Unemployment Rate Among Young Graduates?

The growth of the unemployment rate among university graduates reveals insufficient creation of qualified jobs, despite a sustained economic growth rate in the region (5% per year on average). This latter result indicates that the correlation between the GDP growth rate and the net creation of qualified jobs is weak due to a growth pattern low in total factor productivity (Blanc et al., 2007). To explain these weak productivity gains in the SEMCs, the significant weight of the public sector as well as the low added value content of employment in the private sector are the elements most often put forth.

A Public Sector with Too Much Weight?

Historically, the public sector constituted the main job opportunity for university graduates in the SEMCs. Although this bias of qualified labour towards the public sector, a priori less productive than the private sector, was not optimal for the economy in the long term because it slowed productivity gains, it did ensure a certain social cohesion between youth and society. This social contract has slowly crumbled under the effect of two
developments. First of all, the number of graduates has quickly increased, as described above, and secondly, recruitment into civil service has slowed or even tapered off. Indeed, in the 1990s, the SEMCs, under the impulse of structural adjustment programmes, introduced privatisation and economic liberalisation policies in their economies and had to cope with strong budgetary constraints. Hence, in Morocco, the total public and semi-public sector in employment (including non-graduates) decreased by 2.5 percentage points from 1999 to 2010. In Egypt, where the public sector has much more weight, it fell by 4 points from 1995 to 2004 and in Tunisia, by 6 points from 1997 to 2003 (Kocoglu, 2011). The attractiveness of the public sector for graduates can be ascribed to the numerous advantages associated with public employment (job security, access to social security funds and an advantageous retirement system). In the case of the SEMCs, there is also a higher starting salary than in the private sector. Indeed, in the majority of SEMCs, the public sector offers higher salaries than the private sector, the gap being particularly significant in Morocco, with the average public sector salary being 75% higher than the average salary in the private sector. These advantages, in particular the higher salaries, affect the search strategy of job seekers by modifying their reservation wage, among other things, particularly among graduates, and thus fostering segmentation of the labour market.

The majority of long-term unemployed university graduates are first-time job seekers, highlighting difficult transition from university to the labour market

A 2004 survey on labour market integration of Tunisian university graduates (Ben Halima et al., 2011) illustrates the “binary” situation of young graduates well. Eighteen months after graduating, employed graduates enjoy an average salary higher than those who obtain employment in the private sector, all else being equal. This salary advantage only involves holders of a Master’s degree, which is the degree nearly half the graduates from Tunisian universities obtain. When Master’s Degree holders pass the entrance examination for civil servants, they then obtain a job, namely in the public education system, with a “high” monthly salary. Should they fail the entrance exam, they either become unemployed or obtain a job with a very “low” salary in the private sector, and most often in the informal private sector. For other degree holders, there are no significant salary differences between public and private-sector employment. This second finding demonstrates that the private sector is not sufficiently attractive to graduates in terms of salary.

Thus, the combination of rarer job openings in the public sector and rapid growth in the number of graduates has led to the formation of long “queues.” Apparently, young graduates from the SEMCs are involved in income search strategies oriented towards obtaining public employment, leaving aside activities that would be more productive for the economy’s growth. As a consequence, young people choose general courses of studies allowing access to public employment. Once graduated, they wait, unemployed, until they can find a job corresponding to their expectations in terms of salary and work conditions, which the public sector is the most likely to offer them. In some cases, they run the risk of long-term unemployment, which can turn into “exclusion through unemployment.” In Morocco, for instance, the long-term unemployment rate, which is 44% for those without a university degree, rises to 77% for university graduates, with an average unemployment duration of 40 months, as opposed to 24 months for the former. In Tunisia, the average duration is 28 months for university graduates, as compared to 19 months for non-graduates. Moreover, the majority of long-term unemployed university graduates are first-time job seekers, highlighting the difficult transition from university to the labour market. The problem of long-term unemployment among young graduates is key for several reasons. In the first place, the non-integration of youth into the labour market renders any initiatives to return to employment more costly and uncertain. It entails the depreciation of human capital, which is their main asset on the labour market, and can effectively divert future generations from investing in education and encourage them to emigrate.
The Difficult Transition to the Knowledge Economy

The productive structure of SEMC economies is still oriented towards sectors with low-skilled labour needs (agriculture, services, tourism and low-technology manufacturing industries). In Tunisia, for instance, 90% of the jobs in the textile and clothing sector are for low-skilled personnel, senior management representing less than 5% of jobs. The private sector in the SEMCs does not create sufficient skilled jobs to absorb the massive inflow of new graduates. In the 2000s, Tunisia created an average of 30,000 jobs per year for graduates, whereas double that amount would be necessary to grant each university graduate a job (Kocoglu, 2011). This discrepancy between labour supply and demand thus explains the significantly high unemployment rate among university graduates from a quantitative point of view.

Active employment policies are particularly targeting graduates, leaving less space for unqualified youth, rendering their situation more difficult

The transition towards an economy richer in skilled labour requires structural policies and significant transition periods. The inclusion on the labour market of a generation of educated youth particularly requires the development of a formal private sector more oriented towards sectors fostering the emergence of economic activities with high added value, such as new technologies. The corollary of upscaling of the production structure would be a decrease of the informal sector, which plays a major role in the economies of the SEMCs (up to 50% of non-agricultural employment in Morocco and Egypt). In the absence of this upscaling adjustment of production, the rapid rise in education level will not result in very significant productivity gains, thus penalising long-term growth. The discrepancy between labour supply and demand for graduates can likewise be ascribed to the content and quality of training. First of all, university training seems to be too oriented towards general education to the detriment of technical and scientific training, and secondly, in certain aspects, its quality seems relatively poor (Martín, 2009). Companies seek skills, but degrees are not the means by which youth indicate their skills and their level of productivity to companies in the case of countries with a high graduate unemployment rate. We are thus witnessing the failure of the signalling effect of degrees due to two factors. The first, of a quantitative order, is related to the rapid rise in number of students in higher education. Access is too easy, or recruiters believe it to be so, leading to rapid depreciation of degrees and cancelling the positive signalling effect normally associated with degrees. The second factor concerns the quality of education and the aptitudes required to complete it. If recruiters are convinced that obtaining the degree in question reveals no information on the potential “productivity” of individuals, they will not be able to use the degree as an element for candidate selection. This factor becomes stronger when students are concentrated in only a few disciplines. In fact, the heterogeneity of positions available on the labour market requires a return to heterogeneity of skills. One of the challenges of education policy in the future consists of modifying the perception that recruiters, in particular in the formal private sector, have of graduates, restoring credibility to the signal transmitted by a degree in higher education.

Active Employment Policies Addressing Youth

SEMC authorities have realised the problem of young university graduate employment and, since the beginning of the 2000s, have implemented measures for assisting and guiding them towards inclusion on the labour market. These measures consist of a combination of several types of programmes. First, governments have set up policies of youth job subsidies, which can allow youth to find a job on the labour market if well targeted. However, this type of measure runs up against the well-known problem of windfall effects for businesses as well as the effects of substitution of the remaining population by the targeted population. Moreover, the jobs created using this system may disappear with the end of subsidies. Other public policies attempt to foster youth internships, allowing them to gain in-company experience. However, training is insufficient to guarantee access to em-
employment, as jobs still need to be created. Governments have likewise attempted to improve follow-up on the unemployed to help them in their job search or develop “youth” jobs in the public sector for missions of general public interest. Finally, policies of aid to business start-ups could meet the economy’s needs in job creation and the expectations of youth in terms of independence and freedom. These active employment policies have only had limited success. Tunisia is a good case in point. Compared to other graduates, those having undergone an internship through the Work Experience Scheme (SIVP) have a slightly lower unemployment rate (30% as compared with 36%), but a slightly lower rate of integration into unlimited-term employment (22% as opposed to 28%). If we add the windfall effect for employers, a constant due to employment subsidy policies, the cost-effectiveness ratio of this measure does not seem very positive. Moreover, active employment policies are particularly targeting graduates, leaving less space for unqualified youth, rendering their situation more difficult.

Conclusion

Youth constitute a significant potential for the economic development of the SEMCs, insofar as they are increasingly educated. Nonetheless, the sharp rise in graduate unemployment rates over the 2000s emphasises that this potential not only remains untapped, but even pushed aside into “exclusion through unemployment.” For this potential to be tapped, a systematic approach to the problem is required in order to implement structural measures. Such measures should go beyond short-term policies designed to address the urgency of the situation by creating public jobs or subsidised temporary jobs reserved for youth. In particular, the content of the education supply should be improved (by focusing on common skill foundations) together with its quality in order to better adapt it to the needs of the economy. Policies should also provide support for activities creating qualified jobs such that the productive system can be upgraded insofar as technological content and product quality, as well as support for the creation of innovative new companies via facilitated financing mechanisms.

Bibliography


The Arab revolutions have badly hit the tourism sector of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs)\(^1\), which have all met with declining arrivals – over 20% in losses on average for the entire sub-region.\(^2\) These unprecedented protest movements, combined with other, highly worrisome regional episodes (the terrorist attack in Marrakesh, war in Libya, the Syrian crisis) have alarmed European tourists, many of whom have retreated to the north shore of the Mediterranean for their holidays. The persistence of trouble in the Middle East and the uncertainties regarding the capacity of the new Egyptian, Tunisian and Libyan governments to ensure a democratic transition may cause tourists to continue to avoid South Mediterranean destinations. In countries where tourism accounts on average for 10% of both the GDP and employment, this crisis seems highly dangerous and makes the recovery of tourist levels an economic priority of the first order.

Yet the recovery of tourism activity is not an end in itself. The revolutions have revealed structural shortcomings in the tourism sector, weakened by years of inadequate governance and incapable of offering renewed development opportunities in the spheres of employment and investment. Although growth in tourist arrivals had reached a high in recent years, it is the tourism model itself that was called into question by the revolution. The predominance of mass seaside tourism, dependence on the European market and territorial tourism development imbalances constitute the weak points of poorly balanced South Mediterranean tourism. At a time when the majority of SEMCs are undertaking processes of democratisation, said weaknesses represent the key sectoral challenges these countries are facing.

The Weight of Tourism in SEMC Economies

With nearly 300 million international arrivals in 2010, i.e., approximately a third of the total international tourist flow worldwide, the Mediterranean is the world’s premiere tourist region. Due to the presence of the tourism giants of the north shore (France, Spain and Italy), the SEMCs account for only a small percentage of the total (50 million). On the other hand, their position in regional tourism is significant on the level of growth. From 2005 to 2010, these countries experienced an average annual growth in number of arrivals of 8%. In comparison, European Mediterranean countries not including Turkey registered an average growth rate of 1% for the same period. The South has emerged in the 2000s as the main area of tourism growth in the Mediterranean Region (see Table 8).

The level of tourism development in the SEMCs remains highly uneven. On the South Mediterranean there are both major tourist countries for which tourism has long been a strategic sector (Tunisia, Mo-

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\(^1\) Where SEMC stands for the ensemble of non-European countries along the Mediterranean shoreline, not including Turkey, i.e. Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Palestinian Territories, Lebanon and Syria.

\(^2\) Source: Data from UNWTO World Tourism Barometer, Volume 10, January 2012. Calculations by the author.
rocco, Egypt and Jordan) and countries closed to tourism (Algeria and Libya). Tourist affluence to countries of the Middle East (Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Palestinian Territories) varies in alternating cycles according to the political crises striking the region, although the general trend is towards growth in the ensemble of these countries. In the 2005-2010 period, it was Morocco, Egypt and Jordan that took the lead in the SEMCs with an average annual growth rate (AAGR) of over 9% in arrivals and over 10% in international tourism revenues. Tunisia, the pioneer of tourism development on the South Mediterranean, has become the country with the poorest performance in the region.

With nearly 300 million international arrivals in 2010, i.e., approximately a third of the total international tourist flow worldwide, the Mediterranean is the world’s premiere tourist region

South Mediterranean tourism is characterised by strong dependence on European flows, which on average account for 60% of international arrivals. These flows nurture an economy that represents an important source of employment and investment, whether tourism is the object of economic strategies or not. On the eve of the Arab Spring, the sector accounted for 3.8 million direct jobs in the SEMCs, i.e. 7% of total jobs, and 8.5 million indirect jobs, i.e. 15% of total jobs. By entailing a drastic fall in tourism activity in the region, the revolutions have endangered one of the most dynamic and strategic economies on the South shore.

### The Impact of the Arab Revolutions on Tourism

Considering the cross-cutting nature of economic activity in the tourism sector and its spillover effects on other sectors, the impact of the Arab Spring on South Mediterranean tourism is difficult to evaluate with precision. Nevertheless, the first quantification of declining arrivals and tourism revenues in 2011 suggests the magnitude of losses related to the revolutions. The two revolutionary countries, Tunisia and Egypt, registered a fall in international arrivals of 31% and 33% over 2010, and a drop in international tourism revenues of 51% and 26%, respectively. The Middle East felt the consequences of the Egyptian revolution and the Syrian crisis, with a drop in international arrivals of 41% in Syria, 24% in Lebanon and 16% in Jordan. Israel and Morocco are the only SEMCs having continued to experience growth of international arrivals, though much slower (0.6% and 1.6%, respectively).

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1 UN World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO); 2 World Travel and Tourism Company (WTTC) and TSA Research (Tourism Satellite Account); AAGR: Average Annual Growth Rate. n/a: not available.

3 Source: TSA Research, World Travel and Tourism Company (WTTC).
Apart from the shortage of financial resources they have caused, these losses have also entailed the destruction of thousands of jobs. In the short term, one of the effects of the Arab Spring has been to aggravate the socio-economic situation that motivated it. But the profound impact of these events will be measured by the recovery of tourism in the countries having undergone revolution. In this regard, it seems that resumption of tourism activity in the South will depend more on attitudes on the North shore than measures taken on the South shore, despite the fact that countries having experienced uprisings have not only taken the necessary actions, such as stepping up security in tourist areas and organising public relations campaigns aiming to reassure European tourists, but above all, no hostile acts were registered against tourists during the high season following the revolutions. The hesitation of both tour operators and individual tourists to return to the South can most likely be ascribed to the fact that the Arab revolutions, rather than having aroused the empathy and goodwill of European countries, were quickly relegated to the debate on the Islamist threat that supposedly hangs over the Arab world. The global economic crisis and the victory of Islamist parties at Tunisian, Moroccan and Egyptian elections have fuelled a certain distrust of the South, strongly fostered by the European media and by certain local events, such as the kidnapping of tourists in the Sinai in the winter of 2012. The impact of the revolutions on the collective imagination makes the recovery of confidence one of the greatest challenges of the transition.

The Role of the Revolutions in Revealing Shortcomings in the Tourism Model

Well before the revolutions, numerous sectoral analyses had concluded that South Mediterranean tourism had structural defects. Despite the heterogeneity of situations and levels of tourism development in the SEMCs, all of them have a comparable shortcoming: the low diversity of the tourism offer. This shortcoming, which concerns the nature of the supply (types and ranges of products) as well as its geographical distribution, is associated not only with the form of tourism that has been fostered in these countries, but also the way in which their tourist territories have been structured.

Considering the cross-cutting nature of economic activity in the tourism sector and its spillover effects on other sectors, the impact of the Arab Spring on South Mediterranean tourism is difficult to evaluate with precision.

After decolonisation, the majority of the SEMCs placed tourism at the service of an economic development strategy. In the context of the rise of international tourism in the 1970s, their goal was to foster the creation of jobs in the service sector and attract more foreign currency and investments on their territory. This macroeconomic approach determined the development model for tourism in these countries, whereby priority was given to the creation of major tourist resorts, the range of seaside resorts and marketing via package tours. The orientation towards mass tourism has been a success for countries following that programme, insofar as it has allowed them to capture significant market share in European seaside tourism, as well as contributed to the socioeconomic development of vast coastal regions (the Tunisian Sahel, Agadir, the Red Sea, etc.). Yet the creation of such a specialised supply has likewise entailed negative consequences on the structural level. First of all, the strong seasonality of tourism has resulted in the casualisation of labour, low returns on investments and difficulty in developing real tourism industries (training, expansion of services offered). Secondly, given the absence of differentiation, regional competition has led to a price war between South Mediterranean destinations, which, under pressure from tour operators, seek to continually decrease the sales price of seaside stays. Finally, the products corresponding to this type of tourism are proving increasingly out of step with the evolution of international tourism, where the demand for authenticity is progressively taking the lead over stays at “tourism enclaves.”

4 The term “tourism enclave” designates self-contained spaces such as certain hotel-clubs, which are under surveillance in a secure environment and dedicated exclusively to tourists and the employees serving them. Cf. Freitag Tilman G. “Enclave Tourism Development: For Whom the Benefits Roll?”, Annals of Tourism Research 21, 538-554 (1994).

Panorama Med. 2012
ended up limiting performance and growth potential in the tourism sector (fall in product quality, rise in tourist drain to other destinations, etc.). The territorial structure of South Mediterranean tourism is likewise problematic. The polarisation of tourism activity in coastal areas has but aggravated the development imbalances to the detriment of the hinterland. Moreover, the need to attract European clientele has led South Mediterranean countries to lend priority to a framework based on "points of entry" to their tourism areas, in which airport development has played a key role. South Mediterranean tourism has been built around major centres dedicated to sedentary tourism (Marrakesh, Djerba, Sharm el-Sheikh), which for a long time attracted nearly all tourist flows and investments. This circumscription of activity, limited to several major destinations, has not allowed countries to take advantage of tourism’s territorial planning function, for in the absence of an integrated offer on the national level, the interstices between major centres of tourism and the hinterland have remained poorly planned areas, unconnected to tourist routes and therefore powerless to attract them. With rare exceptions, the SEMCs have not implemented policies of restructuring, segmentation or upscaling that would allow them to step up their attractiveness for tourism. Recent political changes, however, will certainly give them the opportunity to adopt new strategies.

What Kind of Tourism after the Arab Revolutions?

The crisis of the Arab Spring has revealed the obsolescence of tourism models based on both social authoritarianism and a disconnected territorial offer, where tourists are not faced with the socioeconomic and political conditions experienced by the local populations. The liberalisation of social and cultural forces of South Mediterranean Countries would indicate that this model will not survive the process of democratisation. The main challenge facing the SEMCs in the tourism sector thus resides in the capacity that these countries will have of coupling democratic transition with transition in tourism. The tourism transition of the SEMCs entails, first and foremost, the transformation and modernisation of their tourism economy. If we work with the hypothesis that democratic transitions foster economic liberalisation and the adoption of major macroeconomic reforms, then the Arab revolutions open highly positive perspectives for the advent of sustainable tourism development in these countries in the medium and long terms. This change requires recasting tourism governance, banishing anticompetitive practices (corruption, nepotism) and improving influence sharing among the actors of tourism development (the private and public sectors, civil society, local populations). In certain configurations (in Tunisia and Morocco, for instance), administrative decentralisation can constitute a priority goal. Further liberalisation of certain strategic sectors seems likewise essential. This is the case in particular with air transport, whose deregulation has become indispensable to the increase in tourism flows due to the rise of low-cost transport in the world. The experience of Morocco, which signed an Open Sky agreement with the European Union in 2006, has proven a model of success.

The crisis of the Arab Spring has revealed the obsolescence of tourism models based on both social authoritarianism and a disconnected territorial offer

The desire for emancipation expressed by the middle classes through the revolutions probably reflects the capacity of these populations to enter the leisure society. This is why democratic transition renders the development of domestic tourism in these countries inevitable. This development would allow them to stabilise and consolidate their tourism economy, for domestic tourism, less sensitive to endogenous or exogenous crises, is much less volatile than international tourism. Domestic flows are better distributed over time (less seasonality) and space (return of city dwellers to their regions of origin), and national tourists are generally strong consumers of the local offer, to which they have easier access (language, culture, word of mouth). Moreover, domestic tourism serves the national project insofar as it fos-
ters the appropriation of tourist areas by local populations, attenuating the tensions associated with occupation of the land by foreign tourism. The same arguments can be used regarding fostering South-South tourism, which would allow diversification of flows and stronger sub-regional integration, in particular in the Maghreb, where millions of Algerian and Libyan tourists already spend their holidays in Tunisia.

**Domestic tourism, less sensitive to endogenous or exogenous crises, is much less volatile than international tourism**

Finally, the social and economic urgency arising from the Arab Spring and the need to support job creation at any cost could relegate the environmental issues of tourism development to the background. However, ecological constraint remains imperative in these countries, where mass tourism has a serious impact on the environment, in particular along the coast (waste, concreting, overconsumption of water resources, threatened ecosystems). Moreover, in the next century, climate change will have grave consequences in the Mediterranean Basin, with a significant rise in temperatures, a fall in precipitation and a rise in sea level. These developments will influence the location and volume of tourist flows, as the heat waves become more frequent and water resources dwindle, in particular in Egypt and Libya. Under such conditions, the use of green technologies for adaptation to climate change can hardly be avoided in the SEMCs. But in the midst of this crisis in tourism investment, priority short-term issues may limit the capacity of policymakers to opt for these often costly prevention strategies.

**Conclusion**

The situation arising from the Arab Spring calls for South Mediterranean Countries to develop innovative sectoral strategies aiming to diversify investment, the product range and jobs in tourism, and to better segment their tourism market. Unless unrest and inaction prevail, the fall of the autocratic regimes should signal the opportunity for new governments to upgrade and democratise the tourism sector in their countries by fostering the implementation of good institutional practices and allowing all actors (private and public sectors, local populations and civil society) to make their voices heard and defend their interests. Considering the demands made by Arab populations and the delicate nature of structural changes to be undertaken, it seems that only this type of orientation, based on consensus and appropriation, would allow tourism development to accompany democratic transitions in these countries and vice-versa.
Natural Gas Resources in the Eastern Mediterranean: Challenges and Opportunities

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The Eastern Mediterranean is on its way to becoming an important gas province. If developed in a timely and successful way, the region’s resources may significantly change the energy picture in the wider Mediterranean region. Developing these resources will require overcoming numerous major obstacles with geopolitical implications. This article gives an overview of recent developments.

The Eastern Mediterranean: an Emerging Gas Province

The Eastern Mediterranean is, without question, home to large hydrocarbon resources, even though the countries in the region, excluding Egypt, have been quite slow to find them. While Egypt pioneered the discovery of offshore gas with the Abu Qir field in 1969, it was the start of drilling in deep waters in 2000 that opened a new horizon in the Eastern Mediterranean. To date, more than 2,000 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas have been discovered in the Egyptian sector of the Mediterranean Sea. And yet, the Eastern Mediterranean remains under- or unexplored and has good prospects for additional reserves.

In March 2010, the United States Geological Survey (USGS) released an assessment concerning the undiscovered oil and gas resource potential of the Levantine Basin province in the Eastern Mediterranean. The area mainly covers offshore territories, including those belonging to the Gaza Strip, Israel, Lebanon, Syria and Cyprus. According to the study, the mean estimate of undiscovered technically recoverable oil and natural gas liquids (NGLs) resources in the Levantine Basin is about 5.3 billion barrels (Gb). However, what makes the basin important is the large estimated volume of undiscovered natural gas resources, around 3,450 bcm.

Two months later, in May 2010, the USGS issued another assessment. It was for the Nile Delta Basin province, which corresponds to the Nile Delta and Mediterranean Sea sectors of Egypt. According to the assessment, the Nile Delta Basin contains an estimated 6,320 bcm of undiscovered technically recoverable natural gas and 7.6 Gb of oil and NGLs, which is much more than the current proven oil and gas reserves in Egypt. By far, the largest resource is estimated to be in the Mediterranean Sea.

Although a few modest gas discoveries at shallow depths offshore Israel and the Gaza Strip (Noa, Mari-B and Gaza Marine) increased industry interest between 1999 and 2000, two large-scale discoveries since 2009 (Tamar in 2009 and the Leviathan in 2010, which are estimated to contain some 260 bcm and 480 bcm of recoverable gas respectively) have opened up the Eastern Mediterranean, and particularly the Levantine Basin, as a new deepwater gas province. These fields were the world’s largest deepwater gas discoveries between 2001 and 2010. When these fields are taken in conjunction with other smaller-sized discoveries (such as Dolphin, Dalit and Tanin), a total of some 840 bcm of gas have been discovered in the waters of Israel and Gaza through March 2012.

In December 2011, the Eastern Mediterranean received more good news. US-based Noble Energy, the company that discovered most of the aforementioned fields, announced that it had discovered a large gas field (the Cyprus A) located on the southeastern side of Cyprus, around 50 km from Israel’s Leviathan field. The field is estimated to contain some 200 bcm of gas. Encouraged by this discov-
On 11 February 2012, the Republic of Cyprus opened its second licensing round with 12 offshore blocks available. The closing date for the licensing round is 11 May 2012. These discoveries and the two USGS assessments have not only significantly enhanced perceptions of the Eastern Mediterranean's gas potential but also raised expectations for further increases in the region’s hydrocarbon reserves in the future. Naturally, the region has emerged as one of the most promising exploration markets. Today, all countries in the region are racing to secure their own slice of this lucrative market. Offshore Syria is a virgin territory. In order to offset its declining oil output and reduce gas imports, Syria announced its first offshore exploration licensing round for three blocks in March 2011 with a closing date of December 2011. However, the round is currently on hold due to the present political tensions in the country.

Several countries now see potential hydrocarbon resources in their Mediterranean waters as a remedy to improve their energy supply security and lessen their energy import dependence. Lebanon has no domestic gas production and is reliant on imports to satisfy its energy requirements. The country started exploration activities in 2000 by acquiring seismic data in Mediterranean waters. With the hope that similar discoveries to those made offshore Israel and Cyprus will be made offshore Lebanon, Beirut is planning to hold its first licensing round for offshore gas exploration this year. Another country in the Eastern Mediterranean that is heavily reliant on hydrocarbon imports is Turkey. Although Turkey started exploring offshore hydrocarbons in the Mediterranean decades ago, focusing on the Iskenderun Basin, its on-and-off efforts have not proved successful. However, a renewed interest for exploration of the still under- and unexplored offshore Mediterranean area has been taking shape in the country partially as a reaction to the Republic of Cyprus’ offshore exploration licensing rounds. The Arab Spring is likely to play a catalytic role in hydrocarbon exploration efforts in the region for three reasons. First, Egyptian gas supplies to Israel through the East Mediterranean Gas Company pipeline and to Jordan and Syria through the Arab Gas Pipeline have been interrupted 13 times (as of March 2012) due to attacks by militants in the Northern Sinai since February 2011. Second, following increasing public objections to the low price of gas exports, the Egyptian authorities have started to review the existing agreements. Third, several countries now see potential hydrocarbon resources in their Mediterranean waters as a remedy to improve their energy supply security and lessen their energy import dependence.

Potential New Gas Exporters Face Numerous Challenges

After making a series of significant gas discoveries, both Israel and Cyprus are now trying to figure out how to utilise them. One straightforward policy is to meet domestic energy demand, displace oil in the domestic energy mix, generate more electricity from gas and hence reduce reliance on imported oil and coal. Moreover, within a decade or so, these countries will have the possibility of exporting surplus gas to markets where they can fetch better prices. By becoming exporters they will also be able to contribute to European gas supply security in terms of diversifying both routes and sources. However, the question of whether the discovered reserves can find their way to the domestic and international markets in a timely manner requires careful examination. First, meeting domestic demand and creating surplus for exports necessitates the development of the discovered fields, i.e., converting reserves into production capacity. Companies will carry out costly exploration and field development endeavours only if they foresee the ability to commercialise their discoveries with a favourable rate of return. In this sense, much will depend on the gas price the governments will be asking for on the domestic market, the stability of the countries’ regulatory, fiscal and gas policies, and the political atmosphere. Unfortunately, the countries in the region haven’t yet developed a comprehensive and successful energy policy that takes into account the above-mentioned challenges along with the region’s geopolitical changes. In the absence of the export option within an effective policy scheme, not only will they be
Companies will carry out costly exploration and field development endeavours only if they foresee the ability to commercialise their discoveries with a favourable rate of return.

Over the past decade, Egypt has emerged as a key gas producer and exporter. However, the impressive surge in production was restrained by a rapid rise in consumption. If demand-side management measures are not introduced and energy-efficiency improvements are not made, a small and shrinking volume of gas will be available for exports in future. The government has been planning to reduce and slow the rapid rise of energy consumption by gradually targeting subsidies, but any reform on this matter is unlikely to be a major priority to the new leaders in Cairo. In the short to medium term, the government is left with the option of increasing exploration and production. Whether the interest of international companies will continue will largely depend on the country’s upstream policy. The upcoming gas exploration bid round, in which 15 blocks in the Mediterranean will be offered, will be a test ground.

Egypt is expected to remain the sole natural gas exporter in the Eastern Mediterranean up to the end of this decade, when it will potentially be joined by Israel and Cyprus.

Under a conservative scenario, reserves in Mari-B, Dalit and Tamar, in addition to the imports from Egypt, would suffice to cover Israel’s domestic gas need. This means that Israel will have sufficient surplus gas to export. Similarly, the recently discovered gas field has the potential to comfortably turn the Republic of Cyprus into an exporter. The question today is how to bring the gas to customers beyond the domestic market. There are three possibilities: by pipeline, via liquefied natural gas (LNG), and through a combination of both.

A pipeline to Turkey and, from there, onwards to Europe might have been an attractive option a few years ago but seems less appealing in the current geopolitical climate. Similarly, the option to connect to the Arab Gas Pipeline is considered to be limited even though this option could, in theory, collect gas from other producers in the region including northern Iraq and even Lebanon, if gas is found there. A pipeline to Greece from Cyprus, although technically feasible, would be too costly and would heighten diplomatic tensions with Turkey.

Building an LNG plant in Israel — on the coast or offshore — would be quite a challenge for security and environmental reasons. The spare capacities at Egypt’s Damietta and Idku LNG plants could potentially be used, but current political tensions between Israel and Egypt would make access to these plants difficult. Taking the gas from the Leviathan field and other offshore discoveries around by pipeline to Vassilikos, on the south coast in Cyprus, where the gas would be converted to LNG, seems to be a strong option so far. The LNG facility could be located on- or offshore. Another option would be to take the gas to the Israeli coast and send it by pipeline to Eilat and, from there, on to Jordan’s special economic zone at Aqaba, where an LNG facility could be constructed.

Although all these options are technically feasible, the costs involved and the complexity of negotiating the necessary deals, as well as of overcoming the political barriers, pose serious challenges.

New Tensions Are Brewing in the Eastern Mediterranean with Major Geopolitical Implications

Large gas discoveries by Israel and Cyprus in the past three years and the prospect of substantial hydrocarbon resources waiting to be tapped beneath the Eastern Mediterranean waters have heightened political tensions, started to change the complex geopolitical balance of power and paved the way for new strategic alignments in the region.

One of the biggest challenges facing the region is the geopolitical environment, as witnessed in the debate and disputes over maritime boundaries. These disputes are in danger of escalating into full-blown diplomatic confrontation and friction. The unresolved demarcation of maritime borders dating back to 1948 has heightened the diplomatic dispute between Israel and Lebanon since the discovery of the Tamar field in 2009. In 2010, Lebanon submitted to the UN its southern maritime boundary
with Israel and its south-western maritime boundary with Cyprus, which differed from the boundary established in Lebanon’s 2007 agreement with the Republic of Cyprus. The 2007 agreement was ratified by Cyprus but not by Lebanon.

In July 2011, Israel sent a letter to the UN identifying its maritime boundary with Lebanon. The Israeli line runs north of Lebanon’s proposed line in 2010, hence overlapping with what is claimed by Lebanon. The dispute relates to an area of 850 square kilometres. Settling the issue will require negotiations between the three countries. Although Cyprus and Lebanon are currently in talks, the absence of negotiations between Israel and Lebanon, which are formally at war, complicates the matter.

As perhaps the region’s only common denominator, energy has become a main component of the geopolitical struggle in the region and its surroundings.

An even more complicated problem in the region is the dispute between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey claims that maritime boundary agreements signed by the Greek Cypriots with countries of the region are null and void. Hence, Turkey opposed the drilling program in southern Cyprus and called on both the Cyprus government and Noble to halt exploration. When these calls were ignored, Turkey struck an agreement in September 2011 with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on continental shelf and offshore oil and gas exploration. It has yet to be seen whether this action will jeopardise the unification talks on the divided island or Turkey’s accession talks with the EU.

How to manage and contain these disputes remains a challenge. After all, energy policy in the region cannot be separated from security considerations. Tripartite negotiations between Israel, Cyprus and Lebanon seem to be the best way to find a mutually acceptable solution. Otherwise, settling the issue through the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or UN mediation would likely take a decade. The situation between Turkey and the other countries should be viewed less as a legal issue and more as a political and economic one. It is indeed centred on the Cyprus problem, which needs an urgent solution. The presence of gas discoveries may stimulate negotiations, but the lack of trust between the island’s two communities and the absence of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey will not make it easy in the foreseeable future.

Any unilateral action would only exacerbate the increasingly complex geopolitical situation in the region, which already faces formidable challenges. Although hydrocarbon resources could bring countries together, they could also fuel new conflicts and add anxieties to an already volatile region. Finding the common ground needed to turn the region into a booming hydrocarbon province will not be easy, but there is always hope.

Concluding Remarks

Recent major offshore discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean indicate that the region has the potential to emerge as a significant hydrocarbon province. This potential, however, will only make real sense if the discoveries are turned into production capacity. Even then, further numerous challenges would need to be overcome. As perhaps the region’s only common denominator, energy has become a main component of the geopolitical struggle in the region and its surroundings. Growing conflicts over the unresolved demarcation of maritime borders following Cyprus and Israel’s gas finds are arguably the most sensitive challenge in the Eastern Mediterranean, one of the most entangled political regions on Earth.

The question is how to turn these pressing challenges into opportunities. There is no easy answer or solution. Until and unless these challenges are managed carefully and wisely, the myopic policies currently being pursued by the countries in the region without regard for their consequences will prevail. A genuine mechanism that would lead to joint projects, including development and exploitation of hydrocarbon resources, might offer an interim solution. In a perfect world, this would have the potential to change the entire region’s political and economic scene for the better.
Cereals are considered the cornerstone of the great civilizations and constituted one of the premiere agricultural crops, providing a regular means of food around which human activity could be organised. Hence the civilizations in Europe or the Middle East were built around wheat, those of the Far East around rice, those of the Amerindian peoples around maize and those of Sub-Saharan Africa around millet.

In the Mediterranean Region, wheat plays an essential role in societies and their consumption patterns, in relations between the authorities and the population, and in the trade taking place in the region. While agriculture becomes central again on the international relations agenda, wheat alone represents the panoply of geopolitical issues that a staple crop can conjure. This article focuses on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Region and will attempt to present the main trade, geo-economic and socio-political dynamics.

**Cereal Hyper-Dependence on the Rise**

Climate and geography constraints combined with demographic growth and economic development have led the MENA Region to a structural food dependence on international markets, which the prevailing liberal doxa have fostered since the 1980s and the progressive liberalisation of trade. Wheat, a staple food in these countries, is among the most imported foodstuffs. The inhabitants of Arab countries are the greatest consumers of wheat in the world. Nearly 700 grams per person per day in Morocco and approximately 600 grams in Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt, for instance, as compared to 400 grams in India or 320 grams in France. Despite efforts to develop cereal agriculture and improve production, the MENA Region has gradually reached the point of being incapable of supplying sufficient wheat to meet the domestic demand. More than half of the cereals consumed are now imported. From the 2004/2005 to the 2011/2012 seasons, wheat imports increased by 50% in the Middle East and 20% in North Africa. Moreover, for the latter geographic subregion (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt), local wheat consumption rose by 28% from 2004 to 2011, that is, a much greater growth than the world average of 7%. With over 10 million metric tonnes (Mt), which represent approximately 8% of annual international purchases, Egypt is the leading wheat-importing country in the world. Algeria, with 6.4 Mt, ranks 5th, followed by Morocco in 14th place with 3 Mt, Tunisia in 21st place and Libya in 25th. The combined statistics reveal the statistic importance of wheat for these countries. The MENA Region, which has but 6% of the world’s population, has accounted for a third of international wheat purchases every year since the beginning of the 21st century. This represents a volume of between 40 and 50 Mt on average over the course of recent years and an expense amounting to tens of billions of dollars. The evolution of this expenditure also varies according to domestic harvests as well as the price of wheat on international markets. Recently, the price of wheat has been experiencing strong inflation (such as in 2007/2008 and in 2010/2011)

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and is proving highly volatile, two trends that could continue in the future. As of the 2001/2002 season, world cereal production (excluding rice) was less than consumption over the course of 8 years, which explains the nervousness on the markets. Moreover, it is worth pointing out that wheat is the object of a high degree of commercialisation compared to other cereals. On average, 18% of the quantity of wheat produced is sold on the international market, whereas this figure is an average of 10% for maize and 6% for rice. The specificity of wheat is also valid upon examining the figures for fresh fruit and vegetables, since hardly 10% and 4% of what is produced is exported, respectively.

Arab countries will be obliged to continue importing to meet their cereal needs, since the demand for cereals for animal fodder is also on the rise. Considering all cereals together, the net balance (production

CHART 18
Wheat Consumption in 2011 per Person and Year (in kg)

Tunisia
Algeria
Morocco
Egypt
Iraq
Argentina
EU
Saudi Arabia
Canada
United States
The World
China
India

Source: Statistics Division of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAOSTAT)

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<td>83,426</td>
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<td>618,870</td>
<td>617,576</td>
<td>636,543</td>
<td>650,015</td>
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minus consumption) in the MENA Region registered a deficit of 7 Mt in 1970. This deficit amounted to 54 Mt in 2000 and 66 Mt in 2010. On the 2050 horizon, it could reach 115 Mt. Morocco, where rain was rare during the winter of 2011/2012, experienced a considerable decrease in its cereal harvests and will rely more on imports in the 2012/2013 season. With an estimated 5 Mt of wheat, the supply volume has reached a record high since the country’s independence in 1956. This case is neither geographically nor temporally isolated. The Arab countries will be most affected by climate change and extreme meteorological phenomena in the forthcoming years, inevitably burdening their agricultural production and wheat harvests.

Many countries are thus currently attempting to develop their stocking capacities and logistics systems in order to build up serious wheat reserves and thus protect themselves against supply risks. Although they are the greatest purchasers of wheat on the planet, the Arab countries only hold some 10% of the world’s wheat stocks (8% of which in Egypt), whereas 30% is located in China alone. This ambition, which requires substantial financial effort, also arises from a will to reduce losses. Due to lack of efficient infrastructure and transport systems, approximately 20% of the wheat in Egypt, whether from local harvests or imports, goes to waste. These losses, which generate additional costs for States, reveal how the improvement of logistics performance is crucial to national food security strategies.

**Geo-economic Rivalries Growing**

The MENA Region will remain the premiere market opportunity for the world’s cereal producing countries. This state of affairs stokes greed and explains why geo-economic competition is accelerating. The European Union (EU), one of the major bread-baskets of the planet, is one of the privileged partners of the MENA Region for cereals. Approximately two thirds of its extra-EU wheat exports are annually sent there, primarily to Algeria, Egypt and Morocco. France accounts for an average of 60 to 70% of EU wheat exports and nearly three quarter of its sales to third countries are to countries in the Mediterranean Basin. Australia, Canada and Ar-
Argentina are some of the extra-Mediterranean cereal powerhouses likewise selling to the MENA Region, as is the United States. The latter has always been active in cereal commerce, supplying approximately a third of the world’s wheat exports and targeting the MENA Region during the Cold War and today, with both commercial and geopolitical aims. This double motivation likewise constitutes the dynamic relaunched by Russia to reinstate a capacity for strategic influence through the exploitation of its considerable agricultural potential. Russian wheat, which represented over half of world sales before the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, is now making its comeback in the world, in particular in the Arab countries. Thus, Egypt has been purchasing the majority of its wheat from Russia since the mid-2000s. It is the countries near the Black Sea that are currently playing significant roles on the strategic cereal scene. For the 2011/2012 season, a third of world wheat exports has been supplied by Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan (i.e. some 35 Mt). With such volume, Arab countries are naturally turning towards the countries of the Wider Black Sea Region, generally more competitive insofar as price with respect to wheat from the US or the EU. Of the 10 Mt of wheat imported by Egypt in the 2011/2012 season, three quarters were from Russia (66%), Ukraine (6%) and Kazakhstan (2%). Moreover, Arab countries are increasingly obtaining their maize supplies through Kyiv. Certainly, a project that should be followed is the one regularly mentioned by Russia of progressively grouping the producing countries of the Wider Black Sea Region (including Turkey) into a customs union in order to constitute a “wheat OPEC” and thus gain geostrategic weight on the international stage. In any case, the strength of the Black Sea countries should be relativised, considering the high interannual variability of their harvests, their infrastructural backwardness and their unpredictability on the political and legal levels. This was particularly the case when Russia suspended its wheat exports in the summer of 2010 following the droughts there. This unilateral decision not only destabilised the world market by taking wheat prices to new heights, but it also shook Egypt,
which had been the top destination for Russian wheat for several years. The Russian freeze on wheat exports caused panic among policymakers, who were forced to seek wheat elsewhere at higher prices, thus aggravating the national budgetary situation. In January 2011, with international then local inflation, the price of wheat in Egypt was 30% higher than in January 2010.

**Political and Financial Risks on the Rise**

In MENA countries, approximately half the products consumed are cereals and the average household expenditure for food can represent 40 to 60% of the monthly budget. Hence soaring prices for such staple products causes immediate economic anxiety in these societies, in particular among the poorest sectors. Wheat alone shows to what extent a product can be closely monitored by the government. Already at the time of the Roman Empire, a regular supply of wheat and bread to the population constituted an imperative for the authorities. It soothed certain popular ferment and thus purchased social peace. Since then, the fact is that this socio-political equation has not changed. Unrest associated with the price of bread has marked the contemporary history of many countries. This was the case in Egypt in 1977, in Tunisia in 1984 and in Jordan in 1996, and rebellions also broke out in the MENA Region during the world food crisis of 2008. But these riots were relatively well handled by governments, which were well aware of the sensitivity of the matter. Hence transfer mechanisms were developed (subsidies, price support, food stamps) to absorb the impact and render staple products accessible to the greatest percentage of the population.

Purchasing social peace via food subsidies is a major characteristic of MENA countries. It is at the heart of relations between the government and the governed. The problem is that these payments are more and more cumbersome for public budgets, and they are not always very efficient, benefiting cities more often than rural areas and being the object of recurrent corrupt practices. Egypt represents the archetype of this problem. The amount dedicated to food subsidies has been oscillating at

![Chart 21](image)
Around 2% of the GDP for several years and amounted to a total public expenditure of 4 billion dollars in 2011. Nearly 75% of the Egyptian population benefits from the system of subsidies. These are allocated through two complementary mechanisms: the first consists of the allocation of monthly rationing cards that entitle certain households to a specific quantity of staple foods (rice, oils, sugar); while the second consists of “baladi” bread support (the typical “country bread,” a 130-gram loaf sold at 5 piastres). To keep it at that rate, Egypt’s General Authority for Supply Commodities (GASC) covers the difference between the purchase price of the wheat (both local and international) and the low price at which it awards the wheat to mills.

Concerned about the rise in international agricultural prices and the possible contagion of the popular revolts spreading through the Arab world, a number of States decided to boost their systems to maintain the population’s access to major staples. In Morocco, nearly 800 million dollars were mobilised in 2011 for foodstuffs from the Compensation Fund. In Tunisia, nearly 900 million dollars were used by the provisional government to sustain the price of staple foods in 2011. In Algeria at the beginning of January 2011, it was this same anxiety regarding the rise in staple food prices that caused an outbreak of violence, which the authorities quelled via large additional subsidies (for sugar and oils in particular, for an estimated total of nearly 4 billion dollars in 2011).

Concerned about the rise in international agricultural prices and the possible contagion of the popular revolts spreading through the Arab world, a number of States decided to boost their systems to maintain the population’s access to major staples.

At the same time, Algeria also began purchasing wheat in large quantities (7.4 Mt, that is 2.8 billion dollars) as a preventive measure, not only to meet domestic needs but also to assist neighbouring countries destabilised by the geopolitical and climatic situations (Libya, Mali, Niger). In Jordan, Syria and Lebanon as well as the Gulf monarchies, similar measures to keep staple product prices low can be observed. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that approximately 40 billion dollars were allocated to keeping staple food prices low in Arab countries over the course of 2011. Although these subsidies can be analysed as “social transfers” and instruments capable of counteracting inflationist shocks, the situation is not tenable if the latter become too frequent and if such a system endures in such a tenacious climate of corruption. However, the reduction or elimination of food subsidies that certain financial institutions seem to be advocating (noting that this system hampers other essential expenditures in health or education), could deal a severe blow to the social policies of these countries, already in a period marked by great economic hardship and major demands by the population. Maintaining these food programmes therefore requires trade-offs.

The IMF estimates that approximately 40 billion dollars were allocated to keeping staple food prices low in Arab countries over the course of 2011.

Regarding wheat, people and power, it is the matter of the social contract that is being expressed. History has often been punctuated by events organised around the interdependent pair of bread and freedom. One need only consider the French Revolution of 1789. While it would be excessive to speak of bread riots to describe the Arab revolts or revolutions taking place since the winter of 2010/2011, it should however be noted how the rise in food prices was a catalyst for the expression of the varied discontent. In 2011 alone, food inflation reached 15% in Egypt and Syria, 6% in Algeria and Lebanon and 4% in Tunisia. In Morocco, the price of cereals was 12% higher in February 2012 than the same month a year earlier. In Libya, where nearly 90% of cereals consumed come from imports, food inflation reached 10% in 2011. Often mentioned among the factors triggering these revolutions, the problem of high cost of living can thus be placed in the sphere of food insecurity (de-
creased purchasing power), which unrest or fighting can complicate (disruptions of the supply chain, damaged harvests, etc.).

**Conclusion**

Several dynamics converge to strengthen the strategic dimension of wheat in the Mediterranean Region. They illustrate just how essential food and agriculture remain for the development of Nations and for the future of international relations.

In the current period of political, economic and social transitions, working harder together to mitigate risk and reduce uncertainty is a reasonable goal that the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership can set itself. The need for greater cooperation in the field of food security, particularly regarding the supply of wheat, seems obvious.

While needs are on the rise and the stakes are growing higher in the southern neighbourhood countries, the EU should not abandon its policy of agricultural production. Though it does not intend to feed the world, the EU may nevertheless play a role in the demand for food and cereal in the MENA Region. The EU should build on the regularity of its crops and its logistical advantages to compete with other granaries of the world, including those of the Wider Black Sea Region, and thereby build strategic cereal relations with Arab countries. Such an ambition would combine commercial interests with geopolitical duty.

**Bibliography**


www.ciheam.org
The Mediterranean is a rich and vibrant region for investment. The region includes a diverse group of States across the development spectrum. Whilst some States in the region are indeed economically developed and already attract significant investments, other States in the region have progressed and adopted policies aimed at incentivising, promoting, and securing credible investment. In strictly macro-economic terms, the countries on the southern and eastern rims of the Mediterranean have made significant progress in this regard during the past decade.

It is unequivocal that the region has witnessed an accelerated rise in foreign investment, arguably caused by a set of internal factors, such as liberalisation, reforms, large public projects, drops in customs tariffs, and demography, as well as external factors, such as exogenous income, increased relocation, and “near-shoring.” Both sets of factors have simultaneously contributed to the dynamic and appealing nature of investment in the Mediterranean. Moreover, the geographical proximity to the European Union, availability of adequate infrastructure levels, availability of a qualified and cost-effective labour force, and reformed investment policies have equally contributed to the proliferation and progression of investment in the region.

Taking into consideration the significance and increasing importance of Mediterranean Arab States for investments in the region, this article aims to offer a panoramic overview of the diverse investment policies adopted by Arab Mediterranean countries, the prevailing investment arbitration culture therein, and the impact of the recent so-called “Arab Spring” on the envisaged trajectory of investment security and disputes in the region.

**Investment Policies in the Arab Mediterranean: Incentives and Guarantees**

The Arab Mediterranean includes nine States: Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, and Tunisia. Whilst the Mediterranean region mobilises considerable external resources through its exports, it is worth noting that three large types of exogenous resources are equally available and constitute a major source of income: tourism, foreign investment, and migrant transfers.

A scrupulous analysis of investment trends in the Mediterranean region, especially in the Arab Mediterranean, reveals that investment preferences and investors’ appetites have been focused on six main sectors, namely: energy, banking, construction and infrastructure projects, telecommunications, materials (cement, glass etc.), and tourism. To that effect, Arab Mediterranean countries have opted for adopting incentivising investment policies and regulatory frameworks.

It is submitted that Arab countries have experienced a clear transition from “restrictive” investment policies, with an ideology averse to foreign investment, to a more “liberal” and “open” investment policy consistent with the economic and strategic reforms undertaken over the past two decades to stimulate...
economic growth. To this end, almost all Arab Mediterranean countries have enacted investment laws that aim to promote and protect foreign investment. Whilst each Arab State has passed its own investment law(s) consistent with its strategic investment policies, the common denominator and fundamental gist of all such legislative initiatives is to afford adequate security and protection to foreign investment. Moreover, all Arab Mediterranean States have entered into and concluded many bilateral investment treaties (BITs), which provide reciprocal investment guarantees and incentives for foreign and national investors. Since BITs will be independently considered below when assessing the principles of investment arbitration, the following analysis shall solely focus on Arab legislative initiatives.

Given Arab investment legislative initiatives such as Egyptian Law No. 8 of 1997, Syrian Law No. 7 of 2000, Libyan Law No. 9 of 2010, Tunisian Law No. 93-210 of 1993, Algerian Law No. 01-03 of 2001 (as amended by Law No. 06-08 of 2006), Moroccan Law No. 1-95-213 of 1995, Palestinian Law No. 1 of 1998, Jordanian Laws Nos. 67 and 68 of 2003, and Lebanese Law No. 360 of 2001, it appears that security and protection of investment take the form of: (a) investment guarantees, and (b) investment incentives.

With respect to investment guarantees, a survey of Arab Mediterranean investment laws reveals that foreign investors generally enjoy, subject to varying degrees, the following rights:

• equal treatment and non-discrimination between national and foreign investment;
• protection of assets and funds against nationalisation, expropriation, requisition, sequestration, and confiscation;
• the ability to open offshore accounts and to engage in cross-border transfers and the repatriation of funds;
• ownership of land, subject to national security requirements and public policy considerations, other immovables, and movables;
• preferential treatment and facilitation of entry requirements, visas, and residence permits; and
• access to international arbitration as a prominent form of dispute resolution.

With respect to investment incentives, a mapping of Arab Mediterranean investment laws shows that States generally, and subject to varying degrees, offer competitive packages as incentives, including the following:

• reduced corporate and income taxation rates;
• tax holidays;
• availability of special and qualified economic zones and tax-free zones to incorporate companies in;
• incentives for capital formation, such as special investment allowances (accelerated depreciation and enhanced deductions) and competitive capital thresholds, tax credits, and allowances on reinvested profits;
• exemption from withholding tax;
• exemption from, or reduction in, import and export duties, custom duties, value added tax, and/or social security payments for labour; and
• favourable profit distribution schemes and norms.

Whilst each Arab State has passed its own investment law(s) consistent with its strategic investment policies, the common denominator of all such legislative initiatives is to afford adequate security and protection to foreign investment.

Whilst the above-mentioned investment policies (guarantees and incentives) clearly mark a favourable trend to attract foreign investments to the Arab Mediterranean, the Arab Mediterranean has not been immune to investment disputes. On such account, the following section shall shed light on the culture of investment arbitration in the Arab Mediterranean and the diverse principles of investment protection enshrined in BITs involving Arab States as applied by international tribunals.

BITs and Investment Arbitration in the Arab Mediterranean: Principles of Security and Protection

At the outset, it is worth noting that investment arbitration is not exclusive to BIT claims, but rather includes contract claims as well. Investment disputes
can be rooted in contractual arrangements or international investment instruments, such as multilateral or bilateral investment treaties.

Prior to the proliferation of investment treaties, when an investment went sour, the investor's options were limited to the following: (a) attempting to sue the host State before its national courts; (b) arbitration on the basis of an arbitration agreement; and (c) diplomatic espousal of a claim. Nowadays, investment treaties typically confer a "direct right" on investors to bring a claim against the State in international arbitration. International arbitration is currently the most prominent form, and the preferred mechanism, for settlement of investment disputes. Similar to commercial arbitration, investment arbitration can be ad hoc or institutional in nature. A survey of the most common venues and rules governing investment arbitration proceedings reveals that most investment proceedings are hosted by the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), or the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC). Moreover, many investment disputes are administered under United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) arbitration rules in an ad hoc context.

In any event, since treaty-based investment arbitration is increasingly becoming common practice, it is worth mentioning that Arab Mediterranean States have concluded and entered into more than 400 BITs, with Egypt leading the pack with more than 100 BITs. Tunisia, Morocco, and Lebanon are each party to more than 50 BITs, Algeria and Syria to more than 40 BITs, and Libya to more than 20 BITs. Such large numbers of BITs underscore the common misconception about the direct relationship between the number of BITs and the proliferation of investments. It is often mistakenly believed that the greater the number of BITs, the more investment opportunities a State will enjoy.

Whilst it is doubtful that the conclusion of BITs will automatically lead to boosts in investment, it is worth noting that Arab Mediterranean States were parties to a considerable number of investment-treaty arbitration cases under the auspices of ICSID and elsewhere.

However, the term "investment" is not generally defined in multilateral investment treaties such as the ICSID; the term is instead usually defined in legislative instruments, contracts, and/or BITs. To that effect, most BITs concluded in the Arab Mediterranean offer a broad definition of the term "investment." For example, most Egyptian BITs, as well as the Morocco-Spain BIT, use generic language by referring to "every kind of asset" or "every kind of investment in the territory." This normally includes: (a) movables, immovable property, and any other property rights, such as mortgages, liens or pledges, usufruct, and similar rights; (b) shares, stock, debentures, and any other kind of participation in companies; (c) claims to money or to any other performance under a contract having an economic value associated with investment; (d) copyrights, industrial property rights, know-how, and good-will; (e) business concessions conferred by law or under contract permitted by law, including concessions to search for, cultivate, extract, or exploit natural resources; and (f) licences and permits awarded to investors.

Whilst BITs normally define the term "investment," international tribunals, especially those constituted under the auspices of the ICSID, have not always relied solely on the parties in defining what constitutes an investment. For example, in Joy Mining v. Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11), the arbitral tribunal explicitly stated that the fact that the ICSID Convention has not defined the term "investment" does not mean that anything consented to by the parties might qualify as an investment under the Convention. Moreover, it was stated that there is a limit to the freedom with which the parties may define an investment if they wish to engage the jurisdiction of ICSID tribunals.

In establishing the existence of an investment, ICSID tribunals have generally been inclined to uphold the so-called "Salini Test," which sets four main criteria for an investment: (a) a "certain duration"; (b) an "element of risk"; (c) a "commitment that is substantial"; and (d) a "significance for the host State's development."

The above test was initially coined by the tribunal in the case of Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. the Kingdom of Morocco (ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4) and was subsequently followed in many cases including Jan de Nul N.V. Dredging International N.V. v. Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/13) and Consortium Groupement L.E.S.I.–DIPENTA (Italy) v. Algeria (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/8). In other cases, tribunals have considered such criteria as guiding benchmarks or mere examples or have even added new criteria, such as the necessity of a "certain regularity of profit and return." This latter criterion was added by the tribunals for Joy Mining v.
Similarly, the term “foreign investor” has been practically and legally disambiguated in a number of BITs to encompass: (a) natural or legal persons of a nationality different from that of the host State; (b) foreign controlling or minority shareholders of a local company; (c) foreign indirect shareholders of a local company (i.e., notwithstanding intermediate corporate layers); and (d) local companies controlled by foreign investors.

On a substantive level, BITs normally afford certain substantive protection to investors. This generally includes: (a) prohibition against expropriation (whether direct or indirect, de facto or de jure) without compensation; (b) fair and equitable treatment and non-discrimination; (c) most favoured nation treatment (“MFN” clauses); (d) full protection and security (against riots, movements, revolutions, and damage caused by armed forces, police or other governmental authorities); (e) umbrella clauses (availability of treaty protection for breach of contractual rights); (f) free transfer of funds; and (g) access to international arbitration, which can be restricted or unrestricted (restrictions may include: the necessary prerequisite of exhaustion of local remedies, or “fork in the road” provisions that obligate foreign investors to choose between treaty-based arbitration, litigation in municipal courts, or contract-based arbitration).

A survey of the diverse investment arbitration awards involving Arab Mediterranean States reveals that most of the above-mentioned BIT provisions and issues have been raised by investors and States. However, the principle of fair and equitable treatment (FET) unequivocally ranks amongst the most frequently invoked standards in investment arbitration. This notwithstanding, the application of the FET standard by tribunals has not been entirely consistent. Whilst some decisions tend to uphold a broader scope of the FET standard by not making any reference to customary international law, such as the decisions in Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. Egypt (ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6) and Emilio Agustin Maffezini v. Spain (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7), other decisions upheld a different scope of the FET standard that is primarily fact driven and encompasses the denial of justice, such as the decision of Jan de Nul N.V. Dredging International N.V. v. Egypt. In essence, it appears that there are four different categories of acts or omissions that may constitute a breach of the FET standard by a host State: (i) those that adversely transform the legal and business environment; (ii) those that mark a failure by the State to respect its obligations towards the investor; (iii) those that encroach upon the investor’s personal and procedural rights; and (iv) those that appear to be a manifestation of arbitrary and discriminatory treatment of an investor.

As at March 2012, 30 ICSID cases had been filed against Arab Mediterranean States, with Egypt being a party to more than 50% of them. Out of the known 375 ICSID arbitrations, 16 were filed against Egypt, 5 were filed against Jordan, 3 were filed against Algeria, 3 were filed against Morocco, 2 were filed against Tunisia, and 1 was filed against Lebanon. This accounts for approximately 8% of the ICSID caseload.

There appears to be a direct relationship between investment disputes and the investment sectors most appealing to investors

In those 30 cases, arbitral tribunals included arbitrators of diverse nationalities, including: Swiss, French, English, US, Canadian, Australian, German, Italian, Spanish, Chilean, Lebanese, Egyptian, Belgian, Jamaican, Swedish, Greek, Chinese, Dutch and Bangladeshi. However, French arbitrators ranked first in number, with French arbitrators being appointed 16 times to ICSID tribunals involving Arab Mediterranean States, followed by Swiss arbitrators (12 times), US arbitrators (7 times), English and Belgian arbitrators (6 times each), Spanish arbitrators (5 times), and Italian, German, and Canadian arbitrators (4 times each).

With respect to the subject matter of the ICSID proceedings, amongst the pending and concluded cases, 10 cases related to construction projects, 4 cases related to the energy sector, 5 cases related to tourism and the hospitality industry, 2 cases related to the textile industry, 2 cases related to property development, and 1 case related to shipping and handling services. In light of the above, it appears that the construction, energy, and hospitality sectors are the most susceptible to disputes. As already stated, these very same sectors rank amongst the top investment destinations for foreign investors. Accordingly, there appears to be
a direct relationship between investment disputes and the investment sectors most appealing to investors. Concerning the status and outcome of the ICSID proceedings, there are currently 9 pending cases and 21 that have been concluded by an award or proceedings that have been discontinued in relation thereto. Egypt has 6 pending cases, Lebanon 1, Algeria 1, and Tunisia 1. In 10 cases, the State has prevailed, and the investors’ claims were either rejected for lack of jurisdiction or on the merits. In 7 cases, a settlement was reached and proceedings were discontinued. In 4 cases, the investors prevailed and their claims were upheld either in full or in part. Out of the 4 cases in which investors prevailed, 3 were against Egypt.

By and large, it is worth noting that Arab Mediterranean States have positively contributed to, and have been active players in, the universe of investment arbitration. The first ever ICSID arbitration was *Holiday Inns v. Morocco* (Case No. ARB/72/1) involving Morocco, and the infamous Salini Test was formulated in the case of *Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. the Kingdom of Morocco* (ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4). Moreover, *Waguih Elie George Siag and Clorinda Vecchi v. Egypt* (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15) represents another landmark ruling, marking the highest compensation awarded to an individual under the auspices of the ICSID. Similarly, the case of *Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v. Egypt* (ICSID Case No. ARB/84/3) marks the first case in which jurisdiction was ascertained on the basis of a standing legislative offer in a State’s investment law. These are but examples of the important investment cases involving Arab Mediterranean States.

**Conclusion: Investment in the Arab Mediterranean Amidst the Arab Spring of Hope**

It has been seen that Arab Mediterranean States have positively contributed to investment in the Mediterranean region and have likewise concluded many BITs and engaged in investment disputes under the auspices of diverse fora, especially the ICSID, where 8% of all registered cases were commenced vis-à-vis Arab Mediterranean States, with Egypt holding the unfortunate status of being a party to more than 50% of them.

However, it is worth noting that, over the last decade, Arab Mediterranean States have positively contributed to intra-regional investments and have notably boosted their share of investments. This notwithstanding, it seems manifest that investment in the Arab Mediterranean entered a new paradigm during the so-called “Arab Spring” triggered by the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions of January 2011.

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**Arab Mediterranean States have positively contributed to investment in the Mediterranean region and have likewise concluded many BITs and engaged in investment disputes under the auspices of diverse fora, especially the ICSID**

The unprecedented revolutionary tidal wave sweeping across the region and aimed at promoting the rule of law in a corruption-free political and economic environment has, so far, been successful in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. Prior to this revolutionary tsunami sweeping the Middle East, the economic and legal crises suffered by some States striving to join the developed world were not purely a manifestation of the inadequacy of the regulatory and legal framework, but also of the catastrophic lack of well-structured institutions, as well as the lack of sustainable implementation of the rule of law. Predominantly, a distorted image and erratic enforcement of the rule of law prevailed. Nevertheless, the revolutionary spark that lit the candle of democracy and freedom in the region has certainly impacted traditional perceptions of States and governments. Nowadays, it is firmly believed that the “rule of law” serves as a recipe for an effective long-term solution to the most pressing challenges and ails in the Middle East today, including despotism, poverty, conflict, endemic corruption, and disregard for human rights.

In such tumultuous times, people are torn between contradictory centrifugal and centripetal forces. So long as the desire for security, prosperity, stability, and true democracy remains unfulfilled, people’s aching hearts and throbbing minds will reject and continue in utter denial of corruption, despotism, oppression, and poverty. This has generated a colossal sense of optimism and a belief that the future must hold a myriad of better opportunities, which mitigates the looming scep-
ticism, fear, and uncertainty. With such mixed feelings of hope and fear, it is indeed hoped that the proper utilisation and implementation of the rule of law will bring about an eternal season of light, hope, wisdom, freedom, and productivity. This will ultimately have a profound positive impact on the prevailing investment climate and available investment opportunities, whose current status quo remains uncertain due to the ongoing instability.

It is often argued that the most egalitarian countries (Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia) were paradoxically the most affected by the revolutions at the beginning of 2011, whereas other Arab Mediterranean States have been relatively spared until now. However, investors and investment are generally sensitive to political risks and instability. Thus, Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya are currently experiencing a downturn and regression in investment. Whilst it is hoped that such negative trends will end in the near future, it remains to be seen how the new paradigm shift will impact investment policies, contracts, and disputes.

Egypt presents an interesting case study in this regard. Since the inception of the revolution in January 2011, the State has engaged in a full-fledged legal audit of existing investment contracts, resulting in the registration of 4 new ICSID cases. In an attempt to curb and resolve any pending disputes with investors whilst maintaining an investor-friendly approach and climate, the Egyptian Supreme Council of the Armed Forces issued, on 3 January 2012, a decree amending Investment Law No. 8 of 1997. Pursuant to Article 7 of the said decree, it became permissible to enter into amicable settlement negotiations with investors accused of embezzlement and corruption to avert legal proceedings. As a result, diverse amicable dispute settlement committees have been formed and are currently attempting to amicably resolve investment-related disputes and concerns over existing investment contracts.

In Tunisia and Libya, similar initiatives have been implemented to promote investment under the new paradigms. Following the 14 January 2011 revolution, the OECD and the government of Tunisia have started a joint review of Tunisia’s investment policies. The review will chart the country’s progress in developing an effective policy framework to promote investment for development. It will suggest ways to further improve the climate for both domestic and foreign investment. This review is taking place as part of the adherence process to the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises. Tunisia’s adherence would signal its commitment to applying the highest possible investment protection standards.

In Libya, the National Transitional Council (NTC) affirmed, in May 2011, Libya’s commitment and respect to all ongoing legal contracts and agreements concluded with the former Libyan regime provided that such contracts and agreements were validly concluded. This certainly brings a sense of comfort to serious and credible investors and will likely produce positive results by incentivising and promoting foreign investment.

By and large, it seems evident that the investment climate in the Arab Spring will remain favourable to foreign investment, as Arab Mediterranean States cannot afford to sustain a continued negative blow to investment. It is expected that the present negative impact on investment is due to the ongoing political risk and instability, which will likely wither away and disappear with the election of new heads of State and the appointment of new State institutions founded on the rule of law, transparency, and corruption-free practices.

Moreover, following a review of many BITs and investment decisions involving Arab Mediterranean States, it is submitted that: (a) States should reconsider their BITs in light of the prevailing investment case law; (b) States should reconsider the relationship between BITs and the promotion of investment; (c) States should engage in a proper assessment of their investment policies to attract foreign investment and should administer processes and schemes that are consistent with international investment-friendly approaches; (d) States should administer proper schemes for the amicable settlement of investment disputes and avert any risk of legal proceedings that could be detrimental to their image and investment standing; (e) States should avert abusive, discriminatory, and illicit behaviour that could trigger international liability; (f) international arbitrators should carefully consider the behaviour of host States and should also consider investors’ conduct in order to dispense with any abuse of process; (g) States should encourage the building of competent legal teams of experts that are well versed in principles of investment and international arbitration to ensure adequate representation in disputes if needed; and (h) States should discern their competitive investment advantage by determining the sectors and projects that are most appealing to investors.
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For nearly a half century, Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs) have been experiencing major changes that will deeply shape them, and in particular their urban areas. The latter are experiencing considerable expansion and demographic growth, rapidly accompanied by imbalances to which poorly prepared national and local authorities are unable to appropriately respond. This includes the emergence of unplanned urban settlements, with the attendant exclusion and complete or near complete lack of urban infrastructure and basic social services, but also the spread of unemployment and the damage to the urban environment. The tentative answers to this situation (public housing programmes, town planning schemes and urban development plans, targeted employment programmes, etc.) have often contributed but piecemeal solutions, and their lack of consistency and comprehensiveness and their centralised nature have reduced their effectiveness.

Based on the urban development strategy practices advocated by various international institutions and already successfully applied in the North, several cities in the region have recently established their own development strategies. The results of these first experiments are naturally different and unequal, but the actors directly concerned seem unanimous in acknowledging their validity and benefits, even at this early stage.

Coinciding with a time when numerous countries in the region are experiencing unprecedented social dynamics, particularly in cities, a conference held in Barcelona in March 2011 allowed an evaluation of the results obtained and expectations of the cities concerned. The conference organisers (see: www.csp2011bcn.org) commissioned the author of the present paper, in collaboration with Professor A. Lehzam, to draw up a report which has served as material for this paper.

Introduction

Spearheading the economies of these countries, cities have quickly attracted a peripheral or rural population seeking employment opportunities and better living conditions. In a region where the population was essentially rural only 50 years ago, the urban population will represent three quarters of the overall population by 2025, according to a forecast by United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG). Already places of recurring difficulties, cities today reflect countries’ most significant frailties, particularly on the social and environmental levels, and are increasingly serving as the stage for confrontations, at times of a brutal nature, posing major challenges for those who are in charge of planning their development and managing them.

To rise to these challenges, anticipate the economic, social and spatial development of cities and complement and, at times, fill the gaps in classic urban planning practices, many countries have been engaged in more global practices in their urban development for a decade now. These strategies all aim to establish the conditions allowing cities to modernise insofar as employment, urban habitat and infrastructure, and at the same time, ensure economic growth and improve governance.
Qualitative Assessment of City Development Strategies in the SEMCs

The above-stated report discussed the experiences of the cities of Tetouan (Morocco), Sfax (Tunisia), Alexandria (Egypt), Ramallah (Palestine), Amman (Jordan), Aleppo (Syria), Tripoli (Lebanon) and Izmir (Turkey), some of them having renewed the initial exercise and updated it (Tetouan, Alexandria, Sfax).

Received with enthusiasm in many of these countries, above all by local actors, because they focus on priority urban problems and propose action plans generally in keeping with available or foreseeable budgets, City Development Strategies (CDSs) seem to offer the SEMCs a more economic solution than traditional planning, which has become too expensive, even if the architecture of this new approach is not fully developed and the term “strategic planning” can mean different things to different actors.

First of all the report acknowledges that the CDS procedure, based on consensus and a broad, participative approach, has allowed cities implementing one to project their development on the long term and, for some, to launch short and medium-term action plans as well. The fact remains that the results are unequal and the forms of carrying out these strategies and their implementation depends on the economic, social and above all institutional contexts of the countries concerned.

On the methodological level, all the CDSs effected were done so on the basis of the generally advocated methodology (i.e. the one advocated by the Cities Alliance), by adopting the classical stages according to which the report was structured, namely:

- Preparatory stage in which the objectives are defined, the project leadership established, actors organised and the conditions for motivation and participation created;
- Formulating the strategy itself and the action plans to support city development;
- Effectively implementing the plans and programmes, this stage remaining the least advanced in the majority of cities studied.

Preparatory Stage, Themes to Consider and the Matter of Leadership

In principle, a city’s affairs are enshrined in all regulatory texts of countries in the region as falling within the jurisdiction of the elected local government, under the authority and coordination of a mayor. It is he or she who in principle provides the leadership in conducting the CDS in an effective and abiding manner. Although the CDSs of Tunis, Sfax, Tripoli, Aleppo, Ramallah, Amman and Izmir were thus organised, it was the governors assigned to the cities of Tetouan, Alexandria or more recently, Settat and El Jadida in Morocco that conducted the processes. In fact, in the majority of SEMCs, the city governance system is dual, comprising, on the one hand, structures designated by the central government (governors), and on the other, the elected structures pre-
sided by mayors whose decision-making autonomy, though recognised in texts of law, has yet to be perfected in order to lend mayors, together with the city inhabitants, real decision-making authority on the city’s affairs.

Beyond the nature of leadership, the issue of the continuity of decisions and of the process itself remains uncertain insofar as changes of mayor or governor have often led to a slowdown or stop in the process, as was the case in Tetouan and Alexandria after the change in governor, as well as in Amman and Tunis when new mayors were elected. The issue of leadership is not a question of semantics; the leader of the process plays a key role in personifying the strategy, mobilising the actors, lending credibility to the works and building consensus on the issues under debate. A local elected official – rather than a civil servant, though a representative of the government – is the most suited to assuming this task.

Identifying the themes around which the city development strategy should be structured did not present any particular difficulties and, quite predictably, focused almost everywhere on the same generic problems faced by cities in the region: employment (in particular youth employment and the issue of informal employment), developing the local economy, improving the conditions for the administration and financing of the city’s activities, spatial development, informal habitat and shanty towns, urban environment, social infrastructure and transport. The issue of urban governance and local democracy, while an underlying theme (in particular during debates), remained discrete during the preceding decade, but is called on, due to the social upheavals the region is experiencing, to be at the heart of the debates that will fashion the development of cities just as, one would hope, the issue of genre and the role of women in Arab society. Finally, emerging issues such as climate change and the energy economy are rarely discussed, possibly indicating that these issues are far from people’s daily concerns.

Despite the difficulty this exercise seems to have presented among the actors unaccustomed to being asked, there has often been a very strong commitment by the private sector, clearly a partner determined to play a leading role in city development, even beyond the dimension of economic development, as was the case in Sfax, Alexandria and, quite clearly, in Aleppo. Traditionally less present in the debates, the marginalised populations of the informal city often express themselves through organised, committed groups, in particular youth or women’s groups (Alexandria, Aleppo, Tetouan). This stage of formulating a vision has often been a difficult exercise requiring reconciliation of conflicting positions.

By the same token, the formulation of strategic lines along which to develop the CDS as well as that of action plans have remained generic and are often an enumeration or long “wish list,” which in our view reflects the authorities’ desire to satisfy the demands of all social groups. In any case, the following cities are an exception: i) Alexandria, whose well-articulated action plan has enjoyed substantial funding, both national and foreign, guaranteeing the implementation of the CDS; ii) Sfax, which has the support of all the municipalities comprising the greater Sfax metropolitan area, as well as the contributions of a competent technical team; and iii) the restoration programme for the old city of Aleppo (a CDS avant la lettre), which has been continuously implemented and has reached a very advanced stage.

Collectively Devising Vision, Strategy and Action Plans

The sequences of CDS development are stages for which a participative spirit and ownership of the process are expected to be built. One of the stages consists of inviting the different actors to formulate a vision of the city for the forthcoming 15 or 20 years.

Implementation and Institutionalisation of the CDS

With the exception of the city of Aleppo, the majority of the CDSs studied in the SEMC region are either being developed or have not yet reached a level of implementation advanced enough to be able to draw any firm conclusions. It is, however, important to keep in mind that the establishment of an entity designed to render the action plans operational is generally a concern that is not considered until late in the process, which prevents an effective “handover” and above all, deprives those in charge of implementation from gaining the necessary sense of ownership of the CDS project.

One of the weak points of the CDS experience remains its low level of institutionalisation in countries in the region. In contrast to the classic master plans, for instance, which are documents of a regulatory
nature, binding on third parties and with which compliance is mandatory (at least in theory), the CDS has not yet been legally granted the power of a regulatory instrument, with the exception of Turkey or Morocco, where a strategic planning system resembling the CDS has been institutionalised.

Contributions of CDSs in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Region and their Perspectives

Despite the various shortcomings noted, it is undeniable that the exercise of leadership, participation, consensus and decision-making on the local level which a CDS obliges has already had many positive effects insofar as:

- For a certain number of cities, it is the first time that all local-level actors meet to reflect on the city’s problems and its future;
- The CDS contributes to the comprehension of responsibilities on the local scale, the population becoming aware of the municipality’s prerogatives and the boundaries of said prerogatives;
- For the city, it is a communication tool on the national and international levels;
- It likewise provides an opportunity for capacity-building for municipal elected officials and technicians;
- The action plans established through a CDS, even if they are not yet regulatory instruments, are often used by cities as benchmarks for projects to be effected by the authorities and national and international funding agents.

Over the course of a decade, we have observed the evolution of attitudes among local partners, who are increasingly taking the initiative of engaging in the CDS process in their respective cities, taking their cue from the experience accumulated by “pioneer” cities. A recent wave of CDS programmes have been undertaken in certain smaller cities in Jordan as well as in Sousse (Tunisia), Settat, El Jadida and a number of other cities in Morocco, Sidon (or Saida) in Lebanon, etc. This trend reveals a growing awareness that the rise in urban problems can only be addressed on the local level and on the medium and long-term perspectives.

Despite such considerable progress, much remains to be done to correct shortcomings and raise these strategies to the level of success experienced in the Northern Mediterranean and elsewhere. These include shortcomings in local governance whose rectification requires central authorities to agree to delegate the necessary prerogatives to the local level, along with the powers and means to accompany them.

Local partners are increasingly taking the initiative of engaging in the CDS process in their respective cities, taking their cue from the experience accumulated by “pioneer” cities.

In this regard, the Barcelona conference and more recent meetings, such as the one in Beirut (February 2012) of cities in the region having established a CDS (Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia), recommend:

- Reinforcing CDS ownership by including a wider representation in the decision making process;
- Promoting the institutionalisation of the CDS nationwide;
- Supporting the creation of networks of cities having established a CDS, taking advantage of existing networks or networks currently being developed (MedCities, UCLG/NA, GIZ CoMun).

It is quite likely that the changes occurring in the region and the calls for greater democratisation of public life, as well as the need to grant more decision-making power to the levels directly concerned (subsidiarity) will lend additional legitimacy to local authorities, which will make CDS a central, essential tool in their development policies.

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Energy is formally defined as the ability or capacity to do work, and command of energy is setting the outer limits of what can be accomplished by communities, nations, or any social entity. To ensure a large and reliable energy supply is thus among the highest priorities of all countries, and at the moment this is still principally achieved through high shares of fossil fuels in the energy mix. In the long run, however, we will have no choice but to base our activities on renewable energy or sustainable non-renewable systems.

The three principal drivers behind a transition towards higher renewable energy shares are climate concerns (as burning fossil fuels releases greenhouse gas), the prospect of stimulating development by creating "green jobs," and security of energy supply, as renewable energy is typically based on domestic resources. The latter, security of energy supply, seems to be the strongest driver, with nations that are highly dependent on the import of fossil fuels tending to introduce incentives for renewable energy use earlier on and to a greater extent. In the Mediterranean context, security of energy supply has two main aspects. One is the provision of adequate energy services in countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean rim, where higher per capita energy consumption levels would be expected to enhance development (and political stability). The other is the importance of the Mediterranean Sea for energy transit towards the European Union.

Energy Security in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries

With regard to the first aspect, the positive correlation between per capita energy consumption and human development is especially strong during early stages of development, while excessive energy inputs in highly developed societies will not result in any further human well-being. Energy inputs of about 1 tonne of oil equivalent per capita per year seem to be sufficient to achieve high (though not very high) human development, and this is indeed the level of energy consumption observed in the southern Mediterranean. In 2011 Algerians consumed 1.17 tonnes of oil equivalent per capita, Egyptians 0.99 tonnes of oil equivalent, and Turks 1.41 tonnes of oil equivalent. Meanwhile, France consumes energy at a level of 3.86 tonnes of oil equivalent per capita per year, Spain 3.20 tonnes of oil equivalent per capita per year, and Italy 2.82 tonnes of oil equivalent per capita per year. Such energy consumption patterns are in turn associated with various socio-economic indicators that demonstrate that substantial disparities do indeed remain between the northern compared to the southern and eastern Mediterranean rim. The French are more than five times as wealthy as the Egyptians in terms of per capita GDP, and about a fifth of the population in southern Mediterranean countries lives below the poverty line. A person born in Italy can currently be expected to live about nine years longer than one born in Turkey or Egypt. Practically the entire population of the northern Mediterranean rim is literate, while around 30% in the south cannot read or write. In Egypt and Algeria, for instance, 40% of females over 15 years of age are illiterate. Fertility and population growth rates are also in line with expectations based on energy consumption and other trends. In the wealthy, fully industrialised
nations of Mediterranean Europe, total fertility rates, quantifying the average number of children born per woman, are below, or even well below, replacement level. Two children (surviving until reproductive age) are necessary to replace father and mother, and to keep the population size constant. But in Italy and Spain total fertility rates in 2011 were 1.39 and 1.47 children per woman, respectively. Egypt, on the other hand has a total fertility rate of 2.97, i.e. three children are on average born per woman, Turkey of 2.15, and Algeria of 1.75. The resulting annual population growth rates of 1.96% for Egypt, 1.24 for Turkey, and 1.17 for Algeria may sound low at first glance, however, a population growing at 1.96% per year doubles within 35 years.

Imagine an Egypt with twice as many people as now within a few decades and it will become clear that a lot more energy will be needed in southern and eastern Mediterranean nations, not just to stimulate development for the current population size, but to maintain or increase the current level of per capita energy consumption despite the relatively large population growth. Renewable energy and energy efficiency measures will undoubtedly have their role in such a situation, but fossil fuels are expected to remain dominant for decades to come.

Imagine an Egypt with twice as many people as now within a few decades and it will become clear that a lot more energy will be needed in southern and eastern Mediterranean nations

To be sure, the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries combined have a large fossil resource base, and there are several net fossil fuel exporters: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Syria. Algeria ranks 16th in global oil reserves, it has the eighth-largest reserves of natural gas in the world, and is the fourth-largest gas exporter. Libya has some 46 billion barrels of oil in terms of proven reserves, equalling 3.4% of total proven global reserves (by comparison, Saudi Arabia has some 264 billion barrels). Tunisia recently became a net importer of fossil fuels, while Egypt keeps exporting natural gas though it has turned into an oil importer. Whether the region’s fossil fuel importers – Morocco, Tunisia, Israel, Jordan and Turkey – can in fact benefit from these resources will ultimately depend on future levels of regional cooperation.

Energy Security in the European Union

Notably, there will be increased competition for these resources from the regions north of the Mediterranean Sea. France, Italy and Spain are among the world’s top ten oil importers, and imports into the EU as a whole rose by 29% in the ten years between 1996 and 2006. By 2010, proven reserves of 6.3 billion barrels of oil and a domestic production of just below two million barrels per day did not exactly look favourable compared to the EU consumption of nearly 14 million barrels per day. Some 86% of the oil consumed had to be imported, and by 2030 this figure will be 93% under a “business as usual” scenario. The situation looks somewhat better with regard to natural gas, where a production of 174.9 billion cubic metres in 2010 compared to a consumption of 492.5 billion cubic metres, translating to 64% imports (projected to be 75% by 2015 and 84% by 2030), while proven reserves stood at 2.4 trillion cubic metres at the end of 2010.

One of the European Union’s strategies to hedge against supply risks is to diversify its oil and gas imports. Another is to shift more energy consumption from oil to gas. Excluding oil from Norway, the EU now sources about half of its oil imports from the former Soviet Union, a fifth from the Middle East, and some 14% from West Africa. In terms of natural gas imports, the Russian Federation is even more important to the EU, not least because Russia’s natural gas reserves are substantially larger than Russian oil reserves.

To decrease its energy dependence on Russia, the EU has increasingly turned to the Mediterranean. Some 65% of the oil and natural gas consumed in Western Europe passes through the Mediterranean, and the share is bound to increase, as pipeline projects have proliferated rapidly during the past years in just about every corner of the Mediterranean. Turkey already transits oil from Iraq, Russia, the Caucasus, and the Caspian region, and the 3,893 km Nabucco pipeline will, beginning in about 2017 and without touching Russian soil, transport gas from Iraq and Azerbaijan (and potentially from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and even Iran) via Turkey to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria, from where it can be further distributed. What is more, a gas pipe-
line connection is planned between Turkey and Syria to be integrated with the Arab Gas Pipeline, thus allowing for the export of Egyptian gas to Western Europe, while currently most Egyptian gas exports are in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG), which requires far more expensive infrastructure.

To be sure, the role of Algeria is currently much more important to the European Union in energy terms than that of Egypt. Algerian natural gas has long been delivered to Europe through a western pipeline running through Morocco to Spain and an eastern one running through Tunisia to Sicily. In addition, a new direct submarine pipeline from Algeria to Spain through the Mediterranean has recently been opened. Similarly, a gas pipeline from Libya to Sicily has been inaugurated, though it was temporarily closed due to the turmoil in Libya.

Towards More Renewable Energy in the Mediterranean

All the above indicates that a lot of focus remains on fossil energy. However, to utilise more renewable energy is another strategy through which the EU can enhance its energy security, and it comes with the additional benefit of reducing the emission of climate-altering greenhouse gases associated with the use of fossil fuels. The EU has thus committed itself to the "20-20-20" targets, that is: a reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions to at least 20% below 1990 levels; for 20% of EU energy consumption to come from renewable resources; and a 20% reduction in primary energy use compared with projected levels, to be achieved by improving energy efficiency. Mediterranean EU countries have been doing relatively well in this respect. Spain was meeting 15% of its electricity demand with wind power by the beginning of 2011, ranked fourth (behind China, the United States, and Germany) in terms of globally installed wind power capacity, and ranked second (behind Germany) in installed photovoltaic capacity. Meanwhile, Italy ranked fourth in terms of installed photovoltaic capacity, and Greece fifth for installed solar water heaters.

To be sure, Directive 2009/28/EC, laying out the rules with respect to reaching the renewable energy share goals by 2020, allows for EU Member States to achieve their national targets by investing in renewable electricity installations in “third countries,” provided that the produced electricity is being consumed in an EU member country. Member States do not usually view this as an attractive option, simply because their governments prefer to invest in renewable energy to create local employment and increase national energy security. Nevertheless, producing electricity from renewable sources in southern Mediterranean nations for consumption in northern Mediterranean countries is indeed a viable option, and the EU has expanded its renewable energy plans towards the south.

The EU has thus committed itself to the “20-20-20” targets, including a reduction in EU greenhouse gas emissions to at least 20% below 1990 levels

The Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) is one of six key initiatives of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), launched in Paris in 2008, and includes two complementary goals: developing 20 GW of new renewable energy production capacities, and achieving significant energy savings around the Mediterranean by 2020. The European Commission supports the objectives of the MSP through capacity-building projects as well as through its financial support to the European Investment Bank’s Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (EIB/FEMIP) and the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF). Cooperation with international financial institutions, including the World Bank Clean Technology Fund, is an essential part of the MSP, and so is support for industrial renewable energy initiatives such as the French MEDGRID, which focuses more on power transmission, or the German DESERTEC initiative, which focuses more on electricity production.

Desert Energy for Europe

The attraction of such initiatives has to be viewed within the overall potential and limitations of renewable energy. Though everyone would agree that we would all like to live our lives supported by inexpensive, clean and abundant renewable energy, there are a few drawbacks. Renewable energy tends to be more expensive than fossil energy (with externalities
being somewhat irrelevant in the real world as long as they remain excluded from market prices). Renewable energy tends to be intermittent (with solar energy, for instance, delivering during daytime only, and inexpensive, large-scale energy storage solutions besides pumped hydroelectricity still lacking). And renewable energy sources tend to have low energy intensity per unit area, while people are increasingly living in concentrated urban settings. But here recent technological developments have started to make the concept of harvesting renewable energy in North African countries, and delivering it to Europe, more attractive.

First of all, North African countries, stretching deep into desert regions, are less densely populated than European countries. Also, these countries exhibit excellent conditions to harvest wind and especially solar energy. The DESERTEC initiative, for instance, is thus based to a large extent on two technologies. The first, for electricity generation, is concentrated solar power (CSP), which is much more efficient than photovoltaic installations and involves mirrors concentrating solar radiation on a tube or tower to heat a liquid in order to create steam to drive a conventional turbine. Such plants are ideal where a lot of space is available and have been demonstrated in the south-western United States, for instance. The second, for electricity transmission, is an energy grid of high-voltage, direct current (HVDC) power lines, which can transmit electricity with energy losses as low as 3% per 1000 km. In short, such concepts are sound from the technological standpoint, though questions remain with regard to grid stability and energy storage.

Most importantly, it has to be ensured that such projects will indeed entail technology transfer and capacity-building in the south, and that host countries do not just end up being exporters of renewable electricity. To stimulate development, electricity generated this way needs to serve, first of all, local needs, and only surplus power should be exported. But renewable energy often requires substantial investment. The “fuel” tends to be free for renewable energy regimes, and yet renewable energy is more expensive than fossil energy. This implies that most of the lifetime cost of renewable energy installations is incurred up front, while only a quarter is in the case of a natural gas power plant, for instance. The DESERTEC initiative, aiming to utilise Saharan concentrated solar power to meet 15% of Europe’s electricity demand by 2050, comes with a price tag of 400 billion euros. Attracting investments of this magnitude will require stability more than anything, as no government in Europe will base much of its energy security on power lines coming from unsteady regions. Unfortunately, the events of the “Arab Spring,” though carrying the hope for a freer, more democratic and more prosperous Mediterranean, have in the short run introduced much instability: at the time of writing, an outright war is being waged in Syria, rival militias are still engaging in deadly clashes in southern Libya, and plenty of Egyptians feel they have been robbed of their revolution by the military.

**Tumbling Photovoltaics Prices**

To be sure, instability, though of a different kind, has also characterised the northern Mediterranean during the past years. The Greek economy has been rescued, for the moment, by other EU member countries (and Portugal received bail-out loans as well). Spain keeps on struggling, and might be stumbling, and the collapse of Italy, owing about a quarter of all government debt in the euro zone, looms as a nightmare scenario with unpleasantly real potential and tremendous dimensions. Under such circumstances the goals of climate protection and promotion of relatively costly renewable energy systems are no longer priorities, and the generous incentive schemes behind the rise of renewable energy in Spain and Italy, for instance, have indeed been cut to trim budget deficits.

But here, finally, comes what policymakers might view as the best news in recent developments in renewable energy: an astonishing price decrease of photovoltaic solar panels. In part the cutback of generous feed-in tariffs for photovoltaic installations in Germany and Italy is behind this. Germany installed half of global photovoltaic capacity in 2009 and more in 2010 than the entire world combined did the previous year. German taxpayers thus financed the build-up of the photovoltaics industry, but the country no longer offers the same growth incentives, which has left the panel market oversupplied. A few years ago, the growth of the solar industry was hampered by a shortage of polysilicon, from which most photovoltaic panels are made, with prices roughly doubling between 2004 and 2007. In turn, European incentive schemes prompted substantial investments in polysilicon production capacity thatulti-
mately led to the current situation. Critics have argued that the generous feed-in tariffs provided in Europe have failed to trigger innovation in the photovoltaics industry, as practical silicon panels are still no more than 15% efficient. But everyone would agree that they did indeed achieve the mass production of panels that led to price decreases, which were further accelerated when the feed-in tariffs were reduced, causing demand to fall. The current volatility in the industry, characterised by panel makers dumping their product on the market at minimal prices and shutting down excess capacity, will likely be followed by a painful wave of consolidation to adjust to the new level of demand. However, prices are expected to remain relatively low and photovoltaic installations should become competitive without, or with minimal, government support in sunny Mediterranean regions.

In Malta, situated centrally in the Mediterranean Sea, some 1,550 kWh per year will be delivered per kW peak installed, with a space requirement of about 13 square meters per kW peak given a panel inclination of 30 degrees and optimal spacing to avoid shading. In early 2009, photovoltaic module prices were still above 4,500 euros per kW peak, but now the average retail price is between 2,000 euros and 2,500 euros per kW peak, and the lowest stated prices are well below 1,000 euros per kW peak. These prices are exclusive of sales taxes for single modules, and module cost is about 40% of the total installed cost of a solar energy system. However, prices below 2,000 euros per kW peak for total installed systems in residential dimensions have been quoted recently. It is thus easy to see that photovoltaic installations with a lifetime of more than twenty years can now be a reasonable proposal in Mediterranean settings without government incentives, providing that such countries as Egypt (1.9 eurocents per kWh) and Algeria (3.5 eurocents per kWh) end their subsidies to energy consumption and move their average rates of their electricity system closer to those of Mediterranean Europe, where, for instance, in Spain and Italy rates are typically about 13 eurocents per kWh for industry and above 20 eurocents per kWh, including all taxes, for residential consumers. Best of all, photovoltaic installations can play an important role in meeting part of the peak electricity demand during summer daytime in Mediterranean regions as they get wealthier and employ more air conditioning.

More Renewable Capacity in the South

To be sure, the most efficient way to utilise solar energy remains through solar water heaters, though it comes with the drawback that hot water is a much less versatile form of energy than electricity. Solar water heaters have long been cost effective in Mediterranean settings, and Turkey actually ranks second only to China among all nations in the world in terms of installed capacity. Morocco, lacking the oil and gas resources of other North African nations, is also striving to achieve a leading position in renewable energy: the government rolled out an ambitious plan to spend billions of euros on (concentrating) solar energy in order to build several solar power plants capable of producing around 40% of the kingdom’s electricity by 2020. Meanwhile, both Morocco and Egypt have created independent agencies for the development of renewable energy projects and have teamed up with the World Bank to install hybrid gas/concentrated solar power plants. All these are hints that future years will see larger renewable energy capacities to be installed in southern rather than northern parts of the Mediterranean.

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Most Mediterranean countries, particularly the arid and semi-arid ones, are chronically water-stressed. Population growth, urbanisation, development progress and climate change impacts will all exacerbate that stress and result in enormous pressure on available water resources.

It is well recognised that a water crisis is, in many ways, a crisis of governance. It is a crisis due to the failure of institutions to manage water resources for the well-being of humans and ecosystems. Progress towards water sustainability requires governance structures and practices that can foster, guide and coordinate positive work not just for conventional government agencies and business interests, but for the full set of public, private and civil society players, both collective and individual.

The questions now emerging at both the national and regional levels are: how can a crisis of governance be solved? What tools and approaches should be recommended? How can we, as individuals and as a part of collective society, govern the success and control of water resources?

These questions address the fundamental issues leading to effective water governance. However, achieving effective water governance is not an easy process, but rather one that is quite complex. It cannot be tackled using blueprints imported from overseas; instead, it needs to be developed to suit local conditions with the benefit of lessons learnt inside and outside the region.

Introduction

In the Mediterranean countries, and particularly in the arid and semi-arid ones, current practices in water resource management have led to severe challenges in meeting further human, economic and environmental water requirements. Such challenges could be successfully met through effective water governance of all sectoral water uses, especially agriculture, which gets the lion’s share of available water resources.

Governance is a complex product of social and political interactions in which different societal actors are involved at different levels. In the case of water governance, these interactions directly generate policy outcomes affecting agriculture, food, health, education, economic development and poverty alleviation. Indeed, water governance is not about a single organisation that manages a water system; it is about the ability of mutual development to add value (Hamdy and Ragab, 2009; Hamdy et al., 2011). Nowadays, many countries are in the process of changing how water is governed. From a practical point of view, this means formulating, setting in place and implementing water policies, legislation and regulations (Tortajada, 2010).

Governance should reflect broader concerns, such as issues of accountability, control, responsiveness, transparency and participation, in addition to important issues like economic growth and efficiency (OECD, 2011).

Water Governance: What Is It About?

Water governance has more to do with people than water. Therefore, the emphasis should be on connecting people in order to combat compartmentalisation. From a governance perspective, water management is not about hydraulics, dykes or purification plants, but rather the hearts and minds of the people and their vital interests, those requiring the involvement of all relevant stakeholders.

Water governance is about joint decision-making. It is about consensus-building and conflict resolution,
as well as external legitimisation, which implies accountability. It mainly focuses on process. Governance arrangements can only work if the processes associated with the underlying systems are understood. It is to be emphasised that the concept of governance as applied to water refers to the capability of a social system to mobilise energies in a coherent manner for the sustainable development of water resources.

**Defining Water Governance**

At present, there is no universally agreed upon definition for water governance, and its ethical implementation and political dimensions are a matter of national and international debate. Water governance can be perceived in its broadest sense as comprising all social, political, economic and administrative organisations and institutions, as well as their relationships to water resource development and management (Chart 23). The Global Water Partnership (GWP, 2003) defined water governance as the range of political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources, and the delivery of water services, at different levels of society. The UNDP (2004) currently defines water governance as referring to the range of political social and economic processes and institutions through which governments, the private sector and civil society make decisions about how best to use, allocate, develop and manage water resources. Water governance is therefore the set of systems that control decision-making with regard to water resource development and management. It is therefore more about the way in which decisions are made, i.e. how, by whom and under what conditions, than about the decisions themselves (Moench et al., 2003).

**Water Governance: the Four Dimensions**

Water governance has four dimensions: social, economic, environmental and political (Chart 24). The social dimension points to the equitable use of water resources. The economic one draws attention to the efficient use of water and the role of water in overall economic growth. The political dimension is mainly directed at granting water stakeholders and citizens at large equal democratic opportunities to influence and monitor political processes and outcomes. It aims to ensure greater water equity for women as well as other socially, economically and politically disadvantaged groups.

The environmental dimension of water governance refers to sustainable water use and eco-system integrity, with emphasis on its essential role for maintaining a healthy environment. Water quality degradation is consequently a serious threat to environmental sustainability and public health, and it will also reduce the use options of the water that is available.

**Water Governance: Common Pillars**

Most governance principles for managing water resources and services are based on common pillars.
They have been variously combined in different frameworks, thereby emphasising the following universal aspects of governance (Lockwood et al., 2008):

- Legitimacy of the organisations’ authority to govern;
- Transparency in decision-making processes;
- Accountability of actors with regard to their responsibilities, including integrity concerns;
- Inclusiveness of the different stakeholders;
- Fairness in service delivery or allocation and uses;
- Integration of water policymaking at the horizontal and vertical level;
- Capacity of the organisations and individuals managing water;
- Adaptability to a changing environment.

### Keys to Good Governance

For good governance to develop, overall conditions and the general environment must be made favourable: the parties concerned must be amenable to collective decision-making; effective and functional organisations need to be developed; and policy, legal and political frameworks must be suitable to the goals that are being pursued for the common good (Rhoades, 1996; Loolman, 2003; Tilhonen, 2004). For these complex interrelationships to succeed, it must be taken into consideration that they are interdependent and that no single sector, public or private, has the knowledge, information or power to solve the changing societal challenges on its own.

Today, it is well recognised, both politically and technically, that water security, food security and environment sustainability will never be achieved unless we have good water governance. The keys to good governance are summarised in Chart 25.

### Water Governance: the Challenges

The challenges of water governance are enormous when it comes to bureaucratic implementation, public participation, sustainable management of water resources, and the provision of water services. Different interpretations of integrated water management, competing interests among different sectors/stakeholders, power dynamics, and lack of capacity-building are just some examples of the challenges involved.

It is worth noting that water decisions are anchored in governance systems across three levels: government, civil society and the private sector. Facilitating dynamic interactions – dialogues and partnerships – among them is critical for improving water governance reform and implementation (Rogers et al., 2003; UNDP, 2006A and 2006B).

As they are part of their national and international water agendas, many countries are currently responding to water governance challenges by developing and implementing national integrated water resources management (IWRM) plans and strategies (CEDARE and AWC, 2007).

### The Diversity of Governance Roles and Operational Functions

The governance of multi-purpose and hydrologically interconnected natural resources requires many functions in order to provide efficient, equitable and sustainable services. These are the major issues most countries in the region are working hard to address. However, progress towards achieving these goals is still limited. This can mainly be attributed to the fact that some of the governance roles and operational functions needed for resource management and water service delivery have not been clearly identified. Due to the many different actors involved in water governance, the resulting governance structures will vary greatly from country to country, and, as a result, it is now
widely accepted that there is no one ideal system that meets the needs and capacities of all countries (Molden, 2007).

**Water Governance and Water Management**

The terms “water governance” and “water management” are sometimes used interchangeably, but water governance should be distinguished from water management (Chart 26). Water management is about achieving goals, preferably in a functionally and socially responsive and efficient manner, with a given set of means and largely within a given set of conditions and constraints. Water governance is about identifying, choosing or adhering to values and translating these values. This is the key difference between water governance and IWRM (Lautze et al., 2011).

**Water Governance in Agricultural Water Management**

Good water governance in the agriculture field entails shifting from a generally construction-oriented focus to a management perspective. Some prescriptions for improved agricultural water governance include:

- Treating water as an economic good;
- Decentralisation and establishing effective participatory structures and processes;
- Stopping water management fragmentation and shifting to IWRM;
- Mainstreaming gender issues in water resource use and management;
- Introducing new implemental water laws and policies; and
- Declaring water as state property and creating water rights.

Overall, it should be remembered that, without good water governance in agriculture, it would not be possible, in any country, to achieve water security on a long-term basis.

**Water Governance: Major Coordination Gaps**

Table 10 and Chart 27 show the major types of coordination gaps found in water governance. In practice, many of these gaps overlap in terms of the solution intended to address them. This can be clearly observed in the definition of each one.

**TABLE 10**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major Coordination Gaps</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Administrative gap</td>
<td>Geographical “mismatch” between hydrological and administrative boundaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information gap</td>
<td>Asymmetries of information between various authorities in charge of policymaking or implementation of water policy (and between public and non-governmental actors).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy gap</td>
<td>Sectoral fragmentation of water-related tasks amongst government ministries and agencies that hinders integrated policy development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity gap</td>
<td>“Local” water management actors have insufficient capacity to effectively apply water policy in terms of scientific and technical competences, size and quality of infrastructure, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Funding gap</td>
<td>Unstable or insufficient revenues undermine effective implementation of water responsibilities at sub-national levels of government.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: OECD, 2009.
Such gaps proceed mainly from the multiplicity of actors in the water sector. They clearly show that the interaction between regional and central levels of government is not always coherent. The lessons learnt indicate that such coordination gaps are widespread and particularly acute and diverse in decentralised political systems.

Concerning water governance, it is quite evident that there are many different sources of gaps (Chart 28). The presence of so many sources of gaps indicates that improved governance and impacts on water resource management and related services are both complex and dynamic.

Capacities for Water Governance

Water governance requires organisational/managerial, financial, legal and institutional, and social capacities (Chart 29). Those involved in water issues need to be open-minded. In fact, they need to be able to manage their strategies across different organisations and disciplines. This requires building organisational and managerial capacities.

Tools Needed for Effective Water Governance

Establishing an Effective Basin Information System

In a successful water governance system, the basin information system has to be accessible, interactive, affordable, appropriate and equitable. However, the setup of such information systems requires trained people to run them and, therefore, training should be based on an analysis of needs and focused on data administration methods and tools.

Characterising the Interactions between Public Policies (Governance) and Property Rights

To facilitate the effective and efficient use and management of water resources, property use rights must be clearly regulated (Allan and Chibli, 1995). However, in most cases, there are several public policies that regulate the use of a resource, which, when insufficiently coordinated, can result in the degradation of the resource.

Setting an Appropriate Water Resource Regime

Nowadays, the following is a key question for water managers: Is it possible to establish a water resource regime able to take into account the different heterogeneous demands? The answer could be positive if this regime can regulate all uses in such a way that it would be possible to sustainably maintain the capacity of the water resource in question to satisfy all uses and use functions.

Building a Coherent Legal Framework

The creation of an enabling environment for an effective water governance system requires a coherent legal framework with a strong and autonomous regulatory regime. There is a need to evolve a decentralised legal regime that empowers people and makes them the real managers of the resource through clear transactions between stakeholders in a climate of trust with shared responsibility for safeguarding the water resource.
Putting IWRM Tools into Practice

The water crisis in many countries of the world is a crisis of water governance that is mainly due to misuse and mismanagement of water resources. The GWP toolbox for IWRM brings together an array of over fifty tools and references to establish effective water governance systems and put IWRM into practice to overcome governance failures.

National Water Governance Indicators

Water governance indicators are intended to be useful to national stakeholders as a tool for priority-setting and for strengthening the responsiveness of institutions and processes to users’ water needs. Each country has to develop its own indicators, in its own conditions, to monitor and evaluate both progress and drawbacks in a water governance programme.

Building Knowledge and Capacity

The growing challenges require a much greater volume of more structured and better targeted capacity-building supported by related materials and follow-on actions (Hamdy, 2010A). Attention has to shift to capacity-building among decentralised agencies in their new institutional context (Hamdy, 2010B).

Creating an Enabling Environment for Action Implementation

Nowadays, many actions are being taken to achieve more effective water governance, including, among others: revised laws, institutional reforms, the introduction of economic instruments, and social reforms like gender mainstreaming, participation and decentralisation. However, the crucial point is not to identify the actions and tools, but to determine how to implement such approaches successfully.

Building a Partnership Approach: Stakeholders and Public Participation

Governments should stimulate and facilitate the participation of interested parties, providing access to information, authority to act in meetings and, in general, the possibility of expressing opinions and formulating positions. Participation produces a sense of community between the administration and the users, lowers central administration costs and ensures that the interests of users are taken into consideration.

Raising Awareness

Awareness is the foundation of water governance as it is the first step for sensitisation, participation and action. Nowadays, awareness-raising activities are ongoing in many countries, but their coverage is still limited among users, as they have not been approached in an organised way and with a long-term plan. This will affect the efficient use of water.

Concluding Remarks and Recommendations

- Water governance is clearly not an issue that can be approached only from within the water sector or only from the perspective of a single stakeholder or sector. It is, instead, a development challenge that requires cooperation, collaboration and coordination from within and outside the water sector, as well as from the multiple interested parties.
- There is no blueprint for improved governance. The goal should be for each country to plan policy reforms, dialogue, build capacity, implement actual reforms and develop infrastructure in an integrated, timely and sequential manner.
- Implementation of the concept of water governance requires that the entire water cycle be considered a system. An overall "system thinking" mentality is urgently needed wherein the entire water cycle is considered and managed by a single institution rather than fragmented under several.
- It is to be emphasised that transparency and accountability are the two most important pillars of governance in order to build an efficient system that is sustainable over the long term.
- The implementation of any long-term vision of water governance will require understanding the immense changes and challenges that are likely to be faced in the coming years and determining how they can be best understood and addressed to the overall socio-economic benefit of each country and its citizens.
- Governance arrangements, as they have evolved in particular countries, regions or localities, need to be understood fully before conclusions can be drawn regarding their transferability to other countries or regions.
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Open Skies in North Africa: Is Tunisia the Next Morocco?

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The Convention on International Civil Aviation in Chicago in 1944 introduced a complex system of institutions, rules and principles that still governs today’s international air transport sector. Resulting from a disagreement at the time on the regulation of air services, a regime of restrictive bilateral air service agreements (ASAs) between countries came into being, which controlled market access, service levels and fares. Although this did not initially impede the growth of the industry, the rapid development of efficient and safe air travel with new long-range aircraft enabling access to markets further afield and a significant decrease in fares have made the limitations of such an approach apparent.

Although substantial progress towards ‘Open Skies’ has been achieved in the US and in Europe over the last decades, the African market is still struggling to liberalise its air transport sector. Positioned between Europe, the Middle East and the Sub-Saharan African market, particularly North Africa could benefit from the three major liberalisation frameworks in the region, namely the Yamoussoukro Decision with Africa, the Arab League Open Skies agreement with other Arab countries and the formal Open Skies agreement with Europe, based on the European Neighbourhood Policy. Until now, however, only the latter has been a driving force in the progress towards liberalisation.

The European Neighbourhood Policy

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was established in 2004 with the purpose of “avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and our neighbours and instead strengthening the prosperity, stability and security of all.”

The ENP includes sixteen of the EU’s closest neighbours: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. After an initial outline in a Communication on Wider Europe by the European Commission (EC) in March 2003, a Strategy Paper on the ENP was published in 2004 proposing different avenues of cooperation between the EU and its neighbours, including transport.

This commitment to cooperation in the transport sector was reiterated in the Europe 2020 Strategy published in 2010. The strategy focuses on promoting EU economic growth by deploying the external aspects of its internal policies. This is of particular relevance for transport policy, as connectivity, liberalisation of markets and more efficient border procedures all catalyse the flow of goods and people to and from its neighbouring countries.

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2 Ibid.
Under the ENP framework, the EU Neighbourhood Transport Plan was developed with the goal of promoting transport infrastructure and market development in and with the EU’s neighbouring countries. A new revised version of the plan was published in 2011 outlining twenty short- and long-term measures to strengthen transport connectivity. Additionally the European Commission (EC) adopted a Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – towards a competitive and resource-efficient transport system that year with the purpose of enhancing mobility and therefore boosting growth and employment. The roadmap proposed an extension of the EU’s transport and infrastructure policy to its neighbours and the liberalisation of third country markets in transport services.

In the air transport sector, closer integration with neighbouring markets is based on the creation of a wider European Common Aviation Area, a measure that would affect about 1 billion people in the EU and its neighbouring countries in the south and east. In concrete terms, outlined in the 2011 action plan, this encompasses the negotiation of comprehensive air service agreements, support for the modernisation of air traffic management systems, assistance in complying with EU and international aviation security and safety standards, and the integration of neighbouring countries into the Single European Sky initiative.

A dialogue with North Africa was already initiated in Paris in 1995, where the ministers of six western Mediterranean countries (Algeria, France, Italy, Morocco, Spain, and Tunisia) agreed to pursue a joint policy aimed at harmonising and extending the European transport system with the Maghreb transport system. With regards to air transport, the conference set the objectives of harmonising air traffic control systems between Europe and the Maghreb and fostering partnerships between the six countries “in the interest of gradual and controlled liberalisation of the international air transport sector.”

The consultations between the Maghreb countries and their European counterparts were eventually elevated to the level of the EU, which began to negotiate air service agreements on behalf of its Member States.

The Successful Pilot: Morocco

Morocco’s air traffic had been fairly stagnant until 2003 despite investments of €1.2 billion in grants and loans between 1995 and 2003 for economic infrastructure and transport through the MEDA Programme, and a signed Open Skies agreement with the US in 2000. In 2004, in a step towards further air transport liberalisation, Transportation Minister Karim Ghellab presented his plan for a threefold increase in international air transport capacity. This was supported by King Mohammed VI through a letter which stated: “As we had highly recommended, the project to reform the map of the skies has just been put into effect. This will allow not just for the sector’s liberalisation, but also for reducing transport costs, greater fluidity and the appropriate coordination between issuing markets and tourism zones.”

In May 2005 based on the aforementioned initial dialogue, the EC commenced negotiations with Morocco.

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6 Ibid at 16

7 Ibid


9 In November 2002, the EU’s Court of Justice ruled that several Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg, and Sweden) had failed to fulfil their obligations under the European Community Treaty when they had agreed to individual Open Skies agreements with the United States in 1994, 1995, and 1996 (EU 2002a, pp. 2–9). This marked the beginning of new EU external aviation policy that aims to (a) bring existing bilateral agreements in line with community law, and (b) gradually adopt ambitious agreements between the community and third countries (European Commission 2005a).

10 The acronym MEDA derives from the French: Mesures d’accompagnement


on an Open Skies agreement. This initiative was widely seen as the test case for the new European aviation policy.\footnote{European Commission Information Note: EU-Morocco Euro-Mediterranean Air Transport Agreement 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/international_aviation/country_index/doc/morocco_info_note.pdf. Last Accessed 22/06/12} After five rounds of negotiations, Morocco signed an Open Skies agreement with the European Union in 2005, representing the first aviation agreement of the EU with a non-European country. As outlined in the agreement, EU and Moroccan carriers are allowed to operate to and from any point in Morocco and the EU without price or capacity restrictions. The agreement also provides 5th freedom rights\footnote{Charles E. Schluumberger, Open Skies for Africa , Washington: The International Bank for Development and Reconstruction/ The World Bank 2010, p. 63} for both sides. This will be implemented in a two-phased approach with the first stage having come into force in 2006 allowing unrestricted 3rd and 4th\footnote{3rd Freedom Rights: the right to fly from one’s own country to another, 4th Freedom Rights: the right to fly from another country to one’s own.} freedom rights. The implementation of the currently pending second phase depends on the satisfactory implementation of relevant European legislation, which covers the essential elements of some 28 European regulations or directives (e.g. safety, air traffic management, denied boarding, environmental and noise restrictions etc.). Once implemented, Moroccan carriers would benefit from consecutive 5th freedom rights in the EU. In turn, EU carriers could use 5th freedom passenger rights beyond Morocco to countries involved in the Neighbourhood Policy, as well as 5th freedom cargo rights to all third countries.\footnote{5th Freedom Right: the right to fly between two foreign countries on flights that originate or end in one’s own country.}

Since the agreement, international traffic has increased significantly. In 2007, annual air passenger traffic reached 12.1 million out of which 10.55 million accounted for international traffic.\footnote{O-D Market is defined as ‘Origin and Destination Markets’. Refers to passenger travel patterns in a market or market pair.} Between 2003 and 2007 international traffic grew by 20% per annum, 25% alone between 2006 and 2007. About 80% of this international traffic, including the top seven O-D markets,\footnote{Own Analysis based on Data from DiO, Online Airline Schedule Analyser, SRS Analyser (January 2012), online: www.diio.net/products/srs-analyser-1/} was on routes directly covered by the Open Skies agreement. When analysing capacity figures this trend can be seen for traffic after 2007, with an annual growth rate in available seats of almost 5.5%.\footnote{“Flocks of tourists flying in after Morocco-EU air traffic agreement”, Executive, October 2008, www.executive-magazine.com/getarticle.php?article=11101. Last Accessed 22/06/12}

The Open Skies agreement with the EU has considerably increased competition for Royal Air Maroc, which is almost entirely government-owned. This, in turn, partially explains the slowness and hesitance of the Moroccan government throughout the Open Skies negotiations.\footnote{Royal Air Maroc, Flight Safe Database, www.flightsafe.co.uk/public/ram.html. Last Accessed 22/06/12} Although the airline still dominates the market with over 50% market share, 22 new foreign companies have commenced operations to and from Morocco since 2004.\footnote{“New carrier Air Arabia Maroc switches to Casablanca base”, FlightGlobal , 3 November 2008: www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/new-carrier-air-arabia-maroc-switches-to-casablanca-318306/. Last Accessed 22/06/12} 19 European carriers including low-cost airline Ryanair and easyJet, as well as carriers from the region such as Buraq Air, Etihad and Turkish Airlines were attracted by the opportunities offered by the Moroccan market.\footnote{Mark Pulling, “Royal Air Maroc to be privatised: World Air Transport Forum News”, Airline Business Blog, 30 October 2008, www.flightglobal.com/blogs/airline-business/2008/10/royal-air-maroc-to-be-privatised.html} Low-cost airline Air Arabia even set up a new hub in Casablanca in 2009 featuring a fleet of Airbus 320 aircraft.\footnote{World Trade and Tourism Council, Travel & Tourism Economic Impact 2012, Morocco, www.wttc.org/site_media/uploads/downloads/morocco2012.pdf} The airline has, however, continued to operate profitably with US$ 1.5 billion in revenues in 2008.\footnote{www.wttc.org/site_media/uploads/downloads/morocco2012.pdf}

The EC commenced negotiations with Morocco on an Open Skies agreement. This initiative was widely seen as the test case for the new European aviation policy.

The liberalisation of the air transport industry has had a major impact on income from tourism.\footnote{Executive Magazine, October 2008, www.executive-magazine.com/getarticle.php?article=11101. Last Accessed 22/06/12} As the
World Travel and Tourism Council reports, foreign visitor arrivals have been increasing steadily since 2002, with expected growth of 6% per annum until 2020. In 2011, Morocco generated US$8.5 billion in visitor exports, accounting for almost 9% of the country’s GDP.

There are, however, still some major markets with destinations such as Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and UAE, that have restrictive air service agreements with Morocco. A study by InterVISTAS in 2009 highlighted that 53 Moroccan air service agreements still had restrictions on capacity, pricing, designated airports and sometimes even approved airlines. In some cases this may, however, be related to the policies of other countries rather than Morocco’s own. The liberalisation of foreign airline ownership and control is also still restricted to an equity stake of 49%. The above-mentioned study by InterVISTA examined the positive impact the removal of these restrictions could have on the Moroccan air transport industry and the economy as a whole. In terms of fare reduction, the impact of “Open Skies” is estimated at 7%, and would create over 24,000 new jobs. However, ownership and control liberalisation, which has not yet been implemented, could have a much greater impact, resulting in 24% additional traffic, an additional 19% reduction in the average fare, and additional employment of 68,800 jobs.

The Case of Tunisia

Over the past decades, air transportation has played a significant role in the economic development of Tunisia. The growth of the tourism sector in particular, representing 6.5% of the country’s GDP in 2010,

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27 Visitor exports: spending within the country by international tourists for both business and leisure trips, including spending on transport.
30 Ibid at 29
is highly dependent on a flexible and extensive air transport network. Due to the volatility of the sector, however, the political events of 2011 resulted in a massive reduction of tourist arrivals and triggered a crisis in the tourism and consequently air transport industry. Arriving passengers decreased by about 30% and charter flights recorded a decrease of more than 50% in traffic. Until now there are no clear signs of recovery.32

The national airline Tunisair, created through an agreement between the Tunisian government and Air France in 1948, has profited for years from this relatively closed market, controlling 63% of the market. In 2010 the airline reported revenues of $682 million,33 and this year, it controlled the market with a 63% market share34 – a dominance that has not changed significantly in recent years. Besides Air France, which is a shareholder of Tunisair, no other airline has been able to gain significant market share. Due to political circumstance and an unsuccessful restructuring effort, however, the airline has had to incur recent financial losses.

Tunisia has generally experienced relatively slow average traffic growth over the past seven years with 93% of traffic originating from international routes. While international scheduled passenger traffic grew by less than 7% on an annualised basis until 2010 (only 3.43% if we include 2011), international charter passengers have steadily declined (minus 1.69% annualised until 2010, minus 9.27% with 2011). Overall, international air traffic in terms of arriving passengers grew less than 2% (minus 3.36% with 2011). Domestic traffic has been fairly stagnant in recent years although, surprisingly, it grew by 9.55% and 13.61% in 2010 and 2011 respectively. This can be explained by a significant increase in domestic scheduled and charter traffic being handled by Enfidha Airport, which was built between 2007 and 2010 with the purpose of absorbing most of the domestic charter flights that were congesting traffic at Tunis-Carthage.35

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32 Analysis of received passenger arrival data, DGAC Tunis Feb. 2012.
34 Own Analysis based on Data from DiO, Online Airline Schedule Analyser, SRS Analyser (January 2012), online: https://www.diio.net/products/sra-analyser-1/
Domestic charter traffic from this airport tripled from 2010 to 2011.\(^{36}\)

A more detailed analysis of international traffic patterns highlights the fact that air traffic is mainly concentrated on destinations in the European Union (see Chart 32). Overall EU-Tunisian traffic represents around 63% of total traffic with minor fluctuations over the last 10 years.

Due to the large number of international destinations Tunisia’s traffic network is covered by multiple bilateral agreements with countries in Europe, as well as with Africa and the Arab region. In Europe the prime focus is on the Central and Western parts of the EU with little or no connectivity to Eastern and Northern Europe as well as Spain and Portugal.

One reason for this limitation is the fact that Tunisair seems to have been less successful than for example Royal Air Maroc in capturing 6th freedom\(^{37}\) traffic between Europe and West Africa. This is probably due to its smaller size, its more restrictive bilateral air service agreements, and its stronger exposure by geographic proximity to competition from Libya’s Afriqiyah Airways on this particular market segment.\(^{38}\)

In order to progress towards air traffic liberalisation, the European Union (EU) has held informal talks with the Government of Tunisia for several years. On 9 December 2008, the Council of the European Union adopted a Decision authorising the European Commission to open negotiations with Tunisia to establish a Euro-Mediterranean Air Transport Agreement, as part of the process of creating a wider Common Aviation Area with its Eastern and Southern Neighbours by 2010.\(^{39}\)

Initial talks on liberalising air traffic with the EU progressed quite well until the political events of early 2011. Subsequently, Tunisia put its pre-negotiations of an Open Skies agreement with the EU on hold until at least May 2012. This is partially due to the fact that the government was not yet confident Tunisair would be able to face increased competition with low-cost operators, such as Ryanair and

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\(^{36}\) Analysis of received passenger arrival data, Direction Générale de l’Aviation Civile, Tunis, Feb. 2012.

\(^{37}\) 6th Freedom Rights: right to fly from one foreign country to another while stopping in one’s own country for non-technical reasons.

easyJet. Furthermore, many tour operators may be concerned that they would lose the air travel part of their package holiday deals.

Conclusion

There is little doubt that liberalisation of market access in the form of an Open Skies agreement between Tunisia and the EU would stimulate the market. In fact, given that the bilateral agreements with European countries are not yet that liberal, and that 40% of international traffic is still based on charter operators, lifting market access restrictions would immediately create a dynamic response to demand and stimulate the market. New entrants and low-cost operators would compete with the national airline, and with established European operators. In the case of Tunisia however, the main challenge stems from the fact that Tunisair has profited for years from a relatively closed market. Liberalisation of air services in the coming years would require Tunisair to restructure and downsize its operations in order to compete with new market entrants. Such a downsizing is often perceived as a political challenge, which may hinder the implementation of an Open Skies regime. However, far greater employment opportunities would be created in the tourism industry, as well as in other sectors due to the catalytic effect of these new operators.

Furthermore, a large percentage of tourists arrive on flights sold by tour operators. Even though their share has dropped over the years, tour operators would most certainly oppose any liberalisation of air services, as they would lose an important source of revenue.

The political events of 2011 resulted in a massive reduction of tourist arrivals and triggered a crisis in the tourism and consequently air transport industry. Arriving passengers decreased by about 30% and charter flights recorded a decrease of more than 50% in traffic.

Finally, foreign carriers which today benefit from a more closed market with Tunisia will probably oppose liberalisation. Air France in particular, a shareholder of Tunisair, could be opposed to liberalisation resulting in increased competition on the still relatively profitable route between Paris and Tunis.

Given the recent events in Tunisia and the considerable drop in tourist arrivals as a result, the liberalisation of air services should indeed be readressed. The tourism sector, which has suffered most, but also general travel (visiting friends and family), could potentially be revitalised by introducing competition to air service provision. This would certainly increase tourist arrivals, but could also support the development of trade and foreign investments.

Between December 2010 and May 2011 major social uprisings and protests took place in several Arab countries, particularly in North Africa, dubbed the “Arab Spring” or “Arab democratic revolutions” by the international media.

These Arab revolutions are seen as the first great wave of secular and democratic protests in the Arab world in the 21st century. Unprecedented in these societies, the revolts had a clearly social nature and were driven by different structural and demographic factors, in which harsh living conditions, entrenched in unemployment and poverty, coupled with corrupt and authoritarian regimes have played a vital role.

Factors that were not present in revolts in the past, such as globalisation and the universalisation of information and communication technologies (the Internet, mobile phones and social networks), improved training and education in society, together with the negative effects of the 2008 world crisis, which were multiplied in the region, were the perfect breeding ground for a keen awareness in large sectors of Arab societies of the need for change, which was channelled into the famous protests in squares such as Tahrir in Cairo, Pearl in Bahrain or Change Square in Sanaa.

These revolts and revolutions have essentially been an urban phenomenon. Rural areas, which although in general suffer more greatly, have been much less involved. In Tunisia for example, the protests took place inland, in small and medium-size towns (Gafsa and Kasserine, with the tourist city of Sidi Bouzid as the driving force), and started to spread through and express the discontent and frustrations of the coastal towns (Sfax, Hammamet), eventually reaching the capital, and losing none of their intensity on the way.

In Egypt, the capital has been — and still is — the focal point of the mobilisations, although there were also major protests in Alexandria and Suez, and likewise in many of the cities of the densely populated Nile Delta. Reports of widespread institutionalised corruption and demands for better democracy and greater freedom of expression have been widely reported by the international media. However, it is undoubtedly the urban dramas of the vast majority of cities in the area, the reality of everyday life for people living in cities in the region, with high levels of unemployment and extremely poor living conditions, that has been one of the de facto catalysts of the revolutions.

This urban drama is clearly visible in two closely interconnected aspects of city life: access to the housing market and access to basic services. Anyone who has travelled to the suburbs of an Arab city will have seen the very poor conditions and state of the housing, which in most cases does not comply with any legal regulations regarding housing or construction. What is more, any attempt to regulate and standardise housing conditions and the distribution of property on the terrain has had adverse effects on the housing market, leading to disproportionate rises in house prices, thereby making it harder for large sections of society to access the sector. The numerous (mega) projects and city planning works with the accompanying infrastructure, fuelled by the pre-crisis boom years, have only helped to push prices upwards, increasing the pressure on poorer neighbourhoods.

If access to basic housing for most of the population represents one side of the urban drama in most Arab cities, access to public services shows the other side. The supply of basic services like electricity, water, sewage, public transport, waste treatment, etc., is a long way from meeting the most basic of human needs. For many years, these services have been provided by public companies. They have been highly
subsidised, clearly lacked investment in modernisation and maintenance, and offered very low service standards and a large operational deficit. Attempts in the past to introduce reforms and rationality to management, such as investment in technologies, have inevitably led to an increase in the cost of services, making them even less accessible for the majority of the population. The authorities are facing a dilemma for which there is almost no solution, debating between maintaining subsidies – which they can hardly afford –, which leads to inefficient and mediocre services, or the elimination of subsidies and the introduction of incentives (even privatisation) to stimulate investment in and improve these services, although at the cost of making their access impossible for a large amount of the population.

The reality of everyday life for people living in cities in the region has been one of the de facto catalysts of the revolutions

It is small wonder, therefore, that with this accumulation of circumstances, the protests and revolts have been concentrated in the cities and led by their inhabitants – the citizens. Cities offer a unique scenario for exchanging ideas, values, social life and economy. The existence of social networks and the globalisation of communication technologies have been instrumental in allowing the organisation of protests and the almost immediate transmission of information and orders. However, the cities’ public spaces, from the traditional mosques to the more modern squares, have played hosts to the gatherings; this is where the people have made their demands for social, economic and democratic improvements. Without citizens taking over and recovering public space, the revolutions and protests would not have had the same success and strength.

The initial response of European Mediterranean countries perhaps lacked the energy that corresponded to the changes that were occurring. However, from a personal point of view, for many professionals who understand in some depth the Arab world and cities and have had some kind of technical relationship with them, the perspective of the Arab revolutions introduced new elements of hope and opportunity in attaining and overcoming the major challenges faced by Arab cities and society. In the specific case of transport and mobility, which is so closely related to the conception and use of public space in cities, we believe three opportunities have arisen.

The Traditional Urban Structure of the Arab City and its Relation with Public Space

Despite the wide variety of origins and growth patterns, Arab cities were founded on a common set of social, geographic and religious factors, which triggered the beginnings of the morphological development of very similar urban fabrics. The pattern of development of the Arab city, as highlighted by Anthony Kiet, was based on the division of the social hierarchy, in which the daily activities of the majority of the population were concentrated in the city centre, while the leading classes were located in outlying palaces and fortresses.

Starting in the centre of the city, the most common pattern for using the land arose from the multifunctional base structure surrounding (entirely or partially) the main mosque, which branched out into different layers of interconnected souks, between which were interspersed the different commercial spaces, caravansarais, educational and civic areas and buildings, as well as other religious and social structures. All together, this congregation of structures and facilities created a massive mosque-complex, whose central courtyard arose from the main public space not just of the complex, but also, sometimes, of the city itself.

Within this organisation the system of circulation around the souks became the basic route for mobility and access to the central complex. Likewise, numerous smaller open spaces located outside of the main streets became public areas specialised in different social functions, balancing and satisfying the needs of the population.

The urban model of the traditional Arab city was completed with a network of main streets, which connected the central complex with the exterior city walls and gates. Each of these axes was lined with shops, organised along the pedestrian pathways with the clear aim of maximising the clientele as they travelled from one part of the city to another. These structuring axes or avenues had an additional function: they served as protective shields, concealing the residential districts from “intruders.” The entrances to these districts were marked by arches and small doorways where alleyways crossed the main axes, subtly indicating the transition between the public and private sphere, and the entry into the sacred world of Arab family life.
The residential districts made up the rest of the Arab urban morphology. Again, these were structured following social norms and patterns, with wealthier and more prestigious classes located close to the central mosque complex, and the working classes on the periphery.

The process of creating the city was made more complex by the Islamic law on inheritance, which strengthened the relentless subdivision of the residential units as families grew.

Without citizens taking over and recovering public space, the revolutions and protests would not have had the same success and strength

In terms of organising land and transport, the structure of the traditional Arab city represented a perfect example of sustainable management (as we understand the term today) in the area of mobility. The distribution of public space was optimum, thanks to the structuring of the primary elements of community life that minimised the need to travel, and with the generation of excellent pedestrian axes that held together commercial and social activity, while at the same time allowing people to travel between different areas of the city and the central mosque complex. Reducing the need to travel to a minimum, guaranteed access to public space and the latter’s efficient distribution to support social activities and mobility are city planning principles that may “sound” highly revolutionary, but which the Arabs were already putting into practice several centuries ago. And not only the Arabs, since these patterns of urban organisation and mobility can also be identified in cities on the northern shores of the Mediterranean, impregnated with the Christian culture but organised on practically the same principles.

In the 19th century, however, the solid traditional structure of the Arab city (of the Mediterranean city at its fullest extent), began to break down as a result of the slow but widespread process of industrialisation, which arrived mainly through the development and expansion of the European colonies. The urban models of cities like London and Paris began to influence the Arab cities of North Africa. One of the most dramatic transformations of an Islamic city took place in Cairo. Enormously impressed by the designs and planning of Haussmann, after a visit to the Paris Universal Expo in 1867, the Khedive Ismail Pasha, Governor of Egypt, decided to adopt the Parisian models for the Egyptian capital. A new city plan was designed in a less populated area to the southeast of Cairo, which was also the origin of a major social divide: the wealthy classes immediately preferred living in the more Westernised area, while the more popular classes remained in the old city. This decision represented, in essence, the start of the stigmatisation of the old city of Cairo, which until then had enjoyed great urban health (favoured by the traditional Arab-Mediterranean structure), as a slum of the lowest social classes.

The process of Westernising (Americanising?) city planning and urban space intensified in the middle of the 20th century, and with the growth of Western business and professional models, urban growth began to resemble the American model of the central business district. However, this took place in the new city centres, while the old areas began to suffer a process of accelerated degradation, afflicted by a lack of accessibility (in accordance with the new concept of accessibility, that of a private vehicle), of low quality services, facilities evidently not properly maintained, over population, poor economic conditions, etc.

The prevailing Western city planning methods enforce a detrimental separation of functions, designating specific areas for housing, commerce, civic uses, leisure, etc. The original purpose of separating functions was aimed at creating more efficient and rational urban systems, rather than effectively resolving the social needs of the population.

The traditional Arab city and its counterparts on the northern shores of the Mediterranean were conceived and designed on a pedestrian scale, with a highly dense, rich and complex cityscape. The main arteries were integrated into the system of souks and markets, the secondary byways were fully linked in with the system of residential neighbourhoods; the alleyways and entranceways, directly connected with the private realm. Thanks to its design, this circulation system ensured the satisfaction of all the social and spatial needs of its users, the inhabitants of the city. The road system was not just a means, but an end in itself, since it contained countless urban functions, which have today become separated.

The Arab cities have not escaped the vicious circle of city and public space planning, which has proved itself to be ineffectual and ruined the living structure of the traditional city, creating large monofunctional spaces, joined by hard roadway infrastructures. Basic
urban functions have therefore been displaced, heightening the problems of accessibility and mobility (congestion, extremely low quality in public transport services) for the vast majority of the population. This situation has merely served to deepen the degradation and loss of value of the public space, increasing widespread impoverishment and creating the breeding ground for the protests and revolutions that have taken place.

The Three Opportunities of Public Transport Following the Arab Revolutions

The breeding ground for recent events has been the harsh living conditions of most inhabitants of Arab cities, arising from scarce economic resources, limited access to basic services and a serious degradation of the urban public space, which is already a long way from satisfying the traditional needs of Arab culture. It is therefore extremely interesting to note that it is the urban public space and demands for its recovery that have been one of the key elements in the revolts and revolutions that have taken place.

During decades of despotic Arab governments, the two public spaces with the capacity to accommodate and/or generate political expression, which have arisen from the evolution of the traditional structure of the Arab city – the mosques – and subsequent Western city planning – the squares – have, in effect, seen their civic function eliminated. Some of the violent revolts in the past were able to make their demands, albeit fleetingly, in one place or the other, but the repression was almost always severe and unchecked. In the 2011 Arab revolutions, however, both public spaces were aligned in a new form of civil protest, and success came despite numerous initial doubts. It is of particular relevance that both types of public space that bore the hopes of democracy and a better life, the mosques representing traditional values and the squares which arose from the “new city planning,” worked in tandem after decades of mistrust between religious and secular movements.

Of course, the new means of communication, the social networks, have helped enormously with the diffusion of ideas and in calling for demonstrations, but all the demands have been developed, in the end, in the real space of the city. The Arab citizens have again conquered the public space.

The revolutionary events witnessed by the Arab countries have facilitated a kind of new “dialogue” between the spaces of tradition and the spaces of modernity within the city. The mosque, and what it represents, is no longer the antithesis of the square, nor its substitute. Both spaces are taking back their civil roles through the hopes and demands of thousands of anonymous citizens, yet without renouncing the roles and functions that identify and differentiate them.

In this “new order,” both spaces have contributed to protecting and fuelling public opinion, providing a platform where the population can demand its civil rights.

Public transport, as a basic structuring and configuring element of public space, and as an aid to one of the basic needs of the population, mobility, cannot be left outside of this “dialogue.” It can (and must) contribute to the recovery of public space, offering a new paradigm for mobility in cities, in which more sustainable patterns and models than those used today are brought back into use.

The Arab revolutions and their demands regarding public space offer great opportunities to develop and integrate transport systems into community spaces, thus tackling several of the pressing problems of the citizens of Arab cities.

Public transport can (and must) contribute to the recovery of public space, offering a new paradigm for mobility in cities

Specifically three major areas of opportunity can be identified regarding public transport systems in these times of transition in the Arab world:

Today, few people would doubt that public transport systems (including non-motorised modes of transport) are an extremely effective tool for resolving mobility problems for people in both an efficient and intelligent way. The arguments are no longer solely environmental – to lower emissions, noise and other externalities –, but now also consider social integration and economic rationality. Public transport systems make a decisive contribution to improving quality of life, guaranteeing accessibility to different areas of the city (and to the different urban functions that these areas play host to) and providing the basic support for day-to-day economic and social activities. Therefore, giving the impoverished neighbourhoods of Arab cities a good, rational, efficient, well-planned public transport network, would be a
contribution to the social and economic development of the people who live there, and would help to resolve the serious infrastructural shortcomings in these areas. Furthermore, the implementation of public transport projects goes some way to recovering the public space, also understood as a place for the community and for democratic discourse, designed around humans (and not private vehicles) and able to support multiple urban functions and the creation of wealth. Above-ground public transport systems go hand in hand with pedestrian mobility, and with economic, commercial, recreational and communicative activity. In the past, traditional Arab cities relied on their pedestrian axes to structure and connect the different areas of life, from the central mosque to the private living areas, in turn enabling multiple activities to develop and not just providing routes for travelling from one place to another. Today, however, it is the public transport systems (especially above-ground systems) which can adopt this function, connecting the squares with the mosques, the interchange hubs with the administrative buildings and commercial with residential areas. To see how this opportunity can become a reality we need only consider how life develops along the Alemdar – Divan Yolu – Yeniceriler axis in Istanbul, which runs through the main mosques, souks and universities of the city, right through the heart of the old city, and boasts a magnificent light metro system that is perfectly integrated within the city infrastructure, and compare this with the axis that connects Al Sayed Al Merghani, Al Sayed Al Maqreezi, Lofty El Sayed and Ramses Square, which is served by the ancient, dilapidated tram line from Heliopolis to Cairo. Lastly, public transport systems are systems that above all need a democratic and civic management for them to function effectively. Here we can identify a further opportunity that good public transport systems in Arab cities could offer the strengthening of the collective spirit of a community faced with the prevailing individualism of the Americanised city planning and mobility model, which relies on private transport. Public transport systems depend on people observing certain rules of community life, behaviour and usage; from the chosen fare system, that everyone has to comply with, to the rules, rights and duties of the passengers and staff, as well as the need for public transport, its passengers and pedestrians to coexist. The development and promotion of public transport networks, as new unifying elements of the different social spheres of the Arab world, can contribute to the recovery of the central pillars of community life that arise from the structuring axes of traditional Arab cities, which also help to adapt the Western vision to the Arab culture.

Beyond the purely technical and technological challenge that the generalisation and/or extension of the public transport systems represents in the large Arab cities, the revolutionary events of last year have proved that the citizens of most Arab countries are becoming aware that their living conditions could and should be better and that they can and should take back the public space that has been wrongly taken from them by the ruling powers (and take control of the city planning these powers are responsible for). Thanks to the revolutions that have taken place, all the elements that make up the complex and rich human social system can and should have an opportunity and a duty to contribute to attaining the aims and hopes of the population. And public transport is a key component of this playing field, since it can contribute decisively to improving living conditions for the people, ensuring their mobility and accessibility; it can actively help to recover and interconnect the urban spaces which until today have been degraded and/or disjointed; and can collaborate in enhancing the social and democratic spirit of the people.

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The Policy Framework for Research Collaboration in the Mediterranean: A Politically Saturated Space

Scientific cooperation (as opposed to collaboration) appears when support programmes actively promote scientific collaboration at the international level. Scientific cooperation activities are promoted by both international and national institutions. International programmes and national agencies working at the international level, design, fund and sustain these cooperation programmes. Although the discussion on global research programmes has arisen from the urgency of tackling global societal challenges in the Euromed area, it is also based on diplomacy, historical and cultural ties between countries, and political objectives. The new global hierarchy, based on a multipolar world, exacerbates the opposition of, on the one hand, “science for science’s sake” – and the predominance of criteria of “excellence” mainly present in hegemonic countries – and, on the other hand, “science for development” – and the defence of “pertinence.” Of course, excellent research does not necessarily bring about good development, and development is not always linked to excellent research. It is rather a question of defining a clear strategy and enabling an environment that satisfies developmental needs. Thus “science for development” or “science for innovation” can in no way be opposed to “science for academic excellence.”

International scientific collaborations are now part of a world science system that has profoundly changed in its ‘governance’: decisions are no longer limited to the official authorities (governments, international agencies, European Union) but now include the many players of the new learning economy. Final users of science (people suffering illnesses in medical research, rural populations in agricultural science projects, enterprises in innovation policy, and so on) intervene actively in defining research agendas. Large funding agencies act at the global level and are no longer limited by national boundaries.

The case of the Euro-Mediterranean region raises questions such as: How is this competence market structured? Who are the main actors? How is this new hierarchy of competences expressed and how does it translate into policies and the current dynamics of science. Given the history of the Mediterranean Basin, it is no surprise to find a multiplicity of competing agendas, agencies and organisations in the field of research, as well as a wealth of research programmes on the Mediterranean area, executed by foreign and local research teams. Bilateral cooperation has usually been the product of former colonial linkages, and the advent of a national science in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, the product of independence. Most scientific relations in the region have been embedded in this political framework. It is only for the last 20 years that the EU has appeared as a major player in this institutional

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1 A description with a world map of the new global distribution of scientific production can be found in the Atlas du Monde Diplomatique (2012), pp. 70-73.

2 An analysis of this multipolar scientific world can be found in Losego and Arvanitis (2008). A detailed analysis of these changes are to be found in the white Paper ‘Assessment of international scientific cooperation in the Mediterranean region’, MIRA Observatory (2011).
space, which is literally saturated by institutions aimed at promoting cooperation.

Cooperation with the EU

Research cooperation with the EU takes place in the more general policy framework of Euromed cooperation. Initially this political framework was defined by the Barcelona Declaration (1995), which was later replaced by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), aimed at a larger scope than the Mediterranean in order to include all neighbouring countries of the EU.

The principal financial instrument for cooperation has been the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), with almost €12 billion for the period 2007-2013, which replaced MEDA funding in the Mediterranean. As well as research activities, the European Commission (EC) has assigned substantial funding through structural programmes. A Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC) Programme for the Mediterranean Sea Basin has also been defined which is funded by the ENPI, and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). The funding available for 2007-2010 was €583 million, which included €275 million from the ENPI and €308 million from the ERDF (Data from Euromed Expert Group Report). This is not the time to judge the impact or efficiency of these decisions, but it is important to point out that the EU has a strong commitment in the region and it comes as no surprise to see that the research activities form part of this political and cooperation framework.

In the Barcelona Process a number of policy instruments have been designed: the Monitoring Committee on S&T policy (also known as MoCo); the introduction of science and technology in the Association Agreements between the EU and the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs), signed in the context of the ENP; the activities in Brussels of the International Cooperation division (INCO); some policy-oriented projects funded to develop the latest science, technology and innovation systems in the region (ASBIMED and ESTIME, as well as other projects on forecasting and innovation in MPCs); a series of specific ‘instruments’ specially designed for international cooperation in science (INCONET, BILAT, ERAWIDE, SICA...); and the creation of a network of National Contact Points for EU-MPC scientific collaboration.

With regard to research and education, political commitment was shown for the former at a Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Higher Education and Research held in Cairo in June 2007, which stressed the need to move toward the creation of a “Euro-Mediterranean Research and Innovation Area” by:

- modernising the R&D policies in the MPCs
- supporting institutional capacity building
- enhancing the participation of the MPCs in the Framework Programme (FP), while taking into account their particular needs and mutual interests and benefits
- promoting innovation in the MPCs by enhancing the exploitation of society and industry’s Research and Technology Development (RTD) outputs
- favouring researcher mobility

These objectives were given fresh emphasis at the annual meetings of the Euro-Mediterranean Monitoring Committee for RTD (MoCo) which outlined the principles of “demand-driven” and “impact-driven” EU-MPC cooperation based on “co-ownership” and “co-funding.” As a result of these evolutions, the EC now underlines the need for a ‘renewed partnership’ in science, technology and innovation.

Collaborations as Seen through Co-Publications in the Region

A simple way to measure scientific collaborations – although neither complete nor the only way – is by measuring co-authored articles (Gaillard, J., 2010a). Co-publications in the region, as seen from the southern and eastern sides of the basin, are shown in Chart 33. As we can see, the overall production has grown considerably and co-publications from most countries with researchers from the EU have grown in even higher proportions.

This is true of all countries, but co-authorship patterns are very different from one country to the oth-

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4 Analysis done on the 17 first EU Member Countries.
er. Egypt (with 35% of co-publications) in 2007 still has a low proportion of co-publications, while Israel has a very open scientific community with 42%. Smaller countries like Jordan (49%) and Lebanon (52%) have higher levels of co-publications with researchers from foreign countries. Maghreb countries also have higher proportions, mainly with France. Tunisia, the region’s fastest growing country in scientific production, has the lowest level of co-publications (47%) of the Maghreb countries; while Morocco and Algeria, with a proportion of 60% of co-authored articles, could be considered to be too open to cooperation. When growing, co-publications tend to diminish relatively (but not in absolute terms). In fact, the overall pattern of French-speaking Maghreb countries is similar: co-publications with France have grown but proportionally less rapidly than overall production, and new partners are appearing from outside of Europe (mainly from the US and Canada) and from inside (Spain, Italy and Germany).

It is interesting to note that the specialisation pattern of these countries’ publications, largely oriented towards chemistry, physics and engineering, is different from European countries. They also favour mathematics, mainly in the Maghreb and Lebanon, and, in contrast, under-publish in life sciences (biology, bio-medicine) (see ESTIME report and Waast and Rossi (2010)). Israel, Tunisia and Lebanon are exceptions in the SEM countries, since they have a relatively strong medical and biomedical base. This orientation in favour of basic biological and bio-medical research is also the general tendency of many European countries. Moreover, European countries seem to deploy more research activities in ‘basic’ science, whereas SEM countries seem quite clearly to prefer technologically-oriented and applied research, as confirmed by the MIRA Survey on International Collaborations (Chart 35). Thus the expectations of SEM countries’ researchers are more “applied” and technologically-oriented than those of European researchers. The same survey also shows that access to equipment is a stronger motivation for SEM researchers than their European counterparts.

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5 Based on 4,187 responses, 2004 from European countries and 2,183 from Mediterranean countries of a representative sample, this survey was carried out as part of the MIRA project, www.miraproject.eu
These specialisation patterns are very important for two reasons: a) countries usually tend to reinforce their specialisation over time rather than diversify, and b) research and technological development are activities that are “path-dependent,” thus feeding on previous work and accumulated competences.

**Participation in Cooperation Programmes**

*Bilateral Cooperation between European Countries and Mediterranean Non-European Countries*

Bilateral cooperation concerns activities (in research or other fields) that involve two countries...
under a legal framework. Usually some general co-operation agreement exists, at a “higher” diplomatic level, and specific agreements are later proposed and signed as the needs arise. Chart 36 shows the number of bilateral agreements after a census made in 2007 (Rodríguez-Clemente, R. et González-Aranda, J.M., 2007). It tells the story of cooperation agreements in science and technology that were still in force at the time of this survey. This is a one-off survey that has not been renewed. The number of these agreements (124 agreements) is relatively high and there are certainly more of them. Most agreements are those made by public entities, involving universities and governmental structures, but many more agreements that are signed between universities for example, or between private entities on both shores of the Basin are absent from this statistic. One of the difficulties concerning these agreements is their scope and their duration. The agreements are usually not very specific: they just name a domain and some general conventions on possible means that can be mobilised (mobility of researchers, students, co-direction of doctoral thesis, budgeting and so on). As can be seen, the main players are France, Germany, Spain, Belgium and Italy. It is worth mentioning that France has a tradition of signing framework agreements – not only in the Mediterranean region – and that its research institutes (CNRS, IRD, INRA…) that are active in the region are public research institutes, whereas other countries usually mobilise universities.

On the side of the SEM countries, Israel and Morocco dominate this area, followed by Tunisia. Algeria, Lebanon (mainly with France) and Turkey have more or less the same number of agreements. Morocco has been trying since the late nineties and early 2000 to prioritise research (Kleiche, Waast 2008 et 2009). Moreover, as mentioned, Morocco has a history of collaborations with France, but is now extending its cooperation to other European countries and to Canada. Morocco is driving a policy of close relationships with Europe mainly through ‘Twinning projects’: one of these twinnings concerns Science and Technology and another concerns Intellectual Property Rights.

**EU-Sponsored Research Programmes**

At the project level, research is mainly funded through the 7th Framework programme. A recent
report\(^6\) indicates a total amount of €430 million in 168 projects in the region. But this amount covers the expenditures of both European and Mediterranean units. On a slightly more limited sample concerning 151 projects we have determined the distribution of funds as is shown in Charts 38 and 39. Mediterranean countries receive €43 million (10%) from €426 million. The percentage of participation would be even smaller if we put aside the “institutional” or capacity-building projects that are not research projects but policy-oriented platforms, as is the case of international cooperation projects (known as “INCOnets”, “BILATs” and “ERAWIDE” projects).

Thus, FP7 projects are mainly aimed at funding European teams working with Mediterranean partner countries. This seems to be a coherent outcome for an instrument that was designed to serve European research. However, we are still a long way from the principles that have been outlined in the Euro-Mediterranean common research policy.

Research fields where active cooperation takes place can be easily identified (Fig 7). It should be noted that the domains where the EU contribution received by the MPCs is higher does not correspond to the number of projects by domain. This is an important result because it denotes a discrepancy between what is programmed and considered important by the EC and the actual participation of the non-European partner countries. When looking backwards on the whole process, which involved a substantial amount of time and resources, the exchanges between the EU and Mediterranean countries have remained at a political level and there has been little leverage effect with stakeholders outside of governments or public institutions. Simultaneously, the diplomatic effort that has been deployed under the umbrella of the Union for the Mediterranean has been rather slow and has not had the boosting effect that was expected from such a wide-reaching policy framework.

In order to understand the relative importance of these types of collaboration frameworks we can refer to the results of the MIRA survey (www.miraproject.eu) on scientific collaborations. As can be seen in Table 11, more than half of the scientists questioned mention that their collaborations have taken place outside of an official framework. Practically half of the respondents also mention that they have collaborated within a bilateral framework. EU projects account for one fifth of the responses. The survey also suggests that 61% of Europeans and 49% of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean scientists are responding to calls for projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework of Collaboration</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Without Official Framework</td>
<td>1,104</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bilateral Cooperation</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Project</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Project</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>21.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Public Project</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Private Project</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Funded Project</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Responses to the Question</strong></td>
<td>1,887</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: MIRA survey on collaborations - Multiple answers possible.
thus making project funding a common practice. As stated recently in a semi-official document, "A pending issue is how to connect the two core components of this cooperation: bilateral cooperation activities between EU Member States and MPCs, and actions funded by the European Union through various means, mainly the ENPI and the EU Framework Programme (FP) for Research. A clear political mandate is needed to advance in the search for synergies, as there is a generalised view that the tools and resources available to scientific cooperation policies do not yield the expected results." (Coordination of research... p. 2)

The MIRA survey confirms this statement. Chart 40 shows the opinions expressed by researchers from both European and Mediterranean Partner Countries concerning the factors limiting their participation in international scientific calls for proposals/funding.

As can be seen, ‘bureaucracy’ is considered the main burden and, paradoxically, is believed to be a more limiting factor in Europe than in Mediterranean Partner Countries. Nonetheless, on the whole, all scientists, from the north and south, believe there is too much influence from the administration. Besides this aspect, it is clear that partnerships are not very easy to create, let alone manage.

**Conclusion: an Unfit Ideal**

There are several reasons for this unsatisfactory situation of Euromed cooperation in science. Firstly, there is a series of structural aspects concerning the role of research. Research is still not a priority for most SEM countries, nor for the European Union. As the ESTIME project found (Arvanitis, R., 2007), with the notable exceptions of Tunisia (among Arab countries), Turkey and Israel, most research teams have a hard time obtaining the necessary legitimacy in their institutions, usually universities, which are devoted to training rather than research. The MIRA survey, which offers data on the time devoted to both research and teaching and allows us to draw comparisons between researchers from European and Mediterranean countries, is quite illuminating. In Europe, there are more researchers devoted solely to research, and among university researchers, there are more peo-
people spending more time on research. On the contrary, researchers from SEMCs on average spend more time on teaching, administrative tasks and clinical practice.

For the EU, as the UfM has shown, research is among the very few areas where one finds actual and effective linkages and real cooperation between the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean; although, these are rather thinly spread and still not as widely accepted as they should be.

It might be more satisfactory to focus on policy rather than the abovementioned “structural” difficulties. As we have seen, highly demanding needs are necessary to enhance EU-Med cooperation in science and technology. As far as EU-Med research cooperation is concerned, everything shows the need to design a regional programme for science, technology and innovation where the different components could be fitted into a global strategy. Building on the successful experience of some EU-sponsored bilateral programmes, a dedicated regional initiative that would aim at developing the collective capacity to address socioeconomic challenges would significantly contribute to the achievement of a shared vision. To the benefit of the EU, it is necessary to stress that the Commission is actively seeking a way to implement such a regional programme today as demonstrated by the conclusions of the last Euromed Conference on Research and Innovation, which took place in April 2012 in Barcelona. Moreover, a clear need has been expressed in various political arenas (interministerial meetings, MoCo, bilateral programmes, etc…) in finding a bridging mechanism between the needs of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean and EU countries concerning innovation.

Integrating European partners and MPCs in a common research and innovation strategy could also be aimed at creating a Euro-Mediterranean Innovation Space (Pasimeni, et al., 2007). It would be in line with the commercial activities between both sides of the Mediterranean: more than 50% of the trade of the MPCs is with the EU, and for some countries the EU represents the destination of more than 70% of their exports. Europe is the largest direct foreign investor (36% of total foreign direct investment) and the EU is the region’s largest provider of financial assistance and funding, with nearly €3 billion per year in loans and grants. Moreover, recent surveys on industrial innovation in Morocco and Tunisia show that industry is aware of innovation and sustainability issues. More generally, Maghreb countries have been very actively engaged in testing these policy measures that support networking of competences (Arvanitis, R. et M’henni, H., 2010).

But the most important reason why research and innovation should be developed jointly in a long-term strategy lies in the specialisation patterns of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs); any strategy needs to build on these capabilities and not only on those developed by European countries.

This Euro-Mediterranean innovation space should thus create shared research-oriented activities on both sides of the basin. Whatever its name or political backing, hope should be placed in creating such a regional initiative that could play an important role in addressing the urgent demands of the population, youth and the aspirations for more democratic societies on all sides of the Basin.

References


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8 See MIRA project www.miraproject.eu for recent evolutions of this EMIS.


Social Media in the Arab World: the Impact on Youth, Women and Social Change

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The societal and political transformations that swept the Arab region throughout 2011 have empowered large segments of the population. Many stereotypes have been shattered, with Arab youth, “netizens” and women becoming the main drivers of regional change. Arab women and youth in particular have become more engaged in political and civic actions, playing a leading role in the rapid and historic changes sweeping the region. Meanwhile, the debate about the role of social media in these transformations has reached policymaking circles at the regional and global levels.

Throughout 2011, social media usage continued to grow significantly across the Arab world, coupled with major shifts in usage trends. Once used merely as a tool for social networking and entertainment, social media now infiltrates almost every aspect of the daily lives of millions of Arabs, affecting the way they interact socially, do business, engage with government, and take part in civil society movements. By the end of 2011, Arab users’ utilisation of social media had evolved to encompass civic engagement, political participation, entrepreneurial efforts, and social change. With a critical mass of Arab users in many countries, governments have also begun to recognise social media’s potential to develop more transparent, participatory and inclusive governance models. However, while creative and socially beneficial uses of social media abound, they are accompanied by newfound concerns surrounding issues of security, privacy, freedom of expression, and the disruptive uses of social media on foreign policymaking and diplomacy.

The Shift to Activism

The first three months of 2011 saw what can only be termed a substantial shift by social media users in the Arab region towards online civic and political mobilisation, whether by citizens – to disseminate information within their networks, organise demonstrations (both pro- and anti-government) and raise awareness of ongoing events locally and globally – or by governments, in some cases to engage with citizens and encourage their participation in government processes and in others to block access to websites and monitor and control the information on them. The growth of social media in the region and this shift in usage trends have both played a vital role in mobilising and empowering people, shaping opinions, and influencing change. A critical mass of young and active social media users exists in the Arab world today that is using Facebook and Twitter, among other social media sites, to effect this change.

A large percentage of young men and women primarily used social media during the “Arab Spring” to raise awareness within their own countries about societal grievances and the ongoing uprisings – according to several regional surveys conducted by the Governance and Innovation Program at the Dubai School of Government throughout 2011. While many users said they used social media tools to mobilise popular movements, a significant percentage of respondents (25%) also voiced concerns that they could be held accountable by au-
authorities for expressing their social and political views online. In Egypt and Tunisia, specifically, the ramifications of political activism – which included the authorities blocking the Internet – did little to deter people; in fact, the surveys indicate that for almost 60% of respondents, it motivated them further and even pushed the undecided to get involved in the civil and political movements on the ground.

According to the Arab Social Media Report series, Facebook and Twitter usage grew substantially throughout 2011 in the Arab world. For example:

- The total number of Facebook users in the Arab world stood at 37,865,442 as of December 2011, having almost doubled since the same time the year before (21,368,605 in December 2010).
- At the beginning of December 2011, the country average for Facebook user penetration in the Arab region was just over 10%, up from just under 6% at the end of 2010.
- The number of Facebook users in the Arab world increased by 77% between January and December 2011. Youth (between the ages of 15 and 29) make up around 70% of Facebook users in the Arab region, a number that has held steady since April 2011.
- The percentage of female users has been at a standstill since April 2011, at 33.5%. This is still significantly lower than the global trend, where women constitute roughly half of Facebook users.
- The estimated number of active Twitter users (users who tweet once a month) in the Arab region at the end of September 2011 was 652,333.
- The estimated number of tweets generated in the Arab region in September 2011 by these “active users” was 36,889,500 tweets, with an estimated 1,229,650 daily tweets.
- The most popular trending hashtags across the Arab region in September were #bahrain (with 510,000 mentions in the tweets generated during this period), #egypt (with 310,000 mentions), #syria (with 220,000 mentions), #feb14 and #14feb (with a combined 153,000 mentions), and #kuwait (with 140,000 mentions).

Facebook: Mobilising Movements and Calls to Protest

As the statistics above indicate, the number of Facebook users has risen significantly in most Arab countries, most notably during the first three months of 2011 – at the height of the “Arab Spring” – and in the countries where protests have taken place. The role of social media in the revolutions that have swept the region has been debated, with some camps labelling them the main instigators and others relegating them to mere tools. Regardless, it can be stated that many of the calls to protest in the Arab region were initially made on Facebook (save for the first protest in Tunisia), and all did indeed manifest in the streets (with the exception of the first call to protest in Syria on 4 February 2011). This is not to say that there was a causal relationship or that the Facebook pages were the defining or only factor in people organising themselves on those dates, but as the initial platform for these calls, they were undeniably a factor in mobilising the movements.

Conversely, the protests themselves seem to have led to a rise in the number of Facebook users in the region. The countries where protests occurred have all shown a positive growth rate, except for Libya, which could be explained by the number of expatriate workers leaving or switching Facebook locations. A comparison of the growth rate for each country during and following the protests to a similar period the year before shows that the growth rates doubled and even tripled in some countries (see Chart 41). The numbers themselves do not illustrate the type of usage, of course. Some usage may be political, while other usage may be purely social and not entirely related to the civic movements at the time. But the exponential growth in the number of Facebook users coinciding with the protests in each country does indicate the need for further research to explore the possible correlation.

Twitter: Informing the Online Political Conversation

Twitter usage in the Arab world grew throughout 2011 as well, both in terms of the number of users and the volume of tweets they generated. As with
Facebook, much of this growth can be attributed to the events of the “Arab Spring” and its influence on the Twittersphere. This influence was not only reflected in the growing numbers of users and tweets, but also in the fluctuations in the number of daily tweets and in the top trending topics and hashtags during the period of the “Arab Spring.”

In looking at the fluctuations in the volume of daily tweets in certain countries, we noted that some of the fluctuations or “spikes” seemed to coincide with current events at the time. For example, Chart 42 shows a drop in the number of tweets in Egypt during the Internet blackout (28 January – 2 February 2011) and a spike when former President Mubarak left office on 11 February. This does not conclusively indicate that the events directly contributed to the fluctuations in tweet volume, but their concurrence provides a high degree of circumstantial evidence for linking current events to the surge in tweet volume. As with the daily volume of tweets, spikes and fluctuations within the daily volume of mentions of popular trending words and hashtags (in Chart 42, #Jan25, specifically) also coincided with these events and accounted for a large number of the daily tweets. This gives a clearer idea of what the Twitter conversation in Egypt – in this case – was about and indicates that, to a large extent, ongoing social and political events at the time did indeed drive this conversation.

Social Media and Arab Women’s Empowerment – A Regional Perspective

The societal and political transformations taking place across the region have also played an instrumental role in challenging stereotypes about Arab women as oppressed and subservient. In particular, the leading role that women have played in orchestrating and participating in social movements in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen has cemented their position as equal partners to men in transforming the political landscapes in their countries. The most obvious acknowledgement of this leadership role was the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to an Arab woman, Tawakkul Karman, a leading Yemeni political activist. Whether Arab women’s civic and

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2 The Gender and Social Media Regional Survey was conducted jointly by the Governance and Innovation Program and the Gender and Public Policy Program at the Dubai School of Government.
political engagement will be enhanced in the aftermath of the “Arab Spring” remains to be seen. Although social media has been a powerful tool throughout these popular movements, both for mobilising activists and disseminating information, Arab women’s use of social media is low compared to men’s in the region, as well as in comparison to the global female usage average (for example, women make up about half of Facebook users globally, while they make up only a third of users in the Arab region).

Explaining the Social Media Gender Gap in the Arab World

In the Arab world, men remain twice as likely as women to be users of social media. The barriers to women’s utilisation of social media can be divided into two categories: environmental and personal. Environmental factors – which have more to do with the environment in which female social media users operate – constitute the largest barriers to Arab women’s use of social media, specifically “societal and cultural constraints,” in addition to “access to ICT” and “lack of relevant content for women.” On the other hand, the personal factors, which have more to do with the skills or abilities of female social media users themselves, such as “level of education,” “ICT literacy,” “confidence in social media” as a means for communication, and “level of trust in ICT’s security and privacy,” are also viewed as barriers, but with lesser impact (see Chart 43). This suggests that closing the “virtual” gender gap will require efforts to overcome the environmental barriers by addressing discriminatory attitudes and cultural constraints on women, rather than addressing the personal barriers by focusing on “fixing the women” solutions.

Social Media as a Gender Equaliser

Arab men and women largely agree on issues related to social media and its implications for women and civic participation. They use social media in similar ways and have similar opinions on the role that social media can play in women’s empowerment. Whether this is a result of using social media or has more to do with the typical profile of a social media user warrants further research.

Social Media and Changing Perceptions about Women and Civic Participation

A key finding of this research is the shared view of social media as a tool for women’s empowerment. The majority of respondents felt that social media had the potential to be an empowering and engag-
Gender inequality prevails in “real life” in the political, social and economic arenas in the Arab world. This is apparent in the Arab region’s low rankings in terms of gender parity within the political empowerment and economic participation pillars of various women’s empowerment indices, as well as in regional and international reports such as the Arab Human Development Report.

Even though social media is largely viewed as a tool for empowerment, giving women access to and enabling them to create entrepreneurial opportunities, social change, and civic and political action, 40% of respondents asserted that social media may also present new concerns for women’s civic participation. Additionally, the overarching “real life” barriers for women’s empowerment may not be surmountable using social media alone. While “virtual” participation might be a first step towards women’s empowerment, it may not necessarily translate into real-life participation in mainstream political, civic and public arenas. The real-life barriers on the ground within these arenas should not be underestimated and need to be addressed in efforts to promote gender equality in the region.

**Social Media in the Arab Region: from Perception to Reality**

Arab societies continue to have limited channels for interactions, with no real civil society, limited media freedoms and a lack of representative government institutions. Until a few years ago, the flow of information in Arab societies remained overwhelmingly hierarchical, mainly flowing top-down from governments to citizens and state media to society. Today, with a critical mass of social media users across the region and the convergence of these informational sources with other communication channels...
such as satellite TV and mobile telephony, information flows have been almost fully rewired in Arab societies, giving rise to new opportunities for empowerment.

Coupled with the robust growth of social media usage among youth in the Arab region, there is a pervasive perception of social media as an enabler for youth and women’s empowerment.

During the “Arab Spring,” social media played a critical role in most of the popular movements in the region. According to our research findings, it was promising that, coupled with the robust growth of social media usage among youth in the Arab region, there is a pervasive perception of social media as an enabler for youth and women’s empowerment. If lessons are to be drawn from youth utilisation of social media during the ongoing popular movements in the Arab world and young people’s growing sense of empowerment today, these strong positive perceptions suggest that social media will continue to play an important role in empowering large parts of Arab societies in the future. From a societal point of view, this will be realised as long as a critical mass of young Arabs continue to embrace social media with the primary objective of influencing change in their societies.

The growth of social media usage also changed the ways in which governments interact with societies in the region. Arab governments’ reactions to this new phenomenon have been mixed. While some tried to resist change, a few governments were more responsive and started adapting. The few responsive governments tried to take advantage of this growth by putting policies in place to regulate social media usage. With the continued government restrictions on media, civil society and political representation in most Arab countries, and given the region’s young population and increasing penetration rates, social media will continue to play a growing role in the political, societal and economic transformations in the Arab region. From a governance point of view, thanks to the new informational structure in Arab societies, these transformations will continue to take place at an increasingly faster pace and will continue to bypass existing governments’ controls and restrictions.
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The Schengen area – the EU’s zone of passport-free travel, which benefits 650 million travellers annually – is in trouble. The most pressing concern is how to secure Greece’s porous frontier with Turkey, the largest source of illegal immigration into the EU by land. But political tensions between Schengen members have arisen on other fronts, too. In April 2011, France temporarily re-imposed border checks with Italy, after the political unrest unleashed by the Arab Spring led to a rise in uncontrolled migration from Tunisia to the small Italian island of Lampedusa and to Puglia. The number of arrivals was large but manageable, eventually peaking at around 48,000 migrants. Nevertheless, Roberto Maroni, Italy’s then Interior Minister, demanded a major intervention from other EU countries to help deal with the influx, claiming that a “human tsunami” was underway from North Africa.

This exaggerated rhetoric was part of a strategy to pressure neighbouring France into taking in the French-speaking migrants from its former colony. Maroni issued newly-arrived Tunisians with residency papers, giving them the right to move freely around the Schengen area. The French authorities responded by re-instating checkpoints between the two countries and halting trains travelling from the northern Italian town of Ventimiglia, the last town before the border. In the end, this dispute proved to be minor. It was resolved swiftly at a bilateral summit the same month between the leaders of the two countries, Silvio Berlusconi and Nicolas Sarkozy. But the political impact reverberated throughout the EU because Maroni’s tactics alarmed other Schengen members including Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany.

During their talks in April, Berlusconi and Sarkozy agreed that the basic rules governing the Schengen area needed to be renegotiated. EU leaders duly backed this idea at their summit in Brussels in June 2011. Governments want to change the Schengen “border code” so that they can introduce temporary checkpoints more easily; improve the monitoring of the common border; and, in extreme cases, temporarily suspend those countries that cannot or will not maintain their borders properly. But negotiations over these changes have become bogged down in disputes over “legal bases” – in effect, the question of how much power the EU’s institutions will have over any re-erection of national frontiers.

Trying (and Failing) to Re-Write Schengen’s Rulebook

At a glance, France and Italy’s standoff over Tunisian migrants in April 2011 seems to be why EU and national officials are re-thinking the rules governing the Schengen area. But, with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that Schengen governments seized on the events in and around Ventimiglia as a convenient pretext. In reality, frustrations over Schengen’s working arrangements were building for years. But governments cannot now agree either between themselves or with the EU’s institutions about the specific reforms needed to make the passport-free zone work better. This is unfortunate, given that the Schengen area is facing one of the most difficult periods in its short history.

Schengen countries have re-introduced border controls on around 70 different occasions since border controls first came down in 1995. The current rules allow them to do this on grounds of national security or public order, such as the need for special security arrangements at major sporting tournaments or in-
International summits. But some governments want these rules relaxed or clarified so that they can reintroduce border checks more easily and in other circumstances. France, Germany, the Netherlands and others have already quietly stepped up “spot checks” by police at their land borders since the last Schengen enlargement in 2007. Concern over the latter has led the Commission also to seek new Schengen arrangements but only in order to prevent a creeping return to national frontiers in future.

There are four categories of player in the current negotiations on a new Schengen rulebook:

**Nervous policemen:** These are the North European countries, including France and Germany, for which Schengen’s border and policing arrangements do not guarantee enough security. Their governments feel constrained by the existing rules and electorally vulnerable to panics over immigration. As a group, they shelter the highest numbers of refugees in Europe and, together with the UK, host the majority of the EU’s migrants, including those from other Member States. Many have tightened their immigration policies and modernised their border controls in response to recent public demand.

**Disgruntled border guards:** These are the Southern European countries that guard Schengen’s most problematic frontiers. They want the right to make exceptions to the EU’s “Dublin regulation” on asylum, which stipulates that they must care for all asylum seekers who reach their shores first without sending them on to richer countries further north. But though they are annoyed by the lack of solidarity from their Schengen partners, they have no wish to see reform damage the rights of their own citizens to move around freely. Thus Berlusconi’s agreement with Sarkozy in April 2011 baffled expert observers since the current Schengen regime suits Italy better. EU officials say privately that Sarkozy allowed the Tunisians to enter France in return for Italian support to re-open the Schengen agreement.

**Idealistic free movers:** These are the newer members of the Schengen area to the east. Countries in this category maintain the eastern land frontier with Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, once thought to be the greatest potential threat to the common border (hence the headquartering of Frontex in Warsaw and not in the Canary Islands, where it was first deployed in 2006).1 Their border, immigration and asylum systems have yet to be tested by large migrant influxes, since only the Czech Republic and Slovenia have experienced significant inward migration. But they hugely value passport-free travel and are therefore suspicious of any changes to the Schengen system.

**Libertarian legal eagles:** These are not states but EU institutions such as the European Commission, Parliament and Court of Justice. The European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg – although not an EU body – is also a player, because it has the power to sanction countries that treat migrants and asylum seekers inhumanely. The mission of EU institutions is to maintain the openness of national frontiers to goods, services, capital and people. They are therefore naturally inclined to increase their own legal powers to oversee Schengen countries’ border and immigration systems. They are also largely immune from anti-immigration politics.

Any new arrangements to govern the Schengen area must balance the interests of all four sets of players. To this end, the European Commission has proposed three main ideas. First, Schengen countries should be allowed to re-impose border controls temporarily, but the Commission and a majority of Schengen members must approve border closures lasting more than five days. Second, countries that consistently fail to maintain their borders to the required standard can be suspended from the Schengen area if a majority of members agree. Third, the Commission should take over the evaluation of Schengen countries’ border controls from the presidency of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council, the body that ultimately makes decisions concerning the free movement of people in Europe.2 Despite their declared desire to change the Schengen system, most EU governments view these proposals – and especially the first – with horror. This is because these ideas all entail giving new powers to the Commission over national border management. The dilemmas for national sovereignty here are similar to those facing governments in the euro-zone cri-

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1 This EU agency began work in 2005 with a mandate to mobilise equipment, expertise and manpower within the Schengen area and to re-direct them to emergencies along any part of the common border.

2 The term “justice and home affairs” (JHA) covers all EU policymaking on migration, internal security, refugee rules and private law.
sis. On one hand, countries want a stronger Schengen regime where everyone maintains certain standards and plays by the rules; on the other, they are hugely reluctant to cede control over their own borders to a higher authority that would implement such a regime.

Countries like France and the Netherlands say they merely want the existing rules to be made more flexible. In their view, the current circumstances in which national checks are permitted — to protect national security or public order — should be extended, for example, to mass influxes of immigration. The Commission counters that a looser system needs an independent policeman lest countries claim exceptions all the time, thereby critically weakening the passport-free zone. Meanwhile, southern countries fret that “a more flexible system” is code for the right to lock them out of the Schengen area on flimsy pretexts.

Frontex has deployed border missions all over the southern Mediterranean and Aegean, and has an intimate working knowledge of the chief challenges facing individual countries.

Schengen rules can only be changed if a qualified majority of Member States and the European Parliament can agree on proposals made by Cecilia Malmström, the Commissioner for Home Affairs. A lot of governments would rather keep the current system as it is than lose some authority over their own borders. Hence, the Commission’s Schengen proposals are likely to founder unless they are recast to focus only on how national borders are evaluated and the suspension of countries breaching Schengen standards.

The current peer-to-peer arrangements — where national border guards in Schengen states take it in turn to inspect each other once every five years — has palpably failed to resolve persistent problems in Greece and other places. Here again, as in the euro crisis, Schengen countries suffer from a “politeness problem” in policy co-ordination. Officials are reluctant to make hard-hitting criticisms of colleagues in other Member States. And the recommendations contained in their evaluation reports are often not properly followed up by the country under review.

The Commission and the JHA Council should ask Frontex to establish a new regime for evaluating border standards in Schengen countries. Under its careful and methodical director, Ilkka Laitinen, the agency has built up close working relationships with national border, immigration and asylum services throughout the EU. Frontex has deployed border missions all over the southern Mediterranean and Aegean, and has an intimate working knowledge of the chief challenges facing individual countries. If necessary, it should be able to recommend the suspension of governments who refuse to manage their portion of the border properly.

Diplomats call the Commission’s proposal to allow suspensions from Schengen area the “Greece clause,” since it is obvious which country would first be subject to this kind of sanction. In November 2010, Greece’s already porous border with Turkey briefly collapsed altogether leading to an emergency intervention by Frontex. However, the Greek government should be reassured that no moves would be made to suspend it from the Schengen area for at least two years. The country should agree a new action plan with EU officials setting out a realistic timetable for reform of its border, immigration and asylum systems. During this period other Schengen members should second a cohort of national experts to Greece to bolster its public administration and border services, not least to help draw down and disperse available EU funding for border and immigration management.

Another priority is to curb illegal entry to the Schengen area via the southern Mediterranean. Frontex is engaged in an ongoing struggle there to help stem the organised transport by people smugglers of thousands of migrants to the Canary Islands in makeshift boats. Smugglers subsequently switched their routes, first to Malta and Italy, and then to the Greek land border, establishing a “squeezed balloon” dynamic along Schengen’s southern frontier. Illegal entries may shrink as the authorities strength-
en borders in one area, but the smugglers quickly move on to exploit weaknesses in other areas that then bulge. Hence the EU needs to accelerate existing plans to establish – by October 2013 – a single “European border surveillance system” (EUROSUR) to enable the continuous monitoring of the Schengen border and the passing of information in real time between its various parts. At the moment, different types of public authority carry out border controls in the Schengen area, depending on the country: border guards, coast guards, police, customs and sometimes the navy. Currently, there is no way to join up and exchange the records of these agencies or reports about migratory flows and security threats. Concurrently, the EU needs to get North African countries to sign up to so-called readmission agreements on the repatriation of illegal immigrants. After the Arab spring, Catherine Ashton, the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Policy suggested that these should be concluded with all North African countries. Their co-operation on repatriation is critical to securing the southern Schengen frontier. But none currently has a repatriation deal with Brussels, because of arguments over visa access and the lowering of EU trade barriers to their agricultural exports. The EU has new-look “mobility partnerships” with Cape Verde, Georgia and Moldova where, cruelly, these countries are rewarded for collaboration on curbing irregular migrant flows with financial assistance, technical programmes and better access to visas. The Commission has recently opened negotiations on similar partnerships with Morocco and Tunisia. But related negotiations have failed in the past because “a country with 2,000 nationals illegally resident in the EU, sending money back home, is infinitely better off than a country with 2,000 extra unemployed people,” according to a senior official working in the JHA Council.

Conclusion

Imagine if EU leaders were given a sneak preview of today’s euro zone two years ago. They would then have done whatever was necessary to prevent the crisis in the single currency from escalating into something much worse. The same may be true of Schengen. At present, EU governments risk allowing 2012 and 2013 to become the years in which the future of passport-free travel in Europe is seriously questioned for the first time. Without more assertive political action, the fragile confidence that allows 26 European countries to share a single border and visa policy could collapse. Furthermore, it is likely that once open borders are questioned, a tit-for-tat retaliatory re-imposition of controls could ensue, perhaps followed by the re-introduction of work and residence permits for EU nationals. Governments and the EU’s institutions can snuff out this fuse. But to do so they need to stall the enlargement of the Schengen area for two years, using this time to tackle its internal weaknesses and vulnerabilities, accelerate existing initiatives, and strengthen co-operation with countries in North Africa and Turkey. Lastly, borders are essentially elastic. They have always been tightened or loosened in response to domestic political imperatives, large influxes of migrants or economic circumstances. And whatever their present concerns over immigration, few voters would be content to return to a Europe where they are confronted with national frontiers when they commute to work, go on holiday or travel to other Schengen countries on business. But it is to be hoped that their governments never allow matters to reach that point.

THE SCHENGEN BORDER CODE

The Schengen Border Code, published in the Official Journal of the European Union in April 2006, is a Community Code regulating the crossing of the external and internal EU borders. The code aims at improving the previous legislation on border checks by describing the conditions for entering and exiting the Union for EU and third-country citizens. Furthermore the Schengen Border Code regulates the possible reintroduction of internal border checks. In case of a serious threat to public policy or internal security, the code allows Member States to reintroduce checks at the internal borders for a maximum period of thirty days. Before doing so, Member States have to inform the Commission and the other Member States at least fifteen days in advance in order to proceed to an examination of the proportionality of the measures to be implemented. In case of exceptional threats to public order or national security, the Member States can immediately reintroduce border checks on the condition that they notify the other Member States and the Commission of their decision.
Marie Martin
Statewatch, London

In the wake of the historic events that spread from Tunisia to Egypt, Libya and the Middle East within a matter of weeks, it seemed that there might be an opportunity for a new impetus in the EU’s migration management policy in the Mediterranean. A few weeks after the Jasmine Revolution, the EU outlined proposals for a “Dialogue for Migration, Mobility and Security” with Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt, and possibly also with Libya. These new proposals included the negotiation of Mobility Partnerships (MPs). The EU’s proposals are welcome when seen within the wider context of the generally restrictive migration policies (in terms of both narrative and practice) that have had a particularly negative impact on the Mediterranean Basin, a region that has traditionally been home to exchange and mobility.

However, moves towards a mutually beneficial approach to mobility appear less significant upon closer examination. The implementation of MPs, and their relevance for Southern Mediterranean countries, is not the only issue at hand. The negotiation of MPs with Euro-Mediterranean countries is likely to fall short of its promises; they come at a time when profound questions are being raised about the Union’s political will to implement inclusive and genuinely mutually beneficial migration policies on the one hand, and the intensification of the securitisation and externalisation of border controls to non-EU countries on the other.

Making Circular Migration Attractive

Purpose Served

The concept of Mobility Partnerships appeared for the first time in the European Union’s 2007 Communication on circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries. MPs were presented as a new tool to promote legal migration, mainly targeting economic migration. Other short-term migrants, such as tourists or family members visiting relatives, were posited as potential beneficiaries. MPs were presented as capacity-building partnerships and included: border management and border security, job-matching services and visa facilitation for third-country nationals whose skills match the demands of the EU’s labour market, information on the risks of irregular migration, and support to remittance schemes for the diaspora.

MPs are signed by the EU but implemented only with interested EU Member States. The nature of the cooperation varies depending on the country’s needs and on which EU Member States participate. To date, MPs have been signed with Georgia, Moldova, Cape Verde and Armenia. Such partnerships appear to be a consensual solution between two driving forces in the EU: a neo-liberal understanding whereby migration is meant to address labour shortages and demographic challenges (EU 2020 Strategy), and neo-nationalist voices flagging the threat of irregular migration and cross-border crime (Feldman, 2011).

MPs are allegedly “mutually beneficial” to the three parties involved:

- To EU Member States (tailored mobility based on their needs) and the EU (regulated migration and improved border management, as well as development in neighbouring countries thereby limiting the push factors that lead to migration to Europe);
- To the partner countries (enhanced mobility for their citizens, expected positive economic feedback with more highly skilled nationals and remittances, and more secure borders); and
- To the migrants (visa facilitation, economic prospects in the EU, and participation in the development of one’s country).
The Bargaining Power of the EU

Conditionality is a Major Component of MPs

“The implementation [of MPs] will be conditional upon a genuine commitment from the third-countries concerned to readmit irregular migrants who are not entitled to stay in the territory of the Member States and take effective action aimed at preventing irregular migration, establishing integrated border management, document security and to fight organised crime, including trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants” (European Commission, Communication, 2011:248 final).

The EU negotiates MPs on behalf of interested Member States, but their implementation depends on the conclusion of bilateral agreements between the Member States and the partner country.

Aware of the limits of a purely conditional strategy, the EU has developed incentives (mobility facilitation) and presented the attached conditions as part of a win/win/win approach: by bringing to the fore the “human dimension of migration and development policies,” the security agenda of the MPs gains legitimacy and support. Migration policy has been integrated as an element of the EU’s external policy: “maximising the development impact of migration and mobility” is now an operational priority (European Commission, GAMM, 2011). Circular migration and the temporary or permanent return of the diaspora, rather than an attempt to take advantage of disposable migration, are presented as ways to “mitigate brain drain.” “One-stop-shop” information centres in third countries warning against the risks of irregular migration, cooperation with Frontex and the securitisation of borders officially aim to save lives and fight against transnational and cross-border criminality.

Limits to Mobility Partnerships

MPs suffer from several weaknesses. First, they are not legally binding, and no monitoring mechanism is put in place to ensure their proper implementation in line with the set objectives. This lack of commitment from the EU exemplifies the power balance at play in MPs, to the disadvantage of the partner countries (Restlow, 2011). Should third countries cease to abide by the EU’s wishes in terms of border security and migration management, the conditionality clause would apply and visa facilitations would be suspended. In contrast, should participating Member States not commit to the agreement, the only pressure left for partner countries would be to put an end to border management, a decision with which the EU may be able to cope (e.g. using Frontex and the Returns Directive) but whose ultimate consequence would be a severely negative impact on migrants. A further element of this power imbalance relates to the implementation of MPs: the EU negotiates MPs on behalf of interested Member States, but their implementation depends on the conclusion of bilateral agreements between the Member States and the partner country.

A second weakness relates to the total emphasis on the link between migration and development. Indeed, should migrants be seen merely as entrepreneurs? Permanent migration or family reunion is hardly mentioned in official MP documents. Moreover, looking at the partnerships that have already been implemented with some countries, visa facilitation applies to short-term labour migration, making it difficult for migrants to access long-term residence in the EU. But what certainty is there that when migrants return after only a short stay in Europe they will succeed as entrepreneurs in their countries of origin? What about the individual’s readiness or willingness to return to his or her country of origin? What about the capacity of said country of origin to capitalise on, or “absorb,” its returning nationals (Héraud, 2009)? All these questions are left unaddressed.

Mobility Partnerships in the Mediterranean

The Post-2011 Context: Security Above All

The EU’s celebration of its neighbours’ fight for democracy put the Union in a delicate situation. On the one hand, the EU had a moral duty to open up to those whose freedoms had been denied so long that was concomitant with its ongoing desire to attract skilled migrants. On the other, the constant concern regarding irregular migration intensified with the arrival of migrants from Tunisia and Libya last year, re-
opening the debate on free movement in the Schen- gen area for third-country nationals and on the “porosity” of the EU’s external borders. Combatted by all possible technological and legal means, irregular migration is definitely the focal point of EU migration policy in the Mediterranean.

In this respect, an MP with Morocco will probably finally lead to the signing of a readmission agreement with the EU. Since the early 2000s, and particularly once its cooperation with the EU was awarded “advanced status” in 2008, the kingdom has managed to resist pressures to sign a readmission agreement. The negotiation of readmission agreements may not yet be on the MP agenda for the other countries of the region, but cooperation with Frontex and the potential conclusion of Working Arrangements with Northern African countries, as announced in the Agency’s 2012 Work Programme, certainly are. Working Arrangements especially facilitate the return of irregular migrants, particularly when they are intercepted at sea or sent back during joint return flights.

In this context, it should be recalled that relations with third countries are crucial for the EU to achieve an efficient and comprehensive border management system. The upcoming launch of EUROsUR (the European Border Surveillance System), in which Frontex will play an important role, is supposed to improve the EU’s capacity to react to “threats” and undesirable elements (or persons) at its external border. In particular, EUROsUR will permit the creation of “pre-frontier intelligence pictures,” which will supposedly provide the capacity to identify before they reach the EU border, track and ultimately intercept suspected or proven “targets” before or when they reach EU territory. The ability to track “targets” beyond the EU’s borders will depend heavily on the cooperation of third countries. Besides, as the EU is intending to increase the use of biometrics to “ensure secure mobility” (via “smart border” mechanisms), regular migrants entering the EU will probably be registered in the upcoming Registered Travellers Programme. The EU is thereby extending its capacity to control mobility far beyond its jurisdiction, gathering up personal data from ever more countries in the world.

What Added Value for Euro-Mediterranean Partners?

Are MPs a way to bring new impetus to a near lifeless Barcelona Process? The aims of the third edition of the Euromed Migration project are remarkably similar to those of the second. It will “seek to promote legal migration channels, workers’ mobility, as well as synergies between migration and development. It will also support the fight against illegal migration and the strengthening of the border management capacity.” Will a bilateral and “differentiated” approach be more successful? This is far from certain, given the lack of added value provided by MPs to third countries.

The partnership’s advantages are limited to certain countries, while readmission agreements would apply to the EU as a whole. Moreover, there is hardly any prospect for visa liberalisation

First, many bilateral agreements, most of them guaranteeing the portability of social and economic rights, already exist between Southern Mediterranean countries and the EU Member States that are major destinations for their nationals. The bilateral agreement between Spain and Morocco on circular migration, the Integrated Management Information System co-funded by the IOM, Egypt and Italy, the bilateral agreement between Greece and Egypt on seasonal labour migration, Tunisia’s bilateral agreements with Italy on readmission and seasonal work, and Tunisia’s bilateral agreements with France on the joint management of migration are examples.

Second, the fragmented approach whereby the implementation of MPs opens the door only to circulation in some Member States is debatable: the partnership’s advantages are limited to certain countries, while readmission agreements would apply to the EU as a whole. Moreover, there is hardly any prospect for visa liberalisation. Visa facilitation, whereby mobility remains conditional upon visa issuance, is favoured by the EU, especially in the context of the instability in the Southern Mediterranean (Restow, 2011:17)

Third, due to the economic crisis faced by the EU and the upsurge in nationalist rhetoric and policy that seeks to strictly limit the ability of third-country nationals to enter the EU, it is not clear that the EU’s incentives will be enough. In contrast, the EU is like-
On 24 May 2011, the European Commission issued a Dialogue for migration, mobility and security with the Southern Mediterranean countries. This communication, along with the initiatives proposed by the Commission towards a more structured and comprehensive approach to the challenges and opportunities of migration, proposed to address the new challenges – imposed by the Arab revolutions - in the area of migration and mobility, through the implementation of a Dialogue for migration, mobility, and security between the European Union and the Southern Mediterranean countries. This dialogue would be in line with the objectives of the EU's Global Approach to Migration and the EU Neighbourhood Policy and was inspired by the Communication on migration released by the Commission on 4 May 2011.

Since the very beginning of the Arab Spring the EU implemented different programmes and partnerships in order to evacuate and assist the people in need in Libya and in neighbouring countries on the one hand, but also to respond to the Southern countries’ call for democracy on the other. In addition, different missions were put in place aimed at helping countries such as Italy, to face the massive arrival of migrants and asylum seekers from Tunisia and Libya. Besides these measures, the Commission considers that there is a need for the European Union to develop a structured and sustainable plan aimed at enhancing solidarity between the Member States, as well as a need for the implementation of measures for the development of capacities focused on the management of migration and asylum seeker flows in the Mediterranean. In the short and medium term, these measures should continue to provide funds for humanitarian, financial and technical assistance to EU Member States through the strengthening of the competences of FRONTEX. Moreover, additional resources should be provided in order to support the Member States facing emergency situations, as well as the implementation of a regional programme aimed at enhancing the possibility to assist and resettle asylum seekers and refugees in the Southern Mediterranean region. In addition, a set of longer-term measures has also been developed to fight the root causes of migration through cooperation with Southern Mediterranean countries in order to improve economic and social development. This cooperation should also be aimed at ensuring a regular process for migration from Southern countries, as well as promoting a mutual understanding between the European Union and third countries. The Dialogue on migration, mobility and security "will support and encourage reforms aimed at improving security [...]" and an enhanced mobility to the European Union for the citizens of the partner countries, through the tailored and bilateral implementation of Mobility Partnerships between partner countries and EU Member States. This communication illustrates the focus of the EU institutions and Member States on securing the external borders of the Union, as well as on the continuous fight against irregular migration. While the communication announces a dialogue between the EU and Southern Mediterranean countries, the bulk of the measures announced concerns the allocation of budgets and missions aimed at reinforcing external border controls.

For further information:

ly to push hard for the border management and security elements. These contextual aspects are reinforced by the EU’s ongoing tendency to provide less financing for labour migration than for other aspects of its migration policies. This has been confirmed by a former official from the DG Home Affairs of the European Commission: "In 2007–2010, the Thematic Programme on Migration and Asylum spent relatively less on labour migration (17%) than on irregular migration (31%) and migration and development (28%). While the EU has reserved more development funds for the period 2008–2013 for migration in various National and Regional Indicative Programmes, it is not likely that there will be a significant increase in funding for labour migration" (Tamas, 2012:5).

Finally, the looming temporary migration scheme that the implementation of MPs is intended to achieve will not necessarily be beneficial to third-country nationals or to the partner country. Given the significant absence of commitment on the European side of the partnerships to promote integration and the inability of the EU at large to agree on inclusive migration policies, the social and human aspects of migration for the countries of destination are left unaddressed. As regards the obligation for migrants to return, and the fantasy developed around the idea of the entrepreneurial spirit automatically leading to development, it seems to be common sense that the conditions for economically and socially sustainable return do not entirely depend on returnees, but rather, to a far greater degree, on structural issues in the country of origin (Feldman, 2011). If it were to seriously try and tackle the "root causes of migration," the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility would address the structural grounds of obstacles to development (e.g. unequal terms of exchange between the EU and its southern neighbours), and the MPs would be complemented by a genuinely coherent development policy.
“Docility Partnerships”: Regulating and Limiting Mobility

Facilitating regular channels of migration to the EU is not in itself a bad idea. The absence of mobility has generated much frustration in Northern African countries, often leading to the tragic loss of lives of those who are denied regular entry and try their luck irregularly. As is often the case, the EU has chosen to impose its agenda rather than favouring equitable and mutually beneficial solutions. The MPs are a further example of a strategy to increase controls on mobility and limit migration. The EU’s proposal is not even legally binding, which seems at odds with the necessity to build trust, identified as one of the aims of the Migration and Mobility Dialogues (European Commission, GAMM, 2011:5).

MPs may be considered a handy tool, a second-best, at a time when free movement for third-country nationals in the Schengen area is being increasingly questioned and the issuance of work permits to third-country nationals is becoming more and more restrictive. However, not only do they not bring any added value for Euro-Mediterranean countries, they further make them complicit in the EU’s obsessive border control policy, including the forced return of their citizens.

MPs provide an example of the difficulty the EU has with addressing migration in internal policies: the emphasis on neighbouring countries dealing with irregular migration contrasts with the complete blackout on the EU’s own responsibility in contributing to the irregular status of many third-country nationals by imposing restrictive and time-limited visas: about half of the irregular migrants in Europe are estimated by the Commission to be overstayers (Kraler & Rogoz, 2011:8). Finally, the MPs sadly illustrate the Union’s incapacity to defend free movement in the Schengen area: rather than standing firm on one of the core pillars of its establishment, the EU has chosen to circumvent this profound crisis by furthering bilateral mobility partnerships with specific Member States instead of defending the jeopardised access to free movement for all in the EU.

Regrettably, Southern Mediterranean governments are on their way to accepting this state of affairs, as they have done in previous years. They share responsibility for the disposable migration schemes that are proposed. As to the nationals of the EU’s southern neighbours, it remains to be seen how the limitation on movement will be perceived by those whose “core human aspiration […] to shape their own lives, economically and politically” was emphasised by Catherine Ashton, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Bibliography

A year after the Arab Spring, EU migration policies towards its Southern Mediterranean neighbours are at a crossroads. The revolutions in Arab countries saliently disclosed the nature of the regimes – long criticised by foreign policy experts – with whom the EU and its Member States had been cooperating for years in an effort to stem migration flows from the South. Notwithstanding the rhetoric of a “global approach” to migration that the EU officially endorsed as early as 2005, cooperation under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has clearly concentrated on the aspect of migration control and has consisted in the gradual involvement of Eastern European and Southern Mediterranean neighbours in securing the EU’s external borders.

For authoritarian leaders such as Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia or Muammar al-Gaddafi in Libya, cooperation with northern neighbours was a means to boost their national prestige and international reputation in spite of their dubious domestic legitimacy (Paoletti, 2010; Cassarino, 2010).

The conformity of this cooperation with human rights standards and the EU’s liberal values has repeatedly been questioned, leading the EU to intensively discuss the political thrust of its external migration policy. The last major crisis before the Arab Spring occurred in summer 2005, when Spanish border guards and Moroccan authorities brutally deterred irregular migrants from climbing over the fences at the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and later deported them as well as other migrants and refugees to the Moroccan desert. These events and their publication in the media acted as an external shock and provoked a major re-thinking of the prevailing repressive migration policy in cooperation with the neighbouring countries. The result of this reconsideration was the proclamation of the “global approach to migration” in the fall of 2005, aiming at the formulation of comprehensive and coherent policies in partnership and solidarity with countries of emigration and transit. These comprehensive policies were meant to address a broad range of migration-related issues, comprising, apart from border management and readmission, legal migration matters such as labour market access schemes, migrant rights and asylum; and the nexus between migration and development, including the use of remittances, reintegration policies, professional training schemes for migrants and the like.

However, apart from recurrent rhetorical commitments and the launch of broader dialogues in the framework of EU-Africa conferences and summits, the emphasis of EU policies towards its Southern neighbours remained stable. The EU continued trying to conclude a readmission agreement with Morocco which would oblige Morocco to take back, not only its own nationals staying irregularly in the EU, but also third-country nationals who possibly travelled through Morocco before entering Europe. In 2012, these negotiations have reached their 17th round, and are still open. In 2002, two years after having received the mandate from Member States to negotiate a readmission agreement with
Morocco, the European Commission attempted to start negotiations with Algeria. But, like Morocco, Algeria is not interested in taking on such comprehensive obligations and even refused to start negotiations. In the absence of formal agreements, a dense web of informal cooperation activities has developed within the ENP and beyond, basically focusing on the establishment of migration systems in Mediterranean countries, the transfer of technical equipment and know-how to border guards and capacity-building of migration officials, through both EU channels and Member State activities. The question arising now from the Arab Spring is to what extent the peaceful uprisings for democratisation and the deposition of former dictators constitute a second, more profound crisis of the EU’s repressive migration policy that will eventually lead to a breakthrough of the comprehensive approach officially endorsed seven years ago. The signs at the moment are ambiguous. Soon after the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, the European Union was quick to promise major innovations in its migration policy, which culminated in the proposal to negotiate so-called “mobility partnerships.” According to Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner for Home Affairs, “Hopefully Mobility Partnerships will be an important part in the democratisation process in countries across North Africa” (Malmström 2012). Such partnerships have been proposed to Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. However, according to the Commissioner, the proposal has thus far been turned down by Egypt. What is the rationale behind these proclaimed instruments of comprehensive migration cooperation? Although the content of the future partnerships with Mediterranean countries is not yet known, a look at the existing mobility partnerships with Eastern European countries and Cape Verde, as well as the EU’s most recent programmatic document, on a “Global Approach to Migration and Mobility” adopted in 2011, do not portend a major overhaul of existing priorities. Mobility Partnerships were introduced as platforms for ongoing migration dialogue and cooperation between the EU and individual third countries and should reflect the three main facets of the comprehensive approach: legal migration, development, and the fight against irregular migration. Notwithstanding this promising agenda, analyses of existing mobility partnerships unequivocally show that they emphasise projects in the field of migration control, readmission and return, and hardly open any new avenues for legal migration to Member States (Lavenex and Stucky 2011; Carrera and Hernandez 2011). The crux of the problem is that, given the repartition of competences in the field of Justice and Home Affairs, the European Commission has no powers to negotiate on legal avenues for migration. On the contrary, the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that competence over the admission of migration quotas shall remain with Member States. There are a few exceptions, however, which are reflected in the title of the revised “Global Approach to Migration and Mobility,” and these are short-term visas (the so-called Schengen Visas); the temporary admission of students and researchers as well as – pending adoption of the respective directives by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament – intra-corporate transferees and seasonal workers.

The question arising now is to what extent the peaceful uprisings for democratisation and the deposition of former dictators constitute a second, more profound crisis of the EU’s repressive migration policy that will eventually lead to a breakthrough of the comprehensive approach officially endorsed seven years ago.

To what extent Member States will support an evolving EU policy on temporary admission based on mobility partnerships is difficult to tell. For the time being, Mediterranean Member States such as France, Italy and Spain have all maintained their own bilateral migration arrangements with their southern neighbours as part of their foreign relations. French cooperation with Tunisia prior to Ben Ali’s forced flight and soon after allows a glimpse of the complex interplay between Member State and EU policies regarding the Mediterranean Region.

**Tunisian-French Migratory Governance**

When considering bilateral cooperation on migratory governance between Tunisia and France, the...
framework agreement on cooperative management of migration flows and inclusive development signed in April 2008 immediately comes to mind. Before its entry into force in July 2009, the former French Minister of Foreign and European Affairs, Bernard Kouchner, explained to the Senate that the agreement was structured around “the organisation of legal migration based on mobility […], the struggle against irregular migration [through stepped up cooperation on deportation or readmission of irregular Tunisian migrants] and the establishment of cooperation aiming to foster the implementation of a development model to the benefit of the country of origin.” These three dimensions sum up the intentions formulated in this type of agreement.

Why the three dimensions associating the control of both regular and irregular migratory flows with development aid? To answer this question, it is important to keep in mind that bilateral cooperation on migratory governance cannot be isolated from a broader framework of interaction between States, which involves strategic interests or interests more vital than the struggle against irregular migration. In other words, we must not only go beyond the issue of migration, but also analyse factors that have contributed to France’s developing this type of framework agreement with certain African countries, among them Tunisia, and then attempt to understand the reasons and the strategic interests (expected and actual) that led Tunisia to ratify this agreement in 2009.

Predominantly Temporary Migration

Any agreement, whether bilateral or multilateral, entails costs and benefits. What is too often omitted, however, is that the latter vary over the course of time according to the crises and political priorities of the moment, rendering bilateral cooperation more complicated and even uncertain. To remedy this, recourse is often made to compensatory measures or incentives that, in theory, should ensure compliance with the commitments contained in the agreement, even if they may be reformulated (Cassarino, 2010). In the sphere of cooperation on migratory flow control and the struggle against irregular migration between EU Member States and South Mediterranean countries and other African countries the matter of incentives (and their compensatory value) has always been at the heart of debate.

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“Upstream” in the migration process, Tunisian candidates for emigration must meet highly selective criteria in terms of skills and labour, employment conditions, their housing in France and the duration of their stay. Moreover, the agreement stipulates that family reunification applications will be processed “diligently.” However, according to the Law of 26 July 2006 on Immigration and Integration, foreign nationals in France are not entitled to family reunification unless they can attest to 18 months (and not a year) of legal residence in the host country. It is true that the agreement fosters the migration of “young professionals” from Tunisia, who are allowed to stay for longer than 18 months. In any case, in order to be entitled to this prolonged residency, their emigration candidacy must necessarily be associated with a “post-sojourn professional project” in their country of origin. These measures, applicable before actual migration takes place, well reflect the overall goal stipulated in the preamble of the framework agreement: “to encourage organised migration based on
mobility,” in other words, on the selective, temporary nature of said migration.

After migration has taken place and once the migrant is in the host country, a series of provisions aiming to ensure the temporary nature of said “mobility” are also mentioned. While the agreement reiterates the reciprocal obligations insofar as readmission (or deportation) of irregular migrants, it also mentions so-called voluntary returns by people subject to an obligation of leaving the territory. Moreover, even if the obligations regarding readmission of illegal migrants are formulated based on the principle of reciprocity, the latter remains imbalanced (for obvious reasons). It is precisely due to this imbalanced reciprocity that the dimensions of “technical operational cooperation” and “inclusive development” were added to the framework agreement. The underlying idea aims to incentivise Tunisia to cooperate more in readmitting its nationals by contributing surveillance equipment to the Tunisian police authorities, on the one hand, and in exchange for development aid and support for the reintegration of returned migrants, on the other. The majority of these so-called “development” actions generally take place in the form of short-term projects corresponding to priorities aiming to channel migratory flows (both on their departure from Tunisia and on their return). These projects are assigned to different actors by NGOs, intergovernmental institutions or local Tunisian associations.

**Strategic Alliances and Security Paradigm**

It would be erroneous to believe that the former government under Ben Ali had agreed to ratify the framework agreement in 2009 because of the compensatory measures and incentives it contained. The regime of the time knew that playing the card of efficiency in migration and border management negotiations would allow it to attain other ends. In exchange for its cooperation, Tunisia knew that it could count on the support of certain European countries (such as France and Italy) in order to convince the EU to start discussions on Advanced Status for Tunisia.

Said discussions, greatly hoped for by the Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali regime in its search for international legitimacy, began *de facto* in May 2010. This manoeuvre allowed the regime to conceal internal social discontent and strengthen its strategic position, especially since it was able to capitalise on the latter in its relations with EU Member States. The struggle against international terrorism and religious fundamentalism likewise constituted shared problems that, in the context of foreign relations, had direct implications on the way in which cooperation on migratory governance was addressed, readjusted and codified according to a security paradigm.

**After the fall of Ben Ali, the establishment of a freely elected government, the growing mobilisation of Tunisian civil society, it is legitimate to believe that yesterday’s security priorities and paradigms insofar as migration governance cannot be those of today’s Tunisia**

This security paradigm progressively gained ground as a necessary evil in the need to “manage” international migration, relegating respect for fundamental human rights – i.e. those of the migrants and asylum-seekers – to the background without denying their value (Cassarino, 2012). The recourse to this “necessary evil,” emerging from the security paradigm, not only explains how to deal with a given priority, for instance, the “struggle against illegal immigration.” It also diverts attention from the real causes of the problem (social inequality, poverty, underdevelopment, underemployment and political violence and repression), creating the illusion that bilateral cooperation on migration and tighter border controls constitutes an adequate solution to address this problem.

**Beyond the Necessary Evil: Towards a Sovereign Tunisian Migration Policy?**

After the fall of Ben Ali, the establishment of a freely elected government, the growing mobilisation of Tunisian civil society (in Tunisia and abroad) and restored relations between citizens and the State, it is legitimate to believe that yesterday’s security priorities and paradigms insofar as migration govern-
...ance cannot be those of today’s Tunisia. This does not mean they will disappear from one day to the next. But it does mean that the task facing the new Secretary of State for Emigration and Tunisians Abroad, appointed in January 2012, is colossal. On the latter rests the urgent need to rethink the new Tunisia’s migration priorities from the political, legal and economic standpoints. This effort will depend on the need to disengage the migratory issue from an exclusively security-oriented analysis framework in order to place it in a humanitarian perspective based on respect for and defence of fundamental rights and address national development imperatives. Only through this disengagement will it be possible to reconsider the soundness and usefulness of certain agreements and decisions made in the past.

In the meantime, and even more fundamentally, it is urgent for the Tunisian government to define its own priorities and underlying principles on migration policy and make them public. This sovereign step, necessary for any balanced interstate dialogue, has never been taken in Tunisia. It will depend, among other things, on the Tunisian authorities’ capacity to produce autonomous knowledge and expertise, indispensable elements for consolidating Tunisia’s credibility and reception on the bilateral and multilateral levels. Understanding and defining the priorities and underlying principles of Tunisian migration policy in a sovereign manner, avoiding ready-made solutions based on the principle of necessary evil, constitutes the major challenge facing Tunisia today.

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Culture in the Mediterranean and the Arab Spring

A memorable year, 2011 marked a radical rupture with the balances that characterised the post-colonial Euro-Mediterranean Region. The countries of the south shore went into action, each in its own way and at its own rhythm. Nevertheless, the underlying theme of recovered freedom and dignity spread from country to country, drawing a totally new Mediterranean landscape. At the heart of current political issues, particularly in Tunisia and Egypt, the matter of freedom of expression, creation and conscience is one of the focal themes of cultural and artistic actors in the Arab world.

What about the cultural dimension in this new horizon? Has culture, a sphere of freedom par excellence, played a role in activating Mediterranean Arab societies? And how can relations be stepped up between the North and South shores of the Mediterranean from a cultural point of view after the major upheavals underway?

The replies to these questions can only be prudent, for the situations are diverse and unstable. Now more than ever, an attentive look at the specificities and the differences is in order, for considering the Arab world as a monolithic whole should be avoided.

Two levels should also be taken into account: that of the actors in the cultural sector, with their initiatives, aspirations and needs, and that of institutions, with their phases, constraints and progress.

The past few years have witnessed a sort of transfer of Mediterranean issues, until recently in the hands of the European Union, to national governments, a loss of leadership of the EU in Euro-Mediterranean relations and the desire to renationalise border management. In contrast, culture – a domain that has always escaped EU competence – is now considered a strategic sector and an essential component of EU foreign policy.

Culture at the Heart of the Arab Revolutions: Cultural Revolutions?

The Arab revolutions of 2011 took the world by surprise: from diplomats to the military and from researchers to the media, everyone was taken unawares by the events. Everyone, except, perhaps, artists and cultural agents. Indeed, the first tangible signs of the changes on the horizon appeared in literature, cinema and the arts. Indeed, the Arab world has experienced a groundswell of change on the cultural level over the past few years, thanks above all to the circulation of cultural productions throughout the Arab world. The role of the contemporary Arab novel, with its transgressions (religion, politics, sexuality), has been decisive. By the same token, the mobility of Arab writers, artistes and intellectuals has contributed to the constitution of a unified Arab cultural sphere, including the facet of calling into question the authorities and censorship.

On the artistic front, wholly unprecedented, daring initiatives have been emerging for some years now in the very heart of countries with a highly restrictive system insofar as freedom. Consider experiences such as Dream City, a multidisciplinary expression of contemporary creativity taking place in Tunis since 2007; or that of Studio Emad Eddin in Cairo, which

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1 This expression was coined by Farouk Mardam Bey, publisher and writer, at conferences and meetings in 2011 and 2012.
2 Dream City – Tunis: www.dreamcitytunisie.com
3 Studio Emad Eddin – Cairo: www.seefoundation.org
has been an independent art space and a space for citizenship and freedom since 2005.

The Arab revolutions of 2011 took the world by surprise. Everyone, except, perhaps, artists and cultural agents. Indeed, the first tangible signs of the changes on the horizon appeared in literature, cinema and the arts.

These cultural and artistic actions opened breaches and helped the revolts of 2011 develop, like a series of “small Tahrir Squares” that made the gatherings in the large Tahrir Square possible. Art and culture anticipated and interpreted the ferment of society and its younger generations.

Are we therefore dealing with cultural revolutions? The expression does not evoke good memories of the past. However, in their form as well as content, the Arab popular uprisings of 2011 had a strong cultural and artistic dimension. Of course, this can be attributed in large part to the participation of a great number of intellectuals, writers and artists in these movements, together with a significant part of educated urban youth, the spearheads of the revolution.

Tunisia, pioneer of the revolutions, also broke the ground towards a new type of freedom of expression visible in public spaces, in streets and on city walls: since the uprising, graffiti has become omnipresent, thanks to young activists and artists such as Hafedh Khediri (Sk-One) or Mouin Gharbi (Meen One). The people have left silence behind and the freedom they have won has become synonymous with street art. Graffiti has now earned its spurs on the Tunisian cultural and urban scene, together with the cartoon or caricature, an expression of cyber-dissidence by young caricaturist bloggers.

In Egypt, culture has long been an engine of change. It is therefore not surprising that, despite the suffering and oppression, the revolutionaries have adopted humour and derision as a form of expression. “It is currently quite difficult in Europe to understand how culture can change a society, but in our societies, where everything needs changing, it is extremely obvious,” states Ahmed El Attar, a Cairene involved in theatre and culture.4

Another place, another experience: in Libya, rap music was one of the protesters’ forms of expression. MC Jdoub, leader of the “Brothers in Freedom” band from Tripoli and Imed Abbar from Benghazi, for instance, expressed the hopes of liberation of young Libyans in their lyrics, but they were also borne by the events, which boosted the popularity of the hip hop music scene. The issue obviously has a political connotation, considering that under the Gaddafi Regime, music was combated, and not just Western music but also maalouf, traditional Arab-Andalusian music.5

Even in Syria, the tragic and unbearable coexist with creativity and a sense of humour. Throughout 2011, before the situation intensified, the revolutionaries demonstrated great imagination in inventing pacific forms of protest such as dyeing the water red in Damascus fountains, or using ping pong balls with slogans against the regime, dropped by the hundreds on the Damascus avenues descending the slopes of Mount Qassioun.6 Theatrical creativity also participated in the resistance, as illustrated by the marionette troupe “Masasit Mati,” whose 15-episode series ridicules President Al Assad.

Recently as well, on Bourguiba Avenue in Tunis, a very particular protest was called via social networks: a protest against the attacks on the right to protest. Hundreds of people thus occupied the famous avenue, a book in hand, in a silent protest by readers to defend cultural as well as political rights.7

These wholly unprecedented forms of political expression recall the role played by culture as one of the weapons of resistance against dictatorship. But they also bear the traces of a significant change in the contents of political engagement itself. What has struck all observers is how the Arab uprisings in their diversity have inaugurated a new manner of “doing politics,” one that is freer, more libertarian, less ideological, more inclusive, more mixed (men and women, young and old) and non-violent.

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5 BEN BOUBAKAR, Youssef. "Libye, quand le rap devient une arme." Babelmed.net, 31/12/2011
6 ABBAS, Hassan. "Créativité de la révolution syrienne." Babelmed.net, 17/01/2012
Arab Culture and Revolutions as Seen by European Institutions

The new context constitutes a challenge for Europe. Since the revolutions, how have Euro-Mediterranean cultural relations been renewed? What instruments dedicated to culture have been imagined by the EU to rise to these new cultural challenges in the Mediterranean Region?
The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched in Barcelona in 1995 inaugurated a new stage in relations between the two shores by lending the cultural dimension a significant place for the first time. It was a welcome novelty which lent depth and a long-term vision to Euro-Mediterranean policies.

Euro-Mediterranean cultural relations enjoy European political and operational tools that are nevertheless often considered inaccessible to actors in the field due to their complexity.

Since then, the role of culture has become consolidated across European Union policies, in particular in its foreign policy. Indeed, by projecting itself beyond its borders, the EU also projects (exports?) history and values and cannot ignore the traditions, history, mindsets and lifestyles of others, in a word, their culture. For a decade now, this awareness has progressively found its expression in EU policies of development aid and their attendant thematic programmes, such as the Social and Human Development Programme, which expressly mentions the key role of culture in development, insofar as a springboard for growth and a tool for social cohesion.

With regard to geographic instruments such as the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the image is more complex due to the multiplication of mechanisms that coexist and sometimes overlap in the Euro-Mediterranean Region. But there as well, culture is an integral part of the EU’s external relations. In late 2007, the Council’s resolution on “A European Agenda for Culture” confirmed the existence of international cultural issues and opened a vast field of action to the cultural sector.

It must also be recalled that the Culture Programme is open to participation by cultural organisations from the South Mediterranean, as is the case with “Creative Europe,” which will replace it as of 2014 and which emphasises culture as a means of promoting growth, employment and social cohesion. Euro-Mediterranean cultural relations thus enjoy European political and operational tools that are nevertheless often considered inaccessible to actors in the field due to their complexity.

Culture and the ENPI South

Though the Euro-Mediterranean cultural sector can now avail itself of classic EU mechanisms in order to find political and financial support, specific frameworks and ad hoc tools for the Mediterranean Region have also emerged over time.

Since the Euromed crisis, in Brussels, the “Mediterranean” is now referred to as the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) South. It lies along the southern flank of Europe and in this regard, it is part of the European Neighbourhood Policy. This political framework, essentially based on a bilateral logic, does not have a cultural component, in contrast to the Barcelona Process. Nevertheless, the cultural dimension can be included in the Action Plans that each country establishes with the European Union and that constitute the roadmap of Neighbourhood relations. Other possibilities also exist. For instance, Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC) between regions sharing a land or sea border, a priority domain of the ENP, provides a framework for two bilateral programmes (Spain–Morocco and Italy–Tunisia) and a multilateral programme, all of them including Mediterranean projects for the promotion of dialogue, creativity, mobility and training in the sphere of culture.

In addition to these little-known tools, the European Neighbourhood Policy has inherited regional programmes that were the pride of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The most important of them, Euromed Heritage, is in its fourth edition and has a substantial allocation of 17 million euros for the 2008–2012 period that has allowed twelve projects to be funded having to do with cultural heritage at the service of inter-Mediterranean dialogue.

The general outcome is nonetheless disappointing: culture does not occupy a central position, neither in the ENP nor in the Union for the Mediter-
ranean (UfM), which has superbly ignored its role. Will the revolts of 2011 encourage EU institutions to fill the gap?

The Mantra of Intercultural Dialogue

For a decade or so, the issue of culture in the Mediterranean has been progressively displaced from concrete cooperation between cultural operators in different fields, including the performing arts, music and dance, towards the much vaguer field of intercultural dialogue. The tension between these two approaches is always at work today. On the one hand, cultural circles, often with young, independent artists at their heads, have created spaces, festivals, platforms and networks in order to work and create together; on the other hand, the public institutions, Ministries of Foreign Affairs and the mass media have produced a voluntarist discourse on the need for dialogue among cultures in the face of the temptation of isolationism and rejection of the Other in the Euro-Mediterranean Region.

Recall that among the most fervent advocates of “dialogue” were the official representatives of authoritarian regimes and predatory actors of the South Mediterranean, a factor that has contributed to discrediting this overly consensual incantation. The theme of dialogue, now predominant, thus has very little power to mobilise professionals of culture due to its indeterminate nature insofar as content, especially since the Arab revolts have revealed the gulf existing between the societies of the two shores insofar as culture, as well as the inequality of material conditions of cultural production. Now, the demands expressed by the young revolutionaries have allowed the concrete needs of the sector to be measured, not only insofar as freedoms, but also in terms of infrastructure, training and employment in the cultural sphere.

Generally speaking, there is a discrepancy between these two approaches that correspond to different aspirations, more general among the champions of dialogue, more professional among youth and artists.

This debate directly concerns the Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF), an institution whose reason for existence is precisely the promotion of dialogue among cultures. And it is precisely up to the ALF to rise to the challenge of strengthening ties between the North and South shores at a time when the Arab revolutions have clearly revealed the limitations of the Euromed in its UfM version. Hard hit by the wave of revolt in Egypt due to its location in Alexandria, the ALF has demonstrated a certain responsiveness in convening two meetings since spring 2011, in Cairo and Tunis, with the aim of listening to the needs of civil society on the South shore amid revolutionary fervour. In autumn, a new strategy for the 2012-2014 period was announced to address the new situation. Four key words sum up the perspectives: intercultural dialogue, diversity, open and plural democracy and human development (the 4 Ds). It is too early to tell whether these strategic choices will prove meaningful for Euro-Mediterranean societies.

The perspective of seeing a coherent strategy emerge in the field of cultural policy seems pertinent with regard to the context created by the 2011 uprisings

Another, more political perspective has raised a great deal of expectations among the cultural sector in the Mediterranean Region. Launched in Athens in 2008 at the Euromed Conference of Ministers of Culture, the Euromed Strategy for Culture had the ambition of coherently and globally responding to the aspirations of Euro-Mediterranean societies in the cultural sphere. A report drafted in this regard by independent experts furnished an invaluable inventory of the capabilities of the cultural sector and its needs, on the economic potential of culture and the creative industries and finally, on the conditions for intercultural dialogue in the Euromed area and its difficulties.8

The perspective of seeing a coherent strategy emerge in the field of cultural policy, one that indicates sectors where efforts need to be made, seems particularly pertinent with regard to the context created by the 2011 uprisings. In fact, the interest of culture in terms of employment is incontestable and

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could partially meet the immense need for jobs. One can therefore only wonder about the reasons for this promising dynamic to come to a halt, apparently bogged down.

**Culture in the New ENP**

At the outset of 2011, with the radical questioning of European realpolitik in the Mediterranean, it was asserted in Brussels that “the EU must not be a passive spectator” since “there is a shared interest in a democratic, stable, prosperous and peaceful Southern Mediterranean.” The European Neighbourhood Policy has thus been the object of a revision that has led to a new approach. It is based on providing greater support to processes of democratisation in terms of financial means, unprecedented mechanisms and above all, contents. The most remarkable aspects reside in the new emphasis on civil society as a decisive agent of change and on the mobility of people, now considered an indispensable component of exchange in the Mediterranean. This change of direction seems to go beyond the simple announcement effect, although it may be difficult at present to assess the actual terms of implementation and above all, what implications and prior agreements with the stakeholders concerned will accompany these measures. In any case, what is surprising is the complete absence of references to the cultural dimension and the role of culture in the current context. The foundational document of the new Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean ignores the subject, with the exception of a vague reference to the need to “further develop cultural initiatives with the South Mediterranean region.” Naturally, the two components emphasised, those of civil society and mobility, are topics dear to stakeholders in the Euro-Mediterranean cultural and artistic sector, who have been advocating them for years. Yet the complete absence of recognition of the importance of culture remains inexplicable. The texts and plans published over the course of 2011 seemed to break radically with the presence of culture, which is now part of the acquis communautaire as an essential element of public policies both inside and beyond the EU. This disregard is regrettable.

The year 2011 ended in a climate of concern due to the results of elections in a number of countries in the South Mediterranean. These countries are now faced with choices of society that concern the entire region. More than ever now, the pursuit of cultural exchange between the North and South shores is necessary in the interdependent Mediterranean Region. This entails political choices in terms of financial means dedicated to the cultural sector, but also and above all in terms of mobility, namely: the lifting of the unbearable constraints to the circulation of people in the Mediterranean Basin. This requires radically rethinking the Euro-Mediterranean model. Finally, placing culture at the centre of inter-Mediterranean relations means placing the human dimension at the core of policies and contributing to the establishment of relations as equals among countries sharing the same values and facing the same challenges.

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11 See the new EU SPRING programme (Support for Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth) – € 350 million for 2011 and 2012, launched in September 2011; the Civil Society Facility – € 26.4 million for 2011; and the European Fund for Democracy, being created.

As revolution swept through the Middle East and North Africa in 2011, the state of democratic reform in Asia was also in flux. While the sources of change in the region were primarily endogenous, events in the Near East exerted some surprising influences. None of these countries experienced Arab Spring-style uprisings, but the politics, imagery, tactics and fallout of the Arab Spring did resonate in these contexts. In examining the impact of the Arab Spring in Asia, this paper looks in particular at its influence on three countries – China, Burma and Malaysia – and offers some general observations on the region as a whole. Because these three countries all experienced an internal political movement that was somehow shaped by events in the Middle East, they provide a useful snapshot of how the Arab Spring was experienced by the region.

China: Crackdown at Home, Flexibility Abroad

The Arab Spring presented particular challenges to the Chinese government at home and abroad. China shares some of the characteristics that spurred uprisings across the Middle East last year: a despotic political culture; endemic corruption and ruling elite cronyism; growing economic inequality; and rising expectations, particularly among educated urban youth struggling to realise them. At the same time, the conventional wisdom is that China’s leadership has successfully managed these challenges through a combination of robust economic growth and nationalism, supported by effective technocratic authoritarian rule. Economic growth has given and continues to give the regime a substantial cushion. The central authorities have been remarkably effective in channelling popular discontent toward local authorities, so that the Chinese people largely do not connect their quotidian grievances about corruption, lawlessness and inequity with the underlying political system. Regular rotation of top leaders helps to diminish the personalisation of autocracy. While censorship can be grating, it is also extremely sophisticated.

As successful as China has apparently been, the half-life of Chinese leadership legitimacy nonetheless has been shrinking since Mao. After anonymous online calls for Chinese to launch “Jasmine Revolution” protests appeared in February 2011, the authorities expanded their ongoing crackdown on dissent. The Arab Spring reinforced one lesson China learned from its own ample experience with protest: the need to defuse conflicts before they gain broader traction. The Chinese authorities have thus devoted substantial resources to the domestic security sector to ensure they have the capability to interdict trouble. The ongoing arrests and harsh treatment of dissidents, artists, lawyers and other activists, and the increasing difficulty of handling ostensibly non-political protests throughout 2011, however, fed a perception that the party-state was struggling with the costs of managing these challenges. The abrupt sacking of the populist neo-Maoist Politburo member Bo Xilai in March 2012 forced many China watchers to question their assumptions about the internal stability and cohesion of the ruling elite. As the party-state struggles to rebalance China’s economy, and to slow runaway growth in the process, the internal pressures on the regime will only increase. The Chinese authorities’ task is further complicated because they – like their Middle Eastern counterparts – are operating in a wired world. Urban areas of China
have a high level of Internet and mobile connectivity, and smartphones have had a revolutionary impact on the kind of information that can be shared nationwide in an instant. On Chinese micro-blogs such as Sina’s Weibo, and other online outlets, Chinese “netizens” use clever wordplay and tech savvy to spoof and expose the corruption and weakness of China’s leadership. Even new requirements announced in 2011 that Weibo users must register under their real names have not squelched the raucous, often edgy online discourse.

The vociferous public reaction to a deadly high-speed train crash in July 2011 was a perfect storm of frustration with corrupt imperious officialdom, infantilising and self-serving official censorship, and the unexamined costs of China’s breakneck economic development model.¹

The Chinese authorities’ task is further complicated because they—like their Middle Eastern counterparts—are operating in a wired world.

Chinese citizens also demonstrated an increased willingness to stand up to authorities. For example, the remarkable year-end stand off between the authorities and the villagers of Wukan arose after a dispute over land rights got out of hand.² The Wukan villagers used non-violent resistance to deny authorities physical access to the village, while displaying a media savvy and rights consciousness that kept the government off balance. The “siege of Wukan” was only the highest-profile example of the growing number of public confrontations between the populace and the authorities taking place every day across China. The improvisational quality of the leadership’s responses indicates a level of uncertainty about how to deal with these challenges.

From an international perspective, China’s foreign policy approach has been repeatedly challenged by the events of the Arab Spring. While the conservative elements of Chinese foreign policy are sometimes clumsy in dealing with periods of fluidity, the offsetting pragmatism allows Beijing to quickly abandon detrimental “old friends” once it is certain they are no longer useful. Following Deng Xiaoping’s instruction that China should “keep a low profile, hide its brightness, and bide its time,” China kept itself largely aloof from these issues, content to hang back and let Western democracies and regional players set the tone. Nonetheless, the desire to “hide brightness” came into stark conflict with the need to rescue nearly 38,000 Chinese nationals threatened by hostilities in Libya. The Chinese rescue operation was extremely impressive, and won the government plaudits at home, but also demonstrated how China’s integration into the global economy has created new foreign policy risks that threaten its historic posture of non-intervention. Likewise, the competing agendas within China’s foreign policy were highlighted by reports that Chinese arms merchants had been in contact with the Gaddafi regime after the UN passed an arms embargo on it. China had only reluctantly supported the UN arms embargo of Libya under substantial pressure from African and Arab countries—a big step away from its traditional non-interference policies. When UN Security Council Resolution 1973 was tabled, authorising a no-fly zone in Libya, China saw the UN action as a cover for regime change and abstained. China has subsequently joined with Russia to block meaningful Security Council action on Syria.

The international and domestic implications of China’s involvement in the Arab Spring also were reflected in how the Chinese state media covered these events. The swift collapse of apparently stable authoritarian regimes presented a major challenge to even Beijing’s sophisticated propaganda apparatus. Throughout the dramatic events of the Arab Spring, state media were ordered to focus on China’s successful rescue operations, and the chaos and danger of foreign intervention that resulted from grassroots uprisings demanding greater freedom and democracy. Beijing’s prickly reaction to nascent democratisation in neighbouring Burma likewise demonstrated its increasing difficulty in balancing concerns about the possibility of domestic contagion from others’ political liberalisation with the need to maintain good relations with key regional players.

Burma: Coming in from the Cold

Burma’s 2011 moves towards greater freedom and democracy were potentially on par with other Arab Spring events in their magnitude, even as they occurred in radically different fashion. Burma’s military elite initiated a top-down transition process that included unimaginable gestures toward the democratic opposition and broadly expanded personal freedoms. While internal factors were the key drivers of reform, leaders from the government and the democratic opposition have cited the Arab Spring as influential in the changes that have taken place in Burma.

Democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi, while expressing admiration for and shared ideals with her fellow democrats across the Middle East, has urged that Burma move forward with a peaceful transition.

Burma has much in common with the struggling countries that led the Arab Spring. It failed to thrive even as neighbours lacking Burma’s natural advantages steadily advanced towards middle-income status. Like Libya, Burma was long a pariah state subject to an array of sanctions that kept it isolated from the democratic West, but did little to harm relations with its neighbours. It reportedly was even pursuing a nuclear capability. Repressive and autarkic governance was the chief culprit in Burma’s misery and isolation, but abundant natural resources, including gas, precious gems and teak, ensured the ruling elite never experienced the widespread deprivation produced by its gross economic mismanagement. The regime’s brutal suppression of 2007 protests led by Burma’s revered monks ripped away its few remaining shreds of legitimacy. Its grossly incompetent initial response to the devastation of Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 came as no surprise to the Burmese people, who by that point expected nothing but predation from their government.

Like Egypt, Burma held a heavily manipulated election in November 2010. When a nominally civilian government took office in March 2011, expectations were low that it would be more than a veneer of legitimacy for continued military rule. Instead, under general-turned-President Thein Sein, Burma appears to have launched itself on a course of political and economic reform. As the Arab Spring unfolded, Burmese and Western analysts believe Thein Sein argued that Burma was destined to see similarly chaotic uprisings unless it moved forward with a managed transition towards democracy. Burma’s generals and their cronies were reportedly sensitive to arguments that they – and their wealth – would be safer under such a transition than an uncontrolled popular uprising. Moreover, a key driver of change in Burma is a pervasive sense that it was falling behind its neighbours – a sentiment that also resonated among the young Egyptians in Tahrir Square. Democratic leader Aung San Suu Kyi, while expressing admiration for and shared ideals with her fellow democrats across the Middle East, has urged that Burma move forward with a peaceful transition.

As with transitions underway across the Middle East and North Africa, things can easily go sideways or backwards. Ms Suu Kyi and her political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), are preparing to enter parliament and take their democratic struggle into a new phase. Many Burmese political activists continue to be inspired by the popular movements of the Arab Spring, however, and may not have the same patience to work through the flawed system. Between now and parliamentary elections in 2015, there will be many opportunities to see whether Burma stays on its current path of managed transition or veers off onto something that looks more like the Arab Spring.

Malaysia: Taking Inspiration, Getting Compromise

The socio-political movement in Asia most clearly inspired by the Arab Spring was the Bersih (“clean”) 2.0 protests in Malaysia. The Bersih movement was formed by a loose coalition of Malaysian NGOs and pressure groups, also known as the Committee for Free and Fair Elections. Earlier incarnations of the group had organised peaceful protests in 2007 and 2008. The previous elections in March 2008 had

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seen the ruling party, Barisan Nasional (BN), lose a share of its majority in the national parliament and control of five local assemblies. When Bersih 2.0 announced a large protest rally for 9 July, the BN-led government of Prime Minister Najib Razak launched a massive crackdown. The authorities employed the draconian Internal Security Act (ISA) and other emergency laws to arbitrarily detain dozens of activists; used extra-legal means to limit participation in the rally, including refusing necessary permits; and launched a stream of invective against Bersih in state-controlled media.

On the day of the rally, police violently dispersed some 50,000 protesters using tear gas and non-lethal force such as water cannons – evidence of which was shared over YouTube and Twitter. More than 1,600 people were arrested, thousands more injured and one protestor killed due to excessive force by police. Prime Minister Najib, previously considered a moderate reformer, was accused of behaving like an Arab despot.

Within months, however, Najib was promising major reforms, including: scrapping the ISA and the frequently abused Emergency Ordinance; loosening of media restrictions; and a review of freedom of assembly laws. While these promised reforms have so far failed to live up to their billing, the Malaysian opposition and civil society have been empowered by their ability to push the government to take their agenda seriously and respond to it. At the same time, with shades of recent events in Egypt, conservative elements of the elite have attacked the reformists as tools of “foreign powers.” Bersih will need to keep its local quality front and centre as Malaysia heads into 2013 elections that are sure to test Najib’s commitment to reform.

Consequences for the Region: Universality, Connectivity and Responsibility

More broadly, democratic foment continues across the Asian region. The opposition made surprising electoral gains in Singapore, long the bastion of “successful” soft authoritarianism. Thailand continues to undergo political transformation and faces a major political crisis when the beloved King Bhumibol dies. Even North Korea could potentially see changes in the wake of Kim Jong Il’s death. There will also continue to be popular anger across Asia about issues such as rising inequality, corruption and poor governance, as long as they remain unaddressed. The high levels of popular frustration over these issues are symptoms of a deficit of accountability, transparency, equality and opportunity in Asia much as they are in the Middle East and North Africa. As with the Arab world dictators, Asian autocrats must stop seeing dissent as the cause of disorder in society and instead recognise it for the symptom of their failure to genuinely modernise and open up political participation.

While the long-term impact of the Arab Spring in Asia remains to be seen, there have already been some repercussions and new opportunities. The demands for respect, fairness and dignity that undergirded the Arab Spring protests are consonant with values that Asian civil society and democratic activists have been pressing on the region’s governments for decades. Asian autocrats could previously brush these off as “Western” or “American” values, but their emergence at the core of popular protest movements across the Middle East and North Africa has reinforced their universality.

In addition, the emergence of democratic movements in the Middle East and North Africa has created new opportunities for dialogue with Asia’s democracies. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are well positioned to share their experiences of transition to democracy and provide programmatic support to struggling Arab democracies. Likewise, in Southeast Asia there are new opportunities for countries to work together across regional boundaries and share their experiences. Asia’s vibrant, well-networked civil society has yet to establish strong links to its Middle Eastern counterparts. As a Muslim-majority country that has struggled to integrate Islam, democracy and modernity — while also protecting the rights of religious minorities — Indonesia potentially could be a major player in providing practical support for democratisation in countries such as Egypt and Libya.

The potential for the events of the Arab Spring to create new linkages with Asia should not be overstated, but there is definitely an opportunity for expanded collaboration among those who want to share ideas and seek a new path towards modernity that preserves what is unique and important across diverse cultures. Asia has a growing stake in a stable, prosperous Middle East. If leaders in both regions increasingly see that stability and prosperity as emerging through the pursuit of a shared set of democratic values, this recognition could open up even greater opportunities for cooperation and progress.
Map A.1 | Public Debt

General Government Gross Debt (as % of GDP)

- More than 100%
- From 80% to 100%
- From 60% to 80%
- From 40% to 60%
- From 20% to 40%
- Less than 20%
- Data not available

General Government Revenue and Expenditure (2000-2010) (as % of GDP)

- General Government Total Expenditure
- General Government Revenue

Own production. Source: IMF
European Commission Official Development Aid in 2010 – Disbursements (in € million)

Top 10 EC Official Development Aid Recipients in 2010 (€ million)

- Palestine 333.29
- Dem. Rep. Congo 275.00
- Turkey 222.84
- Serbia 219.06
- Afghanistan 215.20
- Haiti 214.62
- Sudan 214.55
- Kosovo UNSCR 1244/99 210.89
- Ethiopia 180.20
- Morocco 168.70

European Commission Official Development Aid in the Mediterranean

Development Aid per capita

- Less than 2€
- From 2€ to 5€
- From 5€ to 10€
- From 10€ to 15€
- From 15€ to 20€
- From 20€ to 50€
- More than 50€

Development Aid (in € million)

- 150 million
- 70 million
- 10 million

Questions.
Results are the average on a scale of 0-10.

1. Q.1 What is your global assessment of the EU initiatives towards its southern neighbours in 2011? (0 Highly inadequate - 10 Highly adequate)

2. Q.2 What is your global assessment of the results achieved by the Union for the Mediterranean in 2011? (0 Highly inadequate - 10 Highly adequate)

3. Q.3 Do you expect the UfM Secretariat to play a key, moderate or negligible role in the Euro-Mediterranean institutional architecture in the near future? (0 Negligible role - 10 Key role)

4. Q.5 What is your global assessment of the results of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2011? (0 Highly inadequate - 10 Highly adequate)
Prospects of sustainable democracy

Question 11. How would you assess the prospects of sustainable democracy in the following countries?

Average value of the responses on a scale of 0-10 (0=Very improbable – 10=Very probable)

- More than 6
- From 5.5 to 6
- From 5 to 5.5
- From 4.5 to 5
- From 4 to 4.5
- From 3.5 to 4
- Less than 3.5

The EU role during the “Arab Spring”

Question 8. How do you assess the EU’s role in Mediterranean Partner Countries during the “Arab Spring”?

(in %)

Appendices

Elections in Tunisia (23 October 2011)

Ennahda percentage of votes by governorate

- Less than 25%
- From 25% to 30%
- From 30% to 35%
- From 35% to 40%
- From 40% to 45%
- From 45% to 50%
- More than 50%

Seats by governorate

- Ennahda
- Congress for the Republic
- Popular Petition for Freedom, Justice and Development
- Ettakatol
- Progressive Democratic Party
- The Initiative
- Democratic Modernist Pole
- Afek Tounes
- Tunisian Workers' Communist Party
- Others
- Independent

Tunisians Abroad

- France 1
- France 2
- Italy
- Germany
- America and rest of Europe
- Arab countries and others

The Tunisian Constituent Assembly (2011)

Own production. Source: Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive http://psephos.adam-carr.net/ and http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/%C3%89lection_de_l%27Assembl%C3%A9e_constituante_tunisienne_de_2011
Remittance Inflows as a share of GDP, 2010 (%)

Evolution of remittances flows (2000-2010) in million $
Appendices

Map A.9 | Population

Average Annual Rate of Population Change
2005-2010 (%)

- More than 2%
- From 1.5 to 2%
- From 1% to 1.5%
- From 0.5 to 1%
- From 0 to 0.5%
- Less than 0%

Evolution of Life Expectancy at Birth and Total Fertility Rate (1955-2010)

Born per woman

Map A.10 | Urbanisation

Percentage of urban population (2011)

- More than 75%
- From 35% to 45%
- From 15% to 25%
- From 25% to 35%
- Less than 15%

Urbanisation

Own production. Source: World Urbanization Prospects, the 2011 Revision United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division.
Map A.11 | Military Expenditure and Arms Transfers in the Mediterranean

Military expenditure (as % of GDP)
- More than 6%
- From 5 to 6%
- From 4 to 5%
- From 3 to 4%
- From 2 to 3%
- From 1.5 to 2%
- From 1 to 1.5%
- Less than 1%

SIPRI Trend Indicator Values* (TIVs) of arms imports to the top 20 largest importers, 2007-2011
TIVs are expressed in US$ m. at constant (1990) prices

SIPRI Trend Indicator Values (TIVs) of arms exports to the top 20 largest exporters, 2007-2011
TIVs are expressed in US$ m. at constant (1990) prices

Top 10 largest TIV of arms imports from Mediterranean countries, 2007-2011
Supplier | Recipient | TIV
--- | --- | ---
Russia | Algeria | 4,300
USA | Israel | 1,659
Germany | Greece | 1,526
USA | Greece | 1,367
USA | Egypt | 1,205
Germany | Turkey | 990
France | Greece | 949
USA | Turkey | 840
Germany | Spain | 835
Russia | Syria | 808

Top 10 largest TIV of arms exports to Mediterranean countries, 2007-2011
Supplier | Recipient | TIV
--- | --- | ---
France | Singapore | 1,975
Spain | Norway | 1,706
France | Greece | 949
France | Morocco | 770
France | China | 755
France | Australia | 736
France | UAE | 641
France | South Korea | 514
Israel | India | 491

*To permit comparison between the data on such deliveries of different weapons, SIPRI has developed a unique system to measure the volume of international transfers of major conventional weapons using a common unit, the trend-indicator value (TIV). The TIV is based on the known unit production costs of a core set of weapons and is intended to represent the transfer of military resources rather than the financial value of the transfer. SIPRI TIV figures do not represent sales prices for arms transfers. They are best used as the raw data for calculating trends in international arms transfers.
Map A.12 | Intra-Mediterranean Trade. Imports

Imports from Mediterranean countries (in % of total imports)

- More than 75%
- From 55% to 65%
- From 35% to 45%
- From 15% to 25%
- From 65% to 75%
- From 45% to 55%
- From 25% to 35%
- Less than 15%

Breakdown of imports from Mediterranean countries

Albania
Algeria
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatia
Cyprus
Egypt
France
Greece
Israel
Italy
Jordan
Lebanon
Libya
Malta
Montenegro
Morocco
Palestine
Portugal
Serbia
Slovenia
Spain
Syria
FYROM
Tunisia
Turkey

Own production. Source: UNCTAD
Map A.13 | Intra-Mediterranean Trade. Exports

Exports to Mediterranean countries (in % of total exports)

- More than 75%
- From 55% to 65%
- From 35% to 45%
- From 15% to 25%
- From 65% to 75%
- From 45% to 55%
- From 25% to 35%
- Less than 15%

Breakdown of exports to Mediterranean countries

- Albania
- Algeria
- Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Croatia
- Cyprus
- Egypt
- France
- Greece
- Israel
- Italy
- Jordan
- Lebanon
- Libya
- Malta
- Montenegro
- Morocco
- Palestine
- Portugal
- Serbia
- Slovenia
- Spain
- Syria
- FYROM
- Tunisia
- Turkey

Own production. Source: UNCTAD
Map A.14 | Air Connectivity Index

Air Connectivity Index

- More than 10%
- From 9 to 10%
- From 8 to 9%
- From 7 to 8%
- Less than 5%
- Data not available

Airports with more than 5 million passengers per year

- From 5 to 7.5 million
- From 7.5 to 10 million
- From 10 to 15 million
- From 15 to 30 million
- More than 30 million

Main airport of the country*

* In passenger numbers. For those countries which have no airport that exceeds 5 million passengers a year.


Map A.15 | Social Networks in the Mediterranean: Facebook

Facebook penetration

- More than 50%
- From 45 to 50%
- From 40 to 45%
- From 35 to 40%
- From 30 to 36%
- From 10 to 15%
- Less than 10%
- Data not available

Facebook users

- Less than half million
- 1 million
- 5 millions
- 10 millions

Travel & Tourism Total Contribution to GDP (as % of GDP)
- More than 30%
- From 15 to 20%
- From 5 to 10%
- From 20 to 30%
- From 10 to 15%
- Less than 5%

* Includes direct and indirect contribution

Travel & Tourism Contribution to GDP (1988-2011)

Domestic Travel & Tourism Spending (2011)
in % GDP

Travel & Tourism Contribution to Employment (1988-2011)

Travel & Tourism Direct and Indirect Contribution to Employment (in %), 2011

Appendices

1. Agreement between Cyprus and Egypt on the Delimitation of the EEZ, February 17, 2003. On March 2, 2004, Turkey sent a note to the UN Secretary-General stating that it does not recognize this agreement.

2. Agreement between Cyprus and Israel on the delimitation of the EEZ, December 17, 2010. On June 20, 2011, Lebanon sent a note to the UN Secretary-General objecting to the agreement.

3. Agreement between Cyprus and Lebanon on the Delimitation of the EEZ, Beirut, January 17, 2007. To be ratified by Lebanon’s Parliament. The agreement defines six coordinate points. First and sixth points could be modified in accordance with further agreements with third parties, namely Israel and Syria.

4. On July 9, 2010 and October 11, 2010, Lebanon deposited with the UN the geographical coordinates of, respectively, its southern and south-western maritime borders. Israel sent to the UN Secretary-General its proposal concerning the limits of its territorial sea and EEZ in July 12, 2011. Lebanon sent a letter on September 3, 2011 to the UN Secretary-General refusing the terms of Israel’s proposal.

5. The agreements and Cyprus’ independence from the United Kingdom came into force in accordance with further agreements with third parties


7. independence from the United Kingdom came into force in accordance with further agreements with third parties, namely Israel and Syria.


9. own production. Source: United Nations; Flanders Marine Institute (VLIZ); Noble Energy and SubSeaIQ.
**Map A.18 | Female Activity**

Female activity rate (15+) 2010
- More than 55%
- From 45 to 55%
- From 35 to 45%
- From 25 to 35%
- From 15 to 25%
- Less than 15%
- Data not available

Youth female activity rate

Data not available

Own production. Source: ILO

**Map A.19 | Youth Unemployment**

Youth unemployment rate 2010*
- More than 35%
- From 25 to 35%
- From 15 to 25%
- Less than 15%
- Data not available

Youth unemployment rate (by sex)

* PS, CI, AL, JO, MA (2008); BA (2008); EG, LB (2007); DZ (2006); TN (2005)

Own production. Source: ILO
January 2011

The year begins on the wave of revolts against various regimes of the Arab world. In Tunisia, the Jasmine Revolution that began in December 2010, leads to the fall of the Ben Ali regime and is quick to spread to Egypt. In Lebanon, the international investigation into the assassination of Rafiq Hariri leads to the break-up of the coalition government. In Albania, the resignation of the Foreign Minister Ilir Meta intensifies the government crisis. In Kosovo, Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi faces investigation by the European Council over his possible involvement in an organ trafficking network. Widespread disappointment with governments is also reflected in Portugal, where Anibal Cavaco Silva is re-elected as President with 52.9% of the votes and the lowest turnout in Portuguese history at 46.6%.

Portugal

- On 23 January Anibal Cavaco Silva, from the Social Democratic Party (PSD, conservative) is re-elected as President with 52.9% of the votes and the lowest turnout in Portuguese history at 46.6%.

Spain

- On 8 January the terrorist group Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) announces a ceasefire in exchange for a definitive solution based on the right of self-determination. The news is not well received since it makes no mention of a definitive disarmament.

France

- On 12 January Jean Marimbert, director general of the French Public Health Agency resigns under pressure from the opposition over his failure to withdraw the pharmaceutical Mediator until 2009, which had killed 500 patients since 1976.

Monaco

- On 1 January Jose Badia replaces Franck Biancheri as Foreign Affairs Minister. On 14 January Monaco completes its government reshuffle with the appointment of Marco Piccini as Finance Minister and Marie-Pierre Gramaglia as Minister for Public Works, the Environment and Urban Development.

Italy

- On 13 January the Constitutional Court rules that the “legitimate impediment law” was partially invalid. The law was blocking two trials of the Mediaset case and one from the Mills case against Silvio Berlusconi by granting him judicial immunity.

Malta

- On 10 January Malta protests against Italy’s decision to issue tenders for oil exploration in the waters around Pantelleria, Linosa and Lampedusa, part of whose continental shelf Malta considers to be under its sovereignty.

Slovenia

- On 21 January Slovenia protests against the Croatian regulation on fishing areas, which includes disputed territorial waters subject to a signed agreement reached under international mediation.

Croatia

- On 5 January the Bosnian authorities arrest the Croatian Tihomir Purda, wanted in Belgrade for war crimes in Vukovar in 1991. His arrest and the publication of a list of another 340 Croatians wanted by Serbia prompts criticism from Zagreb. Serbia provided Croatia with a list of 40 names, which did not include Purda. On 29 January 1,500 people protest in Vukovar against the arrest.
- On 22 January fishermen stage protests calling for fuel prices to be lowered and an exclusive economic zone of 23,000 km² that "protects them from excessive Italian fishing."

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 20 January Bosnias’s War Crimes Court sentences the Bosnian commander Sefik Alic to ten years’ imprisonment, for instigating the murder of Croatian Serb soldiers during “Operation Storm” in 1995.

Serbia

- On 28 January a teachers strike demands a 24% pay increase.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 8 January the EU Mission for Kosovo (EULEX) announces its decision
to file charges against Sabit Geci and Riza Alija, former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK), for war crimes during the Kosovo conflict against citizens accused of collaboration with Serbia.

- On 9 January the December 2010 elections are repeated in 21 electoral colleges because of irregularities. Victory goes to the governing Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK, social democrat).
- On 25 January the European Council adopts Marty’s report, which accuses the Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi of trafficking arms, drugs and human organs. EULEX opens an investigation.

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)

- On 14 January the Finance Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Ilir Meta resigns following his involvement in an influence peddling case. On 17 January Foreign Affairs Minister Edmond Haxhinasto is appointed Deputy Prime Minister and the Deputy Parliament Speaker Nasip Naco becomes the new Finance Minister.
- On 21 January three demonstrators are killed in clashes outside the government headquarters. On 22 January the General Prosecutor orders the arrest of six senior members of the Republican Guard for murder and abuse of power. The dispute deepens between the government and the opposition, which has paralysed the Parliament since the contested June 2009 electoral results, following calls for widespread demonstrations for 26 and 28 January.

Greece

- On 4 January the Public Order Minister Christos Papoutsis confirms the decision to close 12.5 kilometres of Greece’s border with Turkey following the increase in illegal entries via the Evros River.
- On 19 January the railway, pharmaceutical and legal sectors go on strike against a government proposal to open traditionally restricted sectors to the competition.
- On 31 January public transport workers go on strike against the sector’s restructuring.

Turkey

- On 13 January thousands of demonstrators clash with police in several cities, marking the start of a trial in Diyarbakir of 151 people accused of having links with the terrorist organisation the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). On 16 January another demonstration in Istanbul also ends in violence.
- On 27 January the press reports the Supreme Court’s decision to sentence 16 members of the Turkish Hezbollah, nine in absentia, to life imprisonment for around hundred murders in the 1990s.

Cyprus

- On 28 January 10,000 Turkish-Cypriots demonstrate in Northern Cyprus against their government’s austerity programme.

Syria


Lebanon

- On 12 January as a protest against the Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s rapprochement with Washington, the withdrawal of 11 Hezbollah Ministers and other forces from the March 14-led coalition government forces the government’s downfall. Hezbollah and its allies accuse the US of frustrating the Syrian-Saudi initiative to “mitigate the negative effects for Lebanon” of the investigation of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) into the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. On 18 January the Prosecutor Daniel Bellemare issues charges that implicate several Hezbollah members. On 24 January the opposition obtains a parliamentary majority to replace Hariri with the entrepreneur Najib Mikati. Hariri’s fall prompts calls for a “Day of Rage,” which leaves 50 people injured. On 28 January the pro-Western bloc, led by Hariri, rules out its participation in the new government.

Jordan


Egypt

- On 1 January a bomb planted by the Palestinian Army of Islam in the church of Saint Mark and Saint Peter, in Alexandria, leaves 23 dead. The attack leads Christians to burst into a mosque sparking violent clashes.
- On 17 January a citizen sets himself on fire in front of the Parliament in protest against the country’s political and living conditions. On 25 January the largest demonstrations in three decades, responding to the call for a “Day of Rage,” demand political reforms, the end to the Emergency Law in effect since 1981 and measures against unemployment, inflation and low salaries. The government accuses the Muslim Brotherhood of fuelling the unrest. On 26 January the police disperse thousands of people gathered in Tahrir Square, injuring 150 and making 400 arrests. On 28 January telephone and Internet communication is suspended and 20 members of the Muslim Brotherhood are arrested in Cairo, hours before the “Friday of Rage,” called throughout Egypt. On 29 January Mubarak sacks his cabinet and appoints Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman as vice-President. On 30 January Mubarak asks the new Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq to begin urgent reforms and meets with military chiefs. The army pledges its protection of the right to freedom of expression.
- On 29 January clashes in el-Arish, Sinai, between the police and Bedouin groups protesting against poor living conditions leave 12 dead.
Libya

• On 16 January protests in favour of democratic reforms end in clashes with police in Tripoli, Benghazi and Darna.

Tunisia

• On 8, 9 and 10 January dozens of people are killed in clashes between students and the police in Sfax and Kasserine, as part of a wave of protests sweeping the country since December 2010, known as the Jasmine Revolution. On 10 January Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali promises the creation of 300,000 jobs. The government orders the closure of schools and universities. On 11 January the clashes intensify prompting the government to order a curfew. Rafik Belhaj Kacem, the Interior Minister, is sacked and the government announces the release of those arrested during the clashes. On 13 January Ben Ali promises political and economic changes and announces that he will not run in the 2014 elections. On 14 January the government is ousted and a state of emergency is called. Ben Ali flees to Saudi Arabia. The Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi takes over the interim presidency. The army takes control of the country. On 15 January the Constitutional Council removes Ben Ali from power appointing Fouad Mebazaa as interim President of the parliament. Mebazaa asks Ghannouchi to form a unity government. On 18 January four ministers resign due to the presence in the new government of six members of Ben Ali’s Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD). Mebazaa and Ghannouchi leave the RCD. On 20 and 21 January police in Tunisia try to stop thousands of demonstrators demanding the resignation of the ministers of the previous regime. On 22 January the police join demonstrators demanding the resignation of Ghannouchi. On 26 January the Justice Minister Lazhar Karoui Chebbi issues an international arrest warrant for Ben Ali and his wife, Leila Trabelsi. On 27 January Ghannouchi announces the resignation of the ministers connected with the deposed regime. The Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) pledges its support for the new government.

Algeria

• On 8 January the government announces a decrease in the price of basic goods to halt the protests that have rocked Algeria since 5 January and which have left five dead and over 800 injured.
• On 8 January two gendarmes are injured in an attack in Sahel Bouberak. On 9 January a member of the Self-Defence Group (SDG) is killed after being shot on 2 January by AQIM terrorists. On 28 January a communal guard is killed in a terrorist attack in Assi Youcef.
• On 22 January hundreds of demonstrators clash with police in Algiers. Throughout the month there are dozens of self-immolations in protest against the poor living conditions.
• On 28 January a court in Constantine sentences six AQIM terrorists to death for the murder of 20 people in June 2009 in el-Mansoura.
• On 29 January 10,000 people called by the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD, Berber nationalist) demonstrate in Bejaia demanding democratic changes.

Morocco

• On 25 January a man attempts to set fire to himself in protest against the precarious living conditions, in the fourth action of this nature in the last year. The same day, the Communications Minister Khalid Naciri announces that the State will maintain subsidies on basic goods.

Mauritania

• On 17 January a man self-immolates in front of the Senate in protest against the precarious living conditions.

European Union

• On 1 January Hungary takes over the European Presidency with the priority of concluding negotiations over the eurozone’s permanent rescue fund, improving the coordination of financial policy and strengthening the energy and innovation sectors.

Arab League

• On 19 January the Secretary General of the Arab League Amr Moussa calls Arab leaders to respond to the “unprecedented anger and frustration” of their people due to the declining development levels.

February 2011

Northern Africa continues to dominate the news, setting the political agenda of countries like France, where the links between the Foreign Minister and Ben Ali’s regime prompt a cabinet reshuffle, or in Italy where the government fears a massive influx of immigrants from the Maghreb. In Egypt, the army’s position beside the people forces Hosni Mubarak to resign, and marks the beginning of a transition administered by a military council. Libya is the next regime to be threatened where revolution soon takes the shape of a civil war. In Cote d’Ivoire, thousands demand early elections. In Serbia, MPs resign from the cabinet. In Kosovo, Hashim Thaci is re-elected Prime Minister and the magnate Behgjet Pacolli becomes the new President. In Turkey, the terrorist organisation PKK ends the unilateral truce announced in August 2010. In Jordan, the social protests bring down the government.

Spain

• On 1 February the National High Court sentences the former Askatasuna spokesperson Ohiana Agirre to eight years’ imprisonment for his involvement with ETA.
• On 8 February the political party Sortu (Arise, abertzale left) is officially founded. The new party aspires to compete in the Basque local elections.

France

• On 8 February the Prime Minister Francois Fillon admits to having spent his holidays in Aswan at the invitation of Mubarak, thus increasing the controversy sparked after it was discovered that Michele Alliot-Marie, the Foreign Affairs Minister, spent last Christmas in Tunisia at the invitation of circles close to Ben Ali. On 27 February Alliot-Marie resigns and is replaced by Alain Juppé, who is replaced by Gerard Longuet as Defence Minister. Claude Gueant replaces Brice Hortefeux as Interior Minister.
• On 10 February a week of protests by the judiciary culminates in a strike over the lack of resources in the judicial system.

Italy

• On 3 February the Northern League’s (Padanian nationalist, liberal)
Law on Fiscal Federalism, whose approval has been set by the League as a requisite to remaining in the coalition government, is rejected by Parliament. The same day the Council of Ministers approves the project by decree. The President Giorgio Napolitano refuses to ratify it.

- On 12 February the government decrees a humanitarian state of emergency after the recent arrival of thousands of refugees in Lampedusa and Pantelleria from Tunisia.

**Malta**

- On 21 February two Libyan Air Force fighter jets land in La Valletta. The pilots request asylum after refusing to bomb Benghazi.

**Slovenia**

- On 1 February the Parliament approves the right of minorities in the former Yugoslavia to form groups according to their ethnic origins and preserve their culture and language.

**Croatia**

- On 22, 25, 26 and 28 February protests are staged demanding the government’s resignation, the nationalisation of the banks and pay increases, coinciding with demonstrations in support of war veterans and Tihomir Purda.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

- On 7 February Bosnian Serb railway workers launch a strike after two years without receiving full pay.

**Serbia**

- On 5 February the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS, conservative) leads a large demonstration demanding early elections over the government’s failure to tackle the crisis and unemployment and its pro-Western stance.
- On 23 February the former assistant Interior Minister Vlastimir Dordevic is sentenced to 27 years’ imprisonment by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the murder of 724 Kosovo Albanians and the deportation of a further 200,000 during the conflict in Kosovo.

**Kosovo**

- On 14 February the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK, liberal-conservative), appoints Behgjet Pacoli, the leader of the New Kosovo Alliance (AKR, liberal), as the new President.
- On 22 February the Parliament appoints him President and re-elects Hashim Thaçi as Prime Minister in a vote that is boycotted by the opposition.
- On 21 February the EU extends the mandate of the EU Special Representative in Kosovo Pieter Feith by two months.

**FYROM**

- On 13 February clashes erupt over plans to build a church-museum in the fort of Skopje.
- On 21 February Branko Crvenkovski, the leader of the Social Democratic Union (SDSM), accepts the government’s offer to hold early elections putting an end to the prevailing parliamentary boycott.

**Albania**

- On 4 and 18 February fresh anti-government demonstrations paralyse Tirana, Lezha, Korçe and Valona.

**Greece**

- On 9 February a demonstration against the public spending cuts ends in clashes with police.
- On 15 February a public transport strike brings Greece to a standstill coinciding with the Parliament’s approval to restructure the sector.
- On 23 February the year’s first general strike is held against the government’s austerity measures. In Athens, 33,000 demonstrate sparking unrest.

**Turkey**

- On 15 February clashes break out between the police and Kurdish demonstrators in 12 cities during the commemoration of the 12th anniversary of Abdullah Ocalan’s arrest.
- On 28 February the terrorist organisation PKK ends the unilateral truce declared on 13 August 2010.

**Cyprus**

- On 7 February a demonstration is held in Northern Cyprus against the reduction in benefits imposed by Ankara.

**Syria**

- On 2, 4 and 5 February demonstrations are held in the major cities demanding more freedoms and an end to the 1963 Emergency Law.
- On 9 February after being blocked for three years, Syria restores access to Facebook and YouTube.
- On 17 February the government announces a reduction in the price of basic goods.

**Lebanon**

- On 10 February a major protest against Hezbollah accuses the group of appointing the new Prime Minister.

**Jordan**

- On 1 February growing protests force Abdullah II to sack the government of Samir Rifai, who is replaced by the former Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit.
- On 2 February thousands of Jordanians demand the resignation of al-Bakhit. On 3 February Abdullah II pledges to improve anti-corruption measures and develop national dialogue, meeting with the Muslim Brotherhood for the first time in a decade.
- On 6 February 36 tribal leaders condemn the “interference in executive decisions by those who have no constitutional powers” and describe Queen Rania, of Palestinian origin, as “a danger to national interests.”
- On 24 February 6,000 demonstrate in Amman demanding democratic reforms.

**Egypt**

- On 1 February the “Million Man March” calls for Mubarak to step down from the power. Mubarak asks Omar Suleiman to initiate talks with the opposition but refuses to resign. Clashes break out in Alexandria. On 2 February the Parliament suspends its sessions until the allegations of irregularities in the 2010 elections are
investigated. Mubarak supporters attack demonstrators gathered in Tahrir Square in Cairo leaving three dead and 639 injured. On 3 February Mohamed el-Baradei and the Muslim Brotherhood refuse the offer to open dialogue with Mubarak.

• On 4 February Bedouin rebels attack a police station in el-Arish. On 9 February new clashes erupt between the army and members of the Islamist group Takfir wal-Hijra, after it is discovered that the explosion on 5 February in a gas terminal was the result of an attack led by Bedouin rebels. On 16 February the press reports Jerusalem’s approval to deploy more Egyptian troops in the Sinai to protect the supply.

• On 6 February Omar Suleiman offers the opposition greater freedoms and lifts the state of emergency, but his refusal to offer Mubarak’s resignation causes the meeting to end without an agreement. On 8 February Mubarak promises pay and pension increases. On 10 February the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces confirms its position beside the people. On 11 February thousands of demonstrators take over Alexandria and Cairo. Suleiman announces Mubarak’s resignation and the transfer of power to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which on 13 February announces the dissolution of the Parliament, the suspension of the Constitution and the formation of a committee for its reform. Demonstrators announce that they will not leave Tahrir Square until deadlines are set for the transition to civilian rule and the end of the Emergency Laws. On 25 February the Muslim Brotherhood lead a new “Million Man March” against Ahmed Shafiq and other members of the previous regime that continue until the government. On 28 February an order issued by the General Prosecutor prohibits Mubarak and his family from leaving Egypt and freezes his funds.

Libya

• On 15 and 16 February mass protests against the regime end in clashes and multiple arrests in Benghazi. On 16 February 213 prominent Libyan figures sign a petition for Gaddafi’s resignation. On 17 February 24 people are killed during the “Day of Rage,” which commemorates the death of 14 members of the opposition in February 2006. On 21 February fighter jets shoot at demonstrators in Tripoli leaving 250 dead. The majority of imams call for revolution. The Justice Minister and the Arab League representative resign. On 22 February the Interior Minister Abdul Fatah Younis resigns, calling for people to join the revolution. On 25 February the government announces pay increases. Mercenaries of the regime shoot at demonstrators in Tripoli. On 26 February the UN Security Council approves Resolution 1970 that demands an end to the violence, approves an arms embargo on Libya, bans Gaddafi and his family from leaving the country and freezes his foreign assets. Rebels take Zawiya.

Tunisia

• On 1 February the former Interior Minister Rafik Belhaj Kacem is arrested. On 2 February the government replaces the 24 regional governors. On 6 February the Interior Minister suspends the activities of the RCD. On 11 February for the first time in 30 years the police pull out from the universities. On 15 February the government lifts the curfew instated on 12 January, although it maintains the state of emergency. 28 parties and organisations demand the constitution of a National Council to protect the principles of the revolution. On 17 February the former President Ben Ali is reported to have fallen into a coma in Saudi Arabia. On 18 February a general amnesty for political prisoners comes into force. On 20 February Tunisia demands that Riyadh extradite Ben Ali. On 21 February Mouldi Kefi replaces Ahmed Ounaies as the Foreign Minister. On 27 February public pressure forces Mohamed Ghannouchi to resign, who is replaced by Beji Caid el Sebsi.

Algeria

• On 22 February the government announces the “imminent” end to the state of emergency, in effect since February 1992.

Morocco

• On 1 February two unemployed teachers self-immolate in the Ministry of Education. The police prevent a further 38 teachers from doing the same.

• On 9 February the civil service stages a general strike to protest against low wages and the slow progress in the social dialogue initiated in 2008.

• On 10 February the government announces a revision of the Labour Market law to reduce unemployment and increase wages. On 15 February over 1.33 billion euros are announced to halt inflation in basic goods.

• On 20 February the “Day of Dignity” brings thousands of protestors together to demand democratic reforms and the resignation of the Prime Minister. Clashes erupt in the major cities following the resignation on 21 February of Mohamed Boudra, the President of the Regional Council of al-Hoceima and member of the Authenticity and Modernity Party (AMP). Mustapha Ramid also resigns from the cabinet of the Justice and Development Party (JDP), due to disagreements with its President Abdellah Benkiran, who opposes the participation of young members of the JDP in the protests. On 26 February around a thousand people demand a new constitution in Casablanca in a move organised by the February 20 Movement.

Mauritania

• On 26 February thousands of young people in Nouakchott demand political, economic and social reforms and announce the formation of a Joint Action Coordinator.
European Union

- On 4 February France and Germany present their proposal on the Competitiveness Pact, which includes increasing the retirement age to 67, true economic union, harmonised wage indexation systems and limits on public debt.
- On 4 February the European Council approves the action plan for a domestic energy market to reduce EU dependence.

Arab League

- On 21 February, at the request of Qatar, the Arab League holds an extraordinary session to debate the Libyan crisis and condemn Gaddafi’s use of force.

March 2011

The economic crisis prompts Portugal to call early elections. In Spain the abertzale party Sortu is banned because of its ties to the terrorist group ETA. The Socialist Party wins in the French cantonal elections. In Italy, tensions rise on the island of Lampedusa. Anti-government protests take place in Croatia, Montenegro, Albania and also in Bosnia, a country where there are also ongoing complications over the appointment of a new government. Serbia reshuffles its cabinet coinciding with the start of talks with Kosovo, where EULEX arrests the former Minister Fatmir Limaj for war crimes. In Turkey, new arrests are made over the Ergenekon plot and tensions rise in the majority Kurdish southeast. In Arab countries the wave of protests continues, with the outbreak of a popular revolution in Syria and with Libya entering a civil war, which forces the approval of United Nations Resolution 1973 and the start of NATO involvement. Protests also intensify in Algeria, Jordan and Mauritania, as well as in Morocco where Mohammed VI announces a far-reaching constitutional reform. In Egypt, the constitutional reform proposal is approved in a referendum.

Portugal

- On 23 March Jose Socrates resigns after the opposition rejects measures to reduce the public deficit announced on 11 March and responded to on 12 with mass demonstrations. On 31 March the President Anibal Cavaco Silva calls early elections for June.

Spain

- On 23 March the Supreme Court bans Sortu, the party of the abertzale left, on the grounds that it is a continuation of Batasuna.

France

- On 27 March the Socialist Party (PS) wins the second round of the cantonal elections with 35.05% of the vote, followed by the UMP with 18.89%.

Italy

- On 6 March the Interior Minister Roberto Maroni urges a joint European effort to deal with the arrival en masse of immigrants to Lampedusa, where the inhabitants stage a protest on 20 March. On 25 March FRONTEX extends its mission in Italian waters until August.
- On 10 March the government approves a controversial reform of the judiciary that divides judges and prosecutors into two institutions, allows Parliament to set the priorities of the judicial system and limits the prosecutors’ powers to appeal.

Malta

- On 27 March 535 immigrants arrive in Malta from Libya.

Croatia

- On 8, 17 and 19 March thousands demonstrate in Zagreb against the government of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ, conservative) and the opposition Social Democratic Party (SDP).
- On 25 March the President of the national oil company INA Bojan Milkovic proves the formation of the new government despite the Bosnian Croat boycott. Zivko Budimir, from the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP, conservative) is elected President and Nermin Niksic (SDP) Prime Minister. On 24 March the Central Election Commission (CIK) declares that the government is not legitimate as several Croatian delegates had not yet been appointed. On 28 March the High Representative of the International Community Valentin Inzko suspends the decision of the CIK.

- On 19 March a demonstration takes place in Banja Luka in protest against the country’s poor socio-economic situation.

Montenegro

- On 21 and 30 March two demonstrations against the crisis, corruption and unemployment call for the resignations of the Prime Minister Igor Lukic, the General Prosecutor Ranka Carapic and the chief of police Veselin Veljovic.

Serbia

- On 6 March the Prime Minister Mirko Cvetkovic reshuffles the cabinet and takes the position of Finance Minister.
- On 25 March 10,000 civil servants demonstrate in Belgrade demanding improvements in working conditions and salaries.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 8-9 March EU-brokered talks between Serbia and Kosovo conclude without any advances. On 28 March a second round of negotiations begins.
- On 17 March the media reports the arrest of 11 former members of the UÇK accused of war crimes during the Kosovo conflict, among them the former Transport Minister Fatmir Limaj. On 23 and 29 March protests are held against the arrests.
• On 28 March the Constitutional Court rules that the election of Bajram Radi as President is against the constitution. On 30 March Pacolli resigns.

**FYROM**

• On 8 March the government approves a redrafted electoral law, one of the central opposition demands to end the parliamentary boycott.

**Albania**

• On 15 March thousands of demonstrators in Gërdec demand the resignation of the government during the commemoration of the arms dump explosion which killed 26 people in 2008.
• On 21 March 25 socialist MPs file charges against the Interior Minister Lulzim Basha for the death of four demonstrators during the anti-government protests in January.

**Greece**

• On 14 March the IMF announces the release of a fourth tranche of 4 billion euros as part of the rescue package of the Greek economy.
• On 18 March a bomb explodes in front of the Health Ministry. On 23 March the police deactivate a new device in Athens.

**Turkey**

• On 3 March ten people are arrested in Ankara and Istanbul over their alleged involvement in the “Ergenekon” plot. On 4 and 13 March thousands of people protest against the arrests.
• On 15 March three members of the PKK are killed in Simak in the first skirmishes with the army since the terrorist organisation announced the end of the truce on 28 February.
• On 23 March the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP, social democrat, Kurdish nationalist) calls for civil disobedience to demand education in Kurdish, the release of prisoners, the end of military operations in Kurdistan and the lowering of the 10% electoral threshold to obtain representation in Parliament.

**Cyprus**

• On 2 March 25,000 Turkish Cypriots demonstrate in Nicosia against the benefit cuts in Northern Cyprus imposed by Turkey.

**Syria**

• On 20 March Bashar al-Assad sacks the governor of Daraa Faisal Koltoum for his poor handling of the month’s unrest. On 24 March 20,000 people participate in an anti-government sit-in in Daraa. Parallel to this, the government announces “important measures” including the end of the state of emergency that began in 1963, salary increases and better health cover for public workers. Despite the announcement, the demonstrations and unrest continue in Daraa, Hama and Damascus, spreading on 27 March to Latakia.
• On 29 March the government resigns.

**Lebanon**

• On 13 March thousands of supporters of the pro-Western bloc demonstrate in Beirut demanding that Hezbollah hand over its arms.
• On 27 March a demonstration in Jbeil calls for the end of the sectarian political system, the creation of a secular state and an electoral law based on a single constituency and proportional representation.

**Jordan**

• On 24 March clashes break out between police, supporters of the regime and demonstrators in Amman’s Gamal Abdel Nasser Square demanding political reforms and the closure of the Israeli embassy. On 25 March thousands of monarchists show their loyalty to Abdullah II.
• On 26 March the opposition calls for the resignation of the Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit, electoral reforms, the Parliament’s appointment of the government and general elections to elect the Prime Minister.
• On 27 March Abdullah II announces political and economic reforms. The same day, the Parliament rejects a proposal to limit the powers of the monarch.

**Egypt**

• On 3 March popular pressure forces the resignation of the Prime Minister Ahmed Shafiq, who is replaced by Essam Sharaf.
• On 8 March ten people are killed and 110 injured in Cairo’s Moqqatam quarter in clashes between Christians and Muslims during the Christian protest against the burning of a church in Helwan on 5 March.
• On 15 March the Interior Ministry dissolves the State Security Investigations Service.
• On 19 March the referendum is held to reform the constitution. The “yes” vote wins by 77.2%.
• On 30 March the SCAF adopts the Constitutional declaration that will replace the Fundamental Law during the transition.

**Libya**

• On 10 March the EU Council ratifies new sanctions that include freezing the assets of five Libyan banks in Europe. France recognises the National Transitional Council (NTC), formed by opposition forces to the Libyan regime, as the country’s legitimate interlocutor.
• On 17 March the United Nations Security Council approves the Resolution 1973/2011 that authorises the enforcement of an aerial exclusion zone, imposes an arms embargo and allows the use of force to protect civilians.
• On 19 March the EU, USA, Arab League and the AU agree to comply with Resolution 1973/2011. On the same day operation “Odyssey Dawn,” is put into action, which on 20 March forces the Libyan army to end its offensive on Benghazi.
• On 21 March NATO decides to enforce the arms embargo on Libya as of 25 March.
• On 29 March 36 countries and five international organisations agree in London to constitute a contact group for Libya.
• On 30 March the Libyan Foreign Minister Moussa Koussa arrives in the United Kingdom after resigning from his post.
• On 30 March NATO takes over the command of operation “Odyssey Dawn.”
Tunisia

- On 1 March the Higher Education Minister and head of the Ettajdid party Ahmed Ibrahim, the Regional Development Minister Ahmed Nejib Chebbi, the Minister for Social and Economic Reforms Elyes Jouini, the State Secretary for Higher Education Faouzia Charfi and the State Secretary for Industry and Technology Sami Zaoui all resign.
- On 1 March the Interior Minister legalises the Islamist movement Ennahda, whose leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, returned from exile in London on 30 January.
- On 7 March the interim President appoints the third transitional government since the fall of Ben Ali, with Beji Caid Essebsi, as the new Prime Minister.
- On 7 March Ben Ali’s political police force is dissolved.
- On 24–25 March clashes erupt in Sidi Bouzid when thousands of people demand the dismissal of RCD members working in the government.
- On 28 March Habib Essid replaces Farhat Rajhi as the Interior Minister.

Algeria

- On 1 March 5,000 students protest in Tizi Ouzou demanding democratic changes and changes in the education system.
- On 7 March 7,000 communal guards protesting against low salaries and staff cuts clash with police in Algiers.
- On 12, 19 and 26 March the police disperse crowds gathered by the CNCD in Algiers to demand democratic reforms.
- On 13 March the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) and the Algerian National Front (FNA) walk out of the Parliament amid discussions to lift the state of emergency to demand, respectively, the freedom to demonstrate and the approval of laws previously agreed upon in parliament.
- On 23–24 March clashes break out in Climat de France and Bab el-Oued, Algiers, between police and demonstrators protesting over the lack of access to housing.

Morocco

- On 6 March the February 20 Movement organises demonstrations in the major cities calling for democratic reforms. On 9 March Mohammed VI announces a constitutional reform that includes strengthening the role of the Parliament, the Prime Minister and the parties, as well as a regionalisation plan that includes the Western Sahara. On 20 March new protests by the February 20 Movement accuse the commission studying the reforms of not representing the people.
- On 15 March three people are killed in Khouribga in clashes between police and workers, who have been protesting since 2009 against the Cherifien Phosphates Company’s policy on recruiting and dismissing staff.
- On 24 March the new Independent Mediator Institution (Defender of the People) begins its activity, which is added to the creation on 3 March of the National Human Rights Council.

Mauritania

- On 1 March thousands of Mauritani ans in Nouakchott call for constitutional reforms and measures against inflation, unemployment, tribalisation and slavery.
- On 8, 11 and 18 March protests take place by the Joint Action Coordinator calling for the resignation of the government.

European Union

- On 25 March the European Council authorises a reform of the Lisbon Treaty that allows the introduction of the community’s permanent rescue fund with a sum of 700 billion euros from 2013. This measure includes the French-German demand for the “Stability Pact.” Thousand of demonstrators protest in Brussels against the plans to cut public spending.

Arab League

- On 2 March the Arab League considers sending an Egyptian-Algerian delegation to negotiate Gaddafi’s departure from power and postpones the summit of Heads of State until 15 May, when Libya is to hand over the presidency to Iraq.
- On 12 March the Arab League supports the establishment of a no-fly zone for Libya enforced by the United Nations.

April 2011

The economic crisis worsens in the EU with the Portuguese request for an economic bailout. In Spain, the abertzale left presents Bildu, the alternative to the banned Sortu. In Italy a controversial law is passed that reduces trial time-limits. Croatia witnesses the sentence of Ante Gotovina by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Albania and Serbia continue to face successive anti-government protests. In Kosovo, Atifete Jahjaga is appointed President following the resignation of Behgjet Pacoli. In Libya, despite international intervention, the Gaddafi regime forces the rebels to retreat. In Syria, the government alternates violent repression with reform promises in response to country-wide protests against Bashar al-Assad’s regime, particularly by the large crowds gathered after Friday prayers. In Egypt, Mubarak is placed under arrest. In Tunisia the General Prosecutor files multiple charges against Ben Ali.

Portugal

- On 6 April Portugal asks the EU for an 80 billion-euro economic bailout. On 18 April the negotiations begin with the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF.

Spain

- On 3 April the independent Basque coalition Bildu announces that it will run in May’s local elections. On 9 April 20,000 people demonstrate in Madrid against the coalition, which they believe has ties with ETA.
- On 19 April the High Court revokes its decision to release the ETA-member Antonio Troitiño after it reviewed his sentence on 13 April and ordered his release after serving 24 of the 2,232-year sentence. An arrest warrant has been issued for Troitiño, whose whereabouts are unknown.
- On 11 April the Supreme Court opens the trial against the National Court judge Baltasar Garzon, accused of abusing his authority in the Gürtel corruption case. On 19 April the General Council of the Judiciary suspends the magistrate from judicial activity.
France

• On 11 April use of the full Islamic veil in public spaces is banned.

Italy

• On 6 April in Milan the trial begins against Silvio Berlusconi for the Rubygate case.
• On 7 April the government approves a decree by which temporary residence permits are granted for 20,000 immigrants who have arrived from Tunisia since January, allowing them to move freely throughout the Schengen Area. France's reluctance to allow the legal immigrants into its territory opens a dispute with Italy which is partially settled by an agreement reached on 8 April.
• On 13 April the Lower House approves the controversial bill that shortens trial times for people with no previous convictions. The law will allow Berlusconi to escape trial for the Mills and Mediaset cases.
• On 20 April 818 immigrants arrive from Libya and Tunisia in Lampedusa and Pantelleria adding to the 307 that arrived on 12 April.

Malta

• On 8 April Malta accuses Italy of refusing the entry of 171 immigrants rescued in Italian waters by a Maltese patrol boat, and which are added to the 850 arrivals over the last week in Malta. On 12 April another 116 refugees arrive in Malta, which once again reports a lack of cooperation.

Slovenia

• On 10 April, in a referendum, the Slovenes reject the Law on Temporary Employment by the ICTY for war crimes against Serbs in Krajina during Operation Storm, in 1995.
• On 19 April Croatia closes the chapters on agriculture and rural development and regional policy and coordination of structural instruments, in the EU accession negotiations.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

• On 13 April the Bosnian Serb parliament approves a referendum on the legitimacy of rulings made by the High Representative of the International Community. The EU warns that the attempts to subvert federal regulations violate the Dayton Accords.
• On 18 April the leaders of the main Bosnian Croat parties in Mostar call for a constitutional amendment that allows the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be split into two separate entities.

Serbia

• On 4 April Serbian police arrest Bozidar Vucurevic, the former Mayor of Trebinje, wanted by Croatia for war crimes during the bombing of Dubrovnik in 1991. On 12 April Bosnia's State Prosecutor requests his extradition.
• On 16 April around 50,000 people called by the opposition SNS protest in Belgrade demanding early elections and the end of pro-Western policies and the public deficit limit.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

• On 1 April the Kosovo authorities begin the population census in all its territory except the Serbian enclaves in the north, which demand that the UN carry out the count.
• On 7 April the deputy director of the police force Atifete Jahjaga is appointed President.
• On 27 April the government approves a ministerial reform to avoid the New Kosovo Alliance (AKR, liberal) of Behgjet Pacolli leaving the coalition. The party obtains two additional ministries.

FYROM

• On 15 April the President of the Parliament Trajko Vejjanoski calls early legislative elections for June.

Albania

• On 10 April clashes break out in two simultaneous demonstrations in Kashar and Bathore between supporters of the Socialist Party (PS) and the governing Democratic Party of Albania (PDS, conservative). On 17 April a bomb explodes in the PS headquarters in Pogradec.
• On 25 April Bujar Nishani takes over as Interior Minister, replacing Lulzim Basha, who steps down to run in the local elections in May for the Mayor of Trana.

Greece

• On 7 April the press trade unions hold two consecutive 48-hour strikes against the pay and job cuts made by the main media groups.
• On 13 April the former Transport Minister Anastasios Mantelis is given a three-year suspended prison sentence for tax fraud.
• On 16 April clashes break out in Thessaloniki between the police and anarchist demonstrators demanding the release of prisoners.

Turkey

• On 1 April seven PKK terrorists are killed in clashes with the army in Hassa.
• On 18 April the Electoral Board vetoes the lists of the Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP, socialist) for the 12 June elections and 12 independent candidates, seven of whom are backed by the pro-Kurdish BDP, which announces that it will boycott the elections. During the following days demonstrations and clashes break out in Istanbul, Van, Yuksekova, Diyarbakir and Bismil.
• On 25 April 35 people are arrested in Hakkari for belonging to the Union of Communities in Kurdistan (KCK), affiliated with the terrorist organisation PKK.

Cyprus

• On 7 April clashes break out in Northern Cyprus between the police and 3,000 demonstrators against Turkey's benefit cuts.

Syria

• On 3 April Bashar al-Assad asks the former Agriculture Minister Adel Safar to form a new government, which is approved by the President on 14 April.
• On 7 April Bashar al-Assad dismiss-
es the governor of Homs, Mohammed
Lyad Ghazal.

- On 13 April the protests spread for
the first time to Aleppo, the country’s
second biggest city.
- On 19 April the government agrees
to lift the state of emergency and abol-
ishes the State Security Court. A new
law will replace the Emergency Law,
allowing “peaceful” demonstrations with
prior authorisation.
- On 20 April Bashar al-Assad sacks
the police chief in Baniyas.
- On 22 April thousands of Syrians
take to the streets on “Large Friday,” the
largest anti-government protest to date
and the most bloody, with over a hun-
dred deaths.
- On 23 April the parliamentary repre-
sentatives of Daraa, Nasser al-Hariri and
Jail Rifai, together with the city’s mufti
Abdulrahman Abazeid protest against
the repressive measures taken against
civilians. On 27 April 203 members of
the Baath Party in Huran and a further
28 in Baniyas stage their own protests.

**Lebanon**

- On 5 April a four-day riot in Roumieh
comes to an end, leaving two prisoners
dead. The prisoners were protesting
against poor prison conditions and for
a general amnesty.

**Jordan**

- On 1 April hundreds of Jordanians
demonstrate in Amman demanding con-
stitutional reforms.
- On 10 April Abdullah II asks the
President of the Senate Ahmad Lozi to
form a committee to revise the constitu-
tion.
- On 15 April clashes erupt in Zarqa
between Salafist demonstrators and
monarchs.

**Egypt**

- On 1 and 8 April thousands return
to Tahrir Square calling Hosni Mubarak
to meet their demands.
- On 11 April the former Secretary
General of the NDP and Speaker of the
Shura Council Safwat al-Sharif is re-
manded in custody by the Egyptian au-
thorities for embezzlement of funds.
- On 13 April Hosni Mubarak, his sons
Gamal and Alaa and the former Prime
Minister Ahmed Nazif are remanded in
custody.
- On 17 April the Military Junta orders
the dissolution of the NDP.
- On 17 April the State Prosecutor
begins the oral hearing in which he
questions the former vice-President
Omar Suleiman over the police interven-
tions carried out against the Tahrir
Square demonstrators.
- On 18 and 20 April two people are
killed and another six injured in clashes
in Abu Qurqas, Minya, between Coptic
Christians and Muslims.
- On 19 April the newly appointed
Christian Governor of Qena Emad
Mikhail submits his resignation after
several days of protests demanding he
be replaced by a Muslim. On 20 April
the Interior Minister reaffirms his ap-
pointment.
- On 19 April the official committee set
up to investigate Hosni Mubarak con-
cludes that the former President is re-
ponsible for the death of 846 demon-
strators during the January Revolution.
- On 27 April an explosion in the al-
Sabil terminal of the main gas pipeline
in the Sinai cuts gas exports to Israel
and Jordan.

**Libya**

- On 1 April the former Libyan Energy
Minister Omar Fathi Bin Shatwan arrives
in Malta from Misrata after resigning
from his post.
- On 5 April Abdul Ati al-Obeidi is ap-
pointed Foreign Minister to replace
Moussa Koussa.
- On 11 April NATO bombings halt the
advance of Gaddafi’s troops towards
Ajdabiya.
- On 12 April the EU widens sanctions
on Libya freezing the assets of 26 of the
country’s companies.
- On 13 April the contact group on
Libya agrees in Doha to set up a “trust
fund” that will provide resources for the
rebels.

**Tunisia**

- On 8 April a Tunisian court issues an
arrest warrant for the former Head of the
General Directorate of National Secu-
ritv.
- On 10 April the brother of former
President Ben Ali Slah Ben Ali is ar-
rested in Sousse.
- On 11 April the High Commission
for the Realisation of Revolution Obje-
tives announces its decision to ban
RCD members from running in elections
for 23 years. The government later re-
duces this time period to ten years.
- On 11 April an arrest warrant is is-
sued for the former RCD Secretary
General Mohamed Ghariani.
- On 13 April the Justice Minister
Lazhar Karoui Chebbi announces 44
charges to be filed against Ben Ali, his
family and collaborators.

**Algeria**

- On 6 April public workers hold a day
of strikes to demand pay rises and im-
provements in working conditions.
- On 12 April thousands of university
students demonstrate in Algiers de-
manding improvements in the education
system and the resignation of the Min-
ister of Higher Education.
- On 15 April the President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika announces plans to amend
the constitution with the appointment of
a constitutional commission that will
draw up proposals that will be accepted
by the Parliament or “through a popular
referendum.”
- On 15 April 14 soldiers are killed in
a terrorist attack in Damous. On the same
day the army kills four AQIM terrorists in
Tizi Ouzou. On 17 April five gendarmes
are killed in two attacks in Bourira and
Doukane. On 29 April four soldiers are
killed in an attack in Damous.

**Morocco**

- On 14 April Mohammed VI pardons
148 prisoners and reduces the sen-
tence of a further 42.
- On 24 April 27,000 people called by
the February 20 Movement demonstrate
to demand democratising measures, the
creation of employment and the fight
against corruption.
- On 26 April the government announc-
es increases in civil service wages, the
national minimum wage and pensions.
- On 28 April an AQIM bomb in the
Café Argana in the Jemaa el-Fna Square
in Marrakech leaves 16 dead.

**Mauritania**

- On 7 April the government post-
pones the elections scheduled for 24
April to replace a third of the 56 members of the Senate. On 3 April the Coordinator of the Democratic Opposition (COD) demands the measure be taken while there is no agreement between political parties to ensure electoral transparency.

- On 25 April the February 25 Movement calls for a “Day of Rage” in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou to condemn the lack of measures taken to improve the country’s socio-economic situation.

**European Union**

- On 6 April the Parliament’s Budget Committee approves the Parliament’s budget for 2012 which increases by 2.3% compared with 2011, standing at 1.725 billion euros.
- On 13 April the European Commission adopts the Single Market Act, which contemplates the implementation of twelve strategies for its reactivation in 2012.
- On 26 April France and Italy present a common proposal to modify the Schengen Treaty that seeks to “adapt the Treaty to new needs” through the reinstatement of internal border controls in the Union.

**Arab League**

- On 20 April the Arab League delays its annual summit for the second time due to the problems of stability faced by a large number of its member countries.

**May 2011**

Spain holds local and regional elections which are won by the People’s Party, in the same month that the social indignation over cuts in public spending comes to a head in the 15-M Movement. Italy holds regional elections, which end in defeat for the incumbent People of Freedom Party (PDL, liberal conservative). Local elections in Albania fuel tensions after the Democratic Party narrowly defeats the Socialist Party to win the mayoral office of Tirana. The Democratic Rally (DISY, liberal Christian democrat) wins the Cypriot legislative elections. In Malta, the right to divorce is approved in a referendum. The long-awaited arrest of Ratko Mladic puts Serbia on the path to EU membership. In Greece, the demonstrations and unrest intensify following fresh cuts. In the Arab world, the bloody repression of the Syrian regime faces its first international sanctions. In Egypt, the trials against Mubarak and his family begin while the country attempts to resolve conflicts arising from the fall of the regime, particularly clashes between Muslims and Christians. The interim government in Tunisia decides to postpone the legislative elections scheduled for July until October.

**Portugal**

- On 3 May Portugal reaches an agreement with the EU and the IMF to receive 78 million euros over three years, as a financial rescue package. On 21 May the first part of the rescue is approved.

**Spain**

- On 1 May the Supreme Court bans the 254 candidate lists of the Bildu coalition deeming that there is sufficient evidence to connect the party with the terrorist group ETA. The decision means the party will be unable to participate in the May elections. On 5 May the Constitutional Court revokes the order from the Supreme Court allowing Bildu to run in the elections.
- On 15 May a demonstration is held in 50 Spanish cities called by the 15 May Movement, known as the “indignants,” which demands a radical change in Spanish politics. In the days that follow, camps are set up in different cities.
- On 22 May Spain holds local and regional elections. The People’s Party (PP, liberal-conservative) wins most votes in the local elections with a total of 37.5% against the PSOE’s 27.5% and takes most of the provincial capitals. The legalised Bildu becomes the second most voted party in the Basque local elections, behind the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV, nationalist Christian democrat). In the regional elections, the PP wins in 13 of the 15 autonomous communities.

**France**

- On 14 May the managing director of the IMF Dominique Strauss-Kahn is arrested in New York, accused of sexual assault. On 19 May Strauss-Kahn submits his resignation.

**Italy**

- On 15–16 May Italy holds the first round of its partial local elections to renew 11 provincial governments and 1,315 town councils. On 30 May the second round confirms the defeat of the PDL, which loses in major cities like Milan, Turin, Bologna, Naples, Cagliari, Trieste, Siena, Ravenna and Novara.
- On 31 May a boat carrying 900 people arrives in Sicily from Libya, adding to the 1,856 immigrants rescued in the Strait of Sicily on 28 May and the 210 rescued on 29. Including these rescues, over 4,600 immigrants have arrived on Italian shores throughout May.

**Malta**

- On 28 May Malta holds a national referendum on legalising divorce, which had been approved on 16 March. 53.2% of the population votes in favour of its legalisation.

**Slovenia**

- On 16 May the Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS) leaves the coalition government in disagreement over the pension cuts proposed by the government of Borut Pahor. The departure leaves SD as a minority to push forward with its reform programme.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

- On 13 May the Bosnian War Crimes Court sentences the former Bosnian Serb police officer Dragan Crnogorac to 13 years’ imprisonment for his involvement in the death of ten Bosnians in Srebrenica in 1995.
- On 20 May six months after the general elections, the social democrat Denis Bescirovic is voted the new Chairman of the lower house, and the committee entrusted with choosing the new federal government is appointed.
- On 25 May a Bosnian court sentences the former Bosnian general Enes Handzic to eight years’ imprisonment for war crimes against Bosnian Croats in Bugojno in 1993.
Appendices

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 12 May clashes are reported between police and Kosovo-Albanian citizens protesting over the presence in Kosovo of the chief Serbian negotiator Borko Stefanovic, who has travelled to Pristina for an informal meeting with Kosovo’s negotiators.
- On 24 May the road block between Riberice and Zubin Potok reaches its sixth day. The block has been implemented by Kosovo-Serbs calling for the International Security Force in Kosovo (KFOR) to release the businessman Jerem Pantelic, accused of tax fraud by Pristina after refusing to pay taxes to Kosovo.

FYROM

- On 1 May the coalition government, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation- Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE, Christian democrat) announces that it will run in the early elections on 5 June together with the Democratic Renewal of Macedonia (DOM, social democrat), from the For a Better Macedonia coalition.

Albania

- On 8 May local elections are held. The decision to delay publishing the definitive results until the votes for the Mayor of Tirana are counted gives rise to clashes over the ensuing days between supporters of the PDS and the PS. On 23 May the election results in Tirana give victory to Lulzim Basha (PDS) sparking accusations of fraud from the PS.

Greece

- On 1 May thousands of Greeks protest against the government’s austerity policies, on a day that coincides with a rail and sea transport strike.
- On 11 May 20,000 people demonstrate in Athens on the day of the general strike against the economic cuts. The protests coincide with a new EU and IMF audit mission prior to releasing the second tranche of the financial rescue package.
- On 25 May 7,000 people gather in Syntagma Square in Athens and other cities to protest against the austerity measures. On 29 May new mobilisations take place coinciding with a new EU and IMF assessment mission.

Turkey

- On 4 May the convoy of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is attacked by the PKK terrorist organisation in Kastamonu.
- On 6 May police arrest 22 suspected members of the PKK who may have been preparing terrorist actions for the June elections.
- On 12 May 12 terrorists and a soldier are killed in clashes between the army and PKK members attempting to enter Sirnak from Iraq.

Cyprus

- On 21 May the main opposition party, the Democratic Rally (DISY, liberal Christian democrat), wins the legislative elections, obtaining 34.3% of the votes, followed by the governing Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL, communist) with 32.7%.

Syria

- On 6 May despite the mass arrests ordered by the government, protests take place on the so-called “Friday of Challenge.” Throughout the month, the army takes control of cities like Banijas, Homs, Daraa, Deir al-Zur, Rastan and Talbiseh to quell the daily demonstrations.
- On 9 May the EU approves its first sanctions against Syria that include an arms embargo, a foreign assets freeze and a travel ban for 13 senior officials.

Jordan

- On 26 May the Justice and Health Ministers resign because of their involvement, together with the Interior Minister, in Khalid Shaheen’s escape to London in February. The magnate was to serve three years in prison after being found guilty of corruption and bribery.
- On 27 May demonstrations are staged in the cities of Maan and Tafileh demanding reforms in the political system, economic improvements and the end of corruption.

Egypt

- On 5 May the Giza Criminal Court sentences the former Interior Minister Habib el-Adly to 12 years’ imprisonment for money laundering, abuse of power and misappropriation of funds.
- On 10 May the former Tourism Minister Zuheir Garranah is sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for corruption.
- On 13 May thousands of Egyptians gather in Tahrir Square calling for national unity after clashes between Muslims and Coptic Christians on 7 May, which left 12 dead, 230 injured and 190 arrested. The protesters also demand that democratic reforms continue. On 15 May at least 50 people are injured in fresh clashes between Muslims and Copts.
- On 27 May crowds gather in Tahrir Square for the “second Friday of Rage,” demanding that the trials of the old regime’s leaders be accelerated, the end of corruption, the postponement of the elections scheduled for September and the formation of a civilian presidential council to replace the current military junta.

Libya

- On 1 May the Gaddafi troops’ siege on Misrata is stepped up with new attacks aimed at disabling the city’s port.
- On 5 May the Libya Contact Group meet in Rome to approve a “Temporary Financial Mechanism” to provide the NTC with financial support.
• On 8 May the rebels, with NATO support, manage to break the weeks-long pro-Gaddafi forces’ siege of Misrata.
• On 17 May representatives of 25 local councils meet in Benghazi to reiterate their support for the NTC.
• On 24 May NATO launches its biggest offensive on Tripoli, reaching the presidential complex of Bab al-Alizia.

Tunisia

• On 4 May the Sousse Court charges the deposed President Ben Ali, his wife and nephew Kais Ben Ali with plotting against internal security and several deaths during the revolution.
• On 6-7 May police quell demonstrations in the capital calling for the resignation of the interim government.
• On 19 May representatives of all the political parties demonstrate in the capital to defend stability and national unity and condemn the first AQIM attack after the fall of Ben Ali, which took place the previous day in the border town of Rouhia and left two soldiers and two terrorists dead.
• On 22 May the President of the Independent Electoral Commission Kamel Jendoubi announces that the elections scheduled for 24 July have been postponed until the 16 October.

Algeria

• On 2 May Abdelaziz Bouteflika asks the Speaker of the Senate Abdelkader Bensalah to form a committee to carry out the constitutional reforms announced in April.
• On 6 May a bomb in el-Kennar, Jijel, kills five soldiers of the People’s National Army (ANP). On the same day, the journalist Rabah Nezzar is killed in a terrorist ambush in Boumerdes. On 8 May a terrorist protected by the 2005 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation is found dead in Dellys. On 13 May seven soldiers and three terrorists are killed in an attack on a barracks in Tizrarane, Jijel.
• On 17 May port workers go on strike demanding salary and contractual improvements.
• On 20 May Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger agree in Bamako on the creation of a joint security force of 75,000 soldiers under the mandate of the Joint Military Staff Committee of the Sahel Region (CEMOC), to step up the fight against AQIM and illegal trafficking.
• On 22 May in Tizi Ouzou a general strike is called to protest against the kidnapping of a young man in Beni Douala on 12 May, which takes the AQIM’s civilian kidnappings to 63 since 2001.
• On 30 May rail workers go on strike bringing Algiers to a standstill and demanding pay and contractual improvements.

Morocco

• On 1 May 10,000 people participate in a march in Rabat calling for greater political and economic reforms.
• On 8 May over 5,000 people gather in Marrakech called by the February 20 Movement to demand a democratic constitution, the dissolution of the current Parliament and the release of political prisoners, as well as to condemn the attack on the Jemaa el-Fna Square.
• On 15 May Fouad Ali Himma, the founder of the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) announces that he will step down from his positions in the party, one of the demands of the February 20 Movement.
• On 22 May the police disperse two large gatherings in Rabat and Casablanca which have not been authorised by the Interior Minister, against corruption and in favour of greater democratic reforms.
• On 29 May new demonstrations called by the February 20 Movement are dispersed in Casablanca and Sale.

Mauritania

• On 6 May the University of Nouakchott has to interrupt its activity after violent ethnic clashes between Arabic and French speakers, in a repeat of events that took place between 23 April and 2 May.
• On 8 May secondary school teachers begin a three-day strike to demand health cover, salary increases and access to housing. On 22 May teachers go on strike again over the Education Ministry’s failure to act.
• On 17 May public health workers end the strike that had been ongoing since the beginning of April after reaching an agreement with the Health Ministry.

European Union

• On 4 May the European Commission proposes modifying the Schengen Treaty as a temporary and extraordinary measure in order to allow greater freedom to control the Union’s internal borders should this be needed. On 11 May Denmark announces that it will permanently reintroduce customs inspections at its borders. On 13 May the European Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom threatens Denmark with sanctions for infringining the Schengen Treaty.

Arab League

• On 15 May the Arab League unaniomously elects the Egyptian Foreign Minister Nabyl el-Arabi as its new Secretary General.

June 2011

Portugal holds early elections which are won by the PSD. The French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde is appointed managing director of the IMF. New deficit reduction measures are approved in Spain and Italy, where the PDL government also lose the national referendum on the “legitimate impediment” law, the return of nuclear energy and the public water supply. Croatia finalises the EU accession negotiations. In the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia the coalition government VMRO-DPMNE confirms its victory in the parliamentary elections. The climate of strikes and demonstrations continues uninterrupted in Greece, where a request for a second bailout is already being outlined. In Turkey, the Justice and Development Party (AKP, conservative liberal) wins the parliamentary elections with an absolute majority. In Syria, army operations in Idlib force a mass exodus towards Turkey. In Libya, diplomatic talks are stepped up to achieve a resolution for the conflict. In Egypt, new protests take place in Tahrir Square.

Portugal

• On 5 June the PSD wins the early parliamentary elections with 38% of the votes and 105 MPs. Pedro Passos
Coelho succeeds the socialist Jose Socrates as Prime Minister, who announces his departure from the PS.

Spain

- On 9 June protests take place organised by the 15-M Movement and clashes break out in front of the national Parliament in Madrid and the regional parliaments in Valencia and Barcelona. On 19 June thousands demonstrate in the major cities against the political system.
- On 27 June the pension reform is approved which increases the retirement age and the number of years of contribution.

France

- On 14 June the National Assembly rejects a law proposal from the socialist opposition to approve gay marriage.
- On 20 June the former State Secretary of Public Affairs Georges Tron is arrested for questioning over the accusations of rape that led to his resignation in May.
- On 28 June the Finance Minister Christine Lagarde is appointed the new managing director of the International Monetary Fund.

Monaco

- On 16 June Monaco launches the Strategic Council for Investment Attractiveness, which is added to a further two new entities created in 2011 to increase the competitiveness of the principality, the Monaco Business Office and the Monaco Institute of Statistics.

Italy

- On 8 June police arrest 142 people suspected of belonging to the Ndrangheta in Turin, Milan, Modena and Reggio Calabria.
- On 12-13 June Italy votes in a referendum on four key issues: the public votes to revoke the “Legitimate Impediment” Law, against the return of nuclear energy, against privatisation of the water supply and the possibility that private water companies can add 7% of invested capital onto the bills.
- On 15 June the Facecendiere (intermediate) Luigi Bisignani is placed under house arrest accused of leading an illegal corruption network known as P4, whose ramifications reach the highest levels of power.
- On 21 June the government wins a motion of confidence proposed in Parliament in its economic stimulus measures.
- On 30 June a new crisis caused by the accumulation of rubbish in Naples and its subsequent protests forces the government to approve a decree that allows the refuse to be moved to other regions.
- On 30 June the Council of Ministers approves a new public spending austerity package that will mean cuts of 2 billion euros in 2011 and 5 billion in 2012.
- On 30 June the Coast Guard reports that 1,164 immigrants fleeing from Libya have arrived in Lampedusa in the last two days.

Slovenia

- On 5 June in a referendum 70% of the voters reject the government’s plans to increase the retirement age from 60 to 65.
- On 27 June the second largest party of Borut Pahor’s coalition government, the Zares Party (centre-left), abandons the cabinet over its disagreement with the austerity measures proposed by the SD.

Croatia

- On 24 June the European Council approves the closure of negotiations with Croatia making its accession possible for 2013.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 30 June the lack of support from Bosnian Serb MPs prevents Slavo Kukic from being appointed as Chairman of the Council of Ministers as was recommended by the collegial presidency on 14 June.

Serbia

- On 3 June the trial begins in The Hague of Ratko Mladic, for the Srebrenica massacre.

FYROM

- On 5 June the early parliamentary elections end with victory for the VMRO-DPMNE, despite the governing coalition losing the absolute majority, with 56 seats down from 63, while the SDSM increases its representation from 18 to 43 seats.
- On 20 June thousands of people demonstrate in Skopje against police brutality, in one of many acts of protest since the death of the young Martin Neskovski in a protest during the 5 June elections.

Greece

- On 5 June nearly 50,000 people demonstrate in Athens against the government’s austerity programme. The protests come a day before the approval of deficit reduction measures, which include new privatisations and tax increases, laws for cheaper dismissals and salary reductions.
- On 15 June Greece’s third general strike of the year brings the country to a halt and sparks clashes and mass demonstrations in Athens. Added to the protests is the movement of the Greek “indignants” which have been camped in Syntagma Square for 21 days.
- On 17 June George Papandreou announces a cabinet reshuffle. The Defence Minister Evangelos Venizelos moves to Finance Minister replacing Giorgos Papakonstantinou, who in turn moves to occupy the position of Environment and Energy Minister.
- On 22 June George Papandreou wins a confidence vote to implement the austerity measures package which would allow the country to access a new part of the bailout. In Syntagma Square, 10,000 people demonstrate against the government.
- On 28-29 June the fourth general strike paralyses transport, hospitals, banks and the Public Administration.
- On 30 June clashes continue between demonstrators and the police in Syntagma Square. On the same day Parliament ratifies the bill allowing the government’s austerity measures to be applied as of 1 July, with 155 votes in favour, 136 against and five abstentions.

Turkey

- On 12 June Turkey holds parliamentary elections in which the AKP obtain an absolute majority with 49.9% of the
votes. In second place the Republican People’s Party (CHP, Kemalist) obtain 25.9%.

- On 14 June three PKK terrorists are killed in clashes with the army in Imrali, a day before the end of the deadline set by the PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan for Ankara to begin talks with the group.
- On 26 June clashes are reported in Istanbul between the police and demonstrators protesting against the Election Board’s decision to remove the seat of the imprisoned MP Hatip Dicle, accused of spreading terrorist propaganda. Two CHP MPs and another from the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP, Turkish nationalist), are also removed from their positions. On 29 June the CHP and the BDP boycott the parliament’s opening session.

Cyprus

- On 22 June Andreas Moleskis, who is going to be in charge of Cypriot EU Presidency in 2012, resigns over his alleged involvement in a corruption scandal.

Syria

- On 6 June the Prime Minister Adel Safar orders the creation of a committee to draft a new law proposal authorising the formation of new parties.
- On 6 June 120 demonstrators are killed in clashes with police in Jisr al-Shughour. On 20 June the number of people fleeing from the province of Idlib to Turkey to protect themselves from the army stands at 10,000.
- On 20 June Bashar al-Assad assures that the revolution is fruit of a “foreign conspiracy,” and once again offers a range of democratising measures. In response, thousands of Syrians take to the streets demanding his resignation, while the violent repression continues throughout the month.
- On 22 June the EU widens its sanctions against Syria.

Lebanon

- On 13 June the formation of the new government of the Prime Minister Najib Mikati is announced after five months of political disputes since Mikati was appointed in January with Hezbollah’s backing. Key members of the 30-strong government include: Mohammed Safadi who returns as Finance Minister, Fayez Ghusn as Defence Minister and Marwan Charbel as Interior Minister.
- On 30 June an STL delegation in Beirut delivered the indictment to the Lebanese State Prosecutor against four senior members of Hezbollah for the assassination of the President Rafiq Hariri.

Jordan

- On 7 June the Opposition Parties Higher Coordination Committee rejects the proposal of a new electoral law, deeming it insufficient. The bill, submitted by the National Dialogue Committee, includes a single-member constituency system in which each voter votes for their province, increases the number of seats, at national level, from 120 to 130 and stipulates the formation of an independent commission to oversee the electoral processes.
- On 27 June the Parliament votes against trying the Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit and 17 ministers of his first cabinet – with the exception of the former Tourism Minister Osama Dabas – for abuse of power and corruption after authorising the construction of a casino in 2007. The project was brought to a halt when it was discovered that the contract violated legislation. The cancellation of the contract led to state losses of some 2 billion dollars. This decision prompts several MPs to resign.

Egypt

- On 12 June the Salafist party Al-Nour (“the light”) is legalised.
- On 14 June 13 political forces, among them the Muslim Brotherhood and the platform of Mohamed ElBaradei, create an alliance to present a unified candidate for the September elections with a view to creating a national unity government.
- On 15 June the Military Junta lifts the curfew, which has been in effect since January.
- On 25 June the former Trade and Industry Minister Rachid Mohamed Rachid is sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for embezzlement and misappropriation of funds.
- On 28-29 June there is further unrest in Tahrir Square when the army disperses crowds calling for those responsible for the deaths during the Revolution to be tried more quickly and demanding the transference of power from the Military Junta.

Libya

- On 7 June the Labour Minister Al-Amin Manfour confirms in Geneva that he is defecting from the regime.
- On 9 June Abu Dhabi hosts the third meeting of the Libya Contact Group, which discusses the concession of funds and humanitarian aid to the NTC and a transition plan for after the Gaddafi regime. Meanwhile, fighting continues throughout the month between the Libyan regime and the NATO-supported rebels.
- On 12-13 June the United Arab Emirates and Germany recognise the NTC as a legitimate representative of the Libyan people, thereby joining France, Qatar, the United Kingdom, Italy, Gambia, Malta, Jordan, Senegal, Spain, Australia and the US.
- On 27 June the International Penal Court orders the arrest of Muammar el-Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam and his brother-in-law and military intelligence chief Abdullah el-Senussi, for crimes against humanity.

Tunisia

- On 4 June five people are killed in fresh clashes in Metlaoui during protests by employees of the phosphate company Gafsa, which began in March over the company’s recruitment policy.
- On 8 June the 23 October is announced as the official date for the constituent assembly elections.
- On 20 June Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Leila Trabelsi are sentenced in absentia to 35 years’ imprisonment for the embezzlement of public funds and the illegal possession of jewels and money.
- On 26 June the government announces its decision not to allow members of the dissolved RCD to run or vote in the upcoming elections.
- On 27 June the President of the Islamist movement Ennahda (“Renaissance”), Rachid Ghannouchi, confirms his party’s withdrawal from the commit-
Algeria

- On 3-4 June security forces arrest four members of the el-Ansar Brigades, with links to AQIM, in Boumerdes.
- On 4 June four police officers are killed when a bomb explodes on the road between Naciria and Bordj Menaiel.
- On 7 June clashes break out in Ouargla between police and the local population during a youth protest against the high levels of unemployment.
- On 21 June two AQIM terrorists are killed and another two are captured during an army operation in Iliiz.
- On 25 June two soldiers are killed when a device of the AQIM explodes in Beni Zid.

Morocco

- On 17 June Mohammed VI presents the constitutional reform proposal that: reduces the King’s powers giving greater authority to the government and the Parliament; guarantees freedom of religious belief; and makes Berber an official language.

Mauritania

- On 6 and 15 June employees of the state-run media in Nouakchott demand the payment of delayed pay rises, approved in 2009.

European Union

- On 8 June the European Commission presents a proposal of 210 million euros in compensation for European farmers’ losses in the so-called “cucumber crisis,” which began when the authorities of Hamburg wrongly claimed that imports of cucumbers and other agricultural products were the source of an outbreak of E. coli-0104 bacteria, which caused 25 deaths in May.
- On 23-24 June the European Council gives the green light to Croatia’s EU accession, approves the revision of the European Neighbourhood Policy, appoints Mario Draghi as President of the ECB as of 1 November 2011, approves the guidelines for a European immigration policy and the adaptation of the Schengen Space in exceptional circumstances, and agrees to draft a second rescue package for Greece.
- On 27 June Iceland begins accession negotiations.

July 2011

In Spain there is a major cabinet reshuffle the same month that early elections are called. The Italian Parliament approves an ambitious package of measures to reduce public spending by 7.9 billion euros. In Croatia, the former President Ivo Sanader is sent to prison on charges of corruption. Serbia overcomes one of its last obstacles to EU accession negotiations with the arrest of Goran Hadzic, the last fugitive from the Bosnia War wanted by the ICTY. The other major stumbling block, the resolution of the Kosovo issue, suffers a major setback over the border crisis in Bmjak and Janina. Greece receives the fifth tranche of its rescue package. In Cyprus, the explosion of an arsenal in the Evangelos Florakis Naval Base prompts protests and government resignations. Tunisia decrees curfews in Gafsas and Sidi Bouzid due to the instability there. In Egypt, protests continue to gather in Tahrir Square. In Libya, the NTC rebels slowly consolidate their advance towards Tripoli supported by NATO. In Syria, fierce repression of the Baath Party and the mass arrests continue but without abating the protests. In Jordan, the protests are stepped up over Abdullah II’s failure to carry out the announced reforms, while in Morocco the constitutional reform proposal is approved in a national referendum.

Portugal

- On 24 July the PS elects Antonio Jose Seguro as its new Secretary General to succeed Jose Socrates.

Spain

- On 8 July the first vice-President, Interior Minister and government spokesperson Alfredo Perez Rubalcaba, announces his departure from the government a day before being announced as a candidate in the presidential elections. On 11 July a reshuffle of the main positions in the cabinet is announced.

- On 20 July Francisco Camps resigns as President of the Valencian Community to stand trial in the Gürtel corruption case.
- On 24 July a new demonstration by the “indignants” is organised in Madrid demanding changes in the country’s political and economic situation.

France

- On 12 July on a visit to Afghanistan, Nicolas Sarkozy announces that France will withdraw a quarter of its troops by the end of 2012.
- On 13 July the deadline is up for presenting candidates for the socialist party’s primary elections to vote for the candidate for the 2012 presidential elections. The six candidates are Martine Aubry, François Hollande, Segolene Royal, Arnaud Montebourg, Manuel Valls and Jean-Michel Baylet.

Monaco

- On 2 July Alberto II is married to the South African Charlene Wittstock.
- On 7 July Monaco approves a reform of the Real Estate Property Law, with tax cuts of 7.5 to 4.5%.

Italy

- On 1 July Gaetano Riina, the brother of Toto Riina, is arrested in Sicily, suspected of being the new head of the Corleone clan.
- On 14 July 45 members of the Aquino-Coluccio clan from the ‘Ndrangheta are arrested in Italy, Spain and the Netherlands.
- On 15 July the Parliament approves the austerity package presented by the government that foresees a 7.9-billion reduction in public spending over the next three years.
- On 20 July the Parliament approves the request of the Neapolitan State Prosecutor to arrest PDL MP Alfonso Papa, in connection with the P4 corruption scandal.

Malta

- On 25 July the Parliament approves the law that legalises divorce.


Croatia

- On 18 July Croatia, Serbia and Bosnia hold their first three-way summit to strengthen cooperation within the European accession process.
- On 18 July the former President Ivo Sanader is sent to Remetince prison after being extradited from Austria, where he had been under arrest since December 2010 pending his trial for corruption.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 5 July the ICC Appeals chamber rules that the Netherlands is responsible for the death in 1995 of three Bosnians in Srebrenica, while the town was under the protection of Dutch UN troops.

Montenegro

- On 12 July the results are published of the Montenegrin census. The Serbian community rejects them, believing them to be manipulated.
- On 18 July Svetozar Marovic, the vice-President of the governing DPS, submits his resignation on discovering that the National Security Agency was monitoring his family’s movements because of his brother’s involvement in the “Zavala” property development scandal.

Serbia

- On 5 July Serbia and Albania sign visa liberalisation agreements.
- On 6 July Boris Tadic makes his first visit to Bosnia, which is decisive in the normalisation of bilateral relations.
- On 10 July the OSCE adopts the resolution presented by Serbia requesting the opening of an international investigation into the trafficking of organs during the conflict in Kosovo.
- On 20 July Serbia arrests the former Croatian Serb general Goran Hadzic, who was extradited to The Hague on 22 July.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 2 July after five months of negotiations, Serbia and Kosovo sign an agreement that allows border crossings with identity documents and Kosovo number plates and the issue of property deeds and academic qualifications recognised by both parties.
- On 20 July Kosovo announces the prohibition of all Serbian imports and the introduction of a 10% tax on Bosnian imports in response to Belgrade and Sarajevo’s block on Kosovo exports. On 26 July Kosovo security forces intervene to take back control of the Jarihje and Brnjak border posts, taken by Kosovo Serbs demonstrators to allow the entry of Serbian goods. On 27 July the situation requires the involvement of the KFOR.

FYROM

- On 19 July the Parliament approves the official closure of four war crimes cases during the 2001 conflict that were handed over to the ICTY.
- On 26 July the Court of Skopje pronounces the television channel A1-TV bankrupt.

Albania

- On 8 July after two months of disputes, the Central Election Commission confirms Lulzim Basha as the new Mayor of Tirana after rejecting the fifth and last appeal by the PS.
- On 19 July Sali Berisha announces a cabinet reshuffle.

Greece

- On 8 July the IMF concludes the fourth audit of Greece’s economic results, which prompts the release of 3.2 billion euros, in what constitutes the fifth tranche of the first rescue package of the Greek economy.

Turkey

- On 6 July Recep Tayyip Erdogan announces the composition of the new government, which includes 26 ministries, nine more than the previous one.
- On 11 July after almost two weeks of boycott, the CHP MPs are sworn into their seats after reaching an agreement with the governing AKP on the arrests of elected CHP members.
- On 14 July 13 soldiers are killed in a PKK ambush in Diyarbakir.
- On 30 July military chiefs resign over a dispute caused by the government’s refusal to promote any officer allegedly involved in plotting a coup.

Cyprus

- On 7 July the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon meets in Geneva with the President of Cyprus and the leader of Northern Cyprus to reactivate negotiations after “the three worst months” since it began in September 2008.
- On 11 July a fire sets light to a shipment of gunpowder confiscated in February 2009 from the ship Monchegorsk, suspected of supplying arms and other material to Syria from Iran, causing an explosion in the Evangelos Florakis Naval Base that kills 13 people and damages the country’s main power station.
- On 12 July the Defence Minister Costas Papacostas and the general Petros Tsaklikides resign and 10,000 people demonstrate in Nicosia calling for the government’s resignation. On 18 June the Foreign Minister Markos Kyprianou resigns. On 28 July Demetris Christofias forces the government’s resignation.

Syria

- On 4 July the army enters Hama.
- On 10 July the government opens national dialogue in Damascus. The main opposition groups boycott the talks because of the ongoing violent repression.
- On 15 July the “Prisoner of Freedom” Friday in Damascus becomes the largest protest against the regime since the start of the revolution.
- On 25-26 July the government adopts two new laws regarding the electoral system and the formation of political parties in an attempt to pacify the protests, which continue on a daily basis and which by the end of July have left 1,600 dead.

Lebanon

- On 14 July seven Estonian tourists kidnapped in March in Zahle, the Valley of Bekaa, for the Movement for Renewal and Reform, are handed over to the French embassy in Beirut.
- On 26 July six French peacekeepers from the United Nations Interim Force
in Lebanon (UNIFIL) are injured in an attack in Sidon.

**Jordan**

- On 2 July, a day after the “Friday of Shame” protests, Abdullah II approves a cabinet reshuffle that affects the main ministries. Despite the changes, the demonstrations continue, such as that on 15 July which ended with violent clashes.

**Egypt**

- On 8 July a large-scale “Friday of Determination” takes place in Tahrir Square urging the Military Junta to accelerate the reforms demanded by the revolution and to put an end to the military trials against civilians. The protests continue throughout the month despite the successive resignations of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Foreign Affairs and Industry and Finance Ministers.
- On 12 July the Penal Court of Cairo sentences the former Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif to one year in prison for embezzlement of public funds. On the same charges, the former Interior Minister Habib el-Adly and Finance Minister Youssef Boutros-Ghali are sentenced to five and ten years respectively.
- On 20 July the High Council of the Armed Forces announces the approval of a new electoral law, which is opposed by most parties.
- On 21 July the 18 members of the new government take up their positions. On 23-24 July violent protests erupt in Cairo against the new government.

**Libya**

- On 7 July the rebels take control of all the mountainous western area and come within 50 kilometres of Tripoli.
- On 15 July Istanbul hosts the fourth meeting of the Libya Contact Group, which decides to step up the military pressure on the regime and transfer control of political negotiations to the UN Special Envoy to Libya Abdelilah al-Khatib. The countries in the meeting declare the NTC as the legitimate government of Libya.
- On 18 July the Libyan rebels claim to have broken Gaddafi’s defensive lines in Brega, which has been under the regime’s control since March.
- On 28 July the Chairman of the NTC Mustafa Abdul Jalil announces that the commander in chief leader of the rebel forces Abdul Fatah Younis has been assassinated.

**Tunisia**

- On 4 July Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali is sentenced in absentia for the second time to another 15 years in prison for possession of arms, narcotics and archaeological artefacts. On 28 July he is sentenced for a third time to a further 16 years’ imprisonment for two cases of property fraud.
- On 11 July the former Justice Minister Bechir Tekkari is charged with corruption and abuse of power.
- On 13 July the government enforces an indefinite curfew on Gafsa.
- On 16 July security forces stop a demonstration in Tunisia demanding the resignation of the Justice and Interior Ministers and the re-establishment of the High Commission for the Realisation of Revolution Objectives.
- On 18 July a curfew is decreed in Sidi Bouzid to put an end to the antigovernment protests.

**Algeria**

- On 6 July temporary teachers demonstrate in Algiers demanding more permanent posts in public education.
- On 11 July the workers of Air Algérie go on strike demanding pay rises, the second in a month. On 17 July, facing huge losses, the company initiates talks with trade unions.
- On 12 July Tunisia and Algeria sign an important agreement that establishes their sea border.
- On 16 July two AQIM terrorists are killed in two suicide attacks on a police station in Bordj Menaiel, in which two other people are killed. On 18 July seven AQIM terrorists are killed in an army operation in Tisdrine.

**Morocco**

- On 1 July Morocco holds a national referendum on the proposal for a new constitution that supports the political reforms announced by Mohammed VI. The “yes” vote wins with 98.5% of the votes, in a referendum with a notably high turnout at 72%. Throughout the month, demonstrations called by the February 20 Movement or the Justice and Charity movement continue to condemn the result of the referendum and its irregularities.

**Mauritania**

- On 1 July a demonstration called by the February 25 Movement takes place in Nouakchott, in protest against the national census, which is considered as discriminatory against the black population.
- On 4 July 15 AQIM terrorists are killed in an attack on an army garrison in Bassiknou.

**European Union**

- On 1 July Poland assumes the six-month rotating EU presidency. The challenges it faces include: tightening fiscal discipline to stabilise the eurozone and accelerate the economic recovery; strengthening the common market; building relations with the EU’s Eastern neighbours; advancing in EU enlargement towards the Balkans; and improving European immigration policy.
- On 1 July Denmark becomes the first state of the Schengen Space to reintroduce permanent border controls.
- On 11 July the Finance Ministers of the eurozone agree to increase the flexibility of the European Financial Stabilisation Facility. On 21 July the Heads of State and government of the eurozone agree on the second rescue package for Greece, with the participation of the IMF.

**Arab League**

- On 14 July the Arab League approves the PNA’s plans to request full membership before the United Nations.

**August 2011**

Portugal, Spain, France and Italy approve new measures in August to tackle the crisis. In Kosovo the situation worsens in the Serbian majority north. The former Kosovo Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj appears again before the ICTY. In Turkey the attacks of the PKK terrorist organisation intensify. In Egypt the trial against Hosni Mubarak and his sons,
Appendices

Alaa and Gamal begins. In Tunisia, demonstrations take place calling for the resignation of the government, accused of sluggishness and indecisiveness in the trials against the former regime and in the protection of the goals of the Revolution. In Libya, after a final month of fighting, NTC troops enter Tripoli. In Syria, the decrees aimed at legalising political parties and holding free elections seem to have come too late to counteract the revolution that is spreading throughout the country.

Portugal

- On 2 August Portugal re-privatises the BPN with its sale to the International Credit Bank, after stabilising the entity’s accounts with 2.4 billion euros – 1.4% of GDP.
- On 12 August Portugal’s 6 to 23% VAT increase on electricity and gas forecast for 2012 is brought forward to October. The move aims to collect an additional 100 million euros, which will help to reduce the deficit to the projected 5.9% by the end of 2011. The measure coincides with the end of the European Commission, IMF and ECB’s review mission, which concludes with the release of the second tranche of the Portuguese rescue package of 11.5 billion euros.

Spain

- On 19 August the government announces a decrease in VAT on the purchase of new housing and additional austerity measures that seek to save 5 billion euros.

France

- On 4 August the Court of Justice of the Republic orders an investigation into the current IMF director and former French Finance Minister Christine Lagarde over alleged abuse of authority and misuse of public funds in the arbitration of the Tapie case against Crédit Lyonnais in 2007.
- On 23 August the Agriculture Minister Bruno Le Maire pledges millions in aid to help deal with the serious crisis that is affecting the agricultural sector.
- On 24 August the government approves the creation of a temporary 3% tax on annual incomes above 500,000 euros, which will be removed when France reduces its deficit to 3% of the GDP in 2013.

Italy

- On 3 August a draft law is approved in a parliamentary committee that punishes anyone wearing face-covering items in public spaces.
- On 3 August a boat from Libya with 300 people aboard is taken to Lampedusa by the Coast Guard. According to Interior Ministry sources, the boat had asked for help from a nearby NATO ship but received no response.
- On 12 August the government approves a new austerity package of 45.5 billion euros aimed at balancing the budget by 2013. This is added to the first package, which came to a total of 79 billion euros. It includes a reduction of 54,000 local government jobs, territorial reorganisation, privatising certain public services, a tax increase on high earners and anti-fraud measures.

Malta

- On 3 August the priests Charles Pullis and Godwin Scerri are sentenced to five and six years’ imprisonment for sexually abusing eleven minors from an orphanage in the 1980s. The ruling prompts the Archbishop of Malta to apologise to the victims.
- On 16 August a group of illegal immigrants clash with the police leaving 19 injured in a detention centre.

Slovenia

- On 10 August the Prime Minister Borut Pahor accepts the resignation of the Interior Minister and President of the Liberal-Democrats (LDS) Katarina Kresal, after the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption announces that it suspects Kresal of illegally leasing a building to house the National Bureau of Investigation.

Croatia

- On 5 August the commemorative acts for Operation Storm, which led in 1995 to the extradition of some 250,000 Serbs, ignite tensions between Zagreb and Belgrade.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 8 August Bosnian farmers go on protest blocking the country’s major roads to demand more help from the government.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 2 August NATO announces that it is sending troops to help the KFOR deal with the escalation of violence in Kosovska Mitrovica over the Serbian border controls.
- On 10 August Sabit Geci, former commander of the KLA, is sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment by the Court of Mitrovica for war crimes against Kosovo Albanians accused of collaborating with Serbia during the Kosovo conflict.

FYROM

- On 5 August, at the request of the Democratic Union for Integration (DUI, Albanian nationalist) and in virtue of the Ohrid Agreement’s Amnesty Law, a parliamentary majority votes in favour of not taking legal action against four members of the National Liberation Army, involved in war crimes during the 2001 conflict.

Albania

- On 22 August the Albanian Chrome mine and its workers reach an agreement that puts an end to the near month-long strike demanding better working conditions.

Greece

- On 16 August Finland announces an agreement with Greece by which Athens will offer collateral, which, together with its interests, covers Finland’s part of the Greek economy’s second rescue package. Austria, the Netherlands and Slovakia, announce that they will ask for a similar agreement.
- On 29 August Eurobank and Alpha, the two largest Greek banks, announce that they are merging, with the participation of the Qatari fund Paramount.

Turkey

- On 11 August the PKK terrorist organisation blows up a section of the gas
pipeline that connects Turkey with Iran in Agri. The attack follows a similar act of sabotage committed on 3 August.
- On 17 August 12 soldiers are killed in four PKK attacks in Cucurka. The Turkish air force responds by bombing PKK positions in northern Iraq. On 29 August 13 days of bombing sets the death toll at 160.

Cyprus
- On 5 August Demetris Christofias forms a new government in response to the ongoing protests over the explosion at the Evangelos Florakis Naval Base in July.
- On 10 August the Finance Minister Kikis Kazamias announces a second deficit reduction package aimed at saving 800 million euros, which is approved by Parliament on 26 August. The first package, announced on 22 July, already outlined major spending cuts and the privatisation of the Cypriot stock exchange.

Syria
- On 2 August the EU imposes new sanction on key figures of the Syrian regime. On 3 August the United Nations Security Council approves a non-binding declaration that condemns the violation of human rights in Syria and demands an immediate end to be put to the violence.
- On 4 August Bashar al-Assad approves two legislative decrees on Party Law and on the General Elections Law, to “open the way to a multi-party system.” The legalisation of religious, regional or tribal parties is excluded. Both Western governments and the opposition reject the measure as long as there is no end to the violence which continues throughout the country.
- On 5 August a large-scale “Solidarity with Hama Friday,” which takes place in different cities, condemns the over 200 recent deaths in Hama.
- On 18 August the US approves new sanctions which freeze financial assets and prohibit the import of Syrian crude oil.
- On 22 August during a visit of the UN evaluation mission to Homs, Syrian security forces kill three demonstrators, breaking the promise made four days before to put an end to the violence. On 23 August the Human Rights Council agrees on to dispatch an independent commission of inquiry.
- On 31 August the attorney general of Hama Adnan Bakkour resigns in protest against the repression of the regime. At the end of August the number of people killed in the protests that began in March has risen to 2,200.

Lebanon
- On 17 August the STL lifts the gagging order on the accusation against four members of Hezbollah, for the assassination in 2005 of the President Rafiq Hariri.
- On 30 August the United Nations Security Council unanimously approves the one-year extension of the UNIFIL mandate.

Jordan
- On 10 August the Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit and 13 members of his cabinet between 2005 and 2007, are cleared of all charges related to a controversial Casino deal by the Parliament’s anti-corruption Committee.

Egypt
- On 3 August the trial begins against Hosni Mubarak charged with corruption, fraud, abuse of power and murder. Mubarak, who risks being sentenced to death, denies all charges.
- On 5 August the Egyptian Trade Union Federation, one of the central pillars of the Mubarak regime, is dismantled.

Libya
- On 1 August with NATO support, the rebels take control of Zintan.
- On 10 August the EU approves a fifth package of sanctions measures against the Libyan regime.
- On 20 August the rebels arrive at the outskirts of Tripoli. Gaddafi sends a recorded message urging his followers to resist. The NTC says it has taken control of the oil facilities in Brega and Zawiya.
- On 21 August the rebels enter Tripoli in the so-called “final offensive,” supported by NATO. At the last minute, members of Gaddafi’s personal guard and various high ranking military offices give themselves in.
- On 25 August the United Nations Security Council unblocks 1 billion euros of Gaddafi’s foreign assets, for the reconstruction of the State.

Tunisia
- On 12 August a Tunisian court convicts 25 family members of Ben Ali, sentencing them to between 4 months and 6 years’ imprisonment for crimes of forgery, aiding the deposed President to escape, illegal possession of currency and possessing and dealing in narcotics.
- On 15 August the police use force to quell a demonstration in Tunisia demanding that the revolutionary objectives be fulfilled and the resignation of the current government, following the release of the former Justice and Transport Ministers Bechir Tekkari and Abderrahim Zouari and the flight of Saida Agrebi, Leila Trabelsi’s right arm, to Paris.

Algeria
- On 8 August the Algerian press reports four suicide attempts in 48 hours in protest against the economic instability.
- On 26 August 16 people are killed in a suicide attack on the Cherchell Military Academy. The incident is added to two other similar terrorist attacks in Cabilia, on 23 and 24, in which five people are killed.
- On 28 August the Council of Ministers approves a new law that establishes a minimum quota of a third for female candidates in the electoral lists.

Morocco
- On 9 August in Casablanca Hamid Kanuni dies from burns received in an attempted self-immolation in a police station in Berkane two days previous, in protest against the confiscation of his market stall.
- On 16 August the Interior Minister Taieb Cherkouki announces that the legislative elections scheduled for September are delayed until 25 November 2011.

Mauritania
- On 24 August the Council of Ministers announces its decision to postpone
the legislative and local elections scheduled for 16 October, until 24 March 2012, following the pact reached between different political forces, in order to stabilise the country and its tribal organisation system and consolidate democratising reforms before calling new elections.

**European Union**

- On 15 August Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel announce the French-German proposal to create “a true European economic government” that “restores financial market confidence.”
- On 11 August the European Commission announces infringement proceedings against ten states that have still not introduced the 2004 European Directive on the free movement of persons.

**Arab League**

- On 28 August the Arab League Member States agree to send its Secretary General Nabil el-Arabi to Damascus to negotiate an immediate resolution to the violence.

**September 2011**

The IMF releases its second tranche of the Portuguese bailout package. Spain approves a constitutional reform to put a cap on public debt. In France, the Socialist Party obtains an absolute majority in the senatorial elections. The Italian government faces new protests against the deficit reduction measures. The Slovenian government loses a motion of confidence in the Parliament. Border unrest causes Serbia to withdraw from talks with Kosovo. Tensions mount in Greece while the government pushes ahead with austerity measures. Cyprus’s exploitation of energy resources in the Eastern Mediterranean and Turkish pressure to reach an agreement on the reunification of the island before the Cypriot Presidency of the EU in 2012 puts a strain on relations between Ankara, Nicosia, Brussels and Athens. In Syria the repression worsens, despite international pressure. In Egypt, the people continue to put pressure on the Military Junta over its approval of the controversial Election Law and its continued enforcement of the Emergency Law. In Libya, those loyal to Muammar el-Gaddafi resist in Sirte and Bani Walid following the fall of Sabha. In Mauritania, tensions rise as protests take place against the population census.

**Portugal**

- On 13 September the IMF announces the release of 3.9 billion euros. This is the second tranche of its 27.7 billion euro contribution to the rescue package of the Portuguese economy, which, with the EU’s part, totals 78 billion euros over three years.
- On 15 September the government presents public administration reforms that foresee a 27% reduction in high ranking posts.
- On 16 September Portugal announces that Madeira has an unreported 1 billion euro debt, which has been accumulating since 2004, prompting moves to investigate the Portuguese deficit.

**Spain**

- On 2 September the Congress of Deputies approves the constitutional reform that puts a cap on public debt.
- On 16 September the government approves plans to reinstate the wealth tax to collect an additional 1.08 billion euros.
- On 16 September the Supreme Court sentences the Batasuna spokesman Arnaldo Otegi to ten years’ imprisonment for being part of a terrorist group. The former leader of the LAB trade union Rafael Diaz receives the same sentence for attempting to rebuild the banned Batasuna.

**France**

- On 14 September the Paris Appeal Court clears the former Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin in the Clearstream case.
- On 25 September the PS obtains an absolute majority in the senatorial elections for the first time since the proclamation of the 5th Republic in 1958.

**Monaco**

- On 29 September the Monaco Pensioners’ Union demonstrates calling for a 3% increase in pensions.

**Italy**

- On 6 September a general strike protests against the new austerity measures presented in August.
- On 8 September the government announces a constitutional modification to cap public debt.
- On 14 September clashes break out in front of the Chamber of Deputies where spending cuts of 54 billion euros were approved to reduce the deficit. The plan foresees a VAT increase aimed at collecting 4 billion euros a year.
- On 20 September the Lampedusa Centre for Identification and Expulsion of immigrants is destroyed by a fire during protests by a group of immigrants against their repatriation.

**Malta**

- On 21 September Victory Day is commemorated without the participation of the Maltese magistrates, in protest against the scarcity of resources and poor working conditions.

**Slovenia**

- On 5 September the trial begins in Ljubljana of the corruption scandal over the purchase of war tanks from a Finnish company, which had bribed high government officials and the army during the Janez Jansa government.
- On 20 September after months of conflict between the members of the coalition government, Borut Pahor’s cabinet loses a confidence vote in the Parliament.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

- On 1 September Peter Sorensen replaces Valentin Inzko as the EU Special Representative in Bosnia.
- On 5 and 15 September in Mostar and on 26 September in Brcko, the representatives of the main political forces fail to reach an agreement to form a new government, eleven months after the elections.

**Montenegro**

- On 9 September after months of stalemate, the government and the opposition reach an agreement to grant equal status to the Serbian and Monte-
negrin languages in the education system. This agreement prompts the opposition to raise its block on the approval of the electoral law, needed to advance in the European accession process.

Serbia

- On 6 September the ICTY sentences Momcilo Perisic, the former chief of the general staff of the Yugoslav army, to 27 years in jail for crimes against humanity during the Bosnia war.
- On 13 and 15 September the Albanian majority of Presevo, Bujanovac and Medveda, which border with Kosovo, demand greater protection for the Albanian language, the right to work in public institutions and the end of discrimination. Tensions also rise in Sandzak, where the national council makes similar demands for Bosnians.
- On 26 September the Parliament approves the Public Property and Property Restitution laws, the last two required to comply with the conditions for an accession candidate country.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 2 September Serbia and Kosovo reach agreements on customs stamps and cadastral records.
- On 2 September EULEX accuses ten former members of the UCK, among them the former Minister Fatmir Limaj, of war crimes during the 1999 Kosovo conflict.
- On 13 September Kosovo Serb activists block the Mitrovica bridge in protest against Kosovo's imminent move to take control of the border posts with Serbia. On 16 September the Kosovo police and the KFOR take control of the border posts with Serbia. Increased tensions arising from these events prompt Serbia to withdraw from negotiations with Kosovo in Brussels on 28 September.

Albania

- On 5 September the PS returns to Parliament after three months of endless boycotts sparked by the election results for the mayor of Tirana.
- On 9 September the judge Skerdilajd Konomi is assassinated by the Albanian mafia.
- On 23 September the Parliament fails to approve modifications to the penal and civil codes and to rail and sea transport legislation, as the PS demands a review of the laws to be reformed before they are signed, thereby delaying their approval, demanded by Brussels for advances to be made in the accession dossier.
- On 2 September EULEX accuses the former Minister Fatmir Limaj, causing a slump in the European stock exchanges.
- On 10 September Thessaloniki joins the chaos when a demonstration of 20,000 people against the government's austerity measures coincides with other protests.
- On 22 September a new general transport strike brings Greece to a halt in protest over the new austerity measures announced by the government the previous day, which include more pension cuts, the prolongation of wealth tax to 2014 and the transference of 30,000 public workers to labour reserve.
- On 27 September the Parliament approves the controversial wealth tax to collect some 2 billion euros by the end of the year.
- On 27 September tax and customs officials strike against salary reductions.
- On 28 September Athens is brought to a halt by a new transport strike against moves to reduce staff by 10% to counteract the losses caused by the sector in the public purse. The situation is worsened by the taxi strike against the government's plans to open up the industry.

Cyprus

- On 15 September Israel evacuates its embassy in Jordan coinciding with the ban on European companies making new investments in the Syrian oil industry.
- On 23 September the EU approves their approval, demanded by Brussels failing to approve modifications to the pension, property, rail and sea transport legislation, as the PS demands a review of the laws to be reformed before they are signed, thereby delaying their approval, demanded by Brussels for advances to be made in the accession dossier.

Greece

- On 2 September Greece puts talks with the EU and the IMF on hold refusing to adopt the deficit reduction measures, causing a slump in the European stock exchanges.
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Turkey

- On 4 September PKK terrorists open fire in Tunceli on a Turkish police football match, killing two people. On the same day the Turkish air force bombs PKK positions in the Qandil Mountains in Iraq. Further PKK attacks throughout the month leave eight more dead.
- On 12 September Recep Tayyip Erdogan begins a tour of some of the Arab Spring countries in Egypt.
- On 28 September the BDP announces the end of its parliamentary boycott, begun in June.
- On 29 September three teachers are kidnapped in Diyarbakir by PKK terrorists, adding to a further nine kidnapped on 24.

Cyprus

- On 5 September a new demonstration calls for the resignation of the government over its responsibility in the explosion at the Evangelos Florakis Naval Base in July.
- On 8 September the European Commission asks Turkey to change its position against Cypriot plans to exploit hydrocarbon reserves in the Exclusive Economic Zone. On 19 September the US company Noble Energy begins drilling work in Cypriot waters. On 21 September three Turkish warships leave for Cyprus and Turkey and Northern Cyprus sign an agreement to cooperate in the exploitation of energy resources.
- On 27 September teachers go on strike in protests against measures announced by the government to freeze salaries.

Syria

- On 11 September the Golf Cooperation Council (GCC) calls for Syria to immediately end the violence and begin democratic reforms. Clashes continue throughout the month, especially in Homs, Idlib and Hama.
- On 23 September the EU approves the ban on European companies making new investments in the Syrian oil industry.
- On 24 September the army strengthens its presence in Qusayr and on 27 it enters al-Rastan.

Lebanon

- On 5 September the Foreign Minister Adnan Mansour sends a letter to the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon informing him that Lebanon rejects the Israeli proposal for the maritime border between the two states.

Jordan

- On 12 September the GCC proposes aid to Jordan to the value of 2 billion dollars to accelerate its accession process.
- On 15 September Israel evacuates its embassy in Jordan coinciding with the “Million man march” against Israel.
Egypt

- On 5 September the trial resumes against Hosni Mubarak, his two sons, the former Interior Minister and six senior members of the NDP.
- On 9 September the Friday of “correcting the path” in Tahrir Square calls for a clear roadmap for the transition process and the end of military trials against civilians. The Muslim Brotherhood do not participate in the protests.
- On 9 September the Israeli embassy to Cairo is assaulted by demonstrators protesting over the deaths of six Egyptian police officers in Gaza in August. The incident causes the government to consider its resignation, which is not accepted by the Military Junta. On 10 September the Military Junta announces that it will enforce the 1981 Emergency Law again, to avoid clashes like those at the Israeli embassy. On 16 September crowds gather in Tahrir Square to protest against the measure.
- On 26 September the Military Junta approves the Election Law, which allows elections to be scheduled for November.
- On 28 September the former Information Minister Anas el-Fiqqi is sentenced to seven years’ imprisonment for corruption.
- On 29 September Tahrir Square is once again the scene of a mass demonstration against the Military Junta.

Libya

- On 11 September Niger reports the arrest of Saadi Gaddafi.
- On 12 September China recognises the NTC as the governing authority in Libya, joining Russia, which recognised it on 1 September.
- On 16 September the United Nations Security Council approves the 2009 resolution that allows a partial lifting of the arms embargo, the no-fly zone and the freeze on the Gaddafi regime funds. It also hands Libyan representation to the NTC and tasks the UN support mission in Libya (UNSMIL) with restoring public security, consolidating the rule of law and national reconciliation.
- On 22 September the NTC takes control of Sebha, one of the three bastions of the Gaddafi regime, together with Bani Walid and Sirte, which are still resisting rebel sieges.

Morocco

- On 18 and 25 September protest marches are held in different cities called by the February 20 Movement to condemn corruption and the lack of democracy.
- On 23 September three AQIM terrorists are arrested accused of preparing attacks against Western interests in Morocco. The arrests come a day after the trial begins against nine men accused of the attack at Café Argana in Marrakesh.

Mauritania

- On 10 September clashes erupt in Nouakchott against the national census, branded discriminatory against the black population. On 25 September unrest is reported in Kaedi, in Gorgol. On 26 September the government of Gorgol is dismissed. On 27 September demonstrators set fire to the government building in Maghama.

European Union

- On 22 September Finland and the Netherlands veto Romania and Bulgaria’s bid to enter the Schengen Space. The council also rejects the modification proposal of the Schengen Agreement, under which the European Commission would decide if the border controls can be temporarily re-established for security reasons.

Arab League

- On 13 September the Foreign Ministers of the Arab League reiterate calls for Damascus to immediately end the violence in Syria.

October 2011

In Spain the terrorist group ETA announces a definitive end to armed activity. Italy reaches a government agreement on the pension reform demanded by Brussels. Slovenia and Croatia call early elections for December. Border tensions between Serbia and Kosovo continue. Greece approves new deficit reduction measures which open the door to the sixth tranche of the EU and IMF’s rescue package, coinciding with two general strikes. Turkey executes a major operation against the terrorist group PKK on the Iraqi border. The Cypriot government approves a Russian loan to rescue the economy. The Arab League presents a roadmap to end the violence in Syria which is now in its sixth month. In Jordan, the Prime Minister Maraoh al-Bakhit resigns. In Egypt the people continue to put pressure on the military leadership to accelerate the transition and new clashes break out in Cairo between Muslims and Christians. In Libya the last two of Gaddafi’s bastions in Bani Walid and Sirte fall and Muammar el-Gaddafi is captured and executed. Tunisia holds constituent elections won by the Islamist Ennahda. The EU adopts measures to strengthen and stabilise its economy.

Portugal

- On 13 October the government presents the budgets for 2012 which in-
clude reductions in salaries and annual holiday and increases in working hours in the private sector.

Spain

- On 2 October in Pamplona Amaiur is officially launched. The new coalition formed by the abertzale left, Eusko Alkartasuna, Aralar and Alternatiba will run in the November elections.
- On 5 October Spain announces its participation in NATO’s anti-missile defence system.
- On 17 October San Sebastian hosts an international conference without the participation of the Spanish or French governments which calls on ETA to “end armed activity” and urges Madrid and Paris to establish dialogue “exclusively to tackle the consequences of the conflict.” Madrid and Paris insist that ETA just has to give up its arms. On 20 October the terrorist group ETA announces the “end of armed activity” asking for “direct dialogue” to resolve the “consequences of the conflict.” On 22 October thousands of Basques in Bilbao call for independence. On 29 October thousands of Spaniards demonstrate in solidarity with the victims of terrorism.

France

- On 16 October François Hollande wins the primaries of the PS with 56.6% of the votes becoming the socialist candidate for the presidential elections in 2012.
- On 19 October clashes break out in Mamoudzou, in Mayotte, where strikes have been ongoing for weeks against rising prices since the island was granted departmental status in March.

Italy

- On 14 October Silvio Berlusconi scapes through a new parliamentary vote of confidence after the government fails to approve the public accounts from 2010. The results spark unrest in several cities.
- On 18 October the Court of Milan clears Silvio Berlusconi of all charges in the Mediatrade case.
- On 24 October the Council of Ministers fails to reach an agreement on deficit reduction measures because of the Northern League’s refusal to support the pension reform. On 25 October Berlusconi reaches an agreement on this reform, demanded by Brussels, just before the eurozone summit.

Slovenia

- On 21 October the President Danilo Turk dissolves the Parliament to call early elections for 4 December.

Croatia

- On 7 October a law that would annul sentences handed down in Serbia against Croatian citizens for crimes committed in Croatia during the disintegration of Yugoslavia, is not approve due to the absence of a quorum. The opposition did not appear, describing the bill as damaging for relations with Serbia and for the Croatian justice system.
- On 28 October the Parliament votes with a majority to dissolve and schedule early elections for 4 December.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 3 October seven civil servants from Brcko are arrested in the Bingo anti-corruption operation.
- On 28 October the Serbian Wahhabi Muslim Mevlid Jasarevic is arrested after attacking the US embassy in Sarajevo. After the incident, Serb police arrest 20 people belonging to a Wahhabi cell that has connections with Jasarevic.

Serbia

- On 10 October the Police Union of Serbia stages a strike until 25 October demanding pay increases and a new collective agreement.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 20 October clashes break out between the KFOR and Kosovo Serb demonstrators trying to stop Kosovo’s control over the border crossings with Serbia. On 27 October the demonstrators dismantle barricades after an agreement is reached between the KFOR and the governors of the Kosovo Serb municipalities.

FYROM

- On 11 October the committed appointed to manage the population census resigns delaying proceedings for at least six months. The division among the members of the committee lies in whether or not to include the Diaspora.

Albania

- On 7 October Ramiz Alia, the last communist President and first of the democratic government dies.
- On 20 October Albania ratifies an agreement with Kosovo to unify its consulate services.

Greece

- On 5 October Greece sees its fifth general strike of the year with mass demonstrations and unrest in Athens.
- On 12 October the municipal refuse collectors decide to continue a strike that over two weeks has led to the accumulation of 7,000 tonnes of rubbish in Athens.
- On 19-20 October Greece sees its sixth general strike of the year, the largest demonstration since the fall of the dictatorship of the Colonels.
- On 20 October despite dissent in the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), the Parliament approves the government’s latest package of cuts which enables the release of the sixth tranche of the rescue package.

Turkey

- On 18 October the terrorist organisation PKK carries out a bomb attack that kills eight people in Bitlis.
- On 19 October around a hundred PKK members attack border posts in Cucurka and Yuksekova, killing 24 soldiers. The Army responds with an offensive on PKK positions in the Kazan Valley, which ends on 27 October leaving 270 terrorists dead.
- On 29 October three people are killed in a suicide bomb attack by the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons (TAK) in front of the AKP offices in Bingol.

Cyprus

- On 5 October the Council of Ministers gives the green light to the agree-
ment negotiated with Russia for the concession of a 2.5 billion euro loan to help Cyprus survive the effects of the crisis.

• On 31 October a meeting concludes in New York between the Cypriot President, the leader of Northern Cyprus and the UN Secretary General, to speed up reunification before the Cypriot Presidency of the EU in 2012.

Syria

• On 2 October the Syrian National Council (SNC) is formed, which reunites the opposition with the Bashar al-Assad regime.
• On 3 October the army steps up its offensive to control the Homs region.
• On 4 October Russia and China veto the resolution condemning the Syrian regime presented before the United Nations Security Council.
• On 16 October Bashar al-Assad issues a presidential decree for the formation of a commission tasked with drafting a new constitution.
• On 27 October a mass demonstration takes place in Latakia in support of the regime. This is the fourth pro-Bashar al-Assad demonstration so far this month, after two that were held in Damascus and Aleppo.
• On 30 October the Arab League presents Syria with a roadmap to overcome the political crisis. Throughout the month daily protests continue while the death toll by the end of October exceeds 3,000.

Jordan

• On 17 October Abdullah II appoints Awn al-Khasawneh, a judge of the International Court of Justice, as Prime Minister, to replace Marouf al-Bakhit, who resigned after losing a parliamentary motion of censure. Parallel to this, small demonstrations continue, calling for economic and democratic reforms.

Egypt

• On 1 October the SCAF amends the Election Law, allowing political parties to compete for seats reserved for independent candidates.
• On 9-10 October a march of Coptic Christians protesting in Cairo over the demolition of a church in Edfu, Aswan, degenerates into clashes that force the Military Junta to order a curfew. On 10 October the Prime Minister calls a meeting for the Council of Ministers, which announces a bill to legalise unlicensed temples.
• On 10 October the Supreme Administrative Court approves the legalisation of Jemaah al-Islamiyah, the Building and Development Party (Islamist) and the New Ghad Party (“Tomorrow Party,” liberal secular).
• On 12 October the Cairo Criminal Court sentences in absentia the magnate Hussein Salem to seven years’ imprisonment, who has been under arrest since June in Spain, for money laundering. The former Minister of Petroleum Sameh Fahmy has also been charged in the case.
• On 16 October 20,000 students from the University of Mansoura demonstrate to demand the resignation of all deans and university leaders associated with the old regime.
• On 31 October thousands of Egyptians demonstrate in Cairo to call for the release of the activist Alaa Abdel Fattah and to condemn the military trials and appeals to prevent a gathering in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace. A further seven demonstrators are arrested in Dar el-Beida.
• On 9 October 50 teachers begin a hunger strike in front of the Ministry of Education to protest against the situation of some 7,000 teachers which have still not received notification of their renewal for the present academic year.
• On 11 October four people are injured by a bomb blast near Tizi Ouzou.
• On 17 October a woman is killed by the explosion of an AQIM bomb near Ait Slimane, Boumerdes.
• On 22 October three volunteers, two Spanish and one Italian, are kidnapped in the Sahrawi Rabouni Refugee camp. On 31 October four AQIM members are arrested in connection with the kidnapping in Bechar and Tamanrasset.

Morocco

• On 5 October eight Moroccan parties present the Coalition for Democracy in Rabat, a bloc with a mostly liberal standpoint but open to centre-left and environmental options, although they announce that they will not run on joint lists in the elections on 25 November.
• On 10 October the Islamist Justice and Charity movement announces that it will boycott the legislative elections on 25 November and offers its support to the February 20 Movement.
• On 21 October Morocco is elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for the biennium 2012-2013.
• On 28 October the Court of Sale sentences Adel Othmani to death and Hakim Dah to life imprisonment for the attack on the Argana café in Marrakech on 28 April 2011.

European Union

• On 4 October the European Council approves the package of six measures approved on 29 September by the Parliament, which increases the community’s control mechanisms over national budgets and accounts.
• On 5 October the Commission adopts a series of legislative proposals related to the future of the Cohesion Funds for the period 2014-2020, which includes the controversial possibility of suspending aid to regions whose budget policies are not adjusted to the Stability and Growth Pact.
• On 12 October the government and opposition in Slovakia close an agreement to approve the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF). This means the Fund has the approval of the entire eurozone.
• On 10 October the European Council gives its backing to the Commission’s proposal, approved by the Parliament, to strengthen the Frontex borders agency.
• On 12 October the Commission presents its annual Enlargement package. It grants Croatia the status of accession State, recommends the opening of accession talks with Montenegro and FYROM and grants Serbia candidate status. It also expresses concern for the political stalemate in Bosnia and Albania and for the difficulties in relations with Turkey over the Cyprus issue.
• On 12 October the commission presents its radical reform proposal of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The proposal, as of 2014, gives more weight to environmental aspects, limits direct aid and draws a distinction between “active farmers” and the rest. Spain and France announce their opposition to the reform.
• On 23 October the European Council commits to recapitalising the European banking system. For their part, the eurozone states agree on appointing the President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy as President of the new economic government.

Arab League

• On 16 October the Foreign Ministers of the Arab League hold an emergency meeting and unanimously agree – with the exception of Syria – to call for Damascus and the opposition to initiate dialogue within 15 days under the auspices of a committee from the League.

November 2011

The economic crisis leads to government changes in Spain, where early general elections are won by the People’s Party; in Italy, where Silvio Berlusconi resigns opening the door to a new technocratic government; and Greece, where the departure of George Papandreou’s government gives way to one of national unity. In Croatia the trial begins against the former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader. In Kosovo clashes break out between KFOR soldiers and Kosovo Serb demonstrators. The two main Albanian parties reach an agreement to put an end to the parliamentary boycott in place since 2010. In Syria the violence continues despite the announcement of new international sanctions. Egypt witnesses tense days of protest before the start of the parliamentary elections. In Libya Saif el-Islam Gaddafi is arrested and the interim government is established with the difficult task of putting in motion a complex transition period. Tunisia forms a new coalition. In Morocco, the Islamist Justice and Development Party wins the parliamentary elections.

Portugal

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Spain

• On 16 November the former ETA military chief Miguel Garcia “Trapote”, currently serving a prison term, is sentenced to a further 60 years’ imprisonment for the murder in 2001 of the Navarrese People’s Union Councillor Jose Javier Mugica.
• On 20 November Spain holds early general elections. With a turnout of 71.7%, in the Congress of Deputies, the People’s Party wins with an absolute majority with 44.6% of the votes. The PSOE moves over to the opposition obtaining 28.7% of the vote. In the Senate, the PP obtains 136 of the 208 seats, with PSOE in second place with 48 senators.

Italy

• On 7 November the Prime Minister François Fillon presents the new plan to “balance public finances,” which aims to save 100 billion euros before 2016 and which includes, among other measures, a reduction in tax exemptions, bringing forward the increase in retirement age to 2017, a 5% increase in corporate tax, an increase in reduced VAT rates from 5.5% to 7%, and a freeze on income-tax thresholds.

• On 5 November thousands of Italians in Rome call for the resignation of Silvio Berlusconi’s government, which on 8 November loses the parliamentary majority in a new confidence vote.
• On 11-12 November the Senate and the Parliament respectively approve the budget for 2012 which includes new austerity measures. After the approval, Berlusconi presents his resignation.
• On 13 November the Senator Mario Monti is appointed the new Prime Minister and Finance Minister of a technocratic government announced on 16 November, which is aimed at putting the Italian economy back on track. On 18 November the new government wins a confidence vote in the Parliament with an absolute majority allowing it to start its reforms programme.
• On 30 November the Chamber of Deputies approves the bill to introduce a budget balancing clause into the Constitution.
Croatia

- On 3 November the trial begins against the former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, accused of accepting a 665,000-dollar bribe from the financial entity Hypo Bank in 1996.
- On 25 November the former Croatian general Mirko Norac is released on probation after serving two thirds of his 15-year sentence for war crimes against Serbian citizens.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 16 November the United Nations Security Council extends the EUFOR mandate by one year.

Montenegro

- On 8 November the healthcare workers’ strike for increased salaries enters its second week.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 21 and 30 November after two months of stalemate following the border incidents, Belgrade and Pristina resume talks on the status of Kosovo.
- On 23 November the former KLA member Fahredin Gashi is sentenced to 18 years’ imprisonment for war crimes during the Kosovo conflict in 1999.
- On 24 and 30 November clashes break out in Zvecan and Zubin Potok between the KFOR and Bosnian Serb demonstrators trying to stop the Kosovo Albanian authorities from taking control of the area.

FYROM

- On 17 November 65,000 people and 170 institutions sign a manifesto to demand that the European Commission stop avoiding the adjective “Macedonian” to refer to the country’s inhabitants without upsetting Greece.

Albania

- On 15 November the Democratic Party and the Socialist Party reach an agreement to put an end to the parliamentary boycott ongoing since June 2010.

Greece

- On 1 November six PASOK members demand the resignation of George Papandreou over his announcement to call a referendum on the European agreement to cancel 50% of the Greek debt in exchange for bigger cuts. Germany and France will make the payment of the next 8-million euro tranche of the rescue package depending on the result of the referendum. On 3 November Papandreou announces that he will not call the referendum.
- On 5 November the government overcomes a confidence motion to begin talks for the constitution of a national unity government. On 6 November the government and the opposition agree on a new unity government without Papandreou that will set in motion the agreement reached with the EU in October until the early elections in April 2012.
- On 11 November the former vice-President of the ECB Lucas Papademos is appointed Prime Minister.
- On 17 November thousands of Greeks protest against the new government, approved by Parliament the day before with an absolute majority, and the ongoing austerity measures.
- On 29 November European Finance Ministers approve the sixth tranche of the first financial bailout.

Turkey

- On 22 November the Turkish police arrest 15 people in Konya accused of belonging to al-Qaeda, which add to a further 1,800 that have been released during November.

Cyprus

- On 23 November the government approves a second round of licensing for the exploitation of oil and gas in waters south of Cyprus, despite Turkish opposition.

Syria

- On 6 November, the day of the Festival of Sacrifice, at least nine people are killed in acts of general protest. In response, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), formed mostly by defected Syrian armed forces personnel, declares an end to the unilateral truce announced four days before. The truce honoured the agreement in principle reached at the beginning of the month between Damascus and the Arab League to put an end to the violence, which since the beginning of the daily protests has left over 3,500 dead. On 12 November the Arab League expels Syria.
- On 14 November the EU widens sanctions against Syria.
- On 29 November the Arab League agrees with 19 out of 22 votes in favour of imposing sanctions against Syria after failing to reach an agreement with Damascus for an observation mission to be carried out in the country.
- On 30 November in an attempt to alleviate international pressure, the Syrian regime releases 912 revolution prisoners adding to a further 1,800 that have been released during November.
- On 30 November Turkey announces economic sanctions against Syria.

Lebanon

- On 29 November for the first time since 2009, two rockets launched from Lebanon land in Galilee. The attack is countered by Israel with attacks in the area between Aita Shaab and Rmeish.
- On 30 November the Prime Minister Najib Mikati announces the payment of the Lebanese contribution to the STL, despite opposition from Hezbollah. Mikati had threatened to resign if Lebanon were not to comply with its international commitments.

Jordan

- On 18 November hundreds of demonstrators called by the Islamic Action Front protest in Amman asking for greater democratising and anti-corruption measures.
- On 25 November thousands of Jordanians and Palestinian refugees demonstrate in Sweme calling for the liberation of Jerusalem and the end of the peace treaty between Jordan and Israel.

Egypt

- On 10 November a double attack in Bir al-Abd, Sinai, cuts off the gas supply to Jordan and Israel.
- On 14 November the Supreme Administrative Court of Cairo issues a rul-
ing allowing members of the dissolved NDP to run in the legislative elections.

- On 18 November the Muslim Brotherhood and the April 6 Movement join a large demonstration in Tahrir Square rejecting the proposal for a new constitution, on the grounds that it "enshrines a military dictatorship." During the following days major clashes with security forces are reported. On 20 November the Military Junta insists on transferring power to a civilian authority. The parliamentary elections that start on 28 November are the first step in the process.

- On 21 November the unrest forces the cabinet to resign. The Military Junta reaches an agreement with the political parties to hold presidential elections before July 2012 and to constitute a new unity government while the mass demonstrations continue. On 25 November a large-scale "Friday of the Last Chance" again calls Cairo to transfer the power to a civilian authority, this time the main political forces do not participate, with the exception of al-Nour and the Building and Development Party.

- On 25 November Kamal Ganzouri, the former Planning Minister known for his dissident policies within the Mubarak government, is appointed the new interim Prime Minister. The appointment is regarded with suspicion by large sections of the population, such as the April 6 Movement, which believes that his ties with the deposed regime carry greater weight than his personal interests.

- On 28-29 November the elections for the People’s Assembly (lower house) begin with the first of the three phases of two rounds each, which will conclude in January 2012.

**Libya**

- On 8 November the Berber leader Ben Khalifa, exiled during the Gaddafi regime and member of the NTC until 20 August when he decided to leave because of "insurmountable differences," denies that the constitutional bill presented at the beginning of August excludes the Berber language and culture.

- On 15 November representatives of the interim government and the army meet in Benghazi to elect a new Armed Forces chief.

- On 18 November the UN Human Rights Council readsmits Libya, suspended from membership since March 2011.

- On 19 November Saif el-Islam el-Gaddafi is arrested while trying to flee to Niger.

- On 22 November the NTC gives the green light to the interim government proposed by the Prime Minister Abdurrahim al-Keib.

- On 23-24 November at least 23 people are killed in Bani Walid during clashes between the Martyr Brigades of Souq al-Juma and Gaddafi militia.

- On 25 November the Appeal Court of Tunisia refuses the appeal of Gaddafi’s former Prime Minister Baghdadi el-Mahmudi not to be extradited to Libya.

- On 26 November the Libyan Prime Minister Abdurrahim al-Keib escapes unhurt from an assassination attempt in Tripoli.

**Tunisia**

- On 2 November the offices of the satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo are burnt down after launching a special issue in which it changed its name to "Charia Hebdo" and "appoints" Muhammad as "editor," an ironic comment on the electoral victory of Ennahda.

- On 2 November hundreds of women demonstrate in the Tunisian capital demanding that Ennahda respect their rights and freedoms.

- On 19 November Ennahda, the CPR and Ettakatol (social democrat, secular) reach an agreement to appoint the key positions of the new cabinet. Hamadi Jebali will be the new Prime Minister and the leader of the CPR Moncef Marzouki will occupy the position of President of the Republic. Mustapha Ben Jafar, from Ettakatol, will be the Speaker of Parliament.

**Algeria**

- On 15 November the doctor Noun Djellal is kidnapped in Taal Bounane by members of AQIM. This takes the number of kidnappings in Kabylie since 2005 to 65.

- On 17 November the President Abdelaziz Bouteflika sacks Noureddine Cherouati, the President of Sonatrach, the national oil company, and replaces him with Abdelhamid Zerguine.

- On 19 November a former member of the Legitimate Defence Group is assassinated by members of a terrorist cell in Boumerdes. On the same day, also in Boumerdes, a bomb blast injures two police officers.

- On 24 November eight members of AQIM are killed and 12 arrested in clashes with the army in el-Mazara.

- On 25 November Abdullah Djaballah, former Islamist candidate for the presidency of the Republic in 1999 and 2004, announces his intention to launch the Front for Justice and Development (FJD), a new opposition political party to the governing National Liberation Front (FLN).

**Morocco**

- On 25 November Morocco holds parliamentary elections in which the Islamist Justice and Development Party obtains 107 of the 395 seats. The nationalist Istiqlal ("Independence") loses the power finishing second and obtaining 60 seats.

- On 27 November thousands of Moroccans demonstrate in different cities around the country called by the February 20 Movement to condemn the results of the elections on 25 November, which they believe to be "false and fraudulent."

- On 28 November Mohammed VI asks Abdellah Benkirane, leader of the JDP to form the new government.

**Mauritania**

- On 28 November a new demonstration against the population census led by the “Don’t touch my nationality” group is quelled by police. The country’s sub-Saharan population – between 30 and 40% – continues to brand the government’s policies as “racist” and denounces that they are asked to bring documents that prove their nationality to be registered in the census, which is not a requisite for the rest of the population.

**European Union**

- On 8 November the Finance Ministers from the eurozone adopt the package of six measures to strengthen the economic governance of the EU which on 28 September was approved by the
European Parliament. In virtue of these measures, states with excessive deficit and which do not respect the stability criteria may receive automatic sanctions.

* On 15 November Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, presents to the European Parliament the Commission’s work programme for 2012, which aims to coordinate the actions of the commission to support the economic reforms in progress and strengthen the international role of the EU.

* On 18 November the European Council and Parliament agree on the EU budget for 2012 of 129 billion euros, which represents a 1.86% increase.

* On 30 November the 27 Finance Ministers approve the budget for 2012: 129,088 billion euros, representing a 1.86% increase with respect to 2011’s budget.

**December 2011**

The year ends for the EU and its Member States with efforts to ensure financial stability and budget constraint. Slovenia and Croatia hold parliamentary elections. Croatia signs its EU membership. Bosnia achieves its long-awaited agreement to form a government. Serbia sees its European aspirations delayed. Turkey breaks diplomatic ties with France over the “Armenian genocide” issue. In Syria the year ends with the revolution against the regime, which is far from being resolved, while in Egypt, in full electoral process, the Islamists come together as the future force of the government. In Libya, internal security problems arise, due to the rebel guerrillas’ control of strategic points. Tunisia ends with 22 people arrested in Palermo charged with belonging to Cosa Nostra.

**Portugal**

* On 22 December Portugal sells its participation in the country’s main electricity company EDP to the Chinese Three Gorges, in the first major privatisation carried out by the government of Passos Coelho.

**Spain**

* On 23 December the President of the government Mariano Rajoy announces the composition of the new cabinet. Among those appointed are Soraya Saenz de Santamarina as vice-President, Alberto Ruiz-Gallardon as Justice Minister, Pedro Morenes as Defence Minister, Jorge Fernandez Diaz as Interior Minister, Cristobal Montoro as Treasurer, Luis de Guindos as Finance Minister, Miguel Arias Calafate as Agriculture Minister and Jose Manuel Garcia-Margallo as Foreign Minister.

**France**

* On 15 December the Paris Correctional Court gives the former President of the Republic Jacques Chirac a two-year suspended sentence for embezzlement of public funds while he was the Mayor of the French capital.

* On 15 December the French justice system hands down a second life sentence to the Venezuelan terrorist Ilich Ramirez, “Carlos the Jackal,” for four attacks committed in France in 1982 and 1983 that left 11 dead.

* On 27 December France adopts the budgets for 2012 with the aim of lowering the public deficit to 4.5% of GDP and which provides for a 3% tax increase on high earners and reductions of 15% in tax breaks.

**Monaco**

* On 22 December the update of the 2001 monetary agreement is signed in Brussels, which allows the use of the euro in Monaco.

**Italy**

* On 4 December the Council of Ministers approves a new austerity plan of 20 billion euros that foresees tax increases, pension reductions and an increase in the retirement age. Another 10 billion will be reinvested in actions aimed at reactivating the economy and employment.

* On 5 December 81 immigrants from Libya are intercepted 65 miles from Roccella Ionica.

* On 14 December a police operation ends with 22 people arrested in Palermo charged with belonging to Cosa Nostra.

* On 15 December an explosive device planted by the Informal Anarchist Federation is intercepted in an office of Equitalia, the national tax collection agency, in Rome.

* On 22 December the Senate approves the emergency austerity plan presented by the government by 257 votes in favour and 41 against.

**Slovenia**

* On 4 December Slovenia holds early parliamentary elections. “Positive Slovenia” (LZJ-PS, centre-left) led by the Social Democratic Party of Zoran Milanovic, removes the conservative HDZ, gaining 44.5% of the votes and 80 seats. The HDZ of the Prime Minister Jadranka Kosor obtains 22.1% of the votes and 47 seats. On 23 December the Parliament swears in the new government of Zoran Milanovic.

* On 9 December Croatia signs the EU Accession Treaty.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

* On 28 December the leaders of the three communities agree on the formation of the federal government – after more than 14 months of political stalemate – and the enforcement of the law on the census and on public subsidies, demanded by Brussels to advance the accession process. On 12 January the Parliament appoints Vjekoslav Bevanda as Prime Minister.

**Montenegro**


**Serbia**

* On 9 December the European Commission decides to delay its decision on granting Serbia official accession candidate status until March 2012.
decision leads to the resignation of the deputy Minister of European Integration Bozidar Delić.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 2 December Serbia and Kosovo sign the Integrated Border Management agreement.

FYROM

- On 5 December the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rules in favour of FYROM over its claim in November 2008 against Greece accusing it of violating the 1995 interim accord that stated that Greece would not oppose the accession of its neighbour to any international organisation that refers to it as FYROM.

Greece

- On 1 December Greece is brought to a halt by the first general strike with Lukas Papademos at the head of the government.
- On 7 December the Parliament approves the budgets for 2012, marked by tax increases and a drastic reduction in public spending.

Turkey

- On 22 December Turkey suspends diplomatic ties with France in response to the approval in the French National Assembly of a law that brands the massacre of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire between 1915 and 1917 as genocide.

Cyprus

- On 2 December the government and opposition close an austerity agreement that includes tax increases for salaries above 2,500 euros, an increase in VAT from 15 to 17%, a salary freeze for civil servants and 200 million euros in cuts on family benefits and education grants.
- On 14 December the UN Security Council extends the mandate of the UNFICYP to 19 July 2012 and urges the two sides to accelerate reunification talks.
- On 15 December a 12-hour air traffic controllers strike brings Cypriot air space to a halt, in protest against the inclusion of this collective in the austerity measures that the Parliament is voting on the next day.
- On 18 December Cyprus holds local elections in which the main opposition party DISY wins 26 of the 38 town councils including those of Nicosia and the capital district of Strovolos and Larnaca.

Syria

- On 2 December the UN Human Rights Council approves a resolution condemning the Syrian regime for the violence against the demonstrators. According to the UN, the death toll now exceeds 4,000, over 14,000 arrests have been made and more than 12,400 have fled.
- On 3 December the Arab League gives Syria an ultimatum and approves sanctions against senior government officials.
- On 12 December local elections take place despite the climate of violence reigning in Syria and the opposition's call for a boycott.
- On 15 December Russia presents a draft resolution before the UN Security Council which is considered insufficient by the US and Europe who criticise the absence of a firm condemnation of the Syrian regime and Moscow's equal treatment of the government and its opposition.
- On 19 December the UN General Assembly adopts a resolution condemning the Syrian regime proposed by Germany, by 133 votes in favour, 11 against and 43 abstentions.
- On 19 December Syria gives the green light to the Arab League's observation mission to confirm whether or not Damascus is complying with the League's roadmap to end the violence. On 22 December the first observers arrive in Syria.
- On 28 December the government announces the release of 775 people arrested during the protests that began in March.

Lebanon

- On 9 December at least five French peacekeepers and a Lebanese civilian are injured in an attack on a UNIFIL patrol in Tyre.

Egypt

- On 5–6 December the second round of the first phase of the parliamentary elections confirms victory for the Islamist parties, which obtain 113 of the 168 seats: 80 seats go to the Liberty and Justice Party and 33 for al-Nour.
- On 16 December new clashes break out in front of the government offices in Cairo between the army and demonstrators who have been camped there since 25 November in protest against the appointment of the former Minister of Mubarak Kamal Ganzouri as interim Prime Minister.
- On 19 December the clashes enter their fourth consecutive day leaving 14 dead. The US and the EU express their concern over a Military Junta that warns that the country is in danger and accuses groups of individuals of using the protests to destabilise the democratic transition.
- On 20 December the “Million Woman March” crosses Cairo demanding an end to the repression and the transfer of power to a civilian authority.
- On 21–22 December the second round of the second phase of the Egyptian elections takes place. The Freedom and Justice Party leads the results with 36.6% of the votes and 71 seats, followed by the Salafist party al-Nour (28.8%, 41 seats). The third most voted for is the liberal al-Wafd Party (9.6%, 11 seats).
- On 23 December the “Friday of regaining honour” gathers thousands of Egyptians in Tahrir Square against the violent repression of the demonstrations which began the previous Friday leaving 17 dead and around a thousand injured.

Libya

- On 2 December the Security Council extends the mandate of the UNSMIL until March 2012 and widens its scope.
- On 10 December rebel militants from Zintan, who have control over Tripoli airport, attack the convoy carrying the commander of the New Libyan Army Khalifa Hiftar, believing that the military deployment was aimed at taking over the airport.
Groups of guerrillas that fought against the Gaddafi regime, continue to control key points of the country. One of the main challenges of the new government is to take control of these points from the former fighters and prevent revenge attacks in areas that were loyal to Gaddafi.

- On 12-13 December days of protest take place in Benghazi against the NTC in which demonstrators demand greater transparency in decision-making and that the composition of all the senior government positions be made public.
- On 16 December the UN Security Council lifts financial sanctions against Libya because of the lack of currency in the country, although it upholds the embargo on all assets of the Gaddafi family.

**Tunisia**

- On 11 December after five days of debate, the National Assembly approves the provisional Constitution of 26 articles, with 141 votes in favour, 37 against and 39 abstentions. The first law that the Constituent Assembly approves will regulate the powers of the Republic’s Presidents, the government and the Assembly itself.
- On 12 December the National Assembly elects Moncef Marzouki, the leaders of the CPR, as the new Tunisian President.

**Algeria**

- On 16 December the Parliament approves the controversial Media Law, which according to the opposition will damage the freedom of the press by including sanctions on journalists that undermine Algeria’s national identity, sovereignty, security and economy.

**Morocco**

- On 19 December, after the results of the parliamentary elections are announced, the Islamist Justice and Charity Party suspends its connection with the February 20 Movement.
- On 20 December Karim Ghellab, from Istiqlal, is elected President of the lower house of the Parliament.

**Mauritania**

- On 18 December the process of national dialogue, launched in November by the President Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz, concludes with the presentation of the amendments to the 1991 Constitution to create an independent electoral commission and to criminalize coup d’états. The document also includes respect for cultural diversity, Arabic as the official language and condemns slavery. The COD rejects the document claiming that it leaves all the power in the hands of the President.

**European Union**

- On 9 December the European Council agrees, with the exception of the United Kingdom, to extend the EFSF to mid-2013 and bring the European Stability Mechanism forward to July 2012.
- On 14 December the European Council gives the green light to the Commission to begin talks with Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia to constitute areas of free trade.

**Arab League**

- On 7 December the Secretary General of the Arab League, Nabil el-Arabi announces his refusal to transfer the Syrian issue over to the UN Security Council.

**Western Sahara**

- On 21 January, talks between Morocco and the Polisario Front resume after the unrest in 2010 over the dismantling of a protest camp close to El Aaiun. This is the fifth round of informal talks under the auspices of the United Nations.
- On 26-27 February the city of Dakhla witnesses serious clashes between Sahrawis and Moroccans during the celebration of the 35th anniversary of the Polisario Front.
- On 2 March the Moroccan police clashed with around 500 former workers of the Bou Craa phosphate company demonstrating in front of the delegation of the Ministry of Mines and Energy in El Aaiun.
- On 8 March fresh talks are held in Mellieha, Malta, between Morocco and the Polisario, mediated by the United Nations. The talks continue those held in Geneva on 10 February during which “significant progress” was made concerning the Tindouf refugee camps.
- On 27 April the United Nations Security Council unanimously approves a resolution that recognises the need to improve the human rights situation in the Western Sahara and in Tindouf. It also renews the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2012.
- On 6 June the seventh round of talks begin in Manhasset between Morocco and the Polisario, which comes to a close without advances.
- On 20 July the eighth round of talks in Manhasset begins, which closes without agreements on the organisation of a referendum for independence.
- On 25-26 September two people are killed after a football match in Dakhla, in clashes between Sahrawi separatists and Moroccan nationalists.
- On 31 October the last 24 Sahrawi activists held in connection with the dismantling of the Gdeim Izik protest camp, in November 2010, begin a hunger strike to demand a civilian, rather than military, trial.
- On 15 December the 13th Congress of the Polisario Front is held in Tifariti, Algeria, during which Mohamed Abdelaziz, leader of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), condemns the Moroccan regime as tyrannical, and appeals to the new Spanish government for a stronger commitment.

**Gibraltar**

- On 24 April seven vessels in the service of the customs authority of the British Navy intercept two Civil Guard patrol boats in Spanish waters in the Bay of Algeciras, whilst they are arresting the occupants on suspicion of drug-trafficking. The event prompts the Spanish Foreign Office to complain to the United Kingdom.
- On 18 July London announces that it will appeal the decision of the EU Court of Justice that confirms the European Commission’s decision, as proposed by Spain, to consider an area that encompasses part of the waters surrounding Gibraltar to be under environmental protection, alleging that this is a violation of British sovereignty and damages the economic interests of the colony.
• On 4 July the Chief Minister Peter Caruana announces the creation of a Borders and Coastguard agency at the presentation of the budget for the island.

• On 8 December Gibraltar holds parliamentary elections in which the alliance of the Labour and Liberal parties wins 48.8% of the votes.

More information

For a detailed chronology of the wave of changes in the Arab world: 

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The Arab-Israeli conflict escalates in 2011 in the shadow of the revolts across the Arab world. The beginning of the year is marked by a concerning rise in hostilities in Gaza and the West Bank and Israel's gradual tightening of its security measures. The peace talks, in sharp contrast, remain frozen, as they have been since September 2010 after Israel resumed construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Once again, the announcement of new settlements in March and April, coinciding with heightened pressure on Benjamin Netanyahu's government from Jewish settlers following March's events in Itamar, has a crippling effect on the talks. This comes at a delicate time for international relations following the fall of Hosni Mubarak in January in Egypt, a country that was leading the mediation between the parties, and the crisis caused by the damaging leaked documents concerning the peace talks. In February the so-called Palestine Papers force the Fatah Government and Palestine's chief negotiator Saeb Erekat to step down, in a move aimed at improving the image of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and facilitating the difficult reconciliation with Hamas, particularly with regard to reaching an election agreement. On 4 May the long-awaited reconciliation agreement comes to fruition, in a month that represents the first of two important turning points for the development of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 2011. Following George Mitchell's resignation as special US Envoy for the Middle East and before an alarming outbreak of violence during the commemoration of the Nakba, the US announces a new proposal to reactivate negotiations based on the 1967 borders, which is considered unsatisfactory by both parties. In June, tensions rise for the commemoration of the Naksa, particularly around Israel's borders with the Palestine Territories, Lebanon and Syria, where an uprising is fully underway. The year's second turning point takes place on 23 September when the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas presents his unilateral request for full-membership status before the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. The request comes weeks after the diplomatic crisis opens between Egypt and Israel following the assault on the Israeli embassy in Cairo. The attack is spurred by the death of six Egyptian security officers at the end of August during the clashes in Gaza, which mark the end of the unilateral truce of the Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades. October seems to hail some progress with the International Quartet's announcement of a new road map and the historic agreement between Israel and Hamas for the exchange of Gilad Shalit, kidnapped five years ago, for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners. However UNESCO's recognition of Palestine as a full member, which was rejected by Israel and the US, ignites fresh tensions in a year that concludes with mounting tension in Gaza in December while Palestine awaits a response to its request for full UN membership.

January 2011

Israel

- On 9 January the Israeli authorities go ahead with the demolition of the historic Hotel Shepherd, in East Jerusalem, to make way for new settlers. The hotel's location, in the Arab neighbourhoods of Sheikh Jarrah and Wadi al-Joz gives rise to Palestinian protests.

- On 17 January three Labour cabinet ministers walk out of the coalition government due to the lack of progress in the peace talks. The move coincides with the Labour Party (LP, social-democratic) leader Ehud Barak's announcement of the creation of Independence, a new, breakaway centrist political faction of the LP, which will be loyal to the Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

- On 23 January the Israeli commission investigating the attack on the “Freedom Flotilla” on 31 May 2010, concludes that the assault was “legal” given that the flotilla was attempting to violate the Israeli embargo on Gaza. The commission also claims that the flotilla organisers, the Turkish group IHH, “is an extremist group that has been outlawed in Germany and is openly connected with Hamas.”

Palestine

- On 21 January the car carrying French Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie is attacked by families of Palestinian prisoners in Israel while on a visit to Gaza over statements made by the Minister in Jerusalem calling for the release of the Israeli sergeant Gilad Shalit, who has been held by Hamas since 25 June 2006. She described his kidnapping as a “war crime.”

Peace Negotiations

- On 23 January al-Jazeera and The Guardian begin the publication of 1,684 secret documents from the peace talks held in Annapolis from December 2007 to December 2008. The action puts Jerusalem and Ramallah in an awkward situation as the documents reveal embarrassing information, such as: the offer from the former Foreign Minister Tzipi
Livni to surrender Arab-Israeli communities close to the pre-1967 borders in exchange for peace; the PNA President Mahmoud Abbas’ declaration that “it would not be reasonable to expect Israel to absorb even a million Palestinian refugees as this would mean the end of the State of Israel”, instead proposing that Israel absorb a total of 10,000 over ten years; or that the Palestinian negotiators would have considered conceding East Jerusalem, the Jewish Quarter and part of the Armenian Quarter of the Old City. Hundreds of Fatah supporters attack al-Jazeera’s headquarters in Ramallah, while the PNA Government claims that the information has been “distorted by the Israeli media.” On 26 January thousands of Hamas supporters demonstrate in Gaza burning images of Mahmoud Abbas and calling him “traitor.”

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 1 January a woman dies after participating the previous day in a demonstration against the Israeli separation wall. Palestinian sources blame the tear gas used by Israel, an extreme measure that is denied by the Israel Defence Force (IDF).
- On 2 January Israeli soldiers shoot and kill a Palestinian man when he approaches the West Bank checkpoint holding a bottle and ignoring orders to halt.
- On 6 January the Israeli Air Force bombs a secret tunnel in the Rafah area.
- On 7 January a Palestinian is killed by gunfire in Hebron when Israeli soldiers burst into his house in search of his nephew, Waed Bitar, one of the six Hamas militants on hunger strike released by the PNA the previous day. Bitar was imprisoned for his involvement in a terrorist attack in Dimona in 2008. Another four of the released militants are arrested on the same day. The incident intensifies tensions between Hamas and the Fatah-governed PNA, accused by Hamas of collaborating with Israel.
- On 7 January an Israeli soldier is killed and four others injured in friendly fire during a clash on the Gaza border.
- On 8 January mortar shells fired from Gaza by the Islamic Jihad injure three Thai agricultural workers on an Israeli farm.
- On 10 January Palestinian militants fire three rockets at the Israeli coast where it borders Gaza.

- On 10 January Israeli planes attack a Hamas training camp close to Khan Younis and a security post in the northeast of the Gaza Strip.
- On 11 January the Palestinians accuse Israel of shooting dead a farmer close to Beit Hanoun in Gaza, by the Israeli border.
- On 12 January the Israeli air force kills Mohammed Najar, a high-ranking member of the Islamic Jihad, in southern Gaza.

February 2011

Israel

- On 5 February the journalist Anat Kamm is found guilty of espionage. Kamm is accused of leaking thousands of classified documents to Haaretz during her military service, which are potentially damaging for the government and the IDF. Kamm was arrested in December 2009 by the Shabak (the internal security service) and her trial began in May 2010.
- On 11 February Israel announces its decision to accelerate the construction of the security fence on the Egyptian border. The move aims to prevent Hezbollah and Hamas terrorists who have escaped from Egyptian prisons and illegal immigrants from entering the country during the revolt underway in Egypt. The Israeli cabinet fears that the changes in the Egyptian government may lead to a deterioration of the peace currently existing between the two countries. On 14 February Benjamin Netanyahu warns the new army Chief of Staff Benny Gantz to be prepared for any eventuality.
- On 18 February the US vetoes a resolution of the United Nations Security Council to condemn the construction of Israeli settlements on occupied territory. The US Ambassador to the UN Susan Rice claims that it is a matter that must be resolved within the framework of the peace negotiations and not through international sanctions.

Palestine

- On 8 February the PNA announces that local elections will be held on 9 July in the West Bank only, thereby complying with the court decision that urges elections to go ahead, which were initially scheduled for July 2010 and have been delayed ever since.
- On 14 February the PNA government presents its full resignation to the President Mahmoud Abbas, although Salam Fayyad will continue as Prime Minister, in a decision interpreted as an attempt to improve the image of the cabinet following the publication of the so-called “Palestine Papers” and to facilitate the path towards calling elections. Abbas asks Fayyad to form a new government that includes members of other groups and not just Fatah.
- On 17 February Mahmoud Abbas announces that the presidential and legislative elections will not be held in the end if Hamas refuses to hold elections in Gaza. Hamas has said it will not do so until the national reconciliation process has reached its conclusion.

Peace Negotiations

- On 12 February the chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat announces his resignation over the leaks of the “Palestine Papers”, which according to sources from the PNA itself, came from inside his own cabinet.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 17 February three Palestinian fishermen are shot dead by Israeli soldiers on the border between Israel and Gaza, close to Beit Lahia. The IDF maintains that the dead fishermen were attempting to plant explosives on the fence that separates Israel from Gaza.
- On 25 February nine people are killed in Hebron in riots with the Israeli police after a large-scale commemorative demonstration over the killing of 29 Palestinians in the Tomb of the Patriarchs at the hands of a Jewish extremist in 1994. The demonstrations called for the reopening of the central Shuhada Street (of the Martyrs), closed by Israel for security reasons. The neighbourhoods around Shuhada Street and the Tomb of the Patriarchs are home to 600 ultra-orthodox settlers, who still live in the city after an agreement reached in 1997 between Israel and the PNA led to the evacuation of 80% of the settlers. In 2003 the Supreme Court of Israel ordered the eviction of the remaining settlers and the reopening of Shuhada...
March 2011

Israel

• On 13 March the office of the Israeli Prime Minister announces the construction of between 300 and 500 new settler homes in the West Bank settlements of Gush Etzion, Maale Adumim, Ariel and Modiin Ilit. The announcement, condemned by the PNA, comes in response to the murder of a settler family in Itamar, near Nablus, the previous day, by a Palestinian man. The incident leads settlers to demand the construction of more settlements.

• On 15 March the Israeli army intercepts a Liberian-flagged ship on its way from the Syrian port of Latakia to Alexandria and confiscates a cargo of arms thought to be heading for Gaza. Israel suspects there is a connection between the two Iranian warships that crossed the Suez Canal and docked in Latakia the two Iranian warships that crossed the Suez Canal and docked in Latakia from the Syrian port of Latakia to Alexandria and confiscates a cargo of arms thought to be heading for Gaza.

• On 22 March Moshe Katsav, the Israeli President between 2000 and 2007, is sentenced by the Court of Tel-Aviv to seven years’ imprisonment for rape and sexual harassment during his time as Minister of Tourism from 1996 to 1999. This is the heaviest sentence to date given to an Israeli Head of State.

• On 27 March Israel announces the launch of its “Iron Dome” defence system, specially designed to intercept attacks launched from Gaza into Israeli territory.

• On 28 March the Court of Petah Tikva partially lifted a gag order to confirm that the engineer Dirar Abu Sisi, kidnapped in February from Ukraine, has been arrested in Israel. Sisi is suspected of designing missiles launched from Gaza into Israeli territory between 2002 and 2008 and setting up a military academy in Gaza at the request of Hamas.

Palestine

• On 3 March banks in Gaza close in protest against raids carried out on 1 and 2 March by Hamas security forces on two branches of the Palestine Investment Bank and the seizure of 350,000 dollars from the Palestine Investment Fund. Hamas accuses the bank of illegally transferring capital outside of Gaza. The Palestine Monetary Authority, which is controlled by the PNA and oversees the banks in both Gaza and the West Bank, accuses Hamas of armed robbery.

• On 15 March 25,000 people in Gaza and 8,000 in Ramallah take to the streets to show their support for unity between the two Palestinian territories, demanding an end to the division between Fatah and Hamas. On 16 March Mahmoud Abbas announces that he is willing to go to Gaza to resume Palestinian reconciliation talks with Hamas.

• On 30 March a Hamas delegation meets at the Wafd Party headquarters in Cairo with representatives of Egypt’s ruling interim government and military junta. The Hamas delegates express their solidarity with the Egyptian revolution in talks dominated by the opening of the Rafah border crossing, the situation of the Palestinian prisoners in Egypt and the Palestinian reconciliation process.

Conflicts between the Parties

• On 7 March at least seven Palestinians are injured in clashes with the Israeli army and Jewish settlers in the north of the West Bank. The incident erupts after a group of Palestinians throw stones at the settlers who they accuse of uprooting olive trees in the area.

• On 16 March two Palestinians are killed in an Israeli air strike on a Hamas security post in Gaza in response to the launch of a missile from the Strip into southern Israel.

April 2011

Israel

• On 1 April the South African judge Richard Goldstone publishes the article Reconsidering the Goldstone Report on Israel and war crimes in the Washington Post, in which he states that the conclusions of the investigation into Operation Cast Lead, which he headed for the United Nations, would be very different had they known then, what they know...
now. On 5 April, in response to the article, in which Goldstone describes Israel’s parallel investigation as thorough, the Israeli Interior Minister Eli Yishai announces that Goldstone has accepted his invitation to visit areas in southern Israel threatened by rocket launches from Gaza.

- On 4 April the Council of Jerusalem announces plans for the construction of 1,000 homes in an area of Gilo, earmarked for construction for the last ten years, according to the consistory. Israel considers Gilo to be an integral part of Jerusalem since it was conquered from Jordan in 1967, but for the Palestinians it is a settlement in occupied territory. The announcement of new constructions sparks suspicion in the PNA forcing the Mayor of Jerusalem Nir Barkat to deny that it has any connection with President Simon Peres’ concurrent visit to Washington.

- On 8 April the Israeli army launches a raid in the early hours of the morning in Awarta, in the north of the West Bank, in its hunt for the perpetrators of the Fogel Family murder in March in the Itamar settlement. Around a hundred women are arrested in the raid, 80 of whom are released after testifying. These arrests take the total in connection with this event in Itamar to 300 made during the course of Awarta’s frequent raids. On 17 April the army announces the arrest in Awarta of two Palestinian teenagers in connection with the murder of the Fogels.

- On 8 April the army demolishes homes in the Palestinian town of al-Aqabah, near to Tubas, in the West Bank and destroys the town’s road connections.

- On 13 April the Attorney General of Israel Yehuda Weinstein warns the Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman that he will take legal action against him for crimes of fraud, bribery, money laundering and witness harassment, in the investigation into the illegal financing of Yisrael Beiteinu through a network of ghost companies.

- On 21 April Haaretz reports the establishment of a new unauthorised settlement named Regev next to Nablus, to accommodate the arrival of 500 Jewish settlers from Itamar.

**Palestine**

- El 6 April Human Rights Watch, publishes the report No News Is Good News which underlines the lack of freedom of the press in the Palestinian Territories and the arrests and threats to journalists made both by the PNA in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza.

- On 7 April the IMF provides support for the PNA’s efforts towards the recognition of a Palestinian state, with the publication of a report in which it describes the Palestinian government as capable of sustaining its own economy as an independent state, despite the high dependence on international aid and the restrictions imposed by Israel. This report supports statements made by the World Bank in the autumn of 2010.

- On 15 April Hamas security forces find the body of an Italian pro-Palestinian activist in an abandoned house in Gaza. Vittorio Arrigoni was kidnapped the previous day by the Salafist group al-Jihad al-Tawhid with links to al-Qaeda. Two suspects were arrested during the raid. Fatah and Hamas condemn the execution of Arrigoni, who was popular among Palestinians in Gaza, where he was considered “one of them.” On 19 April Hamas forces launch an assault on a house in the Nuseirat refugee camp where Arrigoni’s alleged assassins were hiding. In the attack the group’s leader, the Jordanian Abdelrahman Breizat, and the Palestinian Bilal al-Omari blow themselves up.

- On 27 April Fatah and Hamas sign a draft agreement in Cairo that lays down the foundations for reaching national reconciliation after more than four years of violence. Both delegations agree on the formation of a transitional government until elections are called and the coordination of their security forces.

**Peace Negotiations**

- On 6 April concern over the frozen peace talks prompts 53 prominent Israeli figures, including former heads of the Military, Mossad and Shabak, rabbis and leading businesspeople, to present the “Israeli Peace Initiative” in Tel-Aviv, a plan for the creation of a Palestinian state defined by the June 1967 borders before the Six-Day War and with East Jerusalem as its capital.

- On 20 April the International Quartet (the US, EU, Russia and the UN) give Benjamin Netanyahu an ultimatum, warning him that unless he presents a new initiative to end the conflict with the Palestinians, it will recognise a Palestinian state with its capital in East Jerusalem in the next United Nations General Assembly, and without veto guarantees from Washington.

**Conflicts between the Parties**

- On 2 April an Israeli rocket lands on a car close to the city of Gaza killing three Hamas militants. According to Israel, the deceased were planning to kidnap Israeli citizens during the Jewish Passover in Egypt and Israel.

- On 4 April the Israeli army opens fire on a group of Palestinians approaching the separation fence in the north of Gaza who ignore the soldiers’ orders to halt. One man is killed and two are injured. Following this event, three missiles are launched into Israel from Gaza.

- On 7 April a rocket launched from Gaza lands on an Israeli school bus injuring a teenager. Hamas declares a unilateral ceasefire to put an end to the recent escalation of violence, in an attempt to avoid Israeli reprisals. On the same day, Israel launches an attack on Gaza in which five Palestinians are killed. On 8 April an attack on Khan Younis kills another five people, two of them members of the armed wing of Hamas, the Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades. At the same time a total of 45 missiles are launched from Gaza into the outskirts of Eshkol and other areas of southern Israel. Israel activates its new “Iron Dome” defence system, neutralising two of the rockets.

- On 24 April an Israeli visiting Joseph’s Tomb in the PNA-controlled Nablus is shot dead by a Palestinian police officer. The victim was a member of an excursion organised by the ultra-orthodox Hasidic group Breslov, which was not coordinated with the Palestinian security forces. Benjamin Netanyahu demands that the PNA take “tough measures,” which in turn announces the opening of an investigation. After the incident, clashes erupt between Palestinians and soldiers from the Israeli army, and a group of Palestinians set fire to Joseph’s Tomb.

**May 2011**

**Israel**

- On 1 May Israel announces that it will delay the transfer to the PNA of 60
millions of euros in tax and customs revenue, withheld from Palestinian workers and goods under the economic protocol of the 1995 Oslo Accords. Jerusalem demands that the PNA produce evidence that guarantees that Hamas will not benefit from this money. On 16 May the Israeli Finance Minister Yuval Steinitz orders the transfer of the money claiming to have received the corresponding guarantees.

- On 19 May coinciding with Barack Obama’s announcement of a new strategy to reactivate the dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians, Jerusalem announces the construction of 1,500 new homes in the settlements of Pisgat Zeve, in East Jerusalem, and Har Homa, in Bethlehem. The news comes hours before Benjamin Netanyahu travels to Washington to meet with the US President.

Palestine

- On 4 May the reconciliation agreement between the Palestinian factions is officially signed in Cairo.
- On 17 May the PNA announces its decision to postpone the Palestinian elections scheduled for July until October, to allow time to organise the voting in Gaza.
- On 27 May Egypt permanently opens the Rafah border crossing.

Peace Negotiations

- On 13 May the US Special Envoy for the Middle East George Mitchell steps down from the post, in a decision seen as a sign of frustration regarding the lack of progress in the peace process in the last two years.
- On 17 May after meeting in Washington, Barack Obama and Abdullah II of Jordan urge Israel and the PNA to reactivate peace talks fearing the growing risk of a third Intifada following the bloody incidents on Nakba day. On 18 May in light of the wave of political and social change in the Arab world, Barack Obama announces a new proposal for dialogue between the Israelis and Palestinians based on recognising a Palestinian state with the 1967 borders, prior to the Six-Day War. The new proposal considers delaying the status of East Jerusalem and the return of Palestinian refugees for a second round of talks and demands that the Palestinians recognise the State of Israel’s right to exist, as well as rejecting Palestine’s unilateral proposal to be recognised as a member of the UN. In response, the Israeli government asks Washington to reaffirm the commitments made to Israel in 2004 in which Israel would not have to withdraw to the 1967 borders – which would leave major Israeli population centres in Samaria and Judea beyond Israeli borders – and returned Palestinian refugees would have to settle in the future Palestinian state rather than in Israel. On 25 May in a speech made before the US Congress, Benjamin Netanyahu stresses that Israel does not oppose the creation of a Palestinian state, but that it will never accept a return to the 1967 borders nor the partition of Jerusalem. The United States agrees that “painful concessions” may be necessary to reach peace, which include surrendering certain territories. For its part, the Palestinian position continues to demand an agreement based on the 1967 borders with Jerusalem as its capital. In this respect, the PNA and the Fatah leadership, meeting in Ramallah, reiterate their intentions to seek recognition of Palestinian statehood in the United Nations General Assembly in September.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 15 May violent clashes erupt on the borders between Israel and the Palestinian territories, Syria and Lebanon, during the Nakba (catastrophe) Day demonstrations, which commemorate the creation of the State of Israel in 1948 and the start of the Palestinian exodus. On the Syrian border, 2,500 Palestinian refugees in Syria call for the start of a third Intifada and try to destroy the separation fence. Five refugees are shot dead by the Israeli army in the Druze town of Majdal Shams, on the Shouting Hill in the Golan Heights. Israel accuses the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad of allowing this situation to develop for the first time in years to steer the international spotlight away from Syria’s internal problems. Hours after the incident, around 200 Palestinians who have illegally crossed the border into Israel are captured and returned to Syria. Meanwhile Palestinian refugees in Lebanon attempt to cross the border into Israel by destroying the border fence in the Lebanese village of Ma'rour al-Ras. 15 of them are killed. Israel fears these events – added to the frozen peace talks and influenced by the Arab Spring – will lead to mass marches from refugee camps and raises the alert level, deploying more than 10,000 troops. Demonstrations on the Gaza border also end in attempts to cross into Israel. In the West Bank, more than 20,000 people demonstrate in Ramallah’s Menara Square and clashes erupt at the Kalandia checkpoint. Violent clashes also break out in Palestinian neighbourhoods in Jerusalem.

June 2011

Israel

- On 19 June the Interior Minister announces the expansion of the Ramat Shlomo neighbourhood in East Jerusalem with 2,000 new homes. Ramat Shlomo, captured by Israel in 1967, is located in an area not recognised by the PNA and the international community as belonging to Israel.
- On 25 June the ship Dignité leaves Corsica on its way to Gaza. This is the first of the vessels belonging to the second “Freedom Flotilla” to take to the sea despite warnings from Israel, the UN and various governments from Mediterranean states.
- On 26 June Israel begins dismantling the 2.7-kilometre stretch of separation wall in the West Bank, which isolates the Palestinian village of Bilin, four years after the Israeli Supreme Court’s ruling that it be rectified. The new 3.7-kilometre stretch will return 70 hectares of territory to the village.
- On 14 June young Israelis camp in Habima Square in Tel-Aviv and in Jerusalem’s Zion Square to protest against low salaries and rising house prices, in response to a Facebook invite created by the young evictee Daphne Leef.

Palestine

- On 14 June representatives of Fatah and Hamas meet in Cairo, eight days after the scheduled date, to begin talks to determine the nature and composition of the future national unity government. Progress is hindered by Hamas’ refusal to accept Salam Fayyad, the candidate backed by Mahmoud Abbas
for Prime Minister, considering him to be an “American puppet.” On 19 June the Egyptian mediation fails to bring Fatah and Hamas to an agreement on the formation of the future unity government, forcing it to cancel the next meeting between the parties scheduled for 21 June. On the same day, the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas makes a three-day visit to Turkey to meet with the Turkish President, Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister. Meanwhile, on 22 June the Hamas leader Khaled Meshal meets in Ankara with the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu. Although neither visit produces any results, they demonstrate Turkey’s increasingly important role as mediator in Palestinian reconciliation.

**Peace Negotiations**

- On 17 June the Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman meets with the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, who is in the region to reactivate the peace talks. Lieberman warns that a unilateral Palestinian initiative to request recognition of the Palestinian State before the United Nations General Assembly would imply an end to the Oslo Accords and consequently to any agreement subsequently signed between the parties. Lieberman demands negotiations without preconditions imposed by the PNA and recognises that the possibilities of advancing are “close to nil.”

**Conflicts between the Parties**

- On 5 June, the date of the Naksa, a commemoration of the Arab defeat against Israel in the Six-Day War, violent clashes erupt on the border between Israel and Syria when over a thousand Palestinian refugees demonstrate on the Shouting Hill and try to force their way into the Golan Heights, provoking an armed response from the Israeli army. Yoav Mordechai, spokesperson for the Israeli army, accuses Syria of doing nothing to stop the Palestinians arriving at its border. The Lebanese army closes its border with Israel to avoid incidents. Unrest is reported in the West Bank at the Kalandia border crossing.
- On 7 June Israeli settlers attempt to set fire to a mosque in al-Mughayer, in the West Bank, and paint messages on its wall including, “Price tag, Aley Ayin,” in reference to the recent dismantling of the illegal Aley Ayin settlement, which ended in clashes with the Israeli police. This is one of many cases of new tactic employed by extremist settlers known as “price tag,” which consists in attacking Palestinian targets in reaction to measures taken against the settlement process.

**July 2011**

**Israel**

- On 1 July Greece follows Cyprus and Turkey’s decision not to allow ships form the second “Freedom Flotilla” to leave their ports, to avoid clashes with the Israeli army should the ships enter Gaza waters, where there is an Israeli naval blockade.
- On 4 July the Defence Minister Ehud Barak suspends talks to hand over 84 Palestinian bodies to the PNA, a move authorised by Benjamin Netanyahu for the start of Ramadan, over concerns that the release may undermine negotiations for Gilad Shalit, the soldier captured by Hamas five years ago. The decision also follows fierce criticism from families of Israeli victims in response to the measure.
- On 8 July the Israeli press reports the expropriation of 19 hectares of land in Karyut, to legalise the Israeli settlement outpost of Hayovel, in the final phase of construction.
- On 10 July the Israeli government approves the proposal for the demarcation of the maritime border with Lebanon and Cyprus. Avigdor Lieberman announces that this will be the proposal presented by Israel to the United Nations, in reaction to the one presented by Lebanon in August 2010 that, according to Jerusalem, violates Israeli waters as well as the 2007 Lebanon-Cyprus demarcation agreement. The waters in question contain gas reserves which are either recently discovered or already being exploited by Israel.
- On 11 July the parliament passes a bill that imposes fines and an exclusion from government subsidies for all those who support an economic, cultural or academic boycott of the “State of Israel, its institutions or the area under its control.”
- On 19 July the Israeli navy boards the French ship Dignité, the only vessel from the second “Freedom Flotilla” able to travel to Gaza to violate the Israeli naval blockade on the Strip.

- On 23 and 24 July two mass demonstrations take place in Tel-Aviv and Jerusalem led by Israeli protestors outraged by the inflation increase. On 26 July the government announces an action plan comprising the creation of 50,000 new homes, half of which will be rented at 30% of their current value. On 30 July tens of thousands of Israelis demonstrate in 10 cities across the country demanding the resignation of the government, a decrease in taxes and the lowering of housing prices.
- On 25 July the army intercepts an arms and ammunition cargo being transported across the Dead Sea between Jordan and the West Bank.

**Palestine**

- On 26 July the Hamas government executes two Palestinians accused of spying for Israel.
- On 27 July the Palestinian Electoral Commission announces that the local elections scheduled for October will take place in the West Bank but not in Gaza.

**Peace Negotiations**

- On 11 July the International Quartet meeting in Washington at the request of the EU High Representative Catherine Ashton is unable to reach a consensus for unblocking the peace talks before September, when the PNA is planning to submit its request for full membership before the UN General Assembly.

**Conflicts between the Parties**

- On 5 July an Israeli missile lands in the al-Bureij refugee camp in Gaza, killing two members of the Islamic Jihad who were attempting to launch a missile at Israel.
- On 7 July an Israeli soldier is injured when a bomb explodes in the south of the Gaza border.
- On 12 July the Israeli air force carries out two air strikes in the north of Gaza against two suspected arms factories, after three missiles launched from the Strip land in Israeli territory.
• On 13 July a Palestinian is shot dead by Israeli security forces in the al-Farah refugee camp close to Nablus during a search mission for a fugitive from the Islamic Jihad. Five arrests are also made during the raid.
• On 15 July the Israeli air force bomb Gaza, Khan Younis and Rafah killing six people and destroying several smuggling tunnels. The Israeli army reports that the attack is in response to the previous day’s launch of five rockets into Israeli territory.

August 2011

Israel

• On 4 August the Lebanese parliament approves the cabinet’s proposal for a law that delineates the Lebanese maritime borders and contradicts Israel’s demarcation plan presented in July.
• On 11 August the Interior Minister authorises the construction of 1,600 new homes in Ramat Shlomo, East Jerusalem and announces the approval of a further 2,700, allegedly to tackle the country’s housing crisis and satisfy the demands of the Palestinian people. The announcement gives rise to harsh criticism from the PNA and concern in Washington, which has recently rebuked Israel on 9 August over its announcement of a further 930 homes in East Jerusalem.
• On 13 August around 75,000 people demonstrate in sixteen different Israeli towns against the increase in the cost of housing and basic consumer goods.
• On 16 August the Israeli parliament holds an emergency session to discuss the unprecedented social protests which have swept the country since July due to the rise in living costs.

Palestine

• On 13 August the Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad al-Maliki declares that the PNA will submit their application for full membership at the United Nations General Assembly on 20 September.

Conflicts between the Parties

• On 16 August a young Palestinian is shot dead by Israeli soldiers when he approaches the border between Gaza and Israel close to the Maghazi refugee camp.
• On 18 August several cars and buses are attacked in different coordinated actions close to Eliat, in Negev, by numerous members of the Popular Resistance Committees, who had infiltrated from Egypt, killing eight Israelis and injuring a further thirty. Seven of the attackers are also killed, as well as five Egyptian police officers during the ensuing fighting. The Israeli government accuses Hamas of the attack and responds by bombing Gaza, causing six deaths.
• On 19 August militants from Hamas and the Popular Resistance Committees fire 20 missiles into southern Israel. Israel responds firing ten rockets into Gaza which kill two people.
• On 20 August Egypt attempts to mediate between Israel and Palestine to reach a ceasefire agreement that will halt the worrying escalation in violence. The Egyptian government summons the Israeli Ambassador and decides to recall its Ambassador in Israel Yasser Reda in protest of the death of five Egyptian police officers at the hands of Israeli soldiers in the gunfight on the 18 August, and following statements made by Israel accusing Cairo of failing to control the terrorist movement in Sinai. On the same day, a missile launched into Ashdod from Gaza seriously injures three Palestinian workers coinciding with the announcement made by Hamas’ military wing the Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades to break the “truce,” in effect since Operation Cast Lead. A total of 40 rockets land in Ashdod, Beersheba and Ashkelon.
• On 21 August, in the early hours of the morning, dozens of Hamas militants and supporters are arrested in Hebron and other towns in the West Bank during a massive security operation. Clashes erupt between the Israeli army and young Palestinians. Meanwhile, several rockets, aimed at the Israeli border checkpoint land on Egyptian soil close to Rafah without causing any damages.
• On 24 and 25 August at least six Palestinians are killed during Israeli air strikes on Gaza.

September 2011

Israel

• On 2 September the group of experts commissioned to investigate the Israeli attack on the “Freedom Flotilla” at the request of the UN, concludes in its report that the action was “excessive and disproportionate,” but that the naval blockade imposed by Israel on Gaza is “legal and appropriate” and that Israel had no option but to use force on finding a “violent and organised resistance” from the crew of the flotilla. The report also describes the measures taken by Turkey to dissuade the activists from breaking the blockade as insufficient. After the appearance of the report, Turkey demands that Israel apologise for the death of the nine Turkish activists in the attack. Benjamin Netanyahu refuses to apologise and breaks military ties.
• On 3 September the Kikar Hamedina (State Square) in Tel-Aviv is the gathering place for the “March of the Million,” the largest demonstration in Israel’s history. 400,000 people protest against the rise in the cost of living and the lack of welfare benefits. Another 50,000 demonstrate in Jerusalem and around 35,000 in Haifa.
• On 9 September a group of demonstrators storm the Israeli embassy in Cairo in protest over the death of six Egyptian police officers during the heightened tensions in Gaza at the end of August. The ensuing violence leaves three dead and more than a thousand injured, forcing Egypt to declare a state of alert and deploy large numbers of police to control the demonstrators, who are calling for the cancellation of the Camp David Accords, an end to gas exports to Israel and the closure of the diplomatic delegation. The Israeli Ambassador leaves Egypt.
• On 15 September Israel temporarily evacuates its staff from its embassy in Jordan. The move comes on the same day as calls for a “Million man march” against Israel and a day after some 70 people protest outside the US embassy demanding its closure. Jerusalem fears that there may be similar acts of violence to those that erupted earlier in the month in the Israeli embassy in Cairo.
• On 21 September the Labour Party holds the second round of its primary elections in which the winning candidates from the first round on 13 September face one another. After beating the former Minister of Defence Amir Peretz, MP Shelley Yachimovich be-
comes the first woman to lead the Labour Party since Golda Meir.

Palestine

- On 21 September around 1,500 Palestinians demonstrate in Ramallah to support the request before the UN General Assembly for Palestine to become the 194th state of the UN. On 23 September Mahmoud Abbas submits the document outlining the request to Ban Ki-moon, while security measures are stepped up in Israel and the West Bank. On 26 September the United Nations Security Council begins the closed-door meeting to analyse the application.
- On 28 September security forces from Egypt and Gaza destroy three smuggling tunnels in Rafah.

Peace Negotiations

- On 14 September the High Representative of the EU Catherine Ashton meets with Benjamin Netanyahu and the Defence and Foreign Ministers Ehud Barak and Avigdor Lieberman, to try to reactivate the peace process before the PNA submits its membership application to the UN General Assembly. On the same day, the International Quartet representative Tony Blair also meets with Ehud Barak.
- On 18 September the International Quartet holds an emergency meeting in New York to agree on a position in the negotiations before the PNA presents its application for full membership of the United Nations and to try to restart direct talks with Israel and the PNA. On 24 September the International Quartet proposes a timetable for direct talks that would start within a month to reach a definitive agreement in 2012, parallel to the deliberations of the Security Council over the recognition of Palestinian statehood and to try to find a solution that overcomes the US veto. The Palestinian Foreign Minister considers the new road map as inadequate as it makes no mention of the 1967 borders or the ongoing construction of Israeli settlements in East Jerusalem.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 6 September a raid led by the Israeli army in Khan Younis leads to clashes with militants from the Popular Resistance Committees leaving one of the militants dead.
- On 23 September a demonstrator in favour of Palestine’s UN bid for statehood is shot dead in the village of Kusra, near to Nablus.

October 2011

Israel

- On 9 October Benjamin Netanyahu asks the Justice Minister Yaakov Neeman to set up a taskforce to look at ways of legalising houses in Israeli settlements built on private Palestinian land, which are illegal both in the eyes of the international community and under Israeli law. According to Haaretz the decision responds to pressure from settlers and the ultra-orthodox sectors, despite the Ministerial Committee and Attorney General reaching an agreement in February for the gradual dismantling of the illegal settlements.
- On 30 October the soldier Anat Kamm is sentenced to four and a half years’ imprisonment for stealing around 2,000 confidential documents revealing IDF crimes in the West Bank which she then leaked to the Haaretz reporter Uri Blau.

Palestine

- On 4 October the Council of Europe grants the Palestinian National Council “Partner for democracy” status, which allows representatives to participate in parliamentary assembly proceedings without voting rights. This new statute does not imply recognition of a Palestinian state.
- On 31 October the General Conference of UNESCO approves the PNA’s entry as a full member. In protest the US suspends its contributions to the United Nations body.

Peace Negotiations

- On 2 October Benjamin Netanyahu officially announces the International Quartet’s proposal to resume peace talks with the Palestinians in accordance with the new road map aimed at reaching a definitive agreement before the end of 2012. Mahmoud Abbas says that the PNA will accept the proposal on the condition that settlement construction is definitively brought to a halt.
- On 11 October Israel and Hamas reach a historic agreement under German and Egyptian mediation to exchange 1,027 Palestinian prisoners for the soldier Gilad Shalit, abducted by Hamas and held in Gaza since 25 June 2006. The agreement does not include the release of the main Hamas leaders in Israeli hands and 203 of the released will be left in Gaza, Jordan, Turkey or Europe. On 18 October the exchange of Shalit for the first 477 Palestinian prisoners takes place. The released Palestinians are received by crowds in Gaza to cheers of “We want another Shalit.” In the course of the negotiations the Egyptian Prime Minister Essam Sharaf asks Israel for a similar exchange of 80 Egyptian prisoners for Ilan Grapel and Oda Tarabin, two Israelis held in Egypt under charges of espionage. On 24 October Israel reports the release of 25 Egyptian prisoners in exchange for the freedom of US-Israeli citizen Ilan Grapel, arrested in Egypt on 12 June for “spying and inciting sectarian violence.” The exchange takes place on 27 October.
- On 21 October Haaretz publishes information that reveals Benjamin Netanyahu’s willingness to halt the construction of public and governmental buildings in the settlements in order to resume peace talks with the Palestinians. The proposal was conveyed to Mahmoud Abbas by the Columbian Foreign Affairs Minister Maria Angela Holguin, who is on an official visit to the region.
- On 26 October the International Quartet meets separately with Israel and the PNA. This is the first official meeting of the Quartet with both parties in the same city, Jerusalem.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 3 October clashes break out between Arab demonstrators and the police in Rosh Pinna, in the north of the West Bank, after a mosque is set on fire in the neighbourhood of Tuba Zangariyye by Israeli settlers. The incident follows the death in September of a settler and his son when their car was stoned by a group of Palestinians.
- On 9 October Israel heightens its state of alert in the south of Tel-Aviv
after graves are desecrated in two Arab cemeteries in Jaffa and a Molotov cocktail is thrown at a nearby synagogue.
• On 27 October Israel launches an air strike against four targets in Gaza in response to a rocket fired at Ashdod from the Strip the previous night by the al-Quds Brigades, the armed wing of the Islamic Jihad. This is the first show of hostility since the exchange of Gilad Shalit for 477 Palestinian prisoners. On 29 October an Israeli offensive provokes Palestinian retaliation in southern Israel. 12 militants of the Islamic Jihad and an Israeli citizen are killed in the attacks. On 30 October the Egyptian mediation reaches a compromise with the Islamic Jihad to uphold the truce with Israel.

November 2011

Israel

• On 1 November following an emergency Ministerial Committee meeting, Israel announces its approval for 2,000 new homes in Jerusalem, Gush Etzion and Maale Adumim in response to the PNA’s entry into UNESCO.
• On 1 November the Israeli army arrests one of Hamas’ principal leaders in the West Bank Hassan Yousef together with 11 other people in Bethany. Yousef had been released from prison in August after serving a six-year sentence.
• On 2 November the IDF spokesperson Avital Leibovitz states that Israel is prepared to stop the Irish boat Tahrir at Fethiye in Turkey carrying 27 activists from nine countries in a campaign known as “Freedom Waves to Gaza.” On 4 November Israel intercepts and arrests the crews of both boats.
• On 10 November the Israeli Supreme Court rejects the appeal lodged by Israel’s former President Moshe Katsav against the seven-year prison sentence handed down in March for two cases of rape and another of sexual harassment.
• On 29 November for the first time since 2009, two rockets are launched into Galilee from Lebanon. The attack provokes retaliation from the Israeli army, which launches attacks on the area between Aita Shaab and Rmeish. Israel warns of escalating tension on its northern border.

• On 30 November, despite opposition from the Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, the Israeli government unblocks funds amounting to 100 million dollars which are awaiting transfer to the PNA. The money was frozen in October in reaction to Palestine’s unilateral request before the United Nations.

Peace Negotiations

• On 10 November the Special US Envoy for the Middle East Dennis Ross resigns from the post for personal reasons. The resignation comes at a delicate moment in which the peace talks show no signs of progress and with the PNA’s application to be a full member of the UN on the table.

Conflicts between the Parties

• On 5 November a member of the al-Quds Brigades is killed in an Israeli air strike on a group of militants that were trying to launch a rocket into Israel from southern Gaza.
• On 11 November a Palestinian truck drives into a checkpoint to the south of Hebron, injuring a soldier. A settler driving the other way is shot dead by soldiers who wrongly identify him as an attacker.
• On 14 November a Palestinian police officer is killed in attacks carried out by the Israeli air force on a Palestinian naval police post in Gaza. The Israeli incursion comes in response to a previous attack launched from Gaza into Ashkelon.

December 2011

Israel

• On 12 December the Jerusalem City Council goes ahead with the closure of the access ramp to the Temple Mount, ordered on 8 December for security reasons.
• On 20 December the UN Security Council is unable to achieve unanimous support for a resolution condemning Israel for the continuing settlement construction.

Palestine

• On 29 December Hamas leaders in Gaza meet with the Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir during the Jerusalem Forum, held this year in Khartoum. Hamas asks for the political and financial support needed to make Jerusalem the Palestinian capital and receives Sudan’s commitment to financially supporting the people of Gaza to improve their situation.

Peace Negotiations

• On 11 December Israel accuses the PNA of boycotting the International Quartet’s attempts to restart negotiations by refusing to participate in the visit of the Quartet envoys on 13 December, unless Israel halts settlement construction in the West Bank immediately.
• On 18 December Israel releases the 550 Palestinians that form the second group of prisoners to be freed in exchange for Gilad Shalit.

Conflicts between the Parties

• On 7 December a terrorist is killed in clashes that erupt between Israeli soldiers and members of the Islamic Jihad.
• On 8 December an Israeli air strike on Gaza kills a member of the al-AqsaMartyrs, Issam Batch, when he was discovered preparing an attack into southern Israel. In response, during the course of the following days, a spurt of
violence erupts with crossfire between Gaza and southern Israel.

• On 11 December Mustafa Tamimi, a member of the Popular Resistance Committees, is killed during a demonstration in Nabi Salah, close to Ramallah after being hit by a teargas canister fired by Israeli soldiers.

• On 13 December 50 ultra-orthodox settlers attack an Israeli military base in Ephraim in protest against the imminent dismantling of a series of illegal settlements in the West Bank, particularly the Mitzpe Yitzhar settlement. Meanwhile, young settlers in Qalqiliya throw stones at Palestinian-owned cars for the same reason. Benjamin Netanyahu calls an emergency meeting with military chiefs.

• On 14 December a village mosque in Jaffa Road in Jerusalem is set on fire and offensive comments painted on its walls which make reference to the “price tag.”

• On 20 December the PNA accuses the Israeli government of doing nothing to stop “settlement terrorism,” following the so-called “price tag” attacks over the last seven days. Settlers have attacked the Okasha mosque in Jerusalem and the al-Nur and Asahaba mosques in the West Bank, occupied the Saint John the Baptist church in the Jordan Valley, carried out several attacks on Palestinian vehicles and olive groves and a child was run over by a settler bus.

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January

1-4 January 2011  
EU-Egypt

Brussels: The President of the European Council (EC), H. Van Rompuy, and the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, C. Ashton, strongly condemn the terrorist attacks perpetrated against the congregation of a Coptic church in Alexandria, causing dead and wounded. In a letter of condolence addressed to President Hosni Mubarak and the families of the victims, the President of the EC qualifies the attack as a vicious and inhumane act bringing fear and hatred to Egyptian society as a whole.

6 January 2011  
Migration

Athens: A seminar organised within the framework of the Euromed Migration II project analyses the social reports on gender in international migration, associated with the study of other factors such as social class, race and North-South relations. The Euromed Migration II project attempts to reinforce cooperation on migration management. Throughout the seminar, the papers demonstrate that all of these relations influence the image, legal status and position of migrants in the social stratification of European host societies. The seminar also reveals the diversification of female migratory profiles (legal and illegal migration, labour migration, asylum seekers, migrants in forced exile, family reunification, victims of slave trade and human trafficking, etc).

7 January 2011  
Cooperation

Paris: At the third edition of the New World, New Capitalism symposium organised by the French Ministry of Industry, Energy and the Digital Economy, the Secretary General of the Union for the Mediterranean (UIM), Ahmad Masa’deh, proposes a concrete Strategic Mediterranean Plan aiming to improve Mediterranean cooperation and integration. The stated Plan exhorts the EU to invest more in multilateral envelopes, beyond the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI), and put an end to the inequality created by the culture of “aid and financing” while moving towards a similar way of approaching exchanges between the North and South shores through investment and transfers.

17 January 2011  
UIM

Barcelona: The Secretary General of the UIM, A. Masa’deh, and the Vice-President of the European Investment Bank (EIB), P. de Fontaine Vive, signed a memorandum of understanding to step up collaboration. The agreement reflects the development of already extant ties between the two organisations and bases the partnership on six concrete areas: exchanging information, promoting UIM projects to facilitate their financing, promoting greater comprehension of the region, improving visibility and raising awareness among stakeholders, developing networks and detaching personnel in order to allow the implementation of priority UIM projects. In this regard, the EIB will have two permanent representatives at the UIM to facilitate communication between the two institutions.

19-22 January 2011  
Audiovisual

Ouarzazate: The MovieMed Festival, now in its second edition, is a Euro-Mediterranean cinema tourism gathering that contributes to strengthening cooperation between actors in the field of tourism and encourages investment in and economic development of Mediterranean audiovisual production. The festival allows cinema and tourism professionals to meet and establish cooperation partnerships based on business meetings, but also to establish good practices through workshops on cinema tourism. At the MovieMed Festival, the Marseille – Provence Chamber of Commerce and its partners announce a forthcoming good practices handbook.

24 January 2011  
Audiovisual

Brussels: Ten independent Arab producers are selected to participate in a DOCmed training programme divided into three one-week sessions over the course of a year. Implemented within the framework of the Euromed Audiovisual III programme financed by the EU, DOCmed targets documentary film producers, directors and scriptwriters in the Southern Mediterranean Region. This programme is implemented locally by Beirut DC (Lebanon), Eurodoc (France) and Doc in Tunis (Tunisia) in cooperation with Arte France. The project focuses on international co-production of creative documentaries as well as the establishment of improved production standards or adaptation to more advanced technology.

26 January 2011  
UIM

Barcelona: The Secretary General of the UIM and Jordanian diplomat Ahmad Masa’deh resigns from his post because “the conditions under which [he] accepted the position have changed.”
28-29 January 2011
ARLEM
Agadir: The second plenary session of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM) brings together representatives of the UIM, EU Institutions and local and regional Mediterranean authorities. This is the opportunity for local and regional leaders of the Assembly to confirm their engagement to maintain dialogue and decentralised cooperation in the Mediterranean Region on social, economic and territorial development. Representatives also discuss three reports prepared in 2010. ARLEM is presided by two co-presidents equitably representing EU partners and the EU and comprises an equal number of local and regional representatives from EU Member States and Mediterranean countries, as well as members of the Committee of Regions (CoR).

29 January 2011
EU-Egypt
In a joint declaration, D. Cameron, N. Sarkozy and A. Merkel appeal to H. Mubarak to play his role as president in the current situation in Egypt, avoiding all forms of violence against the civilian population and protesters, quickly implementing the promised political, economic and social reforms and ensuring that they meet the aspirations of the Egyptian people. By the same token, they urge the Egyptian President to enter a process of transformation consisting of holding free elections and forming a government that is inclusive and representative of the population as a whole, while always respecting human rights and fundamental liberties.

31 January 2011
ALF
Alexandria: The Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) announces the suspension of activities at its headquarters in Alexandria as well as the repatriation of part of its staff for security reasons and to maintain communication with national networks. Indeed, the situation in Egypt has already led the Bibliotheca Alexandrina to close, as well as the Swedish Institute where the Foundation has its offices. The ALF constitutes the first institution jointly established and funded by all members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It carries out projects fostering dialogue among cultures, the rapprochement of peoples and regional cooperation in the spheres of culture, science, education, human rights and women’s empowerment. The ALF resumes its activities in the week of 7 February 2011.
www.euromedalex.org/

February

1-2 February 2011
Maritime Security
Genoa: The maritime authorities of Mediterranean Partner Countries meet during the second annual Euro-Mediterranean SafeMed II project meeting. Jointly organised by the European Commission, the Regional Marine Pollution Emergency Response Centre for the Mediterranean Sea (REMPEC) and the Italian Coastguard, which is hosting the event, the meeting aims to allow the maritime authorities under SafeMed and EU Member States to exchange their points of view and positions as well as develop an adequate response to the problems identified in applying the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code.
www.safemedproject.org/

3 February 2011
EU-Egypt
Brussels: High Representative C. Ashton appeals to Vice-President O. Suleiman to guarantee the security of protesters and, in general, to respect human rights and fundamental liberties. This appeal comes after a meeting between the two officials in which the High Representative expressed her concern to the Vice-President about the violence perpetrated against pacific protesters and qualified the intimidation and aggression directed at journalists as “totally unacceptable.” Since the onset of protests, both Ashton and J. M. Barroso, as well as the EU as a whole have shown particular support for Egypt and have called for dialogue to settle the “disagreements” pacifically.

3 February 2011
EU-Tunisia
Brussels: Following a meeting with the Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Ounees, the EU reaffirms its full support for the country’s transition to democracy. At the same time, C. Ashton states that she is impressed by the amount of work carried out in so little time by the Tunisian Authorities and readily the EU’s wish to see gestures accompany words. This meeting allows leaders to begin talks on aid that the EU would be liable to provide in the short and long terms on the economic and social levels to countries in transition.

4 February 2011
EU-Egypt
Brussels: In a declaration, European Council officials strongly condemn the violence and incitement to violence committed on Egyptian territory and emphasise the right of all citizens to demonstrate freely and the duty of the authorities to protect this right. The EC urges Egypt to respond to the aspirations of the people through dialogue...
and not repression. The EU states that it is determined to provide its full support to States pursuing democratisation processes and the EC invites C. Ashton to establish concrete EU support measures to democratic transitions, in particular through the ENP and the UIM. www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/119143.pdf

4 February 2011
EU-Algeria
Brussels: European Parliament (EP) President J. Buzek welcomes the decision by Algerian President A. Bouteflika to lift the state of emergency in Algeria. Buzek interprets this decision as a first step towards taking into account the Algerian people’s aspirations and recalls that a disagreement between people and the government is foreseeable but that the State is the guarantor of citizens’ right to freely express their opinions.

7-8 February 2011
EU-Morocco
Rabat: During a visit to Morocco, the EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, Š. Füle meets with the Moroccan Prime Minister and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Economy and Finance and Agriculture and Fisheries, as well as other high representatives of the Moroccan government. The visit aims to reiterate EU support to political and social reforms carried out in the country and their continued development. This visit is crucial, since, as Füle recalls, “with an allocation of nearly 200 million euros per year, Morocco is the main recipient of funding by the EU through its European Neighbourhood Policy.”

17 February 2011
Transport
Marseille: The MedGovernance Transport Seminar aims to discuss an integrated transport policy for the Mediterranean. This territorial cooperation project, launched in 2009, comprises six partner regions with different research centres and aims to draw up policy recommendations for building the Mediterranean area that take into account the role and participation of regional actors. In this regard, the Trans-Mediterranean Network for Transport (TMN-T) concept emerges and participants agree that South Mediterranean ports, with the exception of Tangiers, must implement logistics measures in order to develop transport means other than roads.

19-20 February 2011
Local Development
Hermel: The launch meeting for the project “Promoting Women’s and Youth Participation in Local Development Processes,” under the Cooperation in Urban Development and Dialogue (CIUDAD) programme, is co-organised by the city of Hermel, the Province of Rome and the association Union de l’Action féminine (Tangiers). At the meeting, the work plan, budget and partnership agreement are defined by the organisers and the EU delegation to Lebanon using the CIUDAD support mechanism. This initiative will take place in Lebanon and Morocco, within the framework of the CIUDAD programme funded by the ENPI (15 countries are participating in the programme, under the ENP).

22-24 February 2011
Youth
Amman: As of its launch meeting, the Euromed Youth IV Programme focuses on the implementation of a shared vision among the different actors present: Euromed Youth units, the European Commission and EU delegations. This meeting aims to present a communication strategy and define the structure of communications channels between the Euromed Youth units and the other actors. The programme as a whole supports local initiatives designed to encourage and stimulate mutual cooperation as well as solidarity between youth in the Euro-Mediterranean Region.

www.euromedyouth.net

25-26 February 2011
Cities
Málaga: The 2nd Euro-Arab Cities Forum meets to debate the issue of autonomy, local governance, urban management for sustainable development and matters relative to heritage, culture and tourism. The Forum is co-organised by the city of Malaga, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, the Council of European Municipalities and Regions, the Standing Committee for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership of Local and Regional Authorities and the Arab Towns Organisation. Consisting of five thematic sessions, the Forum addresses cooperation between European and Arab cities, local governance, urban management for sustainable development and municipal services, as well as culture, heritage, tourism and financial instruments.

www.coppem.org/default.asp?p=267

March

1 March 2011
Migration
Brussels: The EP’s Civil Liberties Commissioner asks the EU Member States to accelerate work on the “asylum package” and reiterates the indispensable nature of solidarity in allowing migrants to resettle.

3 March 2011
EU
Brussels: Following a visit to the Tunisian-Libyan border by the Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and the Hungarian Minister for European Affairs under the Hungarian EU Presidency, 30 million euros in aid were allocated in order to respond to the Libyan humanitarian crisis through an emergency aid package to add to the 13 million euros already disbursed.

3 and 4 March 2011
UIM
Rome: At the 7th session of the UIM Parliamentary Assembly, the Euro MPs and MPs of Mediterranean countries send a joint message of support to the movements struggling for democracy in the South Mediterranean Region while condemning the violence of the Gaddafi regime. On this occasion, the project is discussed of creating a Euro-Mediterranean investment bank designed to financially contribute to the democratic transition processes while calling for stepped up international aid to counter the humanitarian crisis in Libya. At the session, L. Cardarelli is appointed the UIM Acting Secretary General.

8 March 2011
Women
Brussels: On the 100th anniversary of International Women’s Day, EU High
Representatives meet to pay tribute to the women having played an essential role in recent events in South Mediterranean countries and mark the importance of the presence of women in the new order emerging from the uprisings being experienced in Northern Africa. On this occasion, a number of European leaders recall the importance of respecting women’s rights in all processes of the transitions and of development.

8-9 March 2011
Civil Protection
Rome: A forum is held at the Campodoglio Palace based on the mid-term results of the 2005-2015 Hyogo Framework for Action in the Mediterranean Region (designed to improve preparation of countries in the face of possible natural or man-made disasters). Above all, the forum provides an opportunity for the different actors involved to evaluate the contribution of the Euromed Programme PPRD South to the Hyogo Framework.

11 March 2011
EU-Arab Spring
Brussels: At an extraordinary EC meeting to define EU orientations as revolts in Mediterranean countries evolve, the Council seeks to define the priorities for future EU policies and actions supporting all measures towards democratic transformation and pacific change. Moreover, the Council commends the constitutional reform initiative in Morocco, the election announced in Tunisia and the Egyptian transition. The European Council emphasises the importance of the role of the European Commission in EU-South Mediterranean youth cooperation measures as well as of the release of additional funds.

14-15 March 2011
Urban Planning
Barcelona: The Conference on Urban Development Strategies in the Mediterranean aims to lead the different actors in the Mediterranean area towards a common approach to their vision of urban development in the region. Attending are mayors of cities on both the North and South shores of the Mediterranean, as well as experts from international and financial organisations. The final declaration puts an emphasis on including citizens in formulating urban policy, taking the environmental factor into account in prevention and risk management policies and stepping up public-private partnerships. It is agreed to share experiences between cities, creating a triangular cooperation dynamic (North-South-South).

www.commed-cglu.org/spip.php?article582

15 March 2011
Communication
Malta: The Euromed Postal Community (Euromed PC) or Postal Euromed is the new organisation in charge of implementing exchange and cooperation projects between fourteen national postal networks in the Mediterranean region. This postal community emerged following a 2007 initiative by the Groupe La Poste aiming to step up multilateral Mediterranean cooperation, giving rise to the Constituent General Meeting in Rome, founding this new permanent structure whose mission it is to promote and defend the collective interests of the community before different international organisations as well as developing a higher level of integration among regional postal networks by transferring know-how and technology and sharing costs.

16 March 2011
Investment
Barcelona: The 3rd Plenary Meeting of the Mediterranean Investment Initiative is an opportunity to present concrete measures for attracting long-term foreign investment to the Mediterranean. This initiative brings together some thirty public and private investors from the Northern, Southern and Eastern Mediterranean as well as multilateral cooperation and development institutions. The measures presented conclude the cycle of reflection begun in 2009 aiming to make investment secure by harmonising the legal framework, placing the accent on human capital and financial measures fostering investment in the Mediterranean Region.

www.2im.coop/spip.php?article33

22 March 2011
Maritime Security
Brussels: The EC, EIB and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) launched a study on cooperation in the Mediterranean Region within the framework of the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP). In order to foster the maritime sector in the Mediterranean, the study centres on social aspects, maritime surveillance and security and investment in maritime infrastructures.

25 March 2011
Migration
Brussels: Through Frontex, the EU launches Operation Hermes in order to assist the Italian Authorities to manage migratory flows from Northern Africa, in particular from Tunisia, to the Island of Lampedusa. This operation is taking place on demand of the Italian Authorities through the cooperation of the above-stated institutions with the Tunisian Authorities and has been extended for an additional five months (to the end of August). Its geographic scope has also been extended. Particular attention is lent to individuals requiring international protection.

www.frontex.europa.eu/

April

14 April 2011
Migration
Brussels: After the European Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs meeting in Luxemburg called for solidarity and cooperation on migration, considering the migratory pressure from South Mediterranean countries, and emphasised the importance of long-term measures, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) appeals to States to act in a spirit of solidarity to seek solutions to the causes of these migratory flows.

27-30 April 2011
Literature
Alexandria: The second “Écrire la Méditerranée” literature forum is organised by the French Institute of Egypt and Bibliotheca Alexandrina, with the support of the ALF and the Centre méditerranéen de littérature. The forum intends to bring together some twenty writers and intellectuals from Egypt and the rest of the Mediterranean Region in order to let them speak about the recent changes occurring in the region and the new challenges to which Southern Mediterranean countries must rise in order to reinvent
themselves. This platform for discussion deals with new forms of literature engaged or politically committed literature and the birth of a new sense of identity. www.euromedalex.org/sites/default/files/FR_0.pdf

May

5 May 2011
Women
Brussels: An informative session is held in Brussels. The initiative, jointly organised by the Euromed Gender Equality Programme (EGEP) and the European Training Foundation (ETF), is designed to provide information on the evolution of women’s rights and equality between women and men. Organised within the framework of the ENP, the initiative aims to improve gender equality on the political, institutional and legal levels. At the meeting, strengthening women’s economic power and the active participation of religious dignitaries in fostering gender equality are put forward. www.euromedgenderequality.org/index.php?langue=en

11 May 2011
EU-Arab Spring
Brussels: In a speech delivered before the EP, C. Ashton puts forth three methods to be applied by the EU to support transition processes in South Mediterranean countries. They consist of promoting mobility of youth and businesses, facilitating the development of their markets with the EU and providing resources for these countries. By the same token, Ashton recalls that the Arab Spring revolts are a historic rendezvous that the EU cannot afford to miss.

11-12 May 2011
Enterprise

24-28 May 2011
Heritage
Tunis: The Mutual Heritage Project is part of the Euromed Heritage 4 Programme and has organised the 7th Training Session on Restoration and Renovation. This session aims to train young future professionals in architecture, heritage, urban planning, education and tourism in the Maghreb, Europe and Palestine. The training is done through conferences, debates and exhibits mainly concerning 20th century heritage in the Medina of Tunis. www.mutualheritage.net/

25 May 2011
Neighbourhood Policy
Brussels: C. Ashton and Š. Füle launch a new ENP strategy to strengthen relations between the EU and its neighbours. At the same time, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) expands its mandate to more countries in the South Mediterranean and the EIB increases aid amounts following a made-to-measure policy for each country. This new policy is established within the framework of the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the South Mediterranean adopted in March 2011. The European Commission also publishes reports relative to the progress made on the ENP Action Plans. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com_11_303_en.pdf

30 May 2011
SMEs
Casablanca: Following the postpone ment of the conference that had been programmed for 3 March 2011 in Tunis, Morocco hosts the 9th FEMIP Conference entitled “Mediterranean Infrastructure Challenges: The Potential of Public-Private Partnerships.” The conference is jointly organised by the Moroccan Ministry of the Economy, the EIB and the Association of the Mediterranean Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASCAIE) and is designed to make the recent and current public-private projects known, encourage Mediterranean Partner Countries to use public-private partnerships (PPPs) as an engine for modernisation and pursue joint PPP action in the Mediterranean Region. This conference essentially focuses on the PPP experience acquired, the legal framework of partnership projects and the improvement of PPP attractiveness. www.eib.org/attachments/med/femipconference-in-casablanca-conclusions_en.pdf

June

15 June 2011
EU
Brussels: At a round table organised by Members of the European Parliament (Euro MPs), Š. Füle emphasises the capital importance of democracy as a means to gain stability in Southern Mediterranean countries. Regarding the new ENP strategy, he insists on the establishment of solid, sustainable democracy and provides guidelines for the project to be in accordance with European values, and likewise states that evaluation of country progress by the EU will be based on this criteria, together with those of equality and non-discrimination.

15-16 June 2011
Free Trade
Brussels: The 5th round of negotiations between the EU and Algeria on tariff dismantling occurs soon after the 4th round, which took place on 30 and 31 May 2011 in Algiers. At the 4th round, the parties attempted to resolve their differences regarding the list of agricultural and industrial products subject to dismantling. At the 5th round, the parties negotiate the deadlines for tariff disappearance in order to allow a greater margin for preparation to Algerian companies facing the European competition that will arise as of the definitive establishment of the Free Trade Area. In this regard, Algeria’s request to extend the deadline from 2017 to 2020 was accepted by the EU at the 5th round.

20 June 2011
EU-Arab Spring
Luxemburg: The European Commission and C. Ashton launch a major series of
measures to support transition processes in South Mediterranean countries consisting of “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the South Mediterranean.” This project is the focus of work at the European Council extraordinary meeting, which declares that it supports the Partnership and sets the Council of the EU the task of analysing the different proposals contained in the project. In its conclusions on the ENP, the Council of the EU encourages this partnership initiative and calls on the leaders behind this project to ensure its implementation and continuity.


21 June 2011
Free Trade
Brussels: The Council of the EU supports the development of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) between the EU and Northern Africa and welcomes the establishment of a Working Group for the Southern Mediterranean, designed to contribute coherent international support to democratic transition in the Mediterranean Region. The European Ministers of Foreign Affairs put forth the need for improvement to allow results-oriented regional cooperation through concrete projects.

23 June 2011
Women
The Acting Secretary General of the UfM, L. Cardarelli, shows his support to the recently created Women for the Mediterranean Foundation. The Foundation seeks to contribute to attaining greater equality between men and women and promote their role in society. At the Foundation’s inauguration, the UfM Secretary General and Deputy for Social and Civil Affairs recalls that women’s involvement in society is linked to a country’s development level. This initiative is part of the launching of the EU programme Promoting Gender Equality in the Euro-Mediterranean Region (EGEP).

24 June 2011
Migration
Brussels: In May, the European Commission adopted a series of measures designed to improve management of migratory flows from the Southern Mediterranean region generated by the Arab Spring. They are meant to relax visa regulations, foster partnerships for mobility and establish common EU asylum regulations. The President of the European Commission calls on Member States to demonstrate solidarity towards their southern neighbours. European leaders adopt the European Commission’s proposal to begin dialogue on migration, mobility and security with ENP Partner States.

27-29 June 2011
Women
Brussels: A training workshop to eliminate stereotypes and improve the image of women in the media in the Euro-Mediterranean Region is held as part of the EuroMed Gender Equality Programme (EGEP). This training session is the first to use the manual “Women and the Media in the Euro-Mediterranean Region,” drawn up by EGEP. At the workshop, experts familiarise journalists with women’s rights issues and offer them tools for analysing women’s image in the media.

July

4 July 2011
MedGovernance
The Final Policy Paper of the MedGovernance Project is published. It contains the final conclusions and recommendations to regional actors (regions and regional research centres) on the actions to be taken in partnership with EU Institutions. The document emphasises the importance of greater and more fluid cooperation between the UfM, the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM) and other regional institutions and calls on regions to implement common initiatives and projects in MedGovernance priority sectors.

www.medgov.net/sites/default/files/node_files/other/medgov_finalpolicypaper_FINAL.pdf

5 July 2011
UfM
Barcelona: The UfM welcomes its new Secretary General, Youssef Amrani, with a ceremony at the Pedralbes Palace that brings together Foreign Affairs Ministers from Mediterranean countries and representatives of the city of Barcelona. This assumption of office ceremony is marked by the role that the new Secretary General shall play in the changes in Southern Mediterranean countries after the resignation of the Jordanian, Ahmad Masa’deh in January and the Italian, L. Cardarelli, who was Acting Secretary General beginning in March. Amrani will hold the post until the election of Fathallah Sijilmassi on 10 February 2012.

5-6 July 2011
Energy
Barcelona: As part of the Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP), the first joint committee of national experts meets on initiative of the UfM Secretariat’s Department of Energy. This plan is designed to promote renewable energy and energy efficiency in UfM countries. At the end of the meeting, the members approve a master plan, primarily oriented towards action by Mediterranean countries on timing, objectives and working methods for renewable energy.

7 July 2011
Transport
Brussels: In accordance with the new ENP, a plan to improve transport infrastructure has been launched by the European Commission to boost transport connections with the EU’s Eastern and Southern neighbours. The measures stipulated in this plan are intended to ensure connections between EU transport networks and those of its neighbours through the establishment of a transport committee capable of supervising and channelling regional cooperation on transport.

www.euromedtransport.org/En/home_4_46

7-9 July 2011
Universities
Lecce: The UniMed (Mediterranean University) General Assembly is held to discuss different cross-border cooperation programmes and other initiatives launched in the region. The EP Members attending make a declaration on the creation of exchange programmes similar to Erasmus and Leonardo da Vinci in order to promote transnational mobility of students from both North and South-shore Mediterranean countries.

www.uni-med.net/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1
11-12 July 2011
SMEs

Milan: The second Euro-Arab conference on support to SMEs aims to encourage cooperation between Arab and EU countries in order to develop SME capacity to create jobs, curb the constantly growing unemployment in Arab countries and discuss means of stimulating mutual investments in the SME sector. This year’s conference particularly focuses on the food, furniture, textiles and leather and automotive industries, electronic engineering and automotive fuel delivery systems. The meeting serves as a platform for SMEs to find new professional partners.

13 July 2011
Syria

Brussels: The President of the EP meets with Haitham al-Maleh, an opposition figure and human rights activist in Syria. The meeting follows al-Maleh’s release, brought about by the appeals launched by the EP and J. Buzek, among other efforts. Together, they recall that given the repression and violence perpetrated against the civilian population, the Syrian regime is closed to dialogue.

13 July 2011
Arab Spring

Cairo: The President of the European Commission, the President of the EIB and the Vice-President in charge of activities in the region travel to Cairo to meet with the Egyptian senior officials. This visit is in keeping with the European Commission’s priority of providing support to sustainable growth and employment in Southern Mediterranean countries. The President of the EIB points out the importance of the economy in the process of democratic transition, recalling that the revolts originated as protests against mass unemployment. The EIB establishes energy, housing, infrastructure and small enterprise as funding priorities.

13-16 July 2011
Refugees

Tunisian-Libyan Border: A delegation from the EP visits the refugee camps along the Tunisian-Libyan border for the second time since the fall of Ben Ali and emphasises the importance of action by Member States to work towards the resettlement of refugees from areas of conflict. During the visit, the delegation meets with the Tunisian Prime Minister, representatives of the UNHCR and other humanitarian aid organisations present, as well as with the refugees themselves. The members of the delegation stated that Tunisia is displaying an extremely high degree of solidarity with Libyan refugees and that this should serve as an example for EU Member States to respond to the international issue of refugee resettlement.

18 July 2011
EU

Brussels: Bernardino León, a Spanish diplomat and candidate recommended by C. Ashton, is appointed by the Council of the EU to the post of EU Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean Region. This position was specifically created to allow the EU to respond coherently to the Arab Spring and step up its political role in the Southern Mediterranean countries. He is slated to collaborate with the Working Group for the Southern Mediterranean.

26 July 2011
UfM

Tunis: Secretary General Y. Amrani meets with Tunisian Prime Minister B. C. Essebsi. They underline the importance of relaunching cooperation and put the differences to use between the actors in the region to build a new common Mediterranean area. They consider the ENP and the current regional context allow the opportunity to take up a transparent strategy and adapt to the new situation. They also discuss priority issues such as human rights, the eradication of poverty, Mediterranean solidarity and the increase in financial aid to Southern Mediterranean countries announced by the EU.

August

22-26 August 2011
UfM - Arab League

Cairo: The Secretaries General of the UfM and the Arab League meet to seek solutions for developing regional cooperation and discuss the issues of the ENPI and UfM projects for promoting growth and development in the Mediterranean Basin. At the meeting, Y. Amrani emphasises the exemplary, pacific democratic transition in Egypt and appeals to the international community and the EU to provide support to the Egyptian government in order to allow their reform process to be completed quickly and under the best possible conditions.

September

1 September 2011
EU

Paris: At the Paris conference in support of the new Libya, H. Van Rompuy states that the EU should support, protect and aid the country’s democratic transition so it can return to the forefront of the international arena. Recalling the key role played by EU Member States in political and military matters, he emphasises that the time has come for the country’s wealth to reach its citizens. At the same time, the EU unfreezes the financial assets and economic resources of numerous Libyan institutions in order to allow the economy to revive, which would benefit both the interim government and the citizens.

6 September 2011
ARLEM

Brussels: At a visit to the CoR, Tunisia’s Minister of the Interior reiterates the Tunisian authorities’ commitment to developing the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM) on the morrow of the Arab Spring experienced in Tunisia. Habib Essid also announced the future appointment of three representatives from the interim local authorities in the south, centre and north of Tunisia to represent Tunisia in ARLEM. The Vice-President of ARLEM, moreover, offers Tunisia a new tool developed by the CoR and the European Commission to facilitate the process of cooperation: a forum allowing local authorities to connect with their European counterparts and exchange advice and expertise.

21-22 September 2011
Business

Alexandria: The 1st Euromed Invest Summit brings together numerous European and Southern and Eastern Mediterranean enterprises from MedAlliance networks. A plan is developed to offer concrete, realistic tools to respond to policies launched by the EU and the G8...
in 2011 insofar as investment and development of SMEs. The Summit focuses on the issues of the expectations of EuroMed business representatives and the need for a new economic partnership between Europe and the Mediterranean Region, with a general view to the region’s economic integration.

25 September 2011
EU
Brussels: The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) hosted a meeting with 25 NGOs from the Southern Mediterranean Region and the EU in order to analyse the events shaking the region and the challenges arising therefrom for the construction of democratic, participative societies. All participants agree that the democratic transition is not yet a tangible reality and they emphasise the importance of the regional civil society’s role as well as that of the EU in consolidating democratic achievements.

29 September 2011
Urban Planning
Alicante: The international seminar on the challenges of urban development in the Mediterranean Region gathers experts, the university community and representatives from the authorities associated with the development of regions and cities in the Mediterranean Basin. This seminar aims to establish a strategic urban development programme for the Mediterranean via cooperation, taking into account the need for economic growth and the population's needs.

29 September 2011
Airspace
Cairo: Following various workshops carried out in 2011, the second Conference on a Euro-Mediterranean Common Aviation Area takes place as part of the Euromed Aviation Project II. The Conference focuses on establishing a common Euro-Mediterranean airspace through global airspace agreements with Mediterranean Partner Countries with a view to handling the sharp increase in passengers that air transport will experience in forthcoming years. At the Conference, the Euromed Aviation Project II and the MASC (Mediterranean Aviation Safety Cell) Project are presented. www.euromedtransport.org/aviation

October
October 2011
FEMISE
FEMISE publishes its annual report, this year dedicated to the fundamental transition that the Southern Mediterranean Region has just begun. The report analyses the macroeconomic situation in the region, the fall of authoritarian regimes, the position and role of youth in the transition process and the new direction cooperation should take between the EU and Southern Mediterranean Partner Countries at this historic time. www.femise.org

5-7 October 2011
Water
Milan: WaterMed, the Mediterranean water technology fair, holds its 2nd edition to debate issues of water treatment, water reserves and their distribution, measurement and control technology and its use, and research and development on the subject. This fair gathers representatives from different universities, research centres, institutions, associations and industries, providing knowledge on water and water management in the Mediterranean Region through an exchange of knowledge by experts in all sectors associated with water supply and management. www.emwis.net/thematicdirs/events/2011/10/watermed-2011

6-7 October 2011
EuroMeSCo
Barcelona: This year’s annual EuroMeSCo conference – “A New Mediterranean Political Landscape? The Arab Spring and Euro-Mediterranean Relations” – focuses on the changes and transitions resulting from the revolt movements and the analysis of the fall of authoritarian regimes, the consequences and expectations created by the Arab Spring and the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations. The work programme for 2012 is submitted to the General Assembly. The aim is to make EuroMeSCo a platform for the study of Euro-Mediterranean affairs with significant power to influence policies in the region. www.euromesco.net

8-11 October 2011
Youth
Fez: The 4th edition of the Fez Forum on the UM focuses on "Youth and the Challenges of Globalisation: Environment, Education, Training and Creativity." This forum is organised by the Moroccan Interdisciplinary Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CMIESI), the Assembly of the Mediterranean and the Arab League. Participants discuss issues of human development and the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) at the heart of South-South cooperation, youths’ perception of a substantial world partnership and economic, social and environmental policy issues, as well as the issue of environmental education.

10-15 October 2011
Economy
Marseille: The 5th edition of the Mediterranean Economic Week is dedicated to sustainable urban development. The week focuses on particular attention on the issues of SMEs financing, the Arab Spring context and the role of women in the economy. Also part of the events is the Eco-Cities Forum for Mediterranean professionals and actors engaged in sustainable development. www.semaine-eco-med.com/

19-25 October 2011
Elections
Tunisia: A delegation of the EP to Tunisia observes the elections in the country, the first elections of the Arab Spring. Before observing the elections, the Euro MPs meet with the candidates to the Constituent Assembly responsible for drafting the new constitution. They also meet with various representatives of the authorities, the parties existing in the country and civil society. The 15 members of the delegation joined another 130 EU observers, the latter having made a more in-depth pre-electoral analysis.

20 October 2011
Students
Brussels: The EU increases the number of Erasmus Mundus scholarships for students from Southern Mediterranean countries for the 2011-2012 academic year. To this end, 750 scholarships for students from the South are added to the 1200 already extant. The European Commission likewise announces future measures to promote university student and faculty exchanges from the Southern Mediterranean Region. This initiative follows the creation of partnerships between EU and Mediterranean Partner Country universities and is designed to foster mutual understanding and exchange of ideas and
knowledge. In this regard, the European Commission plans to increase the budget for the Erasmus Mundus programme.

21-23 October 2011

ALF

Krakow: The 10th annual meeting of the 43 Heads of National ALF Networks met in Poland under the aegis of its EU Presidency. This year’s meeting focuses on the role the ALF and its networks should play in the face of the historic changes the Southern Mediterranean Region has undergone due to the Arab Spring. The ALF concentrates its efforts on adapting its programme of activities to the democratic transitions in the region. Moreover, it organises the 2011 Euromed Dialogue Award ceremony at the Egyptian NGO, Development No Borders (DNB). Finally, the meeting concludes with the official announcement of the establishment of a new ALF network in Libya, on the very day Libya’s “national liberation” is announced by the National Transitional Council (CNT). www.euromedalex.org

25 October 2011

Maritime Transport

Brussels: At the 8th meeting of the Sub-Group on Motorways of the Sea, the practical, concrete point of departure for the MEDA MoS II programme is drafted. The programme coordinators and each of the beneficiary countries of MEDA MoS II draw up a first draft of national action plans and identify their respective needs with a view to adapting the technical assistance programme. In addition to ensuring the continuity of MEDA MoS I, the second edition of the programme focuses on studying and putting to use logistic and environmental aspects of the new projects as well as establishing “door-to-door” maritime and intermodal connections. www.euromedtransport.org/home_autoroute.php

November

3 November 2011

Heritage

Kaslik: Within the framework of the Euromed Heritage programme, the Manumed Project presents the Virtual Library of the Mediterranean. This event is held at the Holy Spirit University of Kaslik (USEK), Lebanon. The Manumed Project is designed to contribute to the preservation of written heritage and languages through the Virtual Library of the Mediterranean, allowing the emergence of the largest digital corpus in the world on the written heritage of the Mediterranean Region. http://data.manumed.org/

9-10 November 2011

Urban Planning

Strasbourg: The first UfM Inter-ministerial Meeting since the Arab Spring revolts takes place under the French-Egyptian Co-Presidency. The focus is on sustainable development in the Mediterranean Basin. The meeting allows debate on the creation of an urban development agency for the Mediterranean, called for at the beginning of the year by ARLEM. The latter represents the position of regions and cities before governments and national representatives of partners such as the Arab League, the European Commission and the European Council. At the end of the meeting, the UfM Secretary General is entrusted with the task of formulating the future Euro-Mediterranean Urban Development Strategy, in collaboration with UfM Member States. www.ufmsecretariat.org/

14-15 November 2011

Audiovisual

Tunis: Professionals and national authorities in charge of cinema and audiovisual from the Southern Mediterranean Partner Countries meet at the First Regional Conference on the Euromed Audiovisual III Programme. The Conference revolves around the Euromed Audiovisual III Programme, which is to last for the three forthcoming years, the analysis of cooperation relations between European and Southern Mediterranean countries and among the latter, as well as the establishment of the programme’s priorities. Moreover, a project is presented to collect data on cinema markets for improved comprehension and boosting of cinema and audiovisual markets. http://euromedaudivisuel.net/p.aspx?l=en&mid=106&i=en

15-16 November 2011

Economic Transition

Barcelona: The Euro-Mediterranean forum, Fostering Mutual Understanding, Harmony and Cooperation between the EU and ENP South Partners, is organised by IEMed to discuss Southern Mediterranean economies and draw up recommendations for economic revitalisation. These recommendations are based on the experience gained in past economic transitions and determine the role to be played by central banks, macro-economic policies and international and European institutions in this context. www.iemed.org

16 November 2011

Economy

Luxemburg: A new study published by the EIB’s Economic and Financial Studies Division reveals the major challenges in the post-Arab Spring period. In fact, recalling the economic components of the last few months of crisis, the study brings out the strong risk of growth decline in Southern Mediterranean Partner Countries and the negative influence that the Arab Spring and the corresponding social and political crises have exercised on public finances and on the international market. The report asserts that the greatest challenge for the Euro-Mediterranean Region is the creation of jobs and the mobilisation of national resources. www.eib.org/

16 November 2011

UfM

Strasbourg: Y. Amrani and J. Buzek meet to discuss the major role played by the UfM in the changing Euro-Mediterranean Region. They conclude that the UfM should play a fundamental role in strengthening cooperation and regional integration in the Mediterranean area through its support to democratic transitions while paying particular attention to job creation and sustainable local development. The UfM’s Secretary General states his will to continue to work in close collaboration with the UfM’s Parliamentary Assembly and the EP.

16-18 November 2011

EESC

Istanbul: The Euro-Mediterranean Summit of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions gathers representatives of economic and social councils, employers associations, trade unions and other economic and social interests groups as well as NGOs. Topics of discussion at the Summit are issues relating to the Euro-Med Region and a coordinated political response to events in the
Southern Mediterranean Region. To this end, a variety of speakers and major experts from the EU and Southern Mediterranean Partner Countries participate. www.cese.europa.eu/?i=portal.en.events-and-activities-euromed-summit-2011

21 November 2011
Deauville Partnership
Kuwait: While at the 8th Forum for the Future, Amrani recalls the UfM’s commitment to the Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition. The Forum reviews the Partnership’s initiatives and the progress made. The UfM Secretary General emphasises that the UfM’s contribution to the Working Group on Investment Security in the Mediterranean Region and reiterates the UfM’s full support to the process of democratic transition in Tunisia.

22 November 2011
ALF
Brussels: As part of the Partnership for Democracy and Prosperity, the High Level Advisory Group for a Renewed Strategy of Intercultural Dialogue in the Emerging Mediterranean Region meets at the European Commission headquarters. This high-level meeting follows the one convened by Š. Füle in September to establish the Foundation’s programme for 2012-2014 and its role in the new European policy of support to transition processes in the Southern Mediterranean EU neighbourhood. At the current meeting, Füle reveals the in-depth partnership work in close collaboration with the ALF to revitalise civil society organisations and NGOs in the Southern Mediterranean Region.
www.euromedalex.org

21-25 November 2011
Economy
Barcelona: At the 5th Mediterranean Economic Leaders’ Week, solutions for a better future in the face of the region’s major problems are discussed. Delegates from both Northern and Southern Mediterranean countries focus their discussions on strengthening public-private partnerships and adapting the educational system to market needs. Y. Amrani and the ASCAME representative sign a cooperation agreement to boost the private sector in the economic and social development of the region based on job creation and SMEs, among other priorities. www.medaeconomicweek.org/index

December
1 December 2011
Arab Spring-EU
Brussels: At the Foreign Affairs Council meeting, EU Foreign Affairs Ministers reiterate their support for processes of democratic transition in Southern Mediterranean Partner Countries and their commitment to the EU’s new partnership with these countries on the basis of universal values and mutual responsibility. The EU’s response to the region’s problems is the focus of the meeting: its partnership with civil society, the role of women in the transitions, the funds granted by the EIB and the EBRD, the establishment of a Free Trade Area, job creation or migration and mobility policies in the Euro-Mediterranean Region.

1 December 2011
Syria
The Bashar al-Assad Regime decides to suspend its membership in the UfM in response to measures taken by the EU that qualify as “unjustified political and economic sanctions.” The regime considers these measures an intervention in the country’s internal affairs constituting a violation of its sovereignty. Said suspension shall remain effective until the EU stops its measures of asset freezing, sanctions and visa bans.

9 December 2011
Croatia
Brussels: Croatia signs the Treaty of Accession to the EU and officially enters the EU. The Treaty will become effective as of 1 July 2013 and will make Croatia the 28th Member State of the European Union, as long as it keeps its commitments to the EU until then. The country will be able to participate in the Council’s work and preparatory bodies.

15-16 December 2011
Development
Warsaw: Organised by the European Commission and the Polish Presidency, the European Development Days, just after the Arab Spring, are dedicated to democracy, human rights and governance. Accordingly, the Development Days are attended by special guests such as the Acting Tunisian Prime Minister, the President of the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as numerous other world leaders and representatives of different organisations of interest on the international arena. There is discussion of the link between development and democracy, as well as the EU’s new approach through its Programme for Change and the effectiveness of development aid.
www.eudevdays.eu/past-edds/2011
Chronologies

Other Cooperation Initiatives in the Mediterranean

NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

In the mid-1990s, after the end of the Cold War, NATO started to rethink its role and mission within a new framework and realised that the best way to prevent possible threats to its members was to extend security and stability outside its borders. To this end, NATO launched an initial initiative for Central and Eastern European countries called the Partnership for Peace (PfP). It subsequently launched a second initiative, the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), targeting the southern shore of the Mediterranean. Originally conceived of as a forum for dialogue, the MD later evolved into something more like the PfP. In June 2004, the Alliance re-booted its cooperation with Arab countries by launching the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), aimed at Gulf countries, and by upgrading the MD to a “genuine Partnership.” The MD started in late 1994 with five countries: Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Egypt and Israel. They were joined by Jordan in 1995, and Algeria in 2000. Its aims are to contribute to stability and security in the region, to prevent misunderstanding between NATO and its Mediterranean partners and to promote relations between the participating countries. It is based on the principles of self-differentiation and non-discrimination, mutual benefit, and complementarity with other international security organisations. At the 1997 Madrid Summit, the scope of the MD was expanded beyond a mere forum for political consultation to include a more practical dimension whereby Mediterranean countries could also take part in a number of activities (training, seminars, and conferences at which NATO shared its expertise). At the same summit, the Mediterranean Cooperation Group was established as the Dialogue’s driving body under the authority and supervision of the Atlantic Council. The MD’s Annual Work Programme encompasses different areas of practical cooperation in civil and military affairs. The activities included in the programme are mostly military (85%) and comprise courses at the NATO Defence College, the opportunity to observe or participate in military exercises in order to achieve interoperability, and the chance to take part in NATO-led operations. Additional areas of cooperation include: public diplomacy, military education, defence policy and strategy, civil emergency planning, crisis management and weapons, among others.

As mentioned above, at the Alliance’s 2004 Istanbul Summit, the NATO Heads of State and Government decided to expand the political dimension of the MD to include meetings of Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers and Heads of State and Government. In addition, the number of areas addressed by the Annual Work Programme was increased, as were the number of activities in each area and the number of plenary meetings (NATO+7). Moreover, the practical dimension of the dialogue was improved through the provision of Individual Cooperation Programmes (ICPs), indicating the objectives of a country’s cooperation with NATO in the short-to-medium term. The first countries to complete their individual programmes were Israel and Egypt; to date, all MD countries except Algeria have developed their own ICP with NATO. MD activities are self-financed, but the Alliance can consider providing financial assistance on a case-by-case basis; and cooperation on combating terrorism, intelligence sharing and contributing to military operations (Morocco and Israel participated in Operation Active Endeavour and Morocco contributed forces to the stabilisation of Kosovo).

After a series of high-level consultations between the NATO Secretary General and the GCC countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) was launched at the NATO summit held in the eponymous Turkish city on June 2004. Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar joined the Initiative in the first months of 2005, and the UAE joined shortly after. The ICI focuses on practical collaboration in fields in which NATO can contribute its knowledge and expertise. It offers a menu of bilateral activities in several areas of cooperation, including: tailored advice on defence transformation, budgeting and planning; military-to-military cooperation to attain interoperability; participation in selected NATO PfP exercises and NATO-led operations on a case-by-case basis; and cooperation on fighting terrorism through intelligence sharing. Since the Initiative’s launch, its political dimension has been enhanced (to include high-level meetings, the ICI Ambassadorial Conference and NATO+4 meetings) and its public diplomacy activities have been strengthened. ICI partners have also participated in NATO-led operations: in Afghanistan and, more recently, in Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya, to which Qatar and the UAE contributed air assets.

In 2011, the ICI Group, composed of political advisors from 28 NATO Member Countries and responsible for pro-
posing a series of practical activities and ensuring their implementation, was replaced by the Political and Partnership Committee, which is responsible for all partnerships. It also engages ICI countries to develop individual work plans and supervises the implementation thereof.

The new Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010 refers to both the MD and ICI countries. It underscores the great importance the Alliance attaches to its groups of partners and reafirms its desire to deepen its cooperation with them, in addition to highlighting a series of new security threats: cyber attacks, terrorism, and energy security. The new partnership policy approved at the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin in April 2011 affords all NATO partners access to the same range and number of activities, meaning that MD and ICI partners will have access to activities previously reserved only for PfP partners.

Chronology of the Main Events: January 2011 – December 2011

• 2 February, Brussels (Belgium): NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen meets journalists from Morocco. Topics discussed include NATO’s new partnership policy; its transformation and outreach to the Mediterranean region and the Middle East; its military cooperation under the MD; its partnerships and the ICPs; intelligence sharing; and the fight against terrorism.

• 9 February, Tel Aviv (Israel): NATO SG Rasmussen meets Prime Minister Netanyahu and Foreign Affairs Minister Liberman and highlights Israel’s valuable contribution to the MD from the start and the need to cooperate and strengthen political dialogue and practical cooperation in order to face common security concerns. The NATO SG also delivers a speech at the 11th Annual Herzliya Conference covering a wide range of security issues. In his speech, he underlines the importance of defining threats and challenges in order to find common solutions, especially in times of upheaval and uncertainty. It is also a chance to define NATO’s role in the Middle East peace process: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a major impediment to regional stability and, although NATO is not involved in the peace process, it could nevertheless act as a facilitator. The fact that Israeli and Arab partners gather around the same table in the MD is an achievement that should not be underestimated.

• 14-16 February, Doha (Qatar): NATO SG Rasmussen conducts his first bilateral visit to the ICI partner. He is received by the Emir and the Crown Prince and has consultations with government and military officials. In his discussions, the NATO SG underlines that NATO and its Gulf partners face common new threats and that, precisely to this end, the Allies are enhancing security policy consultations and offering greater practical cooperation.

• 15 February, Doha (Qatar): The NATO Deputy SG, Amb. Bisogniero, addresses the audience of the NATO-ICI Ambassadorial Conference, which gathers together representatives from the four ICI partners, as well as Oman and Saudi Arabia in their capacity as observers. The MENA and Gulf regions are currently experiencing a period of instability; however, they have also expressed a strong desire for real reform and democracy, which are the basis of long-term stability. NATO and its Gulf partners need to work more closely together to reinvigorate their partnership in the framework of the new Strategic Concept by ensuring greater opportunities for consultation on security issues and expanding the range of practical activities. The areas of potential enhanced cooperation are: energy security, maritime security and the proliferation of missile technology.

• 1-2 March, Athens (Greece): In a seminar organised by the Middle East Special Group (GSM) of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA), members of the GSM gather to discuss the situation in North Africa and the Middle East. The NATO PA is an inter-parliamentary organisation of legislators from NATO countries and 14 associate members, and its GSM provides a forum for parliamentarians from NATO and the MENA region to discuss political and security issues. In the year’s first seminar, parliamentarians focus on the regional upheavals and their possible consequences, emphasising the support that the NATO PA should be prepared to give for democratic transformation in terms of increasing media freedom and creating stronger civil society institutions and viable election systems.

• 27 June, Brussels (Belgium): A group of experts from think tanks and research institutes from the Middle East, Europe and North America visit NATO headquarters and meet with NATO international and military staff to exchange views on current developments in the Middle East, the prospects for the region, the perception that its inhabitants have of NATO and the West, and the future role of NATO partnerships (MD and ICI).

• 4-5 July, La Maddalena (Italy): The NATO PA GSM’s second seminar of the year focuses on the changing situation in the Middle East and North Africa through key speeches by senior officials from Italy, Egypt and Iraq and, on the initiative of the host country, Iran, which triggers several objections.

• 22 September, Brussels (Belgium): A group of young leaders from the MENA region visit NATO headquarters as part of the United Nation Alliance of Civilizations Fellowship Programme. Topics tackled include NATO’s transformation and outreach in the region and its operation in Libya.

• 7 December, Brussels (Belgium): During the NATO Foreign Affairs Ministerial Meeting, the ministers discuss how to further engage the MENA countries following the Arab Spring. They welcome the events occurring in the region and underline the need to reinforce cooperation with interested countries. To this end, they state that they are ready to consider requests for partnership with NATO from countries in the region, including Libya, and to share NATO’s unique expertise in defence and security-sector reform.

For further information:

Mediterranean Dialogue
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52927.htm

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52956.htm

NATO PA Mediterranean Special Group
http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=743

NATO Defence College
www.ndc.nato.int/
2. Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation in the OSCE

Since the OSCE’s 1975 Helsinki Final Act, security in Europe has been considered closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean region as a whole. Accordingly, over the last decades, the OSCE has strengthened and enhanced its relations with Mediterranean countries, namely: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. What was once simply a formal statement without any practical or political consequences has developed over the years and also been challenged by events in the region, as witnessed by the recent uprisings and political uncertainty affecting some Arab countries. In the early 1990s, Algeria, Israel, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia requested a closer relationship with the OSCE as “non-participating Mediterranean States.” As a result, they were invited to Ministerial Council meetings, Security Review conferences and OSCE Troika meetings and had free access to OSCE documents. At the 1994 Budapest Summit, this relationship was finally institutionalised and an informal contact group was set up to facilitate the exchange of information on issues of mutual interest. Mediterranean countries were also invited to certain selected meetings of the Permanent Council devoted to Mediterranean issues. In 1995, these countries were finally upgraded to the real partnership status of Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation (MPCs). In 1998, Jordan also applied to become an MPC. The 2003 Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century advocated for deeper cooperation with MPCs due to the increasing importance of the threats originating in adjacent regions. This intensified cooperation could result in inviting partners to participate as observers in Permanent Council Meetings and to take part in information exchanges, as well as in encouraging them to voluntarily implement OSCE commitments. Identified fields of cooperation with partners also included: anti-terrorism activities, border issues, economic and environmental activities, anti-trafficking initiatives, human dimension meetings and election observation. In 2007, the cooperation was taken a step further with the establishment of the Mediterranean Contact Group, which meets five times a year to address possible ways for the OSCE to support a peaceful democratic transition in the Southern Mediterranean based on individual MPCs’ requests and tailored to their specific needs. Representatives from OSCE MPCs (namely, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia) brief experts from the OSCE and other international organisations on current events in their countries. These meetings provide an opportunity to address a wide range of issues in the three OSCE security dimensions: border security and management, energy and environmental security, and migration management and democratic reform. In 2012, Ireland handed over the chairmanship of the Mediterranean Contact Group to the Ukraine in order to take on the OSCE Chairmanship.

Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC)

29 June – 1 July, Vienna (Austria): This year, the ASRC, under the theme “Towards a Security Community: What Has to Be Done,” offers an opportunity to review security work undertaken by OSCE Participating States (PSs). It is preceded by a special session to address interaction with Partners for Cooperation (Afghanistan and Mediterranean Partners in particular) and to explore the potential for enhanced engagement in tackling international threats and border and migration management.

20th Annual Session of the OSCE PA

6-10 July, Belgrade (Serbia): More than 200 parliamentarians from the Member States of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly adopt the Belgrade Declaration, which addresses cybersecurity, Internet freedom and human rights, among other issues. They also...
call for reforms to make the OSCE more transparent and open to civil society.

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Fall Meetings - Mediterranean Forum

9 October, Dubrovnik (Croatia): The Croatian Parliament hosts the 10th Annual Fall Meeting, which includes the Mediterranean Forum, in which representatives from Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia join their colleagues from the 52 Participant States of the OSCE PA. Parliamentary delegations from Algeria and Morocco and diplomats from Israel and Tunisia brief attendees on their respective countries. Participants stress how important it is for governments to speak out on human rights issues, support the role of women in North African politics, and progress towards a two-state solution in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

www.oscepa.org

OSCE Mediterranean Conference

10-11 October, Budva (Montenegro): Given current events in the region, this year’s conference is devoted to “Democratic Transformation: Challenges and Opportunities in the Mediterranean Region.” Participants share best practices and lessons learnt. Among the key topics are: the role of police and the army in democratic society; promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law; and the strengthening of good governance. The conference confirms that the security of the OSCE area and that of the MPCs are “inextricably linked.” The Lithuanian Chairmanship of the OSCE is also working on an action-oriented document to be presented at the Vilnius Ministerial Council to upgrade and strengthen dialogue and cooperation with Partners.

www.osce.org/eca/86972

Side Events at the Vilnius Ministerial Council

4-5 December, Vilnius (Lithuania): Two conferences and a side event are organised before the OSCE Ministerial Council. The OSCE-MPC Conference for Civil Society on “Transparency and Pluralism in Electoral Good Practice, Political Participation, Justice and Legal Reform” and the side event on “Tolerance and Discrimination in Democratic Transition” offer a forum for more than 80 civil-society representatives from OSCE PSs and MPCs to exchange ideas, get in touch, network and draft recommendations for the Ministerial Council. They also provide a chance to raise NGOs’ awareness of OSCE standards, institutions, tools and practices. For its part, the “Civil Society Parallel Conference” gathers together representatives from civil society throughout the OSCE area to review the status of human rights in the region and the challenges for media freedom and citizens’ freedom to meet and organise. They also review the threats and challenges to the democratic process and the rule of law. A compilation of recommendations on these issues is presented to the Ministerial Council for consideration and distributed to all 56 OSCE Participating States.

OSCE Ministerial Council

6-7 December, Vilnius (Lithuania): The Foreign Ministers of the OSCE Participating States and Partners for Cooperation gather to address security challenges. A consensus is reached in addressing transnational threats, combating trafficking of human beings, promoting equal opportunities for men and women in the professional sphere, and enhancing engagement with Mediterranean Partners. In the Vilnius Declaration a decision on Partners for Cooperation (Asian and Mediterranean) underscores the participants’ willingness to promote sustainable security and support democratic transition under the UN framework. In the Council’s closing remarks, the partners also decide to raise the Partnership to a new level by facilitating greater interaction on a wide range of practical issues to help them manage their transitional processes and implement reforms.

www.osce.org/node/82462

3. The 5+5 Dialogue

The 5+5 Dialogue was set up on 10 October 1990 during a ministerial meeting in Rome of the ten countries of the Western Mediterranean Basin: five countries from the Arab Maghreb Union (Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Libya and Tunisia) and five members of the European Union (France, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Malta). The 5+5 Dialogue has a flexible and informal nature. Over the years, it has been transformed from a merely political forum to one for strengthened regional and multidisciplinary cooperation in the Western Mediterranean. Its flexibility and informality have enabled a gradual opening up, and the participating ministers and senior officials now meet to discuss an increasing number of issues. The Dialogue only deals with the Western Mediterranean and thus does not have to address the Israel-Palestine conflict, which, along with the homogeneity of the Dialogue participants, enables it to reach more agreements. Originally just a political compromise between Foreign Ministers, it later expanded to include other spheres, such as education, the environment and renewable energies, as well as home affairs (since 1995), migrations (since 2002), inter-parliamentary relations (since 2003), defence (since 2004), tourism (since 2006) and transport (since 2007). Due to its practical and operational nature, it is an ideal forum for the exchange of ideas and the launch of new initiatives. It can also capitalise on its restricted geographical scope, which is limited to the Western Mediterranean. This initiative has encouraged the insertion of Libya and Mauritania in the regional context.

Main Meetings in 2011

• 21-23 February, Tunis (Tunisia): The 5+5 Education Ministers meet as planned at the last meeting, held in Birritz in 2009. Participants take an interest in digital development in schools. The first edition of the Euromed Education exhibition takes place during the International Fair in Kram. As part of the “5+5 Education” initiative, this meeting is the first chance for information and communication technology (ICT) sector professionals and ministers to build new partnerships, increase their knowledge of the education sector and note the differences between the two shores in order to enable better relations with regard to education in the digital era.
• June, Valetta (Malta): The second 5+5 Summit of Heads of State and Gov-
4. Adriatic Ionian Initiative (All)

The Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (All) was established at the Summit on Development and Security in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas held in Ancona in 2000 as a response to the region’s political and ideological fragmentation following the dismantling of the Berlin Wall. In the presence of the European Commission, the Foreign Ministers of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy and Slovenia signed the Ancona Declaration with the aim of strengthening regional cooperation to promote economic and political stability in the area and to support the prospects for EU integration of its non-EU Member Countries. In 2007, Serbia and Montenegro joined the Initiative. The region’s geopolitical situation has changed since the organisation was founded: Slovenia joined the EU in 2004, Croatia will become an official member by 2013, and the other four countries – Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia – are advancing towards EU integration within the Stabilisation and Association Process framework, albeit each with its own timeframe and conditions.

The All’s main focus is to find common solutions to common problems given the historical, social, cultural and geopolitical similarities among the region’s countries. According to the Permanent Secretariat (PS), stronger social and trade relations between the Participating Countries will strengthen the region as a whole both politically and economically. The problems addressed include: environmental protection in the Adriatic and Ionian Seas; inter-university cooperation; culture; the preservation of art after natural disasters; the fight against crime; and maritime cooperation.

The Initiative’s decision-making body is the Adriatic Ionian Council (comprised of the Foreign Ministers of the Participating Countries), and its agenda is prepared three times a year at the regular meetings of the Committee of Senior Officials (the executive body). The Initiative’s Chairmanship rotates alphabetically each year in May/June. The Montenegrin Chairmanship ended in May 2011 and Serbia took over until May 2012. The All Permanent Secretariat (PS), founded in 2008 under the Greek Chairmanship, manages the Regional Cooperation Programme, which co-finances cross-border projects operated through the Round Tables and supports All countries in the process of implementing the EU Strategy for the Adriatic Ionian Macro-Region. The PS was launched to make the initiative more “project-oriented,” as this technique has proven to be effective in the macro-region.

In this regard, the approval of the EU Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Macro-Region, the third macro-region in Europe, is an important step towards the region’s development. Its tasks are to connect the areas of the macro-region to promote sustainable development and protect the coastal marine environment from pollution while following the EU’s strategic guidelines for development, growth and stability and, in particular, the EU’s 2020 Strategy. The latter will be implemented in 2014 during the Greek and Italian Presidencies of the European Union. The common goal of the cooperation between All Participating States, coastal regional authorities and the thematic networks is to make the basin an internal sea of the EU by the time the Western Balkan countries have been integrated. Due to the area’s highly heterogeneous characteristics, the Adriatic and Ionian Seas will be affected by the free movement of persons, goods and services. The Initiative also collaborates with other regional organisations in South-Eastern Europe, namely the Central European Initiative (CEI), the Regional Co-operation Council (RCC), the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Danube Cooperation Process (DCP) and different Adriatic and Ionian forums (Forum of the Adriatic and Ionian Chambers of Commerce, UniAdrion and the Forum of Adriatic and Ionian Cities and Towns). This wide network of relationships is a key reference point for the development of EU policies at the local and regional level; it helps make the support for transnational partnerships strategic at a local level and contributes to the structuring of systems of dialogue and collaboration among local authorities, regions and central administrations.

All action is conducted through four Round Tables devoted to the following issues: small and medium-sized enterprises; transport and maritime cooperation; tourism, culture and inter-university cooperation; and the environment and protection against fire.
Main Events under the Montenegrin Chairmanship

During the Montenegrin Chairmanship, the main focus of the Round Tables has been close collaboration within the EU framework in order to facilitate EU accession.

• 8 April, Ancona (Italy): During the 1st International Forum on Fisheries of the Adriatic-Ionian Basin, held in collaboration with Adriatic and Ionian coastal states and the European Commission, participants agree to study new common cross-border projects, particularly in the area of subsidiary activities for fisheries.

• 11-13 April, Budva (Montenegro): The 9th Meeting of the Presidents of the Parliaments of All Member Countries on “The Area of the Mediterranean – The Cradle of the Mediterranean” and “Sustainable Development in the Energy Sector in the Adriatic-Ionian Region” is held. The participants officially undertake to mobilise their respective parliaments to intensify their efforts to achieve the EU integration of all Western Balkan All Participating Countries and to ask the European institutions to develop a macro-regional strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Basin.

• 12 April, Podgorica (Montenegro): The Round Table for Tourism, Culture and Inter-University Cooperation aims to promote faster, permanent development among the All countries by strengthening the tourism sector. The mandate of the meeting is to reach maximum potential through vocational education and maritime tourism development while recognising the importance of sustainability and environmental protection. The panel also addresses the issues of cooperation in tourism and expansion to distant markets.

• 22 May, Brussels (Belgium): 3rd Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials. The Montenegrin Chairmanship reminds participants about FYROM’s interest in becoming a member of the All. A consensus is not reached due to the refusal of Greece, Albania and the All-PS Secretary General, which argue that the All is a maritime organisation and that there is thus no reason for a non-coastal state to join. The participants agree to take time to assess the FYROM’s proposal and to work on a legal framework for accession. The Serbian Chairmanship indicates the following priority areas: transport and communication and inter-university cooperation.

• 23 May, Brussels (Belgium): At the 13th Meeting of the Adriatic and Ionian Council, participants acknowledge the progress made in strengthening ties between the EU and All countries to facilitate their future entry in the EU and to facilitate collaboration on joint programmes. The participants also underscore the common desire of the Parliaments of the Participating States to collectively reach EU goals and the importance of intergovernmental cooperation in the Adriatic and Ionian Basin as a tool for promoting sustainable development in the region.

Main Events under the Serbian Chairmanship

The main objectives of the Serbian Chairmanship are to improve the promotion of the democratic values of the EU and to strengthen relations between All Member Countries. Special attention will be given to the fight against organised crime.

• 21 June, Belgrade (Serbia): Meeting of the Committee of Senior Officials of the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative. One of the priorities of the Serbian Chairmanship is for the EU to establish the Adriatic Ionian Macro-Region. Support from EU Member Countries is crucial for this purpose. The participants also support the proposals to work on a protocol for the preservation of artwork after earthquakes or natural disasters and the drafting of guidelines for submission of common, cross-border projects subsidised by the funds provided by Italy. The All-PS will be a reference point for information on the approval of the Adriatic Ionian as a macro-region and has access to funds (provided by Italy) to support the establishment of the macro-region. The participants agree that the All does not foresee new enlargements.

• 23 September, New York (USA): In informal meeting of Foreign Ministers of All, CEI and SEECP Member States. The aim is to strengthen cooperation among the CEI, the SEECP and the All, especially in terms of economic cooperation and the need to upgrade infrastructure and transport facilities in the region. The Ministers agree that a flexible, project-oriented approach is the most efficient for the region and call for the inclusion of private business in designing and implementing these projects.

For further information: www.aii-ps.org/
This chapter provides details of the results of presidential and legislative elections that took place in 2011 in independent states, presented in circum-Mediterranean order. The list also includes referenda and those elections held in autonomous entities or in any other relevant territory that are of particular political significance.

**Portugal**

**Presidential Elections**

23 January 2011

Previous elections: 22 January 2006

Parliamentary Republic. The President is elected for a five-year term.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>% 1st round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aníbal Cavaco Silva (Social Democratic Party, People’s Party, Hope for Portugal Movement)</td>
<td>52.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manuel Alegre (Socialist Party, Left Bloc, Democratic Party of the Atlantic, PCTP/MRPP)</td>
<td>19.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fernando Nobre (Independent)</td>
<td>14.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Manuel Coelho (New Democracy Party)</td>
<td>4.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defensor Moura (Independent)</td>
<td>1.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout 46.52%

**Legislative Elections**

5 June 2011

Previous elections: 27 September 2009

Portugal has a unicameral Assembly of the Republic (Assembleia da Republica) with 230 seats. The deputies are elected through a party-list proportional representation system. Assembly members represent the entire country, rather than the constituencies in which they were elected. Governments require majority support in the Assembly in order to remain in office.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SDP)</td>
<td>46.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party (SP)</td>
<td>32.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Party (CDS/PP, Christian democrat)</td>
<td>10.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Unity Coalition (CDU, coalition of the Communist party and the Ecologist party)</td>
<td>6.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Bloc (BE, Socialist/Trotskyite/Communist)</td>
<td>3.48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 58.03%

**Spain**

**Legislative Elections**

20 November 2011

Previous elections: 9 March 2008

Parliamentary Monarchy with bicameral legislature, the Cortes Generales is composed of the Senate and the Congress of Deputies. Elections are held to renew both bodies to serve four-year terms: 350 members are elected to the Congress of Deputies through proportional representation with closed party lists, and in the Senate 259 seats are allocated as follows: 208 directly elected in four-seat constituencies and the other 51 appointed by the autonomous legislatures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Senators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People’s Party (PP, conservative)</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE, social democrats)</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Deputies</th>
<th>Senators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Left (IU-ICV-CHA, left wing)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union, Progress and Democracy (UPD, liberal)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convergence and Union (CiU, conservative nationalist regional)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amaiur (left wing independent regional)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basque Nationalist Party (EAJ-PNV, conservative nationalist regional)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC, social democrats independent regional)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galician Nationalist Bloc (BNG, left wing independent regional)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canarian Coalition-New Canarias (CC-NC-PNC, conservative regional)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 68.94%

**Slovenia**

**Legislative Elections**

4 December 2011

Previous elections: 21 September 2008

Parliamentary Republic with bicameral legislature, the Assembly of Slovenia (Skupscina Slovenije). The National Council (Drzavni Svet) has 40 members, which represent local and business interests, among other duties. Their terms of office last for five years. Elections were called to elect the 90 members of the National Assembly (Drzavni Zbor).
88 were elected based on a system of proportional representation. The two remaining seats were reserved for members from ethnic minority groups. Terms of office last for four years.

**Croatia**

**Legislative Elections**

4 December 2011

Previous elections: 25 November 2007

Croatia has a unicameral system based on the Parliament of Croatia (Hrvatski Zbor) composed of 151 members elected to a four-year term on the basis of direct suffrage by secret ballot. Seats are allocated as follows: 140 members of the parliament are elected in the 10 constituencies representing the whole Croatian territory and they can either belong to a party or run as independent; three members are elected in the constituency representing the Croatian Diaspora and eight are elected to represent the ethnic minorities in a one-seat constituency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zoran Jankovic’s List – Positive Slovenia (LZJ-PS, Social liberalism)</td>
<td>28.51 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenian Democratic Party (SDS, conservative)</td>
<td>26.19 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats (SD)</td>
<td>10.52 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gregor Virant’s Civic List (LG, liberal)</td>
<td>8.37 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Pensioners of Slovenia (DeSUS)</td>
<td>6.97 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenian People’s Party (Slovenska Ludska Stranka, SLS)</td>
<td>6.83 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Slovenia – Christian People’s Party (NS, Christian democrat)</td>
<td>4.88 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungarian and Italian National Community</td>
<td>- 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 65.6

**FYROM**

**Legislative Elections**

5 June 2011

Previous elections: 1 June 2008

FYROM is a parliamentary republic with unicameral legislature. The 123 members of the Assembly of the Republic (Sobranie) are elected on the basis of direct suffrage to a four-year term: 120 of them are elected through proportional representation (using the D’Hondt method) in six constituencies; the other three are elected by citizens living abroad through a majoritarian voting system. The renewal of the Parliament was called after its early dissolution on April 14 2011.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties/coalition</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coalition: Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) and allies</td>
<td>40.26 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and allies</td>
<td>33.65 42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Union for Integration (BDI/DUI)</td>
<td>10.51 15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 61.77 (domestic electoral districts)

**Turkey**

**Legislative Elections**

12 June 2011

Previous elections: 22 July 2007

Parliamentary Republic whose legislative power is vested in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi), which is composed of 550 seats. In order to gain a seat in Parliament, a party must obtain at least 10% of votes cast in the Parliamentary elections at national level, while independent candidates must obtain 10% of votes cast in the district where they wish to be elected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrat Party of Albanians (PDS/DPA)</td>
<td>6.06 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Revival (NDR)</td>
<td>2.74 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93.22 123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 63.48%

**Cyprus**

**Legislative Elections**

22 May 2011

Previous elections: 21 May 2006

Presidential democratic republic with a unicameral legislature. 59 members of the House of Representatives (Vouli Antiprosopon/Temsilciler Meclisi) are elected by proportional representation for five-year terms of office, with the exception of the three representatives of the Maronite, Roman-Catholic and Armenian minorities. 24 seats are allocated to the Turkish minority in the Northern part of the island, although they have remained vacant since 1963.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Coalition (DISY, conservatives of the liberal party)</td>
<td>30.3 20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Egypt

#### Referendum

19 March 2011

The referendum concerns constitutional reforms, which include a limitation on the presidency to a maximum of two six-year terms, judicial supervision of elections, a commission to draft a new constitution following the parliamentary election, and easier access to presidential elections by candidates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>77.27%</td>
<td>22.73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Legislative Elections

28 November 2011 – 11 January 2012

Previous elections: 29 November 2010

Egypt has a bicameral parliament composed of the Advisory Council (Majlis al-Shura), and the People’s Assembly (Majlis al-Shaab). People’s Assembly representatives will be elected in the 2011 elections. The Assembly was dissolved by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) after the fall of Mubarak. There are a total 508 seats in the People’s Assembly: 498 seats are elected and 10 seats appointed by the SCAF. Out of those 498 seats, two-thirds shall be elected from party lists through proportional representation. The remaining 166 seats are open to candidates running as individuals -two for each of the 83 districts-, who may or may not be affiliated with a political party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom and Justice Party (Muslim Brotherhood)</td>
<td>44.6 % 222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Nour Party (Salafi)</td>
<td>22.5 % 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Wald Party (Nationalist liberal)</td>
<td>7.8 % 39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (social democrats)</td>
<td>3.2 % 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Egyptians Party (Social liberal)</td>
<td>3.0 % 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building and Development Party (Salafi Islamist)</td>
<td>2.6 % 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Wasat Party (Moderate Islamist)</td>
<td>2.0 % 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reform and Development Party (Liberal)</td>
<td>1.8 % 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Socialist Alliance Party (Socialist)</td>
<td>1.4 % 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignity Party (Nasserist)</td>
<td>1.2 % 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom Party (NDP offshoot)</td>
<td>1.0 % 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Citizen Party (NDP offshoot)</td>
<td>1.0 % 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Party of Egypt (NDP offshoot)</td>
<td>0.8 % 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Progressive Unionist Party (Social liberal)</td>
<td>0.6 % 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authenticity Party (Salafi Islamist)</td>
<td>0.6 % 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Party (NDP offshoot)</td>
<td>0.6 % 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomorrow Party (liberal)</td>
<td>0.4 % 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilization Party (Islamist)</td>
<td>0.4 % 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Islamic Labour Party (Islamist)</td>
<td>0.2 % 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice Party (Centre-right)</td>
<td>0.2 % 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Arab Socialist Party</td>
<td>0.2 % 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt Freedom Party (Social liberal)</td>
<td>0.2 % 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Peace Party (Social liberal)</td>
<td>0.2 % 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian Reform Party</td>
<td>0.2 % 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Unification Party (NDP offshoot)</td>
<td>0.2 % 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Party (NDP offshoot)</td>
<td>0.2 % 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasserist Party (Nasserist)</td>
<td>0.2 % 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality &amp; Development Party (centre-left)</td>
<td>0.2 % 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>4.2 % 21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elected Members</td>
<td>100 % 498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAF Appointed Members</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Members</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout: 54%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Tunisia

#### Constituent Assembly Election

23 October 2011

Previous elections: 25 October 2009

Constitutional Republic with unicameral system composed of the National Constituent Assembly (Al-Majlis Al-watani Al-Taasisi) created in 2011 after the dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and Chamber of Advisors by the new Government following the removal of President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali the same year. The 217 seats of the new Constituent Assembly are elected by direct suffrage through proportional representation on closed lists.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ennahda (Islamist)</td>
<td>37.04 89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congress for the Republic</td>
<td>8.71 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(social democratic)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular Petition for</td>
<td>6.74 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom, Justice and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development (populism)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ettakatol (social democratic)</td>
<td>7.03 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Democratic Party</td>
<td>3.94 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(social liberal)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Initiative (Centrist)</td>
<td>3.19 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Modernist Pole</td>
<td>2.79 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(socialist)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afek Tounes (liberal)</td>
<td>1.89 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisian Workers’ Communist</td>
<td>1.57 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Movement</td>
<td>0.75 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement of Socialist</td>
<td>0.56 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats (social democratic)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Patriotic Union (liberal)</td>
<td>1.26 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Patriots’ Movement</td>
<td>0.83 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Marxist and pan Arab)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghrebain Liberal Party</td>
<td>0.47 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Social Nation Party</td>
<td>0.38 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Destour Party</td>
<td>0.38 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive Struggle Party</td>
<td>0.25 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity and Equality Party</td>
<td>0.19 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Unionist Nation Party</td>
<td>0.14 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>1.54 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout: 51.97 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Morocco

#### Referendum

1 July 2011

The referendum concerns the approval of the fifth constitutional reform proposed by King Mohammed VI. On July 17 2011, The Interior Minister Taib Cherkaoui announces the results of the referendum.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>97.58 96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>2.42 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout: 73.46 %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Legislative Elections – Assembly of Representatives

25 November 2011
Previous elections: 7 September 2007
Parliamentary Monarchy with bicameral legislature: the Assembly of representatives (Majlis al-Nuwab/Assemblée des Répresents) and the Assembly of Councillors (Majlis al-Mustasharin). In the 2011 elections the 395 members of the Assembly of representatives are elected with direct universal suffrage: 305 from party lists in 92 constituencies and the remaining 90 seats from a national list (single constituency) according to a system of quotas: 60 seats reserved for women and 30 reserved for men under the age of 40.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Development Party (PJD, Islamist)</td>
<td>27.08</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istiqal Party (PI, Centre-right, nationalism)</td>
<td>15.19</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| National Rally of Independents (RNI, Centre-right, liberal) | 13.16 | 52 |
| Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM, liberal)          | 11.90 | 47 |
| Socialist Union of People’s Forces (USFP)               | 9.87  | 39 |
| Popular Movement (MP, conservative)                      | 8.10  | 32 |
| Constitutional Union (UC, centrist)                     | 5.82  | 23 |
| Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS, communist)        | 4.55  | 18 |
| Labour Party (PT, Centre-left)                           | 1     | 4   |
| Democratic and Social Movement (MDS, centrist)           | 0.50  | 2   |
| Party of Renewal and Equity (PRE, liberal)               | 0.50  | 2   |
| Environment and Development Party (PEDD, green)          | 0.50  | 2   |
| Democratic Way (AHD)                                     | 0.50  | 2   |
| Green Left Party (PGV, green)                             | 0.25  | 1   |
| Party of Liberty and Social Justice (PLJS, centrist)     | 0.25  | 1   |
| Front of Democratic Forces (FFD, socialist)              | 0.25  | 1   |
| Action Party (PA, Centre-left)                            | 0.25  | 1   |
| Union and Democracy Party (PUD, conservative)             | 0.25  | 1   |

Turnout: 45.4%

Sources

Adam Carr’s Electoral Archive
http://psephos.adam-carr.net
Freedom House
www.freedomhouse.org
IFES Election Guide
www.electionguide.org/index.php
Keesing’s Record of World Events
www.keesings.com
OPEMAM Observatory on Politics and Elections in the Arab and Muslim World
www.observatorioelectoral.es
Parline Database
www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp
## TABLE A1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Payments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>145.27</td>
<td>79.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>108.43</td>
<td>79.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>185.35</td>
<td>219.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo (Res. 1244 of the UNSC)</td>
<td>161.26</td>
<td>210.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>30.94</td>
<td>10.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>90.08</td>
<td>41.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>82.14</td>
<td>56.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>34.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>654.00</td>
<td>222.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>59.21</td>
<td>38.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>50.40</td>
<td>40.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>72.20</td>
<td>98.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territory</td>
<td>340.87</td>
<td>333.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>193.50</td>
<td>103.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>12.00</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>78.93</td>
<td>69.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>69.00</td>
<td>39.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>155.00</td>
<td>168.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>15.62</td>
<td>19.08</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


## CHART A1

**EU Cooperation 2010**

### TABLE A2

**European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI): 2010 and 2011**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2010 (in millions of euros)</th>
<th>2011 (in millions of euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank and Gaza*</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total ENPI (Bilateral)</strong></td>
<td><strong>940</strong></td>
<td><strong>802</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The data for the West Bank and Gaza include the ENPI, humanitarian aid, UNRWA and the Instrument for Stability.\n\nOwn production. Source: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/aap/2011_en.htm

### TABLE A3

**Mediterranean Candidate Countries for Accession**

#### Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(in millions of euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>153.58*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROm</td>
<td>91.68*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>653.70</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component I. Transition Assistance and Institution Building</th>
<th>2010 (in millions of euros)</th>
<th>2011 (in millions of euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political criteria</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic criteria</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting programmes</td>
<td>15.60</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component II Cross-border Cooperation</td>
<td>21.30</td>
<td>21.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component III Regional Development</td>
<td>56.80</td>
<td>14.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>9.47</td>
<td>6.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>29.40</td>
<td>1.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
<td>8.40</td>
<td>26.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component IV Human Resources Development</td>
<td>36.91</td>
<td>12.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component V Rural Development</td>
<td>36.91</td>
<td>12.50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total includes multi-beneficiary programmes.**

**Total includes Nuclear Safety multi-beneficiary IPA 2010

### TABLE A4

**Provisions for Aid under the IPA for 2011 (Candidate and Potential Candidate Countries)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>157.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>98.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>781.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>108.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>202.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo (Res. 1244 of the UNSC)</td>
<td>68.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-beneficiary programme</td>
<td>160.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE A5

**European Investment Bank Loans to Mediterranean Countries in 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans by Sector</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Croatia</strong></td>
<td>511.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cofinancing of EU-supported projects mainly in transport and environment sectors</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading of vinyl chloride monomer (VCM) plant and construction of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) plant at complex on island of Krk</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of shopping centre in Split</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of projects carried out by SMEs and mid-cap companies</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bosnia and Herzegovina</strong></td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and rehabilitation of water and sanitation facilities in Republika Srpska</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in senior A tranche of regional A&amp;B sub-fund</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serbia</strong></td>
<td>690.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Replacement of electromechanical meters by digital meters integrated into remote reading and connection/disconnection system</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of 47 km bypass, of which 27 km of motorway and 20 km of road, on panEuropean transport corridor X, west and south of Belgrade</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of motorway section in pan-European corridor X in Serbia</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of new Sava bridge and approach roads in Belgrade</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments aimed at revitalising public sector R&amp;D</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in senior A tranche of regional A&amp;B sub-fund</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support programme for increasing supply and quality of pre-university education</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Montenegro</strong></td>
<td>49.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation and construction of municipal water and sanitation infrastructure</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in senior A tranche of regional A&amp;B sub-fund</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FYROM</strong></td>
<td>52.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expansion of water supply networks in rural areas and improvement of wastewater disposal nationwide</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in senior A tranche of regional A&amp;B sub-fund</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Albania</strong></td>
<td>50.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme of rehabilitation of secondary and local roads throughout Albania</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in senior A tranche of regional A&amp;B sub-fund</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>1,934.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs, primarily in manufacturing and services sectors</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of renewable energy, energy efficiency and climate change mitigation projects</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading of access network for fixed line operations</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension of water and wastewater system to serve entire Bursa metropolitan area</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening of science and research system and improvement of Turkey’s innovation capacity</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D conducted at national research institutes associated with Scientific and Technological Research Council</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects, with particular focus on smaller businesses</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects, mainly in manufacturing and services sectors</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of SMEs in several sectors</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>309.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs located in least developed provinces of eastern Turkey</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*(Continue)*
## TABLE A5  European Investment Bank Loans to Mediterranean Countries in 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Amount (€)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>906.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza-West Bank</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Morocco**: Expansion of Tanger Med Port’s container transhipment facilities (200) and construction of motorway between Berrechid and Beni Mellal (220).
- **Tunisia**: Upgrading of national power grid (185), construction of 400 MW single-shaft combined-cycle gas turbine plant in Sousse (194), and first phase of construction of 18 km of priority railway lines in Tunis (119).
- **Egypt**: Upgrading and expansion of national power transmission network (260), construction of gas-fired combined-cycle power plant in Nile Delta, north-west of Cairo (300), and construction of oil-refining installations for converting heavy petroleum residues to cleaner middle distillates in Mostorod (346.4).
- **Lebanon**: Financing of projects carried out by small and micro-enterprises (1.5) and participation in generalist private equity fund investing in Lebanese SMEs (5).
- **Syria**: Modernisation of water supply and wastewater collection and treatment infrastructure in north-west Syria (55) and provision of medical equipment for new hospitals in Damascus (130).
- **Algeria**: Construction and operation of sub-sea natural gas transmission pipeline between Beni Saf in Algeria and landfall near Almería in Spain (500).
- **Gaza-West Bank**: Participation in generalist private equity fund investing in SMEs in Palestinian Territories (5).


## TABLE A6  EU Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO)

### Funding Decisions in Mediterranean Areas in 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Amount (€)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara (Sahrawi refugees)</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Palestinian Territories**: 51
- **Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon**: 7
- **Western Sahara (Sahrawi refugees)**: 10

Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean

TABLE B1  Breakdown of Net Spanish Official Development Assistance in the Mediterranean Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>€</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maghreb and Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>39,026,882</td>
<td>9.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>14,793,292</td>
<td>3.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>7,287,400</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>17,350,782</td>
<td>4.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>26,448</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>136,923,140</td>
<td>34.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>71,376,756</td>
<td>17.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Saharan Refugees</td>
<td>20,835,166</td>
<td>5.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>4,502,032</td>
<td>1.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>89,143,277</td>
<td>22.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>401,265,175</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Balkans and Turkey</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>10,298,105</td>
<td>7.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>26,477,111</td>
<td>18.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>502,774</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>1,254,918</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>1,290,507</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Kosovo (Serbia)</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>140,524,582</td>
<td>100.00</td>
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Source: AECID, Seguimiento PACI (PACI Follow-ups, i.e. reports on the Annual International Cooperation Plan) for 2009 and 2010.

CHART B1  Breakdown of Spanish Development Aid in the Maghreb and the Middle East by Sector (2010)

- Financial Infrastructure and Services 53%
- Productive Sectors 6%
- Multi-Sector 2%
- Non-Sectoral 3%
- Education 7%
- Health 4%
- Population and Reproductive Health Programmes/Policies 1%
- Water Supply and Treatment 2%
- Governance and Civil Society 12%
- Other Social Services and Infrastructure 10%

Source: AECID, Seguimiento PACI 2010.
**CHART B2**  
Breakdown of Spanish Development Aid in the Balkans and Turkey by Sector (2010)

Financial Infrastructure and Services 80%

Productive Sectors 0%
Multi-Sector 0%
Health 0%
Non-Sectoral 1%
Education 4%
Population and Reproductive Health Programmes/Policies 0%
Water Supply and Treatment 11%
Governance and Civil Society 2%
Other Social Services and Infrastructure 2%

Source: AECID, Seguimiento PACI 2010.

**TABLE B2**  
Breakdown of Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean Region by Objective (2010)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Water and Sanitation</th>
<th>Environmental Sustainability, Combating Climate Change and Habitat</th>
<th>Economic Growth for Human Development</th>
<th>Social, Technology and Research for Human Development</th>
<th>Culture and Development</th>
<th>Gender in Development</th>
<th>Migration and Development</th>
<th>Peace-Building</th>
<th>Humanitarian Action</th>
<th>Other Areas</th>
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<td>43,000</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>67,500</td>
<td>9,600</td>
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<td>45,691,480</td>
<td>2,259,159</td>
<td>1,219,121</td>
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<td>4,999,555</td>
<td>3,333,929</td>
<td>4,560,346</td>
<td>1,309,832</td>
<td>8,467,263</td>
<td>1,144,984</td>
<td>473,668</td>
<td>921,828</td>
<td>986,550</td>
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<td>2,754,552</td>
<td>549,015</td>
<td>1,316,679</td>
<td>249,595</td>
<td>373,794</td>
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<td>40,800</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>17,459</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>28,920</td>
<td>3,255,000</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0,000</td>
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<td>46,788</td>
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<td>80,000</td>
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<td>60,000</td>
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<td>62,250</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
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<td>54,005</td>
<td>99,800</td>
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<td>195,428</td>
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<td>0</td>
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Source: AECID, Seguimiento PACI 2010.
## Table C1

### Number of Foreigners from MPCs in the European Union by Nationality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Total Euromed Foreigners</th>
<th>Other Foreigners</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (2008)*</td>
<td>8,185</td>
<td>79,867</td>
<td>3,591</td>
<td>1,005</td>
<td>1,609</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>1,598</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td>39,954</td>
<td>137,839</td>
<td>833,609</td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>70</td>
<td>945</td>
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<td>451</td>
<td>486</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>755</td>
<td>892</td>
<td>4,532</td>
<td>419,887</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,783</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>28,972</td>
<td>36,923</td>
<td>292,874</td>
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<td>69,034</td>
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<td>39,879</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11,046</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>26</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>311</td>
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<td>384,032</td>
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<td>271</td>
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<td>491</td>
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<td>947</td>
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<td>887,205</td>
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<td>3,086</td>
<td>2,425</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>1,384</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,897</td>
<td>2,590</td>
<td>812,892</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3,860</td>
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<td>2,479</td>
<td>17,651</td>
<td>673,722</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>205</td>
<td>869</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3,469</td>
<td>121,531</td>
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<tr>
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<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>87</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>391,635</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>373</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>58</td>
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<td>507</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1,257</td>
<td>1,701</td>
<td>5,258</td>
<td>194,749</td>
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<td>53</td>
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<td>130</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>33</td>
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<td>39</td>
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**Total**: 800,899 2,089,286 366,456 139,696 56,660 17,478 88,528 1,470 30,530 2,380,095 5,971,098 24,991,106

---

Own production. Source: "EUROSTAT; rest from the official statistics institute of each EU country. Most recent data available."
TABLE C2

Remittances

Total Remittances from Migration Countries

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<th>Outflow Countries (US $ million)</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>Share of the 2010 GDP (%)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
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<td>15,018</td>
<td>15,908</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>1,912</td>
<td>1,932</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
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<td>12,923</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1,410</td>
<td>1,406</td>
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</tr>
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<td>12,227</td>
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<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>1,476</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>1.23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>1,228</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>1.10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Share of the 2010 GDP: Belgium 0.9%, France 0.2%, Germany 0.5%, Greece 0.5%, Italy 0.6%, Luxembourg 19.5%, Netherlands 1.7%, Portugal 0.6%, Spain 0.9%, Turkey 1.23%

Total Remittances Received in Origin Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inflow Countries (US $ million)</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011 (estimates)</th>
<th>Share of the 2010 GDP (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1,610</td>
<td>2,202</td>
<td>2,044</td>
<td>1,942</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>5,330</td>
<td>8,694</td>
<td>12,453</td>
<td>14,213</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>944</td>
<td>1,422</td>
<td>1,411</td>
<td>1,475</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2,883</td>
<td>3,794</td>
<td>3,641</td>
<td>3,554</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>5,202</td>
<td>7,181</td>
<td>7,558</td>
<td>7,558</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>5,451</td>
<td>6,895</td>
<td>6,423</td>
<td>7,081</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>2,079</td>
<td>1,988</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1,510</td>
<td>1,977</td>
<td>2,063</td>
<td>1,955</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,146</td>
<td>1,476</td>
<td>993</td>
<td>1,235</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>1,228</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>1,106</td>
<td>/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Share of the 2010 GDP: Algeria 1.3%, Egypt 3.0%, Israel 0.60%, Jordan 12.8%, Lebanon 19.6%, Libya .., Morocco 6.8%, Syria 2.6%, Tunisia 4.4%, Turkey 0.1%, Palestine /


TABLE C3

Illegal Border Crossing to EU by routes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Routes</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Mediterranean Route</td>
<td>11,043</td>
<td>4,450</td>
<td>64,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Mediterranean Route</td>
<td>39,975</td>
<td>55,688</td>
<td>57,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Mediterranean Route</td>
<td>6,642</td>
<td>5,003</td>
<td>8,448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Balkan Route</td>
<td>3,089</td>
<td>2,371</td>
<td>4,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Borders Route</td>
<td>1,335</td>
<td>1,043</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western African Route</td>
<td>2,244</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Circular Route from Albania to Greece</td>
<td>40,250</td>
<td>35,297</td>
<td>5,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 104,599 104,051 140,980

Own production. Source: FRONTEX Annual Risk Analysis, 2012

CHART C1

Illegal Border Crossing to EU by routes

Number of illegal border crossing

- Central Mediterranean Route
- Eastern Mediterranean Route
- Western Mediterranean Route
- Western Balkan Route
- Eastern Borders Route
- Western African Route
- Circular Route from Albania to Greece

Source: FRONTEX Annual Risk Analysis, 2012
The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements

### TABLE D1: Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start of Negotiations</th>
<th>Agreement Concluded</th>
<th>Agreement Signed</th>
<th>Entry into Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>May 1996</td>
<td>December 1996</td>
<td>February 1997</td>
<td>July 1997*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>March 1995</td>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>June 1997</td>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td>April 2002</td>
<td>September 2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Interim agreement signed by the EU and the PLO (to the benefit of the Palestinian Authority).

- To enter into force each Association Agreement must be ratified by the European Parliament, the Parliament of the Partner Country and the Parliaments of the 25 Member States of the European Union.
- Until its accession to the EU, Turkey shall be governed by the Customs Union Agreement, which entered into force in January 1996 and is based on the First Generation Agreement of 1963.
- In 2008 the Association Agreement with Syria was revised. It was planned to be ratified on 26 October 2009. However, Syria indefinitely postponed signing the Association Agreement with the European Union. The agreement will enter into force provisionally when it is signed by Syria. The definitive entry into force requires the European Parliament’s evaluation and ratification by the Member States. In December 2011, Syria suspended its adhesion to UpM.

### TABLE D2: Stabilisation and Association Agreements with Western Balkan Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start of Negotiations</th>
<th>Agreement Signed</th>
<th>Entry into Force (Interim Agreement)</th>
<th>Entry into Force</th>
<th>Candidate Country</th>
<th>Start of Negotiations</th>
<th>Entry into the EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>November 2005</td>
<td>June 2008</td>
<td>July 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td>February 2010</td>
<td>January 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*On 21 May 2006, a referendum was held, which led to Montenegro’s independence from the Federation it had formed with Serbia.

- EU relations with the Western Balkan Countries are regulated by the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). The SAP serves as a framework for the development of various instruments and helps each country to carry out political and economic transition preparing them for a new contractual relationship with the EU: the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs), under which they aim to progress towards closer association with the EU.
Negotiations with Serbia were interrupted in May 2006 due to lack of progress in cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In early 2007, the new administration in Belgrade launched a plan and constituted a National Council for cooperation with the ICTY, a measure which allowed negotiations to resume on 13 June 2007. In April 2008, the European Union and Serbia signed the agreement. The Interim Agreement will not enter into force until the EU Council considers that Serbia is fully cooperating with the ICTY. In December 2009, the Council unfroze the Interim Agreement, which entered into force in February 2010. The SAA came into force in January 2011.

After its declaration and the EU’s acknowledgement of Montenegro as a sovereign and independent State, the EU has maintained relations with independent Montenegro. The SAA was signed on 15 October 2007. In January 2008, the entry into force of the Interim Agreement represented progress towards the national ratification process and closer relations with the EU. The SAA entered into force in May 2010.

Three years after the start of negotiations between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005, the SAA was signed and the Interim Agreement took effect. However, despite real progress in collaboration with the ICTY, the Commission still notes numerous dysfunctions in the institutional and judiciary spheres.

More than seven years after the start of the negotiations, Croatia will join the European Union on 1st July 2013.

In June 2003, the Thessaloniki European Council decided that all Western Balkan countries be considered as potential candidates for EU accession. FYROM (2005) and Montenegro (2010) have already been granted candidate country status. Albania (2009) and Serbia (2009) have also applied for EU accession.

The ENP Action Plans allow the European Union to maintain a progressive, differentiated policy towards its neighbouring countries based on the different levels of cooperation established.

An Action Plan, developed after the signing of an Association Agreement, establishes priorities and a timetable for political and economic reform. Action Plans are the operational tools of the legal framework represented by the Association Agreements.

Progress is analysed each year through evaluation reports. The extent of the progress made determines the levels of cooperation and access to the European Market.

In 2011 there was no progress made by the two countries which are yet to agree an Action Plan (However on December 2011, the Foreign Affairs Minister, Mourad Medelci, affirmed that Algeria had accepted to take art in exploratory talks with the European Union on ENP)
# Signature of Multilateral Treaties and Conventions

## TABLE E1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multilateral Treaties on Human Rights and Penal Matters*</th>
<th>Racial discrimination</th>
<th>Civil and political rights</th>
<th>Economic, social and cultural rights</th>
<th>Discrimination against women</th>
<th>Torture and other mistreatment</th>
<th>Rights of the child</th>
<th>Crime of genocide</th>
<th>International Criminal Court</th>
<th>Financing of terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### Source:
UN UN UN UN UN UN UN UN UN


## TABLE E2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multilateral Treaties on Labour Rights (year of ratification)</th>
<th>Freedom of association and collective bargaining</th>
<th>Elimination of forced or obligatory labour</th>
<th>Elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation</th>
<th>Abolition of child labour</th>
<th>Rights of immigrant workers <em>a</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Convention</strong></td>
<td>87*</td>
<td>88*</td>
<td>105*</td>
<td>111*</td>
<td>138*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Source:
ILD ILD ILD ILD ILD ILD ILD ILD ILD ILD

### TABLE E3: Multilateral Environmental Treaties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multi-lateral Environmental Treaties</th>
<th>Date of adoption</th>
<th>National Strategy for Sustainable Development</th>
<th>Number of municipalities involved in Agenda 21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="#">Multilateral Environmental Treaties</a></td>
<td><a href="#">Date of adoption</a></td>
<td><a href="#">National Strategy for Sustainable Development</a></td>
<td><a href="#">Number of municipalities involved in Agenda 21</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Notes:
- b. From the Framework Convention on Climate Change.
- d. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity.
- f. Convention to Combat Desertification.
- h. Ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or succession. i. Signature. j. The National Strategy for Sustainable Development can be found in different stages that go, from smallest to greatest commitment, from the absence of data, to the progress of the strategy, and culminates in its implementation. k. Year of update. (...) Unavailable information.

### TABLE E4: Multilateral Disarmament Treaties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multi-Lateral Disarmament Treaties</th>
<th>Date of adoption</th>
<th>Nuclear weapons</th>
<th>Bacteriological weapons</th>
<th>Conventional weapons</th>
<th>Chemical weapons</th>
<th>Nuclear testing</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><a href="#">Multilateral Disarmament Treaties</a></td>
<td><a href="#">Date of adoption</a></td>
<td><a href="#">Nuclear weapons</a></td>
<td><a href="#">Bacteriological weapons</a></td>
<td><a href="#">Conventional weapons</a></td>
<td><a href="#">Chemical weapons</a></td>
<td><a href="#">Nuclear testing</a></td>
<td><a href="#">Antipersonnel mines</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Notes:
The Mediterranean in Brief

### TABLE F1  Human Development Index (HDI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth 2011</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling 2011</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling 2011</th>
<th>GNI per capita 2011 PPP $</th>
<th>Human Development Index 2011</th>
<th>Position in HDI Ranking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>79.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>20.573</td>
<td>0.809</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>26.508</td>
<td>0.878</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>30.462</td>
<td>0.884</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>81.9</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>26.484</td>
<td>0.874</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>79.6</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>21.460</td>
<td>0.832</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>4.196</td>
<td>0.582</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>4.243</td>
<td>0.632</td>
<td>119</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>72.6</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>13.076</td>
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<tr>
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<td>73.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>5.300</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td>95</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>81.6</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>25.849</td>
<td>0.888</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>72.8</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>2.656</td>
<td>0.641</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>6.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>5.269</td>
<td>0.644</td>
<td>113</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>74.8</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>12.637</td>
<td>0.760</td>
<td>64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>7.281</td>
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<td>94</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>73.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>7.658</td>
<td>0.698</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>72.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>4.196</td>
<td>0.582</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: UNDP.

### CHART F1  Human Development Index (2010-2011)

#### Top 5 countries with highest Human HDI
- Norway
- Australia
- United States
- Netherlands
- New Zealand

#### Top 5 countries with lowest HDI
- Chad
- Mozambique
- Burundi
- Niger
- Congo (D.R.)

Own production. Source: UNDP.
### TABLE F2  
**Population: Demography**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.36</td>
<td>919</td>
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<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>1.41</td>
<td>6,378</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<td>2.4</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>3.9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>1.42</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>15.9</td>
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<td>0.5</td>
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<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>1.18</td>
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<td>-0.5</td>
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<td>8.8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>-0.8</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>1.46</td>
<td>1,133</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>2.7</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.3</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>17.5</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
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<td>3.10</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>1.86</td>
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**TABLE F2 Notes**

- a. Net annual average of migrants: the annual number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants
- b. Net number of migrants divided by the average population of the receiving country for the period under consideration
- (..) Data unavailable

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**CHART F2  
Total Fertility Rate Evolution (1950-2010) Mediterranean Most Densely Populated Countries**

---

**CHART F2 Notes**

- Own production. Source: POPIN.
### TABLE F3  
**Population: Structure and Distribution**

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*Own production. Source: WB.  
WB WB WB WB UNPOP Bleu Plan Bleu Plan MDG WB  
a. Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F3  
**Rural Population (2010)**

[Diagram showing rural population percentages and density across different countries and regions.]

*Own production. Source: WB.*
### TABLE F4  Education and Training of Human Capital

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<td>2008/11&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
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<th>Top 5 countries for expected years of schooling</th>
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<td>Cuba</td>
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<sup>a</sup> Latest data available from this period. (...) Data unavailable.

---

### CHART F4  Expected Years of Schooling (2011)

- **Duration of compulsory education**
- **Expected years of schooling**

Top 5 countries for expected years of schooling:

- **Australia**
- **New Zealand**
- **Ireland**
- **Cuba**

Own production. Source: UNESCO and UNDP.
### TABLE F5  Health and Survival

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<th>Infant mortality rate</th>
<th>Maternal mortality ratio</th>
<th>People living with HIV/AIDS</th>
<th>Prevalence of smoking</th>
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<td>per 1,000 born alive</td>
<td>under-five per 1,000 born alive</td>
<td>per 100,000 born alive</td>
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Own production. Source: WB

### CHART F5  Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 born alive)

[Infant Mortality Rate chart]

Own production. Source: WB
### TABLE F6: Nutrition and Food Security

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Cereal trade kcal/person/day</th>
<th>Dietary energy consumption</th>
<th>Cereal trade imports tm</th>
<th>Cereal trade exports thousands $</th>
<th>Children under weight for their age % &lt;age 5</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<td>28,280</td>
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Own production. Source: FAO. Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F6: Food Supply Quantity by Type of Products (kg/capita/yr)

[Chart showing food supply quantities by type of products for different countries, with bars representing different regions: Africa, Asia, America, Europe.]

Own production. Source: FAO.
<table>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>Population per physician</th>
<th>% Population with sustainable access to improved water sources</th>
<th>% Population with access to improved sanitation</th>
<th>Births attended by skilled health personnel</th>
<th>% of women with a husband or partner who report use of contraception</th>
<th>Contraceptive prevalence rate</th>
<th>Adolescent fertility rate</th>
<th>Total health expenditure</th>
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<td>10</td>
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**Notes:**
- Own production. Source: WHO
- Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

---

**CHART F7: Breakdown of Spending on Health (2006)**

- Private expenditure on health
- General government expenditure on health

- Own production. Source: WHO
TABLE F8  
Gender: Social Development

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Adult literacy rate ≥ age 15</th>
<th>Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio</th>
<th>Year women received right to vote</th>
<th>Year women stood for election</th>
<th>Year first woman elected or appointed to parliament</th>
<th>Seats in parliament held by women</th>
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<td>women men 2006/09'</td>
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Own production. Source: WB UNESCO UNESCO UNESCO UNESCO UNDP UNDP UNDP IPU

---

CHART F8  
Life Expectancy at Birth (1990-2010)

- **Women 1990**
- **Men 1990**
- **Women 2010**
- **Men 2010**

---

Own production. Source: WB.
### TABLE F9  Technology and Communication

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<th>Outgoing international calls</th>
<th>Incoming international calls</th>
<th>Mobile phones</th>
<th>Personal computers</th>
<th>Internet users</th>
<th>Information and communications technology expenditures</th>
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<td>per 100 inhabitants</td>
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<td>per 100 inhabitants</td>
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Own production. Source: WB

a. Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F9  Fixed Broadband Subscriptions per 100 Inhabitants (2005-2010)

[Fixed Broadband Subscriptions graph]

Own production. Source: ITU
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<th>TABLE F10 Security and Military Expenditure</th>
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<td><strong>Security and Military Expenditure</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Internally displaced people by country of asylum by country of origin Total armed forces Conventional arms transfer Imports Exports Military expenditure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>thousands</td>
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</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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Own production. Source: IDMC UNHCR UNHCR WB SIPRI SIPRI SIPRI SIPRI SIPRI.

Data refer only to Palestinian refugees under UNHCR mandate. Military pensions not included. Data from 2008. Total exports or imports for the entire period. Includes part of the military pensions. Data refer to the approved budget, not real spending. Excluding para-military forces. Includes civil defence spending, which usually accounts for about 4.5% of the total. Data unavailable.

<table>
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<th>CHART F10 Share of Mediterranean Countries in World Total Military Expenditure (2002-2011)</th>
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<td>![Chart Image]</td>
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Own production. Source: SIPRI.
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<th>agriculture</th>
<th>industry</th>
<th>services</th>
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<th>Price index</th>
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Own production. Source: WB. * Data from 2008. ** Data from 2007. (..) Data unavailable.
TABLE F12

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<th>Cereal production</th>
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Own production. Source: FAO

² Agricultural area is divided into ‘arable land and permanent crops’ and ‘prairies and permanent pastures’.
³ Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

CHART F12

Tomatoes Production (in tonnes 2010)

Tomatoes production

- Mediterranean countries 27%
- Rest of Asia 47%
- Oceania 0%
- America 17%
- Rest of Europe 5%
- Rest of Africa 4%

Own production. Source: FAO
### TABLE F13

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<sup>a</sup> Included bovine, caprine and buffalo livestock.
<sup>b</sup> Includes chicken, hens, ducks, turkeys and geese.

( ..) Data unavailable.

---

### CHART F13

**Milk Production (by type) 2010**

**Total production (in thousands of tonnes)**

- **Cow milk**
- **Goat milk**
- **Sheep milk**

---

Own production. Source: FAO.
### TABLE F14  Fisheries

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Own production. Source: FAO. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F14  Trade in Fish and Derivate Products (2009)

**Top 10 fish importer countries**

- China
- Japan
- United States
- Thailand
- Spain
- Denmark
- Germany
- Nigeria
- Korea
- France

Own production. Source: FAO.
## TABLE F15  Employment and Unemployment

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Own production. Source: ILO.

* Latest data available from this period.

## CHART F15  Unemployment Rates (2005/2009*)

- **Youth unemployment rate (%)**
  - Syria: 35%
  - Lebanon: 15%
  - Turkey: 20%
- **Male unemployment rate (%)**
  - Egypt: 24%
  - Libya: 8%
  - Tunisia: 16%
- **Female unemployment rate (%)**
  - Morocco: 10%
  - Algeria: 14%
  - Portugal: 12%

Own production. Source: ILO.

* Latest data available from this period.
### TABLE F16  
Income Distribution

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Source: WB. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F16  
Percentage of the Population Living on Less than $2 a Day (2005/08)*

- Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population)
- Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) (% of population)

[Bar chart showing the percentage of the population living on less than $2 a day in various countries.]

Top 6 countries with largest population living on less than $2 a day:
- China
- Indonesia
- Pakistan
- Vietnam
- Brazil
- Mozambique
- Egypt

Source: WB. Latest data available from this period.
### TABLE F17: Gender: Economic Activity

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Own production. Source: WB

*Latest data available from this period.

### CHART F17: Employment in Agriculture by Gender (2004/09)*

- Men employed in agriculture (in % of male employment)
- Women employed in agriculture (in % of female employment)

---

Own production. Source: WB

*Latest data available from this period.
### TABLE F18 Production and Energy Consumption

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<th>Energy production</th>
<th>Energy consumption</th>
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<th>GDP per unit of energy use</th>
<th>Net energy import</th>
<th>Energy consumption by source</th>
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Own production. Source: WB.

*Negative values indicate that the country is a net exporter. (..) Data unavailable.

__CHART F18 Net Energy Import* (2007)__

[Chart showing net energy import for various countries]
### TABLE F19
Production, Consumption and Access to Electricity

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Population with access to electricity</th>
<th>Electricity production</th>
<th>Electricity consumption per capita</th>
<th>Sources of electricity</th>
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Own production. Source: WB.  
* Excluding hydroelectric. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F19
Sources of Electricity (2009)

- **Coal**  
- **Gas**  
- **Oil**  
- **Hydroelectric**  
- **Renewables**  
- **Nuclear**

Own production. Source: WB.  
* Excluding hydroelectric.
## Table F20: CO₂ Emissions

### CO₂ Emissions

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<th>Country</th>
<th>2009 million mt</th>
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<th>2009 world participation %</th>
<th>Emissions intensity by GDP kg CO₂ per million $ PPP</th>
<th>Emissions intensity by GDP world participation %</th>
<th>Emissions intensity by GDP industry and construction %</th>
<th>Emissions intensity by GDP transport %</th>
<th>Emissions intensity by GDP electricity and heat production %</th>
<th>CO₂ emissions by sector other sectors %</th>
<th>Passenger cars (per 1,000 people)</th>
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### Chart F20: CO₂ Emissions (2009)

- CO₂ emissions per capita
- CO₂ emissions per capita (tonnes)
- CO₂ emissions / TPES (tonnes CO₂ / terajoule)
- CO₂ emissions (million tonnes)

Owen production. Source: IEA.
### TABLE F21  Water

#### Water resources

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Own production. Source: FAO

a. Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

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Own production. Source: FAO

#### Desalinated water production

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Own production. Source: FAO

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### CHART F21  Dam Capacity

**Countries with highest dam capacity**

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Own production. Source: FAO
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Own production. Source: FAO, FAO, FAO, FAO, WB, WB, WRI, UICN, WWF.

a. Only mammals and birds are included. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F22  Marine Protected Areas

[Chart showing marine protected areas for various countries]
### TABLE F23  
**International Trade**

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<th>Current account balance 2010</th>
<th>Workers’ remittances 2010</th>
<th>% of exports</th>
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Own production. Source: UNCTAD.

a. From good and services. b. Workers remittances, salaries paid and transfer of capital are included. c. Own production using UNCTAD data. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F23  
**Trade Balance in Services (2010)**

Own production. Source: UNCTAD.
### TABLE F24

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Own production. Source: UNCTAD.

### CHART F24

**Export Concentration Index (2010)**

- GCC
- Sub-Saharan Africa
- CIS
- Southern Asia
- South America and Central America
- Eastern and South-Eastern Asia
- North America
- European Union

Own production. Source: UNCTAD.
### TABLE F25

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<td>14.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>62.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>0.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>58.7</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>25.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>68.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>78.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.090</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: UNCTAD.

### CHART F25

**Import Concentration Index (2010)**

![Import Concentration Index Chart](chart_f25.png)

Own production. Source: UNCTAD.
### TABLE F26
Tourism in the Mediterranean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inbound tourists</th>
<th>Outbound tourists</th>
<th>Tourists' overnight stays</th>
<th>International tourism receipts</th>
<th>Tourism expenditure in other countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>exchange rate</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>% in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>% in the Mediterranean</td>
<td>% of imports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>-7.5</td>
<td>6,439</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>12,844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>-6.7</td>
<td>53,128</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>52,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
<td>76,824</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>22,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>43,239</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>29,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>-8.4</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>302</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>-5.8</td>
<td>1,824</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2,586</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>-0.9</td>
<td>9,335</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2,497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>-0.2</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1,044</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>6,665</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1,856</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>-6.4</td>
<td>14,915</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>47,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>-10.9</td>
<td>2,141</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1,019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>25,506</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10,496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>-25.2</td>
<td>6,092</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>5,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>1,844</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>3,789</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>-9.7</td>
<td>2,321</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>11,914</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>-2.1</td>
<td>6,901</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2,623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>1,912</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>8,341</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own production. Source: UNWTO. WB WBA WB UNCTAD WB WB WB WB</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHART F26
International Tourism Receipts (2009)

Own production. Source: WB and UNWTO.
### TABLE F27  Official Development Assistance (ODA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official development assistance by donor country</th>
<th>Official development assistance in recipient countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Million $</td>
<td>% of GNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>649</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>5,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>12,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2,966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>1,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>137</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>449</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>2,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>551</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>994</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Own production. Source: OECD. OECD. OECD. OECD. OECD. OECD. OECD.

* Own production using OECD data. (..) Data unavailable

### CHART F27  Official Development Assistance in Mediterranean Recipient Countries (2000-2010)

- Multilateral
- Africa
- America
- Asia
- Europe
- Other
- Balkans
- Rest of Mashreq
- Turkey
- Maghreb
- Palestine

Own production. Source: OECD.
### TABLE F28
External Debt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2010 Long-term debt</th>
<th>2010 Short-term debt</th>
<th>Debt service</th>
<th>2010 External debt</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$ million</td>
<td>% of GNI</td>
<td>per capita</td>
<td>$ million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>8,457</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>2,226</td>
<td>7,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>32,222</td>
<td>84.3</td>
<td>3,255</td>
<td>29,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>2,308</td>
<td>39.1</td>
<td>3,847</td>
<td>2,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>5,804</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>2,902</td>
<td>3,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>4,736</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>4,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>293,872</td>
<td>40.4</td>
<td>4,037</td>
<td>215,749</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>4,729</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>4,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>24,293</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>5,784</td>
<td>20,811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>7,822</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>1,262</td>
<td>6,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>34,844</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>31,695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>21,584</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>2,056</td>
<td>16,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>5,276</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>3,498</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>25,403</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>794</td>
<td>23,603</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: WB.

- Own production using WB and UNPOP data.
- Data from 2009.
- Own production using WB data.
- Data unavailable.

### CHART F28
Breakdown of External Debt by Maturity (2010)*

* The World Bank offers no data on more developed countries.
Definitions

Adolescent fertility rate
Number of births per thousand women aged between 15 and 19.

Agricultural land area
Land surface area made up of arable and permanently cultivated lands and by permanent meadows and pastures.

Agricultural population
Persons who depend on agriculture, hunting, fishing or forestry for their subsistence. This category includes all those who carry out an agricultural activity and all this entails without official employment.

Annual population growth rate
Exponential change in the growth of the population during the period indicated.

Aquaculture production
Includes marine, freshwater and diadromous fish, molluscs and crustaceans cultivated in marine, inland or brackish environments.

Arable lands and permanent crops
Agricultural surface area that groups the data on arable or farm land and land used for permanent crops. Arable and farm land is land given over to temporary crops (those giving two yields are only counted once) temporal meadows for cutting or grazing, land dedicated to commercial vegetable gardens or orchards and land temporarily fallow for a period of less than five years. The term does not include land that has been abandoned as a result of migratory cultivation. Land destined for permanent crops refers to land dedicated to crops that occupy the terrain during long periods and that do not need to be replanted after each harvest, such as cacao, coffee and rubber. It includes land occupied by bushes destined to flower production, fruit trees, walnut trees and vineyards, but excludes land planted with trees destined to the production of firewood or wood.

Armed forces
Strategic, land, naval, aerial, command and support forces. It also includes paramilitary forces, such as the gendarmerie, the customs services and the border guard if they are trained in military strategy.

Average annual supply of fish and fish derivatives
Calculated from the disposability of fish and its derivatives for human consumption, divided by the total population within the geographical borders of any given country. Nationals living in other countries are excluded, although foreigners living in the country are included.

Births attended by skilled health personnel
Percentage of births attended by health personnel (physicians, nurses and midwives) that are trained in the care, supervision and counselling of women during pregnancy, birthgiving and puerperium, and who can also deliver babies and assist them on their own.

Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions
The emissions of carbon dioxide produced in the burning of all fossil fuels used by a country.

Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions by sector
Shows the proportion of carbon dioxide emissions produced by the burning of fossil fuels in the sectors of transport, industry and electricity production. The transport sector includes emissions produced by all forms of transport by road, rail and air, including agricultural vehicles travelling by road. International journeys by boat or aeroplane are excluded. The industrial and construction sector includes emissions produced by all types of industry and construction. The electricity sector includes emissions produced by the generation of electricity for public use, including thermal power stations.

Cereal production
The figures for cereal production only refer to harvests of dry grain. Crops harvested for hay, unripe foodstuffs, forage and silage, or are used for grazing, are therefore excluded.

Cereal production yield
The outputs per hectare have been calculated using the data on surface area and production.

Cereal trade
The figures obtained by the FAO, have been supplied by the respective governments in the questionnaires sent out by the FAO.

Children under weight for their age
Percentage of children under five whose weight and height, for their age, is less than twice the standard deviation in comparison with the average for the relevant age group. The population of reference is the child population of the USA, which is assumed to be well nourished.

CO₂ emissions intensity by GDP
Average quantity of CO₂ emitted per unit of incomes generated by a particular economy.
Appendices

Consumer price index
Reflects changes in the cost, for an average consumer, in the acquisition of a basket of goods and services that can be fixed or can change at specific intervals; for example annually. The Laspeyres formula is normally used.

Contraceptive prevalence rate
Percentage of women who are married or in a relationship who report using at least one method of contraception.

Crude birth rate
Number of births per year per thousand inhabitants. An estimate is made in the middle of the current year.

Crude death rate
Number of deaths per year per thousand inhabitants. An estimate is made in the middle of the current year.

Current account balance
The sum of the net exports – exports minus imports – of goods and services, incomes and net transfers.

Daily newspaper circulation
Refers to those newspapers published at least four times a week.

Debt service
The sum of the main payments and interest payments made for long-term debts, interest paid on short-term debts and repayments (redemption and charges) to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Desalinated water production
Amount of water produced by elimination of salt from salt water using a variety of techniques, including inverse osmosis. Most of this water is used for domestic purposes.

Deserts and dryland areas
Total area of semi-arid land (dry lands), barren and hyperborean (desert) that make up a country.

Dietary energy consumption
Amount of food, in kilocalories per day, available for each person in the population.

Duration of compulsory education
Number of years, within a determined age group, that children and young people are legally obliged to attend school.

Expected years of schooling
Number of years of schooling that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-
specific enrolment rates were to stay the same throughout the child’s life.

**Export/Import concentration index**
The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index is used, in a normalised version, to obtain values between zero and one (maximum concentration). It measures the degree of market concentration and the calculation takes into account the different product groups exported, according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC).

**Exports**
The value of all goods supplied by an economy to the rest of the world. It excludes labour and income in concept of property, as well as transfer payments.

**External debt**
The sum of the national debt, with public guarantee, private unsecured long-term debt, credit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and short-term debt.

**Fertility rate**
Number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current age specific fertility rates.

**Fertilizer consumption**
Amount of vegetable nutrients used per unit of cultivatable land. The fertilisers considered are nitrogen, phosphorus and potassium. Consumption is calculated as production plus imports minus exports, and traditional nutrients (animal and vegetable fertilisers) are not included. The data obtained is the result of dividing the consumption of fertiliser of each country by the surface area of arable and permanently cultivated land.

**Fishermen**
Includes the number of people employed in commercial and subsistence fishing (both personnel on land and at sea), who work in fresh water, brackish water, marine area or in aquaculture activities.

**Fixed telephone lines**
Fixed telephone line connecting the subscriber’s terminal equipment to the public switched network.

**Foreign direct investment**
Net direct investment that is made in order to achieve a lasting participation in the management of a business company operating in a country other than that of the investor. It is equal to the sum of the equity capital, the reinvestment of earnings and other long-term and short-term capital.

**Forest area**
Understood as all land with natural or artificial plots of trees, whether productive or not.

**GDP (see Gross Domestic Product)**

**GDP per capita (see Gross Domestic Product per capita)**

**GDP growth rate**
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.

**GDP per unit of energy use**
Indicator of energy efficiency. The temporary differences and entire countries partly reflect, structural economic changes, changes in the efficiency of particular sectors and differences in the use of fuels. The GDP has been converted into 2005 international dollars.

**Gini index**
Measure of greater or lesser inequality in the distribution of income and consumption, considering a state of perfectly equal distribution. A value of zero represents perfect equality and a value of one hundred total inequality.

**GNI (see Gross National Income)**

**Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita)**
Using the official exchange rates to convert the figures in national currency into USA dollars does not measure the relative internal acquisition powers of each currency in each country. The International Comparison Project (ICP) of the United Nations and the World Bank develop measures of the GDP on an internationally comparable scale using as conversion factors, the Purchase Power Parities (PPP) in respect to each country.

**Gross National Income (GNI)**
The sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. The added value of the net profit of an industry after having summed up all profits and deducted international contributions.

**HDI (see Human Development Index)**

**Households with television**
Percentage of homes with a TV set. Data provided for some countries refer only to homes with colour television so values shown may be lower than actual figures.

**Human Development Index (HDI)**
Index elaborated by the United Nations Development Project (UNDP) relating three indicators: income level (per capita GNI), health (life expectancy at birth) and level of education (mean years of education and expected years of schooling).

**Immigrants**
Refers to the people born outside of a given country at the mid point of the year. The data is given in absolute figures and as a percentage in respect to the population of the receiving country.

**Imports**
Value of all goods received by an economy from the rest of the world. It excludes labour and income in concept of property, as well as transfer payments.

**Inbound tourists by destination country**
Number of tourists who travel to a coun-
try other than that in which they have their usual residence, for a period not exceeding 12 months and whose main purpose in visiting is other than an activity remunerated from within the country visited.

**Infant mortality rate**
Shows the number of deaths of infants under one year of age per thousand live births.

**Information and communications technology expenditures**
Includes internal and external spending on information technology, as well as telecommunications and other office infrastructures.

**Internally displaced people**
As a result of armed conflicts or human rights abuses, some 25 million people live as internally displaced population. These people were forced to flee from their homes for fear of losing their lives, but unlike refugees, they were displaced within their country’s borders. Even though internally displaced people are twice as many as refugees, their situation receives less international attention.

**International tourism receipts**
Income received in a given country from visitors, including payments made to national freight companies for international freight. It also includes the prepayment of goods and services received in the destination country. It can include the income from single day visitors. The percentage it represents in respect to exports is calculated as a ratio of the exports of goods and services.

**Internet users**
Defined as the computers within an economy that are directly linked to the worldwide Internet. These statistics are based on the country codes of the addresses of the users and do not always correspond to the physical location of the computer.

**Irrigated lands**
Irrigation data refers to the areas equipped with hydraulic infrastructure to supply water to crops. Areas with partial or total control of the distribution, surface areas irrigated by diversion of rises in level and low and flooded areas where available water is controlled are included.

**Known species**
Refers to the total number of species in a given country. Only mammals and birds have been taken into account.

**Land area**
Refers to the total surface area minus the surface covered by inland waters. Inland waters are defined in general as rivers and principle lakes.

**Land under cereal production**
The figures related to cultivated crop surface areas generally refer to the area harvested, although those corresponding to permanent crops can refer to the total planted area. The figures for the cultivated cereal area only refer to harvests of dry grain. Crops harvested for hay, unripe foodstuffs, forage and silage, or used for grazing, are therefore excluded.

**Life expectancy at birth**
The number of years that a new-born infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.

**Live animal stock**
The data on stock covers all domestic animals regardless of age, location or final purpose. Estimates have been made for countries that have not supplied data, as well as for countries supplying partial statistics.

**Live animal trade**
Enormous quantities of unregistered animals cross the borders of some countries. In order to obtain more representative international trade figures of live animals, the FAO has incorporated estimates of the unregistered trade.

**Long term external debt**
Debt that has an original or extended maturity of more than one year. It has three components: public, publicly guaranteed and private non guaranteed debt.

**Maternal mortality ratio**
Annual number of deaths of women owing to causes related to pregnancy, for every 100,000 live births.

**Mean years of schooling**
Average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older in their lifetime based on education attainment levels of the population converted into years of schooling based on theoretical durations of each level of education attended.

**Mediterranean and the Black Sea catches**
Fishing catches for commerce, industry or subsistence (including recreational catches where the data is available). The data refers to the catch by the fleet of a country in the Mediterranean and/or in the Black Sea.

**Military expenditure**
Total expenses effected by the Ministry of Defence and other ministries on the recruitment and training of military personnel, as well as the manufacture and acquisition of military supplies and equipment. Military assistance is included in the expenses of the donor country.

**Mobile phones**
Mobile telephone users subscribed to a public, mobile and automatic service providing access to the public telephone network using cellular technology.

**Net energy import**
Shows the amount of energy use by an economy and to what extent it exceeds its domestic production.

**Net enrolment ratio**
Number of students enrolled in a level of education who are of the official school age for that level, as a percentage of the total of the population of official school age for that level. The figures are shown for primary and secondary education.

**Net migration rate**
Net number of migrants divided by the average population of the receiving country within the period considered.

**Net number of migrants**
The entry of immigrants into a given country minus the outgoing emigrants of the same country.

**Official Development Assistance (ODA)**
The net payment of donations and loans granted under advantageous financial terms by official boards of partner coun-
tries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as international organisations, with a view to promoting economic development and wellbeing, including co-operation and technical assistance.

**Oil equivalent**

All the values of energy production and consumption presented in this classification are calculated and published by the International Energy Agency (IEA) which uses the equivalent metric tonne of oil based on the calorific content of the energy products as the unit of measurement. An equivalent metric tonne of oil is defined as $10^7$ kilo calories or 11,628 gigawatts per hour (GWh). This amount of energy is practically equal to the amount of energy contained in a tonne of crude oil.

**Outbound tourists by country of origin**

Number of trips that travellers make to a given country from their normal country of residence, for a period of less than one year, for any other reason than to undertake a paid activity in the country visited.

**Passenger cars**

Road motor vehicles, other than two-wheelers, intended for the carriage of passengers and designed to seat no more than nine people (including the driver).

**Permanent pasture**

Refers to land used permanently (five years or more) for herbaceous fodder, whether cultivated or uncultivated (meadows or uncultivated land for grazing).

**Personal computers**

Independent computers in use, intended for use by one single user at a time.

**Population density**

The result of dividing the average annual population of a country by its land surface area expressed in square kilometres.

**Population in urban agglomerations of more than 750,000 inhabitants**

Percentage of the population of a country living in metropolitan areas, that in 2005 had a population of more than 750,000 people.

**Population on the Mediterranean coast**

Estimates of the percentage of the population that lives in the coastal area.

**Population living with HIV/AIDS**

Estimated number of people of any age infected with HIV or AIDS. Includes the whole living infected population at the end of 2003, regardless of whether or not they have developed the disease. It shows the actual figure and the percentage in respect of the population of the country.

**Population per physician**

The figure is obtained by dividing the number of inhabitants of a country by the number of physicians in its health system.

**Population with access to electricity**

Refers to the number of people with access to electricity as a percentage of the total population.

**Population with access to improved sanitation**

Percentage of the population with access to adequate installations for the elimination of excrement, such as connection to drains or systems of septic tanks, flush latrines, pour flush latrines or ventilated improved pit latrines. A system of elimination of excrement is considered adequate if it is private or shared (but not public) and if it allows the efficient avoidance of people or animals entering into contact with the excrement.

**Population with sustainable access to an improved water source**

The percentage of the population that has reasonable access to any of the following sources of drinking water: household water connections, public standpipes, bore holes, protected dug wells, protected springs and rainwater deposits. Reasonable access is defined as the availability of at least twenty litres per person per day, from a source located within a radius of one kilometre from the home of the user.

**Prevalence of smoking**

The percentage of men and women who smoke cigarettes. The age range varies between countries, but in general it is 15 years of age or above.

**Primary pupil-teacher ratio**

Number of pupils registered in primary schools divided by the number of teachers in primary schools.

**Protected areas**

Areas of land or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biodiversity, natural and associated cultural resources and managed through legal and other instruments. According to The World Conservation Union (IUCN) it includes the total area of all natural reserves, virgin areas, national parks, natural monuments, management areas of habitats and species, as well as protected land and sea areas in each country.

**Public expenditure on education**

Composed of capital expenses (construction, renovation, major repairs and purchase of heavy equipment or vehicles) and running costs (goods and services consumed during the current year and that need to be renewed the following year). It covers expenses such as salaries and rendering of services, contracted or acquired services, books and didactic material, social welfare services, furniture and equipment, minor repairs, fuel, insurance, rent, telecommunications and travel.

**Public health expenditure**

Refers to the recurring and capital expenses in government budgets (central and local), loans and external concessions (including donations by international agencies and non-governmental organisations) and social or compulsory medical insurance funds.

**R & D expenditures**

The current and capital expenses of creative and systematic activities that increase the stock of knowledge. Includes basic and applied research and experimental development work that leads to new devices, products or processes.

**Refugees**

People who have been forced to flee their country for fear of persecution
owing to reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinions or membership of determined social groups and who are unable or unwilling to return. The asylum country is the country in which the refugee has requested asylum, but has not yet received a response, or where he or she has been registered as an asylum seeker. The country of origin refers to the nationality of the seeker or to the country in which he or she is a citizen.

**Rural population**
The estimated population at the mid point of the year in areas defined as rural, as a percentage of the total population of the country.

**Scientists and technicians in R&D**
Professionals that have received further training to work in any scientific field.

**Sectorial distribution of the active population**
Shown by the percentages of the workforce employed in the different economic sectors: agriculture, industry and services.

**Share of income or consumption**
In the questionnaires carried out in homes in diverse countries to determine the distribution of income, they make five divisions (or quintiles) from the lowest to the greatest incomes. The two lower quintiles (40%) are considered the poorest. A relation is also made between the richest 10% and the poorest 10%, in order to establish the degree of inequality in incomes.

**Short-term external debt**
Debt owed to non-residents having an original maturity of one year or less and interest arrears on long-term debt.

**Surface area**
Refers to the extension of the country in its totality, including the surface area occupied by inland waters.

**Threatened species**
Includes all the species classified by The World Conservation Union (IUCN), as "vulnerable, in danger, or in critical danger," but excludes all introduced species, species whose status is not sufficiently known, extinguished species and those still without an assigned status. Only mammals and birds have been taken into account.

**Total catches**
Fishing catches for commerce, industry or subsistence (including recreational catches where the data is available). The data refers to the catch by the fleet of a country in any part of the world. Marine fishing is practiced in seas or oceans, while freshwater fishing takes place in rivers, wetlands and inland lakes.

**Total health expenditure**
Funds mobilised by the system. Sum of general government and private expenditure on health.

**Total population**
Includes all of the residents of a country or territory with the legal status of citizen, except refugees settled in a country of asylum, who are generally considered as part of the population of their country of origin. Values for 2005 and projections for 2050 are shown.

**Tourism expenditure in other countries**
The expenditure in other countries of tourists from a given country, including the payments to national freight companies for international freight. It can include the expenses of single day travelers. The percentage it represents in respect of the exports, is calculated as a ratio of the exports of goods and services.

**Tourists' overnight stays**
Number of nights that non-resident tourists spend within the country visited, regardless of the type of tourist establishment.

**Trade balance**
Account that holds the imports and exports of an economy during a certain period of time with the purpose of reflecting the corresponding balance. The negative values indicate a deficit in the trade balance.

**Trade in fish and derivative products**
Expresses the value associated to the exports and imports of live, fresh, frozen, chilled, dried, salted, smoked and tinned fish and derivative products. Includes fresh and salt water and aquaculture fish, molluscs and crustaceans.

**Under-five mortality rate**
Probability of death between birth and becoming five years old, expressed per thousand live births.

**Unemployment rate**
Percentage of the active population without work, but available for and seeking employment.

**Urban population living in slums**
A place of precarious settlement is a group of individuals who live under the same roof and lack one or more of the following conditions: secure tenure (State protection against illegal eviction), access to drinking water, access to basic healthcare, structural dwelling quality and sufficient vital space. In accordance with the situation of the city in which the precarious settlement is found, this concept can be locally adapted.

**Water consumption**
Total water used by humans in a year, without taking into account the losses due to evaporation in reservoirs. Includes water from non renewable underground sources, from rivers coming from other countries and from desalinated plants.

**Water dependency**
Percentage of water available in one country, coming from another.

**Water resources**
Refers to the total renewable resources, covering the watercourses of the country (rivers and underground rain water reserves) and the watercourses originating in other countries.

**Women in parliamentary seats**
Refers to the percentage of seats occupied by women in a lower or single chamber, or in a higher or senate, according to each case. In the case where there are two chambers, the data refers to the weighted average of the participation of women in both chambers.

**Wood fuel production**
Includes wood from trunks and branches, used as fuel for cooking, heating or producing energy.
Workers' remittances
According to the definition of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Balance of Payments Manual, workers' remittances are goods and financial assets transferred by immigrants living and working in an economy (where they are considered residents) in favour of the residents of their former country of residence. An immigrant must live and work in the new economy for more than one year to be considered a resident there. The transfers made to the immigrants own accounts abroad are not considered transfers. Moreover, all those derived from the possession of a business by an immigrant are only considered to be normal transfers to the country of origin.

Year when women obtained the right to stand for election
The dates refer to the year when the universal and equal right to stand for election was recognised. In the cases when two years appear, the first refers to the first partial recognition of the right to stand for election.

Year when women obtained the right to vote
The dates refer to the year when the universal and equal right to vote was recognised. In the cases when two years appear, the first refers to the first partial recognition of the right to vote.
List of the Organisms Consulted for Drawing Up Tables, Charts and Maps

CITES, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
www.cites.org

EIB, European Investment Bank
www.eib.org

Europeaid, Development and Cooperation
ec.europa.eu/europeaid

European Commission-Trade
ec.europa.eu/trade

EUROSTAT, Statistical Office of the European Commission
ec.europa.eu/eurostat

FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
www.fao.org

VLIZ, Flanders Marine Institute
www.vliz.be

IDMC, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
www.internal-displacement.org

IEA, International Energy Agency
www.iea.org

ILO, International Labour Organization
www.iло.org

IOM, International Organization for Migration
www.iom.int

IMF, International Monetary Fund
www.imf.org

IPU, Inter-Parliamentary Union
www.ipu.org
ITU, International Telecommunication Union
www.itu.int

IUCN, World Conservation Union
www.iucn.org

Med.Cronos
www.iemed.org

Millennium Development Goals Indicators
http://mdgs.un.org

OECD, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
www.oecd.org

Psephos Adam Carr’s Election Archive
psephos.adam-carr.net

Plan Bleu
www.planbleu.org

SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
www.sipri.org

UNAIDS, Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS
www.unaids.org

UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
www.unctad.org

UNDP, United Nations Development Program
www.undp.org

UNEP, United Nations Environment Programme
www.unep.org

UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
www.unesco.org

UNFPA, United Nations Population Fund
www.unfpa.org

UNHCR, United Nations Refugee Agency
www.unhcr.ch

UNICEF, United Nations Children’s Fund
www.unicef.org

United Nations Treaty Collection
untreaty.un.org
List of the Organisms...

United Nations Population Information Network (POPIN)

UNPOP, United Nations Population Division
www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm

UNSTAT, United Nations Statistics Division
unstats.un.org

UNWTO, World Tourism Organization
www.unwto.org

WB, World Bank
www.worldbank.org

WHO, World Health Organization
www.who.int

WRI, World Resources Institute
www.wri.org

WTTC, World Travel & Tourism Council, Economic Data Search Tool,
www.wttc.org/research/economic-data-search-tool/

WWF
www.wwf.org
Country Abbreviations in Charts and Maps

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<td>LB</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
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### Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AA</td>
<td>Association Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAGR</td>
<td>Average Annual Growth Rate</td>
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<td>AECID</td>
<td>Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>AII</td>
<td>Adriatic-Ionic Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (TR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALF</td>
<td>Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQAP</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula</td>
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<td>AQI</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<td>ASAs</td>
<td>Air Service Agreements</td>
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<td>BIT</td>
<td>Bilateral Investment Treaty</td>
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<td>CBC</td>
<td>Cross-Border Cooperation</td>
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<td>CDS</td>
<td>City Development Strategies</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party (TR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CiU</td>
<td>Convergence and Union (ES)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNRS</td>
<td>Centre national de la recherche scientifique (FR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPR</td>
<td>Congress for the Republic (TN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSCM</td>
<td>Interparliamentary Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSF</td>
<td>Civil Society Facility</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil Society Organisations</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Concentrated Solar Power</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee (OECD)</td>
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<td>DCFTA</td>
<td>Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPS</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Socialists of Montenegro (ME)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Democratic Party (CS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>Euro area</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECB</td>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
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<td>ECJ</td>
<td>European Court of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Environment Agency</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>EED</td>
<td>European Endowment for Democracy</td>
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<td>EFSF</td>
<td>European Financial Stability Facility</td>
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<td>EIB</td>
<td>European Investment Bank</td>
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<td>EMP</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Partnership</td>
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<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
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<td>EMWIS</td>
<td>Euro-Mediterranean Information System on Know-How in the Water sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENPI</td>
<td>European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument</td>
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Acronyms and Abbreviations

EP European Parliament
ERDB European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ERDF European Regional Development Fund
ESDP European Security and Defence Policy
ETUF Egyptian Trade Union Federation
EU European Union
EUROMED Euro-Mediterranean
EUROSUR European Border Surveillance System
EZ Euro zone
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FEMIP Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership
FEMISE Forum of Euro-Mediterranean Economic Institutes
FET Fair and Equitable Treatment
FIS Islamic Salvation Front
FJP Freedom and Justice Party (EG)
FLN National Liberation Front (DZ)
FP Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development
FSA Free Syrian Army
FTA Free Trade Area
GAFTA Greater Arab Free Trade Area
GASC General Authority for Supply Commodities (EG)
GCC Cooperation Council for Arab States of the Gulf/Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNP Gross National Product
GSPC Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
GWP Global Water Partnership
HDI Human Development Index
HDZ Croatian Democratic Union (HR and BA)
HVDC High Voltage Direct Current
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICI Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
ICSID International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
ICT Information and Communication Technologies
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDF Israel Defense Forces
IEA International Energy Agency
IMF International Monetary Fund
ITC Information and Communication Technologies
IU United Left (ES)
IWWM Integrated Water Resources Management
JHA Justice and Home Affairs
LIFG Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas
MB Muslim Brotherhood
MCSD Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development
MD Mediterranean Dialogue
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MENA Middle East & North Africa
MFN Most-Favoured-Nation
MNLA National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (DZ and LY)
MoCo Euro-Mediterranean Monitoring Committee for RTD Cooperation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MPCD</td>
<td>Popular Constitutional and Democratic Movement (MA)</td>
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<td>MPCs</td>
<td>Mediterranean Partner Countries</td>
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<td>MPs</td>
<td>Members of Parliament</td>
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<td>MPs</td>
<td>Mobility Partnerships</td>
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<td>MSP</td>
<td>Movement of Society for Peace (DZ)</td>
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<td>MSP</td>
<td>Mediterranean Solar Plan</td>
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<td>MUR</td>
<td>Unity and Reform Movement (MA)</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>ND</td>
<td>New Democracy (GR)</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Democratic Party (EG)</td>
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<td>NGL</td>
<td>Natural Gas Liquid</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisations</td>
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<td>NIF</td>
<td>Neighbourhood Investment Facility</td>
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<td>NOC</td>
<td>Libyan National Oil Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTC</td>
<td>National Transitional Council (LY)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>OEM</td>
<td>Original Equipment Services</td>
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<td>OME</td>
<td>Observatoire Méditerranéen de l’Énergie</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>PA</td>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
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<td>PASOK</td>
<td>Panhellenic Socialist Movement</td>
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<td>PJD</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (MA)</td>
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<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party (TR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PM</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Popular Party (ES)</td>
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<td>Democratic Constitutional Rally (TN)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RND</td>
<td>National Rally for Democracy (DZ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTD</td>
<td>Research and Technology Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Agreement</td>
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<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Process</td>
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<td>Supreme Council of Armed Forces (EG)</td>
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<td>Special Tribunal for Lebanon</td>
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<td>TRNC</td>
<td>Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</td>
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<td>UCLG</td>
<td>United Cities and Local Governments</td>
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<td>UfM</td>
<td>Union for the Mediterranean</td>
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<td>UGTT</td>
<td>Tunisian General Labour Union</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNCITRAL</td>
<td>United Nation Commission for International Trade Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNGA</td>
<td>United Nations General Assembly</td>
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<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</td>
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