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Foreword

Senén Florensa
President of the IEMed Executive Committee

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Director General
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Studying the Mediterranean means, above all, studying the complexity of the multitude of interrelations that exist in the region. The relations between the two shores and between the many countries, cultures, religions, economies and societies form an intricate network of interdependencies. The IEMed’s Mediterranean Yearbook seeks, with each new edition, to shed light on these issues and to enhance the visibility of the interrelations between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbours.

The traditional Euro-Mediterranean complexity has been compounded in recent months by a series of unforeseeable yet unexpected upheavals that have given rise to an atmosphere of both uncertainty and hope. The uprisings and protests in the Arab countries and their ensuing consequences (ranging from reform to civil war) have dictated the Mediterranean agenda over the last few months. They have likewise set the agenda for the IEMed’s Mediterranean Yearbook: as a result of the events, the key topics addressed in this year’s edition were revised, not only to include a separate section to address them but also because of their considerable impact on the other articles. Thus, the chapter devoted to the new lay of the land in the Arab world contains both articles about these events in the Arab world as a whole and articles on Tunisia and Egypt, the most paradigmatic countries in the context of the protests.

Whilst these events certainly dominated the media, this year’s Keys to the Mediterranean go beyond the Arab uprisings. The punishing global economic crisis has taken a particularly heavy toll on the Mediterranean countries, and even more so on the Northern Mediterranean ones, and was thus something that the Yearbook could hardly ignore. The repercussions of the bailouts of Greece and Portugal and the current woes of Spain and Italy have been a constant focus of attention in recent months.

The new European institutional architecture resulting from the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon and its impact on Euro-Mediterranean relations, along with the future of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), are other key issues addressed in this edition. Although they have garnered less attention in the media, they are nevertheless crucial to determining the region’s future.

Finally, one must not forget the situation in the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict, which always plays a prominent role in international events. This year’s Yearbook takes a look at US attempts to renew the negotiations and how they are affected by the domestic situations of Israelis and Palestinians.

The Yearbook’s thematic dossier this year focuses on the reality of the new Mediterranean in a world in flux. Intended as a reflection on the new international context resulting from the emergence of new actors in the Mediterranean and the forging of a stronger structure for the UfM, the Dossier could not help but address current events, incorporating the issue of the uprisings into its analysis. Indeed, this context served as its frame of reference, with analyses ranging from the role of the Mediterranean in global geopolitics or the role of Euro-Mediterranean relations in a changing world to the influence
of the Gulf and BRIC countries or the role that the Balkans may play in the international construction of the Mediterranean. It moreover explores the economic evolution of the Southern Mediterranean and the efforts to democratise and reform the Arab world in light of recent events.

As in every edition, the articles in the Panorama section supplement and round out the overview of the Mediterranean year, offering a window onto the most important events to take place in the Mediterranean region. This section reflects the Yearbook’s desire not to leave any thematic area untouched and contains a broad selection of articles covering everything from politics to business, migration to security, energy to desertification, and demographics to freedom of expression, offering the political, economic, social and cultural keys to the Mediterranean agenda.

The Yearbook concludes with an extensive section of appendices that complement the opinion pieces and analyses with a wealth of statistical data and information on development cooperation and migratory movements, as well as chronologies of the main events in the region and a selection of maps.

The IEMed’s Mediterranean Yearbook Med.2011, the Yearbook’s eighth edition, continues to embody the working model chosen by the IEMed to provide a tool both for stakeholders and experts and for the interested public at large to gather information on, analyse and monitor the Mediterranean reality. It is a model based on diversity, both thematically and with regard to perspectives, bringing together more than fifty authors from a variety of fields and backgrounds to ensure that the Yearbook is an open, plural and multidisciplinary product.
Perspectives
A Changing Europe and a Changing Arab World Are Here Today

Amb. Youssef Amrani
Secretary General
Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean,
Barcelona

A Europe with expanding membership and a visionary mission: to cooperate across borders and grow without barriers. A Southern Mediterranean with new horizons and growing hope: for democracy, peace among neighbours, opportunities for its people and a secure future for its youth. Between them, a partnership for peace, shared prosperity and dialogue: the Union for the Mediterranean.

With the changes taking place in the Mediterranean, it is possible today to think of a single region, one that stretches from north of the Baltic Sea to south of the Mediterranean, one that is shared by Europe and the Middle East. This is the basis for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, our region-to-region platform for cooperation and development. It is a relationship with significant shared interests and unlimited potential, and it is up to us to develop it to its fullest.

Reforms and revolutions in the Mediterranean do not take place in isolation; they are the result of a long process of profound underlying social and economic changes. As the Northern neighbour, Europe shares an interest in overcoming many of the challenges that the countries to the south of the “big lake” are suffering from. For years Europe has been a genuine partner in the search for solutions, and it will continue to be one when it comes time to reap the benefits of success: a vibrant area of peace, democracy, equal human rights and fair opportunities and a prosperous future throughout a shared hemisphere.

These realities give the Union for the Mediterranean an important and prominent role to play in shaping the prospects for change in the region. By responding promptly to the new reality, by reacting to what the nations in transition and reform are hoping for, the Union for the Mediterranean can become a key tool for regional cooperation and help to develop the full potential of the southern regional dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Today, young Europeans are reaching adulthood who never knew a divided Europe. Many of their young Arab counterparts have no such positive experience; they have grown up in a world of division and conflict. Now, together, we have an opportunity to remove the barriers to their future and to leave the past behind.

Today, a renewed Arab Generation has begun. We have seen such beginnings fail in the past, but this time a unique confluence of events has created new openings for success. Now, together, we can, we must, fulfil the promise of democracy coupled with economic prosperity.

However, the first imperative is to understand and articulate the potential of peace. We must now begin to re-envision the future: a region where conflict gives way to cooperation, where a regional economy brings together the capabilities and resources of 43 countries – more than 750 million people, from the Atlantic to the Red Sea – and where cross-border partnerships advance economic development, protection of the environment and the dialogue between cultures. It is a future that empowers people to be full participants in global progress, and it will enable a new scope for the partnership with our European neighbours, in science, technology and trade. Achieving such a partnership will also make a substantial impact on other issues, from poverty to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, from the need to promote regional integration to the necessity to facilitate mobility.
Keys
Who would have foreseen such agitation? Who dared hope that the Tunisian people would be capable of overturning a plundering police regime whose stability and strength were extolled in Europe and elsewhere? Even those who are not novices in Arab politics were taken by surprise, dumbfounded by the turn of events, stunned by the speed of the victory of the Tunisian people and astonished by the maturity and modernity that it displayed.

It is thus hardly astonishing that the uprising by the Tunisian people had the effect of an electroshock. Let’s admit it — the surprise was complete: a young street vendor, harassed by police in Sidi Bouzid, immolates himself on 17 December 2010 and a sweeping movement of revolt is triggered. Arising in the Centre-West region (Kasserine, Sidi Bouzid, Feriana, etc.), the movement spreads like wildfire throughout the entire country, which is roused and takes to the streets. Mohammad Bouazizi dies on 4 January 2011.

Believing it to be a simple riot like those that have punctuated the history of this country, the police do not go in for half-measures: tear gas and real bullets. But the more the Tunisians are cut down, the more the protests spread and become generalized. Deaf to the appeals of youth, Ben Ali first takes refuge in silence, confident in the efficiency of his police force, then he takes the floor only to attribute the riots to “excited and subversive” elements, before finally facing the facts and acknowledging the errors committed, uttering the famous phrase coined by another general (of greater stature) “I have understood you.” This came too late; the protest had reached the point of no return. Ben Ali calls in the army but it rebels and, through the voice of its chief, refuses to shoot at the crowd. The regime collapses and the dictator, pursued, flees on 14 January 2011.

Tunisians themselves were surprised at the turn of events. They were prone to believe that the dictator had sharp teeth and long arms, but he turned out to be a paper tiger in the face of a population no longer fearing him and going into action. Evidently, fear changed sides.

I pride myself in closely following political, economic and social developments in Tunisia and the Arab world. Nevertheless, I must admit that I was caught unawares. I wanted change; I deeply hoped for it and never stopped repeating that “night is darkest just before the dawn” and that “after the winter of dictatorship will come the spring of freedom.” Then came the great surprise, a youth immolating himself and an entire country rising up for freedom. Thus, everything begins in the sacrificial mode, as it is called by Abdelwahab Meddeb, who adds that “it is Christ-like: giving of oneself to give health to others.” Personally, I believe that Bouazizi’s self-immolation was devoid of any religious or sacrificial import; it was simply a statement made through fire, an act committed in order to say “enough” or “no.” This gesture cannot be associated with a form of Jihad either, for any cause whatsoever, nor, a fortiori, a simple suicide. These young Arabs who immolate themselves are seeking above all to make their despair visible. Perhaps they believe they can spark the population through a ripple effect and put them into action. And if they have succeeded, it is because their countries resembled dry scrub fields that only needed a spark to set them ablaze. Without believing in the miracle of unpredictability, it is clear that the situ-
The Longevity of Authoritarian Arab Regimes

Yet if the situation was ripe for change, how can one account for the longevity demonstrated by authoritarian Arab regimes? Where were they getting their capacity to withstand such headwinds? And as a corollary, why have the Arab peoples waited so long, when waves of democratization had swept away the Franco and Salazar regimes in Spain and Portugal in the 1970s and the dictatorships of Latin America in the 1980s and the authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe in the 1990s?

Let's first answer the question on the longevity of these regimes. I ascribe it to several factors of both an internal and an external order.

Internal Factors

First of all, these factors have to do with the nature of the post-colonial Arab State. Indeed, once the threshold of independence was passed, the problem of affirmation of nationhood took precedence over everything else. The Arab republics, created by military coups or national revolutions (Algeria 1962, Syria 1948, Egypt 1952, Iraq 1958, Sudan 1969, Libya 1969), brought to power new elites, essentially military and often of rural or petit-bourgeois origins. Under this new governing class, the nationalist, socialist and Arabist State succeeded the liberal State of the preceding decades. These military teams posed as the "saviours of the Arab nation from the clutches of colonialism" and "developers of societies," but quickly lapsed into elementary populism, silencing all dissent and accusing any opponents of being "agents of imperialism." In the name of the "glorious Arab nation" and its "eternal mission" (Al-risalah al-khalidah), as per slogans brandished by the Ba'ath Party and other parties of that type, the new regimes rubbed out differences for the sake of unity. They made stability take precedence over democracy, establishing a tacit social contract with their populations: the State would take charge of matters of development, political independence and social justice in exchange for the population's consent and its not demanding political participation. This negative consensus could work when the Arab population was still low; it no longer functions today because the Arab population has quadrupled over the past sixty years, its needs have rocketed and the States' means have been diminished by poor governance: the predatory excesses of regimes, arms purchasing and generalized corruption. Having lost all legitimacy, the States resort to a single or dominant party and a highly sophisticated system of repression and control, making a real climate of terror reign.

In oil-producing countries, oil revenues function as a damper: they devalue labour, the entrepreneurial spirit and efficiency, since the States' revenues are not linked to labour; they reduce taxation and empower States (recall the catchphrase of the early Americans: "no taxation without representation"); they canker the national economy via plethoric public employment and the generalization of corruption; and they buy the populations' consent. In sum, they clearly embody the "natural resource curse" known as the "Dutch disease," where revenues have a negative effect not only on economic efficiency, but also on democracy. This is true in emirates and monarchies just as well as in republics, as in the cases of Libya and Algeria.

The Palestinian issue has had negative effects on democracy: certainly, it is perceived as a source of suffering and humiliation by Arab peoples from Mauritania to Oman, but for regimes, it has been the object of all sorts of manipulation. Haven't they bombarded their peoples with misleading slogans? They were supposed to "close ranks against the Zionist enemy," and were told "not to create diversions," not to "break the national consensus on the struggle against Israel and its occupation" and that "it is time for combat and not debate." Regimes have used and abused this fallacious, so-called nationalist litany. The worst thing, as indicated by the journalist, Khaled Hroub, is that "these bywords have resounded for decades and have had a considerable impact on large sections of the population, which have accepted these regimes in return for the struggle against Israel" without asking themselves whether a dictatorship is more effective than a democracy in a struggle against a national enemy.

In monarchies, a different logic has prevailed: it is what Joseph Maila called "the logic of retribution." It is essentially a logic that seeks to maintain the hierarchical representation of social order based on tribal order (the emirates), the use of a "lineage indicating blood relations or proximity to
the Prophet” (the Hashemite lineage), “the protection of the Holy Places of Islam” (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), or the fact of being “the Commander of the Faithful” (Morocco).

Not only are populations not involved in economic and social choices, but they are the victims of the predation of public officials, whose corruption raises society’s sense of helplessness and weakens awareness of the public nature of the State.

Thus, globally, Arab political culture, both in republican and monarchical States, leaves little room for the citizens due to a lack of the institutional mediation necessary between the head of state and his subjects (ra'aya), between the Founding Father of the nation and his “children,” between the “saviours of the nation” and their “protégés.” In such a relationship, the State is no longer a “public good,” but rather a “private resource,” tapped by the Head of State, his family and the ruling classes that revolve around them. This means that not only are populations not involved in economic and social choices, but they are the victims of the predation of public officials, whose corruption raises society’s sense of helplessness and weakens awareness of the public nature of the State, making the latter a hostile phenomenon seen as a necessary evil.

External Factors

Naturally, in addition to these endogenous factors contributing to the longevity of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, we must also consider external factors, which can be summed up as the “instrumental function” of these regimes in the defence of the interests of external powers.

These regimes’ alliances with the major world powers during the Cold War were a determining factor in their longevity. Indeed, from 1956 to the collapse of the USSR at the beginning of the 1990s, the entire Arab subsystem was penetrated and polarised. By “penetrated system,” I understand a system submissive to interference by external actors. This is due to its geographical riches (gas and oil), its geographical location (key, corridor or crossroads region), its geopolitical and geostrategic importance (connecting the Mediterranean with oceans and bordering Africa, Europe and Asia) and its economic interest as a vast market, or even in its geotheological dimension, since the region is endowed with a sort of “sacred geography” by the three major monotheistic religions. The penetrated nature of the Arab regional subsystem predates the Cold War – since ancient times the Arab world has been coveted by political powers and has been the object of all sorts of desires and rivalries. But with the onset of the Cold War, the penetration became complete; not a single remote area was spared.

This produced a nearly systematic polarization in the Arab world between the pro-American (and pro-Western) contingents and the pro-Soviet sectors. Roughly speaking, the monarchies sided with the Americans and the “popular socialist republics” with the Soviets. Yet neither the Americans nor, a fortiori, the Soviets considered the issue of “political freedom.” Their concern was that their respective allies be “loyal” to their commitments. Dictatorships did not pose much of a conscience problem for the Soviet Union. As for the Western world, it recognized the low degree of freedom granted populations by their allies, but they were nonetheless “their allies” (“our son of a bitch”). Hence the Cold War froze democratic claims and fossilized regimes.

These regimes put themselves forth as guarantors of stability, and if necessary, of a regular flow of oil and gas. Indispensable to the operation of the word economy, these two resources are widely present in the Arab world, which possesses nearly 60% of proven oil reserves and nearly 20% of gas reserves.

These regimes portrayed themselves as bulwarks against Islamism, or even against jihadism. However, all experts on the matter unanimously recognize the role of authoritarian Arab regimes in the re-Islamisation of societies in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. Early on, after the death of Nasser and the erosion of Arabist ideology, Sadat encouraged student Islamist movements in order to counter students of left-wing, Nasserist ideology at Egyptian universities. Elsewhere, regimes have sought to beat Islamists at their own game by competing in mosque-building zeal. In Algeria, for instance, more mosques have been built than schools. Other Arab countries have followed suit, leading to the development of a conservative
culture, the reinforcement of the role of religion and the multiplication of signs of Islam or references to it, and of religious TV and radio programmes. In Tunisia, according to Hakim Ben Hammouda, it was Ben Ali’s son-in-law who was behind the creation of the Ezzitouna radio station and an Islamic bank. Far from being secular, authoritarian powers have largely contributed to Islamization in both its moderate and radical versions. The development of the rule of wearing headscarves has been concomitant to the strengthening of dictatorships.

Have these regimes been more effective as anti-terrorism bulwarks? Certainly, but above all in order to protect themselves and not the West. And in any case, could one assume that democratic States would not be capable of fighting against terrorism? These regimes portrayed themselves as anti-migration sentinels. It was the European Union (EU) that pressed them to play the role of border guard for the EU, often in exchange for substantial financial aid packets. We know that this externalisation of control causes human tragedies, fosters traffic in human beings, changes migratory routes and simply makes the crossing more dangerous, longer and more profitable for people smugglers. But what is ethically unacceptable in this policy of "long-distance policing" is that the EU demands that authoritarian regimes, which do not need to consult their peoples, turn an open, vibrant, interdependent and integrated border into an "alienated border," to use the expression of Donnan and Wilson.

This delocalisation of control offers no guarantees insofar as democratic rights. How can we trust someone like Gaddafi to protect the rights of migrants in his country, in his temporary holding facilities or detention centres? This is like asking a wolf to protect sheep.

Thus, the longevity of authoritarian Arab regimes over the course of decades cannot simply be ascribed to internal factors, but also to the instrumental function assigned them by their external allies, with the damage this has entailed. In fact, it is as a “bulwark against terrorism” that authoritarian Arab regimes have managed to crack down on civil society demonstrations, whether Islamist or not, imprisoning, silencing, torturing, exiling, in the face of the astonishing near silence of manifest Human Rights advocates. And it is as "anti-migration sentinels" that these regimes have been able to detain sub-Saharan immigrants under wretched conditions or enlist them as mercenaries in their armies of repression, as is the case in Libya.

### The Fiction of the Arab Exception

To account for the longevity of authoritarian Arab political systems, we must thus consider the nature of the governing teams, the different legitimations they have used, and the instrumental functions with which they have been entrusted. In sum, to understand events in the Arab world, it is in social sciences that we must seek an answer and not in the Koran or a fortiori in culturalist explanations. However, the culturalist theory on the Arab exception, the least pertinent one from a social sciences viewpoint, was and continues to be widespread among certain intellectual circles and in the Western media, and therefore on the level of popular perception. How many magazine covers – and not only sensationalist ones – haven’t we seen bearing such headlines as “Is Islam Compatible with Democracy?,” “Islam Against the Republic,” “Integration of Muslim Immigrants Impossible,” “The Islam-West Shock.” All of these headlines lend a distorted image and denote great intellectual poverty.

What exactly is the “Arab and Muslim exception” theory? For the culturalist school, “there is a specific homo islicicus, anthropologically cut off from the rest of humanity,” which implies that Islam is irreparably associated with a sort of theocracy incapable of opening up to the pluralist world and its democratic corollary. This is the thesis held by Bernard Lewis on “the intrinsic despotism of Islam.”

According to the proponents of the culturalist theory, the Arab world, since it is primarily Muslim, suffers from the same authoritarian exception and constitutes the only region that has remained behind in the planetary process of democratisation, as it is refractory to pluralism. “At present, an Arab democrat,” writes David Pryce-Jones, “is not even an idealisation, but a contradiction in terms.”

Others have followed his lead, pointing out tribal divisions, the constant challenging of authority, chains of seditions and the succession of revolts that would render the Islamic City anarchic from the start, such that the culture of violence and of force supposedly

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1 Lewis, Bernard. What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Reponses, Oxford University Press, 2002.

prevailing in the Arab-Islamic area would not allow the emergence of a dynamic civil society and an area of Rule of Law. To back up their arguments, the proponents of the culturalist theory go as far as evoking the importance of obedience to a Prince, Sultan, King, Zaim, Sheikh or father. In sum, social life is supposedly characterised by relations of authority, domination and dependence, and the Leader is attributed the features of an agent of repression.

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The extreme poverty of such a theory is blatant, yet it has had a great deal of repercussion. Why? The answer is not simple. I assume it is in part due to major ignorance regarding the ancient and recent history of the Muslim and Arab world, and that this negative determinism is nourished by a generalised confusion between Islam in texts and historical Islam, that is, Islam as manifested by the social practices of those who live in it. Perhaps among some there is a hint of bad faith, or a will to present Israel as a “democratic haven” amongst “an ocean of tyranny,” in others, an erroneous reading of Ibn Khaldun’s notions of al-Asabiyyah and Hisham Sharabi’s notions of neopatriarchy. It is not unlikely that the proponents of this thesis are influenced by the Muslim legal corpus, where the interests of the Ummah (Muslim community) normally prevail over individual rights.

Arab Democratic Revolutions Debunk the Myths

The Arab revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt not only toppled authoritarian regimes; they also debunked the theories of the Arab and Muslim exception. With their blood and their courage, young Tunisians and Egyptians – like other young Arabs – have written, or are writing the epitaph, not only for dictatorship in Arab lands, but also for the dictatorship of culturalist ideas on Arabs and Muslims. In doing so, they have dealt a powerful lesson to those who only saw inert, docile crowds walking Arab streets; they have provided an incisive rebuttal of the thesis of stability through dictatorship and revealed the incoherence of the EU, which planned on rewarding Tunisia and Egypt by granting them “advanced status.” At the same time, they have condemned the suspect friendships of certain European States with authoritarian regimes in the South in the name of a misconception of realpolitik. The Arab peoples have followed the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions with enthusiasm, and even with a certain degree of envy. The other Arab regimes have attempted to divert attention or minimise the significance of these events. They believe they are safe, but the pursuit of liberty is contagious, as can be seen in Syria, Yemen, Libya and other Arab countries, both rich and poor.

Insofar as a “successful revolution,” that of Tunisian youth will create a following. We can rightly speak of a Tunisian paradigm. Indeed, a number of lessons can be gleaned from events in Tunisia. The first is this population’s maturity: it remained united, its movement remained spontaneous and there was no political party or religious organisation leading it. This prevented partisan or religious appropriation. The Tunisian people demonstrated extraordinary courage and self-control: they did not respond to police violence with violence. By remaining pacific, the protest finally triumphed over the obstinacy of the cronies of despotic power. Better yet, the slogans chanted by crowds remained secular: freedom, employment, dignity. I never once heard “God is great.” Although there has indisputably been a re-Islamisation of a sector of Tunisian society, as one protestor recalls, “God is in the heart of Tunisians, but he is absent from the street.” Tunisian Islamists took a low profile and did not seek to control the protest movement or even appropriate it. This is a first in Arab countries: religious claims and political demands were not mixed. This says a great deal about the progress of secularisation in Tunisia, whose merit, needless to say, lies with Bourguiba himself. Women were efficient actors in the movement. Spearheads of social change in Tunisia, they did not remain on the margins, nor were they sidelined. Today they are cited as examples in all Arab countries.
This revolution is not one of “empty bellies” but of “minds full of dreams and hope” for a different Tunisia. Certainly, economic issues such as youth unemployment, corruption and clientelism have been singled out, but it was above all the irrepressible desire for freedom that spurred the protesters on.

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The dictator deposed, democracy remains to be conquered. In this sense, the path remaining will be difficult: the technocratic structure of the dictatorship and the regime’s foundations (the militia, the secret service, the single party system, etc.) need to be dismantled, elections worthy of the name have to be organised and a democracy of appeasement and inclusion must be established. Yes, moderate Islamists will have to be included, but no one should ever be allowed to monopolize the Tunisian revolution. The army, whose credibility has remained intact, should be on its guard, avoiding blunders and not giving in to the temptation of producing a “saviour of the nation” figure from among its ranks. How many “saviours of the nation” have actually been, under other horizons, the “gravediggers of democracy”?

In view of these Tunisian specificities, it is clear that the Egyptian revolution comes the closest to the Tunisian paradigm, with a more important role assigned to the Military Council, whereas Libya is the country farthest from the paradigm. In the latter, the revolution by youth veers towards armed rebellion, the Gaddafi regime’s repression takes on a bloody turn and the West intervenes, with an international mandate and Arab endorsement, to impose a no-fly zone and “all necessary measures.”

Insofar as the EU, it will have to review its policies from top to bottom and thoroughly reconsider its relations with Mediterranean countries and with Arab countries in general. Paralysed by the risks of all the “isms,” including fundamentalism, Islamism, terrorism, radicalism and “harraguisme” (illegal migration), the EU has kept its eyes well closed to dictatorships. Now it will be forced to open them; the Arab democratic awakening could well awaken Europe. From now on, it will not have to deal with the “Arab street” but with “Arab opinions.” And this is not the least of the merits of the democratic revolution in the South Mediterranean Basin.
The events that have rocked the entire Arab world, with very few exceptions, since the beginning of 2011, have made headlines across the globe, bringing to the fore a series of unavoidable debates and reflections for experts, academics and analysts. First and foremost, and one of their fundamental characteristics, is the unpredictability of the political terrain, particularly in the sphere of international politics, in the widest sense of the word. Social sciences, the theory of international relations, political science or the economy have certain methodological and analytical weaknesses, some of which are difficult to correct or modify, but we are at least aware of them: what exploded throughout the Arab world had not been predicted by anyone, not in the affected political regimes, their respective civil societies, the Western world, or even among the most renowned of international academics. Indeed, disregarding for a moment the gravity of the news of his death on 2 May 2011, the Arab revolts caught Bin Laden and what has come to be known as the “al-Qaeda franchise” entirely unawares.

This unpredictability is perfectly comparable – if we give the situation the appropriate historical perspective and some of its content more relevance – with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, or the simple possibility that Gorbachev’s Perestroika in its beginnings would not only put an end to the bipolar world and the Cold War, but also the Soviet political regime itself. The comparison, of course, is of relative value and should not be overly studied, as this would assume similar global consequences. But it is valid for reaffirming the unpredictability of politics.
national legitimacy from the aforementioned secular language of lay politics: the equivalent of the demands of the great European revolutions of the last two and a half centuries; or more if we consider the English revolution of the 17th century, and its fight for the habeas corpus or bill of rights.

Fourthly, it is also striking to note that these movements, as far as we can determine in the first three months of the revolts, have been highly transparent in their structural and organisational simplicity. Their outbreaks have been spontaneous, without prior organisation. (Had this existed of course, it would have been in secret, since these were dictatorial regimes.) They were not classified, prepared, programmed, with prior tactics or strategies, and no organisation, Islamist or secular, can claim to have led or managed them. It is true, as has happened in the case of crises in other authoritarian regimes, in other transitions, that a host of new parties and diverse leaderships have emerged, some of which have had a part to play – the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and few others. But in these fallen regimes, such as Tunisia, Egypt or Libya, if there was any surviving opposition, it was imprisoned, exiled or, for all intents and purposes, destroyed. Naturally, in more advanced phases of the transition that is underway, it will be no mean feat for this fragmented plurality of political options to search out and eventually find a relevant space for its institutional presence. But there will be a process of "natural selection," an electoral solution or social influence at different levels.

This is exactly what a transition is, and if concluded with reasonable success – and there is no assurance for that across the board – the competition on the way will be tough, including interventions from the media, social networks and diverse international actors; indeed the race to influence society will adopt multiple forms. The revolts have been social, popular, spontaneous, without prior preparation and have organised themselves in real time as they developed; but six or eight months since they began, neither Tunisia or Egypt have a new system of parties, a truly legitimised government running for election, or a political force that represents the majority of the people. This phase is "under construction."

Fifthly, and perceivable in the initial phase of the revolts, the movement has had diverse expressions, but with a similar underlying format: the aforementioned urban sphere (as a realm of action), young people, women activists (of particular relevance in the social traditions of the Arab world) and exhaustive use of the famed social networks and the Internet, with all its potential, etc. In some cases, regimes seem to have regained the initiative after the first few weeks, like in Algeria; in others their fall from grace has been dizzying, like in Tunisia and Egypt; others seem to drag on interminably with their dictators clutching to the power, like in Yemen after six months, with protestors winning in certain areas, while in others the confrontation has reached a stalemate; finally, there are those cases where the regime has, at least provisionally, led its own self-reform, such as that of Morocco and Jordan, where the fact that the monarchy is so deeply rooted in society and enjoys a high degree of historical legitimacy seems to play an essential role, and their civil societies are (very relatively) more autonomous and "denser" in their expression. Citizens identify themselves with these monarchical forms of State and Government, because they facilitate their loyalties to the watan (fatherland) and dawlat (State) in a way which is compatible with the demanded democratic reforms. Finally, we have the variants of Libya and Syria, who have opted for mass, systematic repression, with the risk of civil war provoking different responses from the international community, which we will address later.

The revolts have been social, popular, spontaneous, without prior preparation and have organised themselves in real time as they developed

It is true that historically in the political culture that we call "Arabism," the highest legitimacy of a citizen’s various loyalties resided (according to the hegemonic version), in concepts like umma al arabiya, the Arab supernation, understood as a collective call from the entire Arab world. Which, of course, has not stood the test of time and has failed in its attempts to deal with the aforementioned concepts of fatherland or State (watan and dawlat respectively), as demonstrated by the successive failed attempts at building superstates, such as the UAR (United Arab Republic) in the fifties. Paradoxically, various factors have expressed this historical incapacity: in particular, the fact that the liberation of the current Arab countries was highly diverse: those in Africa freed themselves from the classic European coloni-
alism (by France, Britain, Italy and Spain) and in the Middle East they sought liberation from the Ottoman Empire, which reigned over them for almost five centuries! But this series of variables paved the way to a great variety of Arab political regimes that are much more "national-state patriots" than "pan-Arabists," with the added problem of multiple social or interstate loyalties: clans, tribes, fragmented religious minorities. It is enough to ask the Lebanese, Syrians, Iraqis and Yemenites for their opinion to have a vague idea of the complexity of the problem.

Finally, we are witness to a fully regional transition, regardless of the variety of solutions that we can see in each individual case. Although not identical, the concept is similar to that of a classic political transition. In political science, there is a long and solid tradition in transition studies understood as a change of state political system (government in its wider sense), normally from authoritarian or dictatorial forms, to forms of conventional representative democracy. Transitions such as a regime change can and often do adopt different varieties and rhythms of consolidation.

The concept of regional transition goes beyond this and has another dimension. This is the case when several countries with geopolitical continuity enter into more or less simultaneous transitions, but do so for internal reasons specific to each of them. The last quarter of the 20th century was rich in regional transitions: those of southern Europe (Spain, Greece and Portugal in 1974/1975), those of the Latin American Southern Cone (Chile, Argentina and Uruguay between 1982 and 1990), and to an extent that of the post-Soviet Bloc, or Eastern Bloc (in the bipolar world), whose effects can still be felt today. In these regional transitions, the internal dynamics, and its rhythms, are usually specific to each case and country, but often turn into transactional processes, based on negotiations between various actors, including some, such as the army or the judiciary (that are not secondary as such), from the previous regime, which are recycled and adapted to the new situation. And the cases in question include this kind of variable above all. That is to say, there will be more negotiated transitions than breakaway, triumphant revolutions. And there will be steps backward or the preservation of the status quo, as seems to be the case of Syria in June 2011, which has benefited additionally from two factors that distinguish it from Egypt and Libya respectively: on the one hand the army is not allowing the regime to fall, is dealing with the toughest part of the repression and – together with Egypt – is far and away the most powerful of all the Arab world. On the other hand, the international community adopted at the time a more cautious, more incrementalist and peaceful approach (in the Libyan case), for a group of variables that will keep the controversy open surrounding the so-called "double-standard" in the use of force when the Responsibility to Protect (known as R2P) is at stake. This unquestionable dilemma cannot be avoided.

The case of Libya deserves special attention, since this is an exception: the revolt has become a civil war with all its consequences, the confrontation has reached a stalemate and the new variable is the use of international military force, invoking the aforementioned R2P. Let us look at that in more detail.

The intervention ordered by the Security Council (SC) in Libya has given rise to much debate. On the one hand, it is a case in which large segments of the public opinion transmit a sense of confusion. It is one of the dilemmas of the so-called "duty to intervene" (in the nineties) or "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P: endorsed by the United Nations in 2005 and 2009). Dilemmas have arisen in each and every case that has led to international intervention under this invocation in exactly the last 20 years – disregarding the case of Iraq in 2003, since it is the only one in which the differences with Libya are so large that referring to it would be pointless.

The criteria of legality is officially non-objectionable: resolution 1973 of the SC (March 2011) is explicit, is prior to using force, clearly defines the mandate, and furthermore sets the limits that the mandate cannot pass. In this case, the criteria of legality is reinforced by the criteria of legitimacy. The cases that in the past have not received intervention, or in which it came late, like in the former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995, under the United Nations mission UNPROFOR, have heavily influenced the decision of the SC members. Even those who had their reservations – for various reasons for which they should answer – have abstained; there have been no votes against. The abstention of China and Russia is, therefore, a non-objection; and veto was within their power.

Resolution 1973 is clear: it aims to defend the Libyan people from the attacks of their own government, a mandate of articles 138 and 139 of the document referred to here. It aims to defend civilians – considered a basic Humanitarian International Right – and
specifically undertakes the so-called “Responsibility to Protect”, defined by the 2005 International UN World Summit, and by the declaration of its Secretary General in 2009, who is calling for its “effective implementation.” The SC says that it is acting under chapter 7 of the Charter (relative to the use of force) and is granting a double mandate. On the one hand the no-fly zone, which requires military means to be enforced and needs to be used to maintain the credibility of the Resolution, assuming Gaddafi makes it necessary. And he did so in the 48 hours following the United Nations Resolution. His forces were stopped 15 km from the centre of Benghazi and he has repeatedly violated his own ceasefire. But the specific mandate of Resolution 1973, aside from the no-fly zone, has another essential aspect: it authorises the use of the means necessary to defend the population when under threat from that force. It is not true to say there are no precedents. There are several, and furthermore their variety shows both its efficiency if done with resolve (protection of the Kurdish population in northern Iraq, with the 1991 no-fly zone, which was maintained for over 10 years with a high level of efficiency), and the human cost if it is not done in this manner (UNPROFOR in Bosnia Herzegovina or the failure to protect Shiites in southern Iraq in 1991). The resolution does not authorise and expressly vetoes any land invasion or deployment of troops with intentions to occupy. In the opinion of many experts, that does not imply that security perimeters cannot be created when ACNUR and other humanitarian agencies have to be deployed on the terrain, should the case arise. The Libyan crisis has caused an exodus towards the Tunisian and Egyptian borders of between 150,000 and 200,000 people, which is ten times higher than the exodus towards southern Europe in the same time. The return, repatriation or relocation of these people forms part of the humanitarian problem to be resolved. The Resolution does not aim to fight against the territorial integrity of Libya, and does not call for regime change. It does not propose this and it is not within the powers of the SC to do so. When it comes to Security Council resolutions, the States decide for themselves whether or not and in what way to participate in the subsequent operations, which explains why the EU or even NATO (since it does not come under the Mutual Defence Pact of Art. 5) have no reason to take a common, collective position with these organisations.

There has been a qualitative change and nothing will return to how it was before January 2011

There is also the unequal treatment to consider, in particular in Yemen. (The same day that the Resolution was approved 50 demonstrators were killed in the capital alone.) The Arab League and the SC should follow the case very closely. This is a further dilemma: where are the limits for the SC? Yemen, Bahrain? The unequal treatment exists, and unfortunately there are a lot of them. All the dilemmas boil down to this: the international community, faced with this situation, has two options. The first is to not take action anywhere, thus avoiding unequal treatment, and wait for the time to act everywhere simultaneously, successfully resolving all situations in question. The other option is that the SC and the UN decide when and where it should and can act, with the appropriate mandate, sufficient means and a sufficient collective will, assuming the burden of all the dilemmas.

When all is said and done however, there is an overwhelming consensus on the overall phenomenon of change in the Arab world. Its origin was unpredictable, it has adopted diverse rhythms and forms in its development, there will be steps backwards in certain cases, but overall there has been a qualitative change and nothing will return to how it was before January 2011. That is how history progresses: in fits and starts, but unrelentingly moving onward.
The fleeing of former President Ben Ali on 14 January 2011 after a month of social unrest affecting every city in the country and with over 200 deaths can be considered a surprising episode because of its rarity in the normal course of State histories, and an important turning point in the history of Tunisia, a country with a population of 10.5 million that has had to endure two successive dictatorships since independence from France, those of Habib Bourguiba (1954-1987) and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali (1987-2011).

This date has a historic scope, not only for “little” Tunisia, but also for the entire Middle East and North African (MENA) region, where, following the triumph of the Tunisians over Ben Ali, peoples revolted, one after another, to oust their despots. Indeed, the winds of revolt blew over Egypt, where former President Hosni Mubarak was forced to leave the highest office after thirty-one years of unshared power, but also over Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, Jordan, Syria, Algeria and even Morocco. At the time these lines were written, the governments in power in these countries were also facing more or less virulent protest movements and were resorting to violence to contain their raging populations. We are therefore witnessing a sort of *remake* that recalls what happened in Tunisia – give or take a few details and according to the specificities of each country –, namely, pacific protests led essentially by young people, beyond all partisan frameworks, with demands that can be summed up in three words: dignity, liberty and democracy. This is what lends the Tunisian revolt its importance and exemplarity. It was the Tunisian revolt that invented the strategy, the method, and came up with the means. The other peoples of the region who have followed the movement have but applied this modus operandi, with more or less success depending on the case.

We must emphasize here that what just happened in Tunisia in early 2011 is not a simple “palace revolution”, and much less so a military putsch, as certain French media would have us believe, under the influence of their country’s intelligence services. The latter, who were visibly surprised by the fiery popular revolt that set Tunisia ablaze, did not wish to admit that what was happening was simply a revolution, that is, an explosion of generalized fury in which all walks of society participated, following in the wake of youth, triggered by profound indignation and an irrepressible will for change, and that in four weeks got rid of a despot whom everyone believed impossible to overthrow, and swept away a regime among the most well-established in the Southern Mediterranean. How did this revolution manage to break out? What conditions made it possible? Who are the real actors? And what are their chances for success? In other words: will they attain the goal they have set themselves, i.e. to build the first real democracy in the Southern Mediterranean area?

**The Spark Set Off by Sidi Bouzid**

Historians will remember 17 December 2010 as the date of the onset of the first Arab revolution of the 21st century. On that day, in Sidi Bouzid, a city in the Centre-West of Tunisia, street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi, slapped in the face by a police officer, and a woman at that – an extreme humiliation in that highly traditionalist region – attempted to lodge a complaint with the governor of the region...
(the prefect), but was prevented from entering the
government buildings. Enraged, the young man,
who was the sole breadwinner for his family, all
members of which (parents, brothers and sisters)
were unemployed, doused himself in flammable liq-
uid and immolated himself. Transported to the
emergency ward of a hospital in Sfax, then to Tunis,
he died suffering terribly.

In the context of a dictatorship where corruption
and repression had become increasingly unbearable, what could have remained a minor incident
became, as of 18 December, the detonator of a
protest movement that gradually spread from Sidi
Bouzid to all the cities in Tunisia. Relayed, with
photos and videos as support, by social networks
and foreign media in the face of the deafening si-
lence of the local media, the movement grew and
was gradually joined by people from all sectors of
society. The youth having been joined in the meantime by trade unionists, professional associations
(lawyers, journalists, etc.) and militants of radical
opposition parties – those who had become satel-
lites of the Ben Ali Regime maintained a silence
reflecting complicity –, the protest movement
ended in apotheosis on 14 January 2011, in a
massive protest in front of the building of the Min-
istry of the Interior, symbol of Ben Ali’s repressive
system, located on Avenue Habib Bourguiba, Tu-
nis. And it was due to the determination of the Tu-
尼斯ians, who demanded his departure in a single
voice, shouting “Get out!”, that General Ben Ali
finally decided to flee in the evening, seeking ref-
uge in Saudi Arabia.

This end to one of the most brutal dictatorships in the region is the logical outcome of a long
process of political disintegration of a repressive, corrupt regime that succeeded in turning all
Tunisians against it.

Ben Ali did not take long to establish his dictatorial
regime. As of 1991-1992, after the dismantling of
the Islamist Ennahdha movement, whose members
were sentenced to long prison sentences or forced
into exile in Europe, he did not tarry to impose total
control over political life. Opposition parties had to
choose between playing the role of useful puppets
in a façade of pluralism or that of pariahs muzzled
by a strong police machine. The media, national or-
ganisations (employers’ associations, labour un-
ions, farmers, women, etc.), associations of profes-
sionals (magistrates, journalists, lawyers, etc.) and
the ensemble of civil society ended up under the
iron control of an increasingly centralised regime,
where all decisions were made by the Head of
State and his immediate entourage, consisting of
members of his family, in particular his wife, and
certain close collaborators.

It is this personalised and centralised regime that
gradually moved towards a form of “thug rule” not
stopping at any abuse: persecuting opponents, tor-
ture, unfair and fabricated trials, abuse of social
goods, nepotism and corruption.

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How can the political downfall of the Ben Ali regime
be explained? The latter, an army officer long di-
recting military intelligence, joined the Ministry of
the Interior at the end of the 1970s. Over the
course of his chequered career, he was often at the
heart of events marking the country’s history.
action levers, although he succeeded in keeping the economic machine in a more or less proper operative state, with an average annual growth of 5% during his two decades in power, although he succeeded, moreover, in gaining a following, both nationally and internationally, for the idea that a dictator who brings prosperity, even if it is relative prosperity, is better than a democracy bringing instability and uncertainty, the deposed dictator nonetheless committed a number of fatal errors that turned his presumed power into an immense weakness in the eyes of his fellow citizens. These errors were:

- The carte blanche given to his family members, who took control of significant sectors of the country's economy, often by illegal means;
- His total indifference towards demands for liberty and democracy expressed by the country's elite, the most well-educated in the Arab world, as well as by young people;
- The neglect of inland regions of the country (Northwest, Centre-West, Southwest and South). These traditionally rebellious regions bordering on Algeria and Libya did not receive their share of investments, infrastructures and attention from the State. Having developed a certain mistrust of the central government over the course of the years, it was these regions, where unemployment had reached double the national average (30% as compared to 14%), that finally sparked the revolt. The world recession of 2008, whose effects began to be strongly felt in Tunisia, a country whose economy is based on industrial exports and tourism, did the rest.

Ben Ali, Europe's “Favourite Dictator”

How was a regime of such characteristics able to enjoy the active support of the majority of European countries, to the point where, while the revolt grew in Tunisia, they long hesitated to distance themselves or express the least criticism towards a partner who had real bullets shot against peaceful demonstrators? The reactions in Paris, Rome, Berlin, Brussels, Madrid and London, to cite only Tunisia's main economic partners, were late, timid and without conviction, which created the sensation among Tunisians of having been left to their fate. And it will most certainly be a long time before they forget their grievances against the European Union and Western countries, who, at the first popular, pacific outburst in the Southern Mediterranean region demanding dignity, freedom and democracy, immediately turned their backs on these principles, which they demand so garishly when Iran, China or Cuba are concerned.

Why didn't European countries foresee these demands? Why did they underestimate them? In fact, seen from Western capital cities, Tunisia under Ben Ali had all the guarantees of the ideal partner:

- It was the first Southern Mediterranean country to have signed an Association Agreement with the European Union (in 1995), by virtue of which it dismantled all tariff barriers with Europe for industrial products and established a free trade area with Europe, effective as of 1 January 2008;
- It effectively collaborated in the anti-terrorist struggle, in particular after the 11 September 2001 attacks;
- It also took an active part in the struggle against illegal migration;
- It played the role of moderator in the Southern Mediterranean area and was an active agent in the Middle East peace process;
- It thus offered an image of stability in a regional environment where areas of tension are not lacking.

For all of these reasons, and not only, this Tunisia was considered a model European countries would have liked to duplicate throughout the region. That the population of this country was crushed under the weight of a dictatorship of the most atrocious and corrupt nature evidently mattered little for European strategic calculations.

On another level, the deposed dictator, who had his hands on entire sectors of the national economy, which he administered (nearly) as if they were his private property, set up a vast system of propaganda. Organised around the Tunisian External Communication Agency (TECA), this system bribed politicians, artists, writers and journalists, often handsomely rewarded, who lobbied for the regime in the main European media.

Thus, every time human rights organisations, relaying the appeals of Tunisian civil society, denounced Ben Ali's human rights violations, the network of friends of Tunisia, above all in France, went into
action to defend the dictator: an open, moderate, pro-Western man, enemy of Islamists, etc. Thanks to this propaganda machine, Ben Ali had actually succeeded in lending weight in Europe to the idea that he was the sole rampart against the rise of Islamism in Tunisia and that if he fell, the Islamists would take power.

Many Europeans, sincerely or out of self-interest, were willing to take this lie at face value, which consequently lent the Ben Ali regime, above all in Europe, a sort of halo of integrity that not even the corruption scandals bespattering the members of his clan or their human rights violations could dent.

Ben Ali, a rampart against Islamism? This myth, which Europeans and Americans considered obvious, did not long stand the test of the Tunisian revolution. From the first demonstrations by youth, everyone was able to see that the slogans being brandished had nothing to do with Islamism. The demonstrators were simply demanding greater freedom, respect and participation, but also more dignity, justice and equality. These were no “food riots”, as certain European media stated at first, perhaps considering that in the Southern Mediterranean, there could be no demands other than for food. It was a revolution of (and for) dignity.

The Revolution at a Crossroads

Another characteristic of this revolution: the movement that led up to it escaped all partisan control. It was spontaneous and massive, without recognised leadership, rejecting all political control whatever its origin. And even if some parties, organisations and civil movements eventually joined it, the movement has remained independent and refractory to any attempts at appropriation. This may be its strength, but it is also its weakness. For a revolution can help build a modern democracy; but in the absence of a credible and unifying leadership, it can also lead to disorder and anarchy. And this is the main challenge of the Tunisian revolution, which is now at a crossroads.

The day after Ben Ali fled, 15 January, the political system was strongly shaken by the scorched earth plan established by the deposed president before he fled, which resulted in the release of all common law prisoners, acts of pillage and arson in numerous enterprises, serious breaches of public security and a series of assassinations whose circumstances have not yet been cleared up.

These were no “food riots”, as certain European media stated at first, perhaps considering that in the Southern Mediterranean, there could be no demands other than for food. It was a revolution of (and for) dignity.

The very evening of 14 January 2011, however, the establishment of a transition government allowed constitutional continuity to be preserved. This government is in charge of handling general affairs, relaunching the economic machine and organising the elections for a constituent assembly. This assembly, which should be elected on 24 July 2011, will be in charge of restoring popular legitimacy and drawing up a new constitution.

In the meantime, commissions that should ensure the conditions for a smooth democratic transition have been established. The High Commission for the Realisation of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reform and Democratic Transition is working on the reform of the electoral code and the conditions for organising pluralist, transparent and credible elections, the first in the country’s history.

The National Fact-Finding Commission on Cases of Embezzlement and Corruption is investigating affairs involving members of the former clan in power. Its mission is to prepare substantial case files against members of the Ben Ali clan in order to assist the judiciary to restore the rule of law, and above all, to repatriate the clan’s assets held in foreign banks.

The National Fact-Finding Commission on Cases of Abuse during the Last Period is in charge of investigating the assassinations committed in the weeks before and after the fall of the regime by snipers deployed in the country and whose identities and affiliations are the object of speculation. Who are these killers? To which security force did they belong? And from whom did they receive the orders to fire on peaceful protesters? A heavy silence surrounds these questions, while the families of the victims and public opinion lose patience.
A fourth commission, called the National Commission for Media and Communication Reform, is in charge of establishing a new media system over the ruins of the system inherited from the former regime and to ensure the establishment of conditions for balanced, transparent coverage of the forthcoming elections. The majority of current media (television channels, radio stations, newspapers, etc.) having all been involved, to differing degrees, in Ben Ali’s despotic system, the Commission, like the other commissions mentioned, is having a great deal of difficulty carrying out its mission.

The future of the Tunisian revolution is contingent on this government’s capacity to withstand the criticism erupting everywhere, continue dealing with urgent matters and establish, regardless, the conditions for successful elections.

The generalised atmosphere of suspicion, heightened by the demands to judge former collaborators of the ousted regime, the settling of accounts among members of the public administration and social movements in public and private enterprise represent definite threats to the process of democratic transition.

The transition government has made numerous decisions designed to break with the past, namely, arresting and trying numerous members of the Ben Ali clan and its close collaborators, the removal from their posts of some forty former senior security offices, the dismantling of the political police service, the dissolution of the former party in power, the Democratic Constitutional Rally (RCD), etc. Unfortunately, this government is having great difficulty in reaching unanimity due to the slow pace at which it is dealing with urgent matters. Also, protesters continue to demonstrate in the streets to demand its dissolution, suspecting it of attempting to gain time in order to “clean out the Augean stables” and thus eliminate traces of past embezzlement by certain figures of the Administration.

The future of the Tunisian revolution is contingent on this government’s capacity to withstand the criticism erupting everywhere, continue dealing with urgent matters, rendered even more complicated by the collateral effects of the war in Libya, and establish, regardless, the conditions for successful elections on 24 July 2011, which the Tunisians, just as their European partners and the international community as a whole, hope will put the first Arab democracy on the right track.
During the first months of 2011, the Egyptian political system was shaken by a veritable political earthquake, as the almost 30-year rule of President Hosni Mubarak was brought to an end by a popular uprising. Despite uncertainties regarding the country’s future – whether a fully democratic system will be implemented or whether the army will retain a “special” role within the polity – it is impossible to overstate the significance of the “Egyptian Revolution” and its impact on the Arab region and the Mediterranean neighbourhood as a whole.

Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation on 17 December 2010 sparked not only the Tunisian revolution, but a string of uprisings across the region, the best-known and thus far most successful of which was Egypt’s “January Revolution.” There, independent labour and civil society organisations called for a demonstration on 25 January – opposed by the regime, ignored by traditional parties, and spurned by the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) – which turned out to be successful beyond anyone’s most optimistic expectations. Much like in the Tunisian protests, and echoing the “First January Uprising” of 1977, ordinary Egyptians’ anger was rooted in a combination of pauperisation and political repression that had become the hallmark of regional “façade democracies.” Although Egypt’s revolution was a surprise to many, few careful observers missed the increasing frustration of ordinary people over the past decade or the increased civil society and trade union activism since 2006 that were the result of this marginalisation. On 25 January, and even more significantly on Friday the 28th, Egyptians’ frustration and desire for change outweighed the fear the regime had ended up relying on, and a combination of popular pressure and regime factionalism resulted in Mubarak’s ouster.

The Egyptian revolution’s potential regional impact should not be underestimated, as subsequent revolts in Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and latterly Syria show – not to mention significant protests in Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Palestinian Occupied Territories. Protesters in Tunisia and Egypt are now struggling to consolidate their gains. Others hope to emulate their success. While it is far from clear what enduring changes these uprisings herald, some important lessons on the roots and significance of Egypt’s revolution can already be drawn.

Roots of the Uprising: Economic Stagnation and Police Repression

The causes of the uprising lay in a combination of three kinds of factors: ongoing trends towards the impoverishment of poorer sectors of society and the pauperisation of the middle class, the façade of democratic institutions masking a reality of increasing political repression since the 2005 “Cairo Spring,” and a series of trigger issues, primarily Mubarak’s attempt at having his son Gamal “inherit” the Presidency (tawreeth), state security forces’ torture and assassination of Khaled Said for wanting to expose corruption, (global) food price spikes, and, of course, the success of the Tunisian revolution itself. Long-term economic trends belied Western optimism – particularly the IMF’s – in the health of Egypt’s economy: while certain macroeconomic in-
indicators were very positive (e.g. showing a steady increase in GDP and decrease in the current account deficit), others – particularly increased youth unemployment, a population bulge, and middle class pauperisation – ought to have sounded alarm bells. While privatisation policies may have helped increase GDP, they clearly favoured narrow, politically connected business elites, the enrichment of whom caused considerable popular resentment. Certainly, they were of little benefit to the nearly 40% of Egyptians who live on or under $2 per day, particularly since the (already abysmally low) minimum monthly wage of LE400 ($68) was never enforced. The rise in food prices combined with pressure to cut subsidies on staples such as flour – which had already sparked “bread riots” – over 2010 further exasperated ordinary Egyptians.

Both workers and wider sectors of society were increasingly irritated by Mubarak’s blatant attempt to anoint his son Gamal as successor. Amongst the army as well, attempts at “succession” proved irksome.

In parallel, certain sectors of Egyptian society saw a marked increase in political activism. In particular, technically illegal independent trade unions organised an increasing number of (increasingly effective) strikes from 2006 on. In 2010, there were more strikes than in the previous four years combined. These strikes not only boosted these unions’ popularity, but also provided valuable experience with organising and mobilising. Moreover, civil society groups, such as Kifaya! (Enough!), Shayfeen-kum (We See You), the April 6th Youth Movement and a range of important human rights groups – the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights, etc. – increased in activism and popularity. Particular mention should be made of groups like the Centre for Trade Union and Worker Services, the Hisham Mubarak Law Centre and the Egyptian Organisation for Economic and Social Rights, which straddled civil society and labour.

Although some of these groups’ leaders were themselves sceptical about the degree to which such activism could translate into a broader political movement, it was clear that both workers and wider sectors of society were increasingly irritated by Mubarak’s blatant attempt to anoint his son Gamal as successor. Amongst the army as well, attempts at “succession” proved irksome; personal loyalties did not extend to Mubarak’s son.

Another trigger issue was the increase in routine abuse of power by the security forces. Khaled Said’s case is exemplary: his assassination in Alexandria on 6 June provoked an outcry, not just for its sheer brutality, but because Said was not a political activist, but rather merely seeking to expose a case of police corruption of which he had evidence. Opposition groups organised mass protests in his native Alexandria, the largest of which was also attended by Muhammad El-Baradei on 25 June, but Said became a powerful symbol of regime corruption precisely because he was an “ordinary” citizen.

The “El-Baradei Effect” and the Parliamentary Elections

February saw considerable political ferment as former head of the International Atomic Energy Agency Muhammad El-Baradei decided to return to Egypt and effectively committed publicly to running against a Mubarak candidacy – père or fils – in the presidential elections expected for 2011. Initially embraced by many, and feared enough by the regime to smear him and his family, El-Baradei won few friends by being frequently away from Egypt. Indeed, he missed the beginning of the January uprising, only returning three days after protests began, on the eve of 28 January, or “Friday of Anger.” A side effect of this loss of credibility was that when he proposed what could have been a boycott of the parliamentary elections planned for the end of November and early December, he was first backed but then abandoned by every major political group, including the “reformists” within the Muslim Brotherhood. Such a boycott could have been very effective in depriving the regime of the fig leaf of democratic legitimacy that has been one of the primary functions of elections ever since Nasser and, particularly, ever since Mubarak came to power.

The elections themselves were widely expected to provide the regime with an excuse to crack down on
January - November 2010 – Background Events

The profound unease felt by large sectors of society in many Arab countries came to a climax, as demonstrated by many events, such as the multiple and growing protests shaking the region. In addition to the demands for political reform and greater freedom, there are other demands, such as improved living conditions, damaged by the rise in prices following the 2007-2008 food crisis and the fall in disposable income.

Governmental corruption and inefficiency in providing basic social services, unemployment, discrimination against minorities and inter-religious tension are affecting the stability of almost all the countries of North Africa and the Middle East.

December 2010 – Detonators

The self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, a young Tunisian fruit and vegetable peddler from Sidi Bouzid, and the results of parliamentary elections trigger revolts in Tunisia and Egypt.

The month of December in the Maghreb is thus marked by the spread of waves of protest against the high cost of living and unemployment, giving rise to clashes with security forces.

January 2011 – The Revolution Triumphs in Tunisia

The Jasmine Revolution attains its first goal: on 15 January, Ben Ali leaves the country under the pressure of the protest movement after 23 years of unshared power. Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi takes over the interim presidency and forms a “national unity government” marked by the entry of three opposition heads, but in which the outgoing administration retains the key posts. In the meantime, the Tunisian army acts as “guarantor of the revolution”.

In Egypt, the tension mounts rapidly and protests multiply in other Arab countries. Social networks are proving to be an effective social mobilization tool beyond government control.

February 2011 – The Revolution Triumphs in Egypt

The interim government launches the transition process in Tunisia and the activities of the former ruling party, the Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD), are suspended.

In Algiers, the National Coordination for Change and Democracy (CNCD) calls for demonstrations to the slogans of “Algeria free and democratic,” “the power is a murderer” and “the people want the fall of the regime.” Some 2,000 people brave riot police. The state of emergency, imposed in 1993 to fight against Islamist guerrillas is lifted by presidential decree on 24 February after several sit-ins and strikes.

The president of Egypt for 30 years until now, Hosni Mubarak steps down on 11 February, after having roused the fury of protesters, and this despite having delegated his powers to the vice president several days earlier.

While social mobilization and calls to protest intensify in other countries (Morocco, Syria, Bahrain), popular revolt breaks out in Libya. The movement, with various social and political demands, leads to an armed conflict between rebels and loyalist forces affecting all major cities. The government uses militias, mercenaries from Chad and Nigeria and its revolutionary committees to repress the demonstrators.

March 2011 – In Libya, Revolution Turns into Civil War

While the difficult transition processes advance in Tunisia and Egypt, Libyan troops loyal to Muammar al-Gaddafi manage to turn the situation around, taking the rebel strongholds one by one. On 17 March, the Security Council adopts UN Resolution 1973, giving the green light for the establishment of a no-fly zone over the country. In accordance with the UN authorization, military operations are undertaken in Libya by a coalition of countries led by France, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the participation of Spain as well.

Other countries repress social unrest (Syria, Algeria and Mauritania).

In Morocco, King Mohammed VI sets up an Advisory Committee for the Revision of the Constitution in order to strengthen democracy following the 6 March events in front of the Parliament in Rabat, in which protesters demand “rule of law” and “radical” political and social reforms.

April 2011 – Syrian Protest Spreading

Former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and his two sons Alaa and Gamal are detained for 15 days on 13 April as part of an investigation into the use of violence against demonstrators during the January and February uprisings.

In Syria, the popular protest movement that began in mid-March extends to all major cities, despite violent repression by the armed forces under government orders. Security forces particularly entered the rebel city of Deraa, focal point of the protest, backed by tanks and armoured vehicles, and do not hesitate to open fire on residents and demonstrators, leading to the resignation of over 230 members of the ruling party. According to the NGO Human Rights Watch, the toll in deaths, injuries and arrests can not be verified at this time.

May 2011 – Libyan Civil War at a Stalemate

Spring is marked by loyalist forces being pushed back and the death of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s youngest son, Saif al-Arab Gaddafi, and three of his grandchildren in NATO air strikes against his operations. It is estimated that over 10,000 people have been killed since the beginning of events.

In Syria, the repression continues, especially in the centre of the country where the army sends tanks and machine guns, although President Bashar al-Assad declares a general amnesty on 31 May, including for members of the Muslim Brotherhood and all political prisoners.

June 2011 – Morocco Presents its Draft Constitutional Reform

As Libya continues to endure heavy fighting, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, one of Gaddafi’s sons, proposes holding free elections under international supervision within three months, indicating that his father would leave office in case of defeat.

(continue)
the MB. In the event, they resulted in a farcically large majority (93.1%) for Mubarak's ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). Brazen statements such as ex-Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif’s claim that “it was a shock [to people] that the NDP won the majority of seats, while the Brotherhood won none, because it wasn’t expected” fooled no one outside Egypt, and certainly no one within it. The result was even more grotesque than the sheer majority: during the second round, the NDP attempted to rig elections in favour of complacent – if not complicit – members of the opposition, producing surreal scenes in certain constituencies in which NDP candidates complained that the party had rigged elections in favour of their opponents. Thus, the elections revealed one of the regime’s fundamental weaknesses: as a key tool to access patronage, the NDP proved attractive to the “official opposition,” buying its pliability to authoritarianism, but precisely this feature eventually made it difficult to impose party discipline. This became clear in 2005 during the first attempt to marginalise the “old guard” opposed to Gamal and his “businessmen” allies, when sidelined NDP incumbents ran and won as independents, only to rejoin party ranks. In 2005, roughly half the NDP parliamentary party was elected as “independents.” In the 2010 elections, the NDP often ran two candidates – sometimes up to four – in the same constituency, emphasising what was by then a three-way split between “Gamalites,” the “old guard” and the undecided.

Most attention was on the 2011 presidential elections and the growing fear of *tawreeth*, but while they did not quite provide a breaking point, less than two weeks before the start of the Tunisian revolution, the elections’ farcical result certainly reminded ordinary Egyptians of the regime’s hypocrisy – to the extent that was even necessary.

### Confessional Strife?

Another key factor in the maintenance of Mubarak’s regime was Coptic-Muslim tensions. Surprisingly, protests were assertively anti-sectarian, despite marked increases in tensions throughout 2010, epitomised by the explosion of a bomb outside a Coptic church in Alexandria on 1 January, killing 24 and injuring 97. Sectarian tensions had been increasing steadily throughout the year, but just before the elections some Coptic activists started holding the regime responsible for their situation, rather than “Muslim extremists” as usual. The Alexandria bombing broke this new atmosphere and worsened the tensions considerably. The state did nothing to allay such fears when, for example, it took unwarranted action to “combat” avian flu by destroying all pigs, a crucial source of income for Coptic zabaleen, traditional garbage men. In the aftermath of the revolution, documents have been found that seem to corroborate what most observers already suspected: that the regime was exacerbating sectarian tensions, either directly through such actions or indirectly by allowing extremist Salafi groups to flourish as part of a conscious strategy to divide – and therefore more easily control – Egyptian society. Indeed, such manipulation was effective enough that at the outset of the revolution all religious elites – the Copts, the Azhar, and the MB – emphatically opposed the protests.

### The Uprising

By early January there was a considerable amount of tension in Egypt, and an increased presence of security forces in the streets, but no clear sense that this would translate into an uprising – much less a

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successful one. Indeed, there were several attempts
to emulate Bouazizi’s gesture, not least in Cairo, but
none sparked the same outrage in what was widely
perceived as a politically apathetic population. The
25 January demonstration was called by independ-
ent civil society and trade union groups, but shunned
by established political elites, including the Muslim
Brotherhood, underscoring the gulf separating them
from ordinary Egyptians. Most observers, and the or-
ganisers themselves, hoped the protest would be
significant, but did not expect much. Noted com-
mentator Issandr El-Amrani, for example, tweeted “if
you get a tenth of the 80,000 people or so who sup-
port the initiative online, it will be a success.” In the
event, more than ten times that number took to the
streets across Egypt, with protests in Cairo and Al-
exandria, but also Ismailiya, Mahalla El-Kubra, As-
wan, Suez, Port Said and many others.
The protest went through several phases and played
out on different levels. First, surprised by the sheer
scale of demonstrations, the security forces failed to
counter protesters. This allowed demonstrators to
control public spaces, particularly Cairo’s Liberation
(Tahrir) Square. By evening, the security forces had
entered a second, confrontational phase. Attacking
reduced numbers of protesters with water cannons,
teargas, rubber bullets, taser bats and clubs, they
re-took Tahrir Square in the early hours of 26 Janu-
ary. With newly unified opposition forces planning
demonstrations for Friday the 28th, Internet and mo-
bile phone services were cut and over a thousand
people arrested. The most spectacular failure of this
confrontational tactic, however, came on the 28th
itself, when protesters across Egypt took back pub-
lic spaces, simply overwhelming security personnel.
Notably, protesters were extremely disciplined in
avoiding initiating violent confrontations: the targets
of protesters’ anger were police stations and, in par-
ticular, the NDP headquarters, which was set ablaze.
By evening, the security forces had withdrawn and
the Army moved in and, having apparently refused
orders to shoot protesters, were welcomed by
crowds across the country.
The regime then adapted its tactics to mix repres-
sion with co-option, announcing reforms and threat-
ening harsher crackdowns. On 29 January, Mubarak
appointed Ahmed Shafiq Prime Minister, announc-
ing the new government’s remit to control inflation,
increase employment and fight corruption. Two key
appointments signalled struggles within the regime
itself: General Intelligence Service Chief Omar Sule-
iman filled the post of Vice President, vacant since
1981, and Army Chief and Defence Minister Mu-
hammad Tantawi was also appointed Deputy Prime
Minister. Suleiman was reputedly closer to Egypt’s
(reviled) security forces, while Tantawi could use the
armed forces’ reputation amongst ordinary Egyp-
tians as leverage – on demonstrators, but also on
Mubarak and Suleiman.

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Direct confrontation having failed, security forces
attempted to sow chaos – in particular by carrying
out random attacks and freeing and sometimes en-
listing prison inmates. On 2 February, protesters
holding Tahrir Square were subjected first to a day-
time assault by plain-clothes security forces and
hired thugs in the so-called “Battle of the Camel,”
and then to an all-out night-time assault, with pro-
regime thugs throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails
at protesters both from outside the square and
from on top of buildings, as well as using birdshot
ammunition. Close to collapse, protesters were ap-
parently saved by the intervention of “heavies” from
the MB and football “ultras.” The following days
saw demonstrations grow even larger across Egypt
in response.
The fate of the uprising was being played out on two
parallel “tables”: the streets and squares of Egypt,
and the back-door negotiations between elements
of the army and intelligence services, parts of the old
regime, and a series of would-be “leaders” of the
revolution, from the Brotherhood itself to a self-pro-
claimed group of “wise men” including business ty-
coon Naguib Sawiris and political scientist Amr
Hamzawy. The result was three-way brinkmanship
between the army, the regime and the opposition, in
which the protesters’ refusal to compromise and
sheer will to face down regime repression was the
sine qua non of change. Ultimately, the army seems
to have “blinked” first, calculating that protesters
would not go away and that their pressure could be used to maintain the Army’s privileges under a new “guided” regime.

**The one measure taken with considerable speed – the push for elections – has been opposed by most independent groups, as it makes it easier for established groups close to the old regime to control Egypt’s post-uprising parliament**

Protesters themselves represented many different forces in Egyptian society, and it should be noted that while the relative strengths of and differences between organised groups such as unions, parties and Islamists are significant, most protesters were unaffiliated, even without any political experience. The bond holding them together was in a sense “negative,” protesting the current state of affairs, with little agreement on what kind of change was necessary. It is, however, important to underscore the Brotherhood’s absence: many of its young members took part in protests against the wishes of their leadership. Indeed, in the aftermath of the revolution, protesting the leadership’s conservatism, its willingness to compromise with the (new) regime, and its own internal authoritarianism, these groups have repeatedly challenged the MB’s “old guard,” and some have split to form their own parties.

**Post-Mubarak Transitions**

The removal of the primary figures of the old regime is the first step of structural reform that protesters have called for. It is still too early to tell whether this is what the result of the revolution will be or whether elements of the former regime – NDP, security forces, military and complacent figures among “opposition” parties and religious elites – will manage simply to adapt the old regime’s modus operandi and isolate key opposition groups. Having effectively removed Mubarak and Suleiman, changed the government, and suspended parliament, the military, or the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), now rules in a state of exception, part executive, part legislative and – thanks to the widespread use of military courts – more than a little judiciary. It is also clear that, with the single exception of elections, which serve the military’s interest in restoring a semblance of normality and “reform” in Egypt, measures of “real” reform have not come either swiftly or spontaneously from Egypt’s interim leadership, but only in response to continued pressure, particularly from independent unions and civil society groups such as April 6th.

Parliament was suspended, media laws relaxed and elements of the former regime arrested and prosecuted, and the military eventually replaced PM Ahmad Shafiq with the more popular Essam Sharaf and Interior Minister Muhammad Wagdi with Mansour El-Essawy in early March, but only after considerable popular pressure. A Constitutional Panel was appointed to amend the Constitution in only ten days, rather than entirely replace it. Its decisions limited presidential terms but not powers and did not make a Constituent Assembly compulsory, but rather afforded the new parliament the “option” of electing one from its own ranks within 100 days. A referendum was called on the proposed amendments in which around 75% of voters – a massive 41% of the electorate compared to paltry turnouts during the Mubarak era – approved the amendments. Some have interpreted this as a “victory” for Islamists and remnants of the NDP, although most voted “yes” in a bid to secure some gains for the revolution and prevent the military from staying on.

The one measure taken with considerable speed – the push for elections – has been opposed by most independent groups, as it makes it easier for established groups close to the old regime – especially the NDP and MB – to control Egypt’s post-uprising parliament. Finally, the much-hated emergency law, which suspends many civil and political rights, has still not been repealed. Such resistance by the military is slowly eroding its support amongst core protesters, just as the military attempts to erode protesters’ popularity by accusing them of increasing “instability.” Friday, 8 April, saw the first protests in which the military and Tantawi were directly accused of dragging their feet.

**Beyond the Uprising**

The only certainties seem to be that in post-uprising Egypt there is a flourishing of political activity – not only the formation of new parties, but also splits
within Islamist movements, particularly the MB – and that central to Egyptian politics is still a complex game between the military, the security forces, elements of the “old guard” (the NDP, but also the MB and other “decorative opposition” groups), and the independent civil society and labour groups that called for the uprising.

Egypt’s “Second January Uprising” provides a timely reminder that authoritarian systems can be frail as well as strong and that the economic and political causes of the uprising must be addressed with long-term structural reforms. The risk of not doing so is not simply the failure of Egypt’s uprising, but also of missing an unexpected window of popularity for non-sectarian forms of democracy and ultimately discrediting the notion of democracy itself. The uprising has at least temporarily shown the potential limits of Islamist popularity: failing to take this opportunity risks playing into the hands of ultra-conservative and Salafist groups. Key to this opportunity will be meeting protesters’ demands not just for the formal trappings of democracy, but also for its social, economic and political substance.

Bibliography

The Lisbon Treaty and Euromed Relations

The New Architecture of the Treaty of Lisbon: Implications for Euro-Mediterranean Relations

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The changes introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon are particularly significant on the institutional level. The entire system has, in effect, been restructured and new balances and inter-institutional relations are emerging with the effective implementation of the treaty provisions and the establishment of such structures as the European External Action Service (EEAS). These changes naturally affect Euro-Mediterranean relations on the whole and on different levels. Below we will examine the main changes affecting Euro-Mediterranean relations. We will limit ourselves to the main political institutions, but clearly, with regard to the Court of Justice of the European Union, for instance, the impact of the Treaty of Lisbon will be significant, if only because the Court’s jurisdiction on visas, asylum and immigration have been broadly extended. The modifications of the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and Social Committee are likewise considerable.

The European Council: A Full-Fledged Institution with a New President

From the Single European Act in 1986 to the Treaty of Nice, the European Council has always been an institution that was somewhat set apart in the successive treaties. In the framework of the Treaty of Nice, it did not appear under Article 7, instituting the European Community and enumerating the Community’s institutions; it was the object of a specific article of the Treaty on the European Union (Article 4).

The European Council Has Become a Full-Fledged Institution

In the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Council is included in Article 13 § 1 alongside the other EU institutions. It thenceforth consists of “the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, together with its President and the President of the Commission,” whereas “the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall take part in its work.”1 The European Council provides the European Union (EU) “with the necessary impetus for its development and shall define the general political directions and priorities thereof.” Moreover, it is explicitly stated that the European Council “shall not exercise legislative functions.”2 The European Council must identify “the strategic interests and objectives of the Union.”3 It can thus make “decisions [...] on the strategic interests and objectives of the Union” which “shall relate to the common foreign and security policy and to other areas of the external action of the Union.” The problem is that the general rule that the European Council “shall act unanimously on a recommendation from the Council”4 remains valid. The European Council has regularly lent impetus to Euro-Mediterranean relations. Recall, for instance, the 1972 Summit of Heads of State in Paris, which

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1 Article 15 § 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) / Title III: Provisions on the Institutions.
2 Article 15 § 1 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) / Title III: Provisions on the Institutions.
launched the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP), the European Councils of Essen (December 1994) and Cannes (June 1995), which marked the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and therefore the Barcelona Process, or the Copenhagen European Council of December 2002, which launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Its inclusion alongside the other EU institutions means that what can be called “the supreme political authority of the EU” will become more visible and this will be strengthened by the presence of a President that does not change every six months. Both on the internal and external levels, the prestige, visibility and thus political weight of the European Council is clearly strengthened.

The obstacle resides in the consensus regulation, which may limit the initial ambitions. In the face of crises such as the ones in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt, the sluggishness of reactions is partially due to the absence of consensus. Consider the interests of Malta and Italy with regard to the proximity of the Libyan crisis, or those of France in Tunisia. The main challenge to lend renewed “impetus” to Euro-Mediterranean relations and make the Mediterranean Region one of the EU’s policy “priorities” as well as one of its “strategic objectives” is the consensus regulation. Indeed, we will often have to settle for the lowest common denominator. A great deal thus depends on the President of the European Council, who must play the role of facilitator in negotiations.

A “Permanent” European Council President

Elected by the European Council “for a term of two and a half years, renewable once,” the President of the European Council plays a key role, as he or she must “endeavour to facilitate cohesion and consensus within the European Council.”

The Council of Ministers is likewise the object of numerous new provisions in the Treaty of Lisbon.

A Restructuring of Configurations within the Council

First of all, we should recall that the former General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) was split into two different councils:

5 According to Article 15 § 6 of the TEU, the President of the European Council “shall chair it and drive forward its work; shall ensure the preparation and continuity of the work of the European Council in cooperation with the President of the Commission, and on the basis of the work of the General Affairs Council; [...]”

6 Article 15 § 6 of the TEU.

7 See the remarks by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, at the EU-Morocco Summit in Granada on 7 March 2010, PCE 47/10, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/fr/ec/113201.pdf


• the General Affairs Council, which shall “ensure consistency in the work of the different Council configurations” and “prepare and ensure the follow-up to meetings of the European Council, in liaison with the President of the European Council and the Commission”; and
• the Foreign Affairs Council, which shall “elaborate the Union’s external action on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the European Council and ensure that the Union’s action is consistent.”\(^\text{10}\) The latter is chaired by the High Representative.\(^\text{11}\)

**The New Rotating Presidency of the Council of Ministers**

The matter of the new presidencies is important for Euro-Mediterranean issues. The Spanish and Belgian presidencies found themselves in the difficult situation of transition from one system to another. The Belgian Presidency, however, despite the absence of a new federal government, was able to rely on a European Council President fully aware of the Belgian institutions.

The major difference between this and the preceding system is that the country in charge of the rotating presidency of the Council gives way to the presidency of Ms. Ashton insofar as the foreign affairs configuration.\(^\text{12}\) The system of equal rotation “by pre-established groups of three Member States for a period of 18 months” remains valid for other institutions, whereas the presidency of the European Council shall be filled by its new “permanent” president.\(^\text{13}\)

The impact on the level of intergovernmental meetings dealing with Euro-Mediterranean matters is significant. In fact, the great majority of conclusions adopted on the Mediterranean Region are done so within the framework of the Foreign Affairs Council, under the leadership of Catherine Ashton. The High Representative thus convened an informal meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council for 10 March 2011 to discuss the issue of the Libyan crisis and the EU’s neighbours to the south.\(^\text{14}\)

**The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy**

The function of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy actually combines a number of former functions, namely, those of the former High Representative, Javier Solana (with the exception of the position of Secretary General of the Council), and those held formerly by Benita Ferrero-Waldner as European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). There is still currently a commissioner in charge of the ENP and Enlargement: Stefan Füle. The High Representative is likewise the Vice-President of the European Commission,\(^\text{15}\) whence the title of “High Representative/Vice-President” (HR/VP), and coordinates foreign relations aspects in the Commission. She is thus called to work with the commissioners in charge of external matters. In addition, Ms. Ashton takes over the role of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the former rotating presidencies and chairs the Foreign Affairs formation of the Council.\(^\text{16}\) Thus, there is no denying the position’s complexity and the breadth of the tasks to be carried out.

According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the High Representative conducts the CFSP, contributes by her “proposals to the development of that policy,”\(^\text{17}\) and must “ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action.”

Within the European Commission, Ms. Ashton has responsibilities on the “external relations” level in general and on the level of “coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action”\(^\text{18}\) in particular. This coordination function is certainly essential and

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\(^\text{10}\) Article 16 § 6 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) / Title III: Provisions on the Institutions.

\(^\text{11}\) Article 18 § 3 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) / Title III: Provisions on the Institutions.


\(^\text{14}\) Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, convened an informal extraordinary session of the Foreign Affairs Council in the form of a working breakfast to be held on Thursday, 10 March, European Union, Brussels, 3 March 2011, A 083/11.

\(^\text{15}\) Article 18 § 4 of the Treaty on the European Union.

\(^\text{16}\) Articles 18 § 3 and 27 § 1 of the Treaty on European Union / Titles III & V.

\(^\text{17}\) Articles 18 § 2 and 27 § 1 of the Treaty on European Union / Titles III & V.

\(^\text{18}\) Article 18 § 2 and § 4 of the Treaty on European Union / Title III.
corresponds to the goal of greater consistency of the EU’s external action on the whole.

The High Representative thus has a preponderant role to play in Euro-Mediterranean relations. In charge of external relations in general and of the CFSP in particular, the High Representative is thus at the convergence of the EU’s different external policies. The beginning of 2011 was marked by an increased presence of the High Representative on the Mediterranean stage. Ms. Ashton travelled namely to Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan and Tunisia from 14 to 22 February 2011. Of course, a great deal will depend on the effectiveness of the new European External Action Service (EEAS), a truly hybrid institution at the heart of the new EU external relations system.

In the intergovernmental sphere, the High Representative represents the European Union on issues arising from the CFSP, conducts “political dialogue with third parties on the Union’s behalf” and “shall express the Union’s position in international organisations and at international conferences.” The importance of political dialogue in the Middle East conflicts, an aspect that was the object of a speech by the High Representative, should also be emphasized, along with the High Representative’s role insofar as the Quartet. The High Representative thus has a preponderant role to play in Euro-Mediterranean relations. In charge of external relations in general and of the CFSP in particular, the High Representative is thus at the convergence of the EU’s different external policies.

The European External Action Service

The European External Action Service is comprised of “officials from relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States personnel.” It was the Council Decision of 26 July 2010 that established the organisation and functioning of this new European body. Specifically, the EEAS is “a functionally autonomous body of the European Union.” It has “the legal capacity necessary to perform its tasks and attain its objectives.” Under the authority of the High Representative, the EEAS is “made up of a central administration and of the Union Delegations to third countries and to international organisations.” In reality, the EEAS assists the High Representative in conducting the CFSP and the Common Security Policy.

19 Article 27 § 2 of the Treaty on European Union / Title V.
27 Article 27 § 3 of the Treaty on European Union / Title V.
and Defence Policy (CSDP), in the Foreign Affairs Council and with relation to her responsibilities as Vice-President of the European Commission in the sphere of external relations.\(^{32}\)

The EEAS has a central administration organized into Directorates-General (DGs).\(^{33}\) At the head of the administration is Ms. Ashton, who is assisted by an Executive Secretary-General, a Chief Operating Officer and two Secretaries-General. A Directorate that includes North Africa, the Middle East, the Arabian Peninsula, Iran and Iraq particularly interests the Mediterranean Region. Various geographic bureaus cover the following regions, with a quite classical breakdown:

i. The Middle East;
ii. The Arabian Peninsula, Iran and Iraq;
iii. Regional Euromed and Union for the Mediterranean policies;
iv. The Maghreb.

Thematic bureaus specializing in ENP coordination connect this Directorate with the one covering the Eastern partnership and the European Union’s eastern neighbours, including Russia, which enjoys the benefits of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) but which is not part of the ENP as such (cf. the organization chart in Chart 1 above).

Finally, it must be kept in mind that the European Commission delegations, now “Union delegations” (UDs) since the entry into effect of the Treaty of Lisbon, are an integral part of the EEAS. In other words, all Mediterranean delegations, which are

\(^{32}\) See Article 2 § 1 and following of Council Decision 2010/427.

\(^{33}\) See Article 4 and following of Council Decision 2010/427.

\(^{34}\) “The EEAS shall be made up of a central administration and of the Union Delegations to third countries and to international organisations” (Article 1 § 4 of Council Decision 2010/427). The “Commission and the EEAS will agree on detailed arrangements relating to the issuing of instructions from the Commission to delegations. These should provide in particular that when the Commission will issue instructions to delegations, it will simultaneously provide a copy thereof to the Head of Delegation and to the EEAS central administration” (Preamble, Point 13 of Council Decision 2010/427).
playing an increasingly important role, are henceforth part of the EEAS, from which they may receive instructions.34

The European Commission: Restructuring of Portfolios and Reorganization of the “RELEX Family”

With regard to the European Commission, the changes on the level of external relations are very significant due to the creation of the EEAS, which comprises part of the former officers of the European Commission’s “external relations family.” In addition, recall that Ms. Ashton is also Vice-President of the European Commission.

Restructuring of Portfolios, Enlargement and ENP

One of the fundamental elements with regard to Euro-Mediterranean relations is the regrouping of the former “enlargement” portfolio and part of Ms. Ferrero-Waldner’s portfolio, i.e., the ENP portfolio. Commissioner Stefan Füle is thenceforth in charge of both enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy. It is still too early to make an appraisal but it will be interesting to examine the impact of this change in the future. In any case, it is clear that it will be relatively subtle, Ms. Ashton being in regular contact with Commissioner Füle on matters relating to neighbourhood policy. It is thus rather the overall reorganization that should be considered.

The European Commission and Reorganization of the “RELEX Family”

One of the problems is that the Commission, with the exception of the CFSP and certain other cases, is to “ensure the Union’s external representation.”35 This is not so simple when considered from the external perspective. Indeed, it is difficult for certain EU partners to find themselves between the President of the European Commission, the President of the European Council and the High Representative / Vice-President of the Commission.

The European Commission must in any case foster the general interest of the European Union and take the initiative, since this is its part of its mandate.36 The creation of the EEAS does not mean that all competences of the EC on external affairs are transferred to it. The so-called “RELEX family,” which designates the Directorates-General and services of the Commission in charge of external relations for the European Commission, is being restructured. It currently comprises the following DGs and services: Development, Enlargement-ENP, Trade, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection, and Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DEVCO). These DGs and services continue to be in charge of the different actions pertaining to them under the leadership of the respective commissioner, but it must be kept in mind that the High Representative coordinates aspects of the EU’s external action as a whole.

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With regard to international agreements, it is either the EC or the High Representative (“where the agreement envisaged relates exclusively or principally to the common foreign and security policy”) who “shall submit recommendations to the Council, which shall adopt a decision authorising the opening of negotiations and [...] nominating the Union negotiator or the head of the Union’s negotiating team.”37 At this level as well, coordination will be essential. Naturally, common policies such as the Common Trade Policy and Common Agricultural Policy, which are of capital importance for Euro-Mediterranean relations, shall continue to be handled by the EC, and it is up to the latter, in conjunction with the Council and the High Representative, to “ensure consistency between the different areas of its external action and between these and its other policies.”38

35 Article 17 § 1 of the Treaty on European Union / Title III.
36 Article 17 § 1 of the Treaty on European Union / Title III.
37 Article 218 § 3 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
38 Article 21 § 3 of the Treaty on European Union / Title V.
The European Parliament: Stepped Up Legislative and Budgetary Prerogatives

The European Parliament (EP) is considered one of the major beneficiaries of the Treaty of Lisbon, as its legislative and budgetary prerogatives have been largely strengthened. With regard to new financial perspectives and the revision of the ENP, its budgetary powers should be taken into account. However, the lack of progress regarding the Parliament’s role insofar as CFSP is regrettable.

Legislative Powers

On the legislative level, the Treaty of Lisbon replaces the procedure of co-decision by ordinary legislative procedure, which becomes the main legislative procedure, within the framework of which the EP is considered a true co-legislator, along with the Council of Ministers.

The new procedure extends to some forty new areas, including areas relating to migratory issues or judicial cooperation. The EP’s approval procedure, a true veto power, likewise extends to new areas, as does the consultation procedure. The role of the European Parliament is thus clearly strengthened within the legislative framework. This implies the institution’s increased importance in the adoption of legislation regarding Euro-Mediterranean issues.

Budgetary Powers

The forthcoming financial perspective is an important period for the EP, which has seen its powers stepped up in the budgetary sphere. Hence, there is no longer a distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure, which allows it to better counterbalance the powers of the Council in this area. It must be emphasized that the EP also has rights as discharge authority with the EEAS, which does not, however, resolve the CFSP’s democratic deficit.

External Relations Powers

With regard to issues relating to the former first pillar (European Communities) of the Treaty of Nice, the powers of the EP are strengthened thanks to the extension of powers and prerogatives of the Parliamentary Assembly in the above-stated legislative and budgetary areas.

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With regard to the CFSP and the CSDP, however, the EP’s powers remain very limited. Indeed, the Treaty of Lisbon establishes that the High Representative “shall regularly consult the European Parliament on the main aspects and the basic choices of the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defence policy and inform it of how those policies evolve.” Although the EP can “ask questions of the Council or make recommendations to it and to the High Representative” and, twice a year, holds “a debate on progress in implementing the [CFSP],” there is no denying that the EU still has a significant democratic deficit in specific areas of security and defence. This is all the more problematic since the Court of Justice has no competence in these matters, with a few, scant exceptions.

Conclusions

Understanding the new institutional system is not easy, all the more so because we are still in a learning stage. When the EEAS is launched, things should move faster and one can expect the establishment of a new dynamic in the medium term. Generally speaking, it can be considered that the Treaty of Lisbon is strongly marked by intergovern-

39 Article 36 of the Treaty of Lisbon.
40 Cf. Article 24 § 1 of the Treaty on European Union / Title V.
mentalism. Indeed, either new, mixed structures with a great intergovernmental predominance such as EEAS have been created, or intergovernmental institutions have been strengthened, as in the case of the European Council. There are a slew of other examples, as, for instance, the strengthened Petersberg Tasks, the European Defence Agency or structured cooperation.

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It must be emphasized that, though the pillar structure of the European Union was abolished, a sort of hidden pillar remains. Indeed, Chapter 2 of the Treaty on European Union’s Title V is entitled “Specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy Dispositions.” The Treaty clearly stipulates that the CFSP is subject to “specific rules and procedures” and that it is subject to the general rule of unanimity. Moreover, “the adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded” and “the common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative […]” In other words, there has been no communitarisation of the CFSP – far from it, in fact. Though the European Commission keeps significant prerogatives in external relations, the creation of a hybrid EEAS, that is, one composed of different types of officials, radically changes the situation. On the supranational level, it is clearly the European Parliament that enjoys the greatest progress; but only a priori, since the Parliamentary Assembly must yet provide itself with the means for its ambitions.

Insofar as Mediterranean affairs, it is clear that these changes will have a significant impact. The actors are multiplied, and this, unfortunately, is not a sign of efficiency. Many things will depend on the efficiency of the new EEAS. Inter-institutional and personal relations between the High Representative, the Presidents of the Commission and the European Council and Commissioner Füle are crucial for the Mediterranean facet of the EU’s external relations.

Today, with the challenges of the political transitions underway and the crises in the Mediterranean Region, the European Union under the Treaty of Lisbon has new tools that it should use with the greatest consistency possible, and this is one of tasks of the High Representative. A consensus must above all be reached between the 27 Member States within the European Council under the impetus of its president, and the EU must be capable of quickly mobilizing funds for emergency humanitarian aid while investing in the long term in transition processes that could radically change the order in the Mediterranean Region.

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42 Article 24 § 1 of the Treaty on European Union / Title V.
It has been a fascinating year for observers of the Mediterranean reality. After more than fifty years of stability in the Arab countries, interrupted only by the Algerian and Arab-Israeli conflicts, the region has been rocked by profound and unexpected changes. The year 2011 will be remembered as the year of Arab revolutions, the year of the uprising (intifada), of the awakening (sahwa) or even of the renaissance (nahda), for these are the terms used by the media of the countries that have suddenly found themselves immersed in a spiritual renewal in a political and cultural arena that had, to date, been stubbornly refractory to modernisation. Nobody can say what the outcome of this transnational wave that has swept the countries of the Arab world in both the Mediterranean region and the so-called sixth continent of the Arabian Peninsula will be. What we do know, or intuit, is that nothing will ever be the same. Decolonisation and nationalism altered the Arab geopolitical landscape in the 1950s; Islamism became increasingly influential in the 1970s and has been a key factor and actor ever since. Today, the current democratic movement, despite its hesitant and uncertain beginnings, is likewise inaugurating a new era.

For Europe, the first consequence of this new era is that we are obliged seriously to consider what is happening in the countries of the Southern Mediterranean. There is no longer room for excuses. It is no longer acceptable, no matter what happens, for everything to remain the same. This time, the changes are real and of historic proportions. The second consequence is that it will be necessary to conceive of, negotiate and implement a policy specifically for the region, a policy designed for a region in transition.

To address this new stage, and the challenges posed by an evolving region, consideration must be given to at least two priorities: the need for greater coherence among the existing policy frameworks and the need to adapt the priorities of EU policies. That is, it is necessary both to adapt the instruments and to modify their content.

With regard to the first point, the three most important European initiatives of the last 15 years have been the Barcelona Process of 1995, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) of 2003 and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) of 2008. The EU has always considered the Mediterranean a priority. However, its policies for the region have often been deemed ineffective. The paralysis in many countries, the lack of substantial changes and the embrace of gradualism as a principle of action have all come under fire. This criticism has been levied at both the states and EU institutions; both actors have sought to bring off initiatives and proposals.

The 1995 Barcelona Process offered a good balance between Community and national initiative. The ENP is markedly Euro-centric, placing clear emphasis on the role to be played by the EU’s institutions. Meanwhile, the UfM is openly based on a national initiative. All three initiatives have led to major achievements. However, all three could have done more, and sooner. The goal going forward is to leverage what has already been achieved and to table new proposals in the two areas of action of EU policy: bilateral relations and multilateral or regional relations.

Bilateral relations are based on the Association Agreements that arose as a result of the Barcelona Conference in 1995. Beginning in 2005, these agreements were supplemented by the ENP’s Action Plans, which added a new methodological feature: the negotiation of similar convergence objectives to those of the candidate countries for accession to the EU. The idea was to incorporate work processes similar to the acces-
sion process, even though Southern Mediterranean countries are not candidates for EU membership. Multilateral relations should be conducted based on the foundations laid down at the Paris Summit in July 2008 that created the UfM. At the Summit, two institutional innovations were agreed with regard to the organisation’s predecessor, the Barcelona Process: the co-presidency shared by the EU and the South and the joint Secretariat, headquartered at the Palace of Pedralbes in Barcelona.

**It is no longer acceptable, no matter what happens, for everything to remain the same. This time, the changes are real and of historic proportions**

Thus, on the one hand, there is the ENP – so profoundly European as to be included in the Treaty of Lisbon – specifically designed to meet the needs of a post-2004-enlargement Europe and to take into consideration the fact that, as a result of this enlargement, the EU has new neighbours. On the other hand, there is a regional framework for cooperation based on the Barcelona Conference, which, with the launching of the UfM, has become more multilateral. In short, what, within the framework of the Barcelona Conference, had been a single integrated Mediterranean policy with two interdependent components – the bilateral Association Agreements and the multilateral Barcelona Process – became, in 2005, two relatively separate policies: the ENP, which is not specific to Mediterranean countries and also covers Eastern Europe, and the Barcelona Process, which became the UfM. And this is perhaps one of the main objectives and one of the primary needs: to try to reintegrate the two processes, the ENP and the UfM, by endowing them with greater coherence and synergy. This can be achieved by granting the ENP, which today is exclusively bilateral, a regional dimension within the framework of the UfM and by tasking the Barcelona Secretariat with coordinating this dimension, in full coordination with the EU institutions.

The second issue meriting in-depth consideration is the need to adapt the content of the EU’s policies to the new regional reality. Today, in light of the revolutions and evolutions of the last few months, it is necessary to reassess what the priorities should be. And the top one is, without a doubt, to implement cooperation policies to assist with the transitions in the Arab Mediterranean countries. The UfM was conceived of as a policy of stability and support for stability. The Barcelona Process, through the conclusion and implementation of free trade agreements, managed to initiate and provide support for economic transitions. This was the crowning achievement of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership launched in Barcelona in 1995. The ENP’s Action Plans follow in the same vein, aiming to incentivise regulatory changes and modernise the legislative framework of the partner countries in order to bring it into line with EU law. However, it is now necessary to move beyond the economy and support political transitions. This will be a wide-ranging task requiring the application of two, often controversial principles: the principle of differentiation and the principle of conditionality. The first requires the establishment of differentiated cooperation programmes and goals, depending on the degree of commitment and ambition of the authorities in the Southern countries. The second entails making this cooperation conditional on progress and advances on reforms. This is the general thrust of the latest communications from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and from the Commission: to do more for those who do more, a ‘more for more’ policy already contained in the first documents to define the ENP, but which, following the changes in the region, today can finally be applied. The Mediterranean is home to major interests; a significant part of our security and economic future are at stake there. At the same time, it is in the Mediterranean where we want to project our values, our way of understanding international relations and of organising societies democratically. Energy, immigration, terrorism, trade and investment are some of the factors in the equation of these interests. Democracy, human rights, the rights of women or the rights of ethnic and religious minorities are some of the values we want to promote and defend. To do both things at once, preserve interests and promote values, has been a diplomatically difficult task in a region in which three conflicts, including one of major international prominence, namely, the Middle East conflict, have dominated the political scene for some time now. The challenge is to define a policy based on a more complex and subtle balance between interests and values; between the weight of the relations with each country and the need to safeguard a regional framework for cooperation; between the urgency of supporting democratic changes and the need to maintain stability and peace.
The Middle East Situation

The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 2010: Obama in Charge

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The Setting: Obama’s New Middle East Approach, His “Cairo-Vision” and the Second Term of Benjamin Netanyahu

On 2 September and 14 September 2010, direct negotiations between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas and United States President Barack Obama took place in Washington with the ultimate aim of reaching an official “final status settlement” to the conflict by agreeing on a two-state solution. At the end of the same month, the direct talks ended when Israel failed to renew the 10-month settlement freeze that had been in place since November 2009 and the Palestinians failed to recognise Israel as a Jewish state as a precondition for continuing the peace talks. None of the efforts made by different actors on all three sides over the rest of the year were able to bring the three parties back to the negotiation table.

Obama’s speech in Cairo on 4 June 2009 was widely seen as a new beginning for US relations with the Muslim world, not only after the eight years of the preceding administration but, as Obama stressed at the very opening of his speech, after decades of alienation and mistrust during the Cold War. Throughout the region, hopes for the new president’s Middle East policy were high. The Palestinians, especially, hoped for a more “even-handed” approach and an intensified engagement.

In many regards, Obama meant to mark a turning point in US-Middle East relations: he advocated for renewed trust and confidence between the parties and the US, while once again attempting to transform the image of the US into that of a serious and honest broker for peace and democracy. As a consequence, his unusual decision to tackle the Israeli-Arab peace process at the beginning of his term by “actively and aggressively seek[ing] a lasting peace between Israel and Palestinians, as well as between Israel and its neighbours"1 became a litmus test for his new relations with the Middle East. In one regard, though, Obama used the speech to reinforce a strategic change undertaken by the previous administration. While the Bush administration did not give high priority to the Arab-Israeli conflict until the Annapolis Process, in her last year in office Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice did confirm that solving the Arab-Israeli conflict was in the US administration’s strategic interest. The US has been an important player in the region for decades, pursuing three main goals: energy security, Israel’s security and regional stability. However, since the deployment of over 230,000 US soldiers in the region,2 the third goal has taken on new meaning, particularly with respect to America’s global reputation and internal politics. The Arab-Israeli conflict was seen as paramount to US strategic interests because success in achieving peace between Palestinians and Israelis seemed to be key to making progress on pressing challenges for the US in Iraq and Afghanistan, the difficult situation with Iran and, indeed, more sweeping issues, such as the need for political reform in a generally repressive region.

Obama followed up on this by calling the Arab-Israeli conflict the second-largest cause of tension, ranking behind only the US military missions in Afghanistan and Iraq and before the international conflict with Iran.3

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The US administration was therefore left in the position of not only being first and foremost the guarantor of Israel’s security and an overarching regulatory power in the region, but also (somehow) having to voice its own interests. In addition, in his Cairo speech Obama cited what was, in his view, the largest hurdle on the Israeli side – the settlements.

**Negotiations Between Israelis and Palestinians on the Washington-Jerusalem Axis**

When Benjamin Netanyahu started his second term as prime minister on 31 March 2009, it took him a while to adjust to the new US administration’s policy. In June 2009, he responded to the perceived changes with what seemed a significant change in his stance on the peace process. In a speech on 14 June 2009 at Bar Ilan University, he endorsed the building of a Palestinian state. At the same time, he must have been keenly aware that his first term in 1999 ended when he lost his own coalition’s support, and he thus reached out to his own constituency by stating that there would be no settlement freeze in East Jerusalem.4 This change was widely seen as an outstretched hand towards the US, especially after special envoy George Mitchell had put immeasurable effort into preparing proximity talks. In the meeting between Obama and Netanyahu on 18 May 2009 prior to the speech, the Obama administration made very clear that support for the Israeli position on Iran was linked to the peace process,5 that all building activities in the settlements were to be halted, and that the current administration would not abide by a 2004 letter to former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in which then President George Bush agreed to allow Israel to retain major settlements. After Netanyahu returned to Israel, he briefed the Knesset on his visit and repeatedly disagreed with a settlement freeze. At the same time, however, he began to dismantle illegal outposts, a decision that was met by resistance from the settlers and arguments with the pro-settlement parties in his coalition. Thus, Netanyahu’s Bar Ilan speech represented a compromise between his government and strong demands from the US and was seen as a response to Obama’s Cairo speech, coming, as it did, only a few weeks later.

On the heels of strong diplomatic efforts during the fall and faced with resistance from large swathes of his coalition, Netanyahu imposed a 10-month settlement freeze on 26 November 2009. The freeze excluded East Jerusalem, infrastructure, schools and synagogues and permitted the completion of apartments and buildings that were already underway.

From the Palestinian perspective, the substantial pressure on Israel to freeze the settlements can be seen as an instrument of the US administration to regain the trust of both Abbas and the Arab League. While the Bush administration set the tone of negotiations in sync with the Israeli side by demanding a halt to all terror attacks from the Palestinians as a precondition for direct negotiations, the Obama administration turned this formulation around. Agreeing with Abbas, Obama insisted that no direct negotiations should begin before the Israeli side had ceased settlement construction. Throughout 2009, Abbas remained publicly silent and waited for the US to deliver, while the US helped in Sharm el-Sheikh raising funds to rebuild Gaza after the war, supported Salam Fayyad in improving infrastructure and economic develop-

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3 See also the comment by US Central Command Chief General David Petraeus that Israel must see its conflict with the Palestinians “in a larger, regional context” having a direct impact on America’s status in the region. *Journal of Palestine Studies* 155, Spring 2010.
4 During his first term as prime minister, Netanyahu had signed, despite the protests of the right-leaning parties, the so-called Hebron Protocol and the Wye River Memorandum. He was also criticised by the more left-leaning Israeli parties for his “Three No’s” policy.
5 Remarks by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as reported in the *Washington Post*, 24 April 2009, by Glenn KESSLER (“Clinton Counters Israeli Stance on Palestinians and Iran”).
ment in the West Bank and sent Mitchell to the Arab neighbours to lobby in support of Obama’s peace approach. On 3 March 2010, the Arab League endorsed the proximity talks for a period of four months under the condition that they not be continued thereafter if no border outlines had been agreed on.

In early 2010, under pressure from the US, both parties agreed to proximity talks with Mitchell. However, the political strain involved provoked growing tensions between the US and Israel, prompting Israeli Ambassador to Washington Michael Oren to refer to the moment as the worst crisis between the countries since 1975. During a visit to Israel by Vice President Joseph Biden, who wanted to announce the direct talks, Israeli Interior Minister Eliyahu Yishai (Shas) announced the approval of 1,600 new houses in Ramat Shlomo (East Jerusalem). Biden and the US administration spoke out strongly against this announcement, which was seen in the United States as an insult to Biden and the president. The Israeli cabinet criticised Netanyahu, and the interior minister apologised for the diplomatic turmoil he had caused. However, from the Israeli perspective, the issue was the timing of the announcement and not the order itself. To the Israeli government, as voiced by Public Affairs Minister Yuli Edelstein, it was clear that “according to Israeli law, Jerusalem is sovereign Israeli territory, so no special commissions are needed to build within the municipal borders of Jerusalem. There will not be in the foreseeable future an Israeli government willing to divide Jerusalem. Normally, our friends in Washington understand that.”

This crisis could have served as a chance to revisit Israeli readiness and the number of concessions Netanyahu was actually willing to make, given the delicate nature of his coalition, simply to start proximity talks, let alone the serious compromises that would be required for any final agreement with the Palestinians. It could also have been a chance to assess the new US approach and realise that the diplomatic crisis was not simply an instance of “disagreement between friends” but a genuine power struggle. On the Palestinian side, it could have served as a moment to reconsider the pitfalls of the narrow preconditions. Indeed, Obama did consider proposing a US peace plan on the suggestion of former National Security Adviser Samuel Berger under a committee headed by General James Jones. Again, the six former national security advisers deemed the Middle East conflict too important in relation to Iran to follow Mitchell’s step-by-step approach to bringing the two sides together. However, this decisive moment passed, and the US administration began to endeavour instead to tone down its actions and focus on bridging the gap, while the Israeli side remained entrenched.

Particularly unusual at this point in the process, was the reaction of the Mideast Quartet. Like the other international actors, such as the European Union, the Mideast Quartet stood on the sidelines during Mitchell’s diplomatic marathon and did its best to support the Fayyad Plan of building a Palestinian state within two years (i.e. by September 2011) and to deal with the mounting humanitarian situation in the Gaza Strip. On 19 March, the Quartet released a statement pointing out that the “annexation of East Jerusalem is not recognised by the international community” and admonishing Israel to freeze all settlements, including in East Jerusalem.

The Bilateral Steps

By late April, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had announced that the Arab League would re-endorse proximity talks at its upcoming meeting, which it did on 1 May 2010. The talks started on 9 May and were the first peace talks since Ehud Olmert had resigned as Israeli prime minister in September 2008. Two clocks were ticking: the Arab-League clock demanding serious progress on border issues within four months (by 9 September) and the Israeli clock counting down to the end of the moratorium on the settlement freeze (26 September).

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7 www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/06/AR2010040602663.html
8 Off the record, newspapers reported that Netanyahu apologised. Meanwhile, American Jewish organisations lobbied for reconciliation, and, according to Israeli sources, Netanyahu had drawn up a package of confidence-building measures, etc. At the same time, Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman said in an interview with Der Spiegel on 21 March 2010, “We never promised to stop building in Jerusalem.”
The talks opened with an offer from President Abbas to grant more land from the occupied West Bank to Israel, as the Palestinians had agreed in talks with Olmert in 2008. Using the Olmert offer as the basis for negotiations and tackling core issues, such as settlements and borders, first, the Palestinian side attempted to set the tone. Mitchell agreed to this starting point, rejecting Netanyahu’s idea of starting with water issues. The proximity talks were slowly coming along in their difficult way, with Israel demanding that the Palestinians stop engaging in “incitement” and the Palestinians demanding improvements in the situation in the West Bank, etc., when the clash between the Israeli naval forces and the Mavi Marmara off the coast of Gaza on 31 May 2010 cost the lives of 9 Turkish activists, left 60 people severely wounded (53 activists and 7 Israeli soldiers) and caused an international uproar for weeks to come.

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Faced with this situation, the US administration tried once again, first, to pressure Israel to investigate the incident, alter the Gaza blanket ban and seek contact with Abbas as a confidence-building measure even in this time of crisis and, second, to make sure that the proximity talks did not break down. However, as a consequence of the Mavi Marmara incident, the situation in Gaza, which had previously been excluded from the peace talks because of the ruling Hamas government there, made its way onto the agenda. The Quartet again went one step further and pressured the Israeli government to ease restrictions on the entrance of goods into the Gaza Strip. In a July meeting with Obama, Abbas handed over his blueprint for direct talks as the basis for negotiations in written form, while Netanyahu refused to enter direct talks with an outline of an agreement. According to the newspaper Al Hayat, Abbas proposed an agreement on a Palestinian State within the 1967 borders with a land swap and a compromise on Jerusalem on the eve of Netanyahu’s meeting with Obama on 4 July.

The Israeli side remained firm in its opposition to entering direct talks with prior written agreements, but did agree to immediate direct talks. During the weeks following the meeting between Obama and Netanyahu, efforts were stepped up to bring the Palestinian side into direct talks. Obama gave his first interview to Israeli television, Netanyahu reached out through US media and think tanks and met urgently with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Mitchell turned to the Arab League, Egypt and Jordan. Following their meeting on 29 July, the Arab League’s Secretary General sent an official response to Obama endorsing direct talks but leaving it to the Palestinians to decide when to enter them. In August, Abbas agreed to enter direct talks and the date was set for 2 September in Washington.

Breakdown and Standstill

The beginning of the direct talks was overshadowed by a killing close to Hebron in which four Israelis lost their lives. Both leaders condemned the cruel incident and reminded each other that extremists trying to stop their negotiations had often emerged during direct negotiations and should not be reason to stop talking. During the direct talks between the two parties, both reiterated their main issues: for the Palestinians, the paramount importance of the settlements and borders; for the Israelis, the importance of security issues, as well as the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. They did agree to map out the areas in which compromises were necessary in order to start negotiations about the final status issues. They agreed to meet again in Sharm el Sheik on 14 September, continuing to meet every two weeks in order to achieve the ambitious goal of reaching a peace agreement within two years. Like a Damocles sword, the Palestinian threat to walk out of the negotiations if the Israeli side did
not prolong the settlement freeze loomed over the negotiations and ultimately caused them to break down when the moratorium ended on 26 September. On 11 October 2010, The Israeli side offered to extend the moratorium if the Palestinian side recognised Israel as a “State for the Jewish people,” which the Palestinians claimed had nothing to do with the issue of borders and settlements. On 13 October, Yasser Abed Rabbo issued a press statement affirming that the PLO would do so, as long as the Palestinians were granted a state within the 1967 borders, including East Jerusalem. The Fatah movement immediately called for Abed Rabbo to step down. In November, following the congressional elections on 2 November 2010, the US administration made an offer to the Israelis that was seen as a continuation of its former approach – linking its support for Israel’s security to the peace process. It offered a $3 billion package of military aid and the assurance that it would veto anti-Israel resolutions in the UN (which it generally does already) if Israel would agree to another three-month settlement freeze – it would not be asked to renew it again afterward. The Israeli security cabinet considered the offer and declined it on 2 December. The resumed peace negotiations of the Obama administration thus completely failed in 2010.

The 2010 Negotiations and the So-called “Palestine Papers”

What went wrong this time? Looking at the role of the international community in 2010, it is clear that the former “division of labour” between the US, the EU and the Quartet had remained the same. The EU and the Quartet agreed with Obama’s vision of the new Middle East and thus agreed with his approach of bringing the two sides together in direct peace negotiations. They defined their role as that of providing aid and support to the Palestinians in the West Bank and, as much as possible, to the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. At the time of writing, Tony Blair is negotiating with President Netanyahu on how to deal with the Gaza Strip, and questions are mounting regarding how and when, through the EU and the Quartet, negotiations with Hamas might be possible and reasonable. Obama’s ambitions have come in for criticism as strong as his initial effort, reflecting the high political weight he has given to the process. The criticism focuses on his approach of: a) making the settlements the core issue of the entire process; b) linking support for Israel’s security and with regard to Iran to progress on the peace process; c) giving up too soon when things became difficult; and d) not finding any new approaches to the conflict and the different actors involved. The first point made it extremely difficult for Netanyahu to enter negotiations in the first place, because of his pro-settlement coalition, and made it equally difficult for Abbas to set his own tone in the negotiations, as it left him no room to manoeuvre with his own constituency. He was measured against a parameter that the US had imposed and that both he and the Arab League had accepted early on. The second point was even more difficult for the Israeli side. After the breakdown of the direct negotiations in December, Secretary of State Clinton acknowledged the fact that the Israeli need for security has grown and is now even harder to ensure, as the actual threat no longer comes from the West Bank but from Iran and its proxies in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. The very last move of offering the Israelis a military aid package in exchange for a settlement freeze was therefore criticised as bribery and an indirect threat to Israel’s security. Looking at the beginning of the direct talks, it is worth noting that the issues that arose in the prior indirect talks had not yet been resolved. While the Israelis did not want to enter the negotiations with a fixed framework, the Palestinian side wanted to start where the negotiations between Olmert and Abbas had ended in 2008. The US administration did not resolve this issue, even though it was indicative of where both actors were coming from: Abbas from a long history of

11 The PLO recognised Israel’s right to exist in 1993. Recognition of Israel as a Jewish State, or a “State for the Jewish people,” as Olmert had put it, is a different issue. The difficulty lies in the character of the State of Israel and the question of the Palestinians (Arab-Israelis) living in Israel with Israeli nationality. This issue is being debated within Israeli society and also plays a role in the negotiations.

12 See Hillary Clinton’s speech “Remarks at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center for Middle East Policy Seventh Annual Forum” (www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/12/152664.htm).
negotiation and the – to many Israelis still puzzling – rejection of Olmert’s offer, and Netanyahu from a very different coalition and with a different political agenda than his predecessor’s. The US administration did not take this sufficiently into account. The influence of the US was limited from the very outset.

The “Palestine Papers” caused turmoil on the Palestinian side, because they raised the question of whether the negotiators were transparent with the constituency about the scope of the compromises. Yet another angle on the 2010 negotiations can be found in the “Palestine Papers” or the so-called “Palileaks.” These documents, published by Al-Jazeera in mid-January 2011, were notes from the Palestinian negotiators taken during the 36 meetings between Abbas and Olmert between December 2006 and mid-September 2008. The publication of these notes forced chief negotiator Saeb Erekat to resign, after he claimed that they had been stolen from his office. The papers themselves show that, over the course of the negotiations, both sides came closer than ever before, and they include far-reaching, although unsigned, compromi-
es by both parties, which were interpreted by surprised analysts as the possible blueprint for an agreement. However, these papers caused turmoil, especially on the Palestinian side, because they raised the question of whether the leadership was negotiating with the full mandate of the people, and whether the negotiators were transparent with the constituency about the scope of the compromises. This turmoil reflects the complexity of Palestinian society and the communication between the leadership and the people. On both sides, the papers contradicted the ongoing assumption that “there is no partner for peace” on the other side. At the international level, they prove that Israelis and Palestinians can indeed negotiate directly, just as they did in over thirty meetings. However, the agreement was never made public or enacted, and the question remains of why Olmert and Abbas did not seize the moment. Looking at the timing, it was clear that Olmert’s term was ending. It can thus be assumed that Abbas did not want to continue with an outgoing prime minister on the Israeli side and was hoping that the Obama administration would be more helpful in pushing the agreement through, especially in light of former negotiation processes such as Camp David or the Taba Summit in 2000/01, when both President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud Barak were at the end of their respective terms of nothing else, it can be seen as a sign that Abbas was coming from a very different starting point when he entered the negotiations with Netanyahu in 2010.
The linkage theory in international politics, which assumes interactions between domestic politics and foreign policy, has a long intellectual pedigree. The Democratic Peace theory, which postulates that a regime’s internal character influences its warlike tendencies, is a variant of linkage politics initially conceived by Immanuel Kant. Conventional wisdom largely considers domestic political dynamics as an independent variable, while foreign policy is the output of both domestic political dynamics and the perceptions of the international environment.

Henry Kissinger once observed that Israel never had a foreign policy, only domestic politics – an assertion that became canonical in academic literature and media commentary. Subsequently, many pundits have ascribed Israel’s difficulties in reaching a peace agreement with some of its neighbours to the “fragmentation” of Israeli society and politics, which leads to a misreading of the behaviour of this important Eastern Mediterranean actor.

This article rejects that widespread assertion, showing that there is a more complex relationship between Israel’s domestic politics and its foreign policy. The first section refutes the thesis of a fragmented Israel, while the second depicts the prevalent Israeli view of the failed peace process. The third section analyses the impact of the failed peace process on Israel’s domestic politics, looking particularly at the decline of the Labour party. The fourth section focuses on the rise of a strong unilateralist instinct in Israel’s foreign policy, an offshoot of the failed peace process.

Is Israel a Divided Society?

The common image of a deeply divided Israeli public is totally inaccurate. An analysis of the political, social and economic dynamics within Israel indicates, in fact, that political-societal cleavages of the past have largely disappeared. Firstly, the acerbic debates over economic policies that were commonplace until the late 1970s have since disappeared. The majority of Israelis agree that capitalism is the best way to create greater wealth. Israel’s strong, vibrant economy is a result of the wise economic policies of the past two decades, stressing market values and adapting to globalisation. Currently, all economic indices forecast bright prospects, despite continuous global economic woes and security issues. A strong economy reinforces stability and eases social and political tensions.

Second, the Ashkenazi-Sephardi social rift has become much less divisive than in the past: intermarriage is on the rise; the number of Sephardi politicians at the local and national level has increased; and the past three decades have seen an influx of Sephardic Jews into the middle class, as well as into senior officer ranks in the Israeli military. Israel also holds a good track record for successfully integrating immigrants from a wide range of countries with diverse cultural backgrounds into mainstream society.

Furthermore, greater consensus exists throughout Israeli society on issues pertaining to the peace process. Significantly, the ideological debate over the future of the territories acquired in 1967 has ended. The Sinai was relinquished in 1979 and the Gaza Strip in 2005. Nobody really advocates a return to these territories. Attitudes toward the return of the Golan Heights in exchange for full peace
with Syria have been extremely consistent since 1994; roughly two-thirds of the Jewish public oppose giving up the Golan, and about the same percentage does not believe in the reality of a lasting peace deal with Damascus, or in the sincerity of Assad’s declarations that he is even interested in peace.

Moreover, most Israelis subscribe to a “two-state” solution with the Palestinians – once seen as a mortal danger – though many are sceptical about the ability of Palestinian state-building. Indeed, a large majority favours relinquishing heavily Arab-populated parts of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), and retaining the settlement blocs, Jerusalem (particularly the Temple Mount) and the Jordan Rift Valley. The territorial debate, revolving around what percentage of historical homeland should be relinquished to Arab control, is not ideological, but couched in a pragmatic assessment of Israel’s security needs.

Furthermore, the expectations of the left after the Oslo agreements for peaceful coexistence with the Palestinians, which elicited much criticism in parts of Israel, have since been replaced by a sober consensus that peace is not around the corner. According to a January 2011 poll, 68% of the Jewish public believes that the Palestinians do not see a two-state solution as the end of the road, and that even if a peace agreement is signed, the Palestinians will continue the struggle for a Palestinian state throughout the Land of Israel. (A parallel survey in the territories, which was conducted by an American team, found that the majority of Palestinians indeed view the two-state formula as an interim stage and believe the conflict will only end when a Palestinian state is established from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea.) Israeli society has resigned itself to the idea that it must live by the sword for the foreseeable future; it has displayed great social resilience in the face of Palestinian terrorism and missile bombardment from Lebanon and Gaza.

The only rift within Israeli society which is still of great social, cultural and political importance is the religious-secular divide. However, this situation does not differ greatly from the afflictions of identity politics faced by other Western societies. Moreover, the clash is not between two clearly defined camps, leaving room to establish a reasonable modus vivendi. A growing number of Israelis identify themselves as traditionalists, situated in the middle of the orthodox-secular continuum.

The Failure of the Peace Process

Israeli society, with the exception of fringe radical leftist circles, is unanimous in its assessment that peace negotiations with Syria and the Palestinians, started in the early 1990s, have failed and that the onus of responsibility for such failure is on the other side.

Syria is usually seen as unreasonable and uncompromising territorially and intent on getting a better deal than Egypt in the 1970s. In fact, many doubt the intention of the Alawite minority regime to pursue real peace. It is argued that the current regime actually prefers the continuation of conflict (the status quo) in order to legitimise its rule and shows interest in negotiations only to shield Syria from potential US-inspired Israeli aggression. After all, Israeli Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin (1992-95), Ehud Barak (1999-2001) and Ehud Olmert (2006-08) all offered withdrawal from the Golan Heights yet were unable to secure a peace treaty.

Palestinian responsibility for the collapse of peace negotiations is even clearer. Rabin agreed to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the West Bank and Gaza, believing in the exchange of territories for security (not peace). Then, Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat failed to deliver as terrorism continued and even reached record levels after 2000. Moreover, the Palestinian leadership refused to accept extremely generous offers by two Israeli premiers: Ehud Barak in the summer of 2000 (Camp David) and Ehud Olmert in the fall of 2008. Similarly, Israel’s total removal of its presence from Gaza in 2005 – both military and settlements – has failed to elicit good will among the Palestinians.

The lack of pragmatism in Palestinian politics prevents a historic compromise with the Zionist (Jewish) national movement. This predicament has been aggravated by an internal split between the Fatah movement, the historic carrier of Palestinian nationalism, and Hamas, a more recently established Islamist movement. Hamas, a radical Islamist organisation that tries to impose Sharia Law and is dedicated to the destruction of the Jewish state, emerged the winner in the January 2006 elections to the PA Legislative Council. In June 2007, the Hamas militia led a bloody coup and subsequently seized power in Gaza. The rift between Hamas-controlled Gaza and the Fatah-controlled West Bank seems to have acquired permanency, intensifying the centrifugal tendencies in Palestinian society and politics.
The growing Hamas influence radicalises Palestinian society and weakens its ability to reach and implement a settlement with Israel. It is the military activity of the Israeli army against Hamas activists in the West Bank that keeps Hamas from taking control there as well.

The Palestinians say “no” to negotiations with Israel. They expect Israeli concessions without negotiations, believing that the international community will put pressure on Israel. Such a strategy only reinforces the Israeli assessment that there is no real Palestinian partner.

The Hamas government in Gaza has refused to accept the conditions required by the Quartet (US, EU, Russia, UN) for recognition and support, which are: a public commitment to nonviolence, recognition of Israel and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations. Furthermore, during recent years Hamas has launched thousands of Qassam rockets into Israeli towns. Despite the economic difficulties faced after the military coup, and the destruction inflicted by Israel during the Gaza incursion (Winter 2008/9), Hamas has not changed course. Nowadays, the Palestinians (the PA and Hamas) say “no” to negotiations with Israel. They expect Israeli concessions without negotiations, believing that the international community will put pressure on Israel. Such a strategy only reinforces the Israeli assessment that there is no real Palestinian partner.

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The Impact of the Failed Peace Process on Domestic Politics

The decline of the Labour party in Israeli politics is largely due to its association with the failed peace process. In the June 1992 elections, Labour scored 44 Knesset seats, since then, the party has seen a substantial downturn in popularity. In the elections of May 1996, May 1999, January 2003, March 2006 and February 2009, Labour received respectively 44, 34, 26, 19 and 13 Knesset seats. In January 2011, as a result of a split in the party, Labour retained only 8 Knesset seats, and its future looked particularly uncertain. A perfunctory analysis of electoral behaviour in the 21st century indicates that Labour has lost its hold over many centrist votes that shifted first to Shinui (in 2003) and afterwards to Kadima (in 2006 and 2009).

The decline of Labour has also been seen in its poor ability to form governing coalitions. From 1977, Israel was ruled by a Labour-led coalition only twice, in the 1992-96 and 1999-2001 periods, when at its helm were security-oriented, centrist leaders like Yitzhak Rabin in 1992 and Ehud Barak in 1999, both more popular than their party. Barak’s ability to form a coalition government in 1999, despite the right-wing majority in the Knesset, was based on the fact that he was elected directly to be Prime Minister (within the framework of a two ballot system – one vote for a party and one vote for the Prime Minister). Labour initiated the Oslo process in 1993. Yet, the “peace process” has since been discredited in Israel, with “peace” becoming a derogatory word for many, even those who supported the experiment. Similarly, attempts to trade the Golan Heights for a peace treaty with Syria – initiated by Rabin in the 1990s and by Barak in 2000 – failed to gain the support of most Israelis.

After 2000, the so-called “peace camp” in Israeli politics, led by Labour, was ascribed responsibility for the Palestinians’ terror campaign. Most Israelis blamed the Oslo agreements for allowing a situation where Palestinian terrorists could enjoy sanctuary so close to Israel’s main cities. The results of the 2003, 2006 and 2009 elections reflect this judgment. While Labour party leaders continued to pay lip service to the idea of peacemaking, stressing the need for negotiations with the Palestinians, there was growing incongruity between these statements and the facts on the ground. The rise of centrist parties such as Shinui and Kadima, and their relative electoral success, clearly underscored Labour’s move toward the dovish pole of the continuum. Amram Mitzna and Amir Peretz, who, respectively, succeeded in capturing leadership positions before the 2003 and 2006 elections, both displayed very leftist positions. Leaving the centre of the political map to Likud and/or new centrist parties denied Labour the largest pool of Israeli voters.

Moreover, over time Labour lost its most important political asset – identification with the establishment and the building of Israel. Two central activities in
building the Jewish state – military service and land settlements – were gradually given up by Labour and its supporters. In the past, kibbutz members, generally aligned with the Labour party, were disproportionately represented in the ranks of officers within the Israel Defence Forces (IDF). This is no longer the case. The social composition of officer graduating classes in the IDF has gradually changed, with modern-Orthodox recruits now overrepresented. While the IDF remains the most esteemed institution in Israel, the Labour party is no longer identified as its mainstay.

Similarly, the intensive settlement activity under the guidance of Labour-led governments essentially came to an end in 1977, leaving other subpopulations to fill this void. While the majority of Israelis are prepared for large territorial concessions in the West Bank within the framework of a two-state solution, they still regard settling the Land of Israel as an important Zionist value. Labour has foolishly allowed the modern-Orthodox and Conservative circles to adopt the values and symbols which were once clearly associated with the founding party of the State.

Another important Zionist symbol that has been deserted by the Labour party is Jerusalem, which was united by the IDF in the June 1967 War under the command of Rabin, the then Chief of Staff. A united Jerusalem has for years been a representation of faith within the national consensus – a vision which Rabin continued to uphold throughout the Oslo peace process. The willingness, then, of his disciple and political heir Ehud Barak to divide Jerusalem at the 2000 Camp David Summit, stunned many Israelis. The violation of this “taboo” portrayed Labour as a fringe leftist party and was harmful in electoral terms since over two-thirds of Israeli Jews oppose any partition of Jerusalem. The 2009 elections again raised the issue of a united Jerusalem following reports that the Kadima-Labour government had negotiated with the PA and agreed to transfer parts of Jerusalem to the Palestinians.

It is a political folly to underestimate the enormous appeal Jerusalem has for Jews in Israel. Labour ignored this and paid the price. Gradually, Labour’s original positions on issues of war and peace, as well as on the territories, were adopted by the Likud party, while Labour shifted further to the left on the Israeli political spectrum. This section shows how attempts to deviate from the Israeli consensus on issues related to war and peace have been politically counterproductive.

The Rise of Unilateralism

Israel seems to have moved into a pronounced unilateralist mode since 2000. What comes immediately to mind is the May 2000 withdrawal from Lebanon, the erection of the security barrier, the 2005 pull-out from Gaza and the 2009 settlement freeze.

The reasons for this transformation in Israeli thinking are complex; but essentially they are related to the failures in the peace process. Israeli unilateralism expresses, first and foremost, a deep disappointment with the Syrian rejection of Israeli peace overtures and a sober realisation that there is no Palestinian partner ready for a historic compromise with the Zionist movement, even at the cost of painful Israeli concessions.

The emergence of a corrupt and inept Palestinian society, mesmerised by the use of violence, and displaying elements of a cultish worship of death, has strengthened the Israeli impulse for separation. The unilateral quest for separation received additional expression in the solid public support for constructing a security barrier, which is meant to protect Israelis from the threats and dangers posed by a corrupt, despotic and fanatic Palestinian society.

The unilateralist impulse, an ingrained feature in Israel’s political culture, also reflects a mixture of contrasting elements in the Zionist psyche. The Promethean ethos – mankind defying the gods, taking its fate into its own hands – has always appealed to Zionists. Activism is well regarded in Israel. The statement of Israel’s founding father, David Ben-Gurion, that “It is not important what the Gentiles say, but what the Jews do” reflects the entrenched belief that facts created on the ground, even when in disregard of the wishes of the neighbours and the international community, have a lasting impact.

At the same time, Israel’s unilateralism shows recognition for the limits of its military power. Israel lacks the capabilities of big powers to impose their demands on vanquished rivals. Very few in Israel hold onto the notion that Israel’s technological, economic and military superiority could force the Arabs to sign a peace treaty. In a way, unilateralism also pragmatically recognises that Israel’s neighbours cannot bring themselves to formally agree to Israel’s demands, but could informally accept an Israel-designed status quo. The free movement of people and goods over the Jordan bridges after 1967 is a clear
example of a unilateral and informal arrangement that has held for many years. Barak, in 1999, preferred to reach an agreement with Syria to allow Israel to extricate itself from its low-intensity conflict with Hezbollah in South Lebanon. When this did not materialise, he pushed for a unilateral withdrawal from South Lebanon. In the absence of a Palestinian interlocutor, Israel believes it has every right to stop waiting and define its own borders. This is why Ariel Sharon disengaged unilaterally from Gaza. The platform of the Olmert government (elected in 2006), which promised to unilaterally define Israel’s borders in order to maintain a Jewish and democratic State, expressed not only a healthy ethno-nationalistic desire not to fall into the trap of bi-nationalism, but also a deep desire for separation from the neighbouring Palestinians. Under somewhat different circumstances, Benjamin Netanyahu’s government decided on a 10-month unilateral settlement freeze in order to deflect American criticism, with no illusion of a Palestinian change in behaviour. This decision was supported by most Israelis because they favour reducing the Israeli presence in the West Bank, and due to the need to maintain good relations with the US. The appeal of unilateral steps is probably also an expression of the naive aspiration for a simple solution. The slogan “Peace now” was given a try. Subsequently, “Us on one side, them on the other” was also given a try. It is psychologically difficult to digest the instruction to “grin and bear it” while in a protracted struggle over your own home. Unilateralism has been attractive in Israel, even though Palestinian terrorism does not really allow Israel to disengage from the territories. (The IDF continues its forays into Palestinian cities in its counter terror campaign, and as Qassam rockets are endlessly fired into Israel, the unenticing option of reoccupying Gaza is being considered.) In fact, the Israeli leadership understands that pure unilateralism, as appealing as it may be to the people, is not a true policy option. The withdrawal from Gaza was not entirely unilateral as it was approved first in Washington and only afterwards by the Israeli cabinet. The Olmert government hoped to secure some international support for its unilateral plans to disengage from parts of the West Bank, which were aborted after the 2006 Lebanon fiasco. Leaving the Palestinians to their own devices may well be what they deserve, but even Israeli unilateralists have a positive view of international involvement in order to prevent a large-scale humanitarian disaster in the Palestinian territories.

The Israeli unilateralist position also defies the often voiced criticism that the nature of Israeli domestic politics creates paralysis in its foreign policy. In the last decade, the Israeli political system has produced several bold foreign policy decisions. Significantly, it has demonstrated its capacity to remove settlements in Gaza and Samaria in 2005 (and in Sinai in 1981 in the framework of the Egyptian peace treaty). Despite the widespread criticism of the unilateral withdrawals from southern Lebanon and Gaza, the unilateralist approach has appeal and may re-emerge in Israeli foreign policy.

**Conclusion**

This article rejects the claim that domestic fragmentation in Israeli politics is hindering the peace process. Actually, Israeli society is less beleaguered by internal divisions than it may appear, and it has exhibited a widespread consensus on the negotiations with its Arab neighbours. Moreover, Israelis are convinced that the territorial largesse displayed by their governments remains unreciprocated by the Syrians and Palestinians, and they question the sincerity of their interlocutors. The Palestinians are seen as deeply divided, with Hamas in ascendance. The domestic political outcome of this realistic and widely accepted view has been the decreased support for parties associated with the failed peace process, particularly Labour. Furthermore, the misfortunes of the peace process have moved Israel into a pronounced unilateralist mode. As the situation in the Middle East shows no sign of improvement, Israel’s willingness to make risky territorial concessions will decrease as its need for defensible borders continues to rise.
Palestinians and the Establishment of Israel

For a people with a relatively small population, the Palestinians have enormous issues. Yet, as gargantuan as these issues are, the principle behind them is elementary. The Palestinians, like any other of the world’s nations, seek their own state where they can live in dignity and peace. The Palestinian question has been a destabilising factor for the entire region for decades, a region which would no doubt benefit politically and economically from lasting peace for the Palestinian people.

The history of the Palestinians is not a simple one, fraught with conflict, strife, exile and determination. Although the Zionist encroachment on Palestine dates back to the 1870s, in the name of brevity, the cutoff point for this article is the immediate period leading up to the creation of the State of Israel in 1948. The war, exile, occupation and fragmentation that ensued for the next 60 years have resulted in a weakened and divided leadership in the West Bank and Gaza. The culmination of factors, both external and of our own hand has brought us exactly where we are today, a people coerced into a quasi-government framework and who continue to seek independence and sovereignty.

On November 29 1947, the United Nations General Assembly voted on its partition plan, which allocated 56.5% of Palestine to a Jewish state and 43% to an Arab state with an international enclave around Jerusalem. Arab representatives walked out of the session, ultimately rejecting the plan. Clashes quickly erupted between Palestinians and Jews, after which Britain recommended to the UN that its Mandate end on May 15 1948. Jewish gangs then started to bring arms into Palestine and fighting between these groups and the Palestinians intensified, with the Deir Yassin and Ayn al Zaytoun massacres in April and May of that year marking the start of an all-out war. After the State of Israel was declared on May 15, Arab armies entered Palestine in a feeble bid to overcome Jewish forces but were driven out 14 months later, leaving thousands of Palestinians dead and approximately 800,000 in exile. Thus began the journey of a dispossessed and oppressed nation seeking statehood, liberation and independence.

1967 and Beyond

It was between the war of 1948 and Israel’s subsequent occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights in 1967 that the Palestinians began to carve out a revolutionary identity from their catastrophe, aimed at regaining Palestine and rectifying the historical injustice committed against them. By this time over a million Palestinians were living in exile, in refugee camps throughout neighbouring Arab countries – namely Jordan, Syria and Lebanon – in addition to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Palestinians wanted to regain their lost homeland and help those who were expelled from their homes to return safely. Unfortunately, many of those homes had now been destroyed, with new Israeli settlements erected in their place. 85% of Palestine’s villages were annihilated by Zionist forces in the 1948 War in order to make room for the influx of Jewish immigrants, most of whom came from Europe.

The goal of Zionism was to create a homeland exclusively for the Jews even at the expense of its indige-
A statement made by Israel’s first Minister of Education Ben-Zion Dinur in 1954 sums up the early Israeli attitude towards the Palestinians. “In our country there is room only for the Jews. We shall say to the Arabs: Get out! If they don’t agree, if they resist, we shall drive them out by force.” It didn’t take long for Israel to continue with the realisation of this goal. Thirteen years later, the 1967 War broke out after invading Arab armies tried to recapture Palestine. They were swiftly defeated in six days and Israel subsequently occupied the remaining parts of Palestine, including Jerusalem.

Regardless of the mistakes Arafat made throughout the course of history Palestinians will always regard him as the father of the revolution and the man who put Palestine on the map

It took time for the Palestinians to regroup and restructure themselves into an organised political body. This materialised in the form of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), established in 1964 by the Arab League of Nations and recognised as the official and sole representative of the Palestinian people. Fatah, which later became and still remains as the mainstream faction in Palestinian politics, was first formed in the late 1950s by none other than Yasser Arafat, the man in the chequered kuffiyeh who would lead the Palestinians through a revolution, two uprisings – or intifadas – and peace agreements with Israel, before spending the last two years of his life holed up in his presidential compound in Ramallah, besieged by the government of Israel’s then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. He later died in August 2004 in a Paris hospital. Regardless of the mistakes Arafat made throughout the course of history and during his time as leader of Fatah, the PLO and later the Palestinian Authority, Palestinians will always regard him as the father of the revolution and the man who put Palestine on the map. Sadly, his lifelong dream of praying at the Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem would never materialise, but the legacy he left behind has been both a factor of unity and division among all Palestinians, both inside Palestine and in the Diaspora.

The PLO

While Fatah remained at the helm of authority in the fledgling PLO, other factions would be born concomitantly with the 1967 War. The occupation of the remainder of Palestine threw its people into yet another tailspin, with even more Palestinians sent into a life of exile, some for the second time around. The PLO, of course, was banned from establishing its base in Palestine and became the people’s de facto government in exile. It first held office in Damascus, Syria, then Lebanon and finally Tunisia before returning to the occupied Palestinian territories after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993. While there are a number of Palestinian factions within and outside of the PLO, only a handful play a crucial role in the shaping of Palestinian politics today. Behind Fatah in the PLO hierarchy, is the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the leftist movement that applied a Marxist-Leninist ideology to the case of Palestine. Led by the charismatic George Habash, the PFLP, which was created just after the 1967 War, became known for its adoption of armed struggle against Israel and its unbending stance towards the liberation of all of Palestine “from the River [Jordan] to the [Mediterranean] Sea.” The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) quickly splintered off from the PFLP in 1969 and has been led ever since by Nayef Hawtemeh, a Jordanian who believed strongly in Arab nationalism, espousing the idea of Arab responsibility for the liberation of Palestine.

The Rise of Hamas

Hamas, whose inception came in tandem with the first Palestinian intifada in 1987 has now taken on the role of the strongest opposing authority to the PLO. This opposition has manifested itself in the worst split in Palestinian history both politically and geographically, with Hamas in control of the Gaza Strip and Fatah and the Palestinian Authority commandeering the West Bank. The years leading up to the split are crucial to understanding the predicament the Palestinians find themselves in today and perhaps offer a clue as to how the situation could be remedied. In the first months after the creation of Hamas – the Islamic Resistance Movement – in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by the movement’s spiritual leader
Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the PLO factions and the Islamic movement fought side by side against their Israeli occupier. While some may posit that Hamas was created and actually nurtured by external parties to somehow offer an alternative leadership to the PLO, the fact remains that it was not until almost a year later that the real differences began to surface.

Although Hamas, considered as the Palestinian interpretation of the Muslim Brotherhood, did advocate for an Islamic republic in Palestine, it did not butt heads with the secular PLO until the chairman, Yasser Arafat made his historic declaration of statehood in Algiers on November 15 1988. In his speech, Arafat renounced violence and terrorism, recognised Israel’s right to exist and accepted the idea of two states for two peoples based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. With this recognition, the Palestinians had officially conceded 78% of historical Palestine and accepted a state on the remaining 22%. Most felt the concession was more than enough. For many, it was too much.

Hamas, along with the PFLP and DFLP, rejected the notion of relinquishing the Palestinian right to armed struggle. However, the latter two maintained a cautious balance within the corridors of the PLO, which remained the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people both in and outside of Palestine. Hamas was – and is – not a member of the PLO and so felt no compulsion to adhere to the concessions. Thus began the start of a deep rift between the two movements and ideologies, with Palestinians on the street gradually turning to Hamas in direct proportion to their growing disenchantment with the PLO’s leadership.

The Hamas-Fatah Divide

Throughout the Oslo years Palestinians went from being hopeful to despondent. The accords, an agreement that Hamas vehemently rejected, were a slew of legal jargon, restrictions and stipulations on the Palestinians and Israelis which were to be honoured if the 1999 deadline was ever to be met. One of the most important stipulations in the Oslo Accords was about illegal Jewish settlements in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem. Critics of the Palestinians say, and rightly so, that they did not secure definite wording against settlements on their land, which allowed for Israel to exploit the accords and continue settlement building. However, two clauses in the initial DOP and the follow-up Interim Agreement of 1995 did obligate the parties to preserve the entirety of the land that should have become the Palestinian state. Article IV of the DOP states: “The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.”

More importantly, Article XXXI of the Interim Agreement states the following: “Neither side shall initiate
or take any step that will change the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent status negotiations.” These two clauses were, from a Palestinian perspective, directly in reference to Israel’s settlement policy and should have obligated Israel to refrain from any additional settlement building. It is common knowledge, however, that during the Oslo years, the opposite was the case: settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem doubled, as did the construction of homes.

This did not sit well with Hamas, the emerging Islamic movement that was, by all definitions, the antithesis of the politically malleable and secular PLO and PA, the latter’s executive arm. As Palestinians watched settlements grow and Israel’s occupation only become more entrenched they became equally disenchanted with the Fatah-led PA. The tension between the two sides came to a head in 1996 when Israeli authorities began excavations beneath Jerusalem’s al Aqsa Mosque, the third holiest site in Islam in the heart of the Old City. Clashes ensued and the PA took on the role of the ‘long arm of the law’ rounding up scores of Hamas activists and imprisoning them in Palestinian jails.

Furthermore, as Hamas began its campaign of suicide bombings inside Israel in 1996 the PA, on orders from Israel and bound to their pledge to fight terrorism, continued to arrest and persecute Hamas activists throughout the West Bank and Gaza. This newly formed dichotomy in Palestinian society created great tension between the movements and by association, the people. Many saw the PA’s job of arresting fellow Palestinians as doing Israel’s ‘dirty work’; an unenviable task indeed. With Hamas becoming more entrenched in Gaza, traditionally more conservative than its sister entity, the West Bank, the fear among Fatah officials and secular Palestinians was that Hamas would gain popularity at breakneck speed.

The rift only grew wider and deeper after the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004. Arafat, despite his faults, was able to mobilise the people around his leadership and keep civil war at bay throughout his long years of ruling. His successor, Mahmoud Abbas, was not as skilful. Without the popular platform Arafat enjoyed, Abbas was unable to stop united political loyalties unravelling, and Palestinians saw themselves at either end of a polarised spectrum. It was not until 2006, however, that the real rift between the two became dangerously clear. The parliamen-

tary elections that took place under the insistence of the international community ended in shocking results, even for Hamas itself.

**Hamas Rises to Power**

On January 25 2006, Hamas scored a sweeping victory in the Palestinian parliamentary elections, winning 74 of the 132 seats and thus ending Fatah’s historical control over the Palestinian Authority. Hamas was then accorded by the President to form a government, which was unsurprisingly rejected by the international community and Israel for its majority Hamas makeup. Foreign aid was cut to the Palestinians on the premise that Hamas had not accepted the three Quartet conditions for participating in the peace process: recognising Israel, renouncing violence and respecting past agreements. But it was not only the international community that rejected Hamas’ rise to power. Fatah, accustomed to being at the helm of Palestinian leadership, both during its revolutionary years and when it took on the role of quasi-government, was more than willing to allow pressure to build on the Islamic movement in Gaza to bend to the will of the international community or be isolated completely. The two rival forces began armed clashes in Gaza, which culminated in March, April and May of 2007, just months after Hamas and Fatah signed the Mecca Agreement to form a national unity government. Evidently, the agreement did not have the desired effect and the clashes claimed over 100 lives across the two sides. By June 2007, Hamas had ousted Fatah from the Strip and assumed complete authority over Gaza. The coup had been completed and the rift, which had taken root years earlier, had reached its apex, a dangerous point from which we are still suffering today.

**Palestinian Divisions and the Peace Process**

These events were the beginning of a black page in Palestinian history. The international community, led by the United States, backed President Abbas and his separate efforts to form a government in the West Bank, a move Hamas claimed to be unconstitutional. Hamas, in the meantime, remained besieged in the Gaza Strip after Israel clamped down a strangling siege on its coastal area, closely monitoring every item that went in and out of the Strip.
Their rationale was of course that Hamas was a ‘terrorist’ organisation that perpetrated violent acts against Israeli citizens and must therefore be sanctioned. The international community was of the same opinion, refusing to deal with the all-Hamas government now in place in Gaza and ruling nonetheless with an iron fist.

By the time Hamas had taken power in Gaza, the peace process was way into the danger zone. The Aqsa Intifada, which broke out on September 28, 2000, had already turned into Israel’s newest excuse to crack down on Palestinian resistance and continue with its long term plan of expropriating more Palestinian land and delaying any final settlement that may lead to the establishment of a contiguous and viable Palestinian state.

After stop and go efforts to reignite the peace process and somehow salvage the tattered Oslo Agreements, negotiations were restarted in 2010 by the new US President Barack Obama in the form of ‘proximity talks’ between the two sides. Hamas, of course was still out of the picture and continued to reject its diplomatic isolation, despite intermittent efforts to appease the international community during the years of its rule. For example, just after his election into parliament in 2006, Hamas politburo chief Khaled Meshaal said from Damascus that even though his movement would never recognise Israel per se, it would agree to a long-term truce with Israel if the latter withdrew from land occupied in 1967.

This had little impact on the international community and tensions continued to fester between Hamas in Gaza and Fatah and the PA in the West Bank. Arrests of activists from both sides did not help the matter and accusations were flung both ways, pushing any hopes of reconciliation even further away. The proximity talks, which were officially launched in September 2010 under the auspices of the United States, did not last long. Three weeks into the talks, the Palestinians withdrew, citing Israel’s refusal to renew its moratorium on settlement building in the West Bank as a breach of the agreement. Talks have yet to resume, with President Abbas holding his ground on the condition that Israel halt settlement building before the two sides return to the table, a condition Israel continues to reject.

**Calls for Reconciliation and the Arab Revolution**

Unfortunately, it is not only the peace process that faltered. Efforts towards reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah also failed time and again, which in turn affected peace efforts with Israel. Critics among the Palestinians argued that no Palestinian elections and certainly no peace agreement could ever be fully reached in the shadow of the rift between the Palestinian factions. This proved to be true, with even President Abbas stating that national elections, slated to take place in September 2011, would not be held if reconciliation with Hamas was not achieved. Hamas also agreed, at least in principle. However, the two sides have become so entrenched in their false seats of power, there is no telling who will blink first.

All Palestinians, regardless of their political or religious affiliation, want the same thing, their freedom

The revolutions in the Arab world have stirred things up, and hopefully for the better. With the call for change from Arab peoples suffering under sometimes ruthless dictators, the Palestinians made demands of their own. The people, in mass demonstrations, in sit-ins and hunger strikes are now calling on their leaders to put aside their differences and reconcile.

Today, there is finally hope that the leaderships in both Gaza and the West Bank are listening. President Abbas has met with Hamas officials in the West Bank and is expected to travel to the Gaza Strip in the near future to end the rift and form a national unity government with Hamas. Once this major feat is achieved, the Palestinians can focus their efforts on the important task at hand, which is ending Israel’s occupation of Palestine and bringing stability to the region at large. All Palestinians, regardless of their political or religious affiliation, want the same thing, their freedom.
The core of the euro crisis is not fiscal, though fiscal issues did bring the crisis to a head. At its heart, today’s problem stems from misalignments in Europe’s economic structure. These are directly related to the adoption of the euro and the loss of competitiveness in Europe’s periphery countries – Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain – and can no longer be corrected through currency depreciation.

European leaders have come a long way in the last year toward recognising the need for rescuing the countries in trouble and the need to reform the monetary union to make it more resilient. Nevertheless, their response remains too timid and too complacent; they have yet to recognise the full extent of the inevitable losses and have not yet demonstrated the political willingness to share the burden of the greater adjustment to come. The survival of the currency and even of the European project in its current form now depends on policymakers correcting course and pushing for a tighter union.

More than a Fiscal Crisis

The euro crisis was created by a misallocation of resources among and within European countries, reflecting a loss of competitiveness in the periphery, which resulted from and was largely concealed by a demand boom associated with the adoption of the euro a decade ago. This process also led to a large rise in the foreign indebtedness of the private sector from the periphery. Today’s fiscal problems are in large part the consequence of the breakdown of this unsustainable growth model, rather than its cause. A thumbnail sketch of the euro’s formation illustrates these trends.

Nineteen years ago, European leaders signed the Maastricht Treaty, laying the foundation for monetary union and a single currency. The agreement eventually bound the currencies and monetary policy of the periphery to that of the core: Austria, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and Germany, Europe’s largest and most stable economy. Expecting the core’s stability, wealth, and stronger institutional and economic frameworks to diffuse throughout the periphery, market confidence in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (GIIPS) surged and a demand boom emerged.

The demand boom in the periphery was in part the result of a large decline in real interest rates. After averaging over 550 basis points in 1980–1990, the average long-term government nominal yield spreads of the GIIPS vis-à-vis the core gradually declined to 22 in 2000 and 6 in 2003, while the difference in inflation between the periphery and the core fell by much less. Low interest rates and improved confidence fuelled a domestic demand surge, partly financed by foreign lending. As domestic spending increased in the GIIPS, current account balances deteriorated and private debt rose, especially in Greece, Ireland, and Spain.

As domestic demand accelerated in the GIIPS, the prices of domestic activities (i.e., those least exposed to international competition, such as housing) rose relative to the price of exportable products and attracted investment into the less productive non-
tradable sectors. Consequently, the GIIPS’ economies realigned away from manufacturing and industry toward services and construction: from 1997 to 2007, 4 percentage points of GIIPS’ GDP shifted from industry to financial services, real estate, and business services – over twice the shift in the core.

**European Central Bank interest rates became too low for the periphery, fuelling construction bubbles in Greece, Spain and Ireland, as well as an unprecedented banking expansion in the latter**

Over the same period, per capita employee compensation rose by an average annual rate of 5.9% in the GIIPS, despite annual rises in productivity of just 1.3%. The difference in the core was much smaller. As a result, unit labour costs rose by 32% in the GIIPS from 1997 to 2007, compared to 12% in the core. Reunified Germany’s remarkable transformation into the world’s largest exporter underpinned these developments. Defying the trend in nearly all other advanced countries, including the United States and Japan, German exports as a share of GDP rose by 19 percentage points from 1997 to 2007, compared to an average rise of just 2.6 points in the periphery. Consequently, current account balance diverged sharply, as shown in chart 3.

One result was a dramatic decline in competitiveness in the GIIPS against other advanced countries. The loss was particularly severe relative to countries outside of the euro zone, which saw labour costs increase only moderately and whose labour costs in euros benefited from the euro’s nearly 50% appreciation against the dollar from 2000 to 2007. This appreciation largely reflected the sharp increases in productivity in Germany and other parts of the core that the periphery was unable to match. The result was seen in the large rise in the real effective exchange rates of the periphery. The euro zone’s single monetary policy exacerbated these problems. During the boom, European Central Bank (ECB) interest rates became too low for the periphery, fuelling construction bubbles in Greece, Spain and Ireland, as well as an unprecedented banking expansion in the latter. An OECD study estimates, for example, that policy interest rates over 2001–2006 were approximately 50 basis points too high for Germany but 300 to 400...
basis points too low for Spain, Greece and Ireland.\footnote{Ahrend, Rudiger; Courède, Boris and Price, Robert, "Monetary Policy, Market Excesses and Financial Turmoil," OECD Economics Department Working Papers. March 10, 2008.}

Governments in the periphery failed to recognise that the revenue increases from the boom and the decline in public borrowing costs were windfall gains associated to adopting the euro. Consequently, government spending accelerated rapidly. From 1997 to 2007, public spending per person rose by an average of 76%, compared to a rise of 34% in the core.
2 May 2010: Joint Statement on Greece by EU Commissioner Rehn and the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF)

The members of the Eurozone commit to a program of 80 billion euros while the IMF is to provide 30 billion dollars over three years through bilateral loans, following Greece’s presentation of its corrective measures. The first disbursement will be effected as of 19 May, under the conditions set by the Eurogroup on 11 April, in order to effect repayment of a debt of 9 billion euros. The amount paid out in 2010 could reach 30 billion euros.

8 May 2010: Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Eurozone

This meeting is to finalize procedures for the implementation of support measures for Greece, which total 110 billion euros. In view of the crisis, the heads of government of Member States stress the need to accelerate the consolidation and reorganization of public finances, as well as the need for formally complying with the recommendations contained in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), creating a European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM), strengthening governance in the Eurozone and regulating the financial market. The European Council addresses these issues on 17 and 18 June 2010 and discusses the proposals put forth by the European Commission.

4 August 2010: European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) Becomes Operational

As established in the agreement of 7 June, 2010 entered into between the Member States of the Eurozone, the securitization fund is henceforth authorized to issue bonds in order to preserve financial stability in Europe by providing financial assistance to states in the Eurozone experiencing economic difficulties.

28 November 2010: Agreement on a Future European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM) to Assist Member States Experiencing Financial Difficulties

Eurozone finance ministers agree to replace the current EFSF by an ESM in 2013. Council President Herman Van Rompuy submits this agreement to the European Council in December 2010 to discuss an amendment to the Treaty.

The ESM will be the guarantor of financial stability in the euro area and will be based on the current structure of EFSF while supplementing it in terms of economic surveillance.

Private sector participation will be decided on a case by case basis, as per current IMF practices.

7 December 2010: European Council Approves Aid Measures to Ireland

The European Council decides to grant EU financial assistance to Ireland on the basis of a programme negotiated with the Irish authorities, the European Commission and the IMF in collaboration with the European Central Bank (ECB). A loan of up to 22.5 billion euros will be made available, with a maximum average maturity of seven and a half years.

16-17 December 2010: Agreement of the European Council on a Future ESM, to Become Operational in 2013

Heads of State and Government agree on the general features of the ESM, as well as on a draft amendment to the Treaty necessary for its implementation. The latter must obtain the approval of all EU Member States, in accordance with their constitutional obligations, before it can enter into effect.

The ESM will be activated only by unanimous agreement of the countries and subject to strict conditionality in cases where the stability of the euro area would be jeopardized.

1 January 2011: Three New European Authorities: the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)

Together with the European Systemic Risk Board, these three authorities, also known as the European Supervisory Authorities, have begun operating as part of the new European System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), created in 2010 to address shortcomings in financial supervision.

The EBA is the successor to the Committee of European Banking Supervisors. Its mission is to contribute to the stability and efficiency of the financial system in the short, medium and long terms.

The EIOPA, in turn, ensures financial stability, transparency of financial markets and products, and the protection of insurance policyholders and members or beneficiaries of pensions. The ESMA replaces the Committee of European Securities Regulators.

11 March 2011: Eurozone Summit and Agreement on the ESM

Country representatives endow the ESM with a response capacity of 500 billion euros. The ESM will be empowered to grant loans or purchase primary debt of Member States provided that the beneficiary states commit to take specific measures that will condition loan granting or intervention in the primary debt market (i.e. in recently issued debt securities). ESM loans will enjoy "preferred creditor status, which will be lower only to that of the IMF."

Insolvent countries will have to negotiate a comprehensive restructuring plan with their private creditors in the context of collective action clauses (CAC) in order to return to debt sustainability.

17 March 2011: Aid to Romania and Ireland: The European Commission Issues a 4.6 Billion Euro Bond with a 7-Year Maturity

Ireland will receive 3.4 billion euros from the EFSF to finance its aid plan and Romania will receive 1.2 billion euros in loans through the Balance of Payments Facility.
In Ireland and Spain, surging revenue more than compensated for spending increases – they were two of only four euro zone countries to average a government surplus from 2000 to 2007. Other GIIPS, however, showed clearer evidence of fiscal deterioration. In Greece, blatant mismanagement added to the troubles – despite strong growth, Greek deficits averaged 5% of GDP from 2000 to 2007. The financial crisis in 2008 brought an abrupt end to this post-euro growth model. As the periphery countries plunged into recession, tax revenues from over-inflated housing sectors and other domestic activities collapsed, huge bank losses materialised in Ireland and governments discovered that their spending was unsustainable. At the same time, their loss of competitiveness and inability to resort to currency devaluation dimmed hopes of turning to foreign demand for recovery.

Three Scenarios

At the outbreak of the Great Recession in the second half of 2008, the fiscal situation of the periphery looked solid, with debt levels in Ireland, Portugal, and Spain lower than in Germany. Even in profligate Greece, the true state of the fiscal situation would not be exposed until late 2009. Italy had the highest debt/GDP ratio in Europe, but had seen it decline post-euro. Since that time, European leaders have been scrambling to address the fiscal hole in Greece, as well as those that appeared in the other GIIPS as their economies deteriorated.

Confronted with political opposition – to bailouts in the core and austerity in the periphery – policy makers have nevertheless taken unprecedented steps on both fronts to hold the euro together. Although bailouts were previously assumed to run directly counter to provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, euro zone members agreed to provide direct rescue funds for Greece, Ireland and (soon) Portugal, drawing on a newly-created rescue mechanism, the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), established jointly with the IMF. Meanwhile, after much debate, the ECB voted to directly purchase government bonds in addition to injecting very large amounts of liquidity into the banking systems of the worst-affected periphery countries.

Spreads on the government bonds of the periphery have remained high, however, signalling that markets remain unconvinced and – despite large guarantees by the core – are focused on solvency rather than liquidity. As stated, embattled countries need to repair public finances and fix banks (especially in Ireland and Spain), while simultaneously restoring competitiveness so they can grow again – a catch-22, as the latter requires wage and price deflation that makes debt burdens harder to bear.

Going forward, one of three outcomes is foreseeable: a long slog in troubled countries created by austerity and deflation; debt restructuring, with the euro remaining intact; or fragmentation of the euro zone. Each scenario is bad, but the last one could spell catastrophe. Though the probability of a break-up of the euro is small, it can no longer be dismissed as fanciful. Moreover, examining it helps clarify other options.

Scenario 1: Muddle through

If sovereign defaults or a break-up of the euro zone are to be prevented, the crisis cannot spread to Spain – the Spanish economy is nearly twice as large as those of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal com-
bined. For this to be achieved, Spain and the rest of the periphery must convince markets that they are containing deficits and re-establishing the conditions for growth. As part of these changes, these countries must find ways to achieve a competitive realignment (or internal devaluation) vis-à-vis the rest of the world. By definition, this will require prices to moderate or fall and wages to fall relative to productivity. To the extent that structural reforms increase productivity, demand and employment will have to suffer less to achieve the same devaluation.

In addition, the ECB and the European core must commit to more expansionary policy over a long period, contrary to the ECB’s recent decision to raise interest rates. Euro zone countries (and the rest of the EU) will also need to commit to further augmenting the EFSF if needed. We will return in more detail to what is needed for 'muddling through' to work below.

Scenario 2: Debts Rescheduled, Euro Zone Remains

Greece, where debt has already reached 142% of GDP and is rising rapidly, will almost inevitably have to restructure its debt at some point. The cases of Ireland and Portugal are less clear cut, though they too are projected to have debts in excess of 100% of GDP by 2014. If the crisis reaches Spain and the EFSF and ECB facilities are not greatly expanded, Spain’s ability to pay down its debts could also be called into question. Should the crisis spread to Italy, rescue would be close to impossible and debt restructuring would become inevitable, implying another global financial event of ‘black swan’ proportions.

The sovereign debt restructuring could take a soft or hard form. The soft form could include an agreement to reschedule debt at much longer maturities, a lower interest rate, and even a lower principal. The EU no longer explicitly excludes such an approach, as European leaders agreed at their latest summit to incorporate collective action clauses for all euro zone government debt issued after 2013. (Collective action clauses allow a super-majority of bond holders to agree to a restructuring that applies to all creditors, even those who oppose it.) In principle at least, this could be done without major disruption: for example, private creditors could accept the change in terms in return for a full or partial guarantee from an expanded EFSF.

Under a hard restructuring, effectively an imposed default, creditors would take a large hit on principal, which could be in the range of 30-50% (following its default in 2001, Argentina imposed a 70% hit on its creditors). A hard restructuring would have far-reaching implications for banks and private sector entities in the defaulting country, as well as broad effects throughout the EU and beyond. Contrary to the impression sometimes created by politicians, the cost of the default would not be small. For example, were Greece to default on half of the public and private debt it owes abroad, its creditors would lose about €200 billion, a multiple of the direct cost imposed on creditors during Argentina’s default. If several periphery countries defaulted, a banking crisis would almost certainly erupt – France and Germany hold over €700 billion in debt from Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and Greece. Resolving such a crisis would require another large dose of government support for banks throughout Europe. The defaulting countries would fall back into very deep recession amid a collapse in confidence and capital flight.

Scenario 3: The Euro Zone Breaks Up

No country would willingly choose to exit the euro zone. Any exiting periphery country would face capital flight, catastrophic recession, and widespread household, corporate, and banking defaults. Though not impossible, the legal, logistical and political challenges of introducing a new currency in these circumstances would be daunting – for example, how would one convince a creditor or pensioner that is owed euros to take devalued drachmas? The new currency would need to be devalued greatly vis-à-vis the euro, driving up import prices and possibly leading to higher inflation; the country’s borrowing costs would also remain elevated well into the future.

Nevertheless, judging by numerous precedents (consider Argentina again, and more recently, Iceland) an immediate devaluation would help restore competitiveness, boost exports, and probably reignite growth within one to three years – an outcome debt restructuring alone cannot achieve. (Indeed, debt restructuring could erode competitiveness further by encouraging the private and public sector to resume spending, allow wages to rise again and so on.) Thus, if after prolonged austerity a country concluded that debt restructuring was its only viable option and deemed a large banking crisis probable anyway, it could come to see exiting
the euro zone as its least bad option for recovering lost competitiveness and returning to growth. If this were to occur, defaults in troubled countries would be more widespread than in scenario 2, triggering a deeper banking crisis in the remaining core countries that would require even greater government support. Simultaneously, the smaller remaining euro zone would see appreciation and competitiveness loss. Together, these forces would likely push the core back into recession, which would in turn limit the export performance of the periphery. Given the disruption it implies, and the lengths euro zone partners would surely go to resist it, this scenario is unlikely.

A less painful but still traumatic version of the breakup would begin with a German exit. This scenario is even more unlikely, but again worth examining. If further bailouts required Germany to bankroll its larger neighbours as well and ECB liquidity injections were seen to threaten a sharp rise in inflation, German public opinion could force such an outcome. A return to the stronger deutschmark would reduce German competitiveness and hurt export performance. Banks could also suffer as the value of euro-denominated assets fell. Euro depreciation and looser monetary policy would likely follow in the periphery, making the competitiveness adjustment easier and enhancing growth there. Sharp fiscal adjustments would still be needed, however, and debt rescheduling could still be necessary, especially since depreciation would make foreign-currency loans more expensive to repay. Without its German anchor, and the prospect of its financial support, the truncated euro zone would potentially experience an even greater loss of confidence. It is difficult to see how the European project could survive a voluntary German exit.

**Is the ‘Muddling through’ Scenario Working?**

As the three scenarios illustrate, Europe has no good option. To muddle through and avoid even worse outcomes, policy makers need to stop the fiscal bleeding and to address the root causes of the disease – diverging competitiveness and structural misalignments. In principle, an extended period of austerity (in the form of fiscal consolidation, increased household savings and corporate and bank deleveraging) could lower prices and wages in the periphery, thereby re-establishing competitiveness – but is this occurring?

Certainly, there is no shortage of austerity. Since 2007, when economic activity in Europe peaked, domestic demand has fallen by an eye-popping 23% in Ireland, 11% in Greece and 8% in Spain. It has also declined modestly in Italy (4%) and Portugal (2%), while growing by 2% in Germany. However, despite announced wage cuts across the periphery and the euro’s decline (down about 3% in

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**Chart 5**

**Change in Real Effective Exchange Rate since 2000 (% based on unit labour costs)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2011</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td>22.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>-8.0</td>
<td>-4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Commission. Note: An increase represents a loss of competitiveness.
effective terms since two years ago), Ireland is the only periphery country to see its competitiveness improve significantly. As shown chart 5, Spain and Portugal have regained competitiveness modestly, but only at about the same pace as Germany; Greece and Italy have continued to lose ground. Moreover, while world trade is booming again, consensus forecasts for 2011 expect the periphery countries’ economies to be stagnant or shrink.

Thus, austerity alone appears able to redress the competitive and structural divergences at only a snail’s pace. With the possible exception of Ireland, the periphery countries have no choice but to enact structural reforms to stimulate innovation and increase competition in product and labour markets. Without these changes, the divergences between the periphery and the core may persist, or even widen.2

So far, each country has taken modest steps toward such structural reforms, but they have been insufficient. Though not yet reflected in competitiveness indicators, Greece alone appears to be embarking on far-reaching structural reforms as part of its EU-IMF programme. This should not be too surprising: reforms such as liberalising the markets for professional services attack powerful interest groups directly and nearly always require the application of an external force. (It remains to be seen how financial rescues will affect the will to act in Ireland and Portugal, as the governments that requested support were or are soon likely to be voted out of power.)

Rather than push more forcefully for structural reforms, however, policy makers in Brussels and in the capitals remain overly focused on austerity measures, fiscal consolidation and how to finance the adjustment. In fact, the array of proposals brought forward to ease the financial burden on the periphery is truly impressive; they range from debt restructuring, to allowing the EFSF to buy government bonds directly, reducing IMF-EU loan interest rates and extending their maturity, and issuing euro-bonds to fund much of the euro zone countries’ financing requirements.

While each of these proposals has merit, each could also ease the pressure on politicians to act. More crucially, they fail to address the root causes of the crisis.

What Should Be Done Differently?

First, leaders in the euro zone must recognise that they are dealing with at least a five-year problem, and plan their response accordingly. Improving competitiveness, export performance, and the composition of growth will prove to be more important than meeting short-term fiscal targets. Efforts to strengthen economic governance and macroeconomic cooperation have yielded only modest progress so far. The ‘Euro Plus Pact’ – a series of rules designed to improve competitiveness and policy coordination among euro zone members that emerged from the March 2011 EU summit – reinforced the principle of peer review of fiscal and structural reforms established in previous agreements, but offered no new enforcement mechanisms.

Second, the core countries must recognise that allowing or promoting domestic demand to grow faster and wages to rise will both help them and also facilitate the adjustment in the periphery. Surplus countries as well as deficit countries have to contribute to the adjustment. If, through market processes or policy choices, demand growth accelerates in the core – which accounts for a large share of periphery exports – the likelihood that the crisis will be contained increases. Though the objective of the periphery must be to improve competitiveness vis-à-vis all its trading partners, the speed at which wages and demand rise in the core is important since they set the benchmark for price rises throughout the euro zone, and also determine the value of the euro. The recent ECB interest rate hike, though perhaps appropriate for Germany in isolation, will slow the recovery in the periphery and make the competitiveness adjustment more challenging. Rescuing the euro while keeping European inflation slightly below 2% would be just perfect, but the former, not the latter is the main objective.

Third, policy makers must resolve several issues surrounding existing financing mechanisms. At the March summit, leaders were unable to finalise an agreement to enlarge the EFSF; while the lending capacity of its replacement, the European Stability Mechanism, will be expanded to €500 billion, it will not reach its full capacity until 2018. Clarity on the financing mechanisms will help calm bond markets and reduce the chance of Spain coming under

attack. But, critically, the precise shape of these mechanisms is less important than the inclusion of conditions that maximise incentives for politicians to act – including measures that discourage drawing on financing in the first place.

Fourth, clarity is needed on whether and how an eventual debt restructuring will be effected. Sovereign debt restructuring should be seen only as a last resort. However, markets are convinced (correctly, we believe) that Greece will very likely require such restructuring eventually. Both Ireland and Portugal could follow, although that is less certain. Since the three countries are effectively shut out of private markets, the most likely scenario is that the EFSF and ESM will progressively become the owner of a very large part of the debt of these three countries, which the IMF projects will reach 800 billion euro by 2015. Even with eventual rescheduling and reduction in interest rates, some part of this debt will probably have to be forgiven. Under what conditions will that be allowed to happen? How will debt forgiveness be linked to progress on fiscal and structural reforms? Assuming that current private bondholders will be completely sheltered as promised, will new bondholders after 2013 have to take the brunt of private sector haircuts? Answering these questions today presents formidable political challenges in the core countries, but will surely be a prerequisite to ultimate resolution of the crisis and to Greece and others eventually regaining market access.

No Turning Back

Ultimately, the choice facing the euro zone is a more fundamental one than deciding how to capitalise the EFSF, what fiscal goals to target or even what debts to forgive. Though some of the euro’s problems today reflect countries adjusting to the adolescent regime, unpredictable asymmetric shocks and divergent development paths among members will inevitably confront the monetary union again in coming decades. To insulate itself against a repeat of the current tensions, the monetary union must be greatly strengthened. Difficult as it is to envisage this politically today, this will inevitably include a tighter fiscal and transfer union (of which structural funds and the EFSF, for example, are harbingers); tighter coordination of fiscal policies, including tax policies; and increased flexibility of product and labour markets, including facilitation of movement of people across national boundaries.

To be sure, a more fiscally centralised euro zone would mean spreading countries’ debts and risks among its members: helping hard-hit countries return to fiscal health would come partly at the expense of those that are better off. But the risk that asymmetric shocks destabilise the whole euro zone would be reduced.

The political integration that is implied by these changes would also have wider benefits, helping Europe retain its influence on world affairs as several developing countries rise to become the world’s largest economies in years ahead

If such transfers were activated automatically and supported shared European objectives – such as an expanded EU programme to help provide basic unemployment insurance – they may be more politically acceptable. The political integration that is implied by these changes would also have wider benefits, helping Europe retain its influence on world affairs as several developing countries rise to become the world’s largest economies in years ahead.3

A key objective of the euro’s architects was to draw Europe ever-closer together – to ensure ‘there is no going back.’ The crisis has already shown that in this, they may have succeeded beyond their expectations. The euro zone today has no realistic alternative but to press forward with even greater integration – fiscal, structural, and ultimately political. Other courses lead to renewed financial crisis and, as one former euro zone head of state suggested, the potential end to 60 years of European peace. The choice is clear – now politicians have to find a way to bring their people behind them.

The Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) have entered an economic crisis for which they have no direct responsibility whatsoever, considering their weak engagement on international capital markets due to a nearly generalized lack of capital account convertibility. This crisis – originating as a purely financial crisis in industrialized countries having developed a credit bulimia leading to a crisis, first of interbank liquidity, then of credit and finally of final demand – is aggravated by a crisis of raw materials and food staples (crude oil, bread wheat, vegetable oil, sugar) essentially associated with market imbalances, but also with speculative trends on the futures markets.

Until the past few months, one could believe that the EU’s Mediterranean Partner Countries had succeeded in cushioning the effects of the crisis, though at the price of an increase in budgetary deficit and a decrease in growth. However, recent events have demonstrated that the damage went deeper and the sensitivity of populations to declining living standards that may seem bearable in wealthy countries was decisive in South Mediterranean countries, considering the generally precarious living conditions in certain places. This was aggravated by endemic difficulties that the indicated growth regimes were incapable of overcoming:

- The lack of food security: after forty years and the successive revolts in Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia in the late 1970s, the population’s sensitivity to variations in the price of the basic food basket is evident;
- Climbing unemployment rates among university graduates despite strong economic growth rates: in Tunisia, 9% of Masters’ degree holders were unemployed in 1999 compared with 22% in 2008, whereas this country is a “success story” insofar as growth rate;
- Regional imbalances, which have grown;
- Growth accompanied everywhere by a rise in inequalities (cf. FEMISE 2010 Report).

In this context, the crisis, which has had little impact on the MPCs in the financial sphere, has had – and will have for some time to come – a significant impact on the real economy of the countries in the region via exports, tourism, foreign direct investment (FDI), remittances by workers abroad and prices. The most important point is that the recession in EU countries has led to a dramatic drop in foreign demand in a context where the balance of the transfer equation of the MPCs vis-à-vis the EU was already problematic. If we consider the transfer equation reflecting the MPCs’ relations with the rest of the world, its fragility is indeed clear (cf. Galal, Reiffers 2010).

- Apart from Algeria, the MPCs’ trade deficit vis-à-vis the world is 50 billion dollars;
- Their trade deficit with the EU varies from 20 to 30 billion dollars with oil (this is a competitive edge that the EU has nowhere else in percentage of trade concerned);
- The current account is balanced on the global level through services (approximately 18 billion in tourism in periods of peace and some 24 billion in migrant remittances);
But the current account balance is always in deficit, on the order of 10 billion; establishing equilibrium in the balance of payments is always difficult; it is done via foreign investment, while exceptional financing has been needed in the past few years.

Charts 6 and 7 show the same set of variables in billions of dollars for the two leaders of the Arab Spring, namely Egypt and Tunisia, in late 2010. Since then it has been quite clear that if the trade balance continues to deteriorate due to pressure differences between internal demand in the South and the North, and if positive expectations are not quickly restored (with their effect on tourism, emigrant remittances and foreign direct investment), the mechanical effects of the crisis will be greatly amplified.

The Crisis Arrives Just When the MPCs Were Beginning to Converge with the EU

The crisis has made its appearance just when the countries in the Mediterranean Region were experiencing a marked improvement in their economic situation since the Barcelona Process was launched.
Significant evolution in the structure of trade, the growing openness to FDI and significant reforms are the main causes behind this improvement. More particularly, the role of FDI has doubled: in the first place, it has made the Mediterranean an area of capital attraction allowing the region to catch up from its lagging situation in the 1990s, and in the second, it has contributed to the integration of the MPCs into the world economy, producing a domino effect insofar as comparative advantages, technology transfer and improvement of domestic human capital levels. Moreover, customs tariffs have gone down, numerous trade agreements have been signed and trade has taken on increasing importance in the GDP over the past few years. One could note as well a process of institutional and standard of living convergence with the Northern neighbours and higher growth rates, obtained in the majority of cases thanks to growth regimes that were increasingly based on total factor productivity (TFP) and less on capital. Finally, the MPCs have implemented rigorous monetary and budgetary policies and inflation control and have been making efforts towards debt reduction.

**The Crisis Is Patent in Real Income Effects**

Due to the manner of participation in international trade and the weak opening of the capital account (the only countries close to the opening of capital are Egypt, Israel and Jordan), the crisis has not been felt in the MPCs as it has in other regions more involved in international finance. Restrictions to capital movements have thus protected the MPCs, the weak integration of their financial systems with international finance having partially isolated them from the crisis. There has thus not been any real depreciation of financial assets. Hence, the inter-bank market, stock exchange indices and credit have not experienced a depression comparable to that in other regions.

Nonetheless, the shock has been substantial, affecting the countries in the region in two ways. Firstly, through the rise in petrol and staple food prices, the latter having risen by 25% in 2008 whereas it represents 60% of household consumption in poor, rural areas. Though this abrupt rise in the prices was absorbed, it still raised the poverty levels in certain MPCs; for instance, in Egypt poverty rose by 12% following this inflationist effect. Secondly, there was a lasting shock following the decrease in external demand and revenue remittances (primarily from the EU) – expressed through a decrease of exports associated with the fall in external demand, and a decrease in emigrant remittances, tourism and net inflows of foreign direct investment – that has directly affected GDP growth.

**Restrictions to capital movements have thus protected the MPCs, the weak integration of their financial systems with international finance having partially isolated them from the crisis**

The crisis thus had the following immediate effects in the Mediterranean Region in 2009:

- A fall of nearly 30% in goods exports and therefore an aggravation of trade deficits;
- A very slight decrease in tourism proceeds despite a rise in number of visits. An effect can be noted of substitution to the benefit of proximity making European tourists choose the MPCs as their holiday destination; yet current data indicates that the decrease in tourism revenue could be considerable in the summer of 2011;
- A decrease in remittances of 6% on average;
- A decrease of nearly 40% in FDI.

The latter element certainly gives the most cause for concern, as direct foreign investment has been a major factor of growth over the past few years following the strengthening of national attractiveness vis-à-vis foreign capital. In this difficult context, the MPCs will have to maintain a high level of internal demand and move towards the consolidation of a South-South market, currently little developed, in order to revive the inflow of FDI.

**Growth, Employment and Budgetary Balance**

The direct effects of the crisis have taken the form of weakened growth, which has had consequences on employment - the unemployment rate remaining high – and on budgetary deficits, which have in-
creased following the implementation of support programmes.

On the whole, growth in the MPCs remained positive in 2009. Nonetheless, it suffered a shortage of foreign revenue and the growth rate fell to an average of 3% in 2009 (as compared to 5% in 2008 and 4.6% on average for the 2000-2007 period). Growth rates grew in 2010 under the stimulus of recovery measures, as, for instance, in countries such as Turkey and Egypt, reaching an average of 4.8% in the MPCs. Hence, despite the magnitude of the crisis, the policies followed have managed to maintain the major macroeconomic balance in the short term.

The majority of the MPCs have chosen to maintain internal demand through the budget. Naturally, this choice has put them under major deficit pressure (5.7% and 5% in 2009 and 2010 against only 2.7% on average in 2008). Even Algeria, which had had a considerable budgetary surplus thanks to its oil resources, faced a deficit approaching the MPC average in 2009. Thus, the possibilities of support through the budget in coming years are limited, especially for the MPCs that are progressively ceasing to enjoy a good sovereign debt rating (these are the cases of Egypt and Tunisia). The possibilities of limiting the social impact of the crisis via public intervention are therefore diminished.

With regard to employment, the rate of job creation over the past few years has corresponded only to the need for covering new arrivals on the job market. As of 2006, the reduction of unemployment has slowed (-0.8% in 2006, -0.4% in 2007) to give way to a rise in 2008 (0.25%). On the whole, the MPCs have never really followed a strategy of labour market improvement. The absence of a strategy for promoting scientific and technical studies has contributed to unemployment among young university graduates while at the same time, the private sector lacks skilled labour. FEMISE has calculated that, at a constant activity rate, the MPCs would have to create at least 22 million jobs by 2020 only to maintain the current situation (cf. FEMISE Research Report FEM3d-02 and FEMISE 2007 Annual Report). Unemployment has remained on average unchanged from 2008 to 2009, always under the symbolic 10% mark (official figures). In 2010, the employment rate decreased on average, but it seems that in a certain number of MPCs (namely Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) the growth rates were not high enough, neither quantitatively nor qualitatively, to modify the dynamic of job creation.

**Current Accounts and Foreign Reserves**

The effects of the crisis are also felt in the current accounts. The weakness of exports has led to greater current account deficits in the majority of the MPCs. Thus, whereas the region registered a current account surplus in the 2000-2007 period, in 2009 it had a deficit of 4.1%, which was to remain nearly unchanged in the years to come. This suggests that the MPCs will find it harder to pay the debt service denominated in foreign currencies. If the trade balance remains negative and there is no inflow of foreign capital, the lack of liquidity will be felt and reserves could experience a significant decrease.
FEMISE has already indicated that countries with flexible exchange rate regimes and more developed financial markets should theoretically be better off (Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia). Nonetheless, the social unrest that broke out in Egypt and Tunisia will lead to a decrease in the budgetary leeway for pursuing adequate monetary policies and thus the countries that have been "role models" insofar as monetary policy are no longer safe. In addition, the rise in the prices of food and energy simply increases the risks incurred.

We note in passing that the position of international finance remains limited in the balance of payments of the MPCs. This poses a major dilemma: on the one hand, recourse to international capital markets seems necessary to meet financing needs and maintain the volume of investment, but on the other hand, this recourse requires capital account convertibility, and therefore greater volatility and greater dependence vis-à-vis market expectations in a tense social and political context.

### The Post-Crisis Period

**The Need for a Growth Dynamic Based on Total Factor Productivity (TFP)**

For a long time, the growth rate of the MPCs has been dominated by the accumulation of capital. Yet extensive accumulation of capital can have a negative effect on productivity in the long term.

In any case, as the near entirety of the economic literature indicates, differences in income per capita can be ascribed in the long term mainly to differences in productivity. An increase in productivity that does not negatively affect employment (that is, total factor productivity – TFP) can facilitate macroeconomic management and purchasing power can be maintained through raised wages indexed to productivity. Finally, there is a link between productivity and profitability of firms.

It has been indicated (cf. Ahmed Galal and Jean-Louis Reiffers 2010) that the contribution of TFP in the 1980s and 1990s was zero at best, with the exception of Tunisia and Israel. Since the mid-1990s, however, it has risen, particularly in Lebanon, Tunisia, Egypt and Israel. Efforts have been made in Morocco, Turkey and Jordan, whereas Algeria and Syria are still behind. On the whole, increase in total productivity has occurred in parallel with an increase in MPC attractiveness for FDI.

Chart 8 shows that Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco were the countries registering the highest TFP growth rates during the crisis. These same countries maintained the highest growth rates in the region in 2009. This seems to confirm the idea that productivity is the most decisive factor for sustainable growth.

In the best of cases, some countries enjoy significant investment rates (30.1% in Jordan, 30.3% in Morocco and 20.2% in Tunisia in 2010) in addition to significant TFP growth.

The crisis should thus be overcome by developing new vectors of growth based on the TFP, not only allowing growth rates to be maintained but also allowing the ever-increasing challenge of
employment in the Mediterranean to be met. Specifically, the MPCs will have to:

- Better allocate their factors towards sectors with greater productivity by agreeing on greater mobility (of people and capital), which involves continuing to liberalize product and factor markets; and
- Foster innovation and training so as to improve the quality of factors used, which entails developing an economy based on knowledge.

Recent unrest in the region, however, could curb the MPCs’ capacity to maintain their attractiveness for FDI and thus reduce the latter’s ripple effects.

**Conclusion**

The crisis and the events following it suggest three concluding remarks:

The first is that a new growth model must be implemented. In a sense, we are dealing with an
economic and social transition equivalent to the one occurring in the late 1980s in East Block countries. The point is to go towards a more democratic type of capitalism. This implies a certain number of major changes: political reforms allowing improved expression of needs, improved transparency and elimination of corruption, development of opportunities for youth, regional balance and a greater reduction of inequalities.

The second is the return to structural policies. International opening should continue, but it should be accompanied by incentive policies using public and private funds and aiming at new sectors and the knowledge economy. Moreover, these policies should not only be concerned with increasing trade gains, but also with compensating the losing parties due to such opening (sectors, qualifications, territories), something that has been neglected far too long by advocates of international liberalization.

The third is the need for regional integration. The transfer equations shown above reveal just how strong interdependence is between Europe and its neighbours. The urgency is to support ongoing political developments and contribute to consolidating positive expectations (European investors, European tourists, youth from the South), which will be key factors in overcoming the crisis. Needless to say, in view of the trade surpluses gained by our countries, it is in the common interest to strengthen a system of interdependence that is already well-established. And there is even more reason to do so since the South Mediterranean countries, as we have indicated, are not in the least responsible for the crisis affecting them.

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After having been a strategic cornerstone of international relations for several centuries, the Mediterranean lost its importance in favour of the Atlantic, followed later by the Pacific. In this early twenty-first century, will it manage to regain a role, if not equivalent to its earlier status, at least essential to the world balance? The Mediterranean is currently a region of high tension and probably one of the most unstable seismic fault lines of international relations. Thus regional conflicts, of different intensities but some of which endure and are growing worse, have an importance that goes beyond Mediterranean shore countries: Morocco-Algeria, Cyprus-Turkey and, of course, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has proven central. The Mediterranean Region is also a stage for the strategies of international actors, in particular the United States, due to the major energy stakes existing there (Algeria, Libya) and in its immediate proximity (the Arab Persian Gulf States). Moreover, the countries along the southern shore of the Mediterranean have been experiencing strong internal tensions due to the weak legitimacy of the majority of regimes and the related authoritarian repression, explaining the radical nature of opposition forces, which can rarely express themselves legally. The Arab uprisings in the winter of 2010 and spring of 2011 constitute stunning proof.

Lenin used to say that a single spark could start a prairie fire. In Tunisia, a tragic incident turned into a major geopolitical event. A young, 26-year-old Tunisian graduate, Mohamed Bouazizi, faced with the impossibility of finding a job after his university studies, resigned himself to selling vegetables. When the police harassed him, he set himself on fire on 17 December 2010. He did not survive the injuries. A desperate individual gesture? No! Tunisian youth and the general population considered it the expression of collective malaise. The incident unleashed a wave of protests, shattering the image of a country where the regime seemed to easily control the political and social situation. The incidents led to the flight of President Ben Ali on 14 January 2011, after 23 years in power. For the first time, an Arab regime had been overturned, not by a coup d’état, but by a popular revolution.

Under Ben Ali, a social pact had been concluded with the Tunisian population: political liberties were radically limited and controlled in exchange for continually increasing access to consumer goods and services by the majority of citizens. Western countries, in the name of the struggle against Islamism, closed their eyes to the breaches of elementary democratic principles. Ben Ali was both a victim of his success and responsible for his downfall. The population’s high level of education, which allowed it to be in contact with the outside world, created a public opinion that could no longer remain prisoner to official discourse. The regime’s closed nature, its consideration of all criticism as intolerable, considerably isolated it and cut it off from reality. Not allowing any space for opposition actually created a void which young people
rushed to fill. Hence, when the economy began to show signs of slowing down, the restrictions on liberty and the corruption, tolerated until then, became unbearable.

The youth of the Arab world, a globalised youth, compares its fate with others. It no longer accepts being bereft of its rights and liberties in the name of the so-called struggle against Islamism. Governments can thus no longer hide behind the argument of a foreign plot or a terrorist danger. Young Arabs are patriotic and want to be able to live and be successful in their own countries; it is therefore highly unlikely that circumstantial measures will suffice to satisfy them.

In the Maghreb as in the Mashreq, the situation in Tunisia was followed with fervent attention: everywhere, economic and social difficulties had created an environment ripe for protest. After Ben Ali, it was the Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, who hurriedly left power, namely on 12 February 2011. Beyond this victory, however, the transition under army control promises to be complicated.

Despite real differences between States, there is one certainty: peoples, everywhere in the world and thus including the Arab world, are becoming true political actors. They confirm Brzezinski’s statement, according to which, “for the first time in history, almost all of humanity is politically activated [...]” The Arab world cannot escape this generalised movement. The combination of an increasingly educated youth and increasingly flagrant social inequalities is explosive and cannot be checked by authoritarianism.

To grasp the depth of these political upheavals, historical analogies have been advanced. However, we should not get carried away after the success of the Tunisian revolution and the surprise flight of Ben Ali, nor even after the fall of Mubarak in Egypt or the shaking of Colonel Gaddafi. Certain observers were too quick to predict a domino effect in the Arab world. Indeed, it is improbable that such an effect will take place, which would see the ensemble, or even the majority, of the Arab regimes be overturned one after another in a short time span. However, the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutionary processes are creating a shock wave that will be felt not only in the entire region but beyond Mediterranean bounds.

The domino effect predicted for the Arab world was the fruit of an analogy made with the end of communism in Eastern European countries in the latter half of 1989. In just a few months, all the communist regimes, considered immutable, were overthrown, one after another with astounding ease. All of these regimes had, however, a factor in common: they had no internal legitimacy and only remained in place through the external pressure exercised by the Soviet Union. From the moment when Gorbachev clearly indicated that each member state of the Warsaw Pact could go its own way and that he would not oppose any national political choices by military force, all the regimes were overthrown with a speed that no one had predicted.

The combination of an increasingly educated youth and increasingly flagrant social inequalities is explosive and cannot be checked by authoritarianism

However, though the Arab countries have certain facets in common, the differences are sufficiently great to check the domino effect. It is therefore methodologically mistaken to make an analogy between Eastern Europe in 1989 and the Arab world today.

As we have seen, the first country to experience the effects of the Tunisian revolution is not a Maghreb country but Egypt. In Algeria, though part of the population considers the mismanagement of oil revenue as a fundamental injustice and access to employment and housing remains a nagging problem, the country also remembers the horrors of civil war, from which it has only just emerged and into which it has no desire to return. The army, moreover, plays a specific role. However, on 23 February, popular protest forced the government to lift the state of emergency that had been in effect for 20 years. In Morocco, there is a climate of intellectual freedom that Tunisia did not have and which offers several forms of political participation that constitute safety valves. Though there are major social inequalities, the system seems more open than in Tunisia, and, above all, the King, with a significant public presence, still retains great personal popularity, not to speak of his legitimacy as Commander of the faithful. In this case, there is an aspiration to greater political openness and social justice, but not to revolution, which the King’s speech
of 9 March 2011 and the proposed reforms seem to confirm. It was Egypt that had the most points in common with Tunisia. A worn regime, complete political stalemate, the absence of liberty, corruption among the Head of State’s entourage and, on another note, a significant number of internet users and members of social networks. But the differences are also great: the army, in contrast to Tunisia, holds power and does not intend to give it up, even if it let go of Mubarak. Moreover, the strategic importance of Egypt has nothing to do with that of Tunisia. This is why Egypt did not undergo a revolutionary process identical to the one occurring in Tunisia. It is likewise certain that popular protest will not cease after the fall of Mubarak, that other significant political disruptions will occur along the borders of the Nile and that the deep movement underway will not be ended through simple cosmetic changes.

In Libya, Gaddafi has chosen to attempt to drown the popular revolt in a bloodbath. Here comparisons can also be made with Tunisia and Egypt: a regime in place since 1969, the squandering of national riches (to the benefit of Gaddafi’s dreams of Pan-Arabic and Pan-African grandeur) and the temptation of dynastic succession. As we write these lines, Libya is in a state of war, but whatever the outcome, the Gaddafi regime is doomed.

In Yemen, confrontations are taking place against a regime that has been in power for thirty years. In Bahrain, the religious composition of the country (70% Shiites) distinguishes it from its neighbours, who to date are not experiencing any protest movements.

The Iranian regime is delighted with this spirit of revolt, wishing to make people believe it was the instigator, but the Green Movement has experienced it rather as a signal to again take up the torch of revolt, not directed at the United States but rather at the repressive regimes of which Iran forms part.

Some regimes have fallen, others will fall, and yet others will evolve. Those who manage to best anticipate political and social demands will survive. Speaking of a general shock wave means that the regimes could remain in place if they radically modify their behaviour so as to be less cut off from their populations. In any case, the future status quo is hardly foreseeable.

These processes are not limited to the Arab world alone. Africa and Asia are equally involved. The shock wave is a global phenomenon. It concerns the ensemble of emerging countries where the population is sufficiently educated not to take official propaganda at face value and where social inequality, corruption and political resistance to change have become unacceptable. All countries having attained a certain stage of development and education are concerned. Regimes will have to demonstrate political and social openness and take into account their populations’ aspirations for fear of being overthrown.

The shock wave is a global phenomenon. It concerns the ensemble of emerging countries where the population is sufficiently educated not to take official propaganda at face value and where social inequality, corruption and political resistance to change have become unacceptable.

Apart from the analogy with Eastern Europe in 1989, another, just as inaccurate, parallel was also drawn between Egypt and Iran in 1979. Numerous government officials and experts who had long deplored the absence of democracy in the Arab world suddenly became concerned about its possible establishment. Wasn’t there an Islamist danger? Wasn’t there the risk that the Muslim Brotherhood would take power in Tunis or Cairo? The analogy was rapidly established with the Iranian events of 1979, where a revolution deposing a dictator itself turned into a religious dictatorship. In reality, the comparison was quickly exhausted. First of all, the Iranian clergy, highly organized, had directed the revolution; moreover, if the Islamic Republic has managed to endure, all the while exercising a great deal of repression, it is primarily due to the sensation of external threat, which has allowed the regime to rally the population to it. The fear of US intervention to overthrow the regime was coherent, the memory of the overthrow of Mossadegh in 1953 being still vivid. But above all, the Iraqi aggression in 1980 created a sudden burst of patriotism that benefited the Iranian regime. Must it be reiterated that at the time, the Western world as a whole gave its support to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq? Moreover, this sentiment of external menace likewise
explains the difference between Tunisia, Egypt and Iran. In Iran, after the fraudulent presidential elections of 2009, there was likewise a revolt by youth who were educated, informed and in contact with the outer world despite censorship. But repression managed to stifle it, in contrast with what happened in Tunisia and Egypt. In cases where there is a perception of external threat, a regime has less trouble staying in place, even if it is unpopular.

In any case, the Tunisian revolution and the Egyptian revolt should lead to deeper reflection on political Islam. The Islamist threat was a pretext for the Tunis and Cairo regimes to develop political repression against the population, with the support of Western countries. What was evident in these countries was that the revolts were grass-roots (they were not coups led by a handful of officers), pacific and secular. A process of political integration of movements claiming to belong to political Islam can be expected: the way of the ballot boxes will allow them to avoid choosing to take up arms.

The Tunisian revolution and Egyptian upheavals represent the “second death” of American neo-conservatives. The latter had theorised on the need to establish democracies in the Arab world, including through external intervention and even war. The dramatic results were seen in Iraq. The establishment of a democracy after internal political dynamics as in Tunisia is manifestly a much more promising course, less destabilising and less costly in human lives, even if we are only at the beginning of the process.

**Strategic Issues, the Mediterranean Partnership and New International Paradigms**

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), established in November 1995 in Barcelona, was structured around a political-security, economic and financial triptych, and then a social, cultural and human one. Its audacity was to attempt to formulate an overall response to the ensemble of issues while reasserting the inseparable link existing between security, economic and human development and political democracy. This partnership, from the perspective of its initiators, was designed to limit the risks of any violent confrontations that could emerge due to the much too unequal development prevailing between the two shores of the Mediterranean. Obviously, concern with risks of unrest and therefore security problems were central to the origins of the EMP, while at the same time, it attempted to provide a global response to the set of challenges the region posed.

In any case, in 1995, under pressure from Washington, the Mediterranean Partners inopportuneley decided to keep the EMP out of the issue of Middle East peace, though in a climate when many actors still had hopes in the Oslo Process. There is no denying that over the course of the years, the context has become radically different. Thus, particularly after 11 September 2001, the incontestable consolidation of the US’s strategic hold on the region can be seen: on the one hand, in the strengthening of privileged ties with certain key States of the South shore of the Mediterranean (Morocco, Algeria, Jordan, Egypt, Israel), in the signature of bilateral trade agreements with Jordan and Morocco and its increased presence in the oil sector in Algeria, but also in its insistence on recognition of the primacy of politics as a stagnation factor for societies in the region and thus the strengthening of the discourse on the progress that needed with regard to democratic practices; and on the other hand, in the strengthening of the security dimension, namely the improvement of NATO’s position through the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) established in 1994 (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria in 2000), which rendered the EMP more illegible, in particular with regard to its security basket.

Therefore, beyond the modification of the strategic equation, the Mediterranean Partners are more than ever under the political obligation – and it suits their fundamental interests – of implementing a process taking into account all challenges in the region. For, though the EMP, and later the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) proclaimed in 2008, were conceived as coherent wholes, it is nonetheless difficult to believe that the two shores of the Mediterranean have succeeded in reaching a common perception of the stated security and development matters, which explains their respective failure.

The new political situation opening up in the region and the shock wave traversing the Arab world are promising, from this perspective. They magnificently refute all those who, in a more or less open fashion, considered that this part of the world was definitive-ly recalcitrant to the process of democratization that all continents have been experiencing for the past twenty years. The Arab world was often perceived as a sort of black hole of democratic evolution! In reality, the Arab world and the Mediterranean are active-
ly involved in the same evolutions occurring in the rest of the world. What Westerners have not managed to discern — or have taken a long time to see — is the end of their monopoly and hegemony over the conduct of world affairs, the major phenomenon of our times. Of course, this does not mean the end of the role of the stated Westerners, because their power — political, economic and military — will remain decisive in the world order for a long time yet. But for the first time in human history, all the peoples of the world are politically active.

Nevertheless, beyond the real political and strategic divergences existing between the Western powers, there is a point in common that unites them: for them, it is, in the end, the West that is the alpha and omega of international relations and that organises the planet according to its interests and at its pleasure. Thus, beyond their differences, Westerners share to a large extent the same illusions regarding universal values and democracy and their capacity to impose it abroad.

**Democracy cannot be decreed, and can certainly not be carried in the bomb bays of bombers. It is the product of a long process that is never linear, often punctuated by uneven progress, with some steps forward and some back.**

Clearly, the point is not to deny or minimize the importance of individual and collective democratic rights, and we must lend unfailing support to the numerous democratic militants and figures of all continents who demand these rights and struggle to attain them. The point is to grasp that democracy is the product of a long process that is never linear, often punctuated by uneven progress, with some steps forward and some back. It is high time we understood that attempting to impose our democratic conceptions abroad is quite in vain and leads almost inevitably to results opposite those sought.

An aggravating factor: Westerners seems to accept the results of elections — when there are any! — only if they are in keeping with their interests and their own political choices. Thus, the major Western powers condemned the Palestinian election results in January of 2006 because they did not suit them, whereas — and despite the context of Israeli occupation — all international observation missions emphasized the technically impartial nature of the stated electoral campaign. This Western pseudo-universalism with a variable geometry clashes with the cold reality of power relations. Unfortunately, examples are not lacking to illustrate the inanity of the Western powers’ pretensions. In the region that interests us here, it is the persistence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that embodies absolute injustice: UN resolutions systematically flouted, a policy of double standards, the known existence of solutions that the stated international community persists in not doing what it takes to implement...

These divisions also exist on the cultural level, between the proponents of different civilisations, even if this is often denied. Of course, nothing is written in advance in the history of humankind and we should not indulge in the concept of self-realizing prophesies, but it cannot be denied that the clash of ignorances fed by fantasized reciprocal fears or that increasingly numerous misunderstandings constitute factors fostering a hypothetic clash of civilisations, where the Mediterranean constitutes one of the fault lines.

Thus, on both shores, walls of incomprehension are slowly going up. The North’s positive perception of revolutionary protest movements in the South is counteracted by the fear of a massive wave of immigration. In the South, reactions to Westernization are becoming more vivid and references to Islam often become the vector. In the North, secularist, feminist and “human-rightist” groups wish to do battle against, in their own words, Islamist barbarism or
green fascism. All one needs to do is to visit the Maghreb or the Middle East to grasp the damage done by such a policy. The anti-Americanism observable in all milieus and among all social classes is gradually turning into anti-Westernism.

Western policymakers should reflect upon such phenomena rather than adopting a self-righteous attitude consisting of dismissing the idea of economic, social and cultural divides with an arrogant sweep of the hand. In fact, what is possibly the most unsettling, given the magnitude of the challenges, is that a significant proportion of Westerners do not seem to wish to doubt what they consider the superiority of their values, or even subject said superiority to critical analysis.

The alternative is thus quite simple: either the Westerners refuse to see that they have lost their capacity to dominate the world, and their difficulties in making their ideas prevail and in defending their interests will grow more and more significant; or they adopt a realist policy constraining them to evaluate the current state of international power relations and defend their interests through negotiation in accordance with said relations. This return to realism would allow them, in addition, to effectively assert an influence that continues to be significant.

This leads to the matter of implementing real multilateralism. The latter, which, quite rightly, is an attempt to combat defensive nationalist reactions and the hegemony of one country over the others, has gained a great following over the past few years. However, the aim of fostering multilateralism runs up against singular difficulties. It is a fact that deciding by unanimity or majority can be long and laborious. This is, however, the price to pay for the implementation of a practice that must absolutely respect the sovereignty of States. Indeed, if the latter agreed to give up some of their rights, we would obtain the opposite results of what is supposedly sought and, as former French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine well states, it would lead to a “mutualisation of powerlessness.” States are already weakened by the effects of generalized deregulation. This is why, as H. Védrine asserts, the world today suffers from States’ powerlessness rather than from their excess of power. If the trend towards the weakening of the State’s role continues, resorting to multilateralism could seem like a comfortable capitulation. If nothing can be done on a national level, as the liberals insistently repeat, then governments are no longer responsible for anything… For in the current context, maintaining the role of the State is an objective factor of resistance against liberal globalisation.

Real multilateralism thus cannot take root if, at the same time, a multipolar world emerges where relations between the poles are developed and defined through a constant attempt to balance power relations and fluidize the course of international relations.

In any case, the results of multilateralism are to date rather slim, to say the least… Thus, for instance, and there are numerous examples, the Union for the Mediterranean is not working, probably because, among other reasons, the methods of practical decisions have given weight to the demands of the North-shore States, those of the South often being considered mere executors.

Obviously, this does not mean we should resign ourselves to this state of affairs. We are actually in a state of transition: there is no longer a Western hegemonic monopoly, but we have not yet found an alternative solution. Though the reference to multilateralism is a step forward, we must manage to go beyond its often yet incantatory nature.

Real multilateralism thus cannot take root if, at the same time, a multipolar world emerges where relations between the poles are developed and defined through a constant attempt to balance power relations and fluidize the course of international relations. From this perspective, the restructuring of a Mediterranean Partnership worthy of the name is undeniably part of the necessary implementation of new rules and new paradigms in international relations. The strong democratic shock wave sweeping all the South Mediterranean States constitutes an extraordinary opportunity to finally restore the Mediterranean Region’s place in the international balance. A Partnership worthy of the name cannot be built unless the needs and interests of both shores are equally taken into account.

The challenges are great, and very exciting!
The Great Opportunity for Transformation

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The launching of the Barcelona Process sparked an immense wave of hope – and even optimism – regarding the final step towards modernity that Arab and Mediterranean countries would take as a result of the economic progress that their trade integration and association with Europe would trigger. The agreement reached was moreover based on a firm commitment to the jointly declared principles and values of advancing towards democracy, political pluralism, human rights and respect for civil liberties. 

Fifteen years later, the general feeling was that the economic triumphs and guaranteed social gains had fallen far short of what people had been led to believe and, above all, that the promises of democratisation and of political opening had been completely circumvented. Ossified regimes held tight to an authoritarian system that awarded the benefits of progress to a strict dominant minority, leaving the vast majority of the population on the sidelines. The EU's financial, economic, technical and political support did not give rise to the desired social and political transformation, but rather, to the extent that it was effective at all, was increasingly seen as providing support for the current regimes, objectively contributing to perpetuating authoritarianism to the benefit of the groups in power and the associated economic elites. The economic progress of a few therefore co-existed with the frustration of the many, the much greater numbers of the middle and lower classes. These citizens were moreover increasingly aware of and knowledgeable about the situation due to years' of accumulated educational efforts and the emergence of new media and social networks, in particular Al-Jazeera television, that had broken the former monopoly of the official and western social media. 

In this context, the heroic act of self-immolation, spurred by rage and dignity, of the young Mohammed Bouazizi unleashed not only a democratic revolution in Tunisia, but also a wide-ranging grassroots democratic revolutionary movement throughout the Arab world. Had it been limited to just Tunisia, the revolution might have remained an isolated phenomenon, and the regional environment would no doubt have made sure that it was fleeting, too. However, the triumph of the revolution in Egypt, a major demographic, geographic, cultural and political hub in the Arab world, ensured that, one way or another, its effects would be felt in all the countries. 

The revolution began and first triumphed in Tunisia, the first country to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union in 1995, precisely because it was the site of the deepest discrepancies and contradictions between the oppression of the Ben Ali regime and the economic and social progress and modernised outlooks achieved thanks to the sustained efforts of the entire Tunisian society from the early days of independence under President Bourguiba. The modernising policies adopted in education, enhanced women's rights, creation of a modern state and government, move towards Europe, efforts to industrialise, etc., that were the legacy of the Bourguiba government were joined,
beginning in 1995 and despite the growing authoritarianism and oppression, by the continuation of these efforts by ordinary Tunisians, who moreover took full advantage of the facilities provided under the Association Agreement with the EU, the Barcelona Process’s Euromed programmes and the sectoral policies that they promoted.

The Arab democratic revolutions are thus not the expression of the failure of Euro-Mediterranean policy, but rather of the triumph of its principles and, to the extent that its admittedly limited means could be put to use, the fruit of both a possibilistic policy and the failure of the repressive regimes that severely curtailed its implementation.

It is still too early to know the immediate outcome of the different civic movements that make up the Arab world’s democratic revolution. In the short term, it might differ from country to country; however, in the medium term they will all be touched by the transformation. The awakening of civic consciousness cannot be undone and, once it has been awoken, the survival of traditional authoritarian regimes is unthinkable.

The Arab democratic revolutions are thus not the expression of the failure of Euro-Mediterranean policy, but rather of the triumph of its principles

The internal and external consequences of this democratic civic revolution are moreover immense, whether it triumphs immediately or, in the case of certain recalcitrant countries, in the medium or long term. The internal transformation of the countries will be huge, both in terms of their political systems and economically and socially, but the consequences will not stop there. They will also affect the international environment, these countries’ relations with the EU and the rest of the world. Democratic revolution alters the geopolitical environment itself, opening new avenues of interaction between internal transformation and the geopolitical environment of foreign relations.

It is thus of utmost importance to determine what has changed in the Arab world, what changes the various Arab springs have wrought in the geopolitical environment and how these changes will open new channels for evolution. Once again, the relationship with the EU will be pivotal for the Mediterranean world; however, Euro-Mediterranean policy must be adapted to ensure that the lofty goals of the Barcelona Process, set in 1995, can once and for all be achieved.

Social Transformations, the International Environment and the Crisis of the Arab Authoritarian System

1. What we are witnessing with the democratic revolutions is, in reality, the crisis of the Arab authoritarian system, which arose from the liberation movements that won independence by overcoming colonialism in the context of the Cold War. The new states generally embraced an ideology of Arab nationalism, which interpreted independence as a step forward on the road to progress and pan-Arab nationalism as a new force for modernity and the promotion of economic development. To a greater or lesser extent, all the new regimes were interventionist, steeped in the anti-colonialist philosophies and Third Worldism of the 1950s and 1960s. This was true of both the moderate and radical regimes into which the Arab world was divided, which variously aligned themselves with one or the other Bloc in the bipolar confrontation. In general, the monarchies, such as Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies, as well as monarchical Egypt, took a pro-Western line. In contrast, the more radical countries, including post-1952 Nasserist Egypt, the Baathist republics of Syria and Iraq, Algeria under the FLN, Gaddafi’s post-1969 Libya, etc., were more or less pro-Soviet.

Both groups of countries adopted interventionist, bureaucratising policies, which were considered the best way to promote development in the context of a predominantly traditional society. The crisis of Third Worldism and the collapse of the USSR were interpreted as signs of the triumph of economic liberalism and the implementation of the policies advocated by the international financial institutions as a remedy for the recurring crises into which the Arab economies were plunged throughout the 1980s.

These financial adjustment and economic liberalisation policies were accompanied by continued efforts on basic policy, especially in education and health. Efforts to promote economic development and
industrialisation likewise continued, guided by intervention or the market, depending on the country, or by the somewhat more arbitrary decisions taken by governments with considerable oil revenues. These efforts led to a definite, but insufficient economic and social transformation. In some countries especially, such as Tunisia, a middle class emerged and values and mentalities were steadily modernised. However, a growing economic gap separated them from Europe and, at the political level, the authoritarian systems, in most cases born of military coups, remained rigidly in place. As a result, the first cracks and contradictions emerged between, on the one hand, societies that, despite lagging increasingly behind Europe, were nevertheless modernising and, on the other, hard-line regimes that sought to perpetuate themselves in power.

2. The persistence of the Arab authoritarian model is also threatened by sweeping transformations in the increasingly globalised international context.

- From an economic point of view, we are witnessing a series of successive waves of economic booms, of successive economic “miracles,” which first began in the 1950s in Germany and the core of the EEC, reached countries such as Japan and Spain in the 1960s and 1970s, swept the so-called Southeast Asian “tigers” in the 1980s, and, finally, reached China and India in the 1990s and, at the dawn of the new millennium, Latin America. It is a process of economic globalisation, marked by exponential trade growth and, above all, the rise of major emerging countries that are transforming the international economic arena, causing the relocation of industry and growth and drawing trade along with them. China has become the world’s factory and India, increasingly, its office. New technologies have emerged that both promote and accentuate the phenomenon of globalisation. The computer revolution has transformed both production, trade and finance and social media.

- At the political level, we are likewise witnessing a transformation of the international arena through a series of successive waves of democratisation. While in the post-war period the first wave primarily affected Germany and Japan, the second wave began in the 1970s with the democratisation of the countries of Southern Europe – Spain, Portugal and Greece – before reaching Central and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and, in the 1990s, Latin America.

In this increasingly democratised world, the Arab world remained politically anchored in its entrenched authoritarianism, even as it underwent a hesitant transformation. The Gulf countries used their oil revenues to accelerate their path to economic modernisation without apparent political or social transformation, while in the rest of the Arab countries insufficient economic growth and induced social change co-existed with a lack of political change. The spike in oil prices beginning in 1973 led to continuous and massive income transfers from industrialised countries to oil-producing ones, resulting in the equivalent of a sea change both domestically and with regard to the functioning of the global economy and financial systems. In the Arab world, the Gulf countries became exponentially more important and influential. The arch-conservative Saudi monarchy, in particular, strengthened its claim to primacy as the origin of the Arab world and the Islamic holy land, providing generous funding with a clear religious, ideological and political bent.

### The Transformations of the Geopolitical Context: New Realities and New Opportunities

Attention should be called to the following features of this increasingly globalised world:

- In the context of globalisation, the growing weight of the new emerging countries is shifting the global economy’s centre of gravity. Paradoxically, however, the rise of Asia-Pacific with regard to the traditional fundamental relationship between Europe and North America has injected new value into the Mediterranean. Both energy products and general freight are once again being shipped through the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean as the shortest path for the flourishing trade between Asia and Europe in the context of the new globalisation.

- In this ever more globalised world, however, the highly interdependent and complementary nature of the Mediterranean has become much clearer. The North and South Mediterranean are increasingly aware of their complementarity. Europe needs the energy, demographic strength and emerging young markets of the South, while the Arab Mediterranean countries need the technology, investment, markets, industrial relocation and tourism of
the European countries, among many other complementarities.

- Separately, the collapse of the USSR and the Communist Bloc not only encouraged the reunification and democratisation of the European area, but also facilitated the integration of the Euro-Mediterranean area and the assumption by Europe of a new, revitalised role in the region. The historical division of the Arab world into pro-Western and pro-Soviet countries was overcome, giving way to an environment conducive to a more unifying policy, such as that pursued by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This was unthinkable in the context of the bipolar confrontation, during which both Europe and the Arab world were divided, with countries such as Egypt, Syria and Algeria more closely tied to the Soviet Bloc, and the moderate countries remaining in the pro-Western ranks.

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall and the re-emergence of Central and Eastern Europe, the European Communities first launched a wide-ranging policy towards the East under the initiative of Germany with a view to bringing those countries into the area of stability and progress that was Western Europe. It was this context that the Southern European countries, primarily at the initiative of Spain, seized to promote the major European policy towards the Mediterranean that would culminate in the Barcelona Process in 1995.

- The disappearance of the bipolar world also facilitated the undertaking of a peace process in the Middle East through Oslo and the Madrid Conference in 1991. It was a time in which it was believed that the broad understanding between Europe and the Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) would yield dividends of peace.

- However, the emerging Islamist movements had trouble finding an outlet, given the alignment of all the countries with possibilistic and pragmatic policies. The persistence of both a widespread sense of humiliation, a legacy of the colonial past that was fuelled by the continuing humiliating conflict with Israel, and of the development gap with the Western world spawned radical Islamist movements and the proliferation of terrorist groups. The extraordinarily traumatic experience of Algeria in the 1990s was followed by a rise in Islamist terrorism, especially al-Qaeda from its safe haven in Afghanistan in collusion with the Taliban, and the occasional attacks against the West and the United States reached their climax on 11 September 2001 in Washington and New York.

- The US reaction after 11 September, and especially the expansion of the war to Iraq, signified, among other things, an extraordinary intensification of the eternal tension between Shiites and Sunnis in the Islamic world. Since its theocratic revolution of 1979, Iran had proposed an Islamist model, but its Shiite status stripped it of force in the predominantly Sunni Arab world. The fateful mistake of the Bush administration in deciding to attack and destroy Saddam Hussein’s Baathist regime in Iraq has since been revealed to have been one of the biggest change agents in the always complex game of the Middle East. The US’s mistaken and failed destruction of Iraq has not only strained the complex relationship between Shiites and Sunnis to the breaking point, but also thrown into complete disarray the margins for manoeuvre of other actors in the region. Iran stood by as the US itself got rid of the Iraqi strongmen that had kept it at bay from the start of its revolution with a full-scale war. The disappearance of Saddam Hussein’s secular and anti-Islamist regime not only gave Iran and the radical Islamist movements throughout the Middle East a major advantage, but also left Saudi Arabia itself and its allied countries in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) on the Sunni frontlines in the Shiite-Sunni conflict in the Islamic world. The fundamental division and struggle of the Islamic world is now being played out on both sides of the Persian Gulf.

- Interestingly, the growing strategic vulnerability of Saudi Arabia and the GCC countries – due to the fall of the Iraqi strongman, the growing influence and capacity of theocratic Shiite Iran and the Sunni Arab world’s own democratic revolutions – has opened new possibilities for alliances with their Western friends. Saudi Arabia is now seeking to diversify its nearly one-to-one relationship with the US through possible partnerships, above all, although not exclusively, economic ones, with its client countries in Asia and, ultimately, with the EU, providing the latter manages to get its relations with the Gulf countries on track and give them the priority that the situation requires. They are the source of much of the energy that Europe needs, as well as of a significant share of the financial and direct investment in many sectors of its economy, and they may also be the source of stability or in-
stability, depending on how things play out in the rest of the Arab world, which is largely influenced by Saudi Arabia.

• As the budding movements for democratic revolution in the Arab countries prevail and become established, in particular in Egypt, this democratisation should foster and give new chances to the Middle East peace process. The Arab authoritarian regimes have traditionally shielded themselves behind the need to confront the Israeli Zionist enemy in order to retain their hold on power in each country. As the new democratic systems gradually replace the old authoritarian ones, Arab public opinion will find other means of understanding and progress for the region as a whole to be more constructive. However, for these opportunities to prosper, Israel must seize the moment to carry out a major shift in favour of true understanding with the Palestinians and the Arab world, accepting the prospect of a solution that can fulfil the aspirations of both sides.

• The democratic revolution and civic movements that have emerged in all the Arab countries have ultimately exposed the fallacy of the so-called Arab exception. It is now clear that Arab citizens aspire to the same things as the citizens of the rest of the world, to live in countries with representative and democratic governments that respect differences and means of social understanding. This thus opens new avenues for the third wave of democratisation to reach the Arab world and for it to cease to be an exception in the international arena.

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• Since the late 1990s, a large number of MPCs have gradually made economic progress, albeit to different degrees, primarily through their special relationship with Europe. Turkey, for example, has met with such economic success that it is now one of the new major emerging countries. The countries in which the democratic and civic revolution of the Arab world is most likely to prevail are precisely those that have made the greatest economic strides, fundamentally through their partnerships with Europe, whether their political path is now openly revolutionary, as in Tunisia or Egypt, or reformist, as in Morocco and Jordan. While this same economic success has not managed to overcome or lessen the economic gap between the North and South Mediterranean, it has nevertheless been one of the key factors facilitating the modernisation of society and mentalities that has nurtured the democratic civic movements of the Arab springs.

• The Arab springs and, above all, the democratic civic movements in each country have confirmed the theory of the failure of radical Islamism and also that Bin Laden’s death has simply certified the gradual failure of al-Qaeda. The group may continue to launch punishing attacks, with particularly deadly consequences for Arab societies themselves, beginning with Iraq, but it is now clear that public opinion in all Arab countries rejects it and has instead undertaken a movement of self-affirmation and dignity based not on radical Islamist tenets, but rather secular movements of modernising citizens, especially young people.

• This same failure and weakening of radical Islamism is one of the factors that favours the integration of moderate Islamism into the new political systems to follow the Arab springs. Certainly, the secular civic movements will have to leave room in the political arenas of their countries for the brand of moderate Islamism able to drive a more or less important share of public opinion. However, it likewise seems clear that this will indeed be a moderate Islamist movement, which, drawing on the Turkish model of President Erdogan, will help to strengthen the democratic systems of the respective countries, keeping them away from other temptations. Sharia law seems to be far from the ideals and aspirations of young people and new Arab citizens.

• Turkey’s success as a new emerging country is transforming the regional panorama as a whole, opening the door to new possibilities. President Erdogan and his government have managed to harness Turkey’s economic growth and social development, keeping the country’s prospects for EU membership alive and gradually chipping away at the control exercised by the military and Kemalist establishment over the country’s political evolution. Today, no one questions the democratic nature of the moderate Islamism of President Erdogan’s AKP, and the stubborn Kemalist rumours regarding Erdogan’s possible secret agenda to create an Islamist state
due to its major contribution and economic and political strength in the world. It also has an extraordinary interest in inheriting Turkey’s historical ties to its regional environment, just as it has inherited and developed Spain and Portugal’s historical ties with Latin American and the Mediterranean, which have been especially cultivated for this reason since the incorporation of the Iberian countries into the EEC in 1986. Now the EU should benefit from Turkey’s network of foreign relations with its historical environment, through its relations with the Turkmen peoples or through Turkey’s new relations with the Arab world as both a Western and Eastern country, as a European and Muslim country and, above all, as a major new political and also economic model for Arab countries that aspire to its demographic transformation and economic progress in this new stage. Additionally, Turkey’s presence will serve as a counterweight to the perennial claims of primacy by the Gulf countries and, in particular, Saudi Arabia. Europe has an interest both in inheriting Turkey’s set of privileged relations and in the growing role it plays in the region, due to its strategic position on the Black Sea, the straits, the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and due to the special relationship it can develop in the post-Soviet world with Russia as a whole and with the other Black Sea countries, such as the Ukraine or Bulgaria and the Caucasus or Balkan countries.

The Arab Springs and the Search for a New Paradigm in Euro-Mediterranean Relations

1. The democratic revolution of the Arab countries both needs and offers a major opportunity to make the overall approach of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which, according to its stated principles, is traditional, albeit only in theory, a more effective reality. It is worth noting some of the factors that will affect this possibility:

• The Arab democratic revolutions have done away with the myth of the Arab exception and, therefore, are paving the way for the Barcelona Process’s principles of democracy, pluralism and human rights to become the effective reality of the Arab countries.

• The democratic civic movements of the Arab world are defeating Islamism from the inside. They are certainly, and convincingly, defeating and rendering completely obsolete the radical Islamist movements involved in terrorism. However, even beyond this, the
secular and clearly modernising nature of the revolutionary and democratic movements will have an undeniable effect on shrinking the space that, in the absence of other actors, had been occupied by clandestine political Islamist movements in many Arab societies. Movements such as the Tunisian Nahda or even the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt will certainly find their niche, but in a less favourable context than they thought when they were locked in a more or less blatant struggle against dictatorships. All democratic transitions, as has already been seen in those of Southern Europe, especially Spain and Portugal, ensure that, in the process of the transition, moderate parties gradually prevail over extremist ones, which are ultimately relegated to a marginal role. This was the experience in those countries.

EU must launch a major effort to support the Arab springs in order to secure their triumph and consolidation

- The prevalence of new democratic governments in the Arab world will encourage the rule of law and the fight against corruption. That is, the Arab springs will foster not only a political regeneration, but also the effectiveness of an environment conducive to legal certainty and confidence and, therefore, to both domestic and foreign investment.

- The Arab springs will foster understanding between peoples to the extent that conflicts had previously been manipulated by dictatorships in a bid to perpetuate their hold on power. This applies to the entire region, both in terms of improving the chances for understanding between the different peoples of an increasingly democratic Middle East and with regard to other conflicts, such as that in the Sahara.

- If certain MPCs – in particular Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan, in addition to Turkey – are able to guide their political process in such a way that it does not interfere with the economic growth of recent years, this same economic success will, in turn, facilitate the re-launching of their relations with the EU, their main trading partner and the complement of their economic, demographic and political reality in every sense of the word.

- To take advantage of this set of opportunities, the EU must launch a major effort to support the Arab springs in order to secure their triumph and consolidation, which are not yet guaranteed. It is imperative to support the stability and progress of any new Arab democracies that might emerge from the civic and revolutionary movements. The economic moment is particularly complicated for these countries, beginning with Tunisia and Egypt. Continued instability in the region and the clashes between civic movements and those regimes that have responded with repression, such as in Libya, Syria and certain other countries, may damage the economy and, therefore, the social and political stability of different countries. The EU and the countries of the international community at large must thus provide effective and unwavering support for the new Arab democracies. Only then can they help them not miss the boat with regard to the new wave of democratisation that, in this sense, too, is doing away with the Arab exception.

2. It is therefore essential for Europe to undertake a major effort to re-launch the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It is time to move onto a new stage in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) towards the South. In March 2011, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European Commission released a joint communication entitled “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean,” in which they set out an initial approach to the European response in support of the democratic movements of the Arab world. This was subsequently followed by another joint communication by the High Representative and the Commission in May, entitled “A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A review of European Neighbourhood Policy.” Both documents initiated an as-yet unfinished profound rethinking of the ENP with a view to adapting it to the new opportunities and demands of the MPCs and their new international context.

To this end, significant groundwork can be found in the efforts and accomplishments of over 15 years of Euro-Mediterranean policy, which today may finally find the necessary environment to achieve its full potential. However, a substantial increase in the funding for this new stage is required, even if the current time of economic and financial crisis is not a particularly propitious one for Europe to do so. The allocation of approximately one billion euros a year from the Community budget for the Neighbourhood Policy towards the South pales in comparison to the figures bandied about for the bailouts of even small countries within the EU. Indeed, one billion euros for
the entire set of MPCs now seems ridiculous compared to figures that consistently top seventy or eighty billion per Member State with shaky finances in need of rescue, even if the latter funding will, theoretically, be repaid.

Additionally, from the point of view of its conceptualisation and instruments, Euro-Mediterranean policy will likewise require major transformations. The Euro-Arab and Euro-Mediterranean dimension of the Neighbourhood Policy towards the South should be singled out for specific attention, so as to allow the MPCs to be effectively integrated into the large area of economic, social and political progress that the European project has entailed throughout the different stages of its development. This radiating prosperity and progress, which have fully encompassed Central and Eastern Europe in the last twenty years, must likewise spread to the new democratic countries of the Arab world.

This singling out of Euro-Mediterranean policy was already initiated with the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) as the great expression of the partnership between Europe and the MPCs from the Arab world and Israel. Until the new democratic governments of the Arab world can be consolidated and the new opportunities for peace in the Middle East become clear, it will be difficult to specifically define and promote the UfM’s political institutional structure beyond the ministerial meetings. The summits will continue to be problematic, but both the Foreign Affairs and sectoral ministerial meetings must continue to be held regularly, in order for the projects and greater agreement to prosper.

In addition to the EU’s bilateral relations with the MPCs, conducted through the bilateral ENP and the specific Action Plans for each country, regional projects should be implemented through the UfM Secretariat. The Secretariat should be the main new instrument for agreeing, identifying and seeking support and funding for the implementation of projects with a real impact able to serve as examples for the region’s countries.

3. The key to the effective functioning of the UfM is the involvement of the EU’s institutions. To date the UfM has been excessively influenced by President Sarkozy’s primitive approach based on re-nationalising Euro-Mediterranean policy to the detriment of the Community character it so clearly had during the classic stage of the Barcelona Process. For this new stage of Euro-Mediterranean policy conducted through the UfM to be strong and effective, the EU institutions must reclaim their pivotal role as the European party to the Partnership. The EU institutions – the Commission, the Council and the External Action Service – must view the UfM and its permanent Secretariat as their main instrument for Euro-Mediterranean relations and projects.

- An initial step is for the EU institutions to assume the Northern Co-presidency of the UfM, finally taking over from France, whose time in the position has already been prolonged far longer than originally envisaged.
- The second step is for the European Commission, in particular, which today controls the purse strings for the budget and instruments of the ENP – the only policy currently included in the budget – to become fundamentally involved in the UfM and in the functioning of its Secretariat and to make them the venue for reaching agreements and a suitable instrument for designing and implementing effective Euro-Mediterranean regional projects.

These truly urgent initial steps will need to be followed by many more, especially to provide short-, medium- and long-term political and economic support to the democratic movements and for the stability of the new Arab democratic governments. An effort to re-conceptualise and update Euro-Mediterranean policy and the UfM itself will likewise be required, to be carried out jointly by all stakeholders in order to promote the greater shared endeavour, the high hopes for which must not be dashed.
In the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of Presidents Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, initial analyses of what these unforeseen events would herald focused on the contagion or ‘domino’ effect elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The potency of images of unarmed, popular protests did indeed translate rapidly into a changing political mood, with copycat revolts and protests affecting states to differing degrees across the whole region. From Morocco to Iran, what began as an infectious Zeitgeist in early 2011 has provoked, and continues to provoke, very different approaches to political contest in states as diverse as Libya, Syria, Jordan, Bahrain, Yemen, Oman and Saudi Arabia.

At the time of writing, six months on from the departure of President Ben Ali, the region is still in a state of flux. However, there are a number of reflections that can already be made about the geopolitical dimensions of change, which, as will be argued here, may well affect the Mediterranean states of North Africa differentially from the more entangled geopolitical web of the Levant and Gulf states. If the direct roots of contestation have been local, then the spirit of revolt has undoubtedly drawn strength at the regional level, and engaged the minds of Arab citizens more than most, above all the youth of the region. Other groups (Israelis, Iranians, Kurds, Turks inter alia) have had to take events in their immediate neighbourhood on board, and are responding to the perceived opportunities and threats these pose accordingly. The consequences of this interaction of new interests and popular demands in some parts of the Middle East and Mediterranean with the countervail of clampdowns and continuing restrictions elsewhere in the region are likely to be very diverse. In all likelihood it will result in the emergence of an increasingly variegated region of states in coming years. This, in turn, will require a change in the way the region is viewed, where for the last four decades, the rule of narrowly-based, authoritarian regimes has provided the backdrop for the perceptions and policy reactions of both local and international actors.

### Domestic Elements in New Geopolitical Equations

The first element in the region’s evolving equations is the advent of more, and not just new, actors on the regional scene. Just as Tunisia was starting the trend towards revolt, the Egyptian writer Ezzedine Choukri Fisher wrote a piece describing how the Arab world was a place where nothing much happened in 2010 and that 2011 would be no different. His argument was not that all was well in the Arab world, nor that the signs of pressure were not mounting, but rather that the ‘tipping point’ for change was difficult to predict. In practice, it has been a false assertion on the part of many observers to conclude that no one saw any of the protests coming, even if virtually no one, including the main actors, could predict the speed with which Presidents Ben Ali and Mubarak fell. Un-

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2 See Ayman al-Amir’s perceptive article of April 2010, when he argued that tensions across the Arab world were rising to the point of boiling over: Ayman AL-AMIR ‘People’s Power’ in Al-Ahram Weekly 15-20 April 2010 http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2010/994/op1.htm
derlying this view was the long-held perception that neither public opinion nor concerted public action could change the political status quo of so many years’ standing. With the confidence brought by the fall of two presidents in quick succession, and the courage shown by armed and unarmed opponents of their respective leaders in Bahrain, Yemen, Libya and Syria, public opinion is now unlikely to be taken for granted by Middle Eastern leaders, even if their choice has been to repress or sideline protests in favour of alternative strategies for remaining in power.

A second, and qualifying element in the new equation is that revolutions almost always face counter-revolutionary forces. The element of surprise that worked so well in favour of the protestors in Tunisia and Egypt in early 2011 has eluded others in the region. The fear of long drawn-out conflicts and/or stalemates has haunted NATO action in Libya, a political resolution for Yemen following the departure to Saudi Arabia of President Ali Abdullah Saleh and any clear outcome for the protest movement or Assad regime in Syria. Even in Egypt and Tunisia, progress towards elections in the autumn of 2011 has been hampered by the interplay between the old and new guard in each state. Too great a focus on the new actors to the political scene, whether Islamists or the Facebook generation, risks overlooking the role of the hidden, but doubtlessly active, losers of the ‘Arab Spring’. The return of protestors to the streets of Tunisia and Egypt in mid-July 2011, for example, highlighted fears that the slow pace of change and reform in each state signified the re-emergence of vested interests as opposed to the kind of radical changes demanded by protestors. Building a national consensus will take time, as will changing mind-sets unused to accommodating differences of opinion over the way forward. For this, new ways of doing business in both public and private sectors will need to replace the habits of nepotism and corruption that have governed much of the distribution of state resources in recent years. It is by no means clear that under economic pressures, post-revolutionary Tunisians and Egyptians have the patience to compromise over a new set of rules – above all the rule of law impartially applied – through which to govern public and corporate life. Reforming existing state structures and drawing up new constitutions, as well as reorienting economies towards more productive and inclusive ends will all take longer to get right than many might imagine.

With a slower and more contested pace of regional change in coming months, a third element in the equation is undoubtedly the risk of continuing instability. Developments in Tunisia and Egypt will be closely watched across the region, where the risk to other states lies in the competing tensions between contingent and structural pressures within the political and economic systems of the MENA region. The similarities that existed in the region’s authoritarian political systems have already been noted. Where these systems differ, however, is in the resources available to them to react to social-economic and political pressures and in the demography underlying those pressures.

The contingent pressures are those, like the Zeitgeist of early 2011, which created the regional and local environment for popular protest. If handled adroitly and/or decisively by exiting elites and leaderships, these largely circumstantial triggers could well fragment and limit the impact of organised protest, as has been seen in Algeria and, to some extent, Morocco. The structural pressures are those identified in the wake of the Tunisian and Egyptian protests, and by a number of attentive observers beforehand: namely, high levels of unemployment and the increasing visibility of officially sanctioned corruption and nepotism, above all in societies with a median age in the 23-28 age group.

Unless the educational, vocational and participatory demands of this ‘youth bulge’ are met, the underlying pressures of demography will increase, not decrease in coming years. One of the consequences of educational expansion, however imperfect in recent years, is that it has provided the MENA region with a questioning class of people, able to inform themselves and formulate their own views and opinions, especially in defence of their civic rights. It is not the poor who rise up in revolt, but the lower middle classes upwards, and their ability to form worldviews beyond those provided by official state media is a

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3 See Claire Spencer ‘You’ve ousted an Arab autocrat. Now what?’ in Financial Times, 26th July 2011 www.ft.com/cms/s/0/100a348c-b6f0-11e0-a8b8-00144feabe0c.html#axzz1TIlXHWIG

sign of the incipient global integration of this region’s younger generations.

A fourth and final element in the evolving geopolitics of the broader Middle East is the reaction of outside powers. This applies not only to the West, but to remaining authoritarian regimes within MENA with little appetite to see democracy flourish in their immediate neighbourhood. Interference from outside can generate both negative and positive outcomes. For the West, above all Europe and the US, the real risk arises from continuing to assess MENA’s new and evolving realities through the assumption-laden prisms of Islamism, secularism, terrorism and short-term stability, which no longer reflect the changing perceptions and priorities of regional actors themselves. Current debates in the Arab Middle East are more akin to age-old struggles for power, influence, economic access and self-determination than the external depictions of the region that have gained currency since the Iranian revolution of the late seventies.

China and the Gulf states have already made their presence felt in North Africa through investment and construction contracts, and are likely to play a role there, not always in support of democracy or wider popular participation.

It may be tempting, as a result, to suggest that the outside world (primarily, but not exclusively, Europe and the US) allow regional and internal developments in MENA to run their course. One emerging realisation, however, is that few of the region’s developments are entirely external to the core of interests of Europe, as an immediate neighbour and key trading partner, and the US as a strategic partner to Israel and Saudi Arabia, inter alia. The policies of the European Union (EU) and the US have become factors in the domestic, as well as regional calculations of Middle East actors, to the extent that downplaying or ignoring the influence that both already bring to bear on regional developments would be akin to a policy decision in itself.

Ultimately, the current challenges to MENA’s geopolitical configurations should be perceived as an opportunity for Europe and the US to engage with this strategically important region in new ways. Over the longer term it is not just the effects of the protest movements that will shape EU and US responses towards the Mediterranean in particular. China and the Gulf states have already made their presence felt in North Africa through investment and construction contracts, and are likely, along with other international actors to play a role there, not always in support of democracy or wider popular participation. As North Africa’s closest neighbour, Europe cannot remain immune indefinitely to the geopolitical changes taking place on its doorstep, nor continue to see developments in the region as entirely external to the future of Europe itself.

### Changing Geopolitical Assumptions

Geopolitics is normally discussed in terms of what individual states do to align and adjust themselves to the challenges and changes they face in their external environment. Where governing regimes are limited in scope and virtually synonymous with their states, it has been the norm in discussions over the MENA region to equate regimes with the international stances adopted by individual leaders. Pre-2011, what Egypt was likely to do, for example, was largely discussed in terms of what President Mubarak declared to be Egypt’s position. While this approach has not entirely been displaced by his departure, decisions adopted by the interim government of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) have been monitored, reacted to and challenged by a larger array of domestic political actors.

The difference now is that limited elites no longer speak on behalf of whole nations, even where protests have yet to engineer significant political change. As the return of protestors to Tahrir Square in July 2011 demonstrated, the balance of authority and decision-making in Egypt is likely to be contested for some time. The focus has primarily been on the domestic actions of the Egyptian military, but eventually, this will translate into a longer term debate about Egypt’s position in the world and the wider region. This will doubtless include more stringent demands and expectations of its European neighbours, for which European states, both individually and collectively, need to be prepared. For much of the past decade, the geopolitics of the MENA region was also seen in zero-sum terms, en-
capsulated by the ‘with us or against us’ philosophy of US President George W. Bush’s administration. In pursuing the Global War on Terror (GWOT) from 2001 and the allied invasion of Iraq in 2003, conceptual fault lines were erected to depict the two sides of a regional ‘Axis of Evil.’ This pitched ‘moderate’, pro-US states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, along with Israel) against an alliance of ‘radical’ opponents to the US’s regional ambitions, combining state actors with increasingly active non-state actors (Iran, Syria, Hamas and Hezbollah). A further conceptual division arising from Iraq’s descent into violence from 2003 was the sectarian divide between MENA’s Sunni and Shi’ia Muslim communities, with the ‘moderates’ defending the interests of the former and the ‘radicals’ (with the exception of Hamas) on the side of the latter.5

Like many characterisations, there were elements of truth to these alignments. Critically, however, they did not reflect the region’s biggest schism: namely, the division between MENA’s rulers and ruled. For a number of observers, the awakening of MENA populations in 2011 can be traced back to the invasion of Iraq itself, which favoured the rise of Iran as a self-appointed champion of a broad swathe of Middle East opinion opposed to US intervention in the region. The failure of US-led diplomacy to secure Iraq, to recognise Hamas’s election victory in 2006 or deliver a settlement for the Palestinians was popularly exploited by Iran to highlight the perceived duplicity in the US’s commitment to Muslim self-determination. Instead of promoting democracy, the US was depicted by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as pursuing its own strategic interests in the region, namely, the defence of Israel, secure access to the energy supplies of the Gulf and a status quo that precluded Iran itself from asserting its own regional leadership.

In the event, the Iranian regime’s own repression of domestic dissent after the contested general elections of 2009 lost President Ahmadinejad much of the popular support amongst Arabs that he had acquired by 2007-08. It was the street protestors of the Iranian ‘Green Revolution’, rather than the US’s weakness in Iraq, or the failures of Middle East peace-making that went on to inspire the revolutionaries of Tahrir Square and beyond. The loss of Egypt’s President Mubarak from the alliance of regional ‘moderates’ inspired the Saudi leadership, in turn, to step in to limit the spread of revolt in its immediate neighbourhood. With the regional balance still unsettled, how much of the prevailing wisdom about the geopolitics of the Middle East remains, or is likely to remain in place, is now in doubt. A more compelling conclusion to be drawn from the changes unleashed across the Arab world in 2011 is that the previous decade effectively shielded the limitations of authoritarianism as a stabilising force behind the more visible threats of terrorism, sectarianism and Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

The Mediterranean littoral states of North Africa, including Egypt, are only partially affected by this Levantine-Gulf logic. Sunni-Shi’ia divisions, if not sectarianism in other forms, also do not apply

The centrality of Syria to so many of the old debates – about arcs of crises emerging along Shi’ia-Sunni lines, or of covert competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran for influence in Lebanon and Iraq – means that most of Syria’s neighbours (including Israel, Jordan and Turkey) have a vested interest in securing a ‘best case’ outcome in Syria for their own larger strategic interests. That Europe and the US have only a limited ability to engineer their own preferred outcome in Syria, and even Libya, reflects how far regional dynamics have changed since the end of the nineties. A change of regime or less than decisive outcome in Syria will have profound effects on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the regional future of Palestinians, above all as refugees in at least three contiguous states (Syria, Jordan and Lebanon). With the recent change of government to a Hezbollah-led coalition in Lebanon, and continuing protests in Jordan, the inter-connectedness of developments in the Levant, and by extension, the Gulf region has become starker in 2011. The tide of events in Bahrain and Yemen, have likewise been heavily influenced by

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5 For an elaboration of this argument, see Claire SPENCER ‘The Middle East: changing from external arbiter to regional player’ in (Ed) Robin NIBLETT America and a changed world: a question of leadership, Chatham House, London, May 2010 www.chathamhouse.org.uk/publications/books/view/-/id/969/
the interests of their immediate neighbours in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), above all Saudi Arabia.

It is here that assessments of what is at stake in the broader Middle East, as opposed to North Africa and the Mediterranean come into play. The Mediterranean littoral states of North Africa, including Egypt, are only partially affected by this Levantine-Gulf logic. Sunni-Shi’ia divisions, if not sectarianism in other forms, also do not apply. The immediate neighbours of Libya, while that country is still in conflict, are more affected by tides of refugees than by the regional designs of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi’s regime, which most assume will not survive to see the end of 2011. The prospects for different and more independent sub-regional developments are thus more promising for North Africa, as is a different kind of association with the wider Arab world. As the new Moroccan constitution approved by referendum in July 2011 outlines, being Arab corresponds to only one of several overlapping identities – African, Berber and Mediterranean in terms of lifestyle – with which North Africans associate themselves.

Reflections for the European Union

Over the short term, the US and EU have tried to coordinate reactions to developments in MENA with each other, and with the broader international community. In seeking UN and Arab League support for the French and British-led air mission in defence of civilians in Libya, subsequently taken over by NATO, and in the G-8’s response to providing funding lines for Tunisia and Egypt at the Deauville summit in May 2011, the West has been at pains to demonstrate that it has learnt from the mistakes of underestimating wider Arab opinion in recent years.

Perhaps inevitably, however, initial responses have been shaped by individual circumstances, whether this has been military intervention in Libya, a limited security response to Yemen and Bahrain, encouragement towards swifter reform in Jordan and Morocco and until latterly, Syria where sanctions have taken over, or in offering economic and political assistance where leadership changes have already occurred in Tunisia and Egypt. Faced with its own internal crises (in Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland inter alia), the EU has been internally divided over the intervention in Libya and how to manage the upsurge in migrationary pressures from North Africa into Europe, partly in deference to the domestic pressures of nationalist parties.6 None of this yet amounts to a new European strategy towards either North Africa or the MENA region as a whole. Over time, both the contradictions and costs of managing relations with the near neighbourhood states of North Africa will build. Europe will also have to come to terms with the near impossibility of erecting and maintaining ‘Fortress Europe’-style barriers against the pressures for greater mobility in and across the Mediterranean. This is not in itself a zero-sum argument to suggest that attempts to prevent irregular migration into Europe will fail and thus should be abandoned. It is rather that Europe’s position within the Mediterranean region should be reconsidered in terms of the mutual interests, needs and opportunities that now present themselves across the region as a whole, rather than as a set of problems and challenges to be managed from outside.

Despite welcome adjustments being made to the EU’s European Neighbourhood Policy and the creation of new funding lines, more radical rethinking is now needed regarding the possibilities, as well as risks, posed to Europe by the ‘Arab Awakening.’ Unlike the term ‘Arab Spring,’ with its connotations of swift and sharp change, the role of newly ‘awakened’ sectors of North African society is likely to shape and condition events for some time to come. As the Middle East continues on an unsettled path, the proximity of Europe to the region, above all North Africa, may come to overshadow attempts to adapt existing policies to fit new times across the MENA region as a whole.

Even before 2011, it was clear that the EU’s relations with the broader Middle East were structured along several, uncoordinated lines. From the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) of the nineties to the Union for the Mediterranean of 2008, the emergence of the European Neighbourhood Policy in-between, and the separate frameworks for Europe’s relations with the GCC, Iraq and Iran, EU policy has lagged behind the growing inter-connectedness of cross-regional developments in the MENA region. Calls for grand regional strategies to link all these areas together may not, in the event, reflect what is now needed.

The Mediterranean is both a natural hinterland and extension of the dilemmas Europe now faces itself: of how to generate jobs and new growth potential in economies that have been stagnating behind the dynamism of Asian and Latin American growth rates for some time. The banking crisis unleashed in 2007-08, compounded by the Eurozone crisis of 2011, has served to highlight the need for fundamentally different ways of doing business in Europe, politically as much as economically. Yet the debate about Europe’s future remains inward-looking and ill-prepared to imagine North Africa in terms other than a potential security threat if its transitions are not managed well. If Europe were to conceive of the challenges posed by the Mediterranean through a different lens, however, some of the more cooperative ambitions of the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative of 1995 might be revisited in more imaginative ways. Joint ventures between near neighbours, above all Spain and Morocco which are only 14 kilometres apart, could start from assessing the natural and competitive advantages offered by each side of the Mediterranean in sectors such as agro-business, fishing, manufacturing and transhipment enterprises, where previously the two countries cited have been in unproductive competition with each other. Where this kind of investment already exists, it now needs to be seen in a much more strategic fashion, as a means of addressing Spain’s own youth unemployment through sector specialisation, rather than as a net drain on European and Spanish resources to narrow income gaps north and south of the Mediterranean. Start-up businesses should also be conceived as a way of maximising value-added contributions from both sides of the Mediterranean, through combining the best skills, component and labour costs across a broader regional range than has been envisaged hitherto. The aim would be to reinvigorate Europe’s own competitive edge in an increasingly globalised world, as well as enhancing North Africa’s integration into a wider set of global markets.

In the current climate, the timing for such rethinking could not be worse, above all in relation to migration and the integration of migrants, especially those of Muslim origin, within individual European societies. The rise of ultra-right-wing nationalist movements across Europe has come painfully to the fore in the wake of the Norwegian massacres of July 2011. It is also the case, historically, that periods of recession breed introspection and protectionist attitudes until the economic climate improves sufficiently to open minds to new, and often externally-generated opportunities.

Unless Europe’s leaders start planning for the longer term, there is nevertheless a danger that old mind-sets and methods of working with North Africa will reassert themselves, at the expense of the positive energies that the Arab awakening has generated. There are undoubtedly many risks ahead, but also a critical number of Egyptians and Tunisians who are already keen to forge their own paths and develop their own ideas, above all in restructuring their economies. If successful, they would provide role models for their neighbours in Libya, Algeria and Morocco. The much-sought after regional integration of the Maghreb countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania – and now Egypt) could, as a result, take place more quickly at the virtual (on-line) and social level than at the governmental and intra-state level where previous efforts have been concentrated. Europe too will need to move away from its reliance on inter-governmental relations to promote change, in favour of making and facilitating links between the next generation of entrepreneurs on both sides of the Mediterranean. Above all Europeans need to listen and learn from new actors and revisit the EU’s own Euro-Mediterranean vision, to create ‘a common area of peace and stability’ and ‘an area of shared prosperity’, on a more equitable basis than previously. Achieving this will need more than technical assistance, professional training and renewed funding lines, important though these are. The real revolution in thinking about North Africa and the geopolitical potential for the Mediterranean needs to take place in the minds of Europeans themselves. It is not yet clear whether the leadership exists in European capitals and Brussels to exchange one set of assumptions about the region for another. When that time comes, however, it should above all resituate North Africa’s demography as an asset rather than a burden to Europe’s aging populations, and one that Europe would do well to seize upon to ensure its own place in an increasingly globalised and competitive world.

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The Gulf States’ Political and Economic Role in the Mediterranean

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In the last decade both economic and political relations between Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Arab Mediterranean countries have intensified. At the political level, the Gulf States have mainly focused their efforts on the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In particular Saudi Arabia and Qatar have committed considerable energies to sponsor peace initiatives for the resolution of regional conflicts. Let us remember King Abdullah’s initiative in 2007, the Fatah-Hamas agreement brokered by Saudi Arabia in 2007, the Doha accord to overcome the political stalemate in Lebanon in 2008, Qatari mediation between Fatah and Hamas, to which the Qatari regime also provides financial aid,1 and Saudi efforts to overcome the Lebanese political stalemate in 2010. Furthermore, bilateral cooperation ties have strengthened over the years. In the economic field, the GCC has played a key role in the development of the Mediterranean region thanks to foreign direct investment (FDI), which boomed between 2003 and 2008.

The GCC’s Role in the Arab Spring

The outburst of revolts in North Africa at the beginning of 2011 led the Gulf monarchies to play a more assertive role in the Mediterranean countries’ affairs. The main interest of the Gulf States is to maintain security and stability in the Arab region, from Morocco to the Gulf, since they fear that increasing instability would impact negatively on their regimes. Although the Arab uprisings caught the Gulf States unprepared, they reacted rapidly by engaging in an intense diplomatic and political activity. With the exception of Bahrain and Yemen (which is not a member of the GCC), protests in the Arab peninsula have been limited and have not escalated into mass revolts. Gulf monarchies have been successful in keeping domestic dissent under control – which is actually not very widespread – thanks to large public spending packages financed by higher oil revenues, fuelled by rising oil prices. For instance, Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil exporter and the biggest economy in the region, has allocated a $130 billion package, of which $67 billion is to be spent on house-building.

The position of the GCC states vis-à-vis the Arab Mediterranean countries has not been homogeneous. After the initial shock brought on by the overthrow of regional allies in Tunisia and Egypt, they thought the best way to maintain stability in those countries was to sustain their transitional government both politically and economically. This did not stop Saudi Arabia offering safe haven to the exiled Tunisian President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali. Furthermore, at the beginning of July the United Arab Emirates (UAE) President Shiekh Khalifa Ben Zayed al Nahyane expressed his support for the Tunisian interim government and revolution and manifested his intention to contribute to investment projects and to improve bilateral cooperation.

However, Gulf countries do not look favourably at political changes in other monarchies, since the ruling elites of the Gulf, in particular the Saudi royal

family, fear that tentative reforms in other monarchies could embolden demands for political opening at home, endangering the stability of their regimes.

_Egypt_

Egypt’s stability, because of its strategic location and key role in the definition of regional issues and equilibria, is crucial for the GCC. At the same time, both Cairo and the GCC share an interest in strengthening mutual relations. This explains why the Gulf States, in particular Saudi Arabia, will continue to sustain the country, even without Mubarak. Indeed, Egypt will receive the largest share of the Gulf states’ financial aid: United Arab Emirates (UAE) has pledged $3 billion ($1.5 billion to establish a fund for small and medium enterprises, $750 million as a grant to develop projects in housing and infrastructure sectors, and $750 million as loans for other projects), Saudi Arabia $4 billion in the form of soft loans, deposits and grants, and Qatar $10 billion through investment and projects. GCC aid should cover the Egyptian need for international funding – estimated between $10 and $12 billion – until mid-2012 after the interim government refused a $3 billion loan from the IMF. Cairo’s decision seems to be justified by the desire to maintain Egypt’s economic independence from international institutions. Actually, it seems that Gulf financial aid would be preferable over IMF and World Bank loans because it does not require servicing. Furthermore, Gulf grants are not conditioned to an effective democratic political transition like the $20 billion loans the leaders of the G8 in Dauville pledged to Tunisia and Egypt in May 2011.

_Egypt’s stability, because of its strategic location and key role in the definition of regional issues and equilibria, is crucial for the GCC_

However, disaccord has been emerging between Riyadh and the transitional government in Cairo on the new course of Egypt’s foreign policy. The Saudis did not approve either mediation between Hamas and Fatah in brokering a reconciliation agreement or its rapprochement with Iran, after decades without formal diplomatic relations. Although Cairo reiterated the improvement of relations with Iran would not be at the expense of its ties with the GCC, Saudi Arabia fears that a more assertive Egypt on a regional level would challenge its interests if it does not align with Saudi policies.

_Libya_

Libyan authorities’ refusal to permit foreign aid access to civilians was officially the reason why in March the GCC supported the decision of the Arab League to endorse the establishment of a no-fly zone. In addition to the crimes against civilians and the indiscriminate use of force, the aversion of GCC monarchies to Gaddafi and the desire to see his “illegitimate” regime wither away had influenced their response to the Libyan crisis. Qatar and the UAE gave a concrete contribution to the no-fly zone by deploying aircraft. In March, Qatar was also the first Arab country to recognise Libya’s rebel government as the “sole legitimate representative” of the Libyan people, followed by the UAE a couple of months later. The crisis in Libya gave Doha the opportunity to play a more proactive role in line with the ambition to increase its weight at the international level. Finally, GCC countries have provided the Libyan Transitional National Council (TNC) with financial aid – Kuwait and Qatar allocated nearly $300 million – and a relief programme (food and medical supplies) from the UAE.

_Jordan and Morocco in the GCC?_

One of the most interesting outcomes of the Arab Spring is the GCC’s decision, under Saudi impulse, to include Jordan and Morocco in the organisation. This move has been considered as a part of the strategy of Saudi Arabia (the leading member of the GCC) and its allies – in particular the UAE and Bahrain, whereas Kuwait, Oman and Qatar had some reservations – to counter the challenges posed by recent regional developments: on the one hand, the rise of Iran and its attempt to extend its regional influ-
ence, taking advantage of the collapse of moderate Arab regimes in Egypt and Tunisia; on the other hand, the gradual emergence in the wake of the Arab Spring of reformist pleas as well as of liberals and religious forces that could endanger the stability of Gulf regimes.

Within this context it appears less surprising that during its thirteenth consultative summit on May 10 the GCC decided to accept Jordan’s application, which was tendered fifteen years ago, and to extend to Morocco the invitation to join the club, despite the fact that it had never applied. Beyond the differences not only between Jordan and Morocco but also between these countries and the GCC, the purpose of this move would seem to be the creation of a “Sunni monarchy club” – that could become a “reactionary bloc” – favourable to the status quo. In an unsettled security context, Jordan and Morocco’s military capabilities would count for additional assets to counter regional threats outside the reach of the Gulf States’ armed forces.

The GCC decision provoked different reactions both in Jordan and Morocco. In the Hashemite Kingdom, which shares a border with Saudi Arabia, many see the GCC initiative as a good opportunity to tackle their country’s deep economic problems (i.e. large budget deficit, unemployment, poverty, low growth, lack of energy sources, rising energy costs, etc.). Nevertheless, reformist and liberal forces fear that putting Jordan increasingly under the Saudi umbrella could affect any reform process in the country. The same concern is shared by many in Morocco, where instead a bland reform process has been initiated through the approval by referendum of constitutional reforms presented by the King. This is expected to pave the way for a gradual redistribution of powers between the King and the government. However, neither the timing of the accession process nor the kind of status they would be awarded – full membership (including the future monetary union) or partial membership (only of some GCC institutions) – are clear yet. At the beginning of July, talks started to evaluate Jordan’s requirements for membership. Jordan, thanks to its geographic proximity to Saudi Arabia, smaller economy and population, is better positioned than Morocco to become a member state. In addition, Amman has shown greater interest than Rabat to join the organisation. Despite longstanding relations with the Gulf States, Morocco is closer to Europe both geographically and economically.

Before the GCC’s decision, Riyadh announced a grant worth $400 million for Jordan. The stability of the Hashemite Kingdom is of great importance for the neighbouring Saudi Kingdom, bearing in mind what happens in Jordan will inevitably affect its own stability.

Although the GCC initiative has, above all, a political purpose, the economic implications of the enlargement would be even more significant. From an economic point of view, both Morocco and Jordan (oil-importing countries) could benefit greatly from GCC membership. Indeed, this would increase the flow of foreign direct investment, trade and labour mobility and boost tourism and manufactured exports to Gulf region. However, the process might not be straightforward and is likely to take a long time because of the deep differences in economic structures, GDP and GDP per capita, budget deficit and population size (in particular of Morocco).

### GCC-Mediterranean Countries’ Economic Relations

Economic relations between GCC states and Mediterranean countries date back to the first oil boom in the early 1970s. During the first two oil booms, remittances and public aid played a leading role, while during the 2003-2008 oil boom, GCC FDI towards the Mediterranean became more noteworthy and remittances recovered again after a low-level period. Over the years, the main recipients of remittances among Mediterranean countries have been Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. As for investment, GCC FDI has been fuelled, on the one hand, by a strong rise in oil prices, which generated a substantial investable surplus and, on the other hand, by a more favourable investment environment and by the rapid economic growth of the Mediterranean countries in recent years. The reduction of GCC FDI toward the Mediterranean countries in 2009-2010 has to be considered as a consequence of the international financial and economic crisis rather than as a loss of

---


the Gulf States’ interest or a diversion of their invest-
ment flows.

The Gulf States’ economic
wealth, due to higher oil prices and expanded production, is
likely to spill over and benefit
the rest of the region with both increasing FDI and trade
exchanges

According to Anima/MIPO Observatory⁵, GCC FDI
in Mediterranean countries in the period 2003-
2008 amounted to €65.8 billion, that is to say
28.6% of the total amount of FDI – €229.8 billion
– attracted by the Mediterranean region as a whole.
GCC was the second investor after Europe: €85.9
billion (37.3% of the total investment amount).
Mashreq is the main destination of GCC invest-
ment, and Egypt is the largest recipient country,
having attracted €25.6 billion in FDI from the GCC,
which is equivalent to 49% of total FDI flows in the
country. Turkey ranked second, with €9 billion, fol-
lowed by Jordan with €7.5 billion. The UAE was the
main GCC investor, with €35.8 billion, followed by
Kuwait, €11.7 billion, and Saudi Arabia, €11.1 bil-
lion. The UAE was the second largest investor
country in the Mediterranean region as a whole af-
after the United States with €37.3 billion, accounting
for 15.5% of total FDI inflows into Mediterranean
countries. According to the same source, in 2009
GCC invested €6.7 billion in the Southern Medi-
terranean region, that is to say 23.8% of total FDI to
Mediterranean countries, declining to €5.3 billion
in 2010, a share of 16.1%.⁶ Egypt, Jordan, and
Libya had the lion’s share. Most of the Gulf compa-
nies’ investment is in construction, transport, tour-
ism, and telecommunication.

Compared to FDI, trade relations between GCC and
Southern Mediterranean countries (Turkey excluded)
as a whole are less significant, although not irrele-
vant. In 2010, trade exchange between the GCC
and Mediterranean countries amounted to €17.3
billion, that is to say 2.6% of total GCC trade, reach-
ing the same amount as in 2008 after a decline to
€13 billion in 2009.⁷ However, if bilateral relations
are taken into account, Saudi Arabia emerges as
Jordan’s main trade partner, Syria’s third, Egypt and
Morocco’s fourth, and Lebanon’s sixth. The UAE
also ranks among the top ten trade partners of Jor-
dan, Lebanon, and Syria.

Undoubtedly, since 2003, GCC FDI has played a
pivotal role in the economic development of the
Mediterranean region. The GCC’s estimated eco-
nomic growth would continue to have a positive im-
 pact on the regional economic outlook. In fact, the
latest International Monetary Fund projections (April
2011) have raised GCC growth to 7.8% from 5.2%.
Thanks to higher GCC oil revenues, outward remit-
tances from the GCC are estimated to rise from
65.6% in 2010 to 74.9% in 2011. At the same time,
FDI outflow is forecast to increase from $20.9 billion
in 2010 to $42.7 billion in 2011. In addition, GCC
imports are forecast to rise by 18%, from $491 bil-
lion in 2010 to $578.3 billion in 2011. Public aid –
mostly from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE – is
also expected to rise. It goes without saying that the
Gulf States’ economic wealth, due to higher oil pric-
es and expanded production, is likely to spill over
and benefit the rest of the region with both increas-
ing FDI and trade exchanges.

In the medium and long term one of the most impor-
tant implications of the Arab Spring might be the
consolidation of the Gulf monarchies’ stance and
role in the Mediterranean region. While in the eco-
nomic sphere, they are likely to further contribute to
the development and the growth of Mediterranean
countries, questions arise over their attitude towards
political changes, considering the GCC states’ inho-
mogeneous policy when addressing Arab uprisings.
At any rate, Gulf ruling elites have to bear in mind that,
although changes and reforms in the Arab countries
might take a long time, the Arab Spring has initiated
an irreversible process and the return to the status
quo ante is highly unlikely.

The New Mediterranean in a Changing World

The Influence of the BRIC Countries in the Mediterranean

Sébastien Abis
Political Analyst on the Mediterranean Region

As the first decade of the 21st century comes to a close, the Mediterranean Region is more than ever the focal point of great attention. Two factors account for this situation. First of all, the region constitutes the precipitate of major world tensions and divisions. To look at the Mediterranean is to observe the world and its frailties. Secondly, the region reveals the rise of a strategic multipolarity where power plays are expressed. To analyse the Mediterranean is to acknowledge that the entire world crosses it and to perceive that the waves of globalisation lap at its shores. The Arab uprisings of 2011 certainly confirm these observations.

A New World

The Mediterranean Region is not on the margins of changes at work on the international stage. On the contrary, such changes are making the regional geopolitical order more complex. For Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries (SEMCs), this is a time for development of multidirectional relations insofar as both trade and foreign policy. In this regard, it is particularly illuminating to study the growing influence of Brazil, Russia, India and China. These powers have been grouped under the term “BRIC” since 2003, when it was coined by Goldman Sachs Bank. The emergence of these new actors has undeniably redefined the world order. They represent approximately 3 billion individuals (i.e. 40% of the world’s population) and their combined GDP amounts to 80% of the United State’s GDP. Sometimes we forget, but in 2001, one of the crucial dates was when China entered the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the 11th December.

The increasingly lively market of globalisation results in stepped up interconnections between regional areas. These interdependences are redesigning the cartography of a planet discovering new polarities in the early 21st century. The recession has been accelerating the erosion of power of the US and European countries since 2008. We are witnessing a global geo-economic rebalancing whose boundaries contrast with the political atlas of the second half of the 20th century. Powers whose influence is declining coexist with emerging countries whose ambition is becoming apparent. Yet these geo-economic mutations are currently accompanied by heightened patriotic reactions where each actor stakes its partition without seeking to compose a new collective architecture. Unprecedented power relations are deployed and astonishing alliances formed. Countries can be adversaries one day and partners the next according to the issues on the global agenda. It would certainly be illusory to believe that multipolarity contributes to strengthening world stability. In the absence of sufficient reforms, multilateralism is losing ground, for its rules now prove inadequate for such polycentrism. The creation of the G20 constitutes an attempted response, but the results for the time being are quite meagre.

Dynamics in the Mediterranean

The presence of the Big Four in the Mediterranean Region is growing and diversifying. First of all we must emphasize to what point the intervention of the BRIC countries in the region affects the Northern Mediterranean. Indeed, in 2010, investments by BRIC actors in European Union (EU) countries increased and China contributed economic aid to cer-
tain countries suffering from the recession by purchasing public debt (Greece, Spain). Apart from this massive entry of capital, it must be noted that in 2009, a third of EU imports were from the BRICs (of which 19% were from China) and that this group was the destination for 20% of European exports (of which 8% went to China).

The BRIC countries have undeniably gained the upper hand over the SEMCs, since they exported some 49 billion euros’ worth of products there in 2009 (China alone accounting for 50% of this trade and Turkey polarising half of it).

With regard to the SEMCs, it is likewise through the lens of trade and the taking up of economic positions that moves are being made. The BRIC countries have undeniably gained the upper hand over the SEMCs, since they exported some 49 billion euros’ worth of products there in 2009 (China alone accounting for 50% of this trade and Turkey polarising half of it). In contrast, in the same year, the SEMCs made a total of 13 billion euros’ worth of exports to the BRICs (with an equal weight of 25% for each power in the BRIC group). Moreover, it must be taken into account that a fourth of Turkish imports were from the BRIC countries and that this rate rose to 17-18% for Algeria, Egypt, Jordan and Syria. At the same time, the BRICs represent a significant destination for exports from certain SEMCs: 15% of Jordan’s exports go there, 12% of Morocco’s and 11% of Egypt’s. Tunisia, on the other hand, more oriented towards the European market, displays the least BRIC-oriented geo-economic profile. With regard to foreign direct investment (FDI), approximately 10% of the amounts registered in the SEMCs in 2010 were public or private bodies in BRICs.

China Triumphant

The second largest economy in the world has multiplied its alliances in the Mediterranean area. First through investment, being active in a number of sectors such as public infrastructure works (through the public company, China State Construction and Engineering Corporation), the automotive industry, fisheries, textile and electronics, not to mention oil (in Algeria and Libya) or phosphates (in Morocco), resources sought after by Beijing for its domestic supply strategy. In 2010, China was the 4th most important investor in the SEMCs. Hence, in Ain Sokhna, on the western shore of the Red Sea in Egypt, a special economic area was established for Chinese companies. Wishing to capture European and African markets, China seems to be casting its sights on certain Mediterranean ports with the aim of using them as distribution platforms for its merchandise. These relations between the Asian giant and Arab countries are evident in certain widely commented symbols, such as the Chinese workers employed in Algeria or the famous Palestinian keffiyeh, which are primarily manufactured in China. Another strategic sector is nuclear power: Algeria has an experimental reactor in Ain Ouussara supplied by Beijing, which aims to compete in the field with the technology of France.

With regard to trade, in 2009 China ranks 2nd in volume of imports for Algeria, Morocco and Syria, and 3rd for Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Tunisia and Turkey. Hence, China has become a major trade partner of all the SEMCs. The trade balance is steeply tilted in Beijing’s favour, the latter exporting some 23.7 billion euros to the SEMCs, whereas it imports only 3.5 billion euros’ worth of merchandise from this group of countries. In any case, it is interesting to note that China ranks 4th as a destination for Moroccan exports and 6th for Egyptian exports.

On the political level, a number of SEMCs participate in Chinese-African summits, the latest of which was held in Egypt in November of 2009. On the sensitive topic of Western Sahara, China regularly indicates its support for Algeria’s positions at the United Nations negotiating table. Beijing likewise charms its partners by using chequebook diplomacy. During the 2008-2010 period, the amount of loans that China granted to developing countries was greater than the World Bank’s commitments. The mobilisation of its considerable exchange reserves (2.8 trillion dollars in January 2011) contributes to boosting Beijing’s international influence, for this aid does not go without diplomatic compensations. In the SEMCs, the Chinese presence is also evident in a diaspora that is becoming progressively more organised and whose numbers are difficult to quantify. The creation of numerous Confucius Institutes where Mandarin Chinese courses are offered indicates moreover a distinct will to step up cultural ac-
tion and thereby improve knowledge on China, whose culture is little known in Arab societies. The rapid growth of Chinese tourist flows in the world could become an interesting market for the SEMCs in the medium term, in particular Turkey, on the economic level but also (and why not?) insofar as cultural exchanges.

**India Advances its Pawns**

The “largest democracy” in the world is also beginning to enter the Arab world, with a greater orientation towards the Middle East than Northern Africa at this stage. Expanding major Indian multinationals, also present in Southern Europe (Italy, Cyprus, Greece), should be able to capture the Southern Mediterranean markets over the forthcoming years as well. The 4th largest world economy seems to be entering the area gradually. The chemical, plastics, information technology and textile industries are the targets. Yet India, like China, is experiencing a rise in its internal energy needs and it does not view the oil and gas resources in certain SEMCs with indifference. The same is true of Morocco’s phosphates, half of the sales of which go to the Indian market, where agriculture remains linked with the model of the Green Revolution. Indeed, the phosphates of the Sharifian Kingdom constitute one of the priority targets of Indian investment in the region.

Insofar as trade, India is far behind the Chinese power in terms of geo-economic position vis-à-vis the SEMCs. In fact, trade was nearly balanced, with New Delhi exporting some 4.6 billion euros’ worth of products in 2009, whereas it imported nearly 4.2 bil-

### TABLE 4  
**Chinese Trade with the SEMCs in 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imports from China</th>
<th>Exports to China</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Volume (in € millions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3,423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1,122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9,054</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DG Trade (March 2011).

### CHART 9  
**Chinese Trade with the SEMCs in 2009**
lion euros’ worth from the SEMCs. India primarily trades with Egypt and Israel, though it also has another essential client, namely, Turkey, whose Indian imports are significant in comparison to its exports to New Delhi. Another interesting point is that India ranks 2nd as a destination for Moroccan exports and 3rd for Egyptian and Jordanian exports. In sum, though the SEMCs are not a major destination for overall Indian exports, India does constitute a strategic export market for certain SEMCs.

Brazil Is Asserting Itself

Desirous of promoting South-South relations, Brazil implemented a proactive, assertive foreign policy under the Lula Administration (2002-2010). With a significant Arab socio-historical heritage (12 million Brazilians are of Arab origin, with a strong Lebanese community that organised a large Arab culture festival in Sao Paulo in March of 2010), the 8th largest world economy has applied itself to intensifying relations with the Arab world. Two Summits of Heads of State and Governments from South American and Arab countries, held respectively in Brasilia in 2005 and in Doha in 2009, have allowed the development of economic cooperation in mutually profitable sectors and the effecting of diplomatic moves in a context at times requiring true acrobatics. This is the case of Brazil’s cooperation, together with Turkey, on the Iranian nuclear power issue in May 2010 or the recognition of the Palestinian State in December 2010. These commitments, accompanied by reiterate-
Criticism of Israeli settlements, have consolidated the sympathy that Brasilia enjoys among numerous Arab countries. Moreover, certain leaders have expressed the wish to have Brazil play the role of mediator in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. Aspiring to a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, Brazil knows that its audacious, pro-Arab diplomacy can serve its interests.

But this policy has first resulted in shared growth. Since 2002, trade between Brazil and Arab countries has quadrupled. Brazilian companies such as Petrobras (energy), Randon (industrial vehicles) or Norberto Odebrecht (infrastructures) are increasingly active. Within the framework of Mercosur, trade liberation is being established with Morocco, Jordan, Egypt and Syria. All trade figures between Brazil and Arab countries have been on an upward trend over the past few years and the interregional potential seems as yet underexploited. Indeed, volumes remain lower than those prevailing with India or China. The most dynamic SEMCs insofar as exports to Brazil are Algeria, Israel, Turkey and Morocco. Brazil, on the other hand, exports primarily to Egypt. Note that Brazil ranks 7th for Moroccan imports and 8th for Algerian imports.

Apart from this geographic polarisation on a few SEMCs, another aspect of Brazil’s trade with Mediterranean countries is that it focuses on agricultural products (sugar, meats and maize) and raw materials (oil, phosphate and fertilisers). There is a very high potential for synergies between Brazil and the SEMCs. For instance, the modern, exportable Brazilian agriculture perfectly fits with the structural dependence of Arab Mediterranean countries on the

### TABLE 6: Brazilian Trade with the SEMCs in 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imports from Brazil</th>
<th>Exports to Brazil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Volume (in € millions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>411</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>792</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DG Trade (March 2011).
international market to feed their populations. Brazil’s agricultural sales have thus gone from 1.5 to 7 billion dollars between 2000 and 2009, comprising more than half of total Brazilian exports to Arab countries.

Russia, Near and Yet Distant

Russia is a specific case. It is the re-emergence of a power that slumbered for the duration of a complete transition after the Fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Two decades later, Russia is making a comeback in international affairs, though without giving sure signs of a definite takeoff. The sixth largest world economy, it is not shying away from a Mediterranean stage historically perceived as strategic by Moscow. The Russian fleet remains stationed in Sebastopol, arms contracts are concluded regularly with certain SEMCs and numerous tourists seeking the sun spend holidays every year on Turkey’s southern coast. Russia, a member of the Quartet on the Middle East, maintains very close relations with Syria and Iran, which lends it a significant diplomatic advantage in the region. At the same time, convergences are emerging with Israel, where the Jewish community of Russian origin greatly increased in the early 1990s.

Concerning trade, Moscow primarily does business with Turkey. Russia holds the 2nd position in imports effected by Ankara, and is the 5th most important destination for Turkish exports. Moreover, strategic relations are being established in the nuclear power domain. In 2010, a bilateral agreement for the installation of a power plant in Akkuyu, southern Turkey,
just across from the Greek island of Rhodes, was signed by these two countries that border on the Black Sea. Like China, India and Brazil, however, Moscow also aims to establish ties with the African continent and its natural resources. Looking beyond the Anatolian plateau, it is entering the area full force, multiplying its partnership agreements in the energy sector (Algeria, Libya) through the active entrepreneurship of its Gazprom company. In Northern Africa, Russia’s most important clients are in the cereal sector and it is increasingly exporting its wheat there, in particular to the Egyptian and Syrian markets, accounting for Moscow’s 6th and 7th position, respectively, in cereal imports effected by these countries.

2011: Towards a New Mediterranean?

Though economic aspects predominate in relations between the SEMCs and the BRIC countries, the political facet should not be ignored. The global recession has served as a catalyst for geo-economic rapprochement between the BRICs and the SEMCs since 2008. But the exacerbation of tensions in the Arab world since the beginning of 2011 could slow down the convergences against a backdrop of geopolitical malaise.

For some years now, in recurrent debates on multipolarity, two ideological models have often been contrasted, though they are sometimes complementary – due to globalisation – but inevitably antithetical – the universalism of certain values. On the one hand is the famous Washington Consensus, dear to Americans and Europeans, consisting in liberalising the economy and proposing the most democratic governance possible. On the other hand lies what is termed the Beijing Consensus, as it is based on China’s course of actions, namely the combination of a broad opening up to capitalism and the rigidity of a system under the aegis of a single party. Though China has refrained from touting its model, the latter has nonetheless spread progressively throughout the world. This infusion has also affected the SEMCs. The governing elite have been lured by the model of such an economic takeoff without political criteria. Frankly, the Chinese model could better correspond to the aspirations and dynamics of the Arab world, winning out over Western discourse on the need to democratize the region. Certainly, the revolts that have been shaking the majority of the SEMCs since the beginning of 2011 have astonished public opinion and governments the world over. These are truly popular uprisings originating in the streets, uniting people of different generations and amalgamating all the discontent, from the absence of rights to the precariousness caused by the elevated cost of living, not to mention the central issue of employment. At Cairo’s Tahrir Square in February 2011, thirst for freedoms and the desire for social equality were expressed in a generalised movement. A regime fell because it erroneously believed that the population would indefinitely support authoritarianism in a process of economic progress. This belief, however, reflects a lack of awareness of the hidden face of bad development, when the benefits of growth are not shared and social misery grows under the effect of uneven globalisation.

Although the Washington Consensus entails numerous limitations, the Beijing Consensus likewise displayed its own in early 2011. It is indeed not trivial to note how closely the Chinese authorities, as well as the Russian ones, have followed the uprisings shaking the Arab countries and the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt. This observation is not made simply because jasmine originally comes from Asian lands, but naturally because the ailments of the Arab world show certain similarities with those encountered in China and Russia (social inequality, lack of individual liberties, exclusion and pauperisation of outlying areas, oppressed minorities). Clearly, the cultural and political contexts are not identical, yet several factors can legitimately make Beijing fear experiencing a similar scenario of mixed social protest and political demands in the medium term. Beyond the control exercised over the internet and the surveillance of certain sectors of educated youth, China specifically organized in the face of the events occurring in Northern Africa by dispatching its naval forces to assist the tens of millions of Chinese fleeing the fighting in Libya. On the other hand, from the perspective of stalling the revolutions and recurrent troubles in the SEMCs, a scenario they cannot rule out, the Chinese authorities have a tendency to tout the “society of wellbeing,” a formula adopted in the spring of 2011 to raise the population’s awareness of the virtues of stability and control.

Brazil likewise views what is happening in the Mediterranean/Middle East region with great prudence. After having boosted its allegiances in the area under both Lula terms, Brasilia now seems more concerned with conducting a foreign policy having greater respect for human rights since the beginning
of January 2011, under the presidency of Dilma Roussef. The country seems to carry a lot of sway to have managed to postpone the 3rd Summit of South American and Arab Countries, which was originally to be held in Peru on 16 February 2011. Like the other BRICs, on 17 March 2011, Brazil did not oppose the United Nations resolution authorising foreign intervention in the Libyan conflict, allegedly to afford protection to the local population. Yet as soon as said intervention was placed under the aegis of NATO, Brasilia called for a cease-fire and the suspension of military operations. This turnaround can also be ascribed to the strategic stance adopted by a Brazilian power that has been offering an alternative dialogue for several years vis-à-vis Arab countries. Since 2002, Brazil has observer status in the Arab League, just as India has since 2007. Lula has often emphasised the specificity of his country. In contrast to the United States and Europe, Brazil arrives on the scene without a historical or political legacy. It appears as an honest, less moralising partner, not masking its economic artillery behind a diplomatic dance, and moreover, it does not declare systematic alignment with either American or European postures. Keeping an incontrovertible international aura, in particular in the Southern countries, Lula, the guest of honour, even allowed himself to pronounce an apology of democracy at the 6th Annual Al Jazeera Forum held in Doha on 13 March 2011, without causing a stir among the participants nor in the region. It is true that Arab countries could take inspiration from certain Latin American transitions, where the change from dictatorship to democracy was effected with errors that should not be re-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imports from BRIC Countries</th>
<th>Exports to BRIC Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>€ Millions</strong></td>
<td><strong>% of Total Trade</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>4,725</td>
</tr>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>5,699</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
<td>3,842</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1,720</td>
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<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1,303</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2,572</td>
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<td>Syria</td>
<td>2,916</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>25,116</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: DG Trade (March 2011)
peated. Rather than an exportable model of transition, it would be more appropriate to speak of a learning process, as suggested by Lula.

**Prospective Reflections**

It goes without saying that the year 2011 opens a new geopolitical period for the Mediterranean Region. All major powers will have to readjust their strategies in a context that is at once turbulent, fragile and transformed. The United States, just as Europe, will most certainly seek to support the changes and foster democratisation. For Washington, as is often the case, it is the safeguarding of American interests that will prevail, although the Obama Administration has admittedly effected a relatively controlled management of the Arab crises. This said, the United States is not quite convincing because it is no longer credible in its regional discourse. Washington promises progress in the Middle East, but nothing is changing in favour of the Palestinians. Legacies are weighty and it is evident that the US, which used to shape History, simply follows it now. This is particularly true in the Arab world, where its defeats have been stinging whenever it has attempted to remodel the region according to its own strategic agenda.

For Brussels, the issue is major and complex, since geographic proximity elicits various concerns. The temptation of isolationism emerges. The SEMCs themselves, whose dissimilarities are growing more accentuated, may also behave with less enthusiasm towards European countries. Distrust and disappointments may win out over tropisms towards the other shores of the Mediterranean. Divided insofar as its external action and economically weakened, Europe does not have the means to match its ambitions. The skies over Euro-Mediterranean cooperation are currently cloudy, if not outright stormy, whereas the challenges are such that they require multilateral approaches. With the audacious idea of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, launched in the late 20th century, the aim was to strategically strengthen the geographic neighbourhood, to the point of speaking of a regionalisation of globalisation and progressive integration between two unequally developed areas. More than fifteen years after Barcelona, this scenario has not materialised. Europe will most likely be tempted to use the instruments of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which endorse differentiation and the conditionality of relations with the SEMCs. The bilateralisation of relations could thus grow, and the failure of the Union of the Mediterranean will but stimulate this. The absence of political determination and intra-EU divisions have won out over the Euro-Mediterranean ambition, although in 2009, the EU was still the leading source of imports for all the SEMCs (and likewise with regard to export destination for Turkey and the Northern African countries). The density of human and economic relations be-
between Europe and the SEMCs is not materialised on the diplomatic and geostrategic levels. Although still incontrovertible, Europe could see its influence diminish even further for lack of leadership.

**The world has changed, and the Mediterranean with it. This should not lead us to fear these developments, but rather to support the transformations and adapt to them**

Concerning the BRICs, certain dampers on their influence are likely. Although the term “BRIC” rapidly gained popularity on geo-economic foundations, the concept remains controversial, for these countries do not form a homogenous geopolitical bloc, despite annual summits beginning in 2009 aiming to create political and trade convergences between the four powers (in 2011, South Africa officially joined the group, a fifth letter being added to the acronym to become “BRICS”). Two of these countries are democracies (India and Brazil), two are demographic giants (India and China), three are nuclear powers (India, China and Russia) and two are home to a UN Security Council office (China, Russia). Moreover, these powers show signs of endogenous weaknesses that could alter their economic performance. Nonetheless, forecasts made in 2010 are striking insofar as speed of geo-economic shifts: in 2011, Brazil’s GDP is supposed to surpass that of France and that of India surpass Japan’s, while by 2014, Russia’s GDP should outstrip Germany’s, and by 2019, China’s GDP could surpass that of the United States (the forecast made by Goldman Sachs in 2003 pointed to the year 2041…). Over the coming decade, the BRICS countries will represent 50 to 70% of the world’s GDP growth in real terms. These projections are, however, relative, for the global recession could also contribute to slowing their economic growth.

As a trend, the atomisation of the Mediterranean could be confirmed over the coming decade. The SEMCs, increasingly heterogeneous, will pursue multidirectional strategies for their trade and political affairs. Europe, weakened and discredited, will lose more influence. Its priorities will distance it from South Mediterranean shores. It will have to save itself, consolidate its enlargement in Eastern Europe, stabilise the Balkans and decide on Turkey’s accession. At the same time, the BRICS will accentuate and diversify their presence, with inevitable competition among themselves for the area. Exacerbated avidity for rare resources and competition between the powers will contribute to fragmenting the Mediterranean area. The Arab countries, using these rivalries, could possibly develop unprecedented political models corresponding neither to Western models nor to the Beijing Consensus. Via revolution or reform, the political landscape of these countries could evolve over the coming years, whether for better or worse. This scenario is not cause for celebration. However, there is no need for concern regarding the involvement of the BRICS in Mediterranean affairs. On the contrary, this dynamic demonstrates that the SEMCs are participating in globalisation and that the entire world is involved in the Mediterranean bazaar. Above all, far from threatening the imagined integrity of a jigsaw-puzzle region, all of these changes actually question the current relevance of the Euro-Mediterranean idea. Although it remains desirable according to many opinions, can we believe that it remains conceivable and feasible under its current approach? The world has changed, and the Mediterranean with it. This should not lead us to fear these developments, but rather to support the transformations and adapt to them.

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Proposition

The Mediterranean, as its very name indicates, is a geographical reality, a landlocked sea. It is also a cultural and historical reality, derived from a time in which its inhabitants considered it their Mare Nostrum—Our Sea, and saw in it a cultural possibility. It is and can be a border sea, and it is and can be a sea of unity. And it can be these things because of the possibility of constructing it politically around its perception as a common space. For throughout its history the Mediterranean has been as evident in its presence as in its absence; its construction both as a bond and as a border, as a place in which we are who we are, which defines an us, and as a border sea that marks the place where the other begins, and where we encounter him.

Similarly, the Western Balkans do not constitute a differentiated political and geographical unity. Rather, they are the product of a historical creation from without, their differentiation based on orographic circumstance: the Balkans is a relatively recent denomination, in historical terms, that originated with the powers that, in the diplomatic congresses of the 19th Century, drew up maps to a large extent on what had until then been territories of the Ottoman Empire, which, together with the historians and academicians who wrote the history books, they later attempted to turn into reality. As Mark Mazower (2000) points out, during the 18th Century and the better part of the 19th, “Turkey in Europe” was the most common way of referring to the territories that later would be known as the Balkans, and before 1888 — the year of the Berlin Congress — it is rare to find texts referring to the Balkan peoples (indeed, for a long time they were known in the heart of the Ottoman Empire as Rumelia, or Rums — Romans — as this was the provenance of the peoples of ancient Byzantium). Nevertheless, by the start of the First World War, this had become the habitual way of referring to the region from the outside. Even though the term is based on a geographical referent, Mazower maintains that from the start the Balkans are more than a geographical concept:

From the very start the Balkans was more than a geographical concept. The term, unlike its predecessors, was loaded with negative connotations — of violence, savagery, primitivism — to an extent to which is hard to find parallel… Europe quickly came to associate the region with violence and bloodshed. (Mazower, 2000: 4)

Though recent events could lead to a similar identification, only with difficulty can it be explained were it not for the Balkans’ historically constituting the place where the lines dividing the us from the them have been drawn: between Catholicism and Orthodoxy, between Christianity and Islam. This allows for the differentiation from the rest of Europe of a zone that geographically is at the heart of Europe. This is why to speak of the Balkans and the Mediterranean is indeed to speak of geography, but not only, or not even mainly. It is to speak of — and perhaps to be stakeholders in — one of the possible stories of history. The story of the Mediterranean as an object of international construction on the part of
the political entities that agglutinate its inhabitants and all their relevant international actors. The story of the Balkans as a subject of international action in the Mediterranean. Which brings us to postulate the what, the why, the wherefore, and the how of that possible story of history.

To speak of the Balkans and the Mediterranean is indeed to speak of one of the possible stories of history. The story of the Mediterranean as an object of international construction on the part of the political entities that agglutinate its inhabitants and all their relevant international actors.

To speak of the Balkans and the Mediterranean is to speak of certain facts — the entry of Albania into the Barcelona Process in November 2007, and later that of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro in the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008 — and of their potentialities.

And to consider these facts and potentialities, this possible version of history, in the light of the above interrogatives, we are going to embark on an intellectual journey through the Western Balkans and their collective and international dynamics vis-à-vis the Mediterranean, and through the Mediterranean as an object of international construction and of the Euro-Mediterranean Process (first the Barcelona Process, then the Union for the Mediterranean) as a path in this direction. We shall not lose sight of the fact that this journey is undertaken in a special moment of Mediterranean history, when the southern shore is traversing an Arab spring that obliges us, that brings home for us, the need to rethink everything.

On the Balkans and Their International Projection toward the Mediterranean

A Dual Point of Departure

On the one hand, as has already been noted, the Balkans did not construct themselves, but rather are constructed from without, in a process of singularization and differentiation of what had previously been common ground. Common, first of all, with the rest of the Roman Empire, and hence with the Mediterranean (known to its inhabitants as the Mare Nostrum), then with the rest of Europe, and finally with the Ottoman Empire. A singularization precisely in order to differentiate them from the rest of the Ottoman Empire, whose centuries-long configuration constitutes one of the great historical events in the international configuration of the Mediterranean — for centuries fundamentally a question of the relationship between the Empire and the Christian powers — and whose disintegration lies at the origin of many of the contemporary geopolitical crises and tensions from the Middle East to the Balkans.

On the other hand, the Balkans are viewed as a point of encounter among cultures, civilizations, worlds, whose political articulation is conditioned by high-tension wires that divide and structure them and by factors and actors vis-à-vis which their organization into states constitutes a historical phenomenon that is both recent and often transcended by them: scraps of history that remain alive through history, beyond the life and death of the world that gave birth to them. Scraps, waves, or fluxes of history, the past and present of Romanization, which nevertheless ran up against Greek and Ilirian linguistic resistance (hence Greek and Albanian/Ilirian constitute, together with Basque, the only living languages that precede Latin); of the line of Theodosius, the emperor who in the year 395 divided the Roman Empire into East and West, which henceforth would be reflected in the Catholic and Orthodox worlds; of the Slavic invasions after which the Slavic peoples have co-existed in the region with Albanians and Greeks; of the Ottoman invasion and the dynamics of integration and resistance it generated, along with the Islamization of part of the population. Historical resistance or identitary continuity which, added to nationalism trends and the weakening of the empire, laid the groundwork, from the Greeks on, for the process toward independence of the peoples of the region and their political organization into states. A process born, to be sure, as an act of orthodox solidarity through the support of Catherine the Great for the Greek independentists; and which as a geostrategic factor includes access to the Mediterranean for the central Slavic powers, and the presence, in the Mare Nostrum, of central powers such as the Russian or Austro-Hungarian Empires, the Germanic and Slavic worlds.
The culmination of this process was the political organization of the Balkan peoples and territories into states, in which two phases can be distinguished: first, the phase of their independence from the Ottoman Empire — and the Austro-Hungarian one — which came to a head following the First World War with the creation of the kingdom that in time would be transformed into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Albanian state; second, the phase of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. A process which, with the referent of Greek independence, accelerated at the time of the Congress of Berlin, spurred on by nationalisms and Catholic (Austro-Hungarian) and Orthodox solidarity toward the peoples of these religions, a context in which the Albanian case proved to be an exception. The coexistence in the heart of Albania of a Catholic north and an Orthodox south, a good portion of whose population are converts to Islam, means Albanian nationalism has been fundamentally cultural from the start, and its national construction and the affirmation of its collective identity developed around its language; Albanians supported the Rilindja movement, writing and schooling in Albanian, and basically claimed this class of rights from the Ottoman Empire along with the necessary political autonomy to attain them. The difficulty of achieving this, and the parallel advance of other nationalisms in the region, with expansionist tendencies and territorial ambitions, led to the proclamation of independence in 1912, and the struggle for territory in the Second Balkan War. The outcome of this would be the birth of Albania as an independent state with little more than half the territory and population of the vilayets — Ottoman provinces — in which the Albanians resided. Hence, the Albanian question and the Albanian factor in the themes and dynamic of the agenda and collective action in the region was shaped by the Albanian population outside of Albania (in Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, the Presveo Valley, Northern Greece).

What is more, the construction of a state shared with the other peoples of the region had the potential to channel the tensions among them into a common federal project, but also the risk of seeing its potential for balance annulled by the ambitions of expansive national construction of its constituent peoples, Serb hegemony in particular. When Tito and social­ism disappeared as a factor and discourse of cohesion, the narrative and its protagonists reverted to the nationalistic passions that took the relations between the peoples of the former Yugoslavia from a positive sum cooperation based on commonality to a zero sum confrontation based on the exaltation of difference. This led to the emergence of new states living side by side in a landscape with other factors in play. Fundamentally homogeneous states seen from an ethnic, religious, and identitary perspective; and pluralistic states such as Bosnia and Herzegovina or the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In this landscape the “Serbian factor” and the “Albanian factor” made frequent appearances in the explanatory discourses of the regional dynamics.

Once the phase of armed conflict was overcome through a negotiated solution and the creation of new states, and with the perspective of European integration following the Thessaloniki European Council, the Balkans could envision the achievement of integration by means of the process of stabilization, association, and integration in the EU. In this way the EU — much like the Ottoman Empire in its day — is configured as the new external cohesion-builder, and European integration as the formula for surmounting national and identitary issues and tensions. Thus the transition to democracy and the rule of law is at once both a path toward and the means to become a Member State of the European Union. The fundamental challenge of the Balkans is thus shaped as the construction of viable states and the management of the relationships between their peoples by means of cooperation instead of confrontation, which, in turn, presupposes:

- A shift from the construction of the State as a single power to the division of powers and the rule of law as the fruit of a social contract based on citizenship, that is, from the us of shared ethnicity or religion to the us of shared citizenship.
- European integration as a path to collective consensus. An essential element of such consensus, both the goal itself and the path or road map to collective action — constructing the Progress or Opinion Report of the Commission as a shared political program and a blueprint in the process of transformation — , this foreign policy objective is in turn an essential element of national construction, constituting the principal option and challenge of a shared future.

For when we are absorbed in an existence limited to ourselves, accustomed to perceiving international actors as internal actors, to being the object of international action; to exist before others, the other, be-
beyond our own borders, directing our foreign policy and our collective action towards them, viewing ourselves as part of a larger us, wanting to construct ourselves with others, supposes a change of paradigm, of exposition. Like the Mediterranean where we have had a presence and which has been present in us; but where we have been politically absent. Such a situation implies a challenge of maturity, of evolution, of undertaking the external transition as both corollary and complement to the internal transition. Such was the debate that enlivened Albanian foreign policy as it decided upon its candidacy for the Barcelona Process, and such was the potential of the option for Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, as well as for other countries in the region.

Potentiality or Reality? Youth, First Experiences, Lessons and Potentialities of the Participation of the Balkans in the UfM and the International Construction of the Mediterranean

On the heels of a long period of isolation, when a country first emerges on the international stage as a state, forming part of those international organizations and forums to which one may belong by virtue of geographical location or idiosyncrasy constitutes a sign of external normalization, and showing the nameplate of one’s own country in the assembly or council of an international organization constitutes in and of itself an achievement, an act of collective affirmation. To be a member, to participate, to be there, is the objective in itself. And it is satisfactory at first, to be there and to learn how things work. But time goes by and the question emerges as to why and what for, how does this affect me, where do I want this vehicle in which I am no longer just a passenger, but also a co-pilot, to go; and because I am in this vehicle I have taken on certain roads and certain goals, certain opportunities have opened up to me, and the challenge of taking advantage of them rises before me. Once I am in the Mediterranean diplomatically, what Mediterranean do I want? The question arises not only as to what the Mediterranean can do for me, but also as to what I can do for the Mediterranean.

As the group that has come to be known as the “neither/nors” – neither EU nor Arab Group, both of which have prior mechanisms of agreement, and one of whose members occupies a co-presidency – begins to exercise its participation in the UfM, the question posed above has begun to foster, in certain cases, a given expectation or potentiality that each of the Balkan states prioritizes in its participation. The promotion, for example, of the environmental conservation of the Mediterranean, in the case of Croatia, of the Euro-Mediterranean University in that of Slovenia, or of the valorization of the experience of harmonious inter-religious coexistence in a lay society in that of Albania. But if indeed such initiatives constitute first steps toward a response, the Mediterranean path of the Balkans is far from having exhausted all its potentialities. Many questions and answers are yet to be asked and answered – to be asked of ourselves and answered for ourselves. For it is not only a question of being in the Mediterranean, but of what we want of it, what we want in it, what Mediterranean we want, what relations with its other member states we want, what role we can play in all this.

This last question brings us to the consideration of the role the Balkan states could eventually play among the non-EU states to help in surmounting the conditioning of Euro-Mediterranean construction by Arab-Israeli tension, which is both a challenge and a diplomatic option of particular relevance and potential.

The Union for the Mediterranean, the Process of International Construction of the Mediterranean, and the Balkans

Contemporary international construction of the Mediterranean finds its dual origin in its very geographical reality and in the external dimension of its European construction. A European construction that takes off in the decade of the 1950s when the Maghreb is still a French protectorate, awakening to independence at the same time as the Mediterranean policy of the EU. A policy that will then be transformed in the process and in a shared union with its partners in the rest of the Mediterranean, while never ceasing to sustain these partners, yet in some way never allowing that other shore to presuppose policy. A transformation that will involve the option of moving toward co-decision-making,

2 See Montobbio (2009).
toward the construction of a shared us. An option influenced by the reference point of the creation of a zone of shared peace and stability in Europe starting with the Helsinki Act, continuing with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the ensuing process toward its transformation into the OSCE upon the fall of the Berlin wall; influenced also by this fall, and by the necessary reconsideration and reequilibrium it entailed in the external construction of Europe — towards the east, but also towards the south —, as well as in the Middle East peace process that moved from Madrid to Oslo, and required commitment, and required a response. It would have been easy for this response on the part of the EU to be limited to the scenario of the peace process, in line with the prior differentiation that its Mediterranean policy established between the Maghreb and the Mashreq; but in that precise moment the ambition of geographic and thematic globality arose and gave birth to the Barcelona Declaration of November 1995 under the Spanish Presidency of the EU; an ambition that supposed a strategic option for the commonality of the Mashreq and the Maghreb, an option feasible in and for the entire Mediterranean. Without ignoring the concern of certain key states in the configuration of EU Mediterranean Policy as to whether the attention to and dedication of international resources, intended to foster the advancement of the peace process, might occur in detriment of the Maghreb. Hence, if indeed from its birth the concept of the Barcelona Process was meant to be extended to the entire Mediterranean, in effect and in practice it supposed an option to construct in the Mediterranean an us between the EU, the Arabs and the Israelis who inhabit it, and Turkey, a fundamental Mediterranean actor towards the past and towards the future, without which the international construction of the Mediterranean is impossible.

And what about the Western Balkans? They were not considered by the EU at the time to be a subject of international construction beyond their borders, but rather as the object of international action in their own territory, of conflict resolution once again in their own territory, the objective and challenge to European construction in the panorama of the broadest problematics of the consequences of the fall of the Berlin Wall. According to this logic, the relationship with the peoples of Europe who had previously been separated by the iron curtain is a problem of internal construction, and not one of the external construction of Europe, of integration in the common space and project, of the tracing of a path toward these objectives. A logic to which the establishment of the Copenhagen criteria, the affirmation of the European perspective of the Western Balkans in the European Council of Thessaloniki, and the process of stabilization and association and later integration that is opened from there on in and after pacification all respond.

A logic — as the case of Slovenia in fact shows — according to which the Western Balkans are destined to form part of the process of Euro-Mediterranean construction, in response to which it is worth asking “Why not now? Why, if they are Mediterranean peoples, must they wait to be European in order to be Euro-Mediterraneans?” Nevertheless, since Thessaloniki the EU has been offering the Western Balkans the European perspective, but not the Euro-Mediterranean perspective. Hence not until Albania applied for entry into the Barcelona Process in 2006 did the EU seriously consider the integration of the Western Balkans in Euro-Mediterranean construction, thus transforming its dynamic and its geographic scope.

Perhaps because at heart logics and perspectives that have been treated as if they were parallel paths and separate sets, with their corresponding institutional reflection differentiated in the heart of the European commission and institutions, can in fact turn out to overlap and be a site of intersection — the logic of integration and neighbourliness, of the construction of Europe and of the Mediterranean; the DG Relex and the Commissioner of External Relations and the DG and the Commissioner of Enlargement. And nevertheless multiple states of belonging and intersections of sets are possible — often even indispensable, to be entirely frank. Intersections of interpretations, of processes, of instruments, and even of financial chapters. A question, this last, as was seen in the response to Albania’s entry into the BP, that requires a clear distinction between the instruments and funds for development of the EU relationship with each of the Mediterranean states and the instruments for the construction of the Euro-Mediterranean and its regional programs — so that the former may be framed respectively within the Agreement on Stabilization and Association or the accession negotiations, or the IPA funds or in the Accord for Association and MEDA funds, depending on whether we are dealing with states with a European perspective or southern partners; and never-
theless that all might have access to the MEDA regional programs and those of the UfM or other common mechanisms such as the Anna Lindh Foundation. The ultimate dimension of such logics can be defined – as in its day the Cecchini Report on the cost of non-adoption of the internal market did – not only in terms of the advantages of being, but of the cost of not being, by asking ourselves – as we can do regarding non-integration in Europe in order to reach a definitive judgment as to its necessity – what is the cost of the non-Mediterraneity of the Western Balkans. For the Western Balkans, for the European Union, for the rest of the Mediterranean partners, for the Mediterranean itself.

Indeed, the option to be Mediterranean, to be stakeholders in and make a commitment to the participation of the Western Balkans in the international construction of the Mediterranean, as a subject and not only as an object, as a setting and value to be preserved, as a common geopolitical space of all its states and all its inhabitants, beyond the relationships we pose for all of them and for each one of them, individually or as a group – as in the case of the group of the Arab countries or the EU itself, is also an option for the Mediterranean. Making a commitment, having a stake in, the option for the assumption of Mediterraneity on the part of all: for the EU, beyond the necessity and challenge of confronting its own enlargement and its relationship with the southern shore of the Mediterranean; for the Western Balkans; for our southern partners. Which also supposes, in the case of the latter, the assumption of their common Mediterranean condition with the Western Balkans, with which until little more than a century ago they shared the common political space of the Ottoman Empire.

But if any historical question aims straight for our heart and our heads this spring, it is the one posed by the Arab Spring and its potential as a watershed of history, as the possible beginning of a story of history that could end, as never before, in a Mediterranean of peace and stability, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights, shared development and prosperity, and interreligious and intercultural coexistence. One of the possible stories of this history – of the Arabs, the Europeans, the Turks, the Israelis, the Mediterraneans, of the construction of Europe and the Mediterranean – which demands that we be up to the task, that we give it and ourselves a chance. Every earthquake or rumble of history, every wave of democratization, fundamentally supposes a process of internal political change, but at the same time entails an external dimension; the need, opportunity, and challenge to take on an external transition as well. To change the world as our world changes. And the Mediterranean cannot help but change this spring. Many things will have to be rethought, everything will have to be rethought, in a critical consideration of the road travelled and constructed thus far, and we will have to ask ourselves how to improve our navigation toward those desired goals, that shared future, now that the winds of history are bringing us so close. Certainly the international construction of the Mediterranean is not the only possible international scenario or architecture through which to channel a renewed relationship between the EU and the Arab world; which will be more far-reaching, as the international construction of the Mediterranean is also more far-reaching. But this possible and desirable story of the history of the Mediterranean can also be one of sailing together on the Mediterranean toward the Mediterranean itself, of the return of the Mare Nostrum to the encounter with oneself, toward that identification between Mediterraneity and civilization; toward the affirmation of that common space, between all of us and for all of us. And by the same token, for the Balkans as well, in the Balkans, and for the Balkans.

For as María Zambrano said, man is the only being who not only suffers history but also makes it. And in response to the defeatists of the twilight of history and its storms, man can also write the story of history as he would like it to be, the better world that he would like to leave for his children. And the better Mediterranean.

**Bibliography**


The Conundrum of democratisation and reform in the Arab countries has always been defined by three major elements: governance backlogs, development deficits, and a complex regional and international environment. In 2011, protests across the Arab region have demonstrated the arrival of a fourth element: the will of the Arab people. The full picture of Arab democratisation and reform will only be made known to us once we see how these elements fit together.

Overview

In the first quarter of 2011, massive waves of protest rocked the Arab region. The self-immolation of a street vendor in the Tunisian hinterland sparked a chain of protests across the region, each one detonating the next. In several Arab countries people took to the streets, voting against their leaders with their very presence, in scenes that are unprecedented in their audacity and courage, and unexpected in their magnitude and determination.

These protests and their achievements have given rise to a new sense of possibility among peoples who have long suffered political and economic exclusion. There is widespread appreciation that these protestors have indeed sparked some sort of change and have begun to choose their own future. But any prediction of the outcomes of the current revolts would be premature. The region is currently undergoing the most dynamic state of flux in its modern history. A widespread movement toward more democratic political systems is a possibility, but it may not be the only possibility. At the time of writing, two countries have already made decisive breaks with their past and are currently heading towards a new path, although where it will lead them is unknown. Some countries have sought to preserve stability by managing aspects of change within their current systems. Others still are experiencing ongoing contestation, with some governments hardening their positions, leading to a state of polarisation and descending in some cases to a kind of civil war.

It is a challenge, then, to write about democracy and reform in the Arab countries at this moment. We are engulfed in a constant stream of news and analysis, covering remarkably diverse processes, and from a range of viewpoints. Events in a range of countries are evolving rapidly, and in different ways. Every glance at the headlines reveals a new dynamic. Each essay offers a new interpretation. In such a moment, even identifying all of the pieces of this puzzle seems an almost impossible endeavour, much less putting them together to form a clear picture. The task of this short analysis is to begin to lay out a framework within which a few of the major pieces can be placed, to describe the basic contours of these pieces, and to offer some suggestions as to how they might come together.

Our basic understanding that frames the puzzle is that any efforts toward democratic transition or consolidation in this region will have to contend with the bankrupt systems that autocrats have left behind. This has been the case in democratising episodes all over the world, and there is no reason it should not be true in the Arab countries. It may sound axiomatic, but it bears repeating amid the current mixed climate of hope, fear, and conjecture.

The pieces of the puzzle, therefore, are the major structural factors that those who are hoping for a new political system will have to contend with. One piece is the governance legacy. This is a region with no experience in democratic governance. Rather
than embracing pluralism, the Arab states have suppressed diversity since their inception. Rather than build capacity for public administration, they have developed strengths in controlling, promoting apathy and fear, and achieving their own version of stability. A second piece is the legacy of development failure, leaving a deep backlog of poverty and unemployment when prosperity is most urgently needed. The third piece is the complex international and regional climate, which presents both explicit security challenges as well as enormous pressures that are neither clearly for nor clearly against democratisation per se. These three pieces have been juxtaposed rather firmly over the last decades, but to many it seemed like a forced, unnatural fit.

The events in the region signify the emergence of a fourth piece of the puzzle: the will of the Arab people. Although this piece has actually been taking shape, unnoticed, over years, the suddenness of its emergence on the table leaves us with the impression that it has just appeared out of nowhere. Although we know it lies at the heart of the puzzle, many of us are unsure as to where or how it fits in, and what the resulting picture will be.

**Piece 1: Governance, or the Nest of Opacity, Repression and Failure**

The failure of governance in the Arab states is a central factor behind people’s discontentment. But even in a transition to democracy, this legacy will stand as a major obstacle for their satisfaction.

People in the region have an intuitive and experience-based appreciation for the hollowness of the Arab state, for its deeply entrenched corruption, its secrecy, its viciousness and, in the end, its ineptitude. In Arabic the state is often referred to as a ‘nest’ of poor governance: of opacity, repression, and failure. The Arab Human Development Reports offer an illuminating tour of these shortcomings. These reports depict a state that monopolises the public space, insists on controlling everything from personal religious belief to international relations, and allows little margin for initiative beyond its own domain or without its blessing. This state and its vicious ways become part of the nature of the place, suppressing the channels through which public grievances can be heard, further and further alienating a population that only sees the state as less and less legitimate with every passing day, and begins to see it as an invader of the territory it claims to protect.

**With so much attention paid to the security sector, difficult economic or political periods have seen many Arab governments increasingly neglect the whole range of other institutions that are vital for the achievement of progress and prosperity**

This legacy has been a long time in the making. Emerging out of the colonial schemes or arrangements, the modern Arab states were consolidated without taking into consideration the diversity of the human groups they encompassed. Their borders often appear contrived, enclosing diverse ethnic, religious and linguistic groups that did not identify with one another. The first rulers of the Arab states positioned themselves as strongmen above the divisions of their population, sometimes with colonial support or consent. After World War II, the rulers that emerged in their place carried out the same programme, now in the name of liberation from colonial rule. In the republics, these charismatic rulers have been succeeded by strongmen who share their passion for unity, but lack their vision and charisma. As the more contemporary batch of rulers have lost their ability to inspire, they have resorted to ruthless methods to remain in power.

Chief among these methods is the overinvestment in the security sector. Never subject to public oversight, this sector – the police, the internal intelligence services, in some cases the military – has been enormously instrumental to its ruler and has accounted to him alone. Heads of state, increasingly without any other recourse, have granted this apparatus an extremely wide margin for manoeuvre, all the while buttressing its powers through interference with the judiciary, dominance of the legislature, rigging elections, muzzling of the media and interference or co-optation of civil society and the private sector.
With so much attention paid to the security sector, difficult economic or political periods have seen many Arab governments increasingly neglect the whole range of other institutions that are vital for the achievement of progress and prosperity. There are states in the world that have combined authoritarianism with strong, capable institutions. None of these is in the Arab region. Instead, as governments have strengthened their mechanisms of control, they have left public services in shambles, they have neglected development planning, and in doing so, they have shredded every page of the social contracts that were presumed to be binding the Arab societies for so long. Before this state, generations of Arab people have suffered countless abuses of their security and human rights. They have been marginalised and disempowered. Very few can remember a time before emergency law. The only way people can avoid the wrath of the state is to concede that power is a given, not to be questioned or mistrusted.

In addition to these consequences, the unyielding nature of the state has long prevented Arab societies from having a full discussion about various aspects of the nature of the state. Two key examples are the role of religion and the accommodation of diversity. Since their inception, Arab states have sought to maintain strategic ambiguity around the role of religion: while fully embracing the symbols of Islam, they have consistently adopted a vague stance over its position in public life. Their relationship with Islamic groups has therefore ranged from one of repression to co-option. With regard to diversity, most Arab states have not succeeded in developing mechanisms to peacefully accommodate the diversity of its population into the political system. To this day, in many Arab countries minorities are rigidly separated from the systems that govern the distribution of political power and other public systems. In some cases this is an official practice and in others it is unofficial. Governments have tried introducing quotas, most notably in Lebanon, but the system has been met with much criticism, and, more importantly, has proven insufficient to guarantee social peace and avoid civil conflict.

Piece 2: The Development Challenge, Anaemic Growth and Unemployment

The uprisings sweeping across the Arab region underscore not only people’s political discontent, but also their increasing frustration in the face of the region’s manifold development failures. Beneath the upheaval have been tremendous social pressures: polarisation of incomes, rising food prices, a lack of housing, and massive youth unemployment. The protests are an unequivocal indication that the underlying development crisis, which has been growing for decades, has reached an acute and explosive phase. In terms of overall economic growth, the performance of the Arab region at large has been dismal over the last forty years. Of the six world regions tracked by the United Nations Development Programme, the Arab states had the dubious distinction of registering as the only one with a negative average per capita GDP growth over the period 1970-2008, at -1.1%. This in comparison to 3.8% in South Asia and 2.7% in Sub-Saharan Africa.

A range of factors drives this dismal performance. First the utter failure of industrialisation and agricultural strategies pursued in the relatively more diversified economies between the 1950s and the 1970s. Second the overall dependence on hydrocarbon exports as the engine of growth, accounting for 74% of regional export receipts in 2008. And third, the overall deterioration of any sound development philosophy or institutions in most of the Arab states. These are countries that, for the most part, have stood on the margins of economic globalisation, wary of allowing anything in that they cannot control. They have invested very little in research and development, or any other category that could spur innovation, are less industrialised today than they were in 1970, and welcome only a paltry percentage of the world’s Foreign Direct Investment.

And all the while the population has been exploding. Since 1970 the population of the Arab region has expanded three-fold, from 128 million to 359 million in 2010. As is usually the case, this rapidly growing population is overwhelmingly youthful: today 54% of people in the region are under the age of 25.

Decades of development failures now see these youths entering adulthood facing persistent obstacles such as increased competition and high levels of unemployment in an overall context of economic stagnation. The most recent data available show a regional average youth unemployment rate of 30%. Of course, development is about much more than income and the Arab countries are to be given credit for the progress they have made in some non-income dimensions, particularly in expanding access to education. Gross school enrolment has nearly doubled over the past four decades, from 34% in
1970 to 64% today. But what leaders around the region may be learning now is that social cohesion strategies that have a mass-education component may not lead to fully positive outcomes if that education is not appropriate for the labour market, or if economies are not given enough vitality to create jobs for millions of engineers, attorneys, doctors and liberal arts graduates.

Moving to broader dimensions of development, the region faces a number of critical challenges that, consumed with regime continuity, the Arab states have failed to address. There is no more compelling example than water scarcity. Currently, of all the Arab countries, only Lebanon has access to a level of internal freshwater resources per capita that is above the international water-scarcity threshold of 1,000 m³ per person per year. The rest are under that threshold and 13 are below the even lower threshold (500 m³) of severe water scarcity. The Arab regional average in this measure is about one-tenth the world average. At its heart, this scarcity derives from the region’s geographical location across one of the driest bands on Earth. But poor planning and predatory usage have exacerbated the situation, and climate change only makes the challenge more severe by increasing both average temperatures and the frequency and magnitude of drought. The net result is not only the difficulty in finding ample water resources to meet domestic needs or drive industry or agriculture, but also socio-economic impacts like unplanned urbanisation, increased exposure to food price volatility, and, potentially, resource-based conflict.

**Piece 3: The Challenge of Place & External Engagement**

The Arab region throughout history has been centre-stage in world politics. Lying on the largest part of the world’s known oil and gas reserves, and positioned at the main sea and overland links between Asia, Africa and the Mediterranean, it is a part of the world that could hardly be left alone. This developing region has received foreign direct ‘intervention’ rather than foreign direct ‘investments.’ Of course geopolitical significance has its advantages, but it also has its drawbacks. For all the resources and special attention it may garner a country, it also draws more than its fair share of interference, not to mention invasion.

Countries undergoing transformations have at various points in history been able to enjoy, or at least have reason to think they would enjoy, clear support from one world power or another. Cold war independence struggles were able to vie for support of either the United States or the Soviet Union. Southern, Central and Eastern Europe had the powerful incentive of clear prospects to join the European Union. The demonstration effect of countries within the same cultural sphere has been important. Several democracy movements in Latin America drew at least some inspiration from the success of their peers in Spain and Portugal.

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Both for its geostrategic position as well as the state of world politics today, it is in no way clear that Arab societies striving to build their own version of democracy, would have much reason to expect to benefit from similar processes. Though democracy promotion aimed at Arab countries has indeed been a part of the policy agenda in both the United States and the European Union for decades, experience has shown that the complex dynamics of these powers tend, over time, towards a preference for stability and the status quo in the region, which has favoured the continuity of autocratic rulers. If calls for democratic reform have increased in the last two decades, for example in the Freedom Agenda of President George W. Bush, and in the earlier Barcelona Process of the European Union, the major thrust of their policy frameworks remain dominated by geostrategic concerns such as energy, international security objectives such as the ‘war on terrorism’, and preventing the flow of migrants from Arab countries to European countries north of the Mediterranean, and regional security goals such as the security of Israel and the containment of Iran. There can be no reasonable expectation that these geostrategic priorities will change anytime soon; Arab governments
and civil societies could be forgiven for wondering whether and to what extent they can expect to find consistent support for democratisation within this context.

If the broad geopolitical context is fraught with risk, the closer regional context can be even tenser. There is no question that any democratising government in the Arab region would feel pressure to take a harder line in its approach to any number of conflicts and tensions that could originate around the complex Israeli-Palestinian situation. The polarisation regarding the relationship with Iran and its nuclear project, as well as security in the Arab/Persian Gulf region will have an impact on the courses to be taken by the new emerging political systems.

The protest movements in the region leave many questions unanswered. One of the most striking characteristics of these protests is their spontaneity and their lack of organisation.

One of the most powerful symbols of the protests has been the figure of Mohammed Bouazizi, whose tragic and spontaneous protest has been seen as an emblem of young Arabs’ desperation, lack of choices and, in a way, their essential peacefulness. Another powerful symbol has been Khaled Said, whose murder by police in Egypt helped galvanise the monumental protests there. Both embody the dilemma of the Arab youth, the narrow space and limited or negligible choices allowed politically and economically.

The most common refrain of protesters has been that their leaders step down. In some countries, this was an immediate request. In others it came only after protesters were driven to a more hardened position by government responses to their protests that were either unconvincing, violent or both.

But the protest movements in the region leave many questions unanswered. One of the most striking characteristics of these protests is their spontaneity and their lack of organisation. Most of the people involved have had no political affiliation, and the different types of formal and informal groups that have been involved – youth organisations, bloggers, political parties, and Islamist movements – have vastly different constituencies, priorities and methods for seeking to achieve influence.

Accordingly, it remains unclear what exactly these protest movements might stand for, and how they might try to achieve their objectives. It is understood that their supporters want a say in the decisions that affect their lives. It is clear that they want more freedom to be themselves. There is no doubt that they want more economic opportunities.
But what else do they stand for? What are their expectations for a democratising state? What role do they hope to play, and how will they get there? How do they intend to organise? And what about the people who did not join the protest? What are their positions on the major questions facing the Arab state today?

It is difficult to tell. Civil society has been so repressed for so many years, that crucial opportunities for people to test and aggregate their ideas about civic affairs have been missing from the scene.

Far and away the best organised of all actors involved in protests in some countries have been the mainstream Islamic groups. And if political space opens up, it is likely that these groups will change their strategies. It is to be expected that mainstream Islamist groups will seek to move from the opposition into coalition or unity governments.

Over the last few decades, a notable trend in many Arab countries is the expansion of the agenda of Islamic parties to call for a democratic state that, while making reference to Islamic law, shows respect for core democratic principles such as alternation of power, popular sovereignty and judicial independence. Whether this trend continues and how the future political system manages to accommodate these actors will surely be one of the most important aspects of any transition toward democracy in the region.

But this will still leave any country moving toward a new system with an urgent need to search for a new development model. No obvious options jump to the fore. The region has already tried a few models, and none have succeeded. Moreover, the international community offers very little in the way of positive examples at the moment.

Conclusion

Democratic transitions have always been a complex process. While definitions differ, there have been over one hundred episodes of democratisation since the beginning of the Third Wave. The reason the number is so high is because so many countries have needed multiple episodes before consolidating. Transition is a long process, it is not linear and is fraught with challenges. Putting former rulers and their cronies on trial, abolishing ruling political parties, and confiscating their funds, will not change the harsh economic conditions or alleviate sufferings. Unless democratic change is succeeded very quickly by tangible economic improvement for the poor segments of the society, the fall of the tyrants will not meet the expectations of the majority of the people.

It is well known that elections can be quickly organised, but development needs time. Young democracies are challenged most when they have weak institutions. Young democracies are challenged most when they have difficult economic prospects. And young democracies are challenged most when they live in tough neighbourhoods. These pieces have long been part of the puzzle of Arab democracy and reform. Now there is a fourth in the form of the empowered Arab people. We will only know the whole picture of democratisation and reform in the Arab countries once we see how these four pieces come together.

**Unless democratic change is succeeded very quickly by tangible economic improvement for the poor segments of the society, the fall of the tyrants will not meet the expectations of the majority of the people**

At present, it seems that the countries in the region are heading toward a number of different scenarios. Tunisia and Egypt have moved toward a scenario in which the people are charting their own course. They have overcome autocratic regimes and now will have to undertake the difficult task of true democratisation and reform. Other countries such as Morocco and Jordan are struggling to manage reform within their existing systems. Still others such as Syria remain in a deadlock, with governments seeking to crush the will of protesters. If these governments succeed, the question of reform will be off the agenda in these countries for some time, which unfortunately is already the case in Libya, where the most significant moves to be made in the near term are not by reformers at all, but rather by the international community.
South Mediterranean economies have evolved positively over the past twenty years when viewed from the perspective of the classic evaluation criteria used by international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank or similar institutions. Growth rates have generally been maintained, local stock exchanges have generally demonstrated good performance despite fluctuations due to the international economic crisis, public finance deficits have been well held in check and the balance of payment equilibrium has been favourable. However, these classic criteria for evaluating the health of the economies of South Mediterranean countries have proven illusory in light of the popular revolts massively affecting Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, and, to a lesser degree, Algeria. These revolts have revealed strong protest based just as much on the desire for political freedom and changes in the exercise of power – confiscated by a corrupt, authoritarian oligarchy – as on the social distress of both urban and rural youth. By burning himself to death in December of 2010 in protest against the constant infringement of his human dignity, young Mohammed Bou Azizi, a Tunisian from a poor rural area, set off the spark that triggered all of these revolutionary movements. The simple, clear slogans of protesters from Tunis to Benghazi and Cairo, and reaching as far as Yemen and Jordan, primarily focused on issues of socio-economic dignity: decent wages, job opportunities, doing away with the multiple forms of corruption and clientelism. The proof has thus been supplied that the form of development followed by the South Mediterranean countries has been far from satisfactory and that the criteria used to judge these countries’ economic performances were hardly pertinent. Rarely has there been such massive blindness, except with regard to the performance of major American and European banks and their directors, whereby the behaviour of these banking systems in the most long-industrialized countries has led to the most serious financial and economic crises since the 1930s. Youth in the Southern Mediterranean countries have managed to make remarkable usage of the changes occurring in the world of computing and electronics to quickly lend protest movements repercussion, allowing their amplification and resistance to police repression. This constitutes a remarkable example of grasp of the useful effects of world transformations in the communications sphere, whereas until now the societies concerned seemed to have remained sheltered from major world changes. One could consider that South Mediterranean economies have to date only passively experienced the major changes of the world economy without using them to improve their performances. Whereas a significant number of third world economies have managed to adapt to the economic changes of the past half-century and use them to their advantage, South Mediterranean economies have largely remained lethargic, dominated by diverse forms of rentier economy in which the authoritarianism of political regimes has developed and vast circuits of corruption have prospered. As we have demonstrated in a previous study, the production base of these economies has remained weak despite all of the structural adjustment programmes applied under the guidance of the IMF and the World Bank. Over the past few years, the European Union has also granted substantial budgetary aid to South Mediterranean countries to bring up to standard or modernize their economic, financial and educational
institutions. Certain countries have even been considered very good pupils, such as Tunisia, whereas Egypt seemed to have a vibrant economy attracting a great deal of foreign investment.

It is therefore important to attempt to identify the economic and social problems that made the growth of South Mediterranean countries a “bad” growth, entailing very high unemployment rates, increasingly blatant social inequality and multifaceted corruption reaching mammoth proportions at the level of elite economic and political decision-makers, all of this stimulating a migratory surge to leave these countries, including both poor workers without decent jobs and intellectuals and skilled professionals seeking jobs that cannot be found in their countries, the brain and skilled labour drain moreover aggravating the vicious circle of bad development.

A Liberalisation of Economic Structures that Has Not Revitalized Economies

South Mediterranean countries experienced a brief period of State and public sector domination of the economy, a period that lasted from their accession to independence over the course of the 1950s and 60s to the crisis of the 1980s, characterised by excessive indebtedness of these economies, in particular in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Algeria, not to mention Turkey. This crisis, which corresponded with the general crisis of third-world country indebtedness breaking out in 1982, was also characterised by the increase in public deficits and foreign trade. It then entailed the implementation of structural adjustment programmes under the aegis of the IMF and the World Bank in those countries as well as in many other third-world economies that experienced insolvency problems in repaying foreign debt. These programmes were not implemented without leading to food riots in certain capitals following the decrease of State subsidies of staple foods.

In any case, whereas the 1980s crisis pushed certain countries to enter the virtuous circle of economic growth based on a strong dynamic capable of reviving the major industrial sectors and keeping them under control, South Mediterranean economies sunk into diverse forms of rentier economy. Structural adjustment and economic liberalization programmes were carried out so as to progressively transfer a large part of activities of a rentier type from the public sector to a few privileged companies of the local private sector, often associated with European multinationals. No efforts have been made to begin a process of accumulation and appropriation of modern technologies allowing economies to diversify and take advantage of the globalisation of markets, taking up a position on them as dynamic exporters. The contrast with the performance of South-East Asian economies or those of certain Latin American countries, in particular Brazil, is striking. The causes need to be reviewed.

The structural adjustment programmes and EU aid programmes showed little concern for the real economies and their revitalization, but rather were much more concerned with institutional modernization of a free trade nature

By activities of a rentier type, we understand the activities whose profit rates are essentially based on the absence of manufacturing or technological efforts, with no entrepreneurial risks and whose main source lies in the exploitation of raw materials, archaeological or tourist sites attractive in and of themselves or strategic transport routes or means such as the Suez Canal or the passage of oil or gas pipelines through national territory, as well as the simple activity of commercially distributing imported goods, which is devoid of risk. In addition, other sources of rentier profit are capital gains on real estate and the exportation of labour force, whether qualified or not, which ensures the national economy a regular, abundant flow of external resources without local productive effort.

A quick glance at South Mediterranean economies shows that these activities, with a low innovation and production content, are those that dominate the formation of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In the first place are energy exports (Algeria, Libya and, to a lesser degree, Tunisia, Egypt and Syria) and exports of other raw materials, such as cotton or phosphate (Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco). But we must also consider that mass tourism is a very low value-added activity and creates only low-qualified, often seasonal jobs, and in addition, it contributes greatly to degrading the environment and the limited water
resources. The only investment risk in this sector is political, when wars or acts of violence of a terrorist nature decrease the arrival of European tourists. The same is true of investments in the large-scale retail sector, namely for numerous imported products. The risks are low, the jobs created are low or medium-skilled. The same applies to the real estate sector, where a high demand continues due to the high population growth rate in South Mediterranean countries; the luxury construction segment has, moreover, been fuelled by the new fortunes made thanks to privatisations and extremely high profit rates of these low-value-added activities.

Insofar as emigrant remittances, note that they are the result of productive activity located outside of the national economy and that they entail additional consumer spending, most often to the benefit of foreign imports or spending consisting of investment in the real estate or tourist sectors. According to World Bank statistics, the ensemble of Mediterranean third countries – including the countries bordering the Adriatic – received 564 billion dollars in remittances from 1970 to 2009. This impressive inflow of foreign resources hardly seems to have contributed to revitalizing the economies receiving said remittances or reducing the very high unemployment rates. In addition to this inflow, foreign aid to the amount of 170 billion dollars was also received for the same period.

In reality, the structural adjustment programmes and EU aid programmes showed little concern for the real economies and their revitalization, but rather were much more concerned with institutional modernization of a free trade nature, involving the withdrawal of the State and the public sector from economic activities. As we have written elsewhere, some twenty years ago, these programmes should have been complemented by structural adjustments targeting in the private sector and designed to break the rentier economy and reorient private investment towards high value-added, innovative sectors, in the manner of what has been successfully accomplished in South-East Asian countries. The programmes deployed by international financial institutions or the EU exclusively focused on the disengagement of the State from the national economy through privatisations, balance of public accounts and fiscal reforms reducing the proportion of direct taxes and increasing that of indirect taxes, under the pretext of stimulating private investment, but also the liberalisation of domestic and foreign trade and the reduction of customs tariffs. It is therefore not surprising that these programmes resulted in a considerable increase in private wealth, which has been massively invested in rentier-type activities, including those of privatized companies with a high profit rate, in particular mobile telephony.

This behaviour was fully rational in the absence of any public policies aiming to imitate the example of joint efforts between the State and the private sector, as deployed in South-East Asian countries. Private investors, often several family groups close to the political power centre or emerging from this political elite, turned to sectors with very high profit rates, entailing very little technological risk or no costly efforts insofar as research and development and human resource training. The result has been a reinforcement of the perverse dynamic of the rentier economy in these countries, offering but few opportunities to young university graduates increasingly entering the labour market; moreover, the rentier economy has strengthened the authoritarian structures of power and facilitated corruption among leaders, taxing national wealth at the highest levels. It is these young people who are playing the key role in the major popular protests of Egypt and Tunisia that are spreading throughout the Arab world.

**Changing Economic Paradigms**

The recent events in the South Mediterranean should open the doors to the changes most needed in those economies. The idea here would be to immediately put an end to the most glaring social injustices, eliminate corruption and boost productivity. This is hardly an easy task in view of the neo-liberal environment predominating in the Euro-Mediterranean Region. The multifaceted fragility of economies is another problem, namely the huge trade deficits, dependence on remittances from emigrants and tourism revenues, the food deficit and the impact of climate variations, a very weak industrial base and hypertrophy in the real estate, financial and low value-added trade sectors, as well as totally inappropriate taxation systems. Economic policies thus need to be adjusted accordingly to meet these challenges. In order to do so and as a priority, governments must address the need to break the perverse mechanisms of the rentier economy to arrive at the virtuous circle of a productive economy that is innovative and competitive on world markets.
The Urgency of Tax Reform

The weakness of tax structures in South Mediterranean countries has been demonstrated. Numerous tax loopholes allow investors to legally escape taxation on their income. Tax incentives established via extremely generous investment codes are not linked to performance criteria insofar as job creation, professional training, improvement of product quality or the establishment of research and development capacities for new industrial procedures. In this manner, the State deprives itself of a modulated and truly incentivizing use of the taxation tool for developing local industrial control.

In addition, certain countries have also set up tax-free zone systems for exclusively exporting industries or systems of corporate income tax exemption for the exported portion of production. This system leads to segmentation or a serious compartmentalization within the industrial fabric and can reinforce the dichotomy between companies benefiting from tax exemptions exclusively oriented towards the international market and companies oriented towards the domestic market and production under the shelter of customs protections. Moreover, controlling the system is particularly difficult.

In any case, these generous tax exemptions do not seem to have produced a technological accumulation allowing the firms in the Arab countries concerned to capture or expand market shares in industrial segments of innovative industries, achievements in the textile and clothing sector remaining fragile.

Another sphere of more or less vast tax exemption is that of capital gains on property and real estate, which incur little or no tax, whereas they constitute a very important source of accumulation of wealth for numerous people, who have thus managed to become new rich. Indeed, considering the significant demographic pressure all Arab cities are experiencing, the prices in the real estate sector have increased remarkably since the 1950s. The rent control established in a number of Arab countries under the pretext of protecting tenants has devalued and frozen a significant proportion of real estate, allowing capital gains to grow all the stronger on bare land and new construction put up for sale and not for hire. Real estate investment has thus become a highly profitable type of investment with quick returns.

Moreover, a significant share of the profits and savings gained in oil-exporting countries of the Arabian Peninsula by Arabs of various nationalities has thus been invested in the so-called luxury real estate sector and major retail distribution centres in all major South Mediterranean cities, increasing the profit rate even more. States, however, do not seem to have benefited, in terms of increased internal revenue, from the significant capital gains brought about by these investments, due both to the low level of taxation, more focussed on property transfer taxes rather than taxation on capital gains, and the underestimation of the price of transactions to at least partially evade property transfer taxes.

Another sector with very low taxes is that of trade profits, in particular intermediary transactions carried out by influential individuals between the State and public sector companies and major multinationals exporting goods and services. The payment of commissions by these firms to local intermediaries, a practice that has become generalized in all Arab countries, whether socialist or capitalist, and that is difficult to control, seems to have completely evaded taxation. The significant profits have attracted numerous engineers and lawyers to the sector, who have managed to build significant fortunes immune from all taxation. The systematic recourse of public sectors to major international calls for tenders for State markets, but also for imports of common products via State importation monopolies has allowed these major, influential intermediaries to acquire disproportionate economic positions in local economies.

Even in countries where imports are free, certain individuals have succeeded in becoming trade agents for major foreign companies exporting the most common consumer goods and have managed to impose elevated prices on the local market. The case of Lebanon, despite its ultra-liberal regime, is ludicrous, in particular with regard to products in the agrifood sector, pharmaceuticals and detergents. Considering the greatly limited capacity of local industries to meet the domestic demand, the acquisition of dominant positions on import markets through systems of exclusive commercial representation has turned the activities of a small number of individuals into an oligopoly. In this domain, the State does not receive an appropriate proportion of tax revenue, whether in the form of customs tariffs, where value declarations are significantly minimized, or company tax, where active corruption in the fiscal service is commonplace. In addition, shortcomings in tax legislation allow a great many high-income individuals or businesses to legally evade taxes.
Moreover, no South Mediterranean countries have established any taxation whatsoever on personal fortunes, despite the spectacular multiplication of major personal fortunes over the course of the past few centuries. In reality, insofar as direct taxation, only salaried workers in the private sector and civil servants and other public sector workers have no way of evading tax, which hits them full force, especially since it is levied at the source on a monthly basis, as opposed to the income of liberal professions, corporate profits and other sources of State revenue through direct taxation, levied the year after the reporting year.

In this manner, the majority of income tax is paid by salaried workers and certain large companies, often foreign, holding concessions for exploitation of oil or other raw materials. The personal income tax levied in Mediterranean countries does not surpass 2 to 4% of budgetary resources once the tax on salaried workers has been deducted. Direct taxation in South Mediterranean countries thus functions as a source of social inequality compounding a series of other mechanisms aggravating inequalities and social tension instead of being a means of attenuating inequalities and ensuring a minimum of redistribution of income with a view to equalising opportunities. Considering the extent of social needs in the sphere of healthcare and education that the State is finding increasingly difficult to meet, the current distribution of taxes is an element aggravating the crisis of political legitimacy and prevents any solution of an economic or financial type for reaching a dynamic macro-economic balance.

Moreover, the majority of programmes neglect reforms of municipal finance, whose proper operation is indispensable for improving urban management, which is undergoing a serious crisis throughout the world and also fuelling protest movements. Real estate tax revenue is generally weak, whereas it should be a major source of revenue for local government. Taxation should be oriented so as to equalize the profit rates between different industries and wholly restructure investment incentive systems to encourage the development of professional training, job creation and technological expertise in certain key industrial segments. This is not the place to discuss in detail the tax reform urgently required to orient the private sector towards activities strengthening the productive base. But it is important to realize that the low economic efficiency and blatant injustice of current systems are two major elements of the permanent legitimacy crisis of socio-political and economic structures in the South Mediterranean and in the Arab world in general. In reality, the association between taxation, democracy and the Rule of Law is absent from all economic and political analyses of the Arab world, as well as from the majority of claims made by political parties. However, it seems quite difficult to ignore the fundamental aspect of a just and effective tax system in the genesis of any democracy in economic development, but also to structure a genuine process of collective development allowing all social classes of the population to form part of the world of productive modernity.

The Imperative of Developing a Strategic Vision of Knowledge Accumulation and Innovative Technology Expertise

Over the course of the past thirty years, South Mediterranean governments, and more generally, those of Arab countries, have completely given up all visions of a process of industrial development and of the demands that such a process requires insofar as the educational system, research and development and continuous training of human resources. Industrialisation efforts effected during the early years of independence were dropped beginning in the early 1970s under the avalanche of petrodollars and the liberalisations carried out in the hope of attracting foreign investment. These liberalisations were subsequently accelerated under the effects of structural adjustment programmes, giving rise to the emergence of very large fortunes, out of proportion with the productive capacities of the economies concerned. The planning of the development of educational systems was not done according to the need to accumulate technological knowledge and have the local population master it, but exclusively according to population growth. Technical training, including agricultural education, has remained marginal and has not been anchored in the needs of the real economy. Nor has the rentier-type private sector felt the need to participate in a collective effort of the State, local authorities and the educational and university system to establish clear goals insofar as recovery and expertise in certain technology fields in the key sectors of economic globalisation. It is this collective effort that has ensured the success of South-East Asian economies and that has
been entirely absent from the economic policies of South Mediterranean countries. The latter have seen their public policies deeply influenced by international financial institutions and the European Union, which has become the leading supplier of financial aid to these countries. Under the shelter of this influence, modern private sectors have expanded their sources of profit to the benefit of the few without the economy of these countries becoming truly innovative or competitive. The dozens of thousands of small, informal family businesses have not been integrated into the developed industrial fabric. They have thus also continued to have very low productivity and the turnover generated by them has remained more than modest. Insofar as the rural sectors, farmers’ income has also stagnated, if not decreased.

It is therefore not surprising in this context that the Barcelona Process aiming to create a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area did not achieve the results sought. Quite to the contrary, the migratory pressure on Europe from the South Mediterranean shore, which EU leaders hoped to reduce, has but grown due to the rise in unemployment and lack of decent job opportunities — in the sense established by the International Labour Organization — in the economies concerned.

**Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Economic Area Based on a Common Industrial Strategy**

In conclusion, it will be very difficult for the South Mediterranean countries alone to effect the drastic changes in public policy required to begin real collective use of modern industrial technologies, including those relative to high added-value services, namely in electronics and computing, medical and health research, renewable energy, and so forth. If the European Commission bureaucracy continues to refuse to think in terms of industrial strategy, in particular on the scale of the vast Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, there are high chances that South Mediterranean countries will continue to be beset by poor development and brain and skilled labour drain, and therefore racked by political instability, which will but increase migratory flows. The same is true of the IMF and the World Bank, which are exclusively concerned with the progress of the formal liberalisation of economies and balancing public accounts, but never look into the causes of the poor performance of the private sectors in terms of technology expertise, research and development, professional training, innovation and increased competitive capacity of their export products.

The major popular revolts that have shaken numerous South Mediterranean countries should lead to revising the simplistic, neo-liberal approach to development that has predominated to date in North-South relations. The European Union itself would gain a great deal if it agreed to consider the future of the European continent through a new approach, for the economic crisis of North shore Mediterranean countries is also very strong and these countries are regularly gripped by vast popular protest movements as well.

The major obstacle, however, to achieving a change in attitude reducing the naive belief in the virtue of the market alone, far from any State intervention, lies in the corpus of neo-liberal dogmas that the EU applies to itself with a vigour existing nowhere else. The prosperity and stability of the Euro-Mediterranean Region largely depends on abandoning these dogmas to the benefit of active policies aiming to make South Mediterranean countries rapidly leave the vicious circle of the rentier economy so it can become an active partner of an innovative economic dynamic creating employment both in the North and the South Mediterranean, and capable of better facing up to Asian competition on the one hand, and that of the North American continent on the other.

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The current year has brought crucial events that will radically modify the Mediterranean landscape in the near future. Although the Barcelona Process, slowed down by its prolongation via the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) – which, moreover, is not very comfortable with its structure, projects and visions – did not directly contribute to the development of the population on the South Shore, it did open eyes on both shores, without explicitly intending to do so, to structural problems associated with the matter of political reform and democratic transition in South Mediterranean countries.

The first months of 2011 were the stage for a good number of protest movements in Northern Africa as well as in the rest of the Arab countries. The protesters chose revolution as a definition of what occurred in Tunisia and Egypt. This will cut short any external attempts to modify views of events and will lead us to consider the situation from a less “Eurocentric” angle. Indeed, we have noticed that over the past few months culturalist analyses on the capacity of South Mediterranean societies for democracy have become quite obsolete. This is not the place to condemn the prejudices and stereotypes that have inundated Western literature for decades, but it is important to mention them.

The new communication technologies (blogs, social networks and satellite networks, as well as mobile telephony) and the armed forces have been pointed out as being essential factors in the success and culmination of these revolutions, each in its own way and to different degrees. Naturally, the former factor can represent the common denominator in all the successful revolutions or those underway. The role of the armed forces, on the other hand, is not so “positive” in the various cases. Understanding how these two main factors function will open perspectives on possible future transformations of the political arena in South Mediterranean countries. This article discusses these factors and their impact, as well as the main regional actors active on the political stage, with the aim of providing a realistic view on the future of the Mediterranean Region.

The Role of New Technologies and Social Networks

In Ben Ali’s Tunisia, control of the media and its repression was one of the activities most dear to the regime. Since then, new communication technologies have spread considerably as a means to avoid censorship. Blogs have been an essential tool for supplying information. Social networks have also opened a window for freedom of expression despite highly effective state control of internet. The protests that began on 17 December 2010 proved, through their development, the key role played by these means of communication. The fall of the regime has paved the way for a ramification of this sector in all regards, without it being dominated by one or another of these emerging political forces. Social networks are seeing the creation of numerous new groups that represent the different political and social trends. Tunisian Islamists have also managed to join the trend of agitation underway on the net. In fact, all the political parties active in the local arena, as well as those seeking to emerge, have created an account on social networks. Information on events is transmitted nearly in real time and well before being broadcast by the “liberated” Tunisian or pan-Arabic stations highly active in the area since 14 January
In addition to images, videos and documents transmitted via these accounts, social networks have allowed anonymous people to make themselves heard, addressing the Tunisian population with a more or less thought-out discourse in order to express a position on events concerning them. The “imitation” effect of these techniques and procedures has been prominent in the Egyptian case. A “new pan-Arabism” has been born. Far from fossilised ideologies and hackneyed slogans, the young people of the Arab countries, the new “citizens,” have succeeded in creating a new definition of Arab nationalism more linked to the values of democracy, freedom and dignity than to the utopian dreams of territorial unification used by repressive regimes to increase their control while being incapable of meeting the political and economic demands of their “subjects.” Egypt was the first beneficiary of the Tunisian fervour in all of its dimensions, in particular in the communication sphere. We have observed the highly “constructive” exchanges that have taken place among the young people of the two countries on the most appropriate manners of virtually communicating and making their influence felt. It is true, however, that in the case of Egypt, freedom of speech was much more liberal under Mubarak, particularly since the beginning of the 21st century. These past few years have seen the creation of private satellite channels and the growth of private press relatively critical of the regime. “The dogs bark but the caravan passes” – this has been, to a certain extent, the Egyptian regime’s position on the subject of freedom of expression.

In other Arab countries deeply concerned with the political changes in Tunisia and Egypt, the common denominator was the apparent surprise, not allowing the officials and censors time to react. In Syria, for instance, after a period of hesitation, the media placed the emphasis on the instability that the events in Tunisia and Egypt could engender. Then, the “official” analysis identified the relations of the “dead” regimes with the Western world as having been the main cause of their demise. On the other hand, blogs of all tendencies acclaimed the accomplishments of the Tunisian and Egyptian peoples, recalling their similarities to the situation in Syria.

In Algeria, considered by observers as the country most concerned with what is going on in Tunisia, and even as “fertile ground for change” the State media provided only the most minimal coverage, clearly revealing the government’s discomfort or concern. In the private press and on internet sites it was enthusiasm that predominated, with direct forecasts on the situation in Tunisia and the assertion that an evolution in this direction in Algeria could not be ruled out. Hence appeals made to the government to grasp the significance of the Tunisian revolution and open the doors to freedom before it were too late.

The Arab authorities are beginning to feel the weight of cyberspace more than ever before

Social networks were the main source for all press agencies and television stations. Among these, Al-Jazeera was the first to use the videos and sound recordings posted by protesters, while attempting to verify their authenticity and reliability as much as possible. After having been “shunned” by the majority of Tunisian intellectuals for years, considering it having affinities with conservative movements, Al-Jazeera suddenly became the “Tunisian” channel par excellence. In its coverage from 17 December 2010 to 14 January 2011, it demonstrated extreme professionalism. The other pan-Arabic channels attempted to follow events, but they could not compete with Al-Jazeera. One of the latter’s journalists, from Tunisia, stated that “after a great many years when we hadn’t had the opportunity to send a cameraman, we suddenly found ourselves with hundreds – it was the protesters themselves who were our main sources.”

The events in Tunisia have emphasised the profound changes in the Arab media scene. They were followed by millions of Arab television viewers and internet users. The reticence first shown among certain activists at the idea of using social networks seems to have dissipated. The Arab authorities, fearing a domino effect after the Tunisian revolt, have not only taken economic measures in order to absorb the rising anger in their respective societies, but, above all, they have also grasped the real danger of new communication technologies and have begun seriously thinking about the adequate methods for limiting their damage.

The Arab authorities are beginning to feel the weight of cyberspace more than ever before. Control will be stepped up, governments turning to more effective experts.
Armies: A Reassuring Factor for the Population or for the Dictators?

For over forty years, the word “army” in the Arab world was synonymous with coup d'état and state of emergency. The institution was at the origin of political systems or their ultimate guarantor. Whereas it represents a component of the security apparatus, the government’s last recourse, in Tunisia and Egypt, as we have seen, it dissociated itself from the police forces and recognised the legitimacy of protesters’ demands, eventually leaving its chief in power. What has happened over the course of the past few decades to make societies rejoice at the intervention of the armed forces or even call for it, as was the case in Tunisia and later during the Egyptian revolution? Aware of the historical weight of the army in the construction of the nation-state after independence in the respective countries, the majority of Arab leaders, whether emerging from the army’s ranks or not, quickly understood the danger it could represent. They all undertook to marginalise and neutralise it, particularly by granting it considerable economic privileges.

In Egypt, it was the United States that financed this policy for the most part, granting substantial allowances to generals. At the same time, the heads of State developed a complex system of security apparatuses whereby the State’s mission to protect was metamorphosed into protection of the regime. Security agencies are in charge of information tasks and maintaining order; they control citizens’ everyday activities. Designed as the coercive arm of the regime, these security agencies became the direct managers of policy and public space. Direct management of public life by these agencies has grown without precedent over the past decade. More security has entailed less politics; the insurrections in the region reveal the decline of political institutions.

The characteristics of security systems in the Arab world are no different from those of Latin America, Eastern Europe and Southern Europe before their transition to democracy: the role of shield between the State and society, operating in a closed circuit of apparatuses varying in size and complexity, but whose culture of impunity and method of operation remain the same and encourage an inexorable logic of terror. The mass insurrections that broke out at the beginning of the year had the effect of breaking the closed circuit in which the machines of power operate. The population serves as an indicator of divergences and catalyst of rivalries. The people’s insurrection has had the effect of separating the institutions serving the regime from those that claim to serve the cause of the State – first and foremost, the army. Kept away from tasks of maintaining order, the latter can play the role of guarantor of the transition. There are numerous links between it and the security apparatus, however. Long isolated from political decisions, even during the Bourguiba years (1957-1987), the Tunisian army has not been involved in the country’s economic life and has thus not participated in the regime’s corruption. Members of the Egyptian armed forces, on the other hand, have been in power since the revolution of 1952. Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser had an ambitious social and economic development project for his country and for the entire Arab world. His nationalist ideology won over the people, who forgave him his failures in political management and his systematic attacks on the freedom of expression. In contrast, his successor, Anwar al-Sadat, also from the army and champion of economic liberalism to the benefit of a new parasite upper class, introduced the culture of corruption while ensuring the loyalty of the army: he granted it economic privileges with a view to marginalise it. Over the past ten years, the resentment of the army towards Mubarak has grown. The president elicited discontent by allowing a small circle of businessmen gravitating around his heir to accumulate more and more wealth.

In the days preceding the regime’s downfall, differences emerged: should they continue to support Mubarak or force him to resign? The consensus in favour of the second option grew stronger, but the army seemed to hesitate to assume the responsibility itself for deposing him. The great difference lies in the nature of the military intervention: in Tunisia, the army acted to protect the people; it forced Ben Ali to leave, with the approval of the American “friend.” The Egyptian army, on the other hand, appeared at the onset of events to fill the security gap in the street. It subsequently remained neutral when the regime’s militia forces attacked the protesters. It definitely made the decision to break with a dying regime but preserve the system. After the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions, the army is in a position to set its conditions for the return to civil power. For the time being, nothing would indicate it wishes to supplant it. In this regard, observing Turkey’s political management of the military facet will help to comprehend future scenarios.
Turkey: An Example to Follow?

Turkey has opted for renewing the strategic vision of its foreign policy. It has done so following reflection over the course of several years. Turkey’s recent diplomatic ambition, timidly deployed since the year 2000, has now been assumed. But the question remains of whether Turkey has the capacities corresponding to the ambitions of a middle power that would not endanger its institutionalised links with the West.

Turkey’s political expertise in democratic transition, the coexistence of diverging forces and its management of the relationship between politics and the military will serve as fertile ground for cooperation with a number of South Mediterranean countries.

It is certain that the new foreign policy corresponds to a long-term strategic option in accordance with a perspective based on coherent analyses of the multipolar world. However, it is clear that the reticence increasingly felt in Europe to Turkey’s accession has played a primordial role in its new diplomatic orientations. While waiting for Europe, Turkey has the ambition of becoming a real middle power. The leaders in Ankara are convinced that an influential Turkey will strengthen its arguments and help persuade the European Union (EU) to accept its accession.

According to Ahmet Davutoğlu, architect of Turkish diplomacy, Turkey is “a country with a multidimensional geography”; it should pursue a “policy of peace”, become a pole of “regional stability” and attain a situation of “zero problems with neighbours” thanks to “soft power.” Becoming a leading State in the region is not a camouflaged desire. The leaders of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), realised that it was possible to change the rules of the game in neighbouring regions “surrounding” them and extend their political and economic influence towards farther regions that had been the monopoly of the great powers.

Certain observers qualify the new Turkish diplomacy as “neo-Ottoman,” since it gives priority to relations based on cultural and religious affinities. These analyses show ignorance of the social and internal dynamics transformations in Turkey. A Syrian intellectual rebels against such a simplification, asking: “Is it conceivable that a knowledgeable man such as Erdogan erase a century of History in which Turkey has modernised and ridded itself of the weight of its Ottoman heritage?” A lucid analysis sums up the situation stating that the AK Party in power is “a conservative party on issues of society, democratic in policies and neo-liberal in economics. It is the political expression of the new Anatolian bourgeoisie that has grown in power since the 1980s. This entrepreneurial bourgeoisie, puritan and traditionalist but attached to a democratic regime and pro-European, is part of modern Turkey.”

The political and economic weight of Turkey was strengthened during the Arab revolutions. The return of Egypt on the regional arena will not weaken the Turkish role. The two countries will open to areas of their respective interest. Turkey’s political expertise in democratic transition, the coexistence of diverging forces and its management of the relationship between politics and the military will serve as fertile ground for cooperation with a number of South Mediterranean countries. Hence, Turkey plays a decisive role, and will continue to do so in the future, in the peace process between Arab countries and Israel despite the tensions it has experienced over the past few months with the right-wing Israeli government. This conflict, which remains without a fair and equitable solution, is the crux of all the geopolitical problems hampering all projects in the Mediterranean.

The Israeli-Arab Conflict

The widespread and deep-rooted attachment in the consciousness of Arab societies to the Palestinian issue is not a marginal phenomenon or simply a fad.

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3 KİLO M., the al-Safir daily, 6 September 2010, Bayreuth.
It is a constant that should be taken into account when attempting to comprehend the region’s complex structure. Public opinion as well as the Arab elite are more than ever concerned by this conflict, which drags on, becoming increasingly difficult to resolve. Like any socio-political action in countries in this region since the emergence of the Nation-State, decisions to sign peace treaties were not made after consultation with the people, but were rather decisions imposed from above, completely marginalising the role of societies and their representatives. Since then, peace has existed only between governments, but has been completely absent from the spirits and cultures of both sides. Hence, a more scathing animosity can be seen in the societies whose governments have signed treaties with Israel than in the Arab societies that are not yet members of the “peace” club. The measures to be undertaken so that peace can be adopted by Arab and Israeli public opinion must be considered. In the current situation, this is an impossible task. The occupation of Palestinian territories, with the “autonomous” territories surrounded, rendering the economic situation unbearable for the Palestinian people, the war in Iraq, the matter of Palestinian and Iraqi refugees and the heightened sentiment of injustice and rejection do not but increase the barriers to any hopes of political improvement leading to economic development.

To escape war through wars seems a suicide policy. Leading the warring parties to hold talks without pre-requisites could be one of the solutions. This would involve recognising the different parties without preliminary selection. The representatives of the different parties would be chosen by each party, even if the choice may seem wrong to some, a factor which would in no case affect their credibility within their society.

**The Gulf States and the Mediterranean Region**

The Gulf States are at a critical point in their turbulent history. On the one hand, the matter of the legitimacy of rulers worries some (Bahrain), the rise of Islamism others (Kuwait), terrorist networks financed by a faction in power yet others (Saudi Arabia) and competition for control of a heterogeneous government yet others (United Arab Emirates). In addition to all of these seeds of agitation, conflicts that are undeclared but not, however, camouflaged, are developing between leaders (Saudi Arabia and Qatar, for instance). These conflicts are portrayed in different manners but the media play a primordial role in inflaming them. This rivalry is reflected on the Arab stage in general in the use of oil revenue to influence allegiances. Saudi Arabia can be seen to play an increasing role as a vehicle of American policy in the Middle East, while Qatar attempts to play the role of a “free electron”, with its ambivalent policy seeming to open towards Israel while providing support to radical movements. The rise in oil prices will but accentuate the impact of policies undertaken by these States on the ensemble of Arab countries. The issue is to ascertain in which direction the autocratic regimes of the Gulf States will go: will they move towards political opening or remain in a state of political stagnation that will engender implications regarding retrograde forces of all types? It is also impossible not to notice the timid attempts at opening through the organisation of municipal elections in Saudi Arabia and legislative elections in Kuwait and elsewhere. However, there is also no denying that the oil manna is in the hands of the ruling families, and that these countries exist on the basis of selected distribution. The Gulf region is strewn with US military bases and national security is ensured by experts from different Western countries. This reveals the fragility of these States. Their fears following the Arab revolutions could turn into efforts at “sabotage” via the manipulation of financial aid to South Mediterranean countries, aid they will be needing on the short and medium terms.

**Perspectives for Democratisation and Reform**

Beginning in the year 2000, a great hope arose among certain people, from the Maghreb to the Mashreq, with the rise to power of King Mohammed VI in Morocco, King Abdullah in Jordan, President Assad Jr. in Syria and Prince Hamad in Qatar. The idea of political reform seemed to be gradually advancing, according to some who believe it is enough to spend nine months in Europe to become a democrat. Numerous current leaders in the region have studied here. For instance, the majority of dictators in Sub-Saharan Africa went to major universities or military schools in Europe. The great hopes arising at the beginning of century were quickly dashed, however; the disappointment was so great that the reactions of the population, in particular young people,
began to be felt. With the recession, institutionalised corruption, very high unemployment rates, virulent repression and muzzled speech, the social protest easily turned into political protest in its most concrete version.

In this context, Arab civil society has experienced significant development after having been present only in weak States such as Palestine and Lebanon. They succeeded in asserting themselves in countries where reforms were undertaken, as Morocco and Jordan. Since then, three types of civil society organisations have emerged in the region:

- Real civil society, which manages to make its way, with great difficulties, through a minefield.
- Organisations that are actually governmental, behind which are always family members of the ruling class. These organisations, which attempt to replace the failing social role of the State, manage to garner European aid.
- The civil society of cocktail receptions revolving around Western embassies. This is where the diplomats or posted Europeans find their “natural” interlocutors, for understandable reasons: they speak their language, drink alcohol like them, their wives do not wear veils, etc. It is the "desired" formula. The situation is moving towards this paradigm. To remedy its shortcomings, it is necessary to seek the support of European civil society and have the latter act as a conduit for all of Europe’s Mediterranean policies. Official institutions could support such a scheme without being in an advanced position.

Notice that the Turkish example provides food for thought that could eventually help develop ideas for the future of Arab civil society, such that the different trends – religious and secular – could harmoniously coexist.

The post-revolutionary period will experience an effervescence of civil society organisations of all sorts. The efforts of Western funding agencies will concentrate on establishing “efficient” and “transparent” programmes to assist in the process. Needs will be expressed by those concerned and there will no longer be any external “agendas”. It will be much more judicious to meet the expectations and demands expressed by credible actors of civil society in countries undergoing change.

In the “revolutionary” movement sweeping the Arab countries, fears of a counterrevolutionary movement are the order of the day. Everything will depend on the transition and how it is managed. Hence political movements with religious connotations (the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Al-Nahda in Tunisia) sow panic due to their weight and organisation among the ranks of the secular. This consideration, however, remains on the order of speculation or exaggeration. Even if the first stages of the new political structure lend themselves to confusion regarding the democratic convictions of certain radical representatives of religious movements, this should not call into question the entire process of constructive national dialogue.

By Way of Conclusion: What Will the Future Bring?

The most important revolution that has taken place has been that of the triumph of the people’s will over submission, of audacity over fear and of participation over despotism. The transition will not be easy and requires numerous factors to succeed in founding a constitutional State and institutionalising the separation of powers. The presence of a multitude of emerging political forces is a normal, positive phenomenon. Experiences in Eastern Europe display the same processes: several years after revolutions there, the situation returned to normalcy, with alliances based on common principles. The transitional period remains critical and highly fragile, but the strength of those men and women who succeeded in overthrowing some of the most feared tyrants of contemporary History will not weaken in the face of reticence, sabotage or bad will. This process will need support from Europe, the closest neighbour, whose economic interests and political stability concerns should lead it to provide support to the democratic process, after having supported authoritarian regimes for a long time, authoritarian regimes existing under diverse banners. Foreign intervention in an interactive form aiming to provide support to democratic transition is more than necessary. We must not adopt the position of isolation and state that the transition period in the South Mediterranean should be effected exclusively through the efforts of the population alone. It goes without saying that they should assume the brunt of it, but without foreign aid, their mission will be more fragile and threatened. This aid – intervention – can come in diverse forms. Support should be provided to the democratic tran-
sition by strengthening the development of national economies and helping them to emerge from a long episode of corruption and poor governance. Thus it will be necessary to strengthen projects between civil society organisations on both sides of the Mediterranean and support social projects in the sphere of development. The experience of democratic transitions that have taken place in Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal and Greece) could provide useful patterns, especially insofar as preparing elections and reform in the security sector.

This process will need support from Europe, the closest neighbour, whose economic interests and political stability concerns should lead it to provide support to the democratic process, after having supported authoritarian regimes for a long time.

The esteem that the insurgent Arab peoples have gained among the international community is very important. It is a factor that will contribute to the desired change in the stereotypes and prejudices saturating Western political literature.

It is important to emphasise that the fear that took root in the spirits of the Arab countries’ populations during decades of humiliation and repression has changed sides. Arab leaders now have the “opportunity” to share this feeling, finally. A number of Arab leaders, as was the case with Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, believed their countries had been spared and they did not feel concerned by what was happening in neighbouring countries because “they are different”. The ophthalmologist’s forecast was shortsighted and Syria has in turn been “hit” by the wave of protests.

Governing under a state of emergency over the course of several decades is the epitome of weakness. The majority of Arab regimes do not have or no longer have legitimacy. They have spent years despoiling their countries under various pretexts. They have frustrated any attempts at real development by applying economic policies without identity, whether left-wing or right-wing. To stay in power the longest time possible, they have developed a systemic corruption in order to share revenue and possibly distribute it among protective elements and centres of power helping them to repress and muzzle public life. They even usurped civil society by encouraging the creation of a civil society made to measure, as corrupt and clientelist as the government itself. Finally, they rendered the press mute if not accessory. By censoring all artistic and literary creation, these regimes are the primary culprits responsible for assassinating the soul and creativity of an ancestral culture, something that none of the invaders or colonisers had managed to do in centuries. The commotion of these “sand tigers” is no longer surprising, with a good knowledge of how they operate and their composition.

The revolt spreading through countries where the social, cultural and political conditions are ripe is not an infection, for revolution is not a virus but rather a remedy and the annunciation of a resurrection. The overwhelming wave will continue to spread, but possibly under different forms. Each country is different, with its particular circumstances, capacities and factors that prepare the ground for such deflagration. In any case, to speak of idiosyncrasies should in no case reassure the fearful and the champions of stagnation. It is only to explain that the form of change can vary from one country to another. All Arab countries without exception will face this wave sooner or later.
Panorama: The Mediterranean Year
Since its launch in 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has raised high expectations regarding the establishment of a privileged relationship between the European Union (EU) and its neighbouring countries. The initial Commission documents offered a prospect of new contractual relations, participation in various EU activities and “a stake in the internal market.” From the outset, it was also made clear that this new policy would not replace but rather tries to reinforce existing forms of regional and sub-regional cooperation. Despite the ENP’s ambitious objectives to involve the EU’s neighbours in an increasingly close relationship based upon respect for common values and leading to further political and economic integration, the proposed methodology and geographical scope raised significant questions. For the countries of the Mediterranean, in particular, the potential impact on the Barcelona Process/Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was a key concern. Certain partner countries and observers feared for a dilution of the EMP and a shift of the EU’s political attention and financial aid towards the eastern periphery at the expense of the Mediterranean area. Others pointed at the opportunities of the ENP to establish an integrated Euro-Mediterranean market and to increase the effectiveness and coherence of the EU’s activities in the region. More than five years after the entry into force of the ENP, the time has come to make a first evaluation of this policy.

Regional Differentiation and the Challenge of Coherence

The ENP is not the result of a predetermined blueprint, but rather a dynamic process which is in constant evolution. Of particular importance is certainly the increased regional differentiation with the design of more specific policies for different groups of countries. In the southern periphery, the Union for the Mediterranean builds upon the acquis of the Barcelona Process in an attempt to deepen the Euro-Mediterranean integration and to increase its visibility for citizens. In the East, the Black Sea Synergy (BSS) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) constitute the regional framework of the ENP. The EaP includes the six ENP countries in Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus (Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan); the Black Sea Synergy also includes the two regional powers Russia and Turkey but not Belarus. Whereas the BSS essentially focuses on the regional problems of the Black Sea area, the EaP is more oriented towards the partner countries' alignment with the EU. The differences in focus and methodology between the EaP and the BSS cannot conceal that both policy initiatives to a large extent deal with similar problems and challenges. For instance, the integration of the energy markets is a key objective of both the BSS and the EaP thematic platforms on energy security. There is, in other words, an obvious overlap regarding the issues and sectors for regional cooperation and legal approximation.

The introduction of new regional initiatives is a logical result of increased differentiation and provides new impetus to the EU’s neighbourhood relations but also raises questions of effective coordination and policy coherence. It is crucial to avoid the ENP disintegrating into a bundle of competing policies,
Bilateral Differentiation as an Incentive for Reform

It is no secret that the ENP’s methodology has been largely inspired by the EU’s recent enlargement experience. The listing of priority areas in individual Action Plans and the assessment of progress in periodic Commission reports resemble the practice of the Accession Partnerships and the regular Commission monitoring of progress towards accession. The close link between the pre-accession strategies and the methodology of the ENP implies that the EU has to address similar problems, such as the gap between internal and external standards or the tension between objective and geo-political considerations in the assessment of a country’s performance. In the framework of enlargement, the inclusion of all candidate countries in a comprehensive, inclusive and ongoing accession process counterbalanced by initial perceptions of discrimination. Based upon the image of a competition where all participants join the race at a different stage and advance on the basis of their individual performance, the EU transformed the idea of differentiation into a strong incentive for domestic reform. The ENP is based upon a similar rationale of positive conditionality and it even includes additional incentives, such as increased financial assistance for the best performing countries. The perception of differentiation as an incentive is based on the assumption that competition between countries that are part of a common policy framework enhances the effectiveness of the EU’s conditionality. While this might be true in the specific context of the EU’s enlargement policy, the different framework of the ENP has to be taken into account. First, the ENP target countries do not share a clear mutually agreed objective. In comparison to the membership perspective, the final goal of the ENP is less tangible and more disputed. Second, the candidate countries never seriously questioned the necessity of domestic reforms, whereas the ENP includes a number of authoritarian regimes and reluctant participants who are unable or simply unwilling to pay the price for alignment with the proposed EU model of governance. Hence, the basic preconditions for successful conditionality, such as attractive incentives and a favourable domestic context, are absent in the ENP. The effectiveness of the EU’s engagement will depend more, therefore, on ‘joint ownership’ and concrete initiatives rather than on asymmetrically imposed norms and the offer of long-term benefits.

A key weakness of the ENP seems the impossibility to offer an attractive perspective to countries that are not necessarily interested in closer relations with the EU. The impact of the ENP on countries such as Belarus, Libya, Syria and Algeria is at least questionable. Moreover, it is difficult to find an appropriate balance between the differentiation of legal relations at the bilateral level and the ambition to promote regional and sub-regional cooperation. A considerable differentiation in relations between the EU and individual EMP countries might lead, for instance, to a fragmentation of the Barcelona Process. This is particularly the case in the Middle East, where an intensification of bilateral EU-Israel relations could potentially weaken cooperation between Israel and its Arab neighbours. A gradual shift from multilateralism to bilateralism could indeed be observed in the EU’s Mediterranean policies, with an increased focus on the establishment of ‘advanced’ bilateral relations.

Finalité: Everything but the Institutions?

The implementation of the Joint Document establishing Morocco’s advanced status in its relationship with the EU represents, according to the ninth meeting of the EU-Morocco Association Council on 13 December 2010, “a real qualitative change...
PARTNERSHIP FOR DEMOCRACY AND SHARED PROSPERITY

In light of recent events in the Mediterranean, it is imperative to review the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). To this end, the EU has launched the “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PDSP),” an initiative based on a true commitment to the shared values of democracy, human rights, social justice, good governance and the rule of law. It is a differentiated approach that is sensitive to the specific characteristics and circumstances of each country.

1. Immediate Response

The EU’s first response was to respond rapidly to the challenges arising in the Southern Mediterranean. This response has included: €30 million in humanitarian aid; facilitation of consular cooperation and evacuation; Frontex joint operations; use of the €25 million in the EU External Borders Fund and European Refugee Fund; High Representative/Vice President visits to Tunisia and Egypt and an international coordination meeting in Brussels; and support for democratic transition.

2. Adaptation of the EU’s Approach

The EU’s response to events in the Southern Mediterranean countries has led to a review of the ENP to adjust it to the current situation in the Mediterranean. The PDSP is based on the principle of “more for more,” that is, those countries that go further and faster with specific and quantifiable reforms will receive more support. To this end, support will be reallocated or refocused away from those countries that stall or backslide on the agreed reform plans.

3. Democracy and Institution Building

The EU is ready to support the process of democratic and constitutional transition through the provision of specialised advice, electoral assistance and technical expertise. In the sphere of economic and social development, the EU calls for the creation of a platform for civil society, political parties, trade unions and associations, funded by the EU and with the support of EU political parties, trade unions, foundations and NGOs. Moreover, the EU plans to increase its support for civil society through a Civil Society Neighbourhood Facility. Finally, social dialogue between trade unions and employers can be supported through the Euro-Mediterranean Social Dialogue Forum.

4. Tackling the Challenges of Mobility

With a view to enhancing people’s mobility, the EU considers it necessary to strengthen its capacity-building efforts in the Southern Mediterranean countries in the spheres of borders, migration and asylum and to ensure more effective cooperation between law enforcement services. In addition, the EU has proposed the creation of Mobility Partnerships with Partner Countries specifically to manage the movement of people between the EU and each third country. In the short term, the Commission will work with Member States on legal migration legislation and visa policy to support the goal of enhanced mobility. To this end, local Schengen cooperation should be reinforced and full use should be made of the improvements to the EU Visa Code.

5. Promoting Inclusive Economic Development

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a critical role in economic growth and development and job creation. Consequently, the EU is ready to support a sound regulatory framework through cooperation and policy dialogue under the Euromed Industrial Work Programme. This should be accompanied by employment and social policies. To tackle these challenges, funding could be provided by international financing institutions (IFIs), the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

6. Maximising the Impact of Trade and Investment

For trade and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) to deliver their full potential, they must take place in a favourable business climate. The EU’s support measures for trade and investment in each country should be tailored to its specific situation. In the short-to-medium term, the EU has proposed: accelerating the conclusion and approval of trade liberalisation agreements, especially on agricultural and fishery products with Tunisia and Morocco; launching negotiations on agreements on conformity assessment and acceptance of industrial products; accelerating the bilateral negotiations currently underway on the liberalisation of trade in services; and concluding the regional Convention on pan-Euro-Mediterranean preferential rules of origin in 2011. In the medium-to-long term, the ultimate objective is the creation of comprehensive free trade areas. The countries most committed to economic and political reform could thus be more deeply integrated into the EU single market, including through actions such as regulatory convergence.

7. Enhancing Sectoral Cooperation

In terms of the security and transit of oil and gas supplies, there is clear potential to build a Euro-Mediterranean partnership for the production and management of renewables. Likewise, in the medium term, the Southern Mediterranean could be integrated into the EU’s internal energy market, thereby creating an EU-Southern Mediterranean Energy Community. With regard to education, greater use should be made of the Erasmus Mundus, Euromed Youth and Tempus education programmes to increase the number of young people from the Southern Mediterranean who participate in them. As for the agricultural sector, the EU’s Partner Countries should improve efficiency and productivity and ensure the security of the food supply. Rural development could be supported by launching a European Neighbourhood Facility for Agriculture and Rural Development based on EU best practice. Finally, the regulatory environment in the information and communication technology sector should be developed. Likewise, it is vital to ensure the security, stability and resilience of the Internet and other electronic communication technologies.

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8. Regional and Sub-regional Implications

Following the recent dramatic events in the Southern Mediterranean, regional cooperation has become increasingly important. Urgent progress should be made on the Middle East peace process and the positive elements of the Barcelona Process should be integrated with those of the Union for the Mediterranean in a new approach.

9. Financial Assistance

Among other financial assistance, approximately €4 billion is currently available for the period ending in 2013 under the ENPI financing instrument. Now more than ever before, major efforts must be made to ensure coordination and consistency with IFIs. Additional financing to encourage private-sector investment will be provided under the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF). Moreover, the Commission will provide an information tool and develop an investment protection framework for European companies interested in investing in the region.

As for the macroeconomic assistance required by some countries facing short-term difficulties, EU Macro-Financial Assistance could be considered.

For further information:
The Way Forward

Finding an appropriate legal and political format to upgrade the relations between the EU and its neighbouring countries is a work in progress and a process of trial and error. In the past, the ENP has perhaps focused too much on form rather than on substance. It might be true that “the strong symbolism of a new label that marks a strengthened commitment of the Union might help to raise the profile of relations with the EU and thus unlock additional political will and administrative capacity,” as argued by Patten and Solana in their Joint Paper of 2002. However, new labels in themselves are not enough and need to be accompanied by clear and realistic objectives.

In order to be successful, the ENP needs to be pragmatic. A good example of such a pragmatic approach is, for instance, the mobility partnerships between the EU and third countries. Based upon the support of the Union and the participating Member States, concrete cooperation projects are developed to improve the opportunities for legal migration to the Union and support the partner countries in the management of migration flows. Such partnerships are not restricted to the management of legal migration to the EU (such as a project of seasonal migration of Moroccan workers to Spain), but also include projects to facilitate circular migration for migrants settled in the EU (such as a programme to support entrepreneurs of Moroccan origin in Europe in setting up sustainable economic activities in Morocco). Another example of pragmatic cooperation can be found in the field of energy where the Union has concluded memoranda of understanding with several ENP partners, has established early warning mechanisms and invests in the promotion of increased energy efficiency and the use of renewable resources. Moreover, the recent accession of Moldova and Ukraine to the Energy Community Treaty is a fundamental step towards the creation of a pan-European energy market. The significance of this treaty cannot be underestimated. It implies the establishment of a common regulatory framework for energy markets in the ‘Wider Europe’, to use an old-fashioned term, by extending the application of the acquis communautaire in significant areas such as energy, environment and competition law to the territories of the participating countries.

So far, no Mediterranean ENP partners have been involved in this example of flexible integration but, following the example of Turkey, an observer status may not be excluded.

Conclusions

Despite its ‘growing pains’ and limitations, the ENP offers an interesting framework for the exchange of good practices among the various actors operating in the European neighbourhood. It allows for a cross-fertilisation between different regional policies and increases the interdependence between the Union and its neighbours on the one hand, and among the neighbouring countries themselves on the other. For several reasons, such as the continued existence of ‘frozen’ conflicts, the lack of interest among certain partner countries, the inability to offer sufficiently attractive incentives and the ambiguity of its final objectives, the potential of the ENP has not yet been fully exploited. A more focused and pragmatic approach, including a strong social dimension and a connection with EU programmes, such as the Europe 2020 strategy, may help to overcome the remaining stumbling blocks for a more successful implementation of the ENP.

Bibliography


In light of the success of the first edition of the Euromed Survey, the report for which was widely disseminated, this article presents some of the main highlights from the second edition, which corresponds to 2010. Although the fieldwork for the survey was conducted between October and December 2010, that is, prior to the convulsive events that have recently rocked the Southern Mediterranean, the analysis and interpretation of the survey results take into account the new scenarios unfolding in the region and strive to identify the relationships with them.

Some 598 experts, policymakers and members of civil society from all 43 Member Countries of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) participated in this edition of the survey, answering the questionnaire between November and December 2010. The questionnaire included a total of 31 general questions divided into three thematic blocks and paid special attention both to the main features of Euro-Mediterranean policy and to economic and financial issues (specifically, the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA), including, among other things, the liberalisation of services and agricultural products, sustainable development, energy and water).

The responses received provided a balanced and representative sample from both the Southern and Northern Mediterranean (44% and 54%, respectively). Likewise, the responses from Mediterranean Partners Countries (MPCs), which, for the purposes of this analysis, include all Member Countries of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and UfM, and from the 27 Member States of the EU accounted for 49% and 47.3%, respectively.

**Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Union for the Mediterranean 2008-2011: Satisfactory Planning and Relevance, Lacklustre Implementation**

The global assessment of the Euro-Mediterranean process was not as positive as the view of the potential of the Euro-Mediterranean institutions. Respondents’ opinions in these areas showed that experts and actors are still willing to give the construction and development of the EMP/UfM’s institutional architecture the benefit of the doubt with regard to its eventual full operational deployment. There was no consensus regarding the assessment of the implementation of the free trade area (FTA). However, the respondents generally felt that the implementation of the FTA had had a more positive impact on the growth and competitiveness of MPCs, in particular, than on areas such as employment, on which its impact was deemed to have been minimal.

As for the sectorial strategies, the Euro-Mediterranean action plans and the six projects launched under the UfM, respondents took a twofold approach: while they were critical or very critical of the progress made on the implementation of the different programmes, they were also uneven in their assessments, revealing a notably positive trend with regard to the assessment of the suitability or relevance of the projects themselves or their relevance within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean objectives.

In general, the Euro-Mediterranean strategies and action plans suffer from a lack of visibility, as witnessed by the significant share of survey-takers
who were not familiar with them. Those who did know them considered them to be quite important to achieving the EMP’s objectives. However, when the survey questions turned to the actual progress made on these plans and strategies in recent times, respondents revealed an even more acute lack of knowledge. More than 50% of the survey-takers believed progress had been made on only two plans: the Istanbul Plan to Strengthen the Role of Women and the Priority Action Plan on Energy. At the other end of the spectrum, 80% of survey-takers believed that no progress had been made or regression had occurred on the Employment Framework of Actions, which has indeed been severely hampered by the current economic situation.

The global assessment of the Euro-Mediterranean process was not as positive as the view of the potential of the Euro-Mediterranean institutions

As for the UfM projects, their importance was undisputed: all received very high scores. However, they have not all advanced at the same pace. More than 50% of the survey-takers believed that progress had been made on only two of the six projects: the Mediterranean Solar Plan and the Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI). The stumbling blocks encountered setting up the Secretariat have undeniably affected the projects. The projects most likely to be viewed as having experienced greater progress were those that have taken on clearly defined forms.

The Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area: A Mixed Impact in an Inhospitable Environment for Economic and Financial Cooperation

The thematic dossier of the second edition of the survey focused on the 2010 implementation of the EMFTA and on Euro-Mediterranean economic and financial cooperation. At the economic level, it is worth noting, first, that the global economic crisis has engendered a certain degree of pessimism among the survey-takers with regard to the future prospects for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Given a choice of seven possible outcomes of the current economic crisis, the survey-takers most frequently believed that the EU would tend to turn inward and seek to resolve its own problems, closing itself off to the outside world and failing to integrate the MPCs into its economic strategies.
Additionally, there was no clear consensus among the survey-takers as to whether significant progress had been made on the implementation of the general free trade area (FTA). In contrast, when asked about the implementation of the specific FTAs with each MPC, survey-takers had a clear idea of which countries had made the most progress and which countries the least, giving rise to three well-defined blocks of countries depending on the status of the implementation process for their individual FTAs: the first block, corresponding to countries with very high scores, notably and sig-
significantly includes those countries that have done most to implement their FTA (Tunisia, Morocco and Israel); the second block is comprised of countries receiving high scores (Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon); and, finally, the third group includes Palestine and Algeria, which have made only moderate progress. Also worth noting with regard to this section of the questionnaire is the fact that the survey-takers believed that the implementation of the FTA has had a positive impact, especially on the growth and competitiveness of the MPCs, as opposed to on areas such as employment, on which it is seen to have had only a minimal impact (see Chart 15).

South-South integration received a failing mark with regard to the implementation of the different initiatives intended to help achieve it. Nevertheless, within this context, the Agadir Agreement was rated higher than GAFTA and far higher than the UMA.

Specifically, for the survey-takers, the FTA has had a greater impact on growth and competitiveness (6.1 on average) or small and medium-sized enterprises (5.8) than on employment (5.6) or State revenues (5.3), although in all cases the impact was considered to have been positive. In the case of Turkey, the impact of the customs union on these same areas followed the same order, although the individual scores were significantly higher.

Attention should also be drawn to other aspects related to the thematic dossier on economic and financial cooperation, including: South-South integration, agriculture and services, and financial cooperation.

South-South integration, an essential component of a true Mediterranean free trade area, received a failing mark with regard to the implementation of the different initiatives intended to help achieve it. Nevertheless, within this context, the Agadir Agreement was rated higher than GAFTA and far higher than the UMA. Additionally, the survey-takers viewed the agreements between Turkey and certain MPCs as an efficient mechanism for achieving the FTA, especially survey-takers from the MPCs themselves.

In the sphere of agriculture and services, the scores given to the progress on the negotiations to liberalise trade in services and agricultural products did not encourage optimism, particularly given that the lowest scores came from the MPCs. Although the survey-takers as a whole believed that agricul-
Natural liberalisation would have a positive aspect on both the MPCs and (to a lesser extent) the EU, they also believed that full liberalisation is unlikely to occur. In this context, the way forward will require establishing the deep and global free trade areas envisioned with the MPCs, as, according to survey-takers from both the Northern and Southern Mediterranean, they provide high added value.

Finally, with regard to financial cooperation, the effectiveness of financial cooperation in the form of bilateral assistance under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), as well as financial cooperation provided in the form of direct budget support, received mildly positive scores, with the assistance provided under the ENPI being rated slightly higher. It is worth noting that survey-takers from the Mashreq rated the effectiveness of the ENPI most highly, while non-Mediterranean Europeans gave a negative score to direct budget support.

Priorities

When the survey questions turned to those issues deemed to be most neglected by the EMP/UfM, or those on which progress should be made a priority at the EMP or UfM project level, the initiatives linked to young people and education received the highest scores. When this result is viewed in conjunction with the perception that the FTA has not had a significant impact on job creation, three variables (young people, education and employment) emerge that are critical both to the analysis of the survey and the explanation of the uprisings and democratic transitions now sweeping the Southern shores of the Mediterranean. These results and their interpretation in light of the current transformations should make it possible to establish priority action lines to reorient the current process of Euro-Mediterranean regional integration.

Future scenarios

Economic and financial cooperation is one of the main objectives of the process of Euro-Mediterranean integration. Now that the deadline set for the creation of the FTA has come and gone, it is safe to say that it has only been partially implemented and that not all parties view its impact in the same way. However, in addition to the foregoing, two issues directly affect the fulfilment of this objective. First, according to the survey-takers, the global economic crisis will affect the implementation of the FTA by leading the EU to abandon its current eco-
nomic strategies. Second, the unrest now sweeping the Arab world, despite having begun after the fieldwork for the survey had been completed, has given rise to two new factors that can be seen in the qualitative reports on the survey.\(^1\) On the one hand, given its association with a change in value systems, the depth of the movement that began in Tunisia may put an end to the liberal consensus that enabled the launch of the Barcelona Process. That consensus, which prioritised economic development over democratic reform, has proven unable to accept that the governing elites in the MPCs were anything but reformers and that they directly or indirectly appropriated the financial mechanisms for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. On the other hand, while the result of the uprisings is eminently political, they have a clear socioeconomic basis in the increase in inequality and social injustice and, thus, the implementation of the reforms and economic cooperation intended to facilitate the transition to a free trade area should be reviewed in order to increase their credibility and effectiveness.\(^2\)

**Conclusions**

In conclusion, as part of a general reflection on the survey and its interpretation, one must ask how it is that none of the participating experts managed to detect or predict anything resembling the changes that have taken place, above all, in Tunisia and Egypt. No one detected the pre-revolutionary situation, despite the impending nature of the events, and for many of the questions concerning the outlook for the future, respondents gave the same answers as in the 2009 edition and, in some cases, even took more optimistic views. In any event, the answers received may point to a significant gap between the problems and expectations of the people and the points of view of the experts and policymakers.\(^3\)

However, the results also reveal the detection of the serious short- and long-term challenges facing the region and, in particular, its people (impact of the crisis on development, social tensions resulting from structural unemployment, continuing irregular migration), as well as the strong likelihood that the current political regimes will remain in power and, thus,

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\(^2\) Ibid.

that the detected and diagnosed problems will not be effectively tackled and resolved. More than revolutions, the responses seem to indicate a resigned acceptance of a situation that is unlikely to change.

The new panorama of democratic reforms and transitions opens the door for a similar reformulation of Euro-Mediterranean relations, one that moves beyond the mere setting of objectives that are more rhetorical than real and, above all, fully capitalises on and maximises the role of the UfM. However, the new panorama of democratic reforms and transitions opens the door for a similar reformulation of Euro-Mediterranean relations, one that moves beyond the mere setting of objectives that are more rhetorical than real and, above all, fully capitalises on and maximises the role of the UfM.
The Challenge of Security in the Sahel: The Algerian, Moroccan and Libyan Perspectives

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The Sahel’s Emergence as a Security Threat

The ‘security-development’ crisis that has engulfed much of the Sahel over the last 12-18 months, especially in Mauritania, Mali and Niger, has been recognised by international and EU bodies as posing a particular threat and challenge to the EU and EU interests, especially in the Western Mediterranean region, and, of course, to the Maghreb itself. For example, at its External Relations Council meeting in Luxembourg on 27 October 2009, the Council expressed its “concern over the security situation in parts of the Sahel region, in particular in Mauritania, Mali and Niger. (…) Recent events indicate that the region runs the risk of becoming a safe haven for terrorist networks and activities. This situation constitutes first and foremost a serious threat to the Sahel region and its population, but also to other regions, including Europe.”

For example, in November 2009, Richard Barrett, the former British intelligence official and the UN’s highest ranking official responsible for monitoring the activities of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, said that, while attacks by al-Qaeda and its operatives were decreasing in many parts of the world, the situation was worsening in North Africa. He was referring specifically to the activities of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which had changed its name from Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in January 2007.

Within a year of the October 2009 meeting, the Sahel had risen to the top of the agenda of the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council. At its meeting in Luxembourg on 25 October 2010, the Council concluded that “the development of cross-border threats such as terrorism and organised crime, coupled with extreme poverty, unresolved internal conflicts and the weakness and fragility of the States concerned, constitutes a growing challenge for the stability of the region and for the European Union. These threats directly affect the local populations and States of the region, particularly Mauritania, Mali and Niger. They also have an impact on the security of European nationals. (…) In close cooperation with the States of the region, (…) the European Union intends to (…) foster security, stability, development and good governance in the Sahel-Saharan strip.” Accordingly, it instructed the European Commission to draw up a strategy on the region for the beginning of 2011.

The Origin of GSPC/AQIM Activity in the Sahel

The first action attributed to GSPC/AQIM in the Sahara-Sahelian region was the abduction of 32 European tourists in Algeria in February-April 2003. Fourteen were taken to Mali before being released, reportedly for a ransom of around €5 million. The operation was run by an Algerian, Amari Saifi (alias El Para). El Para, as documented in The Dark Sahara and The Dying Sahara, is widely believed to be an agent of Algeria’s Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS), which orchestrated the operation with the complicity of US military-intelligence services. The US used the operation to justify the launch of its Sahara-Saharan front in the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

After El Para’s 2003-4 operation, the other incidents attributed to GSPC/AQIM prior to 2008 were
the attack on the Lemgheity garrison in Mauritania in 2005; two engagements in September and October 2006 between Tuareg and an alleged GSPC group in northern Mali; the attack on Djänet airport in south-east Algeria on November 11 2007; and the murder of four French family members near Aleg in Mauritania on December 24 2007.

The ‘security-development’ crisis that has engulfed much of the Sahel has been recognised by international and EU bodies as posing a particular threat and challenge to the EU and EU interests, especially in the Western Mediterranean region, and the Maghreb itself.

In spite of massive propaganda and disinformation, mostly from Algerian and US military intelligence sources, it is very doubtful if GSPC/AQIM had anything to do with any of these incidents. Evidence suggests that the Lemgheity attack was organised by the Cavaliers de Changement, a Mauritanian movement opposed to President Ould Taya, who was overthrown by a military coup a few weeks later. The two engagements against the GSPC by Malian Tuareg were arranged by Algeria’s DRS, who paid the Tuareg to undertake the attacks to make it appear as if the Tuareg were supporting the Americans in the GWOT. Djänet airport was not attacked by AQIM, as claimed by the Algerian security forces, but by Tuareg youth in Djänet as part of their social protest against the Algerian government. The convicted murderers of the French family in Mauritania admitted to being members of AQIM only after two and a half years in detention and alleged torture.

2008: The First Hostages since 2003

The year 2008 saw the first hostage-takings since 2003. However, both abductions took place outside the region. Two Austrians were seized in Tunisia in February, while two Canadian diplomats, the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy and his assistant (their driver was later released), were seized near Niamey in December.

It is likely that neither pair was abducted on AQIM orders. The Austrians were seized by Hamed Essoufi, alias Abdelhamid abou Zéid, second-in-command to El Para in 2003 and strongly believed to be associated with the DRS. There is strong circumstantial evidence that the Austrians were taken hostage on the orders of the DRS, staged as an act of AQIM ‘terrorism.’ Local information from Niamey suggests that the Canadians were seized by henchmen working for the Niger government and passed up to AQIM. All four finished up as hostages of AQIM and were held in the same part of northern Mali as 14 of El Para’s hostages in 2003. The Austrians were released after eight months and the Canadians after four, both after reported ransom payments.

2009: The Escalation of AQIM Activity in the Sahel

Since 2009, AQIM activity in the Sahel has escalated: between January 2009 and January 2011, 19 Westerners (all Europeans), a Togolese and a Malagasy (both subsequently released) were abducted by or on behalf of AQIM. At the time of writing (April 2011), four Frenchmen (all abducted from the Areva uranium complex at Arlit, Niger) and an Italian woman (abducted in southern Algeria) were still in captivity.

Four of these 21 hostages have died: three French and one English. In the case of the three Frenchmen, one may have died through natural causes and the other two as a result of French military intervention. The one death over which there is no ambiguity regarding AQIM’s culpability was that of the Englishman, Edwin Dyer, who was executed in Mali by Abou Zeid on May 31 2009. Dyer’s execution gave AQIM extensive international publicity and ‘credibility’ as a serious terrorist organisation in the Sahel. However, serious questions about the roles of both the British and Algerian authorities in his murder remain unanswered.

At the Heart of AQIM is the DRS

On hearing of Dyer’s murder, the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown said: ‘I want those who
would use terror against British citizens to know beyond doubt that we and our allies will pursue them relentlessly, that they will meet the justice they deserve.' Neither Abou Zeid nor al-Qaeda in the Sahel (AQIS) has been pursued relentlessly. The exact opposite has been the case, except for a brief engagement by a Malian army patrol which reportedly killed three members of AQIS. AQIS believed it had been betrayed by Malian intelligence officer Colonel Lamana Ould Bou, a double agent between AQIS and Mali’s State Security. Lamana was gunned down in Timbuktu. Just before he died, he told the local media that: ‘At the heart of AQIM is the DRS.’ Lamana Ould Bou confirmed what some people knew and many others suspected, namely that AQIS was fundamentally a creation of the DRS. Its core structure, or ‘heart’ to which Ould Bou referred, comprised Abou Zeid, El Para’s former second-in-command, and a few dozen Algerian GSPC who had accepted President Bouteflika’s amnesty and ‘repented.’ A few dozen of these ‘repents’, as they were known, appear to have been encouraged or were sent by the DRS into Algeria’s extreme south in 2006 where they were reorganised by Abou Zeid into the ‘hard core’ of AQIS. Most reports from Algerian and other ‘intelligence’ services, estimated their number during the period 2006-2008 at around 200. Since Abou Zeid’s return to the region with the two Austrian hostages in 2008, AQIS has been actively recruiting radical Islamists – young ‘jihadists’ – from within the Sahel. Most of the new recruits are Mauritaniains, who, according to Algerian security sources, now outnumber Algerians, with small numbers from Mali and probably less from Niger. Estimates of the total number of AQIS are now put at around 300-400.

The Tuareg Rebellions

AQIS has had a major destabilising presence in the Sahel, especially since the end of 2009 and early 2010. One reason for this has been the failure of both the Mali and Niger governments to achieve satisfactory and long-lasting peace agreements with the Tuareg after rebellions had begun in both countries in 2007. The causes of both rebellions were multiple and localised. Both, however, reflected an increasing sense of marginalisation and disenfranchisement, compounded by the abuse of indigenous rights by international mining companies, notably uranium in Niger, without any benefit to the Tuareg populations themselves. In both countries, the rebellions ‘fizzled’ out, in a state of exhaustion and despair, with no coherent ‘post-conflict’ peace plan other than crudely brokered deals in which Libya’s Colonel Gaddafi managed to ‘buy off’ some of the rebel leaders while persuading fighters to lay down their arms for a ‘cash payment.’ In Niger, the overthrow in February 2010 of President Mamadou Tandja in a military coup, rather put the question of a Tuareg settlement onto the back burner. The result of this lack of any serious attempt at ‘post-conflict’ resolution and reconstruction, combined with the massive damage done to local economies since 2003 – particularly the tourism industry – by Washington’s GWOT, meant that many hundreds of young Tuareg former rebels found themselves with absolutely no economic livelihood. Not surprisingly, a growing number have sought survival through ‘banditry’ as ‘auxiliaries’ to AQIS.

International Drugs Trade Moves into Sahel

The destabilisation caused by the presence of AQIS and the post-rebellion problems of the Tuareg were compounded by the emergence in the region of seemingly massive drug trafficking interests. Smuggling and ‘trafficking’ of goods of one sort or another across the Sahara has always been an integral part of the desert’s economic lifeblood. Increasingly over the last decade, drugs – cocaine from Latin America and cannabis resin from Morocco – have overtaken cigarettes as the dominant commodity.

Smuggling has always been an integral part of the desert’s economic lifeblood. Drugs have overtaken cigarettes as the dominant commodity

The scale of the cocaine trafficking came to light in November 2009 with the discovery of a Boeing 727, capable of carrying 10 tonnes of cocaine,
wrecked on a makeshift airstrip at Tarkint in Northern Mali. The plane’s undercarriage had seemingly failed and the crew had tried to incinerate the evidence. The plane appeared to have been one of several that had carried cocaine from Latin America (probably Venezuela) into the Malian desert for transshipment across the Sahara.

Perhaps not surprisingly, investigations appeared to reveal a close overlap between those elements of AQIM, the DRS and Malian State Security who were involved in the ‘hostage-taking’ business and those involved in the drugs trafficking. In addition, many of the local Tuareg and Arab communities clearly had more than a passing interest.

July 22 2010: France’s Military Interventions

On July 22 2010, France carried out two disastrous military raids into Mali: one to the north-west of Timbuktu; the other in the Tessalit region of north-east Mali. The raids, undertaken alongside Mauritanian forces, failed in their alleged aim of freeing Michel Germaineau, a Frenchman abducted in Niger and held hostage by Abou Zeid. AQIM claimed to have executed Germaineau in retaliation for the raids, in which 6-7 AQIM members were killed. However, evidence from both local sources and DRS agents indicated that Germaineau may have died from heart disease some weeks before.

President Sarkozy’s response to the Germaineau announcement, in language reminiscent of George Bush, was to declare war on AQIM. AQIM’s response was to seize seven hostages (5 French and 2 African) from Areva’s uranium mining complex at Arlit in northern Niger on September 16. The hostages and their abductors were tracked to the same Tigharghar Mountains near Tessalit where France had made its abortive July 22 raid. At the time of writing, the two Africans and a French woman have been released; four remain captive. The four survivors are believed to have been moved to north-east Niger.

In January 2011, two more Frenchmen, Antoine de Leocour and Vincent Delory, were abducted from a restaurant in Niamey (Niger). They were killed the next day during a French military assault close to the Niger-Mali border.

This series of events – Sarkozy’s botched July 22 raids, his ‘declaration of war’, the Arlit abductions and the deaths of Leocour and Delory – have raised questions about both the calibre of France’s intelligence services and its predisposition to military intervention in the Sahel.

Some commentators have argued that the rush by French intelligence services to identify (incorrectly according to Algeria’s DRS) Leocour and Delory’s kidnappers and the haste with which Sarkozy ordered a massive military intervention when the lives of the hostages were not in immediate danger suggest that Sarkozy’s decision-making is geared more to improving his popularity with France’s electorate than safeguarding the lives of hostages and ensuring France’s best long-term interests in the Sahel.

Algeria’s Motives in the Sahel

Alternatively, there is reason to believe that France may have been led into a trap in the Sahel by Algeria’s DRS.

Algeria is being strongly backed by both the US and the UK as their key ally in their ill-informed and ill-conceived regional counter-terrorism strategy. This, in turn, has strengthened Algeria’s own ambitions of establishing itself as the dominant regional power in the Sahel. Hence its brinkmanship strategy of destabilising the region through its orchestration of AQIS, while putting itself at the head of a largely self-created regional security grouping, comprising itself, Mauritania, Mali and Niger, which would be sufficient to deter any foreign (i.e. Western) military intervention in the region.

Algeria’s questionable commitment to the Sahel’s security was demonstrated by its very noticeable boycott of the October 14-15 Bamako conference to examine the security and ‘terrorist’ situation in the Sahel

The ongoing theatre that ensued through much of 2010 saw the establishment in April of a joint command headquarters at Tamanrasset between these four countries and a series of security conferences
and meetings, managed almost entirely from Algiers, designed to reassure and reinforce Algeria’s US and UK alliances, while excluding all other Northwest African powers, especially Morocco, from any involvement in the Sahel.

However, France’s influence in the Sahel, as the former colonial power, is an obstacle to Algeria’s hegemonic intentions. Hence its strategy of trying to embarrass France (through misleading information) and weaken its standing in the region.

While France is certainly experiencing difficulties in the region, Algeria’s strategy could backfire. Firstly, Algeria’s neighbours have become increasing aware of its role in managing ‘terrorism’ and fermenting instability in the region. For example, one Mauritanian Minister, Cheikh El Moktar Ould Horma, accused Algeria of being AQIM’s porte-parole, while a Wikileaks document revealed Mali President Toure’s anxieties about the Algerian army’s association with AQIM.

Algeria’s questionable commitment to the Sahel’s security was demonstrated by its very noticeable boycott of the October 14-15 Bamako conference to examine the security and ‘terrorist’ situation in the Sahel. The conference was attended by anti-terrorism experts from all G8 member countries and their counterparts from Burkina Faso, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. Representatives from Spain, Switzerland, Australia, the European Union, the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) also attended.

Secondly, the EU is becoming increasingly aware of Algeria’s duplicitous role in the Sahel.

**Libyan Contagion**

Thirdly, the above concerns are likely to be overwhelmed by possible ‘spill-over’ consequences from events in Libya. By mid-March, some 20,000 refugees/returnees had arrived back in Niger and Mali. This number will rise substantially, causing potentially huge problems for Sahelian countries. These difficulties will be compounded by the return of many armed and militarily trained Tuareg.

The region could become even more insecure if these movements are accompanied by an inflow of arms and so-called ‘al-Qaeda’ elements. Not surprisingly, it is Algeria that is beating the al-Qaeda drum most loudly, with ministers issuing alarming reports of al-Qaeda operatives and arms flowing into the region, although, as is so often the case, without any verification.

**Further reading**


In its 20 November 2010 meeting in Lisbon, the North Atlantic Council adopted a new “Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.” The Lisbon Strategic Concept is NATO’s third post-Cold War concept, following those issued in 1991 (Rome) and 1999 (Washington D.C.). The new Concept provides a very clear-cut illustration of the Alliance’s objectives (“Core Tasks and Principles”); the evolution of the security environment justifying those objectives (“The Security Environment”); and the instruments the Alliance intends to use to achieve its objectives (“Defence and Deterrence,” “Security through Crisis Management,” “Promoting International Security through Cooperation”). Unlike that adopted in Washington, the Lisbon Concept marks a considerable shift in the process of change and reform that the Alliance kicked off at the end of the Cold War, as it takes an unequivocal step forward in the transformation of NATO from a defensive alliance into one concerned with members’ broader security from a global rather than merely regional perspective. The new strategies and policies that the Alliance plans to implement to achieve its updated objectives and broader security objectives are bound to have a considerable impact on the Mediterranean and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (although the new Concept mentions the latter only very briefly, in paragraph 35). From this perspective, this paper, first, examines the new strategy and policies of the Alliance. It then considers the implications that the new Concept may have for the Mediterranean, with particular reference to NATO-EU relations and the prospect of deeper NATO involvement in the Middle East.

The Global Relevance of the New NATO Strategy

The debate over whether NATO should go “global” was implicit in the 1991 reformulation of the strategic environment (an array of multi-dimensional risks stemming from areas others than those the Alliance had dealt with in the Cold War). In the 1990s, the United States repeatedly asked its European allies to provide NATO with a new rationale by expanding the Alliance’s mission to the so called “out-of-area,” in particular to the Persian Gulf, but its efforts were to no avail. In the first decade of the 21st century, most Europeans continued to reject engagement in the Greater Middle East, and, although the 11 September attacks did lead to a NATO intervention in Afghanistan, side by side with the United States, the allies remained sharply divided on Iraq.

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1 The New Strategic Concept: Active Engagement, Modern Defence, available at www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf. See also Lisbon Summit Declaration issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon, available at www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_68828.htm?mode=pressrelease. (Both documents were accessed on 10 January 2011.)


In conclusion, the Alliance has proved unwilling to adopt an automatic commitment to cope with any threat stemming from any part of the globe. While Art. 5 automatism remains valid in the case of defence, other more or less direct threats need to be considered and their nature assessed on a case-by-case basis before any shared commitment is undertaken. In this sense, the Alliance was not transformed into a global alliance.

It did not become global in another sense, as well. There has been a debate about enlarging the membership beyond the traditional perimeter, for instance, to include countries such as Japan. This would have done away with the original Euro-American identity of NATO. However, this kind of global development has also failed to materialise. NATO remains a Euro-American or Euro-Atlantic alliance whose membership has been enlarged on the European side without exceeding the European perimeter. Furthermore, the new Concept, in stressing NATO’s willingness to keep the “door open,” expressly refers to “European democracies” only (paragraph 27).

At the same time, though, NATO has remarkably strengthened its capabilities to intervene in different places and for whatever objectives the allies may want or need. Functionally, NATO has become a global alliance and is ready to act globally. The decisions made in Lisbon enable NATO to improve its global capabilities. Also, the definition of the security environment (paragraphs 7-15) points to a global vision thereof, stressing that “Many regions and countries around the world are witnessing the acquisition of substantial modern military capabilities,” in particular, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, and that “Instability of conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security.” Moreover, unlike the previous Concepts, it speaks of terrorism as a “direct threat.” This trend towards globalisation is summarised in the Concept’s Preface: “The citizens of our countries rely on NATO to defend Allied nations, to deploy robust military forces where and when required for our security, and to help promote common security with our partners around the globe.”

Global Approach to Partnerships

One of the most evident aspects of NATO’s globalisation is the reordering that the Lisbon Concept envisages with regard to its external cooperation. This development directly impacts the Mediterranean Dialogue and NATO’s Mediterranean policy. Previously, NATO had pragmatically pursued distinct and unrelated cooperation relations with other organisations and countries, the Mediterranean Dialogue being one of them. The Lisbon Concept has now brought these relations together under the homogeneous structure of “partnerships,” and they have emerged as NATO’s principal tool for conducting its external cooperation.

The Concept mentions a list of partnerships, including the UN, the EU, Russia, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the NATO-Ukraine and NATO-Georgia Commissions, the Western Balkans, the Mediterranean Dialogue, and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) (in that order).

In the new strategy framework, the varying relationships set up by NATO in the past – as well as any new ones that NATO may initiate in future – will thus be implemented in a single policy framework, in which NATO will act as a hub. This will definitely increase the broad effectiveness of NATO’s external cooperation policy and open the door to interaction between the various partners.

The homologation of the different kinds of external relations maintained by NATO is twin to the intention of multiplying partnerships around the globe. Admittedly, this trend towards multiplication is already underway. It is reflected in the ICI in the Persian Gulf and the cooperation with Georgia in the Caucasus, which clearly goes beyond NATO’s traditional area. The Lisbon Concept states, “The promotion of Euro-Atlantic security is best assured through a wide network of partner relationships with countries and organisations around the globe.” Setting up new partnerships around the globe is clearly the vector that will allow NATO to go global and act globally. In other words, NATO is adopting a “global approach to partnership,” which objectively goes in the direction of an overall NATO globalisation.

The Lisbon Concept underscores that NATO’s approach to partnerships, in addition to being global, will also be flexible: “We will enhance our partnerships through flexible formats that bring NATO and partners together – across and beyond existing frameworks.” This means that NATO will not feel captive to given frameworks and is prepared to act with single partners, both within existing partnerships and across their boundaries, if need be.

A global approach by means of a variety of existing and future partnerships and the use of flexible for-
Implications for the Mediterranean

In a reaction similar to the one that, at first, followed the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the Mediterranean partners (which moreover do not loom high on the partnership list) may perceive the Lisbon changes to the NATO Concept discussed above as a downgrading. However, again as in the case of the ENP, they will soon understand that the change is actually bound to upgrade their bilateral relationship with NATO, and they will very much appreciate this upgrade.

By establishing a “hub and spokes” structure of relations among partnerships, the global approach to partnerships is bound to strengthen the bilateral nature of the current “hub and spokes” relationship between NATO and its partners within existing individual partnerships, in particular the Mediterranean Dialogue. The flexible formats, which will be used in implementing this approach, are complementary to the global approach to partnerships. In fact, they will allow individual partners, if willing, to take part in ventures and debates that cross the varying partnership frameworks. This may well present opportunities to individual Mediterranean partners, which they will be happy to seize.

This is already true for individual partners’ participation in peace support operations and related training and civilian management tasks (a large menu of which is offered by the Concept in paragraph 25), as well as for special operations, such as “Active Endeavour” (in which Morocco has been taking part since October 2009).4 The global approach and the flexible formats may provide novel opportunities for cooperation across different geopolitical regions, i.e. beyond the Mediterranean, most of all with respect to proliferation, terrorism, transnational illegal trafficking and cyber attacks (the new kind of risk added by the Lisbon Concept to the standing list), as well as communication, transport energy and the security environment. Flexible formats will enable NATO and its partners to cooperate individually and across existing frameworks in technology, interoperability, exercises and military planning.

NATO’s flexible formats may provide opportunities for cooperation between the Mediterranean Dialogue and the ICI countries. They may also foster cooperation – to date extremely limited – among the Mediterranean Dialogue countries themselves.5 Most importantly, they may upgrade NATO-EU cooperation in the Mediterranean, where the EU has always been and continues to be particularly engaged with its Euro-Mediterranean frameworks (the ENP and the Union for the Mediterranean) and its own policies, from development aid and commerce to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

The Lisbon Concept is remarkably more open towards NATO-EU cooperation than the previous concepts were. This reflects President Sarkozy’s decision to have France rejoin NATO’s integrated command. As a result of that decision, it is precisely in the Mediterranean, a region traditionally seen by French governments as falling within France’s exclusive purview, that fresh opportunities for NATO-EU cooperation may arise.

In principle, NATO-EU cooperation in the Mediterranean could materialise in the bringing to bear of certain NATO capabilities in the military and security realm and of certain EU capabilities in the economic/civilian realm. In general, it should be facilitated by the convergence between NATO and the EU as organisations dealing with broad security concerns. Cooperation could easily be fostered in the field of civilian crisis management. A number of areas mentioned in the Lisbon Concept, such as communication, transport, energy and the security environment, might also lend themselves to broadening cooperation between NATO and the EU in the Mediterranean.

Military cooperation, i.e. cooperation between NATO and the EU’s CSDP, has already been successfully achieved in the Western Balkans. It could be further

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5 See RAZOUX, Pierre, Comment redynamiser le Dialogue Méditerranéen de l’OTAN avec les pays du Maghreb?, NATO Defense College, Research Papers No. 64, December 2010, which mentions, among other options, maritime and energy security, the struggle against terrorist trends in the Sahel and the need to keep a “door open” to Libya.
developed in North Africa and the Near East, where the EU has considerable experience, in particular with regard to Palestine (providing political conditions one day allow for a “third-party intervention” in which NATO and the EU could work out a suitable division of labour). Admittedly, despite the Lisbon Concept’s new-found warmth towards NATO-EU cooperation, problems stemming from Turkey’s opposition to cooperation in the military field, unless the EU somehow includes Turkey in the CSDP, have yet to be overcome. That may hinder further developments in NATO-EU military cooperation in the Mediterranean (and elsewhere).

The global approach and flexible formats, while encouraging cross-cooperation, certainly will not render the existing regional and bilateral frameworks of partnership void. According to the Concept, “We are firmly committed to the development of friendly and cooperative relations with all countries of the Mediterranean, and we intend to further develop the Mediterranean Dialogue in the coming years.” NATO’s Secretary General has expressed his organisation’s special interest in the Mediterranean on many occasions.7

To conclude, reference must be made to the possible deeper involvement of NATO in the Middle East by means of new partnerships in that region and/or by upgrading the existing partnership with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries in the ICI and/or through operations that NATO might be asked to lead in the region, such as a third-party intervention in Palestine. Should NATO take on possible new tasks in the Middle East, and should it do so using its new “flexible formats” approaches, the current distinction between its relations with the Mediterranean and its relations with the Middle East or the Greater Middle East will no doubt fade. First, the trend is embedded in the new approaches ushered in by the Lisbon Strategic Concept. Second, the geopolitical evolution of the Middle East and the Mediterranean over the past few years has objectively united the two regions. The Mediterranean, as a separate strategic or political framework, can no longer really stand alone. It makes sense as an EU neighbourhood, less so as a strategic prospect from the transatlantic and CSDP perspective. From this point of view, the new NATO strategy may contribute to making overall Euro-Atlantic strategy more effective and to modernising the EU’s strategic approach.

Conclusions

NATO’s new Concept is definitely a significant step forward for the Alliance. The global approach to partnerships and the use of flexible formats in NATO’s relations with the different partnerships promises to be effective.

From a general point of view, whether and to what extent it will be possible to implement the new doctrine will depend less on the doctrine itself than on developments inside and outside the Alliance.

Additionally, when it comes to the Mediterranean and the Middle East, the outstanding weakness is that NATO’s good (and now also flexible) relations are more with regimes than with countries or people. While with democratic members and partners, changes in governments will hardly cause changes in relations with NATO or call NATO into question, no one really knows what would happen if NATO’s current partner regimes in the South were to fall or change.

Admittedly, this is less a problem for NATO (or, for that matter, the EU) than for the Member States. It is the latter that have to decide to shift from a policy of stability with a rhetoric of democracy to a less ambiguous policy of reforms and democratisation (with the costs that may entail). The new Concept lays the foundations for greater effectiveness, but on the condition that the regimes remain stable. This is the question that the Member States of NATO and the EU must focus on in the coming months and years, placing more emphasis on their declarations in favour of political reform and good governance.

Finally, whether NATO will be able to implement such an ambitious agenda remains to be seen. Here again, much depends on future international developments and, even more, on whether the Member States will be able and willing to support and fund the agenda. In particular, in an era of decreasing military expenditure, funding may emerge as a major stumbling block.

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7 Most recently, see the speech by the NATO Secretary General at the NATO-Jordan Public Diplomacy Conference, “NATO, the Mediterranean and the broader Middle East region,” Amman, 7 March 2010.
Over the last year, the shortcomings within the EU’s security policy towards its southern neighbourhood have dramatically come to the fore. For years, the EU has declared that the best way to ensure its security around the Mediterranean is through developing a “ring of friends” – “a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood” with whom the EU would enjoy “close, peaceful and co-operative relations” (European Commission Communication on Wider Europe, 2003). In order to achieve this goal, EU Member States have officially committed themselves to pursue a twofold strategy: to help stem the various conflicts which exist within the region and to promote good governance amongst their neighbours through the offer of closer bilateral ties.

EU governments have invested significant efforts in attempting to achieve the first objective of supporting conflict resolution, and have been particularly active towards the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is considered a key EU foreign policy priority. But the difficulties of working as a single organisation composed of 27 countries have limited the EU’s ability to be taken seriously as a diplomatic heavy weight in the region. As a result, the impact of EU efforts has been limited and several of the conflicts across North Africa and the Middle East have continued to worsen.

While EU governments have been genuinely committed to conflict resolution, their interest in implementing their declared objective of strengthening good governance across their southern neighbourhood has been more limited. Over the years, the EU has often given only lip service to calls for democratic reforms and stronger respect for human rights amongst its Arab neighbours. Many European governments have preferred to cooperate with the various authoritarian regimes in place in order to guarantee short-term stability and secure the collaboration of southern countries in areas of interest to Europeans, including the control of illegal migration and counter-terrorism. But as popular protests toppled regimes across the Arab world during the early months of 2011, they threw into question many of the EU’s short-term security gains and highlighted the long-term unsustainability of its approach to the Mediterranean.

Helpless EU Institutional Innovations

2010 began with the entry into force of the EU’s Lisbon treaty. Member States had heralded the treaty as strengthening the EU’s ability to speak with one voice and to become a more effective security actor. By creating the European External Action Service, double-hatting the High Representative for Foreign Affairs as a European Commissioner and eliminating the rotating Presidency for matters relating to foreign policy, the treaty will, in the long run, strengthen the coherence of the EU’s institutional set up. Before Lisbon, the existence of numerous spokespersons for EU foreign policy – from the European Commission, the EU High Representative to the rotating Presidency – often confused its message. In addition, the fact that both the European Commission and the Council worked on foreign affairs meant that the EU duplicated many of its efforts. At times the allocation of resources was strikingly inefficient. For example, although the European Commission did not have any competences to deal with political matters relating to the Middle East Peace Process, it had staff working on the issue within its delegations in each country of the region. The Council on the
other hand – which was in charge of political matters – only had one staff member in the region. Many of those inefficiencies will be addressed in the long term, although over the course of 2010, the internal debates about the structure of the External Action Service had the unfortunate downside of distracting the EU from pressing foreign policy matters across the Middle East and North Africa.

However, institutional tinkering has been incapable of addressing the more fundamental challenges that have limited the EU’s ability to act as a coherent actor across the Mediterranean in the past and has continued to do so during the course of 2010 – namely the difficulties EU governments face in forging common positions and their unwillingness to let the EU speak on their behalf. For example, in September 2010, French President Nicolas Sarkozy criticised US attempts to revive the Middle East Peace Process and invited Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to Paris to hold peace talks. The French President did so without consulting other Member States or the EU institutions, and at the time the official EU position was to support the US-led efforts.

Continued Inability to Stem Conflict

Throughout the course of 2010, the EU continued its attempts to implement a key aspect of its security policy towards the Mediterranean: stemming the various conflicts across the region that endanger European stability, in particular the Arab-Israeli conflict. The EU did some valuable work in alleviating Palestinian living conditions, but its lack of diplomatic clout continued to prevent it from encouraging Israelis and Palestinians back to the negotiating table, and the conflict continued to worsen.

Europeans continued to provide large amounts of financial assistance to the Palestinians. These made a significant contribution to the development work of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad in the West Bank. EU funds also alleviated the humanitarian situation in Hamas-controlled Gaza, still facing significant limitations on imports and exports imposed by Israel. The EU continued training Palestinian police forces in the West Bank through its police mission EUPOL COPPS, and troops from several European countries remained deployed within the UN’s mission on the Israeli-Lebanese border, monitoring the cessation of hostilities.

Over the course of 2010, the internal debates about the structure of the External Action Service had the unfortunate downside of distracting the EU from pressing foreign policy matters across the Middle East and North Africa

During the course of 2010, the EU’s other flagship institutional innovation of recent years, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), also proved incapable of addressing some of the underlying challenges limiting the EU’s influence amongst its southern partners. Introduced as a French initiative under President Sarkozy in 2008, the UfM was designed to strengthen the EU’s regional policy towards its Mediterranean neighbours by focusing on projects (such as cleaning up the Mediterranean Sea and building motorways) and creating new institutions – including a joint Secretariat and co-Presidency that would be held by one EU Member State and one Southern partner. But since its introduction, the UfM has suffered from the same problems that blighted its predecessor, the Barcelona Process: disputes amongst the Southern partners relating to their various regional conflicts – the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular – have prevented cooperation on other matters and the initiative has ground to a halt. During the course of 2010, a summit for the UfM leaders was postponed for the second time, indefinitely, and the Secretary General of the organisation resigned.
the various parties involved in the conflict. Although even Washington, which traditionally has significantly more leverage than Europe over Israelis and Palestinians, struggled to weigh on the various parties during the course of 2010. Despite repeated efforts by the Obama administration, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas refused to restart peace talks, barring a brief moment in the autumn that rapidly came to an end.

As a result the conflict worsened throughout the course of the year: Hezbollah and Hamas continued their military build-ups in Lebanon and Gaza respectively, partly with Iranian assistance. The long-term damage to Gaza’s private sector grew under the sustained border closures, as did the risk of radicalisation amongst its alienated population. Israeli settlements expanded in East Jerusalem and the West Bank – further complicating their withdrawal in the event of a peace agreement. And in October, Mahmoud Abbas declared that the Palestinians would unilaterally attempt to seek recognition of an independent Palestinian State at the UN by the autumn of 2011.

The Final Days of Short-Termism

2010 was to be the last year before Europeans would be forced to face the unsustainability of their bilateral security policies in the Mediterranean. For years, EU leaders had acknowledged that many of the authoritarian regimes across North Africa and the Middle East were vulnerable to collapse. European leaders were conscious that several autocratic leaders were ageing and that their succession was uncertain – not least in the case of Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak. There was a general awareness across Europe about the risks posed to various Arab regimes resulting from their low levels of economic development and large young populations. At the same time, EU officials also acknowledged that the lack of political pluralism within many authoritarian regimes was hampering the development of liberal opposition parties and in certain cases fuelling religious extremism.

EU leaders, however, did not adopt any long-term strategy to cater for the likely eventual collapse of autocratic regimes within their southern neighbourhood. The EU gave lip service to the need for democratic reforms amongst its neighbours in order to ensure long-term security, but in practice, European leaders preferred to focus on their short-term well-being. EU governments were conscious that democratic reforms could produce significant instability in the medium term. The victory of Hamas, Hezbollah and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in elections in the Palestinian territories, Lebanon and Egypt over recent years had done much to limit enthusiasm across Europe for strong calls for elections within the Arab world.

EU governments preferred to work with the various authoritarian regimes in place in order to ensure their cooperation on a variety of short-term European security interests. These included cooperation on counter-terrorism and illegal migration. In 2010, the EU notably continued trying to negotiate readmission agreements with its southern partners so that they would take back illegal immigrants from Europe – notwithstanding the poor human rights record of several southern neighbours in handling migrants. EU governments were also keen to work with autocratic leaders across North Africa and the Middle East to ensure access to oil, gas and trade.

During the years leading up to 2010, even if the EU had given more importance to democratic and broader good governance reforms amongst its neighbours in the Mediterranean, the scope for success would have been limited. The leaders of autocratic Arab regimes had no interest in reform and the EU had few incentives to sway them. EU membership – which had proved so effective in reforming Eastern Europe during the 1990s – was not in the cards, and, in any event, was not of interest to most southern countries; meanwhile, aid, trade concessions and visa facilitations could not offer the EU the same leverage.

Nevertheless, EU Member States showed strikingly little interest in exploiting the potential of the limited incentives at their disposal. For years they remained reluctant to liberalise trade in agricultural goods and to offer greater mobility for the populations across the shores of the Mediterranean. Upon taking office, Stefan Fule, the new European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, suggested that the EU should consider facilitating visas for its southern partners; but he was strongly rebuked by Member States.

By 2010, the EU’s policy of conditionality appeared to have gone significantly astray. Of the various regimes that would face popular protests during the early months of 2011, several had seen their bilateral relations with the EU upgraded as a reward for
good behaviour, or were in the middle of negotiations, including Tunisia.

The Arab Spring

In the early months of 2011, the various shortcomings in the EU’s security policy towards its southern neighbourhood were dramatically brought to the fore. European leaders were completely taken by surprise as protests calling for democracy spread across the Arab world, toppling the regimes in Tunisia and Egypt and leading to military conflict in Libya. While the collapse of the various autocratic regimes has created a significant opportunity for the spread of democracy, there is also now the risk of significant turmoil and instability across the region. The social and economic disparities within many Arab societies, including those of Egypt and Tunisia, and their lack of many foundations required for stable democracies – such as strong political parties and civil societies – are likely to make their political transitions a formidable challenge. In some countries there is a risk that the popular uprisings, and the ensuing government response, will strengthen sectarian tensions, not least in Bahrain.

The EU’s response to events was once more weakened by divisions amongst EU Member States. Initially certain EU governments were averse to criticizing the leadership in Tunisia and Libya and were completely divided over the merit of intervening militarily in Libya in order to stop the attacks Gaddafi was inflicting on his people in response to their protests. Germany was pitted acrimoniously against France and Britain. And after failing to reach a consensus within the EU or NATO, Paris and London decided to seek UN endorsement for a coalition of the willing. (Although the EU has subsequently agreed to deploy a military mission to support the humanitarian efforts in Libya).

Since the uprisings erupted, several EU senior policymakers, including Commissioner Fule, have acknowledged that the EU had not given enough importance to democracy promotion and human rights in the region, equating authoritarian regimes with stability. The EU is expected to invest significant efforts in assisting the countries that have overthrown their autocratic leaders. And several EU Member States would like the EU to give more weight to conditionality within its neighbourhood policy – a policy that the EU was already reviewing before the uprisings.

But at the time of writing there was still no consensus on exactly how the EU should redesign its long-term approach to its neighbours, and the EU still needed to address several key challenges. Firstly, European leaders are likely to want to continue ensuring their short-term security interests with their southern neighbours, be it cooperation on counter-terrorism or controlling illegal migration. But there is a risk that some of the new governments in North Africa – if they are elected representatives – will be unwilling to provide the same level of cooperation with EU partners as their predecessors, if the terms of such cooperation appear unpalatable to their electorate. New governments might be less willing to accept illegal migrants from the EU, if EU Member States continue to be so unwilling to envisage any form of visa facilitation.

Secondly, if the EU becomes a fervent supporter of democratic reforms in countries whose regimes have been overthrown, how will it reconcile such an approach with its policies towards countries whose autocratic leaders have not been overthrown? If the EU adopts two very different policies, there could be a risk that its credibility suffers, both in the eyes of the autocratic regimes and those undergoing political transitions.

Events have forced the EU to acknowledge that its approach to security – both long- and short-term – had significant weaknesses. Whether EU Member States choose to strategically review their approach to their southern neighbourhood remains to be seen. Even if they do, it is unlikely that stability will ensue in the medium term within the countries beginning political transitions under difficult conditions. Nonetheless, any marginal improvements that EU leaders can deliver in terms of political and economic support to the region will be of great benefit to both Mediterranean and European security.

Bibliography


The Lisbon Treaty and the Status of the European Union in the International Arena: The May 2011 Upgrade at the UN General Assembly

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On 3 May 2011 the UN General Assembly (UNGA) passed a resolution on the “Participation of the European Union in the work of the United Nations”¹ in order to upgrade the role of the European Union within the UNGA and to bring it in line with the reforms in the Lisbon Treaty. It was a political decision taken at the highest echelons of the EU to press for the adoption of this resolution at all costs, despite an adverse political environment in New York. The EU High Representative Catherine Ashton saw the resolution as a hard-won victory for the EU, stating that “The Resolution will in future enable EU representatives to present and promote the EU’s positions in the UN, as agreed by its Member States.”

This contribution discusses the political and practical consequences of the resolution, and whether the EU has achieved its goal to enhance its participation within the UNGA. We argue that despite the efforts by the EU Delegation and the EU High Representative herself, this watered-down resolution fails to meet its original purpose. The politically central goal set by the EU in trying to obtain enhanced observer status at the UNGA was to improve its leverage and visibility as a global actor, codetermining developments on the international plane. This was in line with the letter and spirit of the Lisbon Treaty, which foresees a stronger external representation of the EU through the President of the European Council, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and the EU Delegations adding to the European Commission. However, the final version adopted by the UNGA only secures speaking rights for President Herman van Rompuy and HR Catherine Ashton at the UN ministerial plenary meetings, which take place at the beginning of each regular season of the GA, whereas it unacceptably qualifies the actual participation rights of the EU in the everyday work of the GA and, thereby, its capacity to influence decisions of this UN organ.

The Resolution

The EU first attempted to upgrade its role in the UNGA in September 2010. The EU’s failure at the time to secure enhanced rights was blamed on both a poor diplomatic effort on behalf of the EU, as well as a surprising level of resistance from other States to the proposal. The EU came back to the table with a renewed effort to secure “enhanced observer status” and was able to get a resolution passed, albeit with many important amendments and concessions (explained in detail below). The Resolution was passed with 180 votes in favour, and none against. Zimbabwe and Syria abstained, while ten States did not record a vote: Azerbaijan, Côte d’Ivoire, Kiribati, Libya, Nauru, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Vanuatu and Venezuela.

¹ United Nations General Assembly, Resolution A/65/L.64/Rev.1.
The Resolution passed in New York on 3 May 2011 bears surprisingly little resemblance to the draft of September 2010. Notably, all references to the Lisbon Treaty have been removed. The Resolution no longer makes any reference to the benefits of regional integration, or to the long-standing relations between the EU and the UN, which appeared in the first draft. The Resolution gives no background or context whatsoever regarding why such participation rights are necessary. In essence, the European proposal was utterly de-Europeanised.

Most importantly, however, the participation rights that the EU ‘won’ remain less than what is needed under Lisbon for the EU to truly behave as a global actor within the UN. The EU has secured the right to be inscribed on the list of speakers together with the representatives of major groups, and to have its communications circulated directly as documents of the UNGA. As to the former, the practice in New York is for the President of the UNGA to determine the exact order of the list of speakers. In accordance with the Resolution, the President will now be able to give the floor to the EU representative earlier in the discussion. This means that the EU delegation in New York will have to negotiate each summer with the office of the President in order to secure a speaking slot among the first speakers at the UN ministerial plenary meetings in September.

The Resolution further provides that the EU also has a right to reply “as decided by the presiding officer,” which is restricted to just once per item. However, the EU has no right to challenge decisions of the presiding officer and is therefore incapable of defending itself in case of perceived arbitrary decisions taken by the latter. Additionally, the EU has no right to raise a point of order, nor to vote, nor to put forward candidates in the UNGA.

Furthermore, contrary to the letter and spirit of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has willingly conditioned its capacity to voice its view in the UNGA even on issues touching upon its own (exclusive or exercise shared) competences on the “agree[ment] by the Member States of the European Union.” In addition, it can only make proposals and amendments orally and these “shall be put to vote only at the request of a Member State.” It may be noted here that this outcome may serve the foreign policy of some EU Member States, which insist on denying the competence of the EU Delegations to represent them in international fora. It remains to be seen whether a restrictive interpretation of this resolution may be used as a precedent by such Member States in other international organisations.

Thus, in practical terms the EU has only gained the right to present its views at the UNGA before its own nameplate. In all other aspects it is procedurally handicapped and still has to rely on its Member States to promote its agenda in the UNGA. It has agreed to remain in the backseat in international relations behind its Member States, cementing a long-standing – but unacceptable in post-Lisbon terms – modus operandi in the UNGA. The EU spent valuable political capital and lost the political impetus from the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, all for a resolution that fails to achieve its original goal.

**Effect in Other UN Organs and Bodies**

The enhanced rights that the EU now enjoys within the UNGA will also flow on to some other bodies related to the UNGA. This is because the Resolution states that the modalities of participation also apply within the General Assembly’s “committees and working groups, in international meetings and conferences convened under the auspices of the Assembly and in United Nations conferences.” The subsidiary organs of the General Assembly include Boards, Commissions, Councils and Panels, Committees, and Working Groups. The Resolution only allows enhanced participation within the Committees and Working Groups.

It is unclear whether and to what extent the Resolution will impact upon the status of the EU in other UN organs, programmes or funds, such as the Human Rights Council or World Food Programme, or the specialised agencies, such as the World Health Organisation or the Food and Agriculture Organisation, all of which have their own rules of procedure. Each UN organ decides whether to grant observer status to a non-state body, and the modalities under which the latter might participate. This means that the modalities of the EU's observer status vary from organ to organ. Therefore, it appears interpretatively consistent to

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2 There are six Committees under the General Assembly: Disarmament and International Security Committee (First Committee); Special Political and Decolonization Committee (Fourth Committee); Economic and Financial Committee (Second Committee); Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee (Third Committee); Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee); and the Legal Committee (Sixth Committee).

argue that the Resolution does not apply generally in the UN system. However, the general title of the Resolution, which makes reference to the “work of the UN” cautions against any adamant conclusion at present. On the other hand it is indisputable that the new arrangements do not apply to the Security Council. Further, it should be assumed that the Resolution is with no prejudice to certain organs within the UN family where the EU has already obtained wider participation rights than the ones foreseen in the Resolution. This point, together with the contentious ones raised above, remains to be clarified in practice and authoritatively by the interpretation of the UN Office of Legal Affairs.

The EU Precedent: The Participation of Other Organisations in the UN

While essentially not gaining much from the Resolution, the EU also made some important concessions. In this respect the EU agreed to lower the threshold in the Resolution for other regional organisations to obtain similar rights in the UNGA. The Resolution states that the UNGA may adopt modalities for participation of other regional bodies “following a request on behalf of a regional organisation that has observer status in the General Assembly and whose Member States have agreed arrangements that allow that organisation’s representatives to speak on behalf of the organisation and its Member States.” This means that a regional organisation such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) or African Union (AU) could seek participation rights similar to those obtained by the EU if the organisation’s members have allowed the organisation to speak on their behalf. This is a far lower threshold than that in the corresponding section in the draft of September 2010. The 2010 draft would only have allowed enhanced participation rights for organisations that had “reached a level of integration that enables that organisation to speak with one voice.” The new wording is a result of a negotiation involving the EU and Caribbean Community, which has stated that it would seek similar participation rights in the future. Future requests for greater participation by regional bodies must still be voted upon by the UNGA on a case-by-case basis. However, the current Resolution sets a precedent that would make it easier for other organisations to upgrade their role at the UNGA. Participation in international organisations, including the UN, is generally limited to states. Where international organisations have created an exception to this rule, they normally only allow membership for regional organisations with a relatively high degree of integration and decision-making power, such as the EU.\(^5\) This Resolution effectively lowers the threshold for intergovernmental organisations to participate within the UN bodies. For example, in its Interpretative Declaration, CARICOM stated that “The conferral of identical rights [to those given to the EU] is not dependant on a duplication of the European Union’s modalities of integration, nor is it premised on the achievement of any perceived “level” of integration.”

Following the vote, representatives of the Bahamas (representing CARICOM), Nigeria (representing the AU) and Sudan (representing the Arab League) stated that the Resolution was a precedent to allow other regional bodies to upgrade their participation rights. They will likely expect the European Union to be favourable towards these requests. Greater participation by these regional bodies will eventually downplay the exceptional nature of the EU, which has a higher level of integration and decision-making autonomy than other regional bodies.

The Resolution also raises questions for the UN. The Bahamas argued that the Resolution might create “a new category of non-State observer with a unique complement of rights and privileges.”\(^6\) Smaller states, who are given a voice within the UNGA on the same level as more powerful ones, feel that this voice will be diminished if the UN becomes dominated by regional organisations. Nauru, which did not vote, argued that the Resolution posed “serious risks” for the organisation and would change the nature of the UN. The Hungarian representative, on behalf of the EU, sought to allay these fears, stating, “As we have agreed from the outset, the UN is, and should remain, an organisation of States. The European Union will remain an observer at the General Assembly.”\(^7\) Yet another criticism was that the EU’s enhanced observer status would increase its repre-

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\(^4\) Draft Resolution A/64/L67 of the UN General Assembly – Participation of the European Union, Annex L, in Emerson et. Al, Upgrading the EU’s role as a Global Actor: Institutions, Law and the Restructuring of European Diplomacy, Centre for European Studies, 2011.

\(^5\) Participation of the European Union within international organizations is often made possible through a specific ‘Regional Economic Integration Organization Clause’ (REIO clause) that allows entities such as the EU to participate. E.g Article 2(4), Constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization

\(^6\) Statement by The Bahamas on behalf of CARICOM, 3 May 2011.
A NEW STRATEGY FOR A NEIGHBOURHOOD IN TRANSFORMATION

At the EU borders lie 16 countries whose perspectives and aspirations have a direct impact on the former. The events of these past few months in Southern Mediterranean countries only accentuate this interdependence. In this context of change and given the limited results obtained through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU has begun the process of revising the Policy in order to step up support for the political reform underway and provide a more adapted response on a case by case basis.

Providing Support for Progress towards Strong Democracy

Supporting the Deepening of Democracy: The level of aid allocated as support to sound, sustainable democracy will depend on the progress made by each country in terms of political reform.

Establishing a Partnership with Society: Developing a plural civil society is an indispensable condition for guaranteeing a healthy democracy. Hence, a facility dedicated to civil society (as part of the ENP) would allow organisations improved access to EU aid. By the same token, the establishment of a European Fund for Democracy would stimulate the emergence of numerous democratic political actors representing the plurality of society. Another indispensable issue in a democracy is fostering media freedom. In this regard, unhindered access to internet by civil society and the use of electronic communications technology are essential. Finally, the EU will step up dialogue on human rights.

Intensifying Political Cooperation on Security: The EU intends to strengthen its participation in the resolution of protracted conflicts, ensuring a concerted use of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as well as other instruments, and promote joint action with ENP Partners regarding key security issues in international areas.

Providing Support for Sustainable Economic and Social Development

Sustainable Economic Growth and Job Creation: To attain these goals, the EU will encourage partner countries to adopt policies favourable to more sustained, sustainable and inclusive growth, the development of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) and micro-enterprises and job creation.

Strengthening Trade Ties: Since the EU is the main export market for neighbouring countries, a deep and comprehensive free trade area (FTA) with the EU would prove the most effective tool for strengthening trade ties. In the long term, the most advanced partners could progress towards regional economic integration. In the shorter term, the EU will seek to extend trade concessions in existing agreements or negotiations underway in sectors likely to stimulate an immediate recovery in the economies of partner countries.

Strengthening Sectoral Cooperation: Cooperation can be strengthened in all sectors involved in the domestic market, according to the criterion “more for more.” The areas of cooperation proposed are knowledge and innovation, climate change, environment, energy, transportation, maritime affairs and information and communication technology.

Migration and Mobility: In these domains, the emphasis is on visa facilitation for some partner countries of the ENP and the liberalization of the visa regime for the most advanced partners. Thus, the development and/or emergence of mobility partnerships would ensure proper management of the movement of people between the EU and third countries. Finally, the EU encourages member states to fully utilize the opportunities offered by the EU Visa Code.

Establishing Efficient Regional Partnerships through the ENP

Strengthening the Eastern Partnership: From the EU perspective, deep and comprehensive free trade areas are essential for strengthening political and economic ties with EU partners in the East. In this regard, the EU is planning to launch comprehensive programmes to provide partner countries with the necessary administrative capacity to introduce reforms.

For the Eastern Partnership, topics on the agenda are: further democratization; continuing the visa facilitation and visa regime liberalization processes; intensifying sectoral cooperation, particularly in the sphere of rural development; and maintaining a substantive dialogue in areas such as education, transport and social and employment policies.

Establishing a Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the South Mediterranean: The ENP should provide an ambiguous response to the winds of change blowing in South Mediterranean countries. This response is addressed in the joint communication, “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean.”

Simplified, Coherent Action and Programme Frameworks

Clearer Priorities through More Determined Political Leadership: Action plans and relevant EU aid under the ENP will be focused on a small number of priorities and more specific benchmarks will be introduced.

Financing: The aim is to target the funds slated and programmed through the ENPI and other relevant instruments of foreign policy in light of the ENP’s new approach. The latter involves the provision of additional resources of up to 1.242 billion euros by 2013. In addition, resources are to be mobilized to strengthen the budget.

Involving the EIB and the EBRD: In order to support major infrastructure projects, stimulate development and address key challenges in energy, environment and transport, we must ensure that the EIB and other regional banks have sufficient financial resources. Therefore, the EU proposes expanding the EIB and the EBRD’s lending possibilities, in particular by the extension of the latter’s mandate to certain southern partners.

Planning for 2013 and Beyond: With regard to the post-2013 financial framework, the future European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI) will provide most of the budget support to Partner Countries. The procedure for obtaining financing through the ENI should be more flexible and simpler and the conditions stricter in order to allow greater differentiation between the countries receiving aid.

Finally, coordination efforts will have to be stepped up between the EU, its Member States and other international financial institutions (IFs) and significant bilateral donors to maximize external support to the reform agenda established within the context of the ENP.

For further information:
sentation when Europe is already viewed by many as over-represented in international fora. Nauru argued that the EU would effectively gain a “28th seat” through the Resolution. Again, the EU sought to allay these concerns by giving assurances that the new modalities would not negatively affect the rights of States to address the General Assembly.

It is necessary to keep in mind the dynamics within the UN and the institutional culture in order to explain the objections raised by different states and micro-states in the process of consultations. Member States of other regional organisations did not share identical preferences in the negotiation. However, it can be safely argued that their primary interest lies in safeguarding the intergovernmental nature of the UN and the UNGA as a guarantee of their sovereignty mirrored in their institutionally unrestrained capacity to make foreign policy at the UN and to codetermine decisions. In the UNGA their vote counts and they are determined to safeguard this right. Simultaneously, they perceived this negotiation as an opportunity to upgrade the status of their regional organisations in the GA in the future.

How the EU is Viewed Externally

This saga illustrates the diverging views on the type of actor the EU is within the international system. It is clear that the EU viewed the changes as merely ‘procedural’ whereas other states saw them as a threat to their interests and to the intergovernmental nature of the UN as a whole.

The Lisbon Treaty created a foreign policy architecture that would allow the EU to speak with one voice on the international plane, creating permanent positions such as the President of the European Council and the High Representative. However, to make use of these changes, the EU has sought to adjust the rules of the international organisations in which it participates. This has meant that the Lisbon reform now carries with it an external dimension, whereby the EU must persuade other UN Member States to allow its greater participation in international fora. Its inability to do this seems to be one of the reasons for the watered-down text of the Resolution. As evidenced by the shocking rebuff it received in September 2010, the EU underestimated the opposition that such a proposal would generate, whereas it had an inflated view of its international stature as a global actor.

In Europe, the EU is viewed as a supranational organisation with a distinct legal personality and a high level of autonomy. Yet the debates within the UNGA show that externally the EU is still viewed as a European ‘bloc’ virtually indistinguishable from its Member States. A UN press release following the vote, for example, repeatedly describes the Union as a ‘bloc’. As discussed above, the text of the Resolution also attests to this. The EU may now present proposals “as agreed by the Member States of the European Union” and these can only be put to a vote “at the request of a Member State.” This language does not present the EU as an autonomous global actor, but one that remains tied to its Member States.

Conclusion

Rather than being seen as a diplomatic victory at the UN, the latest resolution should at best be seen as the beginning of a greater diplomatic effort to upgrade the EU’s role in the World Organisation. The impact of the Resolution will only be known once we see how it will be used in practice. As evidenced by the restrictive interpretation by CARICOM, some states will seek to use the resolution to restrict the EU’s participatory role. The EU must forcefully insist on exercising its rights, otherwise these hard-fought changes will be a hollow victory. This negotiation also highlights the actual standing of the EU in global politics. The international community apparently does not conceive the EU as a powerful actor capable of pursuing and achieving its central goals without bending to pressure. The fact that the EU found itself obliged to negotiate sometimes from an inferior position with micro-states is highly illustrative in this respect. Lastly, there remains a question over the extent to which the EU has to be ready to flex its economic muscles when this is absolutely necessary. It is inconceivable for the world’s number one donor of development aid to be unable to relatively easily secure the support of the majority of states in the UNGA on an issue of instrumental importance to it.

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7 General Statement on behalf of the European Union by H.E. Mr. Csaba Kőrösi, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Hungary, at the United Nations General Assembly 65th Session, 88th Plenary meeting on "Strengthening of the United Nations system: draft resolution (A/65/L.64/Rev.1)."

8 General Assembly GA/11079/Rev. 1*, 3 May 2011.
For some years now, the extreme right and right-wing populisms have been enjoying significant success in legislative elections in certain countries: 29.5% in Serbia (2008), 29% in Switzerland (2007), 28.2% in Austria (2008), 19.6% in the Netherlands (2010), 17.2% in Norway (2009), 16.7% in Hungary (2010), 13.9% in Denmark (2007) and 11.4% in Italy (2008). In many other countries, these parties have surpassed the 5% mark. These electoral successes in the heart of Europe cannot, however, be interpreted as signs of the irresistible growth of the extreme right. A good number of countries escape this trend, among them Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. However, in many European countries, populist parties or the extreme right exert weight on the political agenda and are even at the threshold of power, as is the case in the Netherlands or Denmark (cf. Map 1).

**How Can Their Political Identity Be Defined?**

Independently of heteroclitic, at times relatively hazy doctrinal references and despite varied political itineraries, these diverse extreme right parties have some points in common. They are most often characterised by: centralised partisan operation under the authority of charismatic leaders, frequent recourse to populist demagogy and finally, certain central, recurrent themes in their political arguments. Among these can often be found a highly xenophobe discourse commonly embodied by frequent recourse to “anti-immigration” topics, a declared authoritative component, particularly explicit in the sphere of “law and order”, a composite economic programme, synthesising the neo-liberalism of the 1980s and the protectionism of the 1990s and overuse of the “anti-system” discourse regarding the “elite ruling from above”. Of course, many of these themes have been used at other times by political forces demonstrating little attachment to democracy. Directly and generally lumping today’s parties together with the fascism arising between the two World Wars would, however, be ambiguous and even false. The fascist parties of the 1920s and 30s arose in a context of very deep economic and social crisis – the Great Depression of 1929 – for which there is no equivalent today. They also developed thanks to frustrations emerging after the World War I: the frustration of humiliating defeat in Germany, the frustration of the neglected victor in Italy. Today, neither economic and social misery nor the traumatisms of a long, bloody conflict are the case in Europe. These fascist parties were also totalitarian, considering that a single party should dominate the whole of society and organise it from the top down. The Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), The French National Front (Front National, FN), the Netherlands Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) and the Italian North League (Lega Nord, LN) do not advocate turning away from the regime of pluralist democracy. The parties from between the wars practiced the “Führerprinzip” or the “Cult of the Duce”, whereas the central role of the leaders of today’s populist-nationalist parties falls well short of this. In sum, none of today’s parties advocates massive State intervention in the economy – whereby the Nazis and Fascists did – or a corporatist organisation of society. Today’s reality cannot be viewed from yesterday’s perspective for then
we might not grasp the element of modernity characterising contemporary extreme right parties. Focussing on filiations would mean running the risk of overlooking the broad and original nature of a new political phenomenon. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the old extreme-right parties of a fascist type that still survive in Europe are anaemic. Neither the Spanish extreme right (which won only 0.1% of the votes in the last legislative elections), mostly bogged down with nostalgia for defunct Francoism, nor the British extreme right with neofascists undertones (1.9% for the British National Party in the last legislative elections), nor the Portuguese extreme right, still weighed down by memories of Salazarism (0.2% of the votes in the last legislative elections), have a great deal of repercussion in elections. They have all fallen in the shadows of electoral marginality. On the other hand, when the more or less distant heirs to these old groups tackle today’s problems, their success can be spectacular. The FPÖ in Austria, the FN in France, the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF) in Denmark, the Progress Party (Fremskrittspartiet, FrP) in Norway and the PVV in the Netherlands have all well surpassed the 10% mark, and in Austria and Switzerland, extreme right or right-wing populist parties have even obtained over 20% of the vote.

How Can We Interpret These Outbreaks?

In Eastern Europe, the issue of national minorities and borders is a strong vehicle of nationalist fervour. A fervour fuelled by a precocious political disillusionment prospering on a background of authoritarian culture. Yet disillusionment also affects longstanding Western democracies. The dissatisfaction of the voters with stagnant political systems where the quasi-consensus can seem to stifle public debate is particularly evident in countries such as Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland. The extreme right then appears as a number of anti-system populist parties denouncing those who have “monopolised” State power to the point of being confused with it. The extreme right thus politicises the anti-political sentiment that questions traditional parties and their systems of alliances.

A questioning that is all the more virulent since partisan loyalties based on class or religious divisions that were often underlying traditional parties in Europe are in crisis. The working class has gone into decline, religious engagement has faded, immense middle classes have developed and their values have detached themselves from the religious moulds of yore. The extreme right is creating new shared lines around new issues: Europe, globalisation and immigration. By insisting on national crite-
ria against the real or supposed multiculturalism of its adversaries, ethno-cultural nationalism is attempting to gain sway. This nationalism likewise attempts to revive a set of traditional values undermined by the “cultural liberalism” of our societies. After the 11 September 2001 attacks and the development of Islamist terrorism, it has found an enemy of its stature and the anti-Islamist tone of its struggle has become accentuated. Attesting to this is the major victory of the Swiss referendum on prohibiting the construction of minarets, which gained 57.5% of votes on 29 November 2009, or the extremely heated debate undertaken in Germany regarding Thilo Sarrazin’s statements on the impossible integration of Muslims in his book “Germany Does Away with Itself”.

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Until the early 1980s, numerous observers considered that post-industrial societies were undergoing a true “silent revolution” bringing “new politics” where issues such as gender equality, quality of life or the promotion of minorities were becoming essential. The strong comeback of the extreme right constitutes a challenge to this model of analysis. In the face of the libertarian pole of “new politics”, concerns for law and order, strict respect for authority, less tolerance for minorities, attachment to traditions and traditional moral values have returned, brought on, among other things, by the significant ageing experienced by European populations. In a way, the “new left” and social movements of the 1970s were succeeded by a “new right” and identity-based movements in the 1980s and ‘90s. With the crumbling of social ties, the sense of insecurity and anomie have progressed and have entailed a demand for a sense of belonging, for community and for identity that the extreme right and neo-populist movements attempt to meet.

However, beyond this largely culturalist explanation of the success of the extreme right, a more global explanation in terms of political response to the new economic and social state of our societies is worth expounding. Over the past few decades, the move from an industrial capitalism with social assistance (with its Welfare State) to a more individualist, post-industrial capitalism has been accompanied by true world upheaval marked by social fragmentation, alienation from traditional identity groups (social classes, ideological families, local cultures), the individualisation of risks, the growing mobility and the double movement of cultural and ethnic diversification within societies and at the same time, their growing interdependence. The economic and financial crisis of autumn 2008 did not reverse the trend. The emergence of the extreme right was a direct response to these transformations. The rejection of immigration and sometimes xenophobia then became the response to the challenge of a mobile world, increasingly multi-ethnic and multicultural. Gradually, rejection of the “Other,” presented as a real means of “cultural protectionism,” emerged as an extension of the call for “economic protectionism” and a questioning of the earlier neo-liberal creed. The extreme right then developed a real “Welfare State chauvinism” that has had great success among popular circles directly threatened by the advent of post-industrial society. In addition, it has condemned neo-liberal globalisation, advocated leaving the European Union and the euro, demanded protectionist economic measures, called for re-nationalisation of the economy, etc. Thus, in the face of the growing opening up of our societies on the economic as well as the cultural and political levels, the extreme right structures itself on the anxiety generated by “open society” and is attempting to invent the alternative of a “nationally refocused society.”

Democratic Malaise

Finally, the latest element of the crisis of modernity seems to be continuously fuelling the dynamic of the extreme right: democratic malaise. In his brilliant political history of religion, Marcel Gauchet demonstrated how “disenchantment with the world” not only affected the religious sphere but more globally, all systems of representation justifying a collective devoir-être (moral ideal) in the making and thus political ideologies. This collapse of systems of repre-

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sentation alleging knowledge and control of the future has led to a loss of political reference points and a profound crisis of political representation. The latter is generalised in Europe and the symptoms are numerous: high abstention rates, an increasingly negative image of politicians, growing forces of protest, etc. Certain countries are experiencing a deeper malaise because political representation no longer reflects the diversity, novelty and complexity of divisions traversing societies. This malaise seems to attain its climax in political systems where political conflict has lost its meaning, where left and right at times give the impression of making agreements on the essentials, where the main political groups divide the spoils of power among themselves in an institutional quasi-consensus. This system has at times gone quite far and has been institutionalised under the form of what Arend Lijphart has called “consociational democracy”. In those countries where the “democracy of consensus” or “consociational democracy” has become a full-blown system – the “Proporz” system in Austria, the “concordance” system in Switzerland, “verzuiling” (pillarisation) and participacy in Belgium and the Netherlands – extreme right and/or populist parties have room to rally discontent and opposition to the status quo. When citizens say to themselves: “Society changes but the system of distribution of power and the elites are immutable”, protest and identity-based populists are seen as the only real opponents. In France, an impoverished version of this “democracy of consensus”, the so-called “cohabitation”, produced the same effects and, in the second round of the presidential elections in 2002, boosted Jean Marie Le Pen, herald of a radical opposition to the “system” and the “Establishment.”

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The rise of the extreme right in Europe is not an inevitable phenomenon. True, when politics are desacralised and become disenchanted, certain people nurture nostalgia for the old, revolutionary or ultra-reactionary passions that still drove the political scene only a few decades ago. But as Marcel Gauchet recently recalled, “The enchantment of politics was the nightmare of the 20th century.” The resurgence here and there of both right and left-wing extremisms is often but the echo of a poorly digested disenchantment and of the difficulty of assuming “disenchanted,” “modest,” yet above all modern politics.

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2 As Marcel Gauchet writes in *Le désenchantement du monde*, conflict as an axial form of political relations requires that “the antagonism concern, at least virtually, the ensemble of the collective phenomenon and that it be anchored in civil discord, that it represent on the political stage a disension or an array of disensions inherent to the very functioning of relations established between individuals and groups” (p. 282, op. cit.).

3 Based on his studies of the political system of the Netherlands, Arend Lijphart came up with the notion of “consociational democracy”, which is defined as governance by a cartel of political elites attempting to transform a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy. The Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland have often been considered the best examples of this model. Cf. Arend Lijphart, Julian Thomas Hottinger, “Les démocraties consociatives”, in *Revue internationale de politique comparée*, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1997, p. 529-697.

4 “Cohabitation” or power sharing between a left-wing President of the Republic and a right-wing Administration lasted from 1986 to 1988, and then again from 1993 to 1995. From 1997 to 2002, “cohabitation” existed between a right-wing President and a left-wing Administration. Hence, for twenty years, France primarily experienced a political system of power sharing rather than a regime where the Executive and the Legislative branches share the same political bent.

By mid-day on Wednesday, 5 January 2011, news had reached the offices of newspapers in Algiers of major riots by youth in Oran, the country’s second largest city. Subsequently, over the course of six days, all the towns in the north as well as several towns in the south experienced clashes in the streets between youth groups, often comprised of several hundred people, and reinforced security forces. Public buildings were vandalized, shops and private warehouses looted, street furniture burned. The damages were estimated at nearly a billion euros. The government crackdown left two dead and dozens injured, and more than five hundred young people were arrested across the country. This spontaneous movement of marginalized, unemployed youth had no clear demands nor spokespeople. It was not strong enough to attract other categories of young people, such as high school and college students, but it did suffice to create a new political situation in Algeria. Indeed, the situation changed so profoundly that President Ben Ali made a thundering fall on 14 January 2011 and the Egyptian revolution had gotten underway by 25 January. But what was the Algerian context before this historic turning point in January 2011? That of an exacerbated political impasse. Two years earlier, in January 2008, several months of deliberation resulted in a default agreement between the current president and the Algerian army, represented by the head of security forces, General Toufik. President Bouteflika was eligible for a third presidential term in the spring of 2009. The matter did not obtain unanimity at first. Nor did the name of a successor to Bouteflika. In any case, in order to take up a third term, the President would have to change the constitutional limit of two presidential terms for a single candidate. In spring 2008, the campaign for a constitutional revision and a third presidential term had obtained no positive results. The rupture with society was profound. The president was obliged to resort to a simple parliamentary vote to achieve his ends. The turnout in the presidential election of 9 April 2009 was less than 30% according to various sources on the ground. Popular disaffection for politics had never been greater. When the “urban insurrection” of January 2011 took place, popular riots had already been on the rise in Algeria for several years. In 2010, news agencies chronicled some 1400 conflicts and riots leading to or involving citizen rallies, attacks on administrative offices, major roads cut to traffic and confrontations with the security forces. Contested social housing distribution, broken promises by the local authorities to build roads, stabilize the electrical grid or build natural gas supply networks – the sparks triggering unrest multiplied over the months. Workers’ strikes, with civil servants in the lead, were the other major front of the “Algerian social guerrillas.” In the face of the gradually rising waters, the fragile cohesion of the Algerian government was deeply damaged. By the end of the summer of 2009, the Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS) – i.e. military security – decided to personally conduct an operation to reform the country’s economy. This was the beginning of major corruption cases that mainly involved the presidential sphere. Abdelaziz Bouteflika made the mistake of allowing his ambition of family succession to be glimpsed by floating the trial balloon of a political party led by his “younger” brother, Said. This is not traditional approach in the Algerian regime’s internal affairs. The powerful Minister of Energy and Mines, Chakib Khelil, in office since December 1999, was caught in the Sonatrach storm. The top management of the oil company, the largest
African company, was removed, and placed in custody. The Minister resigned from his post, but the tens of millions of euros in bribes mentioned in the press in the Sonatrach affair and the scandal of the East-West Motorway construction shocked public opinion. The break is growing, the political impasse consolidating a little more.

Budgetary Room for Manoeuvre

The spark produced by Mohamed Bouazizi, the Tunisian wildfire and the Arab revolution met with glowing embers in Algeria. But the fire did not take. The main reason is the amount of “liquid” thrown on the fire. By the third day of the riots, the Algerian government had decided to lend a strictly social content to the anger of youth. Its first reaction was to exclude any political content in the events, even before the political issue arose upon Ben Ali’s flight from Tunis and the occupation of Tahrir Square in Cairo. The first response to the movement of uprisings was therefore within the budgetary sphere. The equivalent of two to three billion dollars were mobilized in the first quarter 2011 to support the price of oil and sugar, improve interest rates for access to housing and finance the creation of micro-enterprises for those under 35. The government’s fire-fighting measures also included not collecting taxes on a large part of wholesale and retail distribution activities. The obligation of using cheques for all transactions exceeding 500,000 dinars (5,000 euros) was dropped. Unable to provide immediate jobs for young people (unemployment is at 23% in the under 29 age group), the Algerian authorities abandoned plans to reduce the informal economy. Street vendors conquered new shopping streets in city centres. The line of defence of the Algerian authorities is not based solely on “political corruption” via the massive purchase of social peace. It also relies on society’s fresh memory of the chaos of civil war. Algerians are not willing to do just anything to overthrow President Bouteflika and the political system. They are afraid of disunity. This is the most widely shared conviction among the Algerian decision-makers. They feel this gives them additional flexibility in the face of rising popular protest. The greatest flexibility however, is afforded by the 160 billion dollars in foreign reserves registered by the Bank of Algeria in the first quarter of 2011. In the same period, the Central Bank of Tunisia had 4 billion dollars.

The Algerian Spring Is a Social Spring

The strategic choice of the Algerian authorities not to make political concessions in the first month following the youth revolt of January 2011 cost them socially even more. The message was quickly perceived by all classes of society holding any leverage over the state. The government rewarded the players’ capacity to do harm, to struggle: protesters, highway robbers, rioters. Organized professional associations would take action in their turn as well. Larger and larger strikes paralyzed public service, slowing the country down. Doctors, court officials, paramedics, finance staff, the Communal Guards (tens of thousands of security auxiliaries recruited to protect villages from Islamist groups) – everyone wanted to occupy the public space. The government was obliged to give in to one after the other. The protest movement then extended into the public economic sector, with tangible gains for the most combative groups. The Arab Spring is a social spring in Algeria.

The “Minimalist” Response Soon Insufficient

Three factors were to compel President Bouteflika, in the face of the shock wave after the January riots, not to limit himself to his strictly budgetary first line of defence. The first was that social protest had intensified and threatened to take a turn towards insurgency at any moment. Six Algerians committed suicide via self-immolation during the month of January alone. The tension was extreme. The second factor was that political demand was weak in the street but strong in public opinion, marking the limits of social measures by the State. A National Coordination for Democracy and Change (NCCD) was born and called people to march, despite the fact that this was still banned, every Saturday in Algiers. Social movements moved beyond their corporatist framework in major student strikes in which the demand for the regime to step down rang out during rallies and marches. The third factor was most certainly the winds of the Arab revolution, gaining ground with the fall of Hosni Mubarak on 11 February 2011. The Libyan revolution was underway by the end of February and the discomfort of Algerian officials was evident in their rare interventions. The Council of Ministers of 3 February 2011, the first after the riots of 4 to 9 January, anticipated the situation and made
its first concession: the state of emergency in force since February 1992 was lifted. At this point, President Bouteflika also promised to broaden citizen participation in public life and to reopen the television and radio — strictly governmental — to democratic expression. The Algerian government would weather the storm for two and a half months with only these two, very poorly kept promises. The new line of defence became clear: not to make political concessions under pressure, gain time, not yield anything of significance. After the social response that put the country into movement in search of wage adjustments that had become officially possible, the minimalist policy response very quickly ran out of breath.

**The line of defence of the Algerian authorities is not based solely on “political corruption” via the massive purchase of social peace. It also relies on society’s fresh memory of the chaos of civil war**

President Bouteflika sent messages to Algerian opinion through his foreign visitors. Former French Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin announced after a visit to Algiers on 21 February that the Algerian president intended to engage in “deep and comprehensive political reforms.” It was only on 15 April, on the 12th anniversary of his election as head of state, that Abdelaziz Bouteflika spoke directly to the nation. The deliberations within the regime on the nature, extent and timing of reforms that were to be undertaken had been long. In the end, the President had decided on an “in-depth” revision of the constitution to re-balance the powers and expand political practice. He wished to involve the opposition in the constitutional proposals. He announced a series of revisions of laws (i.e. electoral, political party and information laws) to enhance freedoms and proposed making the parliamentary elections of spring 2012 a new beginning in the country’s democratic experience, begun in 1988-89 with the end of the single party. President Bouteflika’s political reform agenda respected all election dates. This means that he intends to serve out his third term in full, until April 2014. The numerous proponents of dissolving parliament and adopting a constituent assembly as in Tunisia were disappointed. Although giving the impression of retreating, the Algerian regime did so in only very small steps. The factors prompting it to undertake self-reform were gaining ground... starting with the winds of freedom in the Arab world.

**Algeria Threatens to Remain the Only “Autocracy”**

The announcement by King Mohamed VI of Morocco of constitutional reform moving towards strengthening the power of the Prime Minister and Parliament resounded like a thunderclap in Algiers. For many years, the Algerian regime had been claiming to be the most open in the region. The revolutionary changes in Tunisia and Egypt and those underway in Libya abruptly discredited this posture. But the commitment to undertake key political reforms in Morocco, the country that had most observed the Algerian regime, removed the last argument in favour of the status quo in Algiers. The only static political power in all of North Africa became that of President Bouteflika. All the more so since his regime failed in its attempt to follow an old dogma of Algerian revolutionary diplomacy and not take part in the political processes of neighbouring countries. At the flight of President Ben Ali and the major gatherings in Tahrir Square, Algiers chose silence. In Tunisia, public opinion has come to classify the Algerian attitude as “hostile” and Tunisian opinion-makers refer to their revolution as “hemmed in at both international borders,” putting Qaddafi’s antipathy on the same level as Bouteflika’s awkward silence. The Arab revolution surprised Algiers at the height of an isolationist trend. Between the end of 2008 and January 2011, Algiers undertook a closing of the economy by tightening conditions for foreign investment in the country (December 2008), then the government entered into open conflict with the largest foreign investor, Egypt’s Orascom, followed by the chaotic consequences of Algeria-Egypt qualifying matches to the World Cup, freezing relations between the two countries (November 2009). Tension with Morocco had also become very strong again after the Sahrawi uprising of Laayoune (November 2010). The partnership with France had been experiencing difficulty for a long time (2009) and Algeria was considering amending its Association Agreement with the European Union (2010). The regime, linked to the slow biological rhythm of an ill, weakened president, sur-
vived the eruption of unrest among the Arab masses and clung to its doctrine, unadapted to the times, of neutrality in “the internal affairs of neighbouring countries.” This position, already wholly inadequate in view of the high connectivity of opinions in the era of Facebook and Al Jazeera, became politically disastrous after Libya’s loss of control. President Bouteflika’s refusal to condemn the massacre of peaceful demonstrators by the Gaddafi regime with the use of heavy weapons has led him, over the course of events, to be implicitly designated by the National Transition Council (CNT) in Benghazi as the Libyan dictator’s main regional support. In wishing to spare his Libyan friend, President Bouteflika simply reinforced the image of a man and a regime committed to the old Arab order, that of potentates who can dispose of their people in all liberty. US Vice President Joe Biden publicly reported, in the first week of the bombing of Libya by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), that Ahmed Ouyahia, the Prime Minister of Algeria, had assured him over the telephone that his country supported Security Council Resolution 1973, establishing the no-fly zone. That same week, the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs in Algiers, together with his Russian counterpart Lavrov, called for “the end of NATO bombing.” Algerian “neutrality” is finally rightly perceived by Arab opinion as a refusal to support the movement of the people in Tunisia – and Egypt and Libya, as well as Yemen and Syria – to free themselves of the yoke of the former autocratic Arab order. This attitude has aggravated current isolation. Algeria, the leading economic power in North Africa in GDP and fiscal surpluses, has in fact become a background political player on the stage of major changes taking place along its borders. On her visit to the region in early April, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton bypassed Algiers on her visits to Tunis and Rabat.

President Bouteflika has adopted a political agenda where everything can, in theory, change... except him

He does not appear as a facilitator ensuring a “controlled re-opening” of Algerian politics. His role is, however, essential, as the impetus behind the government can come from no one but him. The form of government in Algeria has historically not been collegial, but rather Bonapartist. Crises such as the one arising after the electoral victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) in 1992 have made governance fall back into an artificial collegial mode. The weight of the army then becomes predominant again. But the natural tendency of the regime is to hide behind a guardian figure in order to ensure the system’s coherence. This figure was more or less strongly embodied by Houari Boumediene (1965-1978) or by Chadli Bendjedid (1979-1992), who were more or less challenged by other factions of the socially dominant bloc. Abdelaziz Bouteflika has not reconstituted the total pre-eminence of a Bonapartist rule but he has significantly reduced the direct influence of the army on political decisions. His ability to win a third term despite his shaky health shows, conversely, the army’s inability to provide an alternative clan to hold the office of President of the Republic. President Bouteflika has adopted a political agenda where everything can, in theory, change: the constitution, electoral law, public life, the composition of parliament... except him. Will the Arab Revolution and the Algerian Social Spring manage to change this? This will depend on the evolution of the Arab movement in general and the Algerian movement in particular. The success of democratic transition in Tunisia as well as the depth of constitutional reforms and their effectiveness in Morocco are key parameters, just as well as the ability of social movements in Algeria to keep the spirit of protest alive long enough to link up with a steady rise of the demand for political change.

The Pace of Change Uncertain

The Algerian government has embarked on a “political reform” agenda that excludes the most important electoral event, the presidential elections. President Bouteflika is thus expected to remain in power until the end of his third presidential term in April 2014. The fragility of the Algerian situation arises there-from. The “self-reform” conducted has been weak and is losing legitimacy. The Algerian president has responded slowly and in small successive steps to the dual pressure of internal and external events.
With direct diplomatic talks between Morocco and the Polisario Front having proven unproductive since 2007, recent developments in the Western Sahara conflict have taken place mainly on the ground, partly in the disputed territory itself, and have been driven by Sahrawi protest action and Moroccan responses. A greater challenge to Moroccan rule than the intifada of 2005, the violent clashes in November 2010 can be seen as a catalyst, helping to bring a change of policy in Morocco. This vindicates the judgement of Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy that, “given the political deadlock in Western Sahara, a new factor must enter into the equation if things are to change” (Zunes and Mundy, 2010, p. 263).

While one potential ‘new factor’ – the withdrawal of support by one of Morocco’s powerful allies – has failed to materialise, the prospects of change have been strengthened by new forms of resistance by Sahrawi activists (Shelley 2004: 206-207), presenting challenges that Morocco has been incapable of dealing with peaceably. At the same time, opposition activity has revived international interest in the Western Sahara, by applying ‘heat’ to a conflict long regarded externally as ‘frozen.’ Ultimately it is the challenge presented on the ground, in combination with rebellion and revolution elsewhere in the Arab world, that now promises to change the ‘equation.’

Whereas Morocco’s 2007 autonomy plan lacked credibility due to the lack of democracy in the occupying country (Garcia Lopez, 2010), the growth and generalisation of popular pressure for regime change within the Arab world (which some analysts have seen the Sahrawi movement anticipating) has brought a more far-reaching reform offer from Mohamed VI. The Moroccan monarch’s speech on 9 March 2011, announcing plans to replace the ‘executive monarchy’ with a European-style constitutional monarchy accompanied by a devolved system of parliamentary government, could make autonomy a feasible formula at last, especially if it finds favour with Moroccan settlers in the Western Sahara as well as indigenous Sahrawis.

Although the military aspects of the conflict have remained unchanged, dramatic events on the ground have generated new dynamics affecting the future status of the disputed territory. Two of these are analysed below: first, the controversy surrounding Morocco’s expulsion of Sahrawi human rights activist Aminatou Haidar on 14 November 2009; and second, Western Sahara’s ‘48 hours of rage’ that challenged Moroccan control twelve months later.

A Little Local Incident... That Became International

To many observers, the Haidar episode seemed to be a straightforward case of Moroccan violation of the rights of a pro-independence Sahrawi activist, who had received the prestigious Robert F. Kennedy human rights award in 2008 for “promoting the civil and political rights of the Sahrawi people of Western Sahara, including the freedom of speech and assembly and the right to self-determination.” Refused entry at Laayoune airport when returning home from abroad on 14 November 2009, she had her Moroccan passport confiscated and was expelled to the Canary Islands for describing her nationality as Sahrawi on the landing card. Haidar’s situation immediately attracted sympathy in Spain, and quickly awakened international humanitarian interest as a result of
a month-long hunger strike in Lanzarote airport in protest at not being allowed home.

After intense efforts by the Spanish government to find a solution that would be accepted by both Haidar and Morocco, it was an intervention by US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton that eventually persuaded Morocco to accept Haidar’s return, but only after France and Spain had issued statements acknowledging the application of Moroccan law in the Western Sahara and after the US had reiterated its support for autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty as the basis for a solution to the regional conflict. Rabat retreated when it became clear that Haidar might die on foreign soil, become a Sahrawi martyr and cause popular pressure within Spain to bring about a rethink of the Spanish government pro-Moroccan policy.

While upsetting relations with Spain unnecessarily, Morocco’s diplomatic blunder appears to have been motivated by frustration at the failure of its autonomy proposal to become a concrete basis for the UN-sponsored negotiations. Not only was the Moroccan formula being resisted by the Polisario and its supporters, Mohamed VI had also received a letter from President Barack Obama in July, differentiating his position from the unqualified pro-Moroccan stance of his predecessor, by saying that the US would work with all parties to the conflict in pursuit of a solution.

Just days before Haidar’s arbitrary expulsion from Morocco, Mohamed VI had celebrated the 24th anniversary of the invasion of the Spanish Sahara by announcing plans to ‘impose’ autonomy on the Sahrawi population, insisting that, in relation to the conflict, “one is either a patriot or a traitor.” By expelling her to Spain, with the acquiescence of the Spanish authorities, the King also seemed to be putting pressure on Madrid – notwithstanding President Zapatero’s pro-Moroccan orientation – to give unambiguous support to the autonomy formula. Spanish representatives did make concessions to the Moroccan position in their efforts to overcome the crisis, but at the political cost of facing vociferous criticism from the non-governmental parties in Spain – including some frequently aligned with the minority Socialist administration. Angered by socialists efforts to persuade Haidar to end her protest and accept political asylum in Spain, parliamentary pressure on the government grew, not least through a resounding vote reaffirming the principle of self-determination for the Sahrawi people.

Haidar’s expulsion quickly rebounded against Morocco, for although it was supported by many Moroccans, who saw her hunger strike as an attempt to blackmail the monarch and achieve a propaganda coup against Morocco, it was widely seen in Europe as an arbitrary act that violated her human rights. It thus placed in question the European Union’s depiction of the Moroccan regime as liberal and reformist, and underlined the flimsiness of Morocco’s offer of Sahrawi autonomy. The EU itself was embarrassed by the actions of its privileged southern neighbour and support grew for a proposal to add human rights monitoring to the mandate of the UN peacekeeping mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO) – a move blocked by France.

At the beginning of 2010, Mohamed VI went on to announce a ‘renewal and modernisation’ of the Moroccan state, in an effort to reassure international partners that his country was serious about regionalisation

The disapproval of Moroccan actions found practical expression in the difficulties surrounding the renewal of the EU-Morocco fishing agreement, under which Spain was the main beneficiary. Against a backcloth of European concerns over the Saharan situation, the legal services of the European Parliament proceeded to propose that either the agreement be suspended or that it exclude Western Sahara’s particularly rich fishing grounds on the basis that there was no evidence of the Sahrawi population benefiting from the existing agreement. The overall outcome of the episode, which Haidar was able to exploit politically, was that the Polisario was handed a propaganda victory, the Western Sahara conflict acquired more salience on the international agenda and doubts surrounding the recently bestowed ‘advanced status’ of EU-Morocco relations grew within Europe. Subsequent WikiLeaks revelations showed that the US also viewed Spain’s handling of the Haidar case as ‘disastrous.’

At the beginning of 2010, Mohamed VI went on to announce a ‘renewal and modernisation’ of the Moroccan state, in an effort to reassure international
partners that his country was serious about regionalisation. The Southern Provinces would be in the forefront of devolution measures to be elaborated by an advisory committee headed by Omar Azziman, who was to be replaced as ambassador to Spain by the controversial figure of Ahmed Ould Souilem, a defector from the Polisario movement. The committee failed to report within the six months initially allowed for it to produce proposals. Thus, by the second half of the year, the Moroccan regime was once more suffering from a failure to deliver on reform promises, the consequences of which were felt both domestically and in the context of conflict resolution talks, presided over by UN envoy Christopher Ross.

**Civil Society, Smashing the Ice**

Morocco’s refusal to discuss any proposals but its own provoked a temporary boycott of the talks by the Polisario. Increasingly, however, resistance to the policy of imposition came from civil society activism. In August 2010, NGO activists from the Canary Islands were arrested for demonstrating solidarity with the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara capital of Laayoune. Their tactics owed something to the example set by international supporters of the Palestinian population of Gaza, aimed at breaking the Israeli blockade of the occupied territory. Meanwhile, a key feature of the protest movement on the ground, which came to a head in October and November, was the absence of political identification with the Polisario. Resentment of the Moroccan occupation, exacerbated by the prospect of an imposed insubstantial autonomy, was fuelled by social and economic discontent. A variety of issues converged to ensure that the biggest demonstrations staged by Sahrawis since 1975 expressed pre-eminently social grievances. These related to: the withdrawal of subsidies traditionally received by nomadic Sahrawis; high levels of youth unemployment; anger over the privileged economic circumstances of many of those upholding Moroccan claims to sovereignty; and disgruntlement at the way in which the EU, despite internal opposition, still seemed intent on including Western Saharan resources in fishing agreements with Morocco. The idea of establishing a protest camp had been trialled the previous year, but it now became a massive, high-profile activity, as the camp at Gdeim Izik, 12km to the east of Laayoune, gradually came to attract some 20,000 demonstrators. Surrounded by Moroccan police forces, the political reality of the occupation of the territory quickly entered into the confrontation, especially after a 14-year old Sahrawi boy was killed in an incident at a security checkpoint on October 24th. At the same time, the social nature of the grievances was reflected by Morocco’s initial attempts to placate demonstrators by making offers of land, subsidies and benefits.

**Amid a Moroccan clampdown on independent news reporting, the impression that reached the outside world was of a brutal offensive against the protestors, claiming dozens of victims in the space of two days**

When concessions failed to persuade the protestors to back down, the camp was broken up forcibly early on November 8th, thus pre-empting its reinforcement by several thousand supporters arriving in a fresh convoy of protest vehicles from Laayoune. Attempts by Morocco to minimise the political damage by deploying unarmed gendarmes and members of the para-police auxiliary forces ultimately meant that, while dozens of protestors were injured, the fatalities were mainly on the Moroccan side. The destruction of the camp immediately brought further Sahrawi protest action, punctuated by a number of merciless attacks by enraged opposition militants back in Laayoune itself, as police undertook house-to-house raids in search of the camp protest leaders. Amid a Moroccan clampdown on independent news reporting, the impression that reached the outside world was of a brutal offensive against the protestors, claiming dozens of victims in the space of two days. The Polisario was quick to claim that 11 civilians had been killed; and later reported that there were 36 bodies in a hospital. The Spanish Human Rights League went further, claiming that over 100 people had been killed and more than 2000 arrested for being Sahrawi. Moroccan Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi-Fihri was later to concede that detainees may have been tortured in police stations. However, organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International found that Morocco’s figures of
13 killed, including 11 members of the security forces and two civilians, were accurate. Human rights reports made clear that abuses had been committed on both sides: Moroccan forces had not only been resisted by civilians with Molotov cocktails and gas bottles, but also targeted by militias intent on cutting throats; meanwhile, they stood accused of a disproportionate use of force, including systematic beatings of detainees and at least one case of rape.

Overall, Morocco suffered by far the greatest loss of face. First, it had not been able to deal with the situation without eventually resorting to force. Second, its intervention to eradicate the camp was a reminder to the outside world that its presence in Western Sahara involved occupation and repression, notwithstanding the fact that some of the violence was between Sahrawi communities. Third, when it came to the crunch, the reaction of the authorities contradicted Moroccan claims to be proceeding with a process of devolution. Fourth, restrictions on media access and travel to Laayoune by concerned European groups keen to observe the events, fuelled international doubts about the extent of the regime’s commitment to liberalisation and reform.

To defuse the external condemnation it received, especially from within Europe, Morocco replaced the civil governor of Laayoune with a Sahrawi. There were diversionary efforts within the Moroccan Parliament to shift the focus of international attention to the Hispano-Moroccan disputes over Ceuta and Melilla, partly in reaction to the widespread criticism of human rights violations emanating from Spain. One consequence of the events was that, under strong criticism for its conciliatory attitude towards Rabat, Zapatero’s government in Madrid was finally persuaded to modify its position by joining the group of countries demanding that the UN should play a role in protecting human rights in the Western Sahara.

**Reverberations in Morocco**

While so-called ‘demonstration’ effects are complex processes, whose causes are difficult to identify (let alone prove), one may at least hypothesise that the sporadic protests seen in Morocco itself during the early months of 2011 drew some of their inspiration and possibly actually learnt from the ‘hours of rage’ and preceding protest campaign witnessed in the Western Sahara, along with the upheavals that were shaking neighbouring North African states at the time, in some cases much more deeply than Morocco itself. It may be that the biggest lesson – drawn especially from the fall of successive heads of state in North Africa – has been learnt by Mohamed VI himself: that the future of the monarchy in Morocco depends on much more decisive political reforms than those contemplated at the start of his reign. In March 2011, in quick succession, he first announced the creation of an independent body to monitor human rights and then, on the 9th and after receiving recommendations from Omar Azziman and his advisory committee, plans for a new constitution, involving a system of democratically-elected regional authorities.

Adding credibility to the decentralisation plans was a concurrent commitment made to reducing royal powers and giving Morocco a constitutional monarchy within a democratic framework. Although the precise implications of this for the Sahara were not immediately clear, these early indications of a forthcoming ‘transition from above’, encouraged by pressure from below and within the Arab world, at least imply that the offer of autonomy from Morocco is now much more meaningful, and thus a more formidable contender for popular support among Sahrawis alongside the more established cause of independence.

**Bibliography**


Amidst the winds of change rapidly sweeping from the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean down to the Arabian Sea, Lebanon is plunging into political immobility following a government crisis that unseated incumbent Prime Minister Saad Hariri and left the country with yet another void in its executive branch of government. The recent standoff between two deeply divided political camps is but an illustration of Lebanon’s perpetual and recurrent crisis in political governance. It is also the culmination of six years of tumultuous political upheaval between the opposition, led by the deposed Prime Minister, and the new majority, led by the pro-Iranian Hezbollah.

The seeds of the ongoing crisis were sewn on February 14 2005, when Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was killed by a massive car bomb on Beirut’s seafront. Though unsubstantiated, accusations concerning the assassination were made against Syria, whose forces had been stationed in Lebanon since 1976. Syrian heavy-handedness in Lebanon had put the late Hariri at odds with the country’s policies in Lebanon. Events culminated in a colossal demonstration on March 14 2005 demanding that Syrian forces leave Lebanon and that an international investigation be opened into the assassination. Pro-Syrian demonstrators had previously taken to the streets on March 8 to pledge their allegiance and show their gratitude for Syria’s support of Hezbollah. The assassinated Prime Minister’s son, Saad Hariri, assumed leadership of the anti-Syrian movement, backed by a constellation of political factions. Dubbed later as the Cedar Revolution for independence and sovereignty, the 14 March demonstrations hastened the departure of all Syrian forces from Lebanon six weeks later, although for many it turned out to be a disappointing uprising that left unfinished business. It was later revealed that the March 14 leaders, themselves wily politicians and the movers and shakers of Lebanon’s sectarian political system, overlooked major political reforms and focused on preserving their hold on power. Subsequently, the legislative elections held in June 2005, following what was arguably one of the largest demonstrations in Lebanon’s modern history, brought cosmetic changes to the composition of the first parliament after thirty years of Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. With the country divided between two camps – March 8 and March 14 – essentially led by Shiites and Sunnis respectively, five years of instability ensued, characterised by the assassination of anti-Syrian political and media figures, a war with Israel and dangerous sectarian clashes reminiscent of Lebanon’s fifteen-year civil war. The period stretching from 2005-2011 has also witnessed successful Arab mediation of internal conflicts led by Qatar, a series of UN Security Council Resolutions and the founding of a hybrid international tribunal to try the assassins of Rafiq Hariri.

A History of Political Malaise

Lebanon’s chronic political ills have weighed heavily on the governance system’s ability to keep pace with the rapid changes taking place around it. This has translated into an irrecoverable fragility that stands in the way of the country’s attempts to reform itself and reinvent its political system. Culturally and economically, Lebanon remains a gateway for Europe to the Arab East. The country boasts a modern system of education, a strong and vibrant banking system, and an unparalleled – though not flawless – financial, medical and tourist service infrastructure. The coun-
try's multilingual, pluralistic society and historically friendly culture render Lebanon a top destination for businesses seeking to establish a presence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

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Dating back to the latter part of the 19th century, the make-up of the country, which was known as and limited to Mount Lebanon and Beirut, included competing minorities, most notably Maronite Christians, Sunnis, Shiites and Druze among many others. The gathering of opposing sectarian minorities, each seeking protection from a foreign power at the time and proclaiming a distinct narrative of its own, led Lebanon's melting pot to become a cause of ongoing instability and periodic confrontation. With heavy interference from the Ottoman Empire, France and to a lesser degree Britain, Lebanon unwillingly became a proxy battleground for foreign powers, a role that has continued under different guises to this today.

The creation of Greater Lebanon in 1926 was accompanied by a constitution that apportioned power-sharing to the various sects according to their size in the population. A post-independence gentleman's agreement known as the National Pact was established in 1943 by Lebanon's political elite, which specified that the President of the Republic be Maronite, the speaker of parliament, Shiite and the Prime Minister, Sunni. Lebanon's system of governance effectively became consensus-based between the leaders of its major sects — a recipe for continued bickering and conflict and hence for a constant need of foreign intervention. The creators of the National Pact undoubtedly knew the dangers of relying on consensus for governing between vying minorities who often sought foreign support and encouragement to win their position. Lebanon's strength, it was argued, was derived from its weakness. Clearly this formula did not withstand the test of time as periodic communal wars, backed by outside powers, punctuated Lebanon's modern history during the second half of the twentieth century.

Lebanon's longest civil war from 1975-1990 ended with a creative power-sharing accord that was never fully implemented, aimed at giving the country a serious chance to build a modern democratic state. Known as the Taif Agreement, it stopped short of becoming a peace-building blueprint for Lebanon and opened the way for warlords to become the new political elite. Governance became a matter of deal-making between sectarian leaders, most of whom were driven by the desire to consolidate their newly-gained positions and ensure self-preservation. Syrian forces were stationed in Lebanon to guarantee that the Taif Agreements be selectively implemented to serve their design to maintain tutelage over the post-war political system. Hence, subsequent electoral laws and gerrymandering were tailored to serve pro-Syrian politicians and ensure that they retain power. A blanket amnesty law was issued in 1990 and stymied any serious effort to conduct meaningful reconciliation between the country's various communities, who had been engaged in fratricide for a decade and a half. The unspoken atrocities, thousands of internally displaced families and 17,000 people left missing after the war remain unresolved issues to this day. A post-war drive for economic recovery was characterised primarily by massive spending on reconstruction projects and on modernising Beirut's infrastructure, with very little spent on development and education in peripheral areas. In fact, post-war rebuilding funds were carefully apportioned between sectarian leaders to serve the latter's interests with no transparency or accountability required. Consequently, Lebanon's debts, resulting from gigantic borrowing to finance reconstruction and satisfy power-hungry elites, spiralled out of control reaching 52 billion dollars in 2011.

The post-war years also saw an exponential increase in the military power of the pro-Iranian, exclusively Shiite Hezbollah, which until 2000 led a successful armed resistance against Israeli occupation of South Lebanon. Hezbollah benefited from a close Syrian-Iranian collaboration over Lebanon to build its military shrewdness and security apparatus at the expense of the regular armed forces. Hence, in no time, Hezbollah became the strongest military force in Lebanon and has remained as such to this day. Following the liberation of South Lebanon, and particularly after the Syrian pullout from Lebanon, Iran's influence increased thanks to Hezbollah's armed presence. This was a factor that did not sit well with other communities, particularly the Sunnis.
Post-Syrian Regime

Between 1990-2004, Syrian presence in Lebanon had calibrated relations between the country’s political leaders, who by 2004 had formed a deeply entrenched elite with a wide web of sectarian interests behind them. Syrian officers became de facto arbitrators of the frequent conflicts between the governing elite and ensured that Lebanon’s dysfunctional post-Taif system worked reasonably well. Syria’s hasty exit from Lebanon exposed the fragility of the country’s consensus and the contradictions between the foreign allegiances of its leaders. The armed Hezbollah quickly became the target of choice by non-Shiite communities who essentially saw the Shiites as the only armed sect remaining, and therefore with an unfair advantage over other communities. In the late sixties and early seventies, when the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) began waging cross-border attacks against Israel from South Lebanon it was the Sunnis accused of seeking an unfair advantage, since the PLO was predominantly composed of Sunni fighters. Today in Lebanon, armed resistance led by one community is once more at the heart of communal conflict.

Political differences were further aggravated when Hezbollah sparked a war between Israel and Lebanon in July 2006, which took the lives of 1,200 innocent civilians and left the country’s infrastructure in devastation. The war ended with Hezbollah feeling triumphant and seeking to impose its writ on the political system. A severe political crisis ensued that paralysed the country and included Shiite ministers walking out from government, a parliament closure by the pro-Hezbollah Shiite Speaker and an 18-month-long sit-in in the heart of Beirut’s business district that dealt a debilitating blow to the economy. The standoff ended with Qatar-led mediation in Doha following a brief armed takeover of Sunni west Beirut by Hezbollah fighters, thereby confirming the former’s fears of bullying tactics by the armed Shiites. Once more, outside intervention was needed to resolve Lebanon’s conflicting political issues. While a consensus system is supposedly self-equipped with conflict resolution mechanisms and negotiation processes, the Lebanese governance system relies on an unspoken arrangement which apportions political influence and economic dividends among a closed circle of sectarian and communal leaders. Instead of being a source of richness, with emphasis placed on the commonalities that exist between its various sects, Lebanon’s pluralist system often displays its differences and contradictions while ignoring what binds its society together.

In 2006, the UN Security Council approved the statutes of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon following leaked reports of a Syrian hand in the assassination of Prime Minister Hariri. Shortly after, leaked accounts of the investigation connecting Hezbollah to the assassination began to appear in certain international news outlets. While no official accounts of the investigation have been revealed, and consequently no evidence has been published, rumoured accusations that Hezbollah was responsible for Hariri’s murder have exacerbated already high tensions between Lebanon’s Shiite and Sunni communities. Hezbollah accuses the Sunni-led March 14 camp of facilitating foreign conspiracies to weaken the Party of God by supporting what it perceives as a politicised tribunal. The March 14 coalition, on the other hand, sees Hezbollah’s insistence on retaining its weapons as serving Syrian-Iranian ambitions to wrest control over Lebanon. This is but an illustration of the political fault lines that maintain a grip over Lebanon’s fragile governance system and subsequently prevent it from reforming itself.

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The Doha Agreement, sponsored by the Qatari mediated intervention, produced a consensus to elect a President of the Republic following an eight-month vacancy, left when President Emile Lahoud’s mandate came to an end. The agreement also included consensus over the adoption of a 50-year-old electoral law ensuring that incumbent communal leaders retain their seats in parliament. Furthermore, March 8 were given the unprecedented blocking third veto power in the new government formed after the presidential elections, creating yet another cause for political logjam and dysfunction, since it gave the opposition the upper hand in blocking any serious
decisions taken by the government that were not to its liking. The futility of institutions and the impossibility of the rule of law were never more flagrantly displayed than in the 2009 legislative elections. The result of these elections afforded March 14 a clear majority of 70 out of 128 parliament members, which in a normal democracy would have allowed them a comfortable lead to govern and form a cabinet. Instead, the requisites of consensus with the Hezbollah-led opposition voided the elections of any meaning when the cabinet was formed with the blocking third in the hands of the opposition. As the debate over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon intensified and talk began of impending indictments against Hezbollah operatives, the latter demanded that Lebanon annul its cooperation with the international court. They also demanded the end of all forms of collaboration with the tribunal on the grounds that the investigation had been mislead by false witnesses and that the court is a pro-Israeli tool out to get the Party of God. When Prime Minister Hariri refused to back down from supporting the tribunal, Hezbollah brought down the government by using the blocking third veto, sending Lebanon once again into a government crisis.

**Lebanon's Future in an Unstable Region**

Proponents of the domino theory wonder whether Lebanon will catch the uprising fever that is gripping countries in the Middle East and North Africa. While it would be inaccurate to observe the region through a single prism equating the problems of every country, many states in the region share grievances against repression, lack of freedom and poverty. Oddly, Lebanon stands out with an incongruent set of socio-political issues that constitute enough reason to revolt, but are not entirely shared with its neighbours. Lebanon has no single political figure to bring down to open up the way for the building of a democratic system; nor do the Lebanese suffer the oppression of a stifling security apparatus. A newly formed group of a few thousand activists have started a campaign of marches to “bring down the sectarian system.” While the movement has been steadily growing until the time of writing, unless it identifies specific and drastic changes there is little chance it will succeed. Lebanon’s sectarian culture has over a hundred years of history and is protected by deeply entrenched elites who have no qualms about using violence as a means to an end.

Following the collapse of the Hariri government, March 8 – with the help of Hezbollah intimidation – managed to secure a minimum parliamentary majority for billionaire former Prime Minister Najib Mikati to form a government in January. Since then two Arab regimes have fallen and several other uprisings have taken place. Since Lebanon’s political situation is intrinsically linked to regional dynamics, the fate of Lebanon’s future government hangs in the balance; another reason to expedite reforms to ensure constitutional processes are clear and respected. Any future reforms in Lebanon must start with a democratic, fair and representative electoral law; a clearly outlined process to phase out sectarianism and a timetable for the implementation of the forgotten Taif Agreement.

Until then, Lebanon’s craving for cyclical crises will continue, with no end in sight.
As the situation stands today, it would appear that Jordan is unable to match the radical political changes seen recently in the Arab World, in the likes of Tunisia and Egypt, and which are currently knocking on the doors of Yemen, Libya and Syria. Nevertheless, Jordan is fully engaged in a country-wide debate between its social and political components regarding how the political reform and democratic transformation should be carried out and on what basis.

While it is true that this debate had been ongoing many months before the Bouazizi incident in Tunisia, it has now been given fresh impetus and is being taken more seriously following the outbreak of Arab revolutions that have marked this new era in Arab history, known as the “Arab Spring.”

Two fundamental reasons help to explain why this seemingly new era of political change may not be able to embrace Jordan as well, which might find itself outside of the “Arab Spring.” The first is that the Jordanian political regime, in marked contrast to many Arab regimes, is characterised by a high degree of flexibility and the ability to manoeuvre. This enables the regime to engage the public opinion with a host of political initiatives, which keep people waiting for their possible outcomes. Added to this are frequently changing governments – as well as parliaments more recently – which all helps to keep Jordanians in a state of constant wariness. Large segments of the population, however, believe that despite all of this, the movement can succeed.

The second reason, on the other hand, is more significant and relates to the internal, vertical division in Jordanian society between its two basic components: Jordanians of Palestinian origin and East Jordanians. Sadly, this division is further exacerbated by influential powers from both within and outside the regime, which contribute to the current situation and polarisation in Jordanian society. The unfortunate result is a growing atmosphere of mistrust, mutual fears and accusations between influential elites from both sides of the equation or, to be more precise, from both communities. Furthermore, this division acts as a barrier, preventing both communities from creating a common national agenda; one that embraces Jordanians, regardless of their origins or religion.

This phenomenon has been particularly visible during the last six months, and the impact of the division is reflected in the country’s process of political reform and democratic transformation. This was further demonstrated when hundreds of youths gathered in the Interior Ministry Square for a sit-in demonstration in the heart of Amman, like their counterpart youths had done in Cairo and Yemen. This was made out to be a purely Palestinian move to overthrow the regime and create an alternative home for Palestinians. In reaction to this interpretation, hundreds of young people from Jordanian tribes in the governorates made their way to Amman to save it from the Palestinian threat, which ultimately – and regrettably – led to unprecedented tension between both communities and damaged national unity among Jordanians.

Who Is Behind the Demonstrations?

During the last six months, thousands of demonstrators and protestors have openly taken to the streets, representing all quarters and political schools and trends, although pressing for different agendas and chanting different slogans. The main opposition comprised Islamic parties (the Muslim Brotherhood), leftists and nationalists, as well as trade unions, syndicates and civil society organisations. All of these
parties demand political and constitutional reforms, and call for measures to be taken to fight corruption and uphold the sovereignty of law, as well as social justice, a constitutional monarchy, elected governments and parliaments that emerge from free, fair and transparent elections.

In this regard, the Jordanian Islamic Movement – which, it is worth noting, includes Jordanian citizens from different origins – plays a key role throughout. Meanwhile, the youth opposition includes a number of youth organisations and bodies that emerged more or less during the last six months, and seeks inspiration in the events that took place in Tahrir Square in Cairo, Al-Habib Bourguiba street in Tunis and the Square of Change in Sanaa. Indeed, this youth opposition has more radical goals, enjoys a high-spirited drive and has been able to attract young people from other traditional parties; a factor that has affected political parties, other reformist groups and traditional currents, including the conservative one, which might explain the generational conflict seen inside these parties.

A third party to all of this is the traditional Jordanian nationalist current, which is composed of purely Jordanian elements from East Jordan, or the sons of tribes. This current gathered strength after it was joined by “retired military” and tribal heads, and calls for the protection of Jordanian nationality and the strengthening of the pillars that support state institutions, such as the government and parliament. It also aims to enhance the state role and public sector. This current is keen to avoid political reforms in the country that may lead to Palestinians playing a definite or decisive political role – it believes that the country’s economic reforms led to the Palestinians achieving their economic objectives and fear that this situation will repeat itself in the political arena. This all goes hand in hand with other goals, such as demarcation of land for tribes to live on and move around in.

Paradoxically, this current does nothing to hide its anti-Israeli sentiment, openly disapproving of the peace treaty signed between the two countries, while at the same time accusing Palestinians of backing the theory of an “Alternative Home” for the Palestinians. The latter is fuelled by Palestinian demands for full political rights in Jordan, in addition to their social, economic and civil rights. Some elements would even go as far as withdrawing Jordanian nationality from the Palestinians and establishing a political divide and disengagement with the West Bank, which would mean granting all those coming from the West Bank and Jerusalem with passports issued by the Palestinian Authority (PA) and withdrawing their Jordanian nationality.

How Has the Regime Dealt with the Protest Movements?

Not surprisingly, the resounding upheavals experienced by the Arab region recently, symbolised by the downfall of the Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes, have sent shock waves through the Arab world – including Jordan and all other Arab regimes – as well as the world at large. Everyone was taken by surprise and left shaken, and fears grew that this may be repeated in Jordan and elsewhere in the Arab world although the Jordanian regime (like all other Arab regimes) claimed that this would not be the case, pointing out the significant differences between Jordan and Egypt and Tunisia. In fact, the resulting shock and anxiety characterised the regime’s reaction in so far as the street demonstrations were concerned, when it introduced certain measures that would satisfy people’s needs, buying their silence and keeping them in their homes. These included increasing salaries for employees, setting fixed prices on fuel and electricity, the continued support for basic commodities, promises that radical political reforms were underway, allowing citizens to demonstrate, raising the degree of freedom for people to voice views and opinions and giving the press and media greater freedom and independence.

Regrettably, these “soft” measures taken by the regime suddenly began to move in the opposite direction when it was felt that the wave of protests would break certain “red lines.” “Rough” measures were taken to suppress youth attempts to stage a sit-in in the heart of Amman (in the square by the Interior Ministry). Similarly, excessive force was used to halt or suppress the “March to return” to Palestine, where thousands of young people (mostly Palestinians) were trying to demonstrate for the right of return to Palestine on 25th of May 2011.

In connection with this trend, in recent months Jordan has witnessed the phenomenon of gangsters (or sappers), with certain youths carrying out attacks on demonstrators, press workers, the media and opposition figures, by physically striking them, verbally insulting them and even threatening to kill them. On other occasions they have attacked the media and
international news agency offices by destroying their contents. And all this despite the government’s disapproval. The opposition and public opinion, however, are convinced that the gangsters are working under the direction and financial support of influential quarters; as was the case in Egypt and Tunisia, or as is now the case in Syria, Yemen and Libya.

**Government Reform Initiative**

The carrot and stick policy, however, was clearly not going to work in the long run, and was unable to pave the way out of the present deadlock vis-à-vis the political reform process. Jordan does not have the huge sums of money needed to buy the people’s silence and win their loyalty, as is the case in the rich Arabian Gulf. Also, historically the Jordanian regime has not been a bloody one, nor has it been known to apply security or military solutions to a purely political problem. It therefore launched its political reform initiative, which aimed to meet the minimum requirements of both demonstrators and public opinion, and at least constituted a safe path: if the regime was able to generate national consensus on this, then the problem would be solved; but if it failed to accomplish that, then the authorities would have bought the extra time it badly needed to see how the course of events would develop in the region as a whole.

This was the context in which the government decision was taken to launch a National Dialogue Committee entrusted with this task, headed by a moderate political figure, the Upper House Speaker Taher Al-Masri. The committee was responsible for formulating electoral law as well as political party law. A royal committee was also set up to prepare suggestions to amend the constitution in a way which would enhance the parliament’s authority and would leave the King’s powers unchanged, which encompass many areas such as appointing and dissolving the government, dissolving parliament and postponing parliamentary elections.

For its part, the Jordanian Islamic Movement boycotted the National Dialogue Committee, and regarded its formation by the government as a weak initiative with certain limits regarding what may emerge from it. Meanwhile, other political forces and figures criticised the unbalanced representation inside the committee, since it did not represent all the components of Jordanian Society, notably Jordanians of Palestinian origin.

Not surprisingly, the findings of the committee created widespread national debate in Jordan’s social and political spheres. Many political forces saw its recommendations as a moderate step, which neither adhered to the wishes of the Jordanians that took to the streets, nor approved their goals. The continued social protest following the announcement of the NDC results is testament to this belief.

Amazingly, the committee adopted a unique system of electoral law based on a mixed parliament, whereby 88.5% of parliament seats are based on an open proportional list at the governorate level, and 11.5% are based on an open proportional list at the national level, but one that is restricted. It was observed that this complicated and unique system responded to two basic challenges or two potential problems, which overshadow the political decision-making machine at the local level. The first of these is preventing the Islamic movement from winning a wide-scale majority in parliament; and the second is ensuring that parliamentary representation of Jordanians of Palestinian origin remains below 20% of the overall number of seats in parliament, despite the fact that they compose at least 50% of the population.

Although the Jordanian public opinion is waiting for the “government initiative” to present both draft laws before parliament (electoral law and political parties law), eyes remain fixed on the constitutional amendments committee. This, however, is expected to do no better than in Morocco, where the recommended amendments affected some of the King’s powers. The election results obliged him to choose the Prime Ministers from the largest parliamentary bloc.

So in this context, the constitutional amendments committee is likely to put clearer constraints on the cases where the king can use his power and authority to dissolve parliament. These constraints would also force the government, when demanding the dissolution of the parliament, to submit its own resignation within two weeks of this happening. The amendments are also expected to improve the performance of parliament and the electoral process in general.

1 “Restricted” proportional open list at the national level means that this list includes 15 seats in parliament out of 130 seats, the overall number of seats in parliament provided that each governorate is represented (there are 12 governorates in the Kingdom in addition to 3 seats for Bedouins).
The Attempt to Join the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

On the 10th of May, the Gulf Cooperation Council leader decided to accept Jordan’s application for membership in the GCC countries at the end of the 13th consultative summit, acknowledging the fact that the country presented a request to this end 15 years ago. Along with this decision, GCC leaders also extended an invitation to Morocco to join the council, otherwise known as the “Arab Super Rich Club”, despite the fact that Morocco had not presented an application. Indeed, this decision was viewed in Arab political circles as an unexpected step and one of great importance. Some political observers described this decision as an attempt to create a “Sunni monarchies club”, while others described it as an attempt to recreate the “Baghdad Pact” – an agreement aimed at establishing an alliance among pro-Western countries (or pro-US) in their conflict with the former Soviet Union (USSR) and its satellite countries, during the Cold War. Indeed this decision must be seen within the context of Saudi Arabia’s strategic perspective to confront the challenges and threats the Saudi Arabian Kingdom and its allies are facing, which can be reduced to three areas: Iran and its allies; the approaching Arab revolutions experienced throughout the Arab world, which could endanger the Gulf countries; and the fear of emerging regimes existing beyond Gulf control, not to mention the fear of al-Qaeda and terrorism.

The Gulf’s strategic vision is trying to profit from Jordan’s extensive experience in the field of security and the military, especially in facing such threats. Evidently this vision is enhanced by the Gulf countries’ certainty that the US would provide them with a security umbrella against Iran, and could extend this to a comprehensive war on al-Qaeda, but they are neither able nor willing to protect them from internal revolutions and the fury of their people and the masses.

On the other hand, many Jordanians understandably welcomed the GCC decision to accept Jordan as a member, believing this could solve the problems of unemployment, poverty, low growth and rising energy costs, which is taking its toll on the national economy. But the reformist current and liberals fear the decision might be a way of beginning to build a new “military alliance” to counter the Iranian threat and “the Arab Spring revolutions” simultaneously; a position they would rather not see Jordan occupying. Furthermore, the reformists fear that Jordan may suffer certain practical consequences as a result of joining the GCC, such as possible infringements on human rights (women, minorities, freedom of expression), which would affect the country’s future regarding its reform programme and democratic transformation. The alliance has come as a result of the Arab Spring revolutions and aims to counter them. In a way, subjecting Jordan to the “Saudi umbrella and era” implies a social, cultural and religious impact that may result from an extreme Saudi Wahhabi school-of-thought.

Where Is Jordan Heading from here?

It is expected that during the second half of 2011 the constitutional amendments will be ratified, following their presentation by the entrusted committee, and the government is expected to present an electoral draft law and political parties draft law, which are based on the amended constitution for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. It was also ensured that the ratification would uphold the parliament, without which no constitutional amendments can take place. However, it is as yet unclear whether the government will present the draft law to parliament or whether these laws will be issued as provisional laws, as has been the case in the different elections over the last 22 years in the Kingdom, which were all held under provisional laws.

Regardless of what happens, the Jordanian monarch is expected to dissolve the 16th parliament before the end of 2011, or by the coming spring at the latest. Fresh calls will then be made for early elections to elect the 17th parliament. If this happens then the Jordanians will have elected three parliaments within five years (2007-2011).

In the wake of the newly suggested electoral draft law, the next parliament can hardly be expected to be any different from previous parliaments, and neither can we expect to see a widespread public drive for a change in the rules of the country’s political process. In this regard, there are no signs to indicate any mounting pressure from the international community to press for a breakthrough in this field and enliven the path of political reform and democratic transformation. Paradoxically, if Jordan’s attempts to join the GCC find fresh impetus and are successful, then the agenda of political reform and democratic transformation will be slowed, since most Jordanians are looking for new job opportunities, less economic hardship and improvements in social and living conditions.
Most observers, Turkish and foreign alike, acknowledge that Turkey has a constitutional problem. It is paradoxical that Turkey, after more than six decades of competitive multi-party politics, has not been able to consolidate fully its democratic regime and in this regard lags behind some of the newer “third wave” democracies, such as the three Southern European countries (Spain, Greece, and Portugal) and many Eastern European democracies. The immediate blame for this failure may be laid at the feet of the Constitution of 1982, the product of the military regime of 1980-83 (the National Security Council, NSC regime). The military rulers of this period blamed what they saw as the excessive liberalism of the 1961 Constitution for the breakdown of law and order in the late 1970s. Consequently, they set out to make a constitution that would strengthen the authority of the state at the expense of individual liberties and to create a set of tutelary institutions that would exercise strict control over elected civilian authorities. This meant a considerable narrowing down of the legitimate area of democratic politics. It has often been observed that the primary goal of the 1982 Constitution was to protect the state against the actions of its citizens, rather than to protect the citizens against the encroachments of the state, which is what a democratic constitution should do.

It is no wonder that the 1982 Constitution, devised through entirely undemocratic and unrepresentative procedures that left the final say to a five-member military council, led to a constant wave of criticism and demands for change as soon as civilian authority was restored in the fall of 1983. Consequently, the Constitution has undergone 16 amendments since 1987, some major, others minor. The general trend of constitutional change has, no doubt, been towards liberalisation and democratisation, so much so that the EU Commission observed that Turkey “has sufficiently satisfied the Copenhagen political criteria,” thus opening the way for accession negotiations to commence at the beginning of 2005. It is commonly admitted, however, that such reforms were not sufficient to completely eradicate the authoritarian, statist and tutelary legacy of NSC rule.1 On the other hand, it would be a simplification to blame Turkey’s constitutional problems entirely on the NSC legacy. As I have tried to explain elsewhere in greater detail, deeper problems can be found in the incompatibility between the requirements of a truly liberal democracy and some of the principles of the founding philosophy of the republic (Kemalism).2 Notably, three principles (nationalism, populism and secularism as understood during the single-party period) still create obstacles to the development of a genuinely liberal and pluralistic political system. Turkish nationalism, while never racist, nevertheless carried ethnicist overtones. Thus, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) programme of the 1930s and 1940s defined the nation as a “body of people united in language, culture, and ideal.” The insistence on...
linguistic and cultural unity and the goal of creating an extremely homogeneous society make it difficult, even today, to recognise a legitimate space for cultural and linguistic diversity and thus lie at the root of Turkey's Kurdish problem.

Similarly, populism as defined in this period was clearly synonymous with corporatist and solidarist ideologies that rejected class struggle and entrusted the paternalistic state with the duty of harmonising the diverse but compatible interests of occupational groups. Another ideological principle of the CHP, statistism (or étatisme), was seen as a method of accomplishing such harmonisation. Secularism was understood not as the separation of governmental and religious spheres, as in most Western democracies, but as a total way of life and a totalistic positivist ideology that aimed to consign religion solely to the conscience of individuals and to deny it a legitimate role in the public sphere. As a corollary of this revolution from above, the state elites that spearheaded the Kemalist revolution have maintained a paternalistic and tutelary attitude towards civilian democratic politics coupled with a deep distrust of civilian political actors. The Kemalist ideology and its tutelary mentality are strongly reflected in the 1982 Constitution.

More importantly, the 1982 Constitution's statist-solidarist-tutelary philosophy is not limited to such abstract and philosophical notions, but is supplemented by carefully designed and elaborate tutelary mechanisms. Chief among these is the Office of the Presidency of the Republic. This office was designed to be impartial and above party, controlled by the state elites, with extensive supervisory powers over civilian politics. Through his broad powers of appointment, the president was expected to influence the composition of other tutelary agencies, such as the Constitutional Court, other elements of the higher judiciary and the Board of Higher Education (YÖK).

Another important tutelary agency is the National Security Council, first created by the 1961 Constitution but substantially strengthened in its 1982 counterpart. Before the constitutional amendment of 2001, military and civilian members were represented in equal number on the Council, assuming that the president of the republic, who presides over the Council, is a person of civilian background. Furthermore, under Article 118 of the Constitution, the Council of Ministers had to give "priority consideration" to the recommendations of the NSC. The 2001 constitutional amendment gave civilian members a majority and underlined the advisory character of the NSC's recommendations. The amendment was accompanied by changes to other laws, particularly to that on the NSC secretariat. The net effect of these reforms was a significant degree of civilianisation of the political system. Yet it is no secret that the military still enjoys much greater power and influence than the military of any consolidated democracy and far beyond what the letter of the Constitution and the relevant laws suggest.

The experience of other democratising countries suggests that the removal of such vestiges of military regimes, or "exit guarantees," is not impossible in the long or even medium run. Two important and interrelated factors affecting the long-term viability of exit guarantees are the probability of a new military coup and the degree of unity or disunity among civilian political forces with regard to the military's role in politics. Commenting on the Latin American experience, Agüero observes that "by failing to display a united front, civilians have shown no common understanding of the obstacles which the military present for the prospects of democratic consolidation. A critical deterrent against the military, which would increase the costs of military domestic assertiveness, is thus given away, opening up civilian fissures for utilization by the military." This analysis seems to fit the present Turkish case. The complete civilianisation of the regime and the elimination of other tutelary features are obstructed by a numerically not so large but politically strong coalition of civilian forces, such as the main opposition party, the CHP, the Constitutional Court, the higher judiciary and a sizeable portion of the mainstream media and academia. The unifying factor is their deep attachment to the Kemalist legacy and their fear that the present governing party, the conservative AKP, may lead the country towards an Islamic regime.

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3 For a comprehensive study on this point, see Taha PARLA and Andrew DAVISON, Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2004.

Where such deep societal division exists, it is difficult to expect democratic institutions to function normally. Thus, the AKP government has had to face not only parliamentary opposition, but also the opposition of many state institutions, including the former president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer (until the end of his term in August 2007), the military, the Constitutional Court and the higher judiciary in general and, until quite recently, the YÖK. Of these state institutions, the Constitutional Court deserves special attention since in recent years it has become an active participant in the ongoing political conflict. Created by the Constitution of 1961, the Court was viewed and viewed itself as the guardian of the fundamental values and interests of the state elites and their Kemalist ideology.\(^5\) In its practice over close to half a century, the Turkish Constitutional Court has essentially behaved consistently with the expectations of the state elites that created and empowered it. In other words, it has acted as the guardian of the two basic pillars of the Kemalist ideology, the national and unitary state and the principle of secularism.

The state-oriented attitude of the Constitutional Court can most clearly be observed in cases involving the prohibition of political parties. The court has consistently closed down Kurdish ethnic political parties through an extremely rigid interpretation of the Constitution and the Law on Political Parties. The court's attitude towards the allegedly Islamist parties has been no more tolerant. So far, the court has closed down five parties on account of their alleged anti-secular activities. More recently, the Constitutional Court refused to close down the present governing party, the AKP (Justice and Development Party), but ruled that it had become a focal point of anti-secular activities and deprived it of half its state subsidies.\(^6\) In these decisions as well as in others related to secularism, the Constitutional Court defined secularism not as the simple separation of the state and religion but as a total philosophy, a way of life, reminiscent of Comtean positivism and scientism.

Certainly, Turkish rules on the prohibition of political parties do not exhaust the area of democratic deficit. Restrictions on freedom of expression; reluctance to broaden cultural rights for linguistic minorities; discriminatory practices against the heterodox Alevi minority; over-politicisation of the judiciary; and, above all, civil-military relations are other obstacles in the way of full democratic consolidation.

**Over close to half a century, the Turkish Constitutional Court has acted as the guardian of the two basic pillars of the Kemalist ideology, the national and unitary state and the principle of secularism**

Thus, the ongoing constitutional debate centres around the question of the liquidation of the authoritarian, statist, and tutelary features of the 1982 Constitution. This debate has gained particular intensity after the coming to power of the conservative AKP, which, in the view of its opponents, is an Islamist-leaning party. The constitutional amendments of 2010 constitute an important step forward in this direction. The amendment package, consisting of 25 articles, was adopted by the Grand National Assembly with a more than three-fifths but less than two-thirds majority, and, consequently, it was submitted to a mandatory referendum in accordance with Article 175 of the Constitution. The text was finally adopted by a 58% majority in the referendum of 12 September 2010, following a bitterly contested campaign.

The most important provisions of the amendment package are those related to the composition of the Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (HSYK). With regard to the Constitutional Court, the number of its judges was raised from eleven (with four alternates) to seventeen, three of whom are selected by parliament from among candidates nominated by the Court of Accounts (two) and the presidents of the bar associations (one). Four members are directly elected by the President of the Republic from among candidates nominated by the Court of Accounts (two) and the presidents of the bar associations (one). Four members are directly elected by the President of the Republic from among all judges and public prosecutors, rapporteur judges of the Constitutional Court, practising lawyers, and high-level public administrators. The president also chooses three members from among three candidates nominated for each seat by the YÖK, three members nominated by the Court of Cassation, two

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nominated by the Council of State (the supreme administrative court), one nominated by the Military Court of Cassation, and one nominated by the High Military Administrative Court, again from among three nominees from each vacant seat.

The changes with regard to the composition of the Constitutional Court are not radically different from the previous system, under which all judges of the Court were appointed either directly (3 out of 11) or indirectly (upon the nominations of the other high courts and the YÖK) by the President of the Republic.

The novelty introduced by the constitutional amendment essentially involves a limited role for parliament in the selection of judges and an increase in the number of judges nominated by the YÖK (from one to three). Probably, a more consequential novelty is the introduction of constitutional complaint by individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated by an administrative or judicial decision. Another positive change is the raising of the decisional quorum of the Court from a three-fifths to a two-thirds majority in party prohibition cases and in the review of the constitutionality of constitutional amendments. This change will no doubt make it more difficult for the Court to close down political parties.

The changes with regard to the High Judicial Council (HSYK) are more radical. Under the previous arrangement, the HSYK was composed of three members (and two substitutes) nominated by the Court of Cassation and two members (and two substitutes) nominated by the Council of State, with the Minister of Justice and the Undersecretary of the Ministry of Justice as ex-officio members under the chairmanship of the Minister. Now, the number of members has been raised to twenty-two, with twelve substitutes. Seven regular and four substitute members are elected by the judges and public prosecutors of all regular first-degree courts, three regular and three substitute members by the judges and public prosecutors of administrative courts, three regular and three substitute members by the Court of Cassation, two regular and two substitute members by the Council of State, and one regular and one substitute member by the Justice Academy. The President of the Republic appoints four regular members from among law professors and practising lawyers. The Minister of Justice and the Undersecretary of the Ministry remain as ex-officio members. The Minister is still the chairman of the Council. However, his/her role is reduced to a mainly symbolic and ceremonial one. The constitutional amendment was intended to break the monopolistic domination of the two high courts over the HSYK and to make it more representative of the judiciary as a whole by allowing a strong majority of the Council to be composed of judges of all degrees elected by their own peers. Another improvement is that the HSYK shall have its own budget, building and secretariat (under the previous arrangement secretarial services were provided by the Ministry of Justice), and judicial inspectors shall heretofore be attached to the HSYK instead of the Ministry of Justice.

The constitutional amendment package also contains other improvements, such as the introduction of an Ombudsman; the narrowing down of the area of competence of military courts in favour of civilian courts; the strengthening of positive discrimination (affirmative action) in favour of women, children, the elderly, the disabled, and widows and children of war veterans; and the introduction of new rights, such as personal data protection, the removal of certain restrictions on the right to travel abroad and children’s rights.

However, the referendum campaign was bitter and divisive. The opposition parties argued that changes with regard to the judiciary were intended to make it an obedient servant of the majority party, even though most foreign observers, including the Venice Commission, saw them as an important step forward in the right direction. In any case, the constitutional debates did not end with the referendum. The leaders of the AKP often stated during the campaign that the amendment package was only a first step on the way to a totally new and more liberal constitution and that the National Assembly to be elected in June 2011 should take up the task of preparing such a constitution. Thus, it appears that the forthcoming election campaign will centre mostly on constitutional issues. However, bitter divisions over such critical issues as minority (essentially Kurdish) rights, the principles of the nation-state and nationalism, the limits on the freedom of religion, and civil-military relations make the adoption of a constitution based on a broad consensus unlikely.

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Traditionally, Turkey has not had a policy towards the Mediterranean per se. The Eastern Mediterranean has, of course, been of immediate concern for a long time, primarily because of the Cyprus problem. Otherwise, the rest of the Eastern Mediterranean has been construed as part of the Middle East. Furthermore, Turkey has traditionally shied from being labelled as a Mediterranean country and resisted being called such by the EU, fearing that it could undermine its membership prospects. This was, for example, one of the main reasons for Turkey’s energetic opposition to Nicolas Sarkozy’s initial idea of a “Mediterranean Union” in May 2007. The rest of the Mediterranean or the Maghreb traditionally has been beyond Turkey’s foreign policy horizon. However, all this is changing. In the last few years, Turkey’s relations with the countries along the southern shore of the Mediterranean have been significantly transformed. Political relations with the Arab world in general have been improving, while relations with Israel have taken a serious downturn. Nevertheless, what remains common to Turkey’s relations with these Mediterranean countries, including Israel, is that trade and the movement of people are playing a growing role. This is driven by the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy into that of a “trading state.” When this is accompanied by current Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “zero problems policy,” Turkey may finally become an agent of regional integration, even if certain challenges remain.

The Rise of the Trading State

Turkey is becoming a “trading state,” and this is having an increasingly large impact on both its domestic politics and its foreign policy. In 1975, foreign trade accounted for 16% of Turkish GDP. In 2008, this figure had increased to 52%. In real terms, Turkish foreign trade increased from around $11 billion in 1980 to $333 billion in 2008, in spite of the world recession. Furthermore, the value of Turkish exports and their diversity have also increased. While the export of manufactured goods accounted for only 27% of merchandise exports in 1980, by 2008 this figure had risen to 79%. Lastly, the relative significance of the EU in Turkey’s foreign trade, though still very high, has fallen from a peak of around 49% of overall trade in 1995 to around 41% in 2008 (Table 9). Neighbouring countries have taken on growing importance as their share has grown from 14% to 25%. In particular, trade and the movement of people from ex-Soviet-bloc neighbours have increased (Tables 9 and 10). However, in recent years Turkey has been trying to aggressively liberalise its visa policy and expand its trade with the Middle East. The growth in trade with the Middle East has not yet matched the growth with other regions. While trade with the ex-Soviet-bloc neighbours increased by more than 940% between 1995 and 2008, the rate of increase with the Arab Mediterranean countries

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was much less than half that (Table 9). However, over the course of 2009 and 2010, the government has sought to expand Turkey’s trade relations with the Arab Middle East. The lifting of visas for the nationals of a string of Arab countries, as will be discussed below, is primarily driven by economic considerations. In terms of the broader Middle East, so far it is actually trade with Israel, Iraq and Iran that has grown significantly. The increase with Iraq, especially with the Kurdish region, has been particularly dramatic. Trade with Iran has been dominated by natural gas and petroleum imports, while Turkey’s exports have been limited. Iran is the only major economy in the region that still remains relatively closed to Turkish exports and businesses. This, in turn, very much explains the Turkish government’s efforts to maintain good relations with Iran with a clear expectation of gaining better access to the Iranian market. The situation with Israel is very different. The economies of both countries are much more compatible, and trade and business relations have been expanding ever since the free trade agreement was put into place in 1996. Recent deterioration in bilateral relations does not appear to have significantly undermined this trend.

Turkish relations with Israel have been problematic since Erdogan’s brush-up with Peres in January 2009 at the Davos World Economic Forum. Relations took a turn for the worst with the Mavi Marmara incident in May 2010. Despite Erdogan’s anti-Israeli rhetoric and his government’s threat to break diplomatic relations with Israel unless Israel apologises for the killing of nine Turkish nationals on board the Mavi Marmara, not one word has been uttered about abrogating the free trade agreement with Israel. This is particularly significant considering that Necmetting Erbakan, the leader of the Refah party, from which the AKP emerged, had virulently objected to this agreement. Similarly, even if there has been a considerable fall in the numbers of Israelis coming to Turkey, the government has not attempted to introduce visas for Israeli nationals travelling to Turkey. The decline in foreign trade between Israel and Turkey from $3.4 billion in 2008 to $2.6 billion in 2009 was more a product of the global financial crisis than of the crisis in Israeli-Turkish relations. In percentage terms, the fall is less than that which occurred in overall terms or in trade with the EU. Between these two years, Turkey’s overall trade and trade with the EU declined by 27% and

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TURKEY</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2008</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Import</td>
<td>Export</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>% of G.Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>530</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>179</td>
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<td>Jordan</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>191</td>
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<td>Egypt</td>
<td>211</td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>238</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>125</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>269</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Mediterranean TOTAL</td>
<td>1,441</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>2,941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mediterranean TOTAL</td>
<td>1,608</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>3,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>689</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet Bloc Neighbours*</td>
<td>3,813</td>
<td>2,161</td>
<td>5,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU**</td>
<td>16,861</td>
<td>11,078</td>
<td>27,939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12,738</td>
<td>6,236</td>
<td>18,974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>35,709</td>
<td>21,607</td>
<td>57,316</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: TUIK (Turkish Statistical Institute).

* Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Trade data with Armenia are not available.

25% respectively, compared to a 23% decline in trade with Israel. Meanwhile, over the course of 2010, business and trade with Israel picked up again. In the first six months of 2010, trade with Israel was up 43% compared to 2009. The increase in trade with the EU during the same period was only 25%.

Movement of People under Turkey’s Middle East Policy

A more liberal visa policy has been an especially striking characteristic of Turkey’s neighbourhood policy. However, this policy has been extended to parts of the Arab Mediterranean only recently. The number of entries of nationals of Arab Mediterranean countries increased from about 270,000 to just over 780,000 in 2008 (Table 10). This constitutes less than 3% of overall entries into Turkey in 2008, compared to entries from the EU and the former Soviet-bloc countries, which respectively constituted 56% and almost 26% of all entries. The number of Iranians that entered Turkey in 2008 was actually much higher than those from the entire Arab Mediterranean world. Similarly, more than half a million Israeli nationals entered Turkey in 2008. The difference is primarily a function of the fact that former Soviet-bloc country nationals, Europeans, Iranians and Israelis enter Turkey visa free or with sticker visas easily obtained at entry points. This situation is changing fast. In a major and dramatic break from past practice, the current government began to liberalise visa requirements for most Arab countries. Visas for Moroccan and Tunisian nationals were lifted in 2007, and visas for Jordanian, Lebanese and Syrian nationals in late 2009. It is still difficult to substantiate the net impact of visa liberalisation. The increase from 2007 to 2009 for Morocco and Tunisia was 74% and 35% respectively. Most of these entries were composed of suitcase traders engaging in economic activity in a similar way to what happened in the early 1990s, when Turkey opened its borders to nationals of the ex-Soviet world. In the case of the former Soviet space, following an initial period of suitcase trade, both the numbers of entries from and trade with the ex-Soviet world exploded. The increase in the number of people entering Turkey from the ex-Soviet-bloc neighbours between 1995 and 2008 was about 360%, while trade for the same period increased by more than 900% (Table 10). Just as a more liberal visa policy played a central role in the expansion of trade with Turkey’s northern neighbourhood, it would be reasonable to expect a similar expansion in trade with Arab Mediterranean countries following the liberalisation of visas. Such an expectation may materialise sooner rather than later because of the energetic way in which Turkey has been pushing economic integration, especially with Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. In July 2010, Turkey led the effort for the establishment of a “Close Neighbours Economic and Trade Association Council” with these three countries. The Council aims to establish a free trade area within five years based on the recognition that “free trade agreements contribute to the expansion of world trade, to greater international stability, and, in particular, to the development of closer relations among our peoples.” Actually, such an objective is not that far from the stated objectives of the European Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Whether the Council will achieve its objectives only time will tell. However, Turkey already has free trade agreements with Jordan and Syria, and the one with Lebanon is nearing ratification. These steps are clearly in line with Davutoglu’s ambitious vision of an integration project leading to free movement of goods and people from the city of Kars to the Atlantic, and from Sinop to the Gulf of Aden.

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6 Calculated from data on www.tuik.gov.tr.
7 All figures were obtained from www.tuik.gov.tr.
8 These figures are calculated from the above tables for the former Soviet republics neighbouring Turkey, as well as Bulgaria and Romania. However, Georgia was not included in the calculation of the average for entries from the ex-Soviet world because of the over 50,000% increase in entries from Georgia to Turkey between 1995 and 2008, which would have skewed the average significantly.
9 Joint Declaration on Establishing a “Close Neighbours Economic and Trade Association Council” for a Free Trade Area between Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey, 31 July 2010.
Turkey’s “Zero Problems Policy,” the Trading State and Challenges Ahead

Turkish relations with the Mediterranean have entered a new era. This article has argued that the expansion of these relations is driven by Turkey’s “trading state” interests. It is highly likely that there is going to be greater economic integration accompanied by greater movement of people between Turkey and the Mediterranean in the near future. The “zero problems policy” closely associated with Davutoğlu aspires to arrive at a stable and prosperous neighbourhood for Turkey.11 Such a neighbourhood inevitably would fall in line with Turkey’s “trading interests.” However, Turkey’s “zero problems policy” is not without its problems. This policy has engendered considerable Turkish involvement in regional issues, ranging from efforts to mediate between Arabs/Palestinians and Israelis, between Sunnis and Shi’a in Iraq, between Afghanistan and Pakistan, between Bosnia and Serbia, and between Iran and the West to resolving bilateral conflicts such as Cyprus and relations with Armenia. The government has run up against the harsh realities of international politics, especially in respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the controversy over the Iranian nuclear programme, not to mention the complexities facing the improvement of Turkey’s relations with Armenia and Cyprus. “Getting to zero” problems have required more than just good intentions.12 Furthermore, conspicuous closer relations with Hamas and the broader Muslim world, the rhetoric employed by the Turkish Prime Minister and his befriending of such leaders as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Omar al-Bashir accompanied by Turkey’s improved relations with Iran and Syria have ruffled feathers in the West, provoking a whole literature on whether Turkey is turning its back on the West. This situation has been further exacerbated by Turkey’s deteriorating relations with Israel. Indeed some of the rhetoric employed and certain aspects of the current Turkish foreign policy do seem to run against the interests of a “trading state.” They risk undermining Turkey’s credibility and run counter to Turkey’s efforts to seek a stable and peaceful

neighbourhood. However, it is precisely this latter objective of Turkish foreign policy that should be recognised as an objective in parallel with that of the EU and the broader West. Just as the “zero problems policy” needs some nuance and fine-tuning to strengthen Turkey’s credibility and serve Turkey’s “trading state” interests, the EU needs to adjust its policies to a "new" more democratic and economically robust Turkey. The Economist is right in answering the question “is Turkey turning its back on the West?” with a resounding "no." However, it is also right in noting that a risk does exist of Turkey “turning its back” if the US and the EU fail to come to terms with a changed Turkey. In turn, the AKP government and its foreign policy decision-makers need to make allowances for the fact that "getting to zero" is not as straightforward as one might wish and that the complexities of international as well as domestic politics need to be woven into Turkish foreign policy. Criticising Israel may sell well domestically, but it is doubtful whether it serves Turkey’s broader interests in the Middle East, especially its interest in a stable and peaceful Middle East.

Furthermore, as a number of public opinion surveys and statements by leaders of Turkey’s neighbourhood have underlined, Turkey’s added value to the region’s stability and economic and political development is intimately tied to the health of Turkey’s EU relations. Maintaining or nurturing stronger relations with the EU is also important, especially in terms of Davutoglu’s vision for Turkey’s neighbourhood. Davutoglu and other ministers in the AKP cabinet have pointed out on numerous occasions that they do not see a conflict between Turkey’s EU membership aspirations and its desire to expand relations with its

neighbourhood and beyond. They have also argued that Turkey is in a way trying to do what the European integration project has achieved in Europe by encouraging greater economic integration and interdependence in Turkey’s neighbourhood.

Turkey’s added value to the region’s stability and economic and political development is intimately tied to the health of Turkey’s EU relations

However, Davutoglu’s ideas are likely to carry much more credibility if Turkey is able and willing to develop stronger relations with the EU. The fact that 64% of the Arab public surveyed supported the view that it is Turkey’s EU membership prospects that make Turkey an attractive partner for the Arab world speaks for itself. The centrality of the EU to Turkey’s relations with the Middle East is also corroborated by how “Middle Eastern elites worry about any sign of Ankara turning its back on its EU accession process.” In turn, the EU ought to give Turkey the benefit of the doubt and recognise Turkey’s interest in addressing regional problems by emulating EU experience in integrating the region. If Turkey’s increased trade and movement of people does indeed contribute to greater integration and, hence, greater stability and peace in the Middle East, Turkey would have to be seen as an asset for the EU, at least, and especially, in terms of the EMP and ENP.

15 The desire to emulate the experience of the EU in regional integration has been noted by Ibrahim Kalin, the chief advisor of the prime minister, as well as by some EU officials. See: INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, “Turkey and the Middle East: Ambitions and Constraints,” Europe Report, No. 203, 7 April 2010, p. 11.
Turkey’s relationship with the West has always been a contested issue both in Turkey and in the West. Ever since the 19th century, questions of modernisation have been closely related to issues of identity and, therefore, to domestic affairs and foreign policy. For Ottoman reformers and their successors in the Turkish Republic, modernisation has meant the fashioning of the polity along European lines through “Westernisation.” Turkish foreign policy is a key area in which some of the ramifications of this “imagined” identity can be sought. For a long time after the establishment of the Turkish Republic, numerous factors, including the Depression and World War II, prevented the forging of a multifaceted exchange between Turkey and Europe. When Turkey sought access to various Western institutions, such as the Marshall Plan, the OEEC (later OECD), the Council of Europe and NATO – all created to cement the Western alliance in the wake of the war – it did so in an effort to underscore its place in the Western bloc. The young republic’s Grand Project of Westernisation, it was thought, could not be achieved without the cooperation of Europe and the US. The post-war international system offered Turkish policymakers fertile ground for instituting organic links with the West, which resulted in the redefinition of the policy of Westernisation as belonging to the Western alliance. Within this context, Turkey began to take part in different organisations designed to enhance cooperation with Europe and the US. Membership in the emerging European Community (EC) was a logical extension of Turkey’s inclusion in other Western organisations, since the EC offered an economic dimension that supplemented the Western alliance. The absence of the US from the emerging EC did not at that point conflict with Turkey’s efforts to maintain very close relations with this ally. Turkish policymakers believed (and rightly so, with hindsight) that the US supported the creation of a Community based on the promise of Western unity. Therefore, for the Turkish governing elite during the early Cold War period, “the West” largely meant “Western Europe and the United States,” undifferentiated as the Western alliance.

The bipolar world established after the war goes a long way towards accounting for the ease with which Turkey established itself in the Western alliance. The demise of this international system, beginning as early as the 1970s, prompted all parties to revise their previous assumptions. On the Turkish side, this revision led to the realisation that the Western alliance was divided and that cooperation with the US no longer ensured the smooth relationship with Europe that it once had. In the seventies and eighties, Turkey found itself increasingly distant from the EC, which began to define liberal democracy as a sine qua non for accession. This shift in European emphasis towards democracy, seized upon by the Greeks, Spanish and Portuguese, was an opportunity of which the Turkish governing elite of the time could not take advantage. Even as the EC came to define itself less strictly in terms of economic development and more in terms of Europeanness, including, above all, the promotion of liberal democratic values, human rights and the rule of law, Turkish policymakers continued to point to economic parameters in their push for Turkey’s membership. However, the negative turn in the relationship with the EC during that period did not result in a debate over the “loss of Turkey” for the West, because the same period saw intensive cooperation between Turkey and the US increasingly
Even as the EC came to define itself more in terms of Europeanness, including, above all, the promotion of liberal democratic values, human rights and the rule of law, Turkish policymakers continued to point to economic parameters in their push for Turkey's membership.

Turkey's relationship with the West has not been an easy one; it has had its ups and downs, its ebbs and flows. The present debate over this relationship, however, is unique compared to other periods. It is taking place at a time when Turkey is a negotiating country with the EU and within a context of increasing talk about a “train wreck” in the relationship. Turkey's relationship with the US has also become more difficult, less smooth and cooperative than during the Cold War. Furthermore, its relationship with the West must be viewed within the changing international context, in which the international system is increasingly multipolar and regional actors are adopting more autonomous orientations. Such changes have led Turkey to undertake efforts to tailor a new strategic role based on a more regional orientation, which has entailed a reassessment of its identity and appurtenance. Furthermore, the existence of a governing party (the Justice and Development Party or AKP) since 2002 that is quite different from previous governments in terms of its views of Westernisation and that places heavier emphasis on the country's Islamic identity has affected Turkey's foreign policy and relations with the West. In order to clarify the present debate on whether the West is losing Turkey, in what follows, I will first briefly examine the changing international and regional context before focusing on the relationship with the European Union (EU). I will then conclude by looking at the prospects for the relationship with the West.

Changing International Context: From the Cold War to the Post-Cold War

For the Turkish governing elites during the Cold War, the “West” largely meant Western Europe and the US, undifferentiated as the “Western alliance” and dominated by the US. At the end of the Cold War, Turkish elites belatedly realised that the West was no longer an undifferentiated entity and that the ground was more fertile for regional orientations. Turkey's relationship with its neighbourhood thus underwent a major transformation with the end of the Cold War. In the Cold War context, this relationship was defined by the exogenous parameters of the Western alliance. Turkey was a “frontier” state within the containment policy of the Western alliance vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. As a result, it had a difficult relationship with its neighbours, because most of the countries in the neighbourhood were either in the Soviet bloc or had tense relations with the West. Since Turkey defined its relationship with its neighbours in the context of the Western alliance, it did not have much choice with regard to its neighbourhood orientation and policies but to show its solidarity with the alliance, which narrowed its room for manoeuvre.

Whilst the relaxation of the tensions between the US and the Soviet Union in the seventies ushered in some changes in Turkey's relationship with its neighbours, Turkey did not actually discover its neighbourhood until the end of the Cold War. In that period, Turkey not only became more actively involved in neighbourhood issues, but also more “autonomous” as a result of the disintegration of the Cold War framework. Turkey's interaction with its neighbouring countries increased notably, and its economic initiatives with them, as well as the growing number of cultural and societal interactions, took on particular importance. Turkish entrepreneurs invested all over the neighbourhood, and Turkey's volume of trade with its neighbours has increased about twentyfold since the end of the Cold War in 1991. This “sea change” in its relationship with its neighbours is particularly visible in its adoption of visa-liberalisation measures towards an increasing number of neighbouring countries in recent years, which has resulted in a more conducive climate to societal interaction between Turkey and its neighbours. The introduction of an Islamic identity into Turkish political discourse has also had an effect on its orientation towards its neighbourhood. Closer links with Middle Eastern...
countries have been established both at the official level and through entrepreneurs and other civil-society actors. As the international system experienced major turbulence over the last decade and became increasingly multipolar in the midst of the economic crisis, the ground for regional orientations became more fertile, and Turkey adopted a more multi-dimensional foreign-policy orientation to achieve its goal of becoming a regional actor. Turkey’s increasing autonomy from its Western allies, as well as its increasingly unilateral orientations within its neighbourhood, have fuelled the debate over whether it has changed axes in recent times.

In addition to Turkey’s evolving relationship with its neighbourhood, the country’s relationship with the EU also underwent a major transformation in the post-Cold War context. After a long period of problematic relationships in the seventies, eighties and nineties, the EU’s Helsinki Summit in 1999 put an end to the EU’s long-standing exclusionary orientation and yielded a more inclusionary policy towards Turkey, which became part of the enlargement process with a similar accession-partnership relationship to other candidate countries’. The dramatic events of 9/11 resulted in a more inclusionary attitude towards Turkey not only in the US but also on the part of EU Member States and led to the realisation that including Turkey would challenge the discourse on the “clash of civilisations.” In this climate, Turkey was characterised as a “model” for the countries in its turbulent neighbourhood. These changes at the international and European levels were reinforced by domestic developments. The major economic crisis that rocked Turkey in March 2001 caused business actors to realise the need not only for the IMF anchor but also for the EU anchor in order to achieve the much-needed economic stability of the country. This assessment by the economic elites was shared by the political elites, and the EU “anchor” became the backbone of economic and political stability in Turkey.

In the changing European and Turkish contexts, both the coalition government until 2002 and the AKP government after 2002 focused on a major reform drive. Turkey thus entered an important period of transformation in which the Western-oriented reform drive increasingly turned into the concrete project of Europeanisation, focused on critical issues of democratisation. This period witnessed the belated realisation by Turkish political elites that the European integration process meant not only economic integration but also a major political transformation involving changes in sensitive political issues, such as civil-military relations, the extension of cultural rights to minority groups and the abolition of the death penalty.

With the process of Europeanisation, the EU acquired major transformative capacity within the context of Turkey’s reform initiatives and in fact became the crucial actor in defining Turkey’s relationship with the West.

In the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit, the “EU anchor” therefore became more crucial in defining Turkey’s relationship with the West, as the EU affected domestic developments in Turkey through the process of Europeanisation. The different Turkish governments’ internal reform initiatives were moreover supplemented by a new outlook on foreign policy, regional initiatives and neighbourhood relations. These changes in foreign policy orientation were also characterised as Europeanisation by many analysts at the time, as they emphasised “non-zero-sum” rather than “zero-sum” solutions based on multilateral diplomatic and economic-cum-soft-security instruments as opposed to military-cum-hard security measures. With the process of Europeanisation, the EU acquired major transformative capacity within the context of Turkey’s reform initiatives and in fact became the crucial actor in defining Turkey’s relationship with the West just as in the bygone Cold War decades. All these developments meant that the relationship between Turkey and the EU was increasingly nearing high tide.

What Went Wrong?

It ultimately proved difficult, however, to sustain the positive turn in the Turkey-EU relationship and the process of Europeanisation. Just as Turkey started negotiations in 2005, after a long waiting period, the process of European integration took an unfortunate downturn. The EU had been immersed in prolonged institutional problems over the last decade, marred by the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in the
successive referenda in France and the Netherlands. The Lisbon Reform Treaty emerged as the lowest common denominator, but even this compromise solution had to make it through a turbulent period before entering into force in December 2009. The EU’s long-standing institutional stalemate was reinforced by the recent economic crisis, which has plagued the EU Member States since 2008. In this rather negative context, the enlargement policy became the scapegoat for both the prolonged institutional stalemate and the emerging economic troubles. As the EU’s agenda became consumed by issues of economic governance and competitiveness and the challenges of international cohesion, the political momentum for enlargement waned and discussions of enlargement fatigue became common. Since the end of the elitist phase of the enlargement policy, the public has played a more important role, and the possibility of referenda on future accessions to the EU, specifically in the case of Turkey, has increased. Whilst support for enlargement among the European public has never been high, it is even more tepid in the case of the current potential candidates, among which Turkey enjoys the lowest support. Support for enlargement has especially tapered off in leading Member States, such as Germany and France. The most significant change has been in Germany, which used to be the most ardent supporter of the enlargement policy but is no longer pushing forward. The Franco-German axis, which has traditionally been one of the main backbones of both European integration and the enlargement policy, now stands opposed to one of the EU’s most successful policies.

Turkey became an easy target in this downturn, since it was one of the remaining two candidates and, in fact, the more problematic one at the negotiation table. It became a hot topic in the domestic debates of leading members, such as Germany, France and the Netherlands, particularly during national elections and popular referenda. The debates furthermore began to revolve around major identity issues, primarily Turkey’s “Europeanness,” based on essentialist orientations. In these debates, Turkey’s “Europeanness” was defined in terms of cultural/religious identification rather than political/economic references. Debates over Turkey became increasingly contextualised within the debate over Islam vs the West. In both France and Germany, major political parties and politicians began to make strong statements suggesting that Turkey was neither geographically nor culturally European. Specifically, these stances gave rise to new ideas for alternatives to full membership, ranging from offering Turkey a “privileged partnership” to membership in projects such as the Union for the Mediterranean. Ultimately, these debates in the leading Member States undermined the much-needed credibility and effectiveness of Turkey’s accession process and led to a decline in trust in the relationship.

The changes in the broader international climate as a result of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 reinforced these adverse tendencies at the European level. The US invasion destabilised Iraq and the broader Middle East and resulted in major problems for Turkey. Iraq’s destabilisation compounded Turkey’s Kurdish problem, bringing it once again to the fore after a period of dormancy. It also fostered an emerging debate on Turkey’s turbulent neighbourhood. Those in the EU who had often characterised Turkey as a liability found a more conducive environment to voice their opposition to its accession. Furthermore, the US invasion of Iraq increased anti-American sentiments around the world, and these sentiments reached their highest-ever levels in Turkey at over 90%. The rise of anti-American attitudes in Turkey began to have adverse effects on the EU process and public perception of the West in general. In addition to the rather negative contextual shifts at the European and international levels, the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU in 2004 without a solution to the enduring Cyprus problem exacerbated negative public perceptions of the EU and the West.

Turkey acquired a new role in the neighbourhood through its soft-power capabilities, which were themselves a result of the transformation of the EU accession negotiation process.

The aforementioned contextual shifts and stalemate in the EU accession negotiations affected the pro-reform coalition and led to the disintegration of the consensus on the European vocation and the rise of a more sceptical coalition of forces. Unfortunately, as Turkey started negotiations, the EU came to be seen as less of a transformative actor, and enthusi-
asm for the reform process fell off sharply. As conditionality rather than incentives seemed to dominate the negotiations, the accession process became less attractive for Turkey. Consequently, the political costs of supporting the process increased, leading to a dramatic decline in the domestic ownership of the project. In this context, the European debates about Turkey affected Turkey negatively, even as Turkish debates about political reform affected Europe negatively, giving rise to a “vicious circle” in the relationship.

The recent problematic period coincided with greater “activism” in Turkey’s foreign policy towards its neighbours. Turkey is involved in many foreign-policy initiatives in the Middle East, Caucasus and Balkans, through which it seeks to establish good relations aimed at ensuring “zero problems” with its neighbours. Turkey acquired a new role in the neighbourhood through its soft-power capabilities, which were themselves a result of the transformation of the EU accession negotiation process. As the EU’s significance in Turkey has waned, Turkey’s orientations towards its neighbourhood have increasingly diverged from the EU’s and its foreign policy has become increasingly “unilateral.” Turkey’s growing involvement with the Middle East region through unilateral policies moreover causes tensions with the US. These tensions were exacerbated following the deterioration of Turkey’s relationship with Israel. Furthermore, Turkey’s relationship with Iran has recently diverged from the viewpoints of the EU and the US on the nuclear issue. This negative turn in Turkey’s relationship with Israel has been transformed into a potential role as a “regional keystone” in its neighbourhood. The EU anchor has been critical in this process of transformation, both substantially burnishing Turkey’s image in its neighbourhood and increasing its role as a regional soft power. However, Turkey’s role has remained at a rather potential level because of the lack of effective channels of dialogue between Turkey and the EU on the CFSP, the CSDP and neighbourhood issues. With its increased focus on foreign policy and security issues, the Lisbon Treaty provides a conducive context, and its provisions show that there is more room for “structured cooperation” and “enhanced cooperation” in these areas. Unfortunately, these mechanisms are still restricted to the members of the EU. However, in addition to coherence in the areas of foreign policy and security, there is also an urgent need to create more flexible mechanisms. If more flexible mechanisms become viable in these areas, it could help bring the policies of countries like Turkey more into line with the EU’s and thus foster the creation of more effective channels of dialogue on neighbourhood issues. Collaboration in these areas could be useful in building up much needed trust in the relationship and could help to inject new life into the problematic accession negotiations. However, collaboration in the areas of foreign policy and defence should not be thought of as a substitute or alternative to the accession process. It must be remembered that Turkey acquired its new role in the neighbourhood through its soft-power capabilities, which are largely the result of the EU accession process.

Prospects for the Relationship

Turkey’s relationship with the West is at a critical juncture, especially its relationship with the EU, which fans the debate over whether Turkey is changing its axis and whether the West is losing it. The debate is not new; it resurfaces whenever Turkey’s relationship with the West, and especially with the EU, becomes more problematic. The debate on Turkey is also shifting from one on axes to one on its role as a model for other countries, especially those in its convulsive neighbourhood. Current changes in both the international system and its neighbourhood require moving beyond the debate over whether the West is losing Turkey and looking for ways to link it and its neighbourhood to multilateral mechanisms, which, in turn, must be redefined and revitalised in light of the current turbulent multipolar system.

In the last two decades, Turkey’s prior Cold-War role as a “frontier state” has been transformed into a potential role as a “regional keystone” in its neighbourhood. The EU anchor has been critical in this process of transformation, both substantially burnishing Turkey’s image in its neighbourhood and increasing its role as a regional soft power. However, Turkey’s role has remained at a rather potential level because of the lack of effective channels of dialogue between Turkey and the EU on the CFSP, the CSDP and neighbourhood issues. With its increased focus on foreign policy and security issues, the Lisbon Treaty provides a conducive context, and its provisions show that there is more room for “structured cooperation” and “enhanced cooperation” in these areas. Unfortunately, these mechanisms are still restricted to the members of the EU. However, in addition to coherence in the areas of foreign policy and security, there is also an urgent need to create more flexible mechanisms. If more flexible mechanisms become viable in these areas, it could help bring the policies of countries like Turkey more into line with the EU’s and thus foster the creation of more effective channels of dialogue on neighbourhood issues. Collaboration in these areas could be useful in building up much needed trust in the relationship and could help to inject new life into the problematic accession negotiations. However, collaboration in the areas of foreign policy and defence should not be thought of as a substitute or alternative to the accession process. It must be remembered that Turkey acquired its new role in the neighbourhood through its soft-power capabilities, which are largely the result of the EU accession process.

The dramatic changes in the international system and the turbulence and uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa put pressure on the US, the EU and Turkey to focus more on multilateral policies and look for ways to link multilateralism to regional actors in the Middle East and foster a sense of joint ownership among them. A critical role exists for all three in the present international context in the regions neighbouring Turkey and the EU. There are two
broad possibilities for these regions: either they will become immersed in major conflicts and “power politics” will predominate or they will eventually become part of a somewhat stable multilateral system. How the US, EU and Turkey act will be extremely important in shaping these trajectories in the neighbouring regions. The recent events in the Middle East and North Africa increase the pressure on the three actors to take a more active joint stance in the neighbourhood. The upheavals in the Arab world open windows of opportunity but also of vulnerability. In order to capitalise on these opportunities, the trio needs to engage in a comprehensive dialogue with the regional actors and prioritise socio-economic development and human security. It should also be ready to “listen to” and learn from the regional actors rather than imposing its own solutions. One of the most important things that the US, EU and Turkey can do together is to encourage a new security paradigm alongside regional actors that links security, development and freedom together for the Arab world and prioritises the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

**Given the changing context in the Arab world, all actors need to rethink their policies. Turkey and the EU should find new ways to make their neighbourhood policies compatible**

When assessing Turkey’s push into the Middle East within the broader context of neighbourhood relations, the Turkish political elites and government should realise that the EU anchor is crucial to Turkey’s role in the neighbourhood. Turkey was able to transform and enhance its soft-power capabilities through the EU accession process. It largely owes its appeal in the region to its relationship with the EU; its unique position in the region is the result of its EU anchor. Given the changing context in the Arab world, all actors need to rethink their policies. Turkey and the EU should find new ways to make their neighbourhood policies compatible. For Turkey to play the kind of role it aspires to in its neighbourhood, important hurdles must be overcome, particularly in relation to the persistence of profound political problems, as seen in the rise in infringement of freedom of expression and organisation within the country’s increasingly polarised political context, shaped by tendencies on the part of the AKP government towards majoritarian and more authoritarian rule. The most important lesson in this climate would seem to be to “heal thyself” in order to serve as an example for the countries in the neighbourhood. It should also be underlined once again that the EU process has served as the anchor for the consolidation of democracy in Turkey, just as it did for Turkey’s Southern European neighbours. The recent events in the neighbourhood place pressure on both the EU and Turkey to overcome the present vicious circle in their relationship and define a more effective working relationship, which will require complementarity in their orientations towards the neighbourhood. Turkey’s efforts in its neighbourhood require more active support from the EU and the US, but Turkish policymakers should not second-guess the need for democratic consolidation. The consolidation of democracy is a necessity not only for Turkey, but also for the neighbourhood that it shares with the EU. This, rather than the geopolitical significance that made it so crucial in the Cold War period, is the best possible way to anchor Turkey in the West.

**References**


Even though two decades have passed since the start of the violent disintegration of the Yugoslav federation, a number of conflicts in the region are still unresolved. For the most part, they are ethno-political in nature, both within the successor states in the region and between them. Consequently, the Western Balkans (the politically correct term used by the European Union (EU) to describe the former Yugoslavia plus Albania minus Slovenia) remain a permanent testing ground for the EU's ability to act in the self-assigned role of the “driving force” (in the parlance of the European Commission (EC)) for conflict transformation. Indeed, it was the Yugoslav catastrophe in the 1990s that originally challenged the EU to demonstrate that it can be more than a trade pact and induced it to develop far-reaching ambitions in the international arena. In due course, the “Balkan impulse” led to the construction of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). As of today, the EU's international standing and credibility still depend to a great extent on its scorecard in the Western Balkans. Memories of the EU's disarray in the early days of the Yugoslav catastrophe are immediately recalled whenever new EU foreign policy projects, such as the current ones in the Mediterranean, are debated.

Enlargement was repeatedly characterised by the EC as one of the EU's most effective foreign policy instruments. In order to remake the Western Balkans “in its own image,” the Union is exercising its normative power to a greater extent than it ever has before when dealing with transition countries. The effects are palatable. Without doubt, it is essentially the EU's pledge to accept the Western Balkan states as future members that motivates the governments in the region not to let the often barely suppressed conflicts escalate further. The governments are aware that acts contravening the EU’s policy in the region would instantly jeopardise their countries’ accession prospects. The EU's leverage was clearly visible when, in the autumn of 2010, Serbia gave in to demands from Brussels, backed by direct pressure on Belgrade from certain leading EU Member States, to abandon its goal of achieving the condemnation of Kosovo's secession in the United Nations General Assembly. Instead, in early 2011, Belgrade and Pristina started an “EU-facilitated dialogue” aimed at solving humanitarian and other issues, all of which would hopefully further stabilise the region in spite of the Kosovo conundrum.

However, it is far from certain that Belgrade and Pristina will be able to find a durable modus vivendi that would eventually pave the way for EU membership. Equally undecided is the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the three main ethnic groups are still debating the same issues that led to war twenty years ago – how to share power, the degree to which their country should be a (con)federal or unitary state, and whether more centralisation is really the precondition for entry into the EU. The list of the most serious “open wounds” in the Western Balkans would be incomplete without pointing out the fragile relationship between the Slavic and Albanian populations in the Republic of Macedonia. The latter’s implacable demands for ever more autonomy have a familiar ring in the region: in the past decades, such designs have preceded State disintegration. Moreover, there is a solid body of evidence-based research to corroborate that the Albanians in Kosovo, the Republic of Macedonia and Albania itself strongly support the unification of their
The Failing Transition

Against this backdrop of a number of complex unresolved issues, the EU’s policy strives to prepare the Western Balkan countries for membership in the Union while simultaneously assisting them to overcome the effects of war, economic backwardness and weak governance. With some shocking exceptions in Kosovo, there was little violence in the Western Balkans in the last decade and most of the governments complied, to various degrees, with the complex conditionality imposed by the EU in the framework of the accession process.

The transition model proposed by the EU and other Western institutions to the would-be members from the Western Balkans has not achieved the expected results based on the experience of Central and Eastern Europe. Presently, the most dangerous threats to stability in the region – with all the possible repercussions for the security of the EU and the continent as a whole – come from the unrelenting economic crises. Even though all parts of the Western Balkans are firmly chained to the EU through trade and investments, economic growth in the Western Balkans has faltered in the last two to three years. The majority of the countries in the region would need double-digit annual growth rates just to avoid lagging too far behind the EU. Instead, the economies of most countries in the region have shrunk as a result of both the recent global recession and domestic failings. Unemployment (which stands at around 20% in Croatia and Serbia and more than 40% in Bosnia and the Republic of Macedonia) is increasing, and the prospects of there being more jobs soon are bleak. Foreign investment, often presented as the cure-all together with credit-fuelled domestic demand, has significantly diminished. In essence, the transition model proposed by the EU and other Western institutions to the would-be members from the Western Balkans has not achieved the expected results based on the experience of Central and Eastern Europe. The region’s de-industrialisation following the collapse of the former Yugoslavia and the ensuing wars was not reversed, and new exportable goods and services did not materialise to the necessary extent. Budget deficits, external debt and job losses have soared. In addition, organised crime and the failure to contain corruption, serious deficiencies in the judiciary, the inadequate skills of the workforce and insufficient infrastructure all undermine economic performance and weaken social cohesion.

Maintaining stability in the Western Balkans depends to a great extent on convincing the population that the sacrifices – whether of an economic nature (fiscal austerity, social welfare cuts, etc.) or in terms of ideals (giving up national or nationalistic traditions and goals) – are worth enduring because of the higher aspiration of achieving EU membership. In this context, the precise timeline for achieving this membership is of lesser importance to the population; for the people, it is far more significant to see a change for the better in everyday life. If the public authorities deliver improvements in living standards and the quality of governance, the population will support policies that concentrate on reform, democracy and the rule of law. However, the pounding economic crisis is swiftly demolishing the credibility of Western Balkan politicians’ promises of a better future life in the EU, as amply documented by the annual Gallup Balkan Monitor. Accordingly, conditions are arising for a “second coming” of nationalistic populism, which already fatally wounded the former Yugoslavia in the nineties.

In the Western Balkans, nationalism is usually accompanied by received wisdom about “historic strategic alliances” with external powers such as the US, Russia, Turkey or nowadays even China. Nationalists and conservatives often present such junior partnerships of their countries as a better alternative for the future than to remain in the eternal waiting loop outside the EU. Indeed, even the most pro-European-minded people in the Western Balkans increasingly despair of the widespread impression that the EU is becoming something of a “moving target.” The reason for this, in addition to domestic socio-economic stagnation, is the obvious displeasure of some influential Member States towards further enlargement in the near or medium-term future. Whereas Greece, Italy, Austria and other countries in the neighbour-
hood (and with strong financial and economic interests in the region) support continuity in the enlargement policy and have even proposed introducing a fast track for the EU membership of the Western Balkan countries, Germany, the Netherlands, France and a number of others insist on “moderation” when it comes to accepting new members. Evidently, the EU is applying stricter conditionality in the negotiations with the Western Balkan aspirants than in any previous enlargement round. Furthermore, Member States do not hesitate to make use of the enlargement process for their domestic objectives (for instance, in the disputes between Athens and Skopje, Ljubljana and Zagreb, the Hague and Belgrade, Nicosia and Ankara, etc.). The outcome has been a “creeping nationalisation” of the enlargement policy, which discredits the EU’s commitments to aspirant States and undermines the transformative power of the enlargement process.

A significant subsection of the political decision-makers in the EU does not take notice of the deteriorating popular attitudes in the Western Balkans towards the Union and the possible implications for the EU’s security and thus, also, its international standing. In contrast, the US insists that events in the Western Balkans continue to pose the principal challenges to stability in Europe. Starting from the premise that the Western Balkans is a crucial region for Europe’s future, the US has pledged to continue to “work with Europe on Europe” until the European project is completed with the inclusion of the Western Balkan aspirants. To this end, Washington does not hesitate to exert pressure on EU Member States, such as the Netherlands or Slovenia, demanding that they not impede the accession process of Western Balkan countries because of their national political agendas. However, it remains to be seen whether this US intervention will be effective or whether “nationalisation” will become an overriding trait of EU policy towards Southeast Europe. The US’s inconclusive political interventions with certain influential Member States on behalf of Turkey’s EU membership may indicate the limits to persuasion even when attempted by the hegemon.

Integration Before Membership

If the EU wishes to keep the Balkans from back-sliding into protracted conflicts, and if it intends to provide evidence that it can guarantee the security of its whole natural “interest zone,” the European continent, then the EU Member States must re-examine their policy towards the region. This revision has to start with the financial centrepiece of the EU’s transformative power, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), which is meant to help with reforms, secure a successful socio-economic transition and foster the integration of the Western Balkans with the EU even before membership.

As IPA funds are chiefly disbursed according to the population size of the beneficiary countries, Turkey will receive the lion’s share of the €11.5 billion allocated for the years 2007 to 2013. For instance, in 2012, the EU plans to support Turkey (which is presently lucky to have almost Chinese levels of economic growth) with nearly €900 million, whereas Serbia, the largest Western Balkan country, will receive less than €207 million. In addition, a significant part of the pre-accession funds is consumed by various intermediary organisations and the engagement of expert consultants from EU countries. However, once a country enters the EU, it is “showered” with money from the EU. Consequently, available funds are often not fully tapped because the new members are unable to carry out a sufficient number of meaningful projects in time. In the case of Croatia, the increase is expected to be tenfold, so the country will probably have, in its first year as an EU Member State, around €2 billion at its disposal. Predictably, Western Balkan countries have submitted proposals to allow them increased access to EU structural funds even before accession.

Bozidar Delić, Serbia’s deputy prime minister for European integration, has, since early 2011, led the initiative to reform the EU’s pre-accession assistance instruments. He has gone even further and proposed that the EU, possibly through its new Financial Stability Facility, provide limited loan guarantees to Western Balkan states so that they can raise funds in capital markets on better terms. Lower inter-
est rates and longer repayment schedules for fresh capital would permit the Western Balkan countries to increase their investment in industrial and other projects that could boost employment and thus ease some of the social pressures. Delić argues that in this decade alone his country would save more than €3 billion if the interest rates that Serbia currently pays on foreign capital markets were reduced to the rates applied to countries able to rely on EU loan guarantees. Obviously, in return, the Western Balkan countries would have to accept maximum external fiscal and macroeconomic surveillance. A strict monitoring mechanism could be created by expanding the role of Eurostat, the EU’s statistics office, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Already, a number of Western Balkan countries have standby arrangements with the IMF that ensure access to financial liquidity. Stricter external surveillance of the financial flows in aspirant countries is beneficial to all involved, as public procurements and other expenditures from state coffers tend to be among the prime sources of corruption and crime.

Gradually expanding the acquis communautaire by establishing similar “communities” (transport, justice and home affairs, foreign and defence policy, employment, media and culture, etc.) with aspirant countries would promote stability, predictability and trust in mutual relations.

However, a new “growth agenda” alone is not sufficient. More determined steps are required to foster deeper integration without waiting for the countries to be fully ready to enter the EU. The Energy Community Treaty, which entered into force in July 2006, and the abolishment of entry visa requirements for citizens of most Western Balkan states in 2009 and 2010 are examples of how the EU can export its laws, rules and institutions to perspective Member States before full integration. Gradually expanding the acquis communautaire by establishing similar “communities” (transport, justice and home affairs, foreign and defence policy, employment, media and culture, etc.) with aspirant countries would promote stability, predictability and trust in mutual relations. This method could also serve as a model for the EU to pursue integration with its eastern neighbourhood and the Mediterranean.

References


Kosovo – Partial Progress, Paralysis and Recognition

Over three years on from its declaration of independence from Serbia following the breakdown of negotiations over its final status, Kosovo continues to struggle for broader acceptance within the international system, despite the backing of many of the world’s leading powers. Though it is recognised by 75 UN Member States (at the time of writing), the EU remains divided over the issue, leaving Kosovo’s EU accession prospects shrouded in uncertainty. With lingering doubts about its economic viability and capacity to tackle organised crime and corruption, and in the midst of a spate of war crimes accusations against the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Kosovo continues to struggle to secure new recognitions. The Kosovo question remains a source of considerable debate and conjecture, not only because of its relevance for other cases of contested statehood, but also because of its implications for the deployment of UN missions into crisis situations marked by secessionist tendencies. How the Kosovo issue is ultimately resolved, therefore, will have important ramifications for conflict resolution efforts elsewhere in the coming years.

Though Kosovo has secured membership of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank since unilaterally declaring independence on February 18, 2008, five EU Member States – Spain, Cyprus, Greece, Romania and Slovakia – continue to withhold recognition. Each country fears that the Kosovo precedent could have damaging implications for their own internal politics; for the Basques and Catalans in Spain, Cyprus and the unrecognised Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, and Romania and Slovakia with their respective Hungarian minorities. Whilst these divisions did not prevent deployment of the status-neutral EULEX (EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo) – the largest EU civilian mission ever launched under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – they do continue to impede Kosovo’s EU accession prospects. Whilst other countries in the Western Balkans have secured visa liberalisation, Kosovo remains without a visa roadmap that would lay out the conditions required for joining the white visa list. Though the European Parliament has on several occasions called for a common approach towards Kosovo, the current stalemate looks unlikely to end anytime soon, leaving the EU with the difficult task of persuading Kosovo that it ultimately has a membership perspective.

The ICJ Ruling – An Opportunity Lost?

Vehemently opposed to Kosovo’s independence, Serbia’s primary course of action has revolved around its October 2008 request to the United Nations General Assembly to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in order to consider whether “the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo [is] in accordance with international law?”.

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The ICJ issued its much-anticipated advisory opinion on July 22, 2010, in which it declared, by ten votes to four, that "general international law contains no applicable prohibition of declarations of independence" and therefore the events of 17 February 2008 "did not violate general international law." Thus, the ICJ essentially ruled that Kosovo's declaration was neither legal nor illegal; simply that international law doesn't address such matters.

The ICJ's ruling failed to provide the clarity sought by many countries uneasy about recognising Kosovo's independence, particularly with respect to questions concerning the right to self-determination or succession.

Though non-binding, the ICJ's ruling was expected to spark a flood of recognitions for the nascent state by removing some of the existing uncertainties regarding Kosovo's status. That these failed to materialise can in part be attributed to Serbia's successful diplomatic campaign and, more importantly, to the fact that the ICJ employed a narrow interpretation of the question posed. As the ICJ noted, the General Assembly "does not ask whether or not Kosovo has achieved statehood. Nor does it ask about the validity or legal effects of the recognition of Kosovo by those States which have recognised it as an independent State." By refusing to address either "the status of the acts of recognition" or whether the declaration had indeed led to the establishment of State – namely, the declaration "severed from its legal effects" – the Court's Opinion provides little guidance to the UN General Assembly ("the requesting organ"), as a dissenting opinion by Judge Bennouna argued. The ICJ's ruling therefore failed to provide the clarity sought by many countries uneasy about recognising Kosovo's independence, particularly with respect to questions concerning the right to self-determination or succession.

The persuasive power of the ICJ's opinion has also been diluted by some of the legal intricacies employed by the Court. The assertion, for instance, that the declaration was adopted during a special session of the Kosovo Assembly by those acting "together in their capacity as representatives of the people of Kosovo outside the framework of the interim administration," not by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo. As such, the declaration's authors were deemed not to have exceeded the constitutional framework for self-governance established under UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) regulations. Judge Bennouna, for one, notes that "there was no doubt in the minds of the Secretary General and his Special Representative in Kosovo that the declaration was in fact the work of the recently elected Assembly of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo" and that "all those living in Kosovo must comply with the regime of self-governance established by the United Nations."

Kosovo's International Standing – Repairing or Reiterating its Reputation?

With the expected post-ICJ windfall of recognitions having failed to materialise, attention has again turned to Kosovo's diplomatic efforts to justify its independence. Prior to and since its unilateral declaration, Kosovo has struggled to persuade sceptics that it is an economically viable state, capable of prospering without international donor assistance and remittances from its extensive Diaspora. Kosovo remains one of the poorest regions in Europe, with unemployment at around 40%, average annual per capita incomes of approximately €2,000 and some 37% living in poverty. With tens of thousands of young people entering the labour market each year, Kosovo faces a challenging socio-economic dynamic. Though rich in natural resources, such as lead, lignite and copper, exploiting these reserves will require considerable investments in new technologies and transportation infrastructure, particularly to end the daily power blackouts that hamper industrial production.

Kosovo's international standing has been further impacted by a report by the Council of Europe's special rapporteur, Dick Marty, entitled Inhuman treatment of people and illicit trafficking in human organs in Kosovo, which was adopted by the Council of Europe's parliamentary assembly in late-January. Marty's report makes a number of serious allegations against Kosovo's current Prime Minister and former political leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Hashim Thaci. Aside from the allegations of "disappearances, organ trafficking, corruption and collusion between organised criminal groups and politi-
THE STABILISATION AND ASSOCIATION PROCESS (SAP). Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania and Kosovo (pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1244). On 21 June 2003, the Thessaloniki Summit of Heads of State and Government of the EU and the Western Balkans confirmed the EU membership prospects of the Western Balkan countries acknowledged at the Santa Maria da Feira European Council (19 and 20 June 2000) and added to the conclusions of the EU-Western Balkans Summit held in Zagreb on 24 November 2000. Thus, at the Thessaloniki meeting, the Stabilisation and Association Process was established as the EU’s policy for the Western Balkans with a view to supporting these countries in their efforts to establish a progressively closer relationship with the EU that would culminate in their accession. Such a prospect acts as an incentive for these countries to undertake effective political, economic and social reforms. In exchange, the SAP allows the participating states to benefit from financial aid and technical assistance, as well as free access to the single European market. The components of the SAP that enable fulfilment of its objectives make up the so-called Pre-accession Strategy and are as follows:

- **The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA).** The SAP between the EU and a given country is formalised by means of an SAA, the objectives of which are the country’s stabilisation and swift transition to a market economy, the strengthening of regional cooperation and, ultimately, the country’s accession to the EU. Once signed, the SAA must be ratified by the EU’s institutions, each Member State and the country concerned. During this ratification period, the trade relations with the signatory state are regulated by means of an Interim Agreement on trade and trade-related matters.

- **Accession Partnership (AP).** Approved by the European Council by qualified majority, at the proposal of the Commission, the AP implements the SAA and constitutes the framework for the economic, financial and technical cooperation to assist the country in the implementation of the reforms included under the SAA. Thus, the AP specifies the priority areas in which reforms should be undertaken, offers guidelines for financial aid and sets out the principles and conditions to frame the Partnership. To this end, the AP includes the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA). The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), which, as of 1 January 2007, replaced all previous instruments (the CARDS programme, the specific pre-accession instrument for Turkey, and the PHARE, ISPA and SAPARD programmes) as the sole financial mechanism, is used to offer financial aid for these reforms. The IPA was allocated a total of €11.5 billion for the 2007-2013 period to cover its five components: transition assistance and institution building, cross-border cooperation, regional development, human resources development, and rural development.

- **Regional Cooperation.** Regional cooperation is an essential element of the SAP. Consequently, the EU uses the IPA to provide financial support (€430 between 2007 and 2010) for several regional cooperation initiatives. To this end, the South-East European Cooperation Process, whose operational arm has been the Regional Cooperation Council since 2008, provides the framework for regional cooperation initiatives, whilst a series of sectoral agreements and initiatives promote gradual regional integration among the pre-accession countries and between them and the EU. The main such agreements and initiatives are: the Central European Free Trade Agreement, the Energy Community Treaty, the European Common Aviation Area Agreement, the South-East Europe Transport Observatory, the Education Reform Initiative of South Eastern Europe (ERI SEE), the Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI), the South-Eastern Europe Health Network (SEEHN), the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and the EU Strategy for the Danube Region. Most of these initiatives moreover include Moldova and the Ukraine.

Other components of the SAP include the political and economic dialogue between the EU and the pre-accession countries, the results of which are integrated into the accession negotiations, and participation in EU programmes, agencies and committees.

The Enlargement Process. Turkey, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Iceland. During the implementation of the Pre-accession Strategy, potential candidates on track to meeting the Copenhagen Criteria (democracy and the rule of law, a functioning market economy, and the ability to implement the Community acquis) may submit an application for membership to the European Council. If the Council receives a favourable opinion from the Commission, it may (unanimously) grant official candidate status to the country, thereby beginning the accession negotiations, which conclude – following a screening stage and a monitoring and supervision stage – with the definitive closure of the 35 chapters (one for each political sphere) contained in the NPAA. The conclusion of the negotiations leads to the signing of the Accession Treaty, which must be ratified by the candidate country and all EU Member States, at which point it enters into force, turning the candidate country into a full-fledged Member State of the Union. In the interim between the signing of the Treaty and its final ratification, the candidate country is considered an Acceding State.

Sources


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cal circles in Kosovo,” one of the most damning indictments is Marty’s assertion that “the international organisations in place in Kosovo favoured a pragmatic political approach, taking the view that they needed to promote short-term stability at any price, thereby sacrificing some important principles of justice.” Assertions that the interests of stability were placed before those of justice has further undermined the humanitarian discourse on which Kosovo’s independence has often been justified.

Serbia-Kosovo Talks – A Way Out of the Impasse?

Whilst Serbia’s pursuit of an ICJ ruling temporarily shifted the issue from the political to the legal arena, the question of Kosovo’s status is now firmly back in the realm of international and domestic politics following the ICJ’s ruling. Despite initially submitting a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly which stated that unilateral secession is not an acceptable means of resolving territorial disputes and calling for dialogue to find mutually-acceptable solutions to “all open issues,” Serbia ultimately accepted a compromise on an EU-backed resolution that paved the way for dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina. After delays arising from Kosovo’s snap elections towards the end of 2010 and subsequent coalition negotiations, Serbia and Kosovo finally commenced talks in March 2011; the former led by Borislav Stefanovic, political director at the Foreign Ministry, the latter by Edita Tahiri, the deputy Prime Minister. Robert Cooper, a special advisor in the European External Action Service, chairs the talks; highlighting the EU’s determination to take the lead in securing a sustainable solution to one of the Western Balkan’s most intransigent problems and demonstrate the lure of possible EU membership.

The initial emphasis of the talks is finding solutions to technical issues — such as electricity supplies, telecommunications, vehicle registration and access to airspace — that will improve living conditions for all, whilst setting aside status-related questions. However, as several examples highlight — particularly that of the Republic of Kosovo customs stamps which Ser-

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¹ SAA: Stabilisation and Association Agreement.
² Initially, accession negotiations with Croatia were scheduled to begin on 17 March 2005; however, the process was suspended pending a favourable ruling by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), on 3 October 2005.
³ The beginning of the accession negotiations has been indefinitely postponed due to the Greek veto, which will not be lifted until a satisfactory settlement is reached in the dispute over the official name of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
⁴ Montenegro declared its independence from the federation that it had formed with Serbia on 3 June 2006. Previously, the EU had begun negotiations for an SAA with Serbia-Montenegro in October 2006.
⁵ The negotiations were suspended on 3 May 2008 due to a lack of cooperation by Belgrade with the ICTY investigations.
⁶ The SAA signed between the European Economic Community and Turkey, known as the Ankara Agreement, establishes a multi-part process consisting of three long stages: a preparatory stage (1964-1970), a transitional stage (1973-1995) and a final stage (from 1996 until the full economic integration of Turkey into the EU). To complete the transitional stage, Turkey and the EU adopted, on 21 November 1970, an additional protocol for the full elimination of mutual customs duties, which entered into force on 1 January 1973. Subsequently, and to complete the final stage, on 22 December 1995, they signed a Customs Union Agreement, which entered into force on 1 January 1996.
⁷ The SAA and the Intermediate Agreement on trade and trade-related matters with Serbia were suspended from 15 September 2008 to 7 December 2009 due to a veto by the Netherlands, which demanded proof of greater cooperation with the ICTY.
⁸ In the case of Kosovo, and based on its specific status pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1244, the Stabilisation and Association Process Tracking Mechanism came into operation on 6 November 2002.
bia refuses to recognise – technical issues often have a very distinct status connotation. The challenge for the EU – as the chief mediator – is how to continue moving the talks forward with demonstrable signs of progress and tangible outcomes, without the looming spectre of status issues – particularly those concerning the north of Kosovo and the status of Orthodox monasteries within Kosovo – paralysing the possibility of securing agreement on a number of fronts.

Further problems abound. Serbia faces general elections in 2012 that will further constrain the political space for difficult and often contentious concessions, whilst question marks linger over Kosovo’s own newly-formed coalition government. The strong performance of Vetvendojsije (‘Self-Determination’) in the recent Kosovo elections suggests a shift towards a more assertive creed of nationalism; one that advances the unification of Albania and Kosovo. In addition, enthusiasm for further enlargement continues to wane across Europe, with countries preoccupied by their own economic problems and sceptical about the Union’s capacity to absorb new members. Domestic and external factors will therefore continue to have a profound impact upon the dynamics of the very talks themselves, further complicating efforts to elicit compromises from both parties.

Resolving the North as a Prerequisite for a Sustainable Settlement

Whilst the Kosovo government, supported by its international sponsors, insists that status issues are not up for discussion, the future of the predominantly Serb-populated north of Kosovo, where Pristina’s institutions have little influence, remains contested. Concessions on the north, however, could pave the way for a broader compromise on the issue of Kosovo’s status. Whilst the ideas of partition or a land-swap – where Kosovo would give up the north in return for the predominantly ethnic Albanian part of south Serbia (commonly referred to locally as ‘the Presevo Valley’) – are often deemed the most straightforward solution, any further changes of borders in the Balkans on the basis of ethnic lines would have ramifications for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Another proposal concerns greater autonomy for the north, the basis for which can be found in a combination of the Ahtisaari Plan and the six-point plan of UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, which outlines pragmatic measures relating to policing, customs arrangements, the judiciary and infrastructure, plus local autonomy in education and culture, and special features for Mitrovica (such as the university and hospital).

Shared sovereignty over the north of Kosovo may provide the soundest basis for a sustainable settlement between Kosovo and Serbia

However, viewing the north as akin to a ‘condominium’ – “a political territory (state or border area) in or over which two or more sovereign powers formally agree to share equal dominium (in the sense of sovereignty) and exercise their rights jointly, without dividing it up into ‘national’ zones” – provides for a more innovative solution involving the sharing of sovereignty over the contested territory. The special legal and political framework of Brcko District in Bosnia and Herzegovina provides a regional example of such an arrangement. As an autonomous administrative unit, Brcko’s powers of governance are derived from the country’s two entities, the Republika Srpska and the Federation; with the district simultaneously belonging to both and its residents being citizens of either one. Brcko District – with its own assembly, administration, police and judiciary – has been hailed as an institutional innovation that successfully contends with a contentious and strategically important territory. Shared sovereignty over the north of Kosovo may provide the soundest basis for a sustainable settlement between Kosovo and Serbia.

The Kosovo Precedent?

Proponents of Kosovo’s independence have long insisted that it constitutes a sui generis case, without precedent for other disputes of a similar nature; an inevitable outcome deriving from the unique context created by the demise of the former Yugoslavia, the atrocities that accompanied its fragmentation, NATO’s ultimate intervention and years of UN administration. Nonetheless, these repeated insinuations have not stopped other secessionist movements from invoking the Kosovo example as a means
of motivating or legitimising their own particulate claims. Ethno-national groups have sought to assert the international precedent that they believe Kosovo created. Indeed, many interpreted the ICJ’s opinion as a victory for their respective cases. Secessionist movements within and beyond the EU’s borders continue to insist that Kosovo is a model for their own respective causes.

The Caucasus – a region of growing strategic importance to the European Union – has witnessed serious instability in the period since. Russia’s decision to recognise the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2009 demonstrated the West’s incapacity to define what does and does not constitute a precedent. Deprived of legal and diplomatic weight, NATO has been powerless to prevent the de facto independence of these two breakaway regions. Armenia and Azerbaijan, meanwhile, have clashed over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, whilst the Moldovan province of Trans-Dniester has called for international recognition of its independence. In the context of the violent breakup of the former Soviet Union and its own frozen ethno-national conflicts, therefore, the Kosovo precedent has immediately come to life.

The Kosovo case could also have profound implications for UN peacekeeping missions around the world. Andreas Zimmermann, a professor of public international law at the University of Potsdam, speaking about countries whose agreement is required before the UN can deploy, has cautioned that “it would be a dangerous precedent if these countries, after the Kosovo experience, concluded that the arrival of peacekeeping forces represented the first step in the secession of a crisis region which seeks independence.” Zimmermann’s concerns are such that he described the proceedings currently before the ICJ as being of the “utmost relevance for the functioning of the overall system of the United Nations and its ability to maintain and restore international peace and security.”

Conclusions

The international position of Kosovo following the ICJ’s advisory opinion remains bedevilled by damaging splits within the EU and global concerns about the precedent that the Kosovo case may set; not only for other secessionist movements, but for UN peacekeeping missions and conflict resolution more broadly. Kosovo also faces a number of questions about its economic viability and commitment to upholding the rule of law. In order to overcome these impediments, Kosovo will need to engage Serbia in a process of dialogue and negotiation that can ultimately lead to a sustainable settlement that will allow both to advance towards membership of the EU; a key potential motivator of compromise and concession in the region. Resolving the issue of the north of Kosovo remains key in this regard and will require innovative solutions in sovereignty and autonomy that have come to define Europe itself. Failure to do so will leave Kosovo’s international position paralysed and the Western Balkans vulnerable to further instability. The extent to which Kosovo will ultimately constitute a precedent, therefore, will depend upon its ability to overcome the obstacles to its regional, European and international integration.

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The North African Energy Scene

Algeria, Libya and Egypt are the Mediterranean region’s biggest hydrocarbon resource holders and producers. In 2009, they accounted for over 90% of the region’s proven oil and gas reserves and about 85% of its output (see Table 11). In the early 2000s, governments in these countries set out to expand hydrocarbon exploration and production, introducing more attractive upstream investment terms for international oil companies (IOCs) and injecting more resources of their own in the sector. As a result, their combined reserves and output of oil and gas increased each by about 25% between 1999 and 2009, driven mainly by the expansion of Libya’s oil reserves from 30 to 44 billion barrels and Egypt’s gas production from 17 to 62 billion cubic meters per year (Bcm/yr).

At the same time, Europe’s resolve to reduce dependence for its energy needs on imports from Russia, the continent’s single most important supplier of oil and gas, was reinforced by the series of gas supply disruptions caused between 2006 and 2010 by transit issues with Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, Belarus. This led the European Union to assert rather optimistically that by 2013 the southern Mediterranean could be as important for Europe as Russia in terms of energy supply. However, it is now evident that this is unlikely to materialise – while Russia provides the EU with over 30% of its gas imports and just under 30% of its oil imports, North African supplies account for about 16% of the EU’s natural gas imports and 13% of its oil imports.

Moreover, the latter half of the 2000s saw North Africa’s upstream activity become relatively subdued, with the politics of ‘resource nationalism’ trumping earlier decisions to ramp up hydrocarbon exploration and production. Thus, by the end of the decade, Egypt was unable to fully utilise its existing gas export infrastructure, let alone expand it. Libya and Algeria missed their respective flagship production and export expansion targets of 2.3-3 million barrels/day (bbl/d) of oil by 2013 and 85 Bcm/yr of gas by 2010. In addition to the twists and turns of the investment and institutional frameworks in these countries, North African energy supplies have been constrained by domestic energy needs. These have been growing at faster rates over the last ten years, reflecting sustained economic and population growth, energy-based diversification strategies, and distorted consumption patterns caused by the artificially low pricing policies pursued by governments across the region.

These trends and developments pertain most particularly to natural gas, upon which the energy policies of North African countries, as well as the EU’s import diversification strategy, are mostly based. Renewable and alternative sources of energy – mainly solar and nuclear power – have also been the focus of these countries’ energy policies in recent years, but only timid steps have been taken towards achieving meaningful progress in their development within the next decade.

The recent events have cast serious doubt on the political and economic prospects of the region, with likely implications for the energy sector. The unexpected radical political changes that began unfolding in North Africa at the start of 2011 raise questions not only about the implementation of the energy policies devised by North African governments prior to the uprisings, but also more crucially regarding the likely impact of political change on the substance
of these policies and their future trajectories. This article focuses on the likely impact of recent events on the natural gas sector in North Africa given its importance in the energy policies of Algeria, Egypt and, to a lesser extent, Libya, as well as its central role in the interdependent energy relationship between Europe and North Africa.

Security of Supply from the MENA Region

In a region where for decades political change was painstakingly slow – even non-existent – the events of the last four months in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have been a shock to the system. The popular uprisings that have so far uprooted long-serving despots in Tunisia and Egypt and are seriously challenging the power grip of autocratic leaders in Libya, Syria and Yemen are a reflection of the new sense of political agency that young people in the region have discovered. This new dynamic will have a transformative impact on the ‘social contract’ that has defined the nature of politics in MENA countries since their accession to independence and will in all likelihood affect their relations with foreign governments and businesses, including in the energy sector.

As is well known, the MENA region is an important player in global oil and gas markets, accounting for about 60% of proven oil reserves and 45% of gas reserves. It has long been associated with regional conflict and political instability, which have been the main causes of energy security concerns in consuming countries with relatively high dependence on MENA hydrocarbon supplies. The recent revolts have worsened perceptions of political risk in the region, exacerbating Western fears of supply disruptions and the withering of upstream investment opportunities for IOCs.

Concerns over the interruption of energy flows from the region have not been totally unfounded: the revolts in both Egypt and Libya – and to a lesser extent Tunisia – have affected oil and gas supplies. Algerian gas shipments through the Transmed pipeline, which supplies Italy with around 32% of its pipeline gas imports, recorded a sudden 40% dip amid the chaos immediately following the departure of Tunisian President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali on 14 January, but normal flows resumed shortly thereafter.

In Egypt, fears over the disruption of transit flows through the Suez Canal, through which some 7% of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) passed in 2010, and the 2.3 million bbl/d Sumed oil pipeline did not materialise. However, an explosion on 5 February at a gas compressor station at El-Arish, in the Sinai, cut off gas supplies to Israel and through the Arab Gas Pipeline to Jordan and Syria. It took more than five weeks for the repair work to be completed and for Egyptian pipeline gas exports to resume, only for a second explosion to take place on 27 April causing another suspension of gas flows.

Finally, in Libya where the most dramatic events since the eruption of the uprisings in the region have taken place, gas flowing at an annual rate of as much as 9-10 Bcm/yr through the Greenstream pipeline to Italy and the 40-year-old, underperforming Marsa el-Brega LNG plant, as well as 1.6 million bbl/d of oil supply, have been taken out of the market as a direct result of the full-blown confrontation between rebel fighters and government forces and the suspension of IOC upstream activities in the country.

However, if these disruptions vindicated consumer concerns over the security of energy supplies from the MENA region, they had a rather limited impact on the fundamentals of oil and gas markets. These adjusted fairly flexibly to the loss of output capacity in Libya, by far the most important outage in volume and qualitative terms. What the Libyan disruption did was feed into market concerns over the potential spillover of unrest into neighbouring Algeria, which exports roughly the same amount of light sweet crude, but supplies Europe with about six times as much

| TABLE 11 | 2009 North African Oil and Gas Data* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Reserves | Production | Exports |
| | Oil | Gas | Oil | Gas | Oil | Gas |
| Algeria | 12,200 | 4,500 | 1.8 | 81 | 1.5 | 53 |
| Egypt | 4,400 | 2,190 | 0.7 | 63 | 0 | 18 |
| Libya | 44,300 | 1,540 | 1.65 | 15 | 1.5 | 10 |
| Rest of the Mediterranean** | 4,000 | 180 | 0.6 | 16 | 0 | 0 |

Sources: BP (2010) and OPEC (2010).

* In millions of barrels (per day of production) for oil and Bcm (per year of production and exports) for gas.
** Reference mainly to Syria, Italy and Tunisia.
gas as Libya. Furthermore, given the unrest in the Gulf countries of Bahrain, Yemen and Oman, there was also anxiety in the market concerning stability in major oil exporter and spare capacity holder Saudi Arabia.

**Emerging Pattern**

Market reactions to the spread of unrest across the Arab world reflected wider uncertainty about the nature of the phenomenon and its potential destabilising effect for the region and the global economy. The feeling among observers of the region was that if this could happen in Tunisia and Egypt – the two countries believed, prior to the uprising, to be among the least likely to experience such events – it could well happen anywhere. Attention soon turned to countries like Algeria which had higher political risk rankings and where popular expressions of discontent were more common.

However, despite the eruption of popular protests in almost every Arab country since the Tunisia uprising, attesting to the common grievances of young people in the region, there seems to be an emerging pattern in terms of the end result of these demonstrations in the short term. Countries with nominal republican political systems, as well as long-serving leaders (over 20 years in power) with a propensity to promote nepotism and dynastic succession at the expense of broader participation in the political process, have seen the most radical uprisings and calls for the removal of leaders and their regimes. Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria fall within this category. In other countries, the ‘contagion effect’ has demonstrated itself through the revival and emboldening of longstanding political demands for change, some of which are based on ethnic grievances such as in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.

In Algeria, where localised protests have been a permanent feature of the political background for the best part of the last decade, events in the region encouraged opposition organisations to press harder for political reforms. But the striking feature of this renewed activism is the shared aversion to political violence and instability among large sections of the Algerian population and political class. Algerians had their botched ‘spring’ more than 20 years ago and are no longer interested in sudden, radical change. Instead, political and economic reforms are likely to be introduced, but quite how deep and meaningful they will be will hinge first and foremost on intra-regime dynamics.

In the face of this ‘awakening’, all MENA countries share an undecided future. The final outcome of the recent events is as yet unknown, and the longer-term consequences of the transformation process it has ushered in are as uncertain for countries that have had their leaders ousted, as for those that have not/will not.

**Impact on Gas Development**

Concerns about the short-term disruption effect of political unrest in North Africa on gas supplies from the region gave way to uncertainty over longer-term development issues as soon as it became clear that the risk of short-term market shocks was minimal. Domestic price subsidies, upstream investment terms and export policies are the main issues in question.

Artificially low domestic gas prices have become over the years an untenable feature of gas markets not only in North Africa but throughout the entire MENA region. They have caused enormous distortions in consumption patterns across the region, have indirectly hampered upstream development in some countries, and in many cases have added to the fiscal pressure that governments face. In North Africa, Egypt had been grappling with the issue of energy subsidies before the unrest of January 2011 and was planning to raise gas prices for industrial users by the end of the year from $1.25 to $2.65-3/IMMBtu. Elsewhere in the MENA region, most governments – with the exception of Iran’s – showed little urgency to tackle the issues of low gas prices. Their concerns stemmed from the potential socio-economic effects raising gas prices would have in terms of inflation and attracting investment in the downstream sector – both vital ingredients for social stability.

The recent events are most likely to all but reinforce North African governments’ longstanding hesitation to deal with the issue of subsidies, at least in the short term. Stability, political reform and survival will now be the main priorities for old and new governments in the region, which means gas price reforms will be put on the backburner. This was exemplified by the Algerian government’s prompt announcement back in January that it would maintain its 7-billion-dollar annual subsidy for the gas-to-power sector.
The same is likely to apply to the issue of upstream investment terms. With many countries in the region facing gas supply shortages, there is an urgent need for governments to improve the fiscal terms for foreign investment in the upstream. However, short-term political priorities are likely to delay meaningful action in this direction. What is more, the likely temptation for governments to maximise the rent from hydrocarbons in order to be able to buy social peace could militate against the improvement of fiscal terms, especially given the current relatively high oil price environment. In Libya, the outlook for the current standoff is highly uncertain, with the country facing the prospect of prolonged civil confrontation and possibly partition. But it may be expected that an eventual rebel-led, post-Gaddafi government will promulgate improved hydrocarbon investment legislation by way of reviving the economy and cementing its relations with foreign partners. Conversely, as was seen in Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussein, new governments could be tempted to use the energy sector to demonstrate their nationalistic credentials, notably by imposing restrictive terms on foreign investors.

Artificially low domestic gas prices have become over the years an untenable feature of gas markets not only in North Africa but throughout the entire MENA region.

Finally, the coming to power of new governments may lead to a revision of gas export policies, which would have an impact on the prospects for North African gas exports over and above the amount of gas available for export from the region. Again, Egypt is leading the way in this regard, with the government announcing a revision of the price and volume elements of its gas supply contracts with Jordan, Israel and the operator of the Damietta LNG train, SEGAS. In the meantime however, the second explosion in the Sinai, said to be larger than the first one, may result in a longer supply disruption, which in the case of Israel at least could precipitate plans for the development of alternative supply options from offshore fields and/or floating LNG.

Outlook

With issues of supply shortages and strong demand growth pervading most regional gas markets, the outlook for North African gas supply was not particularly promising before the uprisings. The recent events are only likely to exacerbate the region’s main gas market issues, particularly in the short term. The longer-term prospects remain highly uncertain, and a lot will depend on the type of politics that will ultimately emerge and its implications for the ‘social contract’ between state and society in the region, for the efficiency of government institutions and decision-making processes, and for the economic development models that countries in the region will pursue. In all of this, politics will continue to be the main determinant of gas development policies in North Africa, especially in the short term.

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The South Mediterranean is the first area in the world to experience a real revolution initiated, in part, by the spread of Information and Communication Technology (ICT). In fact, ICT has allowed peoples of the South Mediterranean to revolt against their social, political and economic conditions with the aim of establishing democratic regimes and laying the foundations for ensuring improved living conditions. The shockwave has been as spectacular as it was unexpected by the majority of international experts. Beyond considering the immediate political and media impact of such a revolution, post-modern and technological at once, the aim of this brief article is to discuss whether ICT constitutes a vector capable of modifying the paths of economic and social development in South Mediterranean countries.

The digital economy refers to the ensemble of processes by which economic agents use ICT in their production, consumption or basic organisational operations, whether these agents are businesses, groups, social networks, markets, associations or whatnot. ICT has permeated spheres of production as well as consumption. All companies are equipped with digital technology, as is a large percentage of consumers, such that transactions are increasingly being effected directly via this technology or with its support. The digitalisation of the economy has entailed economic effects in the Mediterranean area that need to be considered in order to grasp what this implies for other virtual or real spheres. At the same time, other effects, likewise assisted by ICT, require certain conditions to reach maturity and should be established as priorities in economic policies.

This brief note will render an account of the stylized facts characterising the observed benefits of the digital economy in the South Mediterranean and explain their scope (part one). It will then describe constraints weighing on the positive effects of the digital economy on the south shore of the Mediterranean in order to suggest courses of action for overcoming them (part two). In this regard, particular attention will be lent to the conditions for the emergence of industries with a content that, from the author’s perspective, constitutes a terrain where the advantages of a digitalised economy can be felt, along with its limits.

Advantages of a Digitalised Economy for South Mediterranean Countries

Use of ICT Is Spreading at a Satisfactory Pace... but a Qualitative Digital Divide Endures

The use of ICT has progressed significantly in the Mediterranean region over the past few years. The rise in access to Internet and in generalised computer and mobile telephony use has been spectacular. Data from the UN Agency for Information and Communication Technologies (ITU, 2009) show the South Mediterranean countries catching up with those of the North in mobile telephony. For instance, the proportion of individuals owning a mobile telephone in Algeria went from 1.4% in 2002 to 81.4% in 2007! Some consider mobile telephony was the key to the regional economy’s entry into the digital era. Although the divide remains great insofar as computer equipment between countries or social classes, the fact is that computers today fall just as much under the category of collective goods as under that of private goods, which limits the negative impacts of under-equipment. Attesting
to this, multiple-user computers under semi-public access at cybercafés or under full public access offer a number of possibilities allowing rationalised use and overcoming the constraints associated with private goods. There is no denying that access to Internet is experiencing highly significant progress. Public strategies have allowed the generalisation of connexion sites (universities, cybercafés, public spaces, etc.), which have been facilitated or strengthened by competition between telephony operators and Internet providers. The spread of new connexion tools and the innovations they entail have crossed quite quickly from the North to the South shore of the Mediterranean. Current issues concern the quality of the connexion, its bandwidth and its capacity rather than the simple existence of a connexion. Indeed, whereas downloading a file can take a few seconds with a high-speed connexion, it could take several hours with a low-speed one. For instance, the bandwidth in 2007 was 857 in Algeria, 304 in Syria and 1,023 in Egypt, whereas it reached 7,190 in Israel, 8,390 in Turkey, 62,484 in Sweden and 9,617,645 in Luxembourg. The majority of connexions are still medium-to-slow speed, preventing users from exploring or taking advantage of the ensemble of Internet possibilities under high-speed connexions. This is a digital divide that should be remedied if we really wish to foster the “digital economy” in the South Mediterranean and take full advantage of the potential of ICT as a whole.

**Significant Benefits Registered in Public Sectors such as Healthcare, Education or Administration in General**

Spectacular progress has been made in the domain of core government functions thanks to the generalisation of ICT-supported applications. Indeed, the growing computerisation of public administration, the convergence of applications and the generalisation of workflow systems have allowed significant gains in productivity for the public sector in South Mediterranean economies. ICT has improved public education processes by making abundant pedagogical resources available. Applications in the sphere of distance education have allowed education to reach geographically dispersed or marginalised populations, as demonstrated by the number of virtual universities in certain countries. Attesting to this, Tunisia is currently risking establishing the rule that a fifth of education be carried out in digital form. Numerous administrative forms are also available via Internet and payment of public utility invoices has become generalised. Morocco’s customs services are a striking example of the progress of ICT use in public sectors.

**The simplification of administrative processes allowed by ICT as well as the resulting information gains could allow significant improvement of competitiveness for Mediterranean economies**

The development and spread of applications fostering e-government and e-administration have allowed substantial improvement of State performance, leading to gains in efficiency and quality of services rendered in South Mediterranean countries. We are witnessing a major modernisation of public services alleviating budgetary constraints weighing on administrations that are often too unproductive. However, efforts are still needed to optimise applications in numerous spheres. The simplification of administrative processes allowed by ICT as well as the resulting information gains could allow significant improvement of competitiveness for Mediterranean economies.

**The Emergence of an ICT-Assisted Service Industry**

Parallel to the generalisation of new applications in the public domain, numerous enterprises have emerged that use ICT to carry out subcontracting activities in the service sector. In fact, one of the most significant consequences of the implementation of ICT concerns its capacity to allow companies to reorganise their value chains or outsource internal transaction costs so as to focus on their core activities. Businesses are subcontracting or offshoring their annex or secondary activities. This trend, observed in the United States since the mid-1990s, has become generalised in the Mediterranean area since the beginning of the 21st century. North Mediterranean firms, taking advantage of the cultural and geographic proximity of South Mediterranean countries, have offshored a number of their activities or processes, such as accounting, hotlines and advising services. As a consequence, an industry
specialising in this type of activities has emerged and rapidly become consolidated in South Mediterranean countries.

The fact that French is a second language in the Maghreb countries has allowed them the advantage of attracting francophone companies, which outsource a number of activities, some of them significant. By the same token, certain German, Spanish and Italian companies are investing in training personnel in the South Mediterranean so as to likewise subcontract their activities and take advantage of the difference in labour costs and the more accommodating legislation. This trend has triggered re-specialisation towards the service sector. The relocation of service industries to the South Mediterranean has reinforced the interdependence of Mediterranean economies. One of the hopes of South Mediterranean countries consists of strengthening the opportunities offered by this re-specialisation niche in order to develop service industries with greater value-added or high research and development (R&D) content. Nevertheless, serious constraints are arising to hinder this scenario, whose contours should be described.

Constraints on the Digital Economy in the South Mediterranean

Although ICT implementation finally seems to be rising to the challenges in south shore countries, there are clearly a number of barriers still limiting applications and efficiency. First of all, multiple ICT applications require specific skills (e-skills) that in turn require States to implement overall strategies in this sphere. Secondly, migration to the North of the south shore’s ICT-qualified workers exercises an impoverishing effect that likewise limits the emergence of a real ICT sector in the South Mediterranean. Finally, we must also keep in mind that the content of products or services marketed via Internet remains weak. The weight of the content developed in the South Mediterranean remains marginal on the global scale.

The Issue of Digital Skills

The efficient use of ICTs requires specific skills. This set of skills or abilities is known as e-skills. Three types of e-skills are generally distinguished. First of all, instrumental or generic skills, which concern handling tools, instruments and software. This is a basic skill level preliminary to information skills; it involves searching, comprehension, classification and use of information as allowed by ICTs. In the second place, information literacy, which is based on numerous levels of information use, considering the wealth of the latter on Internet. Information literacy is indispensable for an efficient use of Internet or ICTs in general. In the third place, strategic skills relative to ICT use, designed to accelerate learning, productivity and innovation.

The current digital economy in the South Mediterranean is oriented more towards the consumption of content than its production

The dynamics observed recently, in particular in digital social networks, show that South Mediterranean users display significant ICT skills on the instrumental and informational levels. Indeed, political disruptions and improvement in education levels in certain countries, such as Tunisia and Jordan, have allowed the inclusion of a great many people in the digital economy (e-inclusion). Once information is no longer available except through this channel, it becomes necessary for everyone to acquire the basic skills for accessing it. Moreover, the need to select information, verify the sources and develop a critical spirit in this regard has accelerated the acquisition of certain information literacy skills. This recently acquired e-skills capital could prove primordial in the years to come. Nevertheless, transforming this capital into e-skills involves the delicate issue of the development of strategies by South Mediterranean countries. On the one hand, numerous impediments prevent the development of companies’ full e-skill potential (Bellon et al, 2006 and 2007). On the other hand, the sphere of e-commerce remains limited due to technical constraints relating to the absence of “reliable” transaction systems and consumer trust in on-line transactions. At present, these constraints prevent acquired skills from being efficiently used in the commercial sphere. In addition, until recently, the political systems in operation limited the development of citizen initiatives that could be ICT or Internet-supported. In this sense, political
initiatives of broad scope could be undertaken in order to foster strategic skills and consolidate the positive dynamics observed in basic ICT skills and information literacy.

**Brain Drain in the ICT Sector Exercises an Impoverishing Effect on This Emerging Industry in the South Mediterranean**

The emerging ICT industry in South Mediterranean countries, at this early stage, consists of providing offshoring opportunities for certain services, rendered possible by the cultural proximity between North and South Mediterranean countries. Thus, a majority of French, Italian and Spanish call centres have outsourced their hotlines to Maghreb countries, as indicated above. Other services not requiring high skills levels have followed. This first stage suggests a future increase in international outsourcing of high value-added services. This will require employment of increasingly qualified personnel (essentially engineers). This increase in service range, however, has run up against the absence of qualified labour. Even worse, qualified workers in the sector and engineers having trained in the South Mediterranean are moving to North Mediterranean countries due to the wage difference. This trend has increased over the past few years. Of course, positive effects can be expected in terms of technological externalities, network externalities, the establishment of futures companies on the south shore, or even money transfer businesses. Nevertheless, the fact of the matter is that this northward qualified labour flow currently limits the growth of the ICT sector and the re-specialisation of southern economies. The immigration legislation of European countries remains lax in this regard, primarily due to the European Union’s e-skills shortage. In fact, in 2008, the European Commission estimated that 40% of Europeans had no ICT qualifications. The gap between supply and demand of digital skills continues to grow in Europe, such that the term “e-skills gap” has become commonplace. Thus, recourse to ICT-qualified labour from the Mediterranean Basin seems an obvious option. Nonetheless, this strategy limits opportunities for South Mediterranean countries, since they need to develop industries with local content. Developing a joint strategy aligning the interests of both North and South Mediterranean countries should be a focal point in the construction of the future Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).

**Low Local Language Content on the International Level**

Industries of native language content remain reliable. However, contents in Arabic, Turkish or Hebrew, for instance, are insignificant on the international level. The world production of contents is largely in English, or involves languages such as Mandarin Chinese, Spanish or French. The percentage of world content production in Arabic is low compared to the proportion of the world’s population speaking that language. This gap reveals that the current digital economy in the South Mediterranean is oriented more towards the consumption of content than its production, although this situation seems to be gradually improving. The Arab revolutions have contributed to modifying behaviour with regard to information and its sources, but a great deal remains to be done before southern countries can enjoy the advantages of the digital economy.

**Conclusions**

The aim of this brief article was to demonstrate how South Mediterranean countries have benefited from and could implement ICT to positively influence their economic growth trends. The digital revolution has shaken the political arena in the countries concerned and could modify the structures of their economies. However, various prerequisites seem necessary for this to occur. For instance, a strategy should be implemented to foster digital skills based on a concerted action plan jointly developed by North and South Mediterranean countries, primarily in order to prevent brain drain and promote the development of content in local languages. In fact, the technology involved is neutral in principle, but less so when the aim is to use semantic content to an economic end. In this regard, it is qualified as “biased technology” (skill-biased technological change), as it cannot benefit all people and all countries to the same extent. Indeed, it can even cause inequalities between countries or people to grow, a factor that also calls for the implementation of specific development strategies.
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: A Vehicle to the Future

The year 2011 is a year of change. The future for the Southern Mediterranean countries, from Morocco to Turkey, is still highly uncertain, especially in light of the recent uprisings and political changes taking place in Tunisia and Egypt. The reasons for these movements and protests are basically the same everywhere and include not only poverty but also the struggle that young people face to find jobs and the hardships usually encountered by entrepreneurs, all of which is coupled with corruption and suppression. Just how severe the impact of this turmoil will be on the region’s economy has yet to be seen, although there are already some alarming signs, such as the acute currency devaluation and the downgrading of Egypt and Tunisia by the international rating agencies.

In these difficult circumstances, the compulsory solution for the economy becomes the full development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). SMEs have been shown to be the backbone of any economy, especially emerging market economies, and they have proven to be highly resilient to the recent international financial crisis. SMEs make significant contributions to job creation and are behind the expansion and creation of value-added in a number of sectors that drive not only economic growth but also development. The SME sector becomes more important as economies develop; the share of formal SMEs increases substantially with the level of development. The contribution of SMEs to gross domestic product (GDP) rises from an average of 15.6% in low-income countries to an average of 51.5% in high-income countries.

In Egypt, as in other Mediterranean countries, SMEs dominate the economic structure. Estimates vary, but according to the most reliable sources, in Egypt they account for more than 80% of enterprises, yet their contribution to GDP does not exceed 25%. Accordingly, to help Egyptian SMEs realise their potential, a number of very successful yet fragmented strategies, policies and interventions have been implemented over the past few years. However, Egypt is a country with a massive population scattered over a vast geographical area, and in light of the recent political changes and the expected economic repercussions, there is now a critical need to make more coordinated efforts to ensure that this important sector lives up to its full potential.

Challenges Facing SMEs: The Egyptian Case

Egypt is a lower-middle-income country with an estimated population of 80 million that is growing at an annual rate of just over 2%. The real GDP growth rate reached 7.2% in 2008, while annual GDP growth averaged 4.7% over the period from 2000 to 2008. Recent reforms in Egypt resulted in spectacular progress at the macro level. This was reflected in very healthy economic indicators, such as high growth, a stable exchange rate, commendable accumulation of foreign reserves, a balance-of-payments surplus and an unprecedented spurt of both domestic and foreign investment. However, the impressive growth rates witnessed over the past few years did not translate to lower poverty levels, improved income distribution or higher per capita expenditure. This is explained by
the fact that this growth was mainly the result of an increase in revenue from the Suez Canal, tourism, oil and worker remittances from the Gulf and was by no means coming from the development of the SME sector or the growth of innovative entrepreneurship.

The economic and political landscape has dramatically changed in Egypt since January 2011 and, as a result, the economy is currently facing major challenges: first, how to overcome the economic and financial losses incurred at both the macro and micro levels as a result of the complete standstill that the country came to for more than three weeks; second, how to achieve and maintain a rate of GDP growth that will be sufficient to absorb the increase in the labour force, especially in light of the possible withdrawal of most foreign investment; and, third, and most important, how to achieve a level of economic growth that is inclusive enough for the results to trickle down and the fruits to be shared by the broad base of society.

This raises the important question of where to find new sources of job creation at a time when the traditional sources – agriculture and government – are no longer sufficient. It is from this perspective that the role of SMEs becomes unquestionably critical. Nevertheless, it is essential to ensure that national policies do not view SMEs as a means of absorbing labour at the bottom of the pyramid and reducing poverty, as when SME development is treated as a social issue it leads to high levels of subsistence enterprise activity with limited potential for economic growth.

It is often argued that SMEs are the backbone of economic activity in developed and developing economies alike. However, the challenge lies in the economic contribution of SMEs, which varies significantly when measured not by the sheer number of enterprises but rather against their contribution to the creation of sustainable jobs and to GDP growth rates. The question then becomes one of transforming the sector from a mere “sponge” for low-productivity activities to a dynamic contributor to modern economic growth, which should be the main objective of any strategy designed to promote the growth and development of the SME sector.

Specifically, the SME sector in Egypt suffers from several concrete constraints that hinder its growth and development and can be summarised as the severe lack of the following crucial factors:

- The skills and systems required to compete effectively in global markets.
- Access to finance.
- Access to information.
- Business development services (BDS).
- Vocational training for labour.
The lack of these factors, together with a weak logistics sector and limited access to markets, distribution channels and supply linkages with larger firms, has created a disabling business environment for SMEs in Egypt. Above all, informality has become a dominant characteristic of the SME landscape. Estimates indicate that the informal sector accounts for more than 30% of the Egyptian economy compared to less than 15% in countries such as China, Singapore and Vietnam (Schneider and Buehn, 2009). Nonetheless, SMEs’ most crucial problem continues to be limited access to the finance required to ensure the growth of the sector. Statistics indicate that in Egypt, even though the SME sector accounts for more than 80% of all economic units, it is able to access less than 10% of the available financing resources. Indeed, some studies reveal that only 5% of small businesses in Egypt have bank loans. Compounding matters, 2009 saw a painful decline in available finance for SMEs in Egypt. This was a direct impact of the recent global financial crisis, whereby banks further reduced their exposure to the SME sector even as other finance providers were unable to step in to fill the gap and equity investors in particular, who barely existed prior to 2009, withdrew even further.

Over the past few years, Egypt has realised the critical importance of developing its SME sector. Accordingly, considerable efforts have been made by different government bodies, civil-society organisations and international donors to level the field for SMEs. However, these initiatives have not yielded the expected results because they have been fragmented and largely uncoordinated due to the absence of a single organisation or body able to take the lead in this field and assume responsibility for coordinating all the efforts in order to maximise output.

**The Road Map: First, Think Small**

One of the reasons behind the recent waves of political unrest and revolutions washing over the Middle East is believed to be the dramatic increase in the number of unemployed youth over the past twenty years. The real engine of GDP growth – and new jobs – is innovation and SME start-ups. Governments have a crucial role to play in supporting enterprise creation, ensuring a level playing field for smaller businesses and building the capacity of the SME sector to ensure its growth. It is thus highly recommended both for Egypt and all other developing economies to focus on SMEs and on innovative entrepreneurship programmes. The SME agenda should lie at the heart of all national strategies and activities because only SMEs can make a positive contribution to development as drivers of economic growth and as “civil-society builders.”

It is highly recommended both for Egypt and all other developing economies to focus on SMEs and on innovative entrepreneurship programmes. The SME agenda should lie at the heart of all national strategies and activities.

In conclusion, the main recommendations for achieving healthy growth of the Egyptian SME sector can be summarised as follows:

1. A single government or non-governmental body or organisation must be responsible for the overall development and growth of SMEs and innovative entrepreneurship.

2. With regard to SMEs’ access to finance, the issue is not necessarily a lack of financing, but rather the mismatch between the available products and the ability of potential entrepreneurs to create convincing and “bankable” business plans and appropriate platforms to use them. Accordingly, it is critical to ensure that SMEs have access to a wide range of financial products, such as private equity funds, venture capital funds, leasing facilities, factoring and cashing, etc., and to improve the financial skills of SME owners and start-ups, as well as their ability to present a convincing business case and properly communicate business performance to financial institutions.

3. Tax policy is one of the main levers that governments can use to stimulate SME growth and entrepreneurship. As such, it should be designed with small firms in mind, taking care to ensure that it promotes transparency and encourages business start-ups, business growth, innovation and business transfer.
4. Innovation and entrepreneurship should be supported and enhanced as they are the only means of creating new sustainable jobs. In Egypt, business education is largely limited to teaching students how to prepare sound business plans that banks will not be willing to finance regardless unless backed by sufficient collateral. The government should thus adopt full-fledged integrated programmes that provide entrepreneurs with the required business skills, practical experience and ongoing coaching and mentoring, before ultimately pointing them towards and helping them to access financial products that match their needs. Additionally, the government should encourage private and public banks to make small capital investments, perhaps through government loan guarantees.

The Egyptian economy is expected to absorb the shocks generated from the recent political transformation by empowering the SME sector

Governments in general, and specifically in Egypt, are the single largest buyer of goods and services. The government procurement market is vast; however, the difficult and complicated pre-qualification and tendering processes used by the government make it impossible for smaller suppliers without a dedicated tendering team to win government contracts. Accordingly, to support the SME sector the government should decentralise the procurement procedures, introduce e-procurement, ensure that tendering requirements are proportionate to the work undertaken, guard against corruption and, finally, educate suppliers about the tendering process.

Egypt has weathered global financial crisis relatively well in the past. The Egyptian economy is expected to absorb the shocks generated from the recent political transformation by moving on a fast track towards enhancing and empowering the SME sector, with special focus on creating a new generation of innovative entrepreneurs.

References


Decreasing Investments of Gulf Countries in the Mediterranean Region

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Introduction

Following the world economic crisis in 2008-2009, global inflows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) rose marginally by 1%, from $1,114 billion in 2009 to almost $1,122 billion in 2010, based on UNCTAD estimates. This stagnant global flow in 2010 was accompanied by diverging trends in the components of FDI. A strong rebound in FDI flows to developing Asia and Latin America offset a further decline in inflows to developed countries. Developing and transition economies, for the first time, absorbed more than half of global FDI flows.

The Southern Mediterranean (MED) countries were somehow less affected by the world economic crisis. Their low-level integration in the global economy helped to cushion the impact and their financial markets were far less exposed to sophisticated financial products. Second-round effects (in particular a drop in tourist flows, exports towards Europe, migrant transfers, foreign investments) had a more negative effect on the economic performance of these countries. However, their GDP growth continued to remain modestly positive, recording an average of 2 to 3%, which was higher than that of neighbouring countries from the northern rim, for example.

The MED countries, therefore, continued their positive trend for appealing to international capital and investments. According to the annual review of the Mediterranean Investment and Partnership Observatory (ANIMA-MIPO), 2010 was marked by good achievements in terms of FDI attraction and international partnerships in the Mediterranean countries. Indeed, since the beginning of the last decade, the emergence of economic opportunities in the Mediterranean region has attracted the interest of new external actors, such as China, India and the Gulf countries, in addition to Europe and North America. In particular, since 2003, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates) have increased their economic presence in the Mediterranean countries mainly through growing FDI. The global economic crisis, for which the GCC states’ economies were not immune, reduced their financial surpluses and their ability to invest in the Mediterranean. Usually ranked second to Europe in terms of foreign investments in the Southern Mediterranean countries, in 2010 the Gulf States were caught up by the USA/Canada and the emerging countries.

The Mediterranean Continues to Attract FDI

The Mediterranean countries are small, open economies with close ties to the euro zone area. While some MED countries are large oil exporters, most of them have large tourism sectors and benefit from expatriate remittances. Accordingly, their economies are vulnerable to declines in exports, oil revenues, tourism receipts, remittances and FDI inflows. The Southern Mediterranean countries did not escape the global economic crisis but demonstrated that they were well placed to respond to it. They suffered because of its secondary effects, albeit to a varying degree, depending on category and country. The drop in exports is the most substantial and direct channel through which the global crisis has affected the region, and the fall in FDI inflows also appears to be significant, while remittances, judging by past experience, tend to be a relatively stable source of revenue.

As a result, real GDP growth weakened significantly in 2009 and recovered only moderately in 2010, al-
though it remained positive. However, the weakening of economic activity in the Mediterranean region has been less pronounced than in advanced economies and most other emerging market regions. This is largely because the direct impact of the global financial turmoil on banking sectors and financial markets in Mediterranean countries has been relatively limited. This is mainly attributed to: (i) their lack of exposure to US mortgage-related assets that turned “toxic,” a feature the region shares with other emerging markets, and (ii) the limited financial development of many countries in the region and their limited integration into global financial markets. Nevertheless, over the last few years many of these Mediterranean countries have attracted significant FDI inflows, particularly when compared with previous decades. This is largely due to a more dynamic domestic demand capable of appealing to foreign investors attracted by low-cost solutions, especially in terms of relatively cheap labour. The trend, however, slowed down in 2009 due to the crisis.

2010 was also a transition year for the southern rim of the Mediterranean with a net improvement in foreign investment in that year. According to the annual review of the Mediterranean Investment and Partnership Observatory (ANIMA-MIPO), which tracks investments into the Mediterranean, the number of announcements of FDI projects grew in the MED countries with 826 projects identified in 2010 against 542 in 2009, producing an increase of 52%. This upward trend in the number of investment projects was, however, less marked in terms of an increase in inflows: €33.2 billion against €28.4 billion in 2009, up by 17% (Chart 22). For their part, international partnerships between companies rose by 71%; 493 projects in 2010 against 288 in 2009. This is partly due to the effect of the EU-funded Invest in Med programme, which is devoted to these partnerships and tends to be better at detecting such investments.

The Mediterranean Recipient Countries and Sectors

Records over the past three years show that Turkey (whose impressive rise to power has been attracting investments), Egypt (but still far from its past records) and Israel have proved to be the three major destinations for FDI. The Maghreb trailed behind and its performance has been disappointing on the whole. Only Tunisia has recorded a strong rise in FDI prior to the political crisis at the end of 2010. FDI announcements have reached their lowest level in four years in Libya. In Morocco, which is usually the shining star for partnerships favoured by SMEs, investments have remained nearly at the same level as in

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Source: ANIMA-MIPO and UNCTAD converted in € and estimated for 2010. MED-11: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian territories, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey.
Investments in Algeria were less marked due to a certain anti-liberalism (restrictions on imports control of FDI, etc.). In the Mashreq, Syria continues to confirm its new attractiveness, Lebanon receives mainly portfolio investments and the other countries (Jordan and especially Palestine) are stagnating.

Five main sectors usually favoured by investors: energy, building and public works, telecoms and material (cement, glass, etc.) took the lion’s share of FDI inflows in 2010. However, there was a sizeable drop in tourist investments due to the overcapacity in the sector. There was a large increase in the number of banking projects, in particular in Syria, given the liberalisation of the sector since 2009. The emergence of the distribution and franchise sectors and an increase in the automobile sectors (especially in Turkey and Morocco) were also noted for FDI. There was a disappointing performance for the agri-food business (only €219 million announced in 2010), the software industry (supposed to be one of the strengths of the Southern Mediterranean countries, with only €535 million) and chemical/petrochemical and fertilisers (only €394 million). It was also noted that cutting edge industries such as aerospace (in Tunisia and Morocco), engineering, general public electronics and logistics have gained new grounds, while textiles, a leading sector in the region, remains at a very low level in terms of foreign investments (€128 million).

In terms of project numbers, energy took the lead with a total of 123 projects, followed by banking (88 projects), software (77 projects), electronic equipment (51 projects), engineering (51 projects), tourism (45 projects), building and public works (41 projects), the automobile industry (38 projects) and finally the agri-food business (37 projects). It is also worth noting that in 2010, FDI created nearly 175,000 direct jobs (against 93,000 in 2009) and around 585,000 indirect jobs, making a total of 760,000 jobs.

Gulf Investments in the Mediterranean: The Passion Slows but Does Not Recede

Gulf States, like those in the rest of the world, could not escape the severe economic and financial crisis albeit at a moderate level. The GDP in the six states of the GCC shrank by only 0.6 percent in 2009, and, even as oil prices and revenues declined, current account surpluses shrank but remained positive. GDP growth was sustained in the non-oil sectors due to heightened investment in domestic economies in the 2000s, and, because of quick increases in anti-recessionary government expenditure, the recession did not go as deep in the GCC as it did in the industrial countries and oil exports, which underpin their economy, made a recovery in the following years (see Chart 23).

Indeed, through most of the 2000s, the GCC states were the largest source of net global capital flows in the world, rivalling China as a ‘new financial superpower.’ They are also the home to some of the largest and oldest Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs), with estimated assets between $600 billion and $1 trillion at the end of 2008. However, due to the crisis, they used their financial surplus and called on their SWFs to help address challenges such as low financial liquidity, high unemployment and to mitigate the impact on their economic systems. They also sought to play a role in helping neighbouring countries to overcome the economic crisis within the broader Middle East region.

The GCC is much more integrated with the rest of the world than with the Mediterranean region be-

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cause of the role of oil and gas in trade patterns. But integration via labour markets is significant, especially for Mashreq countries and Egypt. FDI linkages from the GCC to the rest of the Mediterranean are also important and during the last decade, Gulf investors have become a major player in the region, sometimes surpassing Europe. Since the inception of the ANIMA observatory (January 2003), they have invested some 70 billion euros in almost 700 projects and they tend to be concentrated in rather large “big ticket” projects (a ratio close to €100m per project), mostly in the Mashreq and Maghreb. For example, Gulf Finance House (GFH) announced the launch of Africa’s first offshore financial centre in Tunis Financial Harbour in collaboration with the Tunisian Government (€2,100 million), while Qatar Telecom (Qtel) announced that it would exercise its pre-emptive right on the remaining 50% stake in Tunisia from Orascom Telecom, recently acquired by Russian Vimpelcom (€1,100 million). In fact, GCC states had announced even more larger amounts to invest in the MED (€160 billion), but, of course, the global crisis has reduced some of their ambitions. The acceleration of their investment has been recent (2006 and 2007), mainly thanks to the Emirates and is somehow linked to a real estate/tourism bubble.

Gulf countries’ net investments in the Mediterranean, however, which have been growing over the last decade and have for a number of years overtaken that of North America and in some years even that of Europe, were caught up in 2010. Gulf countries have thus been surpassed by the “other countries”, mainly emerging ones, and are on a par with the USA and Canada (Chart 24). These 3 groups issue 15 to 16% each of the FDI directed towards the Southern Mediterranean countries. European investments took the lead for the third consecutive year and remained the main FDI source, constituting half of the investments in the Mediterranean in 2010. Usually ranked second, investments from Gulf countries are on the decline. Hardly hit by the financial crisis and the bursting of the housing bubble, Gulf countries adjusted their investment strategies. They supplied 18% of the flows announced during the first three quarters of 2010, against over 25% on average since 2003; and the average size of their investment projects has been halved to 50 million euros against an average of 100 million euros since 2003.

Gulf investors’ three favourite sectors, namely public works, banking and tourism, are still at the top, while public works and tourism projects are in relative decline and banking projects record a marked increase. Distribution emerges as a new leading sector, with over 10% of the total number of projects for the first nine months of the year, against 5% on average. Apart from the SWFs, Gulf investors also seem to favour lighter commitment and short-termism: partnerships from Gulf countries are rising, with 40
projects detected in nine months against 21 in total in 2009, mainly hosted by Mashreq countries. Transportation seems to attract several partnership projects: low cost carriers such as Emirati Air Arabia and Fly Dubai grab new market shares and launch new routes to MED countries.

It is also noted that European predominance is even stronger for partnerships (264 projects making 545 of the total in 2010), with North America coming second (20% of the total projects), and the Gulf reaching only 12%. Partnerships originating from the emerging countries made 9% and intra-MED 6%. Compared with 2009, however, the Gulf partnerships have tripled and those between MED countries have doubled, which is a source of great encouragement. Europe has a preponderant share of franchises and management contracts (public-private partnerships), (see Chart 25).

Conclusion

What some have called “the beginning of an affair” between the Gulf and the Mediterranean is still alive, despite the global and regional crisis. Over the last decade, GCC investors have become major economic players in the Mediterranean, sometimes surpassing their European counterparts. The Gulf has grown to be more enamoured with the Mediterranean, not only because of their common historical, cultural and religious heritage, but also because of the opportunities for growing close economic ties and return on investments.

However, Gulf-Mediterranean integration is far from being achieved and the two regions are still poles apart. Gulf investments in the Mediterranean help to bridge the gap and offer both an opportunity for diversification of investment for the former and a source for economic development for the latter. Gulf countries are also the most involved in world financial markets, mainly through their sovereign funds. Hence it was the first Arab region to feel the effects of the world financial and economic crisis, whose impact differed from one country to another. The crisis not only reduced their financial powers and dented their confidence, but also encouraged them to focus their investments mainly on the home market in an effort to stabilise their economies and financial system. Although they continued to invest in and support neighbouring countries, their investments in the Mediterranean have lagged behind that of Europe, and stand at a par to that of the United States and Canada in 2010.

The Mediterranean region, despite certain initial setbacks arising from the global economic crisis has, however, managed to recover and in 2010 has been
able to attract its fair share of foreign investments due to its appeal as a rewarding destination for FDI and partnerships.

Faced with the challenges of the Arab Spring and its aftermath, it will remain to be seen how the region will recover and translate the chaos of revolutions into an opportunity for the needed economic, social and political reforms, which underscore a country’s stability and economic performance and attract more foreign investments. The Gulf, shaking off the effect of the global crisis and gaining more confidence, is likely to continue its passion for investments in the Mediterranean, increase its share in the future and restore its position as one of the main sources of FDI, nurturing further regional cooperation and integration.

References


Turkey: A Developing Economic Power

Turkey has learned to remain stable and strong at times in its recent history in which its environment has been subject to profound geostrategic realignments. It proved this from 1989 to 1991, when the Soviet Bloc collapsed, producing a shock wave that dramatically altered all the regions to which Turkey in one way or another belonged: the Balkans, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia and even the Middle East, as a result of the first Gulf War against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Turkey emerged in that period as a multi-regional demographic, political and military power. In 2001, Turkey and its AKP government responded to the worst economic crisis in the country’s history by implementing structural reforms that would make it the world’s 16th largest economy by 2010. According to the OECD’s projections, Turkey will be the Member Country to experience most growth between 2011 and 2017, registering an average annual rate of 6.7%. In 2010, at a time of major international crisis, the Turkish economy grew 8.9%, the third highest growth rate in the world that year and the highest in Europe.

In the same vein, as early as 2008, the World Bank estimated that Turkey accounted for 50% of the GDP of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, including Israel and Iran. This share has grown slightly since.

Different sources\(^1\) rank Turkey among the main emerging economies of the coming decades, and its government has explicitly set the goal of becoming one of the 10 largest economies in the world by 2023, the centennial of the country’s foundation.

This domestic economic dynamism has made Turkey a powerful trading state, in need of new markets to sustain its economic expansion. The AKP government’s trade policy has pursued this goal since mid-2000, a decision that was bolstered by the appointment of Ahmet Davutoglu as the Turkish Foreign Minister on 1 May 2009.

These efforts have borne fruit as a result of an active and systematic Turkish campaign, at multiple levels, to strengthen the country’s ties to other emerging markets, above and beyond the classic, more consolidated and mature markets of the United States and European Union.

As a result of this economic need, Turkey has reassessed the value of its neighbouring markets, especially those of the Middle East, in light of their demographic potential, considerable need for infrastructure investment, logistical accessibility, receptiveness to doing business with Turkey and growing public- and private-sector purchasing power.

Thus, whilst in 2002, EU markets received 56% of Turkish exports, this figure had fallen to less than 50% by 2009. At the same time, the share of Turkish exports going to Middle Eastern economies rose from 9% in 2002 to 12.5% in 2004 and to 19% in 2009. That same year, joint Turkish exports to Syria and Iran exceeded those to the United States.

The production diversification of the Turkish economy has gone hand in hand with a diversification of the provinces and cities in which this development

\(^1\) Forecasts by Goldman Sachs and HSBC predict that Turkey will be one of the main emerging economies by 2050, whether or not it joins the EU.
has taken place. Thus, in recent years, the inland cities of Anatolia have witnessed the emergence of a dynamic, highly conservative middle class, especially active in the development of more traditional sectors, such as agriculture, food, the automobile industry and textiles. In keeping with their religious profile, the members of this new class find in work ethic and the generation and distribution of wealth a means of realising themselves as good believers. This phenomenon has been likened to a form of Islamic Calvinism.¹

As a result of this more traditionalist sociological profile, and of its location in Turkey’s inland cities, such as Gaziantep, Konya, Denizli, Adana, Mersin and Kayseri, the growing international economic relations of this entrepreneurial class are more often than not forged with sociologically and geographically close economies, such as those of the Middle East. This middle class has structured its economic interests in a series of organisations created in the early 1990s based on values related to dialogue, ethical responsibility, solidarity or awareness of the social responsibility of both companies and individual business owners.³

Members of this class likewise dominate the representative economic and political institutions of their regions, including governorships, town halls and chambers of commerce.

As a result of this process, according to the Turkish Exporters Association (TIM from the Turkish), in 2001, a total of nine Turkish economic sectors exported more than $1 billion; this figure had risen to $18 billion by 2009. Likewise, whereas in 2001 Turkey exported more than $1 billion to just five countries, in 2009, it exported in excess of this amount to 25 countries. In 2001, only four Turkish provinces exported goods for a value of more than $1 billion, but by 2009, 12 provinces did.

Indeed, in 2010, a total of 50,000 Turkish companies were regular exporters. Likewise, the number of registered companies in Turkey rose from 723,503 in 2001 to 1,170,248 in 2008. Turkey’s foreign trade volume stood at $87.613 billion in 2002. This figure had nearly trebled by 2010, to $299.423 billion.⁴

**Turkey As a Hub and Engine for Economic Development in the Middle East**

The socioeconomic benefits of Turkish development have stirred growing interest among the region’s economies. To this end, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Palestine, Morocco, Tunisia and others have all signed free trade agreements with Turkey, multiplying economic and social contacts at all levels.

In some cases, such as Libya, Iran, Syria, Jordan, Iraq or Lebanon, agreements have been signed for reciprocal visa waivers for nationals of the signatory countries. Such agreements have enabled the free movement of people between the signatory countries, which has intensified cultural, business, tourism-related, political and social contacts.

Between 2002 and 2008, the entry into Turkey of citizens from neighbouring countries increased 170%, with Syria registering the highest percentage growth (222%, with the number of entries rising from 126,428 to 407,000), followed by Russia (204%, with the number of entries rising from 946,500 to 2,879,000) and Iran (163%, with the number of entries rising from 432,280 to 1,135,000).⁵ This trend is likely to continue as a result of the efforts being made to strengthen regional cooperation dynamics, such as the recent entry into force of such a reciprocal visa waiver agreement between Turkey and Russia on 16 April 2011.

The political and economic authorities of several countries in the Middle East view the Turkish experience as a possible model to follow. This is especially true of the smaller states, which hope to benefit from a certain spillover effect by increasing the linkage of their economies to Turkey’s. To this end, a growing number of political actors, especially economic ones, have implemented active policies to strengthen their countries’ ties to Turkey and have found their Turkish counterparts to be quite receptive to their efforts.

Proof of the fluidity of the political relations between Turkish and Middle Eastern authorities can be found in the fact that, from 2003 to March 2011, the Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, officially visited more countries in the Middle East (45) than, for example, in the EU (41).⁶

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¹ For further information on this term, see European Stability Initiative, “Islamic Calvinism: Change and Conservatism in Central Anatolia,” www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_69.pdf.
³ The most relevant cases are MÜSİAD (www.musiad.org.tr), TUSKON (www.tuskon.org/) and ASKON (www.askon.org.tr/default.asp).
⁵ T. C. Emniyet Genel Müdürlüğü (Turkish national police).
⁶ Compilation of data taken from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
In the same vein, the proliferation of Turkish stakeholders that have established, expanded or strengthened their economic, political and social contacts with countries in the region has increased to such an extent that the relations between these countries have gone from being a strictly bilateral affair handled by governments to being the sum of the interests and actions of a variety of non-state actors, especially economic ones.

One factor that has facilitated Turkey’s acceptance in the region as an engine for these policies, in addition to the legitimacy afforded to it by the success of its development model, is the non-conditionality of its international proposals and agreements.

The bilateral economic relations between Turkey and the countries of the Middle East, especially its neighbouring countries, have been transformed into a dense and increasingly solid network, comprised of public- and private-sector companies (especially small and medium-sized enterprises), chambers of commerce, business associations, municipalities, governors, think tanks, universities, NGOs, etc. The explicit objective of the authorities, and the implicit objective of the other socioeconomic stakeholders, is to promote a growing and complex economic interdependence that enables shared development, prevents conflict through fluid dialogue at all levels, and allows for the development, by the region’s states, of possible common futures. One factor that has facilitated Turkey’s acceptance in the region as an engine for these policies, in addition to the legitimacy afforded to it by the success of its development model, is the non-conditionality to date, of its international proposals and agreements. Influential economic actors in the Middle East, such as the EU and the United States, have tied their economic agreements and relations in the region to the need for these countries to implement a wide range of reforms (economic liberalisation, respect for human rights, democratisation, etc.). Turkey, in contrast, has not assumed the role of explicit promoter of economic and political reform with the region’s countries, trusting instead that its influence in this sphere will grow as a result of the evidence of the success of its model (soft power).

Infrastructure: A Building Block for Regional Interdependence

In recent years, the growing regionalisation of Turkey’s economic relations with the Middle East has been reinforced with infrastructure projects that explicitly and increasingly integrate and serve as a backbone for the region, strengthening its emerging interdependence in the medium term. These regional projects require the active cooperation of the authorities of the countries where they are carried out, which find incentives to collaborate in the economic benefits and capacity for political influence that they entail. Some of the main regional infrastructure projects to date, completed or in progress, include:

- **Energy infrastructure:** Gas and oil pipeline networks linking Iraqi energy resources to Europe via Turkey and Egyptian resources to European markets via Jordan, Syria and Turkey (Euro-Arab Mashreq Gas Pipeline).
- **Passenger and freight rail infrastructure:** Links between Syria and Iran via Turkey; a link between Aleppo and Gaziantep; medium-term plans to link Turkey to northern Iraq and Baghdad; and a south-north corridor from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council countries to Turkey and Europe. Some of these rail projects are already on the shortlist of priorities agreed by the Euro-Mediterranean countries within the framework of the regional cooperation of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM).
- **Modernisation and construction of road and motorway networks,** especially from Turkey to Syria and northern Iraq.
- **Interconnection of electricity grids** between the Mashreq economies and Turkey.
- **Interconnection of advanced telecommunication infrastructure,** such as the JADI project, a major underground fibre optic network linking Jeddah, Amman, Damascus and Istanbul, or the Regional Cable Network (RCN), a $500 million project spanning 7,750 km that will create a permanent fibre optic highway between...
Fujairah, in the United Arab Emirates, and Europe, via Turkey.

- Opening and modernisation of new border crossings for the purpose of facilitating regional trade, especially on the borders between Turkey and Syria and Turkey and Iraq. Likewise, Turkey and Iran have made provisions to open five new border crossings equipped for trade between April and June 2011, the first of which will be inaugurated on 16 April by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of both countries. Additionally, several simplifications have been defined and implemented in the rules governing shipping to make transport between the countries in the region and between them and third countries faster and more flexible.

According to the 2010 World Bank technical study Regional Cross-Border Trade Facilitation and Infrastructure Project for Mashreq Countries, the Mashreq region’s existing infrastructure is insufficient to accommodate the projected increase in transport needs arising from regional trade and population growth. The study identifies three key logistics corridors for the region, as shown in the following map:

- A north-south corridor linking the EU to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states via Turkey, Syria and Jordan, with connecting links to Lebanon and Egypt;
- An east-west corridor linking the ports of Latakia, Tartus, Tripoli and Beirut to Iraq via Syria;
- A second east-west corridor linking the same ports, plus the Jordanian port of Aqaba, to Iraq.

The World Bank’s projections for these corridors for 2020 are as follows:

- Daily transit in the north-south corridor with origin/destination in Turkey will be approximately 12,500 TEUs\(^8\) a day, equivalent to 2,500 lorries and 15 trains in each direction.
- The combined transit of the two east-west corridors will be approximately 11,000 TEUs per day, equivalent to 2,200 lorries and 12 trains in each direction.
- Such a volume of freight would completely overwhelm the capacity of the current road networks and border crossings. The rail corridors could attract between a third and half of all long-distance traffic. Therefore, plans exist to create new rail links for all three corridors.

\(^{7}\) www.euromedtransport.org/image.php?id=183

\(^{8}\) Twenty-foot equivalent unit or the volume of a 20-foot container.
To tackle these challenges, the World Bank has launched the Mashreq Corridor Programme (MCP), which aims to implement these projects gradually over a period of fifteen years, at a total estimated cost of about $5.2 billion. The economic and social impact of executing these projects, in terms of synergies and job creation, is a powerful incentive to multiply and strengthen the cooperation between the affected regional economies.

The Close Neighbours Economic and Trade Association Council (CNETAC): The Middle Eastern Common Market?

The emergence and recognition of Turkey as an economic power accepted by the states in the region and able to bring together international cooperation projects has allowed Turkish leaders to seize the moment to lead an open political and economic regionalism in the Middle East.

Several regional factors have enabled and encouraged the strengthening of the relationship between the states of the Eastern Mediterranean. The Turkish need for economic expansion has found an echo in the need of neighbouring economies to internationalise and find new means of development to address their socioeconomic challenges (population growth, a bloated and inefficient public sector, etc.). This objective need is reinforced by the fact that the leaders of many of these countries have a similar understanding of the situation and share a certain vision of common goals.

In keeping with this shared vision of the need to create a sort of common future, on 31 July 2010, the governments of Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon signed a regional free trade agreement for the explicit purpose of creating a Middle Eastern common market. This ambitious agreement, called the Close Neighbours Economic and Trade Association Council (CNETAC), establishes as a medium-term objective the free movement of capital, goods and people through the creation of what has been called the “Middle Eastern Shamgen Area.” It likewise establishes a series of deadlines and multilateral follow-up mechanisms to guarantee the implementation of the necessary measures to achieve this area. To this end, a High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council between the four countries has been set up to ensure and oversee the project, which shall meet regularly to study and sanction the progress.

Initially, the agreement emphasises the economic building blocks of trade, transport, tourism and energy, designating one country in each case to lead and coordinate progress in the field under its own responsibility.

The CNETAC is comprised of three pillars of cooperation: political, cultural and economic. The economic pillar is the one set out in the most rigorous detail and the one for which the most tangible and immediate objectives and deadlines have been established. The three pillars, in turn, encompass fourteen objectives, which range from promoting SMEs to food security, by way of cooperation in third markets, the joint definition and implementation of new infrastructure, educational cooperation and cultural exchanges. Likewise, a road map has been drawn up for each objective to ensure that all cooperation is thoroughly and wholly conducted between the four countries, thereby turning it into a common acquis.

The four current member economies of this organisation believe that the project will lead to the development of positive synergies through the creation of the embryo of a Middle Eastern common market. To this end, all four countries hope to incorporate new members in the project by 2014 (as shown in Map 2) and to publish an initial comprehensive assessment of the CNETAC by 2015.

For now, the project envisages the incorporation of Egypt and Iraq in the near future, as these countries would give it greater demographic, economic and strategic heft. The authorities of both these countries are likely to take a positive view of membership in the organisation, as it could offer their countries economic benefits, political influence and the chance to become part of a regional bloc at a time of redefinition of economic roles and regionalisms around the world.

CNETAC and Regional Cooperation: Beyond the Current Status Quo?

CNETAC is an intergovernmental agreement, but one of the underlying factors of this attempt to foster closer relations is the manifest interest of the private sec-

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9 The term is intended to underscore the parallel with the European Schengen agreement on the free movement of people and is based on the Turkish name for the Syrian capital, Sham.
tors of the member economies, which are more or less developed depending on the country. Their representative bodies offer grassroots support for strengthening these relations. To this end, the Levant Business Forum was set up to consolidate the project and audit its progress “from the outside.” This standing Forum, which meets once a year, is responsible, among other things, for preparing the White Book and Action Plan for the satisfactory establishment of the free trade agreement and the agreement for the free movement of all factors of production. Likewise, it is expressly tasked with lobbying each country’s government to ensure swift implementation of the necessary reforms to meet these objectives.

This aspect is particularly important at a time in which the instability of certain regimes in the region is growing. This is currently the case in Syria, although not exclusively so, as several countries in the region are also increasingly subject to political and social tensions. The fact that a considerable part of the effort to strengthen relations in the region is being made by a variety of non-state actors (companies of all sizes and sectors, universities, chambers of commerce, civic associations, research centres, town councils, individuals and, ultimately, civil society at large) makes it possible to believe that it will survive any possible changes in government, whether due to elections or the current uprisings. In short, the increasingly positive view held by many national stakeholders of the socioeconomic benefits of sharing a certain economic destiny would seem to suggest that the current open regional cooperation will be relatively immune to any possible swings in the region’s political fortunes.

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Overview of EU Policies and Financing Frameworks with Southern Mediterranean Countries

Policy Frameworks and Funding Instruments for EU Cooperation with the Southern Mediterranean before 2007


Southern Mediterranean Countries (SMCs) have benefitted from EU development assistance since the 1970s within different policy frameworks under which a series of bilateral agreements formed the backbone of EU funding to the region. Beginning with the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP) in 1972, Europe’s southern neighbours concluded cooperation agreements based on the three pillars of trade, social and financial cooperation. The latter pillar built on financial protocols that specified the aid volumes committed to SMCs. Financial and economic cooperation took three forms: grants and European Investment Bank (EIB) and European Commission (EC) 1% interest loans.

The EU’s enlargement to include Greece, Portugal and Spain in the 1980s called for a redefinition of its relations with its southern neighbours. The Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP) of 1990 sought to reinforce the existing frameworks while providing them with narrower objectives and strategies. The ECU 2.37 billion allocated for the period 1992-1996 represented an increase of 40% in commitments compared to the previous policy framework. It was aimed at supporting the implementation of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) and World Bank’s structural adjustment programmes, in particular the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and financing regional cooperation initiatives. Trade relations were deepened through duty-free access to European markets for agricultural goods in 1993. The main innovation of the RMP was support for South-South integration, which was perceived as a stabilising factor for the region and the EU. The initiatives that followed the RMP reaffirmed the importance of regional integration with the ambition of creating a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area.

2. 1995-2007: The Barcelona Process

In the aftermath of the Gulf War and the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, the 1995 Euromed Partnership went beyond the RMP by attempting to tie the EU’s stability wants to SMCs’ socioeconomic development needs. In November 1995, the Barcelona Ministerial Conference marked a crucial shift in the way relations were structured by engaging SMCs’ foreign affairs ministers in the final statement. While the previous approaches considered Mediterranean “third countries,” the Barcelona Conference,

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1 She is also Director of the Mediterranean Prospects Network – Medpro (www.medpro-foresight.eu).
2 The acronym SMC refers to Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.
which gave rise to the Euromed Partnership, used the term "Mediterranean partners." The Partnership went one step further than other initiatives and built on three pillars:

- Political cooperation and dialogue with the ultimate goal of achieving a prosperous and stable regional ensemble through the adoption by Partner Countries of measures encouraging democratic development and good governance;
- Economic cooperation and regional integration with the aim of achieving a Free Trade Area by 2010; and
- Socio-cultural cooperation by fostering people-to-people contacts and a vibrant civil society through concrete initiatives.

At the institutional level, the Barcelona Process (BP) revoked the previous cooperation agreements and established bilateral Association Agreements (AAs) as the building blocks for Euro-Mediterranean relations. AAs are concluded for an unlimited period of time and cover the three dimensions of the Euromed Partnership with slight differences between countries. Broadly, they consist of titles covering trade in goods and services, economic cooperation, social/cultural cooperation and financial cooperation, the latter category specifying that funds will be allocated to help SMCs meet the objectives set out in their AA.

To reach the objectives set in the AAs, cooperation initiatives are implemented in two steps. First, Country Strategy Papers (CSPs) adopted by the EC and the SMCs sum up the political and economic situation of each country, set out the "EU's strategic response" and detail both the general and specific objectives of the cooperation. National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) adopted by the EC and the SMCs categorise these objectives into priorities and sub-priorities. To meet the objectives set as sub-priorities, funds are allocated to specific cooperation programmes, some of which are used to fund initiatives in the beneficiary countries, such as awareness-raising activities and pilot projects. To achieve regional cooperation objectives, the same steps are followed according to Regional Strategy Papers (RSPs) and Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs), both of which have the same structure as their national counterparts. Under the BP, CSPs/RSPs were drafted for the period 2002-2006. Two series of NIPs/RIPs defined the objectives thereof for the periods 2002-2004 and 2005-2006.

The BP also institutionalised relations at the regional level by establishing conferences on foreign affairs at the ministerial level aimed at monitoring the progress achieved on meeting the objectives set in the Barcelona Declaration. Several sectoral ministerial conferences were also established under the Partnership, including conferences on agriculture, water, energy and health, to name a few. In addition, the Euromed Committee, composed of senior officials from the EU, Member States and SMCs, is responsible for the overall administration of the Partnership. The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, which consists of parliamentarians from the European, Member State and SMC parliaments, makes recommendations for the Partnership. Furthermore, the 5+5 Dialogue, an informal structure that gathers together the foreign affairs and/or interior ministers of Spain, France, Italy, Malta and Portugal with those of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, aims to reinforce the BP by discussing all the issues affecting it. While the idea dates back to the 1980s, the 5+5 Dialogue did not materialise until 1990. The first meeting was held in 1991, but the process then stopped until 2001. Several meetings have been held since then, the last one in April 2010.

The Euromed Partnership also brought changes at the financial level by creating the MEDA programme (from the French "mesures d’accompagnement"), a set of financial and technical measures to accompany the reform of economic and social structures, and the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP). The MEDA programme revoked the financial protocols used to finance Euro-Mediterranean cooperation by providing financial and technical support to SMCs conditional on the implementation of mutually agreed reforms. Contrary to previous provisions, allocations were no longer given on a country basis but on a project basis. The MEDA pro-

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3 The Euromed Partnership/Barcelona Process targets Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, the Palestinian Authority, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey.

4 Israel is an exception since the EU-Israel AA does not have a title on financial cooperation.

The programme lasted until the end of 2006 and had a total budget of €8.7 billion, split into two programming periods: MEDA I, from 1995 to 1999, with a total budget of €3.43 billion and MEDA II, from 2000 to 2006, with a total budget of €5.35 billion. The FEMIP, which is managed by the European Investment Bank (EIB), was established in 2002 and aims to improve the region’s private sector and SMEs’ access to finance. FEMIP benefits from a yearly allocation from the EU budget (€32 million per year for the period 2007-2013) and provided almost €6 billion in loans between 2002 and 2006. The FEMIP also manages an additional financial instrument, the FEMIP Trust Fund (FTF). The FTF finances technical assistance and venture-capital projects in the Southern Mediterranean with contributions from the EC and 15 Member States.

The European Neighbourhood Policy and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

The EU’s 2004 and 2007 enlargements called for another redefinition of its external policies amid fears that Eastern neighbours6 were attracting increasing attention from Brussels to the detriment of the SMCs. To prevent this perception among its Southern partners, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was created in 2007, embracing both Eastern and Southern countries. The ENP sought to promote a closer political, economic, social and cultural and scientific dialogue while enhancing cross-border cooperation and shared responsibility in the areas of security, prosperity, justice, regional stability and conflict resolution and prevention. Most of these objectives are already embedded in the BP and take into account the heterogeneity of both regions as well as their experience in dealing with Brussels’s institutions and the EU’s programming of assistance, which was split into East and South.

At the institutional level, the entry into force of the ENP did not modify the structure of the bilateral relations, but it entailed significant changes for the SMCs at the financial level. While the MEDA programme targeted them specifically, the newly created European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) was designed to benefit both regions. In ab-

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6 Eastern European countries under the ENP include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, hereinafter referred to as “Eastern neighbours.”
absolute terms, the entry into force of the ENPI did not translate into lower commitments to the SMCs, yet _prima facie_ figures suggest that the EU is increasingly shifting its attention towards its Eastern partners. If Israel, Lebanon and Palestine are excluded, average yearly per capita commitments to SMCs are lower than the commitments to the Eastern neighbourhood by a factor of 3. The following table shows the breakdown of ENPI commitments for both types of countries for the period 2007-2009. Regional cooperation was not ruled out under the ENPI: for the period 2007-2009, commitments to SMCs amounted to a total of €371.4 million. An additional instrument was also created: the Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC) programme. The CBC's objectives are fourfold: the promotion of economic development in bordering regions; support for secure and efficient borders; the promotion of people-to-people contacts; and cooperation in the fields of public health, the fight against organised crime and the environment. The CBC has been allocated a total of €1.11 billion for the period 2007-2013, of which €355 million (31% of the total CBC budget) have been committed to multi-country initiatives for the protection of the Mediterranean Basin and to Morocco and Tunisia for border protection programmes with Spain and Italy.

The entry into force of the ENP created another EIB-managed funding instrument: the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF). The NIF aims to support investments in infrastructure and the private sector (with a particular focus on SMEs) in both the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhoods. It benefits from a €700 million commitment from the EC and from voluntary contributions from 15 Member States, which totalled €47 million in 2009.

**The Union for the Mediterranean**

Since 2008, the SMCs have benefited from an additional policy framework, the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), created under the French presidency of the EU. While Euro-Mediterranean relations have gotten deeper with each step, the EU’s cooperation and assistance have done little to enhance the overall economic and social development of the SMCs. Two reasons were cited for this by the UfM’s initiator, Nicolas Sarkozy: first, while the EU acts as a unified block, the SMCs are divided, which hinders cooperation results, and, second, the EU’s initiatives were not visible enough. To tackle these two issues and to revive the optimism initially felt under the Barcelona Process, in July 2008, the Euro-Mediterranean Heads of State created the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. While the initiative initially sought to target only European countries bordering the Mediterranean, following criticism voiced by Germany, the UfM was opened to all 27 EU members. Today, the UfM consists of a total of 43 countries gathered around six concrete initiatives:

- de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea;
- establishment of maritime and land highways;
- a joint civil protection programme for prevention, preparation and response to natural and man-made disasters;
- the Mediterranean Solar Energy Plan, which explores the opportunities for developing solar energy in the region;
- the Euro-Mediterranean University, inaugurated in June 2008 and based in Slovenia; and
- the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative, which supports companies operating in the region by offering technical assistance and access to finance.

At the institutional level, the UfM builds on two bodies: the co-presidency and the General Secretariat. The co-presidency is held by one EU Member State and one non-EU-Member State and rotates every two years. Egypt and France held the co-presidency until the February 2011 popular uprising that led to the ouster of Hosni Mubarak. Since then, the co-presidency has been empty. The UfM’s decisions are taken at the bi-annual summit of Heads of State and Government and at the Annual Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers, based on an agenda prepared by a conference of senior officials headquartered in Brussels. The General Secretariat, based in Barcelona, is responsible for the implementation of the policies and projects identified and adopted by

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7 Both Lebanon and Palestine benefit from significant commitments for distress relief, rehabilitation and humanitarian aid.

8 In addition to the 27 EU Member States, the UfM’s members include: Albania, Algeria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. Libya declined the invitation but has observer status. The Arab League has also been granted observer status.
the UfM. After two years of delays, the General Secretariat opened its doors in Barcelona in September 2010.

At the institutional level, the UfM established ambitious objectives and governance structures to further promote regional integration. At the financial level, two additional instruments were created: the InfraMed and Faro funds. InfraMed was launched in May 2010, with contributions from Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDC, France), Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP, Italy), the European Investment Bank (EIB), Caisse de Dépôt et de Gestion (CDG, Morocco) and EFG Hermes (Egypt). InfracMed is the UfM’s first financial facility and is intended to finance infrastructure projects. Its commitments amount to €385 million and are expected to increase to €1 billion. The Faro fund was allocated a total of €1 million to fund innovative projects on both shores of the Mediterranean. Faro is managed by Invest in Med and provides entrepreneurs with up to €20,000 per project in seed capital, financing half of their expenses.

An Analysis and Evaluation of the EU’s Development Funding for SMCs

Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia and Morocco, the Main Beneficiaries of the EU’s ODA

Notwithstanding the discrepancies between allocations for Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood Countries, the EU has proved to be a stable and increasingly committed donor to SMCs. Beginning with a level of 0.2% in 1995, the ratio of the EU’s official development assistance (ODA) for SMCs to its GDP had reached 0.89% by 2007. Hence, from a yearly average of €400 million committed to SMCs for the programming period 1995-2005, the EU’s ODA to SMCs grew fourfold to reach €800 million for the programming period 2005-2006. Likewise, between the entry into force of the BP and the ENP, total commitments to SMCs increased 150%, rising from €2.16 billion in 1995 to €3.2 billion in 2005. However, these figures hide important variations in the EU’s ODA to SMCs. With a median commitment of €216 million for the period 2007-2010, EU policy towards SMCs is focused on Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. This is hardly a new trend, as these countries have concentrated 60% of the EU’s ODA commitments to the region since the creation of the BP. Their importance in the EU’s Mediterranean policy becomes even more apparent upon analysing their share of total EU country programmable aid to the region (CPA). CPA is defined as the amount of aid that goes directly to the recipient country’s budget for the implementation of mutually agreed reform programmes. It excludes commitments for the categories of emergency relief, distress relief, humanitarian aid, food aid, debt forgiveness, technical cooperation and the administrative costs of donors (Mwega, 2004). Over the period 1995-2009, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia concentrated 67% of the EU’s CPA to SMCs. Over the same period, the share of CPA out of total ODA that they received from the EU averaged 100%. This figure contrasts with those for Algeria, Lebanon and Syria, whose shares of CPA out of total EU ODA have averaged 66%, 52% and 76%, respectively, since 1995. Several factors help to explain such trends. For Algeria, the country’s civil war, which formally ended in 1999, called for non-CPA assistance in the form of emergency/distress relief and food aid, which, together, accounted for 25% of total EU ODA to the country between 1995 and 1999. Moreover, the country’s endowment of hydrocarbons offers no incentive for it to engage in foreign-advocated reforms, since oil revenues can be redistributed to relieve any possible pressure while protecting current interests. In the case of Syria and Lebanon, it is the importance of non-EU donors that explains why they received lower amounts of both ODA and CPA. Throughout the 1990s, Syria was a major recipient of ODA from Arab donors, who directed a total of $2 billion towards the country. Although Lebanon received only $830 million over the same period, the figure is still 2.5 times more than what the EU pledged between 1995 and 2009 (World Bank, 2010). The large presence of Arab donors likely simply shifts these countries’ interests away from the EU, especially


11 Specifically, these Arab donors are Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
since it is not conditional on the implementation of reforms.

**Beneficiary Sectors of EU ODA**

The EU’s priorities for bilateral cooperation with SMCs are structured in terms of support for economic development, trade, poverty alleviation and institutional reforms, as stated in the general objectives of the Barcelona Process, the ENP and the different NIPs. Indeed, when looking at the breakdown of commitments to SMCs by sector for the period 1995-2009, the areas of infrastructure and transport, industry and trade, education, government, civil society, conflicts, peace, security, banking and financial services have concentrated 60% of total commitments to the region. As far as regional cooperation is concerned, trade and industry, multi-sector initiatives and education concentrate 67% of total commitments.

ODA is generally motivated by three broad concerns. First, a genuinely developmental motive may spur donors to pledge resources to a recipient to promote growth and poverty alleviation. Traditionally, sectors such as healthcare and education have been thought to reflect altruistic aid motivations. Second, ODA can be used as a means to cement trade and financial relations with the recipient country through the opening of markets, thereby ensuring opportunities for exporters, suppliers and contractors in donor countries. Usually, tied aid, i.e. the amount of aid on which the recipient country pledges to buy goods and services from the donor country, is used as a proxy for underlying trade motivations for development assistance flows. Third, ODA can be politically motivated to ensure the allegiance of recipient governments to the donor’s political objectives. Commitments for institutional reform, good governance and the security sector can be used as proxies for politically driven aid (Mwega, op. cit).

The large share of commitments for transport and infrastructure, health and education qualify the EU first and foremost as an altruistic donor to SMCs, since these categories concentrated 39% of all commitments to the region over the period, for a total of €3.8 billion. Second, the significant amounts allocated to the categories of trade and industry and banking and financial services, for which commitments amounted to €1.6 billion over the period (16% of the total), show the EU to be a trade-driven donor. This is especially salient when considering the emphasis placed on the creation of a Free Trade Area between the EU and the SMCs, as well as the impetus given to south-south integration since 1995.

However, commitments for governance, civil society and institutional reform, proxies of politically motivated aid, show the EU to be a donor particularly concerned with creating stable and accountable institutional frameworks in the region (Woods, 2005). This is especially clear in view of the importance that the category of government, civil society, conflicts, peace and security took on over the 2007-2010 programming period. Between 2005 and 2009, commit-

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12 Woods notes that security/governance is a growing concern in EU institutions’ ODA irrespective of the recipient country/region.
ments in this category grew at a rate of 145%, rendering it the most important for the 2007-2010 period, as shown in Chart 28.

For the period 2007-2010, an examination of the NIPs reveals that the emphasis on the creation of an independent, transparent and, eventually, accountable judicial framework ranks high in Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Examples include the Algerian programme for justice modernisation, which clearly states the objective of enhancing the judiciary's in-
dependence, and similar programmes implemented in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and, to a lesser extent, Morocco. Interestingly enough, in light of the 2011 Arab Spring, Tunisia did not benefit from such programmes for the period concerned. Also, prior to Hosni Mubarak’s ouster and amid concerns over electoral fraud in September 2010, €13 million were committed for Egypt to reform its administration and to support electoral processes in the country. Control of migration and drug trafficking, both of which are included in all AAs, also ranked high among the EU’s cooperation priorities with Egypt for the 2007-2010 programming period. Notwithstanding these objectives outlined by the EU’s programming documents, however, little has changed as far as the adoption of democratic reforms by recipient countries is concerned (Youngs, 2008). In Jordan, the regime has blocked the EU’s attempts to develop civil society and reform the media and electoral laws, while the judiciary reform programme has merely translated into financial support for the government to increase the judicial system’s capacity and streamline processes.

For the 2011-2013 programming period, examination of the NIPs does not allow for a clear identification of sector trends since a large share of commitments are labelled as “multisector.” However, the broad trends described here are likely to persist. At the country level, the highest increases are seen in the commitments to Morocco and Jordan, which have risen 27 and 12%, respectively. At the sector level, commitments for economic development and modernisation, governance and human rights concentrate at least 25% of all commitments to the region.

The Future of EU Development Assistance to the Southern Mediterranean

The EC’s Response to the Arab Spring: “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity”

In light of the uprisings that began to rock the Southern Mediterranean in early 2011, it is useful to analyse the EU’s early reactions as far as future directions of ODA are concerned. The Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan uprisings took many actors, and especially the EU, by surprise. The strength, rapidity and coordination of civil society in overthrowing decades-old autocratic regimes demonstrated how impossible it is to continue past policies while ignoring both peoples’ democratic and socio-economic aspirations. The EU’s response to the “Arab Spring” and an embryonic vision of the future of its neighbourhood policy towards the Southern Mediterranean is embedded in the 8th March Commission Communication on “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity.” In addition to the immediate humanitarian assistance provided “to support democratic transition” in Tunisia and later Egypt, the Communication introduced several changes in the way the EU will conduct future policies towards the Southern Mediterranean.

First, the EU’s new approach builds more on the principle of “differentiation.” Under this principle, the EU will commit more resources to reforming countries. Under this “incentive-based approach,” countries making fast progress on reforms will draw resources away from countries that hold back on their implementation. At the country level, the Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (hereafter, “the Partnership”) is likely to reinforce the current country-based patterns of ODA commitments, since, as of 10 May 2011, only Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia had agreed to either reform or amend their constitutions with a view to increasing political freedoms.

Second, a qualitative change is expected to take place as far as support for democracy and institution-building is concerned. While the promotion of democratic reforms and good governance ranks high in the EU’s approach to relations with the Southern Mediterranean, little has effectively been done and the language has failed to translate into concrete initiatives. Since the enactment of the Barcelona Process, OECD DAC data record a total commitment for support for NGOs of merely €1 million; and a study on democratic reform in Morocco states that pressure from the EU to promote democratic reform has been anything but effective (Khakee et al., 2008). A Civil Society and Neighbourhood Facility was created, to focus on the advocacy capacity of civil society organizations (CSOs); their ability to monitor reform and participate effectively in the policy dialogue could potentially reverse past trends if properly implemented. The future release of additional details will allow further assessment of its effectiveness, especially in light of the existing “European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights.”

Third, support for economic development is reaffirmed with proposals to increase the EIB’s lending mandate and calls on the Council to adopt EC proposals on EIB refloows. Under the current arrangement, neither
the EIB nor other financial intermediaries are allowed to reinvest the funds from previous operations. According to the EC’s communication, lifting this constraint would immediately free up €120 million to finance new operations, an amount equal to 32% of the concessional loans issued by the EIB to the region since 1995. Moreover, the amendment to the mandate of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) advocated by the EC to allow the bank to undertake operations in the region would also make additional financing resources available. The memorandum of understanding signed on 1 March between the EC, the EIB and the EIF paves the way for the EBRD’s positioning in the region.

Fourth, the EC’s communication recognises the need to adapt its regional cooperation strategy to the current situation prevailing in the region so as to focus on “projects delivering concrete benefits in energy, environment, transport, trade and social dialogue.” While the Lisbon Treaty urges the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) to reform, a possible approach to grant the institution a new role could consist in granting the EU the co-presidency and transferring a share of the funds earmarked for regional cooperation to the UfM for the design and implementation of development projects that match the objectives of both the BP and the ENP (Ayadi and Fanelli, 2011).

Concluding Remarks

Since the 1970s, the Southern Mediterranean has been targeted by different policies under which commitments to development assistance have grown simultaneously with an expansion and deepening of cooperation with the EU. Reflecting the diversity of the political regimes on the southern shores, the EU’s development assistance has been concentrated in a few countries, while the sectoral distribution of its commitments show it to be a donor governed by both altruistic and trade-related concerns, with an increasing interest in governance-related aid. However, as illustrated by the popular uprisings triggered by repressive political regimes and poor socioeconomic conditions, despite the increasing amounts committed for development assistance, little has been achieved.

Against the current backdrop of profound changes in the EU’s Southern neighbourhood and turbulent times in the Eurozone, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is set to evolve. The business-as-usual vision, which is largely built on partial and fragmented cooperation in specific areas of interests between the EU and the individual Southern Mediterranean states, is no longer a credible scenario for the future. The 2011 Arab uprisings have created an opportunity for the EU to revisit its fragmented policy towards the region. A new Euro-Mediterranean vision must emerge to enable four decades of fragmented partnership finally to materialise in tangible positive results for the region and the EU.

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**SECTOR CLASSIFICATION DETAILS**

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What Is Desertification?

Desertification is a term widely used and poorly understood. Often people confuse it with natural deserts and forget that desertification is mostly a human-induced process occurring outside deserts. The term was coined by the French ecologist Auberville, who, in the early 1950s, used it to describe the process of the transformation of tropical forests in Africa into savannahs and, ultimately, desert-like environments. It was not until more than two decades after Auberville’s warning that the topic reached the political agenda. This was largely due to the impact of extended drought in the West African Sahel in the early seventies, which brought about the United Nations Conference on Desertification held in Nairobi in 1977. Following the historical Rio Earth Summit in 1992, the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) entered into force in 1996, defining desertification as a process of land degradation in arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid areas of the world that is the result of natural phenomena (e.g. climate variation) and anthropogenic factors. The outcome of this type of degradation has typically been considered to be either a persistent reduction in or loss of both the biological and economic productivity of land and environmental quality. The UNCCD uses the aridity index (calculated as the ratio of mean annual precipitation (P) to mean annual potential evapotranspiration (PET)) to define drylands, which include those areas with an aridity index of between 0.05 and 0.65 (excluding polar and sub-polar regions). More recently, the UNCCD has endorsed new terminology that groups desertification, land degradation and drought (DLDD) together. This seems to accommodate better the broad coalition of countries that have signed the convention rather than causing them to shy away from its major focus on drylands. Given the disputable results on the ground, the current prevailing belief is that rather than on “combating desertification,” heavy focus should be placed on supporting sustainable land management by promoting best management practices that combine traditional methods with modern technology. The Mediterranean is also affected by desertification, although the intensity of the process varies from South to North and depends on both biophysical and socioeconomic and political contexts. Nevertheless, a complete and accurate estimate of the extent to which desertification affects the region as a whole is lacking, despite the concerted studies and extensive research carried out, especially over the last two decades. It is worth emphasising that, together with two other UN Conventions, specifically those on climate change and biodiversity, the UNCCD is of tremendous importance in the global environmental agenda.

How to Assess Desertification?

Originally, desertification was seen as the expansion of deserts into greener environments (i.e. sand encroachment), and numerous efforts were made to “measure such enlargement” through remote sensing technology or fieldwork, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. But desertification is not straightforward or easy to evaluate, especially in quantitative terms, and a number of indicators are needed. As a land degradation process, it has myriad components, in-
cluding water and wind erosion, salinisation, nutrient depletion, organic soil loss, etc., which together result in the physical, chemical and biological degradation of the land. Human-induced processes, such as overgrazing, deforestation, deliberate forest fires and soil sealing and compaction, exacerbate the intensity of desertification. Often, offsite damage, such as sedimentation, is much greater than onsite damage. When these factors are combined with adverse socioeconomic conditions, the final effects are far more devastating.

The need for better and more accurate assessments of desertification has haunted the UNCCD for the fifteen years since its entry into force and was once again strongly emphasised at the last Conference of Parties (COP9), held in Buenos Aires, Argentina in September 2009. A number of assessment methodologies have been suggested to meet this need, all of which strive to integrate the assessment of desertification through the use of both biophysical and socioeconomic indicators recently summarised as the "dryland development paradigm" (Lambin et al., 2009). However, often major problems do not derive from a lack of methodologies, but rather from a lack of harmonisation and the difficulty of using desertification figures (qualitative or quantitative) to describe areas and regions whose biophysical, socioeconomic and political contexts can differ so widely.

The situation in the Mediterranean is at best incomplete. Studies suggest that 30% of semiarid Mediterranean drylands are affected by desertification (Rubio and Recatala, 2006) and that 47% of the region’s people suffer these effects (Safriel, 2009). Country studies and estimates do exist, but they either do not always cover the whole national territory or are based on locally developed methods of estimation, thereby creating confusion for regional users, since what might be “severe erosion” in Italy may not be the same in Tunisia and Morocco and vice versa.

The European Environment Agency’s European Topic Centre on Land Use and Spatial Information has produced a map at 1:1 million scale showing the Northern Mediterranean’s sensitivity to desertification using a composite evaluation of soil, climate and
relief characteristics but without taking socioeconomic factors into consideration (Map 4). Despite its limitations, such a methodology could be expanded to make at least an initial regional assessment.

**Why Worry about Desertification in the Mediterranean?**

The Mediterranean region is tectonically active and subject to frequent earthquakes, and Etna is one of the most active volcanoes in the world (hopefully Vesuvius will not wake up!). Soils are relatively young in geological terms and highly vulnerable to erosion, while the climate is characterised by an unequal annual distribution of rainfall with more than 80% falling from October to March, often in the form of torrential rain. Summers are hot and dry, and the topography is often rugged. When one adds the long periods of overgrazing, deforestation and wildfires, one has the “perfect ingredients” for land degradation.

Drylands, as defined by the aridity index, cover 33.8% of the territory of the Mediterranean EU countries (with the exception of France, these countries are all included in Annex IV of the UNCCD). Dryland areas cover about 69% of Spain and 66% of Cyprus, and in Greece, Portugal, Italy and France, this figure ranges from 62% to 16%. The distribution of drylands is quite accentuated in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, where such lands account for up to 61.3% of the territory of the countries involved. The Southern countries bordering the Sahara and Arabian deserts have hyper-arid drylands (true deserts), semi-arid drylands, and dry sub-humid drylands. In contrast, the Northern Mediterranean countries have semi-arid drylands, dry sub-humid drylands, and non-dryland regions or otherwise humid areas. Overall, there are 30 million ha of semi-arid drylands in the Mediterranean (Rubio and Recatala, 2006).

Other concerns relate to the well-known fact that the availability of fertile soil suitable for crop production in the region is quite limited. This is especially true in the Middle East and North Africa, or MENA countries, where, excluding Turkey, the percentage of agricultural land is only 5%. The situation is critical in Libya (1.2%), as well as in Algeria and Egypt, which both report only 3.4 %, and Jordan, where just 4.5% of the land is fit for agriculture. The rest of the land in these countries is comprised of desert sands, shallow, saline, waterlogged and gypseous soil, and rock outcrops. Additionally, controversial options for agricultural expansion at the expense of forests or pastures (as occurs in the Tropics) are limited or nil in the Mediterranean. Even if land were to be reclaimed for agricultural production, it would most likely be of poor quality and require intensive investments to be or remain productive. Hence, the challenge of sustained agricultural production largely depends on proper use and management of existing land and water resources, which no doubt complement each other better than in any other region in the world. If water availability were to increase in the region, so could the options for growing crops.

Another indicator to consider is the ratio of agricultural land per capita. In general, Mediterranean Europe is blessed with more land suitable for agriculture than the MENA countries (once again excluding Turkey). This ratio is around 0.25 in the MENA region, compared to 0.30 in the Mediterranean EU. In contrast, the population is increasing at a faster pace in the South. Data and predictions for the whole region show that by 2020 agricultural land per capita will stand at 0.22 ha, down from 0.48 ha in 1961. This decrease is mostly due to population growth, but also to desertification and rapid decline of soil quality.

A striking example of this is soil salinity build-up compounded by the use of poor-quality water for irrigation. In Egypt, affected areas have grown by more than one million cropland hectares over the last two decades. Salinity and sodicity are also naturally widespread throughout the region, affecting more than 10 million ha, including 3.4 million ha in Spain, followed by 2 million ha in Turkey. Urban areas, especially on the Mediterranean coast or around big cities, have also grown at the expense of fertile agricultural land. The most impressive examples are the cities of Barcelona, Athens, Cairo, Tripoli (Libya), Beirut, Casablanca and many others big metropolises in Spain, Côte d’Azur in France, the islands of Sardinia and Sicily (Italy), Malta and more.

**Population Pressure, Tourism, Livelihoods and Desertification**

The Mediterranean is home to more than 430 million people, but contains only about 7.9% of the world’s agricultural land. The region’s population...
has increased by 50% over the last 30 years, and the upward trend remains strong, especially in the South, which has registered annual growth of 2.1%. Likewise, urban areas of the MENA region, which are mainly concentrated in coastal areas, have registered annual population growth rates as high as 4%. The population in the South, including Turkey, could reach 300 million people by the year 2020.

The tourism industry has also had a significant impact. According to the outlook for 2025, tourist flows could reach as high as 396 million, nearly doubling the region’s population, particularly in summer. A remarkable example is Malta, which has a population of less than half a million but receives about 1.2 million tourists each year. Overall, such high human pressure, along with drastic changes (and occasional mismanagement) in land use, has a direct impact on water and land consumption and the degradation of ecosystem services, thereby accelerating desertification to such a degree that many authors compare the impact of the last 50 years to that of entire past centuries. The tourism industry has moreover played a major role in the overdevelopment of coastal regions, and this has accelerated a special form of desertification known as “littoralisation,” while also increasing eutrophication of the Mediterranean Sea.

Climate Change and Mediterranean Desertification

There is ample evidence that climate change will impact the Mediterranean in various ways, but all climate models predict that the region will become drier and hotter and that the intensity of extreme events and drought will increase. Another issue is rising sea levels. In countries such as Egypt, a mere one-meter rise in the sea level could flood an area of 970 km² in the Nile Delta, affecting 9% of the country’s population and about 13% of its arable land, not to mention causing extensive damage to coastal wetlands. Italy could also lose 6% of its territory, and many of the Mediterranean lagoons may disappear (ISMEA IAMB, 2009).

A typical link between climate change and desertification would be the increase of arid areas at the expense of more humid ones, which will be accompanied by reduced crop productivity. Further on, agriculture could also suffer from a shorter growing season, heat stress during flowering and rain during sowing. Other consequences of climate change include increased erosion and flash flooding, decreased slope stability, and groundwater recharge. Finally, the tourism industry could suffer, too, as tourists may look for cooler destinations.

Desertification should also be seen as a major environmental security threat for the region due to its many negative features, which degrade biological productivity, provoking famine and malnutrition and consequently social unrest

Other issues affecting desertification include poverty, income levels, public health and South-North migration flows, which have different consequences for each side. It is likewise worth mentioning that desertification should also be seen as a major environmental security threat for the region due to its many negative features, which degrade biological productivity, thereby provoking famine and malnutrition, especially among women and children, and consequently social unrest.

Learning from the Past and Preparing for the Future

Extensive EC-funded research has been conducted over the last two decades mostly in the Northern Mediterranean. Since the milestone MEDALUS (Mediterranean Desertification and Land Use) project, which ran from 1991-1999 under the leadership of Dr. J. B. Thornes, a number of other projects have been carried out. One recent positive example worth mentioning quickly is the DesertWatch Information System, which the European Space Agency is using as a prototype to help countries outside the Mediterranean meet their UNCCD reporting obligations.

However, one cannot expect to remain in the assessment stage forever, and sooner or later the infamous “Mediterranean syndrome” must come to an end. The need for action on the ground in order to leave behind the era of pessimism is stronger than ever, and the best way to combat desertification is to support sustainable land management.
Studies show that SLM has the potential to increase yields by 30-170%, increase soil organic carbon sequestration by up to 3%, thereby mitigating climate change, and increase water-use efficiency by up to 100%. Technologies such as conservation agriculture, no-till or reduced tillage systems, afforestation and agro forestry, growing halophytes in saline areas, water harvesting, increased water-use efficiency, mulching, controlled grazing and terracing need to be implemented. The Mediterranean is the birthplace of agriculture, and its people have had the ingenuity to build efficient irrigation systems since ancient times, including the amazing, millenary terraces of Cinque Terre in Italy, which still stand today. However, the time has come for sustainable agricultural and rural development in the region, and especially dryland development, to be linked to other economic activities, too, such as eco-tourism, solar energy production (although not at the expense of fertile soil!), aquaculture and perhaps less farming and pastoral activities in areas where the degradation process has reached irreversible levels.

The Mediterranean stands at the crossroads of three continents, and its countries are divided into four different UNCCD Annexes (I, II, IV and V). Some are considered to be affected by desertification, while others are considered to be both affected and donors (Annex IV). Given this unique case, the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean might consider creating a special unit within the organisation’s Division of Environment and Water to ensure more harmonised, regional coordination of country focal points not only under the UNCCD but also under other UN conventions, such as those on climate change and biodiversity. In short, desertification, together with inefficient and inequitable use of water, exacerbates hardship and political instability, and solutions to these problems are still pending.

References


The Challenges for Biodiversity Conservation in the Mediterranean

With its great biological and cultural wealth, the Mediterranean region faces the challenge of protecting its biodiversity from the threats of the modern world: high population growth, habitat loss and fragmentation, and overexploitation of natural resources. The efforts made to conserve Mediterranean biodiversity over the last 40 years are reflected in numerous conventions and agreements between Mediterranean countries to identify priority areas for biodiversity and implement measures to protect and manage them. The challenge in the coming years will be to ensure comparable implementation of these conventions in all the region’s countries.

The Value of Biodiversity

Biodiversity, understood as the variability of all life forms in a given region, is a valuable resource, as the genomes of each species, and even each population, hold the accumulated information of millions of years of evolutionary adaptations. The current benefits provided by all the different species are relatively unknown, as is the future potential of such a vast wellspring of information.

The Mediterranean Basin is considered to be one of the most biodiverse regions in the world. The geographical complexity resulting from its specific climate conditions and geological history has given rise to a high diversity of plant life based on an intricate combination of factors such as climate, geomorphology, soil, hydrology and land use. This situation enables the existence of one of the largest concentrations of endemic plants in the world. The region is home to an estimated 22,500 plant species, including some 11,500 found nowhere else. By way of comparison, non-Mediterranean Europe is home to about 6,000 species. Thus, symbolic and high-value tree species, such as the Lebanon cedar, the argan in southwestern Morocco, or the oriental sweet gum and Cretan date palm tree in Greece and Turkey, are found exclusively in the Mediterranean region.

However, plants are not the only highly diverse group in the region. Some 319 mammal species (89 of which are endemic); 489 bird species (25 endemic); 230 reptile species (77 endemic); 79 amphibian species (27 endemic); and 253 endemic species of freshwater fish have been recorded in the region to date. The situation is similar with regard to the region’s marine life. Although the Mediterranean Sea accounts for less than 1% of the global water surface, it is home to 7% of the world’s macroscopic marine species, of which between 25% and 30% are endemic (Table 14). Furthermore, most of the biodiversity figures mentioned so far include only the most well-known and studied groups of organisms; however, these account for only a fraction of the total number of species found in the Mediterranean. Indeed, the marine environ-
ment alone is home to an estimated 17,000 species (Coll et al., 2011).

**A Biodiversity ‘Hotspot’**

Changes in the landscape and land ecosystems have increased in recent decades, especially in the Mediterranean. The main pressures on these ecosystems and their biodiversity come from tourism, urban development in coastal areas, overfishing, intensive farming and irrigation, and the abandonment of traditional agricultural practices. Some of the effects of these activities, such as the changes in the vegetation cover, can be easily estimated. For example, only 5% of the region’s original vegetation is thought to remain relatively intact. However, the effects of the contamination generated by these activities on biodiversity and the way ecosystems function are harder to identify and quantify.

Because of the fast rate at which its ecosystems are being destroyed, the Mediterranean region, so rich in exclusive species, is considered a biodiversity hotspot. This term is used to designate regions with a high number of endemic species

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The results of the Red List for the Mediterranean confirm the environmental problems plaguing the region and the threats to its traditionally high biodiversity: 54 mammal species, some endemic, such as the Mediterranean monk seal, the Barbary macaque or the Iberian lynx, are critically endangered. Likewise, more than 142 endemic freshwater fish and, more broadly, a total of 442 animal and plant species have been classified as endangered. The real figure is no doubt higher, but to date only around 3,000 species from certain groups of organisms, mainly vertebrates and terrestrial species, have been assessed. There are very significant gaps in the knowledge of the region’s species, including with regard to well-studied groups, such as mammals.
Much of the Mediterranean’s diversity is linked to human activity. There is probably no other region in the world where the development of ecosystems has been so closely associated with humans for so long. For, in addition to thousands of plant and animal species, the Mediterranean is inhabited by a broad diversity of cultures. Today, the region has an estimated population of about 452 million inhabitants, not counting the 170 million tourists who visit each year. This figure is expected to burgeon to 523 million by 2025. In the coastal zones, the population will jump from 143 million inhabitants in 2000 to 174 million in 2025 (UNEP/MAP-Plan Bleu, 2009). However, the impact of human activity has been different in the north and south of the region, due to differences in aridity, land use, socio-economic conditions and, above all, demographic pressure. At present, the GDP of the countries of Mediterranean Europe is about five times higher than the GDP of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries (UNEP/MAP-Plan Bleu, 2009). The current model of economic development increases the pressure on the environment, whilst poverty increases dependence on natural resources. The resulting loss of biodiversity affects economic growth potential, reducing the welfare of the human populations (health, food, ecosystem services) and limiting their options. The challenges and possibilities for biodiversity conservation are therefore largely influenced by economic inequity.

The Answer: Set Common Goals

The need to minimise and reverse the loss of biodiversity calls for a collective response from international institutions, governments and the body public. To this end, governance, understood as management of social or environmental policy, makes it possible to tackle this situation by allowing social and institutional stakeholders to share their experience and knowledge and is the basis for meeting the challenges of biodiversity conservation. One sign of progress on this issue is the large number of multilateral agreements signed and ratified in the last 40 years to protect the region’s biodiversity (see Chart 29).

The design and implementation of natural resource management policies requires the development and measurement of indicators of the status of biodiversity. For example, the assessment of the risk of extinction of species at the Mediterranean level is a relevant indicator for regional political initiatives such as the Barcelona Convention. To this end, the Red List gives an idea of the status of biodiversity and offers scientific data for the development of natural resource conservation and management policies. These data make it possible to determine whether or not a country has met its commitments and objectives under different international agreements, such as the objective of stopping the loss of biodiversity by 2020 agreed in the Convention on Biological Diversity (see Table 16). Protected areas lie at the core of the efforts to protect the world’s endangered species, and their pivotal role not only as essential providers of ecosys-
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* In the process of joining.

**GOVERNANCE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS RELATED TO BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION**

**CBD (Convention on Biological Diversity):** The convention has three main aims: the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of the components of biological diversity, and fair and equitable trade and sharing of the benefits arising from the use of genetic resources.

**CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora):** The convention aims to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild plants and animals does not threaten their survival. The convention accords varying degrees of protection to more than 33,000 plant and animal species and establishes a regulatory system for imports and exports with a view to preventing overexploitation of the species included on the list.

**African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources:** It is a regional convention that urges Contracting States to adopt the necessary measures to ensure conservation, utilisation and development of soil, water, flora and fauna in accordance with scientific principles, with due regard to the best interests of the people.

**Barcelona Convention:** The convention aims to reduce the pollution of the Mediterranean Sea and protect and enhance the marine environment in the region, thereby contributing to its sustainable development.

**Bern Convention (Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats):** The aims of the convention are to conserve wild flora and fauna in their natural habitats, especially those species and habitats whose conservation requires the cooperation of several States, and to promote such cooperation. Although this convention is specific to Europe, Tunisia and Morocco formally observe it.

**Ramsar Convention:** The convention maintains a list of “Wetlands of International Importance” and works to promote the wise use of all wetlands with a view to preserving the ecological characteristics deriving from such systems.

**CMS (Convention on Migratory Species or Bonn Convention):** The objective of the convention is to conserve terrestrial, marine and avian migratory species threatened with extinction throughout their range. The parties undertake to strive to strictly protect these species, conserving or restoring the places where they live, mitigating obstacles to migration and controlling other factors that might endanger them.

**Habitats Directive:** The aim of this directive is to maintain biodiversity by means of the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora in the territory of Member States. To this end, it establishes an ecological network of special areas of conservation, called “Natura 2000.” To contribute to the coherence of the network, provisions are made for supplementary activities in the spheres of surveillance and monitoring, the reintroduction of native species, the introduction of non-native species, research and education.
tem services and biological resources but also as key components in strategies to mitigate climate change is increasingly recognised. Moreover, at times they have proven to be crucial to protecting certain threatened human communities and places of great cultural and spiritual value. However, conservation activities have not been equally implemented in the countries of the Mediterranean Basin. Despite being home to a considerable diversity and wealth of species, some countries suffer from structural deficiencies and a lack of work methodologies that weaken their ability to protect sensitive or important areas for biodiversity. This notwithstanding, the number of protected areas in the Mediterranean has increased considerably in the last 30 years. More than 4,200 such areas, subject to varying degrees of protection, have been declared throughout the region. The brunt of these areas is found in Northern Mediterranean countries, which are home to 95% of the areas with the highest categories of protection (I-IV). Nevertheless, the number of areas under some form of regulated management has steadily increased in the Southern Mediterranean, too, and some 200 areas in the region have been accorded one of the highest levels of protection (categories I-IV) (see Map 5).

The number of protected areas in the Mediterranean has increased considerably in the last 30 years

The data presented here show that Mediterranean biodiversity requires further study, as there are still
insufficient reliable data to enable comparisons across time and space regarding its actual status, the pressures exerted on the ecosystems and their effects over time. Whilst there is ever more information on biodiversity in the Mediterranean, and it is increasingly available to decision-makers, it is also fragmented, rarely covers all countries and does not include sufficient analyses to facilitate the work of the different stakeholders. The confluence of so many factors in and around the Mediterranean Sea leads to a strong interdependence between the region’s countries in terms of their impact on biodiversity. Inevitably, its use and conservation requires the involvement of each and every one of them. Consequently, in order to achieve good results in terms of biodiversity, common data and methodologies must be developed that enable the implementation of coordinated biodiversity conservation plans and policies.

References


Cruises in the Mediterranean in 2010: Crisis-Free Tourism

With an increase of 163% in the number of passengers, the European cruise industry has registered significant growth in the last 10 years and emerged virtually unscathed from the 2008-2009 economic crisis. This situation is testament, above all, to the potential of cruise tourism in the Mediterranean region, which experts from the sector have baptised “the New Caribbean.”

According to data from MedCruise, the Mediterranean’s share of the global cruise offer (calculated in bed days) rose from 11.65% in 2000 to 18.25% in 2009, the largest market share gain (6.56%) in the world. In contrast, in the actual Caribbean, capacity fell by 7.80% in the same period.

In 2009, Mediterranean ports handled some 26 million passengers. Moreover, between 2000 and 2009, the average number of passengers per port call climbed from 830 to 1,715, a difference that can be attributed to the increase in the average size of the ships.

According to recent forecasts, 2011 is expected to bring further growth. Thus, the Royal Caribbean group should see a stunning 45% boost in its presence in the Mediterranean compared to 2010, with a total of 23 ships, 2.5 million passengers and 865 port calls. Likewise, the Carnival group should see a 17% increase in its presence compared to 2010, with a total of 51 ships, 4.3 million passengers and 1,724 port calls. Moreover, in 2011, for the first time ever, no fewer than 17 ships with capacity for more than 3,000 passengers are scheduled to sail the Mediterranean.

Thanks to growth in tourism flows and in the average size of the ships, the cruise industry has been sparking numerous urban and architectural infrastructure projects based on the construction of new cruise-ship terminals.

Clearly, the extensive issue of the relationship between Mediterranean ports and cities is hardly limited to this industry. However, given the degree of “novelty” and sheer size of the phenomenon, it is worth paying special attention to cruise ports, as, under certain conditions, an urban and port policy alert to the opportunities offered by cruises can use them to trigger significant “urban regeneration” in general (CTUR, 2010). It is moreover necessary to take this “industry” approach in order to understand some of the events of 2010 that had a significant impact on the relationship between Mediterranean ports and cities.

The Current Mediterranean Cruise Port Geography

In 2010, the Mediterranean country to register the highest passenger throughput was Italy, with 7.6 million passengers (31.8% of the total). It was followed by Greece (6 million passengers, or approximately 25% of the total) and the Spanish Mediterranean, with some 5 million passengers, equal to 70% of all Spanish cruise passengers (7.1 million).

To give an idea of the importance of this type of tourism, in 2010, in Spain, cruise passengers accounted for approximately 12% of all foreign tourists to the country (52.6 million).

In order to analyse the phenomenon from the point of view of ports, this article will focus on the statistics for the ports belonging to the MedCruise net-
work, an association with 67 members, representing 98 cruise ports in the Mediterranean Sea and its neighbouring regions (the Black Sea, the Red Sea and the near Atlantic). The MedCruise data are believed to encompass approximately 70% of all Mediterranean flows.

Table 17 shows the top port cities, i.e. “home ports” (points of embarkation and disembarkation for cruises) and “transit ports” (tourist visits).

Home ports (also called “turnaround ports” (see Table 17/a) include a small number of highly specialised cities that are major tourism hubs offering

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Arrivals/Departures (passengers)</th>
<th>Share of total port traffic</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Western Med.</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>1,180,239</td>
<td>54.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adriatic</td>
<td>Venice</td>
<td>1,170,298</td>
<td>82.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Med.</td>
<td>Civitavecchia</td>
<td>720,451</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Med.</td>
<td>Balearic Islands</td>
<td>447,853</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Genoa</td>
<td>436,385</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Bari</td>
<td>228,259</td>
<td>40.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Med.</td>
<td>Marseilles</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>27.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Naples</td>
<td>145,258</td>
<td>11.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Valencia</td>
<td>97,189</td>
<td>52.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eastern Med.</td>
<td>Cypriot Ports</td>
<td>95,720</td>
<td>29.9%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>83,873</td>
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<td>78,020</td>
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<td>Palermo</td>
<td>66,449</td>
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<td>Livorno</td>
<td>40,348</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Med.</td>
<td>French Riviera</td>
<td>36,980</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
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<td>La Valetta</td>
<td>28,324</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
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<td>Monaco</td>
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<td>Latakia</td>
<td>16,912</td>
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<td>Rijeka</td>
<td>14,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Med.</td>
<td>Toulon</td>
<td>14,253</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: MedCruise 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Port</th>
<th>Transit (passengers)</th>
<th>Share of total port traffic</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Western Med.</td>
<td>Naples</td>
<td>1,154,742</td>
<td>88.8%</td>
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<td>Civitavecchia</td>
<td>1,082,487</td>
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<td>Barcelona</td>
<td>971,226</td>
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<td>Dubrovnik/Korcula</td>
<td>901,389</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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<td>Balearic Islands</td>
<td>789,509</td>
<td>63.8%</td>
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<td>Livorno</td>
<td>754,965</td>
<td>94.9%</td>
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<td>Tunisian Ports</td>
<td>752,246</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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<td>Western Med.</td>
<td>French Riviera</td>
<td>707,929</td>
<td>95.0%</td>
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<td>Marseilles</td>
<td>456,000</td>
<td>72.3%</td>
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<td>Western Med.</td>
<td>Port of Madeira</td>
<td>425,433</td>
<td>97.6%</td>
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<td>La Valetta</td>
<td>413,589</td>
<td>93.6%</td>
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<td>Palermo</td>
<td>412,451</td>
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<td>409,935</td>
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<td>Gibraltar</td>
<td>348,199</td>
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<td>Bari</td>
<td>339,626</td>
<td>59.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Med.</td>
<td>Lisbon</td>
<td>331,885</td>
<td>79.8%</td>
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<td>Venice</td>
<td>250,682</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
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<td>Messina</td>
<td>243,378</td>
<td>98.1%</td>
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<td>Western Med.</td>
<td>Genoa</td>
<td>235,083</td>
<td>35.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western Med.</td>
<td>Ports of North Sardinia</td>
<td>234,923</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
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Source: MedCruise 2010.
strong centralisation of the population flows that might generate demand, optimal transport infrastructure (airports and motorways) and major terminals able to handle the complex organisational tasks required at the start and end of cruises. The top home-port cities are Barcelona and Venice, with flows of over one million passengers each, followed by Civitavecchia, the cruise port in Rome. Obviously, this ranking does not include home-port cities on the southern shore of the Mediterranean.

A rather less concentrated breakdown can be seen in the group of transit ports (Table 17/b), headed up by Naples and Civitavecchia/Rome (major artistic and cultural attractions), followed by Barcelona and Dubrovnik. The ranking of transit ports also includes some ports from the southern shore. Specifically, the Tunisian ports appear in seventh place. This is indicative of the so-called South’s potential, which will no doubt continue to grow in coming years, providing the necessary conditions for political stability exist.

Generally speaking, in many major tourism destinations, cruise tourism has grown much more, proportionally, than “conventional” tourism over the last ten years. Thus, between 2000 and 2009, in Venice, cruise passenger movements grew by a factor of 4.1 compared to 1.4 for hotel reservations. These figures were 2.9 versus 1.1 in Naples, 3.6 versus 2.1 in Barcelona, 1.8 versus 1.3 in Genoa, no less than 13.3 versus 2.2 in Valencia, and 6.5 versus 2.4 in Dubrovnik. An analysis of the MedCruise flows by geographical area shows the Western Mediterranean in a clearly dominant position, accounting for 79.6% of passengers and 71.4% of port calls, thanks to the size of the region and the number of ports to which it is home. The Adriatic, which is based above all out of Venice, is the second most important area (accounting for 17.5% and 21.9%, respectively), followed by the Eastern Mediterranean (2.4% and 4.6%). Notwithstanding the above, it is worth noting that between 2000 and 2009, the Adriatic was by far the most dynamic area in the Mediterranean cruise industry in relative terms. In contrast, the Eastern Mediterranean continues to occupy only a marginal position.

The Development of “Structures”:
A Selection of Regional Hubs

An Introduction to Terminal Policy

Before analysing recent developments in cruise infrastructure, it should be noted that building expensive terminal infrastructure in transit destinations (that is, in destinations that do not meet the necessary conditions to become true home ports, despite the hopes of the local authorities) is not actually essential to attract cruise companies, as what matters to them, above all, is a city’s attitude. This may be reflected by professional associations in the industry, such as Cruise Copenhagen, that organise and propose tourism services of interest for both passengers and crew or in the capacity of the cities in a given cruise area to put together committees (as done by the Cruise Baltic association, for example), build networks and agree on common standards that offer greater value, from a cooperative-competitive perspective, to a system of destinations than to individual destinations regarded competitively.
Nevertheless, port organisations and local authorities have often built infrastructure and terminals even in cities with no or virtually no potential to become home ports, undertaking them as prestige projects or to underscore a city’s interest for the cruise market.

**Building expensive terminal infrastructure in transit destinations is not actually essential to attract cruise companies, as what matters to them, above all, is a city’s attitude**

Some port authorities and city councils have even decided to build new terminals in cities that are quite close together. Not only does such proliferation run the risk of creating intense competition between the cities, it also, and above all, entails a virtually useless economic outlay for which taxpayers will ultimately have to foot the bill.

Separately, it is worth noting that cruise companies are investing increasingly more private capital in destinations that truly aspire to become home ports in which terminals play an essential role. This capital is used to manage the terminals, to ensure maximum service efficiency and quality, and to take as much commercial advantage as possible of these facilities (as witnessed, for example by the fact that these companies often try to expand their functions to include other user categories, too).

**Development in the Adriatic Region**

The development of the Adriatic as a cruise region is linked, above all, to the development of Venice, a global urban tourism capital. Indeed, in 2010, Venice’s modern terminal, located next to the city’s historical quarter, received a record 2,075,175 passengers (in a total of 1,426 port calls), 193.08% more than in 1997.

Venice is proof that growth in tourism flows (and in the average size of ships) poses a key challenge to so-called cruise cities. It is no coincidence that, also in 2010, even as a new terminal area was being opened in the historical quarter, the necessary permit was granted to build a new cruise quay, to be located far from the historical city on dry land, specifically, in Fusina.

This new terminal for large ships, to span an area of 7,000 square metres, will be used to handle the transit of more than 6,000 passengers at a time and will act as a new multifunctional “gateway” to the city. Moreover, a 25,000-square-metre commercial complex will be built to house office space, shopping malls, a hotel and a multi-level car-park with capacity for 2,300 vehicles.

Of course, cruise ships will continue to sail by St. Mark’s Square, except for the most modern vessels, which are 360 metres long. These ships are currently unable to access the quays of the Venetian terminal; however, they will be able to anchor at the new dryland port, entering the lagoon through one of the harbour’s other entrances.

New sea-highway terminals, a logistics platform and a container terminal will also be built near the new cruise terminal. These investments will enable the redevelopment of part of the industrial area of Porto Marghera, one of Italy’s main petrochemical hubs, albeit one that has largely fallen into disuse.

As a result of the development of the “cruise destination” industry, and beginning with terminal management, increasingly more operations are being financed with capital from major national and even international companies, which sometimes pursue network strategies, depending on their routing policies.

To this end, the passenger terminal management company in Venice is implementing joint-venture policies to develop new terminals in the Adriatic, such as the terminal in Ravenna (for which the first half of the work was completed in 2010). Likewise, in light of predictions regarding the creation of a “co-operation network” between the different Adriatic destinations, in 2010, Venice implemented a collaboration policy with Dubrovnik, the second largest cruise port in the Adriatic.

The “Adriatic phenomenon” also assumes that the shortest routes in this region of considerable historical and natural interest will be expanded. Accordingly, in addition to the aforementioned Ravenna, other minor destinations have also contributed to this growth, in some cases commissioning new terminals in an attempt to attract cruise lines.

Dalmatia, for instance, is trying to draw cruise ships farther north than Dubrovnik, specifically, to relatively small cities that, to date, have only a weak market presence, such as Sibenik (with funding from the
European Investment Bank) and Zadar. The latter, which handled 18,000 passengers in 2010, has begun work on a new terminal, to be located in a new port area that will span some 25 hectares and is projected to have 12 new quays.

Finally, in the northernmost reaches of the Adriatic Sea lies Koper, Slovenia’s only port city, which is quite well connected to the road network. In recent years, it has emerged as a reference point for several companies (receiving some 40,000 passengers in 2010), and a new cruise-ship terminal is being built there. Meanwhile, Trieste, just a few short kilometres away, has decided to privatise the company that manages its terminal (located in the historical city), which is currently being reorganised and enlarged. The new managers represent the interests of both cruise-ship builders and banks, and they have been tasked with reactivating cruise-ship activity, which resumed in 2010 following several years of near total neglect of the city by cruise ships.

The Western Mediterranean: Between the North Shore and the South Shore

There continues to be great haste to build cruise-ship terminals and, more generally, to manage maritime tourism flows, even in the busiest areas of the Western Mediterranean.

Thus, the Genoa Port Authority’s development plan for 2011-2013 includes the construction of a new cruise-ship terminal (€10 million), with a 340-metre-long quay to accommodate large modern ships. Nearby La Spezia has chosen to follow a similar path, including plans to build a new terminal in its waterfront development programme.

In Barcelona, the market leader, Costa Crociere, began negotiations in 2010 with the local authorities to build a second major terminal “exclusively for this type of vessel," only shortly after the completion of the Palacruceros terminal in 2007. Similarly, Malaga continued work throughout 2010 on a new terminal slated to be inaugurated in 2011 (€15 million) equipped with commercial areas and located near the terminal completed in 2007, with a view to strengthening its potential as a home port and offering the services that the largest ships require. The same city has also built a new smaller passenger terminal at the port as part of a plan to redesign its waterfront that will also include the creation of a commercial area (14,000 square metres) and space for cultural purposes (4,000 square metres), as well as a marina able to accommodate 626 yachts.

The operations in Barcelona and Malaga aim to strategically reinforce not only these cities’ positions as home ports, but also their positions as “base ports” for cruise companies. In other words, they will enable these ports to offer goods and services for the ships and activities that cruise companies organise. This will leave competitor ports located on Italy’s Tyrrhenian coast, such as Civitavecchia, less room to manoeuvre. It is also worth noting that base-port activities have a significant economic repercussion, and they greatly contribute to increasing the local economic impact of hosting cruise ships by generating further spending in addition to that already done by passengers in their visits to the city.

The increase in cruise flows and routes in the Western Mediterranean has caused a spike in investments, even on the westernmost coast of the Maghreb

In France, the group of cruise-ship builders that has directly managed the Marseilles terminal since 2009 has also thrown its support behind the construction of a second terminal, to span 6,000 square metres, intended to allow the port to reach one million passengers in future. Even in Toulon a proposal has been made to build a quay able to accommodate large ships and to increase the city’s hotel capacity, due to the many possibilities undeniably offered by home ports.

The increase in cruise flows and routes in the Western Mediterranean has caused a spike in investments, even on the westernmost coast of the Maghreb. Indeed, in Tunisia, the La Goulette cruise-ship terminal has been operating since 2008, the year of the first stage of its construction, and it does so as an integral part of a commercial and tourism resort built from scratch in the “historical-traditional" style. This project is an example of the effort to take advantage of the enormous potential of the mass tourism generated by the ships that sail along the southern shore, as it is seamlessly integrated into the commercial circuit.
Tangiers offers another example of the implementation of a good tourism strategy based on cruises and other types of maritime tourism, which could be extended to other parts of the Maghreb, providing they offer the necessary conditions of political stability. To this end, the city inaugurated the Tanger-Ville project in 2010, which envisages the transformation of part of the commercial port (84 hectares) into a multifunctional area dedicated to maritime tourism, able to handle the disembarkation of up to 300,000 cruise-ship tourists by 2016, in addition to the tourism flows arriving on ferries. The project’s developers believe that by 2020, the facilities will already be handling 750,000 passengers a year. The tourism port, integrated in the multifunctional tourism area, should be able to accommodate 1,600 berths. The premises, which will also be home to a museum, a convention centre, a cinema and several areas for shopping and entertainment, will be linked to the historical city centre by means of a cable car able to transport some 2,800 people an hour.

The Eastern Mediterranean and the Draw of the Gulf

The development of terminal infrastructure on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, which continue to be “day trip” destinations for cruise tourists, has been scant, particularly since completion of the work on the new terminal in Alexandria in 2008. Recently, Kusadasi Port in Turkey, the embarkation point for day trips in the region, inaugurated a new building, whilst plans exist in Cyprus to open a new terminal in 2012. In contrast, work on the Galataport Project in Istanbul has momentarily slowed, although it seems that a tender will be put out shortly to build the site, which will span some 100,000 square metres not far from the current terminal. To this end, a master plan will be drawn up, including the construction of three cruise-ship quays and a new terminal, and everything will be part of a commercial operation aimed at the multifunctional renovation of the waterfront, which will include a new luxury hotel, a mall and duty-free shops.

Also in the eastern region, it is worth noting that a cruise ship terminal spanning 3,330 square metres was inaugurated at Port Sultan Qaboos in Oman, in the Persian Gulf region, in 2010. The new facilities handled some 300,000 passengers in 2010. The same year, a second terminal was opened in Dubai (at Port Rashid), which is expected to have a throughput of 500,000 passengers by 2015, compared to the approximately 325,000 passengers it handled in 2010. These facts suggest that this region, rather than the Eastern Mediterranean coasts, is the most innovative in the Gulf with regard to tourism, and that it is positioning itself as a home-port area for autumn cruises in the Middle East. This is thanks, in part, to the optimal airport infrastructure located there and to the hub policy being carried out by some airlines that are currently experiencing strong growth and are thus able to offer passengers planning to embark at the home ports in the region flights from Europe at very competitive prices.

The case of the Persian Gulf shows that the major regional challenges to attract cruises can ultimately be overcome through the efficient implementation of a territorial strategy that goes beyond the construction of a mere terminal or the revitalisation of the waterfront.

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Logistics in the Mediterranean: Current Situation and Prospects

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Logistics constitutes a decisive factor for Euro-Mediterranean integration and is present in all value chains. Studies on Euro-Mediterranean trade and integration reveal the strategic importance of logistics. Optimisation of logistics chains is a component of competitive advantage in the Mediterranean Region. Based on appraisal of the situation, macro-logistic, meso-logistic and micro-logistic decisions have been taken and applied. It is in this dynamic that logistics policies have emerged in South Mediterranean countries to accompany those of their North Mediterranean counterparts. To grasp what is at stake with these policies and ascertain the perspectives of logistics in the Mediterranean, an appraisal of the state of affairs (in particular in south shore countries) is essential.

Overview of the Current State of Logistics in the Mediterranean

An Underdeveloped Sector

The Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs), particularly those in the South Mediterranean, display numerous logistics-transport weaknesses. The proximity to the European market of countries such as Morocco and Tunisia, well-integrated into Euro-Mediterranean trade, lends them a competitive advantage for time-sensitive sectors with respect to areas offering lower costs (low-cost countries) but that are farther away. This relatively competitive advantage is unfortunately hampered by logistics underperformance on all levels (macro-logistics, meso-logistics and micro-logistics):

- An elevated logistics cost equivalent to 20% of the average GDP in South Mediterranean countries;
- Atomised road transport with a predominance of the informal sector despite the reforms under way, with a significant role still played by own-account transport, of below-standard quality, and international road transport dominated by European transport agents;
- Warehousing infrastructures underdeveloped or not developed at all, a dearth of logistics platform networks and skills networks throughout the global logistics chain; a weak supply of logistics services with little diversification, absence of real national logistics service providers, the presence of multinational operators together with the emergence of a few national operators, above all in Morocco;
- Railway freight transport monopolised by public enterprise, though accompanied by significant reforms and major investment;
- Maritime and port transport fully in process of restructuring: port reform with transfer of terminals management to private materials handlers, often multinationals; active private-public partnership with concession of materials handling to private operators, often multinationals (Tanger Med, Casablanca, Port of Bejaia, Algiers, etc.); fleet privatisation (Morocco) or its strengthening in the public sphere (Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, etc.).

Industrial and commercial agents generally prefer insourcing logistics activities. Only some outsource transport and warehousing operations. Logistics insourcing is due to the reluctance of these
operators to trust third parties with in-company business information.

Transport and warehousing represent a substantial share of the market for logistics service providers. Unfortunately, the level of services offered is relatively low in quality, with sub-standard technical conditions.

Logistics subcontracting of the 3PL type (Third-Party Logistics: warehousing, inventory management, order picking, organisation of physical distribution, information and value-added services) are provided primarily by foreign companies or companies oriented towards international trade, whereas Maghreb company offers only cover transport or simple warehousing.

The bureaucratic red tape and the competition of the informal sector in road transport and warehousing render the development of the formal sector and the maintenance of high quality standards difficult. Finally, institutions and often legislation are not adapted to the dynamics of logistics. Information systems are little or not at all developed for the real needs of the supply chain.

Conferences and events have taken place in a number of Mediterranean countries, organised by national governments, the European Union (UE), professional associations, study or research centres and universities. Trade fairs dedicated to logistics and transport have become meeting places for national and international logistics providers, both public and private, as well as other stakeholders. All of these gathering places and events have served as spaces for reflection, study and proposals regarding the development of the logistics sector in the MPCs.

Experience Exchange, Debate and Proposals on Logistics in the Mediterranean Region

A Euro-Mediterranean policy is taking form to build a Euro-Mediterranean logistics area of peace and growth. Numerous Euro-Mediterranean forums and other gatherings have taken place and projects have been developed since the announcement of this policy, which reflects the European Union’s vision concerning development in the South Mediterranean:

- Mediterranean Logistics and Transport Forum (part of the International Logistics and Materials Handling Exhibition - SIL Barcelona): SIL Barcelona hosts the annual Mediterranean Logistics and Transport Forum, a forum for debate on all issues relating to the global logistics chain. The 2008 edition bore the title “The Mediterranean in Movement.” Debates primarily revolved around the following question: Will south shore countries be ready, from the logistics and transport perspective, to enter the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area in 2010? This question prompted the institutional representatives and operators present to assess the state of affairs and make recommendations for developing infrastructure and upgrading institutions. In 2009, debate concerned the creation of a Mediterranean logistics community. The forum allowed discussion of new policies in the logistics sector in Mediterranean countries; it was launched as part of the EU-funded Invest in Med project, among other participating projects. The 2010 edition of the Forum again took up the ports issue as a whole (infrastructures, institutions, crisis and financing, cooperation, etc.). The Forum has the advantage of proximity to the IEMed (European Institute of the Mediterranean), the Centre for Transportation Studies for the Western Mediterranean (CETMO), the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Marseille Center for Mediterranean Integration (CMI) and the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). Logistics is the vehicle par excellence of this Forum with a view to the development of the Euro-Mediterranean area.

The Marseille Center for Mediterranean Integration has the mission of facilitating access to knowledge, strengthening sustainable development and making policies converge towards greater integration, and transport & logistics figures among its concerns.

- Centre for Transportation Studies for the Western Mediterranean (CETMO): This organisation was a pioneer and served as a catalyst in politics of rapprochement regarding transport and by extension logistics on both shores of the Mediterranean. Studies done by this centre constitute a significant contribution towards comprehending transport-logistics issues and how to deal with them in order to build the Euro-Mediterranean Region. The last study on the logistics sector in the western South Mediterranean is an appraisal of the state of affairs in a sector marred by numerous structural weaknesses. The study shows the unequal develop-
ment of logistics in countries of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU). The sector is, however, on the move in certain countries of the Union: Morocco and Tunisia, but it is lagging behind to different degrees in the other three countries. The study proposes feasible solutions that should be integrated into the ensemble of solutions proposed by other institutions (WB, EIB, CMI, etc.).

Logistics and quality are linked: the quality of maritime transport is an essential factor for development and for the profitability of the logistics chain.

- The Institut Méditerranéen des Transports Maritimes (IMTM), based in Marseille, has contributed to discussions on Mediterranean logistics by organising a number of events. As early as 2002, the IMTM organised a colloquium on logistics platforms in the Mediterranean held in Malta. It analysed existing and projected port logistics platforms, identifying the problems existing between Mediterranean ports in fierce competition – the completed and projected logistics platforms being numerous, each port wanting “its own” platform, etc. By the same token, in 2007 the IMTM organised a colloquium in Alexandria on quality improvement in the Mediterranean Region, with logistics at the heart of the debate. Logistics and quality are linked: the quality of maritime transport is an essential factor for development and for the profitability of the logistics chain (need for a Mediterranean logistics community to define norms and constantly evaluate the quality of maritime logistics services through a will for a common Mediterranean policy). In 2008, a colloquium was held by the title of “Towards a Logistics Platform Network in the Mediterranean: Myth or Reality” organised by the IMTM and AMLOG in Tangier. The aim was to elucidate the notion of network and its economic, legal, institutional and informational aspects, and to take stock of the situation in countries of the Mediterranean Basin (strong and weak points on the levels of countries, regions, ports, professional organisations and institutions). This colloquium concluded that the logistics platform network should be an organisation for cooperation and solidarity within a vision of an equitable Euro-Mediterranean region.

- Projects for Integration of Logistics and Transport between Italy and South Mediterranean Countries (ItalMed), and Italy and the Balkans (ItalBalk): On 14 and 15 July 2009, work began in Naples on the ItalMed and ItalBalk Integrated Interregional Co-operation Projects, dedicated to logistics and transport integration in Italy-South Mediterranean and Italy-Balkans relations. The integrated projects, financed by the “Programme of Support to Regional Cooperation,” see the Campania Region as leader of a vast partnership involving eleven other Italian regions (Abruzzo, Apulia, Basilicata, Calabria, Emilia-Romagna, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Lazio, Liguria, Sicily, Tuscany and Veneto) and seven partner countries: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia for the South Mediterranean project, and Albania, Serbia and Montenegro for the Balkan project. The two days were respectively dedicated to the conference presenting the projects and a visit to two top-level logistics hubs in the Campania Region. The conference, which was held at the maritime station of the port of Naples, was actually the first major event to provide information on and promote the projects as well as an important opportunity for debate delving into the topics of transport and logistics in the Mediterranean area and the Balkans. The event was coordinated by the EU Project Study and Management Section of the Campania Region insofar as the institutional part (plenary session), and by LOGiCA - Agenzia Campana per la Promozione della Logistica e del Trasporto Merci (the Campania Agency for the Promotion of Logistics and Freight Transport) for the part concerning country workshops. Participants were: the above-stated LOGiCA Campania Agency, institutional representatives of the Italian Foreign Affairs and Economic Development Ministries, representatives of the Transport Ministries of the six Partner Countries, i.e. Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia for the South Mediterranean project, and Albania and Serbia for the Balkan project; representatives of the Italian regions involved in the projects and numerous operators and consultants in the sector.
The conference on the whole represented a significant opportunity for useful debate towards defining a roadmap for improving commercial traffic connections in the Mediterranean Region and the Balkans. By the same token, this first international-level event provided a strong boost to creating a climate favourable to collaboration and international cooperation between the institutions and technical operators of the different countries involved.

Thanks to the consolidation of the institutional partnership and the establishment of direct contacts between operators in the sector, a work platform was established by joint agreement that will structure the project activities programmed as part of ItalMed and ItalBalk and foster the emergence of joint entrepreneurial initiatives.

- **MedPorts (3 May - 30 July 2010)** – Development of groupings of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) in the port logistics services sector in the Mediterranean Basin – was a project cofinanced by the EU through the Invest in Med programme, designed to increase the volume and quality of Euro-Mediterranean investments and trade and contribute to the sustainable development of the region. MedPorts aimed to contribute to improving advanced port logistics services in European and South Mediterranean Countries and develop a system of integrated transport in the Mediterranean Basin. The main goal of the initiative was to provide support to SMEs and other organisations working in the port logistics and transport sector in the areas covered by the project (Tangier in Morocco, Radès in Tunisia, Port Said in Egypt, Cagliari in Italy) and foster relations among the transport-logistics SMEs of the countries involved.

- **LOGISMED Project**: The Euro-Mediterranean Network of Logistics Platforms (LOGISMED) is an “initiative launched by the European Investment Bank (EIB) to develop the logistics sector in Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs). It envisages the creation of a network of Euro-Mediterranean Logistic Platforms (EMLPs) with well-defined characteristics to support the modernization of a sector that is essential for the development of a Mediterranean free trade area.” This project, conducted by the EIB, is open to interested partners, the MPCs and technical and financial institutions. Among the technical partners are the Institut des Sciences et des Techniques de l’Équipement et de l’Environnement pour le Développement (ISTED) and CETMO. An in-depth diagnosis of the state of logistics in South Mediterranean Countries by LOGISMED confirms that the logistics sector in the MPCs is not sufficiently developed for a number of reasons. The LOGISMED study results were validated by the MPCs at the EuroMed Transport Forum in January 2010. The LOGISMED project would be a way of relaunching the development of EMLPs by attributing a quality label to model platforms in each MPC. These labelled EMLPs would exercise a spillover effect on local, regional and airport or port logistics platforms. One of the aims of LOGISMED is to accompany these changes with logistics training on the Mediterranean level and also to establish common quality labels for training in this field. It is in this framework that the EIB and IEMed organised a high-level seminar on logistics training needs in Mediterranean Partner Countries in the context of the LOGISMED network, held on 23 and 24 November 2010 in Barcelona, which allowed exchange of opinions among experts on proposed models and recommendations. Insofar as training, the LOGISMED programme foresees the training of logistics on different levels in the Mediterranean within the framework of a training network based on a shared programme, as well as the creation of a network of instructors and experts in the fields of transport and logistics to effect the necessary training, etc. LOGISMED strengthens such projects as the EuroMed 2003-2010 project, RTAP (Regional Transport Action Plan) 2007-2013, etc.

- **Mediterranean Logistics Conference (MEDLOG)**: The Tanger Med Special Agency (TMSA) and its different partners, in particular those of the port community, decided to create a recurrent platform for exchange and debate, knowledge upgrading and preparation for the major changes in professions, a platform gathering and allowing comparison of the viewpoints of experts, consultants, professionals and operators and allowing debate among policymakers and entrepreneurs, from the largest multinationals to the smallest local businesses. It was in this spirit that MEDLOG, the Mediterranean Logistics Conference, was created in 2007.
Four conferences have taken place to date (in 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2011). The theme of the first conference was "The Mediterranean, a New Hub of World Trade," and was attended by over 350 individuals involved in all activities of world trade (transport agents, carriers, port operators, equipment manufacturers, consultants, logistics professionals, etc.). They debated the matter of partnerships between countries along the Mediterranean and a number of related issues (free trade areas, the role of transhipment ports, development of logistics areas, ICT, etc.).

The second conference (2008) focussed on "Port Excellence: Integration of Global Logistics Chains and Hinterland Consolidation." Over 430 participants from over twenty countries attended. The main points discussed were the role of the Strait of Gibraltar as a mega Atlantic platform, new initiatives, diversification of maritime routes and the challenges of consolidating access to the hinterland.

The 2010 conference emphasised debate on "International Food Trade and the Logistics Cold Chain." Food supply security is a formidable international challenge. This security is even more important for perishable products, which need an integrated logistics cold chain. A number of aspects were studied (requirements, performance and changes), revealing the challenges of phytosanitary regulation and the organisation of fresh and frozen food logistics. Innovation constitutes a response to cold chain logistics requirements: energy, information systems, warehousing, vehicles, training, etc. Also discussed was the issue of attracting cold chain actors – both foreign and Moroccan – to Morocco to meet customer needs via adapted and progressive means. Then the case of Brazil was presented in the sphere of food trade, in particular transatlantic trade.

The conference in March 2011 was dedicated to the theme of “Green Logistics & Green Ports,” to debate the ecologic aspects of the logistics chain. The stakeholders in complex and/or globalised logistics chains presented their experiences regarding environmental constraint, which call for greater imagination and innovation in handling global logistics flows at the lowest logistics and social costs. Three panels discussed environmental issues: the American experience in environmental issues in the port sector, logistics-related environmental issues, in particular the importance of the maritime dimension, and last-mile logistics.

- **Moroccan Fair on Trades, Transport and Logistics (LOGIMA):** This is the trade fair par excellence on logistics in Morocco. Its aim is to help companies acquire a logistics culture, allow companies to improve their performance, organise a place for information and experience sharing, take stock of logistics evolutions and trends on the national and international levels, offer products, services and know-how in the fields of transport & logistics to those interested and finally, federate the transport-logistics community annually around a platform for meetings, networking and business. Five editions have taken place, with a number of conferences on topical subjects in the world of transport & logistics.

- **The Salon international des Transports, des Infrastructures, des Équipements et de Logistique (SITIEL), International Transport, Infrastructure, Equipment and Logistics Trade Fair) is another meeting place for logistics and transport chain stakeholders, this one in Algeria. It has already reached its 8th edition. This trade fair has gained international renown for combining operator and institutional stands with debates and workshops on highly topical issues in transport logistics. The trade fair’s success is due to the excellent organisation and not the logistics dynamic in Algeria. Logistics is the poor relative of macro-logistic policy in this country. KGN, the organiser, is the publisher of the best transport logistics journal in the Maghreb, Le Phare. The publisher organises numerous seminars and conferences throughout the year on all transport-logistics issues, inviting international experts and professionals.

- **The Association Marocaine pour la Logistique (AMLOG, the Moroccan Association for Logistics):** AMLOG has actively organised, participated in and provided support for a number of events concerning all aspects of logistics: the seminar organised on 9 December 2009 in Casablanca for AMLOG members and partners, “Intermodality and Accompanied Combined Transport: Strengths and Weaknesses. Is There a Future in Morocco and Under What Conditions?” by Jean Louis Deyris; the conference held on 11 December 2009 in Agadir as part of the International Exhibition of the Fruit &
Vegetables Industry (SIFEL), about logistics platforms for the industry, which allowed strengths and weaknesses to be identified insofar as the logistics chain, from manufacturer to distributors, and propose solutions based on experiences in rival industries.

In Casablanca on 28 January 2010, AMLOG also organised a seminar on the Rotterdam Rules and their impact on the logistics chain, with the presentation of a comparative study between the contribution of these Rules in comparison with existing conventions (the Brussels Convention of 1924, the 1968 and 1979 Protocols, the Hamburg Rules, the Geneva Convention on Multimodal Transport of 1980, which never entered into force). The Rotterdam Rules are favourable to mega-carriers and large carriers as well as global logistics service providers. Small and medium-sized carriers as well as the ship-owners and transport agents from the MPCs are not in a good position to handle the risks of the Rotterdam Rules. The Rotterdam Rules also cover multimodal transport (Article 26). The problem will arise in cases of litigation. How will the judge interpret the term “international” in order to apply the CMR or CIM conventions\(^1\) in the case of disputes regarding land transport? The same problem arises with pre and post overland transport in a national area: how will judges be able to apply the CMR or CIM conventions to the portion of transport effected locally instead of the law of the country in question?

The Conference on “Motorways of the Sea” was led by AMLOG’s guest in November 2010. It allowed parallels to be drawn between the European approach on the one hand, with the contributions of Henri de Richemont (author of the report on the Motorways of the Sea) and Dominique Bussereau (French Secretary of State for Transport) and, on the other hand, the Moroccan approach of the MedaMos I Port of Agadir-Port Vendres Port Motorways of the Sea presented by the Moroccan Merchant Marine.

At this gathering and for the first time, strategies were discussed for collaboration of stakeholders across the Motorways of the Sea logistics chain. The conference clarified the debate on Motorways of the Sea, allowing Morocco to take up a more constructive, measured and innovative position in the MedaMos II project.

These forums, trade fairs and projects have been key factors in the emergence of a real Euro-Mediterranean political will to develop the logistics sector in the Mediterranean Region, in particular in the MPCs.

AMLOG was also the official partner for a number of conferences (LOGISTIQUA 2010, International Conference on Logistics by the theme of “Supply Chain Management: A Boost to Competitiveness in Times of Crisis,” École Nationale de Commerce et de Gestion - ENCG Agadir, May 2010; El Jadida Conference on “Logistics: The Key to Competitive Business; Current Situation and Prospects,” El Jadida Faculté Polydisciplinaire (FPJ), Chouaib Doukkali University, May 2010; the Hassan II Mohammedia University Conference on Logistics and Competitiveness of Foreign Trade, June 2010, etc.), in particular:

- The Third International Conference on Information Systems, Logistics and Supply Chain, (ILS 2010), held in Casablanca on 13-16 April. On this occasion, the President of AMLOG emphasised that information systems “interconnect public and private interests (i.e. local authorities and enterprise). They interrelate the long-term (territorial planning) and the short-term (market flexibility). They constitute social factors (territorial factors) beyond immediate markets. It is from this macro-logistics/micro-logistics perspective that we will discuss logistics platform issues in Morocco.”

- At the ICHCA International Biennial Conference held in Casablanca on 26-27 April 2010, the President of AMLOG made a speech on the challenges of the maritime logistics chain (maritime transport, port and

\(^1\) Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road 1956 (CMR) and the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Rail (CIM).
hinterland) regarding control of global logistics costs.

- Finally, a seminar was organised by AMLOG on Incoterms 2010 in February 2011. It was led by Bernard Dreyer, who compared Incoterms 2010 to those in 2000 from the perspective of the international logistics chain.

In conclusion, these forums, trade fairs and projects have been key factors in the emergence of a real Euro-Mediterranean political will to develop the logistics sector in the Mediterranean Region, in particular in the MPCs. By the same token, these events raised awareness among MPC policymakers of the convenience of assigning a specific role to the logistics sector in the development of their economies.

Prospects

Logistics Policies

Commendable efforts are emerging to develop logistics in South Mediterranean Countries. A strong political will to develop a logistics sector in the case of Morocco finds expression in a programme contract, which constitutes a unique case in the Maghreb, between the State and private enterprise to consolidate logistics service and accompany the structuring of the domestic logistics market by creating a network of logistics platforms on the level of all the regions of Morocco, assisting in the development of Moroccan logistics operator activities, fostering skills on all levels and for all logistics activities and preparing administrative personnel to regulate the Moroccan logistics system. Similarly, in Tunisia there is a logistics strategy to create logistics platforms and foster the emergence of local operators and logistics training. In Algeria, no real logistics policy has yet been established but all data would indicate the forthcoming emergence of a logistics policy to accompany the reforms underway. In Egypt, the authorities are aware of the importance of the logistics sector in the national economy; indeed, measures and institutional reforms are underway to strengthen it.

Investment in infrastructure (roads, motorways, logistics areas, etc.) exists in the three Maghreb countries: major East-West motorway works, privatisation of parts of port infrastructures and modernisation of rail transport in Algeria by concentrating on the improvement of port connections with their hinterland and potentially on opening up to the Greater Maghreb. A network of motorways and railways is under construction in Morocco (Tangier-Casablanca high-speed railway line 2015) and we are witnessing the emergence of an International Hub Port in Tangier (Tanger Med), and the privatisation of port materials handling is underway at Moroccan ports. Likewise, in Tunisia, motorways are being built and there is a project for a deep-water port in Enfidha.

Multinationals and global operators in transport and logistics are slowly appearing, except in Morocco, where they are already well present.

Towards the Creation of a Logistics Cluster and a Network of Euro-Mediterranean Logistics Platforms (EMLPs)

To ensure the development of the logistics sector in the MPCs, it seems necessary to accompany national logistics strategies by two essential measures:

- Upgrading the logistics environment by creating a Euro-Mediterranean logistics community in the form of a Mediterranean logistics cluster to provide support to national, regional and local clusters. The experience of North Mediterranean countries provides a wealth of knowledge (European Cluster Observatory site). In this regard, the proposals of the CETMO study (cf. “The Logistics Sector on the Southern Shores of the Western Mediterranean: Assessment and Proposals for Improving the Provision of Logistics Services”) must be discussed and they will have to be implemented in an intelligent manner in order to strengthen logistics competitiveness in the MPCs;
- The creation of a network of EMLPs: creating such a network requires a global, integrated offer and a unified planning and infrastructure policy (roads and motorways, land supply at reasonable prices, specialised warehouses – refrigeration facilities, dangerous goods storage facilities – buildings for collective services and utilities, railway connections, transhipment points for containers, container parks, etc.). Platforms of a Euro-Mediterranean dimension are often located in a logistics activity area adjacent to
an area of multiform and multi-industry economic activity area not far from a port area. These platforms require a series of specific collective services (land, infrastructure, skills, finance, institutions, adapted regulations, etc.).

The model of the LOGISMED project should serve as a flagship for the logistics platform network and the Euro-Mediterranean logistics cluster.

Conclusion

Financial and skills issues will be decisive in creating a network of EMLPs.

The adequate solutions will have to be found for establishing a “private-public” Mediterranean partnership in order to facilitate the start of construction of this network of EMLPs, whose aim is to facilitate successful and fair integration of the interests of private and public operators on both shores of the Mediterranean. Solutions are possible (European Investment Bank, African Development Bank, World Bank, public and private funds, local and multinational funds, etc.). Financial, land and training innovations need to be sought and the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Logistics Community should be encouraged by these forums, trade fairs, projects and so on, in order to build a Euro-Mediterranean area of peace and progress.

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Integration of the Gender Perspective into EU Development and Cooperation Policy

According to the European Commission, equality between women and men is a fundamental principle recognised in international human rights law, a common value of the EU and a necessary condition for the achievement of the EU’s objectives of growth, employment and social cohesion. Although inequalities still exist, the EU has made significant progress over the last decades on promoting equality between women and men. This is mainly thanks to equal treatment legislation, gender mainstreaming and specific measures for the advancement of women, as well as the implementation and monitoring of relevant EU agreements and frameworks. A large body of European legislative texts is dedicated to equality between women and men. It mainly consists of various treaty provisions and directives concerning access to employment, equal pay, maternity protection, parental leave, social security and occupational social security, the burden of proof in discrimination cases and self-employment. The EU’s “Roadmap for equality between women and men” established the priorities for the period 2006-2010. Specifically, it combined concrete initiatives with the integration of equality between women and men into all EU policies and activities (“gender mainstreaming”), including external relations and development. Progress on equality in the EU is measured every year and presented in a “Report on Equality between Women and Men,” prepared by the European Commission in close cooperation with all EU Member States.

A new “Strategy for equality between women and men (2010-2015)” was adopted on 21 September 2010. It is a comprehensive framework committing the Commission to promote gender equality in all its policies. Building on the 2006-2010 Roadmap, as well as the European Pact for Gender Equality, the Strategy spells out actions in five priority areas defined in the Women’s Charter, as well as in one area addressing crosscutting concerns:

1. Equal economic independence.
2. Equal pay for equal work and work of equal value.
3. Equality in decision-making.
4. Dignity, integrity and putting an end to gender-based violence.
5. Gender equality in external actions.
6. Horizontal issues (gender roles, legislation and governance tools).

The Strategy highlights the contribution of gender equality to economic growth and sustainable development and supports the implementation of the gender-equality dimension in the Europe 2020 Strategy.

External Dimension of the EU’s Roadmap for Equality between Women and Men 2006-2010

Both the Roadmap and the 2010-2015 Strategy have as a priority the promotion of gender equality in external and development policies and, in particular, the promotion of gender equality in the European

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Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The EU’s policy on the promotion of gender equality within the EU is closely related to the work undertaken by the Union in third countries.

In the context of the ENP, the EU supports partner countries’ efforts to promote gender equality. The ENP Action Plans set out a jointly agreed agenda of reform priorities and contain the commitments of partner countries to engage in dialogue on related issues (human and women’s rights) and to carry out policy and legislative reforms.

The EU remains committed to speedier achievement of the Millennium Development Goals and to helping to attain the standards set by the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), as well as the objectives of the Beijing Platform of Action (BPfA) and the Cairo Programme of Action, as foreseen in the EU Plan of Action on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Development (2010-2015). The “EU guidelines on violence against women and girls and combating all forms of discrimination against them” offer guidance for conducting political dialogue and taking action, where appropriate, in individual cases of women’s rights violations. The EU will continue to use its development policy to promote gender equality and women’s empowerment.

The EU and its Member States are key players in international development efforts and adhere to internationally recognised instruments and agreements, such as the CEDAW, the Millennium Development Declaration (2000) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) Programme of Action (1994), the BPfA, the Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development, the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action. The EU has also reaffirmed gender equality as one of the five key principles of its development policy in the European Consensus on Development and has recently adopted the aforementioned EU guidelines on violence against women and girls.

The EU is strongly committed to gender equality in its development cooperation and individual relations with third countries. It promotes a dual approach of gender mainstreaming and specific actions combined with political and policy dialogue and acknowledges that gender equality is closely linked to the overarching development goal of reducing poverty. Among other actions mentioned under Priority 6 in the 2006-2010 Roadmap, the European Commission was to “strengthen gender equality in the Mediterranean region, including by organising in 2006 a Euromed Ministerial Conference on gender equality, preceded by a civil society consultation, which could lead to the adoption of an action plan.”

**Bilateral Actions**

Concerning bilateral external relations, gender equality has been included in all work plans defined under the ENP, and dialogue between the EC and its partner countries on this issue has been initiated in several subcommittees. Gender perspectives and equality between women and men are mainly included under three sections of the ENP Action Plans: the promotion of human rights; social policies and employment; and combating trafficking of human beings, especially women and children. In particular, most countries’ plans include: strengthening the role of women in the political (policies related to electoral systems and processes), economic and social spheres, implementing the CEDAW and combating gender-based violence, including honour crimes and crimes related to personal status or family codes. The 2008 Sectoral Progress Report on the Implementation of the ENP notes that “Participation of women in social, political and economic life still has to be strengthened in varying degrees. Discrimination against women and/or domestic violence remains widespread. Further criminalisation of offences against women is needed. While substantial barriers remain, many countries have taken measures to further promote gender equality.”

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To this end, it is worth noting that Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Morocco all have specific bilateral programmes on gender.

**Regional Euromed Context**

At the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Strengthening the Role of Women in Society, held on 14-15 November 2006 in Istanbul, the partners agreed to work on mutually agreed objectives (within a common framework of action) over the next five years. It was moreover agreed that they would adopt “measures to achieve gender equality, preventing all forms of discrimination and ensuring the protection of the rights of women.”

The conclusions adopted by the Istanbul Conference were therefore aimed at strengthening: women’s political and civil rights; women’s social and economic rights; and women’s rights in the cultural sphere and with regard to the role of communications and the mass media.

In terms of the follow-up and review mechanism, the Euromed Committee was invited to “convene, at least once a year, a Euromed ad hoc meeting at [the] expert senior officials’ level to review the implementation of the […] measures contained in [the] conclusions and to inform the annual Euromed Foreign Affairs Ministers Conference. A follow-up to the Euromed Ministerial Conference to discuss issues related to the full enjoyment of all human rights by women and the progress made [on implementing] these measures will take place in 2009.”

In the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), the process established by the Istanbul Conference is a unique and pioneering method, as it has enabled the development of accompanying measures (technical and institutional capacity-building, such as training and/or the development of guidelines and frameworks of action, establishment of knowledge tools, policy review mechanism, etc.) financed by the European Commission aimed at supporting a regional intergovernmental consultation process and provides for civil-society consultations throughout the process.

To this end, the European Commission has developed several cooperation instruments:

- The “Enhancing Equality between Men and Women in the Euromed Region” programme is an accompanying measure to support the current activities of the intergovernmental cooperation process within the framework of the EMP and the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). It contributes to the overall objective of supporting current dynamics and strengthening the capacity of qualified actors in order to promote equality between men and women and provide follow-up for the Istanbul Ministerial conclusions.

  - The “Investing in People” (IiP) programme aims to strengthen the capacity of civil-society organisations active in the field of promoting women’s rights and equality between women and men.
  - The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR): The Mediterranean countries are eligible for country-based support schemes aimed at supporting civil-society organisations that promote human rights. The promotion of women’s rights is explicitly recognised as a priority under this objective.

In addition to these instruments, TAIEX and twinning can be used to further develop joint Euromed actions.

However, the model is still evolving. It is necessary to refine its methods and forge a unique and specific identity for it, as well as to identify complementarities with other international intergovernmental schemes in order for it to be recognised as an efficient and concrete contribution to the full implementation of the international conventions related to the human rights of women, such as the CEDAW, and relevant recommendations of the UN human rights system, such as those deriving from special procedures of the Human Rights Council or from the Universal Periodic Review.

**Challenges for the Istanbul Process**

The part of the Istanbul conclusions presented as the Action Plan should not be regarded as an operational plan for action but rather a political declaration identifying potential and/or intended areas of action. It names only one tool for the follow-up, namely an ad hoc expert committee, and it does not identify the reporting processes or tools the committee will use. The Istanbul Process moreover fails to define its own added value and is considered by some of the partners concerned as a duplication of existing models.
Strengthening women’s role in society is an indispensible part of the region’s development. That is why the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean (13 July 2008) states, “The future of the Euro-Mediterranean region lies in improved socio-economic development (…) and knowledge. There is a need to increase co-operation in areas such as education, (…) strengthening the role of women in society.”7

The Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of the UfM (4 November 2008) likewise emphasises the need to strengthen the role of women in society, stating, “As part of the follow-up to the Istanbul Ministerial Conference held in 2006 on ‘Strengthening the Role of Women in Society’ and in view of a second Ministerial Conference in 2009 to be held in Morocco, the Ministers encourage further concrete initiatives to accelerate the implementation of the Istanbul conclusions. A possible outcome could be a concrete set of joint activities in all fields approved in the Istanbul Ministerial Conclusions.”

A second Euromed Ministerial Conference on Strengthening the Role of Women in Society took place in Morocco on 11-12 November 2009. The conference’s objectives included: to increase awareness of the Istanbul Plan of Action (IPA) and explore opportunities for using it as an advocacy tool for social and legal change; to explore synergies between the national, regional and international frameworks for the promotion and protection of gender equality (IPA, CEDAW, other UN mechanisms, the EMP, the ENP and the UfM); and to strengthen civil-society cooperation and coalition-building in the Euromed region on gender equality and women’s rights.

At the Marrakesh Conference, the Ministers gave a boost to the Istanbul Process, which promotes equality between men and women and had been set in motion three years earlier, by making the Framework of Action more effective. Priorities were established and the follow-up arrangements for the planned improvements were made more efficient. Also at the Marrakesh Conference, the UfM agreed to create a regional foundation and co-operation network to advance women’s rights and to set up a multilateral Euro-Mediterranean Observatory on Violence against Women. The foundation, to be launched with the support of the World Bank, will establish its first sites in Paris, Marrakesh and Byblos, Lebanon. The UfM decided that a women’s foundation could “coordinate energies and means” and “create a network of women around the Mediterranean.” The foundation will be publicly and privately funded, exclusively on a voluntary basis, but the World Bank will make an initial contribution to get it off the ground.

Conclusions

Since its inception in Barcelona in 1995, the EMP has devoted both political attention and financial resources to gender equality. This focus is in accordance with international processes and instruments, such as the BPfA or the MDGs, as well as with the implementation of the CEDAW. Despite these efforts by the EU, the full potential of the Euromed or Neighbourhood instruments has not been used to accelerate the process of achieving full equality between men and women in the Mediterranean. Substantial funds dedicated exclusively to this priority are still quite scarce. Indeed, they are almost absent from bilateral cooperation with the Mediterranean partners, which accounts for the lion’s share of the funds allocated to cooperation with them. Instruments such as twinning, TAIEX, ENP National Action Plans, etc. are almost “gender neutral” and give scant attention to 50% of the beneficiaries in the region. In light of recent events in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Algeria, Morocco and Libya, the statement by the EU High Representative, Lady Ashton, on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of International Women’s Day8 should not be viewed as “mere” lip service. In her statement she said, “Women have played a crucial role in bringing about change in Northern Africa. Amidst violence, women have joined the struggle for change. We hope that the key role that women have played so far will be reflected fully in the institutional changes that are already under discussion in the region. Women must be at the heart of the discussions over the future order.”

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The Mediterranean region underwent a number of significant changes in 2010. Political and socio-economic dynamics in the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean cannot be attributed to merely the persistence of illiberal regimes acting upon apathetic societies. Instead, a number of trends at the societal level deriving from the growing globalisation of these societies contributed to sowing the seeds of the turmoil that engulfed the region at the end of 2010. This article will not look at these trends, as it is still too early to assess the unfolding events currently changing the face of some Arab Mediterranean countries; rather, it will examine the year from another perspective, for 2010 will also most likely be remembered as the year in which the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) began its demise and collapse.

The blatant contrast between, on the one hand, the number of changes that have been taking place in the region and, on the other, the paralysis and crumbling of part of the architecture of the UfM cannot be overlooked and should prompt a thorough reassessment of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. This article will deal with both the institutional component and the objectives of the UfM with a view to shedding light on the reasons behind the partial derailment of the process behind it. In the conclusions it will briefly touch on the perceptions of the states and societies involved, particularly on the southern shore, in order to find a possible way out of the current impasse.

Institutional and Financial Shortcomings

It took almost two years for the UfM to see the light. The initiative was launched in Paris in July 2008 as the new European policy towards the Mediterranean, although it had originally been presented as a national French initiative. However, immediately following the meeting of Foreign Ministers held in Marseille in early November 2008 that laid the foundations for its actual establishment and operations, the UfM was blocked and confined to a limbo due to the eruption of the events in Gaza in December 2008. It did not manage to emerge from the deadlock caused by the standoff between Israel and the Arab states until early 2010. These difficulties were to influence all subsequent developments.

One of the major accomplishments of the UfM in the first months of 2010 was the establishment of the institutional and operational headquarters in Barcelona and the start of consultations with the national governments to fill the different positions, from high-level posts to the technical and administrative staff. This led to the appointment of the Secretary General, on 4 March 2010, and of the six deputy secretaries, hailing from Greece, Israel, Italy, Malta, the Palestinian Territories and Turkey.

The allocation of these positions raises certain doubts in that they represent only Mediterranean countries. This clearly contrasts with the spirit of “Europeanisation” that ultimately inspired the UfM, making it a policy on which all EU Member States agreed. Furthermore, it is no secret that the entire process encountered many practical difficulties due to the scepticism of the national governments, which, with some exceptions, did not invest in the identification of the necessary pool of functionaries and technical staff best suited to hold these positions. As a result, one year after the creation of the
General Secretariat, it is still largely understaffed. Arguably, it took too long to define the institutional structure of the UfM and too much attention was devoted in 2010 to administrative issues to the detriment of the need to act and to start doing something to show the actual potential of this form of cooperation. This would indeed have provided the infant UfM with additional leverage and would have set in motion a virtuous cycle.

The blatant contrast between the number of changes that have been taking place in the region and the paralysis and crumbling of part of the architecture of the UfM cannot be overlooked.

None of the above is meant to cast doubt on the very real importance of having a well-established and solid institutional structure as a necessary starting point for a well-functioning project. However, the total lack of progress in terms of concrete actions was not compensated for by the limited progress on organisational matters and the whole endeavour suffered tremendously as a result from the mismatch between its stated objectives and its actual contributions towards their achievement. This situation has been made even worse by the problems the UfM has had mobilising funds. In November 2010, the high representatives of the governments of the UfM met in Brussels and successfully reached an agreement on three outstanding issues: the UfM’s budget, the priorities of the work plan and the rules for the internal functioning of the Secretariat. In reality, though, the process of defining the budget is not yet over. What they have agreed upon is the need to have a financial endowment of €6.2 million, of which €3 million will be made available by the European Commission provided that other funds are mobilised to cover the entire sum. Notwithstanding some vague commitments made by Spain, France and Germany, nobody else has so far answered the call. This raises the question of whether other national governments or non-governmental institutions will commit to covering the UfM’s expenses and to funding its projects when hardly anything has been done to prove its actual ability to pursue its objectives.

“Low” vs. “High” Politics?

The whole architecture of the UfM has suffered from its inability to deliver concrete results. As far as the high-level representatives’ meetings are concerned, the summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the UfM was postponed twice in 2010. This meeting had originally been scheduled for 7 June but was postponed, first, to November, due to the continuous deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations and the emergence of a rift between Turkey and Israel following the events of the Freedom Flotilla on 31 May. The situation, in other words, was not ripe to advance the dialogue among the parties within the framework of the UfM. The second attempt to hold the meeting, this time on 21 November, was likewise frustrated, and no indication was given on that occasion concerning the rescheduling of the summit to a later date. The situation appeared rather compromised despite the attempt made by France, Egypt and Spain – the countries that have arguably invested the most in ensuring the functioning of the UfM, albeit with poor results – to present the situation as not overly worrisome due to the alleged good progress made with the launch of the UfM’s operational dimension. The three partners insisted on the fact that “Whilst waiting for this second summit, Egypt, France and Spain have invited the institutions of the Union for the Mediterranean to continue their action. They expressed their satisfaction regarding the progress of the projects corresponding to the priorities set by the Heads of State and Government at the Paris Summit on 13 July 2008. They have also taken note of the important steps made towards operational implementation of the Permanent Secretariat based in Barcelona, as well as towards the adoption of its budget and work programme, which will enable the Union for the Mediterranean to continue at a more constant pace with its actions to foster ever-closer cooperation between the two sides of the Mediterranean.”

This may sound like an attempt to find an excuse for the little progress achieved over the year and to deflect attention from the embarrassing situation of paralysis into which the UfM had fallen. Against this backdrop, a number of developments were about to take place in the region. The protests and revolutions that broke out less than two months later in Tunisia and Egypt, not to mention Jordan and Algeria, would strike a tremendous blow against the prospects for cooperation on the basis envisaged by the UfM. Another sign of the UfM’s worsening institutional paralysis was the resignation of the Secretary General on 28 February 2011.

The protests and revolutions that broke out less than two months later in Tunisia and Egypt, not to mention Jordan and Algeria, would strike a tremendous blow against the prospects for cooperation on the basis envisaged by the UfM.

The sectoral ministerial meetings have run up against the same difficulties, with the result that some have been complete failures while others have been cancelled ahead of their scheduled dates. One of the most striking examples of such failure was the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Water held in April 2010, in which a semantic battle raged throughout the session as to the use of “occupied territories” versus “territories under occupation” in reference to the occupied Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese territories, leading to the failure to adopt the agreed Water Strategy. Similarly, a number of meetings intended to address higher education and agriculture had to be cancelled. This calls into question the assumption that by focusing on technical and socioeconomic cooperation the UfM can advance long-term political dialogue among the partners in the region. In other words, it casts doubt on the original notion that by sidelining political cooperation and focussing instead on a number of concrete sectoral projects on which the interests of the parties might converge, the countries could not only promote socioeconomic development but also create a situation more conducive to political cooperation.

The latent pitfalls of this idea have now been exposed in that it is not possible to decouple socioeconomic development from peace and improved domestic and regional political conditions. The persistence of physical and psychological barriers to political dialogue and cooperation among the countries in the region has led to a situation in which, even more than in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), agreement on infrastructural and economic projects must pursue five of the six key objectives of the UfM, with the exclusion of the Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI), and their implementation is hostage to the foreign and domestic politics of the individual southern and eastern Mediterranean countries.

This is related to the status granted to the Member States by the UfM. The shift from the EMP to the UfM has been accompanied by a trend towards the re-nationalisation of European policy in the Mediterranean. The EMP was an EU project in which the Commission played a substantial role and with which the southern Mediterranean countries were associated as partners on a subordinate level in terms of the decision-making process. With the emergence of the UfM, not only did the European governments begin to work directly with the southern and eastern Mediterranean governments and was the Commission effectively sidelined, but the Mediterranean partners were also able to maintain their sovereignty and participate in the initiative on an equal footing with the other members. In this inter-governmental framework, some southern and eastern Mediterranean partners have used their power not to advance virtuous cooperation but to block it out of preoccupations related to their security and foreign policies. As a result, today the southern Mediterranean partners are farther from each other and from Europe than in 1995 when the EMP was launched.

The UfM in the Broader Context of the EU’s Mediterranean Policy

From the previous discussion it is clear that the UfM is going through a delicate phase of its development. Since its ability to function in future should not be taken for granted, a number of steps must be taken to revive it. First, it is necessary to clarify the ambiguity surrounding its principal aim and mission: sometimes it is presented as political dialogue, having been entrusted, as it was, with the functions...
originally covered under the “political and security pillar” of the EMP, and sometimes as an economic one based on the sectoral projects. While the “low politics first, high politics later” approach would mean that the UfM should first strengthen the economic and project-oriented component, which affects the daily life of the Euro-Mediterranean population, with a view to eventually creating the necessary conditions to ensure effective political capability, the current political circumstances in which the initiative is bound to take place, most notably the Arab-Israeli conflict, remain a major obstacle for Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, at least in the eyes of the southern Mediterranean partners.

The positive examples of the “5+5 Dialogue” in the Western Mediterranean and the Adriatic Ionian Initiative, launched in 2000, should push the UfM in the direction of developing “variable geometry” schemes both geographically and thematically.

Second, it must be remembered that the UfM does not act in a vacuum. It should thus seek positive synergies between its own projects and the programmes that the Commission already has in place in the Mediterranean region, some of whose economic focuses, such as the free movement of goods and the execution of large-scale infrastructure and transport projects, overlap significantly. This could offer a possible way around the problem of the shortage of funds that is currently affecting the UfM. However, the implementation and sustainability of the projects, as well as the functioning of the UfM’s institutional bodies, cannot be premised exclusively on the funds allocated by the Commission, as this would amount to a step backwards from the original plans. Finally, and most importantly, it should be taken into account that each non-European Mediterranean partner has a different set of interests and expectations regarding its participation in the UfM. While for the countries in the eastern part of the Mediterranean – the Adriatic region – the UfM represents a welcome dimension of cooperation to strengthen their relations with the EU, it does not offer the same prospects to the countries of North Africa and the Middle East. For most of these countries, the priorities lie with the Action Plans within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and they thus strive to obtain as many advantages as possible in their bilateral relations with the EU. Furthermore, the Maghreb countries lament their marginalisation in the UfM when it comes to the secretaries. To address these shortcomings, Euro-Mediterranean cooperation both within and outside the UfM should increasingly be conducted along sub-regional lines with a view to appreciating and taking into account the specificities and the different needs of the partner countries. The positive examples of the “5+5 Dialogue” in the Western Mediterranean and the Adriatic Ionian Initiative, launched in 2000, should push the UfM in the direction of developing “variable geometry” schemes both geographically and thematically. All in all, taking a broader view, the EU needs to rethink its entire Mediterranean policy to take stock of and react to changing realities in the region.

References


Since December 2010, a rebellious wind has been spreading through a growing number of countries marked by a deficit in democracy and significant economic and social difficulties. Starting in Tunisia, the popular wave of protest against autocratic, corrupt regimes has particularly affected Northern Africa, where changes have taken a radical turn. After the fall of the Tunisian President on 14 January 2011, followed by that of his Egyptian counterpart on 11 February, the “Day of Anger” in Libya on 17 February constituted the point of departure of an insurrectional situation accompanied a month later by the armed intervention of an international coalition authorised by the Security Council on the instigation of France and the United Kingdom. The magnitude and force of the revolts profoundly surprised European leaders who, accustomed to strong, stable regimes along their borders, showed their concern before rising to the occasion and applauding the people’s struggle for dignity.1

The main concern regarded the possible migratory consequences of such instability. Since the year 2000 or so, the European Union (EU) Member States have considerably increased the responsibility and participation of North African countries in controlling European borders. Considered countries of migrant origin and/or transit, South Mediterranean Countries (SMCs) have progressively committed to contribute preventively to stopping possible unauthorised departures of their citizens or third country nationals to the EU. Tunisia and Libya had both modified their legislation in 2004 to accentuate sanctions against aid to irregular migration and had entered agreements with European countries such as Italy to control maritime borders and readmit nationals and foreign nationals departing from their coasts.2 Relaxation of Tunisian border control due to the revolt provided an opportunity for hundreds of Tunisians to leave the country using this provisional breach. After the arrival of some 5,000 Tunisians to the Island of Lampedusa, Italy declared a state of “humanitarian emergency” on 12 February 2011, emphasising the serious, exceptional nature of the situation. Five days after the onset of violence in Libya, Rome expressed the fear of a sudden inflow of 200,000 to 300,000 migrants, whereas Brussels estimated it at 500,000 to 700,000 people. Though these figures correspond globally to the number of individuals fleeing Libya, an infinitesimal minority was moving towards Europe, whereas Tunisia, already destabilised, had to deal with the arrival of 10,000 people per day at its borders, receiving some 200,000 people in a single month, just as Egypt a bit later (source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR).

The fusion of North African political events under the single term of “Arab revolts” has engendered confusion regarding the collective migrations they engendered, grouped under the terms of “illegal migration flows” to Europe and considered to constitute a “threat to internal security.”3 Moreover, because

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1 In its declaration on 11 March 2011, the European Council declared that it “salutes the courage demonstrated by the people of the region” and mentioned “democratic uprisings [...] creating a new hope and opportunity.” EUCO 7/11.

2 The Tunisian-Italian Agreement of 1998, however, excludes the readmission to Tunisia of third country nationals from Arab Maghreb Union Member States.

3 Priorities of the Polish EU Presidency concerning migration from North Africa.
forced departures from Libya followed the voluntary arrivals from Tunisia, the European reaction towards the Tunisian arrivals oriented or even supplanted management of the Libyan arrivals and resulted in strengthening the walls in the Mediterranean rather than any hypothetical Euro-Mediterranean policy.

The Tunisian Revolt and Migration: Limits and Externalisation

The Effects of the Containment of the Population

In contrast to those leaving Libya, primarily foreign nationals, migrants leaving Tunisia over the course of the "Jasmine Revolution" are Tunisian nationals generally falling within the category of "economic migrants." These departures are not the product of destabilisation in Tunisia, except insofar as said destabilisation has provided an opportunity to realise pre-existing ambitions. They remind us that, although data indicates a significant decrease of departures from the Mediterranean coast over the past few years, the closing of borders contains rather than reduces migratory pressure. On 5 April 2011, the European Parliament rightly considered that "whereas in the past migratory flows have changed their routes according to where most pressure was applied, but have never ceased, [...] migration cannot be stopped" (Resolution 2010/2269(INI), provisional version, Migration flows arising from instability: scope and role of EU foreign policy).

These departures confirm that the policy of containment fosters the development of criminality related to the organisation of irregular migration and increases migratory movement focussing on opportune places at specific points in time. These peak collective arrivals in Europe most certainly conceal the real temporal dimension of migrations, which are dreams built up over the long term, with profound motivations, and as such cannot be solely ascribed to sudden political events, albeit democratic ones. The constancy of the migratory aim explains its adaptability to policies of obstruction leading to incessant change of migratory routes and a sophistication of criminality in response to more sophisticated mobility controls.

Fueling prejudices and justifying emergency measures, the geographic and temporal concentration of a Tunisian migration flow that is altogether quite modest has served the security and xenophobe discourse, which uses it as an opportunity to raise the spectre of "uncontrolled immigration" (Guéant, 17 March 2011), or even "the human tsunami" (Berlusconi, 4 April 2011). It is noteworthy that no European State has seen fit to relativise the importance of these arrivals – except in order to get rid of them – or to foresee their decline in the medium term and voluntary return to a Tunisia offering new perspectives in the long term.

Urgent: A Migratory Policy

On 12 February 2011, in the face of the powerlessness of North African authorities to close their borders, the de facto suspension of readmission and a Tunisia rejecting from then on the presence of Italian police forces in its seas, Italy found itself without an interlocutor in the South and declared a state of "humanitarian emergency." The declaration of its incapacity to handle the collective arrival of migrants bound for all of Europe served to raise awareness among its Northern partners. The evident disorganisation in taking charge of the migrants on Lampedusa indeed offered the spectacle of the invasion of an island by a number of foreigners greater than the local population and much greater than the capacity of the detention centre reopened for the occasion.

Breaking out in a period when Europe is marked by heightened nationalism and a strong political manipulation of xenophobia, the Arab revolts are nurturing European prejudices rather than reducing them

The European governments were quick to remind Italy that 20 to 30,000 migrants, though having arrived collectively, by no means constituted an unmanageable burden for a single State justifying a possible redistribution of these newcomers throughout the EU. Determined to force them to get involved, in particular France, which through its Minister of Home Affairs requested it to "keep the migrants itself," Italy delivered 26,000 temporary residence permits to Tunisians having arrived between 1 January and 5 April 2011, the date on which a repatriation agreement was finally signed with the interim Tunisian government. Based on a provision of the Italian immigration law allowing the adoption of "extraordinary reception
measures in case of exceptional events” (Article 20), these permits for temporary residence valid within the Schengen Area were issued to Tunisians who, for the most part, wished to migrate to France. The latter then resorted to the protective measure allowing re-establishment of inner EU borders in case of a threat to public order or domestic security and proceeded to impede foreigners bearing such a permit from entering its territory.

Beyond apparent divisions, EU Member States corroborate the fact that they share a single vision on migratory policy. Collectively determined not to participate in serving as host country to people leaving the South Mediterranean Countries, the European countries take advantage of the massification effect of the upheavals to rally around the goal of securing borders, the chinks thus revealed in the outer EU borders justifying a return to control of inner borders within the Schengen Area. Out of step with the most immediate as well as more long-term migratory challenges, the French Minister of Home Affairs, followed by his British counterpart, declared in mid-April the wish to likewise reduce legal migration to national territory.

Breaking out in a period when Europe is marked by heightened nationalism and a strong political manipulation of xenophobia, the Arab revolts are nurturing European prejudices rather than reducing them. On 20 February 2011, i.e. three days after the onset of insurrection in Libya, the EU decided to launch Operation Hermes 2011, expanding in space and time the pre-existing FRONTEX mission in order to “strengthen Europe’s border control response capability in the Central Mediterranean.”

**Libyan Revolt and Migration: Strengthening Externalisation**

*From the Angle of “Mixed Flows”*

The generalisation of violence in Libya as a result of the spread of revolt, the disproportionate repression against it and armed international intervention has led to the departure of hundreds of thousands of people. With a job market hungry for labour, Libya had attracted a great deal of immigration since the onset of its oil extracting activities forty years ago. As of 2002, however, it has been considered by the EU as a priority because it constitutes an area of transit for “mixed flows” seeking to reach Europe. By regularly claiming to be invaded by over two million “Africans” ready to cross the Mediterranean, the Libyan regime knew how to make use of European fears and magnify the image of a visible migrant invasion. With the outbreak of war, the vast majority of people fleeing Libya has taken the land route into Tunisia or Egypt in the hope of returning to their countries. The collective departures reveal the extreme diversity of the migrant population in Libya, as well as the complexity and great heterogeneity of the “Africans” present. Whether they are Africans from West Africa having found a labour market cruelly lacking in their region, or the million or so Sahelian Africans from neighbouring Chad and Sudan, the majority had been living in Libya for years. Many of them have had to face the incapacity of their government to repatriate them, a situation aggravated by the fact that they are unregistered or simply by the impossibility of returning to their countries. Thousands of Somalians, Ethiopians and Eritreans have also been living in Libya for decades. Although they had all the characteristics of refugees, they had been living there as “economic migrants,” having found de facto asylum and work in a country that does not recognise the existence of refugees on its territory.

The Libyan situation recalls the tenuous dividing line between refugees and voluntary migrants. Thousands of migrants are still currently in Libya, trapped by the war and the inability of their countries of origin to protect them. If they are not in hiding or drafted to serve in the pro-Gaddafi troops, some of them flee via the nearest maritime border. The UNHCR emphasises the incongruity of seeing hundreds of thousands of people find protection in Tunisia and Egypt, whereas the minority taking to the sea find themselves in great danger (cf. Appeal of 8 April 2011). At its extraordinary meeting of 11 March 2011, the European Council declared its “highest praise” and “support” to the “solidarity shown by the Tunisian people with the people fleeing from Libya.” The Council, however, on 11 and 12 April 2011, when the Foreign Affairs Ministers were to provide a collective response to the “management of migration coming from the southern neighbourhood region,” confirmed two priorities on the European agenda: reinforcing control of the external borders and externalising the responsibility of support for voluntary and involuntary migrants.

*Asylum Elsewhere*

After war broke out in Libya, a terrible discrepancy appeared between the reality of the movement of
peoples in the Maghreb-Sahel area and the alarmist and disproportionate positions in Europe. A similar discrepancy emerged between the announcement of a forthcoming wave of migrants and the absence of collectives measures to prepare for it. On 25 February 2011, Cecilia Malmström, the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, considered it premature to organise measures of solidarity, since “no migrants from Libya have arrived yet” (Le Monde, 26 February 2011). Two months later, the European Commission had yet to launch a single initiative based on stipulations established in EC law on asylum, in particular Council Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons, though recommended by the UNHCR and the European Parliament. It is indeed difficult to imagine an influx of refugees from North Africa, since the Mediterranean wall proves to be so impassable. On 15 March 2011, a boat approaching the coast of Sicily with some 1,800 people on board was returned to the coast of war-torn Libya by the Italian authorities, who accused Malta of likewise having refused the boat access to its ports (source: PANA, 15 March 2011). What Italy was doing was simply reiterating the practice of turning back immigrants begun in 2003, when it was already deploring the inadequacy of measures to compensate for its responsibility as an outpost of the European Union and the unfairness of the Dublin Criteria, redefined in 2003. At that time, Italy had an understanding with the Libyan regime whereby they jointly organised the return of people reaching Lampedusa from the Libyan coast. The European Commission then invoked the absence of its competence to sanction possible violations of EC law. In 2009, Italy complained of FRONTEX’ insufficient contribution to the management of “mixed flows” departing from the Libyan coast and made an agreement with Tripoli to turn back boats intercepted in the seas between the two countries. The Arab revolts allow Rome to be heard. The Council of 11-12 April 2011 agreed on the aim of stepping up FRONTEX competences as well as amending its legal framework, as recommended by the Commission on 10 March 2011 (COM(2011)118), thus coming closer to Italian demands for a European Agency that would be more involved in managing migrants and their repatriation (Maroni, 15 February 2011). On 15 April 2011, the French Foreign Affairs Minister declared that a strengthened FRONTEX would have the mission of assisting people on the seas, with the aim of repatriating them immediately to their point of departure and not transporting them to European territory. The European Parliament, however, stated on 5 April that “In addressing the current humanitarian crisis in northern Africa, [Parliament] notes that FRONTEX cannot be the main tool in dealing with the resulting migration flows originating in the region,” and it urged “the Council to put in place a burden-sharing action plan to help resettle refugees from the region, based on the solidarity clause set out in Article 80 of the TFEU, and to provide support for displaced persons in accordance with the provisions laid down in Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001.” Never yet implemented, the temporary protection measure, established at a time when the EU was showing support towards its Eastern neighbourhood, seems to constitute the instrument suited to the current situation. Contingent to a Commission initiative, such a collective response is running up against the latter’s silence. Insofar as the solidarity clause on asylum, it is simply being ignored by a Council fostering the externalisation of protection. In a manner incongruous with events in Northern Africa, its conclusions claim to be based on a long-term perspective recommending increasing the capacity for hosting and managing migrants in South Mediterranean countries in the domain of international protection, namely by activating or developing regional protection programmes. Despite the clearly pathetic spectacle of recent exchanges between EU Member States, the indelicacy of the proposals adopted reveal greater unity than it would seem. European countries share the same desire to keep the “burden” of migration on the other side of the Mediterranean. Without hesitating to maintain a policy of Maghreb regime cooperation in controlling European borders, anticipated by the maintenance of a power imbalance between the North and South shores, European countries confirm their unity on the external dimension of migrant management and reinforcement of external EU borders undertaken as of the Seville Council of 2002. Refusing to assume the short-term effects of the revolts in the “southern neighbourhood,” they seem to likewise ignore their potential long-term effects, whether they be the attraction effect that could be exercised by a more democratic Tunisia or Morocco, the consequences of the disappearance of the Libyan labour market, the possibility of changes in Maghreb policies on control of peoples and mobility, or the image Mediterranean peoples will retain of European “solidarity.”
In the history of the Arab world and of humanity itself, 2011 will be considered an *annus mirabilis*. The upheavals underway – in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, etc. – are vectors of considerable transformation on all levels: political, social, economic, cultural, ideological and religious. Are we sufficiently aware that they also have a demographic underpinning?

This article will first describe the demographic changes underway since our last assessment, published in the *Med.2007 Mediterranean Yearbook*, then it will go beyond description to show to what extent demographics is implicit in current or future events.

The most significant finding is a phenomenon of demographic convergence with the north shore of the Mediterranean at a sustained rate in the great majority of Arab and non-Arab countries in the South. The fertility rate was chosen as the focus from among all other indicators, as it carries the strongest emotional and psychological charge, and moreover has served to lend a repulsive image of the Arab and Muslim worlds, as in the writings of the journalist Oriana Fallaci. It reveals that the degree of convergence is remarkable in the cases of Lebanon, Tunisia, Turkey and, a bit farther away, the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the rates are on a European level or even lower. This same convergence will reach Morocco in only a few years, perhaps Algeria as well, and even more surprisingly, Libya, where the fertility rate continues to fall. On the other hand, the demographic transition seems to have slowed down or be at a standstill in Egypt, Syria and Jordan. But the most distressing changes have to do with the Israel-Palestine tandem.

Curiously, the countries where a revolution took place or is underway – Tunisia, Egypt and Libya – all display different demographic figures. In some countries where instability is intensifying, there is a completed demographic transition – Bahrain – and in others, this transition is but at an embryonic stage – Yemen and Sudan. However, demographic transformation concerns all Arab countries and everywhere it is bringing grandiose political change.

In **Morocco**, the fertility rate has decreased steadily since 1975 while life expectancy has increased. In the 2004 census, the fertility rate was at 2.47, which is quite low (cf. France: 2.02). The panel survey of 2009-2010 confirmed the decreasing trend (2.36), but the pace of decrease had slowed (-0.9% per year), which is logical at such low fertility rates. The fertility rate remained stable in urban areas, thenceforth predominant, at a sub-replacement fertility level (2.05 children per woman), the decrease involving only rural areas (2.8 as opposed to 3.0 children 5 years earlier).

In **Tunisia**, recent total fertility rates have for a decade now been below the replacement rate (2.10). The last one was calculated in 2009 and is 2.05. The difficulty common to all Maghreb countries is to predict future fertility now that rates have fallen so low. Several years ago, in 2002, Tunisian demographers had projected a very low fertility rate, of only 1.5. The most recent projections, in 2005, estimated a floor value of 1.75 as of 2024, that is, less than the values estimated by the United Nations – concerned with maintaining a certain global homogeneity – in their hypotheses. More recently, in 2009, the projected decrease is on a more modest scale: 2.01 by 2029, to stabilise thereafter.

**Algeria** has long stood out for its very high pre-transitional fertility rate, which surpassed that of Morocco and Tunisia by one child per woman. Its later transition than its neighbours is less due to
populationist and pro-natalist government policies than to the effects of the rentier economy. However, in two decades, the Algerian fertility rate has caught up with that of Tunisia and Morocco. But since 2000, contravening the laws of demographic transition, the fertility rate seems to be rising. The rise in fertility since 2000 is too significant to be ascribed to a statistics problem. It is perhaps even too significant to be ascribed to nothing but short-term factors, as improvement of the economic situation, an abatement of the crisis and a decrease in political violence, which would have increased the propensity to marriage – the country went from 280,000 marriages in 2005 to 341,000 in 2009 – and consequently to engender more children. Perhaps what is behind it is a revision of procreation strategies bringing Algerian demographics closer to that of the Middle East. In fact, this is not so. The rise in fertility rate is entirely due to the increase in marriages. Marital fertility has continued to decline. But it should be noted that the last survey (Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey – MICS 3, 2006) revealed a lower fertility than the Register Office: 2.27 as compared to 2.71.

Underpopulated and with a rentier economy, Libya has experienced a demographic transition similar to that of the oil-producing Gulf States. For a long time, official pro-natalism was rewarded by a generous redistribution of oil revenue. The oil counter-shock followed by the international embargo led the Libyan population towards Malthusianism. This country, one of the most enigmatic insofar as demographics, rarely discloses statistics. However, we have managed to ascertain that the Libyan fertility rate continued to decrease to reach 2.68 in 2003, a figure very close to that of Algeria.

The incredible stability of Egypt’s fertility rate contrasts with its current political instability. Or perhaps the former accounts for the latter? Despite an extremely high population density due to the fact that only 4 to 5% of the million-km² territory is habitable by a population of 85 million, the population continues to rise at the surreal rate of 2% per year. This strong growth is due to a very high fertility rate – considering the context – that shows no tendency towards stopping and has levelled off at over 3.02-3.25 children, i.e. 50% greater than Morocco or Tunisia. There is no single, simple explanation for this complex phenomenon. On the contrary, it can be ascribed to a whole series of cultural, political and ideological determinants, or associated with migratory flows that lead Egyptians to prefer the Persian Gulf as a destination over Europe, the destination chosen by Maghreb populations; with the consequences that this destination implies on choices of family planning.

This same stability is the case in Syria and Jordan. Despite the enormous progress made in both countries in education and the eradication of illiteracy, the fertility rate remains very high, surpassing 3.5 births per woman. The decrease in fertility quickly slowed down to practically disappear in the 1990s (3.5 births per woman in 2005). The latest health survey, effected in 2009-2010, confirms this stable, high fertility rate at 3.5 births. In Jordan, fertility is even higher (3.59) and has stabilised. Here also, as in Egypt, there is no simple reason but rather a combination of factors: the absolute patrilineality and the overbearing need to have a male descendant explains the fact that fertility has stabilised at such a high rate, in contrast to the Maghreb, where numerous couples have freed themselves of this categorical imperative. Confessional and regional rivalries, as well as those of ethnicity (Palestinians / Transjordanians) slightly curb the decrease in fertility rates by the effect of competition between different groups.

Lebanon, on the other hand, is an entirely different world – highly modern in its low fertility rate (1.69) and in the fact that this low rate has become the privilege of all confessional groups, from Maronites to Shiites, not to mention Greek Orthodox, Catholics, Sunnis and Druses. Here, the demographic rivalries occurring in the 1960s and 70s before the civil war and which contributed to fuelling it evaporated, giving way to a country appeased on the demographic level and pending appeasement on the political level as well.

The demographic transition in Turkey has greatly progressed, with a fertility rate of 2.09, thenceforth below the replacement rate. In other words, despite an Islamist government in power that is pro-natalist, as was the regime of Necmettin Erbakan, civil society and families can freely decide on the number of children they will have and are limiting births.

Another illustration of this phenomenon of dissociation is that of Iran, theoretically Islamist, where the fertility rate is even lower than in Turkey: (1.83). The difference between these two countries most likely resides in the fact that Iran has integrated its Kurdish minority better than Turkey, where Kurds display
a significantly higher fertility rate than the national average.
In fact, all of these trends were more or less expected according to our last assessment in 2007. The major surprise lies with the Israel-Palestine tandem, or rather with the demographic behaviour of Jews and Palestinians. The fertility rate among Jews has continually risen year after year, today reaching the symbolic threshold of 3 births per woman, whereas the rate continually falls among the Palestinians in the occupied territories: the West Bank (and Jerusalem-East), and even in the Gaza Strip, where it was at a world record high during the years of the First Intifada. Today the fertility rate is at only 3.5 births, which is low given the conflictive demographic situation (see Chart 28). The paradox is that Palestinian fertility is becoming more modern under the effect of the emergence of the individual, whose values are no longer societal values, whereas the fertility of Jews in Israel is becoming “Arabised”, subscribing to patriarchal norms, also therefore populationist, pro-family and pro-natalist, which are those of the Establishment in power since the creation of the Jewish State.

**A Demographic Reading of the Revolutions Underway**

The Arabs took the world by surprise, not only with their revolutions, but also due to the fact that it was Tunisia that lit the fuse. However, revolution was inevitable. Demography attests to this. The process experienced by Europe as of the 17th century spread throughout the world. It could not spare the Southern Mediterranean, which for four decades now has been experiencing the same demographic, cultural and anthropological transformations as Europe since Cromwell in England to Robespierre and the French Revolution, followed by other European revolutions up to Lenin in 1905-1917. The Arab world is not a preserve or an exception. To believe the contrary is to be essentialist, to invent a homo arabicus or a homo islamicus, by definition averse to progress.

The eradication of illiteracy, first among boys and then among girls, has brought the transformations we are currently experiencing.

The progression of education, the eradication of illiteracy, first among boys and then among girls, has brought the transformations we are currently experiencing. With the exception of the Lebanese Christians, who have benefitted from the presence of Christian missions and their universities since the 19th century, the Arab world began to metamorphose thanks to higher levels of education and decreases in fertility rates beginning in the 1960s in the most advanced countries. In certain countries, such as Tunisia under Bourguiba, there was the will...
to modernise by providing access to education for boys as well as for girls. In Morocco, this was the case under the first governments after independence, which had made education their priority before they put a damper on it because it could call into question political hierarchies. Until the accession of Mohammed VI to the throne, the highest levels of power at times blocked the advance of education. Which explains why Morocco is behind in literacy today, above all among girls and in rural areas.

**TABLE 18**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population in 2010 (thousands)</th>
<th>Recent Fertility Rate</th>
<th>Maximum Fertility Rate</th>
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<th>Literacy Rate</th>
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<th>GDP per capita (USD)</th>
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* National populations, not counting foreigners.


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The decrease in fertility rate, which has fallen to two children in the most advanced Maghreb countries, has been so strong that traditional values of a patriarchal nature have been shaken.

Generalised education has led to birth control and the use of contraceptive means, whose economic advantage need not be demonstrated, but which can be a temporary factor of uneasiness within families. The decrease in fertility rate, which has fallen to two children in the most advanced Maghreb countries, has been so strong that traditional values of a patriarchal nature have been shaken. The calling into question of the *pater familias* leads to the calling into question of all the “fathers of the people”, as has occurred in Tunisia and Egypt.

Moreover, endogamy, that is, isolation of the family group leading to closed social groups and rigid institutions is decreasing. A less endogamous society opens up to the outer world and is potentially more liable to revolt when it is under authoritarian or despotic governance. Generalised schooling and a decrease in birth rate can also indirectly cause greater awareness and revolts. These two elements lead to disruption of the family unit. The effects are both positive and negative. Positive, because when the parents limit their descent, they can care for their children better, feed them better and allow them to be educated better.
and longer. Thus, in a smaller family, the model towards which the Arab and Muslim family is moving, mother-father, parent-children interactions become more democratic, which cannot but have positive repercussions on society and politics. Negative, because, as these societies have been patriarchal, as soon as an educated child and a father who is illiterate yet holds absolute family power are living together, family life becomes troubled. Such family problems can temporarily lead to problems on a more general scale and partially account for Islamist phenomena.

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It is true that unemployed young Arab university graduates were the first to revolt. But from Morocco to Jordan, all age groups and genders were present among the protesters. In no case can the revolutions be considered an exclusive exploit of youth. Nor is it an Islamic revolution; this ground swell is essentially of secular origin.
The internal conflict in Libya has given rise to massive outflows of people to neighbouring countries. As of 26 April 2011, a total of 634,835 people had crossed from Libya into Egypt, Tunisia, Niger, Algeria, Sudan, Chad and Italy (UNHCR, 2011). The response of European countries has been mixed. On the one hand, European Union (EU) Member States and the EU as a whole have committed to providing financial support for both the short-term resolution of the emergency at the border and the long-term process of institution-building. On the other hand, countries such as France and Italy have panicked over the potential “invasion” of irregular migrants from Libya and Tunisia and lamented the lack of support shown by the EU. Notably, on 26 April 2011, both countries called for a revision of the Schengen system, as well as the possibility of temporarily establishing internal border controls in case of exceptional difficulties in handling common external borders. In fact, the changing and, at times, contradictory manner in which European countries have dealt with political turmoil in North Africa is not new. Overall, relations with third countries in North Africa in the sphere of migration, i.e. the so-called external dimension of migration policy, have long been fraught with tension. Against this backdrop, this paper provides a brief historical analysis of the ideas and practices framing the external dimension of European migration policy, with a specific focus on the cases of Tunisia and Libya.

The following analysis is divided into two sections. First, I define the concept of the external dimension and introduce the (mainly academic) debate on the issue. I will argue that the prevailing view is skewed towards criticism of the process for its inherently illiberal practices, which consolidate pre-existing power inequalities between countries. In brief, the process is taken to be a glaring example of the attempt by European states to circumvent international human rights obligations and thus shift the burden of managing migration to neighbouring countries. Against this general background, the second section provides an empirical analysis of Tunisian and Libyan negotiations with the EU on the subject of migration. Here one key idea will be put forward: the unfolding practices relating to the EU’s external border engender sources of leverage that benefit both migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries. The ongoing political turmoil in North Africa has consolidated this dynamic. European concern over large-scale arrivals from North Africa and the multiple cooperation initiatives intended to co-opt third countries into the EU’s external dimension agenda have provided countries such as Tunisia and Libya with greater political clout vis-à-vis their counterparts in Europe.

Defining the External Dimension of European Migration Policy

Since the outbreak of protests across North Africa, the issue of managing irregular migration across the Mediterranean has been at the centre of the European debate (Cassarino and Tocci, 2011). Particular attention has been given to the contentious practice whereby Southern European states, such as Italy, seek to prevent the arrival of migrants fleeing North Africa and, if possible, to return them to their country of origin (Geddes, 2008). Broadly speaking, the EU’s external dimension refers to cooperation between Member States, third countries and regional and international organisations on issues such as...
terrorism, organised crime, corruption, drugs and migration. Although definitions of externalisation in the area of migration are quite diverse, most observers seem to agree on one underlying feature: the process whereby European countries seek to transfer the location where migration control takes place outside their territorial borders is largely related to the gradual development of free movement within the EU and the consolidation of a single European external border enshrined in the Schengen Agreement. Externalisation takes numerous forms. Policies normally regarded as part and parcel of the EU’s external dimension include: migration missions to develop a dialogue on migration with third-country authorities; circular migration, defined as the movement of people (temporary in most cases) between two or more countries, which may be beneficial to all parties; and readmission agreements to ensure that third-country nationals illegally residing in Member States can be returned to their countries of origin. Another prominent manifestation of the externalisation of migration policy is the expanding collaboration between police authorities on both sides of the Mediterranean. This involves operational co-operation between border police, liaison officers, intelligence personnel and magistrates, as well as data exchange through the Schengen Information System (SIS) and technological cooperation on document fraud and the fingerprinting of asylum seekers. In connection with this, pre-border surveillance and joint offshore patrolling operations, such as those led by the European External Border Agency, FRONTEX, are taken as further examples of what has also been called the de-territorialisation of migration policies (Carrera, 2007).

Most academics concur that the content of these measures is consistently security-oriented. The European approach towards migration from third countries is framed in terms of security and addressed through security measures. This is evidenced by the fact that, despite the emphasis placed on the synergies between migration and development, EU expenditure is overwhelmingly focused on control measures. Accordingly, academics tend to unanimously condemn such policies as inherently illiberal. The “paranoid” xenophobic “delirium” contributes to the “globalisation of domination” that reproduces and consolidates power inequalities between states on both sides of the Mediterranean (Bigo, 1991). Similarly, such practices fall outside the purview of international legal standards and are likely to breach international human rights norms. Recent examples have included the notorious “push back” operations in 2009 and 2010 to Libya and Tunisia, in which the interception of migrants in international waters and their immediate return to third countries may have constituted a breach of the non-refoulement principle insofar as they may have been denied assistance and protection. Furthermore, the practice of transferring migrants to neighbouring countries is a marker of power relations between migrant-receiving and migrant-sending countries. Transit countries are under pressure from the EU to control migration and either prevent arrivals or readmit migrants who manage to reach Europe. In short, the attempt by European countries to move their borders southward is understood as a further example of the expansion of EU normative power. However, an empirical analysis of the collaboration of Tunisia and Libya with the EU does not support such an account. On numerous occasions, these countries have been reluctant to acquiesce to European requests to control their borders. As will be seen in the following sections, the external dimension of European migration policy thus reveals complex give-and-take bargaining arrangements that defy the prevailing consensus on the matter.

**Tracing Recent Cooperation Between the Two Shores of the Mediterranean**

Bilateral and multilateral relations between the EU and North African countries have largely taken place within the so-called Barcelona Process, launched in November 1995 and involving 15 EU Member States and 14 Mediterranean Partners Countries. The Barcelona Declaration formed the basis of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which was renamed in 2008, when it evolved into the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). With the consolidation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004 – regulating bilateral policy between the EU and each Partner Country – the Barcelona Process has become the multilateral forum for dialogue and cooperation between the EU and its Mediterranean partners. In fact, at present, bilateral relations are managed under the ENP and through Association Agreements signed with each Partner Country. Tunisia was the first Mediterranean Partner Country to sign an Association Agreement with the EU, on 17 July 1995. Under the terms of the Agreement,
which came into force on 1 March 1998, the two parties undertook to cooperate on political dialogue, trade and economic, social, cultural and migration issues. The Agreement envisions financial co-operation to support political and economic reforms in Tunisia. Accordingly, since then, Tunisia has been collaborating with the EU to promote the use of legal channels of migration, prevent irregular immigration, readmit migrants who have irregularly entered the EU and support activities led by FRONTEX. Since the revolution in Tunisia in January 2011, reforms have become even more central to EU-Tunisian negotiations.

In an effort to encourage institutional reforms, on 11 March 2011, the EU committed to strengthening its collaboration with Tunisia in four main areas: (1) preparation for the elections of the Constitutional Assembly scheduled to take place on 24 July 2011; (2) support for civil society organisations in Tunisia; (3) the promotion of human rights, mainly through the Tunisian League for the Defence of Human Rights, as well as other organisations active in the field; and (4) support for the three National Committees established by the interim government to support the process of democratic transition.

To support such wide-ranging reforms, the EU promised to double its financial assistance to Tunisia for the years 2012-2013 from €160 million to €320 million. In this package, migration-related issues are key. The EU has asked Tunisia to readmit those of its citizens who have fled to Italy. The request relates to the agreement signed between Italy and Tunisia on 5 April 2011 whereby Italy committed to providing Tunisia with specialised border-control equipment with a value of up to €30 million (Ministero dell’Interno, 2011). The agreement also allows the 20,000 Tunisians who have arrived in Italy since the so-called Jasmine Revolution to remain for at least six months with temporary residency permits. In turn, Tunisia agreed to accelerate and simplify return procedures for those Tunisians who arrived in Italy on or after 5 April. Reportedly, as of 29 April, 650 Tunisians had been repatriated to Tunisia (Migrants at Sea, 2011). Significantly, this practice can be considered an example of externalisation as defined above, insofar as possible human rights violations are concerned. Yet this is not the whole story. The “externalisation” provision comes as part of a wider package, including a whole range of incentives intended to secure Tunisian collaboration. Hence it can be argued that the evolving agreements on migration normally situated within the EU’s external dimension cannot be reduced merely to the transfer of responsibilities to third countries. Current events demonstrate that in discussions on migration, especially those taking place since the political upheavals across North Africa began, both parties have been able to employ and benefit from a certain degree of leeway. Consequently, rather than weakening third countries, externalisation provides them with new opportunities to engage with, and extract concessions from, EU Member States.

The case of Libya, while markedly different from Tunisia, especially given the ongoing internal conflict, also sheds light on the multiple ways in which migration has reduced the margin of action of European countries. The extent to which the EU, and Italy in particular, have sought to entice Libya into collaborating on migration has already been amply documented (Paoletti and Pastore, 2010). Following the lifting of European sanctions in 2004, Italy and the EU sought to formalise broad relations with Libya, especially in the area of migration. As regards Italian-Libyan relations in particular, between 1998 and 2008, numerous formal and informal agreements on migration were concluded. Especially following the signing of the Friendship Treaty in August 2008, migration flows from Libya declined dramatically. As part of this agreement Italy undertook to pay a total of $5 billion over 20 years as compensation for its colonial past. This package included investments in infrastructure, the largest project being a coastal motorway between the Egyptian and Tunisian borders. The agreement proved to be a turning point. Since then, according to the Italian Minister of the Interior, irregular migration from Libya to Italy has decreased by 90% (Camera dei Deputati, 2010). Until the civil war in 2011, relations with the EU, and in particular agreements on migration, saw major improvements.

On 12 November 2008, the EU launched negotiations on a wide-ranging Framework Agreement. After the release, in 2007, of the Bulgarian nurses and Palestinian doctor who had been detained, facing a possible death penalty, on charges of having infected Libyan children in a hospital in Benghazi, the European Commissioner Waldner-Ferrero announced an enhanced relationship between the EU and Libya. In fact, the proposed framework agreement was intended to cover, inter alia, economic and social development and “migration management.” Notably, this agreement was under discussion despite Libya
THE EUROPEAN ASYLUM SUPPORT OFFICE

On 19 May 2010, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union adopted a regulation establishing a European Asylum Support Office as part of the measures aimed at achieving the goals planned for completing the Common European Asylum System. The main function of the Office is to increase the coordination of operational cooperation between Member States in order to achieve a greater harmonisation of common rules and minimum standards through technical assistance and exchange of information and best practices. The Office is also intended to support Member States under particular pressure because of their geographical location or the sudden arrival of a large numbers of non-EU-country nationals by promoting the relocation of asylum seekers to other Member States, according to the principle of “burden sharing.” With this mandate, the Support Office was set up as an autonomous financial and administrative body of the Union with legal personality. According to the provisions of the regulation, the Office should operate in close cooperation with Member State asylum authorities and services, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the European Migration Network and the FRONTEX agency. The Commission first proposed the creation of a European Asylum Support Office in its Policy Plan on Asylum of June 2008 in order to reduce the great disparities between Member States in the procedures and conditions for granting international protection as well as the forms that such protection takes. Asylum became an integral part of the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Since then, the European Union has worked to make progress on the construction of a common asylum policy with a view to achieving higher standards of protection for asylum seekers. However, the adoption of minimum standards left Member States considerable discretion in the application of European measures. The Treaty of Amsterdam transferred the issue to the first pillar and laid down the basis for the adoption of binding measures on asylum issues. So far, four directives have been approved, drawing on the two main pillars of the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees: the definition of “refugee” and the principle of non-refoulement. The Dublin II system was put into force together with the “Eurodac” Regulation in order to establish the mechanisms and criteria to determine which State is competent for an asylum application lodged in a State by a third-country national. In the context of the “Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows” programme, the European Union has set up a fund of €614 million for the 2008-2013 period to support action of a non-profit nature addressed to refugees or beneficiaries of international protection.

being party neither to the Barcelona Process nor to the subsequent UfM. Nevertheless, the discussions addressed a variety of issues, including readmission agreements. In concomitance with the temporary closure of the UNHCR office in Libya on 9 June 2010, the EU and Libya began the seventh round of negotiations on migration and asylum. However, Libya continued to refuse to sign a readmission agreement. In fact, during this round of negotiations, the two sides signed a set of guidelines that included the priorities for the EU in its financial and technical contribution to Libya and left out the readmission clause. Shortly afterwards the Commission announced that the issue of readmission of irregular migrants from third countries would not be retained in the negotiations with the aim of reaching an agreement with Libya and finalising the process (Council of the European Union, 2010a).

In short, two inter-related points are relevant here. First, Libya has selectively adhered to all requests put forward by Italy and the EU. Second, until the EU froze the negotiations on the framework agreement on 22 February 2011, significant compromises had to be made by both Italy and the EU in order to secure Libya’s collaboration on migration. Notably, despite the escalating internal conflict in Libya and the imposition of the EU embargo on the country, Libya’s leader has continued to threaten European countries – though in vain – with the potential for massive in-flows of migrants from Libya onto European shores. A multifaceted picture thus emerges. Far from being a one-way transfer of ideas and practices, the external dimension of migration rests on changing bilateral and multilateral interactions in which North African countries have been capable of affecting the behaviour of their counterparts.

Conclusion

Countries on both sides of the Mediterranean have long used migration as a bargaining chip in their foreign policies. Importantly, the instrumental use of migration as a foreign policy tool applies to Libya as much as to other countries, for instance, in North or South America (Greenhill, 2010). As Aristide Zolberg observed as far back as 1982, the “deliberate action” of regulating immigration is fundamental to the nation-state system (Zolberg, 1982: 2-3). It has been amply acknowledged that ever since this system developed in its modern form, the right to regulate entry has been a fundamental concomitant of sovereignty (Zolberg, 1982). Simply put, the linkages of such movements of people to foreign policy are hardly new. In this sense, current events in the Mediterranean appear to follow established practice in foreign policy. The external dimension of EU migration policy lays bare the interactive, rather than...
unilateral, nature of the relations between the two sides of the Mediterranean.

While commentators and politicians have advocated international norms and the rule of law across North Africa, European discourses and practice have been driven by short-term electoral politics.

Overall, the external dimension of EU migration policy is not limited to the transfer of migration control enforcement measures outside European territory. A much more complex bargaining process is in the making. The changing cooperative arrangements that Tunisia and Libya have engaged in with the EU do not provide for the outright de-location of migration control mechanisms. This leads to two tentative conclusions. Firstly, the fears aroused by unfounded projections of massive arrivals to Italy expose the European “hypocrisy” gap. While commentators and politicians have advocated international norms and the rule of law across North Africa, European discourses and practice have been driven by short-term electoral politics (Greenhill, 2010). Secondly, the cooperation and tensions between countries on either side of the Mediterranean take multiple forms, which, for one, refute the one-sided account implicit in the externalisation mantra. Accordingly, the ongoing political instability across North Africa may invite a more nuanced investigation of the diffuse and multi-layered power dynamic underpinning the EU’s external dimension.

Bibliography


Islam in the Electoral Debate

Islam has become a major electoral issue in Europe with the rise of the so-called “populist” parties over the past few years. In the Netherlands, the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV), led by right-wing populist MP Geert Wilders, won 17% of votes in the 2009 European elections and 20.5% in the legislative elections in June 2010, putting it in third place behind the two major traditional parties (the liberal and labour parties). In October 2010, the Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitlichen Partei Österreichs, FPÖ), founded by Jörg Haider and currently led by Heinz-Christian Strache, gained 27% of votes in the Vienna municipal elections, where it ranked as the second party. In Denmark, the Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF), led by Pia Merete Kjærsgaard, also ranked third in the 2007 parliamentary elections, with 13.9% of the votes. In Finland, the April 2011 elections put the new nationalist party, True Finns (Perussuomalaiset, PS), in third position as well, with 19% of the votes. In France, the National Front (Front national, FN), now led by Marine Le Pen (since 2011), attains ratings comparable to the other two major parties (UDF and PS), according to surveys. In Sweden, the new extreme right-wing party, the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna, SD) appeared in parliament in September 2010, with 5.7% of votes. Finally, the Swiss referendum of November 2009 banning the construction of minarets should also be mentioned. In addition, two parliaments (in Belgium and France) passed a law banning the use of the Islamic burqa in public.

We can thus see that in many European countries, a “populist” party focussing its campaign on the Islamic “threat” in Europe is neck and neck with the two traditional major parties (usually the conservative right and the social-democrat left). Yet in other countries where populism has not formed a new political party (Britain, Spain, Germany), or where it is developing on the basis of other issues (ethnic nationalism, separatism) as in Belgium or Italy, the debate on Islam still plays an important role in political controversies, as shown by the success of the book, Deutschland schafft sich ab (Germany Does Away with Itself), by Thilo Sarrazin, member of the Social Democrat Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, SPD), which was a best-seller in the autumn of 2010, or the role played by the controversy over the construction of a mosque in the municipal elections of Milan in June 2011.

Yet such a rise of populism raises the question of the movement’s nature. It was in the 1980s that immigration became the favourite war horse of the European extreme right (the Front national in France, the British National Party in Britain), but there are two new developments today. First of all, the debate is less about immigration than about Islam, as if even the opponents of immigration had come to recognize that immigrants are in Europe to stay and that the fundamental issue is that of their integration into the European landscape. Hence the fact that debate focuses above all on the presence of religious symbols in the public space: veils, burqas, minarets and halal meat (in 2011, the Dutch parliament banned both halal and kosher ritual slaughter), but also the presence of crucifixes in Italian schools (which means there is no symmetry or equality between Christianity and Islam). The issue of Islam predominates in the immigration debate. The second ele-
ment that explains the breakthrough of populist parties is their transformation from the fascist extreme right emerging in the 1930s to a new category integrating values that were hitherto left-wing.

The Transformation of Populist Parties

Parties that make their hostility to Islam the focal point of their campaigns are often classified as far right when, in fact, things are more complicated. Some certainly have historical roots in the far right, as the National Front in France or the FPÖ in Austria, but others, such as the Dutch PVV or the Danish People’s Party, have recently formed through a coalition of nationalists and secularists, the latter often coming from the left, and united by their common hostility to Islam; they are often associated with a “sovereignist,” eurosceptic position. In economics, they are not necessarily liberal like the traditional right: the Danish PP endorses the Social-Democratic concept of the “welfare state.” On the issue of morals and values, many endorse the sexual liberation of the 1960s and defend feminism and gay rights, as is the case with the Dutch PVV, thus attracting traditionally left-wing voters. Moreover, this secular and liberal positioning on the issue of values allows them to reject Islam as contrary to freedom of individual choice. But of course, this is not without contradiction, because the Catholic Church opposes the sexual liberation of the 1960s. Populist parties thus defend a Christian identity of a “secularised” Europe unrelated to the current teachings of the Church. It is even more complicated when a party moves from a traditional extreme right position to modern populism. In France, for example, since the election of Marine Le Pen as president of the party, the National Front strives to tone down traditional extreme-right references (latent anti-Semitism, defence of family values, economic liberalism) and emphasizes the defence of secularism.

The debate on Islam has upset the traditional division between left and right in the majority of European countries, which were thus far characterized by right-wing endorsement of traditional Christian values, its economic liberalism and its hostility to immigration, while the left was liberal regarding the values of society, in favour of greater state control regarding the economy and more open to immigration.

Absence of a Muslim Vote

Whereas populists see Muslims as a community united around their faith, the political behaviour of Muslims in Europe shows, on the contrary, their low level of politicization and their high level of diversity. In the absence of statistics, it is difficult to gain an overview of the electoral behaviour of European Muslims. The first point to consider is, of course, the issue of citizenship. For Muslims to be able to vote, they have to be citizens, and most likely only in France and Britain is there a sufficient mass of Muslim voters to have some weight, in theory, in elections. But two other factors also play a role: voter registration (as well as abstention) and the election method.

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The presence of people of Muslim origin in national parliaments does not, in fact, reflect their demographic weight in the country, and paradoxically, does not reflect their degree of integration either. The reason is the electoral system. In France, for instance, a country that has the largest Muslim community in Europe and where integration (particularly linguistic) is progressing, there is not a single Muslim member of parliament in Metropolitan France (with the exception, therefore, of the overseas departments). On the other hand, Germany (7 MPs of Muslim origin from a total of 640), the Netherlands (7 “practicing” Muslim MPs and 7 non-practicing ones from a total of 150), Great Britain (8 Muslim MPs from a total of 650), Belgium (4 MPs elected in 2005) and Greece (2 MPs) show greater diversity, although in most of the cases mentioned, integration is far from being considered a success by either the authorities or public opinion. The reason for the discrepancies between integration and representation are electoral laws. Muslim representation can emerge in two cases: 1) in a list system (Germany, Holland, Belgium), which allows parties to get candidates of immigrant origin into eligible positions; and 2) in a first-past-the-post system if the
Believing that no dialogue project can be successful if it is not based on the scientific understanding of the deep transformations affecting the societies to which it is addressed, in 2008, the Anna Lindh Foundation embarked on the development of the Anna Lindh Report on Euromed Intercultural Trends. Conceived as a tool for knowledge and action on cross-cultural relations in the Mediterranean region, the Report is a scientific publication issued every three years that presents an analysis of the evolution of the values, mutual perceptions and intercultural behaviour of people around the Mediterranean. It is a pioneering and “democratic” study, since it gathers the opinions and aspirations of a sample of 13,000 people from the Euromed region through a public opinion poll conducted by Gallup Europe.1 An international pool of intercultural experts interprets the results of the poll and provides qualitative analyses on issues of major concern for the promotion of intercultural dialogue. In the 2010 Report, the topics analysed by the experts include, among others: differences and similarities in value systems; the religious factor in intercultural relations; media treatment of cultural diversity (the focus of the Report’s thematic dossier); the role of culture in Mediterranean relations; intercultural citizenship; human mobility; Islam, the West and modernity; and regional cooperation and the Union for the Mediterranean. The analysis is enriched with good practice and case studies on intercultural dialogue recommended by the Anna Lindh Foundation’s network of civil society organisations. The Report itself can be considered a product of intercultural cooperation among more than 40 experts from 20 different countries committed to the promotion of a new narrative of Euro-Mediterranean relations that goes beyond the traditional North/South or Islam/West dichotomies. In fact, the poll results show that the Mediterranean exists as a space for social interaction in which at least one in every four people had the chance to meet or talk with a person from the opposite shore of the Mediterranean during the previous year. In this regard, social media are the main tool for intercultural interaction for Arab youth (24%). In terms of values, it is interesting to note that, even though religion is the main value for the Southern Mediterranean (62%), and respect for other cultures is a central priority for Europeans (58%), there is a certain convergence between Europeans (56%) and Southern Mediterraneans (41%) on the recognition of the importance of family solidarity, and they also share a vision of the region as a space with a common heritage, a sense of hospitality and a specific lifestyle (80%). The people interviewed showed a high level of mutual interest. In particular, 68% showed interest in cultural life, 58% in economic conditions and 51% in religious practices. They also believed that a future common Mediterranean project could lead to more innovation and entrepreneurship, youthful dynamism and respect for cultural diversity. We can therefore state that if any clash exists between the people on the two sides of the Mediterranean, it is a clash of misperceptions related to a lack of deep knowledge of the other.

Based on these findings, the Report presents a range of proposals for intercultural dialogue policies and guidelines for intercultural action at the local and international level addressed to policymakers, opinion leaders and civil society. Furthermore, the contents of the Report were used as the basis for a series of debates carried out in collaboration with the Anna Lindh Networks and academic partners and involving media practitioners and social leaders. The Anna Lindh Report can be downloaded in English, French and Arabic at www.annalindhreport.org.

Eleonora Insalaco
Coordinator of the Anna Lindh Report

1 The following 13 countries were surveyed in the opinion poll conducted by Gallup Europe for the 2010 edition of the Anna Lindh Report: Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, Egypt, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Lebanon, Morocco, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Turkey and the UK.
Today, on the world stage, “mobility” and “intercultural dialogue” are an everyday phenomenon. However, given the urgency of policy, both nations and local authorities (or coalitions and networks of either) will not regret taking the time to study these terms, for any confusion as to their meaning could have costly consequences. Collectively, these authorities approach future policies in different, even antagonistic ways, and each level of power will have to quickly express its choices and strategies. “Mobility and dialogue, yes, but with what aim?” is a burning question that calls for some political observation.

To attempt to make this indispensable clarification, one should examine everything that may have contributed to bringing about change since the point when unequal colonial relations were formally eliminated, a point that we can establish more or less precisely as the 1960s, which witnessed simultaneously – and this is not a coincidence – the independence of African countries and the emergence of Europe.

**Paradigm Shift**

This continuum is still underway, but, apart from the fact that it is driven by the increasing importance of cooperation tools, today it is impelled by two paradigm shifts, two outcomes that directly affect the subject of this article:

1. Particularly in the Mediterranean, the notion of “intercultural dialogue” has essentially been driven by inter-ministerial relations, a “dialogue of Culture Ministries”, rather than by a dialogue between Cultures themselves, as a sort of continuation of the “diplomacy of influence,” even recently evoked by the preceding French Foreign Affairs Minister (cf. Bernard Kouchner’s scoping document on cultural diplomacy, September 2009: “Globalization is accompanied by heightened competition in all domains. The prosperity and security of our country, the promotion of our interests and our values require a strengthened capacity to project our language, our culture, our ideas, our vision of society and the world,” in Réforme de la Politique Culturelle Extérieure, 26 December 2009). Furthermore, such intercultural dialogue is essentially organized around inter-State cultural relations.

Naturally, all logistics aspects associated with this level of exchange, and in particular, the funding of cultural or artistic mobility, have been traditionally integrated in the related budget lines. The aim of cultural mobility was clearly associated with the showcasing national or local cultures and rarely understood as a development factor.

But after two decades, in a nearly mechanical manner and as an effect associated with the construction of the EU, the political impact of regional development funds is reinforcing a certain empowerment of local and regional authorities, establishing a gradual convergence of local authorities towards a sort of differentiated federalism where the local cultural identity, possibly reinforced by the need to consolidate an “attractiveness for tourism,” plays an essential role, both for better and for worse.

In addition, in the era of the globalisation of conflicts, paradox would have it that a certain number of tensions, often associated with causes of a cultural order, seem impossible to regulate by the sole will of national diplomacies.
“Neighbourly discussion” is often the only key to thorny, age-old conflicts. We are thus witnessing a downslide of sovereignty and the emergence of a regional or local diplomacy alongside national diplomacy. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that one of the framework documents for local cultural policies, Agenda 21 for Culture, was produced by the global network of local governance, United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG).

In the Mediterranean, the notion of “intercultural dialogue” has essentially been driven by interministerial relations, a “dialogue of Culture Ministries,” rather than by a dialogue between Cultures themselves.

2. On the EU level, the Treaty of Lisbon, instituting competitiveness and creativity, has reinforced the missions and goals of local officials in the matter.

In the face of their constituency, no local policymaker, whatever their political colours, would dare to claim that creativity and power of attraction are useless for the local societal model. It follows that the common future of the inhabitants of these local areas cannot be imagined without high-skilled, creative individuals, which also explains the acceleration of the “transfer of interest for the artistic phenomenon” from the State to local authorities, which, we must recall, were already the main funders in many cases. This trend has been inevitably accompanied by an international, or more precisely, “extra-local” positioning of local authorities, this power of attraction being obviously oriented towards the outside world. Combined with the indisputable “European Cultural Capital” effect (promoting the local level, of which no State would wish to deprive itself, although candidacies have followed one another with uneven success), said transfer of interest and goals would be consolidated through a certain number of international treaties such as the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (CCD, 2005), which also insists on the territorial dimension of Culture, as well as on its contribution to local development, or the Lisbon Treaty, which emphasizes the need, induced by competitiveness, for alliances among local authorities within the EU. Like all international treaties, the latter two engagements are intended to be binding, and even if we can doubt whether they would be enforced, they are still wholly unambiguous symbols of engagement. Local authorities know this just as well as States.

What Has Happened over the Past Five Years in the Sphere of Mobility?

It is difficult to provide an exhaustive answer to this question, considering that the communication of the majority of mobility operators has been highly concentrated on the local area and their beneficiaries, without necessarily seeking global communication, and that it is difficult to know all the initiatives taken in this domain. It seems this level of purely factual information has not sufficiently nourished the fundamental debate emerging now.

Under the form of a colloquium, at the initiative of the Roberto Cimetta Fund with the support of the Institut Français, an important general meeting of mobility operators was held in Fez, Morocco, from 12 to 14 May 2006. It allowed the opportunity to set out several major shared principles, take stock of existing ones and present several foundational texts. More recently, on 13 September 2010, on the initiative of the European Commission and the Roberto Cimetta Fund, the essential organisations concerned with the mobility of artists and operators, whether from Europe, Africa or the Arab World, met in Brussels under the form of an informal “think tank” to compare one another’s modes of operation, but above all to compare experiences underway and attempt to define common issues.1

1 The organisations invited were the following, all of them involved on one level or another with these issues: the Roberto Cimetta Fund, Gulbenkian Foundation, Safar Fund, European Cultural Foundation, the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie, Arts Move Africa, the Prince Claus Fund for Culture and Development, Felix Meritis Foundation, Young Arab Theatre Fund, Arab Education Forum, TransEuropéennes and the Ford Foundation.
Without great difficulty, a definite convergence has emerged around several principles. Their evolution should be understood as a logical consequence of the paradigm shifts discussed above. These principles all tend not to restrict mobility to a simple trip, none of the above-mentioned organizations wishing to be relegated to the sole function of “specialized travel agency.”

“Equitability” requires balanced relations between operators and artistes from the South and the North; but, coordinators of cultural partnerships are all too rarely from the South, which means that the majority of projects are steered and influenced by operators from the North.

These principles can be divided into two categories: those that directly protect human rights; and those that act specifically on site.

- In the chapter on rights, “equitability” requires balanced relations between operators and artistes from the South and the North. However, it must be noted that coordinators of cultural partnerships are all too rarely from the South, which means that the majority of projects are steered and therefore invariably influenced by operators from the North, even though they may demonstrate the best will. This is an unflinching indicator that, although it does immediately point to a real need in training and structuring, it also brings into question the legitimacy of a “Nordic criterization” in the face of a possibly different project culture in the South.

- By the same token, the importance of cultural mobility as a factor of peace, emissary of cultural diversity and facilitator of dialogue has been pointed out repeatedly by professionals in the sector, but does not seem to be perceived as yet in an operational manner by policymakers. They are yet to be convinced of the importance of the cultural phenomenon both in emergence and in conflict resolution.

- Finally, understanding hospitality as a shared investment rather than a charitable act is an idea difficult to grasp due to our traditional morals, both in the South and the North, and it is not surprising that this conservatism remains ignorant of the potential benefits that could be obtained from reciprocal visits. There is, however, apart from real economies of scale, the embryo of mutual respect, much more important than the flitting compassion generated by the media. Hospitality is a window of knowledge, an enrichment. Turning these principles into concrete action in the field obliges the experts providing travel grants to comply with three conditions:

  - The first most certainly concerns the imperative need to structure teams and territories. The beneficiary is no longer taking a one-way trip. Until very recently, the aim consisted in locating and attracting the best artists in the South and relocating them to European terrain, where their creativity served the image interests of our leaders, or the material interests of our cultural enterprises. This modus operandi, which, after the different countries had won their independence, gradually took the place of real cooperation, emptied these countries of their “creative raw material,” impoverishing them as surely as the pillage of their physical resources, and, it must be said, often with the complicity of the political elite of those countries.

  - Understanding hospitality as a shared investment rather than a charitable act is an idea difficult to grasp due to our traditional morals, both in the South and the North. A mobility grant can only be justified by the structuring effect that the recipients will bring to their countries of origin. The paradox of such a trip is that its benefits are measured more upon return of the traveller than during the trip.

  - This need for structuring naturally implies a principle of returns on investment. One can thus consider the travel grant as a down payment, an instance of collective “risk-taking” as-
sumed by the financiers of the mobility funds whose objective is to work towards the emergence of international artistic collaboration. In this regard, it could be useful to attempt to quantify the “investment/benefits” ratio of such aid. For many artists and operators, an airline ticket can represent several months’ wages, but its cost remains an extremely good investment in view of the chain of benefits it can generate. We then move from the vision of individual benefit to that of a collective dynamic. It is always wise to put into perspective the amount of the travel grant and the amount of its expected economic benefits. In any case, it is a comparison of figures that cannot leave the experts concerned indifferent.

- Expecting benefits amounts to considering the time factor. Each trip occurs within a long term, within the continuum of development action. The experts in charge of the selection will no doubt be sensitive to this factor. Yet the sustainability and structuring of teams and territories cannot be combined or conceived without a project for a societal model. The individual journey should lead to reflection on the beneficiary’s position in the collective space, and should be understood as a privileged moment of political awareness. Conversely, the community must accept this individual perspective, made exterior by the journey, and accept the reform that could arise therefrom.

Conclusions

Let us conclude with this project for a societal model. Predicting the time frame also means broadening the debate. In the South Mediterranean, 70% of the population is less than twenty years old. When all of these generations are old enough to travel, thousands of artists and operators will assert their right to travel the world. Will we have to create an enormous international mobility fund to meet their legitimate claim? Or, on the contrary, will the principles of democracy have they given rise to real local cultural policies, developed in collaboration with citizens in order to meet their needs? Will this societal model have the necessary linkage of biodiversity / cultural diversity / democratic pluralism built into its DNA? Will it have acknowledged the essential role of culture as a developer, peacemaker and liberator?

If the answer is yes, international mobility funds will become useless, for it will be the local authorities that will invent, adapt and control all expenses relevant to the local community, including investment in the mobility of its brightest minds, perceived as a shared process of enrichment.

If the answer is no, pressure and injustice will be so great that mobility will have given way to exodus with no return, administrative travel, ghettos and conflict. The issue is moving away from global competition between nations and it is the ensemble of local political decisions on a project for society that will definitively address mobility hopes.
Appendices
Map A.1 | Economic Crisis in the EU. Basic Indicators

**Annual Growth of the GDP. 2009-2010**
EU27 Average 2%

**Unemployment Rate. December 2010**
EU27 Average 9.5%

**Growth of the GDP, between the 4th quarters of 2009 and 2010 (by %)**
- Less than -1%
- Between -1% and 1%
- Between 1% and 2%
- Between 2% and 3%
- Between 3% and 5%
- Over 5%

**Harmonized unemployment rates (by %)**
- Over 15%
- Between 15% and 12%
- Between 12% and 9.5%
- Between 9.5% and 7.5%
- Between 7.5% and 5%
- Under 5%

**Public Deficit 2010**
EU27 Average=6.4%

**Public Debt 2010**
EU27 Average=80%

**Public Deficit (-)/Surplus (+) as a % of GDP**
- Deficit greater than -30%
- Deficit between -31% and -30%
- Deficit between -29% and -9%
- Deficit between -9% and 6.4%
- Deficit between -6.4% and -4%
- Deficit between -4% and 0%
- Surplus

**Public debt as a % of GDP**
- Over 100%
- Between 100% and 90%
- Between 90% and 80%
- Between 80% and 80%
- Between 50% and 30%
- Under 30%

Own production. Source: Eurostat, Eurostatistics. Data for short term economic analysis. 05/11.
Map A.2 | Civil War in Libya (February 16 - April 29)


Questions:
Results are the average on a scale of 0-10. (0 Very disappointing – 10 Very positive)

1. B.1 What is your global assessment of the results of the Euromediterranean Partnership/Union for the Mediterranean in the from July 2008-September 2010 period?

2. B.3 How would you assess progress made regarding the setting up of the UfM Secretariat between November 2008 and September 2010?

3. B.4 Do you expect the Secretariat to play a key, moderate or negligible role in the new Euromediterranean institutional architecture in the near future?

4. B.5 How do you assess the importance of the Summits of Heads of State or Government for the advancement of the Union for the Mediterranean?

C.4 How would you assess the progress of the implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area between the EU and the Mediterranean Partner Countries? Results for the FTA in general and for each of the Mediterranean Partner Countries under the operative Association Agreement.

Average value of the responses on a scale of 0-10. (0=Very disappointing – 10=Very positive)

- Less than 5
- From 5 to 6
- More than 6

C.5.1 a How would you assess the Impact of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Areas on the economies of the Mediterranean Partner Countries in terms of growth and competitiveness, social impact, impact on Small- and Medium-sized enterprises and fiscal impact?

C.5.2 How would you assess the impact of the EU-Turkey Customs Union (established in 1996) on the Turkish economy?
ALGERIA
From early 2011 on demonstrations and protests, often violently repressed, take place continually. On April 15 Bouteflika’s announcement of constitutional reforms is greeted with skepticism by different opposition groups.

EGYPT
On January 25 mass demonstrations take place in the principal Egyptian cities. Demonstrators occupy Tahrir Square in Cairo. Demonstrations continue in the following days. On January 29 Mubarak dissolves his government but protests continue. The army decides not to intervene against the demonstrators. On February 11 Mubarak abandons the presidency and power reverts to the armed forces. Rallies continue with smaller followings. On March 19 constitutional reform is approved in a referendum. Presidential elections are projected for September.

TUNISIA
As of December 2010 protests against unemployment and corruption spread, resulting in the flight of Ben Alí on January 14. After the third prime minister, elections are set for October 23.

EGYPT
On January 25 mass demonstrations take place in the principal Egyptian cities. Demonstrators occupy Tahrir Square in Cairo. Demonstrations continue in the following days. On January 29 Mubarak dissolves his government but protests continue. The army decides not to intervene against the demonstrators. On February 11 Mubarak abandons the presidency and power reverts to the armed forces. Rallies continue with smaller followings. On March 19 constitutional reform is approved in a referendum. Presidential elections are projected for September.

TUNISIA
As of December 2010 protests against unemployment and corruption spread, resulting in the flight of Ben Alí on January 14. After the third prime minister, elections are set for October 23.

LIBYA
From mid-December on, protests against the Gaddafi regime are continual. The violent repression leads in a few days to a situation of armed confrontation between the government and rebels in control of Benghazi and other cities to the East. On March 17 the UN Security Council establishes a no-fly zone over Libya. On March 19 the international alliance begins bombing of Gaddafi military objectives. As of the 24th, NATO assumes military command of the mission while on the ground both sides wage continual offensives and counter-offensives.

MOROCCO
On February 20, 2011 a series of demonstrations demanding greater democracy begin. On March 9 the king announces in-depth constitutional reform. Mobilizations continue as political and economic reforms are prepared. Constitutional referendum is set for July 1.

JORDAN
From January on demonstrations take place demanding greater democracy, economic betterment and an end to corruption. On February 1 the king replaces the entire government. Demonstrations continue throughout the year despite King Abdullah’s announcement of a reform plan that the government does not quite carry out.

SYRIA
In February demonstrations in support of the Egyptian revolt evolve into a series of protests in favor of greater political freedom. Throughout February and March both protests and repression intensify. On March 29 Bashar Al-Assad forces the government to resign. On April 19 the state of emergency is lifted after 48 hours but demonstrations and their violent repression by the army continue despite continuing announcements of reform and dialogue by the regime.
Map A.6 | Border Movements of the Libyan Population During the Conflict

- **Tunisia**: 264,293 (26% Tunisians)
- **Algeria**: 13,962 (12% Algerians)
- **Niger**: 75,621 (96% Nigerians)
- **Chad**: 45,116 (99% Chadians)
- **Sudan**: 1,454
- **Egypt**: 189,812 (58% Egyptians)

*Does not include border movements of Libyans. According to the IOM, 194,000 Libyans crossed the border with Egypt, of whom 180,000 have returned to Libya. The border with Tunisia was crossed by 400,000 Libyans of whom 281,000 have returned.

Data Status 5 July 2011.

Own production. Source: IOM.

Map A.7 | Direct Investment by China in Southern Mediterranean Countries

- **Total Chinese FDI in 2009 (in millions of $)**
  - Less than 10 million
  - Between 10 and 30 million
  - Between 30 and 50 million
  - Between 50 and 300 million
  - Over 300 million


Own production. Source: MOFCOM.
The Logistics Performance Index (LPI) is the weighted average of countries’ scores in six key areas:

- **Customs**: Efficiency of the clearance process (i.e., speed, simplicity, and predictability of formalities) by border control agencies, including Customs.
- **Infrastructures**: Quality of trade and transport related infrastructure (e.g., ports, railroads, roads, information technology).
- **International shipments**: Ease of arranging competitively priced shipments.
- **Logistic competence**: Competence and quality of logistics services (e.g., transport operators, customs brokers).
- **Tracking and tracing**: Ability to track and trace consignments.
- **Timeliness**: Timeliness of shipments in reaching destination within the scheduled or expected delivery time.

The indicators appear on a scale of 1-5, from poorest to highest performance.
Main trading partners of Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1- EU (27)</td>
<td>74,016.9</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2- Russia</td>
<td>16,205.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3- China</td>
<td>10,184.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4- US</td>
<td>8,601.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5- Switzerland</td>
<td>4,374.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6- Iraq</td>
<td>4,362.8</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7- Iran</td>
<td>3,879.7</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8- Ukraine</td>
<td>3,004.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9- Algeria</td>
<td>2,753.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10- UAE</td>
<td>2,559.7</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Volume of trade in millions of euros (2009)

- Less than 1,000
- From 1,000 to 1,500
- From 1,500 to 2,000
- From 2,000 to 2,500
- Over 2,500

Direct foreign investment in Turkey by sector (millions of $)

- Gas, electricity and water supply: 2,040
- Financial intermediation: 1,575
- Construction: 391
- Wholesale and retail trade: 310
- Real estate operations, rental and commercial: 282
- Other manufactured products: 620
- Transport, storage and communications: 199
- Extraction from mines and quarries: 195
- Basic metals and metal products (excluding machinery): 160
- Food products, beverages and tobacco: 145
- Other: 343

Own production. Sources: EU DG Trade and www.invest.gov.tr on the basis of data from the Central Bank of Turkey.
Map A.10 | Commercial Agricultural Balance and Evolution of the Price of Food

Commercial agricultural balance (2008)
- Red: Net importers above 5 billion dollars
- Orange: Net importers between 2 billion and 5 billion dollars
- Yellow: Net importers between 1 billion and 2 billion dollars
- Yellow-green: Net importers between 500 million and 1 billion dollars
- Green: Net importers between 0 and 500 million dollars
- Red-green: Net exporters between 0 and 2 billion dollars
- Yellow-green-red: Net exporters between 2 billion and 7 billion dollars
- Green-yellow-red: Net exporters above 7 billion dollars

Evolution of the price of food (2006-2010)
- Total CPI
- Food CPI

Own production. Source: FAO and ILO.
Fixed Broadband Subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (2009)

- Less than 2%
- Between 2% and 5%
- Between 5% and 15%
- Between 15% and 20%
- Between 20% and 25%
- Over 25%

Evolution in cell phone use (2002-2009)
per 100 inhabitants

Digital gap
Fixed Broadband Subscriptions per 100 inhabitants

Fixed Broadband Internet Access Tariff

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>$ per month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYROM</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: ITU.
Map A.12 | Population Structure by Age (2010)

Population between 15 and 24 years

- Represents 100,000 inhabitants between 15 and 24

Population 65 and over

- Represents 100,000 inhabitants over 65

Objective (3A) of Millennium Development Goal 3 is to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 2005, and at all levels by 2015. It is measured by the following indicators:

- Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education
- Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector
- Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament

| Year | Albania | Argentina | Bulgaria | Cambodia | China | Croatia | Cyprus | Czech Republic | Denmark | Egypt | France | Greece | Hungary | India | Indonesia | Iran | Iraq | Israel | Italy | Jordan | Kenya | Korea | Kyrgyzstan | Laos | Latvia | Lebanon | Lithuania | Luxembourg | Madagascar | Malaysia | Malta | Mauritania | Mexico | Morocco | Mozambique | Myanmar | Nepal | Netherlands | New Zealand | Nicaragua | Nigeria | Norway | Oman | Pakistan | Panama | Peru | Philippines | Poland | Portugal | Qatar | Romania | Russian Federation | Samoa | Sao Tome and Principe | Saudi Arabia | Senegal | Serbia | Seychelles | Sierra Leone | Singapore | Slovakia | Slovenia | Somalia | South Africa | South Korea | Spain | Sri Lanka | Sweden | Switzerland | Syrian Arab Republic | Tanzania | Thailand | Togo | Turkey | Uganda | Ukraine | United Arab Emirates | United Kingdom | United States | Uruguay | Uzbekistan | Venezuela | Viet Nam | Yemen | Zambia | Zimbabwe |
|------|---------|-----------|----------|----------|-------|---------|--------|---------------|---------|-------|--------|--------|---------|-------|----------|------|------|--------|-------|--------|------|-------|---------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 2000 | Less than 15% | From 15% to 20% | From 20% to 40% | From 40% to 45% | From 45% to 50% |
| 2010 | Less than 15% | From 15% to 20% | From 20% to 40% | From 40% to 45% | From 45% to 50% |

Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural sector

The indicator shows the extent to which women have access to paid employment, which will affect their integration into the monetary economy. It also indicates the degree to which labour markets are open to women in industry and service sectors which affects not only equal employment opportunities for women but also economic efficiency through flexibility of the labour market and the economy’s capacity to adapt to changes over time.

Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament

The proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments is the number of seats occupied by women in the single chamber or lower chamber in national parliaments, expressed as a percentage of all the seats. This indicator covers the single chamber in unicameral parliaments and the lower chamber in bicameral parliaments. It does not cover the upper chamber of bicameral parliaments.

Ratios of girls to boys in primary, secondary and tertiary education

Ratio of girls to boys (gender parity index) in primary, secondary and tertiary education is the ratio of the number of female students enrolled at primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education to the number of male students in each level. The data from each country for the years 2000 and 2010 have been used (or the closest available data).
Map A.14 | Official Bilateral Aid to Development among Mediterranean Countries

Main Mediterranean recipients of the Mediterranean donors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Volume of ODA (in millions of $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>170.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>124.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>349.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Main Mediterranean destinations of bilateral ODA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Volume of ODA (in millions of $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>114.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>46.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>588.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of bilateral ODA going to Mediterranean countries

- Less than 8%
- Between 8% and 16%
- Between 16% and 24%
- Over 24%

Volume and percentage of the total ODA of the donor country

- Between 1% and 2.5%
- Between 2.5% and 5%
- Between 5% and 10%
- Between 10% and 15%
- Over 15%

Main donors to Mediterranean recipient countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Volume of ODA (in millions of $)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>238.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>190.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>97.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>426.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentage of ODA received from Mediterranean countries

- Less than 10%
- Between 10% and 20%
- Between 20% and 30%
- Between 30% and 50%
- Over 50%

Volume of ODA received and main donor countries (in millions of $)

- US: 394.6
- France: 58.9
- Germany: 39.8
- Total: 473.3

Own production. Source: Database of the OECD DAC.
Map A.15 | Dependence for Income on International Tourism and Cruise Traffic in the Mediterranean

Dependence for income on international tourism
(as a % of exports)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Less than 7%</th>
<th>From 7% to 10%</th>
<th>From 10% to 15%</th>
<th>From 15% to 20%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From 20% to 25%</td>
<td>From 25% to 30%</td>
<td>Over 30%</td>
<td>Data not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cruise passenger traffic
(ports belonging to MedCruise)*

| Under 50,000 | From 50,000 to 250,000 | From 250,000 to 500,000 | From 500,000 to 1,000,000 | Over 1,000,000 |

*Does not include ports of the Black Sea countries belonging to MedCruise

Own production. Source: WB and MedCruise.
### Map A.16 | EU Residents from Mediterranean Member Countries

#### Principal countries of origin of residents from the MPC in EU countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Residence from EU (%)</th>
<th>Residence from outside EU (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>MA 59.9% 0.4%</td>
<td>EG 12.3% 0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>MA 35.5% 13.1%</td>
<td>FR 32.8% 18.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Foreign residents from the MPC as a % of total foreign residents

- **Less than 2.5%**
  - Portugal: MA 59.9%, EG 12.3%
  - Morocco: MA 35.5%, FR 32.8%

- **From 2.5% to 5%**
  - From 5% to 15%
  - From 15% to 25%
  - From 25% to 50%
  - Over 50%

#### Ratio of residents in Europe to the total population of the country of origin

- **Less than 1%**
  - From 1-2%
  - From 2-3%
  - From 3-4%
  - Over 4%

---

*Own production. Source: See Section 6.4 of the Yearbook.*
CROATIA
- Otok singing
- Gingerbread craft from northern Croatia
- The Sinjska Alka, a knights’ tournament in Sinj
- Two-part singing and playing in the Istrian scale
- Lacemaking
- Traditional manufacturing of children’s wooden toys in Hrvatsko Zagorje
- The Festivity of Saint Blaise, patron of Dubrovnik
- Annual carnival bell ringers’ pageant from the Kastav area
- Spring procession of the Ljelje/Kraljice (queens) of Gorjani
- The procession of Za Krizen (following the cross) on the island of Hvar

ALBANIA
- Albanian folk iso-polyphony

SYRIA
- Falconry, a living human heritage

EGYPT
- The Al-Sirah Al-Hilaliyyah Epic

CYPRUS
- Lefkara laces or Lefkaritika

PALESTINE
- The Palestinian hikaye, women storytellers

SYRIA
- Falconry, a living human heritage

January 2010

The year begins with Spain’s semester in the Presidency of the EU. In France, sentencing in the Clearstream case exonerates Dominique de Villepin of conspiracy charges. In Croatia, Social Democrat Ivo Josipovic wins the presidential elections in the same month that Zagreb and Ljubljana agree to renew negotiations on the accession of Croatia to the EU. In Bosnia, tensions among the three communities in the country flare up again, as they do in Kosovo, where the Serbian enclaves do not accept the new institutional framework established with the 2009 Kosovo elections. In Tunisia, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali announces cabinet changes. Morocco also announces changes in the government, while in the same month Mohammed VI announces the creation of a consultative committee to lay the foundations of the decentralisation process.

Portugal

- On 9 January Garikoitz Garcia Arrieta and Iratxe Yañez Ortiz de Barrón, members of ETA, are arrested in Portugal near the Fermoselle border crossing.

Spain

- On 4 January the prisoners’ collective of the Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) terrorist group announces the expulsion of five prisoners from ETA for advocating for the abandonment of armed struggle. On 29 January seven ETA prisoners announce their decision to abandon the group.
- On 26 January the recently created anti-terrorist unit of the Ertzaintza (police force of the Basque autonomous community) arrests five people suspected of being members of ETA in several Basque localities. On 28 January two more people are arrested and three caches containing 40 kilos of explosives are located.
- On 29 January Spain presents its plan to reduce the deficit to the maximum 3% permitted by Brussels. The plan considers measures to reduce the alarming increase in unemployment and a proposal for pension reform that increases the retirement age to 67.

France

- On 21 January the National Assembly (Parliament) adopts the polemical reform of the electoral law proposed by the government, which will take effect in the 2012 presidential elections and which provides for the elimination of 33 election districts and guarantees 11 seats for representatives of French nationals residing abroad.
- On 21 January 124 Kurds disembark from a ship in Corsica, in the first massive disembarkation of immigrants on this island.
- On 28 January the court that rules on the Clearstream case absolves the former prime minister, Dominique de Villepin, of the accusations of conspiracy against the then Minister of the Interior and current President Sarkozy.

Italy

- On 9 January more than 1,100 immigrants are transferred from the Calabrian city of Rosarno to shelters in Bari and Crotone following a wave of attacks by the local population.
- On 28 January the Council of Ministers adopts an extraordinary plan to combat organised crime, which includes the creation of an agency for the management of seised property and a bill that will allow for the grouping of all anti-Mafia legislation. On the same day, the capo of the Contini clan of the Camorra, Paolo di Maura, is captured in Barcelona. During the month of January security forces detain 85 members of the Camorra and 50 of the ‘Ndrangheta.

Slovenia

- On 13 January Prime Minister Borut Pahor and his Croatian counterpart, Jadranka Kosor, agree to allow the resumption of negotiations for the admission of Croatia to the EU.
- On 27 January the opposition parties submit a proposal of impeachment against Danilo Turk, the President of Slovenia, considering unconstitutional the concession of an order of merit to Tomaz Ertl, former chief of the UDBA, the political police of Communist Yugoslavia.

Croatia

- On 3 January Ivo Sanader, implicated in a number of corruption scandals and expelled from the ranks of the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ, conservatives), announces his return to politics three months after his resignation as Prime Minister, which placed Jadranka Kosor at the head of the government.
- On 10 January Ivo Josipovic of the Social Democrats wins the presidential elections on the second round with 60.3% of the votes. The independent candidate, Milan Bandic, who had the support of the conservatives, obtained 39.7%.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 12 January the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) renews the process against Vo-
jislav Seselj, the Bosnian Serb leader, after almost a year of inactivity.

- On 21 January the Bosnian federal Parliament rejects the Bosnian Serb bill to establish an electoral census for 2011 owing to the block of the Bosnian-Croatian and Muslim representatives, who are opposed to the inclusion in the census of questions about ethnic and religious identification.
- On 25 January the EU Council of Foreign Ministers extends the mandate of the Althea Mission of the EU General Staff (EUFOR) beyond 2010 if the situation requires.

Serbia

- On 4 January Serbia files a lawsuit against Croatia with the ICTY for acts of genocide committed by the Croatian Army against Serbo-Croats during and after the disintegration of Yugoslavia.
- On 5 January Rasim Ljajic, president of the Serbian National Council for Cooperation with the ICTY, presents his resignation having failed to arrest Ratko Mladic, former Bosnian Serb army commander during the war in Bosnia.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 6 January Fatmir Sejdiu, the President of Kosovo, requests the aid of the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and the International Civilian Office (ICO) to dissolve the government structures that continue to function in the Serbian enclaves parallel to the local governments chosen in the November 2009 elections.
- On 12 January the Kosovo police do not allow Goran Bogdanovic, the Serbian minister for Kosovo, to visit the Strpce enclave. On 26 January the Kosovo police expeł Branslav Ristic, the Vice-minister for Kosovo, on the grounds that his presence in Kosovo territory was unauthorised. Both incidents lead to the presentation of a formal protest by Serbia to the US, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom.

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

- On 27 January the press reports on the decision of the government to dismiss the Director of the Agency for Education and Mobility, following allegations of his involvement in an EU funds fraud.
- On 28 January the Presidents of Macedonia and Greece meet in London to continue negotiations on the name issue.

Albania

- On 27 January the Constitutional Court annuls the agreement reached by the Albanian and former Greek governments establishing the limits of the continental shelf in the Ionian Sea, claiming that the concession to Greece of 224 square kilometres of territorial waters is unconstitutional.
- On 27 January the agreement on the lifting of visas between Albania and Turkey goes into effect.

Greece

- On 19 January, the European Commission (EC) announces measures against Greece for the falsification of statistics on the public deficit, over and above the sanctions levelled regarding the alarming public debt in the country.
- On 22 January the trial of two police officers accused of the killing of Alexandros Grigoropoulos during a 28 December demonstration in Athens begins in Anfisa.
- On 22 January Greek farmers protest the austerity measures and the delay in payment of farm subsidies by blocking the borders.

Turkey

- On 5 January 20 Kurds are arrested for ties to the terrorist organisation the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). On 23 January 60 more Kurds are detained in Diyarbakir and Istanbul on the same day that sympathisers of the banned Democratic Society Party (DTP) confront the police in Dogubeyazit and Yuksekova.
- On 16 January Istanbul begins its tenure as European Capital of Culture.
- On 18 January the Turkish police arrest 21 members of al-Qaeda in the Adana Province, 16 of whom are imprisoned. On 21 January 120 suspects are detained in a new raid carried out in 16 provinces, the largest operation carried out against al-Qaeda by Turkey.
- On 21 January the Constitutional Court invalidates a reform of the judicial system adopted by Parliament in June 2009, which required the military to be tried for crimes by a civil court. The annulment of this reform sets off a new crisis between the government and the army.

Cyprus

- On 13 January Greek Cypriot leader Demetris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat end a two-day meeting in the framework of the new round of negotiations on reunification of the island without concrete agreements.

Syria

- On 20 January George Mitchell, the US Middle East envoy, meets with Bashar al-Assad, the Syrian President, and assures that relations with Syria are progressing positively and that Syria “should play a leading role in the peace process.”

Lebanon

- On 11 January the Lebanese army opens fire on an Israeli military plane that entered Lebanese air space without authorisation. This is the second incident of this kind in under a month. Agreementing to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), there has been an alarming increase in violations of Resolution 1701 of the United Nations Security Council during the month of January.
- On 28 January Spain relieves Italy of command of the UNIFIL.

Jordan

- On 14 January a bomb explodes beside two Israeli Embassy vehicles travelling between Amman and Jerusalem. The Jordan police arrest a person suspected of having planted the device and of having ties to al-Qaeda.

Egypt

- On 6 January Orthodox Christmas Eve, seven members of the Coptic Na-
gaa Hammady community are shot to death. On 7 January confrontations take place between the police and 2,000 Coptic protesters who deplore the discrimination and harassment they are subject to.

- On 12 January the Muslim Brotherhood (Islamists) elect Mohammed Badi the new Supreme Guide in place of Mohammed Mahdi Akef, thus confirming the increasing influence of the conservative faction of the party.
- On 20 January the Supreme Administrative Tribunal of Egypt temporarily suspends the sentence handed down by an Egyptian court on 3 January prohibiting the wearing of the niqab in universities during exams.

Libya

- On 31 January Muammar Gaddafi loses the presidency of the African Union (AU) to the President of Malawi, Bingu wa Mutharika, whose priority is the eradication of hunger in Africa, in contrast with the programme of the Libyan leader, who sought the creation of a United States of Africa with a common currency and army.

Tunisia


Algeria

- On 7 January workers in the industrial zone of Rouiba demonstrate demanding a raise in salary and government investment in the country of the increasing profits from gas and oil exports. The protest joins those being held by education and health professionals.
- On 9 January 10 soldiers die in a confrontation with Islamist extremists in M’sila. On January 29, three terrorists from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) die during a military operation in Djerrah, Kabylia.
- On 12 January demonstrations take place in Tizi Ouzou y Bejaia provinces to demand Kabylian autonomy and end in violent confrontations with the police.

Morocco

- On 3 January Mohammed VI announces the creation of an Advisory Commission on Regionalisation.
- On 4 January Mohammed VI carries out a governmental restructuring that affects the principal ministries. The Ministries of the Interior and Justice are filled by Taieb Cherkaoui and Mohammed Naciri, respectively.
- On 28 January a Moroccan court sentences Mohammed Belhadj to eight years of prison for his implication in the 11 March 2004 attacks in Madrid.

Mauritania

- On 25 January the EU normalises its development cooperation with Mauritania considering that the country has returned to a constitutional order.

European Union

- On 1 January Spain assumes the presidency of the EU debuting the new system of presidential trios in conjunction with Belgium and Hungary, and facing the challenges of alleviating the economic crisis, advancing in the Balkan enlargement, and activating the new institutional framework of the Lisbon Treaty.
- On 19 January Rumiana Jeleva, the Bulgarian Foreign Affairs Minister and candidate to be the Commissioner of Cooperation and Development, withdraws her candidacy one week after a parliamentary hearing in which she was accused of insufficient competence in her ministerial portfolio and incongruencies in the declaration of her financial interests.
- On 28 January the EU formally confirms its decision to join the Copenhagen Agreement and its objective of achieving a 20% reduction in emissions with regard to 1990 levels.

February 2010

In France, François Fillon, the Prime Minister, introduces the first measures to strengthen national identity. In Italy, tension between the government and the opposition increases with the passing of a law to reduce procedural deadlines. Serbia boycotts the inauguration of the Croatian President in protest over the attendance of the President of Kosovo. The International Steering Group for Kosovo (ISG) approves the polemical plan for the integration of North Kosovo in the Kosovo administrative structure. The Greek crisis leads to approval of a bailout plan without precedent in the euro zone. In Cyprus, the Movement of Social Democrats (EDEK) quits the government coalition. In Turkey, a new plot to overthrow the government of the Justice and Development Party (AKP, conservatives) is uncovered. Libya suspends all visas to citizens of the Schengen Zone. The European Parliament rejects the “SWIFT Agreement” between the EU and the US.

Spain

- On 15 February the National Court orders Baltasar Garzón to reopen the investigation of an alleged 2006 leak that obstructed development of an operation against the ETA extortion arm known as the “Faisáin case”.
- On 28 February the Ministry of the Interior announces the arrest in Normandy of Ibon Gogeaskoetxea, one of the senior officers of the military arm of ETA. Since the start of the year, a total of 30 members of ETA have been arrested in France, Portugal and Spain.

France

- On 2 February a 36-hour French rail-road strike begins protesting the plan to cut back on employment.
- On 7 February the French police evacuate a Calais hangar of the NGO No Borders where a hundred illegal immigrants are housed.
- On 8 February French Prime Minister Fillon announces the first measures to strengthen national identity, including a charter of rights and duties for applicants for citizenship, courses for immigrants on the values of the republic, an emphasis on civics education and a “citizenship card” for youth.

Italy

- On 3 February the Chamber of Deputies approves the polemical bill of “legitimate impediment” which allows members of the government to declare before a judge alleging institutional commitments for a maximum period of 18
months, the time it takes to pass a constitutional immunity law.

- On 10 February the government approves a bill reintroducing nuclear energy in Italy.
- On 11 February Silvio Berlusconi announces the polemical prohibition of electoral debates on public television on the threshold of imminent regional and local elections.
- On 19 February the government presents a bill reinforcing sanctions for corruption in public administration, in response to a report from the Court of Accounts revealing a 229% increase in accusations in 2009.

Slovenia

- On 4 February the government adopts an austerity plan following an EU warning to Ljubljana that it must reduce its public deficit to below 3% of the GDP by 2013.
- On 12 February Roko Zarnic is appointed Minister of the Environment replacing Karel Erjavec, whose management is under investigation by the Court of Audit.

Croatia

- On 10 February Croatia and Bosnia sign an extradition agreement.
- On 18 February Ivo Josipovic is inaugurated President of Croatia succeeding Stipe Mesic. Serbia does not attend the ceremony in protest against the attendance of the President of Kosovo.
- On 19 February the EU-Croatia Intergovernmental Conference approves the start of the chapters on fishing and environment in the accession negotiations.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 1 February Zulfiqar Alispago, the former Bosnian military commander, is arrested for war crimes during the Bosnian war. On March 22, Hasan Hakanovic, also a former commander, is arrested on the same charges.
- On 9 February Valentin Inzko, the High Representative, starts a new round of conversations to reach an agreement on the distribution of state property among the Federation, the entities, and the district of Brcko. On 22 February the European Council on Foreign Relations renews Valentin Inzko’s term for six months.
- On February 10, the Parliament of the Republika Srpska adopts a law for the organisation of a referendum on secession. On 23 February the Muslim members of the Parliament veto the law alleging that it goes against their national interests.
- On 26 February the ICTY begins a trial against Zdravko Tolimir, the Bosnian Serb general accused of the arrest and execution of thousands of Bosniaks in Srebrenica.

Montenegro

- On 22 February the press reports on the six-day strike carried out by the Niksic miners to protest their precarious working conditions and low salaries.

Serbia

- On 9 February Serbia approves the appointment of Boris Arnaud as the new Bosnian ambassador in Belgrade at the 5th Trilateral Summit Meeting between Serbia, Bosnia and Turkey held in Ankara. Bosnia had not had diplomatic representation in Serbia since June 2007.
- On 14 February a police officer dies as a result of the explosion of a device planted by Albanian separatists in Bujanovac.
- On February 18, the Serbian Court of Accounts accuses 19 senior officials, among them six ministers and five former ministers, of violating the laws of public accounting, public debt and civil service.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On February 1, the provisional government of Mitrovica calls for a boycott of the new Kosovo institutional framework. On February 9 the ISG approves the plan presented by Pieter Feith, head of the ICO to integrate the Serbian enclaves into the Kosovo public administration. Serbia – which does not recognize the legitimacy of the ISG – and Russia reject the integration plan before the UN.

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

- On 1 February 12 opposition parties form the Block coalition to defeat the ruling Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), which they accuse of worsening the economic and political crisis.
- On 5 February the Macedonian Parliament adopts the Srebrenica Declaration.
- On 6 February a demonstration takes place in the Macedonian capital in protest against the Skopje 2014 plan for the reform of the historic city centre. An important segment of public opinion, particularly among the Albanians, fears that the plan will reinforce inter-ethnic division in the country.

Albania

- On 3 February US and European diplomats in Tirana meet with Sali Berisha, the Prime Minister, and Edi Rama, the head of opposition, to try to put an end to the situation of institutional paralysis that has been in place since the 2009 elections, whose results are considered fraudulent by the opposition, and which is obstructing crucial decision-making. On 13 February Bamir Topi, the President, meets with Berisha and Rama to find common ground. On 25 February after six months of boycott, the Socialist members of Parliament return to Parliament only to abandon it the following day in response to Berisha’s refusal to open the urns for a recount.
- On 3 February the State Accounting Office publishes irregularities in the public accounts of the government to a total of 52.2 million euros between 2007 and September 2009, in particular in the months before and after the elections of June 2009.

Greece

- On 3 February the European Commission approves the austerity programme presented by the Greek government to reduce its public deficit. On 10 February the countries of the euro zone hold an urgent meeting to approve an unprecedented bailout plan, while strikes take place day after day all month long. On 15 February the euro zone gives Greece three months to present the initial results of the stabilisation plan.
- On 3 February the Vouli (Parliament) reelects Karolos Papoulias, the Socialist candidate, for a second term as the President of the Republic.
On 4 February the Greek government presents a bill before Parliament for the nationalisation of more than 250,000 second generation immigrants giving them the right to vote in municipal elections.

On 16 February an explosive device set by the Conspiracy Nuclei of Fire organisation goes off in a bank branch in Athens.

On 2 February the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), the new Kurdish party created following the banning of the DTP, holds its first conference electing Selahattin Demirtas, a former member of the DTP, as its leader.

On 2 February a mass demonstration takes place in Ankara against the privatisation of public sector companies undertaken by the government under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), with which Ankara is negotiating a new agreement.

On 4 February a military tribunal judging the Ergenekon case condemns Colonel Mustafa Donmez to four years of prison for illegal possession of arms.

On 10 February Ozan Kilinc, owner of the Kurdish newspaper Azadiya Welat, is condemned by a Diyarbakir tribunal to 21 years of prison for publishing propaganda favourable to the PKK terrorist organisation.

On 22 February some fifty high-ranking officers are arrested in relation to a coup d’état plot known as Balyoz (Sledgehammer). On 24 February seven of them are charged. On the same day, the army calls an urgent meeting of senior military staff to evaluate the situation. On 26 February the release of three generals reduces tensions between the government and the army.

On 1 February Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary General of the UN, meets with Demetris Christofias, the Cypriot President, and with Mehmet Ali Talat, the Turkish Cypriot leader, in his first visit to the country. On 24 February Christofias and Talat meet again to discuss the economic and financial chapter of the negotiations.

On 8 February the Movement of Social Democrats (EDEK) abandons the coalition government after two years of tense relations with the Progressive Party for the Working People (AKEL), which accuses of making too many concessions to the Turkish Cypriots.

Syria

On 17 February Barack Obama announces the candidacy of Robert Ford as the first ambassador to Syria in five years. Despite this sign of rapprochement and against Washington’s warnings, on 25 February Iran receives explicit support from Damascus for its nuclear programme.

Lebanon

On 14 February the army shoots at Israeli planes violating Lebanese air space. The raid coincides with the movement of patrols along the length of the border, between Metula and the farms of Shebaa, the Lebanese sector of which has been occupied by Israel since 2006.

On 27 February the Lebanese Council of Ministers gives the green light to a reform of the electoral law contemplating the adoption of a proportional system in all districts, election by direct vote of city council presidents and the establishment of a 20% quota for women.

Egypt

On 2 February Yasser Barakat, editor-in-chief of the al-Mougaz weekly, is sentenced by a Cairo court to a year in prison and a fine of 10,800 dollars for defamation of the government.

On 8 February Egyptian security forces arrest 14 leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, among them Essam el-Erian, the Vice-President, and Mahmoud Ezzat, a member of the party’s leadership council.

On 23 February Mohammed ElBaradei, the former director of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), announces the creation of an organisation to promote constitutional reform in Egypt.

Libya

On 15 February the press reports on Libya’s decision to stop issuing visas for citizens from the Schengen zone, in retaliation for Switzerland’s decision to publish a list of 180 Libyans who cannot enter Swiss territory. The Swiss measure was also a reaction to the arrest of Max Göldi and Rachid Hamdani, two Swiss businessmen accused of violating Libyan immigration laws and carrying out illegal activities. This detention occurred in response to the arrest (Geneva, 2008) of one of Gaddafi’s sons for assaulting two female hotel employees. On 25 February tensions between Libya and Switzerland increase when Gaddafi calls for a “holy war” against Switzerland for having approved in a referendum (2009) the prohibition on the construction of minarets in Swiss territory.

Algeria

On 22 February the army kills Guri Abdelmalek, head of the Al-Arqam cell of AQIM and principal aide to Abdelmalek Droukdel, the leader of the terrorist organisation, during an operation in Bejaia, Kabylia.

Mauritania

On 4 February 60 Islamist prisoners announce their abandonment of armed struggle following the conclusion of the process of religious dialogue promoted by the government during the month of January to check growing religious radicalisation.

On 26 February an exchange of fire takes place in Chegga, near the Algerian border, between the army and a convoy suspected of transporting drugs. Three members of the convoy die and 18 are arrested.

European Union

On 9 February the European Parliament (EP) approves the new Barroso Commission by 488 votes in favour, 137 opposed, and 72 abstentions, after accepting Kristalina Georgieva as the new Commissioner of International Co-operation.

On 11 February the EP rejects the SWIFT Agreement, reached between the European Commission and the US, which foresees giving Washington access to millions of European bank accounts in the framework of the fight against terrorism. On 25 February the Council approves the negotiation of a new agreement.
• On 25 February the European Commission extends Western Balkans trade preferences until 2015.

March 2010

Portugal presents its programme of reforms against the crisis. In Spain, the fight against ETA intensifies and the number of arrests rises. In France, the regional election results give the Socialist Party a victory over the governing Union for a Popular Movement (UMP, liberal-conservative). In Italy, two controversial laws are approved. In Kosovo, the tasks to implement the incorporation of the northern sector into the Kosovo public administration begin. Greece presents its first report on the results of its plan for economic recovery and the EU approves a new financial bailout device in the heart of the Union. In Egypt, Mohammed ElBaradei calls on the citizenry to join the National Front for Change. Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the EU, presents the proposal for the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Arab League approves the start of conversations between Palestinians and Israelis.

Portugal

• On 4 March civil servants call for a daylong strike against the government’s stabilisation plan, which calls for the freezing of their salaries.

Spain

• On 2 March the National Court sentences Arnaldo Otegi, former spokesman for Batasuna, to 16 years of disqualification for public office and two of prison for glorifying terrorism. Otegi is already in prison for his attempt to reconstruct the illegal Batasuna.
• On 10 March Alicia Gámez, one of the three Spanish aid workers captured by AQIM in the north of Mali, is freed upon payment of 2 million euros.

France

• On 1 March 50 deaths are registered in France as a result of Windstorm Xynthia.
• On 8 March legal professionals stage protests in Paris against the lack of funding for the French justice system and against judicial reforms.
• On 21 March the second round of regional elections takes place, in which the opposition alliance headed by the Socialist Party (PS) obtains 54% of the vote, while the UMP obtains 35% and is only able to hold on Alsace. On 22 March Sarkozy and Fillon agree to a reorganisation of the executive branch. At the same time, Dominique de Villepin announces his intention to create a new party as an alternative to the UMP.
• On 23 March another interprofessional public sector protest strike takes place against the inadequacy of the measures adopted by the executive branch against unemployment and wage insecurity.

Italy

• On 5 March the Council of Ministers enacts a polemical decree-law to take effect immediately to assure that the governing party, People of Freedom (PDL, centre-right), is able to take part in the regional elections in Lazio and Lombardy, despite late registration.
• On 10 March amid strong opposition protest, the Italian Senate definitively approves the “legitimate impediment” law.
• On 28 and 29 March 13 of the 20 regions of Italy hold regional elections marked by the highest abstention in Italian history. The PDL retains Lombardy and the Veneto and snatches Campania, Calabria, and Piedmont from the centre left, as well as Lazio, via the Independent Civic List.

Slovenia

• On 9 March after 18 years, Parliament approves an amendment that will allow 18,000 Yugoslav citizens residing in Slovenia to apply for permanent residency or naturalisation. These individuals were struck from the civil registry in 1992 and stripped of their nationality for not having applied in time for the new Slovenian citizenship following independence.
• On 20 March the International Conference on the Western Balkans came to a close in Brdo after adopting a joint declaration of commitment to join the EU. Serbia boycotts the summit in protest over the presence of Kosovo.

• On 23 March the Constitutional Court rules that the border agreement between Slovenia and Croatia does not contradict the constitution. On 26 March the political parties agree to submit the agreement to a popular referendum.

Croatia

• On 8 March Petar Cobankovic, the Minister of Agriculture, reaches an agreement with Slovenian farmers who were protesting in Zagreb against the cutbacks in farm subsidies, which left them with 60% of expected aid.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

• On 2 March Veselin Vlahovic, the Monster of Grbavica, sought on two international arrest warrants for more than 100 crimes committed during the Bosnian War, is arrested in the Spanish town of Altea.
• On 13 March the Bosnian War Crimes Tribunal accuses Nedjo Ikonic, the former Bosnian Serb commander, of the murder of more than a thousand Muslims in Srebrenica.
• On 17 March the Parliament of the Republika Srpska approves, with the opposition of the Bosnian deputies, the population census law including questions on nationality and religion.

Montenegro

• On 25 March Montenegro announces to Thailand that it will not extradite Thaksin Shinawatra, the former Prime Minister of Thailand, as he is a citizen of Montenegro.

Serbia

• On 1 March Ejup Ganic, former member of the Bosnian government, wanted by Serbia and Bosnia for the killing of 40 Yugoslav soldiers in 1992, is arrested in London. On 5 March thousands protest in London and Sarajevo against the extradition of Ganic.
• On 30 March the Parliament approves a resolution whereby Serbia apologises for the Srebrenica massacre though without considering it “genocide,” to the indignation of the Muslim parliamentarians. The Serbian nationalists also reject the resolution for making no ex-
press reference to crimes committed by Bosnians and Croats.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 29 March NATO signs over to the Kosovo police control of the border with Macedonia.
- On 31 March Prime Minister Hashim Thaci announces changes in the government affecting six of the principal ministries. The opposition condemns the measure as a face-saving manoeuvre following accusations of high-level corruption.

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

- On 25 March the Prime Ministers of Greece and Macedonia meet in Brussels but make no progress, after restarting negotiations over the dispute over the name of Macedonia, having received the respective proposals of Athens and Skopje from Matthew Nimetz, the mediator, in February.
- On 6 March the attack on an Albanian by fans of the local soccer club in Skopje revives the tensions between the government and the opposition, which accuses the Executive of not taking action against such incidents and of hostility toward the Albanian population.

Albania

- On 23 March the opposition rejects the proposal of Sali Berisha to name 100 prosecutors to investigate the suspicions of electoral fraud, insisting on its demand for a total recount of the votes.

Greece

- On 3 March the European Commission and the IMF accept the third package of austerity measures from Athens, which include a cut of 2.4 billion euros in public expenditure. On 16 March the euro zone approves a bailout plan for Greece. On 26 March the European Council establishes a new bailout plan for Greece with IMF involvement.
- On 4 March the Ministry of the Treasury presents the reform bill of the Greek Statistical Authority (ELSTA), which is responsible for the repeated provision of false data to Brussels on the part of previous governments.
- On 8 and 11 March two new days of general strike against the austerity plan once again paralyse the country.
- On 20 March two bombs set by the Conspiracy Nuclei of Fire go off in Athens. On 28 March another explosion in Athens causes one death.

Turkey

- On 4 March Parliament ratifies the intergovernmental agreement to build the Nabucco pipeline.
- On 6 March Turkey recalls its ambassador in Washington before the decision of the United States Congress to consider the massacre of Armenians during World War I genocide.
- On 9 and 14 March two soldiers die in PKK assaults in Hakkari.
- On 16 March Erdogan increases tension with Armenia by declaring that 100,000 Armenians who reside in Turkey illegally could be expelled. In addition, he warns that Turkey will not ratify the agreements for normalisation of relations with Armenia until Yerevan withdraws from Karabakh.
- On 18 and 22 March a total of 30 high-ranking military officers are arrested, accused of participating in the Ergenekon plot.
- On 29 March 22 people suspected of belonging to al-Qaeda are arrested in Central Anatolia.

Cyprus

- On 16 and 30 March Greek and Turkish Cypriot Presidents hold two new reunification meetings, making advances in governance, European policy, energy and the distribution of powers among the communities.

Syria

- On 9 March during the International Conference on Access to Civilian Nuclear Energy, Syria announces its wish to develop its own civilian nuclear programme. The resolution, accepted not without reservations, corresponds to a similar proposal by Israel along the same lines.
- On 21 March a Kurdish citizen dies in Raqqa during a confrontation with security forces during the celebration of the Kurdish New Year.

Lebanon

- On 9 March the Lebanese parties renew the national reconciliation dialogue initiated with the 2008 Doha Agreement. The possibility of integrating the arsenal under Hezbollah’s control, the only group that did not lay down its arms following the civil war, in a national defence strategy, continues to be the biggest obstacle to agreement between the pro-Western and pro-Syrian blocks.
- On 10 March the Council of Ministers manages to name three judges to the Court of Justice despite the reservations of six ministers, who abstain. The appointment is needed to overcome the paralysis of the high court.

Jordan

- On 1 March Jordan denies the accusations made in a video by the double agent known as Abu Dujana, regarding the implication of Jordanian intelligence in the death of Imad Mughniyeh, Hezbollah leader, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, and Abdallah Az zam, Osama Bin Laden’s lieutenant.

Egypt

- On 12 and 23 March a total of 83 members of the Muslim Brotherhood are arrested in several Egyptian cities.
- On 13 March serious confrontations take place between Coptic Christians and Muslims in Marsa Matrouh after a group of Copts built a wall that blocked passage on a country road.

Libya

- On 23 March the leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Abdel-Hakim Belhaj, and another 214 militants are released, upon which the government considers that its programme for dialogue and reconciliation has come to an end.
- On 25 March the Swiss government communicates its intention to suspend the restrictions on the entry of Libyan citizens into Switzerland. On 27 March Libya once again allows citizens from the Schengen area to enter the country.

Tunisia

- On 25 March President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali asks the political bureau of
the governing Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD) to increase the number of women parliamentarians to 30%. The Ben Ali measure is taken up by the leaders of the principal progressive parties assuring quotas of between 15 and 50%.

**Algeria**

- On 16 March in Bordj Menaïel the Algerian police arrest six people suspected of belonging to a terrorist cell.
- On 25 March two Algerian soldiers die in a terrorist attack in Kadiriya. On March 26 the army takes down three terrorists in Ait Yahia Moussa.

**Morocco**

- On 2 March Morocco announces the breaking up of a Takfiri network of six people accused of terrorist acts.
- On 7 March the police arrest and expel an Egyptian Franciscan monk on accusations of proselytising. During the month of March 70 Christian foreigners are expelled on the same accusation.
- On 9 March security forces thwart the attempted escape from the Kenitra prison of 10 militants from the Takfiri group Salafia Jihadia.

**Mauritania**

- On 4 March the Constitutional Council of Mauritania rejects 10 articles of the anti-terrorism law adopted by Parliament in January as unconstitutional.
- On 15 March local unions begin a three-day general strike in protest over working conditions.
- On 20 March Mauritania announces the suspension of relations with Israel over the West Bank settlements.

**European Union**

- On 25 March Catherine Ashton presents, following consultation with Parliament, her proposal for the creation of the EEAS (European External Action Service). Ashton’s proposal is an attempt to overcome the differences among the European Parliament, Council and Commission regarding budgetary control and hiring practices.
- On 31 March the Western European Union (WEU) formalises its dissolution to make way in June 2011 to the EU Defence policy provided for in the Lisbon Treaty.

**Arab League**

- On 3 March the Arab League gives the green light for Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to begin US-backed indirect talks with Israel after a 15-month paralysis of the peace process.
- On 27 March the Arab League summit takes place in Sirte, centring its attention primarily on the situation of the Palestinians in Jerusalem. This is in response to the Israeli refusal to halt the settlements. The Arab ministers agree to a 500 million dollar aid package for the Jerusalem Palestinians.

**April 2010**

Spain approves the reform of its Criminal Code. In Italy, Gianfranco Fini announces his intention of withdrawing from the governing coalition. The Slovenian Parliament ratifies its border agreement with Croatia. In Greece, the public debt breaks historic records and the government formally requests the first loan from the aid plan set up by the EU and the IMF. Relations between Turkey and Armenia continue to worsen. The National Unity Party (UBP, conservatives) of Dervis Eroglu wins in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. In Egypt Mohammed ElBaradei’s opposition movement to Mubarak grows stronger. European air traffic is interrupted by the eruption of a volcano in Iceland that causes multi-million-euro losses.

**Spain**

- On 14 April the Civil Guard arrests 10 people with ties to ETA in Bilbao and Hernani. Among them are three lawyers for the terrorist group. On 18 April thousands demonstrate against the arrests in Bilbao and San Sebastián. On 19 April Judge Fernando Grande-Marlaska issues an order of imprisonment for five of the 10 detainees.
- On 29 April the Congress of Deputies approves a bill to reform the Penal Code. The reform provides for tighter sentencing in cases of terrorism and sexual abuse.

**France**

- On 6 April France begins the third railroad strike of the year in protest over low wages and lack of personnel.
- On 27 April thousands of French grain growers demonstrate in Paris in protest over their drop in income and to express their concern about the reform in the Common Agricultural Policy.
- On 30 April Charles Pasqua, the former Minister of the Interior, receives a one-year suspended sentence for one of the three cases of corruption for which he was on trial, agreeing to which he took kickbacks from Sofremi, a state arms export enterprise that was under his jurisdiction.

**Italy**

- On 16 April AQIM frees Sergio Cicala and Philomène Kabore, the Italian couple who were kidnapped in Mauritania in December 2009 and who were kept in confinement in Mali.
- On 17 April Gianfranco Fini, President of the Chamber of Deputies and co-founder with Silvio Berlusconi of the PDL, announces his intention to form his own group in Parliament. On 22 April Berlusconi and Fini engage in a bitter discussion in a televised debate during the convention of the PDL.

**Malta**

- On 18 April Pope Benedict XVI meets in La Valletta with victims of sexual abuse by Catholic clergy during the 1980s and 1990s; he promises that the Church will investigate every case. This is the first official visit of the Pontiff since the wave of sexual scandals affecting the Catholic Church in several countries has come to light.

**Slovenia**

- On 20 April the Slovenian Parliament ratifies the international arbitration agreement signed with Croatia to settle the border dispute between the two countries.

**Croatia**

- On 15 April Ivo Josipovic, the Croatian President, makes a speech in Sarajevo in which he apologises for Croatia’s role...
in the conflict. Josipovic’s declarations open up a confrontation with Jadranka Kosor, the current Prime Minister, and with former prime ministers who consider Serbia, and not Croatia, to have been the aggressor in Bosnia.

- On 19 April Croatia closes the chapter on the free movement of goods in the negotiations on EU accession.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

- On 7 April the federal Parliament is unable to approve a resolution condemning the Srebrenica massacre owing to the refusal of the Bosnian Serb deputies.
- On 10 April the Bosnian Court of Justice announces that Gojko Klickovic, the former Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska, accused of war crimes between 1992 and 1995, has been freed on bail.
- On 13 April the ICTY once again resumes the trial of Radovan Karadzic.
- On 20 April the Constitutional Court of the Republika Srpska declares that the law approved by the Bosnian Serb Parliament in March allowing for the calling of a referendum on independence is not anti-constitutional and does not violate the rights and interests of Bosnian Serbs.

**Montenegro**

- On 13 April Prime Minister Milo Dukanovic is able to survive a no-confidence vote brought against him by the opposition bloc.

**Serbia**

- On 12 April the leaders of the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS, conservatives) and New Serbia (NS, populists) hand over to President Cvetkovic a petition for early elections signed by a million citizens.
- On 24 April Tomislav Nikolic is re-elected Secretary General of the SNS, the main opposition party.

**Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244**

- On 28 April EULEX police search the offices of the Ministry of Transport seeking evidence for a corruption investigation regarding Fatmir Limaj, the Minister of Transport.
- On 29 April the KFOR cedes control of the Albanian border to the Kosovo police force.

**Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**

- On 15 April 17 policemen are wounded in incidents provoked in the Suto Orizari district, the largest Roma settlement in the country, when hundreds of vendors in a market throw rocks at police inspecting the legality of the merchandise.

**Albania**

- On 30 April a mass demonstration called for by the opposition takes place in the streets of Tirana to demand that the government carry out a recount of the votes from the June 2009 elections. On the same day, 22 Socialist members of Parliament begin a hunger strike to demand the reopening of the ballots.

**Greece**

- On 8 April the Athens Stock Exchange plunges and the Greek public debt premium reaches historic highs. On 21 April negotiations begin for the concession of a first EU and IMF loan in a climate of new strikes called against the austerity measures. On 22 April a new record is reached in the value of Greek debt when it is revealed that at the close of 2009 the public deficit was 13.6%. On 23 April Greece formalises its request for a first loan for the amount of 45 billion euros.
- On 10 April six members of the Revolutionary Struggle are arrested for their role in several attacks since 2003, including the 2007 attack on the US embassy.
- On 13 April 15 individuals attack a squadron of riot police by the seat of the governing Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) in Athens. On 14 April four explosions take place in Thessaloniki and another in Athens in front of the office of a Socialist deputy.
- On 14 April the Parliament approves a new fiscal law raising taxes on the wealthy, Church property and offshore businesses.

**Turkey**

- On 7 April Sergei Sarkissian, the President of Armenia, receives Feridun Sinirlioglu, the representative of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, to try to normalise relations between the two countries; on the same day, the Turkish Ambassador to Washington returns to his post after having been recalled in March. On 22 April in light of the lack of progress, the Armenian President confirms the suspension of the ratification of the agreements concluded in October 2009.
- On 22, 28, and 30 April eight soldiers die in confrontations with the PKK in southeast Turkey.
- On 24 April a trilateral summit between Turkey, Serbia, and Bosnia takes place in Istanbul culminating in a joint declaration establishing common guidelines for their EU accession strategies.

**Cyprus**

- On 13 April the government announces a rise in the oil tax of nearly 10%. On 14 April the Democratic Labour Federation (DEOK) calls on the people to mobilise against new tax hikes on basic consumer goods.
- On 18 April Dervis Eroglu, the UBP candidate who is contrary to reunification, is proclaimed the winner in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) elections, winning over the current President, Ahmet Talat.

**Syria**

- On 6 April Syrian authorities deny permission for inspectors from the IAEA to inspect the military installations at Al-Kibar where, based on a 2007 Israeli air raid, it is suspected that a nuclear facility might be under construction.
- On 13 April Shimon Peres, the Israeli President, accuses Syria of supplying missiles to Hezbollah. The Syrian ambassador to the US claims that this false accusation seeks to undermine the reconciliation between Damascus and Washington. On 27 April Robert Gates and Ehud Barak, the respective heads of US and Israeli Defence once again accuse Syria of arming Hezbollah. Damascus, Beirut and Hezbollah deny the accusation.

**Lebanon**

- On 25 April an unprecedented mass demonstration takes place on the streets of Beirut in favour of the secu-
larisation of politics as the only path to stability.

**Egypt**

- On 2 April Mohammed ElBaradei leads a mass demonstration in Mansoura in favour of democratic reform in Egypt. In parallel, Mahmoud Hussein, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, announces in an interview by Al-Jazeera that “he will attempt to coordinate and cooperate with ElBaradei” in a show of clear agreement between the reform and Islamist sectors to remove Mubarak from power. On 6 April the police detain 90 people during a demonstration in Cairo demanding democratic reform.

- On 26 and 28 April the Egyptian Security Court condemns 26 people of different nationalities with ties to Hezbollah to sentences of between six months and 25 years for planning assaults in Egypt.

**Tunisia**

- On 9 April the secretary general of the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP, Socialists), Maya Jribi, announces that she will boycott the 9 May municipal elections because the electoral system establishes the sole dominance of the governing party.

**Algeria**

- On 7 April a bomb attack on a military convoy that was transporting explosives kills two gendarmes and wounds three civilians in Tidjelabine. On 13 April the army begins Operation Ennasr (Victory), the largest antiterrorist offensive since 2005, with 300 targets in all of Algeria.

- On 16 April the al-Qaeda cell Katibat El Farouk frees hostage Ali Hassani without ransom, as a result of intensive mobilisations taking place in Ait Koufi and Boghni since 22 March the date of his kidnapping.

- On 25 April in Tamanrasset the high commands of the armies of the countries of the Sahara and the Sahel approve the expansion of antiterrorist forces to 75,000 members.

**Morocco**

- On 9 April Abdelwahad Radi, of the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) is reelected President of the Chamber of Representatives (lower chamber) for a third term.

- On 10 April the Assembly for the Freedom of Press and Expression, made up of journalists, academics, and activists, is constituted in protest over the attacks on these rights in Morocco.

- On 26 April the Ministry of the Interior issues a report on the detention of 24 members of a Salafist terrorist cell that was planning assaults on foreign interests in Morocco.

**Mauritania**

- On 6 April the non-Arab students of Nouakchott University stage a protest against the government decision to make Arabic the only official language at the university. On 15 April confrontations are reported that result in dozens of arrests.

- On 17 April the Mauritanian authorities open 10 new border crossings in addition to the 35 already in place as part of the package of anti-contraband measures.

**European Union**

- On 15 April the eruption of a volcano under the Eyjafjalla glacier in Iceland sets off a great cloud of ash that paralyses the air space over the European continent for days, causing more than 63,000 flights to be cancelled.

- On 20 April the EC presents to the EP its plan of action for the creation of a sole European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice developed by the Stockholm Programme adopted in December 2009 by the European Council.

- On 22 April the principal European parliamentary groups threaten to veto the launch of the current EEAS project owing to the excessive influence of Member States in detriment to the common interest. On 26 April the European Council reaches a political agreement, based on Ashton’s proposal, which included observing of geographical and gender balance in appointments.

**May 2010**

In Spain, the General Council of the Judicial Power (CGPJ) suspends Judge Baltasar Garzón. France prohibits the use of the veil in public. In Italy, the Minister of Economic Development announces his resignation. In Bosnia, tension increases between the Republika Srpska and the Office of the High Representative. Montenegro becomes an Associate Member of the EU. The Serbian enclaves in Kosovo hold parallel elections in defiance of Pristina. In Greece, days of protest continue as Parliament approves new cutbacks. In Turkey, the opposition submits a motion to the Constitutional Court against the government’s reform package. Syria is newly accused of developing a secret nuclear programme. In Egypt, Hosni Mubarak extends the Emergency Laws for two more years. In Algeria, Abdelaziz Bouteflika carries out changes in the cabinet. The EU approves a bailout plan for failing economies.

**Portugal**

- On 13 May Prime Minister José Sócrates announces the economic adjustment plan agreed upon by the governing Socialist Party (PS) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD, conservatives). The plan envisages a tax increase and a spending cut to reduce the deficit to 7% of the GNP. On 29 May 300,000 workers demonstrate in Lisbon against the austerity plan.

- On 17 May President Aníbal Cavaco Silva signs into law the act that gives the green light to gay marriage, as approved by the Parliament in February.

**Spain**

- On 6 May a boat with 49 immigrants aboard is rescued in Tarifa, Cadiz. On 24 May another craft with 44 sub-Saharan Africans aboard is intercepted in Motril, Granada.

- On 12 May President José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero presents the new package of measures aimed at reducing the deficit from the current 11.2% of GDP to 4.7% by the end of 2011. On 27 May Parliament approves the austerity measures.

- On 12 May Supreme Court Justice Luciano Varela orders the opening of the trial against Judge Baltasar Garzón for prevarication in his investigation of the crimes of Francoism. On 14 May the CGPJ suspends Garzón by unanimous decision.

- On May 21 the National Court condemns Martin Sarasola, Igor Portu, and
Mikel San Sebastián to 1,040 years of prison for the 2006 attack on the Madrid-Barajas Airport.

France

- On 11 May the National Assembly unanimously approves a resolution declaring the Islamic veil to be contrary to the values of the Republic, prior to the adoption of the law being prepared by the government to prohibit its use in public.
- On 20 May the police detain four members of ETA close to the Spanish border. Among them is Mikel Kabikoitz Carrera Sarobe, considered to be the number-one man in the military branch of ETA.

Italy

- On 4 May the Minister of Economic Development, Claudio Scajola, resigns in response to his investigation for taking bribes, having acquired a centrally located apartment in Rome in 2004.
- On 25 May the Council of Ministers approves a budget cut of 24 billion euros, 30% to be contributed by the regions, over the next two fiscal years, in compliance with the objectives set forth by Brussels.
- On 29 May after 21 years on the wanted list, Pasquale Claudio Locatelli, considered to be the liaison between the Camorra and the Colombian narcotics trade, is arrested in the Madrid-Barajas airport.

Slovenia

- On 25 May the police arrest 15 people with connections to Darko Saric, the narcotrafficking capo, who remains at large.

Croatia

- On 30 May President Ivo Josipovic makes his first official visit to the Republic Srpska, for the purpose of continuing the process of reconciliation between Croatia and its neighbours.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 21 and 25 May the authorities report on one of the broadest operations against organised crime, carried out in 100 different locations, and resulting in 105 arrests.
- On 23 May the Bosnian press reports on the letter sent by Prime Minister Nikola Spirić to the Secretary General of the United Nations, urging him to recall its High Representative, whose actions are seen as contributing to the destabilisation of Bosnia.

Montenegro

- On 1 May the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Agreement takes effect.
- On 15 May the Podgorica High Court sentences six former members of the National Yugoslav army to 18 months and four years of prison for crimes against humanity during the attacks on Dubrovnik. It is the first sentence of its kind handed down by Montenegro since its independence.
- On 23 May 14 of the 21 municipalities hold elections. The governing Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) is a clear winner in seven of them, while the opposition coalition, A Better Montenegro, is able to prevail in three.

Serbia

- On 11 May Ivica Dacic, the Minister of the Interior, announces the arrest of nine people with connections to a network of smugglers of Kosovo Albanian immigrants to the EU.
- On 28 May Serbia eliminates visa requirements for citizens of the European Economic Area.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 25 May the EULEX announces the prohibition on unannounced visits to Kosovo from Serbian representatives in light of the imminent parallel elections in the Kosovo Serbian enclaves. On 30 May the date of the elections, which are considered “illegal” by Pristina and the EU, the Democratic Party (DS, centre-right) prevails inNovo Bardo and the SNS in Kosovska Mitrovica, where confrontations take place between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians requiring the intervention of the KFOR.
- On 28 May the IMF and Kosovo agree on an aid package of 110 million euros to provide fiscal stability to the country.

This is the first aid granted to Kosovo by an international monetary organisation.

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

- On 10 May a demonstration of 2,000 Albanians takes place in Skopje to demand freedom for prisoners accused of terrorism and an end to “ethnic and religious discrimination.”
- On 11 May four Kosovo Albanian terrorists die in an altercation with the police close to Radusa in the most serious armed incident since the 2001 conflict.
- On 11 May FYROM inauguates its semester-long presidency of the European Council, despite Greek protests rejecting the name “Macedonian Presidency 2010”, chosen by Skopje.
- On 24 May the ICTY appeals chamber confirms the 12 years’ prison sentence for Johan Tarcovulski, a former officer of the security forces, for the 2001 attack on Ljuboten (a primarily Albanian population), though it absolves former Minister Ljube Boskoski of the same charges.

Albania

- On 14 May thousands of Albanians demonstrate in Tirana to demand accountability with regard to the electoral results of 2009. On 19 May the hunger strike begun in April by several Socialist deputies comes to an end when a compromise is reached between Berisha and Rama to resume negotiations. On 25 May the SP returns to its parliamentary duties and negotiations continue.

Greece

- On 1 May thousands demonstrate against the austerity plan, with violent confrontations with the police in the principal cities of Greece. Protests continue throughout the month. On 2 May the EU and the IMF agree to a 110 billion dollar aid package for Greece. On 19 May Greece is able to make the first payment on its debt thanks to the freeing-up of 20 billion euros by the EU and the FMI. On 27 May the Parliament approves a law reducing the number of city councils from 1,034 to 355); the savings amounts to 1,185 billion euros per year.
- On 14 May Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan arrives in Greece on an official visit to sign some twenty
cooperation agreements, smooth over rough spots on the territorial disputes in the Aegean, and seek agreement on the situation of Cyprus.

Turkey

- On 6 May Parliament approves the constitutional reform that will restructure the Supreme Court of Judges and Prosecutors. The AKP asserts that the reforms are necessary to draw closer to the EU norms, while the opposition and the justices feel that it will have a negative effect on the independence of the Judiciary. On 14 May the Republican People’s Party (CHP, Socialists) files a motion before the Constitutional Court against the constitutional reform package presented on March 22 by the government.
- On 7 May the air force kills five members of the PKK in the course of an incursion into northern Iraq in response to an attack on a military post in Hakkari in which two soldiers were killed. On 20 May the air force bombs PKK positions in Hakurk and Zap. On 26 May four members of the PKK die in confrontations with the army in Tunceli and Bingol. On 31 May six soldiers die in a PKK attack on a naval base in Iskenderun.
- On 17 May Turkey signs an agreement with Iran and Brazil to swap enriched uranium and to lift sanctions on the Iranian nuclear programme.

Cyprus

- On 11 May Chrysostomos II, the Archbishop of Nicosia fans tensions between the government and the Church on declaring before Parliament that the Cypriot Orthodox Church will not pay “a single cent” of the back taxes the government is claiming.

Syria

- On 27 May a United Nations report reveals that Syria, Iran, and Burma are receiving nuclear and ballistic missile equipment from North Korea, an extreme step denied by both Damascus and Pyongyang.
- On 28 May Ehud Barak, the Israeli Defence Minister, and Robert Gates, the North American Defence Secretary, assert that “Syria and Iran are providing Hezbollah with rockets and missiles of ever-increasing capability” and warn Damascus and Teheran that they will keep a close eye on the situation to avert a new destabilisation in Lebanon.

Lebanon

- Throughout the month of May municipal and regional elections are held in four phases. Among the noteworthy results are the victory of Saad Hariri’s coalition in Beirut, Saida and Jbeil, the triumph of Michel Aoun’s candidacy in Hadath or Jezzine, or the appearance of Hezbollah in Bekaa municipalities where it had not previously been represented.

Jordan

- On 18 May Abdullah II endorses the new election law maintaining the “one person, one vote” system rejected by the majority of parties, unions and reform groups, which consider it to favour tribal leaders. The new law increases the number of seats in the lower chamber from 110 to 120 and the number of seats reserved for women from six to twelve.

Egypt

- On 3 May the police repress a Cairo demonstration against the Emergency Laws, approved in 1981 following the assassination of Anwar Sadat. On 11 May Hosni Mubarak announces a two-year extension of the Laws.
- On 14 May tension breaks out again between Egypt and Sudan and the rest of the Nile Basin countries, when the latter sign an agreement modifying the use of the Nile waters and derogating the privileges enjoyed since the colonial period by Cairo and Khartoum.

Libya

- On 10 May a trial begins against 490 people accused of belonging to an immigrant trafficking ring in the first case heard in Libya on these charges.
- On 13 May Libya is elected to be a member of the Human Rights Council of the United Nations, in the face of protests from 37 human rights advocacy organisations.
- On 26 May the government announces the lifting of visa restrictions for US citizens after reaching a trade and investment agreement with the US on May 20.

Tunisia

- On 9 May the governing RCD prevails in municipal elections with 90% of the vote. Agreementing to the Ministry of the Interior, participation reaches 83.47%.
- On 23 May a Tunisian appellate court upholds the 2001 sentence barring activity in the country by the Tunisian League for Human Rights.

Algeria

- On 4 May a woman is wounded in the explosion of a terrorist device in Kabyla. On the same day, security forces manage to deactivate three other bombs and kill three terrorists near Tizi Ouzou. On 18 May two soldiers die and 18 civilians are wounded in an attack in Bouredes. On 31 May the authorities arrest Othmane Touati, co-founder of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).
- On 28 May President Abdelaziz Bouteflika announces changes in his cabinet. Chakib Khelil, the Minister of Energy, is replaced with Youcef Youssi. Nouredinne Yazid Zerhouni leaves Interior to take up the new post of Vice-Prime Minister, and Dahou ould Kabia takes on the Interior Ministry. The heads of Fishing and Civil Engineering hold on to their posts despite the corruption scandals that have plagued their Ministries. The opposition blasts the reforms as “window dressing.”

Morocco

- On 6 May the Sale Court sentences the 12 members of a terrorist cell that operated in Morocco and Spain and was disbanded in June 2009 to 5 to 12 years of prison.
- On 26 May in Rabat, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Mauritania sign a cooperation agreement to tackle common economic challenges such as youth unemployment, industrial restructuring, or pension reform.

Mauritania

- On 25 May the Nouakchott Criminal Court sentences three Mauritanians who belonged to AQIM to death for the killing of four French tourists in 2005.
European Union

- On 4 May the European Transport Council calls an extraordinary meeting to urge the implementation of a “single European sky” in response to the air crisis caused by the Icelandic volcanic ash clouds.
- On 9 May the EU Finance Ministers agree on the design for a rescue plan with the support of France and Germany, for the euro zone economies undergoing difficulties. Aid will reach a total of 600 bn euros, 100 bn of which will be disbursed by the IMF.

June 2010

Reform of the pension system continues to be one of the principal problems for France and Greece in terms of reducing the deficit. In both countries new day-long protests take place. The summit in Sarajevo between the EU and the Western Balkans manages to seatSerbs and Kosovars at the same table and renews the region’s commitment to the enlargement process. In the same month that Croatia opens the three last phases of its accession process, Turkey opens a new phase, the Slovenes ratify the border mediation agreement between Ljubljana and Zagreb by popular referendum, and the first meeting of the Montenegro-EU Association Council takes place. In Lebanon, attacks on UNIFIL forces by the civilian population take place. In Egypt, the National Democratic Party (NDP, Socialists) wins the elections to the Council of the Shura (upper chamber) by immense majority in the same month that the growing protest movement against the Mubarak government organises a massive protest in Alexandria. Libya and Switzerland resume bilateral relations.

Spain

- On 1 June in Hendaye, the French police arrest ETA member Juan Carlos Iriarte Pérez. Throughout the month arrests of members of ETA or their associates take place in France, Italy and Ireland.
- On 8 June civil servants strike in protest over the salary cuts for public employees. In Madrid, some 1,500 civil servants demonstrate before the Ministry of Economy.
- On 22 June the Congress of Deputies (lower chamber) approves urgent measures for reform of the labour market.
- On 29 June after four years of deliberation, the Constitutional Court affirms the constitutionality of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, though it nullifies 14 articles and declares that the references to Catalonia as a nation have no interpretative juridical effect.

France

- On 16 June the government presents a pension reform proposal that raises the retirement age to 62. On June 24 a day-long strike against this measure paralyses most public services.
- On 19 June Dominique de Villepin launches his new conservative political movement, Republique Solidaire, before 2,500 followers in Paris.

Monaco

- On 23 June in Paris, Monaco signs tax information exchange agreements with seven Northern countries, exceeding the number of agreements required by the OECD to be struck from the “grey list” of uncooperative tax havens.

Italy

- On 10 June the Italian Senate approves the polemical Gag Law limiting wiretaps and prohibiting the publication of wiretap information in the media.
- On 23 June Italian mayors stage a demonstration before the Senate to protest that local governments will be responsible for 90% of the 24 billion euro cuts approved by the Executive.

Malta

- On 3 June the Socialist Party demands the resignation of the Minister of Education, Dolores Cristina, owing to an EU investigation into irregularities in the management of EU funds. On 4 June three senior officials of the Ministry resign in relation to the case.

Slovenia

- On 6 June the Slovenes ratify the border mediation agreement with Croatia with 51.5% of the vote.

Croatia

- On 16 June Parliament adopts the amendments necessary to adapt the Constitution to EU legislation. These changes make possible the approval of 14 laws needed to complete the accession negotiations.
- On 30 June Croatia begins the final chapters of accession negotiations: Fundamental Rights, Competence, and Foreign, Security and Defence Policy.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 2 June ten years after the Zagreb Summit, Sarajevo hosts the EU-Balkans summit that reaffirms the Western Balkans’ commitment to European integration.
- On 10 June the ICTY publishes its verdicts against six former high-ranking army officers and one Bosnian Serb police officer for the Srebrenica massacre. The accused receive sentences that fluctuate between 5 years in prison and life for Lieutenant Colonel Vujadin Popovic and the former Colonel Ljubisa Beara, a close collaborator of Ratko Mladic.
- On 27 June one policeman dies and 6 more are wounded in an explosion in a police station in Bugojno. Five Wahhabis are arrested in relation to the attack.

Montenegro

- On 3 June the press reports the arrest on the northern border of 21 smugglers, including are nine customs agents.
- On 5 June the police detain Marin Krivosic, wanted by Croatia and suspected of having been involved in the 1991 death of 96 civilians in Hrvatska Dubrica.

Serbia

- On 6 June for the first time, members of the 19 national minorities elect their representative in the National Councils.
- On 14 June the European Council agrees to initiate ratification of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia on verifying in the report presented by Serge Brammertz, the Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, that Belgrade is cooperating with the Court.
On 28 June in Belgrade, Serbia and Croatia sign an extradition agreement that allows for the extradition to Croatia of Sretenko Kalinic, a member of the Zemun clan and co-author of the 2003 assassination of the Serbian Prime Minister, Zoran Djindjic.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 8 June the EU Council approves the extension for two more years of the rule of law mission of the EULEX.
- On 12 June Albin Kurti, head of the Vetevendosje! (Self-determination) separatist movement, is arrested after announcing that the movement will run in the upcoming elections. The Pristina Court will try Kurti for the February 2007 altercations against the UNMIK.

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

- On 10 June the government approves a 76 million euro cut in public expenditure to aid in debt reduction.
- On 27 June thousands of people called up by the SDSM, the main opposition party, demonstrate to demand early elections accusing the government of a lack of solutions for the crisis and of delays in the accession negotiations with the EU and NATO, which are conditioned by the dispute with Greece over the name.

Albania

- On 1 June the European Parliament postpones the planned resolution on Albanian accession because of the stalling of the political crisis in the country. On June 10, the Albanian Parliament resumes activity. Nevertheless, the failure of parallel negotiations between the government and the opposition causes the SP to renew the boycott on June 30.
- On 21 June the Constitutional Court declares unconstitutional two articles of the electoral code that require political parties without parliamentary representation to gather 10,000 signatures in order to run candidates in the elections.

Greece

- On 23 June Greece experiences a new strike to demand the suppression of the June 16 bill that would abolish collective bargaining, reduce the minimum wage and lower the cost of dismissal.
- On 24 June a letter bomb goes off at the headquarters of the Ministry of Civil Protection, causing the death of an assistant to Minister to whom it was addressed.
- On 29 June a new 24-hour strike paralyses Greece in reaction to the approval of a pension reform that extends the retirement age to 65 and requires a minimum of 40 years of tax contributions in order to receive a full pension. The strike ends with confrontations with the police.

Turkey

- On 1 June the police arrest Seyfi Oktay, the former Minister of Justice, along with six others in relation to the Ergenekon case. On 18 June the court trying the case sets three generals free without charges. In parallel, a court in Ankara frees the chief prosecutor of Erzincan, along with nine other suspects.
- On 8 June 15 people are wounded when a bomb explodes as a police vehicle goes by in Istanbul. On June 15 a soldier and three PKK terrorists die in a confrontation in the province of Siirt.
- On June 16, the army crosses the Iraqi border to capture PKK members, killing four militants. On 10 June new confrontations leave a total of 22 dead in Hakkari. On 22 June five die and 14 are wounded in an attack in Istanbul on a military vehicle. On June 20 four soldiers die in new confrontations in Siirt Province.
- On 28 June the government announces it has decided to refuse to allow Israeli airplanes to fly over Turkish air space in response to the attack on the Freedom Flotilla in which nine Turkish activists died.
- On 30 June the 9th Meeting of the Turkey-EU Accession Conference approves the opening of Chapter 12 on food and animal safety.

Cyprus

- On 2 June Ban Ki-moon, the Secretary General of the UN, appoints American Lisa Buttenheim the new special representative for Cyprus.
- On 4 June Benedict XVI begins a three-day visit to Cyprus with a broad security detail. The visit starts a day after the assassination in Turkey of Luigi Padovese, the Bishop of Anatolia, who had intended to meet with the Pope in Cyprus.
- On 15 June the UN Security Council decides to extend for six months the mandate of the UNFICYP, its peace mission on the island.

Syria

- On 15 June President Bashar al-Assad receives Michel Sleiman, his Lebanese counterpart, in Damascus. Both leaders agree on the need to establish the definitive borders between the two states.
- On 23 June lawyer Muhammad al-Hassani is sentenced to three years of prison, accused of “weakening national sentiment.”
- On 23 June Kamal Hussein Cheikhho, the Kurdish blogger and activist, is arrested by the police on unknown charges on the Syria-Lebanese border.
- On 30 June the UN Security Council decides to renew the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force for withdrawal from the Golan Heights (UNDOF), present since 1974.

Lebanon

- On 1 June the permanent military court condemns two Palestinian citizens and twelve others in absentia to sentences of between one year and life in prison for planning 2008 attacks on the UNIFIL.
- On 20 June two UNIFIL officers are retained by a group of civilians near Naqoura, accused of photographing “Hezbollah positions.” On 29 June residents block the Adeissee-Kfar Kila road to prevent the passage of several UNIFIL vehicles, resulting in their withdrawal.

Egypt

- On 1 June Egypt opens the Rafah passage for the entrance of humanitarian aid to Gaza in response to the attack on the Freedom Flotilla.
- On 5 June the Supreme Administrative Court confirms the sentence establishing that Egyptians married to Israelis lose their Egyptian citizenship.
- On 8 June the governing NDP obtains 80% of the 88 seats in the Shura Council in the second round of elections to
the chamber, characterised by low voter turnout.

- On 25 June thousands of demonstrators led by Mohamed ElBaradei march in Alexandria to protest against police brutality in the framework of a series of protests organised following the June 10 death of young Khaled Said in a confrontation with two police officers.

Libya

- On 8 June Melissa Fleming, the UNHCR spokeswoman, announces that Libya has ordered the organisation to cease its activities in the country, where it has been providing humanitarian aid since 1991.
- On 13 June Libya frees Max Göldi, the Swiss citizen who has been in custody since July 2008. On the same day, the Swiss and Libyan Foreign Ministers agree in Tripoli to restore diplomatic relations.

Tunisia

- On 10 June several opposition groups announce the creation of an Alliance for Citizenship and Equality, a coalition with which they seek to put an end to the “hegemony of the governing party.”
- On 15 June the press reports on parliamentary approval of the reform of the article of the Criminal Code regarding attacks on security abroad, making it illegal to contact foreign organisations in order to “prejudice the vital interests of Tunisia.”

Algeria

- Throughout the month of June confrontations take place between security forces and terrorists leaving more than thirty dead. On 22 June the arrest of eight farmers in M’sila puts an end to the Djebel Boukahil network of terrorist support. Among the arrested are members of the family of Mokhtar Taibouai, one of the most wanted terrorists in Algeria.

Morocco

- On 2 June striking university students demonstrate before Parliament to demand that the government keep its promises to increase public employment.
- On 21 June the Ministry of the Interior announces the dismantling of a Takfirist network that was planning attacks on Jewish interests in Morocco.
- On 27 June the Gendarmerie intercepts a boat in Saida with 36 sub-Saharan immigrants aboard. On 28 June Morocco and Spain hold conversations to intensify coordinated control of illegal immigration.

European Union

- On 7 June the 16 Finance Ministers of the euro zone agree on the creation of an emergency fund of 440 billion euros that would be complemented with loans from the EU and the IMF for a total of 750 billion dollars. In addition, the 27 Finance Ministers agree to give Eurostat greater powers to investigate the reliability of the data submitted by the states.
- On 21 June the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council reach an agreement in Madrid for the fall launch of the EEAS.

Arab League

- On 2 June the League demands an end to the Gaza embargo and announces that it will ask the UN Security Council for a meeting with the Arab countries and Turkey to evaluate the situation following the attack on the Freedom Flotilla. Nevertheless, the meeting does not adopt the Syrian proposal to suspend negotiations with Israel on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

July 2010

During the month of July a number of Ministry-level resignations take place in France and Italy. Bosnia commemorates the fifteenth anniversary of the massacre at Srebrenica. The International Court of Justice establishes the legality of Kosovo’s independence, which motivates Belgrade to submit a draft resolution to the UN that sparks a crisis between Serbia and the EU. In Greece, protests over the worsening of the economic crisis and the measures adopted by the government continue to intensify. The reform process undertaken by the Turkish government gets a strong boost when the Constitutional Court hands down its agreement on the Constitution. In Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood threatens to boycott the November elections in protest over the reform of the Electoral Law. In Morocco, the Salé Appeals Court sentences Adelkhader Belliraj to life in prison. In the same month in which Belgium assumes the 6-month presidency of the EU, the European Parliament gives the green light to the anti-terrorism agreement with the US, and the Commission urges the Member States to reform their pension systems. The Arab League approves the reactivation of the negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis.

Spain

- On 22 July José Blanco, the Minister of Public Works, announces a freeze on nearly two hundred major infrastructure projects in order to achieve a 6.4 billion euro reduction in the budget in response to the austerity measures adopted by the Executive.
- On 30 July the Commission on Work and Immigration in the Congress of Deputies approves the labour law reform; the Party of the Spanish Socialist Workers (PSOE) votes in favour, Catalan and Basque nationalists abstain, and the rest of the parliamentary groups vote against it.

France

- On 4 July Alain Joyandet, the State Secretary for Cooperation, and Christian Blanc, State Secretary for Greater Paris area, announce their resignations due to their respective involvement in scandals of corruption and waste of public funds.
- On 16 July a series of grave incidents occur in Grenoble between the police and inhabitants of the Villeneuve district after a robber was shot by police.

Italy

- On 7 July 5,000 residents of L’Aquila, the capital of Abruzzo which was destroyed by an earthquake in April 2009, demonstrate in Rome to protest over the government’s reconstruction plan. The demonstration ends with violent confrontations with the police.
- On 8 July the Italian police arrest Cesare Pagano, considered to be the head of the “splinter group” of the Camorra and the right hand of Raffaele Amato, arrested in Spain in May.
Med. 336

**Appendices**

On 9 July the media strike for a day against the approval of the “gag law.”

On 14 July Nicola Cosentino, the Under Secretary of Economy, resigns after appearing on the list of people being investigated for influence-trafficking in the judiciary.

On 15 July the Senate approves the economic adjustment plan, which aims to achieve savings of 25 billion euros in the next two years. On July 29, the Chamber of Deputies definitively adopts the austerity plan.

**Malta**

On 17 July in collaboration with Libyan boats, Maltese vessels rescue 55 sub-Saharan immigrants on a raft 44 miles south of Malta.

**Croatia**

On 5 July Jadranka Kosor proposes Drazen Bosnjakovic, advisor to the Secretary General of the United Nations for Human Rights, as the new Minister of Justice in place of Ivan Simonovic.

On 9 and 10 July Dubrovnik hosts the 5th International Congress on Southeast Europe. Serbia boycotts the meeting in protest over the presence of ministerial officials from Kosovo.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

On 11 July 60,000 people commemorate the 15th anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre. On the occasion, 775 of the identified victims are buried in the memorial cemetery of Potocari.

On 19 July Marko Bosic, a member of the army of the Republika Srpska, is sentenced to 10 years in prison by a Bosnian court, becoming the first Bosnian Croat citizen to be sentenced for crimes against humanity.

**Serbia**

On 12 July Serbia and Turkey sign an agreement to eliminate visa requirements during the official visit of the Turkish Prime Minister in which Belgrade and Ankara undertake to intensify bilateral relations.

On 18 July Boris Tadic receives Ivo Josipovic, the Croatian President, on his first official visit to Serbia, with which both countries hope to put an end to past divisions.

On 22 July after nearly two years of deliberations, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) rules that the independence of Kosovo violates neither international law nor UN Resolution 1244. On July 28, Serbia submits a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly insisting that unilateral secession is not an acceptable solution. The document, which does not have EU consensus, opens a crisis between Belgrade and Brussels.

**Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244**

On 6 July the first meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Process Dialogue between the EU and Kosovo takes place. The Commission urges Kosovo to adopt stronger measures against corruption, embark on judicial and administrative reform and ensure the transparency of public sector contracts.

On 13 July Ilir Tolaj, advisor to the Minister of Health, is arrested in a raid for money laundering, tax evasion, abuse of power, fraud, organised crime, and accepting bribes.

On 21 July the ICTY orders a retrial of Ramush Haradinaj, the former Prime Minister and former Commander of the Kosovo Albanian militias during the Kosovo conflict, accused of ethnic cleansing and previously absolved for lack of evidence. The court finds that the process was marred by witness intimidation.

On 23 July the governor of the Central Bank of Kosovo, Hashim Rexhepi, is arrested for accepting bribes and for abuse of power.

**Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**

On 1 July members of the opposition SDSM attack a cameraman of the Ministry of the Interior who was filming a meeting in Parliament between members of the party and a group of public employees who were protesting over the loss of their jobs. On July 15 the Parliament agrees to create an investigation committee.

**Albania**

On 5 July the SP demands the resignation of Ilir Meta, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, after learning of the arrest of a Ministry employee for narcotics trafficking. Meta responds that he will resign in three years, when his term ends.

**Greece**

On 8 July public workers call for a new general strike against pension reform. On 13 July a strike by the workers in the Ministry of Culture and Tourism takes place. On 15 July another civil servant strike disrupts air traffic, public administration and hospital service.

On 26 July Greek truckers begin a work stoppage to protest government plans to open the sector to competition, affecting the petrol supply throughout the country. On 31 July the government turns to the army to guarantee the supply.

**Turkey**

On 2 July the air force bombs PKK positions in the Qandil Mountains, one day after 12 Kurd militants and five soldiers died in several confrontations. On 3 July an explosion destroys a segment of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline, originating in Iraq. On 5 July 12 members of the PKK and three army soldiers die in combat in Hakkari and Elazig. On 11 July over 5,000 people confront the police in a demonstration in Diyarbakir in support of the PKK.

On 7 July the Constitutional Court rules in favour of the constitutionality of the government reform programme, thus annuling an appeal by the opposition CHP. The approval of the measures will be submitted to popular referendum in September.

**Cyprus**

On 13 July the EU Economic and Financial Affairs Council opens proceedings against Cyprus for the existence of an excessive deficit.

On 28 July reunification negotiations proceed with a new meeting to advance in questions of property rights.

**Syria**

On 1 July the authorities arrest 400 members of the PKK in a series of raids carried out in a number of Syrian cities.

On 4 July a military tribunal sentenced lawyer Haitham Maleh to three years in prison for campaigning for an end to
emergency law and “weakening the country’s morale.” On 23 July the EU requests the release of Maleh, Muhammad al-Hassani, and Ali Saleh Al-Abdullah, two more lawyers arrested for “threatening State security.”

- On 13 July two employees of a telecommunications firm are arrested, accused of spying for Israel.
- On 30 July Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the King of Saudi Arabia make a joint trip to Lebanon, a clear sign of the normalisation of relations between the two countries. It is al-Assad’s first visit to Lebanon since the 2005 assassination of Rafiq Hariri.

**Lebanon**

- On 16 July the Salé Court of Appeals confirms the life sentence of Abdelkader Belliraj. The terrorist, with ties to AQIM, was responsible for one of the largest support cells of AQIM, dismantled in February 2008.

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**Mauritania**

- On 25 July AQIM announces the execution of French hostage, Michel Germaneau, in retaliation for the failed attempt by French-Mauritanian troops to free him in Mali on 22 July in the course of which six terrorists died.

**European Union**

- On 1 July Belgium assumes the Presidency of the EU setting as its priorities support for sustainable economic growth, reduction of pollution, achieving greater relevance for the EU in the international arena and advancing in the construction of a European social agenda and strengthening the rule of law.
- On 7 July the Commission presents a report to the Council recommending that the Member States gradually raise their retirement ages to prevent the collapse of their pension systems.
- On 8 July the EP approves a resolution in favour of maintaining the budget assigned to the CAP at its current level, at least until 2010.

**August 2010**

In the month of August, the Spanish city of Ceuta is the scene of a crisis between Spain and Morocco. In Italy, the government of Silvio Berlusconi is able to win a vote of confidence. In Bosnia, the EU Council approves a year’s extension of the mandate of Valentin Inzko. In Greece, the IMF and EU audit of the Greek accounts clears the way to the concession of a second stage of international aid to the Greek economy. In Turkey, the agreement between the government and the army to appoint two high-ranking military officers contrasts with the arrest of a hundred people with ties to the “Sledgehammer” plot. In Syria, pressure from the US and the IAEA to allow full access to Al-Kibar increases. The tension in the Middle East increases in Lebanon, as well, with a border confrontation with Israel, the conviction of former General Fayez Karam for spying for Tel Aviv and the proof that Hezbollah claims to have of Israeli’s involvement in the death of Rafiq Hariri. Libya demands 5 billion euros a year from the EU to “contain illegal immigration.”

**Portugal**

- On 31 August, the number of hectares consumed by the forest fires that have been devastating Portugal throughout the month of August reaches 88,383 – 77% of the 106,000 hectares burned since January—according to the National Forestry Authority.

**Spain**

- On 8 August, the government Delegation in the city of Melilla responds to Morocco’s accusations regarding alleged cases of police brutality by Spanish police on the Spanish-Moroccan border. In addition, police unions report aggressions by Moroccan citizens toward female police officers, as well as a
lack of resources to control the border. On 12 and 18 August, Moroccan organisations block the border between Melilla and Morocco. On 23 August, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, the Spanish Minister of the Interior, travels to Morocco and after meeting with his counterpart, Taieb Cherqaoui, and with the Alawite monarch, announces the “resolution of the incidents.”

- On 12 August, there is a massive influx of immigrants to Spain. In a series of operations more than 180 immigrants are rescued off the coasts of Alicante, Murcia, Almeria, Melilla, and Cadiz.
- On August 22, liberation of the two aid workers who were being held by AQIM in Mali after their kidnapping in Mauritania in November 2009 is announced. They are released upon payment of five to ten million euros and the extradition of the kidnapper from Mauritania to Mali, where he is released. Both the payment and the release of the kidnapper produce discomfort in Algeria.

France

- On 2 August, dairy workers demonstrate in several prefectures across the country to warn of their alarming loss of income and to demand that the State enforce the agreement reached in 2009 regulating the price of milk. On August 20 the dairy workers and the industry agree to a 10% raise in the base price.

Italy

- On 4 August, the government survives a no-confidence vote presented by the opposition by simple majority. The motion was presented against Giacomo Caliendo, the Under Secretary for Justice, on learning of his possible implication in a political plot that sought to influence the Justice Department. This is the first test of the stability of the Presidency after the split with the LDP.
- On 26 August, an ‘Ndrangheta bomb explodes in the doorway of the house of Salvatore di Landro, the chief prosecutor of Reggio Calabria.

Croatia

- On 4 August, the Supreme Court finds Branimir Glavas, the ultra-right-wing deputy who fled to Bosnia, guilty of war crimes committed in Osijek in 1991. He is sentenced to eight years in prison.
- On 5 August, the police arrest Dragomir Casic, accused of war crimes against Croatian officers in August 1991, when he attempts to cross from Serbia into Croatia.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 9 August, the discovery of a mass grave in Lake Perucac holding at least 200 victims of the Bosnian war is announced. The remains could be a fraction of the 840 who disappeared in Visegrad during the conflict.
- On 11 August, the EU Council extends for a year the mandate of Valentin Inzko, the High Representative of the International Community for Bosnia and Herzegovina.
- On 19 August, the Federal Council of Ministers adopts rules on coordination among the different law enforcement agencies in the country, an essential requirement for the lifting of visa restrictions with the EU.

Montenegro

- On 5 August, the government presents to the EU its plan against corruption and organised crime, one of the main tasks left to advance in the accession process.

Serbia

- On 19 August, the Constitutional Court rules that the governmental decision adopted in 2003 to give aid to some 45,000 workers in the parallel institutions in the Serbian majority enclaves in Kosovo is unconstitutional, prompting the indignation of Kosovo Serbs.
- On 27 August, the German and British Foreign Ministers, Guido Westerwelle and William Hague, embark on an official visit to Belgrade to study the possibility of presenting a joint resolution to the United Nations regarding the decision of the ICJ on the independence of Kosovo.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 4 August, Foreign Minister Skender Hyseni formally requests that the UN substitute a new document for Resolution 1244 following the ICJ decree on the independence of Kosovo.
- On 14 August, on a visit to Mitrovica, Prime Minister Hashim Thaci rejects any possibility of autonomy as a solution for Northern Kosovo. Thaci defends a strategy based on the integration of the Serb population.
- On 31 August, excavations begin in a grave found in Zilivoda with the remains of some twenty Kosovo Serb citizens assassinated during the Kosovo conflict.

Albania

- On 16 August, a member of the Greek community is murdered by seven Albanians whom the young man had addressed in Greek. Both Tirana and Athens express their concern about the increase in August of expressions of xenophobia towards the Greek community.
- On 16 August, President Bamir Topi sends back the Property Law bill that Parliament has approved, regulating the return of lands confiscated during the dictatorship, considering it unconstitutional for the National Agency for Property Return rather than the courts to be responsible for settling on possible disputes.

Greece

- On 5 August, the findings of the first audit of Greek public accounts carried out by the EU and the IMF are made public, revealing “considerable progress.”
- On 19 August, the European Commission recommends payment of the second of the approved aid packages.

Turkey

- On 5 August, a soldier dies during a confrontation between the army and Kurd militiamen near Dogubayazit, Agri. On the same day, an officer is wounded in an attack by the PKK terrorist organisation on a police station in Dicle and three members of the PKK die in another skirmish in Hakkari. On 10 August, a bomb attributed to the PKK goes off in Mardin Province in an oil pipeline originating in Kirkuk, killing two people.
- On 8 August, President Abdullah Gul approves an agreement reached between the government and the army, following intense negotiations, to name
General Erdal Ceylanoglu, head of land forces and General Isik Kosaner, Chief of the General Staff.
  - On 13 August, the PKK announces a unilateral ceasefire for the duration of Ramadan. At the end of September, the organisation extends the ceasefire for an additional month.
  - On 31 August, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu declares that he expects Athens to withdraw its territorial claims on the Aegean in response to the Turkish decision to remove Greece from its list of threats to national security, a decision adopted by the National Security Council in October 2009.

Cyprus
  - On 4 and 10 August, the Greek and Turkish Cypriot Presidents hold new reunification meetings without any progress on the right to property in northern Cyprus.

Syria
  - On 2 August, numerous media sources report the July election in Istanbul of Mohammad Riad al-Shaqla, who led the armed sector of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1980s, as the new party guide in exile, succeeding to Ali al-Baynouni.
  - On 3 August, the US envoy to the IAEA announces that the US is thinking of requesting a special inspection regarding the existence of nuclear installations with military objectives in Syria. In May, the Reuters news agency published a confidential report revealing that Syria continues to block the access of inspectors to the Al Kibar installations and pointing to suspicions that Syria could be developing a nuclear reactor with North Korean technology.

Lebanon
  - On 3 August, a border confrontation takes place between Lebanese and Israeli soldiers. In the course of the clash, one Israeli soldier, two Lebanese soldiers and one Lebanese journalist die. As a result of the incident, on August 7, President Michel Sleiman of Lebanon announces a new national rearmament plan to "protect the nation with dignity".
  - On 9 August, the secretary general of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, shows aerial photographs that implicate Israel in the assassination of Lebanese President Rafiq Hariri in 2005. On August 24, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon decrees that the evidence submitted is not complete and requests more information.
  - On 11 August, Elias al-Murr, the Minister of Defence, criticises the US decision to freeze aid to the Lebanese army because of the suspicion of possible ties to Hezbollah.
  - On 20 August, in light of the growing tension, the UN Security Council agrees to extend the UNIFIL mandate for another year.
  - On 24 August, the central Beirut neighbourhood Burj Abu Haidar, inhabited by Shiites and Sunnis, becomes the scene of an armed confrontation between followers of Hezbollah and Al-Ahbash. The conflict leaves three dead and 20 wounded, and reopens the question of compliance with the Al Taef disarmament by all the Lebanese militias except Hezbollah.

Jordan
  - On 1 August, the general assembly of the Front for Islamic Action, the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, decides to boycott the November elections, alleging suspicions of electoral fraud.
  - On 2 August, a rocket launched on the Israeli city of Eliat by fundamentalist militiamen in the Sinai goes off course and lands in the neighbouring Jordanian city of Aqaba; one person dies and five are wounded.

Egypt
  - On 2 August, Madi Al-Kurdi, former member of the opposition to the Mubarak regime, and former member of the leftist group Al-Tagamnu, announces the creation of a popular alliance in support of Gamal Mubarak, son of the current leader, as the next President.
  - On 21 August, Hosni Mubarak confirms that he will attend the renewal in Washington of negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis. The announcement takes place a week after his meeting with Abdullah II of Jordan and Mahmoud Abbas to agree on common positions.

Libya
  - On 30 August, Muammar Gaddafi ends a polemical official visit to Italy during which he demands EU aid in the amount of 5 billion euros annually in order to contain illegal immigration; he asserts that "Islam should become the religion of all Europe."

Algeria
  - On 6 August, Mohamed Idir, mayor of Baghilia, is assassinated in Boumerdes after deciding in late May to allow citizens to demonstrate against the attacks perpetrated in the region by AQIM.
  - On 9 August, Liberté reports that Hassan Hattab, the founder of GSPC, has been removed from the UN blacklist of terrorists, on which he had appeared since 2001.

Morocco
  - On 11 August, the Ministry of the Interior announces the dismantling of a terrorist cell with the arrest of its 18 members, who were preparing acts of sabotage against foreign interests in Morocco.

Mauritania
  - On 13 August, Mauritania releases two Malian nationals suspected of belonging to the AQIM terrorist network who were captured during the failed Franco-Mauritanian attempt to free hostage Michel Germaneau.
  - On 25 August, three soldiers are wounded in a suicide attack in Nema, near the Mali border, when a jeep loaded with explosives bursts into an army barracks.

September 2010

The economic crisis continues to be the backdrop for the diverse European agendas. In this regard, strikes in France, Greece, Spain and before the EU institutions themselves, take place alongside the measures adopted in September to approve a true EU economic governance that will avert future bankruptcies. In Greece, the need to intensify efforts to save the economy leads to the first changes in the Papan-
France

- On 4 September thousands demonstrate in the main cities against the government's decision to expel some 100 undocumented Roma after the police took down several illegal encampments during the month of August. On 9 September the European Parliament warns France that the expulsions violate treaties underwritten by the EU and European Community legislation. On 14 September Viviane Reding, the European Justice Commissioner, threatens legal action and compares the deportations with those carried out by the Nazis during World War II, arousing the indignation of the French government and the censure of a majority of European chancelleries. On 29 September the Commission begins infringement proceedings against France, requiring the submission by 15 October of a plan to bring the legislation into line with the 2004 European directive on freedom of movement.
- On 7 September France undergoes the fourth general strike of the year against government cutbacks and the increase in the retirement age from 60 to 62. On 10 September the National Assembly adopts the pension reform bill. On 23 September France is faced with yet another general strike.
- On 14 September the Senate ratifies the law approved by the National Assembly prohibiting the use of the veil in public spaces by 246 votes in favour to 1 against.

Italy

- On 5 September the President of the Chamber of Deputies, Fini, announces the definitive end of the PdL, though he proposes a pact to finish out the term. On 29 September Berlusconi survives a vote of no-confidence with the support of the 34 deputies who split from the PdL coalition with Gianfranco Fini.
- On 6 September Angelo Vassallo, Mayor of Pollica, is assassinated. Vassallo had been carrying out a policy of resistance to the interests of the Camorra clans.
- On 14 September a major police operation seizes Mafia goods valued at more than 1 billion euros, largely belonging to businessman Vito Nicastr, nicknamed “Lord of the Wind” for his substantial investment in wind energy using money obtained through criminal activity.
- On 22 September in the Gioia Tauro port of Calabria, the Italian authorities seize tons of RDX explosives. The authorities tie the discovery to an operation of the ‘Ndrangheta to supply explosives to Hamas and Hezbollah by way of Syria.

Malta

- On 5 September a fireworks factory explodes in Xaghra, Gozo. Six people die.

Slovenia

- On 9 September the government presents its bill on pension reform which anticipates a progressive rise in the retirement age from 63 to 65.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 14 September the Bosnian Serb Parliament approves a new Law on State Property, stipulating that the Republika Srpska will have the authority to manage and sell all public properties in its territory. The law is criticised by the Bosnian members of Parliament, the High Representative, Valentin Inzko, and the Peace Implementation Council on the grounds that it violates the Dayton Agreements.

Montenegro

- On 14 September Montenegro and the EU sign a confidential information exchange agreement on questions of security, defence and foreign policy.

Serbia

- On 4 September several people are wounded in Novi Pazar, in the Raska district, in violent incidents between the police and demonstrators from the Islamic community in response to the expropriation of a parcel of land ceded for the construction of a school.
- On 8 September Serbia and the EU present before the General Assembly of the United Nations a joint resolution on Kosovo advocating for dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, though it does not explicitly recognise the independence of Kosovo. On 13 September the Foreign Ministers of the EU consider Serbia's
evolution positive and agree to include the Serbian candidacy for accession in their October meeting. The Prime Minister of Kosovo, Hashim Thaci, warns that Kosovo will only agree to conversations on an equal footing.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 26 September 18,000 Kosovo Serbs are left without telephone service when the Kosovo Telephone Agency and Kosovo police agents shut down the Telekom Srbija installations, a Serbian operator that supplies lines to the Serb enclaves of Kosovo.
- On 27 September Fatmir Sejdiu resigns the Presidency on the handing down of the Constitutional Court's decision finding him guilty of having violated the Constitution by simultaneously serving as President of the country and leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK).

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

- On 22 September the police announce that they will increase monitoring of radical Islamism in the country, in response to the call by Sulejman Rexhepi, the head of the Islamic Religious Community of Macedonia (IVZ), for aid from the State and Western embassies to counter the worrisome increase in activity by radical Islamist groups.

Albania

- On 6 September President Bamir Topi signs a decree setting 8 May 2011 as the date for the next local elections, two days before the deadline to issue the document and in the context of parliamentary obstruction blocking reform of the electoral code.
- On 13 September the Social Movement for Integration (LSI), a member of the government-coalition, announces changes in the cabinet. The current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ilir Meta, moves on to the Ministry of Economy, and Edmond Haxhinasto takes over Foreign Affairs.

Greece

- On 3 September the Coast Guard responds to an SOS sent from a ship off the coast of Chios flying the Italian flag; 115 immigrants are saved and a Turk and a Georgian suspected of human trafficking are arrested.
- On 7 September Georgios Papandreou announces his first major cabinet shuffle almost a year after he was elected. Georgios Papakonstantinou, the Minister of Finance and person responsible for the country's economic recovery of the country, remains in place.
- On 14 September Greek truckers begin new protests in the principal Greek cities against the expansion of the trucking sector.
- On 14 September Greece receives the second aid installment stipulated in the bailout plan approved by the EU and the IMF.

Turkey

- On 1 September Turkey assumes the rotating Presidency of the UN Security Council.
- On 7 September security forces kill nine members of the PKK terrorist organisation during a confrontation in Hakkari, following a PKK rocket attack on a military installation. On September 16, 10 bus passengers die in Gecitli when a landmine explodes.
- On 10 September riot police confront a demonstration called by the BDP in Istanbul to denounce the "repression of the Kurdish people by the government" and call for a boycott of the constitutional referendum on the 12th.
- On 12 September 58% of the voters in the Constitutional referendum come out in favour of the package of 26 amendments presented by the government with the support of the EU.

Cyprus

- On 3, 7, and 10 September new meetings take place between Demetris Christofias and Dervis Eroglu to reach an agreement on property rights in the north of the island. On 14 September the meeting of the National Council (Parliament) agrees to the creation of a parliamentary subcommittee to debate the proposals tabled during the negotiations. The agreement comes about following accusations by several political parties of excessive government concessions to the Turkish Cypriots.

Syria

- On 17 September the Russian Minister of Defence, Anatoly Serdyukov, declares to RIA Novosti Russia's intention to fulfil a contract signed with Syria in 2007 for the sale of arms including P-800 Yakhont supersonic cruise missiles, in the face of objections from the US and Israel, which consider that they represent a threat to the security of the Israeli navy and could be transferred to Hezbollah.

Lebanon

- On 6 September Prime Minister Saad Hariri declares to the Asharq Al-Awsat daily that it was “a mistake” to accuse Syria of being behind the assassination of his father, Rafiq Hariri.

Egypt

- On 2 September the streets of Cairo awaken plastered with posters bearing a photograph of Omar Suleiman, the Egyptian intelligence chief, with the slogan “Omar Suleiman is the true alternative to the President of the Republic.”
- On 6 September at a crowded iftar meal in Sayeda Zeinab, Mohamed ElBaradei calls for a boycott of the November presidential elections if Mubarak fails to introduce democratic reforms.
- On 20 September Al-Ahram reports the arrest of Mohammed Khamsi Dababesh, a top Hamas security official, on his arrival at the Cairo airport on a flight originating in Damascus. Dababesh is accused of “implication in activities designed to compromise national security.”
- On 21 September hundreds demonstrate in Cairo before Abidine’s presidential palace in protest over the attempts by President Hosni Mubarak to install his son Gamal in power. The demonstration ends in a confrontation with the riot police and ten arrests.

Libya

- On 1 September the government releases 37 Islamists who had finished the Gaddafi Foundation programme of rehabilitation and religious dialogue, whose director is Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, son of the Libyan President.
Algeria
• On 3 September in Bordj Bou Arreridj the police arrest three Tunisians and four Algerians accused of ties to AQIM and of having taken part in a June ambush in which more than 20 gendarmes died.
• On 6 September four local police die in a terrorist ambush in the province of Skikda. On September 11 a soldier dies in a bomb explosion near Bejsya. On 14 September fifteen gunmen attack a police barricade near Dhehira and kill a local policeman. On 21 September a new bomb attack in the centre of Bordj Menaïel kills two policemen and leaves ten wounded.
• On 8 September Hassan Hattab, founder of the GSPC, makes a call on public radio for AQIM to lay down its arms. On September 9, Algeria frees Samir Saoud, a member of the GSPC, after three years in prison. On 28 August, in an interview for Radio Quran, Sayoud and Othmane Touati had urged AQIM followers to join the reconciliation process.

Mauritania
• On 14 September security forces detain a person suspected of belonging to AQIM and of having participated in the El Ghallaouiya and Aket Tourine attacks in 2007 and 2008 respectively, in which a total of 14 soldiers died.
• On 17 September the army begins an offensive against positions of the AQIM on the eastern border and in the north of Mali. On September 19 confrontations take a toll of 12 terrorists and six soldiers.

European Union
• On 2 September the European Commission, Council and Parliament agree to the creation of a new European Council on Systematic Risk and three European Supervision Authorities to monitors the solvency of banks, markets and financial securities. On 22 September the EP approves the new system of financial supervision presented by the Commission, which will become effective on 1 January 2011.
• On 7 September in his first State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso, defines five priorities for Europe: reinforcing economic governance; affirming the Europe 2020 strategy of stimulating growth to create employment; building an area of freedom, justice and security; and proposing a European tax for the purpose of guaranteeing resources, modernising the EU budget and promoting a homogeneous Europe on the international level.
• On 29 September more than 80,000 demonstrators from workers’ organisations in 30 countries rally in Brussels during the “European Day of Action” in protest over the austerity plans adopted in recent months by European governments.

October 2010
In Spain, a significant cabinet reshuffle is announced, and in France protests against pension reform increase. In Italy, Gianfranco Fini launches his new party, split off from the government coalition. Another government coalition is broken in Kosovo, threatening to advance the elections scheduled for February 2011. Bosnia holds crucial parliamentary and presidential elections for the future of the country. In Albania, parliamentary activity continues to be eternally blocked when the socialist deputies once again abandon the chamber. In Turkey, the PKK terrorist organisation announces an extension of the cease-fire. In Lebanon, Hezbollah calls into question the international court judging the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. After months of uncertainty, Hosni Mubarak announces that he will run for re-election in the October 2011 presidential elections. The Moroccan government orders a Western Sahara tent city near El Ayoun to be dismantled, seriously increasing the tension between Rabat and the Polisario Front. The EU accepts the French-German proposal to modify the Lisbon Treaty to allow preventive sanctions for excessive deficits of the Member States.

Portugal
• On 12 October Portugal is elected to be a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council.
• On 30 October the government and the opposition reach an agreement that guarantees the adoption of the 2011 general budgets following weeks of uncertainty and a temporary break in negotiations that led to fears of a financial and political crisis.

Spain
• On 1 October eight rafts bearing a total of 164 sub-Saharan immigrants are intercepted in waters off Granada, Almeria and Murcia. On 3 October 43 more are intercepted off the coasts of Ceuta, Almeria and Murcia.
• On 4 October three members of ETA arrested on September 29 declare before the National Court that they received terrorist training in Venezuela in 2008 under the tutelage of ETA member Arturo Cubillas, who has a position of responsibility in the Hugo Chavez government. On 13 October Miguel Moratinos, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, insists that Venezuela give a “definitive response” with regard to the presence of ETA terrorists in its territory.
• On 12 October in Hendaye (France), French and Spanish security forces arrest Urbeka Bravo Corral, presumed director of the international network of Segi (terrorist organisation).
• On 20 October José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero announces significant changes in his cabinet to face the last stage of his term of office. The Minister of the Interior, Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba, takes on the Vice-Presidency and Miguel Ángel Moratinos is replaced in Foreign Affairs by Trinidad Jiménez, who in turn hands the Ministry of Health over to Leire Pajín.

France
• On 5 October the police arrest 12 suspected members radical Islamist cells. The operation takes place in a context of widespread unease in Europe and the US raised by suspicions of a possible attack on European cities.
• On 5 October the Correctional Court of Paris condemns Jerome Kerviel, former broker for the Société Générale, whose actions caused losses of 4.9 billion euros in 2008 in the greatest stock fraud in French history.
• On 12 October a march of over one million people takes place in Paris in protest over the increase in the retirement age proposed by the government. The march coincides with a new strike that paralyses classrooms, transport, and re-
fineries for over a week. On 20 October the government orders police intervention to reopen the refineries as protests continue to unfold. On October 27 French deputies definitively approve the rise in the retirement age.

**Italy**

- On 2 October tens of thousands of people demonstrate in Rome against the Head of Government in the second No Berlusconi Day, a call to mobilisation by the People Pecile civic group.
- On 5 October Gianfranco Fini officially introduces the Future and Liberty for Italy Party (FLI, conservative), which he announced in July following his expulsion from the government coalition.
- On 12 October in Genoa, a soccer match between Italy and Serbia is suspended as a result of violent altercations provoked by ultra-right-wing Serbian fans.
- On 14 October the government adopts the “2011-13 Stability Law” to reduce the public deficit, the day after the Bank of Italy announces that the Italian public debt had reached a new historic record of 1.843 billion euros in August.
- On 15 October the Public Prosecutor in Rome opens one investigation into the Prime Minister for alleged tax evasion and another for tax infractions in 2003 and 2004, in the framework of the Mediaset case.
- On 25 October the government and the provincial authorities of Naples reach an agreement to end the garbage crisis, which arose following the discovery of government plans to open the largest European garbage dump in Terzigno, producing violent confrontations between residents and the police. The government agrees to suspend until further notice the opening of the new dump and to do health and environmental studies in the existing one.

**Slovenia**

- On 10 October the Democratic Party (SDS, conservatives) prevails in the first round of local elections with 18.73% of the votes, followed by the Social Democratic Party with 12.05%. In the mayoral elections in Ljubljana, independent Zoran Jankovic obtains re-election by absolute majority, and in Piran victory goes to Peter Bossman, a Social Democrat of Ghanaian descent.

**Croatia**

- On 14 October Ivo Sanader announces his intention to recover his seat after his sudden abandonment of politics in July 2009 which lead to the appointment of Jadranka Kosor as Prime Minister. The opposition and Kosor herself suggest that it is an attempt by the former Premier, under investigation for a case of corruption, to ensure parliamentary immunity for himself. On 20 October Sanader is readmitted to Parliament.
- On 15 October the former Minister of Economy, Damir Polancec, is sentenced to 15 months in prison for his implication in a case of corruption involving Podravka, a major Croatian food company.
- On 28 October Jadranka Kosor survives a no-confidence vote brought by the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which blamed the government for the loss of purchasing power and the rise in unemployment. The outcome is 79 votes in favour and 62 against.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

- On 3 October Bosnia holds general elections. Bakir Izetbegovic, from the Party for Democratic Action (SDA) for Bosnians, is elected to the three-party Presidential College, prevailing over the current co-President, the Muslim nationalist Haris Silajdzic. The Bosnian Serb co-President Nebojsa Radmanovic, of the Party of the Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), and the Croatian co-President, Social Democrat Zeljko Komsic, are elected to new terms. In the Republika Srpska, the SNSD is the winner. In the Croatian Muslim Federation, the multiethnic Social Democratic Party prevails. In the Croatian cantons the party with the most votes is the HDZ.

**Montenegro**

- On 27 October Deputy Prime Minister Svetozar Marovic announces that Montenegro will declassify all the documents related with the 1992 deportation of Bosnian refugees. Nine former police officers are on trial for this illegal deportation that led to the surrender and subsequent murder of 79 Bosnians by the Bosnian Serb militias.

**Serbia**

- On 10 October at least 122 people were wounded in confrontation between the police and homophobic groups during the gay pride march held in Belgrade.
- On 11 October the Appeals Court releases Ilja Jurisic, the Bosnian war criminal, ordering a new trial after his defence team appeals the sentence of 12 years in prison handed down by a Belgrade court in 2009.
- On 25 October during the meeting of the European Council, the Dutch government lifts its veto on starting conversations on accession with Serbia once Belgrade agrees to continue fully cooperating with the ICTY and to accept negotiations to establish the definitive status of Kosovo.

**Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244**

- On 15 October Xavier Bout de Marnhac of France succeeds Yves de Kermabon as head of EULEX.
- On 16 October the LDK, a minority partner in the governing coalition, announces it will leave the government one day after Jakup Krasniqi, the acting President, announced early elections on February 13, following the resignation of Fatmir Sejdiu.

**Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia**

- On 11 October the opposition SDSM organises a mass demonstration in Prilep against the government’s economic and security policies.

**Albania**

- On 28 October the SP once again abandons Parliament demanding as the condition of their return the demolition of the Enver Hoxha Pyramid, the clarification of the recent murders of two socialist militants, the end of parliamentary immunity in cases of corruption, in addition to a recount of the June 2009 election results.

**Greece**

- On 11 October the Anfisa Court of Justice hands down a life sentence to the police officer who killed the young Alexis Grigoropoulos during a December
2008 demonstration in Athens, unleashing a wave of riots that paralysed Greece for weeks.

- On 24 October the European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmstrom, announces that Greece will have a special deployment of border patrols from the European FRONTEX, after Athens asked for aid in the face of the alarming increase in irregular immigrants to Greece through Turkey, amounting to 90% of the total illegal entries into the EU thus far this year.

Turkey

- On 22 and 27 October 17 people are detained in Smyrna, Istanbul and Van, accused of giving financial and technical support to Al Qaeda.
- On 26 October the European Court for Human Rights sentences Turkey to pay 15 million euros to a group whose property rights were violated in Cyprus during the 1974 occupation of the island.
- On 31 October security forces detain 81 irregular immigrants in the provinces of Hakkari, Mardin, Van Sirnak, and Edirne.

Cyprus

- On 9 October the Minister of Defence announces that for the third year running and to contribute to the advance of the reunification talks, Cyprus will suspend its annual military manoeuvres, planned for October and requests that the TRNC do the same with the joint manoeuvre it carries out each year with the Turkish army.
- On 11 October Demetris Christofias announces that Cyprus would allow the opening of the Famagusta port for commerce with the EU if the TRNC returns the Greek Cypriot occupied district of Varosha to the United Nations for its restitution.
- On 14 October the new Limnitis-Pyrgos border crossing in the northeast of the island comes into service.

Syria

- On 4 October Syria issues 33 orders of arrest against Lebanese nationals and citizens of other nationalities following an accusation of false testimony in the case of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri given by the former Lebanese Head of Security, former General Jamil Sayyed, imprisoned in Lebanon for four years as a result of said testimonies.
- On 13 October the Presidents of Syria and Iraq hold a meeting in Damascus in the course of which they seal the reconciliation of the two countries, whose relations have cooled since the 2009 terrorist attacks in Baghdad following which Iraq accused Syria of not preventing the entry of terrorists through their border.

Lebanon

- On 13 October President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran is acclaimed by thousands of Lebanese citizens during an official visit that Israel considers a “provocation” but which reaffirms the good relation between Teheran and Beirut. During the visit, Ahmadinejad meets with Hassan Nasrallah, head of Hezbollah.
- On 20 October Hillary Clinton informs Prime Minister Saad Hariri that the US will not tolerate any attempt to discredit the work of the UN tribunal investigating the assassination of Rafiq Hariri after learning that the court will also judge Members of Hezbollah. On 28 October the head of Hezbollah calls on the Lebanese to boycott the tribunal. That same day, the US accuses Hezbollah, Syria and Iran of attempting to destabilise Lebanon.

Jordan

- On 26 October the 9th Meeting of the EU-Jordan Association Council approves the advanced status of the partnership and relations with the Hashemite Kingdom.

Egypt

- On 13 October the authorities order the closing of four Salafi satellite television channels belonging to the Saudi company Al-Bahrain, for “spreading false religious and scientific ideas.”
- On 21 October the press chief of the National Democratic Party, Ali El Din Hillal, confirms that Hosni Mubarak will be the candidate of his party in the October 2011 presidential elections.

Tunisia

- On 30 October Tunisia and Libya agree to eliminate barriers to the free movement of goods and people between the two countries.

Algeria


Morocco

- On 22 October Benrabah Benattou, an Algerian terrorist with ties to the AQIM cell of Abdelkader Belliraj, is sentenced to 10 years in prison.
- On 29 October the Ministry of Communications announces the suspension of Al-Jazeera operations in Morocco for “failure to follow the rules of responsible journalism.”

Mauritania

- On 17 October on the Mauritanian border, Malian authorities arrest Sanda Ould Boumama, an AQIM accomplice wanted in Mauritania for his involvement in a 2005 attack in Lemghety in which 15 soldiers died.
- On 20 October three terrorists are sentenced to death for the 2007 murder of a French family in Aleg and for an attack on the police carried out in 2008.

European Union

- On 19 October the EC proposes a series of options to create new resources aimed at reinforcing the EU budget and reducing national contributions. One of these proposals is to create a European VAT.
- On 20 October the EP approves by a broad majority the staffing and financing for the EEAS as a result of which the new organisation, responsible co-ordinating of European diplomacy, is ready to begin functioning. Pierre Vimont, the current French ambassador in Washington, is appointed Executive Secretary general of the EEAS.
- On 29 October France and Germany receive European Council support for
their proposal to revise the Lisbon Treaty, including the possibility of preventive sanctions on countries with a deficit above 3% that do not take measures to lower it upon receiving a warning.

**Arab League**

- On 8 October the Arab League Peace Initiative Follow-Up Committee meets. The meeting gives Israel one month to freeze the settlements in the West Bank and thus renew direct negotiations.

**November 2010**

In Spain, the government gets parliamentary approval of the 2011 budgets. In France, November brings cabinet changes and the approval of pension reform. In Italy, the increasing tension between the LDP and the FLI puts the Berlusconi government on the spot. Croatia closes three new chapters in its accession negotiations in the same month its border agreement with Slovenia goes into effect. Visa restrictions are lifted by the EU for Bosnia and Albania. In contrast, the passage of a no-confidence vote against Hashim Thaci’s government in Kosovo forces him to call for early elections on 12 December. In Greece, the victory of the governing PASOK in the municipal and regional elections contrasts with the persistence of social unrest and a wave of letters bombs in several diplomatic delegations. Tension also rises between the partners in the Lebanese coalition government with regard to the investigations of the International Tribunal into the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. In Jordan, the monarchical candidates win in parliamentary elections marked by boycotts, high abstention and several outbreaks of violence. In Egypt, the hostility between Muslims and Coptic Christians increases. Tension also increases between Morocco and the Polisario Front. The EU confirms the activation of the Ireland bailout plan.

**Portugal**

- On 24 November a general strike against government austerity measures paralyses public services.

**Spain**

- On 7 November 40 sub-Saharan immigrants are intercepted off the coast of Tarifa. On 13 November a raft with 38 sub-Saharans is intercepted and escorted to the port of Almeria.
- On 20 November the government is able to pass the 2011 budgets, the most restrictive ever in the Spanish democratic period, thanks to the support of Basque and Canary Islands nationalists, who receive the transfer of active employment policies in exchange.
- On 28 November elections in Catalonia give the victory to Convergència i Unió (CiU, nationalists) who go from 48 to 62 of the 135 seats.

**France**

- On 2 November a new general strike begins that will affect public transport and last until the 6th, when a demonstration of 140,000 takes place in Paris against Nicolas Sarkozy’s decision to continue with pension reform. On November 9 the pension reform law is finally promulgated. On 23 November a new daylong strike called by unions brings together 23,000 demonstrators all over France.
- On 4 November the police arrest two people suspected of being tied to Islamic terrorist groups. Brice Hortefeux, the Minister of the Interior, confirms that since the beginning of the year 86 people have been arrested on such charges.
- On 15 November Nicolas Sarkozy renews François Fillon’s appointment as Prime Minister, in the context of a cabinet reshuffle, criticised by the opposition Socialists as a clear “shift to the right,” in an attempt to raise his popularity rating. Alain Juppé returns to the government as Minister of Defence in place of Michaëlle Alliot-Marie who replaces Bernard Kouchner of the Socialists in Foreign Affairs.

**Italy**

- On 3 November 47 people with ties to three Mafia clans in Catania and 50 with ties to the Camorra are arrested, including four local police officers. On 5 November 92 people linked to two clans of the Sacra Corona Unita, in conflict over control of drug traffic in the Bari Province, are arrested. On 17 November Antonio lovine, the head of the Camorra, is arrested after spending 15 years at large. On 30 November the police arrest 23 presumed members of the Cosa Nostra, including Giovanni Vitale.
- On 7 November Gianfranco Fini demands the resignation of Silvio Berlusconi as Prime Minister under threat of withdrawing from the government the four Ministers and the Under Secretaries of State who belong to the FLI, his new party, which split off from the LDP. On November 9 the FLI MPs join the opposition to vote on three amendments to the Italy-Libya friendship treaty supported by the Berlusconi government.
- On 30 November thousands of students demonstrate against approval by the parliament of the bill on university reform. In Rome riots take place outside of Parliament.

**Malta**

- On 17 November the European Commission announces the opening of an investigation into state aid conceded by Malta to the Delimara power station on the grounds that Malta could be violating single market legislation.

**Slovenia**

- On 15 November the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) rejects the petition of Slovenia and Croatia to arbitrate in the dispute over non-payments by the failed Ljubljanska Banka (LB) to Croatian citizens. This dispute constitutes the only obstacle to Croatian accession to the EU, when Zagreb refuses to open its market to the largest Slovenian bank, which emerged from the bankruptcy of LB, until the 172 million euros deposited in it by Croatian citizens before the collapse of Yugoslavia are returned.
- On 23 November the Parliament names Branko Maslesa the new president of the Constitutional Court, a polemical appointment as Maslesa is accused by certain sectors of having been an active communist and opposed to Slovenian independence from Yugoslavia.
- On 29 November the border mediation treaty between Slovenia and Croatia goes into effect.
Croatia

- On 3 November six people are sentenced by a Zagreb tribunal to a total of 150 years in prison for the 2006 assassination of editor Ivo Pukanic, when he was investigating ties between Balkan mafias.
- On 5 November Croatia closes the chapters in the accession negotiations having to do with free circulation of people, transportation and institutional policy.
- On 24 November in Zagreb, the Presidents of Croatia and Serbia undertake to resolve the issue of the disappeared in the 1991-1995 conflict, taking a new step in the reconciliation process.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 18 November the UN Security Council approves a year’s extension of the EUFOR mandate and reminds the Bosnian authorities that it is responsible for ensuring continuing compliance with the Dayton Agreements.
- On 23 November Aleksandar Dzombic is appointed Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska following Milorad Dodik, the new President of the Bosnian Serb Parliament.

Montenegro

- On 7 November the government suspends its controversial programme of “economic citizenship,” which offers Montenegrin citizenship to any investor who invests more than 500,000 euros in the country, owing to the lack of harmonisation with EU policy.
- On 30 November Ranko Krivokepic, President of the Parliament, wins a confidence vote presented by the Movement for Change (PzP, conservative) and New Serbian Democracy (NOVA, conservative, unionist), which accuse him of abuses of power.

Serbia

- On 2 November an earthquake measuring 5.4 on the Richter scale shakes the city of Kraljevo causing the death of two people and wounding fifty more.
- On 4 November Boris Tadic, the Serbian President, makes an official visit to the Croatian locality of Vukovar in homage to the 200 Croatian citizens who were executed there by the Serbian army.
- On 15 November the chief prosecutor of the ICTY declares that Serbia is not being helpful to the court in capturing the fugitives Ratko Mladic and Goran Hadzic. On 17 November Serbia requests the help of Interpol to find them.
- On 29 November the European Investment Bank opens its new office of representation for the Western Balkans in Belgrade.

Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244

- On 2 November the Kosovo Parliament votes in favour of the no-confidence vote against the minority government of Hashim Thaci, forcing President Jakup Krasniqi to call for early elections on December 12.
- On 12 November the EULEX presents a formal accusation against seven individuals, among them a senior official from the Health Ministry, suspected of belonging to an international network of trafficking in the organs of citizens in situations of extreme poverty.

Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

- On 12 November in application of the Lustration Law, approved in 2008, the Administrative Court finds Trendafil Ivanovski, former president and current justice of the Constitutional Court, guilty of having spied for the UDBA, the secret services of Socialist Yugoslavia. Ivanovski denies the accusation and announces that he will appeal before the Supreme Court.

Albania

- On 26 October the government rejects an opposition petition to carry out a “limited” investigation of the electoral results of June 2009. On November 26 the opposition renews its protests with a demonstration in Elbasan.

Greece

- On 1 November the police announce the interception of a letter bomb sent to the French embassy addressed to Nicolas Sarkozy, hours after intercepting two others addressed to the embassies of Belgium and the Netherlands, and after a package addressed to the Mexican embassy exploded in an Athenian post office. On 2 November letter bombs go off in the Swiss and Russian embassies. Other suspicious packages are intercepted and detonated. The same day another letter bomb originating in Greece and addressed to Silvio Berlusconi is intercepted in the Bologna airport. On 3 November Greece suspends all postal service abroad for 48 hours, shortly after the German police deactivate an artefact sent from Greece addressed to Angela Merkel. The police intercept suspicious packages sent to Europol, the European Court of Justice, and the French embassy. The Conspiracy Cells of Fire takes credit for all these acts.
- On 14 November Greece holds the second round of municipal and regional elections in which the governing PASOK is victorious, winning in the municipalities of Athens and Thessaloniki, and in eight of the thirteen regions.
- On 15 November protests take place in Athens and Thessaloniki against the EU and IMF bailout plan for the Greek economy, which end in a confrontation with the police.
- On 27 November Greek sailors decide to prolong the strike they began on 23 November unless they get a new collective bargaining agreement. On 29 November the government issues an emergency order to oblige ferries to offer minimal services to those islands that depend exclusively on maritime transportation.

Turkey

- On 2 November the governor of Istanbul declares that Vedat Acar, the author of an October 31 suicide bombing in Istanbul in which 32 people were wounded, belonged to the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons, a splinter group of the PKK. The attack was planned to coincide with the end of the unilateral two-month ceasefire declared by the PKK, which denied any implication in the crime and announced an extension of the truce till the end of the 2011 elections.
- On 7 November General Zek Es is arrested for the attack that took the lives of six soldiers in Hakkari in May 2009, initially attributed to the PKK, after a recording of a telephone conversation between Es and General Gurbuz Kaya is leaked in which Es confesses his part in ordering the placing of the landmines “for reasons of security”.

 filed by an AI language model.
• On 24 November Vecdi Gonul, the Minister of Defence, announces the suspension of duties of three high-ranking army officers due to their alleged participation in the planning of coups. For the first time in the history of modern Turkey a civil authority suspends military commanders.

Cyprus

• On 1 November the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders decide to establish a joint committee to study the possibility of opening more border crossings between the two communities.
• On 18 November the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities meet with the UN Secretary General; they agree to intensify their efforts toward reunification under the formula of a bi-communal federation on an equal basis.

Syria

• On 19 November Syria adopts its eleventh five-year plan, aimed at fostering a transition toward a market-based social economic model, slowing demographic growth, increasing policies of educational development and social programmes, and doubling investment vis-à-vis the previous plan.

Lebanon

• On 2 November the Lebanese press reports on death sentences handed down by a Lebanese court to three people, two of whom had fled the country, for collaborating with Israel.
• On 7 November the UN tribunal investigating the assassination of Rafiq Hariri accuses Imad Mugniyah, a leading member of Hezbollah killed in a bomb attack in Damascus in 2008, of being responsible for the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister. On 11 November the head of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, threatens anyone who attempts to arrest members of his party. On the same day Prime Minister Saad Hariri affirms that he will not allow Hezbollah’s threats to muddle Lebanon’s stability nor its excellent relations with Syria.
• On 21 November the Canadian Broadcasting Company, CBC, reveals data from a report carried out by a UN investigation, offering proof of ties between Hezbollah and the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. The United Nations recognises the existence of the report, while in Beirut there is fear of a definitive crisis of the coalition executive branch, which has not been able to meet for fifteen days, and a return to violence in Lebanon.
• On 14 November Omar Bakri Muhammad, the Syrian-Lebanese Muslim cleric, sentenced in absentia two days before to life in prison by a military court together with 53 other people on different terrorism charges.

Jordan

• On 9 November Jordan celebrates parliamentary elections that are boycotted by the Islamist opposition. Despite the broad police detail outbreaks of violence occur, causing one death. The elections give the victory to candidates close to the king or to tribes closely tied to the royal family, though of the high abstention denotes a growing discontent among the citizens.
• On 24 November the Foreign Minister, Nasser Judeh, calls in the Israeli ambassador to demand explanations and condemn the assault of the police the day before on two employees of the Jordanian embassy in Israel after they refused to identify themselves in a routine check.

Egypt

• On 9 November in Alexandria, the police open fire on demonstrators in favour of Mahmoud Attiya, the candidate of the Muslim Brotherhood. On 13 November new confrontations take place.
• On 17 November blogger Abdul Karim Nabeel Suleiman, in prison since February 2007 for “insulting Islam, inciting sedition and insulting the Egyptian President,” is released.
• On 24 November a demonstrator dies during altercations in Giza, Cairo, between the police and Coptic Christians who were protesting over the freezing of construction on a church. On 25 November the Attorney General asks for preventive prison sentences for 156 people arrested during the disturbances.
• On 28 November Egypt holds the first round of parliamentary elections in which 95% of the seats on the Shura Council (Parliament) are distributed; the governing NDP obtains 209 of the 221 seats. The results bring forth opposition accusations of electoral fraud and riots in several cities leaving 16 dead and one hundred wounded.

Libya

• On 4 November Libyan authorities shut down the print edition of the newspaper Oea, property of Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, son of the Libyan President. On 8 November Libya announces the release of 20 foreign journalists following three days in jail. They all worked for the agency Libya Press, also the property of Gaddafi’s son. In the eyes of several international analysts, the arrests are part of a power struggle between the conservative and reformist sectors.

• On 29 and 30 November Tripoli hosts the EU-Africa summit, with migration and commerce as the central topics. Gaddafi renews his call to Europe to increase the funds devoted to Libya to struggle against illegal immigration if “white, Christian Europe doesn’t want to become black,” and criticises the UN’s linking its aid to the fulfilling of objectives in questions of good governance and human rights.

Algeria

• On 7 November three members of the AQIM die in an altercation with Algerian troops between M’Sila and Djelila. Throughout the month attacks and confrontations between terrorists and security forces and the army take place, with more than 15 mortal victims and numerous wounded. On 20 November there is a general strike in Freha to protest against the increase in terrorist actions in the province of Tizi-Ouzou and demand the liberation of Oman Slimane, a citizen kidnapped on 15 November in Aghrib. He is ultimately freed without payment of a ransom.

Morocco

• On 5 November two Spanish journalists who were covering a trial of Western Sahara activists, are victims of aggression by supporters of Sahara as Moroccan territory. The resulting altercations oblige the court to postpone the trial until December. On 6 November Morocco retains three Spanish deputies who had gone to Morocco to visit the protest camp situated 15 kilometres from El Ay
On the 7th and 8th the same situation occurs with another Spanish MP and a French MP, respectively.

- On 7 November Mohammed VI speaks to the nation with regard to the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Green March in which he assures that Morocco will not allow any violation or doubt of the Moroccanness of the Western Sahara region which is located to the east of the more than 2,700 kilometres of military wall, an area with military presence of the Polisario Front.

- On 9 November the press considers the young people’s demonstrations before Parliament to be a reaction to the announcement in the month of October of a cutback in some 6,000 public sector jobs as part of the plan to combat the crisis.

**Mauritania**

- On 6 November the Mauritanian News Agency reports on the initiation of the first joint patrols between Mauritania and Mali in order to monitor the activity of AQIM on the border between the two countries.

- On 21 November France-Press reports on the surrender to the Mauritanian authorities of 28 young recruits who had fled from AQIM training camps, joining six members who had surrendered earlier in November.

**European Union**

- On 8 November the Council of Ministers of the Interior approves the lifting of visa requirements for Bosnia and Albania despite the reservations of France and the Netherlands. This liberalisation does not take place with Kosovo owing to the insufficiency of its readmission commitments.

- On 16 November the European Ministers of Economy meet in Brussels to debate a possible bailout for the Irish economy, on the verge of a bankruptcy that could spread to Portugal, Spain, Italy and even the United Kingdom. Despite these fears, the European Council does not require Dublin to accept the aid, which Ireland wishes to avoid for fear of a loss of sovereignty or of being obliged to raise corporate taxes. Nevertheless, a joint technical mission from the IMF and the European Central Bank is sent to intensify the preparations for an eventual bailout of the Irish banking sector. On 21 November the European Council accepts Ireland’s petition to obtain a line of credit of 85 billion euros from the EU and the IMF to restructure its financial system and pay down its foreign debt.

**Arab League**

- On 24 November the Secretary General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, threatens to take negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis before the UN Security Council in protest over the continuation of the settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem and the adoption by the Israeli Parliament of a law conditioning the withdrawal from the Occupied Territories to prior approval in a popular referendum or by parliamentary majority of two thirds.

- On 28 November the Arab League announces its intention of mediating among the countries on the shores of the Nile Basin and states its concern about the declarations of the Ethiopian Premier, Meles Zenawi, who threatens to break off relations with Egypt if a more equitable agreement on the use of the river’s waters is not reached.

**December 2010**

Spain faces a strike by air traffic controllers that paralyses the country’s airports, and declares of a state of emergency, the first under Spanish democracy. In Italy, the government barely wins a no-confidence vote as riots take place in the major cities. Croatia closes three more chapters in its accession negotiations. In Montenegro, Igor Lukic succeeds Milo Djukanovic after the latter resigns; in the same month the country becomes an official candidate for EU accession. Kosovo is having a problematic month, holding elections seen to be irregular, and with the publication of a report by the Council of Europe in which the Prime Minister, Hashim Thaci, is accused of being involved in network that traffics in organs, narcotics and weapons. Albania suffers its worst floods in a hundred years, while the government and the opposition end the year without having reached an agreement on the results of the 2009 elections. In Greece, social tension increases with numerous demonstrations against economic cutbacks and the eighth general strike of the year, in the same month that the IMF approves the release of 2.5 billion euros more from the bailout plan. In Turkey, the Balyoz case gives rise to the biggest trial to date of members of the army. The National Democratic Party (PND) wins in the Egyptian parliamentary elections, which are boycotted by the Muslim Brotherhood and considered fraudulent. Tunisia finishes out the year with the beginnings of a wave of protests against the Ben Ali regime.

**Spain**

- On 1 December the government announces a new package of measures to reduce the public deficit in 2011 from 45 billion to 31 billion euros.

- On 3 December the Council of Ministers approves a new decree regulating the new airport model, including the regulation of the workdays of air traffic controllers, which obliges them to make up sick days and personal days. Hours later, AENA, the organisation that manages airports and air space, announces the close of Spanish air space following a massive walkout of air traffic controllers. Faced with sudden chaos, the President of the government signs a royal decree whereby control of air space is transferred to the Ministry of Defence and air traffic control is militarised. In parallel, the controllers’ union, USCA, reiterates its call for workers to return to their posts. In Madrid and the Balearic Islands, the controllers refuse to submit to the government, which responds by decreeing a state of emergency for the first time in the history of Spanish democracy. Gradually the air traffic controllers return to their posts allowing for the reopening of the air space. The crisis leaves 600,000 affected by the cancellations in Spain and close to four million all across Europe. On 5 December the government announces the opening of 442 disciplinary cases and the possibility of requesting prison sentences for sedition. On December 14 the government prolongs the state of emergency for 15 more days. On December 29 the Madrid public prosecutor’s office brings sedition charges against the air traffic controllers.

- On 9 December the National Court absolves Arnaldo Otegi, the former
spokesman of Batasuna, and other leaders of the illegal organisation of the crime of glorifying terrorism considering that there was insufficient proof that the accused were responsible for the display of images and distribution of propaganda in favour of ETA in the course of a political rally.

- On 21 December the Congress of Deputies definitively approves the 2011 budgets, the most austere of the past few decades in Spain, providing a reduction of 7.9% in public spending with regard to 2010, a freeze in civil servant pensions and salaries, an increase in taxes on the highest incomes and the elimination of tax deductions for home purchases.
- On 28 December the National Court sentences Aitor Cotano and Arkaitz Goikoetxea, members of ETA, to 515 years in prison for the May 2008 attack on the Guardia Civil barracks in Legutiano, Álava.
- On 29, 30 and 31 December four rafts bearing a total of 97 sub-Saharan and Algerian immigrants are intercepted off the coasts of Alboran, Almeria and Murcia.

France

- On 16 December the National Assembly definitively adopts the 2011 finance bill that seeks to reduce the public deficit from 7.7% to 6% of the GDP by the end of 2011 and to 3% by the end of 2013.
- On 21 December a vehicle from the Électricité de France company is damaged in an unattributed bomb attack in Ghisonaccia, Upper Corsica. Other devices explode in Upper Corsica on 22 and 29 December causing significant damage.
- On 21 December the National Assembly adopts the new law on internal security, known as Loppsi-2, affecting areas as diverse and polemical as cybercrime, police files, video surveillance and evictions. The law is criticised by the left, which considers it one of the most repressive in recent decades.

Italy

- On 1 December with the votes of the LDP and the Northern League (Padano nationalism, conservatives), Parliament agrees to suspend activity until the no-confidence vote the opposition has brought against the government can take place. On 14 December the government survives the no-confidence vote in a tense session by 314 to 311 votes, thanks to the support of the deputies of the FLI, while in the street protests turns into skirmishes with the police in several cities, resulting in 41 arrests and over 100 wounded in Rome.
- On 15 December the leaders of the three main centre-right parties, Gianfranco Fini (FLI), Pier Casini (Christian Democratic International and Union of the Centre, UDC) and Francesco Rutelli (Democratic Party, DP), agree to form a new coalition, the Pole of the Nation, as an alternative to the PdL.
- On 22 December mass student demonstrations take place against university reform in the main Italian cities. The reforms entail the fusion of small universities, the reduction in majors, a greater presence of the private sector in higher education and cuts in funding for research. On 23 December the Senate definitively approves the reforms.
- On 23 December two letter bombs from the group Informal Anarchist Federation go off in the Swiss and Chilean embassies in Rome wounding two. On December 27 another letter bomb is deactivated in the Greek embassy.
- On 26 December the army removes 1,200 tons of garbage from the streets of Naples, half of the material accumulated since residents first refused, in September to allow it to be picked up in protest over the attempt to reopen the largest garbage dump in Europe there.

Malta

- On 2 December a letter bomb explodes in Pietà, outside a Transport Malta office, wounding two company workers.

Croatia

- On 10 December former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader is detained in Salzburg a day after he flees Croatia, shortly after the Prosecution requests that he be stripped of immunity by Parliament and arrested by the police on charges of corruption.
- On 22 December Croatia closes three chapters in its accession negotiations, corresponding to Justice, Freedom and Security; Environment; and Foreign Security and Defence Policy.
- On 28 December Jadranka Kosor announces changes in the cabinet that affect the Ministries of Defence, Finance, Culture, and Environment, in order to face the final stage in the EU accession talks.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 12 December having gathered 4,000 signatures, the families of the victims at Srebrenica announce that they will file a claim against Carla del Ponte, the chief prosecutor of the ICTY, for having permitted the destruction of nearly one thousand personal effects of the victims.
- On 15 December two members of the State Investigation and Protection Agency, Nedjo Trifkovic and Mitar Milinkovic, are arrested, accused of having participated in the assassination of 11 Bosnian civilians in Sanski Most during the Bosnian war.
- On 21 December four former Bosnian Serb policemen are sentenced to between 22 and 27 years in prison for the death of more than 150 Bosnians and Croats, whom they threw into a ravine near Banja Luka at the beginning of the Bosnian war.

Montenegro

- On 17 December the European Council grants Montenegro the status of candidate for accession.
- On 21 December Milo Djukanovic, the Prime Minister, announces his resignation for personal reasons. Igor Lukusic (DPS) is elected to be the new prime minister. On 29 December the Parliament approves the new cabinet presented by Lukusic. One of the biggest changes is the merging of the Foreign Ministry with the Ministry of European Integration, both now in the hands of Gordana Djurovic.
- On 28 December at Serbia’s request, the police arrest Milojko Nikolic, a former member of a Serbian paramilitary group, accused of having taken part in the assassination of 44 Kosovo Alba-
nian civilians in Cuska during the Kosovo conflict.

**Serbia**

- On 1 December Serbia’s decision to abolish visa requirements for Albanian citizens becomes official.
- On 15 December the Parliament votes in favour of the abolition of obligatory military service.
- On 27 December Mihalj Kertes, former chief of the Yugoslav Customs Agency and right hand of Slobodan Milosevic, is sentenced to six years and eight months of prison for abuse of power and embezzlement of 60 million euros in public funds for private purposes and illegal financing of the Socialist Party of Yugoslavia. To this sentence the Belgrade court adds another of a year and a half for havingabetted the perpetrators of the 1999 assassination of four figures from the opposition to Milosevic.

**Kosovo under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244**

- On 8 December Sefko Salkovic, the political head of the Bosnian minority in northern Kosovo and a member of the Vakat party and the Central Electoral Commission, is assassinated in Leposavic. Salkovic was a firm defender of loyalty toward the Kosovar institutions.
- On 12 December Kosovo holds early elections in which the governing Democratic Party of Kosovo (DPK) prevails with 33.5% of the vote, trailed by its former coalition partner, the LDK, with 23.6%. The separatist movement, Vetevendosje! manages to enter Parliament in third place with 12% of the vote. The elections are held in the shadow of suspicions of electoral fraud. On 16 December before the evidence of irregularities, the Central Electoral Commission decides to repeat the vote in five municipalities on 9 January 2011.
- On 16 December the European Council unanimously adopts the report presented by Dick Marty, a Swiss deputy, who accuses Prime Minister Hashim Thaci of having led a mafia group responsible for trafficking in arms, drugs, and human organs in Eastern Europe during the Kosovo conflict; Pristina and Tirana deny the accusations. On December 20, Thaci announces that he will take legal action against Marty for “defamation.” On 26 December Rasim Ljajic, Serbian Minister of Cooperation with the ICTY, formalises a petition to begin an investigation into the possible suppression of evidence by Soren Jessen-Petersen, chief of the UNMIK between 2004 and 2006.

**Former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia**

- On 5 December thousands demonstrate in Skopje against the government and to call for early elections.
- On 14 December the Macedonian government survives a no-confidence vote with 64 against and 29 in favour of the motion of censure brought by the Social Democrats and the Liberals.
- On 23 December the Ministry of the Interior announces the arrest of 98 people with ties to an international network trafficking in heroin in a joint operation with Austria.

**Albania**

- On 4 December Albania requests aid from NATO to fight against the grave floods the country is experiencing. On December 6, 13,000 people are evacuated in northern Albania due to the overflowing of the Scutari Lake in the worst floods of the past century in the Balkans.
- On December 27 the parliamentary majority of the PDS rejects a proposal of the SP to establish an investigation commission on the June 2009 election results during the final parliamentary session of 2010. Before the persistence of the political block, Sali Berisha warns that the May 8th municipal elections will be held “with or without the opposition.”

**Greece**

- On 2 December confrontations take place between the police and university students during a demonstration in Athens against the reform of the educational sector.
- On 6 December 44 people are arrested in Athens following riots produced during a demonstration commemorating the 2008 death of a young man under police fire, which unleashed a wave of violence in the country. The demonstration also condemns the government’s austerity measures.
- On 9 December the Council of Ministers approves a series of measures to cut expenses in public enterprises, including a reduction in salaries of up to 25% and a limit of one new contract for every five retirees. In protest, the unions call for several days of work stoppages and the eighth general strike in a year. In Athens and Thessaloniki a total of 23,000 people demonstrate provoked violent confrontations with the police. Journalists join the protest during the month with a news blackout against recent firings. On 17 December the IMF approves the release of another 2.5 billion euros more within the aid plan for Greece. On 18 December the government announces a privatisation plan to generate some 7 billion euros intended to reduce the public deficit.
- On 22 December the main unions call for a three-hour work stoppage in Athens and a demonstration before Parliament to protest the approval of the restrictive 2011 budgets.
- On 29 December the police announce the detention in Patras of 75 illegal immigrants hidden in a convoy of vehicles as they wait to take off for Italy. Two of the vehicles’ drivers are arrested under suspicion of belonging to an international human trafficking ring.
- On 30 December a major explosion, attributed to the Conspiracy of Nuclei of Fire, takes place in a parking lot across from the courts for administrative affairs in Athens.

**Turkey**

- On 11 December a member of the PKK terrorist organisation dies in a confrontation with the police in Batman province. The incident occurs in the context of the unilateral truce declared by the PKK until the June 2011 elections. On 29 December three PKK militants die in the course of an anti-terrorist operation in Mardin province.
- On 16 December the trial begins for the Balyoz case against 192 members of the army accused of conspiring in the failed 2003 coup d’état plot. Among the accused are the former commander of the Armed Forces, the Navy, and the First Land army; this is the most important Turkish trial to date of members of the armed forces.

**Cyprus**

- On 6 and 15 December the Greek and Turkish Cypriot heads, Dimitris
Christofias and Dervis Eroglu, meet for the reunification conversation without reporting any noteworthy achievements. Nevertheless, on 19 December the UN special envoy, Alexander Downer, declares that the negotiations are accelerating and he expects important progress before the meeting planned in Geneva for 26 January 2011.

- On 14 December the Security Council votes in favour of extending until 15 June 2011 the mandate of the UN peace mission on the island, the UNFICYP. Turkey registers the only unfavorable vote.
- On 16 December after intense debate, Parliament approves the most severe budgets in the country's history, with major reductions in public spending that will allow reduction of the public deficit to below 4.5% of the GDP.
- On 17 December Cyprus signs an agreement with Israel establishing the border between the territorial waters of both States, an important step toward exploitation of oil and gas deposits in the region. On 19 December Turkey criticises the agreement and affirms that it could endanger reunification conversations.

Syria

- On 2 December the IAEA reiterates its call to Syria and Iran to cooperate with the task of the inspectors.

Lebanon

- On 1 December Saleh Ben Abdallah Al-Qaraawi, supreme commander of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, with ties to al-Qaeda, calls on Lebanese Sunnis to rise up against both the government and Hezbollah.
- On 4 December 120 fires start in Lebanon, one of which requires evacuation of the town of Fitr, 45 kilometres north of Beirut. The Ministry of Defence suspects arson.

Jordan

- On 10 December 150 are wounded in Amman during riots between fans following a football match between two of the main teams in the country, the Wihdat and the Faisali. The majority of fans of the latter are of Palestinian origin.
- On December 21, two Egyptians and a Jordanian are shot by the Jordanian border guard when they attempt to enter illegally in Syria. Ten more are arrested.

Egypt

- On 5 December Egypt holds the second round of Parliamentary elections, boycotted by the Muslim Brotherhood and by the Al-Wafd party, both of which make accusations of electoral fraud. The NDP wins in a day marked by high abstention and 19 arrests in disturbances in several areas of the country.
- On 7 December the Muslim Brotherhood announces its intention of forming a common opposition to the government together with Mohammed ElBaradei's National Assembly for Change.
- On 10 December HRW condemns the existence in Sinai of a network devoted to facilitating the illegal entry of sub-Saharan immigrants into Israel through Egypt, which could be holding hundreds of sub-Saharan emigrants, and requests the intervention of the Egyptian government.
- On December 14, the Ministry of Transportation and Egyptian truckers reach an agreement to call off the strike that began on December 10 in protest over the increase in highway transport taxes.
- On December 20, some twenty former MPs stage a protest before the Court of the Council of the State, calling for the creation of a “people’s parliament,” parallel to the one that emerged from the recent elections.

Libya

- On 28 December Libya approves the lifting of entry restrictions on Tunisian citizens in Libyan territory.

Tunisia

- On 17 December confrontations begin between the police and occupiers of the Governor's office in Sidi Bouzid when the latter attempt to force their way into the governor's headquarters during a protest over unemployment and corruption, which began after a young man whose wares were confiscated by the authorities set himself on fire outside the government headquarters. On 24 December confrontations with the police continue, and one demonstrator is killed. On 25 December the protests spread to the capital and new confrontations take place in Al-Ragab and Maknasi. On 27 December thousands of demonstrators march on the capital in a protest that ends in clashes with the police. On 29 December the police suppress a new demonstration in Gafsa on the same day the President, Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali, appears before the media to urge an end to the complaints, which “gravely harm the Tunisian economy”.
- On 22 and 23 December public health workers go on strike to criticise the low salaries of the sector with regard to their private counterparts.

Algeria

- On 5 December Habib Mourad and Abdeslam Samir, two leaders of the El-Arkam Brigade with ties to AQIM, are shot by security forces in Bordj Menaiel. On 9 December an antiterrorist operation with more than 7,000 operatives begins in Kabylia in the course of which an AQIM logistical support cell is dismantled and at least 16 militants of the terrorist network die. On 25 December one soldier is killed and another five are wounded in another antiterrorist operation.
- On 22 December two members of AQIM give themselves up to the authorities in Tamanrasset, in response to the 2009 call issued by Abderrazak El Para, ex-director of the GSPC, in favour of national reconciliation.
- On 29 December 52 police and one civilian are wounded and 29 arrests are made during confrontations between the police and the inhabitants of Les Palmiers, Algiers, who denounce the insufficient living conditions in the neighbourhood. The riots are the consequence of an escalation in the violence that began seven days before when it was learned that not everyone in the neighbourhood would be relocated to the “new” housing, whose construction had begun in 1984.

Morocco

- On 2 December Morocco threatens to “reevaluate the totality of its relations with Spain in all areas,” hours after the Spanish Parliament requests that the government condemn “the violent incidents” that took place during the November dismantling of the Western Sahara protest camp, Gdeim Isik.
• On 10 December a terrorist cell is dismantled and its six members are arrested in Casablanca, Nador and Oujda. According to the authorities, the cell was also planning car bomb assaults in Morocco.

• On 27 December the Minister of the Interior informs the arrest of six experts in the manufacture of explosives who are suspected of planning attacks in Morocco and abroad.

Mauritania

• On 22 December Mauritania announces the dismantling of one of the largest networks of narcotics trafficking destined for Europe in a joint operation with Mali in which two traffickers are killed and seven more are arrested.

European Union

• On 1 December Klaus Regling, head of the European Financial Stability Facility, announces the first operation of the bailout fund created in May by the Eurozone to aid the member countries, through which the Fund will emit its own debt bonds from January 2011 on.

• On 7 December the Ministers of Economy and Finance approve 85 billion euros in aid to Ireland. The measure carries with it a restructurings of the Irish banking system and a commitment to correct the budget deficit by 2015.

• On 10 December the EU Council finally approves the new 2011 budget proposal presented by the Commission. On 15 December the EP gives the budget the green light, accepting a moderate rise in the budget of 2.91%, but obtaining a greater role for Parliament in the negotiation of future financial perspectives for the 2014-2020 period and the holding of a debate in 2011 on the need to create new internal resources.

• On 16 December faced with the increased volatility of exchange rates, interest rates and the price of the euro, as well as of credit risks, the European Central Bank (ECB) approves a capital increase of 5 billion euros for the first time since its 1998 creation.

• On 16 December the ECB announces the beginning of operations of the European Systemic Risk Board, an independent organisation with headquarters in Frankfurt and headed up by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, which will be responsible for the macroeconomic supervision of the EU financial system.

Arab League

• On 16 December the Arab League decides to subject renewal of Israeli-Palestinian dialogue to obtaining a “serious response” that will guarantee advances in the peace process, in light of the “failure of US mediation.”

• On 21 December the Arab Ministers of Justice and the Interior approve the restarting of the plans to create the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism, signing five cooperation agreements.

Western Sahara

• On 10 February Morocco and the Polisario Front hold an informal meeting in New York, under the umbrella of the UN, to renew negotiations on the Western Sahara. The meeting concludes without notable progress, but with a commitment to proceed with the conversations. It is the first meeting of the parties since August 2009.

• On 7 March Mohammed VI sends a letter to the European leaders who participated in the EU-Morocco summit held in Granada, in the course of which the EU asked Morocco to show greater respect for human rights in Western Sahara. In it the monarch declares that he is taking a stand for a “political solution” that will give the Sahara “autonomy,” as long as it remains within the Kingdom of Morocco.

• On 9 March the Moroccan police shoot at several people from the Matala neighbourhood, in ElAyoun, as they celebrate the return, authorised by Morocco, of a group of Sahrawi activists from the Tindouf camps.

• On 30 April the Security Council approves the extension of the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2011, considering that its presence is indispensable to maintaining the ceasefire.

• On 5 May the Moroccan government receives with satisfaction UN Security Council Resolution 1920, as it confirms that negotiations on the Western Sahara should focus more on autonomy than independence.

• On 13 September Western Sahara activists Ali Salem Tamek, Brahim Dahan and Hamadi Naciri, imprisoned in the Sale jail as they await trial, begin a 48-hour hunger strike to demand their release or a fair trial. The activists were arrested in October 2009 in the Casablanca airport on their return from a visit to the Tindouf camps.

• On 6 October the Polisario Front frees Mustapha Ould Sidi Mould, former high-ranking police official in the Tindouf camps, arrested on 21 September accused of spying for Morocco. On 9 August Mould had publicly spoken out in favour of the Rabat autonomy plan.

• On 24 October one Sahrawi dies and seven more are wounded by shots fired by Moroccan police controlling access to Gdaim Izik, a camp 13 kilometers from El Ayoun, in the largest protest demonstrations since the decolonisation of the Western Sahara. On 28 October Interior Minister Taieb Cheqaraoui meets with the principal Sahrawi leaders to seek solutions to the socioeconomic demands of the thousands of demonstrators. On 8 November the Moroccan army dismantles the camp producing violent confrontations between the Sahrawis and the army and Moroccan settlers who reach as far as El Ayoun, initiating a revolt. The incidents leave five Moroccan agents and one Polisario member dead, dozens wounded and more than 130 in jail and result in the imposition of a curfew. The President of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), Mohammed Abdelaziz, requests the presence of UN troops while several NGOs denounce a situation of “genocide.” On 24 November the EP approves a resolution in which it asks Morocco to accept a UN international investigation. On 29 November the confrontations, which have spread to all of the Western Sahara, spark a new outbreak of violence in Smara, between Sahrawi and Moroccan students. On 16 December the EP approves a report that “condems the repression and arrest of defenders of the human rights of the Sahrawis in the territories of Western Sahara controlled by Morocco” and urges the UN to extend MINURSO’s mandate to include the monitoring of human rights.

• On 8 November new conversations between Morocco and the Polisario Front begin in Manhasset, New York, under the
auspices of the United Nations amidst a tense atmosphere produced by the confrontations in the Western Sahara.
• On 16 December further conversations between Morocco and the Polisario Front take place in Manhasset, ending on December 18 without any concrete agreements but agreeing on common ground to continue the negotiations in January 2011.

**Gibraltar**

• On 2 June a Spanish Civil Guard patrol is corralled by one British Navy boat and two from the Gibraltar police in the Spanish territorial waters of the Bay of Algeciras. The Spanish boat is obliged to leave the zone.
• On 28 September a Civil Guard patrol is intercepted by a Gibraltar police patrol as it pursues a narcotics trafficker in the Spanish territorial waters of the Bay of Algeciras. The incident triggers a complaint from the Spanish government before the United Kingdom. Owing to this incident, on 13 October the Prime Minister of the colony, Peter Caruana, affirms that sovereignty over the waters surrounding Gibraltar is a priority for his government, urges London to defend their sovereignty, and challenges Madrid to take the affair before The Hague Court. On 14 October the press reports on Caruana’s decision to suspend the technical meetings of the Tripartite Forum programmee in Algeciras and Madrid.

On 15 October the Spanish Vice-President, Maria Fernandez de la Vega, responds to Caruana’s actions by affirming that any question of sovereignty “is dealt with exclusively in the bilateral environment” between Spain and the United Kingdom. On 21 October Spain, the United Kingdom and Gibraltar agree to reinstate the technical meetings of the Tripartite Forum, though they exclude the police, judicial, and customs areas from the talks.
• On 2 November, Daniel Feetham, the Minister of Justice of Gibraltar, is stabbed in the middle of the street by an individual who is detained a short time later by the police.

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Chronologies

Chronology of Events in Israel and Palestine

2010 begins with efforts led by the US in Israel and Palestine to reactivate peace talks between the two countries and with advances made by the Egyptian mediation to reconcile the different Palestinian factions. Direct negotiations are resumed between the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and the Israeli government on 2 September, after seven months of indirect talks. The reactivation of the peace process, however, is hindered and threatened primarily by: the irreconcilable differences over the status of East Jerusalem; Israel’s refusal to freeze settlement construction in this part of the capital and in the West Bank; and a new crisis that erupts on 1 June when the Israeli army opens fire on a flotilla of ships carrying activists and humanitarian aid attempting to break Israel’s unilateral blockade around Gaza. The death of Turkish activists in the incident adds tension to relations between Israel and Turkey, which have been under strain since Operation Cast Lead. Also, on 29 September, the UN Human Rights Council votes in favour of the independent commission’s report, which describes the attack as disproportionate and claims that Israel concealed evidence. With regard to the thorny issue of East Jerusalem and the Jewish settlements, worsened by the announcement at the beginning of March of the demolition of a series of Palestinian homes in the Silwan neighbourhood and the publication of major settlement expansion projects, Israel complicates life for the US mediation by refusing to extend the 10-month moratorium on settlement construction after it expired on 26 September. The situation is further intensified by Benjamin Netanyahu’s declaration that “Jerusalem is Israel’s eternal and indivisible capital.” Israel’s negative stance on this issue forces the Palestinian withdrawal from the negotiations in October, backed by the Arab League. On 8 November Israel’s announcement of the construction of 1,300 homes in East Jerusalem dashes any possibility of reaching an agreement and seriously endangers the peace talks. In a fresh attempt to save the process, the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton makes Benjamin Netanyahu a new offer in November, which includes major concessions in areas of security, defence and the integrity of the State of Israel. The year ends, therefore, with uncertainty regarding the future of the peace process, despite efforts made by the US; the increasing likelihood of the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state; and the announcement, on 29 October, by Palestinian’s chief negotiator Saeb Erekat of a resolution to be presented before the United Nations that, if approved, would require an immediate freeze on Israeli settlements.

January 2010

Israel

• On 4 January the press announces Israel’s decision to reduce the Gaza border crossings from four to three, closing the crossing into Nahal Oz “for security reasons.”
• On 22 January the UN reports Israel’s payment to the international organisation of $10.5 million for the damage caused to UN properties during Operation Cast Lead, in virtue of an agreement reached at the beginning of the month.
• On 10 January Israel approves the construction of a security fence along the border with Egypt to prevent the entry of terrorists and illegal immigrants.

Palestine

• On 13 January Israel issues an official apology to Turkey for the treatment of the Turkish ambassador to Israel Ahmet Oguz Celikkol. The Israeli deputy Foreign Affairs Minister refused to shake hands with the ambassador two days previously in front of the press, in protest against Turkey’s broadcasting of a television series branded by Israel as anti-Semitic. Ankara accepts the Israeli apology, putting an end to a new period of tension for bilateral relations.
• On 18 January Israel and Germany hold their second bilateral summit in Berlin. Chancellor Angela Merkel shows her support for the Israeli position regarding the Iranian nuclear programme.

Peace Negotiations

• On 4 January, after a meeting with the Egyptian President Mubarak, the Palestinian President Abbas says he is willing to resume peace talks without preconditions, which were interrupted in December 2008 when Operation Cast Lead broke out, but demands that Israel comply with what was set out in
the Road Map and freeze settlements in the West Bank.

- On 20 January the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu speaks at a press conference about the prospects for a Palestinian state, but with an Israeli presence to guarantee the security of the Jewish State. On 21 and 22 January the US Envoy to the Middle East George Mitchell holds talks with both Netanyahu and the President of the PNA Abbas in an attempt to re-launch peace talks. The main dispute is focussed around East Jerusalem, whose status Israel refuses to include at the negotiating table. On 24 January, at a political act in the Jewish settlements in the West Bank, Netanyahu declares that Israel will never leave the settlement areas. The statement comes hours after meeting with the US Special Envoy George Mitchell.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 8 January the Tsahal (Israeli army) bombs rocket factories and supply tunnels in Gaza leaving 14 casualties, in response to rocket launches from the Strip, which took place during the previous days. On 10 January the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu issues the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and the Hamas government in Gaza an ultimatum to cease attacks on Israeli territory.
- On 20 January Mahmoud al-Mabhouth the man behind the kidnappings of Jewish soldiers at the hands of the al-Qassam Brigades in the eighties, is assassinated in Dubai. Hamas accuses Mossad of al-Mabhouth’s death.

February 2010

Israel

- On 1 February the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reports that the Israeli army sanctioned two high-ranking officers to authorise the use of white phosphorous on civilian targets during Operation Cast Lead.
- On 1 February the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appoints the Philippine General Natalio Ecarma as the new Head of Mission of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights, to take over from the Austrian Wolfgang Jilke. On 10 February the press reports that Israeli pacifists are concerned about a campaign described by some as a “witch-hunt,” led by the Zionist movement Im Tirtzu against the New Israel Fund and other human rights defence organisations accused of treachery and damaging Israel’s image following their collaboration with the Goldstone Commission.
- On 14 February Benjamin Netanyahu makes an official visit to Moscow. The meetings with the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and the President Dimitri Medvedev are primarily aimed at gaining Russian support for adopting sanctions against Iran over its decision to enrich uranium to 20%. The visit takes place at a time when Moscow is toughening its stance towards Tehran.

Palestine

- On 2 February a Hamas leader in Khan Younis, Youssef Sarsour, escapes unharmed after a bomb is detonated beneath his vehicle.
- On 8 January the PNA announces local elections in the West Bank for the 17 July 2010.
- On 14 February Mahmoud Abbas fires his cabinet chief Rafiq al-Husseini after a video is broadcast on Israel’s Channel 10, in which al-Husseini proposes sexual favours to a woman in exchange for work.
- On 14 February representatives of the 13 Palestinian factions, including Fatah and Hamas, meet in the city of Gaza for the first time since 2007 in a move towards signing the Egyptian proposal for inter-Palestinian reconciliation.

Peace Negotiations

- On 7 February Benjamin Netanyahu announces that Israel is “willing to negotiate with the Palestinians and Syria without preconditions” but adds that any agreement will have to respect the fundamental interests of Israel. On 8 February Fatah’s presidential candidate to the Palestinian elections in July 2010 Nasser al-Kidwa asks the US to clarify whether or not its proposal to resume peace talks includes the status of East Jerusalem, the settlements in the West Bank and the definition of the borders. While the President of the PNA Mahmoud Abbas accepts the US proposal, he demands a guarantee that priority issues for the Palestinians are on the negotiating table.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 2 February Israel launches an air strike on Gaza hitting some of the supply tunnels at the Egyptian border. The attack comes in response to the two explosive devices found the previous day on the beaches of Ashkelon and Ashdod and to the rocket launched into southern Israel on 2 February.
- On 7 and 8 February two rockets launched from Gaza land in the north-east of the Negev. Israel responds in the early hours of 10 February with an attack in the south of the Strip and blames Hamas for being incapable of controlling its territories.
- On 10 February an Israeli soldier is stabbed and killed by a Palestinian police officer near Nablus, shortly after Palestinians report the attack on an adolescent Palestinian by a settler in the same city.
- On 11 February an Israeli air strike on Gaza kills a militant from the Islamic Jihad and injures two other people, after an Israeli border patrol was shot at from the Strip.
- On 12 February Israel initiates construction work to modify the line of the separation barrier in the Palestinian town of Bilin in compliance with a ruling by the Israeli Supreme Court.
- On 15-17 February the authorities in Dubai release the identities of 17 people accused of murdering the Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Mabhouth. According to their passports, some of the suspects are German, English, Irish and French citizens. London and Dublin claim that the passports are false. Among the arrested is a former head of security services of the PNA, giving Hamas reason to accuse Fatah of orchestrating the assassination. The PNA security forces spokesman Adnan al-Dmiri assures that the Israeli secret services carried out the assassination having infiltrated the Hamas security apparatus.
- On 22 February violent clashes are reported in Hebron between Palestinians and Israeli settlers in response to the Israeli government’s decision on 21 February to declare Rachel’s Tomb, near Bethlehem, and the Tomb of the Patriarchs in Hebron as national herit-
age. On 24 February the head of the Hamas government in Gaza Ismail Haniyeh, calls the population of the West Bank to a third intifada.

- On 26 February the General Assembly of the United Nations agrees on a resolution, by 98 votes in favour, seven against and 31 abstentions, to give Israel and the Palestinians a further 5 months in which to present their investigations into the war crimes committed during Operation Cast Lead.
- On 28 February six Palestinian demonstrators are injured in clashes with the Israeli police at the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, after a group of Muslims throw stones at Jewish tourists entering the compound.

### March 2010

**Israel**

- On 2 March the Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman urges the US to impose unilateral sanctions on Iran in response to the development of its nuclear programme. Lieberman suggests an embargo that follows the model applied to Cuba since 1959.
- On 8 March the Israeli government announces that it will allow the EU High Representative Ashton and the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to enter Gaza through Israeli territory, allowing both to visit the region on 17 and 27 March respectively.
- On 28 March Israel closes the Gaza borders for 48 hours for the celebration of Passover (Jewish Holiday) which begins on the night of 29 March.

**Palestine**

- On 11 March Hamas releases the British journalist Paul Martin, held since 14 February on suspicion of threatening Palestinian security.

**Peace Negotiations**

- On 2 March the Mayor of Jerusalem Nir Barkat’s announcement to demolish a group of 44 illegally constructed Palestinian homes in the Silwan district in order to build an archaeological park provokes protests from residents suspicious of Barkat’s promises to relocate them and who see the measure as a way to expel them from East Jerusalem. The plan arouses concern in the United Nations and the US, which expresses further unease over a construction project for between 900 and 1,100 new homes in the Pisgat Zeev neighbourhood, also in East Jerusalem.
- On 7 March, despite Israeli announcements to expand the settlements, the Fatah Palestinian government gives the green light to the proposal to resume indirect negotiations with Israel, launched by the US Special Envoy George Mitchell, who is currently touring the region.
- On 8 March the Israeli government approves the construction of 112 new homes in the West Bank settlement of Beitar Illit, hours after the PLO announces its readiness to resume peace talks. On 9 March Israel announces the approval of 1,600 more homes in the Ramat Shlomo neighbourhood in East Jerusalem, causing the US Vice President Joe Biden to condemn the move during his official visit to the region. The EU, United Nations and the PLO also express their disapproval, accusing Israel of jeopardising attempts to re-launch peace talks. On 10 March the Israeli Interior Minister Eli Yishai apologises for the “distress caused both inside the country and internationally.” On the same day in an emergency meeting, the Arab League withdraws its support for talks to resume.
- On 11 March the Palestinian negotiator in the peace process Saeb Erekat announces the Palestinian government’s decision to cancel indirect talks. Joe Biden accepts Yishai’s apology and calls for dialogue to resume. On the same day, the Jerusalem Council confirms the news published by the newspaper Haaretz regarding a plan for the construction of 80,000 more homes in East Jerusalem. The Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak orders the closure of the West Bank borders for 48 hours following a warning from Israeli police of possible unrest due to the announcements.
- On 15 March Netanyahu declares that Israel will not suspend the construction of homes in East Jerusalem and asks the PNA and US to remain calm, assuring that the construction plans do not pose a threat for Palestinians. On the same day, the US Special Envoy George Mitchell cancels his tour planned for the region, in a period of crisis in US-Israeli relations described as the worst in 35 years, since the Henry Kissinger and Yitzhak Rabin confrontation in 1975 over the Israeli presence in Sinai. On 23 March, in a speech before the annual meeting of AIPAC, the largest Jewish lobby in the US, Netanyahu defies Washington’s request affirming that the “Jewish people were building Jerusalem 3,000 years ago and the Jewish people are building Jerusalem today. Jerusalem is not a settlement. It is our capital.” After a closed-door meeting with Barack Obama, Netanyahu announces that the peace negotiations “may be delayed.”
- On 24 March the Jerusalem Council confirms new plans for the construction of between 20 and 100 homes in Sheikh Jarrah, in East Jerusalem.

**Conflicts between the Parties**

- On 14 March the Israeli government reports the capture in Ramallah of Mahar Uda, a Hamas leader and founder of the al-Qassam Brigades, who has been wanted for over 10 years. Hamas accuses Fatah of collaborating in the arrest.
- On 15 March the Beis Yaakov, or Hurva (ruin) Synagogue, located in the Jewish quarter of the old city of Jerusalem and one of the holiest sites in Judaism, opens its doors after being closed for 62 years. The reopening provokes violent clashes on 16 March between Israeli police and Palestinian demonstrators, after Hamas and other radical factions call for a “day of rage.”
- On 18 March a missile launched from Gaza hits southern Israel killing a Thai worker, while Catherine Ashton is visiting the Strip. The Salafi militant group Ansar al-Sunna claims responsibility for the attack, arousing suspicions that al-Qaeda is attempting to wrest control of the Strip from Hamas. On 19 March Israel responds by bombing a secret tunnel at the Egyptian border, a metal foundry and two areas in Khan Younis. On 22 March Israel launches a fresh attack, bombing another secret tunnel in Rafah, a day after Ban Ki-moon visits the Strip. On 24 March the Israeli air force bombs a hangar close to Jabalia, north of Gaza, from where the Israeli authorities believe the attack on 18 March was launched.
During Operation Cast Lead, crimes and other violations committed will evaluate the Israeli and Palestinian committees that, following recommendations set out in the Goldstone report, the council establishes an independent committee that, following recommendations set out in the Goldstone report, will evaluate the Israeli and Palestinian investigations into the alleged war crimes and other violations committed during Operation Cast Lead.

On 22 March the Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom Ron Prosor is summoned by the British Foreign Ministry to be informed of the decision in London to expel an Israeli diplomat due to his connection with the false British passports used in the assassination of Hamas leader Mahmoud al-Mabhouh. On 25 March the UN Human Rights Council establishes an independent committee that, following recommendations set out in the Goldstone report, will evaluate the Israeli and Palestinian investigations into the alleged war crimes and other violations committed during Operation Cast Lead.

On 26 March two Israeli soldiers are killed in an explosion in Khan-Younis. Two Palestinian soldiers are killed in the ensuing cross fire with the Israeli army. On 27 March Israel responds with a Tsahal raid on the town of Abbassan that leaves one dead and seven injured. On 28 March the Israeli police arrest Abbas Zaki, a longstanding Fatah member, together with 12 party militants, at a demonstration in Bethlehem on Palm Sunday. On 31 March Zaki and the other detainees refuse to appear before an Israeli military court refusing to recognise its legitimacy. Outside the court clashes erupt between the police and Palestinian demonstrators who demand the release of the arrested men.

April 2010

Israel

On 4 April, for the first time since Hamas took power three years ago, Israel allows ten trucks to enter Gaza carrying clothing and footwear through the Kerem Shalom border crossing.

On 6 April the Petah Tikva District Court sentences Rawi Sultani to five years and eight months in prison. The young Palestinian with Israeli citizenship was arrested in August 2009 for providing an agent of Hezbollah (identified as Salman Hareb) with information about the Israeli army’s Chief of General Staff Gabi Ashkenazi.

On 7 April the press reports Benjamin Netanyahu’s decision not to attend the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, which begins on 12 April, after discovering that certain countries, led by Egypt and Turkey, intend to issue a formal request that Israel sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

On 7 April the Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman warns that if Ramallah goes ahead with plans to unilaterally declare a Palestinian state in 2011, Israel may annul past agreements with the PLO and annex parts of the West Bank.

On 13 April a new law comes into force that gives the army authority to deport residents of the West Bank without a permit to their countries of origin, as well as transfer Palestinian citizens in the West Bank to the Gaza Strip. The law, which punishes illegal residence in Israeli-controlled territory with up to seven years in prison, is an amendment to the Prevention of Infiltration Law passed in 1969 to avoid illegal entry from Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt.

On 15 April Israel’s former Prime Minister Olmert is charged as the prime suspect in a bribery case for authorising the construction project for the Holyland property development, for which he received nearly a million dollars between 1993 and 2003, while he was the mayor of Jerusalem. The news comes a day after the arrest of another former mayor of Jerusalem, Uri Lupolianski, for his possible involvement in the scandal.

On 22 April the US Special Envoy to the Middle East Mitchell arrives in the country on his first tour since the diplomatic crisis between Israel and the US began in March, as a consequence of the settlement expansion in East Jerusalem. On the same day Netanyahu states that he remains firmly opposed to a construction freeze.

Palestine

On 15 April Hamas confirms the execution of two Palestinians charged as collaborators with Israel. This is the first execution carried out by Hamas since it took power in the Gaza Strip ten years ago. On 16 April the UN Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay urges the authorities in Gaza to abolish the death penalty. On 19 April Hamas declares that it will continue to execute collaborators with Israel.

On 20 April the Palestinian factions meet to discuss Israel’s latest measure to authorise the deportation of thousands of Palestinians in the West Bank and agree to call a protest march on 21 April, between Gaza and the Erez border crossing.

On 29 April Hamas accuses Egypt of killing five Palestinians by pumping gas into a smuggling tunnel in Rafah on the night of 28 April.

Peace Negotiations

On 23 April Benjamin Netanyahu launches a proposal to establish a Palestinian state that would not have East Jerusalem as its capital and with temporary borders on 60% of the West Bank as a step towards independence. On 24 April, in a speech before the Fatah Revolutionary Council, Mahmoud Abbas rejects the proposal.

Conflicts between the Parties

On 2 April Israel launches an air strike on Gaza in response to a rocket launch from the Strip into southern Israel.

On 13 April four Palestinian militants are killed in a gunfight with Israeli soldiers at the border between Gaza and Israel, whilst defending against an Israeli attack. The terrorist group Islamic Jihad confirms the involvement of some of its members in clashes that take place hours after the Israeli air force bombs various Hamas targets in Gaza. On 16 April a gunfight on the border between Gaza and Israel leaves one Palestinian dead.

On 21 April clashes break out in the West Bank between the Israeli army and Palestinian citizens who are denied entry into a village near Nablus.

On 25 April several television stations broadcast a short animation made by the Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of Hamas, concerning the kidnapping of the Israeli Sergeant Gilad Shalit. The ambiguous language of the video in relation to the possible death of Shalit, captured by Hamas in June 2006, causes Hamas to denounce the cartoon. The party’s leader Mahmoud Zahar assures the Jerusalem Post
on 27 April that Hamas “would never kill an Israeli soldier in captivity” and that the video “does not reflect the official position of Hamas.”

- On 26 April Israeli soldiers kill Ali Sweiti, a senior Hamas militant, on a raid in the West Bank. Sweiti was wanted for killing a police officer on the Israeli border six years ago.

- On 28 April a Palestinian man dies after suffering injuries from Israeli gunfire during a protest in Gaza against the “buffer zone,” a 150-metre security area around the border.

May 2010

Israel

- On 10 May Israel is formally invited to enter the OCDE together with Slovenia, Estonia and Chile, despite Palestinian objections.

- On 24 May the British media publishes a secret report declassified by the WikiLeaks web portal for The Guardian, according to which South Africa expressed interest during the mid seventies in an Israeli system for developing nuclear missiles. The Israeli President Shimon Peres, assures that the information has “no basis in reality.”

- On 27 May an unauthorised visit to Gaza from Israeli territory by a delegation of the European Parliament, in the region since 24 May, leads to the cancellation of meetings with leading Israeli dignitaries.

- On 28 May, in line with a ruling by the Supreme Court, Israel opens the connecting highway between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, Route 443, to Palestinian traffic for the first time since 2002. “For reasons of security” Palestinian users will have two entry points and four exit points and will not be able to use it to go directly to Ramallah.

- On 28 May Israel announces that it is preparing to arrest the 800 activists aboard nine vessels carrying 10,000 tons of humanitarian aid, which form the so-called “Freedom Flotilla.” The flotilla set sail the previous day from Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, with the intention of breaking the Israeli blockade on Gaza. On 31 May the Israeli army opens fire on the flotilla, killing at least 15 activists, and intercepts its cargo in international waters, 65 km from the Gaza coastline.

- On 29 May six Palestinians are killed after a gas cylinder explodes in one of the Rafah smuggling tunnels.

Peace Negotiations

- On 7 May, after a meeting between Mahmoud Abbas and the US Envoy George Mitchell, the chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat tells the media that fresh indirect peace talks have officially started. Erekat adds that direct talks can begin as soon as Israel freezes its settlement programme.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 13 May in Mazre al-Sharqiya in the West Bank, Israeli settlers open fire on a group of young Palestinians, who were throwing stones at their car, leaving one dead.

- On 21 May the Israeli army bombs two tunnels in southern Gaza and another in the north, without causing any casualties.

- On 21 May the Israeli army kills two armed Palestinians who had illegally crossed the border between Gaza and Israel at the Kissufim border crossing.

- On 23 May Israel approves a law known as the “Shalit Law” aimed at toughening conditions for Hamas and Islamic Jihad prisoners, in response to the continued kidnapping of the soldier Gilad Shalit. Hamas assures that it will not give in and its prisoners threaten to mutiny.

- On 26 May the Israeli air force bombs the abandoned Rafah airport and a Hamas training camp in Beit Hanoun in response to shots fired from the Strip at Israeli patrols.

June 2010

Israel

- On 1 June Israel arrests around 600 activists on the “Freedom Flotilla” on their arrival in Ashod, 16 hours after the Israeli army’s attack on the convoy. The same day, after an emergency meeting, the UN Security Council calls for an impartial investigation into the attack and demands the release of the ships that have been held, although it does not issue a resolution of condemnation against Jerusalem. The Israeli Deputy Ambassador to the UN Daniel Carmon defends the Gaza blockade and describes the attack as a “preventative measure.” Israel announces the start of the deportation of the arrested activists and says it will prevent the Irish ship Rachel Corrie, which was delayed for technical reasons from arriving in Gaza. On 6 June the UN Secretary-General calls for an investigation into the attack to be carried out by a commission including representatives from Turkey – where most of the flotilla’s crew members are from – Israel and the US. On 7 June Israel announces that it will launch its own investigation. On 16 June the UN announces that it will accept the responsibility of distributing the aid transported by the “Freedom Flotilla.” On 20 June the Israeli government bows to international pressure and announces plans to ease the Gaza blockade. On 21 June the Israeli Defence Minister urges Ban Ki-moon to withdraw his call for an independent investigation under UN auspices, on hearing that a new flotilla composed of two ships, the Julia and the Mariam, is currently preparing to set sail from Lebanon.

- On 17 June around 100,000 Orthodox Jews protest in Jerusalem against...
the Israeli Supreme Court’s interference in their affairs and to declare the supremacy of the Torah over secular law. The protests come as a reaction to a Supreme Court ruling that prohibits discrimination between Ashkenazi and Sephardi children in a religious school in the West Bank settlement of Immanuel.

- On 21 June, despite pressure from the US and Netanyahu himself, the Jerusalem Municipal Planning Committee re-launches the “King’s Garden” development plan for the construction of 1,000 new homes in Silwan, East Jerusalem, which involves the demolition of 20 illegally constructed Palestinian homes.

- On 22 June Israel launches a new satellite from the Palmachim base, manufactured by Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) and equipped with sophisticated imaging systems. The Ofek 9 belongs to a series of low-altitude rockets that Israel began to use at the end of the eighties to improve information on the Middle East.

- On 27 June the family of Sergeant Gilad Shalit, held by Hamas since 2006, begins a protest march towards Jerusalem to demand that the Israeli government negotiate his release.

- On 30 June several Israeli and Turkish media sources reveal that a secret meeting has been held between the Israeli Industry, Trade and Labour Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer and the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu to deal with the crisis that has opened between the two countries following the attack on the “Freedom Flotilla.” The meeting had been authorised by the Prime Minister Netanyahu without the knowledge of Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who says that the decision is humiliating for his party Yisrael Beiteinu and for Israeli diplomacy.

**Palestine**

- On 1 June Egypt opens the Rafah crossing to allow humanitarian aid to be taken into Gaza and Palestinian citizens to enter Egypt, in response to the Israeli attack on the “Freedom Flotilla.”

- On 9 June the PNA President Mahmoud Abbas meets in Washington with Barack Obama to discuss how to re-launch indirect talks between Arabs and Israelis, following the attack on the humanitarian flotilla in Gaza. Obama announces aid for the Palestinian territories to the value of 320 million euros.

- On 10 June the Palestinian Council of Ministers indefinitely postpones the municipal elections set for 17 July in the West Bank, claiming the move is necessary for Palestinian unity. Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum says that Fatah’s internal conflicts are the sole reason for the cancellation.

- On 13 June an Iranian ship carrying volunteers and humanitarian aid leaves the port of Bandar Abbas destined for Gaza, despite Israeli warnings. On 18 June a second ship named Toward Gaza leaves Iran. On 28 June the Iranian Red Crescent Society announces its decision to cancel plans to deliver the aid, claiming it was denied access to pass through the Suez Canal by the canal’s managing authority.

- On 28 June a group of 25 armed extremists sets fire to the installations of a UN children’s summer camp in Nuseirat, in the south of the Gaza Strip. This is the second incident of this kind, the first of which took place on 23 May.

**Peace Negotiations**

- On 1 June three Hamas sympathisers, suspected of firing two rockets at Ashkelon, are killed in a bomb attack on Beit Lahia carried out by the Israeli air force. On 4 June at least four Qassam rockets launched from Gaza land in southern Israel.

- On 7 June five members of the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, the armed wing of Fatah, are killed in Nuseirat, Gaza, by an Israeli navy patrol. The men were carrying out underwater manoeuvres aimed, according to the Israeli army, at perpetrating an attack.

- On 14 June a Palestinian citizen kills an Israeli police officer and injures two more near Hebron.

**July 2010**

**Israel**

- On 1 July Benjamin Netanyahu declares in a televised speech that he is willing to conditionally release 1,000 Palestinians in exchange for the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.

- On 7 July the government declassifies aerial photographs of various towns in south Lebanon, which show evidence of Hezbollah weapons storage.

- On 10 July a Moldovan-flagged ship, chartered by a Libyan charity run by the son of Muammar Gaddafi, leaves Greece heading for Gaza. The Israeli government warns that it will intercept the Amalthea, renamed the al-Amal (hope in Arabic), which is carrying 2,000 tons of food and medical supplies. On 13 July the al-Amal leaves for the port of el-Arish, in Sinai, monitored by Israeli patrol ships, after Egypt offers to accommodate the ship. On 14 July Egypt says it will collaborate in transporting the humanitarian aid by land.

- On 13 July the Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan expresses Armenia’s interest in improving ties with Israel. Sargsyan’s announcement represents a new phase in relations between the two countries, neither of which maintains an embassy in the other country. The worsening of relations between Israel and Turkey, which historically does not have friendly relations with Armenia, would be the key to a change in Jerusalem’s priorities in the Caucasus and Yerevan’s in the Middle East.

- On 23 July the UN Human Rights Council, despite Israeli opposition, appoints an independent committee to investigate the attack on the “Freedom Flotilla.”

**Palestine**

- On 14 July representatives of Fatah and Hamas hold a meeting in Beirut to advance the Palestinian reconciliation process. The talks, led by Azzam Al-Ahmad, head of the Fatah bloc at the Palestinian Legislative Council (Parliament) and Osama Hamdan, the Hamas leader exiled in Lebanon, conclude with both sides pledging to hold regular talks in order to ratify the Egyptian proposal for reconciliation and set a definitive date for the Palestinian elections.
US-mediated peace talks since February. On 6 July Benjamin Netanyahu and Barack Obama meet in Washington after which Netanyahu states that “this is the moment to hold direct talks” with the Palestinians.

- On 18 July in Cairo the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak holds separate meetings with Mahmoud Abbas, Benjamin Netanyahu and George Mitchell, in an attempt to push forward direct peace talks between the Palestinians and Israelis.
- On 19 July, on an official visit to Israel and Palestine, the High Representative of the EU Catherine Ashton asks Jerusalem to put an end to the Gaza blockade and Hamas to release Sergeant Shalit, in an attempt to restart the peace process.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 12 July the Israeli army releases a report recognising that the attack on the “Freedom Flotilla” was marked by poor planning and operational mistakes, although it does not find enough evidence to proceed with trials against the military leaders involved.
- On 13 July one person is killed and five injured by shots fired by Tsahal at the border with Gaza.
- On 21 July an Islamic Jihad militant is killed and seven people are injured by shots fired by Israelis at the Gaza border.
- On 22 July the Israeli army shoots and kills a Palestinian attempting to enter a Jewish settlement in the West Bank without authorisation.
- On 30 July an air strike on Gaza, in response to a rocket launched at Ashkelon, kills a Hamas militant and injures 11 people.

August 2010

Israel

- On 2 August the UN Secretary-General announces his decision to establish an independent commission to investigate the Israeli attack on the “Freedom Flotilla,” led by New Zealand former Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer. On 3 August Israel says it will cooperate with the commission, which will include one Turkish and one Israeli member.

- On 3 August four people are killed in fighting between Israeli and Lebanese soldiers when an Israeli border patrol attempts to uproot a tree in no man’s land.
- On 5 August Israel returns three ships from the “Freedom Flotilla” to Turkey.
- On 5 August a court in Nazareth hands prison sentences to an Arab-Israeli citizen and two Druze citizens residing in the Golan Heights for spying for Syria. They are also accused of planning the kidnapping of a Syrian pilot who deserted to Israel in 1989.
- On 7 August the Israeli navy opens fire on a Lebanese fishing boat for invading restricted waters.

Palestine

- On 7 August Gaza’s only power plant, which provides a third of the Strip’s electricity, shuts down. The closure is due to an administrative dispute between the PNA and Hamas governments, who accuse one another of failing to pay for the fuel needed to operate the plant.

Peace Negotiations

- On 20 August Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas agree to initiate the first direct peace talks in two years, which will take place in Washington in September. The head of the Palestinian delegation for the negotiations Saeb Erekat warns that the Palestinians will withdraw from the negotiating table if settlement construction is renewed after 26 September, when the moratorium decreed by Israel in 2009 expires.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 17 August two Israeli soldiers are injured by mortar shells fired from Gaza. On 18 August the Israeli air force bombs three secret tunnels in Rafah and an alleged weapons factory.
- On 31 August four Israelis are shot and killed while driving on Highway 60 in Kiryat Arba, in the West Bank by the al-Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of Hamas.

September 2010

Israel

- On 6 September the Russian Defence Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and his Israeli counterpart Ehud Barak sign a military cooperation agreement in Moscow. Both countries agree to try to improve relations, damaged years before by Moscow’s decision to sell arms to Syria and Iran.
- On 19 September the Israeli army announces its decision to authorise private vehicle imports into Gaza.
- On 22 September the report by the independent committee appointed by the UN Human Rights Council to investigate the attack on the “Freedom Flotilla” alongside the committee appointed in August by the Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, concludes that the attack constituted “grave violations of human rights law and international humanitarian law” and accuses Israel of failing to cooperate with the investigation and concealing evidence. The Israeli representative to the UN claims that the report lacks impartiality. On 29 September the Human Rights Council approves the report by 30 votes in favour, 15 abstentions and one vote against from the US.
- On 24 September the International Atomic Energy Agency votes against the Arab-sponsored resolution to force Israel to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), by 51 votes to 46.
- On 29 September the Israeli navy reports the detention of Irene, a Gaza-bound catamaran that set sail from Famagusta with nine Jewish activists aboard.

Palestine

- On 6 September Hamas declares that the PNA has arrested 35 of its members in the West Bank, following the attack in Kiryat Arba in the West Bank on 31 August.
- On 24 September in Gaza three days after a meeting called by the Islamic Jihad with all the Palestinian factions, representatives from Fatah and Hamas meet in Damascus in talks between Palestinian factions. After the meeting, both parties report a rapprochement in positions.

Peace Negotiations

- On 2 September Israelis and Palestinians begin their first direct peace talks for two years in Washington. Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas
agree to hold regular meetings every two weeks. On the same day, Hamas, who have been excluded from the talks, along with 12 other groups in Gaza, threaten with attacks on Israel. On 14 September Netanyahu and Abbas hold a second meeting with Hillary Clinton in Sharm el-Sheikh.

- On 16 September Clinton’s tour of the Middle East comes to an end without any changes regarding stances on Jewish settlement construction in the West Bank.
- On 26 September the 10-month moratorium on settlement construction in the West Bank expires with no sign of an Israeli renewal. Netanyahu asks Abbas not to withdraw from the negotiating table. Abbas insists on the need to extend the moratorium and delays a definitive response until hearing from the Arab League. On 29 September George Mitchell meets with Netanyahu and his Defence Minister Ehud Barak to offer Israel “guarantees” in exchange for a two month extension of the moratorium. Mitchell says the US will support Israel’s military presence in Jordan Valley following a peace agreement with the Palestinians and will satisfy the country’s security needs. The meeting ends without any advances being made. On 30 September the High Representative of the EU Catherine Ashton arrives in Tel Aviv to support Mitchell’s efforts after meeting Hillary Clinton in Washington. On 30 September Mitchell holds a meeting with Mahmoud Abbas in which he is unable to persuade the Palestinian President to remain at the negotiating table, despite his offer to push for a definitive border demarcation and an economic and political umbrella for the PNA.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 10 September Israel bombs the Rafah tunnels injuring two Hamas militants in response to an attack launched from Gaza.
- On 12 September an air strike on Gaza kills three Palestinians in Beit Ha’oun after the Israeli army reports a rocketed launched from Gaza into southern Israel in the early hours of the morning.
- On 15 September one Palestinian is killed and six injured in an attack on the Rafah tunnels, in response to a rocket and mortar attack launched from Gaza at Ashkelon.
- On 17 September in the West Bank the Israeli army kills lyad Shilbayeh, one of the leaders of Hamas’s armed wing, during a military operation in the Nur Shams refugee camp, near Tulkarm. On 21 September a rocket launched from Gaza lands in the Sha’ar Hanegev region in response to the attack.
- On 21 September the committee of experts appointed by the UN Human Rights Council, at the request of the Goldstone Report, to monitor the Israeli- and Hamas-led investigations into crimes against humanity committed during Operation Cast Lead concludes that neither of the parties has led a satisfactory investigation.
- On 22 September clashes break out between the Israeli police and Palestinian citizens in Silwan, East Jerusalem, after an Arab citizen with Israeli nationality is shot dead by a security guard. The incident arose after a group of Palestinians blocked and stoned the car in which the guard was patrolling. Later, in response to the young man’s death, crowds throw stones at the Wailing Wall. The Israeli police responds by entering the nearby Temple Mount.

October 2010

Israel

- On 3 October an Israeli military court sentences three soldiers to three years’ imprisonment for using a Palestinian child as a human shield during Operation Cast Lead.
- On 10 October the Council of Ministers approves a controversial amendment to the Law of Citizenship that requires non-Jewish applicants applying for Israeli nationality to swear their loyalty to Israel as a “Jewish and democratic state.” 6,000 Israelis protest in Tel Aviv against the action. On 18 October Benjamin Netanyahu orders the law to be reformed to also include Jewish applicants.
- On 15 October Israel launches tenders for the construction of 238 homes in Ramot and in Pisgat Zeve, in East Jerusalem, beyond the 1967 Green Line.
- On 22 October the Jerusalem Post reports the Israeli government’s refusal to respond to the United Nations’ request to build new schools in Tel al-Hawa, in the south of Gaza, maintaining that they would be located on Hamas-controlled territory and in the vicinity of Hamas military installations.
- On 27 October the Arab-Israeli writer Amir Makhoul pleads guilty before a court in Haifa of spying for Hezbollah. Makhoul was arrested in May by the Shabak, Israel’s internal secret service.

Palestine

- On 13 October Egypt grants permission for the humanitarian aid convoy Viva Palestina to dock at the al-arish port, thus allowing it to reach Gaza.
- On 29 October thousands of Islamic Jihad supporters rally in Gaza to celebrate the 23rd anniversary of the movement chanting “Death to America and Israel” and defending armed struggle and the destruction of the State of Israel. Abdullah Shallah, the movement’s leader, addresses the crowd from Damascus over the telephone and attacks the PNA and the peace talks.

Peace Negotiations

- On 1 October Mitchell and Ashton meet respectively with Mahmoud Abbas and Benjamin Netanyahu in a last-ditch effort to keep the peace process alive. Parallel to this, Netanyahu’s refusal, under pressure from sectors of Likud and its coalition associates, to extend the moratorium on the settlements, causes Barack Obama to issue a warning that the US may raise its veto in the United Nations Security Council on a resolution for the unilateral creation of a Palestinian State.
- On 9 October the Arab League, at a meeting in Sirte, backs Abbas’ proposal to ask the US to support the unilateral creation of a Palestinian State that includes all of the West Bank. It also supports Palestine’s withdrawal from the negotiating table, although it gives the US a month to persuade Israel to halt the settlements.
- On 13 October Yasser Abed Rabbo, Secretary of the PLO Executive Committee, tells Haaretz that the organisation would be prepared to recognise a Jewish State if the US mediation proposes a map based on the 1967 borders. This offer would comply with one of the demands made by Benjamin Netanyahu for the extension of the moratorium on the Jewish
settlements, but contradicts statements made by the chief Palestinian negotiator Saeb Erekat, who declared the previous day that the Palestinians “would never recognise a Jewish State.”

- On 17 October Benjamin Netanyahu announces he will resume negotiations with Hamas to work towards Gilad Shalit’s release.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 4 October a group of Israeli settlers set fire to a mosque in Beit Fajar, south of Bethlehem.
- On 8 October David Be’eri, leader of an Israeli extreme rightwing organisation, runs over and injures several youths in the Silwan district in East Jerusalem, who were throwing stones at his car.
- On 17 October two Palestinian militants are killed in Gaza during an Israeli air strike targeting terrorists preparing to launch rockets from as-Sudanija.
- On 27 October clashes erupt between the Israeli police and Palestinian citizens protesting against a demonstration of ultra-orthodox Jews in Umm al-Fahm, in Haifa.

November 2010

Israel

- On 3 November on an official visit to Israel the British Foreign Minister William Hague meets with his counterpart Avigdor Lieberman and commits to rectifying the British law on universal jurisdiction, under which Israeli leaders accused of participating in war crimes can be arrested on British soil. The pledge coincides with a decision taken by Israeli politicians, military officials and diplomats not to attend the annual high-level meeting between the two countries, in protest against the law passed by the previous Labour government.
- On 3 November the Israeli government decides to suspend cooperation with UNESCO in protest against the organisation’s decision to consider that the Jewish holy sites, Rachel’s Tomb and the Tomb of the Patriarchs, are also mosques. As a consequence both sites have to be withdrawn from Israel’s list of national heritage sites.
- On 8 November Israel announces the construction of 1,300 Jewish homes in Har Homa, a neighbourhood of East Jerusalem with a majority Arab population. The decision intensifies opposition from Palestinians and mediating countries.
- On 10 November Israel arrests the Vice President of the Palestinian Legislative Council and Hamas member Mahmoud Ramahi in el-Bireh, Ramallah. Ramahi was arrested in 2006 in connection with the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit and was released after 32 months in prison in May 2009. This arrest comes weeks after another Hamas member Hatem Qafaish was arrested in Hebron. Hamas claims that the arrests are an attempt to boycott the Palestinian reconciliation talks.
- On 14 November Israel approves the absorption of 8,000 Ethiopian Christian Falash Muras of Jewish origin, who are located in a camp in Gundar, in the northeast of Israel.
- On 14 November Benjamin Netanyahu announces Israel’s plans to build a border fence between Israel and Egypt and a holding centre to stop traffickers and infiltrators crossing the border, accusing Egypt of not doing enough to control the border.
- On 17 November the Council of Ministers approves the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Ghajar, a town located on the border between Israel, Lebanon and Syria, handing control over the town to UNIFIL.
- On 22 November the Knesset (parliament) approves a bill by 65 votes in favour and 33 against under which either a two thirds parliamentary majority or a popular referendum is necessary to ratify agreements signed between the government and neighbouring countries that involve exchanging land for peace.
- On 29 November Tamir Pardo is appointed the new director of Mossad to replace Meir Dagan.
- On 30 November in Dura to the south of Hebron Israeli troops arrest Nayef Rajoub, the former Palestinian Religious Affairs Minister, Hamas member and brother of the Fatah leader, Jibril Rajoub. Seven others are also arrested.

Palestine

- On 9-10 November Fatah and Hamas representatives meet in Damascus to continue with reconciliation talks. The meeting fails to achieve its main aim: to unify the Hamas-run security apparatus in Gaza with that of Fatah in the West Bank.

Peace Negotiations

- On 11 November in exchange for an Israeli extension of its settlement construction freeze, Hillary Clinton offers Benjamin Netanyahu a series of pledges that includes the delivery of 20 F-35 fighter jets, an extensive bilateral security agreement if a peace agreement is reached with the Palestinians, the US veto on anti-Israeli resolutions in the Security Council and pressure on Iran to stop its nuclear programme. On 14 November Netanyahu presents Washington’s proposal to the Israeli cabinet. On 17 November Benjamin Netanyahu delays the Israeli Security Cabinet’s vote on a new 90-day settlement construction moratorium in the West Bank, on discovering that Washington’s pledge does not include Israel’s demands to exclude East Jerusalem from the moratorium, a point that Netanyahu and Clinton had discussed in the meeting on 11 November. On 21 November 4,000 settlers protest against Netanyahu’s consideration of approving a new moratorium.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 3 November a leader of the Army of Islam, a terrorist group linked to al-Qaeda and a rival of Hamas, is killed in an Israeli air strike on Gaza. Mohammed Jamal al-Nimnim orchestrated various attacks on Israel in recent years. On 17 November Islam Yassin, another high-ranking militant in the Army of Islam, and his brother, are killed in an Israeli air strike on Gaza. According to Israeli sources, both al-Nimnim and Islam were involved in a plan to kidnap Israeli citizens in Sinai.
- On 7 November Bedouins in the town of Rahat clash with Israeli police throwing stones in protest at the demolition of an illegal mosque.

December 2010

Israel

- On 1 December Israel authorises the construction of 625 new homes in
Pisgat Ze'ev, in East Jerusalem, two days after authorising 130 new homes in the neighbouring district of Gilo.

- On 2 December at least 40 prison workers being evacuated from a fire on Mount Carmel are killed when their bus overturns. The fires, described as one of the worst in Israel's history, destroy 50 Km² of forest land. Benjamin Netanyahu calls for international cooperation as the fire burns out of control razing the Beit Oren Kibbutz to the ground, forcing 17,000 to evacuate and cutting off several highways leading to Haifa. On 5 December the fire is brought under control. The opposition blames the government for the country's lack of resources and preparation to deal with this kind of catastrophe. On 6 December a young man from Ussafiya confesses to being responsible for the fire after leaving coals from a pipe in the forest.

- On 8 December Israel announces that it will ease the Gaza blockade, allowing exports of manufactured goods and agricultural products. Hamas claims that the measure, praised by the International Quartet, is merely a publicity stunt.

- On 23 December in an interview with Al-Jazeera, the founder Julian Assange reveals that his portal is soon to publish 3,700 cables containing secret and controversial documents that affect Israel, especially in relation to the 2006 conflict with Hezbollah and with January's assassination of the Hamas leader Mahmoud al Mabhouh in Dubai. In recent months WikiLeaks has filtered over 250,000 cables that have embarrassed several governments worldwide, particularly that of the US, but until now very few of the infiltrations have affected Israel.

- On 30 December an unprecedented trial sees the former President Moshe Katzav sentenced to 16 years in prison by the Court of Tel Aviv for two cases of rape and other sex crimes committed against various employees, during his terms as President and Minister of Tourism.

Palestine

- On 27 December Fatah asks Hamas to accelerate its efforts to achieve Palestinian reconciliation and thereby avoid a fresh Israeli offensive on Gaza, coinciding with the second anniversary of Operation Cast Lead.

- On 28 December Fatah announces its decision to suspend one of its strongmen, the former security chief for Gaza Mohammed Dahlan, from all political activity, pending an internal investigation launched to determine the legitimacy of Dahlan's fortune, as well as an alleged military coup attempt on the PNA.

- On 29 December the press reports that Saeb Erekat, the chief Palestinian negotiator for the peace process, has decided to present a resolution before the UN Security Council that demands the immediate end to Israeli settlements on Palestinian territory.

- On 31 December Mahmoud Abbas and his Brazilian counterpart, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, announce the opening of a Palestinian embassy in Brasilia, in Brazil, the first of its kind in the Western hemisphere.

Peacemakers

- On 1 December Ismail Haniyeh declares that Hamas would be willing to accept a peace agreement with Israel if it were approved in a referendum by Palestinians in Gaza, the West Bank and the Diaspora.

- On 9 December the head of the Israeli negotiating team Isaac Molho holds meetings in Washington with Hillary Clinton and George Mitchell in an attempt to re-launch peace talks. On 10 December Clinton holds another meeting with Saeb Erekat, as well as private talks with the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, who meets in Cairo with Hosni Mubarak and the Arab Peace Initiative Follow-up Committee on 8 and 11 December respectively.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 2 December the army reports the death of two Islamic Jihad militants, who were trying to plant explosive devices at the separation fence between Israel and Gaza.

- On 3 December clashes break out in Issawiya, in East Jerusalem, between the Israeli police and demonstrators called by the Sheikh Jarrah Solidarity Movement, a neighbourhood in East Jerusalem with a majority Arab population. The protests are against the poor conditions suffered by local residents, the increasing evictions and the expansion of Jewish settlements.

- On 11 December two Palestinians are killed and an Israeli soldier injured during a gunfight on the border between Israel and Gaza.

- On 21 December two militants from the Ezzedeen al-Qassam Brigades are injured in an Israeli attack on Khan Younis. This and another five attacks on Jabalia, Beit Lahia, Beit Hanoun, Zeitoun and a secret smuggling tunnel in Rafah, are in response to shells fired from Gaza into southern Israel on 20 December.

- On 24 December 80 Palestinians dressed as Santa Claus clash with Israeli soldiers in Bilin in protest against the separation fence in the West Bank.

- On 26 December two members of the al-Quds Brigades, linked with the Islamic Jihad, are killed in a gunfight with Israeli soldiers in Khuzah in Gaza, while attempting to plant explosives near the separation fence.

Sources

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Chronologies

Chronology of the Barcelona Process

January

1 January 2010
Spanish EU Presidency

Brussels: Spain takes over the Presidency at a key moment for Europe with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty. The new Presidency’s priority is to assure a fast and full enforcement of the Treaty, supporting the new institutions in the implementation of the External Action Service and the solidarity clause. The Spanish Presidency’s programme tackles the process of recovering from the economic crisis and achieving a sustainable and balanced growth; the strengthening of its role as a responsible and supportive player in the international order; the development of a “Europe of rights and freedoms;” and the promotion of citizen participation in the life of the Community.

www.eu2010.es

12 January 2010
UfM

Brussels: During the Senior Officials meeting of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), the Jordanian Ambassador Ahmad Masa’deh is designated Secretary General of the Permanent Secretariat of the UfM. The Secretariat will be established in the Royal Palace of Pedralbes in Barcelona. The agenda for the UfM meeting includes a discussion on the adoption of the Statutes of the Permanent Secretariat and the working programme for 2010.


20-21 January 2010
ARLEM

Barcelona: The first official meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly (ARLEM) gathers representatives of the UfM, the European institutions and local and regional authorities from the three shores of the Mediterranean. ARLEM will lend added impetus to Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, both as an instrument for fostering local democracy in the region and as a tool for contributing to the exchange of best practice. The Assembly consists of equal numbers of local and regional representatives from the EU Member States and countries of the Mediterranean rim, as well as members of the Committee of Regions (CoR). The ARLEM programme for 2010 includes urban and territorial development, decentralisation, information society and support for small and medium-sized enterprises.

www.cor.europa.eu

22 January 2010
EMPA

Rabat: Under the Presidency of the Jordanian Senate, representatives of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) officially celebrate the nomination of Ahmad Masa’deh as Secretary General of the UfM. The Assembly highlights the urgency for all partners to adopt the UfM Secretariat Statutes. It also reiterates that the EMPA is an essential tool for strengthening democracy and will monitor the implementation of the UfM Working Programme for 2010 and projects, as a legitimate parliamentary institution of the UfM.


27 January 2010
EU-Jordan

Madrid: The Spanish Prime Minister Zapatero and King Abdullah of Jordan meet to discuss the possibility of an advanced status to be included in the new Action Plan between Jordan and the EU, after the current one expires in June 2010.

February

4 February 2010
Foreign Affairs

Brussels: During the EP Committee on Foreign Affairs meeting, Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos announces the priorities of the Spanish Presidency in Europe’s relations with its eastern and southern neighbours: the development of Morocco’s advanced status and improved relations with Egypt in North Africa; and the peace process in collaboration with Catherine Ashton in the Middle East.

10-11 February 2010
Enterprise

Brussels: The Working Party on Euro-Mediterranean Industrial Cooperation meets to assess the progress in implementing the 2009-2010 work programme and plan the next steps. The meeting brings together delegations of European and Mediterranean business leaders.
from all the Mediterranean Partner Countries, EU Member States and other members of the UfM, with both public and private sectors represented, including business associations, international organisations and projects. Participants exchange information and take decisions upon future progress in the six areas included in the work programme, namely: the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Enterprise, investment promotion, market access, innovation, textiles and clothing and sustainable industrial development.


10-11 February 2010
Civil Protection
Cairo: The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Programme for Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters (PPRD South) organises a training workshop with the EC entitled “Disaster Risk Reduction: Mechanisms and Methodologies in Civil Protection.” The workshop is addressed to high-level officials from the Civil Protection Authorities of the Partner Countries in order to reinforce disaster risk reduction at the regional and local level. During the meeting, participants examine the circumstances linking risk to disaster and analyse the concept of risk mitigation focusing on prevention rather than response.

www.unisdr.org/preventionweb/files/12579_DRRWSAgendaENG.pdf

17-18 February 2010
ESc
Brussels: The EESC and heads of Economic and Social Councils (ESCs) from the Euromed region discuss the foundations for a more robust participation of civil society organisations in the UfM. During the meeting, the presidents of the councils from the Maghreb and Mashreq countries, including Palestine and Israel, point out the urgency of tackling pollution, migration-related problems and the importance of enhancing business cooperation between the EU and the region.

17-18 February 2010
Agadir Agreement
Rabat: Agadir Agreement Trade Ministers hold their second meeting to discuss trade cooperation. A number of resolutions are approved that aim at driving the EU-funded project forward in achieving its objectives and encouraging the private sector to benefit from the opportunities and advantages provided in the Euromed area. The resolutions include facilitating exchanges and investments; encouraging industrial and commercial integration in accordance with the Agadir Agreement; setting an agenda with performance indicators to coordinate trade and other laws; and proceeding with the Euromed rules of origin in accordance with the Agreement.

www.agadiragreement.org

20-22 February 2010
SMEs
Damascus: The Euro-Arab Conference to Support Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) takes place with the cooperation of the Arab League and the EU. The meeting is aimed at strengthening collaboration and existing partnerships between European and Arab nations in the SME sector. The objective is to maximise the benefits of the existing programmes and funds launched by governments on both sides to assist with SMEs in development and rehabilitation. The establishment of the Euro-Arab Business Council for Small & Medium Enterprises is recommended in the final conclusions of the meeting.

22 February 2010
Environment
Brussels: Thanks to the success of the Mediterranean Hot Spot Investment Programme – Project Preparation and Implementation Facility (MeHSIP PPIF) – the EU approves the second phase of the programme. With loan commitments from the European Investment Bank (EIB) the EC will provide 6.2 million euros to help Partner Countries in the planning of pollution reduction infrastructures that meet the required standards for international financial intervention. The technical assistance budget facility is a concrete contribution in the Horizon 2020 de-pollution initiative.

24-25 February 2010
Women
Tunis: A forum takes place organised by the UMCE-BusinessMed, within the framework of the EU-funded Invest in Med project and in collaboration with GTZ and CNFCE-UTICA, entitled: “How to create new opportunities for women within the Mediterranean” aimed at boosting the participation of women in business. The forum is divided in three sessions: networking and regional programmes opening new horizons for SMEs; appropriate tools and new opportunities to promote better market access; and SME financing, summary of the final outcomes of the forum and possibilities of generating business opportunities.

www.invest-in-med.eu

24-25 February 2010
Heritage
Palermo: Euromed Heritage presents a training workshop and the regional conference of the Euromed Heritage 4 programme. The event provides a platform for around 100 actors from civil society, national authorities and professionals in the field of cultural heritage, youth, education and tourism to present the latest theories, methodologies and good practice in mobilising civil society concerning cultural heritage and their impact on its healthy development within the Euromed region.

www.euromedheritage.net

March
2 March 2010
Neighbourhood
Brussels: The EU allocates 3 billion euros for the period 2011-2013 in order to reinforce regional and cross-border cooperation and support political and economic reforms between the EU and its neighbours. Funding is also given to support projects in areas like climate change, transport, energy and the environment, within the framework of the ENP.

2-3 March 2010
Local Authorities
Cordoba: The first EU-Morocco Forum of Local Authorities takes place, organised by the Andalusian Fund of Municipalities for International Solidarity (FAMSI). The aims of the Forum include contributing to establishing the contents of the EU-Morocco Summit with regard
to key issues for local governments of these territories, as well as an increase in decentralised cooperation and the development of an agenda involving local EU governments and Morocco.

www.commed-cg1u.org

4 March 2010

UIU

Barcelona: Foreign Ministers from Spain, France, Egypt and Jordan, the Secretary General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, the European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, Stefan Fule, as well as other local authorities attend the official inauguration of the Permanent Secretariat of the UfM and the presentation of its Secretary General, Ahmad Masa'deh. On 3 March, in a Senior Official Meeting, the Statutes of the Permanent Secretariat are approved.

4-7 March 2010

ALF

Barcelona: Over 1,000 civil society organisations from the 43 countries of the UfM share good practices on intercultural dialogue during the forum organised by the Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF). For the first time the national civil society networks of the ALF are brought together and have the chance to share ideas and develop new partnerships and projects. The main topics of debate, plenary sessions and workshops concern the fields of: education, artistic collaboration, coexistence, migration and religion. Participants agree on a common roadmap for restoring confidence in shared values.

www.euromedalex.org

6 March 2010

Enterprise

Granada: For the first time, European and Moroccan entrepreneurs hold a summit to discuss economic relations between the EU and Morocco. The meeting focuses on renewable energy, transport and infrastructure. In their final declaration they highlight the added value that they can bring to the new phase of relations between the EU and the Kingdom of Morocco and they ask for greater involvement of financial institutions, including the EIB, in financing projects in the industrial and technological sectors.

7 March 2010

EU-Morocco

Granada: The EU-Morocco Summit establishes a roadmap for future cooperation after the adoption of the advanced status. Both sides commit to moving forward in the following areas: creation of an EU-Morocco Joint Parliamentary Committee; participation of Morocco in EU programmes; availability of substantial, additional funds to Morocco under the ENPI for the period 2011-2013; restrictions on trade in services and right of establishment; development of green and renewable energies, starting from the national solar plan that aims to meet 42% of the country’s energy needs; improvement of the connections with trans-European transport and energy networks. As the current action plan expires in 2010, they agree on giving the new document an operational content to achieve the aims of the advanced status. Participants also discuss certain political questions, namely: the Middle East issue, the UfM, the situation in the Sahel, immigration and the Sahara.


8 March 2010

Agriculture

Istanbul: During their 8th Meeting, the Ministers of Agriculture of the CIHEAM Member Countries discuss the effects of climate change on agricultural production in the Mediterranean region. Among the actions to be taken, they underscore the importance of water availability for farmers in order to improve food safety and security, increase crop and livestock production and promote the economic development of rural areas.

www.ciheam.org

10-11 March 2010

Human Rights

Brussels: During the 3rd annual political dialogue meeting, representatives of Egypt and the EU discuss human rights and democracy, freedom of expression and association and steps taken in the EU and in Egypt to tackle intolerance and religious and minority discrimination. The political dialogue was launched after Egypt and the EU agreed on a Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan in 2007 as a policy framework for cooperation in a number of fields of activities, from scientific research to economic, industrial, energy and environmental joint activities.

13-14 March 2010

EMPA

Amman: The 6th plenary session of the EMPA focuses on the Middle East Peace Process, condemning new Israeli housing projects in East Jerusalem as a dangerous settlement building policy that undermines the two-state solution. The Assembly also approves its first operational budget and sets up a permanent secretariat. The proposal to transform the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership (FEMIP) into the Mediterranean branch of the EIB does not achieve consensus. Jordan hands over the EMBA Presidency to Italy until March 2011. The priorities of the future Presidency are democracy and human rights promotion, tackling environmental issues and immigration flows. Croatia and Montenegro, as members of the UfM, join the Assembly for the first time. On this occasion the EMPA changes its name to Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean (PA-UfM).

15-17 March 2010

Women

Brussels: In the framework of the EU-funded programme “Enhancing Equality between Men and Women in the Euromed Region,” representatives from southern and northern Euromed countries hold a round table to examine and validate the results of the analyses carried out on the situation of women in each of the partner countries. The nine national reports that are presented allow the assessment of the legal and judicial framework of each country and the efforts each has made to strengthen human rights in general and those of women in particular. They also include a section dedicated to boosting CEDAW and ensuring the implementation of the follow-up to the Istanbul Process. Priorities are established to improve human rights, ensure equality between men and women and fight against gender-based violence.

www.euromedgenderequality.org
April
7 April 2010
Aviation
Amman: Participants in the 1st MEDA Joint Aviation Authority Workshop reach a consensus on the establishment of the Joint Mediterranean Aviation Authorities (JMAA) proposed by the Evromed Aviation Project. According to the conclusion of the workshop, deep support and involvement of the EC and the European Aviation Safety Agency are felt to be essential to the success and duration of the JMAA. Some consider in particular that the EASA should be directly involved in the rulemaking and standardisation processes, as well as deploying expertise.
www.euromedtransport.org

13 April 2010
Water
Barcelona: The 4th Evromed Conference on Water brings together Ministers from the 43 UfM countries and representatives of the EC and the Arab League, as well as of civil society and financial institutions, in order to approve the Strategy for Water in the Mediterranean (SWM). However, a disagreement between the Arab and Israeli blocs over a reference to the Palestinian "occupied territories" prevents the elaboration of a common document on water management. The meeting is also an opportunity to discuss solutions to common water issues such as climate change and extreme phenomena like droughts and floods.
www.medaquaministerial2010.net/

21-23 April 2010
Health
Rome: Some 200 people – experts and representatives from international organisations and officers from National Public Health Institutes and Ministries of Health of countries in the EU co-funded EpiSouth Network – attend the EpiSouth Conference on Communicable Diseases and Public Health in the Mediterranean and Balkans. The conference focuses on the role played and the added value provided by public health networks in reference to training in field/applied epidemiology, cross-border epidemic intelligence, vaccine preventable diseases in migrant populations and cross-border emerging zoonoses.
www.episouth.org/doc/Agenda_final.pdf

23-26 April 2010
Politics and Security
La Valletta: The 28th Malta Seminar for Euro-Mediterranean Diplomats, organised by the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies and the EC, focuses on a range of issues including globalisation, trade and investment, energy security and the contribution of civil society and the media to Mediterranean cooperation. The Meeting’s conclusions highlight the importance of the contribution of civil society to regional cooperation.
www.euromed-seminars.org.mt/

27 April 2010
EU-Egypt
Luxembourg: At the 6th Meeting of the EU-Egypt Association Council, Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos, Enlargement and ENP Commissioner Fule and the Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit gather to discuss the progress made by Egypt in its social, economic and political programmes, its role in the Middle East peace process and the forthcoming UfM summit scheduled for June, which was later postponed to November and finally cancelled. The other areas of common interest that are discussed are: Sudan, Somalia, Yemen and Iraq. They also examine Egypt’s involvement in the foreign aspect of the Europe 2020 programme, which will guide EU economic growth over the next decade.

30 April 2010
UfM
Brussels: A resolution giving support to the UfM has been approved by the EP Foreign Affairs Committee. Members stress that regional conflicts such as those in the Middle East, Cyprus and the Western Sahara must not limit sectoral and multilateral cooperation. It concedes that building the Neighbourhood Policy in the Mediterranean region on bilateral relations rather than on a global approach has delayed progress in integration and democratic reform. According to the resolution, a major part of the UfM’s new projects must be devoted to teaching, school and university exchanges and research, including upgrading the Erasmus Mundus programmes for the Mediterranean. The institutional architecture of the UfM will not be complete without parliamentary scrutiny of the process, which the
resolution says should be devolved to the EMPA, which in turn should become the parliamentary assembly of the UfM.

May

2–3 May 2010
Local Authorities
Barcelona: The 2nd Forum of Local and Regional Authorities of the Mediterranean aims at ensuring the contribution of the territorial authorities to the construction of a better balanced, more prosperous Euro-Mediterranean area. The meeting should allow local and regional authorities to share different perspectives ahead of the 2nd UfM Summit of Heads of State and Government to be held in Barcelona in June; to establish contact with the new Secretary General of the UfM; and to progress in the construction of a regional Mediterranean agenda which will guide the Forum’s future demands and actions. www.commed-cglu.org/spip.php?article494

5–6 May
EU-Morocco
Brussels: The official launch of the EU-Morocco Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) is attended by Commissioner Fule. The implementation of Morocco’s advanced status with the EU, progress on democratisation and regionalisation of the Moroccan state, and the management of migration between the EU and Morocco are the key topics discussed in the ensuing debate. The purpose of the new body is to strengthen ties between the EP and its Moroccan counterpart (the Moroccan Chamber of Representatives and Chamber of Councillors).

6 May 2010
EU-Israel
Brussels: The EU and Israel sign an agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (CAA), which will facilitate market access by eliminating technical barriers to trade with respect to industrial products. The agreement also offers Israel certain benefits of the internal market, while offering EU exporters easier exporting procedures to Israel. Israel is the first non-candidate country to sign such an agreement.

10 May 2010
FEMIP
Valencia: The 8th FEMIP Conference tackles the issue of energy in the Mediterranean Region. The meeting brings together representatives of the private sector, fund managers, top officials from international financial institutions, energy experts and grid operators. The Conference sessions focus on the different facets of the energy challenge in the Mediterranean and the importance of: an institutional, regulatory, economic and financial framework; innovation to encourage energy efficiency; and development and integration of the electricity generated from renewable energy sources into existing grids. www.eib.org

10 May 2010
EU-Turkey
Brussels: The 48th EU-Turkey Association Council meeting provides a timely opportunity to review EU-Turkey relations. The EU notes progress made by Turkey in its preparations in the framework of the negotiating process. Overall, at this stage, out of 35 negotiating chapters, 12 have been opened and one provisionally closed. The EU underlines that reforms and substantial efforts are still needed in several areas, such as judicial reform and the reform of public administration, the fight against corruption, effective protection of citizens’ rights, freedom of expression and of religion, respect for property rights, respect for and protection of minorities and strengthening of cultural and women’s rights. The EU reiterated Turkey’s obligation of full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement and the importance of progress in the normalisation of bilateral relations between Turkey and all Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus. www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/er/114363.pdf

11–12 May 2010
Energy
Valencia: During the Ministerial Meeting on the Mediterranean Solar Plan, the European Commissioner for Energy Oettinger affirms that countries of the southern Mediterranean need clean energy for their social and economic development, thus stressing the EC’s support for the plan as the “cooperation flagship” with the southern Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Solar Plan is an important step towards a stronger cooperation in the field of renewable energies. It should develop 20 GW of new renewable energy production capacities and achieve significant energy savings around the Mediterranean by 2020, thus addressing both supply and demand.

11 May 2010
EU-Tunisia
Brussels: The EU and Tunisia hold their 8th Association Council meeting in Brussels with the participation of the representatives of the EU Spanish Presidency, the ENP Commissioner and the Tunisian Foreign Minister. In order to strengthen EU-Tunisian relations through an advanced status, they agree to establish an ad hoc working group, which will be tasked to work on a roadmap. The advanced status will focus on more intensive political dialogue, legislative alignment and a comprehensive and detailed trade agreement.

13 May 2010
University
Portoroz: President Mifsud of the Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI) and Secretary General Hachem of the Association of Arab Universities sign a memorandum of understanding for collaboration between UfM Universities. The agreement plans the creation of a joint commission to develop practical and concrete activities of support and internationalisation for universities wishing to cooperate on UfM projects. Besides these activities, a Mediterranean Erasmus and a programme similar to Erasmus for Arab countries to partner the EU Erasmus programme are discussed. www.emuni.si

14–16 May 2010
Euromed Civil Forum
Alicante: The Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum gathers some 250 people from independent organisations and civil society representatives from various countries within the Mediterranean Basin. The forum’s final document contains recommendations encouraging the promotion of equality between individuals
– in particular between men and women – and between the region’s states. It stresses that the progress of democracy requires an end to the conflicts that hinder the region’s stability and asks the leaders of the UfM to demand Israel that respect international resolutions and put an end to the occupation and colonisation of Palestine. It also emphasises the importance of applying mechanisms to ensure that all commitments with regard to human rights, good governance and democracy are respected in the UfM countries.

www.euromed.eurosur.org

17-18 May 2010
UfM Forum
Barcelona: A high-level seminar, organised by the IEMed in collaboration with EUISS within the framework of the ENPI South European programme, gathers experts, academics and officials from the Euro-Mediterranean countries to discuss “The Union for the Mediterranean: Development Perspectives in a Multi-polar World.” The Forum seeks to encourage a productive debate on the coordination and cooperation mechanisms between the bilateral dynamic, the ENP and the multilateral dynamic, as well as the UfM. The meeting produces proposals for four main projects: De-pollution of the Mediterranean; Maritime and Land Highways; Alternative Energies: Mediterranean Solar Plan; and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative.

19-20 May 2010
Tourism
Barcelona: Ministers of Tourism from the UfM countries gather to discuss how to boost the competitiveness of the tourism industry in the region and ensure its sustainability. Representatives of the EC and the UfM as well as the EIB participate in the conference tackling, among other issues, innovation, knowledge and sustainability as key factors to enhance the competitiveness of tourism in the Mediterranean.

www.eu2010.es

20 May 2010
UfM
Strasbourg: The EP approves a resolution providing extra funding to the UfM to help deal with the period of political stagnation that has followed the December 2008 Gaza conflict. According to the resolution, the fresh impetus needed by the UfM will require a historic commitment by Heads of State and Government to provide adequate funding for major projects and consolidate the institutions underpinning the process. More funding should be expended in the field of education for teaching, school, research and promoting cultural exchanges between the Member States’ Universities.

25 May 2010
UfM Summit
Barcelona: The UfM Summit planned for 7 June is postponed until November due to pressure from Spain, which holds the rotating Presidency of the EU, and the co-chairs Egypt and France, in order to ensure the meeting’s complete success. Holding the conference at a time when indirect negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis have only just started is considered “too early.” At this time it would be difficult for Arabs countries to sit together with the Israeli Foreign Minister Lieberman.

26 May 2010
Infrastructure
Paris: Some of the major financial institutions, including the EIB, sign a partnership launching the InfraMed Infrastructure Fund, the first financing facility of the UfM. It will be the largest fund dedicated to infrastructure investments in the southern and eastern Mediterranean with initial commitments of 385 million euros. The Fund will invest primarily in greenfield projects to build urban, energy and transport infrastructure, compliant with minimum requirements with respect to environmental protection, social impact, transparency and procurement.

www.eib.org/attachments/infraimed-note-de-presentation-en_fin.pdf

27 May 2010
Investment
Marseille: In the framework of the French-Egyptian co-presidency of the UfM, various institutions organise a ‘For’Um’ conceived to familiarise financiers, development banks, private sector stakeholders and funds with the UfM’s progress. For’Um is open to the participation of officials from the 43 UfM countries, in particular delegations from Ministries in charge of finances, investment and budget, and will present the latest developments pertaining to the institutional arrangements and the establishment of the Secretariat.

www.for-um.org/

31 May-4 June 2010
Youth
Sharm el-Sheikh: A training seminar on Euro-Arab youth policy cooperation in the broader Euro-Mediterranean context is organised in the framework of the partnership between the EC and the Council of Europe in the field of youth, and in cooperation with the Arab League. The seminar aims to achieve a mutual exchange of knowledge and information about youth policy developments by exploring and learning together regarding the essentials of youth policy and how it is and could be practiced in European and Mediterranean countries. The participants will be civil servants, leaders in non-governmental youth organisations and youth researchers.

June

10 June 2010
EU-Palestine
Brussels: EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht and Palestinian Minister of National Economy Hasan Abu-Libdeh discuss measures to enhance EU-Palestinian bilateral trade relations. The EC is expected to propose granting duty-free, quota-free access for Palestinian exports to EU markets in order to facilitate trade of Palestinian products and to help revamp the private sector.

10 June 2010
Free Trade
Istanbul: The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Republic of Lebanon decide to establish the Quadripartite High-Level Cooperation Council (HLCC) and to create a zone of free movement of goods and persons between their countries. The Quadripartite Council will be coordinated by the Foreign Affairs Ministers, while ministers from other areas may also participate in the Council, depending on the agenda. According to the joint declaration this
quadripartite mechanism “does not replace the bilateral commitments between the parties and is open to the participation of all other brotherly and friendly countries in the region.”


17-18 June

CBC

Brussels: The EU-funded Cross-Border Cooperation programme (CBC) organises a networking meeting of the national information and contact points of its programmes providing an inter-programme platform and the opportunity to learn from each other’s experience, to transfer know-how, exchange good practices and share problems and successes.

17 June

Environment

A group of major European public financial institutions, including the EIB, joins forces to study and promote the creation of a Mediterranean Carbon Fund (MCF). The initiative, designed to support deployment of climate friendly projects around the Mediterranean, has been launched within the scope of the UfM. It will provide expertise at the national level and additional financing to projects developed in the southern and eastern Mediterranean.

18 June 2010

PA-UfM

Palermo: The discussion in the Meeting of the Bureau and the Enlarged Bureau of the PA-UfM tackles the main priorities of the Italian Presidency, including the Middle East peace process; promoting the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights; the integration of migrants; the adoption of measures in the fields of education and training; women’s literacy; and the labour market.

20 June 2010

Energy

Algeria: Energy Ministers from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia meet in Algiers with EU Energy Commissioner Oettinger to accelerate the process of integration of electricity markets in the Maghreb, as the first step towards the full integration of these markets with the European market. A Ministerial Declaration is signed that sets out a concrete action plan for the coming years, as well as the principle of annual ministerial meetings to assess progress.

21-22 June 2010

Education and training

Turin: The European Training Foundation (ETF) organises a seminar in the framework of its regional project on qualifications in the Euro-Mediterranean to get commitment and ownership from the key players in the project on the basis of their specific national sectoral strategies. Participants from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia, representing the tourism and construction sectors, discuss and agree on the project methodology and approach, define activities, roles and responsibilities and set the working plan for the next two years of the project.

www.etf.europa.eu

28-29 June 2010

PA-UfM

Innsbruck: The PA-UfM Committee on Energy, Environment and Water officially resumes its activities, with particular focus on renewable energies and solar energy and the main priorities established for the coming year. The new work plan includes the topics of biodiversity, protection of the marine environment of the Mediterranean Sea and waste management.

July

1 July 2010

Belgian Presidency

Brussels: In accordance with the institution of the trio Presidency under the Lisbon Treaty, Belgium takes over from Spain in the Presidency of the Council of the EU. The Belgian Presidency drafts its main priorities in its six-month programme. The working plan focuses on the Europe 2020 strategy; social inclusion within the framework of the European Year for Combating Poverty and Social Exclusion; climate, energy and environment in the framework of the International Environment Policy; the essential role of the regions within the EU and a greater involvement of its (young) citizens; and sustainable development.

www.etf.europa.eu

4-15 July 2010

EU-Syria

Damascus: The EU supports a two-week training course on national health planning methods, targeted at officials from the Health and other ministries, as well as the State Planning Commission. The event organised by the Syrian Health Ministry in collaboration with the EU delegation in Damascus aims at enhancing the health sector planning process and strengthening the skills and knowledge of participants to master national or organisational health planning processes.

12 July 2010

Neighbourhood

Brussels: The EC is making 757.6 million euros available under its ENPI Inter-regional Programme (IRP) for the period 2011-2013. The IRP provides effective support for the ENP and the Strategic Partnership with Russia through activities implemented at the inter-regional level. According to the Revised Strategy Paper 2007-2013, priorities for the working programme 2011 remain the same as in the previous plan 2007-2010, namely promoting: reform through European advice and expertise; higher education reform and student mobility; cooperation between local actors in the EU and in the partner countries; investment projects in ENP partner countries; cooperation between ENP partners and EU agencies; and inter-regional cultural action. Among these actions, support of higher education reform, institutional cooperation and mobility of students and teaching staff under the Tempus and Erasmus Mundus programmes are important as contributions to the development of the partner countries, but also in promoting mutual understanding, contacts and dissemination of values and experiences.

http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/index_en.htm

13 July 2010

EU-Morocco

Rabat: EU and Morocco sign the 2011-2013 NIP worth 580.5 million euros over three years. The national programme defines the strategic priorities and finan-
cial commitments for the period and identifies five main areas of interest: development of social policies, economic modernisation, institutional support, good governance and human rights, and environmental protection.

19-24 July 2010
WOCMES
Barcelona: The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) organises the third World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies (WOCMES). The event assembles experts, researchers, educators, students and professionals from all over the world in order to exchange information on the state of the art in Middle Eastern Studies and strengthen regional and global networks for joint research.
http://wocmes.iemed.org

August

4 August 2010
EuropeAid
Brussels: The EC approves the 2010 Annual Action Programme for the Mediterranean region, to be financed under the general budget of the EU. According to the 2010 action plans, the main areas covered by European funding are environment, transport, civil society dialogue, migration, police and justice.
http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/

9 August 2010
EU-Morocco
Brussels: The EC approves a new financial support package of 135 million euros for improving the lives of the Moroccan population. The package, in the form of grants, will support reform by the Moroccan government in three areas: agricultural policy with the "Plan Maroc Vert"; the strategy for integrating populations living in remote areas; and the literacy strategy.

September

8 September 2010
EU-Morocco
Rabat: On the occasion of International Literacy Day, the Moroccan Minister of Economy and Finance, the Minister of National Education and the Head of the EC Delegation to Morocco Eneko Landaburu sign an agreement for extra funding worth 110 million dirhams for the support programme for the implementation of Morocco’s literacy strategy. The additional grant aims at supporting the extension of the actions undertaken, particularly for women, and strengthening efforts to ensure learning opportunities and sustainable socio-professional integration, especially for young adults.

7 September 2010
Enterprise
Brussels: A high-level meeting held between the EC DG Enterprise and Industry, the Centre for European Studies (CEPS) and the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) focuses on the progress made under the Euromed Charter of Enterprise and the challenges in financing micro and small enterprises (MSMEs). The working group discusses recent policy developments in the Mediterranean, key conclusions of the Barcelona meeting, the future of financing in the Mediterranean, avenues to improve SME financing in the Mediterranean and new initiatives on SME financing in the Mediterranean. The second part of the meeting deals with the role of private equity and exchanges.

21 September 2010
UIM
Brussels: The UIM senior official meeting aims at discussing the water strategy and the proposed sectoral conferences to be held in the second half of 2010 in the fields of agriculture, food security and rural development, trade, employment, higher education and scientific research. The agenda also includes a discussion on the water strategy and the preparation of the next summit.

23-24 September 2010
Tourism
Malaga: The Chamber of Commerce of Malaga and the Association of Mediterranean Chambers of Commerce (ASCAME) in collaboration with the Euromediterranean Centre for Knowledge, Innovation and Training in Tourism organise the 4th Mediterranean Tourism Forum (Meditour 2010). The forum provides a platform for tourism players form the private and public sector to share their vision on the potential challenges and opportunities in the Mediterranean area. At the end of the meeting ASCAME drafts a final declaration containing ideas and projects for the sustainable development of the tourism sector and open cooperation between the two shores. The main points set out include a proposal for the establishment of a Mediterranean Tourism Council to promote competitiveness and development.

23-25 September 2010
Education:
Portoroz (Slovenia): The EMUNI organises its third conference on higher education and research dedicated to “Entrepreneurial Learning and the Role of Universities.” Professors, researchers and entrepreneurs meet to explore areas including: Higher Education as a Key to Further Development; the Green Alternative; The Euro-Arab Azure University of Entrepreneurship; University/Industry Relations; Incorporating Innovation and Entrepreneurship in Academic Curricula for Science and Engineering Students; and Raising Education Standards at the European Level.
www.he-r.emuni.si/2010/

24 September 2010
Energy
Beirut: The EU signs grant contracts with Banque du Liban (BdL) and Kafalat – in order to complement incentives systems already developed by the Lebanese State.

27-28 September 2010
Human Rights
Rabat: A seminar gathering representatives of civil society and Moroccan and European media actors takes place to discuss press freedom in Morocco. The initiative funded by the European Instrument for Democracy and Human
29 September 2010
Regions
Aberdeen: The plenary session of the Inter-Mediterranean Commission of the Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions of Europe (CPMR) approves the minutes and the Final Declaration of the General Assembly held in Greece on 13 September 2010. The General Assembly discusses the future of the Neighbourhood Policy in the Mediterranean region and the strengthening of the partnership between the regional communities of the Mediterranean Basin. It elaborates proposals for the contribution of the Inter-Mediterranean Commission to the European strategy in the field of water and maritime policies and renewable energy.
http://medregions.com/

October
4 October 2010
Neighbourhood
Jerusalem: The Office of the EU Representative holds its second Joint Consultation on the ENP (the first was held in June) in the Gaza Strip with representatives of Palestinian civil society. During the meeting, representatives of the different Palestinian civil society organisations in the Gaza Strip present and discuss their thoughts on the EU-PA ENP Action Plan and the recently published 2009 ENP Progress Report.

4-6 October 2010
EU-Libya
Tripoli: The European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy Stefan Fule and the Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmstrom meet representatives of the Libyan government to discuss the state of bilateral relations, two years after the start of negotiations on an EU-Libya Framework Agreement. Particular attention is paid to advancing cooperation on migration issues, including the protection of refugees, border control and cooperation with countries of origin. At the end of the meeting an agreement on a migration cooperation agenda is signed, which includes concrete steps on border surveillance systems, mobility-related issues and human smuggling and trafficking. There is also dialogue on refugees and international protection.

5 October 2010
EU-Palestine
Brussels: The EC approves an additional 61.4 million euros in aid for the Palestinian people in 2010. The extra funds are aimed at helping the Palestinian Authority meet its salary obligations for teachers, doctors and nurses in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Part of the funds is channelled through the EU's assistance mechanism for the occupied Palestinian territory, PEGASE, which was launched in February 2008. The rest goes to UNRWA's General Fund to allow it to continue to meet its obligations to provide health, education and social protection services to the Palestinian refugee population.

14 October 2010
ALF
Monaco: On the occasion of the international ceremony of the Anna Lindh Journalist Award 2010, a round table event is organised on the theme of "Media and Intercultural Relations in the Euro-Mediterranean Region." After a presentation of the 2010 "Anna Lindh Report on Euro-Mediterranean Intercultural Trends," which focuses on the impact the media has on public perceptions across the two shores of the Mediterranean, the media and representatives of civil society debate the outcomes of the Anna Lindh Report 2010 and the contribution of journalists to bridging gaps in mutual perceptions across the two shores of the Mediterranean.
www.euromedalex.org/news/potential-media-intercultural-dialogue

15 October 2010
EIB
Tunisia: The EIB signs a 185 million-euro loan agreement with Tunisia for the development of electricity transportation through the construction of 660km of high tension lines. The project, responding to the growing demand for electricity in Tunisia, aims to optimise a secure electricity supply through the new lines and transformers, as well as contribute to the completion of the main electricity supply network between Tunisia and Algeria.

18-19 October 2010
Culture
Algiers: 15 writers from Europe and the Maghreb gather together in the framework of the "Euro-Maghreb writers’ meeting," organised by the EU Delegation to Algeria with the assistance of the Algerian Agency for Cultural Outreach (AARC) and the Cultural Services of the embassies of EU Member States. During the meeting, entitled "Narrative, poetry and fiction as part of women’s contribution to thought," the writers share their experiences and views on three workshops on "Life Stories as an Expression of Reality"; "Fiction as an Expression of Dreams and Change"; and "Poetry as a Space of Freedom".

22 October 2010
Environment
Athens: The Greek Government invites leaders from across the Mediterranean to launch the Mediterranean Climate Change Initiative with the support of the EIB. According to the final declaration of the meeting, the establishment of the project aims to accelerate the region’s responses to the impacts of climate change and lead by example in the transition to a low-carbon development model.
www.medclimatechangeinitiative.org/

22 October 2010
Refugees
Brussels: The EC allocates 10 million euros to providing humanitarian and food aid to vulnerable Sahrawi refugees living in refugee camps in south-west Algeria. This funding will be used to provide a regular and varied food supply. It will also contribute to improving their humanitarian situation by ensuring adequate access to basic services and
the provision of essential relief such as healthcare, clean water, proper sanitation, tents and logistical assistance.

22-25 October 2010
Politics and Security
La Valletta: The 29th Malta seminar for Euro-Mediterranean diplomats, organised by the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies and the EC, focuses on a range of issues including security challenges, trade and investment, the importance of the arts and culture, as well as gender equality and youth in the Euromed Region.

26 October 2010
EU-Jordan
Brussels: On the occasion of the 9th Meeting of the EU-Jordan Association Council, the first ever ENP Action Plan incorporating the “advanced status” partnership is agreed by the EU and Jordan. The advanced status partnership further expands the areas of cooperation between Jordan and the EU, opening up new opportunities in economic and trade relations via a progressive liberalisation in services and the right of establishment, facilitation of market access, progressive regulatory convergence and preparations of future negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, as well as reinforced cooperation with certain European agencies and programmes.

26-27 October 2010
Energy
Barcelona: The DESERTEC Industrial Initiative holds its first annual meeting entitled: “Energy form the desert,” gathering decision makers from the political arena, business community and academia. The initiative, founded on 30 October 2009, aims to produce electricity through the renewable energies in the deserts of North Africa and the Middle East. The meeting addresses several themes, including energy generation and transmission, economic and social development in the MENA region and markets and investments.

28 October 2010
ARLEM
Brussels: In preparation for the plenary session in Agadir (Morocco), ARLEM members meet to discuss the first two reports of the SDEV and ECOTER commissions on urban development and water management, the UfM Summit of Heads of State and Government and priorities for the Assembly’s next plenary session.

November

9 November 2010
Alliance of Civilisations
La Valletta: Foreign Ministers and representatives of governments from 40 Mediterranean countries, and international organisations gather at the first regional meeting for the Mediterranean. Participants agree on a UN Alliance of Civilisations, regional strategy and an action plan on intercultural cooperation for the Mediterranean. The strategy aims at furthering a culture of peace through an enhanced framework for policy development, providing new opportunities to on-the-ground projects, linking innovative initiatives across regions, and promoting people-to-people contacts and collaboration. By building grassroots, civil society capacity and relations across borders, the strategy may also help spur progress in the Middle East peace process.

10 November 2010
EIB
Rabat: The EIB and Morocco sign two loans worth a total of 420 million euros, aimed at major highway and port infrastructures that are key to the country’s economic and social development. The agreements provide 200 million euros to enlarge the Port of Tangier Med and 220 million euros to build a 172km motorway between Casablanca and the south-eastern region of Tadla-Azilal.

10-12 November
EESC
Rome: The annual Euromed summit of Economic and Social Councils and similar institutions gathers civil society organisations from the EU and countries around the Mediterranean in order to promote greater understanding of the main issues affecting organised civil society in the Euromed region and to enhance mutual awareness of economic and social realities. The creation of an assembly for European and Mediterranean civil society is at the heart of the discussion. Participants adopt a statute for the future Civil Society Assembly and agree to seek consultative body status within the UfM. A diverse range of civil society stakeholders and visiting experts from the region examine crucial themes such as decent work and sustainable development around the Mediterranean, vocational training as a factor for competitiveness and job creation.

11 November 2010
UfM
Brussels: During the 9th UfM Trade Ministerial Conference, 43 Trade Ministers of the UfM review the work carried out in 2010 to enhance economic integration and boost Euro-Mediterranean trade and investment. Participants discuss the working programme for 2011 and agree on a list of priorities for the year 2011: making the Euro-Mediterranean trade and investment facilitation mechanism operational; enhancing cooperation with the business community on Euro-Mediterranean trade and investment relations; reinforcing cooperation in the area of fighting against piracy and counterfeiting in the Euro-Mediterranean region; and enhancing sectoral cooperation.

12 November 2010
PA-UfM
Rome: On the occasion of the Bureau meeting of the PA-UfM, Jerzy Buzek emphasises that citizens in the Euro-Mediterranean region need and expect strong and effective cooperation on concrete projects that would benefit everyone. The Bureau meeting calls on the Heads of State and Government to give a strong boost to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, allowing for the effective functioning of its institutions and the implementation of major projects.

15 November 2010
UfM
Barcelona: The EP President Jerzy Buzek expresses his disappointment for the cancellation of the UfM Summit
scheduled for the 21 of November for the Heads of State and Government. According to his declaration, Euromed projects, including the building of roads, measures to reduce pollution and the distribution of scarce resources such as water, food and energy, should advance to help the people in the region.

17 November 2010
Neighbourhood
Brussels: The EC adopts the ENPI Inter-regional Action Programme for 2011. Most of the funding will support mobility of students and academic staff, fostering higher education cooperation between the EU and the neighbouring partner countries in the framework of the Erasmus Mundus programme. Another part is intended to support the harmonisation and approximation of Partner Countries’ national legislations with EU rules through the TAIEX programme. The rest of the allocation is addressed to support advances of governance reforms in the Partner Countries under the SIGMA programme.

19 November 2010
EuroMeSCo
Barcelona: The conference “Barcelona + 15: New Paths of Cooperation Across the Mediterranean” has shown the need to recover political dialogue, build peace in the Middle East and activate the work of the UIM Secretariat to advance the Union for the Mediterranean. The conference is organised by the IEMed and the EuroMeSCo network. This network, which brings together 90 of the main research centres on policy and security in the Mediterranean, has appointed the IEMed as the EuroMeSCo Secretariat for the next two years.

21-22 November 2010
UIM
Brussels: At their 2nd Conference, Labour and Employment Ministers of the UIM discuss new political priorities to reinforce regional political dialogue and the Framework for Actions on Employment, Employability and Decent Work, adopted in Marrakesh on 2008. Ministers agree that the Framework for Actions will be developed thanks to a wide range of tools, including-regional political dialogue; the creation of a network of experts and specialists on employment issues; thematic initiatives; bilateral cooperation projects; and projects promotion by public and private development actors.


22 November 2010
Foreign Affairs
Brussels: The Foreign Affairs Council deals with several themes including the situation in Lebanon and in the Middle East. The council reaffirms its full support to the Government of National Unity led by Prime Minister Hanin, established in the wake of democratic elections, and calls on parties to further engage in dialogue in the spirit of consensus and to respect the rule of law. The Council also reaffirms the full support of the EU for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. With regard to the peace process, Foreign Ministers discuss the current lack of progress and the ongoing settlement activities, particularly in East Jerusalem. The High Representative Catherine Ashton points out that settlements are illegal under international law, constitute an obstacle to peace and threaten to make a two-state solution impossible.

23 November 2010
EIB
Madrid: The EIB signs a financial contract of 500 million euros with MEDGAZ for the construction of a gas pipeline between Algeria and Spain. The project will contribute to meeting the growing gas demand in Spain by: diversifying supplies; encouraging the competitive operation of the internal market by making all the resulting import capacity available to competitors of the main player in the natural gas market; and reinforcing the security of the EU energy supply.

25 November 2010
Human Rights
Strasbourg: In a resolution on the Western Sahara, MEPs strongly condemn the violent events of 8 November, when an as yet unknown number of people were killed during a raid by Moroccan security forces aimed at dismantling the protest camp in the outskirts of El Ayoun. While noting that the Moroccan Parliament has set up a committee of enquiry, MEPs believe that the UN is the most appropriate body to launch an international and independent investigation on the events, deaths and disappearances.

December

2 December 2010
Civil Protection
Brussels: In response to Israel’s request for assistance to fight the fires raging in the northern part of the country, the EC activates the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Numerous participating States offer fire-delaying and extinguishing materials, such as anti-fire powder and fire-fighting aircraft. The assistance’s operation is coordinated by the EU Monitoring and Information Centre.

3-4 December 2010
ALF
Brussels: Civil society representatives from over 40 countries gather for the annual general meeting of the ALF’s Heads of National Networks. The meeting agenda features a debate around the proposed strategy and guidelines for the next phase of the Foundation (Phase III from 2011 to 2014) and an assessment of the Foundation’s achievements in 2010, with particular attention to civil society network development within the different areas of the region, as well as the development of tools and support mechanisms for developing and implementing intercultural projects at the local, national and regional level.

www.euromedalex.org

6 December 2010
Elections
Brussels: The EU High Representative Catherine Ashton, when speaking about the elections to the People’s Assembly of Egypt, says that the implementation of EU measures to increase transparency in the election process is insufficient. In spite of EU attempts to support free and fair parliamentary elections, irregularities have been reported, as well as restricted access for independent observers and candidates’ representatives into polling stations, media restrictions and arrests of opposition activists.
6 December 2010

EIB

Damascus: The EIB Vice-President and Syrian Health Minister sign a finance agreement worth 130 million euros to fund new investments aimed at modernising and expanding the healthcare sector and 55 million euros for the development of modern water supply and wastewater collection and treatment infrastructure in Syria. The Syrian Healthcare II project concerns the construction and provision with medical equipment of eight hospitals located across six of the country’s governorates, as well as the completion of the National Centre for Drugs and Public Health in Damascus. The water supply project is part of the EU Horizon 2020 initiative, one of the priorities of the UfM which aims to tackle top sources of Mediterranean pollution by 2020.

12-15 December 2010

Heritage

Algiers: RMSU organises its fifth seminar entitled “Education and Training” with the scope of strengthening Mediterranean cultural heritage institutional and legislative frameworks. The workshop brings together representatives from each partner country and from each Euromed Heritage project, as well as experts from specialised organisations such as UNESCO, ICCROM, ICOM and ICOMOS, and includes a comparative analysis of the existing training programmes and a debate on the possibilities of cooperation in the Mediterranean Area in order to develop synergies.

15 December 2010

Aviation

Brussels: During King Abdullah II of Jordan’s visit to EC President Barroso and High Representative Ashton, the EU and Jordan sign a comprehensive air services agreement that will open up and integrate their respective markets, strengthen cooperation and offer new opportunities for consumers and operators. The agreement will establish a “Euro Mediterranean Aviation Area” between Jordan and the EU based on common rules and a liberalisation of the air markets. The signing reflects the substantial deepening of the EU-Jordan relationship following the concession of the advanced status.

www.euromedtransport.org/aviation

15 December 2010

Neighbourhood

Strasbourg: At its plenary session, the EP adopts the 2011 EU budget providing a 9.3% increase for ENPI programmes. Around 2.6 billion euros will be made available through the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), with 1.8 billion euros available through the ENPI. Additional funding is also addressed to the Baltic Sea Strategy (2.5 million euros) and to Palestine and the peace process (100 million euros).

16 December 2010

EuroMed-30

Brussels: The EC, in collaboration with the Belgian Presidency, organises a conference entitled “EuroMed-2030: A forward look on the long-term challenges for the Mediterranean area,” aimed at presenting the main trends, tensions and possible transitions in the EuroMed region up to 2030. The event gathers more than 120 Euro-Mediterranean stakeholders to discuss the main results of the EuroMed-2030 Expert Group established by the EC under the Foresight activity of the Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities (SSH theme) of the 7th Research Framework Programme.

http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/events-135_en.html

17 December 2010

Heritage

Istanbul: Within the framework of the Istanbul European Capital of Culture 2010, the EU-funded project Manumed holds its fourth coordination meeting. This meeting will be accompanied by the exhibition “Treasures of the Aga Khan Museum: Arts of the manuscript,” at the Sakip Sabanci Museum, which the Manumed project provides with expertise and the results of its activities on the theme of book craft. Manumed is a Euro-Mediterranean programme for cooperation financed by the European Commission in the framework of the Euromed Heritage IV programme in order to enhance the appreciation of Mediterranean languages and written documents.

www.manumed.org

22 December 2010

Trade

Brussels: The EC and the Palestinian Authority of the West Bank and Gaza Strip agree the text of a draft agreement giving all agricultural products, processed agricultural products and fish and fishery products originating in the West Bank and Gaza Strip immediate duty-free access to the EU market. This liberalisation will be temporary for 10 years – with a review after 5 years – and, before the end of this period, both sides will discuss the possibility of extending the arrangements. The only exception from full liberalisation is the specific duty for imports of fruit and vegetables under the entry price system, which will remain applicable if these entry prices are not respected.
Other Cooperation Initiatives in the Mediterranean

1. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

Since NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) was initiated in 1994, the political and geo-strategic context worldwide has undergone deep changes. At the time, the Soviet Bloc had just fallen, the United States was the only superpower left; and there was widespread confidence that a viable solution could be found for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict through the Oslo Accords. The MD reflected the Alliance’s concern that security in Europe also depended on security and stability in the Mediterranean as a whole. This concern was recently reiterated in the Lisbon Summit Declaration (29 November 2010), which explicitly affirms that peace and stability in the Mediterranean region are essential for Euro-Atlantic Security and that the MD should be further developed by raising its practical and political dimensions.

In addition to contributing to stability and security, the MD has two other fundamental objectives: to improve mutual understanding and to dispel any misconceptions between the allies and MD Partner Countries. Initially, five countries agreed to participate, namely, Morocco, Mauritania, Tunisia, Egypt and Israel. They were subsequently followed by Jordan (1995) and Algeria (2000).

The Dialogue is based on five principles: progressiveness (the number of participating countries has increased and the practical and political dimensions have been enhanced over time); non-discrimination (the same basis for cooperation and discussion is offered to all Partner Countries); self-differentiation (though non-discriminatory, Partner Countries are free to tailor their participation through Individual Co-operation Programmes (ICPs)); a bilateral structure (NATO+1), although multilateral meetings can also be held; and complementarity (the MD aims to complement and reinforce other international efforts).

The political dimension of the Dialogue is promoted by the Mediterranean Cooperation Group (MCG) under the supervision of the North Atlantic Council (NAC). It includes political consultation in the NATO+1 format (providing a chance to discuss issues related to security in the Mediterranean) or the NATO+7 format (generally following a major NATO event), as well as visits by NATO senior officials to the MD countries. The practical dimension includes all the activities laid down in the Annual Work Programme, such as seminars and workshops on a wide range of issues. The military dimension includes an invitation for MD countries to observe/participate in NATO military exercises, courses and other academic activities and to visit NATO military bodies. Since the launching of the more ambitious and expanded framework for the MD at the Istanbul Summit in 2004, both the practical and political dimensions have been upgraded. NATO invited MD countries to establish a genuine partnership and sought to be responsive to their interests and needs. The aim was to achieve regional stability through stronger practical cooperation, including by contributing to the fight against terrorism and achieving interoperability. Since 2004, the number of activities planned in the Mediterranean Dialogue Work Programme (MDWP) has increased sevenfold. It now includes activities in the areas of military education, defence reform, civil emergency planning, crisis management and public diplomacy, among others. The main instrument for strengthening cooperation is the ICP, which aims to enhance the political and practical dimensions and to tailor the cooperation with NATO to each country’s strategic needs. All MD countries except Algeria have agreed tailored ICPs with NATO. Also, the political dimension has improved as the number of high-level meetings has risen, and the NATO Secretary General has managed to visit all MD countries.

However, there are also obstacles hindering the development of the MD. First among them is the number of cooperation initiatives in the Mediterranean Basin: the UfM/EMP, the OSCE’s Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation, and the 5+5 Dialogue. Though complementarity with other regional initiatives is one of the key features of the Dialogue, it has proven quite difficult to achieve proper coordination among the initiatives, avoiding the risk of overlap or duplication of similar proposals. Another obstacle is the gap between the official embrace of the NATO delegation in MD countries and the large segment of public opinion and opinion leaders who take a negative view of their country’s ties with NATO. However, mutual misperceptions and prejudices are mainly due to the conflicts in the region: the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and regional rivalries (the Western Sahara issue, the tense situation between Cyprus and Turkey), not to mention the recent operation in Libya, which, though based on a UN resolution and backed by the Arab League, has given rise to criticism and distrust.

In 2004, during the same summit that saw the upgrade of the MD, another ambitious initiative was launched: the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI). It was addressed primarily to the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Member States and aimed to strengthen regional...
stability, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) joined the ICI, while Oman and Saudi Arabia declined the invitation. The invitation was not exclusive, as any country in the region that subscribes to the Initiative’s aims and content can join it. The Initiative offers a number of bilateral activities grouped into six areas: defence reform and budgeting; military-to-military cooperation, including interoperability; cooperation in the fight against terrorism; cooperation in the Alliance’s work on the proliferation of WMDs; border security; and civil emergency planning. The number of practical activities has more than tripled over time, and there are now some 600 activities to choose from. As in the case of the MD, ICI Partner Countries have also been offered the possibility of drawing up an ICP. In addition to their geographical scope, the ICI and MD differ in other features, too. The MD was founded in a context dominated by the Madrid Peace Conference (1991) and the Euro-Mediterranean Conference (1995), whereas the ICI was launched in a tense climate due to military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and the tension with Iran due to the nuclear crisis. This explains why the MD gives priority to the political dimension, while the ICI is more focused on practical cooperation, as well as why the MD envisages a bilateral and multilateral approach, while the ICI relies mainly on a bilateral format. It is worth mentioning that future developments in the ICI are expected to boost the political dimension of the cooperation by means of a multilateral NAC+4 format. Despite the different approaches, both initiatives share the same objective, namely, to improve cooperation and trust in the region. The ICI Group is in charge of proposing practical activities and supervises their implementation, in addition to assessing ICI Partners’ needs and adapting the cooperation accordingly. In terms of operational cooperation, attention should be drawn to the role of the UAE in Kosovo and Afghanistan and, recently, the participation of Qatar and the UAE in the NATO operation in Libya. Some experts argue that the ICI and the MD should merge; however, according to the Member Countries of both initiatives, a clear distinction should be kept in order to safeguard their specific geographical and geopolitical features. Furthermore, ICI countries insist that they are not prepared to sit at the same table with Israel (an MD country) until a solution can be found for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Within the framework of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, which brings together legislators from Member Country parliaments, the increasing attention given to security in the Mediterranean region led to the creation, in 1996, of the NATO-PA Mediterranean and Middle East Special Group (GSM from the French). The GSM is a forum for cooperation and discussion with the parliaments of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region focussed on political, economic, social and security issues. In 2004-2005, the Assembly decided to reinforce its relations with the region’s parliaments by creating the new status of Mediterranean Associate Member, thereby opening the door for increased cooperation with MENA parliaments (Algeria, Israel, Morocco and Jordan have all appointed their delegations as Associate Members.)

Chronology of the Main Events: January 2010 – December 2010

• 25 January, Rabat (Morocco): NATO Deputy Secretary General Amb. Bisogniero delivers a keynote speech at the conference “The Mediterranean Dialogue and the New Strategic Concept of NATO: Seize the Moment for an Enhanced and Reinforced Mediterranean Dialogue.” Opinion leaders, senior scholars, academicians and officials attend the meeting. During the visit, the Deputy Secretary General also holds meetings with senior government officials in charge of NATO-Morocco cooperation.

• 8-9 February, Doha (Qatar): Amb. Bisogniero travels to Qatar to take part in the workshop “Cooperation in the Framework of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative,” which gathers together opinion leaders, academics and officials from both the ICI and MD countries.

• 16-17 February, Brussels (Belgium): High-level policymakers from Egypt visit NATO headquarters. During the visit, important topics are discussed, such as: NATO’s transformation and outreach in the Mediterranean and Middle East, military cooperation under the MD, the fight against terrorism, relations with Russia, scientific cooperation and civil emergency planning.

• 7 March, Amman (Jordan): NATO Secretary General Rasmussen visits an MD country for the first time, holding bilateral talks with the King, the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister. He also delivers the speech “NATO, the Mediterranean and the Broader Middle East,” in which he underlines the constant progress in NATO-Jordan cooperation.

• 7-8 March, Manama (Bahrain): The NATO Secretary General pays his first official visit and holds talks with the King and senior officials, underlining the strategic importance of the ICI partnership with regard to facing common threats and challenges, such as: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), energy security and piracy.

• 25-26 March, Brussels (Belgium): Members of the Egyptian scientific community visit NATO headquarters and discuss scientific cooperation with NATO under the Science for Peace and Security Programme, as well as military cooperation under the MD.

• 26-29 April, Palestine/Israel: The NATO-PA GSM travels to the Palestinian Territories and Israel to meet members of the Palestinian Legislative Council and the Knesset to discuss NATO’s role in the region and learn more about the critical issues in the region, including the peace process.

• 20 May, Brussels (Belgium): A delegation of women from the Jordanian Armed Forces visits NATO headquarters and holds talks with the Deputy Secretary General and other officials from the MD&ICI Countries Section. The topics discussed include NATO’s transformation and the Strategic Concept, cooperation with Jordan under the MD and gender perspectives in defence forces.

• 26 May, Brussels (Belgium): The NATO Public Diplomacy Division organises a visit to NATO headquarters by high-level opinion leaders from Tunisia. The visit comes a couple of weeks after the Tunisian Foreign Affairs Minister pays a visit to NATO. The topics discussed during the visit include NATO’s transformation and outreach in the Mediterranean and cooperation with Tunisia under the Science for Peace and Security Programme.
7-8 June, Brussels (Belgium): High-level officials from Morocco visit NATO headquarters. The topics discussed include, as usual, NATO’s transformation and cooperation under the MD, as well as the ICP, transformation of armed forces, intelligence sharing, the fight against terrorism and civil emergency planning.

21 June, Nouakchott (Mauritania): The Deputy Secretary General gives a speech at the seminar “The Cooperation between NATO and Mauritania in the Framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue.” The NATO-Mauritania ICP is also presented. The document will tailor the cooperation in a more focused way.

27-28 June, Rome (Italy): At the seminar held by the NATO-PA GSM, the main topics of discussion are: maritime security and piracy, immigration and security, and energy interdependence in the Mediterranean region.

28 June, Brussels (Belgium): The NATO Secretary General meets journalists from MD and ICI countries to discuss topics such as NATO’s Strategic Concept and the Mediterranean, NATO’s current political agenda and NATO operations.

7 October, Brussels (Belgium): Italy, Luxembourg and the USA launch the NATO Trust Fund with Mauritania, which will help to destroy obsolete and unserviceable munitions, enhance specialised personnel skills and provide training and reintegration of military personnel returning to civilian life.

18 October, Brussels (Belgium): High-level opinion leaders from the UAE visit NATO headquarters and meet with NATO officials, discussing, among other topics, NATO’s Strategic Concept, the fight against terrorism and military operations.

4-5 November and 11 November, Brussels: Opinion leaders from Israel and Morocco, respectively, visit NATO headquarters to discuss NATO’s Strategic Concept and transformation, its current operations and its outreach in the Mediterranean and Middle East region.

For further information:
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52927.htm
Mediterranean Dialogue
www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52956.htm
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHOR TCUT=149
NATO PA Mediterranean Special Group
www.ndc.nato.int/
NATO Defence College

2. Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation in the OSCE

Since the beginning of the Helsinki Process, the OSCE has cultivated special relations with six Mediterranean countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. The OSCE dialogue and joint activities with the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation (MPCs) are based on the strong conviction that the security of Europe and the security of the Mediterranean are interdependent. This inter-linkage, enshrined in the Mediterranean Chapter of the Helsinki Final Act, has been underscored in subsequent OSCE meetings and documents. At the 35th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and the 20th anniversary of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 2010, the 56 OSCE Participating States recommitted themselves to the principles and values on which the organisation is based. They reaffirmed the inextricable link between security in Europe and security in adjacent regions and their support for a comprehensive approach to security with three dimensions: politico-military, economic and environmental, and human. As part of the comprehensive approach to security, the domain of collaboration includes various topics spanning all three dimensions: transport, energy security, racism and discrimination, migration, terrorism and good governance. The participation of the MPCs in OSCE summits, conferences and special events provides a broad framework for such cooperation. They are regularly invited to attend OSCE Ministerial Council, Permanent Council and Forum for Security Cooperation meetings as observers. An informal Contact Group with the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation has been set up within the framework of the Permanent Council in order to facilitate the exchange of information and ideas. MPCs moreover actively participate in the Annual Security Review Conference, the Economic Forum, the Human Dimension Implementation Meeting, the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting and the Annual and Winter Sessions of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA). Regular annual meetings are also held between the MPCs and the OSCE Troika and OSCE Secretary General. Since 2010, following the decision of the Athens Ministerial Council, the MPCs have been invited to contribute on an ad hoc basis to the Corfu Process. The political dialogue is moreover complemented by practical work. In particular, the OSCE’s expertise is used to promote the OSCE’s values, facilitate the exchange of good practices and, when so requested, assist the MPCs in implementing their OSCE commitments. Observers from MPCs can participate in the OSCE election observation missions organised by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and mission members can attend OSCE field operations. They are encouraged to participate in OSCE confidence-and security-building measures (CSBMs) and to contribute financially to extra-budgetary projects. In 2010, under Kazakhstan’s Chairmanship, OSCE cooperation with the MPCs focused on the peace process in the Middle East and the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. At the end of the year, Lithuania succeeded Kazakhstan in the Chairmanship of the OSCE.

Mediterranean Contact Group

According to a statement by the Lithuanian Ambassador Renatas Norkus, Chairman of the Contact Group, the year 2010 is marked by intense and significant cooperation activities, as well as genuine discussions and new ideas for the advancement of the Mediterranean Partnership. Efforts to ensure continuity with previous years’ work are made especially in the domain of border management, the fight against terrorism, environmental challenges and human resources. Six thematic meetings are held during 2010 with special focus on CSBMs, border security and management, migration management, tolerance and non-discrimination, gender issues and security. At the annual meeting of the Asian and Mediterranean Contact Groups, participants exchange views and opinions on the outcomes of recent events and discuss issues related to...
terrorism and the protection of human rights.

19th Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

6-10 July, Oslo (Norway): The theme of the meeting is “Rule of law: combating transnational crime and corruption.” The Assembly adopts the Oslo Declaration, which contains resolutions on issues ranging from the situation in Kyrgyzstan to the PA’s involvement in the Corfu Process, the peace process in the Middle East, nuclear security, cyber crime, the situation in the Arctic, the right of return of internally displaced persons, investigative journalism and the death penalty. Among the supplementary items debated by the General Committee on Political Affairs and Security, the peace process in the Middle East is given particular attention. According to the resolution adopted, it is essential to eliminate access and movement limitations that impede trade and to expand the scope and volume of goods that can enter and leave Gaza for trade and humanitarian purposes. The General Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and the Environment debates a range of different topics related to the Mediterranean dimension, including cooperation on energy security and climate change. Alice L. Hastings submits a resolution focused on three points: initiating a dialogue with the UfM and other international organisations, encouraging MPCs to participate in OSCE election observation missions and encouraging them to invite OSCE and other observation missions to their elections.

OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Fall Meetings – Mediterranean Forum

8-11 October, Palermo (Italy): Each year the OSCE PA holds a set of Fall Meetings to enhance inter-parliamentary dialogue on important topics related to OSCE commitments and values. During the Fall Meetings, a Mediterranean Forum takes place. In October 2010, over 200 parliamentarians from 50 countries attend the event. Delegates from the parliaments of Israel, Algeria and Morocco and from the National Palestinian Council participate in the sessions on economic and infrastructure cooperation in the Mediterranean Basin and on cultural and environmental cooperation as an expression of Mediterranean civilisation. Over the course of the first session, participants focus on: the importance of the Mediterranean dimension, including the peace process in the Middle East, with special emphasis on the need to increase dialogue among political and social actors; the homogenisation of transport regulations in the Mediterranean as key to transport infrastructure development; the crucial role of prevention, mutual knowledge and experience-sharing to enhance Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation in the field of civil protection; and the importance of free trade as a vital precursor to free civil discourse, civil society and the rule of law. The second session begins with a speech by the Lithuanian representative and Chair of the Mediterranean Contact Group, who reports on the implementation of projects in the three priority areas for the OSCE Partners, namely, water management, border security and human resources, and invites new countries to join the Partnership. With regard to this issue, it is worth noting that a consensus has not yet been reached among all Participating and Partner States on the application of the Palestinian Authority for Partner State status. Finally, the representative of the Conference of Italian Universities expresses the need to set education and culture at the core of the political agenda in order to emphasise the common patterns of Mediterranean culture that make it a unique geopolitical expression. At the end of the Forum, participants discuss national initiatives to invest in the Mediterranean, in particular, in school, university and cultural exchanges, and highlight the importance of water and energy as fundamental resources of the people of the Mediterranean.

www.oscepa.org/

OSCE Mediterranean Conference

14-15 October, La Valletta (Malta): The conference, entitled “The Dialogue on the Future of European Security – A Mediterranean Perspective,” addresses several topics, including OSCE experience in CSBMs, fostering security and stability by dealing with economic and environmental challenges, and promoting tolerance and non-discrimination. The Conference brings together representatives from all the Mediterranean Partners, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and non-governmental organisations. The opening ceremony focuses on the implications of the situation in the Middle East for security in the Mediterranean and beyond, reaffirming the close links between Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Participants have the opportunity to lay out their concerns and visions of a pan-European security community integrating the Mediterranean region and to identify new opportunities for cooperation. The first session is aimed at discussing ways and means of involving the Mediterranean Partners in CSBMs and arms-control regimes, including the politico-military dimension, as well as coordinating disaster preparedness, cooperation on peacekeeping operations, border management, maritime rescue and the prevention of organised crime. Despite its importance, the implementation of CSBMs is hampered by two factors: the absence of a lasting peace and the fact that the MPCs are not Participating States and therefore implement OSCE standards on a voluntary basis only. Participants also debate the inclusion of the PNA among the Mediterranean Partners and consider that PNA participation could have positive consequences for an open dialogue and cooperation on CSBMs. The second session addresses economic and environmental challenges, such as increasing desertification, dwindling water resources, significant demographic pressure and climate change, in particular, rising temperatures and aridity. Participants stress the importance of finding solutions to these challenges in order to facilitate cooperation and contribute to improving stability. The third session is opened by Ranieri Fsadni, Director of Operations of the European Commission-Arab League Liaison Office in Malta, speaking about multicultural societies and intercultural dialogue. Participants advocate increasing the resources provided to the ODIHR and draw attention to the importance of cooperating with other international organisations, such as the Council of Europe, the Alliance of Civilisations, the UfM, the League of Arab States and UNESCO. The closing session
OSCE Summit

1-2 December, Astana (Kazakhstan): Eleven years after the last OSCE Summit in Istanbul, the OSCE Heads of State and Government gather in Astana to commemorate the 35th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and the 20th anniversary of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. At the Summit, the participants adopt a Commemorative Declaration, which recommits the 56 OSCE Participating States to the vision of a free, democratic, common and indivisible Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security community. Representatives also recognise the need to enhance the level of interaction with Mediterranean and Asian Partners for Cooperation. The Declaration highlights the importance of the OSCE as the most comprehensive regional security organisation in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area for promoting open dialogue, preventing and settling conflicts, building mutual understanding and fostering cooperation. The OSCE Participating States reiterate that their first priority is to protect and promote human rights as fundamental elements at the core of comprehensive security. They recognise the inextricable link in terms of security between Europe and the Mediterranean and Asian regions. This interdependence requires collaboration and interaction with the Partners and engagement to promote stability, prosperity and democracy in the adjacent areas and, in particular, in Afghanistan. As part of the Summit, the OSCE Troika meets with the Mediterranean Partners. The Israeli delegation points out that Israel will continue to defend itself by itself and, at the same time, seek a peaceful solution with the Palestinians and its Arab neighbours through negotiations. The Secretary of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) expresses gratitude for the invitation to participate at the OSCE Summit. He emphasises the similarities between the goals and objectives of the OSCE and those of the OIC, including combating terrorism and extremism, seeking a just and lasting solution to the Palestinian question, upholding respect for human rights and good governance, conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict peace building. He reiterates the call made at the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna for vast cooperation between the OIC and OSCE to promote international peace, security and development. The Moroccan delegation expresses its appreciation to the Kazakh Chairmanship for its efforts at the Vienna and Astana meetings to enhance OSCE cooperation with the Mediterranean Partners and reiterates the need to implement the agenda established at the Mediterranean meetings, including cooperation on terrorism, migration, human trafficking and other forms of organised crime, and environmental challenges affecting security. The common fight against these challenges should take into consideration the root causes of regional conflicts, arms proliferation, socio-economic marginalisation, poverty, extremism, intolerance and xenophobia. The Kingdom of Morocco supports dialogue among civilisations and rejects extremist ideologies. It is also in favour of granting the status of Mediterranean Partner to Palestine as a strong signal on the path towards peace in the Mediterranean region. The President of the Republic of Turkey points out the need to address security and stability in Afghanistan to achieve security and stability in all Central Asia. He also highlights the importance of continuing to pursue beneficial actions in Southeast Europe because of its recent tragic past. The head of the Algerian delegation calls for the reduction of the socio-economic imbalance between the two shores of the Mediterranean and the promotion of sustainable development and disarmament and non-proliferation. Finally, he expresses his support for improving the operation of the Mediterranean Contact Group and extending the OSCE Partnership to the PNA. The Tunisian delegation’s speech focuses on the urgent need to intensify concerted action and to increase synergies in order to address major challenges such as terrorism, violence and intolerance in the midst of an international economic and financial crisis. In this regard, the peace process in the Middle East is a priority, as is tackling the causes of terrorism. As terrorism and extremism flourish in environments characterised by marginalisation, exclusion and poverty, greater international mobilisation is required. Cooperation on the human dimension should be enhanced, including the promotion of dialogue and spreading the values of moderation, open-mindedness and tolerance, particularly with regard to young people. The Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs begins his speech highlighting the interdependence of European and Mediterranean security. He reiterates Egypt’s strong support for granting Mediterranean Partner status to the PNA and the fact that negotiations are only a means to reach the real aim of ending Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and implementing the two-state solution through the establishment of a Palestinian State with East Jerusalem as its capital and borders based on the 1967 lines. The Egyptian Minister also addresses the issue of disarmament and non-proliferation, calling for the creation of a Nuclear Free Zone in the Middle East and an end to the practice of double standards. He likewise expresses concern in the area of tolerance and non-discrimination and asks for a more holistic and balanced approach, calling upon countries to assume their responsibility to propagate a culture of tolerance. The head of the Maltese delegation stresses the importance of working more closely with the Mediterranean Partners to tackle new challenges such as climate change, WMDs, terrorism, organised crime and migration. To this end, a leading contribution by other actors is required, in particular, the European Union and NATO. The Platform for Cooperative Security agreed in Istanbul in 1999 provides the right framework but should be extended to regional and sub-regional actors from outside the OSCE region. Dr Anthony Borg, Deputy Prime Minister...
and Minister of Foreign Affairs, also re-
iterates the Maltese commitment to full
respect for human rights, fundamental
freedoms, democracy and the rule of
law as the core of a comprehensive
concept of security.

http://summit2010.osce.org/

OSCE Ministerial Troika Meeting with
the MPCs

1-2 December, Astana (Kazakhstan):
The annual meeting between the OSCE
Ministerial Troika and the MPCs takes
place on the margins of the Astana
Summit with the participation of the
OSCE Secretary General and the PA.
Participants stress the importance of
the Mediterranean Partnership to tackle
common threats, such as terrorism, cy-
ber crime and human trafficking. They
assess the status of the dialogue and
submit proposals to enhance coopera-
tion and ensure common security. The
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania
and Chair of the Mediterranean Contact
Group presents a number of proposals
for further cooperation, including the
exchange of best practices and the in-
volved of civil society and academia.
It is also proposed that the Contact
Group’s work be oriented towards con-
crete projects and draft decisions to be
submitted to the OSCE’s decision-
making bodies. Some participants
stress the potential value of granting
Partnership status to Palestine and of
enhanced interaction with other regional
initiatives and organisations (the EU,
NATO and the League of Arab States).
Ireland will chair the Contact Group in
2011.

3. The 5+5 Dialogue

The 5+5 Dialogue is a forum for informal
discussion between the countries of the
northern and southern shores of the
Western Mediterranean. The 5+5 Dia-
logue was launched in Rome in October
1990 in order to promote effective con-
sultation among the Foreign Affairs Min-
isters of the 10 participating countries:
Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta
on the one hand and Morocco, Mauri-
tania, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, the five
countries of the Arab Maghreb Union
(AMU), on the other. Its main aim is to
serve as a laboratory of ideas and a
forum to deal with regional problems
through a comprehensive approach,
taking into account the growing inter-
dependence of factors and issues.
Thanks to its flexible and informal char-
acter, it has become progressively more
open and over the years ministers and
senior officials have met on an increas-
ing number of topics. In fact, the Dia-
logue was initially a political commit-
ment between Foreign Affairs Ministers
only but has since been gradually ex-
panded to encompass other spheres,
too, including: home affairs (since
1995), migration (since 2002), inter-
parliamentary relations (since 2003),
defence (since 2004), tourism (since
2006) and transport (since 2007).

Main Meetings in 2010

• 15-16 April, Gammarth (Tunisia): 8th
meeting of the 5+5 Dialogue Foreign
Affairs Ministers under the co-chair-
manship of Tunisia and Spain. The Ministers
renew the commitment to the values of
democracy, solidarity and cooperation
discuss different regional and inter-
national issues. With regard to the Mid-
dle East and the peace process, they
reiterate the urgency of implementing a
two-state solution and criticise Israel’s
settlement policy, considering it an ob-
stacle to peace. They affirm the convic-
tion that a lasting peace can only be
achieved if an overall settlement is also
reached with regard to the Syrian-Israe-
li and Lebanese-Israeli conflicts. Other
relevant topics discussed at the meeting
are: the reform of the international finan-
cial sector, food security, the UfM, tour-
ism, higher education and scientific
research, SMEs and the climate. With
regard to this latter topic, the creation
of a Euro-Mediterranean agency for the
eco-system and coastline protection is
proposed. The Ministers agree to set up
a follow-up committee tasked with pre-
paring the annual meeting and following
up on its recommendations. The next
Foreign Affairs meeting will be held in
Italy.

• 26-27 April, Oran (Algeria): 1st Min-
isterial Conference on the Environment
and Renewable Energy, co-chaired by
Algeria and Spain. Participants ac-
knowledge the importance of good
management of drinking water and ac-
cess to it; reaffirm the importance of
combating marine pollution; recognise
the interdependence of climate change,
desertification and diminishing biologi-
cal diversity; and call for stronger coop-
eration in the fields of natural disaster
prevention and rescue. Other issues ad-
dressed include: waste management
and resources, protection of the coast-
line and integrated management of
coastal areas, the Mediterranean Solar
Plan, and electricity interconnections.
The 2nd Ministerial Conference will be
held in Portugal.

www.pap-thecoastcentre.org/razno/
declaration_Oran.pdf

• 13 December, Tripoli (Libya): The 7th
Ministerial Conference on Migration in
the Western Mediterranean is held fol-
lowing a two-day meeting prepared by
high-ranking officials and experts. The
meeting is attended by the Ministers
responsible for migration, as well as
observers from the International Or-
ganisation for Migration (IOM) and the
UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UN-
ODC). The experts prepare a document
that provides for the establishment of
development projects in the migrants’
countries of origin, creating labour mar-
kets and increasing production to en-
courage potential migrants to stay in
their home countries. The experts em-
phasise the importance of coordination
between 5+5 Dialogue Member Coun-
tries to reduce illegal migration and its
relationship to the development of or-
ganised crime and the growth of crimi-
nal networks, which are active in the
smuggling of migrants. The Ministers
also call for the reactivation of the Fol-
low-Up Committee on Migration in order
to implement the Ministerial Meeting
recommendations.

www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/
shared/mainSite/microsites/rcps/
5+5/7th-Ministerial-Conference-Migra-
tion-Ministerial-Conclusions-Tripoli-
December-2010.pdf

• 1-2 December, La Valette (Malta):
6th Meeting of Defence Ministers. The
5+5 Defence Initiative is made up of 10 Western Mediterranean countries. Established on 21st December 2004, when the Defence Ministers of the Member States concerned met in Paris and signed the Declaration of Intent, the Initiative establishes an annual Action Plan that includes the practical actions on security issues to be carried out over the year. A Steering Committee, composed of two representatives of the Ministers of Defence of each nation, oversees the implementation of the Action Plan. The activities of the Action Plan cover the four areas of maritime surveillance, armed forces’ contribution to civil protection, air security, and education and training. Although Malta turns over the presidency of the group to Mauritania, the Ministers agree to convene a second summit in Malta.


4. Adriatic and Ionian Initiative (AII)

The Adriatic and Ionian Initiative (AII) dates back to the Summit on Development and Security in the Adriatic and Ionian held in Ancona (Italy) in 2000. The Initiative was formally launched by the Foreign Ministers of Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy and Slovenia, who adopted the Ancona Declaration in the presence of the European Commission. Two years later, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) joined the Initiative. Later, in 2007, after the Republic’s dissolution, Serbia and Montenegro appeared in the AII as independent States. Initially, the AII was primarily intended as a means of strengthening regional cooperation among coastal countries in order to foster common solutions to common problems related to security and stability (especially in the Balkan region). The geopolitical context of the region deeply changed over the years: Slovenia joined the EU in 2004, Croatia is about to join, and the other four countries – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia – are proceeding towards EU integration, albeit at different paces. In this context, one of the AII’s main goals is specifically to support the prospects for European integration of its non-EU Member Countries.

The Chairmanship of the AII rotates every six months in alphabetical order: Italy took over from Greece in June 2009, and Montenegro assumed the Chairmanship in June 2010. The AII’s decision-making body is the Adriatic-Ionian Council, composed of the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the participating countries. Its agenda is prepared during the Senior Official Meetings held three times a year. Important functions are also carried out by the AII’s Permanent Secretariat, established in 2008 in Ancona, whose main purpose is to ensure continuity between one Chairmanship and the next, to make the Initiative more “project-oriented” and to gather Member Countries’ proposals.

The Initiative also works in partnership with other initiatives operating in Southeast Europe: the Central European Initiative (CEI), the Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Co-operation (BSEC) and the Danube Co-operation Process (DCP). Over the course of 2010, strengthened collaboration was undertaken with the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), focusing on common interests in the coastal and maritime environment and leading to a joint All-CBSS workshop on cooperation in sustainable development and civil-society dialogue. This close cooperation with the CBSS should be useful in terms of exploiting the Baltic Council’s know-how with regard to launching the process to create an Adriatic-Ionian Macro-Region (accordingly, the CBSS was invited to participate in the All Council). The region spanning from the Black Sea to the Danube to the Baltic is the subject of a specific EU strategy. In this sense, the AII’s strategy is to accelerate its members’ collaboration in order to submit a proposal for an Adriatic-Ionian Macro-Region to Brussels. The Adriatic-Ionian Basin has similarities with the Baltic region, as they both include landlocked seas and serve as a sort of hinge between non-EU and EU Member States. Moreover, to a certain extent the Adriatic-Ionian Basin seems to be the natural maritime outlet for the Danube region.

The AII is active in multiple fields, normally through technical round tables made up of experts from each Member Country. The main fields of interest are: small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), tourism, rural development, cultural and university cooperation, the environment and fire protection.

Main Events under the Italian Chairmanship

The main aims of the Italian Chairmanship were to strengthen the Initiative’s project-oriented approach, to consolidate the European prospects of the AII’s non-EU Member States, to enhance the relations between the AII and other regional organisations and to foster the AII’s parliamentary dimension.

• 27-28 January, Ancona (Italy): At the second meeting of the All Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) under the Italian Chairmanship, a member of the EU Committee of Regions gives a presentation on “EU Strategies for Macro-Regions.” The creation of an Adriatic-Ionian Macro-Region would offer the opportunity to better exploit existing EU funds and foster regional cooperation, in addition to allowing the AII to capitalise on ten years of experience. The EU has already approved the Baltic Macro-Region, while the Danube region is under approval. When requesting the establishment of a macro-region, it is important to show that the relevant governments are working in synergy at all levels and to include the full panorama of regional networks, associations and institutions. In a subsequent meeting on “European Macro-Regions,” the Italian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs identifies some of the strategy’s operational sectors: conservation of the environment, territorial development, improvement of accessibility and communications. The Italian delegation also presents the state of play of the protocols on tourism and SMEs and proposes two new areas of cooperation: rural development and underwater archaeology.

• 11 February, Verona (Italy): The All Member States sign a Cooperation Protocol on Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), aimed at defining a common vision to foster the creation and development of SMEs in the Adriatic-Ionian Basin. To this end, they consider the following issues to be strategic: the exchange of best practices, the establishment of a set of services specifically for SMEs and support for female entrepreneurship.
• 1 March, Rome (Italy): The Italian strategy for the year aims to expand the All’s cooperation on rural development in order to propose at the next CSO meeting that it be included in the existing All round tables. Consequently, an Ad-hoc Round Table on Rural Development is held. The Serbian representative takes advantage of the occasion to present the Regional Rural Development Standing Working Group (SWG), a platform for the exchange of information and data on rural development in Southeast Europe that could be an instrument for fostering cooperation in this field.

• 21 and 22 April, Trieste (Italy): The Round Table on Transport and Maritime Cooperation brings together 19 representatives from the relevant authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Montenegro and Slovenia to discuss ways and methods to strengthen cooperation on maritime issues. The aims of the meeting are to lay the basis for the exchange of experiences related to the protection of national maritime transport systems so as to ensure safety and security and protect the marine environment.

• 5 May, Ancona (Italy): At the 12th Adriatic and Ionian Council, which coincides with the 10th Anniversary of the Adriatic and Ionian Initiative, the Foreign Ministers of the All Participating States adopt the Ancona Declaration, renewing their commitment to the Initiative. They underline the progress achieved towards the European integration of all Members of the Initiative and affirm the need to accelerate the process of visa liberalisation for Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina. They recognise as All priorities: SMEs; transport and maritime cooperation; tourism; cultural and university cooperation; the environment and protection against fire; and agriculture and rural development. The participants also adopt the Declaration of the Adriatic-Ionian Council on the Support to the EU Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region, affirming their readiness to engage in it.

Main Events under the Montenegrin Chairmanship

• 28 June, Podgorica (Montenegro): At the 1st All Committee of Senior Officials, the Montenegrin Chairmanship’s priorities are presented: continuity of the work begun during the Italian Chairmanship, giving follow-up to those protocols that have already been signed, completing the signature of others that are currently underway, and giving support to the macro-region project under the three conditions required by the UE (no new funds, no new structures, no new legislation). Montenegro is chairing three initiatives at the same time (the All, the Central European Initiative (CEI), and the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP)) and wants to take advantage of this fact to strengthen the synergies among them and avoid overlap.

• 12 November, Podgorica (Montenegro): In the Sub-table on Tourism, during the Round Table on Tourism, Culture and Inter-University Cooperation, participants propose initiatives to present the Adriatic-Ionian Basin as an integrated tourist destination, ensure sustainability and eco-tourism in the region, and improve vocational education in the field of tourism.

• 15 December, Podgorica (Montenegro): The main topics at the Round Table on Maritime Cooperation are: prevention of pollution, short-sea shipping and motorways of the sea. With regard to this last topic, experts from the participating countries agree to focus on projects that will provide alternatives to land transport, thereby eliminating some of the traffic on the mainland. To this end, it is necessary to strengthen cooperation and communication among All Member Countries.

For further information:
www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Politica_Estera/Aree_Geografiche/Europa/Balcani/IAI.htm
www.aii-ps.org
This chapter provides details of the results of presidential and legislative elections that took place in 2010 in independent states, presented in circum-Mediterranean order. The list also includes referenda and those elections held in autonomous entities or in any other relevant territory that are of particular political significance.

Slovenia
Referendum
6 June 2010
The referendum was held on an agreement to bring the border dispute with Croatia before an international arbitration tribunal.
The official wording was:
Do you support the implementation of the Law on the Ratification of the Arbitration Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Slovenia and the Government of the Republic of Croatia, which was adopted by the Slovenian Parliament at its session of 19 April 2010, becoming valid?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>51.54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>48.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout</td>
<td>42.66%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Croatia
Presidential Elections
27 December 2009 and 10 January 2010
Previous elections: 25 November 2007
Since 2000 Croatia has been a parliamentary republic. The President is elected to a five-year term by an absolute majority.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>% 1st round</th>
<th>% 2nd round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ivo Josipovic (SDP, Social Democratic Party of Croatia)</td>
<td>32.42</td>
<td>60.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milan Bandic (Independent)</td>
<td>14.83</td>
<td>39.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrija Hebrang (HDZ, Croatian Democratic Union)</td>
<td>12.04</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadan Vidošević (Independent)</td>
<td>11.33</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vesna Pusic (HNS, Croatian People’s Party, Liberal Democrats)</td>
<td>7.25</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dragan Primorac (Independent)</td>
<td>5.93</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miroslav Tudjman (Independent)</td>
<td>4.09</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damir Kajin (IDS, Istrian Democratic Assembly)</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josip Jurčević (Independent)</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boris Miksic (Independent)</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vesna Skare-Ozbolt (Independent)</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slavko Vučis (Democratic Party of Slavonia Plain)</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 43.96% (1st round), 50.13% (2nd round)

Bosnia and Herzegovina
Parliamentary and Presidential Elections
3 October 2010
Previous elections: 1 October 2006
The parliamentary republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina comprises the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Federacija Bosne i Hercegovine), which covers the Bosniak and Croatian areas, and the Serbian Republic (Republika Srpska). Bosnia and Herzegovina has a bicameral legislature, consisting of the House of Representatives (Zastupnički Dom), which has 42 members elected for four-year terms by proportional representation from the two federal entities (28+14), and the House of Peoples (Dom Naroda), consisting of 15 members appointed by the federal entities. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a three-member Presidency, elected by direct universal suffrage for a four-year term. The three members of the Presidency are elected by and represent the three ethnic communities. The post of Chairman of the Presidency rotates among the three members every eight months.

Parliamentary Elections - House of Representatives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SDP)</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Action (SDA)</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for a Better Future (SBB)</td>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBH)</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ-1990)</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Party Work for Betterment (NSRB)</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic People’s Community (DNZ)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Seats for the Serbian Republic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD)</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Progress (PDP)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Democratic People’s Alliance (DNS) 4.6 1
Party of Democratic Action (SDA) 2.6 0
Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBH) 2 0

Turnout: 56.49%

Presidential Elections

Serbian Candidates %
Nebojsa Radmanovic (SNSD) 48.9
Mladen Ivanic (KZS) 47.3
Rajko Papovic (SDS) 3.8

Bosnian Candidates %
Bakir Izetbegovic (SDA) 34.9
Fahrudin Radonic (SBB) 30.5
Haris Silajdzic (SBH) 25.1
Ibrahim Dedovic (DNZ) 2.9
Mujo Demirovic (BPS) 1.9
Dzemal Latic (A-SDA) 1.9
Ibrahim Spahic (GDS) 0.9
Aida Jusic 0.5

Croatian Candidates %
Zeljko Komsic (SDP) 60.6
Borjana Kristo (HDZ) 19.7
Martin Raguz (HDZ-1990) 10.8
Janko Ivankovic-Lijanovic (NSRzB) 8.2
Pero Galic 0.3
Mile Kute 0.2
Ferdo Galic 0.2

Turkey
Referendum

12 September 2010
The referendum concerns a package of amendments to the 1982 Constitution. The revision significantly changes the balance of power in Turkey by making the military more accountable to civilian courts and giving Parliament a say in appointing judges. The reforms increase rights to personal privacy and curtail the power of military courts, removing their authority to try civilians in peacetime. Article 15, which prevents military coup leaders from facing trial or legal reprisal, is repealed. The number of Constitutional Court members is expanded from 15 to 17. Three are appointed by Parliament while the President nominates the rest. The amendments include greater protection for workers, the recognition of unions and the right to strike; collective bargaining rights are extended to government employees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-government independents</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition parties</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 53.0%

Egypt
Legislative Elections

Egypt has a bicameral Parliament consisting of the Advisory Council (Majlis al-Shura) with 264 seats and the People’s Assembly (Majlis al-Shaab) with 518 seats. In the Advisory Council 176 members are elected by an absolute majority vote in a two-round system to serve 6-year terms, while 88 members are appointed by the President, also to serve 6-year terms. Every three years 88 elected members and 44 appointed members are changed. In the People’s Assembly, 508 members are elected by absolute majority vote through a two-round system to serve 5-year terms (64 seats are reserved for women) and 10 members are appointed by the President.

1-8 June 2010
Previous elections: June 2007

Advisory Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1st round</th>
<th>2nd round</th>
<th>Total seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Party (NDP)</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Progressive Unionist Party (Tagammu’)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomorrow Party (al-Ghad, Centrist-liberal)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Democratic Nasserist Party</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Generation Party (al-Geel)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents (other)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents (Muslim Brotherhood)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appointees 44

Turnout: first round 30.8%, second round 14%

Jordan
Legislative Elections

9 November 2010
Previous elections: 20 November 2007
Parliamentary monarchy with bicameral legislature. The National Assembly (Majlis al-Umma) consists of two houses, the Chamber of Deputies (Majlis al-Nuwaab) and the Assembly of Senators (Majlis al-Aayan). The latter has 60 members appointed by the King. The new electoral law increased the number of members of the Chamber of Deputies from 110 to 120. The deputies are chosen as follows: 108 seats are filled from single-seat constituencies and 12 are reserved for women by a special electoral college. Additionally nine seats are reserved for Christians and three for Chechens/Circassians. The country’s system of civil and political rights is not free, according to Freedom House. The main opposition, the Islamic Action Front, boycotted the elections. The majority of candidates are independent, although most are members of indigenous tribes who are loyal to the King.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-government independents</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition parties</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 53.0%

Northern Cyprus (Republic of Turkey)
Presidential Elections

18 April 2010
Previous elections: 17 April 2005
Voters elect a President to a 5-year term of office.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidates</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dervis Eroglu (UBP, Party of National Unity)</td>
<td>50.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mehmet Ali Talat (CTP, Republican Turkish Party)</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahsin Ertugruloglu</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mustafa Kemal Tumkan</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeki Besiktepe</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arif Salah Kirdag</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayhan Kaymak</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 76.36%
**Parliamentary Elections**

28 November and 5 December 2010
Previous elections: 9 and 20 November and 1 December 2005

**People’s Assembly**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Party (NDP)</td>
<td>81% 420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents (includes one Muslim Brotherhood member whose membership was suspended by the organisation; many other independents are affiliated with the NDP)</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Wafd Party (NWP, nationalist liberal)</td>
<td>1.1% 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Progressive Unionist Party (Tagammu)</td>
<td>0.9% 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tomorrow Party (al-Ghad)</td>
<td>0.2% 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Justice Party</td>
<td>0.2% 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Generation Party (al-Geel)</td>
<td>0.2% 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Peace Party</td>
<td>0.2% 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents (Muslim Brotherhood)</td>
<td>0.2% 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nasserist Party</td>
<td>0.0% 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfilled vacancies (due to the invalidation of four races by the Higher Electoral Commission)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: first round 34.95%, second round 27.47%

**Sources**

- Adam Carr’s Election Archive [http://psephos.adam-carr.net](http://psephos.adam-carr.net)
- Freedom House [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)
- Keesing’s Record of World Events [www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com)
- Observatorio electoral TEIM [www.observatorioelectoral.es](http://www.observatorioelectoral.es)
- Parline Database [www.ipu.org/parline/parlinesearch.asp](http://www.ipu.org/parline/parlinesearch.asp)
### TABLE A1

Official Aid to Mediterranean Countries Financed under the European Commission Budget and the European Development Fund (EDF) in 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Payments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>139.04</td>
<td>93.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>111.26</td>
<td>54.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>185.42</td>
<td>221.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>31.29</td>
<td>11.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia (FYROM)</td>
<td>77.89</td>
<td>39.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>82.14</td>
<td>51.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>533.26</td>
<td>571.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>48.78</td>
<td>43.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>48.19</td>
<td>52.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>68.03</td>
<td>60.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>3.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territory</td>
<td>399.78</td>
<td>386.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>140.03</td>
<td>147.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>77.03</td>
<td>77.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>46.58</td>
<td>59.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>146.08</td>
<td>203.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>2.09</td>
<td>25.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### CHART A1

EU Cooperation 2009

### TABLE A2
**European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI): 2009 and 2010**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2009 (in millions of euros)</th>
<th>2010 (in millions of euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>68-</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank and Gaza*</td>
<td>353.6</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total ENPI (Bilateral)</strong></td>
<td><strong>901.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>940</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE A3
**Mediterranean Candidate Countries for Accession**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate Country</th>
<th>Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) 2009 (in millions of euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>151.2*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component I. Transition Assistance and Institution Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assumption of the obligations of membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component II Cross-border Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component III Regional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component IV Human Resources Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component V Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia (FYROM)</td>
<td>81.8*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component I. Transition Assistance and Institution Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Acquis communautaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Economic criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Priority-axis supporting programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component II Cross-border Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component III Regional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component IV Human Resources Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component V Rural Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>531.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component I. Transition Assistance and Institution Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Progress towards fully meeting the Copenhagen political criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adoption and implementation of the acquis communautaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Promotion of an EU-Turkey civil society dialogue</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Support activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component II Cross-border Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component III Regional Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component IV Human Resources Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Component V Rural Development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Total includes multi-beneficiary programmes.
### TABLE A4
**Provisions for Aid under the IPA for 2010 (Candidate and Potential Candidate Countries)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>154.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia (FYROM)</td>
<td>92.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>653.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>106.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>198.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo (Res. 1244 of the UNSC)</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-beneficiary programme</td>
<td>157.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE A5
**European Investment Bank Loans to Mediterranean Countries in 2009**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans by Sector</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Croatia</strong></td>
<td>415</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of 52 sections of trunk road with a total length of 687 km</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity participation in a fund focusing on small-scale energy efficiency projects in south-east Europe</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs or mid-cap companies</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bosnia and Herzegovina</strong></td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity participation in a fund focusing on small-scale energy efficiency projects in south-east Europe</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by small and micro enterprises</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Serbia</strong></td>
<td>896.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of six 220 or 400 kV electricity substations</td>
<td>24.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a motorway section in Pan-European Corridor X between Grabovnica and Levosoje in southern Serbia</td>
<td>384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a new Sava bridge and access roads in Belgrade</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale infrastructure projects</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity participation in a fund focusing on small-scale energy efficiency projects in south-east Europe</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale infrastructure projects</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lease financing of small and medium-scale infrastructure projects</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Montenegro</strong></td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of roads and bridges throughout the country</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of national sustainable waste management system</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity participation in a fund focusing on small-scale energy efficiency projects in south-east Europe</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Macedonia (FYROM)</strong></td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity participation in a fund focusing on small-scale energy efficiency projects in south-east Europe</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Albania</strong></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity participation in a fund focusing on small-scale energy efficiency projects in south-east Europe</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects through MLT loans</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong></td>
<td>2,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading and extension of national electricity distribution networks</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a 135 MW wind farm in the Osmaniye region (eastern Turkey)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of environmental and energy projects</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a high-speed railway line between Istanbul and Ankara</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and operation of a clinker production line in Ankara</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment in the academic research system of the Republic of Turkey</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity participation in a fund focusing on small-scale energy efficiency projects in south-east Europe</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects, with particular focus on small businesses</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lease financing of small and medium-scale projects</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Continue)
### TABLE A5  European Investment Bank Loans to Mediterranean Countries in 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Financing of small and medium-scale projects, mainly in the manufacturing and services sectors</th>
<th>Financing of small and medium-scale projects carried out by SMEs, primarily in the manufacturing and services sectors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Morocco</strong></td>
<td>540</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of two tramway lines between Rabat and Salé</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of the Rabat motorway bypass and widening of the Rabat-Casablanca motorway</td>
<td>225</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a low-cost vehicle manufacturing plant in the Melloussa free economic zone, 30 km from the port of Tangiers</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation in the 2009-2012 development plan for the education system</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tunisia</strong></td>
<td>434</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a toll motorway section from Sfax to Gabès in southern Tunisia</td>
<td>234</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of an airport near the town of Enfidha</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a phosphoric acid plant close to an existing plant (Skhira) near Gabès in southern Tunisia</td>
<td>130</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Egypt</strong></td>
<td>122</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-scale onshore wind farm on the Red Sea coast, south-east of Cairo, to supply the national power grid</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework loan for water supply and wastewater schemes in four governorates in the Nile Delta</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of a microfinance company based in the Dakahlia region</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lebanon</strong></td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a wastewater treatment plant, sewerage network and sea outfall in Tabarja, near Jounieh</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Syria</strong></td>
<td>154.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Framework loan for investment schemes in Syrian cities</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a cement plant on a greenfield site near Aleppo</td>
<td>104.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jordan</strong></td>
<td>165.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of a water extraction and transport system, including a 325 km pipeline, to supply drinking water, mainly to the Greater Amman area</td>
<td>165.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israel</strong></td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in the production capacity of the Hadera desalination plant</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDI in the field of specialty chemicals in several countries</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE A6  EU Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO)

#### Funding Decisions in Mediterranean Areas in 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Millions of euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>MENA</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>66.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Refugees (Lebanon, Jordan, Syria)</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Sahara (Sahrawi refugees)</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>86.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean

### TABLE B1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>€</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maghreb and Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>44,504,061</td>
<td>14.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>10,835,886</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>8,768,835</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>35,918,674</td>
<td>11.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>3,708</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>81,362,865</td>
<td>25.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>68,927,467</td>
<td>21.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Saharan Refugees</td>
<td>23,884,784</td>
<td>7.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>5,163,120</td>
<td>1.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>11,226,020</td>
<td>3.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>314,248,707</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Balkans and Turkey</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>4,508,823</td>
<td>4.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>29,396,450</td>
<td>26.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>652,584</td>
<td>0.59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia (FYROM)</td>
<td>283,109</td>
<td>0.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>82,595</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>11,309,809</td>
<td>10.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo (Serbia)</td>
<td>752,551</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>63,853,483</td>
<td>57.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>110,839,404</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AECID, Seguimiento PACI (PACI Follow-ups, i.e. reports on the Annual International Cooperation Plan) for 2008 and 2009.

### CHART B1

Breakdown of Spanish Development Aid in the Maghreb and the Middle East by Sector (2009)

- Financial Infrastructure and Services: 54%
- Non-Sectoral: 15%
- Education: 4%
- Health: 5%
- Population and Reproductive Health Programmes/Policies: 2%
- Water Supply and Treatment: 1%
- Governance and Civil Society: 8%
- Other Social Services and Infrastructure: 6%
- Productive Sectors: 3%
- Multi-Sector: 2%

Source: AECID, Seguimiento PACI 2009.
### CHART B2  
**Breakdown of Spanish Development Aid in the Balkans and Turkey by Sector (2009)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>Breakdown</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial Infrastructure and Services</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productive Sectors</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-Sector</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Sectoral</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population and Reproductive Health Programmes/Policies</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply and Treatment</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance and Civil Society</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Social Services and Infrastructure</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AECID, Seguimiento PACI 2009.

### TABLE B2  
**Breakdown of Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean Region by Objective (2009)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Democratic Governance</th>
<th>Rural Development and Fight Against Hunger</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Water and Sanitation</th>
<th>Economic Growth for Human Development</th>
<th>Environmental Sustainability, Combating Climate Change and Habitat</th>
<th>Science, Technology and Research for Human Development</th>
<th>Culture and Development</th>
<th>Gender in Development</th>
<th>Migration and Development</th>
<th>Peace-Building</th>
<th>Humanitarian Action</th>
<th>Other Areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maghreb and Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>778,504</td>
<td>637,082</td>
<td>1,393,710</td>
<td>223,500</td>
<td>293,971</td>
<td>695,700</td>
<td>379,323</td>
<td>536,900</td>
<td>709,474</td>
<td>480,162</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37,220,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>564,787</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>1,963,826</td>
<td>252,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,764,195</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>406,462</td>
<td>482,463</td>
<td>29,595</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8,826,936</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>252,103</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>595,964</td>
<td>819,667</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,731,925</td>
<td>255,500</td>
<td>126,035</td>
<td>151,056</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>61,910</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,093,241</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>121,738</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,479,186</td>
<td>336,041</td>
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<td>794,086</td>
<td>1,329,756</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>445,426</td>
<td>501,037</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8,743,193</td>
<td>263,550</td>
<td>3,336,769</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>2,743,791</td>
<td>926,621</td>
<td>9,775,358</td>
<td>8,116,029</td>
<td>287,128</td>
<td>1,369,761</td>
<td>1,809,877</td>
<td>1,111,344</td>
<td>2,027,403</td>
<td>2,688,901</td>
<td>544,724</td>
<td>5,455</td>
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<td>126,608,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>6,504,694</td>
<td>3,537,887</td>
<td>627,390</td>
<td>1,003,086</td>
<td>344,775</td>
<td>203,286</td>
<td>52,170</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>900,780</td>
<td>1,403,278</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,841,083</td>
<td>7,170,979</td>
<td>47,787,349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Saharan Refugees</td>
<td>129,900</td>
<td>694,449</td>
<td>117,695</td>
<td>1,175,814</td>
<td>752,000</td>
<td>275,000</td>
<td>6,005</td>
<td>12,665</td>
<td>1,750</td>
<td>102,802</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>123,249</td>
<td>5,474,528</td>
<td>11,962,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Syria</strong></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>733,697</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>389,286</td>
<td>69,555</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>171,433</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,701,229</td>
<td>1,136,832</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tunisia</strong></td>
<td>214,523</td>
<td>9,200</td>
<td>672,989</td>
<td>232,500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>259,286</td>
<td>849,547</td>
<td>758,176</td>
<td>578,477</td>
<td>911,796</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>89,211,590</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Balkans and Turkey</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>698,906</td>
<td>345,000</td>
<td>322,838</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>170,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5,961,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>1,115,565</td>
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<td>344,942</td>
<td>39,377</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>19,643,000</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,461,285</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,644,942</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>225,048</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>277,726</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>13,750</td>
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<td>32,868</td>
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Source: AECID, Seguimiento PACI 2009.
Migrations in the Mediterranean

## TABLE C1

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<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>139</td>
<td>717</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>5,258</td>
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<td>109</td>
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<td>150</td>
<td>131</td>
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<td>2,250</td>
<td>5,573</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>82,176</td>
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<td>4,912</td>
<td>36,039</td>
<td>66,668</td>
<td>3,066,055</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>800,899</td>
<td>2,089,286</td>
<td>366,456</td>
<td>139,696</td>
<td>56,660</td>
<td>17,478</td>
<td>88,528</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>30,530</td>
<td>2,380,095</td>
<td>5,971,098</td>
<td>30,962,204</td>
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</table>

Own production. Source: "EUROSTAT; rest from the official statistics institute of each EU country. Most recent data available."
## TABLE C2
### Foreigners in the Labour Market

**Algeria (13.4% of Med migrants in the EU)**

<table>
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<th>Men (as % of total)</th>
<th>Women (as % of total)</th>
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</thead>
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<td>Belgium (2007)</td>
<td>50.6%</td>
<td>75.7%</td>
<td>24.3%</td>
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<td>France (2006)</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
<td>63.6%</td>
<td>36.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (2008)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (2008)</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (2007)</td>
<td>51.9%</td>
<td>95.7%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (2007)</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (2008)</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>88.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Tunisia (6% of Med migrants in the EU)**

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<th>% of immigrants in the labour market</th>
<th>Men (as % of total)</th>
<th>Women (as % of total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (2007)</td>
<td>58.5%</td>
<td>77.0%</td>
<td>23.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (2006)</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
<td>69.9%</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (2008)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (2008)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (2007)</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
<td>93.1%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>Spain (2008)</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>80.5%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
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</table>

**Morocco (35% of Med migrants in the EU)**

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<th>Men (as % of total)</th>
<th>Women (as % of total)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (2007)</td>
<td>43.1%</td>
<td>71.5%</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (2006)</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>63.2%</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (2008)</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
<td>76.5%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Greece (2008)</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (2007)</td>
<td>47.2%</td>
<td>83.7%</td>
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<td>36.8%</td>
<td>76.4%</td>
<td>23.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (2008)</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>76.9%</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
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**Turkey (39.9% of Med migrants in the EU)**

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<th>Men (as % of total)</th>
<th>Women (as % of total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>43.1%</td>
<td>70.5%</td>
<td>29.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France (2006)</td>
<td>28.5%</td>
<td>71.2%</td>
<td>28.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (2008)</td>
<td>50.5%</td>
<td>66.4%</td>
<td>33.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (2008)</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
<td>70.4%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy (2007)</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (2007)</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>71.7%</td>
<td>28.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (2008)</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>79.4%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
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</table>

**Lebanon (1.5% of Med migrants in the EU)**

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<th>Women (as % of total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Belgium (2007)</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (2008)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (2008)</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>86.2%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Italy (2007)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (2007)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (2008)</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>79.9%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
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</table>

**Egypt (2.5% of Med migrants in the EU)**

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<th>Women (as % of total)</th>
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</thead>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
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<tr>
<td>France (2006)</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (2008)</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece (2008)</td>
<td>61.3%</td>
<td>97.4%</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
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<td>Italy (2007)</td>
<td>52.5%</td>
<td>98.2%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands (2007)</td>
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<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain (2008)</td>
<td>31.5%</td>
<td>89.4%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
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Own production. Source: OECD.
The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements

### TABLE D1: Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start of Negotiations</th>
<th>Agreement Concluded</th>
<th>Agreement Signed</th>
<th>Entry into Force</th>
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<td>December 1996</td>
<td>February 1997</td>
<td>July 1997*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>March 1995</td>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>June 1997</td>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td>April 2002</td>
<td>September 2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Interim agreement signed by the EU and the PLO (to the benefit of the Palestinian Authority).

- To enter into force each Association Agreement must be ratified by the European Parliament, the Parliament of the Partner Country and the Parliaments of the 25 Member States of the European Union.
- Until its accession to the EU, Turkey shall be governed by the Customs Union Agreement, which entered into force in January 1996 and is based on the First Generation Agreement of 1963.
- In 2008 the Association Agreement with Syria was revised. It was planned to be ratified on 26 October 2009. However, Syria indefinitely postponed signing the Association Agreement with the European Union. The agreement will enter into force provisionally when it is signed by Syria. The definitive entry into force requires the European Parliament’s evaluation and ratification by the Member States.

### TABLE D2: Stabilisation and Association Agreements with Western Balkan Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start of Negotiations</th>
<th>Agreement Signed</th>
<th>Entry into Force (Interim Agreement)</th>
<th>Entry into Force</th>
<th>Candidate Country</th>
<th>Start of Negotiations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>November 2005</td>
<td>June 2008</td>
<td>July 2008</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td>February 2010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* On 21 May 2006, a referendum was held, which led to Montenegro’s independence from the Federation it had formed with Serbia.

- EU relations with the Western Balkan Countries are regulated by the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). The SAP serves as a framework for the development of various instruments and helps each country to carry out a political and economic transition preparing them for a new contractual relationship with the EU: the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs), under which they aim to progress towards closer association with the EU.
• Negotiations with Serbia were interrupted in May 2006 due to lack of progress in cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In early 2007, the new administration in Belgrade launched a plan and constituted a National Council for cooperation with the ICTY, a measure which allowed negotiations to resume on 13 June 2007. In April 2008, the European Union and Serbia signed the agreement. The Interim Agreement will not enter into force until the EU Council considers that Serbia is fully cooperating with the ICTY. In December 2009, the Council unfroze the Interim Agreement, which entered into force in February 2010.

• After its declaration and the EU’s acknowledgement of Montenegro as a sovereign and independent State, the EU has maintained relations with independent Montenegro. The SAA was signed on 15 October 2007. In January 2008, the entry into force of the Interim Agreement represented progress towards the national ratification process and closer relations with the EU. The SAA entered into force in May 2010.

• Three years after the start of negotiations between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005, the SAA was signed and the Interim Agreement took effect. However, despite real progress in collaboration with the ICTY, the Commission still notes numerous dysfunctions in the institutional and judiciary spheres.

• In June 2003, the Thessaloniki European Council decided that all Western Balkan countries be considered as potential candidates for EU accession. Croatia (2004), Macedonia (2005) and Montenegro (2010) have already been granted candidate country status. Albania (2009) and Serbia (2009) have also applied for EU accession.

TABLE D3: European Neighbourhood Action Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Palestinian Territories</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Libya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

• The ENP Action Plans allow the European Union to maintain a progressive, differentiated policy towards its neighbouring countries based on the different levels of cooperation established.

• An Action Plan, developed after the signing of an Association Agreement, establishes priorities and a timetable for political and economic reform. Action Plans are the operational tools of the legal framework represented by the Association Agreements.

• Progress is analysed each year through evaluation reports. The extent of the progress made determines the levels of cooperation and access to the European Market.

• In 2010 there was no progress made by the two countries which are yet to agree an Action Plan.
Signature of Multilateral Treaties
and Conventions
Multilateral Treaties on Human Rights and Penal Mattersa
Economic, Discrimination
Torture
social and
against
and other
e
f
cultural rights
women
mistreatmentg

Rights
of the
childh

Crime of
genocidei

International
Criminal
Courtj

Financing
of
terrorismk

Date of adoption

1966

1966

1966

1979

1984

1989

1948

1998

1999

Portugal
Spain
France
Italy
Malta

1982
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Slovenia
Croatia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Serbia
Montenegro

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Macedonia
Albania
Greece
Cyprus
Turkey

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Syria
Lebanon
Jordan
Israel
Palestine

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1955
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Egypt
Libya
Tunisia
Algeria
Morocco

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2000b

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2002
2003
2001
2002

2000b
2000b

Source:
UN
UN
UN
UN
UN
UN
UN
UN
UN
e. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. f. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. g. Convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

TABLE E2

Multilateral Treaties on Labour Rights (year of ratification)
Freedom of
association and
collective bargaining
Convention
87a

Convention
98b

Elimination of
forced or
obligatory labour
Convention
29c

Convention
105d

Elimination of discrimination
in respect of employment
and occupation
Convention
100e

Convention
111f

Abolition of
child labour
Convention
138g

Convention
182h

Rights of
immigrant
workersi,j
1990

Date of adoption

1948

1949

1930

1957

1951

1958

1973

1999

Portugal
Spain
France
Italy
Malta

1977
1977
1951
1958
1965

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1977
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1932
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2000
2001

Slovenia
Croatia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Serbia
Montenegro

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Macedonia
Albania
Greece
Cyprus
Turkey

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2000
2001

Syria
Lebanon
Jordan
Israel
Palestine

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2000

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2000
2000
2001
2001

1993
2004

Egypt
Libya
Tunisia
Algeria
Morocco

1957
1957
2000
1957
1962

1996
2004k
2006k
2007
2004

2005
1993

Source:
ILO
ILO
ILO
ILO
ILO
ILO
ILO
ILO
OHCHR
e. Convention on Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value. f. Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention. g. Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to
Employment. h. Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention. i. Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. j. Ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or
succession. k. Signature.

Appendices

Civil and
political
rightsd

Med.2011

Racial
discriminationc

397

TABLE E1


### TABLE E3 Multilateral Environmental Treaties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of adoption</th>
<th>Climate Change</th>
<th>Kyoto Protocol</th>
<th>Biological Diversity</th>
<th>Biosecurity Protocol</th>
<th>CITES</th>
<th>Deserti-</th>
<th>Persistent</th>
<th>National Strategy for Sustainable Development</th>
<th>Number of municipalities involved in Agenda 21</th>
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</thead>
</table>

Source: UN UN UN UN CITES UN UN UN WRI

### TABLE E4 Multilateral Disarmament Treaties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of adoption</th>
<th>Geneva Protocol</th>
<th>Nuclear weapons</th>
<th>Bacteriological weapons</th>
<th>Conventional weapons</th>
<th>Chemical weapons</th>
<th>Nuclear weapons</th>
<th>Antipersonnel mines</th>
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<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>2001</td>
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</table>

Source: UN UN UN UN UN UN WRI
### TABLE F1  
Human Development Index (HDI)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Life Expectancy at Birth</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling</th>
<th>Expected years of schooling</th>
<th>GNI per capita PPP $</th>
<th>Human Development Index*</th>
<th>Position in HDI Ranking*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>79.1</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>22,105</td>
<td>0.795</td>
<td>40</td>
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<td>10.4</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>29,661</td>
<td>0.863</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>81.6</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>34,341</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<td>81.4</td>
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<td>16.3</td>
<td>29,619</td>
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<td>16.7</td>
<td>25,857</td>
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<td>8,222</td>
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<td>68</td>
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<td>Serbia</td>
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<td>9.5</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>10,449</td>
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<td>Macedonia</td>
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<td>11.3</td>
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<td>0.719</td>
<td>64</td>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>16.5</td>
<td>27,580</td>
<td>0.855</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>15.6</td>
<td>27,831</td>
<td>0.872</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>73.9</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>5,889</td>
<td>0.620</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>74.5</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>17,068</td>
<td>0.755</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>74.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>7,979</td>
<td>0.683</td>
<td>81</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>10.5</td>
<td>4,628</td>
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</table>

* Own production. Source: UNDP

* Due to changes in calculation methodology for the Human Development Index (HDI), these data are not comparable with those of previous years. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F1  
Components of the Human Development Index (HDI) (2010)

**Top 5 Countries with Highest Life Expectancy (years)**
- Japan: 83.2
- Hong Kong (China): 82.5
- Switzerland: 82.2
- Iceland: 81.2
- Austria: 81.1

**Top 5 Countries with Highest Per Capita Income (GNI) ($ PPP)**
- Liechtenstein: 81,011
- Qatar: 79,426
- Norway: 58,810
- United Arab Emirates: 58,006
- Kuwait: 55,719

Own production. Source: UNDP and UNFPA.
### TABLE F2  
**Population: Demography**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
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<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>5.0</td>
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Own production. Source: UNFPA UNFPA WB WB WB UNFPA UNPOP UNPOP UNPOP UNPOP.

*Net annual average of migrants: the annual number of immigrants less the annual number of emigrants. b. Net number of migrants divided by the average population of the receiving country for the period under consideration. (..) Data unavailable.*

### CHART F2  
**Projected Demographic Evolution in the Mediterranean (2010-2050)**

![Graph showing projected demographic evolution](chart.png)

Demographic evolution by region (2010-2050)

**Countries appear in descending order on the basis of their demographic evolution.**
### TABLE F3  
Population: Structure and Distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population age composition</th>
<th>Population in urban agglomerations of more than 750,000 inhabitants</th>
<th>Population located on the Mediterranean coastline</th>
<th>Urban population living in slums</th>
<th>Population density</th>
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<tr>
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<td>age 15-64</td>
<td>≥ age 65</td>
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</table>

**Notes:**  
- Own production. Source: WB.  
- Latest data available from this period.  
- Data unavailable.

### CHART F3  
Population Age Composition (2009)

#### Top 5 countries with largest population under 15 (%)
- Niger: 50
- Uganda: 49
- D.R. of Congo: 47
- Burkina Faso: 46
- Zambia: 46

#### Top 5 countries with largest population over 64 (%)
- Sweden: 18
- Germany: 18
- Italy: 20
- Japan: 22
- Greece: 18

*Own production. Source: WB.*
### TABLE F4  
**Education and Training of Human Capital**

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<th></th>
<th>Net enrolment rate</th>
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Own production. Source: UNESCO.  
a. Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F4  
**Student-Teacher Ratio in Elementary School (2002/09)**

Own production. Source: UNESCO.  
a. Latest data available from this period.
### TABLE F5  Health and Survival

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<th></th>
<th>Infant mortality rate</th>
<th>Maternal mortality ratio</th>
<th>People living with HIV/AIDS</th>
<th>Prevalence of smoking</th>
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<td>under-five per 1,000 born alive</td>
<td>per 100,000 born alive</td>
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Own production. Source: WB, WB, WB, UNAIDS, UNAIDS, WB, WB.

a. Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F5  Health Expenditure and Maternal Mortality (2008)

![Chart showing health expenditure and maternal mortality](chart.png)

Total Health Expenditure by Region (\% del GDP)

- South-East Asia: 3.6
- Eastern Mediterranean: 4.1
- Africa: 6.2
- Western Pacific: 6.5
- Europe: 8.5
- Americas: 13.5

World average: 9.7

\[ R^2 = 0.4476 \]

Expenditure in health (% of GDP)

Own production. Source: WB and WHO.

a. According to regional groupings defined by the WHO.
### TABLE F6 Nutrition and Food Security

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dietary energy consumption kcal/person/day</th>
<th>Cereal trade imports tm</th>
<th>Cereal trade exports tm</th>
<th>Children under weight for their age % children &lt; age 5</th>
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Own production. Source: FAO FAO FAO FAO FAO WHO

* Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F6 Cereal Imports in the Mediterranean (2008)

![Cereal Imports in the Mediterranean (2008)](chart)

Own production. Source: FAO.
**TABLE F7**

Access to Health Resources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population per physician</th>
<th>Population with sustainable access to an improved water sources %</th>
<th>Population with access to improved sanitation %</th>
<th>Births attended by skilled health personnel %</th>
<th>Contraceptive prevalence rate %</th>
<th>Adolescent fertility rate births per 1,000 women ages 15-19</th>
<th>Total health expenditure % of GDP</th>
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*Latest data available from this period. Data unavailable.

**CHART F7**

Expenditure in Health, Doctors, and Adolescent Fertility (2000/08)*

![Chart showing expenditure in health, doctors, and adolescent fertility](image)

*Latest data available from this period. According to regional groupings defined by the WHO.
### TABLE F8  Gender: Social Development

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Adult literacy rate ≥ age 15</th>
<th>Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio</th>
<th>Year women received right to vote</th>
<th>Year women received right to stand for election</th>
<th>Year first woman elected or appointed to parliament</th>
<th>Seats in parliament held by women</th>
<th>Seats in parliament held by men</th>
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Own production. Source: WB, UNESCO, UNDP, IPU.

a. Referring to the first year appointed in the current parliamentary system. b. The date refers to the first year in which a woman was nominated to Parliament. c. First partial recognition of the right to vote or stand for election. d. Situation as of 31 December 2010. e. For bicameral parliaments, the values shown are averages for both chambers. f. Latest data available from this period. g. Though there are two chambers in the Egyptian Parliament, data are only available for the lower chamber. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F8  Seats in Parliament Held by Women (% of total seats)

![Diagram showing the percentage of seats held by women in various countries.](chart-f8.png)

Own production. Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU).

In the case of bicameral parliaments, the listed data listed are the average of the two chambers, except in the case of Egypt for which only lower chamber data are available.
### TABLE F9: Technology and Communication

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<th>Outgoing international calls</th>
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<td>minutes per capita</td>
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### CHART F9: Internet Use (2008/09)*

*Own production. Source: ITU and WB. *Latest data available from this period.
### TABLE F10  Security and Military Expenditure

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Internally displaced people</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
<th>Refugees by country of asylum</th>
<th>Conventional arms transfer</th>
<th>Military expenditure by country of origin</th>
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**Source:** UNHCR

* Own production. Source: IDMC, UNHCR, WB, SIPRI.

- Data from UNDP, 2007.
- Military pensions not included.
- Excludes US military aid.
- Long-term imports or exports for the entire period.
- Recurrent expenditures only.
- Includes civil defence spending, which usually accounts for about 4.5% of the total.
- Includes part of the military pensions.
- Data unavailable.

### CHART F10  Refugees by Country of Origin (2010) (thousands)

![Refugees by Country of Origin (2010)](chart.png)

**Source:** UNHCR

* Data from UNDP, 2007.
### TABLE F11 Economic Structure and Production

#### Share in GDP by sector

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Own production. Source: WB.  
* Data from 2008; b. Data from 2007; (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F11 Changes in the CPI (2005-2009)

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Countries with highest inflation in 2009 (Top 10 countries)

Mediterranean average: 2.4

Own production. Source: WB.

* Data not available for Lebanon in 2005.
## TABLE F12

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<th>Land under cereal production</th>
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<th>Cereal yield</th>
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* Own production. Source: FAO.

** Only data from countries that produce over 100,000 hectares of cereals are included.

## CHART F12

Cereal Cultivation in the Mediterranean* (2009)

- Own production. Source: FAO.
- Only data from countries that produce over 100,000 hectares of cereals are included.
### Table F13: Livestock

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Own production. Source: FAO.

<sup>a</sup> Included bovine, caprine, ovine and buffalo livestock. <sup>b</sup> Includes chicken, hens, ducks, turkeys and geese. (..) Data unavailable.

---

### Chart F13: Livestock Trade Balance (2008)

![Livestock Trade Balance Chart]

Own production. Source: FAO.

In 2008, exports of live animals from the Mediterranean countries accounted for 18% of world exports and imports 22%.
### TABLE F14  Fisheries

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Own production. Source: FAO.

(…) Data unavailable.

### CHART F14  Fishing in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea (2008)

![Chart showing fishing in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea (2008)](chart.png)

Own production. Source: FAO.
### TABLE F15

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Own production. Source: ILO.

*Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F15

#### Total and Youth Unemployment Rate (2007/09)*

Evolution in youth unemployment (2000-2009)

(selected countries)

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<th>Total unemployment (% of active population)</th>
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Own production. Source: ILO.

Data not available for youth unemployment in Albania, Lebanon, and Tunisia.

*Latest data available from this period.
### TABLE F16  
**Income Distribution**

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### CHART F16  
**Income Participation of the People of the Balkan Countries (2003/2007)**

- **Lowest 20%**
- **Second 20%**
- **Third 20%**
- **Fourth 20%**
- **Highest 20%**

**Principal countries with the highest top quintile (%)**

- Seychelles 69.8
- Colombia 61.6
- Bolivia 61.2
- Brazil 58.7
- Ecuador 58.5
- Honduras 58.4
- Panama 58.0

- Macedonia 48.8
- Montenegro 43.7
- Bosnia and Herzegovina 43.1
- Albania 40.9
- Slovenia 39.6
- Croatia 37.9
- Serbia 37.5

- Israeli 22.5
- Jordan 22.2
- Somalia 22.1
- Egypt 21.5
- Turkey 21.4
- Algeria 21.3
- Morocco 20.6

From Serbia, the most egalitarian country, to Macedonia, the least, the Balkans offer the greatest variety in the level of income inequality in the Mediterranean.

*In these countries the richest 20% of the population holds more than 58% of the country's income.*
### TABLE F17  Gender: Economic Activity

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Female economic activity rate ≥ age 15</th>
<th>Employment by economic activity</th>
<th>Estimated earned income</th>
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<td>% of female employment</td>
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Own production. Source: UNDP. 

- **a.** Latest data available from this period. 
- **b.** Estimations reached using the most recent data for the period between 1991-2004. 
- **c.** Own production using UNDP data. 

### CHART F17  Women’s Income in Relation to Men’s Income (2007) (%)

The 10 countries with the lowest salary gap between genders (2007)*

*In 10 countries female incomes are less than 25% of male income: Libya, Yemen, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Morocco, Oman, Syria, Jordan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.
### TABLE F18 Production and Energy Consumption

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Energy production millions mt oil eq</th>
<th>Energy consumption millions mt oil eq</th>
<th>Energy consumption per capita kg oil eq</th>
<th>GDP per unit of energy use PPP $ per kg oil eq</th>
<th>Net energy import % of used energy</th>
<th>Energy consumption by source</th>
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</table>

Own production. Source: WB.

* Negative values indicate that the country is a net exporter.

* In cases like Libya and Algeria, import values are -470% and -346%.

### CHART F18 Consumption and Energy Efficiency (2007)

Energy consumption per capita (kg oil eq)

GDP per unit of energy use (PPP $ per kg oil eq)

Net energy import (% of used energy)
### TABLE F19: Production, Consumption and Access to Electricity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population with access to electricity</th>
<th>Electricity production (billion kWh)</th>
<th>Electricity consumption per capita</th>
<th>Sources of electricity&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>carbon %</td>
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</table>

<sup>a</sup> The percentages do not always add up to 100% because some electricity sources (solar, wind and geothermal) are not included. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F19: Evolution in Electricity Consumption (selected countries) (1982-2007)

**Top ten per capita consumers of electricity* (1982-2007)**

- **1982**
  - Bahrain: 163%
  - Iceland: 130%
  - United Arab Emirates: 130%
  - Kuwait: 129%
  - Poland: 101%
  - Portugal: 48%
  - Luxembourg: 43%
  - United States: 33%
  - Sweden: 31%
  - Canada: 29%

- **2007**
  - Bahrain: 163%
  - Iceland: 130%
  - United Arab Emirates: 130%
  - Kuwait: 129%
  - Poland: 101%
  - Portugal: 48%
  - Luxembourg: 43%
  - United States: 33%
  - Sweden: 31%
  - Canada: 29%

* Countries arranged in decreasing order on the basis of consumption growth for the period.
### TABLE F20  
**CO₂ Emissions**

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CO₂ emissions</th>
<th>Total Emissions by Sector</th>
<th>CO₂ emissions by Sector</th>
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<tr>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>2008</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
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### CHART F20  
**Vehicles and CO₂ Emissions (2005/08)**

- **Highway CO₂ emissions by region (kg CO₂ per capita)**
- **CO₂ Emissions for highway transport (kg CO₂ per capita)**

**Source:** Own production. Source: IEA and IEA.

**Notes:**
- Latest data available for this period.
- Includes cars, buses, and freight vehicles, but not motorcycles.
- Data unavailable.

---

**TABLE F20**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CO₂ emissions</th>
<th>CO₂ emissions by Sector</th>
<th>Emissions intensity by GDP</th>
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<td>per capita</td>
<td>kg CO₂ / $ PPP (2000)</td>
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**Source:** Own production. Source: IEA and IEA.

**Notes:**
- Latest data available for this period.
- Includes cars, buses, and freight vehicles, but not motorcycles.
### TABLE F21

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<td>coming from other countries km³</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>per capita m³</td>
<td>water dependency</td>
<td>per capita m³</td>
</tr>
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<td>Morocco</td>
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* Own production. Source: FAO.

---

**CHART F21**

Available Renewable Water Resources (1962-2007) (m³/inhabitant/year)
### TABLE F22 Environment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total area (thousand ha)</th>
<th>Forest area (thousand ha)</th>
<th>Deserts and dry lands %</th>
<th>Wood fuel production m³</th>
<th>Land surfaces % of the total</th>
<th>Marine % of the total</th>
<th>Known species</th>
<th>Threatened species</th>
<th>Ecological footprint gha per capita</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>266</td>
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<td>559</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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**Own production. Source:** FAO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Known species</th>
<th>Threatened species</th>
<th>Ecological footprint gha per capita</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>b.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Positive values indicate that the forest surface has increased in the period shown, while negative values indicate a decrease.**

### CHART F22 Changes in Forest Surface in the Mediterranean (1990-2008) (% of variation)

- **Own production. Source:** FAO
- **Positive values indicate that the forest surface has increased in the period shown, while negative values indicate a decrease.**

### CHART F22 Change in forest surface by region (1990-2008) (by thousands of hectares and % of variation)

- **Own production. Source:** FAO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Change (thousands of hectares)</th>
<th>% of variation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>-5.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Western and Southern Asia</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern, Western and Southern Europe</td>
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<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Asia</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
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<td>South-Eastern Asia</td>
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<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern and Middle Africa</td>
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<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Europe</td>
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<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
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<td>3.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
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<td>Egypt</td>
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<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>-9.4</td>
<td>-9.4</td>
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</table>

Positive values indicate that the forest surface has increased in the period shown, while negative values indicate a decrease.
TABLE F23  International Trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Exports $</th>
<th>Imports</th>
<th>Coverage ratio</th>
<th>Trade balance</th>
<th>Current account balance</th>
<th>Workers' remittances</th>
<th>Foreign direct investment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>millions $</td>
<td>2007/09</td>
<td>millions $</td>
<td>inflows</td>
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Own production. Source: UNCTAD. a. Data from 2008. b. Workers remittances, salaries paid and transfer of capital are included. c. From good and services. d. Data from 2007. e. Own production using UNCTAD data. (..) Data unavailable

CHART F23  Foreign Direct Investment in the Mediterranean (2009) (%)

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>9.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rest of the Mediterranean countries</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>37.1%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rest of the Mediterranean countries</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
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</table>

Evolution of foreign direct investment by economy* (2005-2009) (millions $)

Own production. Source: UNCTAD. a. According to UNCTAD classification.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All food items</th>
<th>Agricultural raw materials</th>
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<th>Minerals and metals</th>
<th>Manufactured products</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Export concentration index</th>
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Own production. Source: UNCTAD.

---

**CHART F24**

Export of Manufactured Products (2009) (% of total exports)

---


---

* According to UNCTAD classification.
### TABLE P25

<table>
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<th>Country</th>
<th>All food items</th>
<th>Agricultural raw materials</th>
<th>Fuels</th>
<th>Minerals and metals</th>
<th>Manufactured products</th>
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*Own production. Source: UNCTAD. 

a. According to UNCTAD classification.

### CHART P25

#### Import of Manufactured Products (2009) (% of total imports)

![Chart showing the import of manufactured products by country in 2009 as a percentage of total imports.](chart.png)


![Chart showing the evolution of imports by economy over 2005-2009.](chart.png)
### TABLE F26  Tourism in the Mediterranean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Inbound tourists</th>
<th>Outbound tourists</th>
<th>Tourists' overnight stays</th>
<th>International tourism receipts</th>
<th>Tourism expenditure in other countries</th>
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<td>% in the Mediterra-nean</td>
<td>% in the Mediterra-nean</td>
<td>% in the Mediterra-nean</td>
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<td>587</td>
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Own production. Source: UNWTO, UNCTAD, WB.

---

### CHART F26  Tourists and Income (2008/09)

**Rate of change in arrival of tourists (2009/08)**

- **Europe**
- **Americas**
- **Middle East**
- **Asia and Pacific**
- **World average: -4.2**

**International inbound tourists (thousands)**

- **60,000**
- **20,000**
- **5,000**

**International tourism receipts (% of exports)**

Own production. Source: UNWTO.
### TABLE F27

**Official Development Assistance (ODA)**

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Official development assistance by donor country</th>
<th>Official development assistance in recipient countries</th>
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<td>Greece</td>
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<td>3.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>1.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>1.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>3.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>0.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>1.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---


The lines show the evolution, for each Mediterranean donor country, of the ODA in absolute terms and as a percentage of the GNI. The points indicate the year or period for the data, with the first representing the median for the 1993-94 period, the second the median for the 1998-99 period, and the third through the last points indicate the values for the years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. The first point that appears corresponds to the 1993/94 biennial (except in the case of Greece, which begins in 1998/99) and the last to the year 2009. Own production. Source: OECD.
### TABLE F28
**External Debt**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Long-Term debt</th>
<th>Short-Term debt</th>
<th>Debt service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>million $</td>
<td>million $</td>
<td>% of exports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2008/09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>9,583</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>33,402</td>
<td>76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>2,308</td>
<td>55.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>5,589</td>
<td>62.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>4,719</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>251,372</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>5,236</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>24,864</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>6,615</td>
<td>28.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>33,257</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>21,709</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>5,345</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>23,752</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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* Own production. Source: WB a WBa WBa WBa WBa WBb WBb WBb WBb
a. Own production using WB and UNPOP data. b. Remittances from migrant workers are included. c. Latest data available from this period. (..) Data unavailable.

### CHART F28
**External Debt (2009)**

**Principal debtors** (2009) (million $)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Million $</th>
<th>$ per capita</th>
<th>% of GNI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>109,273</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>92,000</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>27,092</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>20,423</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>16,907</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>15,372</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>13,539</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10,216</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>9,999</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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* Own production. Source: WB and UNPOP.
* The World Bank offers no data on more developed countries.
Definitions

Adolescent fertility rate
Number of births per thousand women aged between 15 and 19.

Agricultural land area
Land surface area made up of arable and permanently cultivated lands and by permanent meadows and pastures.

Agricultural population
Persons who depend on agriculture, hunting, fishing or forestry for their subsistence. This category includes all those who carry out an agricultural activity and all this entails without official employment.

Annual population growth rate
Exponential change in the growth of the population during the period indicated.

Aquaculture production
Includes marine, freshwater and diadromous fish, molluscs and crustaceans cultivated in marine, inland or brackish environments.

Arable lands and permanent crops
Agricultural surface area that groups the data on arable or farm land and land used for permanent crops. Arable and farm land is land given over to temporary crops (those giving two yields are only counted once) temporal meadows for cutting or grazing, land dedicated to commercial vegetable gardens or orchards and land temporarily fallow for a period of less than five years. The term does not include land that has been abandoned as a result of migratory cultivation. Land destined for permanent crops refers to land dedicated to crops that occupy the terrain during long periods and that do not need to be replanted after each harvest, such as cacao, coffee and rubber. It includes land occupied by bushes destined to flower production, fruit trees, walnut trees and vineyards, but excludes land planted with trees destined to the production of firewood or wood.

Armed forces
Strategic, land, naval, aerial, command and support forces. It also includes paramilitary forces, such as the gendarmerie, the customs services and the border guard if they are trained in military strategy.

Average annual supply of fish and fish derivatives
Calculated from the disposability of fish and its derivatives for human consumption, divided by the total population within the geographical borders of any given country. Nationals living in other countries are excluded, although foreigners living in the country are included.

Births attended by skilled health personnel
Percentage of births attended by health personnel (physicians, nurses and midwives) that are trained in the care, supervision and counselling of women during pregnancy, birthgiving and puerperium, and who can also deliver babies and assist them on their own.

Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions
The emissions of carbon dioxide produced in the burning of all fossil fuels used by a country.

Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions by sector
Shows the proportion of carbon dioxide emissions produced by the burning of fossil fuels in the sectors of transport, industry and electricity production. The transport sector includes emissions produced by all forms of transport by road, rail and air, including agricultural vehicles travelling by road. International journeys by boat or aeroplane are excluded. The industrial and construction sector includes emissions produced by all types of industry and construction. The electricity sector includes emissions produced by the generation of electricity for public use, including thermal power stations.

Cereal production
The figures for cereal production only refer to harvests of dry grain. Crops harvested for hay, unripe foodstuffs, forage and silage, or are used for grazing, are therefore excluded.

Cereal production yield
The outputs per hectare have been calculated using the data on surface area and production.

Cereal trade
The figures obtained by the FAO, have been supplied by the respective governments in the questionnaires sent out by the FAO.

Children under weight for their age
Percentage of children under five whose weight and height, for their age, is less than twice the standard deviation in comparison with the average for the relevant age group. The population of reference is the child population of the USA, which is assumed to be well nourished.

CO₂ emissions intensity by GDP
Average quantity of CO₂ emitted per
unit of incomes generated by a particular economy.

**Consumer price index**
Reflects changes in the cost, for an average consumer, in the acquisition of a basket of goods and services that can be fixed or can change at specific intervals; for example annually. The Laspeyres formula is normally used.

**Contraceptive prevalence rate**
Percentage of women who are married or in a relationship who report using at least one method of contraception.

**Crude birth rate**
Number of births per year per thousand inhabitants. An estimate is made in the middle of the current year.

**Crude death rate**
Number of deaths per year per thousand inhabitants. An estimate is made in the middle of the current year.

**Current account balance**
The sum of the net exports – exports minus imports – of goods and services, incomes and net transfers.

**Daily newspaper circulation**
Refers to those newspapers published at least four times a week.

**Debt service**
The sum of the main payments and interest payments made for long-term debts, interest paid on short-term debts and repayments (redemption and charges) to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

**Desalinated water production**
Amount of water produced by elimination of salt from salt water using a variety of techniques, including inverse osmosis. Most of this water is used for domestic purposes.

**Deserts and drylands areas**
Total area of semiarid land (dry lands), barren and hyperborean (desert) that make up a country.

**Dietary energy consumption**
Amount of food, in kilocalories per day, available for each person in the population.

**Duration of compulsory education**
Number of years, within a determined age group, that children and young people are legally obliged to attend school.

**Earned income**
Approximate calculation based on the relation between female non-agricultural salaries in respect to male non-agricultural salaries, the proportion of women and men in the economically active population, the total of the female and male population and the GDP per capita (PPP in USD).

**Ecological footprint**
Measurement of the use of renewable natural resources by humanity. For a given population it is defined as the total area of biologically productive land and water required to produce the resources consumed, to maintain energy consumption, to make way for infrastructures and to absorb the waste generated by the population. The unit used to measure the ecological footprint is the global hectare and is defined as a hectare of biologically productive space, equal to the world average.

**Economic activity rate**
The proportion of the population over 15 years of age that contributes, or is able to contribute, labour in the production of goods and services.

**Electricity consumption per capita**
Refers to the gross production per inhabitant and includes the consumption of auxiliary stations and the losses in the transformers considered an integral part of the central station. It also includes the total electricity produced by pumping stations, without deducting the electricity absorbed by the pumps.

**Electricity production**
Measured in the alternating equipment terminals of electric power stations. Also includes hydroelectric, coal, oil, gas and nuclear energy sources and generation by geothermal, solar, wind, tidal and marine energy, as well as renewable residues and fuels.

**Electricity sources**
Refers to the energy sources used to generate electricity: hydroelectric, coal, oil, gas and nuclear.

**Employed population**
Proportion of the economically active population that is employed. When adding the employed population to the unemployed the result is the whole economically active population or labour force.

**Employment by sector**
According to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), the Agriculture category also includes hunting, fishing and forest exploitation; the Industry category includes mining, extraction activities (including oil production), manufacturing, construction and public services (electricity, water and gas); the Services category includes the wholesale and retail trades, restaurants and hotels, transport, storage services, communications, financial services, insurance, real estate, business services, as well as community, social and personal services.

**Employment rate**
Percentage of population in work relative to the total population of working age.

**Energy consumption**
Consumption equals the local production plus imports and changes in stock levels, less exports and fuel destined to boats and aeroplanes used for international transport. Shown is the consumption per inhabitant, as well as the origin of the source. By origin, the fossil fuels include the power consumption of petroleum, natural gas, coal and its derivatives. In the case of nuclear energy, an efficiency of 33% is assumed (European average). Hydroelectricity excludes consumption from pumping. The modern renewable sources include (wind, tidal, waves, photovoltaic and thermal solar, biogas and geothermal and fuels coming from the biomass, such as ethanol) and traditional ones (solid biomass, including wood, vegetable and animal waste, among others).

**Energy production**
Primary energy forms – oil, natural gas,
coal and its derivatives and renewable fuels and residues — and primary electricity, all converted into equivalents of oil. The renewable fuels and residues refer to solid and liquid biomass, biogas and industrial and municipal residues.

Expected years of schooling
Number of years of schooling that a child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific enrolment rates were to stay the same throughout the child’s life.

Export/Import concentration index
The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index is used, in a normalised version, to obtain values between zero and one (maximum concentration). It measures the degree of market concentration and the calculation takes into account the different product groups exported, according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC).

Exports
The value of all goods supplied by an economy to the rest of the world. It excludes labour and income in concept of property, as well as transfer payments.

External debt
The sum of the national debt, with public guarantee, private unsecured long-term debt, credit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and short-term debt.

Fertility rate
Number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current age specific fertility rates.

Fertilizer consumption
Amount of vegetable nutrients used per unit of cultivatable land. The fertilisers considered are nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium. Consumption is calculated as production plus imports minus exports, and traditional nutrients (animal and vegetable fertilisers) are not included. The data obtained is the result of dividing the consumption of fertiliser of each country by the surface area of arable and permanently cultivated land.

Fishermen
Includes the number of people employed in commercial and subsistence fishing (both personnel on land and at sea), who work in fresh water, brackish water, marine area or in aquaculture activities.

Fixed telephone lines
Fixed telephone line connecting the subscriber’s terminal equipment to the public switched network.

Foreign direct investment
Net direct investment that is made in order to achieve a lasting participation in the management of a business company operating in a country other than that of the investor. It is equal to the sum of the equity capital, the reinvestment of earnings and other long-term and short-term capital.

Forest area
Understood as all land with natural or artificial plots of trees, whether productive or not.

GDP (see Gross Domestic Product)

GDP per capita (see Gross Domestic Product per capita)

GDP growth rate
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local currency.

GDP per unit of energy use
Indicator of energy efficiency. The temporary differences and entire countries partly reflect, structural economic changes, changes in the efficiency of particular sectors and differences in the use of fuels. The GDP has been converted into 2005 international dollars.

Gini index
Measure of greater or lesser inequality in the distribution of income and consumption, considering a state of perfectly equal distribution. A value of zero represents perfect equality and a value of one hundred total inequality.

GNI (see Gross National Income)

Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
The sum of the added value by all the resident producers in an economy, plus any tax on the product (without taking into account the subsidies). The added value is the net profit of an industry after adding together all the profits and subtracting the intermediate contributions.

Gross Domestic Product by sector
The contribution of the distinct economic sectors in the GDP is determined according to the added value determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC).

Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita)
Using the official exchange rates to convert the figures in national currency into USA dollars does not measure the relative internal acquisition powers of each currency in each country. The International Comparison Project (ICP) of the United Nations and the World Bank develop measures of the GDP on an internationally comparable scale using as conversion factors, the Purchase Power Parities (PPP) in respect to each country.

Gross National Income (GNI)
The sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. The added value of the net profit of an industry after having summed up all profits and deducted international contributions.

HDI (see Human Development Index)

Households with television
Percentage of homes with a TV set. Data provided for some countries refer only to homes with colour television so values shown may be lower than actual figures.

Human Development Index (HDI)
Index elaborated by the United Nations Development Project (UNPD) relating
three indicators: income level (per capita GNI), health (life expectancy at birth) and level of education (mean years of education and expected years of schooling).

Immigrants
Refers to the people born outside of a given country at the mid point of the year. The data is given in absolute figures and as a percentage in respect to the population of the receiving country.

Imports
Value of all goods received by an economy from the rest of the world. It excludes labour and income in concept of property, as well as transfer payments.

Inbound tourists by destination country
Number of tourists who travel to a country other than that in which they have their usual residence, for a period not exceeding 12 months and whose main purpose in visiting is other than an activity remunerated from within the country visited.

Infant mortality rate
Shows the number of deaths of infants under one year of age per thousand live births.

Information and communications technology expenditures
Includes internal and external spending on information technology, as well as telecommunications and other office infrastructures.

Internally displaced people
As a result of armed conflicts or human rights abuses, some 25 million people live as internally displaced population. These people were forced to flee from their homes for fear of losing their lives, but unlike refugees, they were displaced within their country’s borders. Even though internally displaced people are twice as many as refugees, their situation receives less international attention.

International tourism receipts
Income received in a given country from visitors, including payments made to national freight companies for international freight. It also includes the prepayment of goods and services received in the destination country. It can include the income from single day visitors. The percentage it represents in respect to exports is calculated as a ratio of the exports of goods and services.

Internet users
Defined as the computers within an economy that are directly linked to the worldwide Internet. These statistics are based on the country codes of the addresses of the users and do not always correspond to the physical location of the computer.

Irrigated lands
Irrigation data refers to the areas equipped with hydraulic infrastructure to supply water to crops. Areas with partial or total control of the distribution, surface areas irrigated by diversion of rises in level and low and flood- ed areas where available water is controlled are included.

Known species
Refers to the total number of species in a given country. Only mammals and birds have been taken into account.

Land area
Refers to the total surface area minus the surface covered by inland waters. Inland waters are defined in general as rivers and principle lakes.

Land under cereal production
The figures related to cultivated crop surface areas generally refer to the area harvested, although those corresponding to permanent crops can refer to the total planted area. The figures for the cultivated cereal area only refer to harvests of dry grain. Crops harvested for hay, unripe foodstuffs, forage and silage, or used for grazing, are therefore excluded.

Life expectancy at birth
The number of years that a new-born infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.

Live animal stock
The data on stock covers all domestic animals regardless of age, location or final purpose. Estimates have been made for countries that have not supplied data, as well as for countries supplying partial statistics.

Live animal trade
Enormous quantities of unregistered animals cross the borders of some countries. In order to obtain more representative international trade figures of live animals, the FAO has incorporated estimates of the unregistered trade.

Long term external debt
Debt that has an original or extended maturity of more than one year. It has three components: public, publicly guaranteed and private non guaranteed debt.

Maternal mortality ratio
Annual number of deaths of women owing to causes related to pregnancy, for every 100,000 live births.

Mean years of schooling
Average number of years of education received by people ages 25 and older in their lifetime based on education attainment levels of the population converted into years of schooling based on theoretical durations of each level of education attended.

Mediterranean and the Black Sea catches
Fishing catches for commerce, industry or subsistence (including recreational catches where the data is available). The data refers to the catch by the fleet of a country in the Mediterranean and/ or in the Black Sea.

Military expenditure
Total expenses effected by the Ministry of Defence and other ministries on the recruitment and training of military personnel, as well as the manufacture and acquisition of military supplies and equipment. Military assistance is included in the expenses of the donor country.

Mobile phones
Mobile telephone users subscribed to a public, mobile and automatic service providing access to the public telephone network using cellular technology.
Motor vehicles
Includes cars, buses and loading vehicles, but not mopeds or motorcycles.

Net energy import
Shows the amount of energy use by an economy and to what extent it exceeds its domestic production.

Net enrolment ratio
Number of students enrolled in a level of education who are of the official school age for that level, as a percentage of the total of the population of official school age for that level. The figures are shown for primary and secondary education.

Net migration rate
Net number of migrants divided by the average population of the receiving country within the period considered.

Net number of migrants
The entry of immigrants into a given country minus the outgoing emigrants of the same country.

Official Development Assistance (ODA)
The net payment of donations and loans granted under advantageous financial terms by official boards of partner countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as international organisations, with a view to promoting economic development and wellbeing, including co-operation and technical assistance.

Oil equivalent
All the values of energy production and consumption presented in this classification are calculated and published by the International Energy Agency (IEA) which uses the equivalent metric tonne of oil based on the calorific content of the energy products as the unit of measurement. An equivalent metric tonne of oil is defined as 10^7 kilocalories or 11,628 gigawatts per hour (GWh). This amount of energy is practically equal to the amount of energy contained in a tonne of crude oil.

Outbound tourists by country of origin
Number of trips that travellers make to a given country from their normal country of residence, for a period of less than one year, for any other reason than to undertake a paid activity in the country visited.

Permanent pasture
Refers to land used permanently (five years or more) for herbaceous fodder, whether cultivated or uncultivated (meadows or uncultivated land for grazing).

Personal computers
Independent computers in use, intended for use by one single user at a time.

Population density
The result of dividing the average annual population of a country by its land surface area expressed in square kilometres.

Population in urban agglomerations of more than 750,000 inhabitants
Percentage of the population of a country living in metropolitan areas, that in 2005 had a population of more than 750,000 people.

Population on the Mediterranean coast
Estimates of the percentage of the population that lives in the coastal area.

Population living with HIV/AIDS
Estimated number of people of any age infected with HIV or AIDS. Includes the whole living infected population at the end of 2003, regardless of whether or not they have developed the disease. It shows the actual figure and the percentage in respect of the population of the country.

Population per physician
The figure is obtained by dividing the number of inhabitants of a country by the number of physicians in its health system.

Population with access to electricity
Refers to the number of people with access to electricity as a percentage of the total population.

Population with access to improved sanitation
Percentage of the population with access to adequate installations for the elimination of excrement, such as connection to drains or systems of septic tanks, flush latrines, pour flush latrines or ventilated improved pit latrines. A system of elimination of excrement is considered adequate if it is private or shared (but not public) and if it allows the efficient avoidance of people or animals entering into contact with the excrement.

Population with sustainable access to an improved water source
The percentage of the population that has reasonable access to any of the following sources of drinking water: household water connections, public standpipes, bore holes, protected dug wells, protected springs and rainwater deposits. Reasonable access is defined as the availability of at least twenty litres per person per day, from a source located within a radius of one kilometre from the home of the user.

Prevalence of smoking
The percentage of men and women who smoke cigarettes. The age range varies between countries, but in general it is 15 years of age or above.

Primary pupil-teacher ratio
Number of pupils registered in primary schools divided by the number of teachers in primary schools.

Protected areas
Areas of land or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biodiversity, natural and associated cultural resources and managed through legal and other instruments. According to The World Conservation Union (IUCN) it includes the total area of all natural reserves, virgin areas, national parks, natural monuments, management areas of habitats and species, as well as protected land and sea areas in each country.

Public expenditure on education
Composed of capital expenses (construction, renovation, major repairs and purchase of heavy equipment or vehicles) and running costs (goods and services consumed during the
current year and that need to be renewed the following year). It covers expenses such as salaries and rendering of services, contracted or acquired services, books and didactic material, social welfare services, furniture and equipment, minor repairs, fuel, insurance, rent, telecommunications and travel.

Public health expenditure
Refers to the recurring and capital expenses in government budgets (central and local), loans and external concessions (including donations by international agencies and non-governmental organisations) and social or compulsory medical insurance funds.

R & D expenditures
The current and capital expenses of creative and systematic activities that increase the stock of knowledge. Includes basic and applied research and experimental development work that leads to new devices, products or processes.

Refugees
People who have been forced to flee their country for fear of persecution owing to reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinions or membership of determined social groups and who are unable or unwilling to return. The asylum country is the country in which the refugee has requested asylum, but has not yet received a response, or where he or she has been registered as an asylum seeker. The country of origin refers to the nationality of the seeker or to the country in which he or she is a citizen.

Rural population
The estimated population at the mid point of the year in areas defined as rural, as a percentage of the total population of the country.

Scientists and technicians in R&D
Professionals that have received further training to work in any scientific field.

Sectorial distribution of the active population
Shown by the percentages of the workforce employed in the different economic sectors: agriculture, industry and services.

Share of income or consumption
In the questionnaires carried out in homes in diverse countries to determine the distribution of income, they make five divisions (or quintiles) from the lowest to the greatest incomes. The two lower quintiles (40%) are considered the poorest. A relation is also made between the richest 10% and the poorest 10%, in order to establish the degree of inequality in incomes.

Short-term external debt
Debt owed to non-residents having an original maturity of one year or less and interest arrears on long-term debt.

Surface area
Refers to the extension of the country in its totality, including the surface area occupied by inland waters.

Threatened species
Includes all the species classified by The World Conservation Union (IUCN), as “vulnerable, in danger, or in critical danger”, but excludes all introduced species, species whose status is not sufficiently known, extinguished species and those still without an assigned status. Only mammals and birds have been taken into account.

Total catches
Fishing catches for commerce, industry or subsistence (including recreational catches where the data is available). The data refers to the catch by the fleet of a country in any part of the world. Marine fishing is practiced in seas or oceans, while freshwater fishing takes place in rivers, wetlands and inland lakes.

Total health expenditure
Funds mobilized by the system. Sum of general government and private expenditure on health.

Total population
Includes all of the residents of a country or territory with the legal status of citizen, except refugees settled in a country of asylum, who are generally considered as part of the population of their country of origin. Values for 2005 and projections for 2050 are shown.

Tourism expenditure in other countries
The expenditure in other countries of travellers from a given country, including the payments to national freight companies for international freight. It can include the expenses of single day travellers. The percentage it represents in respect of the exports, is calculated as a ratio of the exports of goods and services.

Tourists’ overnight stays
Number of nights that non-resident tourists spend within the country visited, regardless of the type of tourist establishment.

Trade balance
Account that holds the imports and exports of an economy during a certain period of time with the purpose of reflecting the corresponding balance. The negative values indicate a deficit in the trade balance.

Trade in fish and derivative products
Expresses the value associated to the exports and imports of live, fresh, frozen, chilled, dried, salted, smoked and tinned fish and derivative products. Includes fresh and salt water and aquaculture fish, molluscs and crustaceans.

Under-five mortality rate
Probability of death between birth and becoming five years old, expressed per thousand live births.

Unemployment rate
Percentage of the active population without work, but available for and seeking employment.

Urban population living in slums
A place of precarious settlement is a group of individuals who live under the same roof and lack one or more of the following conditions: secure tenure (State protection against illegal eviction), access to drinking water, access to basic healthcare, structural dwelling quality and sufficient vital space. In accordance with the situation of the city in which the precarious settlement is
found, this concept can be locally adapted.

**Water consumption**
Total water used by humans in a year, without taking into account the losses due to evaporation in reservoirs. Includes water from non-renewable underground sources, from rivers coming from other countries and from desalinated plants.

**Water dependency**
Percentage of water available in one country, coming from another.

**Water resources**
Refers to the total renewable resources, covering the watercourses of the country (rivers and underground rain water reserves) and the watercourses originating in other countries.

**Women in parliamentary seats**
Refers to the percentage of seats occupied by women in a lower or single chamber, or in a higher or senate, according to each case. In the case where there are two chambers, the data refers to the weighted average of the participation of women in both chambers.

**Wood fuel production**
Includes wood from trunks and branches, used as fuel for cooking, heating or producing energy.

**Workers' remittances**
According to the definition of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Balance of Payments Manual, workers' remittances are goods and financial assets transferred by immigrants living and working in an economy (where they are considered residents) in favour of the residents of their former country of residence. An immigrant must live and work in the new economy for more than one year to be considered a resident there. The transfers made to the immigrants own accounts abroad are not considered transfers. Moreover, all those derived from the possession of a business by an immigrant are only considered to be normal transfers to the country of origin.

**Year when women obtained the right to stand for election**
The dates refer to the year when the universal and equal right to stand for election was recognised. In the cases when two years appear, the first refers to the first partial recognition of the right to stand for election.

**Year when women obtained the right to vote**
The dates refer to the year when the universal and equal right to vote was recognised. In the cases when two years appear, the first refers to the first partial recognition of the right to vote.
List of the Organisms Consulted for Drawing Up Tables, Graphics and Maps

CITES, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
www.cites.org

EIB, European Investment Bank
www.eib.org

European Commission-Trade
ec.europa.eu/trade

EUROSTAT, Statistical Office of the European Commission
ec.europa.eu/eurostat

FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
www.fao.org

IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency
www.iaea.org

IDMC, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
www.internal-displacement.org

IEA, International Energy Agency
www.iea.org

ILO, International Labour Organization
www.ilo.org

IOM, International Organization for Migration
www.iom.int

IPU, Inter-Parliamentary Union
www.ipu.org

ITU, International Telecommunication Union
www.itu.int

IUCN, World Conservation Union
www.iucn.org

MedCruise, Association of Mediterranean Cruise Ports
http://medcruise.com

Millennium Development Goals Indicators
http://mdgs.un.org
MOFCOM, Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China
www.mofcom.gov.cn

OECD, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
www.oecd.org

Plan Bleu
www.planbleu.org

SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
www.sipri.org

UNAIDS, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
www.unaids.org

UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
www.unctad.org

UNDP, United Nations Development Programme
www.undp.org

UNEP, United Nations Environment Programme
www.unep.org

UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
www.unesco.org

UNFPA, United Nations Population Fund
www.unfpa.org

UNHCR, United Nations Refugee Agency
www.unhcr.ch

UNICEF, United Nations Children’s Fund
www.unicef.org

United Nations Treaty Collection
untreaty.un.org

UNPOP, United Nations Population Division
www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm

UNSTAT, United Nations Statistics Division
unstats.un.org

UNWTO, World Tourism Organization
www.unwto.org

WB, World Bank
www.worldbank.org

WHO, World Health Organization
www.who.int

WRI, World Resources Institute
www.wri.org

WWF
www.wwf.org
Country Abbreviations in Charts and Maps

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### Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<tr>
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<td>3PL</td>
<td>Third-Party Logistics</td>
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<td>Association Agreement</td>
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<td>AECID</td>
<td>Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation</td>
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<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<td>All</td>
<td>Adriatic-Ionic Initiative</td>
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<td>AKEL</td>
<td>Progressive Party for the Working People (CY)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AKP</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (TR)</td>
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<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<td>AQIM</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
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<tr>
<td>AQIS</td>
<td>al-Qaeda in the Sahel</td>
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<tr>
<td>AS</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance (GR)</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BDP</td>
<td>Peace and Democracy Party (TR)</td>
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<td>BIS</td>
<td>Bank for International Settlements</td>
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<td>BP</td>
<td>Barcelona Process</td>
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<td>BRIC</td>
<td>Brazil Russia India China</td>
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<td>BRICS</td>
<td>Brazil Russia India China South Africa</td>
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<td>BSS</td>
<td>Black Sea Synergy</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Common Agricultural Policy</td>
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<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community and Common Market</td>
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<td>CBC</td>
<td>Cross-Border Cooperation</td>
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<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women</td>
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<td>CETMO</td>
<td>Centre for Transportation Studies for the Western Mediterranean</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CGPJ</td>
<td>General Council of the Judicial Power (ES)</td>
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<td>CHP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party (TR)</td>
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<td>CIHEAM</td>
<td>International Centre for Advanced Mediterranean Agronomic Studies</td>
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<td>CIM</td>
<td>Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Rail</td>
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<td>CMI</td>
<td>Center for Mediterranean Integration</td>
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<td>CMR</td>
<td>Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road 1956</td>
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<td>CNETAC</td>
<td>Close Neighbours Economic and Trade Association Council</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Country Programmable Aid</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>DCFTA</td>
<td>Deep and Comprehensive Free trade Area</td>
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<td>DEOK</td>
<td>Democratic Labour Federation (CY)</td>
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<td>DFLP</td>
<td>Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
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<td>DFTA</td>
<td>Deep Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>DG</td>
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<td>DLDD</td>
<td>Desertification, Land Degradation and Drought</td>
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<td>DRS</td>
<td>Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DZ)</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>DS</td>
<td>Democratic Party (RS)</td>
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<td>EaP</td>
<td>Eastern Partnership</td>
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<td>EBA</td>
<td>European Banking Authority</td>
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<td>EBRD</td>
<td>European Bank for Reconstruction and Development</td>
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<td>ECB</td>
<td>European Central Bank</td>
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<td>ECHO</td>
<td>European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EDEK</td>
<td>Movement of Social Democrats (CY)</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Environment Agency</td>
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<td>EEA</td>
<td>European Economic Area</td>
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<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>EIDHR</td>
<td>European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights</td>
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<td>EIOPA</td>
<td>European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority</td>
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<td>Hellenic Statistical Authority</td>
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<td>European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument</td>
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<td>ESRB</td>
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<td>EUFOR</td>
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<td>EULEX</td>
<td>European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>EUROSTAT</td>
<td>Statistical Office of the EU</td>
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<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
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<td>FEMIP</td>
<td>Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership</td>
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<td>FIS</td>
<td>Islamic Salvation Front</td>
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<td>FLI</td>
<td>Future and Freedom for Italy</td>
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<td>FRONTEX</td>
<td>European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Agreement</td>
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<td>Free Trade Area</td>
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<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GIIPS</td>
<td>Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain</td>
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<td>GMP</td>
<td>Global Mediterranean Policy</td>
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<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat</td>
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<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terror</td>
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<td>HDZ</td>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union (HR and BA)</td>
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<td>HDZ-1990</td>
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<td>HR/VP</td>
<td>High Representative/Vice-President</td>
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<td>HSP</td>
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<td>HSYK</td>
<td>High Council of Judges and Public Prosecutors (TR)</td>
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<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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ICI  Istanbul Cooperation Initiative
ICJ  International Court of Justice
ICO  International Civilian Office
ICT  Information and Communication Technologies
ICTY  International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
IDF  Israel Defense Forces
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IPA  Istanbul Plan of Action
IPA  Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
ISG  International Steering Group for Kosovo
IUCN  International Union for the Conservation of Nature
IVZ  Macedonian Islamic Religious Community (MK)
KLA  Kosovo Liberation Army
KSF  Kosovo Security Force (since January 2009)
LNG  Liquefied Natural Gas
LOGISMED  Euro-Mediterranean Logistic Network
LSI  Socialist Movement for Integration (AL)
MB  Muslim Brotherhood
MD  Mediterranean Dialogue
MP  Mediterranean Partners
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals
MENAT  Middle East & North Africa
MINURSO  United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MMBtu  one million British thermal unit
MPCs  Mediterranean Partner Countries
NAMSA  NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
NEC  Neighbourhood Economic Community
NIF  Neighbourhood Investment Facility
NIP  National Indicative Programme
NPAA  National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis
NPT  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NS  New Serbia (RS)
NSC  National Security Council (TR)
NSRzB  Work for Progress Peoples’ Party (BA)
ODA  Official Development Assistance
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLAF  European Anti-Fraud Office
PA-UfM  Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean
PD  Democratic Party (IT)
PDP  Progressive Democratic Party (TN)
PDS  Democratic Party of Albania
PET  Mean Annual Potential Evapotranspiration
PFLP  Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PKK  Kurdistan Workers’ Party (TR)
PLO  Palestine Liberation Organization
PPT  Mean Annual Precipitation
PSC  Socialist Party of Catalonia (ES)
PzP  Movement for Changes (ME)
R&D  Research and Development
R2P  Responsability to Protect
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<td>Regional Transport Action Plan</td>
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<td>Stabilisation and Association Agreement</td>
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