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It has now been five years since the Fundació CIDOB and the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) initiated this Mediterranean Yearbook. The project represented a fascinating challenge for the two institutions, which committed themselves to providing a quality product for the whole Euro-Mediterranean area, in order to offer all the actors involved the materials they needed for information and analysis. Now, as we present the fifth edition of the yearbook, with a record of more than 2,000 published pages to provide a greater and better knowledge of the Mediterranean, we can assert that a double objective is being achieved, that of disseminating analyses on the Mediterranean and that of continuity. Five editions which have permitted the presentation of different perspectives and the display of the processes of transformation of the various Mediterranean realities.

2007 has been a difficult year for the Mediterranean region. The multiple challenges presented by the events of last year left behind great dilemmas which had to be faced with a view to building an area of peace and shared prosperity.

In this edition, the key themes turn on a double axis: the conflicts and the international strategies in the region. It seems impossible to speak of the Mediterranean without speaking of conflicts which, unfortunately, still occupy centre stage in Mediterranean reality, and consequently in this yearbook. The situation in Palestine, the terrorist attacks in North Africa or the tragic jigsaw puzzle into which Iraq has turned and its influence in the complex Middle East scenario are the themes with which this edition opens. In 2007 the major international actors redefined their strategic positions in the Mediterranean area: from the role of the United States and its change of strategy, more of image than of substance, in the Middle East, to the effervescence experienced by the European project for the Mediterranean after the proposals of the new President of the French Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy. The media relevance of the French initiatives not only demonstrated the importance to Europe of its southern neighbours, it also promoted a resurgence of interest in the Mediterranean on the part of the most northerly European countries. The result of this effervescence has been to demonstrate to Europe that the Barcelona Process continues to be the cornerstone of Euro-Mediterranean relations. Besides this, 2007 has seen the emergence of new actors in the Mediterranean, which find an echo in the yearbook when it discusses the role of Iran on the complex stage of the Middle East or the growth of the economic interests of the Persian Gulf countries or of China in the region.

This year’s thematic dossier pays a historic debt to the yearbook by focusing on the subject of water. Since the preparation of the first edition, the question of water has always been present as one of the major Mediterranean issues that the dossier needed to discuss. In this edition, the question of water is analysed from multiple points of view: from the management and planning of resources to its implications for the geopolitics of the region. The prospects, eco-
nom ic value, co-operation, conflicts, case studies, political involvement and climate change are elements that the dossier also analyses in their relation to water resources in the Mediterranean.

As in the previous editions, a balance sheet of the leading topics of the year is offered by means of numerous articles written by more than fifty authors from both shores of the Mediterranean. This multiplicity of voices, reflecting the diversity of opinions and points of view, is the true mark of identity of this yearbook.

In the year of inter-cultural dialogue, this Mediterranean Yearbook represents a link in the necessary and fundamental process of mutual recognition between the various cultural dimensions that share the Euro-Mediterranean space. With this in mind, we hope that the Arabic version of the Yearbook will be an additional element in advancing this process. We do not wish to conclude this presentation without thanking all the authors and collaborators who have contributed to the success of this edition. We also wish to highlight the commitment of the Fundació CIDOB and the European Institute of the Mediterranean to the work of continuing to rise to the challenge of improving this product in its future editions.
Perspectives
Towards a Space of Dialogue, Fellowship and Prosperity

José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero
President of the Government of Spain

To speak of the Mediterranean is, above all, to speak of rich, complex and permanent relations on both sides of its shores. The Mediterranean Yearbook, published by the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) and the Fundació CIDOB, reminds us year after year what these relations are and how intensive they are, and above all it takes the pulse of the necessary interdependencies between Europe and its neighbours. These relations make this region a privileged space of encounter and neighbourhood between peoples.

The analysis of the Mediterranean situation also implies the acknowledgment of the difficulties that exist. These are due, in large part, to the fact that the Mediterranean continues to be a space of unequal development and the scene of different lines of fracture: a frontier zone between the leading monotheist religions, between former colonisers and their colonies, between north and south. Certainly, when we undertake a rigorous study of the Euro-Mediterranean region we also need to be aware that we are dealing with a region that holds the keys to the current international conflicts.

On this point, the essential element is to be found in the objectives set by the Barcelona Process initiated by Spain in 1995. Hence the need becomes obvious to take fuller and better advantage of the instruments and policies available to us, so that we can advance towards achieving the shared peace envisaged by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

In 2007 the Mediterranean has continued to focus the world’s attention, to a large extent owing to the continuing conflicts and tragedies in the region. The situation in Lebanon, the scourge of international terrorism and the conflict between Israel and Palestine, with the still pending solution of the Saharan conflict, are important elements which have darkened the Euro-Mediterranean year.

Faced with these challenges of the first magnitude, the implication of Spanish and European policy in the Mediterranean could not be more decided one. We are keenly convinced of the possibility of a space of peace and prosperity. The political effort of Spain is directed to contributing actively to finding means of dialogue that will enable us to continue with the peace process in the Middle East. An example of this is Spain’s commitment to the United Nations mission in Lebanon, which is a key factor for a future of greater security, greater stability and greater peace in the Middle East.

The shadows will not succeed in weakening the determination to continue working for the Mediterranean. Nothing that happens in this region is irrelevant to Spain and we will not cease to support the initiatives that make for reinforcement of co-operation in the region. Spain has upheld that commitment since 1995, when it made clear its will to become a principal actor in the construction of the area of shared progress that the Euro-Mediterranean region ought to be. Europe, for its part, will continue to contribute untiringly to this process, including the actors of civil socie-
ty giving prominence to the role of change and to the promotion of an area of freedom and democracy. The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean has shown the determination to continue to promote with renewed energy the special instruments that Europe possesses in this context. The Barcelona Process is the natural framework for directing European policy towards the Mediterranean, and in accordance with that premise Spain’s strategic aim has always been to act as a true nerve-centre of Euro-Mediterranean relations. The new stage in Euro-Mediterranean politics that is now opening will be one of institutionalising and consolidating the Barcelona Process. The proposals that emerged from the Paris Summit of July 2008 will help us move towards that objective through new and more powerful institutional mechanisms and new projects in co-ordination with the European Neighbourhood and Euro-Mediterranean policies under way. The ambition of the European Union needs to be ever greater and needs to treat the countries on the other shore as equals. That is in the interest of all of us.

The new stage in Euro-Mediterranean politics that is now opening will be one of institutionalising and consolidating the Barcelona Process. The proposals that emerged from the Paris Summit of July 2008 will help us towards that objective.

In this context it becomes necessary to take fuller and better advantage of the instruments and policies at our disposal. The governments of the states of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, especially those of the North, must make a firm commitment for the adoption of joint decisions in strategic areas such as the political sphere, economic cooperation and the integration of immigrant populations through a renewed social pact. Ambitious objectives call for ambitious policies. In the Mediterranean, economic and social cohesion constitute a fundamental element for the development of the region, which also needs to be promoted through cooperation in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Overcoming economic and social inequalities is a necessary condition for the creation of an area of shared prosperity. It is beyond doubt that the different initiatives that have emerged from the Paris Summit in the fields of financial, business or university cooperation, among others, are elements favouring that development. The promotion of the Spanish-Italian initiative for the Agency for Business Development is a good token of Spain’s interest in that objective. In addition, we may stress the advances in cooperation on migration management through different actions, such as the implementation of agreements with countries of origin, the improvement of Community instruments, or the regional and multilateral conferences such as the Euro-African Summit on Migration and Development, known as the Rabat Process.

It is beyond doubt that, by our proximity, our close ties and the intensity of our relations, the Mediterranean constitutes a primary target area of Spanish foreign policy. From the regional point of view, Spain is acting, through the various existing multilateral and thematic forums (Barcelona Process, Dialogue 5+5, Mediterranean Forum etc.), as an engine for the promotion of interest in the Mediterranean within the EU. Our objective is to work for the Mediterranean to overcome its conflicts and tensions and to promote the development of the region. Sceptics will see that as an impossible or distant aim. Nevertheless the only way to reach a solution is to work to achieve it. The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean can also rely on outstanding instruments for dialogue and cooperation such as the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Inter-cultural Dialogue and the Alliance of Civilisations, both of them tools that show a clear Spanish impulsion.

Together we can ensure that the Mediterranean becomes a space of dialogue, fellowship and prosperity. The fifth edition of the Mediterranean Yearbook, Med. 2008, is a good example of what this common effort means.
Keys
As the fifth anniversary of the US-led invasion is marked, Iraq’s transition to normality, i.e. peaceful, institutional politics, is still overshadowed by the spectres of a failed state with inter- and intra-communal uncivil war and mafia lawlessness. Despite improvements in security in Baghdad, Anbar, Mosul and other provinces, prospective normality itself seems haunted by Shi‘i-Sunni, and Shi‘i-Shi‘i (the south) or Sunni-Sunni fighting (west, north-west and north), as by a segmented, conservative Islamic fundamentalism that imposes Taliban-like ethics, code of conduct and dress. Thus, Iraq’s reality is far removed from being the ‘beacon of democracy’ that the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, had announced prior to the 2003 invasion. The five macabre years of transition have had one thing in common: continuous mid-course correction of tactics and aims and incessant lowering of expectations on the part of the US; and continued polarization of communal/sectarian and ethnic politics and fragmentation of sectarian and communal blocs at one and the same time.

**Elections and Constitution: Flawed Legitimacy**

The mounting Shi‘i pressures for early elections and the Iraqization of constitution-writing led to the reduction of the US holiday of reconstruction at leisure from an envisaged 5 years to one lean year; the transfer of sovereignty in June 2004 to an Iraqi government (under the first interim PM, Iyad Allawi) marked the first major mid-course correction taken by the US in the hope that Iraqization would dampen opposition, weaken support for the insurgency and forge a new way forward. Allawi’s cabinet (June 2004 to April 2005), with mediation by the UN through the Algerian diplo-
mat Lakhdar Ibrahimi, delivered elections, but failed to bring security or services. With eight and a half million voters defying the insecurity and participating in the January 2005 elections, the electoral feat dealt a significant political blow to the logic of violence, but it also had destabilizing effects: it marginalized Sunni representation while it over-represented the Shi‘i Islamists and Kurdish nationalist blocs, accentuating communal and sectarian politics.

The Shi‘i-Sunni War

The Ja‘fari transitional government (April 2005 to May 2006) continued political legitimation through the writing of a constitution, the referendum (11 million voters, October 2005) and the second general elections (11.5 million voters, December 2005) which attracted a large mass of Sunnis into institutional politics. Worried by these new signs of constitutional politics, hard-line insurgents moved to bomb the holy shrines in Samara in February 2006. The timing of the attack was almost perfect: the nation was without a government. Ja‘fari was now a caretaker fighting the Kurds and Shi‘i rivals to renew his premiership; and his successor, Nuri Maliki, was not yet appointed.

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What seemed an improving political atmosphere in 2005, the year of the elections, referendum and constitution, was soon shattered by an open Shi‘i-Sunni war in 2006. This was a success of the civil-war strategy, however temporary. And it owed a great deal, not to the insurgents‘ sinister ingenuity, rather to the reckless Shi‘i reaction which assumed a criminal garb similar to that of their foes: they retorted in kind with random killing, communal cleansing, summary executions, all with added institutional tools, the militia, or with lawless action by the police, another militia in uniform. As a result, the Mahdi army, led by the fiery young cleric Muqtada Sadr, turned from an Iraqi-nationalist-anti-occupation outfit into an anti-Sunni militia, leading death squads that killed indiscriminately on the spot; the more disciplined, Hakim-led, Badr Army followed suit to prove its worthiness as a reliable defender of Shi‘is. Baghdad became a city of segmented cantons haunted by sectarian demons. Iraq effectively descended into a medium-level sectarian civil war centred mainly, but not exclusively, on Baghdad. Violence directed at the coalition forces continued, although it was diminishing in scope and intensity, and criminal lawlessness was no less rampant; a measure of Shi‘i-Shi‘i in-fighting was also part of the landscape; however, the main and more sinister terror and horror came from the Shi‘i-Sunni fight for supremacy in Baghdad and its environs. This sectarian conflict blocked the political process that characterized 2005, eroded confidence in the central authorities and their international backers, and strengthened radical and militant tendencies in both Sunni and Shi‘i camps.

In human terms, it drove tens of thousands of families out of Baghdad and over two million fled to neighbouring countries. The massive exodus of middle-class professionals, businessmen and intellectuals into Jordan, Syria and Lebanon (some 2-2.5 million) weakened the social groups that oppose violent politics and long for security and the assertion of a common Iraqi nationalism. Centrist or moderate leaders and factions rapidly lost ground to more radical and militant voices. The shock waves of sectarian conflict also reverberated around the region, almost breaking out into Sunni-Shi‘i violence in Lebanon in the winter of 2007 and raising fears of sectarian trouble in Syria, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, Bahrain and Kuwait in particular.

The Second Government

While the uncivil war went on unabated, the political vacuum was filled after arduous negotiations that ended with the nomination of Nuri Maliki of the Da‘wa party, in May 2006, to head the first government. Maliki inherited an office weakened by intra-Shi‘i rivalry and deteriorating security; the political process was stalemated. Large swaths of the Sunni and secular groups did not approve of the constitution nor of the institutions and power arrangements it had brought into being, but they were willing to seek political solutions. The security situation deteriorated dramatically...
with Shi’i militias and death squads retaliating on the insurgents, mostly al-Qaeda, sinister attacks in kind and wreaking havoc in the nation’s capital and other major cities. The government was unable to act effectively on the security front not only because its armed forces were not yet fully ready, but more significantly because many of the militias on the ground, such as the Mahdi army for example, had ministers in the government, and hence the government was not neutral but rather a party to the conflict or, at best, unable to control its own factions. Prime Minister Maliki himself proved unable to effectively manage these contradictions or to move the political and security agendas forward. By the end of 2006, the situation in Iraq seemed indeed bleak. It was within this context that President Bush announced his new policy, ‘the Surge’.

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Contradictory Assumptions in US Post-Conflict Policy: Belated Lessons

Bush’s announcement of the new policy on 10th January 2007, known as ‘the Surge’, implied an admission of the partial failure of a number of initial assumptions. These assumptions were: that the primary challenge was an undifferentiated Sunni insurgency, but the real challenge turned out to be Sunni and Shi’i extremism, foreign terrorism and a mafia underworld; that the political process would dampen the insurgency, but with the flawed constitutional process and a hegemony of the majority, the process exacerbated the conflict, causing the moderate centre to erode; that the electoral process would attract a critical Sunni mass, but this mass was disappointed with the results of the process and the insurgents managed to gain ground by discrediting the political process and advancing their sectarian strategy; that the US could train and equip a national army and police force in time to deal with emerging threats, but the threats turned out to be much greater than anticipated, the training and equipping proceeded sluggishly, and the new forces were compromised by infiltration, corruption and sectarian agendas; that Iraqi enthusiasm for ‘liberation’ and ‘democracy’ would overshadow security and reconstruction concerns, but liberation quickly turned in people’s perception to occupation, the results of democracy were welcomed by some and rejected by others, and security concerns soon overshadowed all else; that national reconciliation and the writing of a new constitution would be difficult but manageable, but in reality the constitution-writing process failed to achieve national reconciliation, and the Iraqi nation began to fall apart into its ethnic and sectarian subcomponents; that the coalition forces and a rebuilt Iraqi state would be able to contain the influence of regional powers, especially Iran and Syria, but in reality, a monopoly of military force has never been achieved, and Iranian and Syrian influence in Iraq has grown through powerful proxies and clients.

This list is not exhaustive; it reveals, however, some recognition of how far the original assumptions, and consequently strategy, were removed from hard realities. Perhaps the Baker-Hamilton report forced a rethinking of US strategy; it also forced a public recognition of what many, even within the Bush administration, were already admitting in private.

The Surge, Bush’s New Strategy, in Action

When Bush announced the new plan for Iraq in January 2007, the attention of the public focused mostly on the military aspect – the committing of additional troops to the counterinsurgency effort. But in its totality the plan had political, constitutional, legal and regional components as well. The military campaign focused on Baghdad and its environs, and on the Anbar province, which was, in the words of the US president, ‘the home base’ of al-Qaeda. This included: The deployment of an extra 20,000 US troops to Iraq, most of which worked alongside the Iraqi armed forces penetrating Baghdad’s ten military sectors and a 30-mile circle around the capital, conducting door-to-door searches, directly protecting citizens and halting forcible sectarian cleansing. An active search-and-destroy campaign in Anbar province subdued the al-Qaeda-run insurgency there. The Rules of Engagement (ROEs) allowed troops to engage militia forces regardless of their sectarian or political affiliation. The embedding of U.S. units within Iraqi formations – one US brigade within each Iraqi division, lent the campaign a measure of sustainability. The aim of “interrupting the
flow of support” from Iran and Syria to extra-governmen-
tal forces in Iraq proved elusive.

More Security

Throughout 2007, the campaign launched against the al-Qaeda Sunni organization and the Shi’i Mahdi army indeed halted the sectarian war and sectarian cleansing that plagued the capital and achieved an acceptable level of security. Thanks to the schisms between the pragmatic, tribal groups and the dogmatic al-Qaeda fighters, the US turned the tide against the latter in Anbar and Baghdad provinces; and may well go further to dramatically change the situation in other provinces, such as Mosul, Salahudin (Tikrit) and Diyala. At the beginning of the Surge, some 25 out of 159 sub-districts (composed of more than 400 neighbourhoods) in Baghdad were beleaguered, i.e. more than 15% of the capital’s area; now less than 5% of these are still unsecured or under the protection of some non-aggressive militia.

But security came at a heavy price: walls segmenting the city neighbourhoods, blocking business, trade and social interaction.

The Mahdi army received crippling blows in Baghdad, its leader disappeared for a while; its offices vanished, and its formations became amorphous. Anbar and to a lesser extent Baghdad provinces were cleansed of al-Qaeda, allowing families to reinstall TV dishes, businessmen to reopen cosmetic and fashion boutiques and hair-dressers, and the community to enjoy a measure of ‘forbidden’ luxuries. Sadly, thousands of dislocated families could not and did not return, notably the once vibrant Christian community of Baghdad, some 10% of the metropolis’ population.

The ‘Battle for Baghdad’ is still far from over. The military action, the Surge, was meant to provide a breathing space to help the government resuscitate national reconciliation, which is the basic political condition for security and stability; while a $10 billion fund was allocated towards reconstruction and reduction of unemployment in beleaguered communities.

A Fragmented and Weak Political Will

The success of national reconciliation is seen as contingent on a number of political and constitutional conditions, collectively known as national dialogue and national reconciliation. The first word refers to inter-

Throughout 2007, the campaign launched against the al-Qaeda Sunni organization and the Shi’i Mahdi army indeed halted the sectarian war and sectarian cleansing that plagued the capital, and achieved an acceptable level of security community, and now also intra-community, negotiations; the second word, reconciliation, signifies reaching a broad consensus on the contours of the new political order. Dialogue in 2006-7 has been abundant; agreement on basics has not.

Dialogue was hampered by mistrust among Shi’i and Sunni leaders; Shi’i leaders believe Sunnis are covert ‘sectarians’, ‘conspirators with the insurgents’, a ‘front for the return of the old Ba’th regime’, or as of now, ‘accomplices’ in a US-led conspiracy to end the rightly achieved Shi’i majority rule. Sunni leaders conceive of their rivals as ‘flagrant sectarians’, ‘Iranian stooges’, ‘unpatriotic’, ‘death-squad agents’, anti-Arab and the like.

At the heart of the conflict, of course, is the jockeying for the levers of power and the concomitant distribution of wealth (read: oil revenues). Sunni leaders, feeling their minority status, are opposing the Shi’i concept of majority rule: demography, they say, is democracy. Shi’i leaders are torn between their desire to assert their demographic superiority, on the one hand, and the need to engage Kurds or Sunni Arabs, or both, in nation-building and state formation.

The greatest impediment however is the fragmentation of communities. The Kurds have two powerful nationalist parties and two strong Islamist movements; while they are in agreement in their representation, the other communities are not. The Shi’is have the United Alliance bloc (with some 124 out of 275 seats in the national assembly) which has been fragmented into two, perhaps now three Da’wa parties (led successively by the current PM, Nuri al-Maliki, ex-PM, Ibrahim Ja’fari and Karim Inizi), the Aziz-Hakim-led Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the Sadr Movement and its militia, the Mahdi Army, led by Muqtada Sadr; the Fadhila (Virtue) Party, led by Ayatollah Mahmood Ya’qubi, and the Islamic Action Organization led by Ayatollah Muhammad Taqi Mudarris.

The Sunni bloc has no single leadership either. The Twafaq bloc (45 seats in the parliament) is made of
three different groups: the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) led by vice-president Tariq Hashimi, the Ahl al-Iraq led by the conservative Adnan Dulaimi, and a smaller group led by MP Khalaf al-Ulayyan. All the large blocs have begun to fragment.

The in-fighting between Sadr and Hakim’s ISCI in the southern provinces, Kut, Amara, Diwania and Basra, is one indication; another is the withdrawal from the government of 17 ministers: from the Fadhila party in March, from the al-Sadr group in April, as well as from Sunni and secular groups which followed suit. The Da’wa party of the serving PM suffered a split led by Ja’fari. Added to these fissures is the rise of tribes of the Sunni Sahwa (awakening), a movement that works hand in glove with the US forces against al-Qaeda. Their ascendency increases the number of players and weakens the positions of the old Sunni camps as well as an already fragile Maliki. Malikis’s party is the weakest link in the Shi‘i bloc; his lack of political will stems from the institutional weakness of the state, the fragmentation of the cabinet and parliament, and lack of imagination.

In May 2007, an apparent stalemate encouraged various political groups to seek ways to dislodge Maliki or else to bolster his position. Iyad ‘Alawi, Sadr, Fadhila and the Saleh al-Mutlaq al-Hiwar group attempted the creation of a unified bloc to replace Maliki. Although this attempt failed, it invited a counter-effort to create a workable alliance, encompassing the Maliki-Da’wa and Hakim-ISCI on the Shi‘i front; Talibani and Barzani on the Kurdish front, and Hashimi-IIP on the Sunni front; this was labelled the Alliance of the Moderates. The ‘Alliance of Moderates’ promoted the ‘quartet-rule’, involving the three members of the presidential council (President Talbani- Kurd; Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi, Shii-ISCI, Tariq Hashimi-IIP) and the Da’wa-Shi’i PM, Nuri al-Maliki, a device to end institutional fission and introduce a decision-making fusion. At the heart of this arrangement is a tri-polar system of interests; first a Shi‘i-Kurdish compromise to endorse a hydrocarbon law, a revenue-sharing law and federation, and to form a basis for the 80% option of majority rule, should other alternatives fail; second, a Sunni Arab-Kurdish compromise to amend the constitution and subsidiary laws (notably de-Ba‘thification, and the law regulating the authority of the provinces), and incorporate a sizable number of Sunnis in the army, police and bureaucracy, among many other demands; third, a covert Hakim-Hashimi-Maliki understanding to outflank and exclude radicals, such as Sadr and Fadhila (possibly also Ja’fari) on the Shi‘i side, and Adnan Dulaimi, Khalaf al-Ulayan, the Sunni Sahwa tribal force (led in Anbar by Abu Risha family-clan), on the Sunni side.

The new ‘Alliance of the Moderates’ is not that moderate; Hakim’s ISCI is a conservative Islamic outfit, so is the IIP; perhaps only the Da’wa is bereft of such fundamentalist credentials. Its tool of governance, the ‘quartet core’ is hardly cohesive. Its most alarming weakness is its lack of sufficient parliamentary power to sustain a quorum, let alone a decisive majority. Perhaps the best illustration is the failure of the government to endorse the hydrocarbon law, or the implementation of article 140 relative to the final status of Kirkuk (Tamim province). An anti-Kurdish voting bloc easily formed to oppose Kurdish demands on the oil and Kirkuk issues. Much to their dismay, the Kurds discovered that their Shi‘i and Sunni foes, while killing each other with relish, were willing to unite ranks against the Kurds. Centralist or chauvinist sentiments were not wanting among both communal camps of Arab stock. Even the text of the new law on the authority of the provinces dealt a blow to Aziz Hakim’s decentralization drive.

**The Kurds discovered that their Shi‘i and Sunni foes, while killing each other with relish, were willing to unite ranks against the Kurds**

Ironically, the successes scored by the US Surge thus far owe much to the split in the ranks of the Sunni community, namely between local groups that have worldly objectives, and the al-Qaeda lot who have ideological visions. It is also indebted to the monopoly by the US of military operational decisions, bypassing Maliki and his team. The US, however, has failed to bring their military-alliance success into tandem with the political reforms required: broadening political participation, amending the constitution, and providing for reconstruction.

**The Challenges Ahead**

Stuck in their limitations, the Maliki government and its US backers and allies are faced with all the possible drawbacks that delay in political reform might cause.
Reconciliation is a term in wide currency in Iraq nowadays; it has different meanings for different groups though. In general, it embraces three basic issues: broadening political participation; amending the constitution, and drawing a clear-cut schedule for the withdrawal of the US-led coalition forces. These are thorny issues; and their interconnection has proved problematic.

Reconciliation as a process starts with dialogue; and dialogue requires an agreed list of invitees and a common agenda; the list of invitees needs an amnesty, as some of the guests have already been declared ‘terrorists’; the list will also signal a willingness or otherwise to broaden participation, and so on.

The several ‘national dialogue’ conferences held (the last in mid March 2008) have been more about form than substance.

A few steps have been taken, an amnesty and amendment of the de-Ba‘thification law. The government seems incapable of hammering out or committing itself to a clear concept of forming a new broad-based government; while dissolving the militia, Mahdi army, Badr army, and now the Sahwa fighters, is hardly on the agenda, if at all achievable. The Mahdi army, for example, has already adjusted to the ‘Surge’ by reducing its visible presence in Baghdad, lying low in order to avoid direct confrontation, while the insurgency militias have defied the security plan by stepping up their car-bomb, suicide and now the horrific sniper attacks; the Badr group is mainly in uniform, fighting its rivals; the Sahwa lot are sponsored by the guarantor of security itself, the US. Perhaps the long overdue constitutional amendment is even more difficult.

The current constitution has failed to secure national consensus. Not only Sunnis but also Shi‘i factions and Iraqi centrist nationalists have objections. Major contentious issues revolve around the nature and extent of federation, the jurisdiction of local governance, distribution of oil resources, and the power of the presidential council.

The Regional Dimension

Contrary to the recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton report, the centrepiece of Bush’s new strategy has been the old policy of rallying pro-US ‘moderates’ in the region against Iran and Syria. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice initiated the diplomatic effort to build a region-wide anti-Iranian axis (comprising Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt) and build support for the US strategy in Iraq (‘the new unity government’), benefiting from regional concerns over growing Iranian influence, and ‘sectarian’ fears relating to Sunni-Shi‘i tensions. Indeed, the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, the Jordanian monarch King Abdullah II, and other regional leaders have voiced concern over Iran’s growing influence and the fate of Sunnis. Religious leaders, like the Egyptian Sheikh Muhammad Qaradawi, have taken a similar position. Even in countries like Syria and Sudan, there were some backlashes against rumours and press reports alleging attempts to spread Shi‘ism among the Sunni population. The US also took military measures vis-à-vis Iran: an additional carrier strike group and Patriot air-defence systems were deployed to the region. The US also gave special attention to Turkey’s concerns over problems on its borders with Iraq. In addition, recognizing the interconnection with wider Middle East issues, the US launched new efforts to revive the moribund Arab-Israeli peace process.

The Middle East is embroiled in a number of major crises over and above Iraq itself. They include the Arab-Israeli conflict; the US-Iranian stand-off over the Iranian nuclear program; and the US/Saudi-Syrian/Iranian stand-off in Lebanon

This is a recognition that Iraq’s dilemmas are profoundly interlocked with its regional environment, one that presents chronic problems. The Middle East is embroiled in a number of major crises over and above Iraq itself. They include the Arab-Israeli conflict in which the US and Iran/Syria are on opposite sides; the US-Iranian stand-off over the Iranian nuclear program; and the US/Saudi-Syrian/Iranian stand-off in Lebanon. Saudi diplomacy has been active in a series of diplomatic initiatives: the Mecca conference for Iraq (late 2006), the Mecca Fatah–Hamas agreement and attempts to resolve the Lebanese impasse, and the Arab summit of late March 2007. The US, meanwhile, is geared towards rallying a ‘moderate’ Sunni alliance against Iran and Syria. Secretary Rice’s new shuttle diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli conflict aims to strengthen moderates in the region.
Turkey is not an irrelevant player; its military deployment on the Iraqi borders sends strong messages to the Kurds about the latter’s moves to secure a confederal rather than federal status in Iraq.

The Maliki government, however, is more inclined to appease Syria and to develop good relations with Iran. A conflict of policy is apparent. Furthermore, the danger of the sectarian polarization of regional politics has the potential, if exacerbated, to disrupt the Iraqi transition even more. Maliki’s government is painfully aware of this danger. Appeasing and winning over Saudi Arabia and Syria may please Iraqi Sunnis but does not in the least guarantee that Riyadh or Damascus will stop funding and supporting armed Sunni groups. Also, if endorsed by the Maliki government, the appeasement of Syria and/or Saudi Arabia would divide the Shi’i bloc at a critical moment in the political process. Moving closer to Iran, on the other hand, deepens Sunni fears of a Shi’i domination.

The international conference held in Baghdad in early March 2007, followed by the Sharm el-Sheikh meeting of early May, both confirmed a regional and international recognition of the Iraqi government and created the possibility of US contact with Iran and Syria, but the meetings failed to come up with any common agreement or cooperation over the crisis in Iraq. Nevertheless, these meetings constitute inevitable first steps and must be built on so as to work out more agreement on regional and international cooperation, on reinforcing the political and security process in Iraq, and on strengthening the nascent civil war.

In Conclusion

Political fragmentation, weakness, mistrust, lack of imagination, and factional in-fighting rendered the Iraqi government (the cabinet, the presidential council, the parliament and the local governments of the provinces) dysfunctional. The astounding feature is the failure to deliver public goods: services and security. The security breakthrough is well ahead of the political process, which is hampered by factional disunity and monopoly of power.

Elections may not dramatically change power relations, but they can bring new forces and cause new alliances

As the local elections are due in 2008 and the second general elections in 2009, the Islamic parties on both sides of the communal divide seem to be rapidly growing unpopular. Elections may not dramatically change power relations, but they can bring new forces and cause new alliances. The old holistic blocs have already disintegrated; the new offshoots have not yet taken shape.

All in all, Iraq’s democracy is covered with blood; physically at the mercy of death squads, militias, terrorists and mafias; and intellectually under the wing of violent, conservative Islamic ideologies.
My professional colleague Ayman Bardawil, who was born and raised in the southern Gaza Strip town of Rafah, has been living in Ramallah ever since he attended Bir Zeit University, where he got his civil engineering degree. In the past ten years Ayman has worked in television and specifically in animation, and the times he has visited his parents and his siblings' family and friends are fewer than the fingers of his artistic hands. His requests to visit Gaza have often been rejected by the Israelis "because there is no compelling humanitarian reason," an Israeli officer would tell him.

When Ayman’s father lay terminally sick in the summer of 2006 he did get permission from the Israelis to visit. A day after he had returned to Ramallah after his permit expired, his father died and he was unable to travel. Ayman has since moved to Jordan but now, instead of his wanting to visit his family, his mother is looking for ways to escape Gaza.

When Israel was established in 1948 thousands of Palestinians were dispersed, mostly in the nearby West Bank, Gaza, Jordan’s East Bank, Syria and Lebanon. Jordan soon annexed the West Bank, giving Palestinians (refugees or not) Jordanian citizenship. In Gaza, which was quickly overcrowded with refugees, Egypt held the area but Palestinians in Gaza were given travel documents stating that their citizenship is undetermined. Palestinian access to Egypt was restricted, and much of the region’s largely unskilled workforce was dependent on the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), which built and maintained the local refugee camps.

But while in the West bank land was plentiful and a variety of jobs were possible for Palestinians, Gaza’s economic improvement was superficial. Land and water were limited. One third of its land was closed off to make room for a few thousand Jewish settlers. Gaza’s income was largely dependent on workers commuting daily to Israel. At one time over one hundred and fifty thousand Gazans were crossing the Erez checkpoint daily to go and work in Israel and come home at night.

The poverty of Gaza was fertile ground for political activism. Pan Arabism was followed by Palestinian nationalism and finally Islamic militancy. Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, a paraplegic refugee from the village of Jora (now in Israel) north of the Gaza Strip, worked quietly for some time to build up a grass-roots movement. For the most part his initial effort was allowed to continue because the Israeli army wanted to encourage an alternative to the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), whose members were actively resisting the Israeli occupation. Once the Intifada broke out, Yasin’s supporters announced the creation of the Islamic Resistance Movement, better known by its Arabic acronym Hamas. They combined calls for strikes with militarily amaturish attacks on Jewish settlers as well as kidnapping of Israeli soldiers to compete strongly with the predominantly secular PLO groups.

While the first Intifada brought about the Oslo process and the return of the PLO leadership, it failed to produce any real economy in Gaza. High-rise buildings were now evident and with the Palestinian Authority having been allowed to bring with them small arms as part of the agreement with Israel, others like Hamas acquired their own weapons mostly by buying them from Israeli soldiers or on the Israeli black market. Sometime they traded drugs smuggled into Gaza from Sinai for weapons and ammunition. Later, after the Israelis withdrew from Gaza, the tunnel system brought weapons directly from Sinai to Gaza.

The second Palestinian Intifada which erupted in 2000 saw Hamas use the weapons they had amassed
to attack Israelis, and to create their own small protectorate. But the more Hamas and others attacked Israelis, the more the Israelis tightened the siege on Gaza. Within a few years into the 21st century the number of Gazan workers in Israel had been reduced to a few hundred. Along with the rise of poverty and unemployment there was a rise of armed factions, gangs and warlords. The absence of work left young people with little choice but to join whichever group would allow one to have weapons or get some money for being part of this or that militia. The elections of 2006 that swept Hamas into power also produced an international siege that overnight stopped the salaries of all public servants.

With Gazans unable to go to work in Israel and without any resources for economic viability, the Palestinians of Gaza remained totally dependent on the state of Israel, even though Israeli soldiers had left the streets of Gaza and the alleyways of its squalid refugee camps. The fact that Gaza was closed physically and economically meant that with the exception of access to Israeli society (which was mostly as cheap labourers) Gazans were not exposed to other cultures and other experiences.

As the majority of the residents of Gaza were refugees (70%), they naturally had little in the way of family or social roots. Unlike West Bankers (only 10% of whose population are refugees), who still owned the land that they worked and whose population is largely rural, Gazans were living in overpopulated cities where the gun rather than the community was king. Remittances were sent back to the family, but for most young people, having a gun was the only job they understood and which gave them power.

The fact that Gaza was closed physically and economically meant that Gazans were not exposed to other cultures and other experiences

Jerusalem, as a religious, cultural and economic centre of the West Bank provided a cosmopolitan atmosphere that is not present in Gaza. Leading higher educational institutes like Bir Zeit University played a role in cultural openness. My colleague Ayman who studied at Bir Zeit and met Hania, decided to officially move to Ramallah. Most Gazans, however, did not have such a privilege. Once Gaza was besieged, employ-

ment in Israel ended. Two competing military factions for a while were busy resisting the Israeli occupation, but when Israel withdrew Gaza was not opened up either to the West Bank or to Egypt, and a cultural regression began. People like the Bardawils, who had set up in Ramallah, finally moved to Jordan where they got work and a better environment to raise their children.

Meanwhile in Gaza, the desperation and the lack of progress in the peace process coupled with the world’s turning a blind eye to the Palestinians forced the two major Palestinian groups into an ugly civil war. Information now published in Vanity Fair points to a US-funded effort to help the Palestinian secular movement, Fatah, to oust, even by violence, the Hamas militants whose civilian leaders had won the parliamentary elections in February 2006. The senseless killings between Palestinians have hurt the Palestinian cause. Palestinians in the West Bank, where it is rumoured that all available weapons and ammunition have been purchased by militants from one faction or the other, are bracing for possibly some hard days ahead.

The Palestinians have no-one to blame but themselves. Despite the economic and travel embargo that has been placed on Gaza, there is little that anyone can say to explain such madness. The way that attempts at self-government have been carried out leaves little hope for successful peace talks. An outside observer can easily ask: “If you Palestinians can’t learn how to administer power fairly and how to apply the rule of law and understand the meaning of power-sharing and the rotation of power in Gaza, what guarantee is there that you can do that in the rest of the Palestinian territories?”

While the current fighting is a black spot in Palestinian history, some contextualization is necessary. In the next month the Palestinian territories (namely Gaza and the West Bank including Jerusalem) would have been under a foreign, at times very brutal, military occupation that has violated international law by moving Jewish populations into homes built on expropriated Palestinian lands in these areas. The fourth Geneva Convention specifically forbids an occupying power to move its people into areas under occupation. Since the Israelis left Gaza, the only open border for the over one million Palestinians living there has been closed for many more days than it has been open. The Israelis say they regularly close the Rafah crossing point because of the still unresolved problem regarding the imprisonment of an Israeli soldier. Again
such action constitutes collective punishment and is a violation of international law. Furthermore the unjust economic siege in which the international banking system prohibits a single penny from being transferred to an account of the Palestinian Authority has caused extreme poverty and unemployment. With little hope in the present or the future it is only to be expected that the environment should be conducive to chaos such as we see at present.

The Mecca accords between Hamas and Fatah resulted in an agreement in which the dominant legislative power (Hamas) agreed to grant power in order to please the international community and break the unjust economic siege. But, three months into the new national-unity government, no breakthrough with the siege has been witnessed.

Sources from Gaza indicate that the major problem with the current round of fighting was instigated by some of the hard-line officials who were asked to leave in order to make room for the national unity government. Some of these leaders are asking themselves and their comrades what is the sense of sharing power with Fatah if the latter has been unable to deliver the lifting of the economic siege.

One can certainly argue that Hamas cannot put the blame on Fatah for the continuation of the siege. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has repeatedly said that the commitments made by Hamas in Mecca were not enough. It was hoped that they would continue in the path of moderation by moving closer to the demands of the international community.

Whatever arguments are made by this or that person, the pictures coming out of Gaza are not pleasant for anyone supporting the Palestinian cause. As Palestinians were remembering 59 years since the nakbeh (catastrophe) when the Palestinian refugee problem was born, local Palestinian newspapers ran eight column headlines in black and red calling what is happening in Gaza, a new nakbeh. But while remembering the nakbeh is supposed to remind the world of the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their lands and homes, the new nakbeh is threatening to make the dream of an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza as difficult as the right of return is becoming.

One year after the Hamas parliamentary elections and months after internal fighting an agreement was reached in February 2007 in the Saudi holy city of Mecca. The Mecca sulha (reconciliation) signed between the leaders of the two major Palestinian groups, Hamas and Fatah, is being hailed as a major political breakthrough. But the national unity Palestinian government created as a result of this agreement has many daunting internal and external challenges. The Mecca agreement needs to be followed up with an effort to end the economic and administrative siege of Palestine and with serious peace talks with the aim of ending the 39-year-old occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The new government needs to pay its civil servants, restore law and order and end the lawlessness that has become the norm of life in the Palestinian territories.

It is clear to many that the internal fighting in Palestine began in part due to the political impasse caused after Israel and the international community decided to place an economic embargo on the Palestinian Authority. The unjust economic siege which has been religiously enforced by the world banking system (including Arab and Islamic banks) was reportedly due to the failure of the new Palestinian government to submit to the three conditions imposed by the Quartet. The Quartet, made up of the USA, the UN, the EU and Russia, had called on the Hamas-led government to recognize Israel, to accept previously signed agreements between the PLO and Israel and to renounce terrorism.

Palestinians complained that the international community had unjustly imposed an economic siege simply because they were not happy with the free and fair elections in the Palestinian territories. The elections, supervised by international observers headed by former US President Jimmy Carter, had resulted in the overwhelming victory of supporters of the Hamas Islamic movement. The government created after the January 2006 elections has been unable to pay civil servants because of the international banking blockade and the refusal of Israel to transfer to its account tens of millions of tax dollars collected by the occupying power on behalf of the Palestinian people.

After months without pay, the government headed by Hamas’s Ismael Haniyeh was confronted with a serious challenge in September 2006, when civil servants went on strike demanding to be paid. The differences between the Fatah-led Presidency of Mahmoud Abbas and the Islamist government spilled into the streets. The threats by President Abbas to hold elections to resolve the deadlock seemed to pour oil on the fire.

With unemployment rising, income dropping to record low levels, and internal tensions escalating, the internal Palestinian fibre began to disintegrate, dipping into
internal fighting between Palestinians supporting either Hamas or Fatah. Attempts to reconcile the warring groups took place in Gaza, and then moved to Egypt, to Damascus, and finally bore fruit in Mecca under the aegis of the Saudi pro-US King Abdallah, whose country has been a financial backer of the Palestinians for decades. The challenge now is to find a way to get beyond simply ending the internal fighting through the creation of a national unity government. One of the first challenges for the new government is to convince the international community that this new government respects previous Palestinian agreements. This includes the PLO-Israel mutual recognition and the Oslo accords. By announcing the acceptance of previous agreements and supporting the Arab peace initiative, the new government should be able to bring economic normality to the cash-strapped Palestinian Authority. The newly established national unity government had another daunting challenge ahead of it. If the scenes of internal killings and property destruction are not to be repeated, a new overall internal security policy needs to be implemented. The numerous militias, groups, gangs and individuals owning and using arms are dangerous. The new unity government should have insisted on the need for a single and united armed force. In order to end lawlessness the Palestinian security leadership will need to lift the protection given to armed individuals who have been using their weapons with impunity to injure, kill and destroy property. Law and order needs to be the mantra of the unity government if Palestinian leaders from all factions expect the pessimistic Palestinian public to have faith in them again.

When the reconciliation between the leaders of the two major Palestinian groups, Hamas and Fatah, that has just been negotiated in Saudi Arabia, was signed, it was hailed as a major political breakthrough, but there was clearly trouble ahead. The national unity government created as a result of this agreement faced many daunting challenges. The agreement needed to be followed by an effort to end the economic and administrative siege of Palestine, as well as serious peace talks with Israel aimed at ending the 39-year occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At home, the new government needs to pay its civil servants, restore law and order, and end the chaos that has become the norm in the Palestinian territories. The national unity did not last very long. By June 2007 the fighting had not only resurfaced but had resulted in a clear military victory for the Hamas militias. The national security forces loyal to the Palestinian President were routed and had to flee to Egypt and to the West Bank via Israel. Hamas declared their own separatist government headed by the leader of their parliamentary list, Ismael Haniyeh. President Abbas declared the actions a coup and an illegal revolt against the legitimate government, and has cut off all ties with Hamas and its government since. While public servants are still being paid by Abbas from Ramallah, the legal and administrative situation is very messy. The world has refused to recognize the Hamas government in Gaza although Egypt has continued a dialogue with the aim of working out modalities for a solution with Fatah as well as a cease-fire with Israel, where the two sides are trading do-it-yourself rockets on the one side and helicopter missiles from the Israeli side.

The past two years have been among the most difficult years in modern Palestinian history. For years, the world envied the Palestinian people’s strong social fibre, as they held together despite the occupation. With a strong sense of national identity, Palestinians boasted that they had a clear unifying purpose: ending the Israeli occupation and establishing an independent and democratic state.

But the infighting has left a deep wound among the Palestinians. If that wound is to heal, much effort must be exerted to restore a functioning economy, strengthen internal security, and improve Palestinians’ relations with their neighbours and the international community.

The story of the family of Ayman Bardawil is a telling one. “Sometimes when I call her she asks me what I am still doing here,” he says about his mother. Shortly after the end of the internal conflict she was very worried. Even though the situation appeared quiet with no-one left for the victorious Hamas militants to fight, the pleas of Ayman’s mother to leave Gaza are getting louder. Her son is a political leader with Fatah and while he is able to continue his political activity, the mother doesn’t trust the present quiet that Gaza is enjoying now and is worried about the long-term future of living in Gaza. Mrs. Bardawil’s apprehensions are not unique.

For now, families like the Bardawils who are unable to emigrate are hoping that the present one-party control will not last very long. Once multi-party rule returns to Gaza, they hope that the genuine rule of law and democratic principles will replace the rule of the gun and thus allow a true return of power to the source of power, the people.
On 13th September 2006, the former Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) published on its website a communication entitled “Communication and good news.” Emir Abû Mus’ab ʿAbd al-Wadūd (whose real name is Abdelmalek Droukdel) announced that al-Qaeda’s leaders responded favourably to the request to join Osama Bin Laden’s organisation. He noted that, after long talks and contacts that lasted for more than one year, good news had arrived: “The GSPC is now under the banner of al-Qaeda. Its soldiers and leaders swore allegiance to Sheikh Osama Bin Laden.” After recalling that “Zionists and Christians have allied with the apostate slaves in order to call for total war on Islam,” he pointed out that the victory of Islam can only come after the union between the different groups of the Jihad. Only the al-Qaeda organisation is, according to him, capable of guiding the global Jihad and this is why “the GSPC, which considers itself to be one brick (labîna), among others, in the construction of the Islamic State” puts itself at the disposal of its Emir and leader Osama Bin Laden.

On 24th January 2007, a second communication signed by the same Emir, Abû Mus’ab ʿAbd al-Wadūd, announced the change of name of the GSPC, which would now be called Organisation of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). He justified this as follows: “After the GSPC joined al-Qaeda’s organisation and after having sworn allegiance to the current lion of Islam, Osama Bin Laden, God save him […], the group had to change its name in order to demonstrate the veracity of the union, the strength of the understanding and the sincerity of the link between the Mujahidins in Algeria and their al-Qaeda brothers. We were concerned with changing our name from the day we joined but we could not do so before consulting Sheikh Osama Bin Laden.”

Henceforth, all attacks would carry this new label and be in the name of its Emir, Abû Mus’ab, the successor of Abû Hamza (alias Hassan Hattab). While the latter had preferred to rejoin those who had responded to the call of the authorities for national reconciliation, Emir Droukdel preferred to radicalise his position. Through a communication, dated 12th January 2005, he publicly dissociated himself from his predecessor. Henceforth, no concession would be made to the “apostate leaders,” the “supporters of the cross and its slaves.” There would be a notable outbreak of bombings, skirmishes and deadly mopping-up operations.

GSPC: The Long Road Towards Al-Qaeda

Since its creation in 1998, the GSPC has distanced itself from the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) conforming to the positions of al-Qaeda, whose spokesmen had denounced the excesses of the GIA on the occasion of the massacres that had taken place in different towns in the mid-1990s. The year 1997 had been particularly marked by these hecatombs where thousands of villagers from the centre and the west of the country had been savagely murdered. The horrifying massacre committed in Bentalha, on the eve of 22nd September 1997 on the eastern outskirts of Algiers and which in one night had cost the lives of more than 400 citizens, exemplifies this perspective. On 30th December that same year, a horrible carnage marked the first day of Ramadan in three villages located several kilometres from Relizane, in the west of the country (Kherarba, Ouled Sahnine and Ouled Tayeb). The number of men, women and children murdered by armed men came close to
400 people. The year 1998 opened with another massacre perpetrated on 4th January in Ramka and Had Chekala (Relizane). The number of victims amounted to around 1,000 according to A. Ouyahya, the Head of Government at that time. These massacres had damaged the reputation of the GIA in terms of their support in the country and abroad. In order to recover this lost support, the GSPC was created in 1998 and it decided to re-focus its attacks mainly against the power and its symbols. Since its birth, the GSPC has emerged as a righter of the wrongs occasioned in the name of the Jihad through the deviations of the GIA. The State, which has acquired experience in terms of fight against terrorism, finally cuts off the armed groups from most of their support, placing them in a critical situation from a practical point of view and even forcing them to turn against those who in the past provided them with all kinds of assistance and logistics. Moreover, the relative success of the reconciliation policy which managed to rally certain members of these armed groups to a process of national reconciliation had further weakened the advocates of the Jihad, obliging them to search for outside support. The contribution lost at a local level had to be replaced by joining with al-Qaeda and other jihadist groups acting in Iraq, Afghanistan or elsewhere. In exchange for a more active support on the part of the ideologists of the international Jihad, which had ceased due to disapproval of the methods of the GIA, the GSPC agreed to join al-Qaeda’s main line of action. It was out of these circumstances that the GSPC was born. After a testing period and in order to mark its distance in relation to those who the authorities managed to convince within the framework of the reconciliation policy, the GSPC once again requested and obtained from the heads of al-Qaeda stronger approval of its affiliation with Osama Bin Laden’s organisation.

This change of course and of strategy had to be “publicised” and this was achieved by the spectacular attack of 11th April 2007 against the Palace of the Government in the very centre of Algiers. Now known as AQIM, it managed to prove that the combatants of the former GSPC continued to be present and powerful, belying the official discourses that regarded them as moribund and in dire straits. The targets chosen for this first major attack were symbolic enough to sow the seeds of trouble within the heart of the State, whose representatives had until then managed to minimise the media impact of the attacks, which had never ceased.

Although 1997 could be regarded as a year of massacres, 2007 is unquestionably the year of the suicide bomber

This commotion provided evidence that the members of the former GSPC were well and truly within al-Qaeda’s line of action. At the same time, in terms of the local context, it is a way of stating through the acts that they were first soldiers of God rather than mere political candidates. A soldier of God must give up searching or waiting for gratification on Earth: he must devote himself completely to the cause of God until the supreme sacrifice. This is what the communications and acts of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb try to emphasize.

2007, the Year of the Suicide Bomber

As in previous years, 2007 was marked by violent events on a daily basis. Every day people fell victim to bullets or explosives. The confrontations between

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<th>ATTACKS FOR WHICH AL- QAEDA’S ORGANISATION IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQIM) CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY</th>
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<tr>
<td>13th February: 6 people killed in Kabilya in 7 almost simultaneous attacks with bombs and car bombs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11th April: At least 30 dead and more than 200 injured in 2 almost simultaneous attacks in Algiers, one against the Palace of the Government in the town centre and the other perpetrated with the aid of two car bombs against a police station on the eastern outskirts.</td>
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<td>11th July: 10 soldiers killed and 35 injured in Lakhdaria (south-east Algiers) in a suicide attack carried out with a refrigerated lorry loaded with explosives against a barracks.</td>
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<td>6th September: 22 dead and more than 100 injured in a suicide attack against President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s retinue in Batna.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8th September: 32 dead and 45 injured in a suicide attack using a car bomb against a coastguard barracks in Dellys, port of Kabylia, 70 kilometres east of Algiers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>21st September: Close to Lakhdaria, a suicide attack against a bus carrying the employees of the French public works group Razel with 9 people injured (among them 2 French people and 1 Italian).</td>
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<tr>
<td>11th December: 2 attacks rocked the capital and ravaged the headquarters of the Constitutional Council and that of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with 41 dead and more than 170 injured.</td>
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the police and the armed opposition were increasingly bloodier and limited to the circles of the main rivals. Henceforth, the attacks by groups of armed police patrols and their barrack buildings supplanted the isolated targets. The objectives were those put forward by al-Qaeda’s organisation: the State, its symbols and its auxiliaries. Among the strategies employed, the use of explosives and car bombs multiplied. But throughout 2007, the appearance of suicide bombers especially called attention. Although 1997 could be regarded as a year of massacres, 2007 is unquestionably the year of the suicide bomber.

In fact, 2007 really started for the AQIM in the early morning of 11th April, when two suicide attacks with car bombs, carried out almost simultaneously, hit the Palace of the Government in the centre of Algiers and a police station on the eastern outskirts of the capital. The cost was relatively high: around thirty dead and more than two hundred injured. Unexpected and spectacular, those attacks carried out almost at the same time in two highly symbolic places of Algiers came, in the space of a few minutes, after several months of efforts of all kinds to rekindle the link of confidence between the State, its apparatus and citizens.

The spectacle, the nature of the targets reached and the procedure used made this attack on authority a masterstroke that managed to weaken the confidence that the citizens had started to place in the State and its reconciliation policy. This attack tolled the bell for a period of relative calm and disturbed a partially reconstructed peace. The day after this attack, the American Ambassador in Algiers had considered it necessary to warn against other possible attacks by the AQIM. The Algerian authorities protested vigorously against what they considered an intrusion into Algerian affairs which could only sow the seeds of further trouble and panic. This panic would be all the more stronger three days later, on 14th April 2007, when some suicide bombers blew themselves up in front of the American Consulate in Casablanca, causing panic in the neighbouring country and suggesting the power of the organisation beyond the Algerian borders, as its new acronym sought to signify. The warnings of the Embassy of the United States in Algeria about new attacks were confirmed and the anxiety reached its paroxysm in the police services and among the citizens of the two targeted countries.

Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb therefore managed to mark the beginning of its new strategy in Algeria and in the Maghreb, as well as the opening of a new more active and more determined jihadist era. Four months after its allegiance to Sheik Osama Bin Laden, the test was now complete: the GSPC had become international and an active branch of al-Qaeda even if no organic bond is proven. The link is in the first place symbolic and ideological. The al-Qaeda label would have to provide media coverage for operations decided and executed on site in function of the possibilities offered by a highly enclosed security field.

When the public started to believe that terrorism was over, al-Qaeda in the Maghreb hit a serious blow and called that attack Badr of the Muslim Maghreb (Ghazwat Badr al-magrib al-islami). The reference to the battle of Badr was deliberate. It was the first major victorious battle of the Muslims led by the Prophet against the clan of Quraysh, which was behind his exile in Medina. This battle is symbolic because it was won by a small group of Muslims against an enemy who had a larger number of combatants. Moreover, it marked the beginning of the conquest of power by the followers of Islam. Following the example of the Prophet’s companions, the members of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb believe in the possibility that a small group of followers can substitute an army of unbelievers. Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb now follows this spirit: fewer but more determined!

Three months later, on 11th July, a military camp located in the east of the town of Lakhdaria (90 km from Algiers) was the target of an unusual attack. A suicide bomber at the wheel of a refrigerated lorry which usually provided this barracks with goods was able to enter and blow up his lorry filled with explosives. Ten soldiers died and more than thirty were injured. In September the Head of State was targeted in Batna. A suicide bomber blew himself up amidst the crowd waiting for the presidential retinue. The attack resulted in twenty dead and more than one hundred injured. Abdelaziz Bouteflika reacted by reaffirming the “strategic and irreversible choice of the Algerian people” regarding the national reconciliation policy: “We will not abandon it, whatever the price to be paid.”

Two days later, a 15-year-old teenager blew himself up in a coastguard barracks in Dellys, in the wilaya of Boumerdès. The cost was high: 34 dead and around 60 injured. Some ten days later another suicide attack took place in Lakhdaria, in the wilaya of Bouira, against a vehicle carrying employees of a French company. The year ended with a final spectacular action. On 11th December two attacks rocked the capital and ravaged the headquarters of the Constitutional Council and that of the UNHCR (two highly symbolic targets), resulting in 41 dead and more than 170 injured.
Al-Qaeda, a (Shared) Communication Label

Since the rupture with the ideologists of the international Jihad, the armed Islamist opposition has not ceased searching for support capable of providing media coverage for their combat in the geopolitical scene and, above all, for legitimating it from a theological point of view.

How to respond to all those muftis who are increasingly condemning this Jihad whose main targets are Muslims? An authority like that of Ayman az-Zawahiri, is necessary to challenge someone like Sheik Youssef Al-Qaradâwî, who vigorously condemned the attacks in Algeria. Osama Bin Laden’s lieutenant censures the Sheik of al Azhar as follows: “Qaradhâwî believes the main murderers and accuses the Mujahidine of lying. In his fatwa he has referred again to what had happened in the towns of Batna and Delys, presenting the events as the murder of innocents and as an acceptance of the legality of making the blood of innocents flow. Thus, he repeats the lies of the criminal Algerian regime. The operation in Delys was aimed at a naval base rather than a school. As for that of Batna, it aimed to kill the criminal President who has killed thousands of innocent civilians, who fights Islam, refuses to apply the Sharia, is loyal to the United States and France, and recognises Israel because it belongs to the United Nations and supports the Arab capitulation initiative.”

If the combatants, isolated and increasingly cut off from their support, find a real interest in joining an international organisation which makes life difficult for its most determined rivals, it is possible to ask what benefit this organisation can derive, in its turn, from this alliance? The benefits are in fact shared. Al-Qaeda multiplies the centres of extremist activities thereby trying to loosen the noose around it in Baghdad and in Afghanistan. In the eyes of its adversaries, it is still a force to be reckoned with and can choose the time and place to attack. Al-Qaeda’s attacks in the Maghreb also offer the opportunity to speak with strength and be the voice of all oppressed. This is how after the 11th December attacks in Algiers which rocked the headquarters of the United Nations, the Constitutional Council and the police academy, Ayman az-Zawahiri, the number two of al-Qaeda, could state: “The United Nations is the declared enemy of Islam: it has legitimated the creation of the State of Israel on Muslim land; it considers Chechnya as part of the Russia of the crusaders; it considers Ceuta and Melilla as part of the Spain of the crusaders. And it has also legitimated the presence of crusaders in Afghanistan and in Iraq [...], it has legitimated the independence of Timor from Indonesia, while it does not recognise this right to Chechnya or the Muslims of the Caucasus, of Cashmere, of Ceuta and Melilla or of Bosnia.”

AQIM’s members, strong with the support of al-Qaeda’s leaders who approve and sanction their actions, no longer hesitate to assume them publicly and publish photos of their perpetrators on the Internet.

An Undesirable Evolution

The most remarkable new characteristic of the 2007 attacks is probably the procedure adopted. For the first time, the suicide attack was clearly called for by those who had orderer it and the material authors.

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Many questions have been asked about those responsible for the 11th April attacks: were they suicide bombers without realising, or declared suicide bombers, voluntary candidates for death? Public powers are trying to reassure themselves in relation to such an evolution in the modes of action and at first put forward other explanations suggesting that suicide bombers can be so unaware. The will to minimise the symbolic scope of such an act clashes with the reality of obstinate facts.

The answer would come in a communication signed, as was right and proper, by Emir Abû Mus’ab in the name of AQIM. The communication recalls that the choice of such a strategy was not dictated by a lack of logistical means and that it was to be expected that the list of suicide bombers would lengthen. In fact, the

1 On the occasion of the spectacular attack of 6th September aimed at the presidential retinue in Batna, the condemnation (first oral and later in writing) had been argued more vigorously and at length than following the 11th April attacks. See the text of the letters on the website of Al-Qaradâwî, consulted on April/May 2007.
answer was aimed at all those who were trying to reassure themselves by minimising the scope of these acts, attributing them to the confusion of a group in dire straits. These operations are not, as the first official reactions led us to suppose, avatars of attempts that failed or fomented strategies without the knowledge of their author. From the point of view of their intellectual authors, it is a new progression which is not due to a weakness of the means, as one might think, but rather would be the consequence of a better practical preparation. The different statements of Islamists of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb declare it proudly as a new way of acting.

The official discourse has constantly spoken of the “difficulties” of the terrorist groups due to the defections and dissensions. If anything is true in these affirmations, it is also true that the several thousand combatants remaining are more mobilised than ever and determined to die as martyrs. On 11th April 2007, terrorists hit the heart of the State and, later, on the occasion of the failed attack in Batna on 8th September of that same year, they tried to hit the head by targeting the presidential retinue.

Although the facts were well established and proved that the attacks that started on 11th April 2007 fell within the category of suicide attacks, some still awaited a disagreement within the armed groups over the use of such procedures. Through a communication, dated 14th May 2007, the information committee of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb categorically denied what it considers allegations concerning the existence of internal dissensions on the use of the method of suicide operations (‘amalyât istish’hâdiya). On the contrary, it notes that there is a consensus on such a method that delights the combatants who had waited for it for such a long time. According to this same communication, if this option has taken a while to materialise, it is only because of a lack of preparation and it foresees that henceforth the list of candidates for martyrdom (al-istishhâdiyîn) will be longer everyday.

The Suicide Bomber and the Voluntary Martyr

The comparative biographies in the press agree on a certain number of points. The resulting profile of the suicide bomber is that of a new internal convert, a kind of recent born-again, in his thirties, with a precarious social and economic situation, who has already been in prison, mostly for minor offences or for his Islamist past. Some of our suicide bombers seem to have benefited from the pardon offered by the reconciliation law. This reopens the controversy over this law, exemplified by the first declaration of the Head of State after the attack in Batna, which he had just escaped, in which he reasserted his reconciliation policy. This average profile is not always respected. Two cases fundamentally question it: that of Belkacemi Nabil (alias Abû Muç‘ab az-Zarqâwî), the 15-year old teenager who blew himself up in the coastguard barracks in Delys, in the wilaya of Boumerdès; and that, even stranger, of the suicide bomber who perpetrated the attack against the UN headquarters in Hydra, Chebli Brahîm, alias Abû ‘Uthmân, also known as `ammi Brahîm, given his advanced age. He was sixty-four!

Beyond the insurmountable differences, these figures could coincide in a kind of total disillusionment with the political and social policy in the country. They would have preferred other values and another ethic, however utopian. Neither the vocabulary used nor the spirit of these imagined values form part of the character of the suicide bomber. From the point of view of those who ordered these attacks and of their material authors, they are not suicide bombers. Islamists prefer the term istish’hâdî (pl. istish’hadiyûn), which can be translated as (voluntary) candidate, to that of martyr, a term popularised by the Palestinians in the second Intifada. The religious and political elites have widely debated its licit aspect. The famous Egyptian mufti Al-Qaradhâwî, who himself condemned the attack in Batna the following day, had previously contributed to making the status of istish’hâd licit for the Palestinians by stating that the author of such an attack did not commit suicide since he had sacrificed himself for a just cause. Al-Qaradhâwî distinguished between the istish’hâd and the suicide (intihâr). For this very influential wise man, “the suicide (al-muntahir) kills himself and for himself, while this other (the istish’hâd) offers his person as a sacrifice for his religion and his community. The suicide is desperate [...] and the mudjâhid places his complete faith in God. The suicide breaks free of himself and his problems by killing himself while the mudjâhid combats the enemy of God and his enemy with this new weapon placed by destiny (al-qâdar) in the hands of the oppressed (mustad’afín) to resist the tyranny (al-djabarût) of the proud and powerful.”

The debates aroused by the confrontation of Muslims first in Palestine and later in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere have enriched and made the notion of martyr...
to evolve by introducing a distinction between the *shahīd* and the *istish’hādî*. The latter is someone who has decided “to become a *shahīd*”, while the traditional *shahīd* is someone who has gone into combat as a *mudjāhid* waiting for a victory in life but has been surprised by death before he could see his wish fulfilled. The members of the AQIM make a clear distinction between the shahid and the istish’hādî, as shown by the communication of 11th December 2007 by which they claimed responsibility for the double attack against the Constitutional Council and the United Nations headquarters in Algiers. The communication dedicated this operation to one of the main members shot down by the police in October 2007. Entitled *Ghazwat ash-shahid Sūfyān Abī Haydara*, the communication makes a clear distinction between this *shahīd* (martyr) fallen in combat and the istish’hādîyûn who have just accomplished these two operations (*`amaliyatayn istish’hadiyatan*) in order, among other reasons, to avenge him.

The different translations of the Arabic name, such as suicide bomber or *homme-bombe*, are used as a metaphor of the *istish’hādî* but at the same time trivialize his act by reducing it to a mere suicide operation. The debate between those who consider the act as a mere suicide operation and those who attribute to it a more idealistic dimension actually expresses two logics of perception. A conception forged in an increasingly shared spirit and culture of Islam, which considers this act as a sacrifice sometimes elevated to the level of a religious obligation. The other conception, closer from the western point of view and which also has supporters among Muslims (including Arab and Palestinian), considers the suicide attack both as a suicide and a criminal act.

Al-Qaradhâwî’s “theory” was resumed as a guarantee by many groups who attacked the declared enemies of Islam. The trivialization that followed has meant that other groups have seized it, including those who oppose the Arab regimes considered enemies of Islam. However, the phenomenon is neither new nor characteristic of Islam. In this start of millennium, suicide operations have multiplied through the different conflicts of the world we live in and the armed Islamists in Algeria seem to embrace a more global movement, therefore forming part of this fabric woven by the jihadists worldwide, well-symbolised by the Internet, where they have a strong presence.

If the Iranian revolution has had any influence, it is dangerous to attribute the phenomenon to the Shiite conception of the martyr. Such a martyr culture only partially explains how a project of life becomes a project of death. Several logics come together to form the candidate for martyrdom, the potential *shahīd* and the future *istish’hādī*.

To conclude, it is important to point out a phenomenon which could develop in the shadow of the violence of the last few years until becoming a mode of action at least as formidable as the suicide attack. We refer to kidnappings, which in 2007 had many victims. Whether they are in fact committed by armed groups or other actors, they have become a firm reality. In 2007 they reached worrying levels even according to the police who usually minimises the impact of the turbulences that affect the country. According to the declarations made in the Senate on 15th May 2008 by Yazid Zerhouni, the Minister of Home Affairs, and reported by the national press, 375 cases of kidnapping were recorded in 2007. According to the Minister, 260 cases are minor offences while 115 cases of kidnapping have a direct connection with terrorism. In both cases, kidnapping has become one of the expressions of the confrontations and undoubtedly some of these kidnappings could have been perpetrated by armed groups opposed to power. In this case, these kidnappings could suggest that the practical resources of these forces have diminished. The repression and the changing of power have cut the armed groups off from their traditional support. Kidnapping might have become one of the means to fund the conflict as, according to the same declarations by the Minister, the parents of the victims often agree to the demands of the kidnappers and pay the ransom requested, sometimes (perhaps usually) without warning the public authorities.

The most emblematic case is that of the abduction of the brother of a wealthy entrepreneur of public works on 25th April 2007. The kidnappers obtained a ransom of perhaps 25 billion centimes for his liberation, according to the testimony of the victim to the court of Tizi Ouzou which judged the case, and before which he was able to recognise two of her kidnappers on file as belonging to a terrorist group.

References

Iran, a Geopolitical Player in the Middle East

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Iran is an immense country with a national identity marked by the self-esteem of those who know they form part of a great civilisation. Geography also plays a part in Iran’s desire to become a great regional power. This nation state is located at a strategic intersection between the Arab, Turkish, Russian and Indian worlds. It is a key point of transit for the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Indian subcontinent and for three seas: the Caspian, Persian/Arabian and the Sea of Oman. Nevertheless, it has never been an expansionist regional power. Iran has no tradition of invading neighbouring countries, although this does not mean that it has not experienced growing frustration recently in light of its potential regional power combined with the scant chances of exercising it. When it once again claimed its place as a sovereign country under the nationalist government of Mohammad Mossadeq, the US and Britain arranged a coup in 1953 to make it into a local “client state,” to act as a kind of pro-Western vassal state throughout the Cold War, until 1979. The Iranian revolution, which led to an Islamic Republic in accordance with the philosophy of Ayatollah Khomeini, saw the start of a period of isolation and sanction which once again, albeit in a different way, prevented it from fulfilling its potential for exercising regional leadership.

Aware as it is of its potential, Iran is the most traditional Middle Eastern state and the strongest defender of “regionalism”, that is, of developing a strong regional system amongst local players, whilst deeming counterproductive policies of military alliances with foreign powers, such as those practised by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, which aim to compensate for their vulnerability through foreign protection and not that of regional Middle Eastern powers, a phenomenon that has increased enormously since the 1990s.

Despite its isolation and the sanctions, Iran has not missed the opportunity, whenever the situation so permits, to show its important role as a regional player, albeit without securing significant results. During the 1991 Gulf War, its position of collaborating with the international anti-Iraqi alliance, in 1997 with Tehran acting as venue of the Islamic Conference Organisation summit and, later on, showing its collaboration in the “war against terror” by detaining a number of people on the list of terrorist suspects. Nevertheless, it has been US policy since its invasion of Iraq, and all the regional consequences that this has entailed, which has opened the door to Iran progressively becoming a regional player. However, this role, even though it is today significantly more important than it was before, should also not be overestimated.

Factors in Iran’s Favour

Iran’s goal, or “dream”, is to be respected as a great regional power. However, as long as it remains the great enemy of the only global superpower, this will not be possible. The fact is that said superpower sees it as a long-term problem for its policy in the Middle-East. However, Iran plays its hand the best it can, despite being surrounded by US military bases in Iraq, the Gulf States, Afghanistan and Central Asia. On the one hand, there is Iraq and the Shiite question. Amongst the inevitable contradictions arising from the US’s erratic policy in Iraq is that of empowering Shiite players. Indeed, it is precisely those Iraqi Shiite groups with the closest historical and political links to Iran that the US has placed in government in the country: the Islamic Dawa Party, to which Iraqi
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki belongs, and the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), led by Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. Yet, nevertheless, it is the Iraqi Shiite player most independent of Tehran and over whom it has less influence, Muqtada al-Sadr, who has become the great Shiite enemy of the US in Iraq. Relations between Iran and Muqtada al-Sadr are complex, but the latter – a convinced Iraqi nationalist – will never be the Iranian client that al-Hakim has always been. This could lead to Tehran and Washington joining forces in the battle against al-Sadr sometime in the future but this would, in turn, show that it is precisely in Iraq (or, at least, what remains of the country) that the US needs dialogue with and the cooperation of the Iraqians. Therefore, Baghdad became, on 27th May 2007, the only place where the Americans had meetings with Iranian officials, reluctantly acknowledging the regional role to which Iran aspires.

Other significant errors have favoured the political protagonism of Shiite players in the Middle East. In Lebanon, Israel’s failed war against Hezbollah in Sumer 2006 bolstered the latter’s position as a key political player in the country. Hezbollah is, above all, a Lebanese party, whose frame of reference is clearly within its nation-state, but given the required strategic alliances needed by every player in the region, Syria and Iran provide clear focuses of support. The manifest foreign interference in current Lebanese politics strengthens Iran’s policy of strengthening the Middle East through alliances of states in the region and thus opens up to it the ability to influence Hezbollah’s “regionalist” view.

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In Palestine, the extreme policy of embargo and isolation against Hamas, practised by the US, Israel, the EU and the Palestinian National Authority itself (which governs the West Bank), has been a significant contributory factor to Iran gaining entry for the first time to this area, which is so important and symbolic to Arabs and Muslims alike, providing economic support that the Palestinian Islamist party (which is Sunni and not historically associated with Iran) has inevitably received with relief. Additionally, given the possibility of an attack on Iran by the US, using the nuclear question as an excuse but with the clear goal of changing the regime, it should not be forgotten that 75% of the world’s oil reserves lie in the Gulf and that 70% of the population of its Arab countries is Shiite. This population has, been historically marginalised and excluded from Sunni-held power structures and its loyalty to the State is therefore shaky, to say the least.

In Afghanistan, Iranian influence has also been seen on important occasions. The case of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former mujahidin forged in the heat of the war against the Soviets, is particularly noteworthy. Hekmatyar returned to Afghanistan in February 2002 when Iran released him from the “controlled exile” under which he was held by the country’s authorities. Although a stable Afghanistan is key to Iran’s interests (which are seriously affected by numerous Afghan refugees and drug trafficking from the country), the US’s threatening policy against Iran convinced the government in Tehran that the priority for its security was not to contribute to that of Afghanistan, but rather to create problems for the US in the latter country by freeing the notorious warlord Hekmatyar, who immediately began contributing to the armed destabilisation of the country.

Tehran is also carrying out an active foreign policy eastwards, where it is strengthening its leadership and countering the US’s energetic hegemony in the Gulf by establishing close relations, both commercial and energy-based, with its eastern neighbours via the Iran-Russia-India corridor, without forgetting the ties in this area, which are increasingly linking Iran with China. In other words, Tehran is playing its hand in the area as an energy security player. This policy is being headed by Iran’s Foreign Minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, who studied in Bangalore, India. Thus it is that Iran’s “regionalism” is becoming a kind of “panregionalism.”

Factors Working against Iran

Without taking into account the fact that being considered “Public Enemy Number 1” by the only world superpower might be considered something of a handicap, other factors also obstruct Iran’s way to the leadership it seeks in the Middle East. Iran’s regime, far from being monolithic, suffers from great internal division and fragmentation which hin-
ders its ability to provide regional leadership. There is a lack of consensus on the direction the country should take internally, how to manage the nuclear issue, relations with the US and the regional role that Iran should play. This is due to the discrepancies and rivalry between the members of its political class. And this, in turn, means that Iran’s leaders act more in their own interests than those of the country. The result? Institutional paralysis due to factionalism (e.g. Iran wants to form part of the World Trade Organisation, but the liberal reforms required to achieve this goal go against the interests of a key sector of its leadership, whose power is based on controlling around 80% of the country’s economy) and internal disputes on the direction to be followed in foreign policy. One significant example of this is provided by the virulent criticism directed against President Ahmadinejad’s policy by a top politician, Hassan Rowhani, who is close to Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and representative of the “Supreme Leader”, Ayatollah Khamenei, on the Supreme National Security Council, has made clear on a number of occasions his opposition to the President’s provocative style and his position in favour of improving relations with the West and the USA: “The USA is our enemy (...) but even the Prophet signed peace agreements with the infidels” (...) “One can respect another because he has a knife in his hands, but this is very different from the respect one has for him due to his knowledge, his ethics and his science.” Additionally, Ahmadinejad has surrounded himself with a political elite that has become unpopular due to its administrative incompetence, particularly in the field of economic policy. Nevertheless, this incompetence does not mean that the country is moving towards a popular revolt in the case of foreign attack, as some US strategists have been suggesting. Iran’s nuclear programme is the source of widespread patriotic pride.

With regard to Iran’s influence of Shiite Islam, one should also bear in mind the division existing in the world of Shiite religious authority: although this influence is a source of power for Tehran in the Middle East, Lebanon’s and Iraq’s Shiite religious leaders have on a number of occasions made declarations more in line with their respective national interests than with any unconditional alliance with Iran.

In Iraq, the influence that has until now allowed Iran to strengthen its position, even before the US, may in the future depend on developments with the organisation led by Muqtada al-Sadr, who has stated on a number of occasions that he does not want Iran to become involved in Iraqi affairs. If al-Sadr increases his popularity and power at the expense of al-Hakim’s SIIC and the Shiite coalition around Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, Iran would lose influence in the country. Al-Sadr’s form of Shiism is more “Iraqi” and enjoys great popularity amongst the most disenfranchised Shiites. Moreover, not only has it eliminated any anti-Sunni rhetoric, but it also boasts close relation with those Iraqi Sunni sectors that share his radical opposition to the US occupation and the idea of conserving Iraqi territorial unity, rejecting the creation of an autonomous Shiite region in the south, an idea that has, nevertheless, been defended by Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim. Added to this is the fact that Iran’s great ally, Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, is ill and does not appear able to control Iraq’s Shiite community for much longer. His successor, Ammar al-Hakim, neither enjoys Muqtada’s popularity nor appears able to ensure with his charisma the unity of the SIIC and its powerful al-Badr militia after al-Hakim’s death. Iran is aware of this fact, which undoubtedly worries it, because any cooperation with al-Sadr will always be limited and he will never become another al-Hakim, and because, for this reason, the strategic value of Iran’s role in Iraq in US eyes and its ability to share influence with them will be diminished.

Another important factor that should be borne in mind when considering Iranian influence in the Middle East is how events progress in the Lebanon and Syria. In the former country, everything depends on Hezbollah’s experiences and whether it gains or loses strength. Should Lebanon descend into a civil war, or should another war with Israel weaken it, Iranian influence will also be affected. Similarly, should negotiations between Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights progress, the relationship between Damascus and Hezbollah would be harmed.

**Should negotiations between Israel and Syria on the Golan Heights progress, the relationship between Damascus and Hezbollah would be harmed**

In conclusion, almost everything remains to be written on the real emergence of Iran as a regional power in the Middle East. There is no doubt that there are clear indications that it has significant advantages that it did not previously enjoy. However, now more than ever, everything in the region is temporary.
Before it was emptied of a large part of its substance by inter-European negotiations during the first quarter of 2008, the French Mediterranean Union project disrupted routine European-Mediterranean relations throughout 2007. Launched by Nicolas Sarkozy in Toulon on 7th February, in the middle of the election campaign, the project was ceremoniously confirmed by the new President on the evening of his election, 6th May, as the grand plan of French diplomacy. Thereafter, with each passing presidential intervention, the concept underwent a series of revisions and amendments that considerably distanced it from the initial outline and progressively refocused it within the Barcelona Process. In the light of these great diplomatic manoeuvres, which in all likelihood will continue throughout the French Presidency of the European Union, how can we interpret France’s new Mediterranean policy and what lessons can we identify in order to better grasp what is at stake in Europe’s relationship with its southern neighbours?

From the Electoral Argument…

Even though Nicolas Sarkozy’s presidential campaign bred the idea of a systematic break with the past, the speech given in Toulon on February 7, 2007, addressing an audience of repatriates, was simply the next step in a series of reactions and initiatives aiming to respond to the progressive bogging down of the Barcelona Process, sealed by the failure of the 10th anniversary summit in November 2005. At that time, Europe’s Mediterranean actors, and in particular France, were beginning to lose hope that that Process could be overhauled, and other options were beginning to be considered to overcome the dysfunctions present in the European-Mediterranean Partnership. As early as 2001, the Western Mediterranean European countries had re-initiated the 5+5 dialogue by cultivating the region’s inherent complementary economic and cultural aspects, a region that has been saved from the conflict of the Middle East (Chevalier and Pastré, 2003). While ensuring that this dialogue did not compete directly with the Barcelona Process, but rather converged with the Euro-Mediterranean system’s “strengthened co-operation”, they were encouraged at achieving a Heads of State and Government summit in Tunis in December, 2003, and at managing to push forward co-operation in areas such as defence, where Barcelona had not managed a breakthrough.

In more or less confidential circles of decision makers, questions were also being raised about the future of European-North-African relations, without excluding any scenarios, including enlargement towards the south.¹

In France, other responses to Barcelona’s weaknesses came thick and fast over the last year of Jacques Chirac’s presidency: in the space of a year, we saw a “relaunch” of the Euro-Arab dialogue, with no follow-up (April 2006), the “Mediterranean Cultural Discussion Group” initiative (September 2006), and the strengthening of the French-North-African partnership by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (March 2007). Abundant and disorganised, this strategy nevertheless underlined French diplomacy’s obsession with the Mediterranean, a concern that would prove

¹ Cf. e.g: The conclusions of a meeting organised in Paris on October 25, 2004, held in private, by the European Union Institute for Security Studies.
to be more connected with the right than the left during the presidential campaign: the socialist candidate maintained a prudent silence on the issue in contrast with the far more audacious vision of relations between Europe and its southern neighbours that D. Strauss-Kahn had outlined.

From Nicolas Sarkozy’s speech in Toulon onwards, the “Mediterranean Union” project dominated. The arguments developed by Henri Guiano, an adviser to the President and one of the plan’s former commissioners, seduce in their long introduction by explicit and not so explicit borrowings from Braudel, Valéry, Camus, Morin... Believing that “Europe’s future will be played out in the Mediterranean”, he develops the vision of a “Mediterranean Union” to be built using “the European Union as a model”. It quickly becomes clear, however, that one of the major reasons driving the creation of this new group was the need to give Turkey, which Mr. Sarkozy did not want in Europe, an important place in the regional balance. Equally, the generosity of the initial aim was tempered as soon as the project’s specific objectives were tackled: besides collective security, the Mediterranean Union was to have four priorities: the first was the control and management of migratory flows, and the remainder concerned the environment (already covered by the 1976 Convention), joint development, and finally the fight against corruption, organised crime and terrorism. As we can see, security issues dominated. In its aims, its methods and its ambiguities, the sub-regionalism on Europe’s southern borders, reflecting the European project without featuring its extensive competences or competing against it. The need to build “an area of shared peace, security and prosperity between the peoples of the Mediterranean” was also highlighted by Michel Barnier, the Foreign Affairs Minister, following a long line of French politicians, in May 2005. Furthermore, the Mediterranean Union concept was obviously inspired by two previous experiences of organisations for relations between the Mediterranean’s northern and southern shores: the 5+5 dialogue and the 11-member Mediterranean Forum, also known as the “Franco-Egyptian Forum”. The Mediterranean Union constitutes a third and final stage in this co-operation between the two shores that could have been endorsed without colliding with France’s European partners had the initiative been driven less ostentatiously.

… to the Great Diplomatic Scene

From the very evening of his electoral victory, the new President chose to reiterate the importance that the Mediterranean issue held in his eyes, by making a solemn call to southern-Mediterranean partners. His Mediterranean Union project was also seen as a “new face to France’s Arab policy” and an innovative vision for the organisation of the Mediterranean area, in the context that the latent crisis of the European system was likely to encourage individual initiatives.

As early as July, Mr. Sarkozy visited North Africa to promote his project. However, the journey turned out to be rather a disappointment: Morocco, the country that has been most engaged in Mediterranean issues, politely refused the prospect of a whirlwind visit, President Boutefika hardly reacted to his French counterpart’s proposals and only the Tunisian President declared himself in favour. With respect to Libya’s support, just after the affair of the nurses had been closed, it was ambiguous to say the least. On the European side, Italy and Spain showed polite and uneasy interest in the project, but the irritation of other European partners, such as Germany, did not take long to make itself felt. The increasing force of that reluctance explains the successive amendments

Besides collective security, the Mediterranean Union was to have four priorities: control and management of migratory flows, the environment, joint development, and finally the fight against corruption, organised crime and terrorism.

Mediterranean Union idea reflected that of the “Mediterranean Community” that Jean-Louis Guigou had been trying to promote on the left for some two years: the introduction of benevolent and peaceable

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2 Interview in the Algerian newspaper El Watan on May 8, 2005.
that would be made to the Mediterranean Union project in the President’s speech to French ambassadors on 27th August, then in his Tangier speech in November, and in Rome at the end of December, when he met with his Italian and Spanish counterparts, before the final Franco-German compromise that would later be backed by the European Council in March 2008.

The August 27 speech displayed a modest turning point in Nicolas Sarkozy’s initial position on Turkey’s accession to the European Union: he no longer rejected it out of hand, but made it conditional upon the Union considering the limits of Europe itself. Furthermore, the Mediterranean Union’s four pillars were revised: the control and management of migratory flows, the first objective of the Toulon speech, disappeared in favour of “a dialogue between cultures”. Moreover, the cultural approach held a central role in the President’s thinking: on multiple occasions he reiterated the great future “challenge” represented by the “confrontation between Islam and the West”. In order to neutralise this challenge, Sarkozy proposed to establish the Mediterranean Union, but also to help “Muslim countries” to gain nuclear electricity. That, however, did not include Iran, which Mr. Sarkozy considers the main culprit for the troubles in the Middle East. In all, it was clear that France’s friendship towards Arab and Muslim countries was of lesser importance in the President’s vision than renewed support for Israel’s security.

In the following months, the French President named people and teams charged with following the Mediterranean Union project and with explaining it to France’s European partners. The ambassador Alain Le Roy was appointed to pilot the project. Working meetings and symposiums were held in France and other countries concerned. Spontaneous consultations and suggestion boxes were debated with regard to the project, proposing different solutions to overcome the criticisms that it provoked and the difficulties it encountered. For the reluctance expressed by France’s partners has not decreased. Germany in particular did not appreciate the lack of diplomatic co-ordination, contrary to the solidly established custom of the Franco-German partnership, nor what it considered its eviction from the Mediterranean scene. At the beginning of December, Ms. Merkel publicly expressed her regrets at the emergence of a project competing against the European one. While Mr. Moratinos, the Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister, pleaded for “Barcelona plus”. Nicolas Sarkozy took partial account of these objections in a new speech on the Mediterranean Union given in Tangier on 23rd October, during a visit to Morocco. He insisted upon the project’s pragmatic aspects that were to create a “Union of Projects”, flexibly combined and finalised on the basis of joint development. Cultural and educational priorities were affirmed once again. Aware that his project had to avoid competing with other methods of regional cooperation, the President confirmed that the European Commission had to be fully associated with the MU, but was content to offer only observer status to countries not bordering the Mediterranean, such as Germany. Finally, he invited the Heads of State and Government of the countries bordering the Mediterranean to participate in a Mediterranean Union Constitutive Conference to be held in Paris in July 2008, at the beginning of the French Presidency of the European Union.

Ms. Merkel publicly expressed her regrets at the emergence of a project competing against the European one

On 20th December, a few days after the astonishing State visit of President Gaddafi to Paris, a summit brought the French, Italian and Spanish leaders together in Rome with the aim of better reconciling the French project with European constraints. He adopted a "Call from Rome for the Mediterranean", stating that the "Union for the Mediterranean will have the vocation of reuniting Europe and Africa around the countries bordering the Mediterranean". The formula was written by Mr. Zapatero, who preferred it to the Euro-Mediterranean Union defended by his Foreign Affairs Minister. The French maintained the hope of conferring a unique political nature upon this Union in terms of European mechanisms, even though the new structure’s tasks would be specifically to develop complementary projects in fields covered by the Barcelona Process. After a final compromise with

4 Cf. in particular the Rapport du Groupe d’experts réuni par l’Institut de la Méditerranée sur le projet d’Union Méditerranéenne, headed by J.L. Reiffers, undertaken between July and September 2007 and made public in October. While certain proposals made in this report were integrated into the Mediterranean Union project (on the community of knowledge for example), other very pertinent reflections (on increased cooperation and Germany’s association) were hardly given any attention.
Germany, it is that rather vague name, Union for the Mediterranean, which would finally reach the consensus on the European Council of 13th and 14th March, 2008, but emptied even further of its substance and reduced to the level of a sub-title of a painfully clumsy "Barcelona Process". From that time on, we can consider the Mediterranean Union to have evolved; the new configuration was re-integrated into the Euro-Mediterranean logic, including "projects" that will largely be financed by Brussels. The only political element that has survived from the Mediterranean Union project is the co-presidency of the new Union, allocated to two countries bordering the Mediterranean, one on the northern shore and one on the southern. Of course, under the French presidency of the European Union, this painstaking revival of Barcelona will probably lead to new developments and misunderstandings.

Continuing Contradictions

Through these successive re-workings, the French Mediterranean Union project has thus evolved considerably, including its very name, without managing to neither shake off a feeling of permanent improvisation nor erase contradictions present in the project which have left France’s partners and observers alike perplexed.

Three principles are worth highlighting.

- How to delimit the European space and the Mediterranean space given that they intersect? In the eyes of Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s membership to both of these spaces is evident, but he finds it difficult to admit Turkey’s historical and spatial anchoring in Europe, as witnessed in his words to European parliamentarians in Strasbourg: in his mind, the divide in civilisations is based on other considerations.

- How to manage the operational articulation between the European Union and the new Union? With regard to the partners of the Mediterranean Union, which has become a Union for the Mediterranean, the President’s responses have changed over the course of his speeches: he accepted quite early in the process that the European Commission should be completely integrated into the project, but only envisaged the participation of non-Mediterranean European members after the Rome meeting. In fact, it was the European Council meeting of 14th March, 2008 that clearly imposed the presence of all European Union members in the plan. With regard to the sharing out of competences, of course, it is impossible for European Union members bordering the Mediterranean to delegate to the new Union competences that they have already conferred upon the European Union. The competences attributed to it can only be complementary or subsidiary, a fact which supporters of the Mediterranean Union admitted by moving on to the concept of a "Union of Projects". Curiously, they were slow to take advantage of the possibilities offered by European law in the spirit of "enhanced cooperation".

- The last contradiction was the gap, present in all of Nicolas Sarkozy’s speeches, between idealism and realism, between the audacious rhetoric of vision and the modest specific proposals. We cannot avoid a suspicion that Mediterranean rhetoric is being instrumentalised when we see to what extent it contradicts the security objectives pursued: we are still far from the interlinking between the founding utopia and the politics of the possible that characterises the European model. That model is strongly invoked in the creation of the Mediterranean Union, but leaves aside its substances and its aim, i.e. the human dimension. There was never any question of following the European Union’s example and turning the Mediterranean Union into a common human space: we remain within the framework of the Barcelona Process, which formalised the strict separation of economic space and human space, thus leading in large part to its failure.

A Turning Point in France’s Mediterranean Policy

In the end, these Mediterranean manoeuvres can be assessed as disappointing for France, perhaps even wasteful. Little is left of the Mediterranean Union project, except what Spain and Germany were willing to help recover. Given how much engagement the operation required, perhaps it could have been foreseen that the project would fail, and that Spain would perhaps pick up a part of the stakes as in 1995. Even
Too many incoherences, improvisations and announcements undermined the value of the French initiative, harming the country's image with the outside world and leading to reservations within the country's diplomatic ranks.

The founding of the political outline on specific "projects" (hydraulic, transport, nuclear, educational reform...) favourable to French interests, seems destined to end up under European control.

The way the operation was managed entirely justifies the criticism levied against it. Too many incoherences, improvisations and announcements undermined the value of the French initiative, harming the country's image with the outside world and leading to reservations within the country's diplomatic ranks. We get the feeling that the French actors, beginning with the President himself, fell prisoner to a hastily thought-out formula that failed to take account of contradictions, and an exhibitionist style of communication. The journalist Daniel Vernet spoke in Le Monde about the Mediterranean Union "pipe dream". The term was without doubt exaggerated in that the project attempted to respond, however clumsily, to real problems, and we know that it has been repeatedly corrected. But the result of a year invested by French diplomacy in its "major project" is pitiful.

However, the most serious criticism that can be made against the project is that it served, whether intentionally or not, as a smokescreen and cover for the underlying changes made in France's Mediterranean policy. The amendments made to the Mediterranean Union cannot conceal a blatant Atlanticist drift against which Hubert Védrine had warned in his report to the French President (Védrine, 2007, p.63).

Several positions bear witness to this Atlanticist turn, which has sacrificed a Mediterranean heritage of several decades in favour of the illustrious aim of attaining the status of the United States' privileged ally. Thus, the vigorous but exclusive denunciation of the nuclear risk posed by Iran is not in keeping with France's traditional position of general "denuclearisation" in the Middle East: no reference was made to the possession of these arms by any other countries in the region, including Israel. It is true to say that the socialist presidential candidate went even further, by fusing to permit Iran to possess even civil nuclear capabilities. Equally, the only limit imposed upon the reaffirmation of support for Israel's security was the depriving of that nation's colonisation of Palestinian territories. The Atlanticism of the new leaders of France was, until the beginning of 2008, focused on the implantation of a French military base in the Gulf, without consultation with European partners on operational risks.

Of equal importance was a shift in ideology: the recurrent reference to the "confrontation between Islam and the West", the "major challenge" of current international relations, in the purest Huntingtonian style, is new in the views of French Presidents, who, since De Gaulle, had taken care to play a leading part in Mediterranean conflicts without falling into a culturalist rut incompatible with a calm and pacifying reading of trans-Mediterranean realities. They were aware that France had to maintain an alternative voice on these conflicts, and that that original European voice was expected by southern partners and societies.

On that level, the contrast between new French Mediterranean policy and the one that was defended in 2003 is a gaping one. It is true that other Europeans' responses to the region's challenges have hardly been better. They have been too economically realistic and too culturalist, while lacking human realism. Behind the formal quarrels and incompatible moods of Mr. Sarkozy and Ms. Merkel, we can find convergence: the same alignment with the USA, support for Israel despite certain reservations, a reluctance to open Europe to Turkey and the Muslim world, even a difficulty in facing up to the human proximity with the south.

Europe Searching for the Mediterranean

Nicolas Sarkozy is right to affirm that "Europe's future will be played out in the Mediterranean", but the Mediterranean Union project and its later incarnations do not provide the right responses. New relations between Europe and the Mediterranean have yet to be established.

The only positive contribution made by the return to the Barcelona Process through the Union for the Mediterranean is the marginalisation of the Neighbourhood Policy and its unilateral character and a refocusing on the Mediterranean space; however, we can doubt the ability of the new concept – which has won general acceptance because of its very incon-
sistency – to revive the moribund Barcelona Process. We find ourselves back where we started, i.e. with a mediocre and threadbare European Mediterranean policy incapable of meeting the challenges it faces. And yet, they are crucial.

The most important challenge concerns the management of conflicts in the Middle East. On that point, Europe’s policy has moved from the weakness of good intentions to a complete alignment with American policy. Support for Israel is expressed in almost identical terms by Ms. Rice, Ms. Merkel and Mr. Sarkozy: condemnation of the colonisation of Palestinian territories is almost virtual, and associated with no practical sanctions. That same alignment can be seen with regard to Iran: the Europeans’ search for an alternative diplomacy to the talk of war is no longer the order of the day. Of even graver significance is the Europeans’ adhesion to the framework of these arguments, that is to say, a vision that reduces the world and the region opposing the West and its allies to mere “terrorists”. Such a vision justifies the development of NATO’s ascendancy and activities in Europe, the Mediterranean and as far as Afghanistan, at the expense of a European defence.

It is clear that we are not preparing the future of the Mediterranean region by allowing such conflicts to persist and the ideologies that underpin them to mature. By almost blindly supporting Israel and its colonisation policy, Europe has made itself an accomplice to the injustice being perpetrated against the Palestinians, an injustice to which Arab opinion is far more sensitive than to the sort perpetrated by a dictator like Saddam Hussein. Equally, by adhering to the new faces of an East-West conflict, Europeans become hostages to a warmongering discourse that is far from what the European project sought to promote. It is no coincidence that the affair of the cartoons came up just when the reluctance – or even “repugnance”, as around fifty French parliamentarians dared to say – was being increasingly openly expressed towards a large “Muslim” country like Turkey entering the European Union. Europe is now tending to turn Islam and the Muslim World into its external and internal other, the main opposite reflection of its identity. This is an awesome change with regard to the initial spirit of the European project, which sought to rebuild upon universalist and humanist values a Europe that had been brought low by confrontation between different strains of nationalism and disregard for human rights.

At a time when southern Mediterranean societies have never been so close to us, there has been an unwillingness to see just how the construction of a Mediterranean border for Europe would damage the dense fabric of the links that unite them to societies in the North, particularly in the western Mediterranean. We are allowing that border to be legitimised through identity-centred arguments of the cultural or religious variety. If Europeans do not wish to see the Mediterranean become a hostile horizon, they need to save themselves from the perverse effects of such an identity-centred regression and truly take on board their human and cultural proximity with the south. For them, that proximity constitutes both a challenge and an asset, distinguishing them from the other actors present on the Mediterranean stage. It is in the management of the human Mediterranean space that Europeans must prove their conceptual and political boldness and institutional imagination to overcome what has become the poisoned dossier of relations between Europe and its south, that is to say, the movement of people. It is not clear whether the intention of the French Presidency of the European Union to adopt a European migration pact will clearly take account of this area. By not asking questions about the motives and the legitimacy of human mobility in a globalised planet, and by not ousting the propensity to pen the fear of others within imaginary borders, the European project has put at risk the virtuous cycle function that it has exercised both internally and externally till now.

This issue concerns all Europeans. We may regret that the mediocre political consensus adopted on the Union for the Mediterranean, which furthermore lacked popular foundations, has driven back Mr. Moratinos’ Euro-Mediterranean Union proposal. It took up a suggestion made by D. Strauss-Kahn in 2004 (in his Cinquante propositions pour l’Europe), which itself followed a reflection made within the Club de Mar-
seille and in the publication Projet as early as 2002. Alvaro Vasconcelos pleaded the case for the so-called "Euro-Mediterranean Union" in this very publication last year. Even if it has been provisionally ruled out, in the end this perspective will break through in the debate, and the Reiffers report mentions that it was supported by several members of the working group. But it is clear that it scares politicians and is hardly compatible with scenarios aiming to keep Turkey and other Muslim countries out of the European space.

The perception that European and Mediterranean societies belong to a joint space of peace and solidarity provides a more favourable framework of reference for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the overcoming of bilateral misunderstandings.

Thus, the Euro-Mediterranean Union idea has the advantage of bringing two possible scenarios together under one slogan: one maximalist (enlarging the EU southwards) and the other minimalist (creating a confederal structure around the European Union). It is also interested in overhauling the Euro-Mediterranean group itself and basing it upon a joint utopia involving greater mobility for civil society than that envisaged in the reductionist Barcelona partnership or the apartheid implicit in the Neighbourhood Policy. Thus it should be able to achieve strengthened inter-Mediterranean relations without contradicting the European project. Furthermore, the perception that European and Mediterranean societies belong to a joint space of peace and solidarity provides a more favourable framework of reference for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the overcoming of bilateral misunderstandings inherited from colonial history. It would lead to a truly desirable enlargement of the Council of Europe towards the Mediterranean in matters of human rights.

References

2007: A Year of Upheaval and Clarification

Following the dramatic events of 2006, a year in which there were so many challenges to be faced by the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, relaunched at the Barcelona Summit of November 2005, few expected that such an upheaval concerning the Mediterranean was going to emerge at the heart of the EU during 2007.

In the first half of the year, the German Presidency progressed peaceably and Berlin devoted itself, with efficiency and dedication, to administering the annual action programme approved at Tampere at the end of the Finnish Presidency. But very soon, in the thick of the French electoral campaign, the first blow was struck by the then presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy in a speech at Toulon on 7th February against the theretofore excessively conformist status quo.

The announcement by the erstwhile candidate and now President of the Republic, seeking to launch – successfully so – a new initiative in the Mediterranean, in the form of a “Mediterranean Union,” provoked a huge commotion in Brussels and all manner of reactions both among European members and among our associates in the South. This was the point that marked the beginning of an upheaval that still persists in mid-2008, as we wait to discover what will result from an initiative that caused such reverberations.

During the second half of 2007, under an admirable Portuguese Presidency, Euro-Mediterranean activity was intense as we witnessed what I would describe as a period of clarification of positions on the part of the various protagonists. This was accompanied by a certain process of North-South verticalisation taking shape at the Lisbon Euro-African Summit and the subsequent 2008 EU-Arab League meeting in Malta that added new and necessary channels for dialogue with the remaining Arab countries, in the current context of growing interdependence and globalisation.

The Euromed Programme Marches On

Setting aside the criticisms and shocks, 2007 saw a firm-footed advance in the Barcelona Process, which continued developing its sector-based agenda, possibly with an excessive absence of glamour, in accordance with the ambitious five-year action plan approved at the 2005 Summit. That plan had for the first time included – as is well known – a fourth chapter dedicated to the issue of migration and the related facets of justice and social integration, as well as the new code of conduct against terrorism. Among the many Euromed events and achievements during 2007, it is worth highlighting the following as being especially significant:

• The first ministerial meeting on education that took place in Cairo and represents a new milestone in expanding the scope of our co-operation. That meeting was preceded by another in Alexandria by the Euro-Mediterranean University Forum – in which the Rovira i Virgili University of Tarragona is playing such an important and decisive role – for the creation of a regional network that will nurture a better understanding among the chief universities in the region and a harmonisation of curricula that will permit a successful achievement of Euro-Mediterranean exchanges in the image of the Erasmus programme that has produced such positive results within the body of the EU.

• The admirable German initiative of assembling for the first time the Euro-Mediterranean Youth Parlia-
ment in Berlin, which promises to be consolidated into a new regular event, with a fresh sitting already arranged in Morocco between 26th May and 2nd June 2008. This initiative, as with the ambitious scholarship programme launched by the Commission within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), is doubtless a most important step forward towards the necessary "rejuvenation" of our Partnership, not just because young people are being accorded the importance they deserve but because it represents a new and more dynamic vision of society’s involvement in our great regional common project. All this, together with the restructuring in the governance of the Anna Lindh Foundation and the Civil Platform, should contribute to a greater boost to the process, in areas that are not strictly economic, removed from political tensions, such as the Barcelona “third basket.”

- The first Euromed ministerial meeting on migration, which took place under the Portuguese Presidency in La Albufeira on 19th November, was a manifestation of the new chapter IV of our Euro-Mediterranean Action Plan being set in motion. That meeting, together with the conferences on migration and development held in Rabat and Tripoli outside the Euromed aegis, is a true exponent of the verticalisation of our Partnership, adding a new and deeper North-South vision of Africa to the traditional Mediterranean horizontal vision. All this bears witness to the desire on the part of all the Euro-Mediterranean associates to co-manage these matters and extend multi- and bi-lateral contacts with the countries of origin that produce the new and intense migratory movement taking place via the Maghreb towards Europe from the sub-Saharan regions.

- The incorporation, promoted in particular by Spain, of two new non-ENP countries into the Euromed Partnership (Albania and Mauritania) is a significant milestone that will contribute not just to round off the Euromed Partnership’s regional structure but also to maintain the individuality of its own identity, both within the ENP context and within that of the new regional initiatives and even that of already extant sub-regional ones. It is worth remembering that, if the gradual new accessions to the EU have always demonstrated the vitality and attractiveness of the Union, the fact that at this stage two new countries have insisted on participating in the Barcelona Process without receiving any kind of economic assistance in exchange is also proof of the vitality and interest that it arouses in a regional context.

Albania’s presence in our Partnership will also allow a new voice to be heard in our debates, while giving the Tirana government the opportunity to adapt progressively to Community procedures with a view to future membership of the EU. This presence will furthermore no doubt grant the Balkan country a more significant presence on the international scene from which it has been absent for too long, having in recent times frequently been unjustly considered more as the end object, rather than the subject of the major events that have been played out in the region.

Mauritania’s participation can be seen as the culmination of an old aspiration of the Maghreb to see all members of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) included in the Barcelona Process

Mauritania’s participation, for its part, once the country had regained its democratic credentials, can be seen as the culmination of an old aspiration of the Maghreb to see all members of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) included in the Barcelona Process, since, while Libya has not yet decided to join fully, it has been participating as an observer at all meetings not just at ministerial level but also those of senior officials and of the Euromed Committee held monthly in Brussels. Under current circumstances it appeared truly incongruous that Mauritania could not be present when Libya was.

The Barcelona Process, Nerve Centre of the Euro-Mediterranean Relationship

Everything that developed in 2007, crammed with important meetings at all levels, as well as the large-scale interweaving of relations, contacts, projects and programmes financed by a Community budget (including a new fund for governance), constituting an unquestionable acquis, as well as the intense trading relations within the framework of progressive free exchange that is advancing in line with what was foreseen in the Association Agreements, very clearly demonstrates that the Barcelona Process is today wholly consolidated and continues to be – notwithstanding any criticisms and shortcomings – the nerve
centre of the geopolitical, cultural and economic relationship between the EU and our neighbours and associates in the South, whatever new initiatives may be brought forward. That was never more clearly seen than precisely when the new proposal by President Sarkozy arrived on the scene, at the same time as the European Commission was attempting to better shape and move forward the new ENP, which has come to take root in the old regional Partnership with our southern neighbours, contributing a new bilateral catalyst to relations with those that seek it and are prepared to progress in the direction of better governance.

The Barcelona Process is today wholly consolidated and continues to be the nerve centre of the geopolitical, cultural and economic relationship between the EU and our neighbours and associates in the South.

Recalling these origins, it should come as no surprise that Germany should not have felt either comfortable or content with an initiative which, despite all its cosmetic changes, has seemed from the beginning to be not just a unilateral and self-interested attempt to torpedo the Barcelona Process (as many of us who participated in the Great Mediterranean Week in Marseilles between 19th and 24th November last year were able to glean from the speeches that were heard there). It seemed also to be an attempt by France to take back the European baton in the Mediterranean, at a time when the EuroMed relationship is already plainly identified as something that is co-managed on the basis of equality between the EU on the one hand and the associated nations of the South on the other.

The Sarkozy Initiative

Despite the fact that there were many of us wishing to revitalise the Barcelona Process and had even launched proposals to that effect (cf. the speech delivered by Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Miguel Ángel Moratinos on 4th May, on the occasion of his receiving an honorary doctorate at Malta University), it is no surprise to observe how it was from Paris that the official broadside to Barcelona and the expected “Mediterranean shake-up” came, since France was never wholly comfortable with an excessively “communitarian” process that it had never regarded as its “own baby” and was coming at it from a deeply embedded bilateralist position with the intention of effectively disrupting it (Prat, 2006).

To those who have experienced the Process from close up, it was clear that the wish from the Quai d’Orsay, where the French Foreign Ministry is located, had from some time back been to regain positions – inexplicably abandoned in the past – in a region where France has, understandably so, always maintained a strong political, cultural and economic presence (Schmid, 2007).

However, even while admitting that a fresh impetus was required and that its advent has been positive (even if it came from the Elysée Palace and not the Quai), the fundamentals and principles that inspired the launch of the robust Euro-Mediterranean relationship should not be forgotten, not only because they are unquestionable but, above all else, because they now involve the whole of the EU in equal measure,

1 See: “The Rome call for a Union for the Mediterranean by France, Spain and Italy” of 20th December 2007.
as was seen at the latest Barcelona Summit, which had a massive presence of European leaders. In reality, the Sarkozy initiative that started off so controversially, gradually evolved, from its February launch in Toulon and passing through a first unilateral *mise au point* in Tangier (23rd October), to arrive at an enforced attempt at better definition following the Rome tripartite meeting among the three French, Italian and Spanish Presidents, on 20th December 1 that culminated in the Franco-German proposal underwritten by the European Council of 13th March 2008.

**It was clear that the idea of a “Mediterranean Union,” doubtless harboured in everyone’s heart as an eventual “consummation devoutly to be wished”**

In effect what arose out of the Rome meeting was a new concept which was no longer that apparently highly ambitious and rather wishful Mediterranean Union but rather a plain “Union for the Mediterranean” which shed much of the highly charged political implications that had given the impression of being proposed as an alternative to the EU. Finally, post-Rome and, most significantly, following German pressure by then into the current 2008, everything appears to have been shifted towards a more pragmatic focus, leaning towards the “development of specific projects,” within the Euro-Mediterranean framework. In fact, the Barcelona Process is then granted its legal charter, the term having never been official previously, with the subtitle “Union for the Mediterranean” added and an attempt made to endow it with new structures which, even while “light touch” in nature, it will be hard to have adopted consensually.

It was clear that the idea of a “Mediterranean Union,” doubtless harboured in everyone’s heart as an eventual “consummation devoutly to be wished” and which the EuroMeSCo network had already proposed in its excellent evaluation of the ten years of the Barcelona Process (EuroMeSCo, 2005) and which the late professor Emilio Fontela had coined and presented, indeed with very specific details, in a recent publication by the National Defence Higher Education Centre (CESEDEN) under my direction (Fontela, 2007), has not yet found sufficiently fertile ground, nor was the political environment sufficiently calm in 2007 to attempt to turn it into reality. How could it be if only two years previously in Barcelona our southern associates were not even willing to accept agreement – under a British Presidency – on a Declaration that purely sought to present a common vision? How was the concept to be “sold” by the leaders of the Arab countries of the southern Mediterranean to the most radical sections of their population of a “Union” of some of them (only those bordering the sea) when their old colonial cities, the recurring “cartoons crisis” so recent in their memories and the Iraq invasion and its disastrous results were still at the forefront of their minds? And what were they to say to the rest of the extended Arab family that was to be excluded from that Union?

It was because of that, as I understand, that an attempt was made, as early as December in Rome, to alter course to some extent while a way was sought to identify jointly “priority cooperation sectors” to be developed in common, “without aiming to replace existing procedures for cooperation and dialogue that are already shared by Mediterranean countries, but rather simply to give them added impetus in a spirit of complementing all the institutions that are in place.” Thus the initial idea of a “Mediterranean Union” was abandoned in favour of a “Union for the Mediterranean” but acceptance has not yet been gained for the Spanish-Italian idea of a Union that in all events should be “Euro-Mediterranean” something that in the end was agreed, with German support, at the aforementioned European Council in the spring of 2008.

In the event, that “grand idea” to launch something new as an alternative to all the “failed attempts so far” that was announced in Toulon, will end up reduced to a bid, that can be perfectly acceptable to all, to “render more efficient” the existing Partnership (the idea put forward by the Quai d’Orsay from the start) and contribute to steering the Barcelona Process towards a safe haven (an idea that is dear to our Minister for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation) (Moratinos, 2007), emphasising regional programmes and projects running parallel, and complementary, to the bilateralisation that the new ENP represents.

But it is yet to be seen whether it can be thus, given that the regional circumstances which have so far prevented the Barcelona Process from advancing not only persist but even appear to continue deteriorating. Meanwhile, what is clear is the need for a greater collective awareness to be developed both South and North of the Mediterranean and for an enhanced political involvement by all
to be achieved with regard to resolving the region’s problems and to our Euro-Mediterranean relationship, framed within the current Partnership which, under current circumstances, is probably the most appropriate multilateral political structure (and maybe the only one possible), taking into account the region’s political reality.

In the present climate, the decision promoted by Spain to change the statutes of the Anna Lindh Foundation for Intercultural Dialogue so as to give it a greater visibility and efficacy, together with other specific initiatives that might arise at the initiative of others, are examples that can contribute to the collective effort with the aim that has awakened such expectation of reviving Mediterranean relations. This revitalisation is today all the more necessary insofar as, due to globalisation, there are new external and at times distant protagonists who are showing themselves to be taking an interest in the region but whose world vision is very different from ours, as is their agenda in terms of the values that underpin our endeavours.

Governance at the Heart of the Debate

It is interesting to note that, while the new ENP places a particular emphasis on governance, which the EU even promotes by means of a special fund, the Sarkozy initiative makes absolutely no mention of any aspect linked to the promotion of those values that we jointly decided to defend through common action in Barcelona in 1995 and ratified in 2005. That is probably due to attention having been centred from the start on regional themes, specifically leaving the bilateral relationship to be managed under the ENP. That dictum of Bismarck comes to mind here: it says that politicians think about the next elections while statesmen think of the next generations. The maxim was quoted in Barcelona last 28th September by European Commission Director General Eneko Landaburu when together we closed the Seminar on Mediterranean governance and policy organised by the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed).

Indeed in 1995 thoughts were on the long term, setting the framework for a future relationship based on respect for human rights and the rule of law as the means to securing welfare and progress for all the states bordering the Mediterranean.

For that reason it is today clear that, notwithstanding all the economic support that may be given to regional projects, without democracy and without respect for certain values, development and progress are not possible. Democracy is today a commonly held aspiration and therefore it is on that which the Commission places the greatest emphasis in its new ENP. As things stand, whatever the development applied to the Barcelona Process, it will not be possible to merely reinforce it on the basis of specific projects or financial contributions from the private sector and there will continue to be a need for a substantial boost to governance so as to progressively counter the shortfall in democratic legitimacy that remains more widespread than is desirable across southern Mediterranean countries, despite the laudable efforts to narrow the gap being exhibited by many of those who govern them and by new political forces.

It is today clear that, notwithstanding all the economic support that may be given to regional projects, without democracy and without respect for certain values, development and progress are not possible.

Political Problems in the Region Persist

As a final issue, it needs to be remembered that during 2007, the latent problems in the southern Mediterranean region remain unresolved: serious regional confrontations persist, hampering a healthy relationship among all concerned, as also the achievement of our objectives for peace, stability and progress; there is still the lack of a unified approach and greater harmony among the “brotherhood” of southern nations; there is yet no sign of any initiatives originating from these countries towards improving the Partnership. From the EU side, the prospect is little better. There are too many countries that only “participate” in the Process, attending meetings and intervening periodically to defend some national interest, but what is missing is a stronger feeling of “belonging” to the very distinct type of Association that is the Euro-Mediterranean one, which, notwithstanding all its criticisms and shortcomings, by now has accumulated a significant acquis that, even while being little known among the wider public, is nevertheless truly admirable.

Faced with this lack of enthusiasm and of initiatives that might go further than the action programmes regu-
larly set at ministerial meetings, however one looked at it, it was clear that some form of lighting the touchpa-
per was needed, some shake-up that would oblige both sides to "get their skates on" and clarify their po-
sitions as to what we are really seeking to achieve through our Euromed Partnership, which is not merely – by a long chalk – the "unique arena for dialogue" which some of its apparently well-meaning defenders intend. That shake-up was attempted in the past by the Spanish government when it proposed to the British Pres-
idency during the last half of 2005 that a commemo-
ratve Summit should be called, but there was a lack of will on the part of many and – most importantly – the circumstances of the moment (internal political cri-
sis in Israel provoked by Ariel Sharon, a serious terror attack some days earlier in Jordan, troubled elections in Egypt, a sudden illness suffered by the Algerian President, etc.) did not allow it to blossom into the me-
dia celebration that many of us were hoping for. Nev-
ertheless, a little-discussed success of that Summit was not only the approval of an important and original pro-
gramme for action that is applicable even today but also, and most especially, the massive presence of heads of state and government from the newly-enlarged EU at a meeting exclusively devoted to the Mediterranean: it was the birth of the so-called “Barcelona + 10” that it is now to be hoped will be revived with fresh vigour.

Conclusion

Having seen the back of that year of upheaval and clar-
ification that convulsed the Euro-Mediterranean As-
sociation with the launch of the “Sarkozy initiative” and has culminated, once into 2008, in the welcome
decision to consolidate the Barcelona Process, adopt-
ing the subtitle of “Union for the Mediterranean”, our hope is that, after such a commotion, we may see con-
crete results. This will always depend on some progress being made in establishing a peace in the region that is as much wished for as it is necessary and made too in our southern neighbours joining in the initiative with a renewed willingness to take it forward, advancing fur-
ther their internal reform and modernisation process-
es. Actions will speak louder than words.

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The year 2007 ended as it began – despite a vaunted change of strategy – with the USA mired in Iraq. With much of the combat power of the US army committed in Iraq, and facing growing political discontent with the war at home, the legacy of the lackluster Bush administration now depends largely on its ability to claim a plausible Middle East triumph. In addition to the war in Iraq, US policy in 2007 focused on four other major areas of concern during the year. These included promoting President George W. Bush’s “Freedom Agenda,” kick-starting Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, thwarting Iran’s quest for regional hegemony, and maintaining the secure flow of oil from the Gulf. Before turning to the US dilemma in Iraq, which continued to preoccupy US policymakers throughout the year, this essay addresses the other realms that have been declared priorities for US policy in the Middle East.

Against the background of the horrendous al-Qaeda attacks of 11th September, 2001, the Bush administration has been attracted to the argument that a deficit of freedom in Muslim societies gives rise to the conditions in which terrorist recruitment flourishes. American political elites have resisted, often vigorously rejecting the idea that US policy may actually have something to do with the anti-American sentiments found in the Middle East and elsewhere. The Bush administration often treated the failure of its public diplomacy as an advertising problem, as a symptom of America failing to get the message across. When it began to address the low standing of the USA in public opinion its first instinct was to hire a renowned Madison Avenue advertising executive, Charlotte Beers, to formulate a public relations solution. She failed miserably, as have her successors. Thus, a poll of six Arab countries released in early 2008 revealed that over 80% of respondents held unfavorable views of the USA, a figure that has actually increased since invasion of Iraq in 2003 (www.brookings.edu/arab_public_opinion.pdf).

The “Freedom Agenda”

Policies that may have mitigated such negative views have become disappointing failures, as well as testament to the Bush administration’s hypocrisy. For instance, the “Freedom Agenda” was announced with great fanfare in 2002 and 2003, and it continued in 2007 to be a declared priority in the Middle East. The policy now earns little more than official lip-service. Even local opposition figures of a pro-western bent, who embraced the idea of political reform in their own societies, now look to the catastrophic situation in Iraq and conclude that stability and authoritarian order are tolerable compared to violent chaos and civil war.

In Egypt, where the venal regime of octogenarian Hosni Mubarak was earlier ruffled by all the talk about democracy, it was business as usual by 2006 and 2007. Ayman Nour, the opposition figure who had had the temerity to challenge President Mubarak when he went through the motions of running for his fifth term of office in 2005, found himself serving a five year term for trumped-up charges that he forged signatures on his candidacy petitions. On her periodic visits to Egypt, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice issues perfunctory calls for the release of the unfortunate Mr Nour, but her demands are politely ignored. As senior regime officials repeated to this writer in Cairo on several occasions in 2006 and 2007, the Egyptians now understood how to handle the US regime officials, pointing out the threat that Islamists might come to power, as Hamas did in Gaza, and emphasizing Egypt’s role as an alleged pillar of stability. Widespread
labor riots in early 2008, the most serious domestic demonstrations in Egypt in more than 30 years, do put a question mark on the claim of stability. Egypt’s calcified but aggressively repressive dictatorship remains poised for a royal transition from father to son, a transition tacitly approved by Washington. Banker Gamal Mubarak, who has many detractors in the higher ranks of the politically powerful army, has been at pains to emphasize that he has no more appetite for deep political reforms than his father. It should come as no surprise that Egypt is often cited in the Arab world as a prime example of double standards when it comes to US claims that it promotes freedom.

Hamas Seizes Power

The electoral victory of Hamas in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections dramatically dampened US enthusiasm for promoting democracy. Hamas benefitted from public disapproval of the deeply corrupt Fatah, and won 74 of 132 seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council. Hamas is considered by the USA and many of its European allies to be a terrorist organization. Against the advice of Egypt, Israel and the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas (“Abu Mazen”), the White House insisted that the Palestinian elections be held on schedule. To be fair, even leading Palestinian pollsters, notably the respected Khalil Shikaki, failed to predict the Hamas victory. When it occurred, the Secretary of State admitted that she was “(…) caught off guard by Hamas’s strong showing.”

Initially, there were hints that the USA might accept the result tacitly and allow European and Arab allies to incrementally engage Hamas diplomatically so as to pull it in a pragmatic direction and away from violence. Rice herself noted just after the election that “the Palestinian people took full advantage of their democratic opportunity. They voted in incredible numbers; maybe 80% in one of the estimates. And they also clearly voted for change. They wanted a new kind of government and we respect that.”

Knowledgeable non-US officials urged that while it was understandable that the USA would not wish to legitimize a group that is denoted a terrorist organization, it might be wise for the USA to allow others to elicit a pragmatic accommodation from Hamas. Within days of the election, the President was advised by some of the government’s most respected Middle East hands that this might succeed, and he momentarily embraced the approach, but within days the USA was leading a campaign to isolate Hamas in Gaza and starve it of funds and access to other outside support. Notwithstanding the US-led siege, Hamas did maintain a de facto ceasefire with Israel for about a year.

The electoral victory of Hamas in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections dramatically dampened US enthusiasm for promoting democracy

By 2007, about 80% of the impoverished Gaza population and 65% of the West Bank population was living below the poverty line and evidence of malnutrition and slow starvation was becoming commonplace. Not only did the isolation of Gaza succeed in pushing many Palestinians below the poverty line, which is demarcated as families of four earning less than $2 (US) a day, but it lent support to the view that the “Freedom Agenda” was specious.

Following the kidnapping of an Israeli soldier from an outpost overlooking Gaza in June, Israel has arrested most of the elected Hamas legislators and has held them ever since, effectively as hostages. The US plan was to strengthen the West Bank-based Abu Mazen, the Palestinian President, and the Palestinian Authority that he headed. The ostracized and isolated Gaza-based government led by Hamas worked to consolidate its control in the densely populated Gaza Strip.

Muhammad Dahlan, a longtime ally of the USA and Fatah strongman in Gaza received significant American and Egyptian support, as did the Preventive Security Force (PSF) that he commanded. The PSF was being armed and trained to confront Hamas, apparently as part of a covert US plan to topple Hamas (D. Rose, 2008). Amidst growing violence between Dahlan’s group and other Fatah militarimen, on

3 See Alvaro De Soto’s important 2007 report “End of Mission Report by the Under-Secretary General, UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General.”
the one hand, and Hamas and its allies, on the other, Hamas responded in June 2007 by crushing the PSF (Dahlan was not in Gaza at the time), and carrying out what Abu Mazen decried as a coup. By the end of the year, while clashes in Gaza between Hamas militants and supporters of Fatah continued and Israeli periodically raided or shelled Gaza often in response to the firing of crude rockets toward Israeli towns, Hamas remained in firm control there (www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism.htm).

In response, on 15th June, 2007, President Abbas appointed a new government under the Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, a respected economist. Abbas claimed authority under an emergency decree, for which he requires approval from the Palestinian Legislative Council, but since a majority of members are from Hamas and are in Israeli jails there is no practical way for a quorum to be assembled. In any case, Abu Mazen’s action was firmly supported by the United States and several key Arab states, notably Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.

Revived US Peacemaking

When Bush was elected in November 2000 he and his advisors were intent on avoiding entanglement in the Arab-Israeli conflict. His leading advisors ridiculed President Bill Clinton for squandering precious presidential time in pursuit of an Israeli-Palestinian peace. Unlike his predecessor, the new President would bide his time until the belligerents were ready to make peace, until the situation was ripe, and meanwhile the USA would tilt its support toward Israel, particularly after 11th September 2001. Furthermore, it was presumed that after an American triumph in Iraq, the Palestinians would become more pliant to compromise. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, like many active supporters of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, speculated that “the road to Jerusalem will lead through Baghdad” (Kissinger, 2002). That did not quite work out.

President Bush emphasizes that he is the first President to explicitly declare his support for an independent and contiguous Palestinian state living side-by-side and in peace with Israel. Polls taken during 2007 continue to demonstrate that a majority of Israelis and Palestinians support a two-state solution. For instance, a poll taken in late 2007 revealed 53% support in Israel, and a two-state solution attracts comparable support from Palestinians. As the Israeli writer Gershom Gorenberg notes, the idea of a two-state solution has become “boringly respectable.” The Arab League Initiative, first announced in 2002 and reiterated at the Riyadh Summit of the League in March 2007, promises Israeli-Arab recognition in response to a settlement that bears a reasonably close resemblance to the parameters announced by Bill Clinton in December 2000, namely a sharing of Jerusalem with Arab quarters comprising the capital of Palestine, a return of most occupied territory to the Palestinians with limited territorial exchanges to allow Israel to maintain some large settlements contiguous to Israel, and the return of Palestinian refugees to the new Palestinian state rather than to their historical homes within Israel, or the provision of compensation for those who choose not to return. The problem is getting there. With the absence of a solution the human toll continues with 380 Palestinian civilians killed by Israelis in 2007, and five Israelis falling to Palestinian violence.

While Bush and Rice have periodically underlined that concessions from both Israel and the Palestinians will be necessary for a solution to be reached, Bush has stated that he will do no more than nudge Israel. Indeed, Bush has periodically tried to recast the terms of reference for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement. In April 2005 the President declared in a letter to Prime Minister Ariel Sharon that any peace agreement between Israel and a new Palestinian state would have to recognize “new realities,” a euphemism for legitimizing much of Israel’s colonization of the West Bank rather than the more modest territorial swaps envisaged by the Clinton parameters (www.fmep.org/documents/clinton_parameters12-23-00.html), and the seminal UN Security Council Resolution 242 of November 1967.

If the Bush administration slowly came to understand that its failure to move assertively to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict might have undermined other policy goals in the region, US involvement in seeking a solution has been tepid at best. In November 2007 and amidst great skepticism in the Middle East, the USA convened an Israeli-Palestinian peace conference in Annapolis, Maryland, the site of the US Naval Academy. Forty-two other countries attended, including many who later

4 In 2007, 783 rockets were fired from Gaza at Israel, although some fell short and landed in Gaza.
5 For a variety of Israeli polling data sources see: http://btvshalom.org/resources/isr_polls.shtml. For Palestinian data, see the polls of the Jerusalem Media & Communication Centre, including one conducted in late 2007: www.jmcc.org/publicpoll/results/2007/no63.pdf.
Israel and the Palestinian Authority agreed to reach a settlement by the end of 2008, as the Bush presidency was coming to a close

pledged up to $6 billion to facilitate peace and aid the Palestinians at a December 2007 conference in Paris. The US Ambassador to the UN, Zalmay Khalilzad, fashioned a Security Council resolution that would have revealed wide support for the goals of the Annapolis meeting, but Israel was unwilling to allow any role, even an implied one, by the UN in moving toward a peaceful solution. Thus, in a moment of considerable diplomatic embarrassment, Khalilzad was forced to withdraw the resolution before it could be voted on. Israel and the Palestinian Authority, which was much weakened after losing control of Gaza to Hamas, agreed to good faith negotiations to implement the Road Map and to reach a settlement by the end of 2008, as the Bush presidency was coming to a close. The Road Map, supervised by the USA, the UN Secretary General, the European Union and Russia, was originally supposed to be implemented by 2005 calls on both parties to take concrete steps, which for Israel include declaring unequivocal support for a two-state solution, freezing settlement constructions, loosening security restrictions, and improving the humanitarian conditions for the Palestinians; and for the Palestinian Authority the requirements include ending anti-Israel violence, revising the Palestinian constitution, and underlining its acceptance of Israel’s right to exist.

The explicit obligations under the Road Map are explicitly to be simultaneously met by Israel and the Palestinian Authority, but in practice the Israelis have refused to implement their responsibilities until the Palestinians establish security. Much of the Palestinian security apparatus has been systematically targeted and disabled by Israel since 2002, so Abu Mazen’s ability to meet the security strictures of the Road Map is constrained even in the West Bank. Following the Annapolis conference Israeli officials, including the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, stated that Israel ”cannot negotiate according to a time limit.” In contrast, Israel has continued its construction of illegal settlements in the occupied West Bank, often timing announcements of new construction to coincide with visits by Secretary of State Rice.

While Bush foresees the establishment of a “viable, contiguous, sovereign and independent” Palestinian state, the settlements, the network limited access roads and bypasses and the security barriers constructed by Israel make the creation of a viable Palestinian state doubtful. Bush likes to present himself as a decider, a leader who does the right thing regardless of public opinion, yet in the Arab-Israeli context he has not shown political courage. No solution will be reached without a serious US commitment to the diplomatic heavy lifting needed to make it possible. The Bush administration has also been unwilling to entertain peacemaking gestures to Syria, which it sees as playing a negative role in Iraq and in Lebanon, as well as being a key ally of Iran. As a result, although Israel has flirted throughout the year with the possibility of an approach to Syria, and although unofficial, back-channel talks were underway in 2007, the USA made it plain that it was unhappy about the prospect and discouraged Israel’s initiatives.

The Largesse of US policy

One of the enduring ironies of the Bush foreign policy is the extent to which Iran has been a major beneficiary of US policy. In the Arab-Israeli context, the desultory pace of peacemaking and the desperate conditions under which Palestinians are forced to live have been opportune for Iran. By the estimate of one Hamas official, Iran provided that organization with at least $120 million in assistance in 2007, and some estimates are considerably higher. Iranian arms transfers to Gaza have been limited but hardly trivial and Iran has also provided training for Hamas and Islamic Jihad members.

Meanwhile in Lebanon, where, to the annoyance of the White House, Israel failed to subdue Iran-supported Hezbollah in the 2006 war, a stalemate between the pro-US government and the opposition led by Hezbollah but also including large numbers of Christians persisted throughout 2007. The USA is unwilling to countenance a bargain that will benefit Hezbollah, whereas it is impossible to break the stalemate without an accommodation of opposition demands. Not only did 2007 end without any progress toward disarming Hezbollah, as required by several Security Council resolutions, but Iran refurbished the party’s arsenal so that it is at least as well equipped today as

6 See Haaretz, 17th January 2008. The unofficial talks were carried out by the former Director General of the Israeli Foreign Minister, Alon Liel.
it was when the 2006 war began. Although periodically inter-communal clashes have brought Lebanon close to the brink of a wider internal conflict, further disaster has thankfully been averted but no clear solution is on the horizon so long as the USA and Iran are contesting the ground through their proxies.

Proponents of the Iraqi invasion often argued that by toppling Iran not only would the USA rid itself of a dangerous tyrant but the invasion would seal America’s hegemony in the Middle East. In fact, the invasion was a geopolitical gift for Iran. The “Islamic Republic” not only witnessed the demise of its hated enemy, but watched the large Shiite Muslim majority in Iraq rise to power. While there are a variety of perspectives vis-à-vis Iran among Iraqi Shiites, in general the Islamic Republic finds itself with a surfeit of friends and allies, not least among the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council and its Badr Corp militia which was based in Iran until 2003, and today is the most powerful component in the ruling Shiite dominated coalition under Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. For its part, Iran has devoted much of its diplomatic and military energy to building a broad swath of ties, which are not limited to the Shiite co-religionists but include Kurdish parties in the north and Sunni groups in central Iraq. At a time when Iran has faced coordinated efforts of the USA and its European allies to deter it from continuing its march to protect a nuclear weapons capability, the Iraqi quagmire has provided Tehran with a valuable lever for reducing western options, and particularly US military options. A sensational National Intelligence Estimate, released in part in December 2007, found that Iran had actually stopped weapons development in 2003, further undermining the military option for the USA. Iran has an obvious interest in insuring that the USA remains sufficiently entangled in Iraq so as to think twice about opening up a new war front with Iran. This is the goal that guided Iran’s actions in Iraq throughout 2007.

The Iraq Quagmire

President George W. Bush and his administration greeted the report of the blue-ribbon Iraq Study Group in December 2006 with studied coolness and even disdain and the report changed the terms of reference for discussing Iraq in the USA (www.usip.org/isg). While the report, which urged a significant reduction of US forces and a reinvigorated diplomatic effort to find common interests in stabilizing Iraq among friends and adversaries, did not use the word “failure,” the carefully written report made it plain that talk about success in Iraq was fatuous. Thus, in the terms of reference for discussing Iraq the key issue would now implicitly be how to mitigate the extent of American failure there. Instead, Bush seized the idea of a surge of additional forces into Iraq for the stated purpose of stabilizing Iraq and thereby creating an opportunity for reconciliation to take place. Because of manpower limitations in the US Army, the surge, which would increase troop strength in Iraq by 21,000 soldiers to more than 160,000 men and women, would be unsustainable after the summer of 2008. The country was in the throes of a civil war by 2006 and there is no question that the surge was a technical success in terms of reducing the tempo of violence by the end of 2007, but little progress was made toward inter-sectarian reconciliation, or for that matter inter-sectarian reconciliation.

In addition to more US troops, three factors contributed significantly to the 60% reduction in violence that was registered in late 2007: as many as two million Iraqis were displaced within the country, and more than two million had fled outside the country, primarily to Syria and Jordan. While small numbers of these external refugees trickled back into Iraq in late 2007 and early 2008, the vast majority remained outside the country. In Baghdad large swaths of the city that were inhabited by Sunni Muslims had been brutally cleansed by Shiite Muslim militias. Second, the largest Shiite militia, the Mahdi army led by al-Sayyid Muṣṭafā al-Sadr, the popular young cleric who is revered especially among the urban Shiite poor, began a ceasefire in August 2007. Third, even before the surge began, a number of Sunni insurgents, especially in the massive al-Anbar province, broke with the al-Qaeda franchise that had flourished in the chaos of post-invasion Iraq and had done much to accelerate the civil war. This awakening, or sahwa, prompted marriages of convenience, or more accurately, cohabitation agreements between the US ally Turkey and Iran in dampening the Iraqi Kurds’ pursuit of independence (both countries are home to large Kurdish populations), a new strategic dialogue has opened between Tehran and Ankara.

Other of the architects of the surge was neo-conservative Frederick Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute. He was a vocal advocate of the 2003 invasion, which he envisaged would foster “a peaceful and liberalizing [Iraqi] regime that could have a transformative effect on the entire region.” See Commentary, December 2002, pp. 69-72.
forces and local tribal militias, most of which were wholly Sunni Muslim. By late 2007, nearly 90,000 Iraqis were cohabiting with US forces. Each member was being paid more than $300 a month, which was also a boon for tribal sheikhs who pocketed about one-fifth of all the monthly allowances. Thus, while the surge began with the stated purpose of creating a space in which reconciliation might occur, the surge has undermined rather than bolstered the central political authority. Moreover, within the Shiite community there are huge cleavages between the underclass led by Muqtada al-Sadr, and the more middle class oriented groups that dominate the government. Intrasectarian clashes pose, in some areas, a more dangerous threat than intersectorian ones.

US officials tend to exalt the reduction of American deaths in Iraq, but Iraqi security forces and especially civilians have continued to pay a high toll. Over the course of 2007, incidents involving civilians declined significantly at times but an average 14 people were being killed by explosions every day during the year. While the US authorities have claimed they do not have an accounting of civilian deaths in Iraq, it is clear that the toll of civilian lives in Iraq has been massive. The most conservative figure comes from the British group, Iraq Body Count, which estimates that there have been about 90,000 excess deaths in Iraq since 2003. In January 2008, the respected *New England Journal of Medicine* published a study for the period 2002-2006 that estimated 151,000 civilian deaths. Other estimates, using valid statistical techniques, reveal as many as a million civilian deaths. As 2007 ended, Iraq was still looking towards an uncertain future. In the USA the public has long since concluded that the war was a mistake, and with presidential elections looming in November 2008 and a new occupant in the White House in January 2009 a significant reduction in the US commitment in Iraq is possible. The war has been phenomenally costly in human and financial terms (it is estimated that the direct cost is $5,000 dollars a second, which even in cheap dollars quickly reaches astounding sums). Ironically, not only has Iran been a geopolitical beneficiary of the Iraq war, but it has benefited substantially in economic terms. Iranian businessmen are investing heavily in important Shiite shrine cities, particularly in Karbala and al-Najaf, and the Iranian economy benefits directly from escalating oil prices. While the crucial flow of oil from the Gulf has been sustained, since the war in 2003 until 2007 it doubled in price, and it doubled yet again from 2007 to mid-2008 providing a massive windfall for Iran, as well as Iraq for that matter. At best, the USA may succeed in stabilizing Iraq, but the task of reconciliation clearly lies well in the future. Moreover, it is hard to envisage a solution that does not include a significant accommodation of Iran’s interests in Iraq, a conclusion that is positively anathema for the Bush administration. With the USA effectively trapped in Iraq and fearing that a withdrawal will induce chaos and increase Iran’s influence, the Bush administration’s pursuit of a triumph continues to be fleeting.

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9 Beginning in May 2007, the US Ambassador Ryan Crocker, did begin meetings with his counterpart in Baghdad, Iranian Ambassador Hassan Kazemi Qomi, and several additional meetings were held. While Iran did seem to temper its support for Shiite militia groups and limit the flow of particularly lethal charges, Iran remains deeply involved in Iraq. With Iran challenging the USA in the Arab-Israeli zone and in Lebanon, not to mention in the oil rich Gulf, the Bush administration has no interest in reconciling its differences with a regime that it detests; and the feelings are mutual. When Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, the USA delegate to the UN, participated in a panel at the Davos World Economic Forum with the Iranian foreign minister and an aide to the Iranian President, in January 2008, he was upbraided by Condoleezza Rice and much criticized by furious White House officials.
New Economic Actors in the Mediterranean

Foreign Direct Investments in the MEDA Region in 2007: Euro-Med Integration or Euro-Med-Gulf Triangle?

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with contributions from
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Investors from the Gulf made many headlines in 2007 with their large-scale real estate or tourism projects (the Emaar project in Algeria for example) and major acquisitions (privatisation of the Al Watany Bank in Egypt in favour of the National Bank of Kuwait, etc.). These media coups have given them the reputation of being conquerors with deep pockets, ready to pay above the going rate for assets in order to accumulate income, securing the best land and contributing to the property speculation and inflation and affecting construction materials. As in any caricature, this hardly flattering portrait contains a kernel of truth. The contribution of these investors in the development of the MEDA region is more positive than might appear: whereas the European Union invests relatively little in its Mediterranean neighbours, the Gulf could bring to the region the capital necessary for a real lift-off. How should these investors from the Gulf be received? What benefit can the region derive from them? If Euro-Mediterranean integration on its own cannot boost the development of the South, an economic cooperation framework including the Gulf and its investors would probably be a good idea.

Context: Slight Consolidation of FDIs in 2007

As world Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows in 2006 broke through the 4.5% threshold, according to the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the MEDA region (Mediterranean Partner Countries of the European Union: Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, Israel and Libya as observer), with its young population of 268 mil-

CHART 1

Inward FDI Flows by Regional Subdivision and MEDA Share of World FDI (in Millions of USD)

lion inhabitants (4% of the world population), for the first time secured a “normal” part of world FDI flows.

According to ANIMA-MIPO (Mediterranean Investment Project Observatory), which monitors announcements of FDI projects with MEDA countries as their destination, 2007 saw a decreasing FDI value against an ever greater number of projects. Barring accident, this consolidation should not mark a reversal of the trend. The root causes for this enthusiasm are not, after all, about to disappear: petrodollars, proximity to Europe, Turkey’s booming economy, a realisation of MEDA’s market potential and renewed interest shown in the Euromed area generally.

The Barcelona Process has played a positive role in the spectacular growth in FDI by making the southern shore more attractive – more accessible. The integration of the Euro-Mediterranean economic area is, however, progressing too slowly, and it has been the businesses from the Gulf, from emerging countries, from China and India, that have thrown themselves into this new intermediate and well located market at the gates of Europe.

This revival of interest is welcome, but it is not certain that it will be enough. The contribution of these new investors is important quantitatively, but the quality of their projects is sometimes poor (weak multiplier effect, limited repercussions) compared to the importance of their stakes: millions of long-term jobs need to be created each year simply to maintain the current rate of unemployment of young people.

**Euro-Mediterranean Integration, a Necessary but not Sufficient Condition for Economic Take-off in the MEDA Region**

Available macroeconomic data seem to show that Europe and its Mediterranean neighbourhood have entered into a period of (weak) convergence since 2000. The MEDA region benefits each year from a per capita growth almost 1% higher than Europe’s. But with a GNP of US$ 6,209 per person in 2007 (MEDA average, PPP adjusted), MEDA has reached the level enjoyed by Western Europe in the 1950s, or Romania in 1975. At the current rate (although it can, and must, pick up) it will take the MEDA countries 157 years to reach the standard of living in Europe, an achievement that took Greece and Portugal 25 years (Saint-Laurent, 2007).

Barcelona certainly encouraged an evolution in trade between Mediterranean partner countries and the EU. These ten countries so far account for 9% of total external exports of the EU-27 - against 5% not too long ago. Intra-MEDA trade levels are, however, very weak (5% of MEDA’s global trade), while Europe’s importance as a trade partner is extremely variable from one MEDA country to another, besides being asymmetric (heavy trading dependence by a MEDA region which to the EU represents an outlet of lesser importance). The EU is thus a top commercial partner for the Maghreb, while its weight in terms of Jordan’s exports is only 3%.

As regards FDI, the same asymmetry can be observed: although Europeans continue to be the
principal investors in the region, the proportion of European FDIs invested in the Mediterranean neighbourhood is extremely low when compared to American flows into Mexico, or from Japan into its neighbouring area. Latest figures produced by the European Commission (European Commission/ERSSTAT, 2007) show for instance that investments outside the EU accounted in 2005 for less than a third of the total FDI emitted by Member States this year (172 billion euros out of a total of 600 billion, i.e. 28%). Amongst destination regions, Canada-USA, Japan and the countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA: Switzerland, Norway, Iceland etc.) took up 72% of those 172 billion euros, i.e. 42%. The MEDA region followed a long way behind: after Asia, Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe, with a share that amounts to just 3% of these outward investment flows from the EU.

The development of trade exchanges and the progressive acceleration of European FDI towards MEDA would therefore seem to be insufficient to ensure an economic lift-off by MEDA countries. Amongst the external funding available, migrants’ remittances, traditional development aid, or indeed funds invested in the private sector by development banks (EIB-FEMIP, World Bank-IFC, etc.) certainly have their effect, but it is a FDI boom that appears necessary. FDI is a powerful vector for economic integration and sustainable structural change, whereas it may not be the answer to everything. Where will the necessary extra investment come from? With the fresh impulse brought by the French initiative of the Union for the Mediterranean, the time of the assessment came for the Barcelona Process: is it enough to stick to a deepening of the economic relations between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbourhood? Or is it necessary to integrate in the equation the growing interest in the Mediterranean expressed by another neighbour, the Gulf?

The Gulf’s Presence in the Mediterranean: Opportunistic Investments or Injection of New Blood?

A great geographic, cultural and linguistic closeness has led North Africa, Europe and the Near East to weave a complex network of relations. With the awaited physical infrastructures that will reinforce that proximity even further (power grids, telecoms, pipelines, a trans-Maghreb motorway, the project for an Egypt-Saudi Arabia causeway, the proposed tunnel under Gibraltar?) and the advent of a large-scale EuroMena free trade area (the FTA envisaged by the Barcelona Process for 2010, the intra-MEDA Agadir Agreement, the 1988 EU-GCC Cooperation Agreement, Customs Union and future Common Market in the Gulf), FDIs constitute a powerful means of tying in these three blocks durably by fostering the material convergence of their economic interests.

The Gulf and Europe: The 2 Pillars of Foreign Investment in the Mediterranean.

Gulf investors (GCC or the broader “MENA-Gulf” with Mauritania, Libya, Sudan, Yemen, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan) overtook Europe in 2006 as the main issuers of FDI into the MEDA region (Chart 3). With the surge in European investors recorded in 2007 and the net decline in North American projects, the Gulf and Europe appear to constitute now the two pillars of foreign investment in the Mediterranean, representing 35 and 40% respectively of the amounts announced for 2007 (18% of 2007 projects for the Gulf and 47% for Europe). The Gulf cumulates 30% of all the amounts announced since 5 years ago, against 37% for Europe. The relative weight of these two regions together is thus 67% of all amounts announced over the last 5 years, and 66% of the number of projects, bearing in mind that the share that European investors represent in the stock of projects announced since 2003 remains broadly dominant, with 48% of the number of projects.
Three linked movements feed these flows of investment from Europe and the Gulf:

- the boom in energy and commodities, which prompts a race for the base industrial input points and affects extraction industries as much as processing ones (chemicals, fertilisers, plastics, metallurgy, cement, etc.);
- the quest for growth shifts or competitive gains in activity sectors that have reached maturity or saturation in developed countries, or Gulf businesses seeking to attain a critical scale by going outside their limited domestic markets (notably telecom services, banking, etc.). Large and small European businesses (or those operating in Europe) are under pressure from a strong euro, constrained by employment markets that are inflexible (labour laws and social protection regimes) and fettered (aging active population, political resistance to the idea of a renewed mass immigration). Even if relocations are less frequent than would appear, a substantial number of businesses now prefer to build new production capacity outside Europe, as shown by the establishment of Renault-Nissan in Tangier or again, the case of the aeronautical sector, where Airbus requires its subcontractors to follow its redeployment in the dollar zone. These investments are as much aimed at meeting demand arising from the increase in local purchasing power as to addressing external needs (free trade treaties, duty free zones, etc.);
- the channelling of trade surpluses (Gulf revenues from oil and gas) into residential, commercial or tertiary property, into tourism infrastructures but also into manufacturing (metallurgy, fertilisers) or services (banking and telecoms), whether directly by agencies of sovereign funds or thanks to funding that can be raised effortlessly by the rising stars in the Gulf at their over-liquid stock exchange locations (see the largest deals announced in 2007 in the box).

These three movements dovetail into a single effect: a new competition between established multinationals and challengers from the emerging world, most often the Gulf, that have substantial means available to them in the service of their ambitions.

**Competing or Complementary Investment Strategies?**

**A Certain Geographical Complementarity**

Map 1 shows that the principal areas that are sources of FDI into the MEDA region are driven by distinct preferences. The strong affinities are initially the product of geography; the most significant flows being established between the closest blocks (Europe and North Africa or Europe and Turkey, Gulf and Mashreq). This geographical link, though, can be counteracted or reinforced by cultural or historical affinities: privileged business relations based on family and patri-
monial capitalism between the Gulf and Jordan, Lebanon, Syria or Egypt, intimate relations between California’s Silicon Valley and Israel’s Jordan Valley. The complementary nature of the principal investment flows is striking:

- Europe invests especially in Turkey, the Maghreb and Egypt;
- the Gulf principally in the Mashreq;
- the United States concentrates on Israel, and Canada on the Maghreb and Egypt;
- investors from Asia and other emerging economies (Russia, South Africa, etc.) put their money into the Mashreq (Egypt and Syria), Turkey and Morocco.

Another phenomenon, though barely visible, nevertheless deserves to be highlighted: the steady progression in the number of intra-MEDA projects, with cumulative flows approaching 10 billion euros over 5 years (2 billion euros in 2005, 2.5 in 2006 and over 4 in 2007) for a total of 163 projects, of which 55 in 2007 alone. The most important flows are by far those from Egypt to Algeria (and also to Turkey), from Jordan to Egypt, and from Lebanon to Jordan and Egypt.

**Individual Preferences of Gulf Countries**

Among GCC members, United Arab Emirates is the biggest investor in the region: 30.6 billion euros since 2003, which is over half of the GCC total, and 183 projects. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are level-pegging, each having flows slightly above 11 billion and over 100 projects. Bahrain and Qatar are a level below (2.3 and 2.9 billion euros and around 20 projects), while the Sultanate of Oman does not figure in the table below (Table 2) for lack of projects.

As regards amounts invested, Egypt is the preferred destination for Emirate, Kuwaiti and Qatari investors, and the second most important destination for the Saudis. However, it is Turkey that attracts the greatest number of Saudi investors, thanks to 8 significant projects announced in 2007: huge investments by Oger in telecoms and banking, repurchases of banks and food-processing industries. Bahraini investors stand out for preferring Jordan and Morocco (Batelco owns Umniah Telecom in Jordan, property and tourism projects by Gulf Finance House in both countries).

**Greenfield Projects Are Often Oversized**

Gulf countries’ projects in the Mediterranean are notable, firstly for the significance of the forecast budgets announced: the average budget exceeds 268 million euros, as against 70 for European projects. 171 direct jobs per project are created from the Gulf, compared with 95 for a European project, taking into account that the Gulf and Europe are the principal employment creators in the region. The sustainability of these jobs is harder to judge, but it can be supposed that part of the employment created by the investments from the Gulf will only last as long as the time taken in completing the construction site, while European projects generally generate more sustainable jobs in services or industry. The majority of projects identified are those of large private or public capital funds, but it is fair to assume that the level of projects identified is lower in the case of the Gulf than for Europe, to the extent that investors in the former are subjected to less transparency. A greater part of medium and small projects might go unnoticed by the MIPO observatory. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are therefore logi-

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Source: ANIMA-MIPO, Flows in Millions of Euros and No. of Projects
cally under-represented (less than 5% of Gulf projects over the 2003-2007 period).
The Gulf and Europe are rather similar in the preference given to projects known as “greenfield” (creation of new assets, 35% of the total of European projects over 5 years, and 40% of those from the Gulf), even if the budgets diverge: asset creation amounted to only 20% of sums invested by Europe over 5 years against 53% for the Gulf. External growth by acquisition of shares (including privatisation) makes up 27 and 23% of projects from Europe and the Gulf respectively, but accounts for over 60% of total European flows as against less than 30% for the Gulf. These figures mean that Gulf investors are not afraid to launch into greenfield projects with substantial budgets, while European entrepreneurs prefer acquiring existing companies or units, including SMEs, to develop them.

Limited Positive Spillovers

An FDI’s quality is measured, among others, by the importance of direct and indirect local spillovers, and in particular according to the multiplier effect of the investment, meaning the incidence of the project in the local value chain (clients, suppliers, sub-contractors). As regards Gulf investments in MEDA, the very clear preponderance of real estate, tourism and American-style shopping mall projects (53% of total amounts and 48% of the number of projects in 2003-2007) could be regarded as regrettable. Energy, heavy chemistry industry, cement and metallurgy account for 13% of the total, while on the services side, telecoms and banking represent respectively around 15%. This sector mix is a reflection of the unbalanced development model of the Gulf economies, where consumer goods industries and light industries have scant presence.

The impact of investments flowing from the Gulf on sector distribution of FDI projects in the MEDA region is extremely clear. The correlation between the principal investment sectors of Gulf business and the top 10 sectors from Chart 4 is practically a perfect one.

Conclusion

Some thirty private or public holdings make up the major part of Gulf FDI in the Mediterranean. Some are globally recognised names while others aspire to become so.

The champions of the Gulf have changed substantially. They have been able to attract chief executives (CEOs) and other senior executives from the biggest multinationals (half the top management at Dubai Ports World are Anglo-Saxon, for instance) and their personnel is trained in the most modern management techniques. Their investment strategies are ration-
alised, less linked to prestige stakes and more to profitability and long-term success strategies. Moreover, the complementary nature of flows from Europe and from the Gulf in the Mediterranean allows all MEDA countries to benefit from some of the manna that FDI brings. Investments originating in the Gulf usefully come to compensate for the lack of enthusiasm of European companies, and can sometimes create beneficial emulation.

The considerable resources Gulf businesses choose to invest in productive sectors nevertheless represent a risk which it would be unwise to underestimate: the absorption capacity of MEDA countries is limited, and the many crowding-out effects which affect many local operators feed a rumbling discontent that could become troubling if it reached more substantial proportions. The rapid urbanisation and establishment of large polluting industrial complexes
along the Mediterranean littoral involve significant environmental risks. Improving the quality of FDI is essential, for which primary responsibility falls to MEDA regulators who must define limits and enforce them. Governments can maximise the local impacts of FDI by requiring counterparts, in terms of local content, long-term prospects, etc., in return for the preferential treatment which is often granted to the Gulf champions (low cost provision of land, etc.). The unbalanced development which is taking place also has its hidden costs, especially in societies that are already very fragile. If there were a means of combining the Gulf’s financial resources with European technology and know-how, it would seem possible to meet the social needs of MEDA countries in a triangular relationship that would be mutually beneficial and profile.

References


Over the last ten years, the economic presence of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Africa has notably increased (Goldstein and Pinaud, 2006). African countries have become major suppliers of raw materials for Chinese energy and mining industries. But China’s interest in North Africa is also explained by the proximity of this region to the European Union—the first world consumer market—, the local qualified workforce, and a standard of living, like Morocco’s, appreciably higher than in sub-Saharan Africa.

China in North Africa: An Overall View

Trade between the PRC and the African continent experienced new advances in 2007. Bilateral trade grew from 39.7 billion dollars in 2005 to 55.5 billion in 2006 and later to 73.3 billion in 2007. In North Africa, China has again consolidated its trade positions by significantly increasing its market shares. Bilateral exchanges between China and Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt amounted to 13.9 billion dollars in 2007 in comparison to 10.1 billion in the previous year (i.e., an increase of 38%). Since 2007, China has been a major supplier of southern Mediterranean countries. The PRC is now the first supplier of Egypt; the third of Algeria, Morocco and Libya; and the seventh of Tunisia. Chinese imports have continued to increase (by 38% in Algeria and 47% in Egypt) in comparison to 2006. Moreover, in 2008 China should become the second supplier of Algeria after France but ahead of Italy. Nevertheless, as in other North African countries, bilateral trade is highly unbalanced. Tunisia’s cover rate in its trade with China is only 6% in comparison to 42% for Algeria. And these five North African countries only represent 3.4% of the PRC’s exchanges in 2007. However, these encouraging figures for Peking should not conceal the reality. The PRC is unable to transform its commercial revenues into political influence and energy cooperation.

The PRC established close relations with the Maghreb countries at the time of independence, in 1956 with Egypt and in 1958 with Morocco. In December 1958, China was the first non-Arab state that recognised the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA). After the independence of Algeria, political relations continued to be close, marked by frequent bilateral meetings. On his recent trips to Africa, Hu Jintao visited Algeria and Egypt (2004) and later Morocco (2006) but his third trip to Africa in January 2007 did not include any stop in North Africa. Diplomatic relations with Libya were only established later, in 1978, given that Tripoli had until then recognised the island of Taiwan. And despite the rupture of diplomatic relations, Libya continues to have quite close links with the nationalist island which in early 2008 opened a trade representative office in Libya. In January 2006, Muammar Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-Islam, visited Taiwan, and in May 2006 Tripoli received the Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian on his way back from Costa Rica.

Like in many African countries, such as Angola, the PRC has built numerous civil infrastructures in North Africa. Algeria, due to its high foreign currency reserves (of around 110 billion dollars at the end of 2007) brought by the oil manna, has become a privileged market for Chinese construction and public works companies. The plan of support for the economic re-
launching approved in 2001 by the Algerian government seeks to improve the road, railway and sea infrastructures of the country and to construct more than one million homes (Lafargue, 2007). Chinese companies have multiplied civil engineering works. CSCEC (China State Construction & Engineering Corporation) has constructed several buildings, such as the Sheraton Hotel in Algiers or the Al Qods shopping centre, heralded by its promoters as the largest in Africa. CSCEC has also built numerous civil and industrial infrastructures such as the Oran hospital or the Algiers airport and is currently completing the new headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Algiers. In September 2007, CSCEC won the contract for the construction of 700 houses in the new town of Massinissa. The Chinese consortium CITIC-CRCC obtained the construction of two of the three sections of the motorway linking Annaba to Tlemcen for an amount of 6.2 billion dollars. The Chinese company Sinohydro is undertaking the drainage work in the Souf Valley in Algeria and is involved in the construction of several dams in the country such as that of Bouggous in the wilaya of El Tarf. Finally, CSCEC will participate in the extension work of the University of Mansourah in Tlemcen. The presence of Peking is not limited to the construction sector. Several mining prospecting authorisations were granted in June 2007 to Chinese companies such as CGC Overseas Construction and China Geo Engineering. Some months earlier, in January 2007, the Chinese mining company Shaolin signed two contracts in order to start prospecting in the south of the country, in the region of Ahaggar, in the wilaya of Tamanrasset.

In the telecommunications sector, Chinese companies such as Huawei and ZTE (Zhongxing Telecom Equipment) are also very active. In January 2007, the Chinese telecommunications company ZTE opened a training centre in Oran in partnership with ENPT (National Post and Telecommunication School). In January 2008, ZTE signed an agreement with the Libyan operator for the construction of the first network in Africa following the WiMax regulation. In Morocco, Huawei has become the technology supplier (IPTV) for the operator Maroc Telecom. Chinese automotive manufacturers are gradually setting up in countries such as Algeria and Tunisia (notably the motor vehicle manufacturer Foryota). The increase in trade between the countries of the Mediterranean shores and China also fully benefits Egypt. The trade traffic through the Suez Canal rose greatly in 2007, providing the country with unprecedented revenues. In 2006, Egypt received 3.8 billion dollars from customs revenue and 4.6 billion in 2007, i.e. 4% of the country’s GDP.

Also in Egypt, a Chinese company will invest 30 million dollars in a textile factory in the town of Borg al-Arab. And a Sino-Egyptian company will participate in the development of the Suez free zone called Sezone. The main assets of Chinese companies are their competitiveness in relation with Western suppliers (the Chinese workforce is paid according to the conditions of the country of origin), their rapidity in execution of works and a quality considered superior to that of local suppliers. In Morocco, Transtech Engineering Corporation (TEC) constructed the Borj Moulay Omar railway tunnel in 2004 linking Sidi Kacem to Meknes and is responsible for the railway link works between Tangiers and the port of Ras R’mel. The use of Chinese companies is equally justified by the very worrying social situation in the region, as in Algeria with a notable lack of housing. Nevertheless, this foreign presence is paradoxical in a country where the unemployment rate is about 15% of the active population (30% for the under-25s).

For a long time this workforce provoked little disapproval because the Chinese do the jobs that the Algerians reject and because their work directly benefits the Algerian population. However, far from the official discourses, the still muffled criticisms are multiplying. The issue of Chinese immigration is now recurrent in the Algerian press, such as in the daily El Watan. There is a latent feeling of xenophobia towards these thousands of Chinese workers, who live isolated from the rest of the population.

China’s Motivations

In North Africa, China pursues two main objectives: finding new suppliers of raw materials for its energy and mining industries and entering a regional market of almost 150 million consumers.

In the energy sector, the results are still half-hearted. The oil contracts signed by Chinese companies in
North Africa continue to be limited. In the hydrocarbon sector, China is for the time being only a minor client of the North African countries because just 2.1% of oil exports from Algeria go to China in comparison to 5% for Libya. In total, this North African region only covers 2% of Chinese oil imports. China is certainly penalised because of its distance vis-à-vis the Mediterranean countries and because of the obligation for oil tankers to use the now highly congested Suez Canal.

In Libya in 2004, the CNPC (China National Petroleum Corp) constructed two oil pipes linking the Wafa oil field with the port of Mellitah in the west of Tripoli on behalf of the Italian ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) and the Libyan NOC (National Oil Corporation). But, for the time being, Chinese investments in the country continue to be low despite the interest expressed by Peking. Libya has significant oil reserves (3.4% of world reserves) and, above all in the next few years, the pipelines linking the oilfields of the Murzuk basin (in the south-west of the country) with the Mediterranean ports could be extended in order to allow the export of oil from Niger.

But in Libya, where the CNPC had invested taking advantage of the isolation of the regime, Chinese companies are now confronted with Anglo-Saxon competitors, since the lifting of American sanctions from 2004. The first tenders have only granted Peking still limited prospecting areas. And the PRC has even been snubbed, given that in the third tender session in December 2006, the Taiwanese public company Chinese Petroleum Corporation, was granted an exploitation concession in the Murzuk 162 oilfield.

In Algeria, American interests continue to be well established, notably with the presence of Anadarko and Amerada. The events linked to the promulgation of the law on hydrocarbons have dissuaded numerous investors from carrying out their projects. In March 2005, the Algerian Parliament had adopted legislation allowing foreign companies to hold the majority, indeed the totality, of the capital of the oilfield that they would discover. This liberal legislation has never been applied and, in October 2006, a marked turning point in the oil policy started with the adoption of several amendments (decree no. 06-10 of 29th July 2006) stipulating that Sonatrach had to continue as major shareholder in all exploitation projects.

For the time being, the cooperation projects in the field of hydrocarbons are below Peking’s expectations. But the next few years should be more favourable, because China could benefit from the establishment of a gas cartel, an idea supported by Vladimir Putin, which would notably involve Algeria, Russia, Qatar, Venezuela and Iran. Peking, which is for the moment just a weak importer of gas (2% of its gas consumption is bought abroad in comparison to 50% for oil), should look favourably on this project. According to the report of the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2007), the PRC’s gas imports will experience a significant increase in the next twenty years, undoubtedly meeting 40% of the domestic demand in 2015. Although Australia and Indonesia will be privileged suppliers, the countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean should be equally solicited. For the moment, 90% of the gas exports of Algeria and 65% of those of Russia are to the European Union. In order to be a real threat for prices, these two suppliers must first reduce their trade dependence on Europe, their main client. The creation of a gas OPEC would therefore oblige Russia and to a lesser extent Algeria to further export to Asia (mainly China and India) in order to reduce their dependence on the European market.

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The five North African countries with a population of 156 million consumers are a promising market for the PRC companies. Chinese products (common consumer goods such as small electrical appliances, clothing, tea…) are adapted to a population with a still limited purchasing power. The standard of living in Tunisia or Morocco represents only 15% of that of a French person. Western brands with excessively high prices do not meet the demands of the local clientele. North Africa can also act as a springboard for Chinese investors in order to get access to more developed markets on the northern shore of the Mediterranean. The success of low-cost products, such as the Logan, shows that in the European Community there is also a demand for products of rudimentary
technology but with competitive prices. Haier and Lenovo test their products in Africa and improve their reliability and their safety regulations to prepare them for the Community market.

**A Still Limited Chinese Presence**

Although trade exchanges advance significantly, the economic and financial presence of China in North Africa is still limited. For the year 2007, according to the data of the United Nations Conference on Commerce and Development (CNUCED, 2007), Chinese investments in Morocco only represented 4.5% of the total of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and 3% of the total stock. A situation that contrasts with certain Sub-Saharan African states in which the PRC is now the main investor. This situation is explained by the size of the economies of North African countries and their particularities. In 2007, DFI was established at 10.2 billion dollars in Egypt and at 5.2 billion in Morocco but for China it continues to be weak.

This situation can be explained in several ways. In the first place, the states of the Maghreb and the Mashreq are beneficiaries of mass investment made by the monarchies of the Arab-Persian gulf and more frequently than by European countries. In 2006, France and Spain represented 61% of the FDI in Morocco. Chinese capital is not therefore as indispensable as in sub-Saharan Africa, where the backers of western funds appear more cautious (notably because of political instability and bad governance practices). North African countries, due to their more rigorous public management, further reassure the international financial community and can therefore obtain financial aid from the European Union, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Algeria and Libya estimate that relations with China should not be exclusive. All the more so as China is not capable of providing them with the latest military and nuclear technology they need. In this field the Maghreb countries prefer to turn to the United States, Russia or France. Moreover, on the occasion of his visits to Algeria (March 2006) and Libya (April 2008), Vladimir Putin signed several arms deals. 

The year 2007 therefore confirmed the establishment of the PRC in North Africa. This Asian presence was firstly well received but now the criticisms, both in the Maghreb press and in the Moroccan magazine *TelQuel*, of Chinese companies are increasingly frequent.

**A Questioned Chinese Presence**

Several criticisms are levelled at PRC companies. Imported goods are deliberately undervalued at customs and the products sold are of mediocre quality and sometimes prove to be dangerous. Chinese companies are equally accused of not respecting the fishing quotas assigned to them and of infringing the regulations on fishing zones. The lack of reinvestment by Chinese entrepreneurs in Africa is also frequently denounced. The profits made by Chinese merchants are sent back to China. The imbalance of trade relations also awakens a larger number of criticisms. Morocco’s cover rate in its trade with China therefore grew from 18.6% in 2006 to 16.3% in 2007. And China is often seen as responsible for the increase of prices of foodstuffs such as rice or wheat (the price of a bushel of wheat on the Chicago market has multiplied by two since May 2007). In China, the reduction of the useful agricultural surface area (because of the weakness of irrigation and the urbanisation of the country) and the changes in food consumption involve an increase in food imports. The appreciation of the oil barrel (notably caused by the strong Asian demand) also increases the cost of food transport. Finally, the promotion of agrofuels in Europe, as in the United States, also explains this inflation of prices of agricultural products. In Egypt, a wheat importing country, the social situation is worrying. Several riots took place last April to protest against the increase in the price of bread and flour.

Moreover, Morocco and Tunisia are also the victims of industrial delocalisations of Western companies that decide to settle in China. In spring 2007, the American manufacturer of electronic components for the car industry Technitrol announced the closing of its head office in Tunisia to settle in China.

**Morocco and Tunisia are also the victims of industrial delocalisations of Western companies that decide to settle in China**

In Morocco, the presence of Chinese investors in the textile sector is regarded with mistrust. Since the abolition of Multi Fibre Arrangements (MFA) on 1st January 2005 (which eliminated any quota for the
Chinese textiles when entering the European Union), Moroccan companies are faced with the formidable competition of Asian goods on the European market. Chinese production has a weaker cost price thanks to its wage competitiveness (the cost of time in the manufacturing industry in China is about 0.7 dollars against 1.25 dollars in Morocco) and to a more important volume allowing economies of scale. Moroccan small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have then developed their activities in the field of fast fashion thus becoming the privileged subcontractors of European brands concerned with regularly renewing their collections and searching for suppliers capable of guaranteeing delivery in a few days. But in this market niche, Chinese entrepreneurs in Morocco, notably in Derb Omar, the large trading district of Casablanca, are equally active, arriving with their own cloth and rarely using the local workforce. Because of the free trade agreements signed by the European Union and the United States, Morocco is an ideal production base. However, in 2007, textile production strengthened after several months of difficulties and Morocco, as well as Tunisia and Egypt, should be the beneficiaries of the introduction of the gradually implemented pan-Euro-Mediterranean cumulation system of origin. Within the framework of this mechanism, the textile products aimed at the European Union must be manufactured or significantly modified in partner countries such as Turkey and the five North African countries. This initiative should limit the abuses committed by factories, whose activity is limited to assembly without any real added value on site.

In the next few years, China must take into consideration India’s ambitions in this region. Bilateral trade between India and Africa is steadily progressing but is still notably lower compared to Sino-African trade with the presence of fourteen heads of state and government including those of Algeria, Egypt and Libya. Bilateral trade between India and Africa is steadily progressing (25 billion dollars in 2007) but is still notably lower compared to Sino-African trade. Like Peking, New Delhi is searching for suppliers of raw materials for its energy and mining companies and outlets for its industry in Africa. But for the time being, relations between India and North Africa are still limited, notably for political reasons due to the close links between New Delhi and Israel.

References


Dossier: Water in the Mediterranean
Water in the Mediterranean

Resources and Water Demand: Forecasts for the Future of Water in the Mediterranean

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An essential resource for humanity and for ecological balance, water is at the core of the problem of sustainable development. Its management in the Mediterranean area, where it is unequally distributed in time and space, is today characterised by non-sustainable forms of production and consumption, frequent failure to take into account the long term, and policies chiefly concerned with the water offer. Today these approaches are reaching their limit and are coming up against growing social, economic and ecological obstacles in almost all the Mediterranean countries.

Resources are already being overexploited in many places, and there will continue to be significant increasing water requirements as a result of the population growth in the South and East and with the development of tourism, industry and irrigated areas. Within the context of a growing water shortage in part of the region, and in the light of the uncertainties arising from the climate change, the Mediterranean countries are now confronted with several challenges: sustainable management of limited resources, ensuring access to drinking water for the population groups who are not yet supplied, and raising the users' awareness of the importance of water-saving habits.

The first of these challenges means implementing water demand management policies able to reduce loss and inefficient use, managing the resource fairly and assuring its different uses are catered for. An increase in the water offer will also presumably be necessary to be organised through improved resource management (increasing the amount of potentially usable water and combating pollution) or through non-conventional forms of water supply (recycling of treated waste water and desalination of sea or brackish water). The second challenge involves putting the Millennium Development Goals into practice as regards access to drinking water and sanitation. The third calls for reinforcement of the partnerships between the users and the local water management organisations, together with water saving awareness-raising campaigns geared towards the former.

The work of the Blue Plan and the recommendations resulting from the regional workshop it organised in 2007 with its regional water sector partners highlight the pressing need for adaptation of water management policies, improved administration of the different uses and a more economical, efficient use of resources, in order to respond to the population's demand and the need for development in the present and future.

Water Resources in the Mediterranean Region

Fragile, Irregular Water Resources

The conventional renewable water resources – the so-called “natural” water resources – of the group of Mediterranean countries are globally estimated to be around 1,080 km³ per year, for an average year. The most important issue is the conspicuous unbalance in the geographical distribution of these resources:

- two thirds (2/3) are located in the North
- a quarter (1/4) are located in the East
- a tenth (1/10) are located in the South.
The group of 6 countries with the shortest supply (Cyprus, Israel, Libya, Malta, the Palestinian Territories and Tunisia) possesses less than 1% of the whole. The Mediterranean is home to 60% of the world’s “poor” with regard to water (those with less than 1,000 m³ per inhabitant per year) and twenty million people currently without access to drinking water, particularly in the southern and eastern countries.

Overall, 28% of these resources, i.e. some 300 km³ per year, cross the borders and are common to several countries, Mediterranean and others. The rate of dependence on external resources is particularly high in some of the countries: 97% in Egypt (the Nile), 55% in Israel (the Jordan, Mountain Aquifer), 47% in Croatia, and 43% in Syria (the Euphrates).

However, quantifying water resources by annual averages by no means presents a whole picture of the situation, and the gaps are more significant than the averages: with the Mediterranean climate, the annual amounts vary greatly according to wet and dry years; in 9 out of 10 years the minimum assured resources, corresponding to the amounts for a decennial dry year, can fall to a third or a quarter of the average. The variability differences between seasons and years, more marked in the southern and eastern regions, increase this contrast.

The resources should not merely be restricted to “blue waters,” i.e. surface or ground water sources; the “green waters” proceeding directly from rainfall, with an average annual flow of up to 400 - 500 km³ per year in the Mediterranean countries, should also be taken into account. These resources have a similarly unequal distribution: 65% in the North, 20% in the East, and 15% in the South. These figures explain the increase in the demand for irrigation water in the eastern and southern countries, often over 60% and reaching almost 90% in some countries.

**Indicators to Illustrate Water Resource Evaluation**

The competition indicator and the inverse ratio – the index of resources per inhabitant – are very sensitive to population variations and are in general an efficient expression of the relative wealth or scarcity of water in a country. These indicators are of practical use for comparisons on a national level, and particularly for forecasting purposes, as they rest on the only demographic variable, which is relatively easy to forecast. The figure for “natural” water resources per inhabitant is the first indicator able to define situations of “water stress” or “scarcity” (1,000-500 m³ per head per year) and “structural shortage” (less than 500 m³ per year per head). The differences between countries and between interior regions or basins are even greater. For example, the natural resources per inhabitant in Montenegro (a Mediterranean record: over 25,000 m³ per year) are 500 times greater than those of Gaza, the territory with the least resources!

This unbalance is further increased if we express water availability by calculating how many inhabitants need to share each million m³ per year. This competition indicator varies from 40 inhabitants in Montenegro to 25,000 in Gaza!

This stress affecting water resources is even more important when we consider that not all of the natural renewable water resources are necessarily “usable.” In practice, genuinely usable water resources represent around a half or a third of the renewable natural resources. This phenomenon is due to practical limitations (only a third of the whole consists of regular flows), and others of a socio-economic and environmental nature (particularly for the conservation of the aquatic eco-systems). The key figures in Table 4 sum up the contrasts between sub-regions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sub-regions</td>
<td>North (Europe)</td>
<td>East (Near East)</td>
<td>South (North Africa)</td>
<td>Overall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“Natural” Renewable Resources, “Blue Water”</td>
<td>km³ per year</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>247</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(annual averages)</td>
<td>m³ per inhabitant per year</td>
<td>3,915</td>
<td>2,371</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Competition Index</td>
<td>No. of inhabitants per hm³ per year of resources</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>422</td>
<td>1,584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usable Resources (annual averages)</td>
<td>km³ per year</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>m³ per inhabitant per year</td>
<td>1,899</td>
<td>1,279</td>
<td>536</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Blue Plan, 2007. a: Internal and external resources, calculated by sub-regions. Exchanges between bordering Mediterranean countries have not been counted twice; b: According to each country’s particular criteria; c: Rainwater used and consumed (evapotranspired) by irrigated agriculture and pasturesland.*
Water Demand and Use in the Mediterranean

Total Water Demand

The approximately 281 km³ per year used by the inhabitants of the Mediterranean is also unequally distributed, less so between the North and the South than between consumer sectors. Irrigation greatly prevails in the South and the East: 81%, as opposed to the 64% on average for the region as a whole. As regards demand per inhabitant, while this seems quite similar on average per sub-region, it is much more contrasted when calculated by countries: it varies from over 1,000 m³ per year (Egypt) to under 100 m³ per year (West Bank, Montenegro, Croatia). There again, the variation in the relative weighting of irrigation explains most of the differences.

Like the resources, the demand calculated per basin is marked by significant unbalances: the record for demand per inhabitant is in Spain, in the Ebro basin: 3700 m³ per year in around 2000. Water demand is not linked to levels of socio-economic development, and the most developed countries do not use more water than the “developing” countries; in fact the opposite is true. Compared with each dollar of agricultural added value, the annual amounts of water used for irrigation range from around 15 litres in Slovenia to over 3000 litres in Syria and in Egypt.

Water Demand for Agriculture

Analysis of per-sector demand shows that in most of the countries, the main user in terms of volume is still agriculture (irrigation), except in the eastern Adriatic countries and France.

The demand for irrigation water (Table 6) shows a diversity of situations. In the temperate countries, irrigation water withdrawals are not very significant (12% of the total for France). However, the dryer the climate is, the more agriculture needs to resort to irrigation (blue water) and the more its part of the total withdrawal increases. Values of around 80-90% of the total demand for blue water are registered in certain countries in the South and East. This fact highlights the importance of rainfed agriculture (green water), which is not properly exploited and should be valued in the semi-arid and arid countries. Improving the efficiency of rainfed agriculture through conservation of the water and the soils would lead to an increase in the soil’s rainwater storage capacity and would consequently limit the need for irrigation contribution, while at the same time reducing erosion and the consequent silting up of the reserves downstream.

### TABLE 5
Current Water Demand in the Mediterranean Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-regions</th>
<th>North (Europe)</th>
<th>East (Near East)</th>
<th>South (North Africa)</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Blue water demand (use) in km³ per year (2000-2005)</td>
<td>Communities (drinking water)</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Irrigated agriculture</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>76.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Industries not served</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Energy (cooling)</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>127.7</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>92.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaporation of reservoirs (approximate) in km³ per year</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum total (rounded off) in km³ per year</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004 populations in millions of inhabitants</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average demand (of the 4 sectors) per inhabitant in m³ per year</td>
<td>676</td>
<td>580</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Blue Plan, 2007. The key figures in table 5, in which we have considered it relevant to include the net consumption by evaporation of the dam reservoirs (the real supplementary evaporation resulting from the creation of reservoirs is calculated by the difference between the annual averages for potential evapotranspiration and real evapotranspiration applied to the air used); the total average flow for this in accordance with the world register of dams (ICOLD) should be around 20-25 km³ per year in the region as a whole.

### TABLE 6
Water Demand for Agriculture in the Mediterranean Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-regions</th>
<th>North (Europe)</th>
<th>East (Near East)</th>
<th>South (North Africa)</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irrigated agriculture (blue water) in km³ per year</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>181.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demand for green water (rainfed agriculture) in km³ per year</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water demand for agriculture in km³ per year</td>
<td>334</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Blue Plan, 2007
MAP 2  Irrigated Surface Areas in the Mediterranean Countries (in 1000 ha)

MAP 3  Irrigated Surfaces Equipped with Water-Saving Equipment

Source: Blue Plan, Aquastat, 2008
The irrigated surface areas in the Mediterranean countries and the irrigation water demand per irrigated hectare show that the proportions vary greatly from one country to another (Map 2). In 2007, around 182 billion m$^3$ of water was used for irrigating some 24 million hectares as compared with 11 million ha in 1961 (WWF, 2006), which represents an average water demand per hectare of around 7500 m$^3$.

The form in which irrigation is carried out is also very variable, the main part corresponding to gravity irrigation (in terms of surface area, and even more so in terms of volume). However, over the last few years considerable efforts have been remarked with regard to pressure networks such as sprinkling and localised irrigation in the most of the southern and eastern countries. Map 3 shows the amounts of water-saving equipment in the irrigated surface areas.

At least in theory, there is considerable room for progress, which may in fact involve irrigation output and the form of irrigation. As regards the latter, the consumption in m$^3$ per hectare per year varies greatly:

Even though the water transported to the plot in excess of the plants’ requirements is reused in certain cases (irrigation by groundwater pumping or runoff), changing the form of irrigation can, more often than not, lead to significant water savings.

The degree of pressure exerted by the demand on the resources can be seen by the way in which agriculture, and particularly plot irrigation, is practised. The water consumption index per hectare calculated for the Mediterranean countries between 2000 and 2005 reveals a great diversity of situations (Chart 5):

- A 1st group of countries whose water consumption per hectare is between 5,000 and 20,000 m$^3$;
- A 2nd group of countries with a per-hectare water demand between 3,000 and 5,000 m$^3$;
- A 3rd group of countries whose water consumption per hectare is under 3,000 m$^3$.

**Efficiency of Water Use**

In spite of some encouraging progress (Chart 6), the current returns from water use are far from satisfactory; throughout the Mediterranean region, losses and leakages in transport, inefficient irrigation practices and squandering are estimated to be in excess of 100 km$^3$ per year, i.e. some 45% of the total water demand (281 km$^3$ per year) (Table 8).

This is equivalent to a potential “pool” of considerable water savings, of which at least part could be mobilised by a more active “water demand management” policy (increased efficiency of water use).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 7</th>
<th>Variation in Consumption in m$^3$ per Hectare per Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consumption in m$^3$ per ha per year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gravity irrigation</td>
<td>5,000 - 20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sprinkler irrigation</td>
<td>1,500 - 5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Localised irrigation</td>
<td>1,000 - 3,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (FAO, 1999)
### TABLE 8
**Current Losses and Inefficient Use of Water Withdrawn for the Drinking Water Distribution and Irrigation Sectors Only (in km³ per year)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consumer sectors</th>
<th>Sub-regions</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>North</td>
<td>East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Irrigated agriculture</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities (drinking water)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Blue Plan 2007, based on national sources.

### CHART 6
**Efficiency of Water Use (Total and by Consumer Sectors) in the Mediterranean Countries**

Source: Blue Plan (data currently being validated).

### Demand with Respect to Water Resources

**Increasing Pressure on Water Resources**

To evaluate the degree of water stress or shortage, these studies are based on two classic indicators (Table 9): on the one hand, renewable water resources (natural or usable) per inhabitant (M. Falkenmark, 1997), and on the other hand the use index for renewable natural resources (ratio of withdrawal to resources) each matched with revealing thresholds.

### TABLE 9
**Thresholds for Water Stress and Scarcity Situations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situation</th>
<th>Average renewable natural resources (m³ per inhabitant per year)</th>
<th>Index of use of renewable natural resources (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Water stress, water shortage</td>
<td>500 - 1,000</td>
<td>50 - 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water scarcity</td>
<td>&lt; 500</td>
<td>≥ 100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Blue Plan, 2007

The average use indexes in each country suffering this pressure are a new indicator of situations of water stress (above 50%) or scarcity (approaching or even exceeding 100%), and are fairly well correlated with the resources per inhabitant. In accordance with these criteria, all the southern and many of the eastern Mediterranean countries have currently surpassed the stress threshold, and six of them (Algeria, the Palestinian Territories, Israel, Libya, Malta and Tunisia) are in a scarcity situation.

The use indexes calculated by country have revealed three different situations (Chart 7): a first group of countries in which the ratio is under 25%, a second group of countries with a ratio of between 25 and 50%, and a third group of countries where water withdrawals approach or even exceed the limit level of renewable resources (ratio > 75%). These use indexes, calculated on a national level, may hide major disparities as regards the catchment area or on a local level, as is the case in certain countries in the North (Mediterranean Spain, southern Italy, etc.).
The current pressure of water withdrawals – essential sources of water supply in most of the Mediterranean countries – are naturally highly unsymmetrical, as the demand is higher wherever there are less resources. Table 10 shows the average values for another pressure indicator (the index of final consumption of the renewable resources) and again highlights the differences between sub-regions, although the averages by countries are further contrasted.

At present, the total demand approaches or exceeds the renewable resources in several southern and eastern countries, where they are partially covered by the use of non-renewable or non-conventional resources: this is the case in Egypt, Gaza, Israel, Libya and Malta.

*Developments Incompatible with Those of Water Availability*

According to the forecasts made in the Blue Plan (baseline trend scenario), the water demand could be increased by a further 50 km³, reaching 332 km³ by 2025 (i.e. 18% of the current demand), with the South and the East shore countries at the root of this growth (Chart 8). Agriculture should remain the principal user of the water resources, in terms of volume, for satisfying irrigation requirements, particularly in the South and East of the basin. According to the FAO, irrigated surface areas could increase by 38% in the South and by 58% in the East by 2030, while the demand for agricultural water will only slightly increase or remain stable in the North.

Given the essential nature of the drinking water supply, urban demand will undergo rapid, significant growth as regards allocation of resources and investment. In the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, the urbanisation rate has in general exceeded 50% of the total population; it is increasing very rapidly and within twenty or thirty years is expected to reach the “ceiling” of 70-80% which the northern countries will soon have attained. Likewise, in the space of a generation, the population of the Mediterranean countries should increase by 10 million in the North and by 82 million in the South and East, reaching 535 million inhabitants by 2025.

**TABLE 10  Current Pressure on the Average Renewable Water Resources**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-regions</th>
<th>North</th>
<th>East</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>Overall</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Current withdrawals in km³ per year</strong></td>
<td>128</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average use index (%)</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Final consumption in km³ per year</strong></td>
<td>276</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average final consumption index (%)</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Blue Plan, 2007* a. Withdrawals from renewable resources only. Withdrawals from non-renewable or “secondary” resources (water returns) and the resulting final consumptions are not taken into account here.
Furthermore, with some 300 million tourists in 2025 in the Mediterranean coastal regions, which will remain the world’s top tourist destinations, tourism has the effect of increasing the demand for drinking water in the receiving areas: in luxury hotels it is 500-800 litres per person per day, much higher than that of the permanent residents. Golf courses consume as much water per hectare as well-irrigated areas do (7,000-10,000 m³ per hectare per year). Industry, although it uses a lesser amount, is also set to increase its water consumption. This is the case for the Algerian paper pulp factories, for example, which are huge water consumers (just one factory consumes 30 million m³ per year, equivalent to a town of half a million inhabitants); and certain areas have significant projects for industrial development.

While it is difficult to quantify, the environmental demand – mainly used for the correct functioning of the ecosystems – could take on great importance. Certain countries have already included the earmarking of a minimum flow of the watercourses for species protection in their legislation (France), or have explicitly included environmental demand (Spain), and others could follow (Italy, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, etc.).

The unequal tendencies towards growth in demand are expected to spread and worsen the unbalances, particularly in the South and the Near East. So, even if the water resources remained unchanged, the populations in a situation of water stress or scarcity could increase to 250 million by 2025 (i.e. 47%), from a total population of 535 million in the Mediterranean countries, according to forecasts made by the United Nations, and this would be even more so in the case of impoverishment of the conventional water resources. In 2050, all the countries in the South will be in a scarcity situation (Egypt and Morocco will have joined those already on the list).

Water scarcity situations are already the case in part of the Mediterranean region and they will inevitably spread and worsen in the twenty-first century, especially in the South and the East: the countries whose water resources are already the lowest per inhabitant and the most expensive to mobilise and distribute will experience the greatest increase in demand and will run the greatest risk of their resources becoming impoverished. This means considerable efforts will have to be made to adapt to the new Mediterranean contexts (economy, forms of development).

The margins for choice of water policies in the Mediterranean region are not huge, but they do exist. The poli-
cies should be modified towards a rebalance between the offer-orientated approach, which has long predominated, and an approach geared towards demand management.

Ideas for Saving a Quarter of the Water Demand

As water management is also a political issue, these trends cannot be ignored. They can be mitigated by policies especially geared towards improving the efficiency with which resources are used and further diminishing losses and inefficient use, particularly in irrigation, where the average efficiency of water use on a plot barely exceeds 60% and in some towns leakage is estimated to be as high as 40%.

The room for progress in this issue is considerable, as improved water demand management (the Blue Plan alternative scenario) would enable savings of a quarter of the demand, i.e. some 86 km³ per year by 2025 (Chart 8 and Chart 9).

Irrigated agriculture represents the greatest potential for savings in terms of volume, with almost 65% of the total water saving potential identified in the Mediterranean area (transport losses reduced to half, reaching 10%, efficiency in transporting irrigation water to the plots increased from 60% to 80%). The rest of the potential water savings involve industry, representing 22% (recycling rates reduced to 50%), and the supply of drinking water, with 13% (reduction by half in transport losses and leakage affecting users, reaching 15% and 10% respectively).

In the light of this optimistic perspective, theoretically generalised in all the Mediterranean countries, the total water demand could reach 246 km³ per year (102 km³ per year in the North and 144 km³ per year in the South and the Near East), which would be the overall equivalent of a reduction in the total demand of some 40 km³ per year with respect to 2005 (Chart 9).

Essential Reforms for Trend Improvement

The switch from a trend scenario to a more durable development scenario can only be made progressively, through essential reforms with the clear objective of integrated water resource management in all the policies – and in the agricultural policies particularly – and generating the means for it to be put into practice, basically establishing efficiency plans and sustainable financing systems.

Within this context, the question of financing investment in drinking water supplies and sanitation...
(in the South and East), and the use of financial instruments – subsidies, pricing, etc. – to optimise allocation of available resources are vital for the future. The same applies to the reinforcement of management capacities, particularly on a local level. Regional cooperation, benefiting from a longstanding tradition in the water policy field in the Mediterranean area, is in a position to contribute to catalysing and accelerating the desired changes. The recommendations of the regional workshop organised by the Blue Plan and its partners (see box), adopted by the Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development (May 2007) and later by the Mediterranean countries as a whole and the European Community at the 15th meeting of Contracting Parties to the Barcelona Convention (January 2008), are aimed at the political decision-makers, given the essential nature of their role in promotion of water demand management (WDM). They place particular stress on the need to raise WDM to the rank of a strategic national priority, to assure its promotion and to coordinate its definition, follow-up and evaluation within the policies of the different sectors, particularly those of agriculture, energy, tourism, the environment and land planning.

**SUMMARY OF THE ZARAGOZA WORKSHOP’S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NATIONAL POLITICAL AUTHORITIES OF THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES**

1. To make Water Demand Management a national strategic priority, in accordance with the MSSD’s guidelines;
2. To ensure that the problems associated with WDM are correctly articulated with global environmental problems such as climate change or the conservation of biodiversity and the ecosystems;
3. To encourage mobilisation and empowerment of the various actors concerned with WDM;
4. To take all possible measures to raise public awareness of WDM;
5. On a two-yearly basis, to assess the progress made with regard to WDM, highlighting the reinforcement of WDM’s consideration within the national water information systems;
6. To reinforce regional scientific and institutional cooperation to in order to encourage WDM.

**References**


Water in the Mediterranean

Water Management in the Mediterranean Countries of the European Union

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Murcian Agro-Food Research and Development Institute
Former President of the Euro-Mediterranean Information System on Know-How in the Water Sector (EMWIS)

This article will analyse the institutional framework for water management in the EU Member States of the Mediterranean region. Due to the climatic conditions they are exposed to, water is a scarce commodity required for the social and economic development of their societies. Nevertheless, this development must be sustainable and hence respect the environment and natural resources making it up. The article also looks at the European Union’s regulatory framework (in which the integrative function of the Water Framework Directive plays a particularly important role), national legislation (with special reference to the integrative function of the Directive) and the features of European water resource management-related regulations. User communities and their time-honoured participation in water management receive special consideration. All this on the basis of an underlying conviction of the reality of a Mediterranean culture of water.

Water Resources in Mediterranean Europe

The Mediterranean part of the European Union – the subject of this study – is made up of the following Member States: Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Italy, France and Spain. Additionally, due to its sharing the common water culture of these countries, Portugal can be considered as a member of this group. In total, the region thus defined has an approximate surface area of 1.6 million km² that are home to some 185 million people.

The total volume of renewable water resources stands at 650.26 km³ per year. Except in the two island states (Cyprus and Malta), the use of these resources is below this volume. Table 11 provides information on the annual volume of renewable water resources and the proportion thereof used in each of these countries in the year 2000.

All the countries in the region have set up desalination plants for sea and brackish water, which provides an indication of the lack of water in specific places in this territory. The installed water desalination capacity stands at 1.37 km³, or around 2% of renewable water resources. Table 12 contains data on the desalinated water production capacity of the Mediterranean countries of the European Union.

Table 13 contains information on the groundwater resources in each of these countries, as well as the proportion thereof used annually. In general, the extraction and use of groundwater is below the existing volume, except in the case of the two island states (Cyprus and Malta) where it is used almost to exhaustion point.

Finally, Table 14 provides information on the theoretical demand from different usages in the Mediterranean countries of the EU. There, as in many other places on the planet, water demand for agricultural uses (irrigation) stands at around 75% of total usage requirements.

Europe’s Water-Related Regulations

Currently, the legal basis for water management in the territories studied is constituted by regulations stemming, in the main, from public law: however, this does not invalidate the applicability of private water law in some of these territories. European Union water law is made up, principally, of the regulations issued by EU bodies and by those be-
### TABLE 11 Renewable Water Resources in European Mediterranean Countries (km\(^3\) per year) (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Renewable water resources</th>
<th>Water resources used</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>74.00</td>
<td>8.70</td>
<td>65.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>191.00</td>
<td>56.60</td>
<td>134.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>204.00</td>
<td>37.70</td>
<td>166.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>112.00</td>
<td>44.10</td>
<td>67.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>69.00</td>
<td>8.30</td>
<td>60.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>650.26</strong></td>
<td><strong>155.26</strong></td>
<td><strong>495.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Canovas Cuenca & del Campo García, 2007; p. 69

### TABLE 12 Desalinated Water Production Capacity in European Mediterranean Countries (km\(^3\) per year) (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Desalinated water production capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>0.198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>0.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>0.987</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.370</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Canovas Cuenca & Juan y Martinez Vicente, 2007; p.61

### TABLE 13 Groundwater Resources in European Mediterranean Countries (km\(^3\) per year) (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>10.30</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>43.00</td>
<td>13.90</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>29.90</td>
<td>5.50</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>187.51</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE 14 Theoretical Demand for Water in European Mediterranean Countries (km\(^3\) per year) (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>Agricultural</th>
<th>Industrial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>9.26</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td>19.21</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>6.49</td>
<td>8.65</td>
<td>0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>4.45</td>
<td>23.71</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>4.63</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>19.69</strong></td>
<td><strong>65.71</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.59</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% of total: 22.63% 75.54% 1.83%

Source: Canovas Cuenca & del Campo García, 2007; p. 79
longing to the national law of each of the Member States.

**EU Water-Related Regulations**

The Treaty establishing the European Community (EC) provides the basis for the regulations governing water within its territory. Title XIX thereto, on the environment, refers to natural resources, one of which is water, and is made up of three articles of a markedly protective nature. Article 175.2.b) grants the Council the power to adopt, on a proposal from the Commission and acting unanimously, measures affecting the quantitative management of water resources, after consulting the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions.

Article 6 of the Treaty states that environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the policies and activities of the EC, with a view to promoting sustainable development. When these policies are related to the use of natural resources, such as water, one cannot act as if they were unlimited, but instead one must comply with the requirement for prudent and rational utilisation set forth in Article 174.1 of the Treaty.

The fact that the EU places the source of water law within the field of environmental protection shows the goal of protecting resources that lies behind the Union’s constitutional treaty and which is clear in all the regulations deriving therefrom. Thus it is that Point 1 of the preamble to Directive 60/2000/EC of the European Parliament and of the European Council, establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy, the Water Framework Directive, states that “Water is not a commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage which must be protected, defended and treated as such”. Consequently, Article 1 states that its object is to establish a framework for the protection of inland surface waters, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwater. Without doubt this duty of protection must be one of the goals to be achieved by water resource management.

The European Water Framework Directive is the first large-scale regulatory outcome of the Treaty establishing the European Community covering water resources. This regulation codifies and unifies other Community Directives related to this resource. Its background is to be found in the declaration of the Ministerial Seminar on groundwater held in the Hague in 1991, which called for the implementation of a programme of measures to achieve the sustainable management and protection of freshwater resources. Preamble Point 15 of the Water Framework Directive defines the supply of water as a service of general interest for the purposes of Article 16 of the EC Treaty, and requires a special effort on the part of Community institutions and Member State to ensure that this service is provided with sufficient guarantees. No pronouncement has been found which establishes, on a general basis, the meaning of the term “supply”, and this could therefore include the supply of water (surface or groundwater) of a quality that is sufficient for each type of demand from social and economic players, as required by a sustainable, balanced and fair use of water resources.

The Water Framework Directive contemplates each Member State defining each of its river basin districts, territorial units that include one or more neighbouring river basins and the groundwater and coastal waters associated therewith. These are the main units for the management of water resources, which must be based on the forecasts contained in the relevant basin management plans, defined in Article 13 of the Water Framework Directive. These management tools must be initially formulated in 2008 and definitively published in 2009.

The Directive also provides a regulatory umbrella for all the other Community rules which govern different aspects of the management and use of water in the European Union. These include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Directive 91/676/EEC, concerning the protection
of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources.
- Directive 96/61/EC, concerning integrated pollution prevention and control.
- Directive 2006/118/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 12 December 2006, on the protection of groundwater against pollution and deterioration developed in response to the requirements of Article 17 of the Water Framework Directive with regard to the adoption of specific measures to prevent and control groundwater contamination. It has been given the function of ensuring the continuity of the protection provided by Directive 80/68/EEC and modifications thereto, incorporating transitional measures that will govern the application of said system until its expiration, due to repeal, on 22 December 2013. These measures affect, in the main, authorisation procedures for the disposal of substances in Lists I and II, from 16 January 2009 to 22 December 2013.

All these Directives, the modifications thereto and the decisions of the European Court of Justice, together with Water Framework Directive, constitute the corpus of European water law, which forms the basis for the management of water resources in the territory of the Union and whose full coming into force, at least in an initial phase, could be achieved in 2027.

The way in which they have been created compels EU Member States to become guarantors of achieving the end result contemplated in each of these Directives and they therefore must, to this end, begin to incorporate them into their own national legislation. In the case of the European Water Framework Directive, the deadline for carrying this out has been set at three years from the date of its entry into force. Currently, all the Member States in the region under review have tried to formally comply with the duty to transpose this Directive into their national legislation, although the results have not always been entirely accepted by Community bodies. Table 15 contains the timetable for its implementation.

The entry into force of the Water Framework Directive has allowed this regulation to implement not only the aforementioned integrative function but also its capacity to promote a culture of water that is highly respectful of the environment in all Member States that

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>WFD Article</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Directive entered into force</td>
<td>Art. 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Transposition into national legislation</td>
<td>Art. 23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Identification of river basin districts and authorities</td>
<td>Art. 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>Characterisation of river basins</td>
<td>Art. 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Establishment of programmes for monitoring the state of waters and protected areas</td>
<td>Art. 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Start public consultation</td>
<td>Art. 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Present draft river basin management plans to public</td>
<td>Arts. 13 &amp; 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Publication of river basin management plans including programme of measures</td>
<td>Arts. 11 &amp; 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Introduce water pricing policies</td>
<td>Art. 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Make operational programmes of measures</td>
<td>Art. 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Meet environmental objectives</td>
<td>Art. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>First extension of environmental deadlines ends</td>
<td>Arts. 4 &amp; 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2027</td>
<td>Second extension of environmental deadlines ends</td>
<td>Arts. 4 &amp; 13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission of the European Communities, 2007; p. 6.
are equipping themselves with the institutional framework defined thereby to manage their water resources.

**Water Management Regulations in Mediterranean EU Member States**

Water management in the European Mediterranean region is based upon laws democratically passed by the parliaments of the respective Member States and promulgated in accordance with their constitutions. Consequently, the principle of legality lies behind the regulation of water resources, guaranteeing the exclusion of arbitrariness in the related decision-making processes. It can be said that, from 2000 on, the majority of water resource-related legislative activity carried out in Member States is associated with the application of Community regulations within their territories, and with the Water Framework Directive being the common denominator for water management in all of them. The implementation of its principles and the search for the goals set forth within it cannot, under any circumstances, be far from the ancient Mediterranean culture of water. The main water management-related legislative steps taken in the countries studied are listed below.

- **Greece.** Law 3199/2003, of 9 December, of the Greek Republic, transposed the Water Framework Directive into Greek national law. It sets forth a national strategy to achieve sustainable use of available water resources in the country, effective protection of water-related ecosystems and the securing of high levels of surface water and groundwater quality. This Law is, today, a key point of reference for water management in the country.
- **Cyprus.** The Water Protection and Management Law of 5 February 2004 transposed the Water Framework Directive into Cypriot national law. The Law represents the legal basis for the management of this country’s waters.
- **France.** Amongst the water-related laws in France are Law 64/1964, of 16 December and Law 92/1992, of 3 January. Law 338/2004, of 21 April, transposed the Water Framework Directive into French national law. Also contributing to this function was the Water and Aquatic Environment Law 1772/2006, of 30 December.
- **Portugal.** With regard to water-related legislation in Portugal, worthy of note are Law 54/2005, of 15 November and Law 58/2005, of 29 December, which transposed the Water Framework Directive into Portuguese national law.

**The Guiding Principles behind Water Management in the European Union**

Management of water resources is a social function which finds material form in the orderly carrying out of the activities required for the fair and sustainable use of water. Management always relates to the territory in which plans, programmes and actions to rationalise demand are executed, promoting savings and economic, social and environmental efficiency in the different uses of water by means of the utilisation of water resources in accordance with the forecasts contained in general economic planning. In water resource management in the European Union, the following characteristics are noteworthy: rationality, proximity to users, integrated management, prior planning and public participation.

**Rationality**

The principle of rationality is present in the Treaty establishing the EC, with it providing particular inspiration for the provisions regarding production processes in the EU’s territory. From amongst the objectives to be achieved by EC policy, Article 174 of the Treaty highlights the prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources. The environmental component of water resource management is developed around this principle: the concepts of precaution,
prevention, rectifying pollution at source, responsibility (“polluter pays”) and sustainability of water use can be considered as included within it. Rationality also covers the economic aspects inherent in its use and, therefore, in addition to being considered as a natural resource, water should be seen as a production factor wherever, due to its scarcity, it must be considered an economic asset. The recovery of water-associated costs, contemplated in Article 9 of the Water Framework Directive, may also be deemed a manifestation of this principle. Rationality appears in all national legislations as a requirement of proper water management. The need for water planning as a precursor to the management of these resources can also be regarded as a consequence of this principle.

Proximity to Users

With regard to water management, European regulations seek to bring the decision-making process closer to users of the resources. This follows from the path forged by many Member States who took on board the need to transfer to the territories where the water is used all the activities required for its management. For example, Article 13.2 of Spain’s Water Law (1985) includes respect for the unity of river basin systems amongst its water management principles. This is also the case of Article 3.2 of Portugal’s Water Law. The districts introduced by the Water Framework Directive have as their basic territorial reference the concept of the river basin, although they have been extended to include groundwater and coastal waters associated therewith. This explains the relative ease with which these districts have been defined in Member States in which river basins already constituted the territorial reference for water management. For the European Directive, water districts are the management unit closest to the places in which water is used or affected, and these meet with the condition of proximity contemplated in Point 13 of the preamble to the Water Framework Directive. The Directive raises the river basin district to the rank of the main unit for river basin management purpose (Article 2). Currently, in the Member States studied, there are a total of 67 river basin districts, whose numerical distribution is set forth in Table 16.

### Integrated Management of Water Resources

According to European regulations, management of water resources in river basins must be carried out on an integrated basis, taking them as a whole, especially from the viewpoint of satisfying demand. Proof of the validity of the principle of totality at this regulatory level is provided by the formulation of river basin management plans (Article 13 of the Water Framework Directive). The principle of totality inspires the integrated management of water resources, which is based on coordination between the availability and the use thereof and of that of land and other natural resources. This process is in response to the need to put into practice the principles adopted by the international community in Dublin (International Conference on Water Management, January 1992) and in Rio de Janeiro (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 1992), which were subsequently renewed. It is associated with the unity of the river basin.

Article 8 of Galli Law (Legge 36/1994) requires, together with respect for the unity of the river basin, the overcoming of the fragmented management of water resources in Italy. Article 2 of the French Law (Loi 93-3/1992) establishes as a goal of the management of water resources the distribution thereof reconciling the qualitative and quantitative demands of their different uses. Article 13 of the Spanish Water Law, in its initial formulation (1985), adopted the princi-

---

**TABLE 16**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of River Basin Districts in European Mediterranean Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>67</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Commission of the European Communities, 2007; p. 58-61.
ple of integrated management of resources as one of the guiding principles of water management. Article 3.1 d) of the Portuguese Republic’s Law 58/2005, of 29 December, includes the integrated management of water and of the ecosystems associated with this resource amongst the guiding principles of this function.

**Prior Planning**

In European regulations, water planning is deemed a necessary precursor for the management of water resources. Article 13 of the Water Framework Directive establishes the content of the river basin plans that must be drawn up for each water district. Law 3199/2003, of 9 December, of the Greek Republic, introduced a national strategy for the management of water resources in Greece, including the establishment and development of plans for the management of river basin resources.

In Italy, the “Improvement of Water Resources” Legislative Decree 152/1999, of 11 May, governs their planning, financing and management. Article 56 ff of Spain’s Royal Legislative Decree 152/2006, of 3 April, regulates the activity of planning water resources in accordance with the Water Framework Directive.

In France, Article 3 of Law 92/1992, of 3 January, attributes to the management plans of each river basin or basin grouping the duty to bring together the fundamental orientations for a balanced management of water resources.

Title III of Spain’s Water Law governs water planning as the instrument to achieve a good state of and proper protection for public water resources, the meeting of demand for water and balance between and harmonisation of regional and industrial development. It states that this should be carried out in river basin plans and the National Water Plan. Law 10/2002, of 5 July, and the modifications thereto, govern their content, establishing the regulatory forecasts to guarantee compliance therewith.

Chapter III of the Portuguese Republic’s Law 58/2005, of 29 December, deals with the regulation and planning of water resources. Article 24 defines the objectives of and tools for water planning, including the National Water Plan and the river basin management plans.

The brief references above show the great importance planning has in the management of water resources in the territories object of this study.

**Public Participation**

Point 14 of the preamble to Water Framework Directive acknowledges that its success depends, amongst other factors, on the involvement of the public, including water users, in the main decisions on water management. In any case, it is the duty of the planner to encourage active participation, which obviously requires something more than the cold publication of announcements in official journals. Special emphasis is placed on this participation as a prerequisite for the establishment and updating of river basin plans, processes during which the public must be properly informed so that its members may provide their input before the plans are definitively adopted. Article 14 develops this duty and establishes the right to access, after previously so requesting, the documentation and information required to formulate these plans.

**User Participation**

The participation of users of water in the management of the resource goes beyond their presence from time to time in planning processes. In general, all the legislation of the Member States studied contemplates their active presence in both governing and consultative bodies related with the management of water resources. For example, Law 3199/2003, of 9 December, of the Greek Republic, includes user representatives on its National Water Council and Regional Water Councils. Via these bodies, they have influence on the decisions of the Inter-Ministerial Water Committee, the Central Water Agency and the Regional Water Directorates.

In Spain, the Water Law defines “User Communities” as associations of those with rights of use over water or other public water elements. These are public law corporations which are affiliated to the relevant river basin bodies. Article 70 of the Portuguese Republic’s Water Law defines the Water User Communities in said country. In France, Article 31 of Law 92/1992, of 3 January, governs the involvement of territorial groupings in the study, execution and operation of all the water-related works of a general or urgent nature within the field of water resource management. Order 632/2004, of 1 July of the Ministry of Home Affairs, Internal Security and Local Freedoms, governs the owners’ associations whose object is the construction and maintenance of water works associated with them. In Italy, the law provides for the constitution of different types of owners as-
sociations depending upon the responsibilities assigned to them, which include voluntary consortia of irrigators.

In the region studied, there have been different types of water user organisations for more than one thousand years. In many cases, they put into practice ancient know-how on the “whats, hows and whys” of many of the problems of water management, particularly that of shortage of supply to meet all the kinds of demand occurring in each territory. Management of water resources could not be imagined without their active participation.

In general, their operations are organised by means of a founding charter or regulations. These define their governing bodies, which are generally made up of a general assembly, executive body, Chairperson and, in many cases, a tribunal which hears cases on breaches of their regulations.

The Public Administration of Water

Finally, it should be noted that water management in European Mediterranean countries is carried out, almost in its entirety, by administrative bodies subject to public law with statutes defined by the provisions of the relevant national laws. Nevertheless, an overview of this management function would be incomplete if, together with the technical complexity inherent in regulating such a vital, scarce and threatened resource as water, account was not also taken of the political problems associated with carrying out the functions of planning and managing its use and demand.

Study of the legal framework currently in force in this region shows that legislative provisions go further than what was previously possible even if they only provide a response to the needs of today and tomorrow. Taking on board the “New Water Order” requires processes of genuine acceptance on the part of large sectors of society and also of assimilation, not substitution, of what has been, and still remains, the Mediterranean culture of water. All this in the aim of overcoming problems of the division of powers between the territorial public administrations affected by management decisions and, also, to prevent radicalised local positions that call into question the State’s ownership of public water resources.

References


CÁNOVAS CUENCA, Juan and MARTÍNEZ VICENTE, David. Report on Water Desalination Status in the Mediterranean Countries. 2007. IMIDA, IME. Currently being published


This article presents some of the emerging mechanisms related to transboundary water management. It presents ideas for conflict resolution on transboundary waters, addressing some of the principal driving forces for conflicts, mainly the insufficiency of available water resources, and the lack of effective legislative frameworks for sharing transboundary waters.

The article highlights the importance of “green” water assessment, and the importance of adapting the legislative frameworks to consider all forms of available water resources at the transboundary river basin level and at the national level to reduce chances of conflicts in transboundary river basins. It also emphasizes the notion of “no-harm” and protection of prior appropriation of water rights in transboundary water management.

Introduction

The potential for water conflicts over transboundary, shared or international waters (as some countries prefer to call them) is increasing as population, development and the demand for water increase. There are more than 300 major river basins, covering about 50% of the total land area of the earth. Many of these river basins cross country borders, even more as political developments lead to the break-up of nations such as the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Sherk et al, 1998). The number of countries sharing a transboundary river basin may be two or more. Examples of transboundary river basins are the Nile River, with 10 countries sharing the basin, and the Danube River, shared by 17 countries.

With rising prices of food all over the world, water productivity in agriculture will have to be improved for both irrigated agriculture using blue water, and rain-fed agriculture using green water. Blue water is defined as surface water or groundwater that is abstracted manually for the purpose of development or production. Green water is defined as the portion of beneficial abstractions of renewable water resources from green cover which comes from atmospheric water directly and is consumed by rain-fed agriculture, natural pasture, and forests.

Despite the dominant role of green water in rain-fed agriculture for food production, sustaining natural ecosystems, and relieving pressures on transboundary blue waters, the assessment of green water's potential is still unknown on the global scale. Green water constitutes the true potential for solving the food crisis and hunger in the world through rain-fed agriculture, which can fill the food gap at lower costs than irrigated agriculture.

The role of green water calls for looking beyond the transboundary river alone (blue water) to the transboundary river “basin” to capture the benefits of green water and blue water combined, for upstream and downstream riparian countries.

The Potential of ‘Green’ Water

Unlike blue water (groundwater, surface water), which generally has many alternatives for its development and use because of its flexible accessibility and transportability, green water (atmospheric water and soil moisture in the unsaturated zones) can only be taken up by local vegetation. The possibilities for alternative uses of green water in municipal, agricultural, or industrial uses are not always that obvious. How-
ever, green water has alternative uses in rain-fed natural cover and agriculture. This requires changes in crops or land use and will not usually change the water balance quantitatively but could make important differences in a qualitative sense (World Water Council, 2004). Green Water is also transformed daily into Blue Water by the effects of continuous urbanization or deforestation practices in green-covered lands (Abu-Zeid, K., 2001).

The direct beneficial use of rainfall is a substantial amount of water, which, if properly assessed, could significantly switch the balance of equitable utilization formulas. The World Water Council (WWC) defines this water as green water, or soil water, which is the portion of rainfall that is stored in the soil and then evaporates or is incorporated into plants and organisms. In its World Water Vision 2000, the WWC estimates the annual global green water to be 60,000 km$^3$, compared with only 40,000 km$^3$ of blue water, which is defined as the portion of rainfall that enters into streams and recharges ground water. It is apparent how significant green water can be in resolving water conflicts, not only because of its amount but also because of how much green water contributes to food production. 60% of global food production comes from green water (Cosgrove and Rijsberman, 2000).

A proper assessment of water resources is an essential step in the equitable utilization of shared water resources. It provides the opportunity for cooperation among riparian countries of a river basin to develop the untapped water resources in the basin rather than compete over already utilized water resources. It should define each country’s actual utilized water as extracted surface and ground water as well as any beneficial evapo-transpiration resulting from rainfall on the river basin. It should account for all possible potential water resources in each country, within or outside the river basin, whether it is river runoff, ground water, direct rainfall (contributing to green water) or evaporation losses that could be saved (Abu-Zeid, K., 1997 & 2001).

Many discrepancies exist between different methodologies of water resources assessment due to the lack or extreme difficulty of accurate estimation of data, and different definitions and terminologies used in the field. Double counting of the commonly used term “internal renewable water resources” is a repeated feature, and the neglect of atmospheric water (green water) consumed by natural vegetation and forests is a persistent drawback in water resources assessments, especially in transboundary river basins and given the lack of basin-wide agreements in many river basins.

The soaring demand for fresh water, especially competing demands on transboundary waters, is putting high pressure on the effective consideration of other water resources like groundwater and direct fresh water use from green water. Of equal importance is consideration of the potential of non-conventional water resources. The need for a unified systematic approach towards the identification, compilation and processing of reliable data, and a consistent method-
ology for national and river basin water balance calculations is inevitable.

Chart 10 illustrates the water used for irrigated land compared with water used for rain-fed land for selected Mediterranean countries. It shows how some countries depend differently on blue water and green water in their agriculture. France, for example, which depends more on green water, cultivates about 80 million acres, 92% of which is rain-fed. Egypt cultivates 8 million acres, 99% of which is irrigated (Abu-Zeid, K., 2003). This shows the comparative advantage of green water in the north of the Mediterranean versus blue water in the south of the Mediterranean. This is also supported by the fact that a country such as Egypt, for instance, uses all its annual supply of the Nile river flow (55.5 BCM/year of blue water) due to the absence of green water, while a country such as France releases a similar amount of blue water (50 BCM/year) to the Mediterranean through the Rhone river, mainly due to the abundance of green water (in addition to other blue water resources).

Blue and Green Water in the Nile Basin

Similarly, the Nile river basin gives a very good example crossing a wide range of climates ranging from the rainy tropical regions upstream to the desert regions downstream of the Nile basin. Green water plays a very important role upstream in countries such as Burundi, Kenya, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Rwanda and Uganda, while Blue water plays the most important role downstream especially in Egypt and the northern part of Sudan.

While on average 7,000 Billion Cubic Metres (BCM)/year of precipitation falls on the Nile Basin Countries as a whole, the average annual precipitation on the Nile Basin is estimated at 1,660 BCM/year, where only 84 BCM/year of river flow (blue water) accumulates in the final reaches of the river, downstream of Khartoum/Sudan and on to Egypt. Most of the Nile basin’s precipitation is used as “green water,” except for Egypt’s and Sudan’s “blue water” use...
from the Nile, which is only about 55.5 BCM/year and 18.5 BCM/year respectively. Map 4 shows the average annual precipitation over the Nile Basin countries, while Chart 11 shows the per-capita share of the renewable water resources (including blue and green water, calculated based on natural river flows and water sharing agreements) and the per-capita share of green cover (natural pasture, forests, rain-fed and irrigated agriculture) for each of the Nile countries. The country per-capita share of renewable water resources ranges from about 83 thousand m$^3$/capita/year in Congo to about one thousand m$^3$/capita/year in Egypt as of the year 1995. When correlating the map to Chart 11, it is easy to notice that the per-capita share of green cover follows the same pattern as the average annual precipitation (providing blue and green water). The Chart also shows that the per-capita share of green cover (dark blue chart bars) follows the same pattern as the per-capita share of renewable water resources (light blue chart bars), in the sense that the areas benefiting from higher renewable water resources also benefit from a higher per-capita share of green cover. This is closely related to the consideration of green water in the assessment, and the associated green cover of natural pasture, forests, and rain-fed agriculture. Chart 11 shows that although a downstream country such as Egypt, which depends totally on the blue water of the Nile “river”, may be consuming a large portion of the river’s “blue” water that historically has been reaching its boundaries naturally, the upstream countries normally consume larger portions of the river basin’s “green” water. This analysis shows the importance of considering green water, other available national water resources and population in assessing equitable utilization of transboundary waters.

Analysis of Existing Transboundary Water Legislations

The need for an international law to govern the equitable sharing of transboundary water resources between countries emerged a long time ago. Efforts on the professional, non-governmental, and intergovernmental levels resulted in two important outcomes reflected by the 1966 Helsinki Rules and the 1997 United Nations (UN) Convention. Article IV of the 1966 Helsinki Rules (ILA, 1967) states that the equitable utilization principle should govern the use of international drainage basin waters. States refer to these guidelines to the present day and some countries have recommended that elements of the Helsinki Rules be incorporated into the UN’s framework convention on international watercourses that was later developed in 1997.

A legislative framework for an international water law should be elaborated to fairly support the above-mentioned technical and legal aspects of transboundary water management.

In May of 1997, after more than a quarter of a century of working on the topic, the UN General Assembly adopted a framework convention on the law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses. The UN Convention (United Nations, 1997a) was adopted by a recorded vote of 103 in favour, 3 against, and 27 abstentions. Thirty-three countries were absent during the convention’s adoption and some countries that favoured the convention do not have any international watercourses within their territories. Irrespective of being upstream or downstream, countries within the same transboundary river basin did not have the same standpoint regarding the convention. For example in the Nile river basin, Sudan and Kenya were in favour, Burundi was against, Egypt, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Tanzania abstained, while Eritrea, Uganda and Zaire were absent. The 37-article convention, including its 14-article annex, represents substantial progress in the development of international water law. It addresses issues such as the non-navigational uses of international watercourses; measures to protect, preserve and manage international watercourses; and flood control, water quality, erosion, sedimentation, salt-water intrusion, and living resources within the watercourses. However, country responses to these issues vary in accordance with their location —upstream or downstream— on the watercourse. States adopt positions that favour their particular interests. Upstream states support rules that give them control of the waters that originate in their territory, in line with the doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty. In contrast, downstream states appeal to the doctrines of prior appropriation (vested rights) and, in some cases, absolute
territorial integrity, and embrace an approach that would provide them with unaltered flow (in terms of quality and quantity) of the waters that enter their territories. On the other hand, countries with no transboundary watercourses may adopt an environmental protection position, extending the principle of no harm to biological organisms and wildlife that may be affected by the upstream water users, and the impact on water quantity and quality downstream. To date, the Convention has not entered into effect as it has not received full ratification by the required number of countries.

The Helsinki Rules and the UN Convention are both framework documents that provide useful guidelines for future agreements and policies on the utilization of transboundary waters

Similar to the 1966 Helsinki Rules, the 1997 UN Convention offers principles—such as equitable and reasonable use and no significant harm—to which states sharing an international watercourse are to conform when using international waters. However, controversial issues have resurfaced relating to the use of the terms “watercourse” versus “drainage basin”, and international water versus trans-boundary and “shared” water, as well as the countries’ rights versus their obligations, the factors to be considered in the assessment of equitable and reasonable use, the priority weight that may be given to the equitable use factors, and the level of harm that may be considered significant. Questions that remain unanswered include whether upstream countries are entitled to use all of the water that originates on their territories, whether prior developments of downstream countries are protected against subsequent uses of their upstream neighbours, how water-use conflicts can be resolved, and should human water needs be favoured over other water needs including ecosystems.

In the light of the above-mentioned upstream/downstream differences and realizing the reasonable justifications that lie behind these differences, Abu-Zeid, K., (2001) provides a comparison between the Helsinki Rules and the UN Convention.

The main difference between the 1966 Helsinki Rules and the 1997 UN Convention is that the Helsinki Rules pertain to water in an “international drainage basin” while the UN Convention pertains to water in an “international watercourse”. While the definition of the two terms “drainage basin” and “watercourse”, may appear to be very similar, they are quite different when it comes to the use of the waters in a drainage basin versus the use of the waters in a watercourse. One major difference is that the Helsinki Rules would consider the water that falls on the drainage basin and is used before flowing into a common terminus as beneficial water use for the State in place, whereas the UN Convention would not consider any water use outside the watercourse as part of the water budget to be equitably utilized. Examples of beneficial unaccounted-for water uses in international river basins include rain-fed agriculture and natural forests (Abu-Zeid, 1997). The consideration of this issue has a very significant impact on states sharing rivers that traverse extremely different climate environments.

Falkenmark (1999) stated that it is becoming more and more evident that what has to be shared between those upstream and those downstream in a river basin is not the water currently going into the river as the UN Convention on Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses suggests, but rather the rainfall over the river basin. Sustainable water-dependent socio-economic development will simply not be possible without taking an integrated perspective on all water-dependent and water-impacting activities in a river basin and their relative upstream/downstream relations (Falkenmark, 1999). The relevant “factors” for the “reasonable and equitable utilization” of international watercourses as stated in the UN Convention (Article 5) may appear similar to those stated for the reasonable and equitable utilization of the waters of international drainage basins, in the Helsinki Rules (Article V, II). However, some of them are significantly different.

The UN Convention de-emphasized the drainage area’s extent in basin states as a geographical factor. It also de-emphasized the contribution of water in each state as a hydrological factor. Although the population factor is mentioned in the Helsinki Rules and the UN Convention, its application is different because the Helsinki Rules talk about the population dependent on the waters of the basin, which may be different from the population dependent on the watercourse as mentioned in the UN Convention.

The UN Convention de-emphasized, in the article on equitable utilization, the compensation factor and the prevention of substantial injury to co-basin States. It gen-
erally stated the factor as being the effect of the watercourse’s use in one watercourse state on other watercourse states. However, the UN Convention included the “No Harm” obligation and possible discussion of compensation, as one of the factors to be considered in the overall assessment, and not under equitable utilization. This distinction is important since, under the Helsinki Rules, it is clear that a use which causes significant harm could be justified under the principle of equitable utilization. The same is not quite so evident in the approach adopted in the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention. Although States could argue that articles 5 to 7 of the UN Convention mean the same thing, in practice adopting equitable use, compared with no significant harm, as the governing rule can yield quite different results. The no significant harm rule acts as a veto on future development and tends to protect the status quo (i.e., the prior appropriations of the State first to develop) (Sherk et al, 1998).

The UN Convention eliminated “past utilization of waters of the basin” as a factor, and maintained “existing utilization of the watercourse” as a factor. The UN Convention also added “potential uses” to the “existing utilization” factor, which may have added ambiguity to the factor, as there is no common standard for assessing ever increasing future or potential water uses. The UN Convention may have limited the satisfaction of economic and social needs of each watercourse state to the watercourse water only, without considering other water resources within the watercourse States. This issue is even more amplified in the UN Convention by the fact that the “reasonable and equitable utilization” factor addressing the “availability of other water resources” either in the river basin or in the state as a whole, mentioned in the Helsinki Rules, was eliminated in the UN Convention.

Whereas the Helsinki Rules address the availability of other water resources, the UN Convention addresses the availability of other uses. One looks at alternatives on the supply side while the other considers alternatives on the demand side. The UN Convention, by eliminating the possibility of looking at “other available water resources” within the basin and the state as a potential relief to water conflicts over limited water resources, may be seen as defeating the objective of its development. This relates back to the scope of the convention, which does not consider the waters of the basin but rather the waters in the watercourse, in which case direct beneficial use of rainfall (green water) may not be considered in the water budget assessment of the watercourse states.

### Conclusions and Recommendations

In transboundary water management it is important to look beyond the watercourse and towards the river basin to capture the benefits of other available water resources beyond the water in the river. Green water provided by direct use of rainfall and atmospheric water should be an integral element in the assessment of potential renewable water resources. Enhancement of rain-fed agriculture, groundwater use, and use of non-conventional water resources such as re-use of wastewater are essential elements to consider for providing food security and conflict resolution on transboundary water basins.

Reasonable and equitable utilization of transboundary basin waters should consider factors such as available water resources at the basin level and at the national level, and the number of population depending on the transboundary water resource in each country. The obligation of no harm to riparian states on transboundary waters should be emphasized, and prior, historical, or existing uses on transboundary waters should be protected and maintained.

In transboundary water management it is important to look beyond the watercourse and towards the river basin to capture the benefits of other available water resources beyond the water in the river.

A legislative framework for an international water law should be elaborated to fairly support the above-mentioned technical and legal aspects of transboundary water management. It should reflect proper water resources assessment and consideration of consumptive and non-consumptive uses and benefits of water at the national level within the riparian states sharing a transboundary water basin. The Helsinki Rules and the UN Convention are both framework documents that provide useful guidelines for future agreements and policies on the utilization of transboundary waters. However, the scientific community in the engineering and legislative fields need to contribute more to the enhancement and elaboration of a comprehensive, reasonable and scientific international water law.
References


Water in the Mediterranean

Groundwater Resources in the Mediterranean Region: Importance, Uses and Sharing

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Jean Margat
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More than a quarter of the approximately 600 billion m³ of water received annually in the Mediterranean Basin takes subterranean routes in parts of its path. Aquifers also contain the major part of the Mediterranean Basin’s water reserves, and these reserves account for the largest part, perhaps even the whole, of the summer flow of the Basin’s rivers and other streams. A panoramic overview, focussing on the Mediterranean Basin, highlights both the general importance of groundwater as a vital resource for the Mediterranean people and for the natural environment, and also the diversity of the groundwater available and its utilisation. Transboundary groundwater resources are increasing in importance. As much as 80% of the water resources in the Mediterranean region is shared between two or more countries, and in North Africa and the Middle East shared aquifers are the most important source of fresh water. The main activities of UNESCO in 2007 are summarised against this background, paying special attention to the application of the UNESCO-ISARM (Internationally Shared Aquifer Resources Management) project in the Mediterranean. ISARM is an international multi-disciplinary demonstration project coordinated by the UNESCO International Hydrological Programme (IHP) in Paris.

Aquifer Resources in the Mediterranean Region

The complex and very compartmentalised geological structure of the Mediterranean Basin has not allowed the formation of very extensive aquifer systems, with the exception of the South-East African Platform. These aquifers are not very varied in their extension, lithological nature or structure. Map 5 shows the three most common types of aquifers. These are:

- **Karstic carbonated aquifers**, common almost everywhere in the Mediterranean Basin; they are particularly developed in the Dinaric Alps, as for example in Slovenia, where the region of Kras may be considered to have provided the origin of the term “karst”. These karstic carbonated aquifers are underground reservoirs, which are of uneven volume and flow. Being fed predominantly by perpetual surface drainage, they often form abundant springs and important groundwater reserves whose water originates from the plains surrounding them. They also supply numerous coastal and submarine springs, which are often brackish or briny due to sea water intrusion. The water is often at very deep levels, and drilling access is unpredictable, impeding the direct exploitation of these aquifers. Their exploitation should, however, be considered.

- **Alluvial aquifers**, located in the valleys and deltas of the main rivers, are closely linked and often hydraulically connected with the streams. The most extensive ones are those of the Po River Plain in Italy, and of the Nile Delta in Egypt, which contain deep confined layers of water. Easily accessible, they are the most exploited type of aquifer and indeed are sometimes over-exploited.

- **Aquifers of sedimentary, often detritic formations** are either located in coastal plains where they
are in contact with the sea, or in large broad basins in the south-east (Libya, Egypt), and especially outside the Mediterranean Basin in the Saharan region. These deep aquifers contain large quantities of water but are mainly unrenewable ('fossil waters'). They are relatively independent from surface waters and largely endorheic; their slight underground drainage converges towards enclosed depressions near the Mediterranean which are below sea level (down to 90 m at Al Qattara in Egypt), and their waters are mostly saline in the Mediterranean Basin.

Renewable water resources in the Mediterranean Basin are unevenly distributed between the northern shores (Europe and Turkey, 93%), and the southern shores (7%) depending on the climate. The average annual recharge of aquifers amounts to about 155 km³/year, with recharge varying from a few mm/yr in the arid zone of the south to more than 500 mm/yr in the Dinaric Alps.

The majority of these underground flows contribute to the regular flow rate of the water streams, therefore constituting a constant resource in surface water. However, a significant part ends up in the near-shore submarine springs previously mentioned in relation to karstic aquifers, whose total flow might reach 30 to 50 km³/yr.

According to technico-economic criteria, these resources are unevenly accessible and exploitable, and commensurate with the constraints applied for the conservation of surface flow. They are also sometimes relevant to the preservation of tributary aquatic ecosystems of the emerging underground water.

**An Essential Source of Water Supply**

For the inhabitants of the Mediterranean region, the exploitation of groundwater largely contributes to the current water supply, both for drinking and irrigation purposes.

Table 17 summarises the annual average groundwater recharge as well as the total groundwater abstractions in the Mediterranean countries. Looking at the Mediterranean countries as a whole, at the end of the 20th century the abstraction of groundwater was assessed at approximately 66 km³/yr, of which about 40 km³/yr were in the area of...
the Mediterranean Basin (2/3 in the north and 1/3 in the south).

In almost all the countries, the greatest part of abstracted groundwater is used for irrigation: 80% to 90% in Spain, Cyprus, Syria, Israel, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco; more than 50% in Italy, Greece and Turkey. The second greatest part is generally used for the supply of drinking water, and in some places it is even the first (France, Egypt).

The groundwater abstracted largely covers the demand for drinking water in the majority of the Mediterranean countries; and also contributes to a more variable extent to the supply of irrigation water. In several countries in the south, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Israel, the Palestinian territories, Cyprus and Malta, extracted groundwater constitutes a major part of irrigation water supply.

Groundwater thus plays an important role in the regional and national water economies in the Mediterranean and is the predominant source of water supply in one country out of three.

### Resources Are Exploited rather than Managed

When comparing water demand with total available water resources it can be seen that in many Mediterranean countries the capacity to satisfy water needs has become a serious problem. The pressures resulting from groundwater exploitation are varied, often heavy and even excessive in numerous cases. Over-exploitation is frequent and further increasing, notably in the coastal aquifers, where it has resulted in marine water intrusion. This process will be difficult to reverse, both in the north and the south. It has also caused streams to dry up and has weakened or destroyed aquatic ecosystems. The overexploitation of groundwater is already estimated at 5 km³/yr in the region. In the majority of the countries in the south, the exploitation of non-renewable groundwater resources of the large Saharan aquifers, all of which are transboundary, is intensive and growing. This currently amounts to 7 km³/yr, a situation which is not sustainable.

### TABLE 17  Groundwater Resources in the Mediterranean Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Renewable internal groundwater recharge</th>
<th>Portion (%) of total internal renewable water resources</th>
<th>Total current groundwater abstractions (in 2000 or close year)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Annual averages in km³/yr</td>
<td>Part in the Mediterranean Basin</td>
<td>Entire country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>10.44</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>43.0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>~3.0</td>
<td>~1.5</td>
<td>~20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FYR of Macedonia</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>6.04</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>1.074</td>
<td>0.834</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>0.68 / 0.065</td>
<td>~0.50 / 0.055</td>
<td>86 / 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>6.1³</td>
<td>~6.0³</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1.45</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.33</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FAO/AQUASTAT2005. Notes: ¹National sources compiled by the Plan Bleu; ²Including non-renewable source extractions; ³Egypt: of which 4.8 are infiltrations from Nile irrigations (secondary resources); ⁴Israel: of which 0.36 are external (from West Bank, mountain aquifer).
Taking into account both this level of overexploitation and the mining of ‘fossil water’, it can be said that nearly one fifth of the current extraction of groundwater in the Mediterranean countries is not sustainable. An extensive seawater intrusion area has evolved from the northern part of Egypt to eastern Libya. This development has also caused a substantial deterioration of groundwater quality in the Djeffara coastal plain shared between Libya and Tunisia. Saltwater intrusion also occurs in Sicily, Italy. These strong pressures on resources often provoke conflicts in usage, including conflicts between users of groundwater and surface water.

In numerous areas of the Mediterranean the quality of groundwater is under threat from pollution, which is especially linked to urbanisation and the impacts of intensive agriculture. Moreover, in numerous areas of the Mediterranean the quality of groundwater is under threat from pollution, which is especially linked to urbanisation and the impacts of intensive agriculture. This situation also constitutes an area of conflict between users of groundwater and land owners. Satisfying the need for high quality drinking water represents a particularly complex problem. The rational use of groundwater can play an important role in solving this problem.

An Unequal State of Knowledge

Hydrogeological inventories and research and the basic knowledge concerning groundwater in the Mediterranean Basin are generally quite advanced, since progress has followed the trend for exploitation. Regional monographs and national synthesis maps and studies are available in the majority of the Mediterranean countries. However, follow-up studies of natural or influenced regimes of groundwater reserves, detailed cartography and the precise demarcations or boundaries of aquifer systems, which permit the establishment of appropriate management units, have not yet been developed on an even basis. A similar situation exists for hydrodynamic modelling, which could provide effective management tools. In addition, the organisation of user communities is needed for these purposes. The uneven state of the progress in studying Mediterranean aquifer systems constitutes a handicap to their conservation and sustainable management and has a bearing on the sustainable management of the countries’ overall resources.

Shared Aquifer Resources

Transboundary or shared aquifer systems are important sources of fresh water in many regions of the world, particularly under arid and semi-arid climatic conditions, which prevail in the South Mediterranean Region. Management of shared groundwater resources should be based on reliable scientific knowledge and information and avoid potential conflicts between neighbouring countries. Developing cooperative databases for sharing information from different sources and mainly from regional monitoring networks is a prerequisite for formulating and implementing common strategies and management policies for shared groundwater resources. Collecting data at rates that can be sustained over long periods of time, such as water levels, water extraction and groundwater quality in an aquifer, is the foundation on which groundwater management is based. In parallel to reliable data collection, the organisation of databases for analysing information and data on groundwater resources, in terms of quantity and quality, are vital to efforts directed towards planning in order to meet present and future water demands. The groundwater monitoring data can be integrated into geographic information systems in order to facilitate analysis and the use of this information in the decision-making process. To develop reliable cooperative databases, efforts should be made by all member states in order to harmonise groundwater monitoring networks design, standards, quality control and data storage and processing in the region. It is essential that monitoring and assessment of shared groundwater resources in the countries of the region be performed in a comparable way. This means, for example, that in order to assess trends in groundwater quality, the definition of trends, the sampling procedures and chemical and numerical analyses should be comparable on both sides of the border of a shared aquifer. In order to facilitate an integrated approach to transboundary groundwater resources management, UNESCO started the ISARM initiative. This was launched...
in June 2000 at the 14th Session of the Intergovernmental Council of UNESCO-IHP and is an intergovernmental project involving all national IHP Committees. The Council also invited the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the International Association of Hydrogeologists (IAH) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) to cooperate in order to create the UNESCO-FAO-IAH-UNECE inter-agency ISARM initiative to promote studies concerning transboundary aquifer systems. Following is an overview of the UNESCO-ISARM activities during 2007 in the Mediterranean Region, especially in South-East Europe (SEE or the Balkans) and also in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya – an observer country –, Egypt, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey), known collectively as the MEDA region. In this region the UNESCO Chair and International Network of Water-Environment Centres for the Balkans (INWEB) in cooperation with UNESCO/IHP, the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the Economic and Social Commission of Western Asia (ESCWA) and the Economic Commission of Africa (ECA) investigated the shared aquifer resources by use of a two-step methodological approach: first, an inventory of the existing internationally shared groundwater aquifers located in these regions was developed and then a WEB-based interactive meta-database was made available on the Internet to all interested stakeholders, using Google Earth technology.

More specifically INWEB, in cooperation with ECE, ESCWA and UNESCO-IHP, has performed the following tasks:

- Solicited data on shared aquifers in the Mediterranean region from existing databases in relevant UN agencies and relevant non-UN organisations;
- Collected input from other Mediterranean water institutions and experts;
- Compiled data covering groundwater availability, use and demand;
- Integrated the results into an electronic database on shared aquifers in the region that will be accessible to all interested stakeholders.

**Inventory of Shared Aquifers in SEE and MEDA Regions**

Groundwater exploitation in the SEE and MEDA regions has increased dramatically during the last decades, mainly due to an increase in irrigated agriculture, tourism and industry. Thus, many groundwater resources are at risk of being exhausted by over-pumping. With abstraction exceeding the internally renewable water resources, the resulting groundwater scarcity is rapidly becoming a major concern in most SEE and MEDA countries. The pressures on natural groundwater resources are higher in the summer period, when natural supply is minimal while water demands are at a maximum (irrigation, tourism).

Groundwater scarcity is in many cases accompanied by poor groundwater quality, especially in coastal aquifers, where water is often highly saline, reducing its utility. A general groundwater quality deterioration has occurred in many parts of the Mediterranean region, due to contamination in recharge areas, mismanagement during irrigation practice, overexploitation of coastal aquifers and other reasons.

With growing groundwater scarcity and quality deterioration in many parts of the Mediterranean, the contribution and role of internationally shared aquifers in meeting the growing water demand is likely to increase. Cooperative arrangements to jointly develop, manage and protect shared aquifers will become a necessity, not only to avoid conflict but also to optimise utilisation and to achieve water security.

INWEB’s regional assessment in SEE covers transboundary groundwater shared by two or more of the following countries: Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey. Some transboundary groundwater in the region had previously been identified, and had already been noted in earlier UNECE and INWEB inventories. However, the region has seen major conflict and political change in the last fifteen years. Aquifers and groundwater that for many years were located within a single country are now shared between new countries. While the previous UNECE inventory recorded 23 transboundary aquifers in the region and the draft INWEB report 47, this latest assessment identified 65 transboundary aquifers in the region.

The locations of these aquifers are shown in Map 6 and their names are given in Table 18 (see both in Annex). In some cases, these are not yet formally recognised as such, and it has been difficult to obtain information on them.

As a result of the data collected under this project, the database of transboundary aquifer resources in
the MEDA region is available in draft form on INWEB’s website (www.inweb.gr). Two main types of aquifers are distinguished:

(1) Sedimentary basins with shallow unconfined aquifers and deep confined layered aquifers;
(2) Karstic carbonate aquifers.

Furthermore, the study aimed at briefly exploring transboundary karstic and porous aquifers in the region on a national level, and presenting data and information for comparative purposes.

Concerning the MEDA region, the geographic location of shared aquifers was identified and their corresponding names are shown in Maps 7 and 8 as well as in Tables 19 and 20 for North Africa (South Mediterranean area) and Middle East respectively (see Annex).

The Internet-Based Google Map Database

The interactive database is provisionally located on the UNESCO/INWEB’s internet site (www.inweb.gr) under the menu Water Database. The Water Database menu opens four sub-menus:

- Transboundary Aquifers (for the Balkans);
- Internationally Shared Surface Waters (for the Balkans);
- South MEDA Countries Aquifers, and
- East MEDA Countries Aquifers.

Basic hydro-geological characteristics and also information on groundwater use and assessment of the current situation are provided online in summary and in descriptive form. These meta-data and additional information on shared aquifers in SEE and the MEDA regions are available and accessible for use by all member states and other interested stakeholders.

The interactive map allows the web-user from any country involved to take a virtual tour in Google Earth of all shared aquifers in the region and zoom into selected aquifer locations.

By looking at satellite pictures of Google Earth, the local situation (e.g. the location of a river) and the land use (for example agricultural activities and the location of a city in the aquifer’s area) can be clarified. Furthermore, by accessing basic information on hydrology, hydrogeology, water uses and policy, a general understanding of the situation of any particular aquifer or aquifer system can be developed.

Such information is useful to decision makers, water professionals, educators, students and all interested citizens for various purposes like monitoring, modelling and stakeholder participation in the decision-making process.

Conclusions

The importance of groundwater resources in the Mediterranean region and particularly that of shared aquifer resources becomes most apparent when there is increased pressure for economic development and water-related activities on either side of the border. Joint management of internationally shared aquifer resources is not only a scientific or technical problem. It should also involve joint institutions, common monitoring networks, information and data sharing and a common vision for sustainable development of the entire river catchment. The political linkages in transboundary aquifer management are important and involve wider regional concepts, such as “water for cooperation.” Regional partnerships and networks involving decision makers, different scientific disciplines, and stakeholders are important driving forces behind the promotion of innovative approaches and the development of effective action plans. In this respect UNESCO’s ISARM Mediterranean and worldwide programme demonstrates methodological approaches, and shows how multidisciplinarity can contribute to sustainable transboundary groundwater management. UNESCO ISARM plans to produce a toolkit showing the best practices for achieving good results in the field.

References


Annex

MAP 8
Overview Map of Transboundary Aquifers in the SEE Region

Source: UNESCO, Chair/INWEB, 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Aquifer name</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dragonja</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Rijeka</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Zumberak</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>alluvial</td>
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<td>Baranja</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>West Serbia</td>
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<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Feature</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Sava</td>
<td>Croatia-Bosnia Herzg.</td>
<td>alluvial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Kupa</td>
<td>Croatia-Bosnia Herzg.</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>18</td>
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<td>Croatia-Bosnia Herzg.</td>
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</tr>
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<td>19</td>
<td>Neretva</td>
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<tr>
<td>20</td>
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<td>Bosnia Herzg-Montenegro</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Dinaric karst West Coast</td>
<td>Montenegro-Croatia</td>
<td>karstic</td>
</tr>
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<td>23</td>
<td>Dinaric karst East Coast</td>
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</tr>
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<td>24</td>
<td>Beli Drim</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>Lim</td>
<td>Montenegro-Serbia</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>Tara Massif</td>
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</tr>
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<td>28</td>
<td>Macva-Semberija</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>Banat</td>
<td>Serbia-Romania</td>
<td>alluvial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Miroc &amp; Golubac</td>
<td>Serbia-Romania</td>
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<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Dacian Basin</td>
<td>Serbia-Romania</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>Timok Alluvium/Bregovo</td>
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<td>34</td>
<td>Stara Planina/Salasha</td>
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</tr>
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<td>35</td>
<td>Nishava &amp; Tran Karst</td>
<td>Serbia-Bulgaria</td>
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<td>Zemen</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>FYROM-SW Serbia</td>
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</tr>
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<td>38</td>
<td>FYROM-Central Serbia</td>
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<td>Tetovo-Gostivar</td>
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<td>Bistrica-Stogovo</td>
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<td>Albania-FYROM</td>
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<td>Ohrid Lake</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>Vjosa/Pogoni</td>
<td>Albania-Greece</td>
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<td>Greece-FYROM</td>
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<td>Pelagonija/Florina</td>
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<td>Dojran Lake</td>
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<td>Gotze/Agistro</td>
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<td>Erma Reka</td>
<td>Greece-Bulgaria</td>
<td>karstic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>Strilegrad/Orestiada</td>
<td>Bulgaria, Greece &amp; Turkey</td>
<td>alluvial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>Evros/Meric</td>
<td>Greece-Turkey</td>
<td>alluvial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>Topolovgrad karst waterbearing massif</td>
<td>Bulgaria &amp; Turkey</td>
<td>karstic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>Malko Tarnovo karst waterbearing massif</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>Upper Pleistocene Somes alluvial fan</td>
<td>Romania-Hungary</td>
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<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>Lower Pleistocene Mures alluvial fan</td>
<td>Romania-Hungary</td>
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<td>Lower Pleistocene Somes alluvial fan</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td>Middle Sarmatian Pontian</td>
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<td>Sarmatian</td>
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<td>Upper Jurassic-Lower Cretaceous</td>
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TABLE 19  Names of Shared Aquifers in South Mediterranean Region and Countries Involved

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Aquifer name</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Type</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Nubian Sandstone Aquifer System (NSAS)</td>
<td>Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Chad</td>
<td>Nubian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Errachidia</td>
<td>Algeria, Morocco</td>
<td>Sandstone, calcareous, dolomite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>North Western Sahara Aquifer System (NWSAS)</td>
<td>Algeria, Libya, Tunisia</td>
<td>Sandstone, sandy clay, calcareous, dolomite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Tindouf Aquifer</td>
<td>Algeria, Morocco</td>
<td>Alternating series of calcareous rocks and sand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Angad Maghnia</td>
<td>Algeria, Morocco</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Lulimeden</td>
<td>Algeria, Mauritania, Mali</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Mourzouk Djado</td>
<td>Algeria, Libya, Nigeria</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Taoudeni Tanezrouft</td>
<td>Algeria, Mali, Mauritania</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Tin Seririne</td>
<td>Algeria, Nigeria</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Fiquia</td>
<td>Algeria, Morocco</td>
<td>Porous, phreatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Ain Beni Mathar</td>
<td>Algeria, Morocco</td>
<td>Karst, limestone and dolomite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Chott Tigri-Lahouita</td>
<td>Algeria, Morocco</td>
<td>Limestone and sandstone</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Triffa</td>
<td>Algeria, Morocco</td>
<td>Porous, quartenary</td>
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<td>Jbel El Hamra</td>
<td>Algeria, Morocco</td>
<td>Karstic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Djeffar Djeffara</td>
<td>Libya-Tunisia</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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</table>
### Overview Map of Transboundary Aquifers in the Middle East Region

**TABLE 20** Names of Shared Aquifers in the Middle East Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Aquifer name</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Type</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Eocene-Helvetian</td>
<td>Syria, Turkey</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Bazalt-Azraq</td>
<td>Syria, Jordan</td>
<td>Basalt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Nahr el Karib(Cenemonian - Turonian)</td>
<td>Lebanon, Syria, Israel</td>
<td>Limestone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Western Aquifer</td>
<td>Israel, Gaza Strip, Egypt</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>North-Eastern Aquifer</td>
<td>Israel, West Bank</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Coastal Aquifer</td>
<td>Israel, Gaza Strip</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Water in the Mediterranean

The Hydropolitics of the Mediterranean

Habib Ayeb
Social Research Center (SRC)
American University in Cairo (AUC), Cairo

For some years now the question of water in the world and around the Mediterranean has been emerging as one of the most urgent. Its complete politicisation has been based on two leading "arguments," considered by the great majority of observers as "obvious": 1) water is rare and running out, and 2) for that reason the world, beginning with the Middle East, is facing water wars on a military scale. Yet a dispassionate study of the geopolitical and hydro-ecological maps shows very clearly that these prevailing opinions, which over-simplify the extremely complex question of water, lack in rigour in their analysis and suffer from contradictions in the solutions proposed. This article attempts a new approach to the problem of water, taking as its example the Mediterranean, which offers a great hydropolitical diversity: abundance and "scarcity," poverty and wealth, wars and peace, stability and instabilities, etc.

If one glances at the general map of the Mediterranean two colours stand out, besides the dark blue of the sea: the green dominating the northern and western shores indicating abundance of water, and the pale yellow which give the southern and eastern coast an appearance of emptiness equivalent to scarcity of water. If we change scales and zoom in on this or that region around the common sea, we rapidly realise that the dominant colours conceal considerable local diversities. Even so we may assume, for the purposes of geopolitical or rather hydropolitical analysis, the first impression, with that demarcation line between a "humid" north and an arid south; this can be seen clearly enough in the following table, which gives for each Mediterranean country the average annual availability of water per person, including all forms of consumption.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>m³/p/year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>6,764</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3,341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2,707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1,172</td>
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<td>Albania</td>
<td>12,950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>779</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>104</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average Med</td>
<td>2,410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Aquastat, FAO

These averages of water availability are open to objection for at least two good reasons: a) a method of calculation which lumps together the annual needs of all societies irrespective of their degrees of "development," the importance of irrigation or rain-supplied agriculture and of tourism and modes of consumption by the general public; b) averages which give a homogenised arithmetical table taking no account of local inequalities in access to water and; c) averages which only take account of so-called renewable resources and systematically adopt the data provided by local governments although, as it is well known, for technical or more often political reasons the figures do not always correspond to reality. No state obliged to share its resources with neighbours has an interest in making public the true figures. Here we have the old strat-
egy of negotiations and trading in which numerous Mediterranean countries still engage. Even so, however the figures may have been arrived at, this table and the known figures as a whole have the advantage of giving an overall view of the imbalances in the geographical distribution of resources. It makes clear a first opposition between a north living in hydraulic comfort and a south less comfortably endowed and threatened with a hydraulic crisis which some regard as imminent for certain countries of this common sea. Among the different specialists, Jacques Bethmont establishes the following balance sheet. On the northern shore, ten countries (counting the states emerging from the break-up of Yugoslavia) have at their disposal 1,060 km$^3$ within their frontiers and a further 546 km$^3$ in the Mediterranean Basin area for a total population of 187 million inhabitants, whose demographic dynamism, with the exception of Turkey, is weak. On the south shore (the shore including Syria, Lebanon and Israel), eight countries have 154 km$^3$ for a total population of 170 million inhabitants, which is set to double in something like thirty years. Expressed in annual average availability per person, these overall figures reveal even more flagrant differences which are summed up in the following table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mediterranean Population in millions</th>
<th>Total availability in billions of m$^3$/per/year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Mediterranean</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8,588.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Mediterranean</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>905.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The hydraulic stress threshold is conventionally placed at 500 m$^3$ per person per year. Some Mediterranean countries are distinguished by an availability below that threshold. According to the FAO figures (cf. Table 21) this is the case of Tunisia, Algeria, Israel, occupied Palestine and Libya on the southern shore, together with Malta, the only affected country of the northern shore.

**Water-Supply Inequalities, Economic Inequalities and Social Inequalities**

On this unequal distribution of water resources in the Mediterranean area can be superimposed almost exactly an economic and social map. There is obviously no need of figures to draw the general map of “development” in the Mediterranean. The dividing line begins at the level of the Straits of Gibraltar and ends on the frontier between Turkey and Syria. Although one might hesitate a little with Malta, which forms part of Europe, with Libya and, less markedly, with Algeria, which enjoy considerable oil revenues, and also with Israel, which is structurally linked to the Western economies, it is possible to adopt a simplified image of a rich north and a poor south. But just as with water, these images are only valid on that geographical scale. Just as one knows that the south of Spain experiences severe water-supply difficulties, one also knows that pockets of poverty are not lacking on the northern shore, notably in Turkey.

The southern economies remain generally dependent on the North, and the inequality in water-supply is such that it does not remedy the situation. But among the diverse causes of that dependence and producing its most dramatic dimension is undoubtedly the agricultural and food-producing dependence directly linked to the availability and of course the management of water resources. At the present time the south produces no more than 50% on average of its cereal requirements. The remainder is made up by imports originating from the north. Algeria imports more than 75% of its requirements and Egypt is at about 55% of its requirements. The only country of the North that shows a strong dependence is Malta, which produces less than 10% of its cereal requirements, but as in other fields Malta benefits from its status as a member of Europe. Paradoxically, we have had to wait until the current food crisis to realise the dangers and risks caused in more or less dramatic degree by agricultural policies which abandon the principle of “sovereignty” in food supply.

Nevertheless, and contrary to a rather widespread image, the farmers of the south are not lazier or more inactive than those of the north, rather the opposite. In Egypt for example, more than 3.6 million farmers share some 3.5 to 4 million hectares that are wholly irrigated. On the same plots they gather up to 3 harvests a year! The yields, notably of wheat and rice, are among the highest in the world. But the situation of the agricultural sector in Egypt is summed up in the paradox which one finds in many regions of the Third World: an agriculture among the most developed in the world carried on by a peasantry among the poorest in the world. Here the percentage of peasants below the poverty threshold is estimated at between 50 and 80% according to the sources. While it is hard to find comparable development of agriculture elsewhere in the southern and eastern
part of the Mediterranean, one may assume that the effort and involvement of the peasantry is fairly comparable from one country to another. Why then are these farmers not rewarded by high returns for their work and their function as agriculturalists? The question of access to land and to water, which is far from being assured, undoubtedly arises. Where it does not depend on the will of the heavens, in areas of irrigated agriculture, the provision of irrigation water is increasingly subjected to financial conditions by more or less disguised systems of rate-setting, under pretext of keeping down consumption and “squandering.” This constitutes a higher and higher cost, forcing some to reduce their agricultural labour and look for supplementary income outside their lands.

In addition, the agrarian counter-reforms adopted in recent years in some countries have made the position of small farmers even more fragile by liberalising the land markets both for sale/purchase and for leasing, putting an end to the automatic renewal of contracts and their transmission by inheritance from father to son. The clearest case is that of the agrarian reform adopted in 1992 by Egypt (law 96/92), which has put a complete end to the guarantees established by the socialist regime of Nasser. Between the application of that reform in 1997 and 2000, about a million former peasant tenants have lost their lands. Nowadays leases, whose price has multiplied sixfold on average and sometimes eightfold, are granted on a yearly and sometimes on a seasonal basis. In these conditions, the peasants, whose position is thus weakened, no longer make investments and only give the land the minimum fertilisation and work, following the logic of “maximising profits and reducing expenses.”

The other element that constitutes the fundamental difference between the farmers of the Mediterranean area is access to information, credit facilities, insurance and above all to local, national and international markets. The farmers of the south work primarily for local markets, and at best for national ones. The European markets by contrast are in general quite hermetically closed to them. Already they have no access to the necessary information on these markets and even less to the different networks of international trade. But what is even more serious is that the countries of the north, which flood the south with their food exports, close their own markets by complex tariff mechanisms with the aim of protecting their farmers and agricultural producers. It is true that certain big investors of the south and certain large agricultural and food-producing companies own large modern agricultural estates, for the most part entirely irrigated. One finds them more or less everywhere on the southern shore from the region of Souss in the south of Morocco to the Jordan Valley, passing through Tunisia’s Cape Bon and the Nile Valley. They most commonly specialise in fruit and vegetables out of season and the near totality of their production is destined for export, especially to the European markets. By a complete paradox, on this southern and eastern shore of the Mediterranean which is often described as suffering a chronic shortage of water, certain operators, well connected with the major markets, cultivate flowers destined for the markets of the North. Not only is this water “transformed” into a non-food agricultural product in countries where it is sometimes in drastically short supply and where millions of farmers cannot even feed themselves properly, but it is also exported in the form of flowers or other amenity plants. This is the triumph of the famous concept of “virtual water” invented by the English geographer Tony Allan.

The recent crisis in food supply that has shaken a number of the world’s countries, notably Egypt, has had the merit of showing the limits of various approaches to water-related problems. Egypt, where the food crisis has resulted in a number of deaths in brawls or crushes in front of bakeries making and selling subsidised bread, displays by itself the incoherence between the growth of intensive agriculture and peasant poverty and between the growth of agricultural exports and the aggravation of dependence in food-supply. This country, where agriculture productivity averages are among the highest in the world thanks to the daily labour of one of the poorest peasantry in the world, records a rapid growth of exports of agricultural products such as citrus fruits, fruits out of season and flowers while it continues to import more than forty per cent of its cereal requirements.

Unfortunately, Egypt is not the only country suffering this contradiction, which can be seen as catastrophic on both the social and the political level; it brings, on the one hand, difficulties of access to sufficient food for everyone and, in certain cases, serious risks of famine; and, on the other hand, the aggravation of dependence on the north and major international companies. If one walks about the big cities of the North one finds, indeed, immigrants coming from the South, but one also finds flowers, citrus fruits, tomatoes, cucumbers and other vegetables out of season that also come from the southern shore. Just one more paradox? No, the very expression of the inequalities and
economic and political dependences directly caused and aggravated by the abandonment of hydraulic and food-producing sovereignty on the altar of the search for foreign currency and exterior and interior investment.

The Southern Mediterranean, an Area of Conflicts which Aggravate and Are Aggravated by Problems Linked to Water Resources

To make a geopolitical analysis of water in the Mediterranean without considering more than the water-supply data would result fatally in hasty and incomplete, indeed erroneous, conclusions. In fact, around the Mediterranean as elsewhere in the world the question of water is never isolated from the totality of the dominant political, economic and social data. To draw up the hydropolitical map, one first needs to establish the different "layers" of the geopolitical map of the region as a whole. Here a question arises: what is the main characteristic of the overall geopolitical map of the Mediterranean area?

Against a "pacified" northern shore, with the exception of Cyprus, the southern shore is first of all characterised by geopolitical discontinuity. It is enough to look at the map of frontiers – which nearly all date from the colonial period – notably the one between Morocco and Algeria and the one which separates Israel from all of its neighbours, to see the extent to which this region is prey to conflicts both complex and long-standing.

This has obvious consequences for all aspects of regional and even Mediterranean geopolitics. The first example in this respect is the conflict of Western Sahara, which sets Algeria and Morocco especially at loggerheads, and which today constitutes the principal obstacle to the unification of Arab Maghreb and to the initiation of the ambitious North African project whose creation was decided in 1995 by the heads of the five countries concerned. In addition, these conflicts and rivalries over territories and frontiers naturally extend to resources as a whole and especially water resources.

The sharing of surface waters between Algeria and Tunisia and especially those of the Medjerda basin, which has its sources in the mountains of eastern Algeria and debouches into the Mediterranean in Tunisian territory, the sharing of waters of the great fossil stratum buried under the sands of Libya, Egypt, Chad and Sudan, the conflicts over the waters of the Nile between Egypt and the other states on the river's bank, the long rivalries over the slender water resources of the Jordan basin between Israel and its Arab neighbours, especially the Palestinians, and finally the misunderstandings between Lebanon and Syria over common water resources, especially those of the Orontes: these are only a few of the numerous rivalries over resources which, added to other local or international factors, make the southern shore an area of sometimes violent geopolitical ruptures rather than an area of co-operation.

Even so, all the difficulties which arise on frontiers sometimes completely sealed between the different countries of the southern shore, together with the relations between the two shores of the common sea which in any case depend on international relations, could be solved by bilateral or multilateral agreements, or even by collaboration agreements for collective management of common resources. A case often cited is the agreement over steel and coal concluded between France and Germany on the morrow of the Second World War, which indirectly but strongly facilitated the initiation of the European project.

But such positive scenarios completely fail to correspond to the local geopolitics and geohistory. On the southern shore the external difficulties sometimes appear fairly simple compared with the internal conflicts which shake each country with greater or less violence and sometimes destabilise political systems for the most part authoritarian and lacking all legitimacy: more or less "minority" internal claims, for example those of the Berber populations in North Africa, the problems of co-existence that shake Israeli society, the factional and clan rivalries that undermine the very foundations of Lebanese society, and, more generally, the indictment of all the political regimes of the region by more or less radical political oppositions.

This would not be complete if one did not emphasise the importance of social conflicts, sometimes deeper and more "dangerous" than those expressed by the ordinary political organisations in civil society: an example is the claims of the peasantry for better access to the resources needed to preserve their very existence and activities as farmers. The authoritarian nature of the local states only aggravates these antagonisms and sometimes builds frontiers which impede all evolution to regional complementarity, each power being jealous of its privileges and fearing exposure to "plots" organised by neighbours with or without the complicity of internal opponents.
Thus the hydropolitics of the south shore of the Mediterranean are driven more by the numerous political ruptures and antagonisms between the different states than by the total volume of water available. At the same time those hydropolitics are in fact a demonstrable and often “determining” dimension of the conflicts.

Water Poverty: Difficulties of Access in spite of Relative Abundance

The other essential aspect of the problem of water in the Mediterranean is the inequalities in collective and individual access to the resource. Admittedly there are inequalities everywhere on both shores, but undoubtedly these inequalities are more dramatic on the south shore. The most striking and revealing example of that dimension is Egypt.

In this country in which, thanks to the contribution of the Nile, the average availability of water is about 900 m³ per person per year, barely 70% of households are connected to the network of potable water. This figure falls to about 40% in rural areas and in poor or “illegal” urban districts. In the country, families with no direct access to the network of potable water help themselves directly from the irrigation canals or from the water table about fifteen metres down by means of fixed hand-pumps. In both cases, the people expose themselves daily to waterborne diseases either of biological origin (bacteria or microbes) or of chemical origin (pesticides, fertilisers etc.). It is no accident that one finds that about one case in three of child mortality (between 1 day and 5 years) is due to the consumption or use of polluted water. Moreover, the difficulties of access to potable water in Egypt are both the cause and the result of poverty. Like everywhere else, the lack of water causes or aggravates the process of individual or collective impoverishment and poverty often takes the form of difficulties in obtaining potable water. In rural Egypt it is still common to see families who have a tap at home take water from the canal or the underground supply for the sole but dramatic reason of keeping their bills down. Thus, for the sake of their other household needs, they economise on water at the risk of exposing members of the family to serious and financially “costly” illnesses. Only a serious situation of poverty can push people to such high-risk behaviour.

The paradox is that Egypt could have avoided this situation which affects several millions of people. It is a very strong state which controls with a high degree of effectiveness the whole of its territory and society. It is also a country which has relatively homogenised its territory by organising it around its central axis, the Nile, and into a complex and complete hydraulic system which channels water into any small plot of the 3.5 million hectares of agricultural lands, all of them irrigated. Thus it is a country with an “army” of engineers and technicians with a high level of technical training, and can therefore perform all hydraulic works without the need of foreign experts, except for extremely complex cases. Moreover, in view of its geopolitical position on the shores of the Mediterranean and immediately on the border of Israel, Egypt has no great difficulties in “recovering” international and bilateral financial aid. But one is obliged to conclude that in this country, ruled by an authoritarian and corrupt regime, the struggle against poverty and the diseases directly linked to them is not a matter of urgency, let alone a priority.

This particular case unfortunately does not differ much from that of the other countries of the South and the East of the common sea. In some regions the inequality is sometimes even less explicable. But Egypt remains the country in the region where the gap between overall availability and real access by the population is greatest and most unaccountable. It is a model for the gap between the overall availability of water in the Mediterranean and the real levels of access. If one had to choose a key word or concept to analyse and describe Mediterranean hydropolitics, it would have to be “access.” If we analyse and act on the basis of access to water resources, we will not only be more rigorous in our analysis and argumentation, but also more effective in action.
Water in the Mediterranean

The Economic Value of Water and its Implications in the Mediterranean Basin

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The socioeconomics of water in the Mediterranean Basin offers the interest and difficulty of encompassing virtually the entire spectrum of situations of availability of this natural resource and very different socioeconomic situations. The problem of otherness arises. The other, unabundant, is unlikely to have access to or be able to read this text. Hence the interest in generating an understanding in the reader, who enjoys a good water supply and a good economic situation, of the other’s situation. The other receives no salary and is unlikely to ever have one, his economy is marginal and non-monetary, he cannot take a shower, he may suffer thirst, hunger from time to time and a significant degree of malnutrition, he may suffer a water-borne infection which, if it does not kill him, will prevent him from going to school or working. All of this is due to an insufficient availability of suitably treated water and to socioeconomic inequalities. A similar situation arises in countries acknowledged as being developed in which it is sought to guarantee certain minimums free of charge in the provision of basic services to impoverished sectors of society. Many water policies implemented by the Mediterranean countries seek to achieve some day the requirements set forth in the Water Framework Directive (WFD), a policy which has little meaning in those areas where there are other socioeconomic priorities.

The Mediterranean Basin

The Mediterranean Sea is bordered by countries belonging to Europe, Asia and Africa and which offer striking differences in their geography, politics, socioeconomic structure, political alliances, level of strife, insularity, consolidation of their institutions, among other features. Just consider, for example, the differences between the Vatican, Monaco, Malta, Crete, Egypt, France, Bosnia, Palestine, Jordan, Kosovo, without including hydrographically relevant countries such as Sudan in the Nile basin, which raise issues concerning the sovereignty of water (which also affect the Tigris, the Euphrates or the Jordan, although they do not empty into the Mediterranean) or the newborn Macedonia, a truly Mediterranean country. One way to distinguish between countries on the north or European shore (part of the EU), on the south or African shore, in the east (both in the MENA region) and the islands is by their climate and hydrological features, the former with rivers fed by snow from the Alps, the latter with a steadily falling average annual rainfall and economic and social differences with a strong influence of historical, religious and political factors.

Just in the countries in the MENA region, the level of wealth, as measured by the GDP, varies between $1,290 and $16,180 per capita, with substantial inequalities in the internal distribution of income from one country to another. This region has one of the lowest water supply rates in the world and very limited resources. Several countries are included in the bottom 10% of the table of annual water availability per capita, exploiting non-renewable resources, exhausting groundwater supplies and degrading the quality of existing water and even the soil by deforestation, salinisation and erosion. The Mediterranean area may be affected by climate change, with a decrease in water resources and an increase in the demand for water. Agricultural output will fall and the environment will suffer severe damage: forest fires, soil salinisation, etc.

The Socioeconomic Value of Water

The application of economic concepts to the management and use of water (a non-substitutable good
in general terms) leads us to the dilemma of determining the market price. This principle of economics raises difficulties in application, as water for daily personal intake is not the same as water used for irrigation in which agricultural output faces a market price that decides whether it is better to produce or to import (alfalfa, cereals, tomatoes, milk...).

The application of economic concepts to the management and use of water leads us to the dilemma of determining the market price

In financial economics, the value of water is usually identified with the added value or cost incurred in location, collection, storage, control, quality assurance and provision to the user plus the depreciation of the investments made and a possible profit for the service rendered. The same is applicable to water removal (rainwater, wastewater, drainage) and water treatment systems. One could also include the cost of avoiding floods. This added value, after applying fairness, demand control and social policy criteria, becomes a rate or similar concept that is eventually seen by the user as the price of water. This aggregation of costs usually excludes those associated with the externalities caused by use. The net benefit for the user will be the difference between what he receives or thinks he receives with the water he uses and what it costs him or what he pays. In terms of use of water, there is consumptive use, such as water for personal intake, which is returned after a variable period and with changes (physical, chemical, biological) in its quality, and non-consumptive use, in which the water is returned almost immediately to the water cycle, with very little variation in its quality. Use may be the result of a more or less peremptory need (drinking, irrigating, bathing) or simple consumerism and may be solvent or insolvent depending on the price that must be paid.

The basic requirement is about 2 litres of drinking water per person per day (l/pd). At least 20 l/pd of water must be available less than a kilometre away for the hygiene of people and their immediate environment (replaceable in part by sand). Otherwise, day-to-day life and individual and social activity will be hampered by the occurrence of disease. In some hospitals, the death rate in 1880 was up to 80 per 1,000 patients. However, by 1948 (the year that penicillin was discovered), the death rate had fallen to 2 per 1,000 patients (a 98.75% decrease) simply with the use of soap and water for washing. In cities, it is necessary to cover a series of common services that entail a consumption of about 100 l/pd (recommended as the minimum by the World Health Organisation [WHO]). In food production, several cubic metres of water are required to obtain 1 kilogramme of wheat, and even more to obtain 1 kilogramme of veal, particularly if the heifer is fed with feed or grain. On the contrary, very little water is required to obtain 1 kilogramme of rabbit. Food import is associated with a virtual water import that is equivalent to that required to produce the food. Water requirements for all human activities, including commerce, industry and food production, put annual water consumption above 1,000 m³ per year and the recommended amount is between 2,000 and 3,000 m³ per person per year (note the wide range in figures). Such volumes are quite impossible in many arid countries in the Mediterranean Basin. Resource availability varies considerably from one country to another, with a gross resource availability of 23,182 m³ per person per year in Croatia, at one extreme and 126 m³ per person per year in Malta, at the other extreme.

The use of river, lake and seawater to assimilate part of the waste produced by human activity is very badly viewed but is still an option that can be used with caution in certain situations to take advantage of the environment’s self-purifying or assimilation capacity. By this means, financial resources can be directed towards other needs, facilitating a level of development that, in time, will attain sufficient capacity to minimize waste discharge into water or the environment. This practice of discharging effluents into water resources, although recourse to this should be limited, can be assessed economically against other methods of discharge or prior treatment.

Water in nature has a recreational or aesthetic use … and it is considered to be an environmental asset to be preserved. This takes us to the sphere of environmental economics, which is much more difficult to assess than financial economics. When all aspects have been taken into account in the economic assessment, it will be possible to decide how the water should be managed. This is a laudable goal that must be advocated and achieved when the time is right. The available water resources and the socioeconomic situation of each human group will define different conditions for the use and protection of water.
We should remember that in nature, water is used to transport and assimilate energy and matter and to support life. This water must be given legislative protection and the value of ecosystems must be enhanced to offset the lack of economic production that the same water would generate in another use. The same thing happens with water heritage and other infrastructures such as theme parks, golf courses and reservoirs, which store, retain flash floods, regulate water flows, allow navigation, produce electricity and other services, albeit they also have their drawbacks.

**The Mediterranean Region in the Global Context**

At the Dublin and Rio de Janeiro meetings, among others, in 1992 (World Water Commission) and at international conferences, it was agreed that in order to guarantee environmental improvement and to satisfy the needs of the population, it is necessary to increase the effort in technology (mobilise knowledge), finance (private sector investment capacity complementing the public sector) and institutional innovation (with the involvement of users). In the Mediterranean Basin countries, we find major differences in application between the continental countries and the island countries and between the countries in the north and the south, with a particularly sensitive area in the east. Among the international organisations that are involved with water in general and the Mediterranean in particular, there is the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the WHO, the World Bank (WB) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). One concrete plan for the Mediterranean area is the Blue Plan, with organisations such as the Euro-Mediterranean Water Information System (Remide) and the Institut Méditerranéen de l'Eau (IME), which have written other articles for this publication.

The irregular climate of the Mediterranean Basin leads to irregularities in rainfall which require storing water during rainy periods so that it is available during dry periods. Rainfall can often be intense (torrential), causing severe floods even in desert areas. In such situations, the settlements formed near water courses may be seriously affected, with the risk of the loss of human life. The damage caused by flooding is very expensive and more than justifies the investment in early warning systems of extreme rainfall and in lessening the impact of floods through the use of natural spaces or water channelling and regulation systems. The periods of drought can also be very severe, also causing significant economic harm to society. For obvious reasons, during these periods, water supply to people is guaranteed and supply to other sectors is restricted. The downward trend in rainfall in the Mediterranean area is detectable but still not significant. However, the increase in the demand for water is very obvious, leading to increasingly frequent situations, not of hydrological drought but of structural drought due to the inadequacy between resources and demand and of water infrastructures. Both extreme situations are currently the subject of study in the planning done by the EU and the other countries in the area.

**Water and Health; Investments; Water and Population**

Health is an indicator of social wellbeing and economic development. There is a direct relationship between health, water, food, education and employment and, in particular, between health and drinking water supply and wastewater treatment in order to prevent waterborne diseases and disease vectors in stagnant or contaminated water. Child mortality and school absenteeism diminish with a good water supply and drainage system. The same thing happens with adult mortality and work absenteeism.

As a general rule, the population of the Mediterranean area is supplied with drinking water and the populations without such a supply are falling steadily. The rural areas, 10% of the population, particularly in North Africa (152 million inhabitants, 72 living in rural areas), are the most affected by the lack of a drinking water supply although their incidence is decreasing continuously (in 2004, 86% of the rural population had a supply of drinking water), although at a slower rate than in urban areas (96% of the population). Coverage by a drainage system is also im-
proving in these areas (91% in urban areas and 62%
in rural areas).

Most of the population lives in cities and coastal areas. This leads to a high, very localised demand for water and the generation of wastewater which may pollute the coast and the final reaches of rivers and streams, and makes it difficult to reuse the water further inland due to the need for pumps and additional water transportation structures. In such areas, structural imbalances between demand and resources are common, requiring collection, storage, transportation and treatment infrastructures to rebalance water availability and supply in the country and provide water to the population where and when it is needed and with the required quality. These infrastructures absorb financial resources that could be used in other public investments demanded by the population, such as schools, hospitals, roads, etc. The limited financial resources available to governments render it necessary to choose where to make the investments from among the many societal demands. Worldwide, it is estimated that 84 billion dollars are needed to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The average benefit expected with these investments in water supply and drainage with respect to the cost incurred ranges between 4 times the investment in the case of home connection and 12 times in the case of specific supply and drainage points (streets, squares). If there is a price for supply, it is easy to calculate attractive financial formulas for amortising investments made with public or private capital. Successful application of a water rate (its collection and entry of private capital) requires: conviction (participation), legal coverage and social, political and government stability. The use of private capital, which usually receives a return of about 5% (low compared with other activities), releases government’s resources so that they can be used for other social demands and puts into motion a process of privatising water supply services. This usually does not happen with drainage systems, which it is usually more difficult to incorporate into price systems and to privatise. When the population is more scattered, territorial groups covering large areas of population and water use are formed in an attempt to attract private investment and management – the Galli Act in Italy and the Local Water Entities (not active) in Catalonia (Spain). Legislative requirements concerning quality of drinking water and treated wastewater have a strong influence on investments and operating and monitoring costs and, as a result, on socioeconomics.

Certain water infrastructures may entail a lower initial capital outlay but higher operating costs (usually in energy consumption) that can be included in the price of water. As the infrastructure work is completed in a short time, amortisation of the capital expenditure can be begun earlier (less interim interest), with a shorter payback period. As a result, such infrastructures are attractive to private capital operating under a concession (which is common in the Latin area of influence) or privatisation system but possibly more onerous for the population and technology and obsolescence-dependent. Furthermore, the lower capital outlay enables private investment to increase the number of facilities and increase market share. For private capital to become involved, the population must be able to pay the price charged for the water. This is not the case of the more depressed economic strata of society or for all conceptions of public service for religious or tradition reasons. The cost of the water rates may be onerous for depressed economies or saturate many people’s capacity for accepting price increases for services. Decisive, clear, equitable action by governments is required to ensure a price structure matched to social needs and economically balanced to enable maintenance of the drinking water supply and drainage service. In countries with average citizen income levels, investment requirements in water supply and drainage do not exceed 0.1% of the GDP and maintenance of the system may account for 0.2%. However, in a low-income country, these figures increase to 0.43% and 0.67%, respectively, which is much harder to bear for
a weak economy. The fight against pollution increases these figures to 0.75% for rich countries (very strict quality standards) and between 0.3 and 6% for economically weak countries.

The greatest danger is the irrigators’ lack of knowledge and judgement. It is possible to irrigate many trees and plants with wastewater, provided that it has undergone some preliminary treatment. This provides a cheaper source of water with the advantage of added fertilising capacity.

Water policies in the Mediterranean Basin vary. In Libya, the Man-Made River project will mine aquifers in the country’s hinterland to remove the water. Tunisia is privatising the construction of desalination plants in the tourist areas on the coast. In Spain, where the water supply service is highly privatised, the government has ruled out water transfer projects and has given priority to membrane desalination plants as the primary solution. Generally speaking, the water rates do not cover the full cost of supply and drainage and much less the cost of managing the entire water cycle, as recommended by the WFD. By increasing the price paid by the user for the water consumed, the intention is to act on the demand side of water rather than on the supply side. In theory, thanks to the price elasticity of demand, a price increase would decrease water consumption. This is not absolutely true. Domestic elasticity is very rigid as it depends on the facilities installed and also on habits in the use of water. As a result, demand has no consistency or memory and consumption returns to prior levels after a certain time has passed. Price is not sufficient by itself to decrease consumption. Elasticity is greater in industrial consumption and much greater in agricultural uses. Elasticity is a market concept which requires the existence of substitutive goods, which is not the case of water.

**Food and Agriculture: Reuse; Efficient Use**

Agriculture and livestock raising are at the base of food production, the obtainment of economic resources and deeply rooted as a survival instinct. In the Mediterranean Basin, 108 million people live with a water availability no greater than 1,000 m³ of water per year, which makes them poor. 65 million live in a situation of water shortage, as they have access to less than 500 m³ of water per year. To maintain this precarious situation, in many areas there is excessive exploitation of both surface and underground water resources, causing in part, in the case of the latter, salinisation of aquifers due to the infiltration of seawater or other reasons. Adverse health effects caused by the reuse of water for irrigation have created an image of dangerousness. The greatest danger is the irrigators’ lack of knowledge and judgement. It is possible to irrigate many trees and plants with wastewater, provided that it has undergone some preliminary treatment. This provides a cheaper source of water with the advantage of added fertilising capacity (phosphates, nitrates) thanks to the organic matter that has not been removed in an expensive tertiary treatment process that is not necessary. It also saves on additional fertiliser. The WHO’s recommendations for water quality for reuse in irrigation are sufficient from a health viewpoint for the crops indicated and do not incur high treatment costs. The EU gives more restrictive recommendations. This makes sense for watering recreational areas such as golf courses or theme parks, as their users can pay for the tertiary treatments required to provide a reusable water quality that poses no health hazards. Regulations apart, it should not be forgotten that, unless it is removed beforehand, reused water usually has a higher salt content, which poses a significant hazard for soil fertility if it is not leached (by rainwater or periodic watering with less salty water). Given its scarce natural water resources, which were insufficient to satisfy urban demand, Malta already recommended reuse of wastewater for irrigation back in 1884, reserving natural resources for drinking water. Reuse in Malta goes further than irrigation, as it is also used for industrial services (port). The Spanish Mediterranean coast has a long-standing tradition of processing wastewater for reuse in irrigation and also in the maintenance of wetlands, and is starting to restore aquifers with this water. In the reuse of water, the issue of cost distribution has yet to be settled. Wastewater is usually discharged into the environment with a secondary treatment; however, for most reuses, a tertiary treatment and an additional distribution network are recommended, which entail additional costs. On another scale, agricultural production over extensive areas is favoured in the Mediterranean by the
area's climate and the number of hours and intensity of sunshine, but it requires water for irrigation. Products such as cereals, maize, cotton, sugar cane enable mechanisation of work, including harvesting. Other crops such as vegetables and fruit are usually less mechanised and require human labour for harvesting, particularly horticultural products and early fruit. Early production is rewarded with higher prices. The south Mediterranean coast has land and labour generally available and water available in particular areas (Atlas, Nile), which favours implementation of intensive farming and early crops for export and domestic use and will no doubt contribute to socioeconomic development and increasing contacts between countries in the basin.

Countries want to guarantee a minimum of basic products (cereals, oil,...) and depend less on international markets with their associated price oscillations. In general, the countries in the Mediterranean Basin have a calorie intake in the diet in excess of 3,000 kcal. In the south, calories are obtained mainly from plant products, with a strong presence of cereals, while in the north, the calories are obtained from animal-based products (mainly dairy and beef and not from free-grazing animals).

In the countries in the east and south, the surface area that is irrigated is increasing due to the internal demand for food and the dependence on imports, in some cases, for up to 50% of their food requirements. In some countries, the irrigated surface area has grown by 120% during the period 1980-2000. The varying availability of water has meant that the average volume of water used for irrigation per capita ranges between 921 m³ and 180 m³ with similar rainfalls. On the contrary, in the north, cereal growing is decreasing in favour of products subsidised by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); conventional irrigation is receding and being replaced by support irrigation. The impact of the virtual water imported in food products (both plant and animal-based) by countries in the south and east Mediterranean ranges between 200 and 840 m³/person, affecting cereals and meat products, as the countries use the scarce water available for local production of high-value foods. Agriculture accounts for 65% of the water demand in the Mediterranean Basin, ranging between 48% in the northern countries (except for Spain 60% and Greece 80%) and 80% in the other countries, including the islands. Water consumption per hectare depends on each area’s aridity index and is influenced by irrigation techniques, but not so much as may be thought. Productivity can be defined as the percentage GDP contributed by agriculture with respect to the total but it is only one of many indicators of the country's production structure and level of socioeconomic development. Productivity per cubic metre of water used depends on the crop and the time of year. It must also be remembered that behind the basic agricultural output, there is a food industry that creates jobs by adding value to this output. This does not happen with imported products, which often arrive from abroad as finished products ready for sale.

As a general rule, there are no industrial agglomerations or industrial sectors that are major water consumers in the Mediterranean Basin, although there is a lot of industry. Past energy crashes led governments to perform audits to improve efficiency and introduce minimisation practices. Industry has sufficient financial, technological and organisational capacity to implement water consumption and waste production minimisation plans, so we are dealing with an efficient sector. Thus, the added value per cubic metre of water used in production by the Mediterranean chemical industry is greater than in central Europe and the Mediterranean electricity generation industry uses seawater and air to cool and not water from lakes and rivers.

Thanks to the benign Mediterranean climate, the general tendency for population to move from north to south Europe continues to hold great appeal. This includes settlement on the coast of the occasional or regular summer or winter visitor but also the permanent migration of pensioners and even professionals.

Except for countries such as Egypt (on the Nile) and certain parts of the Atlas range, hydroelectric power production is low in North Africa, the islands and the east Mediterranean. On the other hand, the north (including Turkey) does have hydroelectric power production although with virtually no future growth capacity.
**Water-Based Ecosystems; Tourism**

There is considerable interest in preserving both marine and continental ecosystems. In the case of the continental systems, this implies taking less water from the environment for various uses that will compete with each other to obtain it and guarantee a water supply for the ecosystem with sufficient quantity and quality to enable it to perform its functions, maintaining a natural dynamic that usually requires definition and decision. Situations should be avoided in which this desire to preserve leads to conflict by marginalising the development of part of the population. The EU model has become generalised and is being progressively implemented in the countries on the north Mediterranean and some of the islands. Other countries are trying to adapt it with the hope of joining or moving closer to the EU. This requires enhancing the ecosystems’ economic value and offering alternatives for social development to the groups who look to receive more water to improve their situation. All of this must be managed with the active involvement of the water’s users.

**Water is a basic element for the development of countries and the wellbeing of societies**

Thanks to the benign Mediterranean climate, the general tendency for population to move from north to south Europe continues to hold great appeal. This includes settlement on the coast of the occasional or regular summer or winter visitor but also the permanent migration of pensioners and even professionals. The process is particularly noticeable on the European coast and the islands and some countries in the south and east Mediterranean (Tunisia, Morocco, Turkey). The political and social stability of the south Mediterranean countries and their idiosyncrasy and natural appeal will generalise this population movement, which in turn will entail the creation of jobs and water supply infrastructures that will be useful for each country. Likewise, the preservation of ecosystems (such as the Ichkeul National Park in Tunisia) will add tourist appeal. We can say that tourism contains the germ of a certain socioeconomic homogenisation in the Mediterranean area.

**Conclusion**

Water is and will continue to be a hotly debated and complex issue for the entire Mediterranean but it is also a basic element for the development of countries and the wellbeing of societies. It requires participative and responsible management, particularly in the Mediterranean Basin, characterised as it is by enormous time and space irregularities in the distribution of this natural resource.

The reuse of water, the joint management of resources, users’ technification and participation, particularly in agriculture, the guarantee of importing virtual water with food at an affordable price, and use of tourism as a source of income for creating infrastructures, and specifically water infrastructures, and jobs, are all factors to be considered in the search for a solution to the shortage of water resources and for sustainability in the socioeconomic development desired by all Mediterranean countries.

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Impacts of Climate Change on the Mediterranean Area: Its Relevance to the Water Issue

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In the light of observational evidence of mean air and ocean temperature rises and the disappearance of glaciers and perennial snows, as well as average sea-level rises, planetary warming is indisputable. The earth’s mean temperature has risen by 0.76°C since 1850, according to available data. Climate change is an unquestionable fact, tightly linked to development, representing an unprecedented challenge because of the difficulty it presents in finding an answer, owing to the global nature of the problem and the territorial disconnect between greenhouse gas emissions and impacts. These have a global effect on essential natural resources affecting our development model and creating the need to mitigate its effects and put in place the appropriate measures to adapt.

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which came into effect in 1994, constitutes the multilateral political initiative that establishes the foundations for confronting climate change.

Introduction

European sensitivity to climate change varies between North and South: specifically there are various studies which indicate that southern Europe, and particularly the Mediterranean area, will be severely affected. The dry hot climate of south-eastern Europe is expected to become even dryer and hotter, threatening river courses, the resources needed for hydroelectric energy production, agricultural production and forestry plantations. Forecasts predict a considerable reduction in summer rain precipitation, leading to even worse droughts that in the current situation. The main pressures that the environment is expected to be subjected to will chiefly affect biodiversity, territorial planning and landscape, soil and degradation in the territory, woodland degradation, natural disasters, water management and leisure spaces. These effects will bring with them significant consequences, particularly in zones having the territorial distribution, population density and economic development that are characteristic of the Mediterranean area, where the majority of European ecosystems are planned or semi-planned and are frequently fragmented, as well as affected by pollution or other human intervention.

Forecast Effects

In general terms a reduction in average annual rainfall is foreseen for all the scenarios used. This rainfall diminution varies significantly from one season to another and from one zone to another, in response to changes in circulation at a greater scale and the water vapour concentrations. Specifically in the Mediterranean, summer precipitation is expected to reduce substantially (in some zones by up to 70% according to the SRES A2 scenario).

Various authors (Giorgi et al., 2004) have identified a summertime anticyclonic circulation towards the north-western Atlantic, causing a high pressure ridge in Western Europe and a low pressure trough in Eastern Europe. That structure, which acts as a barrier, diverts storms toward the North causing a gene-

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1 As a result of statistical modelling and analysis
2 The A2 emissions scenario model is characterised by placing special emphasis on regional and local culture, contemplating a return to “family” values in the majority of regions. Detailed information can be found at: www.geo.vu.nl/~ivmadapt/ib_scenario.htm
rallised and substantial rainfall reduction in the Mediterranean basin.

Forecast indicates that climate change will have a whole series of impacts on water resources. Annual flows will probably diminish by between 0 and 23% in 2020 on average in the Mediterranean zone, and by a mean 6 to 36% by 2070, using the premises of scenario A2 and B2 and climate scenarios from two different climate models (Alcamo et al., 2007). The same trend applies to the replenishment of underground water tables that are expected to decline across the whole of Eastern Europe.

A rise in average seasonal water flows is also foreseen, with important runs often presenting themselves with great intensity over a short duration in the rainy season (generally spring and autumn in Mediterranean areas) and also phenomena of very low flows during the dry season, with an extension in time (and therefore in area) of dry periods. The risk of flooding is also forecast, particularly sudden surges and concurrent droughts.

Climate change furthermore brings with it an increase in the intensity and frequency of extreme phenomena accompanied by a drop in mean precipitation, resulting in significant consequences for the availability of water resources and land management. River flows during the summer season could reduce by up to 50% in central and some zones of southern Europe, and by up to 80% in some of the rivers of the Mediterranean area.

The Mediterranean zone has a high probability of suffering a significant increase in drought risk, and it is precisely in this zone that a population density exists, as also a considerable demand for irrigation. This will imply a need to develop sustainable management of land planning. Consequently, it is foreseen, with a high degree of probability that the Mediterranean area will be affected by major water shortage (percentage of extraction to availability greater than 40%) due both to climate change and to increased water extraction. That brings along with it important socio-economic consequences resulting from raised competition for water resources.

The following table (Table 23) summarises drought and flood frequencies foreseen for the Mediterranean zone over various time horizons according to a variety of scenarios based on ECHAM4 and HadCM3 models:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>TABLE 23 Drought and Flood Frequency Forecasts</th>
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<td>Time Horizon</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
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Source: Alcamo et al. (2007), Amell (2004), Lehner et al. (2008) and Santos et al. (2002).

The combination of high temperatures and a reduction in mean precipitation during summer periods brings with it an increase in heatwave and drought phenomena, with their considerable social, economic and environmental consequences. In addition, the forecasts also indicate an increased risk year-by-year. In short, climate change impacts on temperature, precipitation and water flow will have an important effect on water resources.

**Observed Effects**

In the Mediterranean zone over the 1950-2000 period the trend in annual precipitation has been one of progressive reduction, most particularly in the east of the Mediterranean area. In certain zones an increase in mean precipitation has been observed, but the irregular distribution of this precipitation entails that many zones are becoming all the more arid.

As a result of these and other changes in temperature and hydrological determinants, impacts are also detected in other sectors such as, for instance, alterations to ecosystems, biodiversity, forest cover, fish life, with the consequences this brings to the sectors of production and dependent development.

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3 Greenhouse emissions effect scenarios (See 4th IPCC report).
4 General atmospheric circulation model, based on the European Centre for Medium Range Weather Forecast – ECMWF model. Detailed information can be found at: [www.ipcc-data.org/is92/echam4_info.html](http://www.ipcc-data.org/is92/echam4_info.html).
5 HadCM3 is a general circulation model that takes into account coupled ocean-atmosphere factors and has a stable control climatology. Detailed information can be found at: [http://cera-www.dkrz.de/IPCC_DDC/IS92a/HadleyCM3/Readme.hadcm3](http://cera-www.dkrz.de/IPCC_DDC/IS92a/HadleyCM3/Readme.hadcm3).
Adaptation and Vulnerability

Climate change impacts on natural features will have a knock-on effect on water use through systems that exploit water resources which perform the functions of regulating, transporting and distribution. Operational systems – hydraulic infrastructure and management regulations – allow for different planning and management options that can act as a barrier to lessen or amplify impacts.

A vital issue consequential upon the need for climate change adaptation is the manner in which water policies are directed under a horizon where guaranteed resources are more restricted

Water resources are a conditioning factor in planning, managing and developing many other sectors and systems – and in particular with a special effect in the Mediterranean area – notable among which are conservation of biodiversity (especially aquatic ecosystems), industrial production, agriculture and tourism. Additionally, among issues of a social nature, it is worth highlighting competitiveness, employment, the need for infrastructures, sustainability and health.

As regards adaptation strategies in the sector, there is a requirement to establish specific policies for water resource management to guide the evolution of the sector in response to climate change forecasts. There is a great potential to direct a rational long term adaptation to climate change which would minimise the projected impacts, but this must be done within a general territorial planning framework. This framework should permit the setting of priorities in sector policies so as to identify and prioritise water demand and achieve an integrated management of water resource systems.

Effects on Adaptation Policies

A vital issue consequential upon the need for climate change adaptation is the manner in which water policies are directed under a horizon where guaranteed resources are more restricted: protection of economic systems, protection of biodiversity, rural development, etc. While clearly the end result will be a combination of all of them, each determines different methods of allocation and subsequently of management.

It is evident in the case of the Mediterranean area, owing to its particular vulnerability, the state of its natural resources and required sustainable development, that the evolution from the current situation should tend towards an adaptational solution, i.e. maintaining the allocation structure (subject to reviewing needs and uses) whilst improving its efficiency, ensuring that it is more flexible and simultaneously more resilient.

A range of measures exist to that end, among which it is worth mentioning as examples:

- Pro-active initiatives in territorial policy promoting those activities that are least “water-dependent” (in terms of both space and time). Factors of importance in the construction sector are practices applied to equipping homes and avoiding soil sealing (open housing).
- Demand management policies that go beyond mere water saving and could include conversion of user sectors in the medium and long term. In addition there can be redefinition of management guidelines.
- Use of new technologies subject to analysing the twin factors of water and energy in their production.
- Bearing in mind that one of the consequences of climate change in the Mediterranean basin is determined by the rise in the torrential degree of rainfall, every attempt needs to be made to maintain availability at a constant level, taking into account the need to consider aquifer replenishment, territorial and infrastructure management planning, and assessing the probability of these types of events occurring.
- Reclaiming spaces neighbouring water courses and affected zones, where possible.
- Improving vegetation cover to prevent erosion processes and encourage condensation.

One of the best instruments in the fight against climate change and the search for solutions to its impacts is rationality, awareness and knowledge of the issues relating to climate change in all its aspects both as to how it is caused and to the short, medium and long term consequences.

For that purpose there is a need to apply measures with the knowledge of scientific results in the public
A number of projects financed by the European Commission are working on the effect of climate change – global alterations in water resources. Examples worth highlighting are:

- **WATCH Project (Water and Global Change)**

- **CIRCE Project (Climate Change and Impact Research: The Mediterranean Environment)**

- **ENSEMBLES Project (Ensemble Based Predictions of Climate Changes and Their Impacts)**

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INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC). *IPCC Technical Paper on Climate Change and Water* (finalized at the 37th session of the IPCC Bureau), April 2008 – document not yet considered by the Panel for possible acceptance or approval.


The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, to present, in a concise manner, the trajectory of Water Governance and Public Involvement/Participation in the Mediterranean region while presenting at the same time the interface between the two terms; and, on the other, to provide an overview of recent developments in the subject through the work of two regional organisations and propose ways of further enhancing this interaction.

Water is high on the agenda for the Mediterranean, given the scarce water conditions the region faces. In addition to having water unevenly allocated in space and time both regionally and within countries, the situation is further exacerbated by intense demographic changes (population growth and urbanisation trends), unplanned use of the available surface and groundwater resources (leading to overuse and abuse of the resource), coupled with the region’s constellation of geopolitical particularities. To add to the situation’s complexity, the consequences of climate change, which are proclaimed to be particularly severe in the Mediterranean, call for an urgent policy shift towards adaptation and mitigation measures in order to tackle these corollaries.

Having painted a rather ominous picture, it is also essential to acknowledge two facts: i) The early (since the 1960s) efforts of pioneer scientists, personalities (see Jain Caistean, Elisabeth Wann Borgese, Aurelio Pechei and Doxiades, etc) and civil society groups in raising public awareness on issues of pollution and degradation of natural resources in the region and the future consequences; ii) the relatively early involvement of countries at regional (since 1975), national and sub-national levels to address overall environmental and water challenges in a region with inherent difficulties in international/transnational relations indicating a genuine desire to tackle the environmental problems, without overlooking the commitment to achieving internationally set targets on water and sanitation (Millennium Development Goals and Johannesburg Targets, for example). Within this framework, awareness has been raised across the region on water resources management being primarily an issue of governance and, thus, requiring political commitment on the one hand and wide stakeholder participation on the other.

**Discussing Governance and Water Governance**

Governance

Governance is a term frequently used to encompass a wide range of meanings; it has become a catchword for functions as diverse as facilitating development and enhancing economic growth, to monitoring the execution of western type socio-economic requirements in the developing world and utilising managerial tools and methods in the public sector to denote the trend towards devolution and private sector involvement.

Despite the apparent convergence with the word government, governance is a wider and more inclusive concept embracing the relationship between a socie-
ty and its government and covering an extensive agenda of policy activities. Governance is about effectively implementing socially acceptable allocation of resources, and power and regulation and is therefore intensely political. This trait at regional level is further reinforced by national sovereignty, social values, ideology and the political systems that tend to impact on attempts to change governance arrangements in all sectors, and the water sector in particular. An important shift in governance thinking is that development is now increasingly seen as a task involving society as a whole and not as the exclusive domain of the government or investors. In the Mediterranean region in particular, where government structures tend to be still rigid, change-resistant and all-policy-encompassing, it is important that the more inclusive governance concept is slowly but steadily gaining ground, also through the encouragement of regional and international forums (UN bodies, EU Agencies, Global Water Partnership-Mediterranean – GWP-Med, donor community), other initiatives and processes (Mediterranean Strategy for Sustainable Development – MSSD, Mediterranean Component of the EU Water Initiative – MED EUWI) and not least the pioneering work of civil society (NGOs individually or working systematically in networks, like the Mediterranean Information Office for the Environment, Culture and Sustainable Development – MIO-ECSDE).

Essentially, governance is about enabling the participation and interaction of all stakeholders, whether public or private, in dealing with issues of common interest, like the distribution and allocation of scarce water resources. Such participation rests upon legislative and institutional arrangements that are inclusive and integrative. As the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit concluded, governance encompasses “…democratic institutions responsive to the needs of the people” and “the rule of law” (Report on the World Summit, 2002).

An attempt at definition would see governance as “…the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels… it comprises the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences” (UNDP Water Governance Programme, www.undp.org/water/about_us.html).

**Water Governance**

With reference to Water Governance, it was not until the 1990s that the concept gained ground in the international arena and it was in 2000 when the Second World Water Forum concluded that, “the world water crisis is a crisis of governance not one of scarcity, and good water governance is one of the main challenges facing governments in attaining water security” (Ministerial Declaration, 2000).

Establishing further this position, the Global Water Partnership re-affirmed that the water crisis is one of governance and that “…it is increasingly about how we, as individuals, and as parts of a collective society, govern the access to and control over water resources and their benefits” (GWP, 2002: 2). In a similar tone, the UNDP proclaimed that resolving the challenges in the governance area forms the key to integrated and sustainable water resources development and management (UN-WWDR, 2003).

Finally, the importance of governance for the financial sustainability of the water sector, a theme of particular interest in recent years in view of meeting the internationally-set water-related development targets, was succinctly described in the Camdessus Panel Report of the Third World Water Forum, where it was stated that “…serious defects in the governance of the global water sector hamper its ability to generate and attract finance” (Camdessus, 2003: 9).

Defining water governance would point towards “…the range of political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources, and the delivery of water services, at different levels of society” (GWP, 2002). From a similar viewpoint, the term is seen as encompassing “…the political, economic and social processes and institutions by which governments, civil society and the private sector make decisions about how best to use, develop and manage water resources” (UNDP, 2004:17) and “all social, political and economic organisations and institutions and their relationships insofar as these are related to water development and management” (UN-WWDR, 2003: 372).

Such understanding reflects a commitment to holistic and integrated approaches and wide stakeholder participation when dealing with water resources management (Scoullos & Tomassini, 2004: 68-69).

**On Public Participation and Involvement**

The discussion on governance and water governance eloquently revealed the linkage between the two concepts and stakeholder involvement. In order to avoid terminological confusion, perhaps it is necessary to mention that public involvement, stakeholder and civil society participation do not contain the same mean-
ing, but for the purposes of this article the terms may be used interchangeably with the discussion focusing on water and environment-related themes. Public participation is not an objective in itself. It is a dynamic, evolving process, central to sustainable development policies, with the aim to ensure that the decision-making is carried out in an informed, as far as possible participatory and in any case democratic and sustainable way. This suggests that decisions are soundly based on evidence provided freely in a passive and active way and influenced by the views and experience of those affected by them, while considering innovative and creative/alternative options and securing that the new arrangements are workable — now and in the future — and acceptable by the public.

Following this line of thinking, the participatory process consists of different components. Access to information was identified as a key ingredient to this process, both as the starting point and as the desired outcome in all stages of the process. When discussing participation, the role of awareness and awareness-raising also come to mind as the way through which people become familiar with the situation and start requesting more involvement. Inevitably, awareness is linked to education (and in particular to Environmental Education and Education for Sustainable Development), which is perhaps the most fundamental means towards awareness-raising.

The following pyramid (Scoullos et al., 2002: 11) represents an attempt to depict the interdependence and the inseparable development of participation, information, education and awareness:

The interlinkage of the four facets is very close and depending on local circumstances each one may act as the basis on which the others are built; this may happen in sequence when each facet acts as the basis/support for the rest for a period of time. In most cases public awareness and environmental education have played this role, while provision of passive information is usually the initial political tool opening the window of opportunity for more participation, which in all cases is the least developed throughout the Mediterranean region.

At this point one should make the further analysis of dividing public participation into two levels of fundamentally different political significance: “public involvement” including “light” interaction, not “binding” in any case for the authorities and never including anything more than “consultation”; and active participation leading to forms of “co-decision” and “self-determination.”

In some cases, such as the provisions of the European Union Water Framework Directive (EU-WFD), information supply and consultation are considered compulsory steps for the introduction of the Directive in the EU countries, while the third more advanced level of active public participation is highly recommended but not compulsory.

The evolutionary nature of participation is better understood when considering the different stages of the process: starting with passive provision of information, followed by exchange of information upon request, raising of public awareness through media and meetings, education on conservation issues gradually developing into education about the root problems and sustainability, access to justice and credit by individual citizens, civil groups and NGOs for environmental purposes and institutionalised full partnership with governments and other socio-economic partners in a new era of shared responsibility and governance. Thus, the linkage between governance and public involvement is further accentuated.

The Evolving Participation Process

The different stages of the evolving participation process are experienced in most countries, including Mediterranean ones, as an uprising curve, very closely linked with the widening and deepening of democratisation, education and sensitisation of the wider public on issues of environment, development and culture. This process is better depicted schematically in the following way (Scoullos et al., 2002: 25 & 37):
The vertical axis of the diagrams refer to different levels of participation (the full list is available at the end of the article), ranging from no participatory practices at all (number 0) to full partnership in a balanced governance scheme with full support to NGOs, local authorities and the public (number 17). In the Mediterranean, the bulk of the countries figure somewhere in the middle of the axis, with activities ranging between provision of financial support to joint information campaigns and selected NGO projects, consultations and ad hoc dialogues, advocacy facilitation and public participation in environmental impact assessment processes and access of the public to state/national environmental and development information databases.

A more simplified scheme would include four “pillars” or “axes” of the participatory process: i) access to information on environmental and relevant developmental issues; ii) participation in consultation, decision-making and monitoring of implementation of agreements; iii) full access to justice; and iv) access to support funds and credit. It is noteworthy that the latter is indeed the most advanced dimension proposed (by one of the authors), although not accepted yet or fully incorporated into the relevant international conventions and legal texts. Schematically, the combination of the four pillars would result in the following Chart 14.

As all four pillars are – in the opinion of the authors – equally essential for the participatory process, a larger and more regular circle denotes a more advanced process, while a smaller and more irregular shape signifies more distorted participatory conditions. The situation of public participation in the Mediterranean is represented with the elliptical shape in Chart 14, due to the lack of institutionalisation of the participatory processes, inadequate funding and lack of access to credit.

At this point, it would be useful to stress once again the linkage between governance and public participation, as the four pillars of the participatory process are also considered key ingredients in the governance (and water governance) process and, therefore, support for these components results in strengthening both processes simultaneously.

It is also interesting to note that the information pillar is rather prominent in the elliptical shape of the Mediterranean (as depicted in Chart 14), indicating that the overall process is in motion but in dire need a) of support towards the other three components and b) of strengthening the “active” dimension of information provision.
The fundamental root problem is the inadequate application of participatory, democratic processes. As more specific problems impeding participatory progress in the Mediterranean, following have been identified:

- Deficient or inadequate legal institutional framework facilitating public participation (including access to information, access to decision-making and justice);
- Deficient administrative infrastructures coupled with limited resources to cope technically with the requests of the public;
- Lack of coordination among the various administrative sectors and public agencies, hindering their ability to be efficient and participatory in receiving input even from other departments/agencies;
- Fragmentation of NGO and civil society initiatives together with weak structures, particularly at national level, where the majority of the critical environment-related decisions are made;
- Reluctance of the authorities to provide information to the public even when this is technically and legally feasible, mainly due to limited (in practice) recognition/acceptance of civil groups and NGOs as legitimate partners in decision making. In many Mediterranean countries representatives of the public do not yet enjoy the type of respect and credit that the authorities ought to demonstrate, despite the generous statements and declarations of good intentions by many governments and political leaders.

In the Mediterranean, the role and involvement of the public and civil society have developed over the last few decades primarily in areas of global interest, such as the protection of the environment, human rights, peace, etc. The right of the public, and the affected stakeholders in particular, to participate in the decisions that concern them has been widely acknowledged, but its practical implementation is somehow still lagging behind. This is even less prominent in the area of water. To this direction, overall global or regional frameworks that are operational in the Mediterranean include:

- The 1976 Barcelona Convention for Protection against Pollution in the Mediterranean Sea (and the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment and the Coastal Region of the Mediterranean – adopted in 1995, replacing the 1976 one). The Convention and its six Protocols together with the Mediterranean Action Plan form part of the UNEP Regional Seas Programme (www.unep.org/regionalseas/programmes/unpro/mediterranean/default.asp). The Mediterranean Commission for Sustainable Development functions in the same context, as it was established within this framework. The Convention’s key goal is to reduce pollution in the Mediterranean Sea and protect and improve the marine environment in the area, thereby contributing to its sustainable development while, among the Commitments undertaken by the partners, is the agreement to “facilitate public access to information and public participation.”
- The Aarhus Convention on “Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters,” signed in June 1998 during the 4th Ministerial Conference on Environment for Europe. The Aarhus Convention is an environmental agreement linking the environment to human rights and government accountability to environmental protection. It focuses on the interactions between the public and public authorities in the context of transparency and democracy. The Convention also acknowledges that sustainable development can be achieved only through the active and responsible involvement of all stakeholders. The Convention has been agreed in the United Nations’ Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) framework and, although it is open to countries from other regions, it has not been signed or ratified by non-UNECE countries (those of the Middle East and North Africa).

The public involvement-related European Union acquis communautaire, concerns the EU-Med countries alone and to a certain extent the accession and/or candidate countries and includes the EU Directive on Access to Environmental Information and the EU Water Framework Directive (EU-WFD). Furthermore, non-binding commitments are included in provisions under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Process (EMP). Within the EMP framework figure the Short and Medium-Term Priority Environmental Action Programme (SMAP), the Comité de Suivi, the EuroMed Civil Forum (through the Euro-Mediterranean Non-Governmental Platform established in 2003) and the Horizon 2020 Initiative to De-Pollute the Mediterranean by the Year 2020.

Indicatively, some examples of the different aspects of public participation, as they stand in various Mediterranean countries, are provided in the table below (information derived from the MCSD Strategic Review for Sustainable Development in the Mediterranean Region – UNEP/MAP, Athens, 2001).

**Public Participation and Water in the EU Framework (Directive 2000/60/EC)**

The trend to integrate stakeholders into national and international water resources management reflects a broader recognition of the public’s fundamental right to be involved in environmental decision-making processes. This recognition, clearly articulated in the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and the consecutive Dublin Principles, has been incorporated in the provisions of the EU-WFD that was adopted in 2000.

The EU-WFD sets out comprehensive legal provisions regarding public participation in river basin management for all EU member states. Three levels of participation are mentioned in Article 14, which forms the core public participation provision of the Directive: information, consultation and active involvement (modelled after the first two pillars of the Aarhus Convention). The Directive provides the member states with considerable flexibility for the design of public participation endeavours, particularly regarding active involvement of stakeholders.

According to the WFD Common Implementation Strategy Document No. 8: Public Participation in Relation to the Water Framework Directive (WFD CIS on PP), member states shall ensure consultation while they are encouraged to promote active involvement. The WFD CIS on PP also states that “...in principle any level of public participation can be organised at any scale, even at the international river basin scale. The main issue is to find for each issue the right combination of scale, stakeholders, public participation levels and methods.” Encouraging participation in the development and implementation of water management plans (inter-

**TABLE 24 Some Examples of the Different Aspects of Public Participation in Various Mediterranean Countries**

| **Existing measures to promote environmental information:** |
| Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, France, Malta, Tunisia and in less distinct forms in other countries |
| **Legislation for access to information:** |
| Cyprus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain |
| **Environmental institutions promoting information, education and awareness-raising activities:** |
| Algeria, Egypt, Greece, Morocco and in less distinct forms in other countries |
| **National legislation for involvement of the public in the decision-making process:** |
| Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Israel, Spain |
| **Involvement of the public in the decision-making process:** |
| Lebanon (not at local level), Croatia, Malta, Syria (through EIA process), France (at local level), Tunisia (largely through NGOs and local authorities) |
| **NGO backing:** exists in various forms in many countries |
| **Cooperation of NGOs with national institutions:** |
| In various degrees and patterns in many countries |
ested parties participate actively in the planning process by discussing issues and contributing to their solutions) may be considered as the Directive’s core requirement on active involvement. Higher levels of participation also include shared decision-making and self-determination. Although the two latter types do not form specific requirements of the Directive, they are often considered as best practices and therefore explicitly encouraged.

However, and despite the EU-WFD’s provisions, the final word on the outcome of the Directive’s implementation rests with the appointed competent authorities. It is they who decide on the extent to which their power will be shared with the other stakeholders and hence, it is they who primarily determine whether the process is or has been “completed” successfully or not.

The EU-WFD’s Role Around the Mediterranean

The vigour and influence of the EU-WFD in the Mediterranean is more than prominent. In the North, the EU member states bordering the Mediterranean have complied with the Directive’s requirements and are in the process of implementing its various provisions. The countries of south-eastern Europe that are not in the EU have signed Association and Stabilisation Agreements with the EU and have all voluntarily agreed to comply with the requirements of the EU-WFD regarding the management of their water resources.

The countries of the eastern Mediterranean, regardless of their national legislations and institutional frameworks, have also declared their intention to comply – to varying degrees – with the requirements of the EU-WFD (especially with reference to IWRM and its insertion into national legislation through the drafting of IWRM Plans, as in the case of Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Israel and the Palestinian Territories). Finally the countries of North Africa, although not directly reflecting on the EU-WFD, take measures for the management of their water resources that align with the Directive. For instance, the codification of water legislation (most countries have already done so); the design and implementation of IWRM Plans (all countries are within this process but at different stages, with Egypt leading the way); the efforts towards establishing National Water Councils, echoing the Central Water Authority provision of the EU-WFD (as in the case of Libya and Morocco); the river basin management measures/plans, (as is the case in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia).

Recently, an interesting pilot project was carried out in Morocco with the support of the MEDA Water Programme of the European Union Water Initiative on the application of the methodology proposed by the EU-WFD. More specifically, the project dealt with the role and importance of economic approaches for integrated water resources management, using a pilot case study on the Sebou River Basin and then employing the results for an economic analysis of water management on a national scale in Morocco.

For the non-EU Mediterranean countries, another point of particular attention concerns the issue of transboundary water resources management (surface and groundwater). The EU-WFD, by concentrating on the river basin as the level of action, addresses the issue of shared waters and provides a framework for cooperation through joint stakeholder involvement. Although full stakeholder coordination as the means towards successful public participation (and therefore implementation of the EU-WFD) in shared water river basins is not a prerequisite, it is highly recommended. Experience from within Europe (e.g. Rivers Danube, Rhine) as well as from outside (e.g. Rivers Orange, Okavango) has shown that coordination and engagement of stakeholders from the riparian countries has led to more efficient management of transboundary waters.

Bringing (Water) Governance and Public Participation Closer

In the following pyramid that represents the supporting structure for sustainable development, Scoullos (Scoullos & Malotidi, 2004: 21-24) has proposed Governance as the basis of the pyramid:

Scoullos has also further analysed the governance components in order to identify the areas where
changes should be made in order to attain sustainable development:

By linking the two pyramids together, it could be argued that attaining sustainable development requires social cohesion and welfare, responsible economy, environmental protection, effective institutions, application of innovative and appropriate technology and education for sustainable development. The latter three components were identified previously (Chart 12) as the three facets of the public participation pyramid.

Public participation is directly interlinked with education and also with the development and operation of institutions. What is less obvious is the acceptable use and transfer of technology.

It is obvious that public participation is directly interlinked with education and also with the development and operation of institutions. What is less obvious – and developed until now in public involvement – is the acceptable use and transfer of technology, which is an area of great importance for the future (like the themes of biodiversity, nanotechnology, chemicals, etc). Furthermore, without awareness the institutions will continue functioning in sub-optimal ways, while without information the fruits of technology will not reach the wide public. In the same manner, awareness is acutely supported by “aware” institutions and information is enriched by sprouting technology.

Promoting the Governance-Participation Nexus through Action

An advantage of the schematic representation of concepts is that it makes it easier to visualise the components and identify the actions needed to strengthen them. Different stakeholders contribute with different ways in this effort across the Mediterranean. In this paper, the action of two organisations will be particularly discussed with reference to the pyramids and the components: the Mediterranean Information Office for the Environment, Culture and Sustainable Development (MIO-ECSDE) (www.mio-ecsde.org), an NGO whose activity extends across the Mediterranean, and the Global Water Partnership – Mediterranean (GWP-Med) (www.gwpmed.org), an international organisation that carries out work specifically in the region. The two organisations work closely together on a number of occasions and on a wide range of activities and primarily aim at creating a dialogue platform among the different Mediterranean stakeholders so that they become more environmentally aware and motivated to participate in endeavours of common interest.

MEdIES

With the view to strengthen the role of education in the field of the environment and sustainable development, an initiative was launched in 2002 by MIO-ECSDE on the field of the Mediterranean Education Initiative for Environment and Sustainability (MEdIES). This ongoing initiative aims to facilitate the educational community (both educators and students) to contribute in a systematic and concrete way to the implementation of Agenda 21 and the Millennium Development Goals, as well as the UN Decade for Education for Sustainable Development (2005-2014), through the successful application of innovative educational programmes in countries around the Mediterranean Basin. The outcome of this exchange of information and collaboration among countries in the north and the south of the region allows the development of a methodological framework and intercultural dialogue, which can be evaluated and further implemented in other regions.

DIALOGUE ON EFFECTIVE WATER GOVERNANCE

The opportunity to discuss the above theme was offered by GWP-Med through the Mediterranean Dialogue on Effective Water Governance (DEWG), which
MIO-ECSDE and GWP-Med work closely together on a number of occasions and on a wide range of activities and primarily aim at creating a dialogue platform among the different Mediterranean stakeholders so that they become more environmentally aware and motivated to participate in endeavours of common interest.

COMJESD

On the theme of information a key activity jointly run by the two organisations is the Circle of Mediterranean Journalists for Environment and Sustainable Development (COMJESD) comprising journalists from all the countries of the region, which aims to create an active forum for regular exchange of information and views about crucial Mediterranean environmental and sustainable development issues, the promotion of capacity building of media professionals and the organisation of joint and concerted actions. Through these activities, information and communication experts are strengthened in their capacity of sensitising and informing Mediterranean societies, improving democratic and participatory processes and in directing more effectively the flow of information produced by scientists, NGOs, etc, to the decision-makers. In this direction, an Elementary Manual on Freshwater Journalism in the Mediterranean (Alawneh et al, 2003) was produced to assist the work of the Circle.

COMPSUD

Similarly, a Circle of Mediterranean Parliamentarians for Sustainable Development (COMPSUD) was created with the joint support of the two organisations, also in 2002, with the aim of promoting suitable mechanisms to support the dialogue among Members of Parliaments (from EU and non-EU Mediterranean countries), politicians and other stakeholders on the protection of the Mediterranean environment and the necessary socio-economic conditions for the sustainable development of the region. This is an open, flexible and light structure that regularly brings together the members of the Circle and is of particular importance because of the highly political nature of the forum.

NATIONAL POLICY DIALOGUES ON WATER (MED EUWI)

Addressing the political nature of water governance, GWP-Med, through its capacity as the Secretariat of the Mediterranean Component of the EU Water Initiative (MED EUWI), is carrying out National Policy Dialogues on Water with the overall aim to assist countries with meeting the MDGs and WSSD water targets by formulating through assessment and policy dialogue (i) financing strategies and/or Road Maps for water supply and sanitation (as in the National Dialogue in Egypt) and (ii) developing national water strategies and IWRM Plans (as in the National Dialogue in Lebanon) as well as defining and prioritising the interventions required in terms of projects and actions and the needed funding. Enhancement of donor coordination is among the expected outcomes of the process, while the National Dialogues constitute multi-stakeholder processes, are demand-led and carried out by the countries themselves involving a spectrum of national actors on water issues. Supporting actions that aim to launch National Dialogue processes are also implemented in Syria, Libya and the Palestinian Territories.

RABAT PROCESS

Initiated in Rabat, Morocco, in January 2006, this regional process is based on the Rabat Declaration on Regional Cooperation for National IWRM Planning in the countries of North Africa and Mauritania. In addition to assessing and evaluating the status of National IWRM Planning in those countries, it aims to facilitate the public dialogue on IWRM Planning within and among those countries and other stake-
holders. Follow-up activities in Tunisia, Morocco, Libya and Algeria have been organised also in conjunction with MED EUWI activities, while cooperation with Mauritania is currently in the pipeline.

**CIRCLE OF WOMEN IN THE MED and GEWAMED**

With the view to address and enhance the role of gender in the Mediterranean with regard to sustainable development (with issues of water and water governance figuring prominently on the agenda), a new Circle of Women in the Mediterranean is about to be established jointly by the two organisations. The work of the Circle will be complemented by the already running GEWAMED project (Mainstreaming Gender Dimensions into Water Resources Development and Management in the Mediterranean Region), a project financed by the INCO (International Scientific Co-operation) Programme within the Sixth Framework Research Programme of the European Commission and addressed to the countries of the Mediterranean region. The project emphasises the networking and co-ordination of on-going research activities with a total of 18 institutions from 14 Mediterranean countries participating in the endeavours.

However, involving stakeholders in water governance cannot be considered an overnight process, but requires time, continuity and perseverance

**REACH, NANOCAP and YouthXchange**

Responding to the issue of technology, as the least developed facet in the Governance pyramid (Chart 16), and with the view to reinforce public participation in this topic, MIO-ESDCE is running three projects: one on the sustainable management of chemicals – REACH (Reaching Sustainable Management of Chemicals in the Euro-Mediterranean Region); one on nanotechnology – NANOCAP; and one on responsible consumption patterns through the translation of a UNESCO/UNEP training kit – YouthXchange: towards sustainable lifestyles.

Within the framework of the above activities, a series of events was organised throughout the year 2007, locally, nationally and regionally. The aim was to create the opportunity for different Mediterranean stakeholders to gather under neutral platforms in order to be informed about, engaged and involved in issues of an environmental and specifically water-related context. It is important to note that the various activities have not been/are not carried out in isolation of other Mediterranean initiatives/processes/frameworks and a key concern has been the identification of potential synergies. Besides avoiding duplication, synergies increase the impact of joint efforts, make better use of available resources and ensure continuity of actions.

**Conclusions**

With Governance being identified as the key issue of concern for sustainable water resources management, and the linkage between governance and participation being more than apparent, efforts that respond to the two need to be sought simultaneously. Such an endeavour is facilitated by the commonalities that the substantive components of the two concepts bear, and even more so by formal and informal frameworks and networks that are operational in the Mediterranean on participation and water governance. However, involving stakeholders in water governance cannot be considered an overnight process, but requires time, continuity and perseverance. It also depends heavily on local particularities, both in terms of resources as well as values, ideology and the democratic “maturity” of the political systems. It also depends on substantially modifying human behaviour towards water resources management, otherwise the solutions envisaged by effective governance and active participation can never materialise and the proclaimed goals may remain void of context without substantial results for the needed progress.

**References**


SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NUMBERING ON THE VERTICAL AXIS OF CHART 13

0. No participatory practices at all
1. Passive provision of unsystematic, arbitrarily selected information on environmental issues passed by the authorities to the public. Passive, uncoordinated environmental education projects developed ad hoc.
2. Acceptance of need for information flow on environmental issues by the authorities.
3. Participation of NGOs in information campaigns on conservation and restoration issues.
4. Active information: responding to requests by the public. Various means for access to selected information held by the authorities on environment and development issues.
5. Financial support for joint information campaigns and selected NGO projects. Introduction of environmental education projects in selected schools or groups. Systematic large-scale awareness campaigns.
6. Consultations and ad hoc dialogue between citizens’ groups, NGOs, local authorities and the state without secured follow-up. Environmental education in curricula and/or coordinated networks and programmes.
7. Facilitation and advocacy by the authorities for access of independent civil groups and NGOs to international funds for projects or their operation with no strings attached.
8. Facilitation mechanisms for participation of the public in environmental impact assessment (EIA) processes.
9. Active participation of the public through transparent mechanisms in drafting sustainability charters (Local Agenda 21, etc).
10. Full access of the public to the environmental and development information database of the state.
11. Participation of groups in the monitoring of implementation and management of sustainability plans.
12. Institutionalisation of No. 7
13. Financing of projects and plans for independent assessments (counter-assessments) or counter-EIAs for controversial projects.
14. Institutionalisation of No. 10
15. Access of public groups to justice including cases of liability and compensation for environmental damages.
16. Access of public groups to supporting funds and credit for operation and projects by national and international sources with no strings attached.
17. Full partnership in balanced governance with full support for NGOs, local authorities and the public for participation on an equal footing.


In the face of population growth, rampant urbanisation, industrialisation and environmental degradation, shared basin management has proved to be synonymous to conflict management. Of the world’s 263 shared basins, sixty-three are in Africa. Most of them are shared by two to four countries, although some are shared by many more. The Nile is a vital resource for the ten states embraced by its basin (Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Sudan and Tanzania), and it is especially important for the survival and development of Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan. Also, five of these ten states are among the poorest countries in the world. Its basin affects some 300 million people, of which 160 million are directly dependent on its waters.

After many attempts, the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement, concluded at the 15th ordinary meeting of the Nile Council of Ministers Responsible for Water Affairs (Nile-COM) held on 24th-25th June 2007 in Entebbe (Uganda), marks an important stage in strengthening Nile cooperation. Certain clauses are of course still a problem and will be later submitted to the opinion of the Heads of State, but once it has been ratified, this Agreement will be the first instrument to bring together all the Nile basin countries and it will serve as an example for settling other conflicts in the Mediterranean area.

The Nile: Facts

Originating from an “uncertain” source, the Nile, called the Kagera at this stage, crosses Lake Victoria (the Victoria Nile), passes the Ripon and Owen Falls and enters Lake Kyoga, flows over the Murchison Falls to enter Lake Albert (the Albert Nile), crosses the southern Sudan plain where it takes the name of Bahr al-Jabal, passes through a swamp area, the Sudds, is joined by the River Sobat on its right shore and the Bahr al-Ghazal on its left shore, and from here it takes on the name of Bahr al-Abyad (the White Nile). At Khartoum, it is met from the right by the River Bahr al-Azraq (the Blue Nile, or Abba’i in Amharic), which has its source in Lake Tana in northwest Ethiopia, and becomes simply the Nile. Its final tributary, the Atbara, flows into it 322 km north of Khartoum. The Nile then crosses the desert regions of Nubia and Upper Egypt with a succession of waterfalls between Khartoum and Aswan, numbered in reverse order from 6 to 1. Between Aswan and Cairo, the river flows through a narrow, fertile valley, finally widening out into a vast marshy delta north of Cairo on the Mediterranean. Its southernmost source, however, remains a controversy. A team of Britons and New Zealanders announced on 31st March 2006 that the source of the Nile is the River Rukarara, a tributary of the River Kagera, and is located in the Nyungwe Forest in southern Rwanda, and not in Uganda. Others believe its source to be the spring of the River Ruvyironza (Burundi), from which the Kagera flows. The Nile is the longest river in the world and measures 6,695 or 6,718 km, depending on its origin. Its basin affects some 300 million people (with 160 million directly depending on its waters). The Nile delivers some 300 million m³ of water per day when it reaches Egypt. Ethiopia contributes over five-sevenths of its flow, and the rest comes from the White Nile.

The Nile in Politicised Convention

The Nile fell within the area of influence of Great Britain during colonisation, and the British took great care to maintain their presence in the area.
This constant concern resulted in a series of agreements being signed between 1890 and 1949, with Germany (1st July 1890), Italy (15th April 1891, 13th December 1906), Belgium (12th May 1894, 9th May 1906), France (13th December 1906), Ethiopia (15th May 1902) and Egypt (7th May 1929, 31st May 1949).

The **Anglo-German Agreement of 1890**

This Agreement recognised German sovereignty over the Sultanate of Zanzibar in exchange for Germany’s acknowledgement of the Nile as a British area of influence.

The **Anglo-Italian Protocol of 1891**

When Italy stated its claims on Ethiopia, Britain feared it would proceed to drain the Nile waters. It therefore delegated its ambassador in Rome, and this Protocol was reached, confirming Italian influence over Ethiopia from the 35° East Meridian, but with the region located in the West, i.e. the Nile Basin, remaining under British influence. It also stated that “the Italian government engages not to construct on the Atbara River, in view of irrigation, any work which might sensibly modify its flow into the Nile” (§ III).

The **Anglo-Belgian Agreements of 1894 and 1906**

Under the 1894 Agreement, King Leopold II, the ruler of the Congo Free State (today the Democratic Republic of the Congo) acknowledged the Nile as a zone of British influence, granting Great Britain a 25-kilometre corridor between Lakes Tanganyika, Albert and Edward and thus guaranteeing continued control of the river. In exchange, Britain agreed to lease the two Sudanese provinces of Bahr al-Jabal and Equatoria to the King with the condition that the former should be governed by the Congo Free State while the Congo remained under the supremacy of either the King, his successors or a Belgian colony, and the latter for the duration of the monarch’s lifetime. However, under major pressure from the French, Belgium surrendered its dominion over these two provinces on 14th August 1894.

This Franco-Belgian Agreement was quickly followed by the Border Treaty between Great Britain and the Congo State in 1906, which stipulated that “Government of the independent state of the Congo engages not to construct, or allow to be constructed, any work over or near the Semliki or Isango River which would diminish the volume of water entering Lake Albert except in agreement with the Sudanese Government” (Art. III).

The **1906 Tripartite Agreement between Britain, France and Italy**

From then on, British control was established over the accesses upstream and downstream of the Nile. As a result of this stabilisation the 1906 Agreement was concluded between the three Nile powers, to maintain “the political and territorial status quo in Ethiopia.” It stipulated that “should events occur to disturb the status quo set forth under Article I, France, Great Britain and Italy shall make every effort to maintain the integrity of Ethiopia (...) they shall agree to safeguard the interests of Great Britain and Egypt in the Nile Basin, and more especially, with regard to the control of the waters of this river and its tributaries...” (Art. IV, a).

The **Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1902**

In this Treaty signed in Addis Ababa with Great Britain for the delimitation of the border between Ethiopia and Sudan, Menelik II, King of Kings of Ethiopia, “engages Himself towards the government of His Britannic Majesty not to construct or allow to be constructed any work across the Blue Nile, Lake Tsana [Tana] or the Sobat, which would arrest the flow of their waters into the Nile except in agreement with His Britannic Majesty’s Government and the Government of the Sudan” (Art. III).

The **Anglo-Egyptian Agreements of 1929 and 1949**

The 1929 Agreement established the acceptance of the Commission’s recommendations made in 1925 regarding the Nile. This was confirmed by an exchange of notes between Mohamed Mahmoud Pacha and Lord Lloyd, recorded as an agreement between the British government (in the name of Sudan and the countries under British administration) and the Egyptian government. The note from the President of the Council of Ministers emphasised that no irrigation or electrical power production works could be built without prior consent from the Egyptian government (§ 4 (ii)). In return, if “… the Egyptian government should decide to undertake works on the river and its branches, or take measures with a view to increasing the water supply to Egypt’s advantage, the measures to be taken to safeguard local interests must previously be agreed on with the local au-
thorities. The construction, maintenance and administration of the aforementioned works will be under the direct control of the Egyptian government" (§ 4 (iv)). In response to the Egyptian note, the British High Commissioner affirmed that Her Majesty's government acknowledged the "natural and historical rights of Egypt in the Nile waters", and considered safeguarding them to be "a fundamental principle of British policy" (§ IV).

The Agreement concluded in 1949 for the construction of a dam on the Owen Falls (Uganda) was drawn up "in line with the commitment made by the His Britannic Majesty's Government on the exchange of notes regarding the use of the Nile waters, on 7th May 1929."

The Nile in the Exemplary Agreement of 8th November 1959

This Agreement, established between the United Arab Republic (now Egypt) and Sudan, distributed the Nile waters by means of subtle calculations, simultaneously taking into account the rights acquired by each country (48 billion/m³ and 4 billion/m³ per year respectively measured at Aswan by Egypt and Sudan) and the average losses caused by long-term stocking of the future Aswan High Dam. It rectified the unbalance in the proportion of the Nile waters previously allocated, Sudan’s part now being 18.5 billion m³ as opposed to Egypt’s 55.5 billion. The two governments agreed to the High Dam being constructed by Egypt and to Sudan building any other works it should consider necessary for the use of its part. In the eyes of the non-signing riparian countries, this Agreement was merely a res inter alios acta alis nec nocet nec prodest; as a result, neither of the signing countries could oblige a third country to acknowledge any fact without their consent.

Egypt and Sudan, sensitive to the future needs of the Upper Nile riparian states, acknowledged the rights of the other riparians in their Agreement. Thus, Sudan stipulated that whenever a claim was made by the non-signing countries, the volume of water that the governments had agreed to allocate to the new demanding countries would be deducted in equal parts from Egypt and Sudan’s allocations, as measured at Aswan (V, §2).

The Nile and its Legal “Regime” at the Time of the “Administrative Powers”

Prior to independence, the Nile treaties were subject to different interpretations, varying according to the interests of the riparian states other than Egypt and Sudan. The succession of these countries after their independence raises the question of the value of the treaties of the former “administrating power.”

The Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement of 1902 and the Question of the Succession of State

Previous to this Agreement, Ethiopia was bound by the aforementioned 1891 Protocol. However, Ethiopia had always invoked the principle of starting afresh and had brought up the question of “its natural rights” over the part of the Nile waters originating in its territory. The Ethiopian government went as far as claiming the title of “original possessor” of the Nile and, consequently, its priority right of use of the waters for the development of its economy and its population. The Addis Ababa government also refused to participate in the work of the permanent joint technical Committee created within the framework of the 1959 Agreement, unlike the other riparian countries. Furthermore, it refused to contemplate any proposals for the collective management of the Nile waters.

Succession of the Belgian Congo and Rwanda-Urundi on the Anglo-Belgian Agreements of 1906 and 1934

The 1906 Agreement required the Sudanese government’s consent for the lesser use that any modification of the regime for the waters would entail. An analogous formula also appears in the Agreement of 22nd November 1934 between Belgium and Great Britain, concerning the use of the waters on the border between Tanganyika (now Tanzania) and Rwanda-Urundi.

Unlike the case with Tanzania, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Rwanda and Burundi did not question the validity of the Agreements. It is true that these three countries are “relatively” less sensitive to the question of sharing the Nile waters than the other riparians.

Independence of the East African Countries and its Effect on the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1929

On gaining independence, Tanzania declared the 1929 Agreement incompatible with its sovereignty in a note sent on 4th July 1962 to the governments of Great Britain, Egypt and Sudan. Uganda’s attitude was also to condemn it. Kenya did the same, but it accorded the Agreement a two-year period of grace, dur-
ing which it should be repealed or replaced; this period concluded on 12th December 1965.

The “Uncertain” Validity of the Nile “Regimes”

In this respect, some of these Agreements were imposed on the successor countries by virtue of Article XI of the 1978 Vienna Convention on the succession of States in terms of treaties, as they were border treaties. However, some of their stipulations solely concerning the use of the Nile waters to this regard were a cause of problems. As for the others, there were arguments for and against their continuity, none of which was particularly convincing. Finally, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) implicitly dealt with the matter in its judgement on the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Dams project (Hungary/Slovakia) of 25th September 1997. It based the principle of transmissibility on the very nature of the international water course, i.e. its nature as a shared resource. It also set out other principles essential for water resource management (equitable and reasonable use and participation, obligation not to cause significant damage, etc.) by virtue of which the successor countries always had the opportunity to modify the treaties concluded by the former administering powers.

In view of this ambivalence, the Vienna Convention and Article III of the Convention on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses (1997) ran too great a risk of giving rise to conflicts instead of solving the problem of knowing which treaties the successor state is bound by or not. With the Nile’s legal regime “remaining disputed,” hydraulic constructions were proposed.

The Nile and the Difficulties of its Constructions

The flow of the Nile is controlled by four main dams: one on the White Nile in Uganda, one in Egypt (the High Aswan Dam), and two in Sudan. There are also at present several major Nile construction schemes either under study or in progress.

The Works in Sudan

Of the approximately 27 billion m$^3$ of water entering the Sudds region, only 14 billion leave the region, the rest being "lost" to evaporation and infiltration. In 1978, Egypt and Sudan began to dig the Jonglei canal, an ambitious scheme for channelling the Nile along a 360 km long canal starting at Bor. Work advanced rapidly until 15th May 1983, when an uprising broke out in the garrisons of Bor and other towns. The “Sudan Liberation Army” was formed, criticising the central government for the lack of any real cooperation with southern Sudan regarding the large financial development projects. The works were reported sine die pending a definitive settlement of the question of the South.

The “Vindictive Dam” on Lake Tana in Ethiopia and Other Projects

This scheme for the Blue Nile consisted of building a dam at the outlet of Lake Tana to constitute a water reserve (for irrigation and hydroelectric power). The scheme went a long way back, with the first feasibility studies having been made by the Egyptians in 1913 and later abandoned in 1936 on Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia. The project remains a source of tension between Egypt and Ethiopia. Also, whenever the situation between the Nile states escalated, it was normally due to a plan, project or event concerning the Nile waters (the dam on the Tekeze/Teccaze, the Finchaa reservoir, the Peace Canal, the scheme for a new valley, etc.).

The Nile, Conflict Prevention and Cooperation Prospects

For several years, efforts favoured by Egypt have been made to encourage cooperation through common schemes for the Nile waters, such as the following:

- the Hydrometeorological Survey of the Catchment of Lakes Victoria, Kyoga and Albert in 1967 (HYDROMET, 1967-1992);
- the Organisation Agreement for the construction and development of the basin of the River Kagera in 1977;
- the Lagos Action Plan for Financial Development of Africa in 1980 (a catalyst for the creation of the Undugu group (meaning “the brotherhood”) in 1983, 1983-1999);
- the Khartoum Declaration between Ethiopia and Sudan in 1991;
- the Technical Cooperation Committee for the protection of the Nile basin environment in 1992 (TECCONILE, 1992-1999);
- the general cooperation framework between Egypt and Ethiopia in 1993;
- the environment management project for Lake Victoria in 1996.

For several years, efforts favoured by Egypt have been made to encourage cooperation through common schemes for the Nile waters

However, these endeavours ended in failure, mainly because they did not succeed in gaining the confidence of the riparian states, several of which considered that their aim was to institutionalise an unfair status quo regarding use of the Nile waters.

The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI)

At their meeting held in February 1999 in Dar es-Salaam (Tanzania), the nine Nile-COM countries created the Nile Basin Initiative (with Eritrea participating as an observer), founded with the aid of the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

Organised by the NBI, the Nile-COM meets annually and provides the necessary political impulse for issues regarding the Nile waters. The technical advisory committee (Nile-TAC), created in March 1998, meets whenever the need arises: composed of eighteen members (an official representative and a deputy member for each country), it issues technical opinions, draws up the proposals to be made to Nile-COM, and aids them in their work. These two bodies are backed by a permanent secretariat (Nile-SEC) based in Entebbe. The Presidency of Nile-COM and Nile-TAC is ensured by an annual rotation system.

The NBI, a participatory process of dialogue between the riparian states, has led to a “shared vision”: it has succeeded in bringing about durable socio-economic development through the equitable use and sharing of the common benefits of the Nile basin water resources. The Strategic Action Programme provides the means for transforming this “shared vision” into specific activities, through an approach based on two simultaneous complementary processes:

- Preparing all the cooperative actions through a regional programme for promoting confidence and cooperation, and for skills development in the basin as a whole (Shared Vision Programme);
- Putting into practice the opportunities for investment and development of cooperation at the sub-basin level in order to obtain specific results (Subsidiary Action Programme).

The projects of the Shared Vision Programme have created a propitious environment for investment. There are currently eight of them, involving practical training, confidence promotion and commitment of stakeholders, the regional energy market, coordination of the Shared Vision Programme, socio-economic development and profit-sharing, trans-border environmental action, optimum use of water in the agricultural sector, and water resource management.

Restored Confidence

One of the Nile basin action plan projects, whose objective was to develop a cooperative framework for Nile management (Project D3), was approved at the 3rd Nile-COM meeting (Arusha, 9th/11th February 1995). This cooperation framework programme was launched in 1997 with the support of the UNDP, the World Bank and other bilateral development partners, and its aim is to study the legal and institutional aspect of the cooperation.

A Panel of Experts (PoE, composed of three legal and hydraulic experts per country) and a Transition Committee drew up a Nile Basin Cooperation Framework Agreement to enable determination of the equitable and legitimate right of use of the Nile waters by each country. The Nile-COM recommended the creation of a negotiation committee to complete the Agreement project, and it was concluded in June 2007. On the one hand, the cooperation framework agreement helped to dissipate Ethiopia’s mistrust, and on the other hand the NBI Programmes fortified the stance of Egypt.

Interdependence is Established

The NBI promotes interest in inter-state cooperation and is attempting to clear the way for the idea of optimum interdependence. The Nile-COM established a fiduciary Fund in March 2003 and asked the World Bank to manage it so that it could be put into practice. Its realisation is based on the principle of a decentralised approach within the different countries in accordance with a determined procedure, and not within a strictly national framework. The NBI has thus developed two baskets of the Subsidiary Action Pro-
gramme: the Eastern Nile Subsidiary Action Programme (ENSAP) and the Nile Equatorial Lakes Subsidiary Action Programme (NELSAP). The first of these two programmes is supported by Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. Its steering committee is made up of three Water Resources Ministers and the Programme Team (a group of three national technical teams). Its objective is to carry out joint actions in situ to reduce poverty, promote economic growth and restore the environment. Its Regional Technical Office began its activity in June 2002 in Addis Ababa: it runs and coordinates the creation of the projects, develops capacities, reinforces the institutions and serves as a secretariat. It is equipped with a Social Development Office that supports all the projects by reinforcing the social development capacity, drawing up guidelines and establishing and analysing studies (preparatory and pilot studies), etc.

Based in Kigali (Rwanda), the second of the programmes involves six states in addition to Egypt and Sudan (Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda). Its objectives are similar to those of the first programme. It was devised to generate long-term effects that would be favourable for the economic integration of the Great Lakes region. Twelve development projects have been identified and classified into two main groups:

- Natural resource management (improving agricultural productivity through rainwater collection, small-scale irrigation and livestock management; the Lakes Albert and Edward fisheries projects; development of a cooperative framework for the water resources of the Mara Basin and the Malakisi-Malaba-Sio Basins, and integrated management of the Kagera Basin; eradication of the water hyacinth in the Kagera River).
- Development of hydropower and the energy market (hydropower development on the Rusumo Falls; prioritisation and feasibility studies for hydropower development; interconnection of the electrical networks between: Kenya and Uganda; Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda; Burundi and Rwanda; Rwanda and Uganda).

These Projects will be drawn up and put into practice by the countries concerned, under the supervision of the Steering Committees or any other monitoring mechanism agreed on by the States themselves. A Coordination Unit was set up in Entebbe in December 2001 to facilitate the creation and realisation of the projects.

To optimise this interdependence, the NBI tends toward integrating the idea of dissociation cost. This represents loss of profit due to discontinuity of the expected "transactions". If this cost is disproportionate and particularly low to the profit of one State, and the other is not in a position to respond, the first state has the power to inflict substantial damage on the second and obtain greater concessions from them. Thus, only a substantial, globally equal dissociation cost for the parties enables this optimum interdependence to be attained.

Conclusion: Ten Riparians, One River and One Common Destiny

There are numerous accomplishments to add to the NBI’s credit: the setting up of a large national and regional network of teachers, journalists, members of parliament, etc., together with other forums; the involvement of the governments, local authorities and civil society organisations; the progress made within the framework of energy exchange, water resource planning, confidence promotion between the stakeholders, etc.; carrying out the projects on a regional, national and local level; signing the Memorandum of Understanding in July 2006 with the community of East Africa for the integrated management of Lake Victoria, etc.

The Nile basin countries share the same interests and their desire is to move forward in the future with the same spirit, that of a "Nile community"

The NBI is a step in the right direction. However, it represents only a transitory agreement, until the countries concerned endorse a permanent framework, both legal and institutional, for the development of the Nile waters (the Nile Basin Commission). This desire for change requires the involvement of the international community (the International Consortium for Nile Cooperation, the World Bank, specialist UN institutions – UNDP, FAO, WHO, UNEP – regional and development banks, etc.) as a facilitator and financial backer, and the commitment of the Nile States. The Nile basin countries share the same interests and their desire is to move forward in the future with the same spirit, that of a "Nile community."
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MEDITERRANEAN AND INTERNATIONAL WATER ORGANISATION AND NETWORKS

ACSAD, Arab Centre for the Study of Arid Zones and Dry Lands www.acsad.org/aboutACSA.htm

Arab Water Council www.arabwatercouncil.org/

EMWIS, Euro-Mediterranean Information System on Know-How in the Water Sector www.emwis.net

Euro-Mediterranean Irrigators Community www.e-mic.org/

GWPMed, Global Water Partnership Mediterranean www.gwpmad.org


IME, Institut Méditerranéen de l’eau www.ime-eau.org

MEDA Water Program www.medawater-rmsu.org/

MEdIES, Mediterranean Education Initiative for Environment and Sustainability www.medies.net

Mediterranean Component of the EU Water Initiative www.euw.net/index.php?option=1&sub=1&id=127


MENBO, Mediterranean Network of Basin Organisations www.menbo.org

NBI, Nile Basin Initiative www.nilebasin.org/

Plan Bleu www.planbleu.org/themes/eau.html

The World Bank, Water Unit, North Africa and Middle East http://web.worldbank.org


UNESCO; Water sustainable development and conservation of fresh water resources in the world www.unesco.org/water/

UN Water www.unwater.org

WaDmema, Regional Water Demand Initiative for the Middle East and North Africa. www.idrc.ca/wadmema/

Water Monitoring Alliance – Mediterranean Region www.watermonitoringalliance.net/index.php?id=1856

MENBO, Mediterranean Network of Basin Organisations

NBI, Nile Basin Initiative

Plan Bleu

The World Bank, Water Unit, North Africa and Middle East

UNEP-MAP, United Nations Environment Programme – Mediterranean Action Plan

UNESCO; Water sustainable development and conservation of fresh water resources in the world

UN Water

UN Water

WaDmema, Regional Water Demand Initiative for the Middle East and North Africa.

Water Monitoring Alliance – Mediterranean Region
Water issues in the Middle East are often portrayed as an international problem with opposing states competing for resources that are becoming inexorably scarcer. Such a perception prevents us from understanding the multi-scalar interactions that determine the various forms of water management in the region. In a case such as the Israeli-Palestinian one, it prevents us from understanding how these overlapping modes of management are affecting water quality within shared aquifers, which in turn generates problems concerning water quantity. Indeed, the more degraded the quality of water is, the less uses it can satisfy.

The present water situation is characterised by highly centralised water management in Israel, institutionalised since the 1950s, and highly decentralised water management in the Palestinian territories. Attempts at negotiating agreements over water in the region have been framed since the Johnston Plan, concerned with sharing surface water in the 1950s, in purely quantitative terms, as if water were an immobile resource. Thus, the Interim Agreement, concluded in 1994, attributed set quantities from each of the three West Bank aquifers to Israelis and Palestinians. It treated water as if it was a pie to be divided among two peoples. Yet, water flows. And its quality changes as it flows. When a Palestinian farmer practices flood irrigation within his plot of land, much of this water returns to the aquifer. But it often does so laden with fertilisers or insecticides. This water, and the accompanying chemicals, then reappears later in a well that is used for drinking water by either Palestinians or Israelis. Once consumed, this drinking water reappears as waste water, now laden with bacterial contaminants. Disputes and cooperation concerning water thus target a mobile resource the quality of which keeps changing as it flows. Important efforts were made in 2007 to reformulate the water issue in the Israel-Palestine case, to abandon the myth of water as a gold mine that needed to be shared quantitatively. These efforts occurred while Israel was progressing along its policy to supply an increasing amount of water from desalination to its population and while the World Bank launched a call for a feasibility study of the Red-Dead Canal project. A historical overview of water management in the Israel-Palestine case is necessary in order to understand the present bottlenecks in progressing towards a sustainable management of the water shared by the two entities. Each period in recent history has left a legacy concerning water management. Each has contributed to shaping the manner the water crisis is now defined in the region and the accompanying solutions that seem acceptable or not to either party. Examining the origin and the impact of each of these legacies allows us to understand the stakes involved in each of the three topics that, water-wise, marked 2007 in the region: the elaboration of an agreement concerning joint water management within a final peace treaty, the pursuit of supply management policy in Israel through desalination and the beginning of a feasibility study of a canal linking the Red Sea and the Dead Sea.

**A Mandate Legacy of Faith in Technology**

The present day Israeli and Palestinian territories lay within the territory of the Ottoman Empire until the end of the First World War. Until the British Mandate was established over Palestine, water had been managed at the local level, with spring or well users themselves determining the rules governing water use, access and allocation. Water was very rarely sold.
Farmers sharing a spring developed rotations of water turns on a time basis whereby they successively directed water to their respective plots via gravity fed irrigation networks. The Mandate authorities, realizing that water law literally varied from one village to another and facing the absence of any real definition of water rights and land tenure deeds, were reluctant to invest in hydraulic infrastructure. They deployed much effort between 1929 and 1937 to formulate a water law that would apply uniformly over the territory of the mandate and would allow for “efficient” use of water in irrigation according to an engineer’s understanding of that term. Their efforts failed.

British efforts to develop a water law corresponded to an attempt to depoliticize Jewish immigration to the Mandate of Palestine. Churchill’s White Paper of 1922 declared the ‘absorptive capacity’ of Palestine would determine the number of Jewish immigrants allowed to enter the territory. (El Eini, 1996) The Zionist leadership claimed this absorptive capacity could be limitless if the country was modernised. Its water experts developed a discourse of water abundance in the area according to which technology alone was necessary. Water was available, they claimed, all that was needed was a means to extract and channel it. Mekorot was created in 1937 within this context, for the purposes of planning, executing and running waterworks for irrigation and consumption throughout the mandate of Palestine.

Faith in technology still contributes to shaping the definition of water issues in Israel-Palestine to this day. Facing water scarcity, two solutions can be pursued: demand management, whereby attempts are made to reduce the quantity being consumed, or supply management, whereby attempts are made to increase the supply of water. Since the mandate days, a deep faith in technology systematically privileges supply management. This paved the way to the construction of an extensive water infrastructure in the past and is now promoting the present desalination policy in Israel and the development of the canal linking the Red Sea and the Dead Sea.

The Post-Independence Discourse of Water Scarcity

After the emergence of Israel, the Zionist water experts’ discourse changed from one of water abundance to one of scarcity. By 1957, they had progressively reviewed their 1950 estimate of renewable resources, 2800 million cubic meters per year, downward to 1850 million cubic meters per year. (Alatout, 2007) Law 5715-1955 concerning drilling and law 5716-1955 on water metering were proclaimed in 1955. Law 5718-1959 on drainage and flood control was proclaimed in 1957. These three laws were consolidated into the Israeli Water Law in 1959. It withdrew water once and for all from the private and communal spheres, a challenging political decision which was legitimised by the new water scarcity discourse. Within 90 days of the promulgation of the water law in 1959, the control of water switched from a totally fragmented situation where every well and every spring had its own law, to an extremely centralized situation. All water users had to apply for a one year-long production licence from the Water Commissioner, who could stipulate any new condition judged necessary in order to conserve water stocks and to improve the efficiency of water management and use.

This extremely centralised water management in Israel was accompanied by the development of a large infrastructure. The National Water Carrier was completed by 1964 to bring water from Tiberias Lake through the north of Israel to the south of the country as the goal of greening the desert was a fundamental tenet of Zionism. This reduced the flow of the lower Jordan, which runs south, from Tiberias Lake to the Dead Sea. The disappearance of the Dead Sea thus began, and was later accelerated by the construction of the King Abdullah Canal in the 1960s, which fed on water from the Yarmuk, a tributary of the lower Jordan. This canal, initially intended to develop irrigation within the Jordan Basin, was later also used to bring water to Amman. Both uses decreased the amount of water that actually flowed to the lower Jordan to replenish the water the Dead Sea lost every year via evaporation. The disappearance of the Dead Sea was also accelerated by the activities of the Israeli and Jordanian companies that developed evaporation ponds in order to mine the salt and minerals.

Meanwhile, the West Bank became a part of Jordan where the former situation continued regarding water management. Wells are much more easily drilled along the coastal plain than in the rocky soil of the West Bank, and, until 1950, most water use in the West Bank originated from springs and rain collection. Capital and technology became available in the 1950s and 1960s for villagers to drill wells along
the northwestern edge of the West Bank. Farmers pooled their savings and created “well companies” in order to gather the necessary funds. The Jerusalem Water Utility was created in the mid 1960s, with the aim to provide piped domestic water to urban dwellers in Ramallah, Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Its progress was stopped by the 1967 war, when it had only reached the northern part of East Jerusalem.

The post-independence discourse of water scarcity developed in Israel in the 1950s legitimised a highly centralised water management carried out by the state via a large infrastructure. This discourse is still hegemonic today. Although such a centralisation did not occur either in the Gaza Strip or in the West Bank, such a discourse has a deep impact on the Palestinian territories today. The decentralised water management that occurs there is often portrayed as inefficient, as if it was responsible for the scarcity and the water quality problems. Yet, water management can be carried out very efficiently or inefficiently in either a centralised fashion or in a decentralised fashion.

The Legacy of Occupation

On 15th August 1967, only a few weeks after the Six Days War, Military Order No. 92 granted complete authority over all issues concerning water in the Occupied Territories to an Israeli officer named by the Area Commander. This strays from the Israeli Water Law but that difference is coherent with the fact that Israel never annexed the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. It remained militarily occupied territory and Israel never extended its national laws there, as opposed to East Jerusalem and the Golan, which were both annexed. A few months later, Military Order no. 158 of 19th November 1967 submitted the construction of any new water installations to the prior obtainment of a permit and allowed the confiscation of any water resource for which no permit existed. Finally, Military Order No. 291 of 19th December 1968 invalidated all prior and existing arrangements of disputes concerning water.

These military orders granted Israel, in theory, total and complete control of water use and water access in the West Bank. In practice, however, Israel did not extend its power as far as these military orders allowed. It used them to limit severely any new well drilling by the Palestinians and to impose a quota on the existing agricultural wells that generally matched the quantity used within the first year it was metered. However, Israel allowed the persistence of customary institutions in water management. It did not interfere with the manner Palestinians determined how the water that was allocated to them by this Israeli-imposed quota would be used, accessed and allocated.

The interdependence of the Israeli and Palestinian water networks that developed during the occupation was made largely invisible by the concomitant development of a nationalist discourse concerning water.

The occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip allowed Israel to cap overall Palestinian water use to the quantities already used in 1967. In the meantime, Israel increased the quantity of water it used by developing its own infrastructure. By the eve of the Declaration of Principles, in 1993, Israel was thus using about 80% of the renewable resources of the West Bank aquifers. In many cases, Israel had also extended its water network to Palestinian towns and villages, supplying Ramallah with 70% of the domestic water it consumed by the time the Oslo agreements were signed, for example. Thus, while the occupation has led to a quantitative appropriation of water that seriously advantages Israel over, it has also seen the Israeli Water Commissioner slash, in drought years, the water allocations to Israeli farmers while it maintained the allocations to Palestinian municipalities. The interdependence of the Israeli and Palestinian water networks that developed during the occupation was made largely invisible by the concomitant development of a nationalist discourse concerning water, focussing only on the overall quantitative allocation to one party and to the other. This discourse also made invisible the persistence of water management carried out, at the local level, by informal Palestinian institutions.

The Legacy of the Oslo Agreements

The Oslo agreements, a series of three agreements signed in 1993, 1994 and 1995, created the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Water Authority.
as the regulator for water management in the Palestinian territories.
The Cairo Agreement of 4th May 1994 between Israel and the Palestinians declared that water and sewage systems and resources in PA areas “shall be operated, managed and developed (including drilling) by the PA, in a manner that shall prevent any harm to the water resources.” This was to the exclusion of all the hydraulic systems of the settlements and the area of military installations. While it does not define the term “harm”, this agreement also commits the PA “not to harm the existing water quantities.”
The agreement signed in Washington on 28th September 1995 by Israel and the Palestinians proceeded with an allocation of the renewable water resources deemed to exist within each of the three aquifers. It essentially recognised the quantities of water used by each party according to the appropriation that had developed through the years of occupation. Some of the water allocated to the Palestinians was not yet being extracted, however. The figures used now seem to have been optimistic concerning the quantities of water that could still be accessed by the Palestinians via new drilling projects without harming the overall renewable resources. The 20/80 ratio therefore may prove to be yet more unequal in reality.

The Cairo Agreement of 1994 between Israel and the Palestinians declared that water and sewage systems and resources in PA areas shall be operated, managed and developed by the PA

The 1995 treaty recognized Palestinian water rights without defining them. It specified these rights would be settled in the permanent status negotiations. The treaty also set up a permanent Joint Water Committee made up of an equal number of Palestinians and Israelis who reach their decisions by consensus. The Joint Water Committee deals with all water and sewage related issues in the West Bank. Its agreement is necessary for any well drilling, well exploitation permit issuance and water development by the Palestinians.
The Oslo agreement thus created a structure, the Palestinian Water Authority, the powers of which were modelled on those of the Israeli Water Commissioner, while it remained dependent on the Joint Water Committee. Created as a regulator, the Palestinian Water Authority initially had nothing to regulate, and could not do so unless it resorted to one of two possible routes. It could try to wrestle water control out of the multitude of mostly informal Palestinian institutions that already exerted it or it could try to acquire control over new resources thanks to the donor funded drilling of wells for domestic water. To this day, the PWA only regulates water for domestic use.

Present Palestinian Water Management

In 2002, the PA promulgated its water law after seven years of preparation. This law declared the PWA was the water regulator. As is often the case around the world, a great disparity persists between the text of the law and the reality of water management institutions. The law was elaborated with the help of international consultants who promoted principles of state water management advocated by international organizations. It was not constructed through a negotiation with the local institutions that actually manage the bulk of the West Bank water. The implementation of this law never materialized. In the meantime, the Ministry of Local Government kept managing many of the drinking water networks via the municipalities and the local communal or private institutions managed 70% of the water used by the Palestinians, i.e. all of the agricultural water and many drinking water networks. The progression of the ‘Israeli Separation Fence’ to isolate Israel from the Palestinians, starting in 2002, had a major impact on water management for the Palestinians. In the first phase of its construction, it affected negatively a great number of Palestinian wells. Most Palestinian NGOs publishing on this issue focussed on the overall amount of water ‘lost’ by counting the number of wells that ended up lying on the Western side of the fence and adding their yearly quotas. Yet, the most important impact of the fence, water-wise, was the fact it only affected negatively wells that were managed by local, mostly informal, Palestinian institutions, wells that had completely escaped control by the PWA and were mostly used for irrigation. (Trottier, 2007) Its serpentine path allowed it to leave unaffected the wells operated by the Palestinian Authority either through the Ministry of Local Governments or the Palestinian Water Authority, which are only used for domestic consumption.
In the summer of 2006, Israel disengaged unilaterally from the Gaza Strip. The legislative elections in the Palestinian Authority had designated Hamas as the winner earlier that year, but the party was prevented from governing. It took over in the Gaza Strip in early 2007 while another technocratic government ruled from Ramallah, leading, in effect to the simultaneous presence of two Palestinian governments, one for each of the two territorial entities. The Palestinian Water Authority was never established as a ministry, its head being nominated by the Palestinian President. It has thus kept operating in the Gaza Strip throughout 2007. The Hamas government in the Gaza Strip developed relatively good working relations with the local branch of the Palestinian Water Authority.

Managing Shared Basins: The Present Challenge

Negotiations concerning a final status agreement, i.e. a peace treaty between Israel and Palestine have been plagued by these historical legacies: the faith in technology that originated in the mandate days and still promotes supply management, the discourse promoting centralised water management as the only response to scarcity that originated in Israel shortly after its independence, the unequal overall water allocation between Israelis and Palestinians that resulted from over forty years of occupation, and the creation of a Palestinian Water Authority by the Oslo agreements modelled on the Israeli method of centralised management that never had the institutional capacity to gather in its hands the powers which these agreements theoretically conferred to it. As a result, negotiations concerning water have only been conceived as the determination of a quantity of water that would be allocated to each of Israel and Palestine, once and for all. The year 2007 was marked by the growing realisation that this could never constitute a solution.

Rainfall fluctuates widely from year to year in this area. Climate change is making such fluctuations even less predictable and, probably, less abundant. Treating water as a pie to be divided quantitatively as if it were a gold deposit is made difficult by the fact the size of the pie fluctuates in an unpredictable fashion, but is more likely to shrink than to increase in the future. Moreover, water flows, and its quality changes as it flows. The same water drop is liable to be used seven times between the moment it falls as rain and the moment it reaches the sea. Its bacterial and chemical content will change every time it is released into the environment. Moreover, even if a quantitative division of water appeared equitable in the present context, demographic growth, in each of Palestine and Israel, and economic development would inevitably mean that such a division would appear inequitable after a number of years. Such simple considerations were never integrated in the formulation of the problem and its possible solutions because negotiations were framed since the Johnston Plan in the 1950s in terms of quantities of water allocated to the various parties. The discourse equating efficient water management to centralised planning further buttressed the idea that each government needed a number so that its experts could then proceed with the centralised management of that quantity. No consideration was given to the existing institutional capacity that rested with the present decentralised Palestinian management of water.

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Although the Annapolis meeting in November 2007 did not occasion any negotiation on water, much work occurred that year to reformulate the water negotiation in a more realistic manner. This would entail building on the existing, functioning institutions on both sides. Instead of parachuting institutions on Palestinian society modelled on Israeli state structures, a successful agreement could build on those institutions already exerting social control on the management of water in Palestine. A successful agreement would recognise the centrally managed character of Israeli water and the decentralised character of Palestinian water management and would cater to both realities. A window of opportunity is offered by the fact that the main Israeli concern in 2007 was the quality of the aquifers while the main Palestinian concern was accessing greater quantities of water. This occurred in a context where Israel was pursuing the development of its large-scale desalination policy and while the World Bank called for proposals to carry out
a feasibility study of a canal linking the Red Sea and the Dead Sea. Israel’s relying on additional supplies of water that would not fall in the definition of shared water, and would therefore remain its own, allows it to be more mindful of the degradation of the quality of the shared aquifers. An agreement that would allow joint management of the shared water on the basis of continuous monitoring of the aquifers determining the extraction rates, one that would give equal rights to both Israelis and Palestinians and where institutions’ requests for water would be judged on a case by case basis, using criteria determining priority of need and impact on the aquifer, is now a realistic possibility. In the short term, this would allow the Palestinians an increase in the quantity of water they use while it would protect the aquifers and serve as an insurance policy for Israel in case it needs to forego its desalination goals. The debate concerning water in Israel/Palestine was elevated to this level for the first time in 2007.

Desalination

The production of water through desalination corresponds to a supply management approach. It is energy intensive, technology-intensive, capital intensive, and centralized. Seawater desalination plants involve, everywhere in the world at present, some form of public-private partnership. The legacies of past periods formulated the water problem in a fashion that portrayed desalination as the solution in Israel/Palestine.

Israel embarked on a path of large-scale desalination when it completed a Desalination Master Plan in 1997 and approved and budgeted large-scale seawater desalination facilities in 1999. It now expects to have coastal plants providing over 500 million cubic meters of water by 2013. The Ashkelon plant, the first of these five plants, is the largest reverse-osmosis plant in the world, producing 100 million cubic meters per year, or 15% of total Israeli domestic demand. It was voted “Desalination Plant of the Year” in the Global Water Awards of 2006 in Dubai, and the Ashdod plant was awarded the title of “Deal of the Year” for 2007 by Project Finance (Garb 2008). In addition, Mekorot also operates 31 small plants in the south of the country.

While desalination eliminates Israel’s vulnerability to the vagaries of rainfall and climate change, it is making it dependent on water quality in the Mediterranean and vulnerable to energy price variability. Soaring energy prices throughout 2007 and 2008 are now making desalinated water increasingly expensive. Desalination of brackish water is already occurring in the Gaza Strip while, in 2008, Israel offered to extraterritorialize a piece of land next to Ceasaria in order to allow for the construction of a coastal desalination plant to supply Palestinians with water. Given the state of the Palestinian economy, however, whether the cost of desalination is bearable over the long term for them is highly debatable.

Desalination is allowing a window of opportunity to reformulate the terms of the water negotiation between Israel and the Palestinians. As it increases the overall amount of water available for consumption, it makes it possible to consider joint management within a final agreement concerning shared aquifers. However, like any supply management approach, it will unavoidably stimulate demand for domestic water. Unavoidably, a time will come when water supplied by desalination will be deemed too little either because economic reality will prevent the completion of the present plan or because demand will have outstripped supply.

The Red-Dead Canal

In 2007, the World Bank launched a call for proposals for a feasibility study of a canal linking the Red Sea and the Dead Sea. This project has a long history. The Harza JRV Group carried out a pre-feasibility study on a very similar project between 1995 and 1997. It calculated the costs of three components: the conveyance of sea water from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea, the desalination facility by the side of the Dead Sea and the transmission of desalinated water to Amman and Jerusalem. The calculations were based on a flow varying from 40 to 80 cubic meters per second. The study used the water demand projections provided by the Water Authority of Jordan and by the Water Commission of Israel and concluded that the project would be necessary by the year 2010. It was turned down as too expensive a manner of generating domestic water.

The present project of a ‘peace conduit’ for which a feasibility study has now been ordered by the World Bank only caters to the first component of the 1995 project, i.e. the canal linking the Red Sea and the Dead Sea. This first component represented more than one third of the overall project’s estimated costs. It was isolated from the other two in the hope that an
‘environmental’ project would be funded by a grant from the international community rather than through a loan, which would reduce the overall costs of the project significantly. The present project is thus promoted to save the Dead Sea from disappearing. It has met opposition from environmentalists, however, who point out that the Dead Sea received a supply of fresh water, not marine water, throughout its history. Filling it with Red Sea water, they argue, could hardly restore it to its earlier condition.

The beneficiaries of the Read-Dead project are the three governments of Israel, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan. They each face different stakes concerning water within their territory and the realisation or not of this infrastructure project will affect them in very different fashions. If realised, this project will completely transform the ecology and the water management situation of the region.

Conclusion

As Israelis and Palestinians, water-wise, were walking on a tightrope in 2007, facing the degradation of their overused, shared aquifers in a context of drought that may very well become recurrent because of climate change, propositions finally emerged for a sustainable joint management that would steer them towards demand management and away from the course of supply management bequeathed by past developments. Ironically, large infrastructure projects firmly rooted in a supply management approach, such as desalination and the Red-Dead Canal, allowed this window of opportunity. Indeed, an increase in a water supply it will not share with Palestinians made Israel’s concerns concerning the quality of the shared aquifers more audible. Only a sustainable agreement with the Palestinians, one that will capitalise on functioning institutions’ capacities while integrating their needs, will allow a management of the shared aquifers that will prevent their continued degradation.

References


A glance at the map (see map A7 in the annexes) of the world’s fresh water availabilities makes clear a common characteristic of the countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean: all of them, from Morocco to Palestine, are among the countries with under 1,000 m³ per inhabitant per year of available water, the lowest levels in the world and well below the threshold of 1,700 m³ of renewable water laid down by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) as the minimum necessary to cover the basic needs of the population. Half the world’s population suffering this type of “water poverty” lives in the Mediterranean. In this situation of “water stress”, access to drinking water has already become one of the main factors of social instability – in some cases, like Algeria, the first water riots have already occurred (for example in November 2007 in the municipality of Reghaïa, on the outskirts of Algiers) – and a recurrent source of conflicts in the region.¹

The figures are eloquent: 30 million inhabitants of the Mediterranean partner countries have no access to a source of safe drinking water, and 35 million have no access to sanitation, and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) is already forecasting that the Arab countries will not reach the Millennium Development Goal consisting in “by 2015, reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water”. Besides this, the distribution of water resources between the north and the south of the Mediterranean is as unequal as that of income: the north accounts for 75% of the total renewable water resources in the Mediterranean Basin, the east for 13% and the south of the Mediterranean only for 10%, whereas more than 80% of land in North Africa is desert. The demand for water in the countries on the south and east of the Mediterranean, which has already grown by 60% in the past 25 years, is set to continue growing, and the scarcity of water in the south can only get worse in the coming decades, especially as a result of demographic growth (an increase is expected from the present 270 million inhabitants to 370 by 2030) and growing urbanisation, but also of the increase in agricultural production (FAO calculates that irrigated lands will grow by 38% in the south and 56% in the east of the Mediterranean by 2030), together with climate change and the desertification of part of their lands: according to estimates by Population Action International the per capita water availabilities will remain at stable levels between 1995 and 2005 to the north of the Mediterranean, and will be reduced by 40% to the south and east of it.

Thus the question of water needs to stop being treated, as hitherto, as a merely environmental problem: it is an essential factor in economic development (especially in relation to agriculture, which consumes between 70 and 85% of available fresh water, but also in relation to tourism and industry), and it is also a social question of major importance (it should not be forgotten that access to drinking water is, above all, a human right), central to the poverty-fighting strategies in the region, besides being an ever more pressing geopolitical problem. But all this should not make us forget that the question of water is, above all, a question of efficiency in the management of available resources: between 40 and 50% of available water is lost in leakages from the distribution systems (see the

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article by Mohammed Blinda), and that the management of demand will be the key to the sector’s future. Political co-operation in the water sector in the Mediterranean is of long standing, for it is one of the axes of action both of the Plan Bleu (Mediterranean Action Plan) launched in 1976 and focused on forward-looking analysis, overall studies and a system of indicators for the Mediterranean Strategy for Sustainable Development, and also of the Mediterranean Commission for Sustainable Development (MCSD) set up under the Barcelona Convention. In the Algiers Declaration adopted at the first Mediterranean Water Conference held in May 1990, the importance was affirmed of a common strategy of water management, and the process culminated with the adoption of the Mediterranean Water Charter in Rome in 1992, in which twelve Mediterranean countries committed themselves to applying common measures of water planning and management and regional co-operation, together with the creation of the Mediterranean Water Network, although the operative dimension and the resources mobilised have been rather scarce during these 30 years.

It has to be recognised that until now water has not been a priority area for action in the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, even though the Work Program annexed to the Barcelona Declaration mentioned water as one of the areas of economic co-operation, with the modest objectives of “to take stock of the situation (...) to identify ways of reinforcing regional co-operation, to make proposals for rationalising the planning and management of water resources, where appropriate on a joint basis, to contribute towards the creation of new sources of water.” But the fact is that for a long time the question of water has been treated more as a technical and environmental question than as an economic, social and political priority. Despite this, political leaders have always been aware, and increasingly so, of the importance of water in the Euro-Mediterranean context and the need to tackle it at the regional level, albeit with ups and downs, as is shown by the conclusions of the successive Euro-Mediterranean Conferences of Foreign Ministers, especially in Stuttgart in 1999 and in Lisbon in 2007. In November 1996 one of the first Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conferences held in Marseilles focused on the subject of water, and in October 1999 there was another in Turin on the local management of water in which a “Action Plan” was adopted with six priorities, which gave rise to two small regional projects, although since then the water ministers have not had another meeting in a Euro-Mediterranean context. One of these regional projects is the Euro-Mediterranean Information System on know-how in the Water sector (EMWIS). EMWIS commands a budget of 3.3 million euros (2 millions under the MEDA Program and the rest contributed by Italy, France and Spain) for 2004-2008, and besides the compilation and dissemination of information it aims at promoting cooperation programs between the national Directorates with competence in the area of water. The MEDA Water Programme (Euro-Mediterranean Regional Programme for Local Water Management www.medawater-rmsu.org) for its part has a budget of 40 million euros for the period 2003-2008, and has focused on nine pilot projects with priority status, besides the financing of water-related activities of public authorities and NGOs. Nevertheless, in practice these projects have not yet emerged from the study phase, and it does not look as if they are going to result in the articulation of a real regional project. The managers of these programs themselves admit that the results fall below what the expectations, their importance and the needs called for, and that they have not succeeded in addressing the water question in an integrated way, although this was one of the axes of the Turin Action Plan. Precedence has been given to a strictly local approach which has given rise to a proliferation of initiatives with no synergies between them.

Integrated Management

In the discussion running up to the adoption of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean partnership, in the course of 2007 and 2008, the question of water emerged again as a political priority in the region. In the Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean held on 13th July 2008 the importance of water was acknowledged, and it seems that at last a qualitative leap has been made in the way of approaching this subject, since a mandate is issued to the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on water planned for October 2008 in Amman (it will be the third, nine years after that of Turin) to define a “Mediterranean water strategy” promoting conservation of water resources, diversifying water provision resources and efficient and sustainable use of water.

According to the experts who took part in the workshop on water held as part of the Encuentros del Mediterráneo
international cooperation and development aid in the Mediterranean area water sector

Presented at the Regional Workshop on Water and Sustainable Development in the Mediterranean, the Georges Corm study is a detailed analysis of Official Development Assistance (ODA) given to Mediterranean countries by the various financing organs. This detailed quantitative analysis is based on OECD data in respect of aid provided by the countries of the Development Assistance Committee, the European Community, and the United Nations financing organs and agencies for the 1973-2004 period, thus allowing us to analyse major sector aid trends.

Water is not a new issue for international co-operation, the first major conference on water having been held in 1977: it was the United Nations Water Conference at Mar del Plata in Argentina, which established as fundamental the “need for access by all human beings to good quality drinking water in sufficient quantity.” This principle remains the basis for international conventions and conferences, which over 30 years have sought to define cooperation priorities, and is found once more in the Millennium Development Goals enunciated in 2000.

The Mediterranean region is at the heart of the problem and the substantial hydro-resource deficit experienced by the countries of the Basin makes it the region where the percentage of public aid reserved for water is highest.

Water is similarly defined as a priority in the arena of regional cooperation; it has constituted one of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s six priorities for economic and financial cooperation since the signing of the Barcelona Treaty in 1995. Since then, a large number of environmental programmes have been implemented around the Basin, within the Barcelona Process framework, but also at the initiative of Arab regional financing bodies, such as the Arab Development Fund, or the African Bank.

Yet, the state of water resources and their inefficient use remain extremely worrying in the region. Such a finding begs the question as to whether financing made available through international cooperation is suited to these countries’ needs, and whether they effectively follow the recommendations expressed in the many world summits and action plans. An analysis of global ODA data published by the OECD does indeed reveal shortcomings in the policy for cooperation in the water sector in the Mediterranean Basin.

Above all, it is particularly concerning to observe that, despite the increasing attention from the international community, there is generally a downward trend in financing commitments. The 1980s, followed by the decade of the 90s constitute the two periods of abundance in terms of the levels of ODA given over to water, which reached as much as 1.539 billion dollars at constant prices in 1996, a level since unequalled and in continual decline. Nevertheless, sums committed have once more gone up since 2002, although not regaining the annual average for the sector over the 1973-2004 period. The share of the water sector itself in ODA totals granted to Mediterranean countries has shrunk over recent years, ending up lower in the 2000-2004 period (6.9%) than it had been for the whole 1973-2004 period (8.8%), a fall which is clear evidence of the diminishing importance given to the water sector, despite all recommendations.

It is harder to arrive at an analysis of sums actually distributed, since the OECD disbursement database only begins in 1990. Nevertheless an increase in disbursements can be observed since 2000, but it is worry-
organised by IEMed in Barcelona on 12th and 13th June 2008, a Euro-Mediterranean water strategy should tackle the problem of water in an integrated way, from the capture stage and availability of water resources (including its creation by desalination) to de-pollution and coastal protection, passing through distribution, rationalisation of use, especially in the agricultural sector, and sanitation. This has not always been the case hitherto, despite the fact that integrated management already figured as one of the five priorities of the Short and Medium-term Priority Environmental Action Programme (SMAP) adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Helsinki in November 1997. It also entails fixing the governance problems posed by water (multiplicity of operators and dispersion of competences among an excessive number of organisms, including the fact that the ministry responsible for water is frequently lacking any power for everything related to agriculture). In fact, one of the challenges that will doubtless arise from the implementation of this strategy will be that of involving the local authorities and companies that manage water distribution and sanitation, and in many cases water collection too.

The integrated management of the water issues links the management of fresh water to the de-pollution of the Mediterranean, although it is obvious that the northern countries tend to give priority to an environmental approach, while the southern countries attach greater importance, socially and politically, to the question of access to drinking water. In this respect, it is important to supplement the execution of the Horizon 2020 project for the de-pollution of the Mediterranean adopted as one of the initial projects of the Union for the Mediterranean in the Paris Summit with a series of initiatives that will tackle the question of access to water; in this respect the Mediterranean water strategy could be a suitable instrument for doing this if it does not remain at a purely declaratory level.

In conclusion, the three basic elements of a Euro-Mediterranean water strategy should be, according to the experts: 1) institutional rationalisation; 2) a coherent policy of investments in infrastructures for desalination, distribution and sanitation, as well as irrigation (with the corresponding resources, which for the most part have to be public ones); 3) an integrated water management policy comprising a process of shared planning and information. To be effective, this Mediterranean water strategy needs to lay down specific common objectives (wherever possible, quantified) and concrete timetables, with common orientations on how to achieve them, a system of indicators to assess progress and the policies and instruments applied, and a sufficient pool of resources to support their implementation. The European Water Framework Directive, which lays down a common system of planning and information in a context of absence of community competences in the matter (water continues to be a matter of national competence), could serve as a model. At any rate the experts agree that, in the Euro-Mediterranean context, the key is in financial resources: “the issue of financing the investments for the supply of drinking water and sanitation (on the south and east sides of the Mediterranean), and that of recourse to economic instruments – subsidies, tarification etc. – to optimise the allocation of available resources are central for the future.”

If the ministers responsible for water measure up to the mandate they have received, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership could take its place at the centre of policies to tackle one of the economic, social and environmental challenges that most affect the everyday life of Mediterranean citizens. Nothing better to give impulsion to its visibility and its ownership by the general public, and an excellent test-tube to combine the project approach adopted as part of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean with the political strategy derived from the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the involvement of non-governmental actors such as civil society (whose participation is essential for the local management of water), local authorities and business.

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Panorama: The Mediterranean Year
When a new European policy is born it is not easy to understand immediately the real motivations. Official documents exist of course, but often they do not tell the whole truth. Moreover, these are the point of convergence between political aspirations which may be different, but which in any case will have to undergo the steamroller of the European Commission’s bureaucracy.

Thus, in the months that follow the launch, the cruder motivations, which cannot be made explicit until the end, are covered over with arguments inspired by noble sentiments. Besides this, other voices raised asserting that, while it is true that the proposal presents limitations and risks, if the right modifications are made it may in the end generate a policy of great scope, of great strategic vision... but this dance of interpretations does not last long. There are two litmus tests that reveal the true nature of the policy in question: its actual implementation and the perception that the parties to whom it is directed have of it. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is no exception to that rule. The first move for a European policy of this kind came from the British government in 2002. The main concern expressed without evasions regarded the fact that the enlargement to the East would put the European Union in direct contact with three ex-Soviet republics, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, whose precarious economic situation and unimpressive democratic record would certainly pose serious risks for the Union – especially in the matter of clandestine immigration and illegal cross-border traffic. The suggestion was therefore made to pay incentives to those countries in exchange for advances in terms of political and economic reforms, granting the countries a special neighbourhood status based on commitment to democratic principles and the free market. The idea was not a new one: in 1999 the European Commission’s planning cell had outlined some possible post-enlargement scenarios up to 2010, in which it proposed the so-called “cordon sanitaire” to guard against turbulent neighbours which the EU would have on its doorstep (Gilles, 1999). Specifically, among the different scenarios, the British government proposed the externalisation of governance with the geopolitical corollary of the construction of a “grey area” between the EU and Russia.

After this proposal, characterised by motives exquisitely and explicitly utilitarian, i.e. determined by primarily European interests, there began a process of proposals, discussions, formal decisions and subsequent adjustments, which went on for a couple of years and in which the different actors sought to modify the nascent neighbourhood policy in accordance with their own interests and visions. There were those who thought to take the opportunity to promote a wider geopolitical vision. That was the case of the Swedish government, which three months after the British proposal relaunched it but widening its area of intervention to Russia, the South of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. It was, however, mainly the European Parliament that, commenting on the first communication from the Commission, supported the idea of undertaking a neighbourhood policy but proposing a very different version from the one proposed by the Commission, completely re-centring the strategic axis (EP Resolution, 2003). The Euro-
European Parliament in effect relaunched an old geopolitical suggestion, present in the debate that had preceded the birth of the Barcelona Process: the construction of a strategic area embracing the whole of Europe (including Russia and the republics of the Caucasus), the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The Resolution refers to “a great pan-European and Mediterranean region” where real common policies, regional and sub-regional as well as bilateral, would have the objective of building a space of free circulation of persons, goods, services and capital. In line with this ambitious geopolitical vision there were proposals for unpublished geographical enlargements (the Draft Report of 2003 also evokes Iraq, Iran and the Gulf states) and the inclusion of the Balkans and Turkey in spite of their status as candidate countries (actual or potential).

The Resolution refers to “a great pan-European and Mediterranean region” where real common policies would have the objective of building a space of free circulation of persons, goods, services and capital.

Of all these proposals, the Council only accepted the extension to the republics of the Caucasus in the two Decisions (GAERC 2003 and 2004) which formalised the birth of the ENP. In fact the opposite tendency prevailed: the one concerned essentially with settling definitively or at least for a long (or very long) period of time the limits of the EU. The ENP was to serve to distinguish and separate “neighbours” from candidates (actual or potential). For that reason the Western Balkans and Turkey were excluded from the “neighbourhood” area. These very same countries, on understanding the situation, took care to keep their distance from the ENP.

To all this should be added the hand of the Commission, which, by assigning the ENP to the services in charge of enlargement, transferred all its methodological and operative instruments to this new policy. Just think about the use of TAIEX and Twinnings,

which were conceived as tools to support the adoption of the acquis communitaire by the candidate countries.

This plurality of diverse motivations and centrifugal forces, which characterised the birth of the ENP and also its subsequent development, is the origin of the ambiguities and contradictions that are targets of many reproaches.

The main ambiguity is due to the fact that, while the action of the ENP is directed towards integration with the Union and convergence with the European model, accession does not figure as a final goal. The Commission defines it as membership-neutral, in the sense that it neither offers nor excludes the prospect of accession to the EU. This epistemological effort does not seem sufficient for our associates to live their participation in the ENP with enthusiasm. The interchange proposed (EC 2003) – participation in the interior market and in some policies of the Union, in exchange for reforms oriented towards the “shared values” (democracy and human rights, the rule of law, the market economy) – is experienced in a problematic manner both by the Eastern and the Mediterranean partners. The former, who aspire to joining the EU and consider themselves “Europeans” and not “neighbours”, do not accept with good grace making the same journey as the candidate countries without having the ultimate goal of accession to the EU. To them it is a climb towards the unknown. The latter – who know perfectly well that for them the question of accession does not arise whether within or outside the ENP – consider that prospect unfruitful because of the insufficient material aid and absence or even regression of the political aid. Most of the Mediterranean associates regard the status of “neighbour,” or even worse “good neighbour,” as a demotion compared with that of “member,” and the ENP as a step backward in comparison with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP). So much so that one of them, Algeria, has so far refused the invitation to take part. Besides this, reforms carry a high price especially at the political level, and without an adequate reward the process is not worth while.

One of the main contradictions of the ENP is precisely this lack of economic and political rewards of sufficient importance to be a stimulus for making reforms, as the prospect of accession had been for the candidate.

countries. With the ENP, the EU is abandoning the traditional principle of conditionality. There are two reasons for this: in the first place the Mediterranean members, considering the high level demanded by the reforms, have made clear that they would not accept it, considering it an unacceptable infringement of their national sovereignty. In the second place, the EU had already assessed the full impotence of the conditionality established in the Association Agreement (according to Art. 2 of the EMP Association Agreement), and even before in those of Cooperation, owing to the impossibility of implementing effective economic and political sanctions without damaging the system of political alliances constituting the type of stability sought in the Mediterranean area. For that reason the way of joint ownership (EC 2004) has been chosen, characterised by some tools of positive conditionality: the financing of activities directed to reform and, for the most “deserving” associates, the possibility of further finance and more advanced contractual statutes.

In all the Action Plans that each country has signed with the EU there are particular commitments – and in some cases more generic ones – which the interested countries have assumed “freely” and which concern democracy and human rights. It must be emphasised that the Action Plans are political documents, not legal ones like the Association Agreement and the verification of the effectiveness of the assumed commitments by means of the monitoring tools remains an open question for the majority of the member states (Balfour, 2007). By this manoeuvre all the parties have managed to come out well. The Union can boast of having obtained important commitments in the area of economic and political reforms. Partner countries, in the name of attachment to the EU, can show their readiness to answer the call to take part in a policy for which they are not enthusiastic, without, for the moment, paying excessive political costs. This especially concerns those who have more problems in facing up to democracy and human rights. And it is not a question of put intentions on trial. The divergence between the good intentions of the Action Plans and the effectiveness of the commitments can be discerned by an examination of the allocations of funds in the National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) for interventions of positive conditionality.

Another point is that the ENP, once again offering the Eastern neighbours the functionalist approach that characterised European integration and the policy of enlargement, is repeating and magnifying the same mistakes. In fact the objective of convergence between the Union and its Neighbours is pursued through integration in the EU’s internal market: this means adaptation to the standards of the Union and a substantial asymmetry in the power relations between the EU and its neighbours. It means proposing/imposing policies of co-operation and integration which are dictated more by the interests of the Union, for example in security, than of the partners, as would be the case with the free circulation of persons. The Mediterranean partner countries had already blamed the Eurocentric approach in terms of nature and functioning mechanisms of the EMP, but it becomes in-

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6 According to the Algerian Minister, “the Mediterranean countries found it humiliating that the European demand reforms from us in exchange for a few euros”, Euractiv 30th November 2005.
tolerable in the case of the Eastern countries in the absence of accession to a common entity, such as that of the Partnership, and to what in this case is identified as the “European club.” All this makes the principle of joint ownership remain pure window-dressing. The Eurocentric approach is reflected in the exaltation of bilateralism and of the principle of “differentiation” (EC, 2004). With respect to the overall Mediterranean policy and the EMP, a big step backwards is being taken. There is a return to the policy of the artichoke (eaten leaf by leaf) which typified the first enlargement and which had given up speaking of pre-accession with the Visegrád group (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia).

The lack of a strategic vision and the inability to face up to the regional dimension in a global context has gradually brought the Union to abandoning the multilateral approach in favour of the bilateral. The very insertion of the notion of “special relationship” in Art. 7 of the EU Treaty is in a way a sign of the same retreat. The same tendency is reflected in the ENP. The proof of it is in the present negotiations with Ukraine (EC 2007a) for a new “strengthened agreement” (Ukraine, like Russia, opposed the idea of a Neighbourhood Treaty) (Delcours), with Morocco for an “advanced statute” (EC, 2007a p.10 and EC, 2008 p.10), while a working group is examining the possibility of a special statute for Israel (EC, 2008).

The risks of this exasperated differentiation are, on the one side, nullifying the level of cohesion that has been laboriously achieved, though it may be a modest one, between the Mediterranean associates after twelve years of the EMP; and on the other side the risk of turning the ENP into a kaleidoscope consisting of the sum of multiple and differentiated Treaties. This atomisation of the ENP shows the whole fallacy of the model of concentric circles which underlies its conception (Amato, 1995). The idea of a “circle of friends” (EC, 2004), coming together because they are contiguous with the EU, never liked to neither of the two groups of partner countries. To the Eastern ones, because of their status of Europeans they feel themselves demoted by fellowship with the Mediterranean partners, who for their part see that re-grouping as the nth expedient for putting their needs and expectations on a secondary level. The truth is that only a pan-European and at the same time pan-Mediterranean geopolitical and geostrategic vision, such as was put forward by the European Parliament in its first Resolution on the ENP, could have kept the two areas together in a coherent way.

Faced with this situation of objective crisis in the general dimension of the ENP, some have advanced the idea of “decentred integration” (Bechev and Nicolaidis, 2007); together with other possible scenarios. The Commission itself had been heading in that direction in the face of the repeated requests of the European Parliament not to lose the regional approach. In this regard the Commission had always stated that, on the one hand, the EMP represented the Southern dimension of the ENP (Wallström, 2005), and on the other hand it has recently taken up the “Black Sea Synergy” (EC, 2007b), which includes, besides the south-east member states, Russia and all the Eastern countries which took part in the ENP: Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. While the situation was tending towards “decentred integration,” the French proposal of a Union for the Mediterranean has broken in (EC, 2008). Although it will be limited to the execution of a few large projects of economic and territorial integration in the Mediterranean area, the governance proposals of this Union characterised by principles of joint decision and parity with common institutions and instruments cannot fail to have an influence on the present-day methods and tools of the ENP and the EMP. It will not be able to be a “happy isle” of parity management relegated to the Mediterranean meso-region, set within a Partnership context that remains Eurocentric. Perhaps the Eastern countries will be content with belonging to a wholly European society, with greater certainty to result in accession. Or perhaps they will seek to change the rules of the game as well.
It is necessary to bear in mind that this “decentred integration” and the decentralisation introduced by the Union for the Mediterranean will only be able to address some of the problems: those related to sustainable joint development; but they will not solve the problems related to geopolitical and geostrategic options nor those brought by globalisation. For the last, the dimensions of the EMP and the Black Sea Synergy, i.e. of a possible “Oriental Union” of Europe (proposed by Sweden and Poland as a counterbalance to the Union for the Mediterranean) (GAERC, 2008), are not enough.

It is necessary to take up again and make effective the European Parliament’s idea of constructing a great “world region,” which nevertheless requires new actors: in the first place Russia and the Arab countries. The first steps in that direction might be: the extension of the EMP to the Gulf States and the transformation of the ENP into an Alliance of essentially political and strategic character. A pan-Euro-Mediterranean alliance: pan-European because it should include all the European countries, Russia included, and pan-Mediterranean in the sense of Great Mediterranean (Amato, 2008).
At all events, even if these are not the scenarios that will finally be established, the ENP no longer has a raison d’être.

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The Mediterranean has reappeared on the European agenda with the background of the debates produced by the initiative of President Sarkozy of a Union for the Mediterranean. There have been three fundamental debates around which the discussions of recent months have developed: the debate over the institutional architecture of cooperation in the Mediterranean; the debate over the external relations of the European Union (EU); and the debate over the very substance of the economic, social and political challenges in the Mediterranean region and the relations between its two shores.

The debate over the institutional architecture has become inevitable with the tabling of a third initiative, that of the Union for the Mediterranean, which joins the already existing ones of the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The latter was born as a European response to the need for an alternative policy to enlargement in order to establish a framework of relations with neighbouring countries not destined to be members of the EU (at least in the middle term). Although initially it was only intended for the East, Spain supported its application to the south of the Mediterranean, with a view to strengthening the bilateral dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, allowing the countries that wished it to deepen and extend their relations with the EU. Some member states however thought that the ENP was designed to replace de facto the Barcelona Process, condemning it to irrelevance. The weak point of that view was in the heterogeneity of the different regions to which the Neighbourhood Policy is directed: Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and the Mediterranean. One thing, in fact, was the bilateral relations of each country with the EU, which thanks to the Neighbourhood Policy could be promoted and developed with new instruments of finance and cooperation. Yet it was very difficult to create a single multilateral coverage for these three regions, so different in many ways, and therefore with such diverse agendas in their approach to association with the European Union. In particular, it was becoming clear that the Mediterranean had a cultural, economic and political identity of its own which needed to maintain its specificity as an area of cooperation with the EU.

The problem of the Union for the Mediterranean, as initially envisaged, is that it preserved this specificity for the Mediterranean but with a reductionist vision, limited exclusively to the countries which geographically have a coastline on that sea. This implied the exclusion of member states of the European Union which though lacking such a coastline considered that they had relevant interests in this region, whether related to immigration, to energy or to security against a terrorism that strikes indiscriminately at both sides of the Mediterranean. The Spanish government, which had received very favourably the initiative of President Sarkozy because of its capacity to focus European attention on this region, could not support the exclusion of any European country wishing to bring its own contribution to cooperation in this area. For their part, the countries on the south side of the Mediterranean preferred in general to maintain relations with the European Union as a whole than to replace it with another union, limited to the countries with a coastline on the Mediterranean.

After the agreement in principle of President Sarkozy with Chancellor Merkel on 3rd March 2008, these dilemmas were finally resolved in the European Council of 13th and 14th March this year. At the dinner on 13th March the Heads of Government put forward the Union for the Mediterranean as a new stage in the development of the Barcelona Process.
The second great debate opened by President Sarkozy’s initiative concerns the external relations of the European Union. In reality, the differences between France and Germany about the Union for the Mediterranean concerned more a question of principle than the Mediterranean policy itself. For the French government it was admissible that a group of specially interested countries should advance more rapidly than the rest of the EU and carry out more ambitious actions that those which the twenty-seven were already undertaking. On the other side, the German government pointed to the risk of fragmentation of the EU’s external relations if policy towards the surrounding countries ended up being made by a closed group of countries, thus breaking the criterion of solidarity that has ruled hitherto. Yet the mechanism of reinforced cooperation, which constitutes one of the novelties of the Lisbon Treaty, has never been seriously invoked as a possible way to permit a group of countries to increase its cooperation with a particular region - in this case the Mediterranean. In effect, this mechanism lays down that in principle the financing of new activities will be undertaken by participating countries. Against that, access to the funds of the European budget seemed to be a fundamental premise for any new initiative, since it was not realistic to think that the European coastal countries could contribute larger means than those that the EU as a whole already contributes. The solution finally adopted by the European Council represents a return to the classic approach of the EU’s external relations, although the idea of projects of variable geometry permits a greater involvement to countries that desire it.

The pact founding the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was based on the premise that the European Union would accompany the process of economic, social and perhaps political reforms in the south of the Mediterranean.

The third of the great debates refers to the very substance of the cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean. Let us remember that the pact founding the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was based on the premise that the European Union would accompany the process of economic, social and perhaps political reforms in the south of the Mediterranean, favouring access to the European market and providing financial help and technical support. The reality is that the southern countries have made significant advances in modernising their economic structures, promoting an opening to the outside world and reforming their fiscal systems by introducing a value added tax which replaces the old regime of revenue based on tariff collection. Nevertheless these measures, combined with those taken to ensure macro-economic stability, have not achieved the result hoped for of promoting a substantial increase in European investment towards the region, which remains stagnant at figures around 5% of the total investment in the world of the EU member states. Now, the paradox is that this economic modernisation largely promoted by Euro-Mediterranean agreements and the progressive entry of those countries into the world economy have increased their attractiveness for investment from other quarters, for examples the Gulf countries, the United States, China and even India. From Europe this development is seen with ambivalence, for the interest of other major international players in the region will tend to its economic strengthening, which in its turn is positive for Europe. On the other hand the impression is left that these other players perhaps have greater faith in the region than its own European neighbours.

These considerations may not have been absent from the reflections that led the French President to launch his initiative of a Union for the Mediterranean. In reality the approach now proposed does not contradict in fundamentals the one adopted by the Barcelona Process; rather it seeks to add to it a supplementary engine in the form of large projects for regional vertebraion. What is true is that in the Euro-Mediterranean framework around 80/90% of financing is devoted to bilateral programmes between the European Union and each of the countries singly, and this distribution reflected the wishes of our Mediterranean partners. The ENP reinforced even further this bilateral dimension and left open the possibility that the Partnership would pay greater attention to projects of regional structuring that would contribute to a greater connection and interdependence among the countries of the South and between these ones and the EU. And that deficiency is precisely what the new initiative seeks to address. Nobody is unaware of the existence of grave political obstacles that will in some cases put a brake on the realisation of these region-
It will be necessary to seek combinations of countries with a greater readiness to advance and also areas in which cooperation may be more viable, such as the decontamination of the Mediterranean Sea, transport, energy and the knowledge society, among other sectors.

Born in Annapolis opens a window of opportunity for confirming by results the viability of the option of negotiations. But whatever happens in this question, which is of such central importance, many countries of the region cannot afford to wait for a peace
agreement to be reached to give serious attention to the prime challenge they face in the next twenty years: the creation of employment and in short the generation of a climate of hope for the millions of young people who will arrive in the labour market in those years. This will be the key question for our associates in the South, and consequently for the Partnership as a whole.

The lack of a solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will continue to act as a fundamental brake to entry into a new stage of regional cooperation

Does this mean that our agenda needs to be basically an economic one, giving an absolute priority to growth above political change towards greater democratisation? This debate is far from being closed either in Europe or among our Southern neighbours. For some it is imperative to concentrate now on the challenges of economic growth and the creation of employment, leaving for a later stage the design of political changes which at present would create an unwanted distraction. Other analysts however maintain that only a search for political reforms and the overhauling of the elites currently in power can achieve the creation of a favourable setting for economic take-off. The truth is that the outside pressure in favour of the latter path has lessened considerably in recent years, following the silent U-turn in US foreign policy, whose strategy of rapid promotion of democracy in the region has yielded to a more long-term vision of the political changes that are judged desirable. In Europe too this seems to be the most visible tendency, as is shown by the significant absence of democracy and human rights from the initial proposals of the Union for the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the fact that the Union for the Mediterranean now becomes one more stage in the development of the Barcelona Process implies that its values continue to be relevant for the future and that the principles of the Barcelona Declaration, including development of democracy and respect for human rights, continue to be a fundamental point of reference in the Partnership, even if each country needs to find its own way to achieve the objectives set out. In conclusion, our agenda for the coming years will be a predominantly economic one, but always seeking to incorporate this dimension in an overall vision which includes those of a political, cultural social and security nature which together make up the full meaning of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
2007 has been a year of crucial changes for Kosovo, particularly in relation to the ongoing debate over its future status as a sovereign territory. This debate was marked by various diplomatic attempts to bring the two parties – Serbia and Kosovo – to a common position, namely through the Ahtisaari plan and the Troika process. The failure of these initiatives confirmed that whatever the outcome of the status talks, the future of Kosovo continued to depend on international assistance, with the onus increasingly falling on the EU as it identifies the Western Balkans as belonging to its realm of responsibility. As a result, the year 2007 also constitutes a key year in the EU’s preparations for yet another new step in its growing role in the region, best exemplified by the preparations to launch the largest civilian European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) mission to date: the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo). This article will analyse the main events that took place in 2007. In particular, these events confirmed that Kosovo will be a notable challenge for a European Union eager to show that its security and defence mechanisms are ready to tackle difficult conflict scenarios.

The Diplomatic Game

The year 2007 witnessed another set of efforts by the international community to bring closer the two opposing views on the future of this territory, with very limited success.

The Ahtisaari Plan

In November 2005 Martti Ahtisaari, former Finnish President, was appointed UN Special Envoy for the future status process for Kosovo. After over a year of direct talks, bilateral negotiations, expert consultations involving the leadership of both Serbia and Kosovo, and the delay caused by parliamentary elections in Serbia, his conclusions were rather bleak. In his March 2007 “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement” (commonly known as the Ahtisaari plan or Settlement proposal), he admitted that the situation is hostage to,

“categorical, diametrically opposed positions: Belgrade demands Kosovo’s autonomy within Serbia, while Pristina will accept nothing short of independence […] it is my view that the negotiations’ potential to produce any mutually agreeable outcome on Kosovo’s status is exhausted. No amount of additional talks, whatever the format, will overcome this impasse.” (UN 2007b: 2).

The status situation at the time – as outlined in Resolution 1244 – was nevertheless deemed untenable by the Settlement proposal. The status quo was negatively impacting on Kosovo’s democratic development, accountability, economic recovery and inter-ethnic reconciliation. The only way out from this impasse was – according to Ahtisaari – to support the conditional independence of Kosovo with international supervision until the territory enjoyed the local capacity to ensure a “viable, sustainable and stable Kosovo in which all communities and their members can live in a peaceful and dignified existence” (UN 2007b: 2).

1 Resolution 1244 respected the territorial integrity of Serbia but introduced the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to prepare Kosovo for self-government, pending a political settlement on its future status. This new situation meant that Serbia did not exercise any legislative, executive and judicial authority over the territory of Kosovo. All these powers rested with the transitional administration that UNMIK represented (UN 1999).
The temporary international supervision recommended by the Ahtisaari plan was to be exercised by an International Civilian Representative, double-hatted as European Union Special Representative, acting as the ultimate supervisory authority over the implementation of the Settlement proposal. The mandate of this figure would be complemented by an ESDP mission in the rule of law area; a NATO-led military force to provide a safe and secure environment throughout Kosovo, just as the Kosovo Force (KFOR) had been doing since 1999; and finally, an OSCE mission to assist in the monitoring process of the Plan’s implementation. The temporary international presence should be intensively engaged in institutional capacity-building in addition to enjoying strong but focused powers in critical areas such as community rights, decentralisation, the protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church and the rule of law. These powers, which extended as far as the capacity to annul decisions/laws and remove public officials, should be exercised when the Kosovo authorities “contravene the provisions of the Settlement proposals and the spirit in which they were crafted” (UN 2007b: 4). In other words, these powers should be “corrective” rather than prescriptive.

The Ahtisaari plan was killed by fruitless negotiations with Belgrade, which rejected it, while the Kosovo Albanians fully endorsed it. It was also hostage to irreconcilable differences between the USA and all the members of the EU (some of which had to be coaxed) on the one side and Russia on the other, which explains the UN Security Council’s failure to draft a resolution to implement the Settlement proposal. Russia, an ally of Serbia, was worried of the precedent Kosovo could set for other secessionist regions, such as South Ossetia, Abkhazia or Transdniestria. The USA, on the other extreme, even declared at one point Kosovo’s right to declare independence unilaterally and immediately.

The Troika Process

At the end of July 2007 a new round of negotiations began. This was the result of the ongoing differences in the UN Security Council over Kosovo’s future status, and agreement among the six-nation Contact Group on the need to move the process out of its stalemate situation. This new initiative, mediated by a “Troika” of representatives from the EU, Russia and US, was meant to provide one last chance to Belgrade and Pristina to find a common solution.

The Troika reported back in December 2007 with poor results (UN 2007a). Neither side was still willing to compromise on the status issue. The Troika proposed a fourteen-point assessment – as a basis for evaluating a range of solutions – that outlined a variety of parameters by which common bodies would be established to implement cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo. This would come in exchange for Serbia’s commitment not to govern or re-establish a physical presence on Kosovo’s territory or to interfere in Kosovo’s access to international financial institutions and its path towards EU integration. At the same Kosovo was meant to commit to full regional integration, particularly on the economic side (ICG 2007: 3). Coined “Ahtisaari-minus” by the Kosovo media, this assessment was not considered seriously by the Kosovo authorities. They were only open to discussing post-independence arrangements with Serbia, had little trust in the negotiation process and were more concerned at the time with their November 2007 general elections. Serbia was similarly dismissive of the Troika assessment, insisting on Kosovo remaining within Serbia but with substantial autonomy and with no return to the pre-March-1999 situation (ICG 2007: 3-4).

2 Non-majority communities in Kosovo were in effect provided with a veto over laws of particular interest to their communities in areas such as language, culture, education and symbols (UN 2007b: 6).
3 The Plan envisaged offering Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo enhanced municipal competences in areas such as healthcare, higher education, local courts and the selection of the police chief; considerable autonomy over their financial matters, including the capacity to receive funding from Serbia; and the establishment of six new or significantly expanded Kosovo Serb-majority municipalities (UN 2007b: 7).
4 The Contact Group is an informal grouping of influential states (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and the US) interested in the stabilisation of the Balkans.
5 These elections gave the victory to Hasmim Thaçi, former leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), who was determined to make Kosovo independent as soon as possible.
With the Troika reporting back its lack of success in finding a negotiated solution, the conditional or supervised independence proposed by the Ahtisaari Plan was back on the table as the best way forward. In fact, as it became clearer that the Troika process would not yield positive results, the Kosovo authorities began to devise alternative ways of moving towards independence – even without UN Security Council authorisation – in close cooperation with those Western states ready to support them. As summed up by the International Crisis Group, the alternative was not an option:

"Accepting paralysis is not a viable option, however. It would lead to an uncoordinated, unsupervised, possibly violent independence process that could stimulate instability in Kosovo’s neighbour countries. It would also seriously damage both the UN’s prestige and the EU’s development as a major political actor in the global stage" (ICG 2007: i)

EULEX Kosovo

In the conclusions of the outgoing Portuguese Presidency of the European Union, the Council thanked the Troika for its efforts, regretted the failure to find a negotiated solution and concluded that the diplomatic avenue was exhausted. It also endorsed the UN Secretary-General’s statement that the status quo in Kosovo was unsustainable and consequently made it clear that the EU was committed to “assist Kosovo in the path towards sustainable stability, including by an ESDP mission and a contribution to an international civilian office as part of the international presence” (Council of the European Union 2007: para.70). At the same time, the Council advised Serbia to fulfil the requirements to fully integrate into the “family of European nations” (Council of the European Union 2008: para. 71). The General Affairs and External Relations Council was therefore invited in December 2007 to begin working on the modalities that such a mission should take, while the EU Secretary-General/High-Representative Javier Solana assisted the process by acting as interlocutor between the EU and the responsible authorities in Kosovo and the UN.

On the basis of the work completed by the EU Planning Team for Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo) established in April 2006, the activation of the EU mission has since taken place swiftly. On 16th February 2008 the Council of the EU decided to launch EULEX Kosovo, the EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo. Headed by Yves de Kermabon, this mission aims to support the Kosovo authorities in building a sustainable and functional Rule of Law system on the basis of an initial two-year mandate which will probably have to be expanded. The mission will include approximately 1,800/1,900 international police officers, judges, prosecutors and custom officers and 1,000 local staff to assist the Kosovo authorities in the maintenance and improvement of the rule of law. For example, EULEX Kosovo is supposed to ensure that serious crimes are properly investigated and prosecuted and the outcomes of that process enforced.

EULEX Kosovo mission aims to support the Kosovo authorities in building a sustainable and functional Rule of Law system. For example, it is supposed to ensure that serious crimes are properly investigated and prosecuted and the outcomes of that process enforced

This EU mission is meant to take over from the UN once Kosovo’s new constitution comes into force on 15th June 2008. However, following the same argumentative line adopted in the transition from the UN to the EU in Bosnia, the Union has made it clear that its mission will not substitute for UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) and thus will not emulate its executive style. Rather, it should be seen as a completely new mission designed on the basis of co-ownership of the process. It will only monitor, mentor and advise on all areas of the rule of law, with specific projects – as already outlined by EUPT Kosovo – designed and implemented in consultation with the appropriate local stakeholders so as to ensure shared views of problems and oppor-

6 The European Union signed a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia at the end of April 2008, as well as offering special changes to the visa regime. The European Commission insists that these concessions are completely separate from Kosovo’s recent independence (17th February 2008).
tunities, while enhancing the transparency of the EU mission. The only exceptions to this ownership rule are the handling of special types of crimes (such as organised crime, war crimes, etc.) and, if needed, riot control where a more executive role by the EU mission might be needed until the local authorities are able to carry out such tasks by themselves.

The year 2007 has been crucial, not only in moving away from the status quo established in Kosovo by Resolution 1244 but also in making Kosovo more of a European issue

The rule of law focus of EULEX Kosovo responds to an international perception of the situation in Kosovo as being characterised, still, by a serious lack of security, the absence of which leads in turn to a lack of development. However, the rule of law mandate of this mission cannot by itself solve some of the other pressing problems that are associated with Kosovo, even if the lack of security is at the basis of many of them. According to a March 2008 report from the European Commission, some of the most serious problems in Kosovo go from strengthening the rule of law (particularly the judiciary) to combating organised crime and corruption, supporting economic development and the creation of jobs, improving conditions for the return of refugees and for minority communities, and enhancing dialogue and reconciliation among communities (European Commission 2008: 7). In the words of Yves de Kermabon:

“Everything in Kosovo is very political, but of course, the police, the justice system and the borders are at the heart of the problem and our mission: to establishing a law-abiding state. Then again, the economy and the schools should not be forgotten. That’s not my mission ... But they represent two more important challenges for Kosovo and on which the success of our mission will depend.” (Europolitics, 2008: 24)

This security-development logic explains the multifaceted approach the Union has envisaged for Kosovo, of which the ESDP mission is simply one element in a wider policy shaped by the Stabilisation and Association Process or, in other words, the EU’s strategic framework for the Western Balkans region. The enhanced EU presence in Kosovo is composed of three arms that together utilise the Union’s full array of political, economic and security instruments. EULEX Kosovo represents the operational arm with political guidance provided by the International Civilian Office/European Union Special Representative Office (ICO/EUSR) that under the leadership of Peter Feith is meant to represent the international community under European guidance. This office is also meant to oversee the transfer of responsibilities from UNMIK to the local authorities, and to the new international authority, as well as the implementation of the Settlement proposal outlined by Martti Ahtisaari in his March 2007 document. The third and last arm is that of the European Commission’s long-term efforts in the areas of economic development, regional integration and the EU perspective for Kosovo. The latter is to take place through the European partnership, political and technical dialogue under the Stabilisation and Association Process Tracking Mechanism and related Community assistance programmes. The EU presence will be further complemented by some of the proposals outlined in the Ahtisaari plan, including an international military presence (provided by NATO), assistance from an OSCE mission with extensive field presence, and capacity-building efforts by a variety of partners, including the UN Development Programme, the World Bank and the Council of Europe.

Concluding Remarks: Kosovo in the EU Era

The year 2007 has been crucial, not only in moving away from the status quo established in Kosovo by Resolution 1244 but also in making Kosovo more of a European issue. While the EU should be praised for its determination to acquire a more prominent role in this conflict, its decisions carry a level of resilience that is already being put to the test. Indeed, at the time of writing, only a few months into the year 2008, the Union is confronted with two main challenges. At the international level, Russia’s use of its weight in the Security Council to avoid the revocation of Resolution

7 As part of its supervision of Pillar IV of UNMIK (on Reconstruction and Economic Development), since 1999 the EU has been active in the area of macroeconomic reforms. Its actions have also been influenced since 2002 by the decision not to integrate Kosovo into Serbia’s Stability and Association Process (SAP), leading to regular meetings between the Commission, UNMIK and Kosovo’s provisional authorities on the territory’s progress in complying with the Copenhagen criteria and the SAP. In the period since 1999 the EU had channelled over € 2 billion through its various instruments (Sebastián 2007: 4).
is posing serious problems in the handover of responsibilities from the UN to the EU as well as inhibiting Kosovo’s integration into the full range of UN institutions. Some have begun to talk of a “readjustment” of the transition plans (between the UN and EU) and others of “the international community in confusion” (John 2008). The underlying fear is that the outcome could be a de facto “soft partition” between “UNMIKland” in Serb-populated areas in the north and “EULEXland” in the rest of Kosovo, mainly populated by ethnic Albanians (John 2008). This fear is influenced by local events that have reinforced the claims of those critics questioning EULEX’s capacity to implement its mandate.

On 17th February 2008 Kosovo declared itself independent against the wishes of Serbia and Russia.8 Protests, violence in areas where Kosovo Serbs live and at the border with Serbia, and the boycott by ethnic Serbs of key institutions built during the UN period (such as the police) to show their refusal to recognise the new Kosovo authorities, are clear illustrations of the tense situation that has rapidly developed on the ground. In fact, the Serb-held enclaves (and the north of Kosovo) operate as part of Serbia (Judah 2008). This situation is certainly not expected to improve in the near future as illustrated by Serbia’s decision to hold its 11th May local and parliamentary elections in those areas. If uncontrolled, these tensions could turn Kosovo into a frozen conflict. Faced with a total absence of Serb interlocutors (both in Kosovo and in Serbia itself), and with the inability to establish itself in the north,9 it remains to be seen how EULEX, and the EU more generally, will be able to assist in the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan, particularly the decentralisation clauses that pertain to Serb-populated areas. The stakes are indeed very high. Tackling appropriately the challenges that have developed since the end of 2007 is crucial not only for the future of Kosovo, but also for that of the EU as an effective international actor in the resolution of conflicts.

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8 Not all EU member states have recognised Kosovo’s independence at the time of writing.

9 NATO has been described by some commentators as unwilling to take the necessary forceful measures to assist the EU in this regard.
The Mediterranean and its adjoining regions contain a sizable number of flashpoints and the security environment remains "Hobbesian." Although the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the situation in the Lebanon (which led to a full scale war between Israel and the Hezbollah in the summer of 2006), the future of Iraq and the Iranian nuclear programme remain the most important unsettled issues, the wider Mediterranean security environment is predominantly characterized by multiple sources of insecurity, fluidity, instability, and continued change and evolution. Sectarian violence and religious rivalries are pieces of the regional security puzzle. There is increasing concern about a renewed multi-dimensional (conventional and Weapons of Mass Destruction [WMD]) arms race in the region, although it should be noted that indigenous explosive devices (INDs) probably remain the single most important cause of casualties in the Middle East. Since the late 1960s, partly as a consequence of the Arab-Israeli conflict but also regional and domestic instability, the countries in the Mediterranean and the Middle East have been spending a considerable percentage of their Gross National Product (GNP) for the procurement of sophisticated military equipment and for their security needs in general. The Middle East has repeatedly had the dubious distinction of being the region with the world’s largest arms imports. In the early and mid-1990s the Middle East’s level of arms imports decreased, but in recent years most countries in the region have again pursued large arms acquisitions. Although according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS') Military Balance 2007, defence expenditures have on the average decreased (1998: 7.73%, 2005: 5.53%, 2006: 5.26%), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that, in the period 1997-2006, military spending in the Middle East increased by 57% in real terms (total expenditures in 2005-2006 reached $72.5 billion plus 6.7 billion for North Africa). The discrepancy can be explained by the increasing financial resources (as a result of increasing oil prices) of certain countries which allowed them to increase the net amount of defence expenditures, while reducing the related percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Defence expenditures – as well as troop numbers in selected countries, such as Saudi Arabia – are expected to increase for 2007 and afterwards. It should also be noted that high military spending in the Middle East goes hand in hand with a lack of transparency and accountability in military budgets. With the exception of Israel, Southern Mediterranean States do not have a power projection capability (very limited capabilities for force transportation by air and sea), and they lack “blue water” navies and sufficient long-range strike aircraft. With very few exceptions, they do not possess across the board advanced military technologies such as stealth capabilities, precision guided munitions, advanced electronics, sophisticated C4I systems, advanced air defence or space capabilities, etc. The main function of their armed forces is to safeguard internal stability and to protect the regimes against domestic challenges. Although the West remains the main arms supplier for the region, the armed forces of several states in the Mediterranean and the Middle East are equipped with weapon systems from the former Soviet Union/Eastern bloc.

**Military Capabilities of Key Regional States**

Among key countries in the Mediterranean and the wider Middle East, Iran is slowly building up its mili-
The Iranian military is considered capable of conducting limited, short-duration offensive operations beyond Iran's borders, but currently is incapable of sustaining large-scale offensive actions. Tehran would require tens of billions of dollars to become a major conventional military power.

Arms Transfers

In the summer of 2007, the United States announced that it will sell military equipment worth $20 billion to Saudi Arabia and neighbouring Gulf states: Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The deal reportedly includes Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs), electronic warfare equipment, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), fighter aircraft upgrades, missile defence systems and new naval vessels. Furthermore, the U.S. will provide to Israel $24-30 billion in military assistance over the next 10 years, whereas U.S. aid to Egypt will reach $13 billion over the same period.

China, heavily reliant on the region’s energy resources, is increasing its political, economic and security involvement in the Middle East. Beijing already provides Tehran with a number of systems,
including the highly-capable C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles. (Hezbollah, or the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, used this missile against an Israeli destroyer during the 2006 war.) In addition, in the late 1980s, China secretly sold Saudi Arabia the nuclear-capable, medium-range DF-3 (CSS-2) ballistic missile. Some analysts believe Beijing is involved in upgrading these 20-year-old missiles for deterring Iran.

**WMD Proliferation**

Although Iraq and Libya (each for different reasons) are no longer part of the WMD proliferation problem, there is concern about Iran's nuclear programme. According to a rather alarmist view, "Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons and long-range missile delivery system is likely to affect its behaviour in the region. Tehran's new military muscle would bolster its aspirations for regional leadership and influence over a number of issues – from resolving territorial disputes to determining energy policy and production limits to serving as a beacon of political enlightenment for Arabs and Muslims worldwide."

Although desalination and energy diversity are the primary motivations for a renewed interest in nuclear power in the region, building up a nuclear infrastructure can concurrently serve as part of a future hedging strategy.

There should probably be little doubt about Iran's rationality and its understanding of the concept of deterrence (despite the persistent efforts of the country's current President to convince the world otherwise) and concerns about the range of Iranian missiles and the probability of nuclear strikes against Europe do not sound especially convincing. On the other hand, the probability of a nuclear “domino effect” has often been emphasized, whereby the presence of nuclear weapons in Iran may well motivate other countries in the region, such as Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, to try and develop their own nuclear weapons. Indeed, according to a senior official of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), six Arab states (namely Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Syria – on 6th September 2007, Israel attacked an alleged nuclear-related construction site in Syria. North Korean involvement has been reported in relation with the site) have shown interest in developing nuclear power. This has deepened concerns that Iran's apparent pursuit of nuclear-weapon capabilities may be provoking some of its neighbours to think about their own nuclear futures. Although desalination and energy diversity are the primary motivations for a renewed interest in nuclear power in the region, building up a nuclear infrastructure, including a cadre of trained personnel, can concurrently serve as part of a future hedging strategy. The interest in nuclear energy in the Middle East, however, is not as recent as media reports suggested. Furthermore, it is far from clear whether these states have really made a decision to go nuclear. In any case, the open nuclearization of Iran could, in combination with other negative developments, deal a deadly blow to the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) regime.

In the past few years there has been no increase in the number of new missile states. While several programmes are a cause for serious concern and could develop into potential international threats, in general the ballistic missile threat is confined, limited, and changing relatively slowly. However, both China and North Korea continue to play an important role in the proliferation of longer-range ballistic missiles and support the development of indigenous capacities for manufacture and modification.

Most missiles in the arsenals of proliferating countries will still be Frogs, Scuds or Scud derivatives for the next ten years. The Iraqi derivatives (Al-Abbas and Al-Husayn) compromised the payload and in-flight stability of the missile in the interest of an increased range. As for the capabilities of specific countries, in addition, to SCUD-Bs and SCUD-Cs, Iran now has an unknown number of Shahab-3 missiles, developed with North Korean assistance, with a range of up to 2,000 km. According to the IISS Military Balance, Syria has 18 FROG, 18 SS-21 and 30 SCUD B/C/D launchers and approximately 850 missiles. There is no evidence of Syria targeting ballistic missiles against NATO or EU countries. Israel has the most advanced missile capabilities in the region, with the Jericho systems that have a range of over 2,000 km and could probably develop a missile with a range of 5,000 km.
In response to trends emerging within the Euro-Mediterranean area, EuroMeSCo’s agenda of activities for 2007 was characterised by a concern for human rights. A domain with many facets, human rights seem to bind together all chapters of the Barcelona Process, and thus proved an ideal topic through which to evaluate the state of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and of the countries that compose it. Held since 1996, the EuroMeSCo Annual Conference reflects the main thread of EuroMeSCo’s programme for that particular year, which in turn is shaped by the issues currently engaging the EMP. Gathering network members, academics, and a range of political, economic and civil society actors from Europe and the Southern Mediterranean, the ultimate aim of this event is to foster a meaningful exchange that will fuel further progress towards the construction of a democratic, prosperous and peaceful shared Euro-Mediterranean territory. In 2007, the pursuit of this objective demanded sensitive consideration of the Partnership’s human dimension, which had been left languishing as secularisation came to the fore of the developing European foreign policy agenda. Migration quickly emerged as the key issue, based on the output of past EuroMeSCo activities and in recognition of the heated debate surrounding the intensive migratory flows within the Euro-Mediterranean area.

In a space defined by diversity, the promotion of a dialogue that goes beyond mere tolerance, towards active respect and recognition, is crucial to stability. Yet to achieve this, diversity must be understood as an asset, not a liability, and partner countries should seek to nurture the accompanying process of cultural adaptation. In a bid to deconstruct, and hopefully also begin changing perceptions, the 2007 EuroMeSCo Annual Conference addressed the question of “A Common Agenda against Intolerance: Human Rights as a Shared Concern”. In the run-up to this event, and as happens every year, three Preparatory Meetings were organised in collaboration with local partner institutes to begin outlining the conference programme through an exploration of the topic’s various angles. These meetings took place in Tunis, followed by Alexandria, and finally Paris, successfully challenging dangerously-engrained stereotypes and reinforcing important lessons.

Migrants stand to offer a great deal as actors of development, in both their host and origin countries, yet they often lack the tools to contribute towards such progress due to a denial of their most basic rights. Human rights lie at the core of the somewhat problematic social changes affecting both sides of the Mediterranean, but that stem from quite distinct contexts. Europe is at present arguably afflicted by an identity crisis, aggravated by the growth of its migrant communities, who are bringing into question the very notion of what it is to be “European”. The perceived threat of terrorism has only served to further complicate matters. Europe’s structural move towards greater secularisation has enhanced the discriminatory nature of immigration policy, while at the more micro-level a suspicion of anything deemed different now pervades society, which would explain the noted rise in Islamophobia. Ultimately, it is human rights that have suffered the most detrimental brunt of these numerous developments.

For their part, some in the Southern Mediterranean claim to be committed to democracy and political reform; yet have these transition processes of sorts also translated into the advancement of human rights in the region? As the 2nd Preparatory Meeting on “Civil Society, Human Rights and Democracy” highlighted, judicial systems in the Maghreb remain marred by unequal access, and a lack of independence and transparency, while the Mashreq appears to have suffered a decline in democracy over recent years, particularly as regards the freedoms granted civil society. Women’s rights are a further issue where progress is wanting. The rules of the “game of democracy” may have been instituted to some extent, but in most countries reform remains only superficial, as was for instance seen in the negligible impact achieved by (managed) elections held in the region over this period. The Southern Mediterranean could be described as caught between the modern and the traditional. Actively engaged in the throes of modern living, yet still very much structured according to religious precepts and traditional values, these societies now also find themselves having to negotiate a new identity that manages to satisfy the demands of both camps, while also initiating a proper social contract that outlines the relation and mutual responsibility between the state and the citizen.

One of the main messages to have emerged from the activities organised by EuroMeSCo over 2007 is that stronger collective action directed towards the promotion of human rights is needed within the EMP, prioritising the rights of migrants and their invaluable role in Euromed relations. It is time to move away from the discriminatory security approach and to finally begin exploring the rich potential that immigrants represent. A true sense of belonging amongst minority communities is perhaps too much to ask for at this stage, yet the cultivation of an empowering sense of ownership is within grasp. The 2007 EuroMeSCo Annual Conference confirmed that the debate in this field is dynamic, creative, and well-informed, expressing a universal concern for the protection of fundamental rights. This shared morality should be capable, with the necessary political will and commitment, of rallying the consensus to effect real change. Albeit somewhat vague and weak, existing international conventions offer a potential springboard from which to develop a binding and more effective common policy that manages to respond to countries’ desire for control over their territories, while simultaneously guaranteeing the right to freedom of movement.

Although an admittedly challenging process, deconstruction of the intolerance and prejudice so deeply rooted in the social psyche is crucial if we hope to achieve the multi-cultural community founded in respect for equality in diversity that is upheld by the EMP. Keeping in mind that “immigrants show us what we are”, it is perhaps time to take a long hard look at what their present constrained experience says about our community and whether this is the image we want associated with the Euro-Mediterranean project.

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replaced COCOM), most states in the region have signed and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (some Arab states, such as Egypt, Syria and Libya have not signed, linking the issue with Israel’s nuclear capability), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the Ottawa Treaty on landmines, and of course, the NPT. Some states are also participating to the UN Register for Conventional Arms. Unfortunately, regional arms control efforts (such as the arms control and regional security (ACRS) talks in the framework of the Arab-Israeli peace process, and discussions for a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone [NWFZ] in the Middle East) have not been successful so far.

Although the EU is becoming increasingly involved in the region, the level and net impact of its involvement in security developments in its southern neighbourhood leaves much to be desired.

There will continue to be strategic uncertainty in the region for the foreseeable future and an escalation in arms procurement and defence expenditures cannot be excluded (especially as rising oil prices allow some regional countries to continue to spend more for security purposes). To prevent this, the EU and the U.S. should assist in the development of a new security system in the Gulf region which will take under consideration Iranian, but also Cooperation Council for Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) and Iraqi security concerns. This, of course, practically presupposes an ‘understanding’ and the eventual normalisation of relations between the US and Iran. Urgent action is also necessary for the stabilization of Iraq and Lebanon and progress in the Palestinian problem.

Although the EU is becoming increasingly involved in the region, as its significant contribution to United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) or the important role of the EU-3 in the Iranian nuclear crisis demonstrate, the level and net impact of its involvement in security developments in its southern neighbourhood leaves much to be desired.

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What is the relationship between human security and human development in the Arab world? What is the role of the population characteristics of people in Arab Mediterranean countries, referred to in publications of international organizations as Middle East and North Africa, in the process of human development? This paper argues that the lack of human security is a major cause for setbacks in human development, at least in some of the Arab Mediterranean countries. It further argues that if a human development perspective is adopted with respect to the population of these countries, both economic development and human security in the Mediterranean would largely improve.

The focus in the paper on Arab Mediterranean countries finds its rationale in the fact that countries along the Northern and Western shores of the Mediterranean have already attained higher levels of human development and found ways of dealing with threats to their human security. This is not the case in most Arab Mediterranean countries.

**Human Security and Human Development in Arab Mediterranean Countries**

To start with, human security, defined as a condition in which people are freed from both fear and want, is assumed in this paper to be a basic condition for human development. This latter concept, defined as the process of expanding people’s choices, including choices of the economic, social and political structures that determine these choices, is inconceivable unless a high degree of human security is enjoyed by the majority of the population concerned.

Adapting the definition of human security used in the Human Development Report of 1994 to the conditions of Arab countries, the forthcoming issue of the Arab Human Development Report has suggested eight dimensions of human security. Freedom from fear entails lessening threats from environmental hazards, foreign military occupation, inter-group conflicts, and repressive measures taken by an accountable government as well as aggression by others. Freedom from want requires having access to decent employment, income and social security, adequate food and proper health care. No country is completely immune from threats to human security, but a reasonable degree of human security is necessary for advances along the path of human development.

Arab Mediterranean countries are facing common threats to their human security. So far some threats are unique to some of these countries. Environmental threats are common to almost all of them. Most of them lie within a water stress region, where the per capita share of water is less than 1,000 cubic meters. Desertification has led to the loss of thousands of hectares of cultivable land in many Arab Mediterranean countries. Loss of biological diversity has also been a feature encountered in a number of them. Finally, climate change could plunge vast coastal areas in Tunisia and Egypt under sea water leading to emigration of millions of people from their homes turning them into environmental refugees with corresponding shrinking of agricultural production, difficulties in the provision of food as well as alternative employment and sources of income.

One other dimension is unique to very few countries, namely foreign military occupation. In this part

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1 All figures in this short paper are derived from the Arab Human Development Report 2008 unless otherwise indicated.
of the Mediterranean region, only the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza at present are subject to this threat to human security, despite Israel’s incomplete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005. The Israeli occupation is compounded by a host of measures taken by Israeli authorities in both areas, including closure of territories, sequestration of land to establish settlements, restrictions on movement and economic activities and frequent raids by Israeli troops on homes and refugee camps claiming to be fighting Palestinians intent on using arms against Israeli soldiers and settlers. Many Palestinians lose their lives in such raids and incursions, most of whom were not involved in any military action against Israelis as testified by B’tselem, the Israeli human rights organization. As a result of these measures, ordinary civilian life, including study in schools, visits to hospitals and economic activities, are very often disrupted, particularly in the Gaza Strip since victory of Hamas in legislative elections in January 2006, and especially following its victory over Fatah in the power struggle in June 2007. The Lebanese have also experienced foreign military occupation at the hands of Israelis several times in the past, including a long occupation of Southern Lebanon between 1982 and 2000. They also went through the trauma of war with Israel in the summer of 2006. Syrian troops were stationed in Lebanon from 1976 until 2005. Some Lebanese considered the Syrian military presence as a foreign occupation despite the fact that other Lebanese welcomed their presence as a source of political and economic support. Inter-group conflict, although not pervasive in all these societies, had cost thousands, if not tens of thousands, of lives in few of these countries. Lebanon had been the theater of a long civil war which continued from 1975-1991 and was about to erupt again in May 2008 before Arab mediation efforts led to a peaceful end of the confrontation between supporters of the government, including Muslims, mostly Sunnis and Christians, and supporters of the opposition who included Muslims, mostly Shiites and Christians. Identity politics was involved in the civil war and this confrontation surfaced, though in different ways, in this more recent confrontation which lasted from November 2006 until May 2008. Identity politics was also behind other bloody confrontations in Syria involving Kurds, in Gaza in the internal fight between supporters of both Hamas and Fatah and in Algeria between several Islamist groups and the government, particularly between 1992 and 1999. The executive authority of the government in most of these States is not subject to any kind of effective accountability either through a powerful legislature, independent judiciary power or even a free and articulate public opinion. Opposition figures and nascent civil society organizations often find themselves being harassed, if not thrown into prison. Such threats have influenced human development in many ways. In countries which came under foreign military occupation or experienced civil wars, large numbers of people lost their lives, liberties or homes. The longest conflict has been the one that pit Israelis against Palestinians and cost the lives of nearly five thousand Palestinians and five hundred Israelis during the period October 2000-April 2008. At the moment of writing nearly ten thousand Palestinians are still in Israeli prisons. The conflict that has endured since 1948 has forced almost 4.5 million Palestinians to seek refuge in neighboring countries, particularly Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The Lebanese Civil War is estimated to have caused the deaths of nearly 100,000 people, the internal displacement of 6,000 with 250,000 seeking refuge. As for the Algerian Civil War, it similarly cost the lives of 100,000 people. There are no exact or even approximate figures on numbers of political prisoners in all these countries. Reports of human rights organizations suggest that the highest number is probably in Egyptian prisons. But all these countries are known to have held people in jail because of their political leanings or membership in organizations the government considers of a subversive nature. Other Arab countries which did not go through such traumatic experiences of civil war or foreign military occupation succeeded in general in reducing levels of poverty and unemployment, and improving nutritional and health levels of the majority of their population. The state of personal security in Arab coun-
tries in general tends to be the best compared to all other developing regions. According to Mustapha K. Nabli (Nabli, et al), levels of unemployment in the MENA region fell in 12 of these countries from 14.3% in 2000 to 10.8% in 2005. The same study found the rate of unemployment in Occupied Palestinian Territories rose from 16.2% in 2000 to 23.5% in 2005 (Ibid, p. 37). Figures on poverty were available in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators for countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria. The first two countries managed to reduce the percentage of the poor in their population to a range of 16.7%/12% during the last decade of the 20th century. No recent figures were available for Tunisia where the level of poverty increased slightly from 1990 to 1995 from 7.4% to 7.8%. In Algeria, which witnessed political instability leading to civil war, the percentage of poor increased, during the first half of the 1990s, from 12.2% to 22.6% (World Bank, 2008, 64-66). The undernourished remained at 6/7% of the total population of Arab Mediterranean countries during this period. While Syria, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco succeeded in either keeping the undernourished as a small percentage of total population or even drastically reducing their numbers, there have been slight increases in the number of the undernourished in Jordan and Lebanon (Ibid, 106-108). In general, life expectancy at birth jumped six years in all these countries from 64 in 1990 to 70 in 2006 (Ibid, 120). Education levels also improved, with the percentage of those who finished primary school moving up from 77% in 1991 to 91% in 2006. Youth literacy advanced by 10 points to reach 81%, and that of girls climbed 17 points to 63% between 1990 and 2005, but with important gender differences (Ibid, p. 90).

Arab Population and Human Development

In terms of human development, no Arab Mediterranean country belongs to the lowest level of human development as measured by the United Nations Development Program. Seven Arab countries rank among those that have achieved a high level of human development. They are all Gulf countries, with the exception of Libya which is a Mediterranean country. All other Arab Mediterranean countries rank among countries with a medium level of human development (UNDP, 2007/2008, 232). Arab government officials view the population factor to be an obstacle slowing down the achievement of higher levels of development in general, pointing out the difficulty of providing education, health care, employment opportunities and decent incomes to a large population relative to resources available in these countries whose population is also growing at a relatively fast rate. Arab population numbered 225.6 million in 1990, grew to 310.7 in 2006 and is projected to increase to 361.9 million by 2015, with a growth rate of 2% between 1990/2005, expected to fall to 1.7% during the period 2006/2015.

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This view is quite mistaken for several reasons. Countries with relatively large populations such as South Korea succeeded in becoming a brilliant success story in terms of economic and political development with a poor endowment of natural resources. Its major source for overcoming hurdles of poverty and under-development was its own people, with their level of education, skills and discipline together with rational, realistic and enlightened economic policies. Secondly, several Arab countries, and not only large petroleum exporters, are rich in terms of their endowment of natural resources. An increase in population in these countries would contribute to their development as many of them require additional workforce. In fact, several reasons account for the fact that no Arab country has managed to match successes of the newly-industrialized countries in East Asia. These reasons include political instability, foreign intervention but also economic policies which focused exclusively on growth, rather than combining growth with improvement of human development. Arab countries do generally rank well on indicators of income poverty, but they rank lower on indicators of human poverty. Notwithstanding progress in improving edu-

2 These countries include Syria and Lebanon. See classification of resource-rich and resource-poor Arab countries in Mustapha Nabli, et al. 2007, p. 3.
cational levels among the people, Arab countries have not attained levels of education and access to knowledge as in other parts of the developing world, particularly East Asia and Latin America. The gender gap in terms of education and employment, to say nothing of political participation, is the largest in Arab countries, compared to all other regions of the developing world. This has been well argued in Arab Human Development Reports. The time has come for Arab governments to view their population as an agent of development, not as a burden on development. Serious efforts are required not only to bridge the knowledge gap between Arab countries and, to begin with, more advanced countries of the Global South, but also to bridge that gap in terms of both political freedom and gender equality. Only then could a genuine Arab renaissance begin.

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Achieving higher levels of human development would contribute to an easing of domestic and regional tensions. Higher levels of human development would stimulate an increase of domestic and regional investments now, as several Arab countries enjoy an influx of financial surpluses as a result of higher oil prices. This, if pro-poor growth policies are adopted, would decrease levels of unemployment, poverty and malnutrition which gave rise recently to protest actions in several Arab Mediterranean countries. This would also help stem the flow of illegal immigrants who risk their lives in order to find jobs in the black labor market in Europe. This would also broaden young peoples’ intellectual horizons and render them less amenable to the discourse of radical opposition movements which call on young people to take up arms against their governments as well as those of foreign countries. In short, human development would be the way to improve human security in Arab countries and in the Mediterranean as a whole, provided foreign military occupation in Palestine and Iraq ends and political stability is restored in these two countries.

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The signing of the Treaty of Lisbon on 13th December 2007 represents a positive release of the Gordian knot that was constricting the European Union (EU), and it allows us to face with confidence the challenges of the future. We are engaged in building a European Union, a political, economic and monetary union of 27 states and more than 450 million citizens. It is an open constituent process consisting in a collection of Treaties, the most significant being that of Rome. Its 50th birthday was celebrated in March 2007 with the Berlin Declaration, which affirms: “In the European Union we are making a reality of our common ideals: for us, the human being is the centre of all things.” In essence, that is what Protagoras said in the Greece of Pericles, when the process of building democracy began. The founding fathers thought the same when they began the task of overcoming embattled nationalisms.

The declaration is an opportune reminder of what has been achieved, peace and prosperity, and a renewed commitment to continue working for a common future, overcoming the crisis over the ratification of the Constitution, to guarantee survival in a globalised world in which it is an ever more minor part. The EU does not live in an ivory tower; in these 50 years its population has fallen from one quarter of the human race to one eighth; powers such as China or India have reappeared on the scene, together with new emerging ones (Mexico or Brazil in America, the Asian Tigers); globalisation has accelerated through the spread of technological progress, as have demographic changes with mass migration, the push of world trade and the need to confront climate change. Besides this, the globalisation of the aspiration to democracy has created a new political and social scene in which the EU has a pioneering experience.

The European Summit in June summoned the Inter-governmental Conference with a detailed mandate to draft the Reform Treaties on the basis of the Constitutional Treaty. Europe had not succeeded as a constituent political project. The step-by-step advance – les petits pas – began with the creation of a sectorial common market, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the atomic one (EURATOM), and that of defence (CED) – a leap forward that was frustrated in the French National Assembly in 1954 –, and the Common Market signed in Rome in 1957.

The setting was a continent divided by the Cold War, with a collaborative reconstruction in the western part thanks to the Marshall Plan, in which the undue penalisation of Germany was avoided. The USA was decisive in the liberation of Europe from Nazism and in its subsequent evolution, by its decided support to the process of integration, a clear difference in its relation to Franco’s Spain.

The concept was as original as it was unorthodox: the cornerstone was the Four Freedoms (movement and settlement of persons, circulation of goods, services and capital); the power of initiative in these matters was conferred on a newly-minted institution, the Commission, together with the power of trade negotiation with the outside world and of upholding competition, to avoid excessive concentrations of economic power. The institutional triangle was designed in its basic lines: the Commission, the community executive, the Council, the representation of the member states with executive-legislative powers, and the Parliament. At the centre, the Court of Justice, a decisive institution in the forming of the Community as an organisation of the rule of law.

From its foundation, the European Community was open to the entry of new states, with the condition that
they must be European and, though not expressly stated, democratic. For that reason, General Franco encountered a firm negative reply when he requested the entry of Spain in 1962.

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The results were very different from the disastrous ones that followed the First World War. Then, President Wilson’s Fourteen Points which inspired the Paris Conference of 1919 changed the world, but they sowed the seed of growing division in the Europe of nations, with a Germany humiliated and obliged to pay impossible reparations.

The rapid post-war recovery, combined with the initiation of the common market, settled the bases of the system of mixed capitalist economy, based on the Welfare State together with an active economic and fiscal policy – known as “Keynesianism” – and a fundamental pact between social partners. With forms that differed from country to country, the European social model was built up. Although it is not a uniform system, its features can be easily identified. In this field, the functions of the EU are mainly declarative, protective and regulatory, not redistributive.

The fundamental concern of the nascent Community was directed to self-sufficiency in food (the Common Agricultural Policy), the elimination of internal barriers and the creation of the Customs Union. Policies since the social or regional ones initially had a complementary character. The Court of Justice was the pioneer in establishing in the 1960s a direct nexus between the Community and the citizen.

Spain’s entry in 1986 took place in the second creative stage of European construction. The Delors Commission proposed that the construction of the common market as an interior market with a social dimension should be completed with a careful preparation of the Economic and Monetary Union, after which the time would come to talk about Political Union at the turn of the millennium. The priorities of the Spanish policy were to enlarge and strengthen its political dimension, with the inclusion of citizenship, economic and social cohesion, the incipient foreign policy and membership in the first group of the Euro countries. Besides this, Spain negotiated and received from the Community, as it was then, a Marshall Plan, jointly with Portugal, Ireland and Greece, in the shape of duplication of regional and social funds and the creation of the cohesion fund.

The fall of the Wall in the annus horribilis 1989 was not the end of history but a new drive which led to the unification of Germany, the implosion of the Soviet bloc and of the former Yugoslavia and the end of the Cold war. The European leaders gave the right political response with the Maastricht Treaty, creating the European Union as a Political, Economic and Monetary Union, with the introduction of European citizenship, the single currency, cohesion and the pillars of the Foreign, Security, Justice and Interior Policies. With that began the second great stage of European construction, in which we are fully immersed. Two new enlargements have taken place which have changed the map, with the admission in the nineties of three prosperous neutral or non-aligned countries (Sweden, Austria and Finland), and in the present decade the group of ten (the whole of Central Europe – Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia – together with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – and two Mediterranean countries, Malta and Cyprus), besides Romania and Bulgaria. At present, Croatia and Turkey are in the process of negotiation.

From another point of view, the EU has asserted itself as a world monetary power with the successful introduction of the Euro, with fifteen member states from 1st January 2002 and applying candidates and a possible reconsideration by Denmark on its self-exclusion. A common economic culture has been put in place, which, to be lasting, needs an acceleration of the Political Union, as historical experience shows.

The Lisbon strategy systematised the socio-economic objectives of the EU (employment, RDI, education and cohesion) from the year 2000, with the aim of keeping up a sustained effort to play a leading role in an increasingly more competitive world in which economic adjustment is a continuous process where life-long learning, research and investment in high-technology sectors play a decisive role.

In the development of an area of freedom, security and justice, Schengen fulfils a pioneering role, to which Plum is added in judicial cooperation. This impetuous open constituent process continues to accelerate. Since its creation, the EU has expe-
rienced a quadrennial rhythm of periodical attempts (Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice) to find an adjustment to the new European and world reality. The method of the Convention, open and public, with the participation of the European institutions, the governments, States and their Parliaments has allowed their lines to be traced for the future. The first Convention drafted the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The second drew up a Constitutional Treaty in which were defined for the first time the principles, values and objectives of the European Union, the Charter was introduced, essential reforms were made and the policies agreed were systematised.

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The balance sheet of the ratification process for the Constitutional Treaty, drawn up in the Madrid meeting of the Friends of the Constitution, was as follows: 18 states had ratified the Treaty (Spain and Luxembourg in referendums), another four were in favour, two had tried it with adverse results (France and Holland) and three had not even initiated the process (United Kingdom, Poland and the Czech Republic). Although more than two thirds were in favour of the Treaty, unanimity means that whoever does not approve in fact vetoes.

The solution was the agreement of the European Council in June to abandon the constituent method for one of reform, transposing the greater part of the Constitutional Treaty into two others, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty of functioning of the EU (TFEU). Clarity falls a victim to the mandate, there is a return to a labyrinthine accumulation of amendments and symbols (flag and anthem, the Ode to Joy), the object of a stupid suppression. The result is a basic text which embodies the principal advances:

- The explicit proclamation of the values of the Union: democracy, respect for human rights, the Rule of Law, with a special emphasis on plural-ism, non-discrimination, tolerance, solidarity and equality between men and women.
- The definition of objectives, beginning with peace and welfare. Sustainable development, based on a balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, tending to full employment and social progress, the combating of social exclusion, the promotion of justice; social protection, inter-generational solidarity and the rights of the child, a high level of environmental protection, promotion of scientific and technical progress; economic, social and territorial cohesion and respect for cultural and linguistic diversity. In its relations with the world, it will contribute to peace, security and the sustainable development of the planet, solidarity, free and fair trade, the eradication of poverty and respect for human rights, according to the United Nations Charter.
- European citizenship now again occupies the place it deserves thanks to the efforts of the European Parliament (EP).
- The Charter of Fundamental Rights is juridically binding and has the same rank as the Treaties. A protocol establishes measures for the United Kingdom and Poland, which wish to exclude themselves from its application. The Charter is innovative in some rights, such as the protection of the human body from capitalist exploitation, data protection in the IT world or the right to good administration.
- Participative democracy is reinforced with the recognition of the right to citizen initiative, starting from one million citizens of a significant number of states.
- The juridical personality of the EU is recognised, with the consequent disappearance of the structure of pillars.
- A clear and precise division of competences is introduced with a flexibility clause.
- The EP-Council joint decision becomes the ordinary legislative procedure, with an enlargement of subjects from 35 to 85. There is a strengthening of the juridical bases for action in the fields of climate change, energy, patents, tourism, sports space and administrative co-operation.
- A horizontal social clause ensures that in the definition of policies account will be taken of a high level of employment, appropriate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training and health pro-
A legal base is established for services of general economic interest.

- A control mechanism is introduced for subsidiarity with an “orange card” (if one third of the Parliaments of the member states reject a proposal, the Commission has to reconsider it).

- In the matter of budget, the complete equality of the EP and the Council is assured, eliminating the distinction between obligatory and non-obligatory expenses.

- Qualified majority becomes the general rule in the Council, with a double majority of 55% of states and 65% of the population, with a minimum of 4 states to block a decision. The system will come into force in 2014 with a security mechanism called the Ioannina mechanism.

- Access to reinforced co-operations is provided, for which the EP needs to give its consent.

- The proposal for the distribution of seats in the EP is accepted, with one more for the President.

- The President of the Commission will be elected by the EP at the proposal of the Council, on the basis of the results of the European elections. The High Representative for the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) joins the Commission as Vice-President, and will be in charge of the external service.

- The Commission, after 2014, will be composed of commissioners drawn from \( \frac{2}{3} \) of the states with a rotation system ensuring equality.

- In Defence, states with the ability and wish to develop their cooperation will be able to do so, with a solidarity clause with regard to any external armed attack.

- The area of Freedom, Security and Justice becomes a community matter, with joint decision and qualified majority voting (QMV), with some emergency braking mechanisms and exceptions for the United Kingdom and Ireland.

- The jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) is extended to all the activities of the EU, with the exception of the ESDP.

- The post of President of the European Council is created, with a mandate of two years and a half, to prepare, co-ordinate and represent the European Council.

- In the revision process, the EP strengthens its role: it has the right of initiative, it is part of the Convention, which becomes the normal revision procedure, and its approval is binding. In addition, the simplified revision procedures allow the passing by unanimity to decision by majority.

- Finally, the TEU includes a clause providing for the voluntary secession of any member state that wishes to withdraw from the Union.

The next challenge is to crown the ratification process in all the member states promptly by 2008, which will call not only for synchronisation but, more importantly, for political initiative, solidarity and mutual good faith. In its first stage, the construction of Europe was carried forward by pragmatic and functional means without putting to the fore the principles and values that inspired it; since the creation of the Union, the states and citizens have been the two fundamental pillars of the Union. Now, the task is to achieve the definitive consolidation of the European Union with the active defence of European citizenship and the development of its social dimension, open to the world as a pioneering form of political response to globalisation.
When future historians come to write the history of modern Greek politics, the developments of 2007 may be recognized as the spark that ignited the most significant major political changes since the 1974 fall of the Dictatorship (Metapolitefsi). These developments appear to increase the challenge posed to the established political and party alignments. These alignments have been expressed within a two-party-plus system, where governments implemented major, hegemonic political projects, which proved crucial to the country’s development. Thus, it was the conservatives of the New Democracy Party (ND) that dominated the delicate transition to democracy in the mid-1970s, the radicalism of the ‘change’ of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) in the 1980s and, after a short interlude of weak governments, the New PASOK that dominated the political scene with its modernizing project of more than 10 years, which led Greece into the Eurozone. Until the 2004 March elections, when the revamped ND, under the leadership of Kostas Karamanlis, nephew of the party’s founder Konstantine Karamanlis, came to power on a platform that promised to overturn the corrupt patterns of the Greek Socialists and to make extensive ‘reforms’, these two parties dominated Greek politics. The parliamentary presence of other parties, which were primarily on the left, was limited and at times symbolic. However, as of last year’s election, this pattern appears to be changing.

2007 was supposed to be a very promising year for the governing ND. Emerging from a rather good performance during the autumn 2006 municipal and regional elections, the Karamanlis government seemed ready to leave behind its political strategy of ‘blaming everything on PASOK’ and finally to implement its program. However, it proved a rather disappointing year for the Government. After it had achieved power on a promise to eliminate corruption, and with an ethical and political condemnation of the partitocracia of public life, one could not have anticipated the series of events that were to jeopardize this promise in a most vivid fashion.

**Incompetence and Corruption**

The Government’s most significant actions and initiatives during last year’s administration revealed a striking incompetence and/or corruption. The failure to contain the mass student movement within the framework of the rule of law, the striking police brutality and misuse of power against immigrants (March), the tragic incapacity of the state authorities to respond to emergencies, such as the twelve missing persons in the Peloponnesian mountains (May) or the sinking of the cruiser “Sea Diamond” at the port of Santorini with unmeasured ecological consequences (April), and finally the pathetic failure of the government to prevent or simply to put out the summer fires which cost the lives of over 70 people and nearly destroyed the archaeological site in Olympia (July, August) gradually challenged the government’s political strategy of ‘blaming everything on PASOK’. The government’s inability to deal with the everyday life of citizens, and to provide them with security and respect for the law, had started to become striking.

Moreover the Governing party’s failure to implement its program and maintain the profile of a moderate non-nationalist, cosmopolitan, rational and law-abiding political force exacerbated its above-mentioned incompetence. The reform of the Constitution held a prominent place in ND’s electoral platform. The sym-
bol of this Constitutional reform was the revision of the article prohibiting the functioning of private universities in the country. Although the majority of PASOK, the leading opposition party, had agreed on this reform, a large popular backlash forced it to be dropped from the Constitutional reform, which led to the termination of the entire process.

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Other major reform promises were the ‘re-establishment of the state’, which basically meant a radical restructuring of the poorly functioning civil service, the ‘rationalisation’ of the pension plans and extensive reforms in the country’s university system based on a new and state-controlled system of evaluation. The last was introduced in a way that led to reactions from both the student and the academic community. The government retreated temporarily and finally introduced a number of contradictory measures, a good part of which are almost impossible to implement. As for the much advertised ‘re-establishment of the state’, this never resulted in a clear and/or concrete set of proposals; however, the governmental party’s interference in the inner workings of the public administration showed that it was simply a façade to colonize the state and control the civil servants. Finally, the reform of the pension plans was delayed after the election and the initial plan managed to rally literally the entire work force against it (thousands of people marched in the streets of Athens just last December). Finally, the plan was temporarily abandoned as the cabinet minister responsible resigned over a personal housing by-law violation. The task of this reform was passed on to the next minister, who faced not only the reactions of the Unions but a widespread mistrust of the Government when yet another major economic and political scandal was revealed in a dramatic way.

In fact, throughout 2007 a number of governmental actions were the outcome of the misuse of state power. This was a pattern set primarily the previous year. The ill-advised transfer of a number of pension plans into hedge funds, which was proved to benefit a number of financiers linked to the government and led to the resignation of the minister responsible, was probably the most striking example, that is, until December. It was then that the Secretary General of the ministry of culture, a political appointee of the Prime Minister himself, attempted to commit suicide. This shocking action was however only the tip of the iceberg, since it was soon revealed that this individual was connected not only to a sex scandal but more significantly to a series of corrupt distributions of millions of Euros through the secret account of his department.

Finally, another major issue that confronted the government domestically was the content of the history text-book for the sixth grade. The book, which was authorized by the government agency responsible, challenges some of the dominant myths of modern Greek history. This was enough for nationalists, of all backgrounds, to react and demand that the book be withdrawn as an official text for students. Since the majority of the reactions came from ND supporters, the government tried to maintain its image as a rational, liberal and non-nationalist political force by deferring the issue and through procedural excuses to sweep it under the carpet. Finally, however it gave in to the pressure and withdrew the book. To many it was yet another proof of the Government’s unreliability.

Foreign Policy: Going with the Flow

During the last year the Government’s foreign policy did not change. The Karamanlis government continued a rather passive political strategy. The visit of UN commissioner Mathew Nimic concerning the issue of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) (January), the visit of the Turkish Chief of Staff to Salonica (April) or the visit of Turkey’s Minister of Foreign Affairs to Athens (December) did not result in any progress on the thorny issues with Turkey or the question of the name of the neighbouring ‘Macedonia’. Nor did the government manage to take advantage of Chancellor Merkel’s visit to Athens or Prime Minister Karamanlis’ trip to Moscow (December), to New Zealand and Australia (May) to promote the country’s interests. Greece has kept a very low profile regarding EU developments, as well as maintaining a low profile in the region and in relation to the events that marked the Mediterranean countries. The only exception to this pattern was the visit of President V. Putin to sign the agreement for the build-
ing of the Bourgaz-to-Alexandroupolis pipeline to transport Russian natural gas. The profound economic impact on Greece and the region itself is clear.

The Opposition

In confronting all these issues, the leading opposition party (PASOK) proved to be strikingly inefficient. Its new leader George Papandreou, son of the party’s founder Andreas, did not succeed in capitalizing on the Government’s failures. Given its long involvement in government, PASOK had a hard time distancing itself from the Government’s political strategy. In fact, on key issues, PASOK’s policies did not differ from those of ND. PASOK attempted to criticize the Government more on ethical and managerial grounds than on political ones. In addition, a number of inconsistent and often confusing organizational initiatives by its leadership failed to revitalize the party, or to renew its personnel and its overall image. The latter was crucial to its political efficiency. Thus, although the public opinion polls showed a clear popular disenchantment with the ND government, PASOK did not make the expected political advances.

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As PASOK struggled with its opposition tactics, the major burden of the opposition was carried by the Synaspismos of the Radical Left (SYN), an alliance of left-wing parties and individuals, mainly through parliamentary but also extra-parliamentary activity. This party, with its radical rhetoric that was distinct from the dogmatism of the Communist Party (KKE), found itself in alliance with almost every expression of public discontent. Led by an ex-communist member of the European Parliament, Alecos Alavanos, SYN managed to make political advances and displayed great dynamism. It penetrated the electoral base not only of the stumbling PASOK but also of KKE. The absence of effective opposition to the Government also created some space for the Communists to mobilize the population’s feelings of protest. The base of this mobilization was structured around a strong ‘euroscepticism’, an anthropomorphic ‘anti-imperialist’ and often unexpected nationalist rhetoric, and a zero-sum logic vis-à-vis the politics of all the other political parties. In a similar vein, the small radical right-wing party (Popular Orthodox Rally- LAOS), which had already elected a member to the European Parliament (2004), seemed to be making advances. The mid-year polls indicated that the influence of this party had been consolidated and that it exceeded the three percent threshold necessary to enter the Greek Parliament. This was verified in September’s general elections.

The Election, the Sign of a New Era?

The September 16th election was called with just one month’s notice, when the fires that had devastated the country had not quite been put out. This was the shortest electoral campaign period since 1974. Although many expected that the election would be called soon after the end of the summer holidays, the opposition parties were not quite ready. The striking culpability of the Government for the country’s calamity had led to the assumption that the election would be postponed. The Government however, building on the opposition’s weaknesses and on excessive use of state funds (paying cash to everyone who claimed some loss in the fires) ran an electoral campaign literally without a program, based on the argument that ND was the only party trustworthy and capable enough to run the country’s government. Arguments like that had been supported by the positive effects of the ND’s recent 7th Congress (July) and were sustained by a generally magnificent communicative strategy. In fact it was the latter that cemented the electoral support for the Governmental party when this was endangered by the natural disasters and the Government’s overall incompetence.

Under these circumstances the electoral result was somewhat to be expected (see Table 25). ND lost about 3.6% of its vote and achieved only a slim majority of 152 seats in the 300-seat Parliament. However, given that LAOS attained 3.8% and 10 seats, one could argue that the overall strength of the country’s right-wing forces was left intact, although electoral studies have shown that LAOS draws its support from all parts of the political spectrum. PASOK, which had run an inconsistent campaign, exposing its political, organizational and primarily its leadership
weaknesses, incurred a loss of 2.4%, which was translated into 15 fewer seats in parliament. The big winners of the election were the parties of the left. KKE gained 2.25% and SYN 1.74%.

The electoral results had divergent effects upon the country’s political forces. ND seems a little numb; the two-seat parliamentary majority could not give its leadership any security and/or flexibility. More dramatic were the reactions within PASOK, as the electoral defeat of a good part of the party was attributed to the weak leadership of George Papandreou. Over the two months that followed, the Greek Socialists became involved in a bitter leadership battle. This was settled in the re-election of George Papandreou with a commanding 55.5% in a three-way race. The party, however, remained divided and was still without enough steam to lead an effective opposition. Under these conditions, SYN with a much stronger parliamentary caucus has capitalized on its electoral gains and displays a dynamism unprecedented for a left-wing party. This was a dynamism which drew its strength from the people’s continuous and deep-seated disenchantment with PASOK’s governmentalist opposition and KKE’s sterile dogmatism. This dynamism was not stifled even when SYN’s very successful leader announced his departure from the leadership of the party. All the serious studies indicate that this small party already commands well over ten percent of the popular vote. By the end of 2007, support for what the Greeks call ‘bipartism’ (the two-party system) displayed signs of fatigue and even decay. As ND and especially PASOK stagger between incompetence, misuse of political power and corruption, which in effect have led them away from genuine societal concerns and limited them to the management of state affairs, the possibility of a new radical realignment of political forces appears closer. The political events of 2007 set the stage for such a development; however, since ‘the proof is in the eating’ the real test will be the 2009 European Elections.

By the end of 2007, support for what the Greeks call ‘bipartism’ displayed signs of fatigue and even decay

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**TABLE 25**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% 10/10/1993</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>% 22/09/96</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>% 09/04/2000</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>% 07/03/2004</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>% 16/09/2007</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ND</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>41.83</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PASOK</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>38.10</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAN</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KKE</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8.15</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SYN</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAOS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Ministry of the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralization.
The Sense of Elections in the Maghreb Countries

Questioning the sense of the elections in the central Maghreb countries – Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia – seems relevant, but somewhat incongruous at the same time. It is relevant as it enables the present state of the political systems to be assessed, albeit imperfectly, questioning above all whether the elites have the capacity to share the power, particularly with the Islamists, on the basis of the Turkish model. At the same time, even though the significant progress made over the last 20 years as regards transparency and electoral competition is genuine, it has not had any effect on the formation of governments, the rotation of the elites in power or the defining of public policies.

In reality, these parameters of democracy are extended in environments that remain fundamentally marked by political authoritarianism and conservatism. We could thus be tempted to wonder, as Guy Hermet did in the past with regard to Latin America, “Why hold elections?”

Political Legitimacy Regardless of the Elections

Since the independence of the three countries in question, elections do not make a great deal of sense in terms of the popular will. The sense of representation has been distorted as the idea of legitimacy has remained separate from political representation. Those with a mandate to exercise power did so in the name of their struggle for independence: legitimacy was not obtained by going to the polls. This historical legitimacy linked to the struggles for independence has been monopolised in Tunisia and Algeria by the single party, and symbolised in all three countries by a leader whose charisma was similarly linked to the fight against the French colonisers. In Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba personified the father of the nation, and in Algeria, Houari Boumediene established a strong State resting on a structured army that was to become the country’s main political actor. In Morocco, although the monarchical institution embodied historical legitimacy, it has been linked with the country’s construction around the Crown since independence was attained in 1956, at the same time favouring political pluralism. Here, the choice of a multi-party system was dictated by the monarchy in order to prevent the Istiqlal party from taking over the political arena. Up until the 1980s, the entire political discourse in all three countries revolved around maintaining national unity and the country’s development. The question of elections was considered a marginal affair, with the countries’ leaders highlighting a legitimacy that had been hard to come by in the fight for the country’s liberation, and which would give them, as they put it, a mandate for representing their fellow citizens.

At the time, this concept of representation was based on the idea of delegation, with the political elites constituting themselves as representatives. However, these legitimacies inherited from the countries’ independence were to become progressively depleted, and from the mid-1970s – and even more so in the 1980s – numerous crises were to reveal this disintegration of the former legitimacies. Both here and there, a

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1 The expression was coined by Michel Camau, at the round table debate, “The sense of electoral consultation in the Maghreb today”. Ifri, Paris, 11 October 2002.
wave of workers’ and students’ strikes occurred, riots brought about by the increase in the price of bread, progressively widespread retaliatory action, and, in Morocco, two coups d’état against the King. The younger generation, born long after the advent of independence, caused the image of a state expected to blend in with society and the nation in a single national unity to stress the construction rather than the reality, giving rise to a serious rift between them and the leaders. This calling into question of the state’s distributive function was coupled with a crisis in political representation: many citizens did not identify with the political elites.

Institutional planning was implemented during the 1980s in order to overcome this growing distance between the leaders and the citizens. In Tunisia, from 1981, Bourguiba resolved to put an end to the single-party era. The elections did not constitute a real democratic transition, however, as they were marked by reciprocal mistrust. The Tunisians witnessed how the proliferation of parties failed to create any real competition, as the former single party (PSD) simply became the dominant party; and although President Bourguiba showed he was willing to make some changes in his style of government, he was by no means prepared to accept the verdict of the polls. The authorities did not appear to have mastered the pluralist struggle, fearing claims and revindications from the parties in the opposition.

The 1989 elections were yet another missed appointment for democratic transition. In the first general elections of the “new era”, marked by President Ben Ali’s ascent to power, the dominant party, renamed the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (RCD), continued to merge with the State, personified in its leader.

In the mid-1980s in Algeria, the abandonment of the socialist model and the sharp drop in oil prices led to the traumatic experience of October 1988. The political leaders opted for pluralism and abandoned the single party, the FLN.

The grounds for a democratic system were implemented with real freedom of press and political pluralism, and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), an Islamist party, was recognised and stood for the general elections, obtaining a landslide victory. The Algerian High Command’s refusal to acknowledge the victory of the Islamists at the polls led to the legislative elections being cancelled, and the suspension of the electoral process plunged the country into civil war lasting over 7 years and causing some 200,000 deaths.

In this precise context, as shown by Luis Martinez (2000), the election had the opposite effect from that intended. Instead of stabilising the power, renewing the elites and providing the authorities with internal regulation, it destabilised the regime, contributed to the collapse of the national community, destroyed the elites and, above all, installed long-lasting violence in the country. Martinez equates this failed election to violence, bloodshed and war.

In spite of the background of civil war, the army, concerned with maintaining the system whilst remaining in the shadow, held a series of polls between 1995 and 1997. The smooth running of these electoral consultations and the fact that they were held on regular dates, as scheduled, showed that they were intended to progressively normalise the country’s political life, while providing the regime with a legal structure.

**The Staging of a Formal Democracy**

During the 1990s, the elections held in each of the countries took place against a background of change to which the executive aspired: *Changer la vie* was the slogan popularised by President Chadli Benjedid; the Tunisians talked about the *Nouvelle ère* embarked on by President Ben Ali, and in Morocco, King Hassan II’s *Alternance* was the key word – a controlled, consensus political opening bringing an opposition party into political play.

In this context, the elections were intended to lead to a political opening and express the renewed political link between the voters and the political leaders. These polls were different from those that had been held previously, as the ruling class made a considerable effort for the schedule to be observed. This concern for formal legality contrasted sharply with the people’s questioning of the sense of the elections. In the three countries contemplated, the authorities highlighted a multi-party political framework and held elections on a regular basis, scrupulously respecting the electoral schedule. They also multiplied the mechanisms of political control, showcasing transparency as if in a bid to break with past periods while surrounding the polls with a multitude of procedural guarantees. All these precautions were intended to provide the authorities with symbolic coherence, while showing concern for constitutional legality.

This legalist aspect was highlighted to such an extent that it became a genuine political programme in
itself, and the electoral campaigns stressed the procedures more than the actual political issues of the campaign. In actual fact, these elections indicated a desire for a top-down transformation; in spite of the concern for transparency and openness, they were controlled by the authorities.

These elections indicated a desire for a top-down transformation; in spite of the concern for transparency and openness, they were controlled by the authorities.

In Algeria, the construction of an institutional edifice with a democratic façade between 1995 and 1997 was censured once again by dissensions arising within the army and which were at the origin of President Zéroual’s resignation. Despite this crisis and the fact that it forced the presidential elections to be brought forward, the army did not relinquish the de facto power it had held since 1965. In 1999, it used the same method as it had tried out after the death of Boumediene: that of a candidate being designated by the High Command. The outgoing President did not keep his promise of free, transparent elections: Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected by default in April 1999, the other six candidates having withdrawn on the eve of the polls to condemn the fraud and manipulation.

In this case, despite procedural guarantees and a discourse hailing transparency, the leaders had difficulty in keeping their promises as regards the elections. By allowing the people to express themselves freely, they ran the risk of a landslide Islamist victory taking place, as had been the case in Algeria in 1991. This lack of competence in dealing with unknown quantities led them to a continuous “patching up” of the results. Change resided in less manipulation and the fact that it was not visible. As for the voters, they were much more attentive to the existence of fraud than to the actual political programme put forward by each party. This game of reciprocal mistrust was revealed by record abstention figures and the refusal to vote of entire regions, such as Kabylie.

In reality, this staging of a formal democracy distracted the citizens’ attention from the real issues that should have been on the table at election time.

For example, the day after the September 2002 general elections in Morocco, the debate was monopolised by the government party and the idea of electoral transparency, two factors seemingly less important than the breakthrough of the Justice and Development Party (PJD) Islamists, who obtained 42 seats in Parliament but did not form part of the government.

The Deceptive Nature of the General Elections

However, just as pluralism did not bring about a true democratic opening, neither was transparency able to constitute a genuine end in itself. It concealed the basic debates that could have focused on the change in the political systems, the efficiency of Parliament, the autonomy of the political parties, mobility, the rejuvenation of the political elites, and so on.

As a result, the high abstention rate recorded did not necessarily mean a lack of interest in politics in general, but very probably a rejection of the form of governance. The voters did not identify with these tactics of deception, intended to give the impression of an incipient democratisation, particularly as their priorities were totally left out of the electoral campaigns. The general elections held in Algeria and Morocco in 2002 in fact showed a very significant abstention rate (54% in the case of Algeria and 50% in Morocco), due to various reasons. First of all, in both cases, the National Assembly did not symbolise the seat of political power. Also, in Algeria, the party leaders in the running had been more concerned with convincing the voters to go to the polls than with actually putting forward any real electoral programme. Apart from the Prime Minister Benflis, the candidates did not succeed in rallying the population. The Algerians were aware of the logic of power underlying these polls, i.e. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s pursuit of popular support in order to reinforce his position with respect to the generals, and the latter’s concern to give the false impression of an outwardly democratic system. On a national level, the high abstention rate certainly owed a lot to the Kabylie region, where the movement of the arouchos or village committees – Kabylie’s active voice since 2001 – had called for an “active boycott.” It was therefore not a question of a refusal to vote, but rather of the elections being prevented by physical threats to the voters.

Also in Morocco, the 2002 general elections showed the Islamists of the PJD to be the third largest political
force in the country, when they won 42 seats in Parliament as opposed to the 14 they had held before. Five years later, the challenge posed when general elections were held again in these two countries was not the profound transformation of the political landscape, but rather the display of the pursuance and consolidation of institutional democratisation, with the consequent modernisation of the political systems. In both cases the abstention rate was even higher than in 2002 (over 65%). There were two basic reasons for this disaffection: the lack of, or weakness of, the parties’ electoral programmes, and the fact that the National Assembly did not yet symbolise the real seat of power.

The National Assembly did not yet symbolise the real seat of power

In Algeria, the population has a negative image of the National Assembly itself and, consequently, of the members of Parliament. It consists of 20 parties, although this does not mean it represents political diversity. On the contrary the candidates are uniform, almost all of them from the presidential majority. The real opposition has been marginalised by the authorities, and many political parties, such as the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), led by Hocine Aït Ahmed, regularly call for boycotts of the elections. Consequently, the 20 parties making up the Assembly are actually artificially maintained in order to give the impression of a democratic, pluralist system. These parties have no real political programme and no real base, and their leaders are the figures referred to in Algiers as the “political intermittents.” Without a programme or any issues capable of mobilising public opinion, during the electoral campaign these individuals spent their time convincing the electors that they should vote, so much so that it could lead us to believe that the mere fact of placing a voting paper in a ballot box has become a genuine programme in itself.

The National Assembly is not totally devoid of constitutional powers, however: it has the means of censoring and controlling the government, and of installing investigation and ministerial interrogation committees. Nevertheless, in the last two general elections it has shown itself excessively submissive to the executive power. By concentrating all the pow-
In actual fact, the two factors coexisted perfectly. The elections were indeed transparent, in accordance with the monarchy’s desire for political opening. Also to the monarchy’s credit was the fact that the PJD found its niche in the Moroccan political landscape. While profiting from this transparency and winning 4 seats, however, it did not escape the authorities’ instrumentalisation of the political parties, particularly as regards constituency redistricting.

The PJD did not escape the authorities’ instrumentalisation of the political parties

In reality, the political opening was just as carefully measured and orchestrated by the monarchy as ever. This concentration of power is in clear opposition to the democratisation advocated by the King. At the same time it puts the sense of the elections and the sense of political pluralism into perspective, as what is really essential is not a party’s actual presence in Parliament or in the government, but whether it has enough manoeuvring room to be able to influence the political decision-making.

Today, these countries showcase democracy while refusing to recognise the verdict of the elections. But while the electoral rendezvous and ballot transparency undeniably constitute progress as regards political opening, in themselves they are insufficient for us to be able to speak of any real democratic functioning. This democracy hailed by the authorities and to which they regularly refer requires substance. It cannot be constructed without taking into account the group of citizens forming its base. It must also be supported by unifying schemes allowing the consensus obtained during the struggle against colonisation to be renewed. When democratic issues are stressed but a democratic government is not actually installed, in a way, discussing it is simply a form of escapism (Hermet, 2007), geared to avoiding facing up to the problems that really exist: unemployment, uncontrolled youth with no ambition and no future, radical Islamist networks increasingly able to recruit “volunteers” for suicide, the wear and ageing of the political systems and politicians, the difficulty in avoiding nationalism and fully accessing internationalisation, and so on.

In this context, when elections are held without the citizens being consulted and taken into account, they simply make use of their privilege of not taking part in something that could represent a strong, comfortable consensus for the creators of this deceptive democracy.

Bibliography


The year 2007 brought a consolidation of existing trends with regard to both Libya’s external relations and its domestic developments. Normalisation of relations with the United States, the European Union and a number of European countries further progressed after Tripoli released 5 Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor sentenced to death for allegedly deliberately infecting hundreds of Libyan children with HIV.

By contrast, domestic developments in the economic and political sphere were marked by an erratic one-step-forward/one-step back pattern. This could be explained in part by increasing internal power struggles between the reform-oriented elite faction spearheaded by Gaddafi’s son Saif al-Islam, who again held a programmatic pro-political and economic reform speech in August, and the status-quo-oriented old guard but also with rivalries among Gaddafi’s sons. The revolutionary leader continued his policy of calculated ambiguity, not clearly endorsing one of the competing factions, in keeping with his long-standing pattern of ruling by spreading fear and uncertainty. Overall, there were few signs in 2007 of a coherent government strategy to confront the broad spectrum of domestic challenges.

**Further Normalisation of Ties with Europe and the US**

Relations with Europe were marked by diplomatic frenzy in the first half of 2007 after a previous death sentence on the Bulgarian nurses was confirmed in late 2006. The negotiations over their release – which on 17 July led to the commuting of the death-sentences to life imprisonment and a week later to their return to Bulgaria – testified to Libya’s high bargaining power in the foreign policy domain. The latter has much to do with the fact that Libya is Europe’s third most important oil supplier and is seen as an indispensable cooperation partner in the European Union’s efforts to reduce illegal African migration across the Mediterranean Sea as well as in the international fight against terrorism. The concessions Libya managed to wrest from the EU in return for the prisoners’ release included compensation for the HIV victims, treatment of the infected children in Europe, and funding for a hospital in Benghazi. Moreover, the EU commission agreed to propose to the ministerial conference the gist of a future framework agreement that would among other things facilitate access of Libyan agricultural products to European markets.

While the EU and particularly the German council presidency had made a substantial effort to negotiate the deal, it was France that eventually managed to take the credit and publicity for it when the French president’s wife of the time intervened at the last minute in a unilateral move to secure the nurses’ release. A French-Libyan military cooperation and arms deal concluded in late July as well as a cooperation agreement for the construction of a nuclear power plant also appeared to be linked to the nurses’ extradition, although negotiations for these deals had started under Chirac’s presidency. Tony Blair’s visit to Libya in February 2007 led to a multi-billion Libyan gas deal with BP as well as an agreement on anti-terrorism cooperation and mutual legal assistance. The symbolic and material rehabilitation of Libya’s regime was further promoted by Nicolas Sarkozy, who invited Gaddafi for an official visit in December 2007. Spain followed suit, although with a much lower-key approach.
Washington also formally upgraded its relationship with Libya by announcing the delegation of an ambassador, one of Libya’s perennial requests. However, resistance to this move arose when a group of Senators including Hillary Clinton tied confirmation of the nominee to Libya’s outstanding compensation payments in the Lockerbie case. As a result, the US ambassador had yet to arrive in Tripoli by the end of 2007. But the administration’s eagerness to fully normalise ties with Libya was reflected in a visit to Tripoli by the assistant secretary of state John Negroponte in April as well as a Libyan government delegation’s trip to the US, the first of its kind in two decades. Despite the steady normalisation of ties with the US and the EU, Gaddafi continued to send contradictory signs to Western governments, upholding defiant rhetoric vis-à-vis the West and particularly the US in many of his speeches. Similarly, Libyan activities in Africa presented a curious picture. On the one hand, Tripoli made efforts to resolve the conflict in Sudan; on the other hand it openly supported the Chadian president Déby by providing him with weapons and continued to meddle on the tribal level in its neighbouring countries.

**Still Turning its Back on the EMP and ENP**

The improving relationship with Europe has not led Libya to embrace either the multilateral Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) or the multi-bilateral European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Libyan officials have made it clear that they have no desire for integration in either of the two frameworks for cooperation. Their declared preference is a framework agreement with the EU that focuses primarily on economic and trade issues. Criticism levelled against the EMP includes the fact that Israel is part of the initiative, that the EMP unites countries with little or no common interests, and that it undermines African unity. Off the record, Libyan officials concede that the main reason for shunning these existing cooperation frameworks is the fact that they would oblige Libya to embark on domestic reform, including in the political domain. By contrast, Libyan officials and Gaddafi himself during his visit to Paris voiced much support for Sarkozy’s plan for a Mediterranean Union, even if Israeli participation was criticized. This enthusiasm for the Sarkozy project can be largely explained by Libya’s desire for cooperation with no political strings attached and a focus on issues such as energy and environment that are of great interest to Tripoli. With its active participation in the 5+5 security initiative since 2004, Libya has already proved that it is willing to cooperate in a multilateral framework as long as this cooperation does not entail interference with domestic affairs. Nonetheless, Libya exhibited a clear preference for bilateral agreements both in the economic and security domains. Yet, even negotiations for such agreements could drag on, as Italy experienced with regard to a cooperation agreement on joint sea patrols to curb illegal migration to Italy, which was finally signed in late 2007 after years of negotiations with many setbacks.

Moreover, Libya demonstrated its strong sense of sovereignty to Western governments in a number of small but significant moves. Employing a tit-for-tat strategy, Tripoli temporarily refused to issue visas to citizens of different EU countries because Gaddafi’s sons had not been granted the requested visa privileges. And in November 2007 thousands of European tourists and businessmen were refused entry at Libya’s ports and airports because they did not have an Arabic translation of their passports. The decree requiring such a translation had been issued virtually overnight and not communicated at all. Such ad-hoc moves not only marked foreign relations but continued to be one of the main characteristics of Gaddafi’s rule.

**Growing Domestic Challenges**

With 38 years in power in 2007, Gaddafi’s enduring reign has only been topped by that of Cuba’s Fidel Castro and Gabon’s Omar Bongo Ondimba. His system, a peculiar design of formally direct-democratic institutions effectively controlled by informal revolutionary structures and tribal politics, as well as his style of rule – highly personalized, opaque, and on the spur of the moment – serve to institutionalize chaos and coercion and have proven to be flexible and highly adaptable. Libya in 2007 could be considered by far more stable than its neighbours Algeria and Egypt. Even though the regime did not face immediate threats, it confronted a number of socio-economic, political and security challenges with unsettling potential effects in the long-run. The socio-economic problems included high levels of corruption (Libya was ranked 131 out of 179 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index), high youth unemployment (overall unemployment was estimated at around 30% by the Economist Intelligence
Unit in its 2007 Libya country profile) and stagnation if not deterioration of living standards. Numerous complaints in newspapers and on official websites about the level of corruption, the disastrous state of the health care system as well as the generally poor delivery and functioning of public services indicate a deep-rooted popular dissatisfaction with living conditions and a low output legitimacy of the regime. While Libya did better in terms of its Human Development Index than all of its Arab neighbours (it ranked 56 out of 177 on the HDI in 2007), an argument made frequently by Libyans is that the real yardstick for Gaddafi’s performance should be the smaller Gulf countries, which like Libya feature oil wealth and small populations.

A Libyan website considered to be close to Gaddafi and his son Saif al-Islam in the autumn of 2007 featured an electronic poll in which only 8% of the respondents believed that the government acted in the interest of the citizens. Even though it is safe to assume that such polls are manipulated for political purposes, their outcome has a certain significance. They highlight that the Libyan government is so widely unpopular that Gaddafi, who holds no formal role in the direct-democratic governing structures (as revolutionary leader, however, he is the supreme commander of the military), sees a need to distance himself from it. This has been a long-standing practice of the Libyan leader in times of domestic crisis.

In the absence of independent polls and still widespread fear of speaking about politics openly, particularly with foreigners (Art. 166 of the penal code still criminalises contact with anyone working for a foreign government) it was difficult to measure the degree of popular dissatisfaction with the existing political leadership, including Gaddafi himself. While there was some student protest and social commotion, popular discontent in 2007 did not express itself as violently as in 2006 when demonstrations in the context of the cartoon crisis turned into anti-regime riots and bloody clashes.

…Yet No Powerful Opposition Movement in Sight

Apart from the Muslim Brotherhood, no potentially powerful opposition movement existed that could have capitalised on the social discontent. The secular democracy-oriented opposition is mainly found in exile and fragmented. Individuals close to these opposition groups in Libya constantly risk imprisonment – a dozen people were arrested and put on trial in 2007 for planning a peaceful demonstration. Merely a small number of academics, mainly from Benghazi, backed by Saif al-Islam or influential families are in a position to criticize the system – the well-informed, regime-critical website *libya al-youm* (www.libya-alyoum.com) reported in December 2007 that they had decided to found a national democracy centre.

Apart from the Muslim Brotherhood no potentially powerful opposition movement existed that could have capitalised on the social discontent

The Muslim Brotherhood, considered to be the numerically strongest Islamist opposition current in the country, continued to express support for Saif al-Islam’s reform agenda – Gaddafi’s most politically active son had in 2006 negotiated the release of over 80 prominent MB members from prison. Yet, some of the Brotherhood’s leaders in exile made it clear in interviews with pan-Arab media that they have become increasingly disappointed with the slow speed at which reforms were implemented. Given that dissenting voices are still brutally repressed, the chances of the Brotherhood becoming a potent political opposition force within the country remained slim. Also, Saif al-Islam in his speeches continued his efforts to cater to the Brotherhood. For instance, he made it clear in his programmatic speech of 20 August, 2007 that abolishing the *shari’a* remained out of the question, citing it as one of four red lines that were not to be crossed, the others being the status of Muammar Gaddafi, national unity, and the security and stability of Libya (BBC Monitoring Global Newsline Middle East Political File, 21/08/2007).

Concerns over security seemed to rise within the regime, as unofficial reports in 2007 repeatedly spoke of small-scale clashes between Islamist militants and security forces in the East of the country, which has traditionally been more anti-regime and pro-Islamist and in the late 1990s had been a hotbed of armed groups. In 2007 around 60 prisoners belonging to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) were released.
However, LIFG leaders outside of the country in the fall announced that the group would join al-Qaeda, the ramifications of which for Libya itself remained unclear. There were a number of indications that Libya like other countries of the Greater Maghreb was a breeding ground for radicalism. In Algeria, several young Libyan militants were either killed or caught, and in late 2007 the New York Times reported that on a list of foreign fighters in Iraq found by the US military 18% were Libyans. Apparently 50 militants had come from one small city (Darnah) within less than a year. Statements by Saif al-Islam in his August 2007 speech advising young Libyans that want to become martyrs to go to al-Anbar and al-Ramadi in Iraq or to Palestine but not to blow themselves up in Libya indicate not only the leadership’s fears over the radical potential among its youth but also its desire to ship the terrorism problem abroad.

Reforms: One Step Forward, One Step Back

With no immediate threat to its power and with the oil price booming – the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated the domestic reserves at way over $80 billion by the end of 2007 – Libya’s elites could afford not to embark on political reforms. There were few signs that the social and economic challenges were being tackled in a systematic way: reform steps in all domains were erratic and contradictory. In the political sphere, Saif al-Islam called for clarification of institutional competences and more institutional stability by establishing a constitution and independence of the judiciary. His push for – albeit limited – political reform appeared to be driven by the conviction that the institutional chaos of the so-called direct democratic system prevents successful modernisation and economic reform. In sharp contrast, Gaddafi and the old guard were striving to further expand these structures by adding a new level of local congresses to the political system. Also, a State Security Court tasked with political cases was established in 2007, de facto reintroducing the notorious People’s Courts that had been abolished in 2005. Promises for more freedom of expression by Saif al-Islam and the creation of two marginally more open newspapers were tainted, among other things, by the arrest of people for organising a peaceful demonstration.

Similarly, reforms in the economic domain remained contradictory. A first step to privatise banks was taken (BNP Paribas bought a minority stake in the Sahara Bank) and a new and more business-friendly investment law was passed. Moreover, Gaddafi made sweeping announcements to boost the private sector by laying off up to 400,000 state employees and providing them with funds to start their own enterprises. At the same time, the government went on a spending spree, announcing public sector wage hikes of up to 80%. The IMF in November 2007 expected an increase in state expenditure by 40%. Also, under the banner of fighting corruption the government arrested dozens of successful private businessmen, some of them known to be critical of the regime, dealing a blow to previous liberalisation efforts (Menas Libya Focus 04/07).

Under the banner of fighting corruption the government arrested dozens of successful private businessmen, some of them known to be critical of the regime

As in previous years such inconsistencies appeared to be the result of increasing regime infighting over how to handle the political and economic challenges. Power struggles also deepened within the Gaddafi family. Saif al-Islam, who heads the formally independent Gaddafi Development Foundation and whose role oscillates between an ombudsman, critic and de facto super development minister of the regime, has built himself a power base through his pro-reform agenda as well as his successful negotiations with foreign governments. But the revolutionary leader has also started pushing a second son, Mu’tasim, making him adviser (or head, depending on the source) of the newly founded National Security Committee and dispatching him to the UN’s General Assembly in 2007 with the Libyan delegation, where he met with Condoleezza Rice. With his military training and as commander of a brigade Mutasim, who is deemed to be close to the hardliners, has a solid foothold in the security apparatus. With virtually all key positions in the security apparatus occupied by members of Gaddafi’s family and tribe, succession will most likely be a family affair one day.
2007 was an intense year for Algeria, full of events of very different kinds. There were parliamentary elections in May and local ones in November (both municipal and wilaya elections), record income from gas and great investment in infrastructure. The country received a number of important international visitors and attended, as neighbouring country and interested party, the first two rounds of peace negotiations between the Polisario Front and Morocco in Manhasset (USA). It also had various disputes regarding the exploitation of its gas resources with the Spanish authorities and companies such as Gas Natural and Repsol YPF. The security situation took a dangerous turn with the change in orientation of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), with its shift in allegiance to Al-Qaeda and consequent name change to “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” at the end of 2006. This led to spectacular terrorist attacks which, due to their being carried out simultaneously and/or by suicide bombers, caused a great number of deaths and injuries, mainly amongst Algerians, but also including foreigners. Neither was 2007 a peaceful year socially speaking. This rise in the price of basic products became unbearable in the summer and early autumn, causing a spread in popular protests and disturbances. The phenomenon of the harragas or clandestine emigrants grew in 2007, despite the efforts taken to counter it, and violence against women increased to worrying proportions, to be combated by means of a nationwide plan involving various ministries and bodies. 2007 saw the end of the year in which Algiers was the Arab Capital of Culture and thus the showcase for these countries’ culture. It also ended with an unbeatable financial balance sheet due to the enormous foreign currency from gas exports, which have consolidated the country’s reserves and will cover its imports for four years. Significant public works were either started or progressed, such as the East-West Motorway, the expansion and modernisation of the rail network, the Algiers metro and tram, the construction of desalination plants on the coast and the significant hydraulic works for the supply of drinking water to cities where its consumption is restricted, such as the country’s capital.

**Elections**

May’s general elections allowed for a refresh of the National Assembly and, at the same time, for some small-scale changes in the government. For example, Mohammed Bedjaoui was replaced as Foreign Minister by the former Minister for the Economy, Mourad Medelci. The presidential alliance (composed of the National Liberation Front or FLN, the National Rally for Democracy or RND and the Movement of Society for Peace or MSP) was once again victorious, although the FLN lost its absolute majority. The aspect most worthy of note was a new historic low in voter participation. There were contradictory statements regarding possible electoral fraud from the Head of the Electoral Oversight Committee and the Minister of the Interior. Another significant outcome was the near disappearance from the political scene of the El-Islah Movement party (MI) after its leader Abdelah Gaballah was not authorised to participate. The entry into parliament of a myriad of small parties meant excessive dispersal of political representation in the country. As a result, the Minister of the Interior, Yazid Zerhouni, spent the summer months trying to combat abstention and approve measures that would prevent the electoral participation of parties that did not win more than a minimum number of votes in the three most recent elections.
November’s local elections saw a nine-point jump in participation to 44%, despite inclement weather conditions including heavy rain and flooding. In addition to confirming the collapse of the El-Islah Movement and repeating May’s results, they saw a strong surge in support for a small party, the Algerian National Front (FNA), led by Moussa Touati. This made it the third-most important party in terms of local politics, at the same level as the Islamist MSP, even though its critics attributed its success to confusion between its initials and those of the winning FLN. Unlike in 2002, the two Kabyle parties took part in the elections and so the region’s traditionally high level of abstentions was at an acceptable percentage.

Terrorism

The allegiance sworn at the end of 2006 by the GSPC to Al-Qaeda and its consequent transformation into Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, a tactical change due to the weakness of the GSPC, led in 2007 to attacks using different methods and seeking international targets. This shift (which is not supported by everyone in the GSPC) does not, according to experts, represent a step towards takfiri terrorism, which deems “civilians” to be legitimate targets whom it considers apostates: should they be killed, they are considered martyrs. Its targets are still politicians and the security services (soldiers, policemen, gendarmes, forest rangers, militias, etc.). Although traditional guerrilla tactics – such as ambushes or small explosions hitting convoys – are still frequently used in mountain or rural areas, more headline-grabbing attacks, such as those involving the simultaneous setting off of a number of explosions or suicide bombers, are now growing, especially in urban areas (the attacks in Tizi Ouzou and Boumerdes in February, Lakhdaria in July, Batna in September and Algiers in December).

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In 2007, close to 600 people died in terrorist attacks, skirmishes and anti-terrorist operations using combat helicopters, artillery and the burning of woodland with napalm bombs, as well as from the result of militia violence. This averages out at some 50 per month, although September, which coincided in part with the month of Ramadan, was by far the most bloody. There were also around 900 wounded, many of them as a result of the attacks in urban areas, especially Batna and Algiers in December. The wilayas (provinces) worst affected by terrorism were those in the centre of the country, especially Boumerdes and Kabylie (Bouira, Tizi Ouzou and Bejaia), but also Algiers, Ain Defla and Djelfa. In the east and south-east, Jijel, Batna, Tebessa and el-Oued. In the west, Chlef and Sidi Bel Abbès. Some attacks against foreign targets also occurred. A number of vehicles transporting workers from gas companies (especially Russian ones) were attacked, as was the Skikda gas pipeline at Jijel on three occasions. A number of French companies received threats and some decided to withdraw their workers. In December, the double attack in Algiers claimed the life of 18 UN (UNHCR and UNDP) staff, leading to criticism of the country’s authorities’ inability to protect such targets.

Foreign Currency and Investment

Algeria benefited enormously from the influx of foreign currency as a result of the increase in the price of oil and gas. This has allowed the country to boost its reserves, with which it can cover four years of imports.
Although Algeria has been prudent by not suddenly injecting this financial surplus into the economy, so as not to create uncontrolled inflation, it has been used to start large-scale public works. There are a large number of these, but perhaps the most spectacular is the 1,200-km East-West Motorway which, including its branches on the central plateau, has a total extension of 1,700 km. It would appear that the environmental issues caused by the road passing through the El Kala Park in El Taref (declared a biosphere reserve by UNESCO) will be addressed by the responsible authorities after an active campaign by ecologists. The rail network, which had suffered great deterioration and lack of attention in terms of both kilometres exploited and staff contracted by the national railway company, will in coming years see substantial growth covering both areas, high-speed lines and a circular routing in the central plateaus linking up with the east-west axis. Desalination plants and reservoirs are also key projects in a country in which many cities, both large and small, suffer from supply restrictions. Lastly, Algiers and the other cities will finally, after many years of failed projects stretching back to the 1980s, see works commence on a 10-stop

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<th>TABLE 26</th>
<th>2007: Significant Events</th>
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<tbody>
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<td><strong>POSITIVE</strong></td>
<td><strong>NEGATIVE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>JANUARY</strong></td>
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<td><strong>FEBRUARY</strong></td>
<td>The authorities prevent the holding of an international congress on the Seven bombs explode simultaneously in Tizi Ouzou and Boumerdes (14 Feb)</td>
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<td><strong>MARCH</strong></td>
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<td><strong>APRIL</strong></td>
<td>Terrorist attacks against Prime Minister’s office and police station in Algiers (11 Apr)</td>
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<td>Algerian army kills presumed no. 2 of Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, Samir Saïoud (aka “Moussaab”, 26 Apr)</td>
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<td><strong>MAY</strong></td>
<td>Legislative elections 17 May</td>
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<td><strong>JUNE</strong></td>
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<td><strong>JULY</strong></td>
<td>Attack in Lakhdaria and on Yakouren barracks (both in Kabylia, 11 and 14 Jul)</td>
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<td><strong>AUGUST</strong></td>
<td>Protests in different parts of the country against increased cost of living and supply shortages</td>
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<td><strong>SEPTEMBER</strong></td>
<td>Failed attempt against the President, in Batna, 6 Sept; attack in Delfis (Boumerdes, 8 Sept); former GSPC leader and founder, Hassan Hattab, surrenders to the authorities (22 Sept)</td>
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<td><strong>OCTOBER</strong></td>
<td>Big prices rises in basic products, noted especially during the summer and Ramadan</td>
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<td><strong>NOVEMBER</strong></td>
<td>Local and provincial elections, 29 Nov</td>
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<td><strong>DECEMBER</strong></td>
<td>Double terrorist attack in Algiers (UNDP-UNHCR and Constitutional Council), 11 Dec</td>
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<td><strong>BALANCE</strong></td>
<td>Foreign currency reserves due to gas reach 71 thousand million euros; Start of or boost to large-scale public works (rail, east-west motorway, Algiers metro and tram, etc.) Reduction of external debt to 900 million euros</td>
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metro line and a 16 km tram route between El Annasser and Bordj el Kiffan. Also during the year, Algeria signed cooperation agreements with both the US and France on nuclear energy for electricity production purposes.

Social Tensions

Nevertheless, neither this surge in revenue nor the large-scale investments have proven able to prevent a feeling of discontent, which has many roots and many forms of manifestation. The cost of living grew at an increasing rate, as certain basic foods (milk, cereals, poultry, etc.) rose in price on the international markets. Algeria’s distribution problems accentuated these increases and led to conditions in which protests became almost inevitable. The summer and the beginning of the autumn, with Ramadan in the middle, saw protests and clashes with the police in countless places throughout Algeria’s rural areas. Sometimes the causes of the discontent were abuses of power in the allocation of social housing, sometimes insufficient water supplies, and other times the lack of foresight with regard to floods or the excessive price of butane gas canisters, incredible though this may seem in the “country of gas”. The protests were sometimes violent and led to strongly repressive measures by the police forces.

The poor living conditions suffered by the population and many of the country’s 23 million young people are giving rise to new and unknown phenomena such as suicide bombers and harragas (clandestine emigrants). The number of the latter, despite religious, social and penal measures aimed at discouraging such movement, grew in 2007 to reach 1,500 interceptions (as well as 83 deaths and an indeterminate number of disappearances at sea). Of these, the majority leaving the west or centre of the country (the Ain Temouchent, Tiemcen, Oran and Boumerdes wilayas) head for the Spanish coast, whilst those leaving from the east (especially Annaba) aim for the Italian coasts of Sardinia or even Tunisia. Another phenomenon that has grown to a worrying level is gender violence, which was the subject of a number of reports and studies in 2007. Figures vary depending upon the methodology employed (from 1 million attacks in 2006 according to the National Health Institute to close to 3 million women who have at some time been victim, or 17%, according to the CRASC): whatever the case, the figures are symptomatic of a situation that needs to be addressed urgently. In response, various ministries and official bodies have set in motion an integrated plan to fight this type of violence.
2007 was predicated by the Lebanon fiasco of the previous summer. An ill-fated and ill-prepared military operation, allegedly to retrieve two soldiers kidnapped by the Hezbollah, has left Beirut and southern Lebanon in ruins, and devastated social and economic life in much of northern Israel. There was a small number of military and civilian casualties on the Israeli side, compared to the human loss wreaked in Lebanon, but it was a high price to pay in Israeli terms.

In the year 2007, the Israeli public waited for the conclusion of a commission on inquiry, which at the end of the day proved too timid to dare accuse the Heads of the State and of the army of unnecessarily dragging Israel and Lebanon into a military confrontation resulting in the death and injury of thousands of Lebanese citizens. But the very existence of the commission was powerful enough to cause the General Chief of Staff to resign, but Israel as a political system failed, and in many ways was unable because of its Zionist ideology, to draw any significant lessons from the second Lebanon war. This is why many observers, and this writer included amongst them, are fearful that another Israeli aggression against Lebanon and the Hezbollah is possible.

The fiasco did not cost the Prime Minister of Israel, Ehud Olmert, his job. Neither did the endless allegations of corruption in his more distant and more recent past. As this article was going to print, the most serious allegation of corruption (June 2008) has been made against him; this time the dice may have been cast and his political career might come to an end.

But as has been the case in post-1967 Israel, a personal change at the top does not mean much in strategic and overall terms. Ever since its creation, the country’s political elite was guided by two principals when faced with the main topic on its agenda: the Palestine question. The first dimension was and is territory or space and the second was and is demography or ethnicity. The drive was to have as much of historical Palestine as possible with as few Palestinians in it as possible.

It was only in 1948 that the young state of Israel had the capabilities to begin to realize this vision. Exploiting the end of the British mandate, the support of the West after the Holocaust, the impotence of the Arab world and disarray in the Palestinian camp the Zionist forces ethnically cleansed half of Palestine’s native population and took over almost 8% of the land. In the process, the forces destroyed more than 500 Palestinian villages and a dozen towns.

But Israel needed more space according to its political elite of the years between 1948 and 1967. A reckless Egyptian leader, Jamal Abd al-Nasser, an inexperienced young Jordanian King and a Soviet proxy regime in Damascus all played into the hands of the land hungry Israelis. The pre-emptive Israeli strike of June 1967 was not the only way to solve the crisis of that year. A sensible American-Soviet solution was on its way. But for the Israeli political elite this was a moment of historical opportunity that led to Israeli control over one hundred percent of historical Palestine. It also added a million and a half Palestinians, weakening the wish to have an as ethnically pure Jewish state as possible.

The Israeli government of 1967 decided not to annex the Palestinian territories it occupied in June 1967 but also not to withdraw from them, even for a peace agreement. It also allowed the colonization of large parts of them by Jewish settlers. From then emerged the Israeli formula for how to run the occupied territories which is the main issue on the Israeli political agenda in 2007, and to a certain extent, is also very high up on the world’s political agenda.
Since the decision back in 1967 was not to leave the territories, but also to allow its people to remain, the Israelis developed a strategy of a mega prison for the territories. It would be an open prison, where the Israelis would be in full control of its boundaries, land, water and air bridges to the outside world and of movement inside the territories. It would be monitored with the help of a huge network of collaboration and a local municipal elite that would have a large share of autonomy in running the affairs of the people. Working inside Israel, provided the people would commute back into the mega-prison, was also on offer. As the years went by, large sections of the Israeli political system were even willing to call that option of the mega-prison a state. It became popular in particular when Ariel Sharon adopted it as an option in 2001 and was even willing to remove the settlers from the Gaza Strip, so as to make it easier on the one hand for the Palestinians to be autonomous, but on the other, for the Israelis to control the strip from the outside.

The need for such actions stemmed from the other option in the Israeli strategy: the high security prison one. This developed in reaction to a Palestinian unwillingness to go along with the mega-prison concept. Twice the Israelis offered an open prison option and twice it was rejected. It was offered in the first ten years of occupation and the decision of the Palestinians in 1976 to vote out most of the collaborating municipal authorities and show allegiance to the PLO was seen as a mutinous act by the Israelis, that led to a policy of punitive action in 1981 by the then Minister of Defence, Ariel Sharon, who also tried to destroy the PLO in Lebanon in 1982.

When the mutiny really came, in the form of the First Intifada in 1987, the Israelis put the high security prison option into operation. They resorted to severe and inhumane punitive actions: the demolition of houses, bans on movement, mass arrest without trial, expulsion of people and tight closure of the areas from the outside.

The second time the Israelis tried to offer the open prison option was in 1993, through the Oslo accord. Almost at the last moment, the Palestinian leader, Yasser Arafat, rejected the imposition leading to the Second Intifada of 2000.

The high security prison option was re-activated with new vigour and insights. It was not only a security policy, it was also a diplomatic campaign and political vision. It was devised by the Israeli Prime Minister of 2001, Ariel Sharon, who even founded a political party, Kadima, to help him implement his vision. This was the idea of unilateralism. The argument put to the world was that there is no partner on the Palestinian side with whom to negotiate peace, hence Israel is entitled to decide the occupied territories fate unilaterally.

It was back to the two historical and ideological dimensions I have mentioned: geography and demography. It was time to decide about the space which would finally be Israel and that of the mega-prison. Loyal to ideas he had developed already in the early 1980s, and which he spelled out in the 21st century, Sharon thought that almost half of the West Bank should be annexed to Israel. Not as one territory, but in bits and pieces. The main consideration was to annex the settlements’ blocs, the military bases, the “Apartheid” roads, the “national park reserves” (which are no-go areas for Palestinians), the water resources and the Jordan valley.

The annexation was almost over by 2007. All these annexed purely Jewish entities cut the West Bank into 11 small cantons and sub cantons. They are today all separated from each other by this complex, colonialist Jewish presence. The most important part of this encroachment is the greater Jerusalem wedge that divides the West Bank into two discrete regions with no land connection for the Palestinians.

Part of this unilateral complex is the wall and separation barrier, built in 2001. There are walls and fences between Israel and the West Bank, but many more inside the West Bank which are used to encircle individual villages, neighbourhoods or towns. There are differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The two geopolitical entities are shaped differently: the West Bank is made of small ghettos and the one in Gaza is a huge mega ghetto of its own. There is another difference: the Gaza Strip is now officially perceived by the Israelis as the ward where the “most dangerous inmates” are kept. The West Bank, on the other hand, is still run as a huge complex of open air prisons in the form of normal human habi-
tations such as a village or a town interconnected and supervised by a prison authority of immense military and violent power.

As far as the Israelis are concerned the mega-prison of the West Bank can be called a state. When Yasser Abd Rabou in the last days of February 2008, threatened the Israelis with a unilateral declaration of independence, inspired by recent events in Kosovo, it seemed that nobody on the Israeli side objected to the idea very much. This is more or less the message a bewildered Abu Ala received from Zipi Livni, Israel’s Foreign Minister, when he phoned to assure her that Abd Rabou was not speaking in the name of the Palestinian Authority (PA). He got the impression that her main worry was in fact quite the opposite: that the PA would not agree to call the mega-prisons a State in the near future.

This unwillingness, together with Hamas’s insistence on resisting the mega-prison system through a war of liberation forced the Israelis to rethink their strategy towards the Gaza Strip. It transpires that not even the most cooperative members of the PA are willing to accept the mega-prison reality as “peace” or even as a “two states settlement.” And, already in 2006, Hamas and Islamic Jihad even translated this unwillingness into Qassam attacks on Israel. So the model of the most dangerous ward developed: the leading strategists in the army and the government braced themselves for a very long-term “management” of the system they had built, while pledging commitment to a vacuous “peace process,” with very little global interest in it, and a continued struggle from within, against it.

In 2007, the world witnessed at close hand what were the implications of the new Israeli strategy towards the Gaza Strip. Since it is regarded as the most dangerous ward in the mega-prison complex, it is the object of most brutal punitive action on the part of the prison authority. These actions include killing the “inmates” by aerial or artillery bombing, strangling the population by economic means and closing the Strip hermetically to the outside world. These punitive actions are not just the inevitable results of the mega-prison concept, but also a desirable one. Also the Palestinian rockets launched against Sderot, a southern development town bordering on the Gaza Strip, which became a frequent sight, serves the logic of the mega-prison. In 2007, all the Israeli generals, who were interviewed about the counter-military actions the army could take against the Qassam missiles, admitted that there was no adequate military solution. But they insisted on the importance, nonetheless, of a continued Israeli policy of retaliation. In other words, the punitive action can not destroy the resistance but it does give an opportunity for retaliation. The retaliation in its turn provides the logic and basis for the next punitive action, should someone in the domestic public opinion doubt the wisdom of the new strategy.

In the near future, any similar resistance from parts of the West Bank mega-prison would be dealt with in a similar way. And these actions are very likely to take place in the very near future. Indeed, the Third Intifada is on its way and the Israeli response would be a further elaboration of the mega-prison system. Downsizing the number of “inmates” in both mega-prisons would be still a very high priority in this strategy by means of ethnic cleansing, systematic killings and economic strangulation.

But there are wedges that prevent the destructive machine from rolling. It seems that a growing number of Jews in Israel (a majority according to a recent CNN poll) wish their government would begin negotiations with Hamas. A mega-prison is fine, but if the residential areas of the wardens are targets and are likely to come under fire in the future then the system fails. Alas, I doubt whether the CNN poll represents accurately the present Israeli mood; but it does indicate a hopeful trend that vindicates Hamas’s insistence that Israel only understands the language of force. But it may not be enough and in the meantime, the perfection of the mega-prison system continues unabated and the punitive measures of its Authority are claiming the lives of many more men, women and children in the Gaza Strip.

In 2007, the Israeli government was trying to convince world public opinion that the violence raging in Gaza was the making of a fanatic Islamic ideology and that the Israeli actions against it should be perceived as part of the overall global “war against terror.” The Israeli Foreign Ministry, aided by military intelligence, worked hard to show that Hamas and Islamic Jihad were agents of either al-Qaeda or of Iran. The mini civil war that erupted in 2007 between Hamas and Fatah was also presented in such a way.

But the origins of the mini civil war lie elsewhere. The recent history of the Strip, 60 years of dispossession, occupation and imprisonment, inevitably produced internal violence such as we witnessed in 2007. That same history produced other unpleasant features of life lived under such impossible conditions. In fact, it would be fair to say that the violence, and
TOWARDS PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST: ADDRESSING CONCERNS AND EXPECTATIONS

On the 11th-12th January 2007, the Toledo International Center for Peace, Search for Common Ground and the Tres Culturas Foundation organize the commemoration for the fifteenth anniversary of the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference. “Madrid +15: Towards Peace in the Middle East addressing concerns and expectations,” is a civil society initiative which brings together influential figures from the parties of the conflict and other relevant actors in order to assert the need for a regional approach to peace and stability in the Middle East.

Delegations from Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, United States, Lebanon, Palestine and Russia, besides Foreign Affairs Ministers from Spain, Norway, Denmark and Sweden, the Secretary General of the Arab League and the EC Commissioner for ENP take part in the event. Participants agree in supporting a comprehensive regional approach which is considered the only way towards a sustainable solution for the Middle East. The 2006 summer crisis in Lebanon, the continually difficult Israeli-Palestinian relations, the war and post-war in Iraq and the emerging regional influence of Iran underline the inter-relation and inter-connection characterizing the issues of the region. In this sense, Commissioner Ferrero Waldner stresses the need to address all components of all conflicts in the region thus being impossible to disentangle one conflict from another: a comprehensive peace should not be limited to Israel and Palestine but must include Lebanon and Syria. The solution cannot be imposed externally but rather come from the parties.

For further information:
www.toledopax.org/Madrid+15.pdf

in particular the internal violence, is far less than one would have expected given the economic and social conditions created by the genocidal Israeli policies ever since 2000.

Power struggles among politicians, who enjoy the support of military outfits, is indeed a nasty business that victimizes the society as a whole. Part of what went on in Gaza in 2007 was such a struggle between politicians who were democratically elected and those who found it hard to accept the verdict of the people. But this is hardly the main struggle. What unfolded in Gaza was a battle between America’s and Israel’s local proxies – most of whom are unintentionally such proxies but nonetheless they dance to Israel’s tune – and those who oppose it. The opposition that won the day in 2007 and took over Gaza did it alas in a way that one would find very hard to condone or cheer. It is not Hamas’ Palestinian vision that is worrying, but rather the means it has chosen to achieve it that we hope would not be rooted or repeated. To its credit one should openly say that the means used by Hamas are part of an arsenal that enabled it in the past to be the only active force that at least tried to stop the total destruction of Palestine; the way it was used in 2007 was less credible and hopefully temporary. But one cannot condemn the means if one does not offer an alternative. Standing idle while the American-Israeli vision of strangling the Strip to death, cleansing half of the West Bank of its indigenous population and threatening the rest of the Palestinians – inside Israel and in the other parts of the West Bank – with transfer, is not an option. It is tantamount to “decent” people’s silence during the Holocaust.

Much depends on the international reaction. When Israel was absolved from any responsibility or accountability for the ethnic cleansing in 1948, it turned this policy into a legitimate tool for its national security agenda. If the present escalation of Israeli punitive actions against the Palestinians is tolerated by the world, they will expand and use those actions even more drastically.

Nothing apart from international pressure, like that meted out against South Africa in the heyday of Apartheid, will stop the killing of innocent civilians in the Gaza Strip and Sderot, the demolition of houses in the Greater Jerusalem areas, the ethnic cleansing alongside the Separation wall and fence and the continued imprisonment of more than 10,000 Palestinians without trial, many of them children. There is nothing we can do against it here in Israel. Brave pilots refused to partake in the operations, two journalists – out of 150 – do not cease to write about it, but this is it. In the name of the Holocaust memory, let us hope the world will not allow the carnage in Palestine to continue.
The year 2007 marked the end of a brief interval of political liberalization in the Arab world which began shortly after the occupation of Iraq and which resulted primarily from external pressures on Arab regimes to reform and democratize. External pressures during the 2003-2006 period created a political opening which activists across the region used to press for longstanding demands for political and constitutional reform. Faced with a combination of growing external and internal pressures to reform, Arab regimes were forced to make some concessions to their challengers.

In Egypt, upon the request of the President, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment to allow for direct competitive presidential elections. In September 2005, Egypt witnessed its first competitive presidential election ever and as expected Mubarak was elected for a fifth term with 87% of the vote. Moreover, during the November 2005 parliamentary elections, which were freer than previous elections, the Muslim Brotherhood, the largest opposition movement in Egypt, won 88 seats. This was the largest number of seats won by an opposition group in Egypt since the 1952 revolution.

Similarly, in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas won a majority of the seats. Hamas was thereby able to establish control over the Palestinian Legislative Council which had been dominated by Fatah since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1996. In Lebanon, in the wake of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri on 14th February 2005, a coalition of pro-Hariri political forces was able through broad-based mass mobilization and external support to force Syrian troops to pull out from Lebanon and the pro-Syrian Government to resign. Elections were held, and the 14th February coalition was able to win a plurality of the votes and to form a new government. In Morocco, King Mohamed VI oversaw the establishment of a truth and reconciliation committee which sought to address the grievances of those who had been abused under the reign of his father. The Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC) also undertook some important reforms during the 2003-2006 period. In 2003 Qatar promulgated a written constitution for the first time in its history. In 2005, Saudi Arabia convened municipal elections for the first time in five decades. And in 2006, Bahrain held parliamentary elections in which the Shiite society of Al Wefaq won 40% of the seats. Subsequently, the first Shiite deputy prime minister in Bahrain was appointed. Theses events, which came to be known as ‘the Arab Spring,’ led some optimists to believe that the Arab world was on the brink of a democratic transformation similar to those experienced in Latin American and Eastern and Central Europe during the 1980s and 1990s. However, in 2007, as political liberalization gave way to heightened polarization and to renewed repression, these hopes were dispelled. The failure of the openings of the 2003-2006 period to create a sustained momentum towards democratization can be attributed to a number of factors. The deteriorating security situation in Iraq and the failure of the United States to create a stable and democratic regime dampened support for democracy promotion efforts within the American administration and reinforced the views of those who held that security and stability must come before democracy. Moreover, the electoral success of Islamists in Egypt and in Palestine further dampened Western support for democracy promotion efforts in the region since the principals of these movements were perceived to be at odds with the interests of the West. Finally, the ascendancy of Iran as a regional power and the growing assertiveness of its allies in Lebanon, Palestine and Syria drove the Unit-
ed States to recommit to its alliances with “moderate” Arab regimes such as Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which were perceived as a bulwark against Iranian expansionism. As a result of these variables, strategic interests once again trumped the democracy promotion agenda for the region. Thus strengthened, Arab regimes proceeded in 2007 to adopt a series of measures aimed at demobilizing their domestic challengers and at reasserting their hegemony over their political systems. Three phenomena in particular could be observed across the Arab world in 2007: the adoption of new laws aimed at reducing political contestation, increased political polarization between regimes and oppositions, and elections with very low levels of contestation and/or popular participation. In the following I examine in more detail each of these three phenomena.

Measures Aimed at Upgrading Authoritarianism and Reducing Contestation

In Egypt, Parliament passed 34 constitutional amendments, some of which were perceived as particularly damaging to the prospects for liberalization and democratization in Egypt. Article 5 of the constitution was amended to prevent Islamists from forming legally recognized political parties and from participating in the political process. Article 88 was amended to suspend judicial supervision over the electoral process and replace it with an electoral committee whose members are chosen by both houses of Parliament which have been dominated by the ruling party since 1952. Article 179 was amended to allow the President to refer civilians to military tribunals and to allow for the adoption of a new anti-terrorism bill which is widely expected to further constrain political rights and freedoms. In addition to these amendments, the Egyptian regime forcibly prevented candidates from the Muslim Brotherhood from contesting the 2007 elections of the Shura Council (the Upper House of Parliament) and the 2008 Municipal elections. Moreover, in 2008 leading Muslim Brotherhood activists who had been referred to military tribunals were given sentences of up to 10 years in prison. In Jordan, the regime oversaw the adoption of two new laws which were perceived as detrimental to the process of liberalization. A new Political Parties Law which raised the minimum number of party members from 50 to 500 was passed. Under the new law, more than half of all Jordanian Political Parties will have to be dissolved in 2008. A new Press Law was also adopted which significantly raises the fines for alleged press offences. Journalists accused of defaming religion, offending religious prophets, inciting sectarian strife or racism, slandering individuals and spreading false information or rumours could face fines of up to 40,000 USD. In Morocco, a country widely perceived as the most liberal in the Arab world, the regime cracked down on the independent press and a number of newspaper editors and journalists from Nichane, le Journal Hebdomadaire, Al Watan Al An and Telquel were charged with fines and/or prison sentences. Moreover, the Moroccan government proposed a new press law which would criminalize journalists accused of offending the monarchy, Islam and state institutions such as the army and the judiciary.

Political Polarization

In 2007, a number of Arab countries were the scene of heightened social and political polarization which led in some cases to the outbreak of violent conflict and/or to a state of stalemate and political paralysis. Such was the case in Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine and Yemen and to a lesser extent in Bahrain and Kuwait. In Palestine, the conflict between Fatah and Hamas escalated in part as a result of the efforts of Fatah to strip the Hamas-dominated Palestinian Legislative Council of its powers. The struggle for power led to a violent confrontation between Hamas and Fatah which ended with a Hamas takeover of the Gaza strip and the breakdown of the Palestinian authority into two separate and competing entities. In Lebanon, the failure of the Sunni-dominated pro-Hariri ruling coalition and the Shiite-dominated pro-Syrian coalition to reach an agreement over the new president left Lebanon without a president and led to a series of violent confrontations between the supporters of the two groups. In Yemen, the Salih regime was busy trying to quell a rebellion in Northern Yemen by the supporters of the Shiite cleric Al Houthi which had begun in 2005. The confrontation between the military and Al Houthi rebels led to hundreds of deaths and arrests and contributed to the expansion of the powers of the military establishment. In Bahrain, the year 2007 saw a number of violent confrontations between the police and demonstrators in Shiite areas. In spite of important political gains made by the politically excluded Shiite majority in 2006,
2007 saw heightened confrontations with the regime. These confrontations were provoked in part by the leaking of a secret document which exposes attempts by the regime to foment anti-Shiite sentiment and to marginalize the Shiite majority. The regime responded to the riots by arresting hundreds of protesters and by cracking down on human rights activists. Kuwait also experienced in 2007 a state of political paralysis which resulted from a stand-off between parliament and the executive. Three consecutive cabinets had to resign in 2007 to avert a vote of no-confidence by parliament. The stand-off ended in 2008 with the dissolution of parliament by the emir.

The inability of the various competing factions to resolve their differences through peaceful and democratic means further reinforces sectarian strife in the region

The state of political and social polarization experienced by some of those countries that had made important democratic advances during the 2003-2006 period, dampened enthusiasm for the democratic process both inside those countries and elsewhere in the Arab world. Moreover, the inability of the various competing factions to resolve their differences through peaceful and democratic means further reinforces sectarian strife in the region, rendering the prospects for democratization more elusive.

Elections Without Participation

In 2007, a number of Arab countries namely Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Oman, Syria and Mauritania held presidential, municipal and/or parliamentary elections. Most of these elections were characterized by very low level of political contestation and very low voter turnout, even by the typically low Arab standards. Moreover, Islamists performed badly in most elections held in 2007 not only because of increased repression but also because of growing disappointment with their performance in many of the countries where they had been elected. Algeria convened municipal and parliamentary elections in 2007. The parliamentary elections which were held on 17th May 2007 reproduced the dominance of Algeria’s ruling alliance – the National Liberation Front (FLN), the National Rally for Democracy (RND) and the Movement of Society for Peace (HMA) – which won 249 out of 389 seats. The Islah party, the largest opposition party, boycotted the election after its leader Abdullah Gaballah was stripped by the Ministry of Interior of his position as head of the party. The ruling alliance also won an overwhelming majority in the municipal elections which were held on the 30th May 2007. Voter turnout in both elections was low. Participation rates during the parliamentary elections were 35.5% compared with 46% during the 2002 elections.

Jordan also held municipal and parliamentary elections in 2007 which yielded similar results. The municipal elections which were held on 31st July were reportedly marred by widespread fraud, which drove the largest opposition party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), to withdraw its 25 candidates after the polls opened. The legislative elections which were held in November were won by pro-government independents. The IAF only won six seats, compared with the 17 seats it had won during the 2003 elections. Voter turnout was approximately 42%. The losses of Islamists were attributed not only to the widespread use of vote-buying but also to internal divisions within the moment between the moderate wing and the hard-liners.

Morocco held parliamentary elections in September 2007. And while these elections were largely considered free and fair by domestic and international observers, voter turnout was exceedingly low. Only 37% of eligible voters turned out for the election, compared with 52% during the 2002 elections. The Nationalist Istiqlal party won the largest number of seats and its leader was appointed prime minister. The Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), which was widely expected to win the largest number of seats, came in second place with 47 seats and was excluded from the coalition government.

Syria was another Arab country that held municipal and parliamentary elections and a presidential referendum in 2007. The National Progressive Front, a coalition which includes the Baath party and nine other smaller parties that have ruled Syria since 1972, won a majority of the seats in both the parliamentary elections held in April and the municipal elections in August. The remaining seats were won by independents. Syrian opposition groups boycotted both elections. The regime reported a voter turnout of 50%.
Some of the smaller Arab countries such as Qatar, Oman and Mauritania also held election in 2007. Qatar held municipal elections in April 2007. However, the first legislative elections, which were scheduled to occur in 2007, were postponed for the second time. Oman held a Shura council election on 27 October. The government estimated voter turnout at 63%, down from 74% in 2003. The Shura Council in Oman plays an advisory role and has no legislative powers. Finally, Mauritania held its first free presidential elections on 25 March which drew 70% of eligible voters.

With a few exceptions – namely Mauritania – elections in the Arab world in 2007 have failed to attract voters and served only to prolong the power of existing regimes and their allies. The absence of any real contestation has stripped elections of their significance and has discouraged voters from participating in a process whose results are predetermined. And where real contestation did exist as in Morocco, the inability of elected officials to affect the policy-making process in a political system characterized by the centralization of power in the office of the monarchy seems to have created disillusionment with the viability of the electoral process.

Some Positive Developments

Even though the state of political liberalization and democratization in the Arab world was largely bleak in 2007, there were nonetheless a few positive developments, mostly in the Gulf region. And while these developments cannot be said to contribute to democratization they nonetheless contribute to the modernization and institutionalization of politics in some of the more traditional polities in the Arab world. These developments include the creation of the Bay’a Council or the Succession Council in Saudi Arabia which seeks to formalize the process of electing a successor to the Monarch, and the modernization of the Saudi judicial system through the codification of laws and the creation of an administrative court and an appeals court. Other positive developments include a new press law in the UAE, which abolishes prison sentences associated with publication crimes, and a new municipalities’ law in Jordan which provides for the election of municipal councils and mayors, who were previously appointed. Finally, women’s rights were reinforced by the appointment of 7 female ministers in the Moroccan cabinet and 4 female ministers in the UAE, and through the allocation of 20% of all municipal council seats to women in Jordan.

Conclusion

The year 2007 marked the end of a political opening which had begun in 2003 and which resulted primarily from external pressures on Arab regimes to democratize. In 2007, the Arab world experienced increased repression, political polarization and low levels of political participation. Such a shift away from the liberalizing trends of the 2003-2006 period was primarily the result of the changing priorities of external powers in the region, who began to fear the ascendancy of Iran and Islamist forces and who thus sought reinforce their alliances with authoritarian Arab regimes. However, increased repression, as the year 2007 illustrates, only serves to reinforce political polarization and apathy, creating a vicious cycle which undermines the prospects for peaceful democratization in the Arab world.

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Several centuries before the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that is currently experiencing the pressure of the French administration to bury it alive and invent a Union for the Mediterranean, an agreement was signed in the 13th century between the Republic of Venice and the Principality of Aleppo. That accord included, in addition to commercial clauses that were dear to both “entities,” certain articles that referred to religious (cultural?) relations and to mutual respect for the differences between the two parties.

The relationship between Syria and the Mediterranean is therefore age-old and can even trace back its roots to the Phoenicians who sailed out from Syrian coasts to exploit, in the economic sense, the other shores of this basin well before our era, leaving their footprint there.

An ancestral relationship, that nowadays faces obstacles that appear less surmountable than they did thousands of years ago, in spite of the new communication technologies. How comes that a Syria, which still keeps a watchful eye on the opposite shore, is going through this period where the ports of the North seem to be closed to it and the sun of the far East attracts it without dazzling it?

An Interior in Ferment or in Stagnation?

The years when Syrians experienced a glimmer of democracy seem very far away. The new generations know little of the experiences the Syrian political scene went through after its independence between 1946 and 1949 and later between 1953 and 1958 – short episodes of a relatively free parliamentary life with “proper” elections and a press which in its time was rich in both quantitative and qualitative terms. After that, internal political life was hijacked so as to “promote progress and the emancipation of the masses.” These masses appeared to some to be immature and unfit to live “normally” without a “ruling” party and an “emblematic” leader. Down with all “imperialist” inventions that aim to “poison” a population seeking “unity, liberty and socialism.”

This atmosphere is the order of the day, with timid political improvements whose impact is not really felt by Syrians. On the other hand, the “socialist” economy has, since the turn of the century, undergone a liberalisation bordering on anarchy in a gloomy atmosphere where real unemployment rate, according to the most optimistic analysis, is closed to 20% in a very young society that, despite all efforts, continues to have a relatively high birth rate.

The withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 did not resolve the economic situation but rather brought back into the labour market thousands of workers previously absorbed by Lebanese demand. The disappearance of a parallel economy benefiting a privileged class also contributed to aggravating an economic crisis, alongside the drop in crude oil production from 600,000 to 300,000 barrels.

Paradoxically, opening up the banking system has, somehow or other, benefited the Lebanese banking sector, badly affected by the withdrawal of billions of dollars by the Syrian “parasitic” bourgeoisie which has grown rich through an opaque economic and political system. Meanwhile, this last year has seen the birth of tens of projects financed by funds from Gulf countries, and particularly Qatar which still has very good relations with Syria, unlike those maintained by its larger neighbour Saudi Arabia. The majority of these projects are concentrated on the areas of services, tourism and construction. There are very few investments in industry, suffering on the
public side from neglect and corruption and, on the private, from a whole *armada* of complicated and contradictory rules that produce corruption and the establishment of relationships of favouritism with decision makers.

**One internal factor that should not be ignored is growing religiosity at the heart of a society that is alien to radical tendencies**

Similarly, subsidies have been cut back as a result of the global rise in the cost of commodities. Prices shoot up and there is a constant failure to find solutions. Poorly considered alternatives, by economists with little experience, risk to further complicate the situation of poorer families. Every pretext is used to try and defend the failures of a decaying administration. Since these events arose, Iraqi immigration has served as a useful alibi, alongside the world economic crisis and, lastly, the boycott applied against Syria in respect of new technologies. While these issues are not entirely to be discounted as impacts on the Syrian economy, it is certain that good governance and transparency, as well as judicial independence, could be highly useful factors in restructuring the economy and society. While the economy is being opened up, the public arena remains restricted. Freedom of expression and association are not prime elements in the state vision of Syrian society. Working within an “ideology” that condemns practically any critical opinion because the country “opposes external pressures and so too the wish of enemy forces to destabilise it,” the media remain tightly controlled, as are other tools of public expression. Some attempts – more courageous than well-organised – result in an intellectual expression that seeks to find its way around undefined and shifting red lines.

One internal factor that should not be ignored is growing religiosity at the heart of a society that is alien to radical tendencies. This phenomenon is not surprising in the regional and international context. Nevertheless, it has been broadly influenced and “moderated” by a desire on the part of the political authorities to tame a scourge that they see as “dangerous” and has succeeded in destabilising several regimes in the region. Following the bloody confrontations of the 1980s with the Muslim Brotherhood, the “official” religion has reclaimed centre stage successfully for the time being, notably through pan-Islamic alliances that the political powers are developing in the region. That gives it a margin of credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of some writers. It should be noted that this growing religiosity does not fit in at all with the ruling Ba’ath party’s, but it seems to be the way of things in this region that the best is made of influential temporary factors.

**Contested Regional Role**

Since the 1970s, Syria has become a required player at the political chessboard of the Near East. This place was attributable to the unquestionable weight carried by its late President Hafez al-Assad. His successor and son, Bachar al-Assad, has attempted to perpetuate this inheritance but that appears to have been excessively hard to do. Is it he who has been unable to preserve the desired “weight” or has it been rather the political circumstances that have prevented him from exercising it? Wisdom appears to dictate that time will be needed to answer this question – as simple as it is complex. Changes, manoeuvres, plots and other factors ceaselessly appear on the regional scene and the years to come may explain what we are going through at the moment.

2007 was an extension of those recent precedents relating to the crisis of relations with the West, but also simultaneously brought with it some new developments under the same agenda. The American wish to demonise Iran and its “faithful” Syrian ally was unable to go any further than rhetoric. The close relations between Syria and Iran, while being relations of strategic interest put in place by the previous leaders of both countries, seemed to be reinforced during that year notably through large-scale Iranian investments in Syrian industry.

Despite appearances, it is important to make clear that this alliance is not a “catholic” marriage and that there are points of divergence in play particularly as regards the issues of Lebanon and Iraq. On the other hand, it is also not easy to envisage a distancing by Syria from Iran demanded by the West and some Arab rulers in order for the doors to be reopened for its readmission into the international fold. Thus, the thesis that predicates the creation and the danger of a Shi’ite upsurge that would threaten the preponderantly Sunni region, propounded by the Americans and accepted by Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt, does not seem
to have any logical foundation. It remains in the domain of fantasies that comfort politicians from those countries on which the Americans bestow the title of moderate States…

During 2007 the Europeans were unable to arrive at a common policy in the region. Positions diverged as to worrying matters such as the Lebanon crisis and the Israel-Palestine conflict. It was therefore easy to distinguish between French diplomacy (if diplomacy it is) and those of Spain or Germany. Because, in contrast to the French desire set on boycotting Syrian diplomacy (at least officially), the Germans and the Spanish kept open their channels with Damascus without thereby seeing satisfactory results. The deployment of European forces in southern Lebanon following the Israeli assault in July 2006 led certain European countries to keep in place their channels for consultation and exchange with Syria.

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A political change at the head of the French executive seemed to offer a glimmer of hope for a dialogue process to be set in motion between Paris and Damascus. That was not impossible, particularly bearing in mind the presence of advisors in Nicolas Sarkozy’s entourage, who enjoy a good knowledge of the road to Damascus. However, American hegemony over issues and in particular as regards the Lebanon crisis, blocked that approach and led the French to follow “instructions” to stall or, at best, to abstain and give way to an American administration whose members are often not singing from the same hymn-book in the positions they adopt.

Paradoxically in a “demand market,” the European Union’s diplomatic machinery remains totally absent from the Syrian stage. Yet economic co-operation between Syria and Europe continues to be built discreetly and modestly, not determined by any strict correlation with the poor degree of political relations. Meanwhile, several projects have been developed in response to European prompting in the areas of economic and administrative reform.

Within its Arab environment Syria maintains stable relations with certain countries (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia...) and more turbulent ones with others (Egypt, Saudi Arabia...). The latter group contest Syria’s role in Lebanon and its alliance with Iran which, in their eyes, represents a threat in the region. The Saudi context is more complex as it includes consideration of “dealings” with the Americans in relation to various matters (Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon). It appears that this US-Saudi pact has come up against certain reservations at the heart of the Washington administration and even at that of the royal family in Riyadh.

The policy for a diplomatic embargo adopted in relation to Syria is not leading to a softening of the stand taken by Damascus, but is rather, on the contrary, buttressing it. Syria no longer dictates events in Lebanon, but it can play a major role in blocking or unblocking the situation. Similarly, Syria continues to have influence on the chief players (Sunnis and Shi’ites) in the Iraqi scenario, even though they do not wield the same political power as the Iranians.

Good relations with Turkey give comfort to Damascus as well as a significant economic and political breathing space in the region. In addition to that, Turkey is happy to offer its services in fulfilling the role of intermediary in possible negotiations with Israel. That role is accepted – indeed demanded – by both countries.

Contrary to the perceptions of some and the wishes of others, the political powers in Syria are not undergoing a period of weakness or even agnosia. They feel protected by events and because they have a series of cards they can still play. They also know their existence is not a foremost preoccupation except for an ”extremist minority” in the American and Saudi administration. Their alliance with Iran gives them an advantage in pursuing negotiations with all the Arab or Western “enemy.” Their attitude in respect of Mediterranean institutions and projects does not present them with any concerns. Since the failure to sign an agreement of association, Syria has developed its strategy towards the region (Turkey, Iran) and has also extended its exchanges in the direction of China.

**Conclusion**

Several challenges confront the immediate future of this small country that retains a real importance on the regional political scene.

The economic reforms which Syria is seeking to undertake risk having pernicious consequences at a social level. Recent months have seen alarming rises in the price of consumer products as well as en-
ergy costs. Despite wage increases, the market still shows itself able to absorb them mercilessly and uncontrollably. The middle classes are dropping out of their status level and joining the lower layers with all that implies from every aspect. The fundamental importance of that class in developing a cultural and intellectual appetite in any society is widely recognised. Its disappearance thus causes an impoverishment that goes beyond the economic. Reform of the economy and possibly of the administration requires to be accompanied politically in the form of democratisation of the system. It is that which seems to present an obstacle to every positive solution sought.

There is a further challenge that appears formidable even if it is not at the forefront of issues to be resolved: the recovery of the Golan Heights occupied in 1967 and then annexed in 1980 by Israel. A just peace accord with that State can defuse a large part of the tension in the region. However, will it be possible to achieve it bearing in mind that war remains one of the primary means of welding Israeli society together? Syria is trying to reformulate its new regional role within the framework of new regional and international circumstances. The outcome will depend greatly on the Lebanon crisis being resolved and on a reconciliation with influential Arab countries in this region. However, such a reconciliation requires willingness to be shown not just regionally but also internationally.

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Avoidance of a Political Crisis in Turkey

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Turkey is a Mediterranean country currently at the negotiation stage for European Union membership. This is the final turning point before their ultimate membership, and it will undoubtedly take many years. To reach this final stage, since 2002 the Turkish government has consented to major efforts being made to comply with the Copenhagen political criteria established by the Union in June 1993, concerning the political conditions required for the candidate countries, basically democracy, the rule of law and respect for human and minority rights.

The Reaction to European Dynamics

During this period of reforms, lasting three years and concluding at the end of 2004, a vital aspect of Turkish political life needed to be seriously overcome: the weight of the military establishment in politics. Along with the army itself, the advocates of the old pro-military – or even militarist – elite saw their influence decline on both a legal and societal level. Observing a desire for change on the horizon, and consequently a reduction in their power, the military and the old Republican elites began to show their discontent from the very moment political reforms directly or indirectly affecting their power were put into practice. Accusing the government of undermining the secular basis of the Republic by diminishing the army’s role of guarantor, these institutions used, and continue to use, all the institutional means open to them (the Constitution, the Constitutional Court, the legal system, the supervisory body of the universities, and so on) to ultimately rid themselves of the neo-Islamist governing party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Despite its Islamist slant, this is of course the party that has accomplished the most democratic political reforms, under European impetus, since the reformist period at the start of the Republic in 1923. More recently, in 2007, at important moments for the institution such as the election of the new President of the Republic and the long-scheduled parliamentary elections, the old elite resolved to place all its stakes on weakening the government party and ultimately returning to power. A gradual undermining process began at the start of the year, increasing in intensity until the date of the elections. The military repeatedly took a hand in the matter, particularly on 27th April, in the form of an electronic ultimatum issued on their website to call the governing party to order, stating that they were prepared to intervene if the need arose. Civil society reacted vehemently the following morning, causing the government to respond in turn during the afternoon, declaring the military’s announcement unacceptable. At this point, constitutional order was restored, the elections were held and the ruling party was voted in with a wide majority. More than anything else, this episode shows the maturity of the Turkish political regime, which has succeeded in holding its own against military guardianship in the political sphere, and firmly rejecting it. It serves as an example of best practice for the Mediterranean region, where similar tendencies exist. Turkey’s European process finally had a clear, decisive impact on the positive outcome of this major crisis.

The Omnipresence of the Military in the Political Sphere

As was the case with the former dictatorships in the Northern Mediterranean, political life in Turkey is indeed marked by the omnipresence, omniscience and omnipotence of the military establishment. This phe-
nomenon has its roots in the history of the Republic. The Westernisation of the Ottoman Empire that began in the early 18th century championed a single cause: assuring the permanence of the state. Transforming the social structure was of secondary importance and only took place as a result of the reforms that first and foremost affected the political machinery. The reforming elites of the Republican period, like those of the Ottoman era before them, were above all keen servers of the political cause. In Turkey, the State has priority over everything else, individuals and society.

The Great War that signalled the end of the Ottoman Empire was followed by the occupation of large parts of modern Turkey, in virtue of the Treaty of Sèvres signed in 1920. Territorial reduction was at its apogee and the State was in a critical situation. It was the largely dominant military component of the Republican elite that saved the State, created a modern Republic based on the Jacobin model, and thus provided itself with solid legitimacy. In the new State, the obsession with the integrity and security of the territory resulting from the traumatic experience of 1920 was to constitute the fundamental basis of the military bureaucracy’s legitimacy, which remains to this day. Reinforced by the obsession with order inherited from the Ottoman era, which considers any conflict, whatever its origin, to be a potential danger, this legitimacy has been a constant throughout the history of the Turkish Republic.

However, the standardisation process that is at work in Turkey, particularly since the start of the European Union pre-membership period, is increasingly confining the military establishment to military tasks. This requires, time, given the legitimacy of the military function, and in any case it should be completed before membership is attained. The defence of secularism and internal security will be taken charge of by the civil forces, as occurs in other comparable countries where the demilitarisation of political life has been strongly backed by the European perspective offered to them.

Expecting a country like Turkey, which was basically created by the military, or expecting a government that has had a very tense relationship with this establishment, to perform a rapid purge of the military’s influence in the political sphere is simply not realistic. This is precisely what has emerged from the political crisis of 2007.

Brief Chronology of Events

On 12th April the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Büyükanıt, recalled the fact that the future President of the Republic would need to comply with the principles of the Constitution. Two days later, several hundred thousand people took to the streets in Ankara in a demonstration in favour of the secularism they considered threatened by the manoeuvres of the governing party, the AKP.

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On 24th April, the AKP nominated Abdullah Gül as its candidate for the Presidency of the Republic. This designation, together with the decision to hold a parliament meeting to launch the presidential election process, shows the AKP’s determination not to succumb to the secular field’s demonstrations, pressure and provocation.

On 27th April, Parliament held its first round of votes to nominate the President. In Turkey the Presidency of the Republic is a largely ceremonial function, the President being elected by the Assembly. However, following the popular referendum embarked on by the governing party and held on the 21st October, the President was from then on to be elected by universal suffrage.

The candidate nominated by the governing party, Abdullah Gül, obtained the votes of practically all of the participating MPs (357), those in the opposition not having been present at the process. But as the quorum of 367 voters was not reached, the vote risked being declared invalid by the Constitutional Court. This was to be the case later on, when the matter was brought to Court by the opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP). But from then on a burning tension began to be felt in Ankara. During the night, a communiqué was issued on the Armed Forces’ website with all the appearance of an ultimatum to the civil authorities. The full translation of this announcement is as follows:

“It is evident that certain circles are making continuous efforts to attack the fundamental values of the State of the Turkish Republic, namely its secularism, and that these activities have recently undergone a
considerable increase. With such action, which is becoming widespread and goes so far as to include the organisation of alternative celebrations to our national holidays, the symbol of our State’s independence and the unity of the nation, these circles are calling these basic values into question, demanding that they be redefined.

By way of example, a Koran recital competition was held on the national holiday of 23rd April. On 22nd April 2007, young girls were made to wear old-fashioned costume and chorus religious chants, with the participation of groups from Sanliurfa, Mardin, Gaziantep and Diyarbakir. At this hour of the night these little girls should have been in bed. At the same time, some individuals attempted to pull down portraits of Atatürk and Turkish flags, clearly showing the real aim and intentions of the organisers of the event. Additionally, instructions were given to all the headmasters of the schools in the town of Altindag near Ankara for ‘celebrating the week of the holy birth’. In Denizli, schoolgirls wore veils and sang religious chants at an event organised by the mufti and a political party. Although the village of Nikfer, in the municipality of Tavas in Denizli, has four mosques, religious conferences for women have been held in a State school building. These events have been observed with concern. The activities held at the schools are announced in bulletins sent by the national Ministry of Education, but such events do not form part of this framework. Although the High Command was informed of them by the competent authorities, no measures have been taken. The fact that the local authorities were perfectly aware of the activities in question being organised and should have intervened and prevented them, makes the situation even more serious. Numerous other examples could be provided.

This fundamentalist concept, contrary to the Republic and whose sole purpose is to call into question the basic values of our State, has been encouraged by certain events and speeches over the last few days, widening the content of its activities. Many developments occurring in our region originate from disasters caused by the instrumentalisation of faith and religion in the political discourse. In our country, as is the case abroad, when an attempt is made to base the political discourse or ideologies on religion, it is corrupt and leads to a total loss of faith, as has been clearly seen in Malatya. There is no doubt that the only means by which the Republic of Turkey can live in peace and stability as a modern democracy is by remaining loyal to the fundamental values of our State as laid down in the Constitution. There is no doubt whatsoever that all of this contradicts the essential and total adhesion to the Republic (as the Chief of Staff stated in his speech of 12th April 2007, insisting on the sincerity of this adhesion) and infringes the fundamental values and provisions set out in the Constitution. Over the last few days, the Presidential debate has focused on the question of secularism. This turn of events is a cause for concern for the Turkish Armed Forces. We must remember that they are a party to this debate and that they are the unfailling guarantee of secularism. If the need arises, the armed forces will clearly express their position and will act accordingly. No-one should doubt this. In short, all those who oppose the idea of “Happy is he who calls himself a Turk!” coined by the great founder of our Republic, Atatürk, are enemies of the Republic, and so they will remain. The Turkish Armed Forces conserve an unwavering desire to fulfill without fault the duties commended to them by law to protect these values. Their bond with and their faith in these values are unshakeable.”

This is the classic line of argument that served to justify numerous military interventions in the past – in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997 – with the effect of the parliamentary regime being suspended each time, the politicians arrested, judged and even sentenced to death as occurred in 1960, and the academics, intellectuals, union leaders and political opponents pursued, harassed, tortured or forced into exile.

The army and the government upped the tone with unprecedented virulence at their face-to-face debates, which had been setting the secular establishment against that of the new AKP for several months, if not since the coming to power of the AKP in 2002.

The following day, 28th April, the military ultimatum was rejected by both the political analysts and the intelligentsia. It was only in the afternoon that the government spokesman and Minister of Justice Cemil Çiçek took a stand, calling the non-elect to order with the words: “In a democratic country based on a legally con-
stituted State, it is inconceivable for a general to make this kind of statement against his government.” Cicek made clear that “the Chief of Staff depends on the Prime Minister” and that the aim of his declaration was to pres- surise the Constitutional Court. He remarked that Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had telephoned the Chief of Staff Büyükkanit to demand an explanation. Despite these clarifications, the military’s warning to the authorities was automatically accused of being a coup d’etat, in this case of an electronic nature. It has gone down in the annals as an e-coup.

From this point on, the army and the government upped the tone with unprecedented virulence at their face-to-face debates, which had been setting the secular establishment against that of the new AKP for several months, if not since the coming to power of the AKP in 2002.

Turkish democracy needs new impetus, and should by no means bask in this partial victory over the power of the military

On 29th April, a huge demonstration bringing together over a million people – something rarely seen in Turkey – was held in Istanbul with a variety of slogans running from “No to the EU, no to America” to “No sharia, no coup d’état.” When the Istanbul stock exchange opened on 30th April, it had dropped by 9%.

This was followed on 5th May by demonstrations in Izmir and other towns in the province, which in many cases were radio-controlled or at least picked up by the most radical fringe of the secularist Kemalist elite.

In Parliament, the last two rounds of the nomination of the President of the Republic had no effect, as the Constitutional Court had demanded a quorum of a third of the MPs present for the vote to be valid. The sitting President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, consequently retained his position and Turkey found itself immersed in an electoral campaign for elections brought forward by several months. Held on 22nd July, they consolidated the power of the AKP, which was seen as the champion of Turkish democracy, having succeeded in holding its own against the military. At the start of the legislature the new Parliament elected Abdullah Gül as the eleventh President of the Turkish Republic.

Much Remains to Be Done

It is evident that the Turkish democracy emerged triumphant from this crisis, with the consecration of the governing party. However, the errors of the military class and the old secular, pro-militarist Kemalist elite frequently serve as an excuse for the government to pass itself off as the champion of democracy, by simply doing the opposite of whatever these groups advocate.

Today, Turkish democracy needs new impetus, and should by no means bask in this partial victory over the power of the military. The challenge remains in-tact and the AKP government, even though it has been reinforced by the elections, does not appear able to lead this struggle, as it prefers to share the power with the military, only troubling them as regards the quite necessary redefinition of secularism. This *modus vivendi* will neither affect the financial power of the military establishment nor bring it back under the authority of the elected party.
After almost nine years of a fruitless international protectorate, Kosovo declared its independence on 17th February 2008. It was recognised by the USA and a number of European states in spite of strong opposition from Serbia and its ally, Russia. The issue is seriously dividing the European Union and is reviving speculation on the risks of a new regional crisis.

From the viewpoint of advocates of this solution, recognising Kosovo’s independence would succeed in “sloting in place the final piece of the Balkan jigsaw puzzle.” This independence would crown the process of dismemberment of the former Yugoslav Federation and do so in a way that would guarantee a lasting stabilisation of the western Balkans. While the Albanians’ age-old demand has now been vindicated, at least in symbolic terms, a new regional crisis seems nevertheless to be taking shape, given that Kosovan independence, while formal, does not presage the viability of the new state. It looks rather like the onset of a new cycle of dismemberment and restructuring of the Balkan region.

**A Remotely Controlled Process**

Over two years, the United Nations envoy conducted negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, which never had a true chance of reaching a satisfactory conclusion. The positions on both sides were antagonistic; the Albanians would not discuss anything other than independence, precisely the very option that was unacceptable to Serbia, which was only willing to contemplate some form of definition of “wide-ranging autonomy.” The Serbian authorities even proposed a veritable “world tour of autonomies,” conjuring up a status for Kosovo based on the model for the Aland Islands in Norway, then the Italian Alto Adige, or if not that, then the one used for Hong Kong, etc.

In reality, the dice were loaded from the very start, with American high representatives declaring, even before discussions were under way, that independence was the “unavoidable” outcome. Such standpoints could not but underpin Albanian intransigence, and render the negotiation process hopeless.

Despite that, Serbia enjoyed a strong diplomatic and legal position. Since the NATO bombing came to an end in June 1999, Kosovo’s status was in effect determined by UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which explicitly envisages Serbian sovereignty over the territory.

Quite clearly, this resolution is still valid to the extent that it has not been overridden by any other resolution of that very same Security Council. Now Serbia is able to count on Russian support in preventing a new text being adopted. Under these conditions, Resolution 1244 holds good, leading to a situation that is at best confused: the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) remains in place, even if it will progressively relinquish the core of its competencies in favour of Kosovan institutions and the new EULEX mission that the EU intends to deploy. The 18,000 NATO troops, the Kosovo Force, are similarly being deployed by virtue of that resolution. From the legal point of view, the bypassing of Resolution 1244 on the part of the Security Council, creates an incontestable precedent, that Russia is bound to wield when encouraging the independence of secessionist former Soviet republics that remain faithful to it, such as Moldovan Transnistria, or indeed Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia. More widely, a number of countries are concerned at the solution provided for Kosovo’s status: Serbia, a sov-
ereign state and UN member, has been stripped, against its will, of 18% of its territory, an act constituting a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter that has been accepted and promoted by the main western states, most notably the USA, France and the United Kingdom.

In reality, the international community has fallen headlong into a formidable trap. Kosovo Albanians believed that they had been promised independence, and they openly threatened to unleash a fresh cycle of violence if that prospect was not quickly fulfilled. They had interpreted NATO’S bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 as explicit support for their demands, and they regarded the United Nations protectorate as a “preparation” for that inevitable independence.

However, the 1999 bombings had no other official purpose than to bring to an end the abuses by the Serbian and Yugoslav security forces in Kosovo and the independence option had not at the time been envisaged by the main actors on the international stage. Similarly, UNMIK was deployed without any proper objectives or timetable.

This protectorate, the costliest in the whole of United Nations history, had not allowed a solution to be found for any of the countless challenges faced by Kosovo. Hence an open-ended extension was inconceivable. There was thus a need to break the status quo, even if the cure chosen were to turn out worse than the disease.

The Fiasco of the International Protectorate

UNMIK had no clearly-defined objectives save the one – enunciated in a wholly theoretical and abstract way – of rebuilding a “multi-ethnic” society in Kosovo. In the event, the deployment of international civil and military forces in Kosovo in June 1999 brought with it violent acts of “reverse ethnic cleansing” against Serb and Roma populations, but also other small non-Albanian communities such as Goranis, Bosnians and Croats.

From there on, speaking of “multiethnicity” was a distraction, the slightest trust needed between the various communities having been wiped out by the reciprocal violence. Whilst the right of return of the approximately 150,000 Serbs and Roma forced to flee from Kosovo since 1999 was recognised as a priority by the international administration, “real” returnees (those not leaving again within a few months) total, at best, a few hundred cases.

The failings of the protectorate are equally flagrant in two other critical areas: reestablishing the rule of law and something approaching a functional economy. Putting in place a police force and an effective legal system has all along come up against endless obstacles. The United Nations police, whose members are drawn from every country in the world and rarely understand Serbian or Albanian, have never been able to draw up an adequate framework for cooperation with the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), itself broadly subservient to the interests of the various parties and factions. The shadow services (those from the previous guerilla forces or from the Democratic League of Kosovo [LDK]) still continue to exercise a far more efficacious watch on society.

These networks of interests, frequently linked to political mafias, have similarly impeded a reconstruction of the legal system: in every case coming up to trial, witnesses retract, the judges themselves are afraid. Under such conditions, it is not at all surprising that practically no trials of ex-guerilla fighters have been successfully prosecuted. This phenomenon goes all the way up to the international criminal Tribunal at The Hague, where it is rare for Albanian witnesses to dare to stand by their depositions against former fighters from the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK).

This failure of justice has as its direct consequence a consolidation of private interest net-works, which back and control the political parties. Thanks to the artlessness of the UN administration, these long years have aggravated mafia creep. Albanian citizens, the first to have suffered from this dereliction, do not forget the responsibility attaching to the international administration, in the same way as they blame them for their economic breakdown.

It is true to say that bringing prosperity to Kosovo was not part of UNMIK’s “contractual” commitments, but the failure of public services, infrastructure and the economy is nevertheless a damning indictment of the international administration responsible for the territory.

The most flagrant example is the electrical power supply. Life in Kosovo since June 1999 has followed the pattern of endless power cuts, a reality that had been unknown up to then, since Serbia had always ensured Kosovo’s supply and its grid maintenance. Class war has taken on a face that Karl Marx never contemplated: the opposition between the happy owners of an electricity generator and the vast majority of the population that is unable to have one. In these circumstances, one suspects that the devel-
Development of any economic activity will become even harder, while power cuts make for permanent social discontent. The record is even more puzzling when one bears in mind that Kosovo was actually supposed to export electricity during the Yugoslav era and that Kosovo A and Kosovo B power stations, at Obilic, near Pristina, were built in the 1960s by French firm Alstom. It is wholly incomprehensible that it has proved impossible to repair them and return them to production when the European Agency for Reconstruction alone has paid out close to 500 million euros to restore electricity production and supply to working order.

Serious instances of corruption have continued to blot the record. Controlling the lignite mines, the Obilic power plants and the public electricity utility, KEK, has been the object of a ceaseless and vigorous political battle in which the main Albanian parties, the LDK, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Alliance for the future of Kosovo (AAK), have always sought to have their “placemen” in the strategic posts, regardless of the required skills and qualifications. Corruption has equally touched the international administration: in December 2002, senior UNMIK official Jo Trutschler, a German national, was arrested on suspicion of corruption. At the end of 2007, the mission’s number two, former US general Steven Schook, was suddenly obliged to quit his post, as he became the subject of an enquiry by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS). He was implicated in the vast and murky business of building a third giant power plant, Kosovo C, a project with a cost estimated at 3.5 billion dollars, for which any economic justification seems questionable, and with environmental consequences that were never examined.

All things considered, Kosovo remains a social time-bomb, ever threatening to explode, with an unemployment rate estimated at 60% of the active population, and with 60% of the population being aged 25 or under. Every year, 40,000 young people celebrate their eighteenth birthday with barely a chance of being able to build their lives and futures in Kosovo. For them the sole prospect is to head off to the West, most often illegally.

Despite the colossal sums that the EU has promised to commit to Kosovo, this state of affairs shows few signs of improving, at least in the short term. Advocates of independence put forward two arguments: foreign investors shunned Kosovo as long as it had no clearly established status, but one suspects that in this respect the situation has barely changed since the 17th February formal proclamation, while the regional circumstances appear to have become yet more uncertain. Another point is that privatisations have remained blocked, given that the majority of enterprises in Kosovo belonged to the Serb Republic: the position has not changed at all since the proclamation of independence, since the political status clearly does not determine private property rights.

Under these conditions, Kosovo’s economic future – deprived of any significant economic resources, aside from its lignite deposits – looks very gloomy. Kosovo’s development can be seen not to be viable other than within the framework of a development in regional trade. Even if Serbia has not yet carried out its threat of an economic embargo on Kosovo, the end of relations with Belgrade will represent a major handicap for the new state.

The Regional Risks

Kosovo’s independence should not be compared to Montenegro’s, in the first place because the two countries did not enjoy the same status: Montenegro was a republic federated to the former Yugoslavia, entitling it, according to the much-cited opinions of the Badinter commission delivered in early 1992, to exercise its right to secede. Most especially, Montenegrin independence was obtained through a ballot that brought together the voices of the majority (the Montenegrins) and those of the greater part of the national minorities: the country’s Bosnians, Albanians and Croats voted massively in favour of independence. By way of contrast, Kosovo’s independence had been sought by just one of the country’s national communities – the Albanians – admittedly a large majority but one which thereby imposed its choice on the other communities. Aside from legal considerations – for example about the exact legal status enjoyed by Kosovo within socialist Yugoslavia – its independence entertains the principle of creating a state on ethnic grounds.

Kosovo’s independence undoubtedly raises a “cross-border Albanian national” issue, even if the question of an eventual national unification is not immediately posited. The outcome of events in Macedonia (where one quarter of the population is Albanian), in the Presevo Valley, southern Serbia, and in Montenegro (where the Albanian minority represents just
6.5% of the total population) will need to be watched closely.
Other consequences of independence: its acceptance is regarded as a precedent by Bosnia and Herzegovina's Serbian nationalists that justifies their own aspirations to secede. Milorad Dodik, the all-powerful Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, “the Serbian entity” of this still divided country, will not fail to play the card of threatening a referendum and partition to block all the indispensable reforms and all the measures that could reaffirm its power. The danger of international sanctions has likewise faded from sight, due to Dodik’s possession from now on of an even more powerful “weapon” of menacing secession.
The final point is that Kosovo’s independence has precipitated a political crisis in Serbia, boosting the most nationalist tendencies. If Serbia “goes for the option” of plunging itself into political isolation and direct confrontation with a substantial section of the international community, it will not be alone in paying the price, since this attitude will have immeasurable regional consequences.
The EU’s own strategy in the region is heading for troubled waters. Since the Thessalonika Summit, in June 2003, the Union has recognised the “vocation” of western Balkan countries to accede, but how could any integration strategy be conceivable if it created an impasse in relation to Serbia, which remains the principal and pivotal state in the region? It is quite simply impossible to imagine a stable and peaceful Balkan region without a Serbia that was itself democratic, stable and on good terms with its neighbours.

What Independence?
Kosovo’s independence will remain, at least initially, formal and symbolic in essence. That independence is under the “control” of the international community, and in this instance the EU. The competencies of elected institutions will, in practice, be limited by the discretionary powers of the European High Representative, following a model close to that being applied in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The territory’s security itself will continue to be guaranteed by NATO troops – even if the current Kosovo Protection Corps (TMK), a civil force, ended up becoming a small army.
At the same time, international recognition of the new state will in reality remain partial, despite the establishment of a number of foreign embassies in Pristina. In effect, the Serbian veto will prevent Kosovo from joining a number of international organisations, notably the Council of Europe or the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Membership of the United Nations, requiring a vote by the General Assembly, likewise remains uncertain.

In the end, the authority of the new state will only be exercised over part of Kosovo’s territory, since the Serbs refuse to recognise the declaration of independence and have thus abandoned all the institutions in Kosovo, not just in the northern sector, but also in all the enclaves. Since 17th February, Belgrade has taken back direct management of all aspects of daily life in the Serbian zones. Under these conditions, Kosovo is well and truly following the partitionist logic.
The EULEX mission, should it succeed in being deployed, will have as one of its essential tasks to oversee the implementation of the principal proposals of the Ahtisaari plan, which contain a number of measures that hold little attraction from the outset for the Albanians, such as decentralisation, which translates into the creation of Serbian communes.

These rules also include symbolic measures that seek to disguise the Albanian national character of the new state: thus, both the anthem and flag must not evoke “any particular national community." This leads effectively to the triumph of the absurd. The new Kosovo is an “ethnic" Albanian state, since the principal non-Albanian community, the Serbs, refuse to recognise independence. At the same time, a heavy-handed international oversight will be employed to attempt to hide this reality by imposing neutral symbols. Quite clearly this mismatch can but foster frustration and exasperation among all the communities, while Kosovo will not only remain a ticking bomb but also a veritable powder-keg that threatens the whole region.

Bibliography

If one had to choose just one *leitmotiv* for news coming from the Balkans in 2007, it would be that of the “return” of the great powers to the region to vie amongst themselves for areas of influence. Although these great powers have at no time been absent from the Balkans since 1990, 2007 saw their rivalry laid bare. However, the outcome of this competition will only be seen over the course of 2008.

The effect of this has been seen in two significant processes: the process of negotiation for joining the European Union (EU), topped off by Romania and Bulgaria joining the club; and the disputes between Russia and the US with regard to burning geostrategic issues, particularly the status of Kosovo. Brussels has also had an important role to play in these tensions, as could hardly be otherwise. Apparently, it was working to ease tensions: however, in reality, a specific hard core of members were backing Washington. These trends affected Balkan countries in transition from an Eastern-block governmental system. In Greece, a country whose social and political system is firmly anchored in the western liberal tradition, political debate and social crises have centred on the internal situation and the country’s new relationship with its neighbour Turkey.

**The Kosovo Problem Enters a New Phase**

2007 marked the deadline for the solution to the dispute over Kosovo on the basis of the plan devised by Finnish diplomat Martti Ahtisaari over the course of the previous year and backed by the United Nations. In February 2007, Ahtisaari presented to political leaders in Belgrade and Pristina a draft of a Security Council resolution for “supervised independence.” However, this plan satisfied neither the Serbs nor the more radical Albanian nationalist, especially the highly-active “Vetëvendosje!” (Self-determination) movement, which organised violent protests against it.

The plan, inspired by the model employed in the Åland islands (which had for a long time been the subject of territorial dispute between Sweden and Finland), was based around granting Kosovo supervised sovereignty which would not – formally – be described as “independence,” even though it made no reference to any kind of Serbian sovereignty over the territory. However, Kosovo would enjoy the prerogatives and symbols of an independent state, such as a constitution, flag, national anthem and access to bodies hosting sovereign nations. An international envoy would be appointed with the power to veto legislation and to dismiss civil servants and political leaders. The 100,000 Serbians and members of other communities remaining in Kosovo would, according to the plan, have wide-ranging autonomy and proportional representation in the government, parliament, police and civil service. Also included was the possibility of Kosovo having an almost token army of 2,500 personnel.

Russia announced that it would veto the resolution because it implicitly violated the concept of national sovereignty at international level. Furthermore, Moscow announced that it would not provide Security Council support for any resolution that did not secure support from both Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs. The situation reached a dead end on 20th July, when it became definitively clear that the plan would not achieve the required consensus in the Security Council. Nevertheless, Brussels already had the intention of taking charge of Kosovo’s sovereignty well before the Ahtisaari Plan, and so there
were already US and EU civil servants in Pristina by October 2007, "preparing the unilateral declaration of Kosovo’s independence, leasing premises and recruiting staff to this end." This was the so-called EULEX Mission, made up of experts, police and advisors to oversee the running of Kosovo’s institutions, in gradual replacement of the United Nations administration. Additionally, EULEX ought to provide Kosovo with a decent judiciary. This moment saw the start of a process towards what appeared to be an imminent declaration of Kosovo’s independence under the aegis of the EU, although this would come after Serbia’s presidential elections in February 2008. In the meanwhile, there was a perceptible return by Russia to the Balkans, from which it had been marginalised ever since the NATO air campaign against the former Yugoslavia in Spring 1999. The great Slavic power was clearly reinvigorated thanks to sustained economic growth and significant investment from around the world (above all from the West) after the state had regained control of energy source, which had been in the hands of oligarchs since the Yeltsin era. Moscow once again felt its voice heard in the Balkans, as had been the norm since the 18th century.

In reaction to this power, President George W. Bush provided clear pressure in support of Kosovo’s independence, particularly in June 2007, during his tour of Eastern Europe and the Balkans. In Poland and the Czech Republic, he sought confirmation of Warsaw’s and Prague’s permission for the installation of an anti-missile shield allegedly designed to stop (improbable) attacks by strategic rockets fired from North Korea or Iran. In Italy and Albania – where there is unquestioning admiration for everything from the States – President Bush stated that he would accept any unilateral declaration of independence by Pristina. This manoeuvre was partly a response to Putin’s offer to install the missile shield warning system in Russia’s base in Gabala (Azerbaijan), which had caught him by surprise. However, it also formed part of a policy very deliberately aimed at undoing any hint of sustained closeness between Brussels and Moscow.

The Second Wave of Balkan States Joins the EU

It is difficult to assess the results obtained by Romania and Bulgaria as members of EU. As it was to be expected, macroeconomic figures are still not especially conclusive, particularly if one bears in mind that, during the second half of the year, the growing impact of Wall Street’s subprime financial crisis on European financial markets was felt. Recent official figures indicate that in both Romania and Bulgaria, the economy had overheated due to an excessive increase in consumer spending on imported goods. According to Valentin Lazea, Head Economist at Romania’s Central Bank, the foreign trade deficit stood at 14% of GDP, compared with 10% a year earlier and 8% two years previously. From August on, inflation exceeded 6%, partly due to the drought, which affected the cost of basic foodstuffs. The problem of an overheated economy also affected Bulgaria, and to an even greater extent, given that, for example, the country’s inflation rate in 2007 was 12.5% (7.3% in 2006) and its foreign debt doubled between 2004 and 2007. As far as GDP per capita is concerned, Romania’s 38% of the EU average and Bulgaria’s 37% were some of the lowest figures of all the 27 member states.

There was a perceptible return by Russia to the Balkans, from which it had been marginalised ever since the NATO air campaign against the former Yugoslavia in Spring 1999. The great Slavic power was clearly reinvigorated thanks to sustained economic growth and significant investment from around the world

Corruption in both countries also remained a matter of great concern for Brussels, which has repeatedly drawn Bucharest’s and Sofia’s attention to the issue. In fact, Romania has since 2004 been carrying out an anti-corruption campaign (“Nu da șpagă” or “Don’t leave a tip”), coordinated by Transparency International and supported by the EU. In Transparency International’s 2007 Corruption Perception Index, Romania was in 69th place and Bulgaria 64th, out of a total of 179 countries, with Somalia and Myanmar at the bottom to the list. By way of comparison, Albania was in 105th spot, Montenegro, Macedonia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina shared 84th position and Serbia was at number 79; Spain held the 25th position, whilst the least corrupt countries were Denmark, Finland and New Zealand.

The fight against corruption gave rise to a spectacular but confused crisis in government that shook Romania until May 2007. President Traian Băsescu of the Democratic Party (who had beaten his predecessor, the Social Democrat Traian Nastase in 2004), faced fierce opposition from the majority parties in the parliament and from Prime Minister and former ally Călin Popescu-Tăriceanu, of the National Liberal Party. In the increasingly bitter confrontation, which broke out from the campaign that the President attempted to launch against political corruption, the Social Democrat Party started in January actions to suspend Băsescu from office, with the argument that his actions were unconstitutional. In April, the Constitutional Court cleared the President, but a few days later a majority of MPs nevertheless voted for his suspension. In the subsequent referendum of 20th April, the President received a direct mandate from the people, with a sufficiently large majority to renew confidence in him and return him to office, thereby putting an end to the crisis. Whatever the facts of the matter, the spectacle was hardly consistent with the stability and political mores to be expected of a member of the EU, which only increased the Brussels’ doubts.

Nevertheless, generally speaking and despite the logical uncertainty about the economic results obtained by Romania and Bulgaria in their first year as members of the EU, the outlook of the authorities in Bucharest and Sofia was optimistic. In May 2007, Romania’s National Forecast announced that the country aimed to reach half the average standard of living of EU member states within seven years, i.e. by 2013. The study opined that Romania’s and Bulgaria’s accession to the EU could be compared with that of Spain and Portugal in 1986 and calculated that Romania could make up in seven years the difference with regard to the EU average covered by Portugal in 22.

Aside from these opinions, it should be noted that there are other figures regarding Romania and Bulgaria to which sufficient attention has not been paid. Two are worthy of especial note: firstly, the transformation of the labour market against the backdrop of globalisation and the EU’s economic area, and secondly, the effects of political integration on interregional conflicts.

The former manifested itself in the mass emigration of the workforce, especially that of Romania, throughout 2007. In the course of a few months, around half a million workers had emigrated to Italy and a similar number to Spain: more than 300,000 immigrants entered the latter country between January and September. This increased influx could not fail to have a social impact on the host countries. Italy even caused an international crisis at the beginning of November when the Italian government signed a decree ordering the mass expulsion of Romanians after the murder of an Italian woman by a Romanian criminal. The crisis was solved after the intervention of the EU authorities and a visit by the Romanian Prime Minister to the Italian capital on 7 November.

There are figures regarding Romania and Bulgaria to which sufficient attention has not been paid. Two are worthy of especial note: firstly, the transformation of the labour market against the backdrop of globalisation and the EU’s economic area, and secondly, the effects of political integration on interregional conflicts.

However, underlying the entire issue, it was possible glimpse political repercussions that could lead to a new, community-wide phenomenon. In autumn 2006, multimillionaire “Gigi” Becali, dubbed “the Romanian Berlusconi,” commenced a project to create an Independent Romanian Party (PIR) with branches in those EU countries with the greatest number of Romanian immigrants, to win their votes in the municipal elections of their respective host countries. The PIR did not contest Spain’s most recent municipal elections, but this is nevertheless a matter worthy of academic study, given the potential political and cultural implications in both the home and host countries, and the trans-cultural cross-pollination involved: the implanting of a “Balkan” way of carrying out politics in countries with a different tradition and within a community macro-context.

On the other hand, Bulgaria’s and Romania’s membership in the EU does not seem to have led to the
feared revival of interregional conflicts. For example, the disputes and tensions between Hungary and Romania with regard to Transylvania were not exacerbated by the fact that both countries were partners and neighbours with actual or imminent obligations regarding mobility and minority rights. The case was similar with Bulgaria, although here what was most significant was the incorporation of a Turkish minority within the EU, for the very first time.

**Bulgaria’s and Romania’s membership in the EU does not seem to have led to the feared revival of interregional conflicts**

By Way of Conclusion

Romania and Bulgaria were not the only Balkan countries to suffer from political instability in 2007. Veteran EU member Greece called general elections for 16th September, from which the conservative New Democracy party emerged victorious with 41.83% of the vote, severely affecting its traditional adversary, PASOK, which entered into a crisis. However, whoever the winner of the elections was, they knew that they had to carry out important reforms. The terrible forest fires of the summer, the worst in the country’s history, provided a dramatic backdrop to the undeniable need for modernising structural reforms. Nevertheless, the implementation of neoliberal-oriented changes led to protests, which turned into the general strike of 17th December against likely cuts in social security benefits.

Social disputes such as those appearing in Greece at the end of 2007, together with the debate on the integration of Romania and Bulgaria into the EU and the progress of Croatia’s candidacy, would appear to reveal a panorama of social and economic modernisation in the Balkans. These countries are increasingly leaving behind their obsessive nationalist and inter-ethnic conflicts which, in any case, it was assured, would resolve themselves when the entire area was completely committed to the process of European integration. In any case, the great question in December 2007 was how a number of countries in the region, beginning with Serbia, and the new power that was Russia, would respond to the more than probable unilateral declaration of independence by the ethnic Albanian authorities of Kosovo, supported by Washington and Brussels.

**References**

The countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are often seen as a menace. Rarely are they considered miracles, economic or political. The MENA countries are associated with economic challenges of modest economic growth rates, weak competitiveness, high unemployment, persistently young populations wanting to immigrate, poverty amidst richness, environmental vulnerabilities and high risks to human security. This is combined with timid political establishments more willing to modernize the administrative apparatus than allow for political diversity and rotation of power. The golden rules governing relations with the MENA countries seem to be: focus on the economy, enhance security, ensure stability, cautiously encourage liberalism and be careful of democracy. We shall argue that these golden rules belong to a minimalist agenda; though seemingly realistic in the short run, it has yet to prove itself effective for medium to long run sustainable human development.

Current Economic Trends


Same applies to some indicators of integrity and transparency, where again Qatar, Oman and the UAE rank highest in the region. Among the non oil-rich countries, Jordan and Tunisia continue to score relatively higher than other MENA countries on government effectiveness and integrity transparency.

Two trends in particular seem pervasive and thus sound loud alarm bells. Most MENA countries, including the better performers (oil-rich Gulf countries) have low levels of trust among the panels of executives who respond to World Economic Forum surveys. Another prevalent trend in the region is bureaucratic procedures considered burdensome by the panels of executives who respond to World Economic Forum surveys.

Given this record for most MENA countries, the latest decision of the EuroMed ECOFIN on 14th September 2007, where EU Finance Ministers met with their Mediterranean counterparts to discuss ways of achieving higher sustainable growth and more jobs, is quite welcome. The Ministers agreed to launch a Euro-Mediterranean Network of Public Finance Experts in an effort to share experiences in fiscal policy issues, paying attention to budget deficits and public debt, increasing public sector accountability and fighting corruption.

The Missing Perspective in Economic Trends

Three trends are often missing in an account of economic performance that is based on surveys of executives and expert opinion: macro economic development strategies, unemployment and inequality. Macro economic trends on how economies are doing overall with respect to sector productivity, poverty and inequality are an important barometer of the overall well-being of societies. For a start, growth

1 The ideas expressed in this chapter do not represent an official position of the UNDP.
rates are volatile and uneven as a result of oil prices, weak competitiveness of exports, weak productivity, conflict and the ensuing political instability in the region (MENA-OECD Investment Program, 2006). This weak growth performance is considered by some observers to be a symptom of more than red tape or investors’ weak trust. It persists despite consistent tariff reforms and a complex regime of free trade agreements (e.g. WTO, EU associations, co-terminus regional and bilateral trade agreements) which have resulted in noticeable reduction of tariff barriers to exports from Arab countries.\footnote{Weak growth cannot be blamed on state-led planned economies any longer as it persists despite the abandonment of state-led development models. This begs the question of why weak growth (Page, 2004) (World Bank, 2007). For some analysts, weak growth is the other side of the coin of a conscious choice to base development strategies on the service sector, weakening in the process whatever gains made previously in the 1960s and 1970s in the industrial sector. The former trend is untenable especially if it is coupled with a private sector that tends to be biased towards low risk services which do not produce enough jobs at a time when the Arab job market has one of the lowest employment absorption rates in the world. This perpetuates an inability to absorb millions of existing and new entrants into the Arab labour market on a yearly basis; the Arab labour force is estimated to have grown by an average of 3.7% per year in the}
period 2000-2005 or 4 million entrants per year (ESCWA, 2007). In consequence, the informal sector thrives in most Arab economies. This means, however, that Arab employees are also more likely to accept insecure jobs, or create jobs based on insecure claims to assets without social security protection.\(^3\)

Both trends become explosive when combined with a third trend: increasing wealth inequality as income inequality continues to have a mixed record. The region has experienced poverty reductions since the 1990s, except Morocco and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs). Nevertheless, incidences of extreme poverty still amount to 22% of the total population of the region (or 52 million people) with Egypt, Syria and the LDCs taking the biggest share thereof. Using World Bank “upper” poverty count,\(^4\) headcount poverty reaches 42%. This is a substantial concern considering that those marginally above that line remain vulnerable to minor economic fluctuations. On the other hand, there is rudimentary evidence that wealth inequality – as opposed to income inequality – is on the rise due to concentration of urban and rural land holdings, among other things. Thus, to boast secure property rights is one thing (as is the case in the World Economic Forum Executive survey); to have social cohesion is quite another.\(^5\)

These trends are important to keep in mind because combined they result in entrenched dynamics of social exclusion. This manifests itself in exclusion from the labour market and from community services. The latter phenomenon manifests itself in the high rates of slum dwellers in urban areas of the region: 42% in 2001, down from 47% in the 1990s (ESCWA, 2007).

### Governance Trends: The Missing Link and the Missing Adjective

The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) has framed governance in the MENA region as a process that entails more than effective administrative management of public finances and of investment and trade policies. Human rights, democracy and rule of law are central to the ENP. This is reflected in the handful of ENP action plans signed between the EC and Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon.\(^6\) In principle, this is a move in the right direction. What this direction requires, however, is a strategic approach.

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\(^2\) ESCWA Millennium Development Goals in the Arab Region 2007: A Youth Lens. The report records declining average tariffs imposed by developed market economies on agricultural, clothing and textile products in different sub-regions of the Arab region and increasing free admission of developed economies’ imports into the Arab region, pp. 59-60.

\(^3\) See numerous research papers by the Population Council in Cairo, Egypt. See also ILO, 2005; World Bank, 2005.

\(^4\) The upper poverty line is defined as the value of the basket of goods and services actually consumed by households whose food and energy intake is equal to the minimum requirement of 2200 calories per person per day. In countries like India this is the basis for calculating the absolute poverty line.


\(^6\) ENP Action Plans are bilateral agreements tailored to individual partners’ short and medium term (3-5 years) reform priorities covering political dialogue, economic and social cooperation, trade, sectorial cooperation, cooperation on justice, and people to people contacts.
As it stands, these various central components of the ENP are additive programmes or activities. It seems to follow a piecemeal approach based on progress reports that are produced by the EC delegation staff. What the region may want beyond a parsimonious “good enough” governance approach is a governance type that allows for development with social cohesion and political inclusion. This entails meaningful participation and civic empowerment, access to justice, and power de-concentration/power sharing. The “Arab Human Development Report 2004” calls for many far-reaching legal and political changes to fortify the institutional foundations of freedom, limit the monopoly on power currently enjoyed by the executive in most countries and ensure an independent judiciary and total free speech.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that participation was on the decline in all these otherwise trend-setting election rounds. For example, in Algeria’s 17 May, 2007 parliamentary elections, almost 65% of the electorate boycotted the elections, “a historical threshold never crossed since independence” (Hachemaoui, 2007). In Morocco, on the day of the elections, a smaller proportion of the electorate went to the polls, barely 34%, according to numbers released by the Ministry of Home Affairs, compared with the elections of 2002 (52%) (FDCM & CERSS, 2007). Though Egypt had its first multi-candidate presidential election in 2005, turnout was lower than previous presidential elections. Most of the electorate were convinced that the incumbent President would win the election.

Beyond voter turnout, there is the issue of rural versus urban and poor versus middle class voters. Although voter turnout is associated with higher levels of education in developed democracies, in Egypt, illiterates are twice as likely to vote as those who can read (Blaydes, 2006). During the 2005 elections, AFP (Agence France Press) correspondents on the ground and members of independent Egyptian groups monitoring the vote confirmed participation was low in cities and higher in rural areas. This is because the votes of illiterates tend to be cheaper to purchase by political entrepreneurs, and illiterates are also more vulnerable to intimidation by state authorities. Similar trends in vot-

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**Meaningful Participation and Civic Empowerment**

The region has seen increased activity with respect to elections in the past 15 years, both national parliamentary, presidential and local. Most notably, Egypt ran presidential elections for the first time in its modern history, Palestine experienced power rotation, breaking the record set by Morocco, Algeria organized multi-candidate elections, Morocco and Jordan organized multi-party elections that saw the power of Islamists wane.
Human rights, democracy and rule of law are central to the ENP. This is reflected in the handful of ENP action plans signed between the EC and Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon.

In Jordan, a behavior based on tribal affiliation instead of party platform or candidate programme are also discernable. These findings have implications for our understanding of meaningful participation, clientelistic politics, electoral authoritarianism, and accountability in autocratic regimes (Blaydes, 2006).

Meaningful participation goes beyond election events. Meaningful participation requires an arsenal of legal safeguards for civil and political freedoms. Most countries in the region, except for Morocco and Jordan, restrict the formation of political parties in the name of containing the threat of Islamist parties. Press freedom remains an issue in the region. In Jordan there is an ongoing restriction on the freedom of the press (Hroub, 2007). In Tunisia, there has been little progress on freedom of association and freedom of expression. The activities of Tunisian independent civil society (NGOs, political movements, trade associations) have also been obstructed. The obligation for daily newspapers and magazines to deposit a number of copies with the authorities prior to publication was abolished in 2006 under the organic law but remains in force for the foreign press. In practice, journalists continue to face various obstacles (e.g. media access to advertising). Electronic public space has not been spared. In Jordan there are draft laws calling for the monitoring of electronic news sites. This is not specific to Jordan by any means; in a study of the internet in 40 countries (excluding Europe and the United States), OpenNet Initiative, an academic think-tank, says that censorship of the internet has spread from just a handful of countries five years ago to 26 nations. Some countries in the Arab region are now blocking entire internet services such as YouTube, Skype and Google Maps.

On the other hand, there are some hopeful signs; several countries tolerate the presence of a critical public space that is given various opportunities of survival. Egypt, Morocco and – to a lesser extent Tunisia – witness the mushrooming of independent press, blogs and electronic networks. In most cases, these spaces need to watch over red lines that should not be crossed. Most recently, the Tunisian President announced that censorship of written publications will move from the hands of the executive to the courts. It remains to be seen whether the courts will be more lenient. In Morocco, a number of political parties chose to publicise their programmes through the so-called “independent” press, which sometimes published the programmes of several parties, with differing agendas, in the same edition (FDCM & CERSS, 2007).

Civic engagement requires a societal infrastructure. The region boasts thousands of civil society organizations. However, most are characterized by shallow grass root presence, weak voluntarism, dependency on development aid and constant state surveillance. In contrast to civil society organizations, the region is characterized by popular and effective social movements. Mostly faith based, these movements (notably the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon) are capable of organizing community based development schemes and social protection schemes as much as they are capable of contesting power. In contrast, non-faith based movements, historically affiliated with socialists and communist thought, have waned considerably, with the most recent Jordanian elections having witnessed the marked absence of any representatives thereof.


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Scores on “Voice and Accountability” are dropping in some countries despite presence of regular elections.

**Power De-Concentration/Power Sharing**

The region’s policy makers manifest reasonable willingness to embark on institutional reform as long as it entails more modern management systems, more effective administrative performance and ultimately more growth and investments. The concern about the image of one’s country in the international community is part and parcel of this willingness to reform. The region has, however, shown the limits of this attitude: economic liberalization yes, political liberalization no, especially if the latter means power rotation and the questioning of the economically liberal development model adopted across the region. Consequently, growth rates no matter how modest have not resulted in the easing of the political legitimacy crisis in the region or in political stability in the long run. Most political institutions, most prominently parliaments and political parties, are discredited for their weakness. With the exception of the Kuwaiti parliament, most of the region’s parliaments are too weak vis-à-vis the Executive, be that run by a Monarch or a President. Even the Parliamentary institution in Morocco – which by design constitutes the most capable in the region to capture societal diversity – has waned over the years (Ottaway, 2007). The Jordanian parliament is equally weakened after the latest elections in 2007. Political parties in both countries, models of relative tolerance of political diversity, have also been curtailed over the years though not all of this weakening is to be attributed to state oppression alone (Ottaway, 2007) (Hroub, 2007).

Parallel to the concentration of assets and wealth in the region, there is an equivalent concentration of political power as well. Though concentration of political power is nothing new to a region of dominant patrimonial authoritarianism, it seems to increasingly converge with concentrated economic wealth, a drastic reversal especially in Arab countries that witnessed a phase of Arab socialism. The most striking trend in this direction is the flagrant presence of businessmen in the political arena, e.g. in Egypt, Jordan and Morocco. The incumbent Egyptian government and the Egyptian parliament have a number of businessmen who are ministers and chairmen of standing parliamentary committees. The latest Jordanian elections were marked by a retreat of the Islamists, a marked absence of the leftists, Baathists and the non-Islamist opposition, and a strong presence of political money which contributed to the victory of a large number of businessmen and wealthy individuals with little political background. In Morocco, the vot-

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ingsystem adopted encouraged political parties to seek “wealthy candidates” to head their lists, especially in large constituencies in rural areas (Hroub, 2007) (FDCM & CERSS, 2007). This points to the main weakness of limited institutional reforms in the region. These reforms can only serve a limited purpose: encourage growth and investments. They cannot be allowed to encourage power sharing or power rotation, especially when the most likely contenders are faith-based. Power sharing and/or power rotation are perceived as too risky by the incumbent ruling elite, the international community and some elements of the opposition as well (Ottaway, 2007). However, without some considerable elements of meaningful participation and civic engagement to advocate for and support power sharing/power rotation, growth may continue to miss the poor and impoverished middle class, especially as both are concentrated in regions that are outside the attention of capital-based elites and investors.

Access to Justice

In most institutional reforms encouraged in the MENA region, attention is given to the legal and normative framework for investment. Recently, however, as seen in the ENP Action Plans, more attention and funds are being devoted to issues of the rule of law and protection of human rights. This is a welcome strategic direction. The overall regional trends seen from the point of view of investors and executives are worrisome. With the exception of the Gulf countries, Jordan and Tunisia, countries of the region score weakly on property rights, judicial independence and reliability of police. One is left to wonder how the scores would have been if the respondents had been poor and vulnerable groups or even the middle class of the region.

The region’s policy makers manifest reasonable willingness to embark on institutional reform as long as it entails more modern management systems, more effective administrative performance, and more growth and investments mentioned in this chapter. Access to justice is critical for poverty reduction in more than one way. The poor are often those most likely to suffer from violations of their physical security, their financial assets or access thereto. The poor are also most likely to have no access to health, education and shelter. When corruption is rampant, the poor are disproportionately disadvantaged because they are less able to pay bribes and, if they do, it constitutes a higher cost for services, costs which they are in dire need of reducing. What would contribute to economic development and political stability is a legal framework that provides remedies to the problems of the poor and middle class – beyond investors – giving them more access to their rights, raising their awareness thereof, ac-

TABLE 29

| Indicators of Property Rights, Judicial Independence and Reliability of Police |
|-----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| Property rights, including over financial assets (1 = are poorly defined and not protected by law, 7 = are clearly defined and well protected by law). | Algeria | Bahrain | Egypt | Jordan | Kuwait | Libya | Mauritania | Morocco | Oman | Qatar | Syria | Tunisia | UAE |
| | 4.50 | 5.00 | 4.70 | 5.00 | 4.80 | 3.70 | 3.70 | 4.80 | 5.90 | 5.30 | 3.80 | 5.40 | 5.10 |
| Judicial Independence is the judiciary in your country independent from political influences of members of government, citizens, or firms? (1 = no, heavily influenced, 7 = yes, entirely independent). | | 3.70 | 3.40 | 4.80 | 4.90 | 5.20 | 4.20 | 3.80 | 3.40 | 4.80 | 5.60 | 3.00 | 5.10 | 4.80 |
| Reliability of police services. Police services (1 = cannot be relied upon to protect businesses from criminals, 7 = can be relied upon to protect businesses from criminals). | | 3.70 | 5.60 | 4.50 | 5.10 | 5.40 | 3.40 | 3.30 | 4.00 | 5.50 | 5.30 | 3.20 | 5.10 | 5.30 |
knowledging and protecting their assets and their human security broadly defined.

**Conclusion**

What the region would benefit from, however, is a strategic view as to what governance trends say about meaningful participation and civic empowerment, access to justice, and mechanisms of power concentration, power distribution and power sharing. These governance domains are of cardinal importance to deal with the aforementioned economic trends within a new formulation of the sort of developmental state and the sort of state society relations required for sustainable inclusive development in the MENA region. The economic development agenda reduced to effective government alone is not enough; the sort of economic development required to address the aforementioned challenges goes beyond the scope of effective administration and transparent public finance management.

The region will need an access to information act that respects, protects and fulfills people’s rights. The region will also require enhanced capacity in collecting, analyzing and sharing information on poverty, inequality, and governance. The latter will have to go beyond international aggregate datasets which are good for cross country comparisons but cannot be catalysts for domestic accountability nor are they likely to provide guidance on reform priorities which address the challenges and revert the trends alluded to in this chapter.

**Bibliography**


Ever since the crisis of the 1980s, economic reform in the Maghreb has focused on macroeconomic stabilisation, with the goal of providing a healthy economic base to favour growth. Unlike its achievements in the field of macroeconomic stabilisation, the Maghreb has proved incapable of progressing in the field of microeconomic, structural and administrative reforms at a comparable rate to liberalise its economic system and enter into a phase of sustained acceleration of growth based on the pressing need to increase the productivity of its economies.

This article highlights the fact that the window of opportunity for carrying out these reforms is limited and that there is an urgent need to speed them up. If this does not happen, the sustainability of key elements such as macroeconomic stabilisation, increased production, integration with the EU and the promising, but fragile, acceleration in economic growth of recent years could be very seriously affected. Outstanding reforms include privatisation, tax reforms, overhauling the administration and financial sector, as well as improving the institutional context. In combination, these reforms pave the way for a move from a logic based on macroeconomic stabilisation to one based on macroeconomic and institutional modernisation.

Looking at the current outcome and future prospects for microeconomic reforms and macroeconomic balances shows a mixed situation. Although things have greatly improved in comparison with the 1980s, the 1990s saw the rate of reforms stagnate. The current decade has witnessed the same firmness with regard to macroeconomic stability and greater dynamism in microeconomic reforms in Morocco and Tunisia, where liberalisation is advancing slowly and unevenly, depending upon the sector. In Algeria and Libya, there is a systematic failure to meet promises to introduce reforms. Increases in oil and gas prices have, paradoxically, proved a serious obstacle to opening up the economy, since they bolster the rentier sector and create resources for maintaining the state’s "clientele" structure, weakening the short-term requirement for reforms.

On a microeconomic level, opening up the economy regionally (i.e. to the EU and, for Morocco, the USA) and multilaterally (for the World Trade Organisation, WTO) calls for a speeding up in reforms and broadening their scope so that Maghrebi businesses become capable of competing in their national and international markets. This pressure in favour of competition bolsters moves for reform, but internal resistance from protected industries, the public sector and part of the administration are delaying the adjustments and the implementation of policies to improve the investment environment and productivity. As already noted, the window of opportunity for reform is small, since it ends with the full industrial liberalisation with the EU from 2012, depending upon the different timetables stipulated in each Association Agreement. If reforms do not progress more quickly, the application of safeguards may be perceived as inevitable, damaging the credibility of the free trade area with the EU and, therefore, the urgency of the reforms. These will be decisive years, especially in Tunisia and Morocco, for the Association Agreements to have the desired effect of modernising Maghrebi economic structures and institutions. Algeria and Libya should also take advantage of favourable crude prices to initiate reforms to modernise and diversify their production structures.

Macroeconomic policy has improved, although large-scale macro balances still suffer from a certain degree of fragility. There are doubts about Algeria’s
ability to manage income from gas and to apply fiscal and monetary policies to manage internal demand and current expenditure, but current crude prices create large budgetary surpluses, which in 2006 and 2007 reached 15% and 11% of GDP, respectively. Libya, with a strong surplus in its public accounts, is in a similar position. In Morocco, fiscal consolidation has barely progressed, whilst current expenditure has increased and public investment stagnated, creating problems of sustainability in the short and medium term. The public deficit is moderate (2.4% of GDP in 2007 compared with an average of 4.6% between 2000 and 2005) and forecasts point to a gradual decrease if the economic growth of the last few years is maintained. Tunisia shows more positive results from the point of view of fiscal consolidation, with an equally moderate fiscal deficit (-2.9% of GDP in 2007), even though current expenditure is showing something of an upward trend to increase the economic legitimacy of the regime. Reductions in tariffs by Morocco and Tunisia represent a challenge to fiscal reform that cannot be put off any longer, something that is also true for the remainder of microeconomic reforms.

Algeria and Libya record strong and increasing current account surpluses, due to the rise in crude prices, which has in the past led to serious difficulties in managing balances on a macroeconomic level and preventing them impacting the monetary market and, with it, inflation. Debt interest remains significant for Tunisia, at around 15% of exports, and although it has fallen substantially for Morocco (8.6% of exports in 2007 against 26.4% in 1995-2000), it continues to seriously affect economic growth. On the other hand, neither Libya nor Algeria have problems with debt, to the point that Algeria has paid its off in advance and keeps to a strict no-debt policy. Inflation remains under control, although price increases in basic products have been recorded, above all in food products, which has had a negative impact on the purchasing power of the poorest sectors of the population. Results in terms of growth and development vary from country to country and, although clear improvements have been made, there is agreement amongst economists that potential growth rates are not being met: the problem being not so much the rates themselves but rather their volatility. Morocco’s economy grew 8% in 2006, close to its potential rate, but only 2.5% in 2007, below the 6% considered necessary to absorb the new workforce joining the labour market every year. Algeria grew close to 5% in 2007 and 2.5% in 2006. Tunisia, on the other hand, keeps to a more sustained growth trend of around 4-6%. From 2004 to 2006 Libya grew at rate close to 6%, but 2003 saw it with negative growth of -3%. Despite these ups and downs, per capita income has increased substantially. According to figures for 2007, PPP (purchasing power parity) per capita income reached $7,778 (current) in Algeria (against $3,874 in 1995), $5,345 in Morocco ($3,005 in 1995) and $9,239 in Tunisia ($4,484 in 1995). In Libya, the figure stood at more than $11,500 in 2006.

Despite all this, the social situation remains highly complex. Poverty, unemployment and the inability of public services to absorb demographic growth lead to greater uncertainty with regard to the economic (and political) future of the Maghreb. Unemployment remains at high rates, and although it has fallen significantly in both Algeria (14% in 2007 compared with 30% in 2000) and Morocco (from 22% to 10% between 2000 and 2007), and stays at 14% in Tunisia, these figures conceal a lot of underemployment and high rates of youth unemployment. Although poverty is not seen with the same intensity as in other developing countries, living conditions in the countryside and the outlying parts of large cities are highly unsatisfactory, especially in Morocco, where poverty affects

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1 All data is taken from FEMISE (2008), except that for Libya (World Bank 2007)
14% of the population (8% of the urban population and 22% of the rural one). Fiscal difficulties, the inefficiency of the public authorities and the volatility of economic growth have proved an obstacle in the past to continued improvement in the quality of life, except in Tunisia. Although the demographic transition will slow down demographic growth, it will not begin to alleviate pressure on the labour market and public services for a number of years, and thus migratory movements and socio-political problems will not disappear, even if they will not worsen at the rate they have done in past decades.

The chief uncertainty currently affecting the economies of the Maghreb is not economic in origin, but rather socio-political. Doubts exist as to the political will of governments to progress with reforms and to create a stable framework for investment, in the light of situations of internal political instability.

Lastly, the chief uncertainty currently affecting the economies of the Maghreb is not economic in origin, but rather socio-political. Doubts exist as to the political will of governments to progress with reforms and to create a stable framework for investment, in the light of situations of internal political instability. In the short term, governments may feel tempted to postpone microeconomic and institutional reforms and slow down their macroeconomic stabilisation efforts so as not to exacerbate social discontent and retain their economic, if not political, legitimacy. Any delay in these reforms could increase the cost of carrying them out in the future, thereby entering a spiral like that which led to the economic crises of the 1980s. To sum up, microeconomic reforms and the strengthening of institutions, which are keys to modernising the output of an economy and boosting productivity, have not progressed at the same rate as that of macroeconomic stabilisation. This uneven result of economic policy is due to technical and economic policy reasons. Technically speaking, macroeconomic reforms are simpler to carry out. They generally have fewer institutional requirements, since the number of decisions and affected players is relatively small, unlike the case with microeconomic reforms, which involve a larger number of transactions and players. From an economic policy point of view, even though macroeconomic stabilisation also involves the appearance of winners and losers, structural reforms allow for a more accurate and visible redistribution of income, thereby creating greater political difficulties. This difficulty is clear in purely rentier economies, such as those of Algeria and Libya, but also in Tunisia and Morocco, where the collection of rents remains a central element of the political scene and one of the focuses of business life.

In recent years a change (albeit modest and gradual) has been seen in Tunisia and Morocco, in favour of accelerating reforms and modernising economic institutions. One can begin to glimpse a transition in economic policy towards a greater emphasis on microeconomic matters related to increasing productivity and modernising their production apparatus, infrastructures and the institutional environment. This economic modernisation must begin with the public sector evolving towards the logic of a service state, and focusing on providing its citizens with services, including key infrastructures. This transition towards modernisation appears to be bearing fruit in terms of economic growth, particularly in Morocco, but this should by no means be regarded as irreversible. Stress should be placed on the fact that there is a small window of opportunity for microeconomic and institutional reforms, and that there is an urgent need to speed them up if doubts are not to be raised as to their credibility, the sustainability of macroeconomic stabilisation, the benefits of the Association Agreements with the EU and the incipient speeding up of economic growth of recent years.

References


THE WORLD BANK. World Development Indicators, Washington DC.
The Mediterranean energy picture captures in microcosm many of the issues facing the global energy market today. Growing demand in the economies of energy consumers and suppliers alike, depleting (European) reserves and limited supplies, socio-political instabilities and geopolitical tensions are all factors squarely weighing into the considerations of policymakers, often creating a nexus between the commercial and the political dynamics of the energy market. Nowhere is this reality more prevalent than in the natural gas market, particularly so in the Mediterranean. As the fastest growing source of primary energy among the major fuels, used in large part for electricity generation, natural gas is traded mostly by pipeline connections and increasingly in liquefied form through liquefied natural gas (LNG) vessels. Its increasing attractiveness as a fossil fuel is driven largely by its efficiency and growing environmental awareness on the part of consumers. Producers, for their part, besides capitalising on large and under-explored reserves, are seeking to secure shares in the booming gas markets and acquire further technical and commercial know-how. In the Mediterranean, existing and expanding pipeline infrastructure linking major players like Algeria, Egypt and Libya to southern European shores, supplemented by LNG export and import terminals, has come to reinforce the traditional supply-demand interdependent relationship that has characterized the region. More recently, however, mounting tensions between consumers and suppliers, including in the Mediterranean, have exposed the double-edged nature of their interdependence, accentuating resource nationalist reflexes on both sides.

The European Union’s (EU) normative confrontation with Russia since the former’s 2004 enlargement, which extended its frontiers well beyond the remains of the iron curtain, has spilled over into their energy relationship, leading to European fears over the extent of the block’s dependence on Russian gas supplies. Subsequently, southern Mediterranean producers were turned to as potential alternative suppliers for the EU. The concept of “strategic energy partnerships” between the EU and these suppliers was then advocated by policy-makers as a means of operationalising the EU’s new security of supply strategy. On the other hand, the growing confidence and sophistication of major Mediterranean gas sellers, owing to record-high prices and unprecedented relational strength, have brought their ambition of seeking added-value elsewhere, such as in the downstream of the European market, at loggerheads with the EU’s sense of vulnerability and policies. The resulting state of play falls short of reflecting the oft-rhetorically celebrated interdependence between the two shores and risks failing to optimise their (energy) relationship. 2007 was the year in which the coming together of these old and new dynamics of the Mediterranean energy scene upset its traditional configuration.

2007, a Turning Point?

The EU’s energy dependence on foreign supplies is forecast to rise from 50% today to more than two-thirds by 2030. Of those imports, gas is likely to grow significantly in the European energy mix, with more than 80% of the EU’s gas consumption provided by a handful of major suppliers. Russia, which currently supplies the EU with a little more than 25% of its gas consumption, will, ceteris paribus, remain the major supplier of gas to the Union.
To this extent, Russia’s energy policies are of immediate relevance to the EU’s energy security concerns. In this context, Moscow’s 2005 decision to revise upwards the price of its gas for its former satellite republics – now decidedly turned westward – and the ensuing dispute which pitted it against Ukraine in January 2006, brought home two startling realities for the EU. First, it became clear that depending for vital energy supplies on one single source exposes energy security vulnerability even to unintended supply disruptions. More importantly, however, the “Ukraine episode” raised the dual question of whether Russia was a reliable energy partner and whether energy now became for Moscow what the normative *acquis* had been for Brussels – in other words, if energy was becoming Russia’s new foreign policy tool.

The sense of urgency for action on an EU energy policy set in motion by the 2006 winter crisis was exacerbated by the Russian-Algerian gas rapprochement during the same period. The signing of two memoranda of understanding (MoU) between the EU’s biggest gas suppliers, Gazprom and Sonatrach respectively, in August 2006 and in January 2007 caused furore in European and, to a lesser extent, transatlantic policy circles. The discretion and opacity surrounding the conclusion of the first MoU in particular spurred anxious reactions to the putative prospect of cartelisation of the gas market, under the strategic impetus of Russia and Algeria. Subsequently, the warming to the idea of a “gas OPEC”, expressed in sequence during the first three months of 2007 by the political leaders of Iran, Russia and Algeria, drew excessive attention to the 6th ministerial meeting of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) that took place in Doha, on 9th April. Established in 2001, the GECF has been a loose structure, bringing together some fifteen of the world’s largest gas producing countries, whose vocation is unlikely to be turned into that of a gas cartel simply under political impetus. In fact, many commentators have advised that, given the nature of the gas market(s) on the one hand and the triadic relationship Russia-EU-Algeria on the other, a gas OPEC was an unlikely short- to medium-term evolution of the GECF and more so under Russian-Algerian collusion (Hallouche 2006; Darbouche 2007; Stern 2007). The expiry in August 2008 of the first MoU between Gazprom and Sonatrach and the apparent explicit decision of Algerian officials not to renew it corroborated the view that Russian and Algerian interests were far from the level of convergence necessary for any collusion on their part to result in a gas cartel.

This gas saga aside, the momentum that emerged in 2006 among European government and Commission (EC) officials for a firmer collective energy policy commitment culminated in 2007 in a series of strategy documents stressing, inter alia, the establishment of international (energy) partnerships with neighbouring producers, based on “shared rules or principles derived from the EU energy policy.” In this vein, the high-profile September “unbundling” proposal (separation of gas and electricity production and distribution networks) is seen in Brussels as conducive not only to better internal competitiveness and efficiency but crucially as a means of influencing the normative frameworks of third producer countries (Youngs 2007: 2). However, the Commission’s inability so far to surpass enduring divisions within member states over the liberalisation of the internal market has botched its efforts “to speak with one voice” with third-supplier interlocutors. Member states like France, Spain and Germany still prefer bilateral approaches to negotiating access and reciprocity. Besides sending confusing “normative” signals to producers, this attitude precludes the very predictability of interdependence that the EC’s 2007 Strategy Review aims to attain and which, from a supply stand point, is of equal importance. As a result, the partnerships proposed by the EU to its energy suppliers are missing an explicit geopolitical element that takes account of the nature of the energy market, the preoccupations of its suppliers and the properties of their energy relations with the EU.

**Nouvelles donnes, nouvelles mœurs in Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation?**

The Mediterranean segments in the policy documents of the EU’s recent energy strategy reviews identify the strategic need for more comprehensive partnerships with countries like Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Qatar as a priority. Indeed, these countries sit at the forefront of the regional gas supply scene. While their export capacities and structures vary, these producers share an undisputable potential in meeting growing European gas demand. As such, the EU’s heterogeneous prioritisation of strategic energy partnerships in its relations with these countries reflects not only their export potentials, but also the type of the existing policy frameworks governing their broader relations with the EU. Accordingly, Algeria tops the EU’s priority list as indicated notably by declarations...
in 2007 of Commission officials, such as Andris Piebalgs and Benita Ferrero-Waldner and the European Parliament President Hans-Gert Pöttering. Indeed, helped by geographical proximity, Algeria has traditionally been one of the major suppliers of gas to Europe. About 95% of its 65 billion cubic meters (bcms) of gas exports is destined to the European market. Decisions taken in 2007, furthermore, regarding the realisation of strategic pipeline infrastructure, notably Medgaz (linking Algeria directly to Spain), Galsi (a direct submarine connection to Italy) and the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (transporting Nigerian gas to be exported via the Algerian network), can only consolidate this position.

Egypt comes second in this European pecking order. The recent expansion of natural gas production has endowed Egypt not only with a vital economic growth engine, but also with an additional factor for deepened cooperation in its relationship with the EU, already governed by a Euro-Med association agreement and a Neighbourhood Action Plan. Through its support for the Arab Gas Pipeline, which will transport Egyptian gas, through Jordan and Syria, to Turkey and potentially to Eastern Europe via the planned Nabucco pipeline, the EU is hoping to dip further into the country’s 17 bcms of gas exports. Qatar, for its part, has since 2006 surpassed Indonesia as the world’s largest LNG exporter and is predicted to supply as much as 30% of the world LNG market by 2010. As such, Qatar offers a viable alternative for the EU in its efforts to reduce its heavy reliance on pipeline deliveries. However, both the EU’s preference for a regional approach towards the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in relation to energy (and other) matters and the absence of a European LNG policy that allows it to compete with the Asian and American markets – both Qatar’s traditional consumers – have so far trumped Community aspirations for a more strategic partnership with the latter. As to Libya, despite its recent attempts to normalise its relations with “the West,” especially after the resolution of the Bulgarian nurses’ crisis in July 2007, no framework has been established yet to streamline its relationship with the EU. With 1,500 bcms of gas reserves, Libya exports a little over 7 bcms of gas to Europe via the Greenstream pipeline which joins it with Italy via Sicily. The scope for an enhanced role for Libya in satisfying the EU’s increasing demand is evident, but until the country adopts a clear energy export policy the prospects for a comprehensive strategic partnership remain rather meagre.

At the macro level, besides the EU market’s lack of competitiveness relative to the growing and liberalized North Asian and American markets, the energy interdependence in the Mediterranean space that the EU’s proposed partnerships purportedly aim to reflect and consolidate is challenged by the fact that the extant energy-markets governing principle of “buyer brings market, seller brings supply” is withering under the effect of new and intertwined economic and political realities. Firstly, recent economic growth in most producer countries, fuelled by record-high energy export revenues, is in turn driving domestic energy demand upwards, leading to a situation of pressure on these countries’ abilities to simultaneously meet their growing gas export commitments. Indeed, with this situation and their eager efforts to diversify their economic activities and create employment opportunities for their often-disillusioned youths, producer countries in the Mediterranean are increasingly faced with a difficult choice: to divert resources away from hydrocarbon investments in favour of other economic sectors at the expense of rentierism; or, to expand energy production and exports, even through foreign direct investment (FDI), at the expense of real economic growth and rationalisation of exploration of reserves. In the present conjuncture, most Mediterranean producers, especially those with sizeable populations and heavy economic reliance on hydrocarbons, such as Algeria, appear to have opted for the former course of action.

Secondly, and relative to the properties of the current juncture, namely high energy prices and a race for access to reserves, gas sellers are growing in sophistication and are as a result seeking to integrate vertically along the value chain, such as through the downstream of the European market. However, such policy orientations, witnessed in particular in the case of Algeria’s Sonatrach, are almost antipodal to the EU’s proposal for a strategic energy partnership with the country, which appears limited to attempting to export the EU’s acquis in this area to Algeria. Notwithstanding the confusing normative signals of the EU’s “unbundling” proposal, these EU strategic partnership proposals not only reinforce the asymmetrical interdependence described above by failing to take account of the economic and political preoccupations of producers, but they also seem to duplicate the regional multilateral work of the EU in this policy area. More specifically, the Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership (EMEP), launched in 1996 under the umbrella of the Barcelona Process, provides the op-
timal framework for the materialisation of a global Euro-Mediterranean strategic energy partnership, especially after its reinforcement by the Ministerial Conference of 17th December 2007 which adopted an ambitious 5-year “priority action plan”, aimed at:

- The implementation of energy market reforms and the gradual harmonisation of regulatory frameworks amongst Euro-Mediterranean partners;
- Engaging in more sustainable energy policies and
- Improving investment climate to ensure the diversification of energy sources.

For the sake of rationalisation of policy, the EMEP ought to be integrated into the newly proposed “Union for the Mediterranean” to constitute a concrete element of a strategic regional partnership, taking account of the nouvelles donnes that are now prominent in the Mediterranean energy scene.

The Geopolitics of Gas in the Mediterranean: A Conclusion

The closest materialisation so far of the growing asymmetrical interdependence that characterizes the Mediterranean gas scene manifested itself in 2007 in the form of a multi-faceted gas dispute between Spain and Algeria. As the closest energy partners in the Mediterranean, the two countries have hitherto enjoyed an exemplary supply-demand relationship. However, Sonatrach’s aspirations to penetrate the Spanish market and commercialize its share of gas that will be transported by the Medgaz pipeline (3 bcm/s) were circumscribed by apparent Spanish protectionism. Indeed, Spain’s Repsol and Gas Natural, two companies heavily present in the Algerian upstream, formed an opposing front to Algeria’s state-owned company for no rational pretext. After thorny negotiations, however, the issue was resolved but only to give way to another bitter discord. This time, it was Sonatrach that decided to terminate the two Spanish companies’ joint contract for the development of a $5 billion LNG project in Gassi Touil, after major delays and rising costs, leading to an (pending) international arbitration procedure. Despite the commercial and economic reasons invoked by the Algerian party, the timing of its decision inevitably led to interpretations positing that the move is at best retaliatory and at worst politically motivated. In this vein, Algeria’s move in March 2007 to publicly announce a decision it had made two years back to revise upwards the price of its gas sold to Spain and the enduring Western Sahara dispute were referred to as possible hidden motives behind this dispute.

If anything though, the Hispano-Algerian gas crisis demonstrates that, while remaining more than just a commodity, natural gas in the Mediterranean is proving to be less than a factor of interdependence. Relations between consumers and producers are growing in complexity owing mainly to the shifting dynamics of the energy and particularly gas market. While legitimately seeking to secure their energy supplies and satisfy their growing demand, European consumers are failing to take account of producers’ interests in their efforts to that end. The latter, on the other hand, while ever more dependent on their energy export revenues are growing in confidence and starting to look beyond immediate commercial interests. The Mediterranean gas picture shows that, while interdependent in many ways, consumers and producers in the region have to look for novel ways in order to sustain that interdependence and redress its inherent asymmetry. The EU needs to engage in meaningful partnerships with its southern suppliers, assisting them more effectively in their political and economic reforms and allowing them access to its market and technologies. Suppliers, for their part, need to adopt more transparent regulatory frameworks and show more openness to political and economic liberalisation. It will take more than just a bunch of “strategic energy partnerships” – perhaps a Union for the Mediterranean is what is needed?

Bibliography

If the contents of this Yearbook were to be sized by the economic importance of the subject of each article, you would now be reading one of the longest ones. It would appear amongst the first pages and would be profusely illustrated. It might well occupy twice the space of the article on foreign investment and many times that of those on development aid and tourism. Its importance might be even greater if, when valuing remittances, the balance contributed by them to the current account was taken into account instead of gross revenues they provide.

Nevertheless, as you can see, this article is the same size as all the rest, as they are not ranked in this way. This, despite the fact that remittances have grown in size since the last edition. This modest increase has also been seen in official initiatives on remittances in the Mediterranean, which have (finally) appeared during the course of 2007, one of the real news items of the past year. However, remittances appeared on the official agenda in a modest, incipient way. But there they are. The main reason for this was a moment of great lucidity, last November, on the part of the countries participating in the first Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Migration, held in Portugal. There, a number of measures to facilitate these flows were agreed, beginning with reducing their price by means of an increase in competition, in addition to the carrying out of a range of analysis and study initiatives. Six months later, none of this has yet been given concrete form, since this is merely a first step, but it is especially promising given that Euro-Mediterranean institutions are beginning to understand the reality of the situation.

This reality is that immigrant remittances in Europe as a whole, and not only the Euro-Mediterranean region, have been the object of scant attention, out of all proportion to their real importance to recipient economies and to the European or Euro-Mediterranean Process in general. This is due to Europe’s general lack of interest in migratory matters, which itself arises from a lack of interest in demographic, not to mention human issues in general. If a Martian tried to analyse intra-European or Euro-Mediterranean relations, he would quickly reach the conclusion that the main factor is the human one. Not only because the main cornerstone of the European Union is the free movement of people, together with goods and capital. Also because the key decisions of the Union and the Commission are taken on a demographic basis, beginning with the political weight allocated to each member state.

Our little green man would clearly see that the shores of the Mediterranean witness the circulation of goods, investments and – above all – people. He obviously would not focus on tourists, who are becoming less and less important since the start of the “Age of fear of Muslims”, but rather on immigrants. Of course, to do this, he would have to analyse the region with some kind of cosmic ray that could furnish him with the right statistics, statistics which Brussels has so far proved incapable of providing and which can only be estimated by employing the most recherché of procedures.

The plain fact is that this demographic base upon which the EU’s decisions are made does not exist. There is no European census, but rather a range of censuses amongst member states, each with its own sources and methodologies, meaning that the results are not comparable. For example, Ireland carries out a conventional census, whilst Sweden performs one based on registered citizens, rather like Spain’s padrón. Austria combines the register with a sample, whilst Germany adds the conventional method to these two.
The result of this is that the figure for European population is a convention, not a piece of data: it is an agreement based on trust that lacks any statistical value, even though it is the basis for decisions such as the allocation of subsidies or votes.

This means that the European Union does not know exactly how many citizens it has, although the margin for error for this general heading is acceptable. The problem comes when one tries to break the figure down into its constituent elements: it is here that the margin for error can become huge. For this reason, the EU does not publish statistics on its immigrants. Brussels simply does not know how many citizens benefit from the free movement of people and neither, of course, does it have an accurate number for how many foreigners it plays host to. It does not know this in the statistical sense, or in other words, in the basis of standardised data for the entire region which is periodically updated and which can be broken down by nationality or any other heading.

If we do not know how many immigrants there are, neither can we tell how many citizens from the Southern Mediterranean there are in the north of Europe. This lack of knowledge of the facts has a deep political impact, of which we are violently made aware from time to time. An example is provided by the discovery that immigration has effects beyond the first generation, as could be seen in the integration-related conflicts that took place in France’s banlieues last year. There, cars were burnt by French youths, born in France, who appear in the statistics like anyone else, when it is obvious they do not see themselves in this way. If we were to apply US-style nomenclature to

ANIMA’s Med Funds study represents the most important attempt to date to understand the Mediterranean capital investment industry: from Morocco to Turkey and from its origins in the 1990s, to its current growth phase.

The years 2005-2008 have indeed seen capital investment lift off in the region (Chart 21), a trend that carries some weight at the heart of an industry that now regards MEDA countries as an economic unit (25% of funds identified target a variety of countries from the Maghreb and Mashreq).

Whilst there were practically no investment funds in the region (Israel excepted) at the start of the current decade, ANIMA has identified 320 funds there today that are active or in the process of being launched. 139 funds were recorded outside Israel and 181 in that country (Table 31).


Over the same period, 94 new funds have seen the light of day (excluding Israel), which is a rise of 67% compared to the preceding fifteen years. Half the funds included in the count raised by corporations based in MEDA countries, while their counterparts in the US and in Gulf countries raised 23% and 22% respectively of the US$ 31 bn concerned.

Funds based in Europe fall way behind (9% of total amounts raised) and the current trend is of growing involvement in the region by the Gulf (45 active funds managing US$ 6.8 bn).

35% of the funds are general ones (multi-sector, opportunity-led approach to the market) and 31% focus on information technologies and innovation (particularly, though not uniquely at the heart of the Israeli capital risk industry). As regards investment stages, the majority of funds (outside Israel) intervene during a business’s development phase and in LBO transactions. A growing proportion nevertheless engages in the initial phases of MEDA enterprises’ life – nearly US$ 1 bn going into start-ups and venture capital, especially in recent years.

Despite significant differences that vary depending on the country, the standard profile of funds is as follows:

- US$ 105 million managed on average: an increasing sum, perhaps “excessively” high for the region (there is an increasing number of mega-funds);
them, they would be Maghrebi-Europeans or African-Europeans, which would provide one with a better idea of their importance. However, obviously, French statistics do not ask questions about matters that may appear racially-motivated, as if they did not exist, even though these Maghrebi-Europeans cross the Straits of Gibraltar in the summers as Moroccans to see their families or send them remittances or feel out of place because of their identity.

**Euro-Mediterranean remittances exist because that is the nature of Euro-Mediterranean relations**

We are unaware just how significant immigration is in Europe, although we know that significant it is. We know that the first group of immigrants in almost all European countries of some size has its origins in the region – Moroccans in Spain and France after the Portuguese, Turks in Germany with the Polish, Albanians in Greece, and other important groups such as the Tunisians in Italy. But this is a very vague intuition which cannot be accompanied by accurate data, since the authorities have still not managed to take immigration on board, even though it has been a phenomenon in Europe for years.

One consequence of this immigration, which is present although only guessed at, is the remittances that irrigate the European and Euro-Mediterranean system, and which constitute its most genuine characteristic. I say this because it is the only totally spontaneous characteristic, in that it is a phenomenon that is not linked to the institutions in its origin (how immigrants

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**TABLE 31  Funds by Region and Receptor Country (ANIMA Survey)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host Area</th>
<th>Host Country</th>
<th>Funds (number and %)</th>
<th>Capital Raised (rise, US$ Million, and %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4  1%</td>
<td>453 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Euromed</td>
<td>14 4%</td>
<td>1,781 6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MEDA-11</td>
<td>44 14%</td>
<td>6,983 23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>4 1%</td>
<td>190 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MENA + emerging*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Euro-MENA</td>
<td></td>
<td>66 21%</td>
<td>9,417 30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1 0.3%</td>
<td>2 0.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Algeria/ Morocco/ Tunisia</td>
<td>16 5%</td>
<td>1,579 5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>2 1%</td>
<td>52 0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>18 6%</td>
<td>846 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>9 3%</td>
<td>64 0.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Maghreb</td>
<td></td>
<td>46 14%</td>
<td>2,543 8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>10 3%</td>
<td>611 2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5 2%</td>
<td>432 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>2 1%</td>
<td>36 0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>1 0.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Mashreq</td>
<td></td>
<td>18 6%</td>
<td>1,079 3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>181 57%</td>
<td>16,740 54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>9 3%</td>
<td>1,218 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Other MEDAs</td>
<td></td>
<td>190 59%</td>
<td>17,958 58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>320 100%</td>
<td>30,997 100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Funds aimed at emerging nations generally, showing particular interest in MEDA

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- 9 years of existence of fund and a mean investment period per project of 5 years;
- a portfolio containing 6 enterprises on average (a relatively modest figure attributable to the fact that the majority of funds are recent);
- a relatively high investment ticket of US$ 7.4 million (US$ 1.9 million average at the lower end). This point highlights the existence of an equity gap in the bottom tranches (between US$ 0.1 and 2 million) and represents a problem for many SMEs and VSBs;
- expected return on funds (21%) to meet the topmost expectations harboured by investors.

ANIMA, in order to ensure a sustained productive impact of capital investment in the region, sets out a certain number of recommendations:

- reinforcing capital investment regionalisation (establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Association for capital investors and multiple replication of regional funds);
- facilitating a wider development of SMEs (rating of businesses, guarantee funds, structures for arbitration);
- reinforcing financing targeted at the start-up phases (lower value tickets, venture capital funds, Business Angels);
- broadening exit opportunities – especially IPOs (development of capital markets, cooperation between geographical stock exchanges);
- promoting good practice: management companies’ social responsibility, limitation of purely speculative deals (over-leveraged and/or purely opportunistic LBOs).

For further information:
Med Funds Survey: an Overview of Private Equity in the MEDA region
arrive), development (how the remittances reach the south) and end. Euro-Mediterranean remittances exist because that is the nature of Euro-Mediterranean relations. Thus it is we know that Morocco receives more remittances than foreign investment and tourist income (of the genuine sort, from foreign tourists, since Morocco counts as tourist income the funds Moroccan emigrants bring with them when they return to the country for their holidays). And there our knowledge ends, since Morocco is the only Southern Mediterranean country to offer serious statistics on the remittances it receives.

Remittances in the Euro-Mediterranean region, easily outstrip the contributions made by the European Investment Bank or the MEDA programme, and even the sum total of all the EU’s instruments

In the other countries, remittances are a reality as clear as immigration is in Europe, but there is the same vagueness when it comes to quantifying them. This can be seen in the other great step taken by Europe with regards to remittances in 2007: a report by Eurostat – the European body responsible for producing statistics – on remittances send within and outside the Union, which totalled no less than €44,500 million for 2006 (Eurostat, 2007). Of these, half are sent to non-EU countries and the other half move within Europe. However, in a move reminiscent of the humour of the Marx brothers, the report does not reveal which countries might be receiving these remittances, although it does indicate which countries they leave. Reading it thus calls for great faith in the author’s abilities and even his powers. However, this does not mean that the statistical value of the document is merely anecdotal, because this is the first time that an official EU body has put into figures the remittances sent from the Union. Even this significant figure may fall short of the mark, if one were to add the figures for remittances that move through non-official circuits and which do not, therefore, appear in official tallies. What is important about these remittances is their destination, which Eurostat appears to be unaware of. Almost all of them go to developing countries – not the world’s poorest, but rather to low or low-to-medium-income ones. This concentration allows one to deduce that remittances are, today, the main channel for transferring resources from the European Union to these countries. In the Euro-Mediterranean region, they easily outstrip the contributions made by the European Investment Bank or the MEDA programme, and even the sum total of all the EU’s instruments. With regard to the main flow of income received by poor countries from the rich, the first Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Migration, held in Portugal last November, reached three specific agreements: a large seminar on the transfer of funds and the opportunities that this may provide in the field of micro-credits, the construction of a Euro-Mediterranean web site to centralise information on remittances and to analyse the possibilities of providing financial support for immigrants legally resident in Europe to co-finance their investment projects in their countries of origin.

One must not fall into the trap of dismissing this programme as insufficient in light of the importance of remittances. It is merely a first step towards a future policy to preserve these flows and take advantages of the opportunities they offer. Of course, one should also be aware of the significant work that lies ahead of us to put this into practice.

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The Agro-Food Sector in the Mediterranean: A Bridge Between the Two Shores

Josep Puxeu
Secretary General of Agriculture and Food
Ministry of Agriculture, Spain

Economic Importance of the Agro-food Sector

In recent months the media has rediscovered the agro-food sector as an economic sector of the first order, occupying a strategic place in its two aspects of food and energy. With the rise in biofuels and the European will to adopt the Kyoto accords, the price of oil and cereals have resulted tightly linked.

Those of us who have always supported a competitive and dynamic agricultural sector necessarily oriented to the market, which occupies positions of world leadership, see that the figures back us up. Agricultural revenue increased in the European Union (EU) in 2007 by 4.7%, with a rise in vegetable production of 8.6%. Moreover, the agro-food industry in the EU-27, with a turnover of 870,000 million euros in 2006, occupies the first position in the industrial sector (14%), ahead of the car or chemical industry. And this data means 4.3 million employees, leading the number of jobs in the community industrial sector.

In Spain the figures are similar; the value of agricultural production in 2007 exceeded 40,000 million euros with an increase of 7% turnover to which 5,600 million euros must be added as direct community subsidies for income and markets. This means an increase in Spanish agricultural income in 2007 of around 9.7%.

Moreover, the Spanish industry in food and drink products, a key factor in the stimulation of the agricultural sector, is also the first industrial branch of the whole sector, representing in 2006 16.22% of net product sales and 14.57% of industrial employment.

Furthermore, on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, agriculture represents 11 to 16% of GDP and between 25 and 40% of employment, with low productivity owing to its limited technical development and capitalization. The high dependence on cereal imports for the provision of basic food products owing to an elevated increase in population is especially notable. These figures help me reflect on Spain’s situation when it joined the EU, and it seems to me that the parallel with the countries of the Maghreb today is inevitable. In the twenty years of opening up of Spanish agriculture, it has been an example of the capacity to adapt and has undertaken a process of real modernization to integrate into a competitive market economy. Because although it is undeniable that the opening up of markets has meant greater pressure on prices, products and calendars, better access to supplies and new opportunities, especially in the community market, have been a clear advantage.

International Framework: The Doha Round

At this time, at the height of the negotiations in the World Trade Organization (WTO), I can only be in favour of reaching a balanced multilateral agreement for one simple reason: I consider the cost of no agreement to be much higher.

For the markets to function well, legal security and some clear rules of the game are the most important tools we can have for the evolution of and adaptation to the different international contexts.

According to the prospects for agriculture 2007-2013 prepared by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), world trade is expected to increase for all basic agricultural products, with a generalized growth in imports in all countries, notably the predominance of the emerging countries, such as China. This international framework gives even more importance to the conclusion of the Doha negotiations.
EU-Maghreb Relations: Reciprocally Advancing

More than twelve years have passed since the first Euro-Mediterranean conference. With the birth of the Barcelona Process we enthusiastically witnessed a new way of understanding regional relations and it proposed a decisive change in a broad multilateral framework of political, economic and social relations between fifteen countries which were then members of the EU and twelve of the southern Mediterranean. Despite the time that has passed, it is clear that the objectives of that moment to create a common space of peace, stability and development of human aspects and understanding between cultures have today acquired a greater and even more important dimension. And this has happened although only a few regional integration projects have probably mobilized so many institutions, civil servants, observatories or forums and that, at the same time, in these years many changes have taken place at EU level and in the international political context. Within the EU, we can note the enlargement to new member states that have changed the new Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, with its 37 current members, or the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy, which with a more bilateral character has become another instrument of support for advancing EU-Maghreb relations. Despite the advances made in these years, in particular the trade agreements in the agro-food sector which, for example, for Morocco means an important degree of liberalization, or the economic resources both from the EU or from the member states in their development cooperation aid, (for example the 5,300 million euros invested in the MEDA programme in the period 2000-2006 or the loans by the European Investment Bank-EIB), there still remains much to do. It is necessary to emphasize the mutual advantages of agro-food cooperation between the countries of the Mediterranean Basin. It is fundamental not to lose sight of the importance of achieving a lasting and balanced socioeconomic development. To this end we have a fundamental instrument, which is the market itself, as the Barcelona Declaration already recognizes. The gradual establishment of a free trade area is, in my view, the best ally for advancing towards an area of shared prosperity. Perhaps it seems contradictory that a member state which is clearly an exporter of Mediterranean products, and whose principal market is the EU itself, supports the free circulation of goods with the Maghreb. But this association has mutual benefits for all participants. For the Mediterranean countries of the EU it means geostrategic stability, a possible supplier of raw materials, the development of the industrial fabric and the possibility of exporting technology and investments in the regions of the South. For the other countries of the southern Mediterranean Basin, it means a potential consumer market of products, the development of their agricultural structures and agro-industrial fabric, and access to infrastructures and knowledge. But I must emphasize an aspect which is fundamental for our production: reciprocity. It is fundamental for free competition to be accompanied by guarantees of animal and vegetable health, as well as quality in its widest sense. Rules of the game which satisfy the demands of the European citizen must be defined equally for all. The EU market is undoubtedly an objective to be reached, but along with its benefits, it has its demands; to enter, we must observe both its food safety and its social and environmental rules.

Uniqueness of Our Agro-food Sector: Heritage of Humanity

The characteristics themselves of the agricultural sector and the agro-food industry make them different from other economic activities. The relationship with the physical environment, in this case especially sensitive and complicated in its environmental, social and economic aspect, makes the agro-food sector a unique and especially attractive instrument for a balanced economic development. In this framework, the business partnership initiatives are a good example of cooperation. It is important to exchange experiences in the rural Mediterranean space and share strategies to achieve the settlement of the population and direct investments, such as those made in irrigation systems, seeking the most efficient use of water and energy. Only through adequate rural development can the rural exodus and emigration be stopped. A rural development that has its best ally in its roots and its essence. The Mediterranean world is synonymous of a culture, a landscape, a form of being and understanding. Therefore we have a valuable tool in our healthy and authentic Mediterranean diet, a true Heritage of Humanity.
“With the forest fire season barely started, 2007 threatens to be destructive in Europe with nearly 337,600 hectares of forest already burnt in fires by the beginning of August, compared to 358,500 for the whole of 2006, and a month of July that has been “the worst-ever” since records began between 1985 and 2005 depending on the country.” That was the announcement by the European Commission in its release of 2nd August 2007, based on data from its European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS).

A Very Grave Outcome for 2007: Heatwave Blamed

In addition to the substantial acreages devastated by fire to which the above-mentioned European Union release refers, the summer of 2007 was equally noted for the very heavy human death toll: the approximately 100 deaths in countries surrounding the Mediterranean, especially in Greece and southern Italy where the fires were particularly deadly, are highly regrettable.

This exceptional situation, which contrasts vividly with the preceding year of 2006, which had conversely been very favourable, needs to be seen in the light of an unusual weather pattern: while the Azores high pressure system, sitting eastward of its customary position, kept Western Europe under torrential rains, eastern and southern Europe experienced heatwaves that invited fire outbreaks, even in countries that are customarily unused to large fires, such as Slovenia, Croatia and Bulgaria (Rigolot, 2007). The drought and successive heatwaves with record temperatures, accompanied by strong, hot and dry winds, as well as – to a lesser extent in certain countries – criminal activity by arsonists, appear to be the chief reasons for the spread of these fires. Under such conditions the firefighters who were mobilised often encountered severe difficulties in taming the flames.

Three Countries Most Affected: Greece, Italy and Spain

The five European states traditionally affected by forest fires (France, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy) suffer an average annual fire tally of 50,600 incidents with 493,000 hectares burnt (data for the 1980-2006 period) (JRC-IES, 2007). However, in 2007, Greece, Italy and Spain on their own produced a total of 495,000 hectares burnt (in 21,000 fires) making them the main affected countries (according to official statistical data from the three countries).

Taking just Greece, Italy and Spain, Chart 22 shows the outcome for areas burnt in those three countries from 1980 to 2007. The 2007 total is 1.4 times the average over the last 27 years. We must look back to 1994 to find a higher level, in the region of 632,000 hectares. Chart 23 illustrates how the number of fires recorded in those three countries from 1980 to 2007 evolved. The 2007 figure represents just over 75% of the average number registered over the last 27 years.

The 2007 Fire Season in Greece

In Greece, the heatwave, following months of drought, struck in three surges starting in June with temperatures of over 40°C, “a temperature record not seen for 107 years”, according to Greek government sources.
So the 2007 fires are the most devastating ever experienced by Greece. Thus, 270,000 hectares of woodland caught fire ravaging at least 250,000 olive trees and killing over 40,000 head of goats and sheep. This record is the worst in 50 years with a succession of large-scale forest fires that afflicted the Greek territory over that season. The most destructive and deadly fires broke out on 23rd August 2007, spread rapidly and were out of control for five days, affecting in similar measure the mainly West and South of the Peloponnese and southern Eubea.

Serious ecological consequences were equally regrettable, notably with “Natura 2000” class sites affected, in proportions ranging from 8 to 50%. Sites of major environmental value, such as Olympia, the Taygetos and Parnonas mountains and the Selinountas and Vouraikou gorges, were badly hit. Local flora and fauna—especially jackals and tortoises—were greatly affected, with a large portion of the region’s

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**CHART 22**
Areas Burnt in Spain, Italy and Greece (hectares)

Source: Greek statistical data: Directorate General for Development and Protection of Forests and Natural Environment, Ministry of Rural Development and Foods; Italian statistical data: Corpo Forestale dello Stato, Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e Forestali, Spanish statistical data: Dirección General para la Biodiversidad, Ministerio de Medio Ambiente.

**CHART 23**
Number of Forest Fires in Spain, Italy and Greece

Source: Greek statistical data: Directorate General for Development and Protection of Forests and Natural Environment, Ministry of Rural Development and Foods; Italian statistical data: Corpo Forestale dello Stato, Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e Forestali, Spanish statistical data: Dirección General para la Biodiversidad, Ministerio de Medio Ambiente.
already rare biodiversity also destroyed (WWF, 2007). So over 3,000 fires were recorded across the country from June to September. As shown in Chart 24 (JRC-IES, 2007 and Greek official statistics), this tally of burnt areas is 7.6 times higher than that for the last ten years and 6.2 times that recorded over the last 27. The number of fires is also 1.7 times higher than that observed in these last ten years and twice that in the last 27. As well as burnt areas, human and material losses are very high: never before had fires caused as many deaths in Greece which now totals as many victims of fires as the whole of Europe in 2003: 79 people died in those fires. The blazes likewise destroyed 1,000 homes and another 1,100 structures and caused damage to hundreds more (Polyzoidis, 2007).

The 2007 Fire Season in Italy

Italy was similarly hit by a heatwave from June. This wave, associated with the “sirocco” phenomenon, a strong, hot and dry wind blowing up from the Sahara, dried out the vegetation in Sicily and Calabria. Following a particularly favourable 2006 (the lowest number of fires and burnt areas since the early 70s), 2007 regained the level of 10 years previously with 141,341 hectares burnt, of which 68,094 were wooded hectares and 73,247 non-wooded, and no less than 9,318 fires recorded (JRC-IES, 2007 and Italian official statistical data). Those figures represent an increase relative to 2006 of 65% in the number of fires and 350% in terms of burnt area. Chart 25 demonstrates that the 2007 total for burnt areas is 1.7 times that observed over the last ten years and 1.2 times higher than in the last 27. The number of fires is 20% higher than in the preceding 10 years, but remains 10% below that over the last 27. Among the regions most affected are found Campania, Calabria, Abruzzo, Sardinia, Apulia, Marche, Lazio, Sicily and Basilicata.

Here too the count is of 18 victims. Sicily paid a heavy price with a total of twelve killed in the fires that ravaged the South of the Peninsula.

The 2007 Fire Season in Spain

Compared to Greece and Italy, the Spanish case appears to contrast more clearly between continental Spain which enjoyed, after several years of drought, the rainiest month of August for five years, and the Canary Islands (notably Gran Canaria) which conversely were subject to an intense heatwave. Thus the 2007 average seems favourable at first sight: 82,027 hectares destroyed, which was 50% less than in 2006 and the lowest degree of damage for 10 years, or stated another way, as can be seen in Chart 26, 63% of the average for the last ten years and 44% of that recorded going back these 27 years (JRC-IES, 2007 and official Spanish statistical data). As for the number of fires, they represent 44% of the mean level for the last ten years, and 58% of that over the last 27.

But this overall outcome, largely determined by very favourable weather in continental Spain, in reality
masks the violent fires chiefly concentrated over end-July and early August on the Canaries archipelago, meaning Gran Canaria and Tenerife. A real catastrophe at an environmental level, these two very large fires ravaged in total more than 35,000 hectares of forest: around 20,000 hectares on the island of Gran Canaria – or over one third of the wooded area – and 15,000 hectares on Tenerife. These fires could lead to some thirty animal and plant species on these islands to disappear. The first had a criminal cause, while that of the second is unknown (official Spanish statistical data). The irregular topography of these islands and the weather limited the opportunity for land and air intervention and the violent winds prevented any intervention by helicopter, rendering control of the fire, not to mention the evacuation of nearly 13,000 people, extremely difficult.

**The Indispensable Role of Prevention**

Prevention also and above all needs to be at the heart of considerations. Apart from temperatures on the rise, it is socio-economic development, especially the flight from the countryside, which is responsible for aggravating the situation. Brushwood is no longer being cleared. Forests, too frequently underexploited, become especially vulnerable to fires becoming highly flammable and combustible. And, as a result, fires are becoming increasingly difficult to tame. Many countries have put prevention plans in place, but few have the capacity to set these plans in motion or apply existing legislation (legislation on brushwood clearance obligations for instance). Fighting drought in order to prevent forest fires could also be part of the measures to maintain precautionary measures wherever possible.

**Some Additional Lessons from the Summer of 2007**

*The Importance of European Solidarity*

In 2007 European solidarity came fully into play, notably through the Community Civil Protection Mechanism (http://ec.europa.eu/environment/). Thirty states are signed up to this mechanism. They pool resources that can be made available to countries hit by catastrophes anywhere around the world. These activities are coordinated by the Commission supported by its *Monitoring and information Centre* (MIC), of the Environment DG. It represents the most important assistance operation to a member state within the framework of the civil protection Mechanism since its creation in 2001. From the start of summer, the civil protection Mechanism has handled a total of 13 assistance requests from six countries. Thus at least eleven countries including France have participated actively this year in fighting catastrophic fires that, over the course of this summer, ravaged hundreds of thousands of hectares in southeastern European countries, most notably in Greece and Italy. Firefighters, fire engines, water pumping equipment, planes and helicopters have therefore been mobilised to tackle fires. These crises recall the urgent need for Europe to organise so it can provide an operational response that will permit the protection of its territory and its populations to be enhanced.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Burnt areas (ha)</th>
<th>Number of fires</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180,000</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Progress in firefighting and prevention has mainly contributed up to now to reducing burnt areas.**

The statistics bear witness to that. But it is not unreasonable to fear that, over forthcoming years, the number of fires that are very hard to control such as those experienced in 2007 will multiply.

promote, as was called for in 2007 by European Union Environment Ministers.

Adapting to the Risk of Climate Change and an Improved Understanding of Resilience to the Consequences of Fire

Progress in firefighting and prevention has mainly contributed up to now to reducing burnt areas. The statistics bear witness to that. But it is not unreasonable to fear that, over forthcoming years, under the impact of climate change, the number of fires that are very hard to control such as those experienced in 2007 in Greece, Italy or on the Canaries archipelago will multiply.

It is important to underline that, more than burnt areas, the intensity and frequency of fires are aggravating factors. The fact is that a low intensity fire progresses sparring pockets of vegetation that will allow regeneration to take place more easily. Conversely, a very intense fire can not only affect thousands of hectares, but destroy everything in its track. Bearing in mind that it takes a tree 25 to 30 years to produce its first seed, if another fire occurs in that period the tree will burn without having been able to reproduce. The increasing frequency of fires could lead to an irreversible degradation of the environment, with woodlands being replaced by scrubland or thicket (Rigolot, 2007).

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EUROPEAN COMMISSION (EC). “Feux de forêt: jamais un mois de juillet n’aura été aussi désastreux.”


Source of Official Statistical Data


Corpo Forestale dello Stato, Ministero delle Politiche Agricole e Forestali, Italy

www2.corpoforestale.it/web/guest/serviziattivita/antincendioboschivo/iniziativesperimentazioni/campagna07

Dirección General para la Biodiversidad, Ministerio de Medio Ambiente, Spain.

For further information:

http://ec.europa.eu/environment/

European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS): http://effis.jrc.it/Home/
Tourism and heritage have merged together in the Mediterranean to provide an exceptional environment that supports the blossoming of holidays, leisure and play. This suitable marriage between the mobility of amenities and the cultural and natural heritage is undoubtedly beneficial for the regional economy; but that does not prevent serious concerns at an environmental level from being raised.

Indeed, the development of tourism in this outstanding region of the world represents a multifaceted activity. On the one hand, it has been the constant and productive phenomenon of the 2000-2007 period, despite the consequences of 11th September 2001 and its dreadful knock-on effects for the Mediterranean. In fact, tourism successfully embodies an excellent economic, social and cultural interface among its three shores. Thus, it contributes to bringing together the large number of different cultural and ethnic mosaics that characterise the Mediterranean’s perimeter. In this regard, tourism has found the way and proved capable of overcoming religious, social and political difficulties (the flare-ups in the Balkans, conflict in the Middle East, terrorist attacks from time to time). On the other hand, this success, whilst remarkable, is to some extent tarnished by the many instances where the environment has been degraded and attacked (uncontrolled urbanisation, solid and liquid wastes, overuse of water). The evidence points to tourism eating away at the very foundations of its potential; in other words, it is constantly feeding off its underpinning qualities.

And it is easy to see why opinions differ when it comes to the global impacts of tourism. Uncritical supporters of globalization hold that it is the expected price to be paid to consolidate and make permanent a success that is so socially and economically beneficial for the peoples of the Mediterranean. Champions of the environment, for their part, denounce the outrageous commercialisation of a heritage that deserves to be classed in its entirety as humanity’s world heritage.

Tourism in the Mediterranean: Safeguarding Heritage or Destroying the Environment?

Tourism, in keeping with its ambiguous image as a re-activator of economies and as “falsifier” of cultures, simultaneously reassures and disturbs. Does it personify a little-loved (harmful activity) but highly desirable (profitable economy) sector in the collective unconscious?

In any event, it is currently the sole domain in which differences, inequalities, divergences and even conspicuous contradictions are subservient to the “Royal Highness” of tourism. A social predisposition – and the material malleability of all these dynamics and contradictions – towards things being expressed if not unanimously, at least with understanding, is proof that the solutions to other problems in the Mediterranean are well and truly to be found. In fact, the real problem is more than anything the lack of political will of the states around its shores and, consequently, that of the international community. It is time, at the risk of offending common courtesy, to go beyond the accepted views from positions that are constrained by “political correctness”, but are proving sterile in the light of past experiences and practices. It is thus time to challenge attitudes without harming sensibilities. It needs to be proclaimed loud and clear that untrammelled capitalism and blind fanaticism are ticking bombs for our shared region and its future.
It is for that reason that the activities of tourism and hospitality exert such a fascination both because of their significance and diversity and because of their authenticity and profitability. They contribute markedly to consolidating the influence and image of the “Mediterranean” destination branding. Proof of this is the fact that it takes the lion’s share of world tourism arrivals: out of 989 million international tourism arrivals in 2007, the Mediterranean Basin managed to capture some 300 million arrivals with revenues in excess of 250 billion US dollars. Europe and its Mediterranean shores stand out for their achievements in terms of tourism. “Europe, the top destination region in the world, with over 50% of all international tourist arrivals, recorded in 2007 a growth that exceeded the average and achieved a total of 480 million tourists. Destinations such as Turkey (+18%), Greece (+12%) and Portugal (+10%) or Italy and Switzerland (both +7%) are evidence of the positive effect of the continuing reactivation of the region’s economy in 2007” (UNWTO, 2008).

In any event, this tremendous economic gap has the merit of cushioning a whole range of political shocks and economic crises that have either been experienced as harmful or perceived so by the peoples and populations of the Mediterranean.

**Tourist Flows, Leisure Mobility and Economic Migrations**

At a geopolitical level, the closure of borders on the northern shore strikes a discordant note in this concert that can be classed as “harmonious” by virtue of the blossoming of intercultural dialogue and a coming together among its peoples. It is also an infringement of the ideals of globalization that gives praise to the free circulation of people, goods and capital.

But despite these unequal exchanges, tourism can rightly be considered to be a profitable economic and socio-cultural interface that is shown to be a unifying force in terms of its wealth-creation and pacification successes, in contrast to the outbreaks of violence and clashes of a social, political and economic nature in the region.

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1 Data on international tourism revenues remain patchy as the majority of countries have only provided figures for the first quarter of the year. At the same time, in order for the analysis to be valid, there is a need for data on exchange rates against the dollar and on inflation. It would therefore be premature to go into too much detail. World and regional estimates will be analysed fully in the next Barometer release, which will appear in June 2008.

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**TABLE 32 International Tourist Arrivals by Region and Sub-region in 2000, 2006 and 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regions</th>
<th>Arrivals 2000</th>
<th>Arrivals 2006</th>
<th>Arrivals 2007</th>
<th>Part 2007</th>
<th>Increase 06/05</th>
<th>Increase 06/07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>682.0</td>
<td>846.0</td>
<td>898.0</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>391.0</td>
<td>460.8</td>
<td>480.1</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>54.9</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>62.2%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Europe</td>
<td>139.7</td>
<td>149.8</td>
<td>155.0</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central/Western Europe</td>
<td>69.4</td>
<td>91.3</td>
<td>92.8</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Eur./Mediterranean</td>
<td>139.3</td>
<td>164.8</td>
<td>176.3</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia-Pacific</td>
<td>110.6</td>
<td>167.8</td>
<td>185.0</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North-East Asia</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>104.2</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South-East Asia</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>60.4</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>128.2</td>
<td>135.7</td>
<td>142.2</td>
<td>15.8%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>90.7</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central America</td>
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<td>7.7</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>18.7</td>
<td>20.2</td>
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</table>

Notwithstanding a number of instances of brutality and periodical terror attacks, the importance and quality of tourist activities and infrastructures developed around the Mediterranean basin are a way of taking a stand against the geopolitical myopia currently being exhibited. This lifebuoy has arrived in time to rescue what could yet be rescued in a region losing impetus, weakened by economic stagnations and political upheavals, in a climate of chronic instability.

The mobility of leisure activity in the Mediterranean region constitutes the salient aspect of North-South relations even if such movement is currently only in one direction. For this reason, relations between the two shores, as regards as South-North movements, remain uncertain due to the rigidity of anti-immigration policies.

In 2007, the Mediterranean appeared in the socio-political map as a uniting feature and at the same time as a demarcation line. Consequently, clandestine migrations tend to be the counterbalance to one-way tourism.

“The Mediterranean received 58 million tourist visits in 1970 and 228 million in 2002. It will be the destination for 396 million in 2025, of which 312 (close to 80%) will be concentrated along the shores.” (www.tourisme-solidaire.org/2008/med.asp). For 2007, optimistic estimates talk of 300 million tourists, of which 240 million have stayed on a coast known for its fragility and rarity. It is estimated that over one thousand kilometres of exclusively tourist Mediterranean beaches were built-up in 2007. This unattractive “costalisation” is beginning to pose a problem for certain European countries within the EU (Spain, France, Italy, Greece…), which are starting to be less reluctant to opt for the demolition of “illegal” or “dangerous” buildings. In other words, the unwelcome pressure that mass beach tourism is placing on the coastline constitutes a gradual threat to the environment.

In addition, tourism generally stretches along the northern shore, notably in Europe’s Latin countries (France: 82 million tourists, Spain: 63 million and Italy: 48 million) according to first estimates. This prime world destination is an “inbound and outbound” area for tourists and at the same time a high revenue geographic region. On the contrary, the southern shore, a receiving zone par excellence, is completely under European influence, both from the tourism and economic perspective. Europeans make up between 50 and 60% of the tourist clientele on the southern shore (Egypt: 56%, Morocco: 62%, Tunisia: 71% and Turkey 47%).

In the Near East, 2007 was a gloomy year for countries bordering the Mediterranean. The Israel-Lebanon war (added to the “permanent” Israeli-Palestinian conflict), Hamas taking control of Gaza, the Turkish-Kurdish conflict, the attacks at Sharm-el-Sheik in Egypt and the impasse of the Iraqi war seriously limited travel to that region. It could even be concluded that this situation of instability – as well as the political upheaval in the Balkans – contributed to boosting tourism to the Maghreb in 2007: 7.5 million arrivals in Morocco (+14%), 7 million in Tunisia (+ 8%) and 0.9 million in Algeria (+ 6%). Egypt beat all records with 11 million arrivals (+22%).

But the Middle East overall is, one way or another, overcoming the gloomy prospects attributable to its many conflicts. “It achieves a total of 46 million international tourist arrivals and continues to be one of the tourist success stories of the last ten years, and that despite permanent tensions and threats. This region is in the process of becoming an established destination, with its number of visitors rising much faster than the world total. In 2007, Saudi Arabia and Egypt were among the principal destinations in terms of growth.” (www.veilleinfotourisme.fr).

The Price of Success: Serious Threats to the Environment

“The Mediterranean, an interior sea of 2.9 million square kilometres, is bordered by 30,000 kilometres of coastline of varying importance. The most open and accessible of them are increasingly being subjected to strong demographic and urban pressures (rural exodus and rampant urbanisation), which endlessly feed the various socio-economic activities (industrial, tourism and port activity). In coastal areas, these activities can exploit appropriate facilities, access to external markets and a skilled and readily available workforce.” (Hillali, 2003)

Practically all the islands, the regional seas and the entire coast of the principal tourist destinations are seriously under threat

However, in a report made public in 2007, the WWF sounded the alarm and warned of the danger of an-
archic tourist development in the Mediterranean basin. Thirteen sites identified by the organisation were included in the index. Biodiversity is seriously threatened there: practically all the islands (the Balearics, Corsica, Sardinia, Cyprus...), the regional seas (Alboran Sea, the Aegean, Tyrrhenian Sea, Ionian Sea...), and the entire coast of the principal tourist destinations are seriously under threat. The report also makes clear that “tourism is a very significant source of water over-consumption; thus, while a Spaniard uses 250 litres per day, a tourist in Spain will use an average of 880 litres” (WWF, 2007). In the Maghreb, this relationship is of around 150 litres per day for domestic usage as against 500 for tourism.

The Blue Plan too gives warning of the excesses due to pollution. The Rome call (December 2007), at the initiative of the French President and the Spanish and Italian heads of government, seeks the establishment of a “Union for the Mediterranean” in the hope of revitalising the Barcelona Process that dates back to 1995 (cf. the convention on the protection of the Mediterranean marine and coastal environment). At first sight, this would appear to set up a function that duplicates the Process. The direction was confirmed in mid-March 2008 by the 27 States of the EU. This protocol deals with the integrated management of coastal zones and issues of climate change in the Mediterranean. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 80% of pollution in the Mediterranean is linked to land-based activities. The facts, indeed, attest to it: the environment and sustainable development are increasingly the issue of the day in the Mediterranean.

During the course of these meetings, “representatives of all subscribing parties to the Convention (21 countries in the Mediterranean regional neighbourhood and the European Union), members of the Secretariat (MEDU), of the Regional Action Centres (RAC), NGOs and other institutions, tried to pool their efforts in order to achieve the Convention’s chief objectives of improved protection, meaning conservation and sustainable development, of the Mediterranean marine environment and coastal region” (www.cop15map.com/es/inicio.html).

According to UNEP, in 2007, “the area of protected marine zones in the Mediterranean is less than 0.5% of the total area of the basin (4%, if the Pelagos sanctuary is included). Yet the objectives set by the Convention on biodiversity (CBD) are for 10% by 2012. The 7 EU countries involved (Cyprus, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Slovenia) did not achieve the CBD objectives even though these are the best-protected coasts.” The absence of reliable statistics for the countries of the South and East of the Mediterranean only permits approximate estimates to be made and these suggest that the situation is far from being satisfactory (www.plongeur.com/magazine/2008/01/17/conference-aire-marine/).

Heritage and Tourism: A Dream Environment as much as a Risk Environment

Tourism, now deeply rooted in the Mediterranean environment, is seen as being a considerable asset as much for the receptor populations as for tourists. It is a necessary but vital evil. For that reason, it should not be forgotten that “travel is a life art but also a necessity for survival. Being an economic necessity for the deprived, a psychological necessity for the affluent” (Michel, 2004), tourism operates as a suitable meeting point between the needs and expectations of visitors on the one hand and the facilities and services offered by receptor communities on the other. This convergent interest, manifested in the profitable synergy between supply and demand, makes for tourism as an activity that promotes harmony and is unaltering in its progress, overcoming economic crises, ethnic tensions and ideological or religious conflicts.

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It should be said that the tourist industry is supported in its conquest of spaces, economies and market shares, in short in its quest for success, by structural, social and historical elements that have proved more resilient than circumstantial crises and acts of violence. Needless to say, the present, whatever may be thought by those suffering from historical amnesia, beholden to a profitable but essentially abusive materiality, derives its legitimacy and validity from the past.
“The whole history of technological and scientific discoveries since the Renaissance shows that method, experience and organization have replaced a purely creative approach which was quite often home made and based on an idealised view of humankind. The vision of Mediterranean people is mainly based on senses and they have, perhaps more than anybody, a need for emotion – a quality (or a defect) which was probably heightened by the Renaissance" (Reiffers, 1992). Emotion, sensitivity and feelings are sentiments particular to human beings, through which brotherhood and friendship, hospitality and solidarity still have a sociable and anthropogenic meaning capable of restraining voracious appetites that are ruled by purely mechanical calculation. Some of these austere materialists, made ill by heartless accumulation, come to treat themselves to a therapeutic cure in this “open-air clinic” known as the Mediterranean. And it is understandable that tourism, a fun and playful activity par excellence, finds significant resonance in a social, cultural and heritage context made up of a threefold combination that is both attractive and evocative: surroundings, society and heritage. Adding to those assets are a benign climate, human warmth and the calmness of the sea. Has something truly new been created here?

**Conclusion**

What conclusion can be drawn from a development of tourism split between optimism and pessimism? It must be that these days there should be no surprise in seeing this modern-age sector nourished by age-long socio-cultural factors (an authentic heritage, cultural plurality, ethnic diversity) and natural features suited to life in the open air (diversity of scenery, mildness of climate, a tame sea).

That said, water is the element that remains the linchpin on which the future of tourist activity will rely. The coastal fringe, while undoubtedly rare, constitutes the second limiting factor for tourism and at the same time proves to be a polarising feature (sedentary tourism) and a vector for distribution (passing tourism).

“But, some will say, does this Mediterranean that is redolent with history, heterogeneous, dispersed, with its draw from the North in terms of its prosperity, still deserve to be regarded as more than a physical entity? Will it be able to rely more on humans and less on nature to become once more, if not the centre of the world, at least a region that, bit by bit, builds up its knowledge, consolidates its economy and renews its culture?” (Reiffers, 1992). While it is hard to give a straight “yes” or unequivocal “no” response to this question, above all we must not abandon the humanist (or humanitarian) hope that recognises the potential and actual value of the women and men of the Mediterranean. The reason for hope rests on the fact that over the millennia they have provided a lead to humanity in periods of darkness! There is nothing to prevent a consciousness being reawakened and minds stirred tomorrow by a shared interest that crystallised around projects of general appeal; the fact that the spark is taking time to rekindle may be the result of an unfortunate setback, but that should not be interpreted by any means as the loss of will or ability of the Mediterranean people to apply their ingenuity and take the future into their hands.

Another issue, another point of interest, the components that make up heritage as a whole, – be they dispersed or concentrated, physical or intangible, old or recent – are constituted into sensitive resources or products that need to be managed with the greatest of care, discernment and, above all, of love, without sinking into a sterile environmentalism. Because, by the very fact that these resources range across values that are simultaneously exceptional, age-old and rare, they run the risk of excessive economic exploitation, speculative abuses, selective indifference and ruinous neglect. Hence the role of considered planning for a sustainable development.

The Mediterranean tourist space in fact exists over an immutable life span that verges on the timeless. These components together contribute to the flourishing of vacationing and leisure while ever protecting the region from being buffeted by shocks or from decline dictated by fashion. The Mediterranean’s tourist activity is a constant that stands up to the unexpected in defiance of passing circumstances. It is up to us, therefore, to ensure that it endures.

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The world has yet to come to grips with one of the most critical transformations of the 21st century – urbanization and urban growth in developing countries. The Mediterranean Population Forum (Barcelona, 11-12 December 2007), which focused on Demographic Transitions, Inequalities and Development, provided an opportunity to review ongoing trends and to discuss what needs to be done about inevitable massive growth in the towns and cities of developing countries.

The expected increases in the world’s urban population are dramatically illustrated in Chart 27, which shows absolute increments in different world regions between 1950 and 2030. This provides a vivid demonstration of the fact that most future urban growth will occur primarily in some of the world’s most populous and poorest countries, especially in Asia and Africa. Indeed, in little more than a generation, the world’s developing regions will double the size of their urban population. The scale of this coming urban growth is unprecedented. Some people talk about urban and slum growth in Africa, Asia or Latin America as if they were simply a repetition of the process experienced by developed countries during the industrial revolution! That is not correct! The urban transition in developing countries is telescoping time, needing just a few decades to do what took a century or more in the industrialized countries. More importantly, the huge demographic dimensions of present urban and slum growth have no parallel in history.

**A New Scale in Urban Growth: Making it Work for People**

Needed: A Radical Change in Policy Outlook

This ongoing urban transition has the potential to be very positive for the resolution of poverty and for sustainability, or it may multiply poverty, human misery and environmental degradation. What will actually happen depends on decisions that are taken now. Many policymakers in developing countries have been wringing their hands over the urbanization process. They would like to prevent it, or at least slow it down. Given the way that demographic and economic trends are converging in the developing world, this is not going to happen. Positive and proactive attitudes towards urban growth, however, could bring about a win/win situation in which social and environmental problems are minimized, the ability of cities to attract investment is maximized and the quality of life for all is improved. Although there has been some controversy about this in the past, it is now accepted that cities have much greater potential for economic growth, for the absorption of labour and for the reduction of poverty than rural areas. Moreover, the same advantages of proximity and concentration help make it much simpler and cheaper to provide the urban population with services and amenities. The reduction of poverty is actually fastest in countries that urbanize more rapidly. This has led one of the world’s leading experts on poverty to state that the only problem with urbanization is that it’s not fast enough (Ravallion, 2007).

**What’s Happening in the MENA Region?**

The Southern and Eastern countries of the MENA region are also in the throes of a massive urban transi-
Indeed, according to official UN data, this region will experience an increase of some 85 million people during the 2010-2030 period alone. Chart 28 presents dramatic evidence of urban growth in several countries of that region. In absolute terms, Turkey and Egypt stand out as countries that are experiencing the biggest urban growth, followed by Algeria and Morocco. At the other extreme, Lebanon, Libya and the Palestinian Territories have had much slower urban growth. As elsewhere, official policy in those countries of the MENA region experiencing rapid urban growth has tended to be increasingly negative. Between 1996 and 2005, the number of countries in the region that want to reduce rural-urban migration has jumped from 50% to 100% (United Nations, 2006). What policymakers are actually saying is that they would like to stop urban growth and they believe that preventing migration would accomplish that. However, most urban growth is now due not to migration but to natural increase. Moreover, efforts to stop rural-urban migration rarely work unless extreme measures are used, simply because people realize that they have more chances of improving their lives in cities. But the point is that negative attitudes towards urban growth makes urbanization unnecessarily problematical and contributes to the social and economic problems of the region, instead of helping to solve them.

The Starting Point: Addressing the Housing Needs of the Poor

One piece of information that is rarely considered in urban planning manuals is the fact that the largest social group in any developing country city is composed of poor people. Actually, the poor are often a
majority! Nevertheless, their needs are hardly ever given serious consideration because the city is planned mainly for those who generate production and those who consume on a large scale. Thus, despite their numbers, the poor are generally left to fend for themselves.

This is particularly damaging in the area of housing. In most developing countries – and this is true also of many countries within the MENA region – the negative attitudes of policymakers towards the urban poor make it much more difficult for them to obtain secure housing in a decent neighbourhood. Since they are not welcomed anywhere, and since they cannot compete in inflated and speculative land markets, the poor inevitably end up invading and settling precariously in all the wrong places – on distant urban fringes, steep hillsides, river banks and other areas subject to natural disasters, in watersheds and ecological preserves and on toxic lands.

The form and location of slum growth inevitably deepens and perpetuates urban poverty. It prevents people from gaining access to what the city has to offer. The sprawling settlements of the poor in all the wrong places have a direct impact on their health and on their ability to access services of any kind. Not taking a proactive attitude towards the needs of the poor makes it much more difficult to make any improvements to the city, or to the living conditions of its population. Just putting in an access road or providing channels for water and sewage is likely to require tearing down existing homes once slum settlements have been established.

Creating a Win/Win Situation

But the lack of a proactive approach to housing for the poor also has far-reaching and lasting repercussions that go beyond the lives and welfare of the poor themselves. It hampers the improvement of a city’s infrastructure and services, as well as the quality of its environment. In turn, this foils attempts to attract investments and thus to create jobs and to improve the economic and social conditions of the population. In short, not taking a proactive attitude towards the needs of the largest social group ends up having negative impacts on the urban environment, the urban economy and the quality of life for all.

Improving access to land and housing for the poor requires political will, vision and the revitalization of long-range planning (which the neo-liberal model has tried to bury), based on good information and projections as to probable future growth. It also requires collaborating with neighbourhood associations and organizations of the urban poor (OUPs), who have often proved to know more about how to resolve their needs than planners and politicians.

It is often said that it is difficult to provide land for the poor because urban land is unavailable. Experts disagree strongly with that. The problem isn’t lack of land but dysfunctional land markets and lack of good policies. In order to provide for the needs of the poor, the functioning of urban land markets needs to improve. As a result of exploitation and collusion between speculators and politicians, the poor often end up pay-
ing more for a piece of land or for a bucket of water than other people. Thus, lack of good regulation and transparency increase poverty.

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Let’s Get Real on Housing for the Poor

Good solutions are realistic solutions. There is no point in putting up showcase housing projects that cannot be replicated on a large scale. What can be provided in a sustainable way is minimally-serviced land on which people initially build their homes, even if at first these are precarious shelters that will be gradually improved over time. Contrary to popular opinion, poor people do have resources and with proper financing structures, most investments can be repaid over time. The technical problems for such solutions are not insurmountable. The biggest problem comes from the inertia of political systems that are geared to immediate results – within the limits of politicians’ mandates. What are required here are a long-term vision and a revolution in political mentality – in order to accept urban growth as beneficial and then, to prepare adequately for it.

Reducing the Ecological Footprint of Cities

Proactive attitudes are also needed in order to reduce the size of the ecological footprint of the cities. The sustainable use of urban space is critical in that respect. There are several things that can be done with urban space in order to enhance sustainability. The first is to plan urban growth with the environment in mind, avoiding the invasion of fragile lands, reducing sprawl and energy use, and minimizing the size and impact of the urban blot. Unfortunately, recent studies show that, world-wide, cities are decreasing in density. That is, cities use up more and more space, not only because they have more people, but also because people are using more space per person. Much of this has to do with improved transportation, especially the greater use of automobiles. The elites of the developing world prize the commodity and the social status of private automobiles and they use their influence to make governments invest in roads. This greatly diminishes their ability to improve mass transportation and, since only a minority have access to cars, it generates increasing inequity while also expanding the size of the urban blot.

Most urban sprawl in developing countries comes from something that is now being called “peri-urbanization.” This is basically an uncontrolled and leapfrog expansion of the urban periphery that greatly contributes to environmental damage and to urban sprawl. Fuelled simultaneously by land speculation, by the land needs of the poor and by globalized firms that seek large expanses of cheap land outside city limits, peri-urbanization is facilitated by the absence of administrative entities that can effectively coordinate the social, economic and environmental problems that affect the city and its hinterland. The result is a rapid and often inappropriate expansion of the urban blot. A visionary and participatory administrative city-region entity that takes a broad view of urban issues is critical.

Cities in a Globalizing World

Finally, even the most ingenious urban policies and orientations are worthless without sound financial backing. Cities need resources to plan for infrastructure and services and they need to generate employment on a scale sufficient to ensure the livelihoods and welfare of a rapidly-growing population. In recent years, the combined influences of decentralization and globalization have provided cities, particularly smaller cities, with exciting new opportunities as well as enhanced responsibilities. Not all of them have the same capacity to take advantage of this historical moment. The gap between responsibility and capacity may be most significant precisely in smaller and medium-sized cities. Smaller cities in the context of globalized decentralization policies have greater flexibility and more room to manoeuvre in preparing for the form, direction and characteristics of rapid urban growth. Some of these cities have done well in selling their comparative or locational advantages, in expanding incomes and reducing poverty in the context of globalized economic competition. However, most city managers traditionally know nothing of the economy of the city they administer.

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Identifying and understanding the comparative and locational advantages of an urban agglomeration and building upon them is an art form that is rapidly gaining in importance. Generating a stable investment climate that stimulates private sector investment and business development is as important at the local as at the national level. A growing body of knowledge highlights the fact that a favourable investment climate includes social and environmental amenities.

Efficient local governments that can show vision and administrative capacity, allied to transparency and good governance, can make a difference in attracting investments and in generating fiscal resources that can be used to improve the living conditions of all. This leads to an urban win/win situation. Showing an ability to meet the land and housing needs of the poor, as well as an effective concern with the sustainable use of urban space, is an important part of the city’s reputation and its attraction for potential investors.

The Time is Now!

The international community has not paid urbanization nearly the amount of attention it deserves. International organizations can help to legitimize the efforts of OUPs and their contribution to the resolution of intra-urban problems. They can also generate strong advocacy for attitude changes and for better governance. They can help generate the political motivation as well as the resources needed for good planning. This includes updated information and analyses as well as training in the use of spatial planning techniques and tools.

The social and environmental future of the developing world depends very much on decisions taken to help orient massive urban growth

The social and environmental future of the developing world depends very much on decisions taken to help orient massive urban growth. The time to act is now. Trying to rectify unsustainable urban processes is much more complex and much more expensive than getting it right from the outset.

Bibliography


Socioeconomic Situation and Transport Infrastructures in the Maghreb

“The Euro-Maghrebian Partnership,” say the participants meeting during these days in late May 2008 in Skhirate, the magnificent tourist resort on the Moroccan coast close to Rabat and to the King of Morocco’s palace, “is the strong point of Euro-African relations.” And yet the history of the process of constructing Euro-Mediterranean, or trans-Mediterranean, relations has been until now much more difficult than we imagined: the economic integration of the Maghreb countries with each other, led by the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), and with the European Union (EU) have not yet yielded the results expected. The frontier between Morocco and Algeria remains closed and relations between Morocco, Tunisia and Libya are almost more complicated than the bilateral relations between each country and the European Union. However, the participants called by the Minister of the High Commissioner for Planning 2030 of Morocco, Ahmed Lahlimi Alami, insist on their need by repeatedly referring to the costs of the non-Maghreb and to the development opportunities lost because of the lack of cooperation between the Maghreb countries. This explains the interest in launching a process of prospective work comprising, at a Maghreb level, the work undertaken or underway in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania, all planned for 2030. A work of reflection and prospective debate undertaken jointly by all countries will enable a visualisation of future scenarios of shared prosperity and a clearer identification of shared interests, beyond the specific positions of the countries today.

But it is not the politicians or the senior officials, affirms Rachid Tlemçani, Director of Development of the Group ONA, an industrial and financial holding of Morocco, who will make possible economic, or even political, integration of the Maghreb or will facilitate relations with the EU but rather the decisions of the companies to locate in one city or another, to trade with one or the other, and the migration flows. In Morocco, where the government has made clear progress stabilising the main macroeconomic indicators and where reforms of the legal, financial and social regulation systems are underway, the conditions are already in place to make possible an accelerated process of growth, similar to that experienced recently by other countries as distinct as Chile, South Korea, China or Ireland. At this time, the infrastructure investment plans, affirms Rachid Tlemçani, are strategic for facilitating the implementation of industrial companies and fostering tourism and international trade. And the large infrastructures can only be developed in an environment of low demand, when they respond to supply logic, based on future strategic visions.

In fact, the Maghreb countries, especially Morocco and also Tunisia, have in recent years made great efforts to modernise their economies and the investment climate. Notable progress has been made in the stabilisation of prices, the reduction of public debt, the reform of the financial system, the improvement of infrastructures, the reform of education, the processes of privatisation and the launch of tourism. GDP has grown at an average rate of 5% since 2001, although it is still very slow in the agricultural sector which depends excessively on the highly variable climatology of the region. The fertility rate, at around 2.5 children per woman, continues evolving downwards and it is expected to reach values of 2 children per woman before 2015, when the national population will no longer rise. The active role of women in society, both through their integration into the labour market and in institu-
tions, political parties or government organisations, is extremely important in the advance of modernisation of the social and cultural structures in the region. Morocco, moreover, has a particularly favourable geographical situation, halfway between Africa and Europe, the international organisations value its political and social stability, and foreign investors recognise its appeal. The plans Visión 2010 (to boost the economy), Azur 2010 (to boost tourism), and Génie (training of 10,000 engineers before 2010 to service the technological sectors), among others, have generated confidence in the international markets. Between 2006 and 2007, Spain has invested more than €1.5 billion in the countries, and the number of companies has already reached 900, of which more than 300 are in the region of Tangiers. The volume of Spanish exports to Morocco has tripled in the period 1995-2003, surpassing the €1.8 billion in 2003 and becoming the third Spanish client outside the EU, only behind the United States and Mexico, while imports rise 15% annually, now making it the first trading partner of Morocco ahead of France.

Cement consumption in Morocco has increased from 7.5 million tonnes in 2003 to 13 million in 2007, and is expected to reach 20 million in 2012. With the construction crisis in Spain, the major Spanish groups find a property market in Morocco with strong potential. Fadesa, established in the country since 2000 and winner of the construction of Guelmim-Smara, one of the resorts of the Plan Azur on the Atlantic coast facing the Canary Islands – €450 m, 650 ha, 8 hotels, 5,000 apartments, golf course and shopping centre – has set up a joint venture with Addoha, a national company specialised in social housing, of high quality developments. It is estimated that the property deficit in Morocco is around one million homes, with an annual demand for 40,000 new homes. The cost of property in Tangiers has now reached €2,000/m².

Transport Infrastructures

A recent World Bank study (2006) on the integration of the Maghreb countries emphasises the importance of transport infrastructures in the growth of trade relations in these countries. A growth of 10% in transport costs can reduce the volume of exchanges by 20%; the duplication of the number of airports in the country can increase imports by 14%; and the duplication of each 100 km² of asphalted roads can increase the volume of trade exchanges by 13%.

In Morocco, the government motorway programme aims to construct 1,500 km of high capacity roads by 2010. Started in the late 1980s, the rate of motorway construction has passed from around 40 km per year during the 1990s to more than 150 km per year at present, currently exceeding 800 km of motorways. Thus, all the main cities in the country will be connected by 2010, from Tangiers to Agadir, from Casablanca to the Algerian border. This will be funded by toll charges as national resources are limited; the same formula, in fact, which was adopted for the Spanish Mediterranean corridor when it was built in the 1970s. It is worth recalling...
that both Spain and France developed approximately 40% of their motorway networks in very short periods of time, less than 10 years.

In 2006, Moroccan trains transported 23.5 million passengers, 12.2% more than the previous year. Goods transport by train is substantially greater in Morocco than in the rest of the Maghreb countries mainly because of the importance of the transport of phosphates, which represents 75% of the 35.5 million tonnes transported in 2006. In the late 1980s, the Office National des Chemins de Fer (ONCF) launched a programme for the modernisation of the national railway network, which is 1,907 km long, with the improvement of tracks, the reform of stations and the electrification of some sections. The company has had positive operating profits since the 1990s, which supports the feasibility of the planned investments. The implantation of a new high speed network is expected, which would start with the section between Tangiers and Casablanca and would then extend towards Marrakech and Agadir, and towards Fez and Oudja. The objective is to construct 1,500 km of track in 20
years. With the information surveys already undertaken and a pre-contract signed with Alstom, the Tangiers-Casablanca section should come into service in 2013, with an estimated cost of €2 billion.

In December 2006, the reform of the Moroccan port sector was implemented, which clarifies and simplifies the necessary bureaucracy to operate in a Moroccan port and introduces competition between different ports of the country. 90% of Morocco’s trade with foreign countries is carried out by sea. With 3,000 km of coast and a strategic geographic situation, the Moroccan merchant navy maintains a preponderant place between the Arab and African fleets. However, the costs of maritime transport in the Maghreb are still higher than those of other competing regions, mainly because of the costs of port maintenance – the greater number of obligatory services – and slower customs bureaucracy. If in Estonia and Latvia, for instance, only one day is needed to negotiate the customs process, in Morocco the time is 8 days.

Among the 30 ports in Morocco, 11 have international trade; Casablanca concentrates 40% of national goods traffic, which amounts to around 70 million tonnes. Strategically, the port of TangerMed is being constructed on the shores of the Gibraltar Strait and will substitute the current port of Tangiers which will be reserved for the stopover of tourist cruisers and leisure boats. Along with hosting passenger lines that cross the Strait – around 3 million passengers per year –, the port will work as a freight distribution point in the Mediterranean, in the form a hub and in competition with Algeciras – the leading container port in Spain – with which cooperation agreements have been signed. In contrast to Algeciras, TangerMed has land for the development of complementary logistics and industrial activities which have been developed as duty-free zones. TangerMed is one of the key pieces in the development programme of the north region, which seeks the implementation of foreign industrial activity. The efforts of liberalisation of the Moroccan air sector (2004-2005) have resulted in a strong decrease of the airport charges, resulting in quick growth of flights between Europe and Morocco. Air Europa, Clickair and Air Nostrum in Spain, Corsair and AirHorizon in France, the German companies LPU and Air Berlin, and the British First Choice have established flights to the main world cities; Ryanair offers destinations of Marrakech, Fez and Tangier; the Marrakech-London route has passed in a short time from 8 monthly connections to more than

### Table 33 Maritime Transport Indicators, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Quality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Container port traffic (TEU)</td>
<td>Total merchant fleet (in thousands GRT)</td>
<td>CIF/FOB freight cost (% of imports)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>354,724</td>
<td>862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>560,682</td>
<td>523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>230,671</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>102,039,032</td>
<td>1,766</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>1,039,369</td>
<td>832</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The most recent data used beginning with 2004. For commercial perception indices, 1 = worst and 7 = best. Source: WDI, 2005; Review of Maritime Transport 2005; and Estache and Goicoechea, 2005.

### Table 34 Air Transport Indicators, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Access</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Quality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air transport, passengers carried (millions)</td>
<td>Air transport, freight (million tonnes per km)</td>
<td>Daytime landing and takeoff charges ($)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>21.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>61.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>20.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia &amp; Pacific</td>
<td>203.3</td>
<td>13,730.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe &amp; Central Asia</td>
<td>65.1</td>
<td>2,138.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East &amp; North Africa</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>1,103.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The most recent data is used beginning with 2004. For commercial perception indices, 1 = worst and 7 = best. Cost refers to a B767-300 devoted to international operations. Source: WDI, 2005; Estache and Goicoechea, 2005; ICAO, 2005.
46. Faced with this increasing competition, the national company Royal Air Maroc has undertaken a process of corporate restructuring, launching a low-cost subsidiary in 2004 under the name of Atlas Blue. The Mohammed V airport in Casablanca has been enlarged and modernised until becoming one of the biggest in Africa, acting as a hub in the north-east of the continent. With a capacity for 11 million passengers, it currently has traffic of 5.9 million passengers (ONDA, 2007) and offers connections, along with Europe, with Algeria, Mauritania, Senegal, Egypt, the Middle East, Syria and Turkey. The arrival of low-cost companies is an important factor for the invigoration of the national tourist activity, both in its traditional forms and other more advanced, including residential tourism and weekend stays, mainly by European residents seeking a higher quality of life and weather at affordable prices. In this sense, the Moroccan residential sector is developing strongly especially on the outskirts of Marrakech but also in Fez. The Moroccan government, under the umbrella of the Plan Azur, is constructing 6 large luxury resorts in several places of the country with the objective of opening the tourist market to foreign operators and diversifying the supply and the clientele. The plan seeks to enlarge the national hotel capacity by 80,000 new rooms and 170,000 additional beds and attract 10 million visitors per year by 2010.

The reform of the transport sector in the Maghreb countries is underway. The enlargement of the motorway networks, the restructuring of the railway services, the high speed projects, the simplification and improvement of the port bureaucracy, the liberalisation of the Maghrebian sky or the privatisation of the national transport companies are actions addressed to a restructuring of the sector enabling the improvement of its competitiveness reducing costs and improving services. Morocco has progressed most in this sense, but Tunisia has also made important advances, above all in maritime traffic. According to the World Bank, regional cooperation is now necessary in the short term through a certain harmonisation of the transit expenditures and a reduction of the excessive charges that increase the administrative costs of the exchanges between the Maghreb countries. A network made up of multimodal port and airport platforms and their connections with the existing or planned transport networks is a key factor to promote the exchange and investment opportunities in the Maghreb.

We should expect the strengthening of the structural reforms in the Maghreb countries, the maintenance of the political and social stability, the recognition of the Maghrebian citizens living abroad as actors of the national development, the advance in the chapter of individual rights and the continuation of the opening towards more democratic governance models to continue with a view to the implementation of advanced statutes with the EU. Although the seeds of a promising future seem to have been planted, it does not seem foolish to believe that the next few years may involve a virtuous process of economic development that places the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean within the framework of the emerging countries.

Acknowledgements

- Mr Ahmed Lahlimi Alami
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- Mr Shafiq al-Yilani

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Turkey’s development assistance to other countries dates back to the 1980s. The first official provision of assistance was to Sub-Saharan Africa which was hit by drought in 1985. The assistance which was approved by the government was the food aid worth US$10 million. Since then, Turkey’s status changed progressively from an aid-recipient country to a net donor. Turkey still receives and provides assistance simultaneously. For this reason, the term “net donor” is used as Turkey disburses more than she receives. Nowadays, there are several actors within the government as far as development assistance is concerned (see Chart 31). Besides these government institutions, NGOs, universities and other charity organizations have become active in recent years and the scope of their activities has been growing at a rapid pace.

Maintaining coordination between all these actors is very important in preventing duplications as well as attaining maximum efficiency. The political coordination of such activities of all governmental institutions is maintained by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while technical coordination is carried out by the Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA). TIKA not only maintains technical coordination, but also provides development assistance itself via development and implementation of projects and programmes. As for humanitarian assistance, the Turkish Red Crescent Society is actively involved in mobilizing emergency assistance to the countries or societies that are affected by natural or man-made disasters. Its counterpart within the government structure is the General Directorate of Emergency Management which operates directly under the control of the Prime Ministry. Humanitarian assistance, however, is outside the scope of this article as it is not considered as part of development assistance.

About TIKA

Background

Turkish development assistance was institutionalized with the establishment of TIKA in 1992 under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at a period that also saw the dissolution of the Soviet Union as well as the disintegration of the Yugoslav Republic. Later on, in 1999 TIKA became affiliated to the Prime Ministry so as to function quickly and effectively. This change provided flexibility in implementing projects, and TIKA’s activities became more visible both at the domestic and international level.

The initial flow of aid was provided following the demand by partner countries, initially to neighbouring and surrounding countries as well as the Central Asian Republics, with which Turkey has close historical and cultural ties. The main objective of TIKA was to assist the newly independent countries in their efforts to align with the market economy as well as with global politics. This initial objective then changed in recent years. Reflecting on the requests from the Balkan countries, TIKA enlarged its scope of activities towards the Balkans. Feeling the responsibility to respond to the requests of developing countries, this scope was enlarged by the inclusion of Middle Eastern and African countries.

By the end of 2007, the number of Program Coordination Offices of TIKA reached 22 in 20 countries and regions, namely in Afghanistan (3), Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ethiopia, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Palestine, Senegal, Sudan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine (Crimea) and Uzbekistan. Apart from these countries, TIKA operates through Turkish Embassies or in cooperation with the international donor community. Therefore the number of countries whose citizens benefited from the TIKA projects and programmes has reached over 100 in 2007.

Approach

While providing development assistance to partner countries, TIKA aims to provide sustainable social and economic development as well as to align its projects with the Millennium Development Goals of the United Nations (MDGs). Another important objective for TIKA is to support capacity-building activities in partner countries by developing human resources. In its efforts to provide development assistance to partner countries, TIKA favours a partner-country centred approach. The needs and priorities of these countries are taken very seriously into consideration during project development phases. While doing so, partner countries are also expected and encouraged to provide some input for the projects to be implemented. This input could be cash or in kind contribution and generally forms a very little part of the project budget. This approach not only provides active participation by the partner country, but also ensures ownership of the project when it is completed and handed over. For this reason, projects are developed to be sustainable and flexible so as to fit with the conditions of partner countries. Moreover, while undertaking such projects, TIKA attributes importance to maintaining coordination with the international donor community to prevent duplications and attain efficiency.

There are several methods that TIKA utilises for undertaking projects and programmes in partner countries, such as providing capacity-building assistance (institutional and human resources); dispatching experts; donating equipment; financing infrastructure projects; financing construction/renovation activities; and extending humanitarian assistance.

Developments in 2007

2007 was an important year in regards to Turkish development assistance. Not only were there developments in terms of development cooperation, but also important institutional changes.

Turkish Official Development Assistance

The technical coordination of Turkish development assistance and the duty of reporting Turkish Official
Development Assistance (ODA) to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) were given to TIKA in 2005 by a Prime Ministerial decree. In 2005, the first study was undertaken by TIKA for the year 2004, including the collection of data from all development assistance actors within Turkey. As a result of this study, Turkish ODA was calculated as US$339 million in 2004. This figure was followed by similar increases in 2005 and 2006, having ODA amounts of US$601 million and US$714 million respectively (see Chart 32). It is important to note here that these figures do not include the amounts disbursed by non-state actors such as NGOs.

This steady increase in the Turkish ODA is mainly due to the comprehensive data collection methods applied by TIKA. Every year, the number of reports filed by the developmental actors in Turkey is increasing and TIKA utilises these data to show the real track record of Turkish ODA. However, it cannot be said that the increase in Turkish ODA is solely based on these comprehensive data collection methods. As a matter of fact, there is an actual increase in the budget for development assistance activities in real terms. The government is increasing the budget of TIKA year by year as well as authorising TIKA for the use of funds allocated within the framework of Turkey’s commitments made at international donor conferences.

One of the important indicators of ODA is its share in the Gross National Income (GNI) of a country. According to the United Nations, in order to attain the internationally agreed development goals by the year 2015, donor countries should disburse 0.7% of their GNI as ODA. However, even the members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD who are providing around 90% of the total ODA disbursed worldwide have not attained this level so far. As for Turkey’s record on this issue, it was
0.18% for the year 2006. Notably, this ratio is above the level set by the European Union (EU) as a medium target (0.17%) to be reached by 2010 by the new members that joined the Union after 2004. Chart 33 compares Turkish ODA/GNI ratio with that of EU members.

Besides this achievement, it also came out that Turkey’s development cooperation activities are compatible with the EU. This fact was also stated in the “Turkey 2007 Progress Report” of the European Commission as “Turkey’s level of alignment [with the EU] in the field of development and humanitarian policy is satisfactory.”

**Turkish Development Assistance Report 2006**

As mentioned above, TIKA undertakes the assessment of a year’s performance in the following year. The ODA data for the year 2006 was reported to the OECD and the figures were also analysed in a report, which was published in late 2007. The report was prepared with a different approach in general.

When the Turkish Development Assistance Report for 2005 and 2006 are compared, one can see that there are some novelties in the latter. These novelties include the analysis of the data of direct investments made by the Turkish private sector as well as other investment operations of the Turkish Central Bank and other Turkish missions. These types of transactions are called “other flows” by the OECD and reached US$1 billion in 2006.

The report also includes the assistance provided to refugees within Turkey. Only in 2006, a total number of 57,942 refugees came to Turkey for various reasons and their needs such as food and shelter were met during their stay in Turkey. The total amount of this kind of assistance was US$38.6 million. The report also analysed the Turkish ODA within the framework of the MDGs. By doing so, Turkey’s efforts in the achievement of the MDGs were assessed for the first time and it came out that 50.7% of Turkish ODA contributed to the MDGs.

**Coordination Board Meetings**

According to Article 4 of the Law 4668 on Organization and Duties of TIKA, dated 2001, the Coordination Board on the Turkish development cooperation activities should convene at least once a year. The Board is composed of high-level bureaucrats from related line ministries; Undersecretaries of the Treasury, Foreign Trade and State Planning Organization; the Presidency of Religious Affairs, the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK); and TIKA. The Board is presided over by the State Minister responsible for TIKA. Other related government institutions as well as the representatives of NGOs could be invited on the acceptance that they have no voting power.

The Board, first of all, assesses the activities of TIKA in the previous year, provides direction and gives advice for the following year. Completed projects are assessed based on the principles set forth in the previous year’s Coordination Board and new projects and opening-ups are defined according to the Turkish foreign policy and within the limits of capacities and budget.

In the year 2007, the Coordination Board convened on 27th December 2007 and was chaired by the State Minister Prof. Dr. Mustafa Said Yazıcıoğlu.

Some important decisions were made at the meeting, such as the identification of regions and/or countries for new field offices to be established, institutional re-arrangements for TIKA and deepening of the scope of projects and activities by focusing on the areas where Turkey has comparative advantages and considerable experience. These areas were identified as the development of information technologies, e-government, good governance, entrepreneurship, SMEs, private sector development, healthy water supply and the transfer of technology in agriculture and health.

**Institutional Developments**

In 2007, there were some institutional developments as regards the improvement of the functioning of TIKA. Following the government’s “Opening-up to Africa Policy”, TIKA has established field offices in Ethiopia and Sudan. In 2007, this was followed by the opening of a TIKA field office in Dakar, Senegal. As in the case of other field offices, the objective of this office was not limited to the projects in that country. These offices serve as regional liaison offices which provide assistance to the countries in their vicinity. Besides this, another TIKA office was opened in Podgoritsa following the independence of Montenegro.

**Relations with International Development Cooperation Actors**

Turkey is party to the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. Harmonization of donors’ assistance to recipient countries is among the pillars of the Paris
Declaration. This is maintained not only in TIKA’s project approach, but also in its relations with major international organizations in development cooperation. Turkey is a member of the OECD and has an observer status at the DAC. Since 2005, TIKA’s experts are seconded to several directorates of the OECD. By the end of 2007, the total number of experts seconded at the OECD reached 13. This has created awareness among TIKA experts about the developmental trends around the world.

As an emerging donor and an observer to the DAC, Turkey initiated a policy dialogue meeting among DAC and non-DAC members of the OECD which materialized in a policy dialogue meeting in Istanbul in 2006. This was followed by a second meeting hosted by the Republic of Korea in Seoul in 2007. These meetings are important in the sense that they provide ground for sharing experiences as well as realizing the comparative advantages of emerging donors.

Another important international organization in the field of development is the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). TIKA’s field offices closely cooperate with UNDP country offices and implement several projects jointly in various countries and sectors. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), being another UN agency, is also a partner of Turkey in transferring know-how and experience accumulated in Turkey in the fields of technology, food industry, textiles and other fields pertinent to the industrial development of partner countries.

Turkey is also a member of the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) and TIKA cooperates with IsDB to transfer Turkey’s experience to other members of the Bank upon their request. This is mainly realized by the provision and dispatch of Turkish experts to IsDB member countries via IsDB and its financial resources. Further to TIKA’s cooperation with multilateral donors, cooperation also exists with several bilateral donors.

As a developing country, Turkey transfers its expertise and experience gained in its own development process to other developing countries. TIKA’s activities are therefore considered within the framework of South-South Cooperation. Furthermore, TIKA’s cooperation with other bilateral donors is a good example of triangular cooperation where one developing country transfers its expertise in a certain field to the other with financial support of an established donor, i.e. a donor from the North.

Project Highlights in 2007

In the year 2007, TIKA undersigned a significant number of projects in a wide area. In 2007, TIKA provided training for almost 2,000 experts in various sectors; constructed and/or renovated 36 schools; supported the education of 783 students; undertook health screening of more than 200,000 people; opened 40 water wells and 6 computer laboratories; supported the construction of 9 roads and bridges; and supported numerous cultural events.

Among all the projects and activities, the projects regarding the reconstruction of Afghanistan are very important. As mentioned above, TIKA has three offices in Afghanistan in Kabul, Wardak and Mazar-i-Sharaf. Health and education projects form the largest share of TIKA projects in Afghanistan. Annually, almost 1 million people receive medical treatment from the hospitals constructed and/or run by Turkey. Also, TIKA builds many schools and classrooms and gives importance to the enrolment of girls in these schools. As for the other regions and countries, TIKA accomplished and commenced some major projects in 2007. For instance, the project on the protection of forests from some forest pests was completed in Georgia and a similar one was commenced in Kyrgyzstan. With this project, natural walnut forests will be healed and walnut production will be increased. These will eventually lead to gradual increases in income of people living in the related regions.

There were also projects in Africa where TIKA has started to operate very recently. For instance, the TIKA office in Dakar is used as a liaison office for West African countries and many experts from West Africa received vocational training in Turkey on automotive, electronics, textile and police services. The disbursement of humanitarian assistance as well as the construction of hospitals for the internally displaced people (IDPs) of Darfur, Sudan, was also completed in 2007.

TIKA also gives importance to the improvement of urban services in partner countries. In this regard, constructions of roads and bridges as well as the con-
struction of water wells and water distribution systems in several partner countries are good examples of TIKA’s cooperation with local governments and municipalities. This kind of cooperation provides sustainability of the projects as well as maintaining ownership of the projects by partners.

Alongside technical assistance projects, some cultural projects were also undertaken by TIKA in 2007. Almost 90% of the construction works of the Turkish Monuments Project in Mongolia (MOTAP) were completed in 2007. This project includes the construction of a motorway of 45 km and the restoration of Orkhun Monuments as well as building a museum. The whole project will be completed by the end of 2008 and is expected to create a place of attraction in Mongolia for many tourists. Besides MOTAP, TIKA supported the restoration of several cultural and historical artefacts in partner countries in order to preserve the world’s common cultural heritage.

Conclusion

Although the planning of projects is carried out by TIKA on an annual basis, the projects are not generally completed in just one year. For this reason, it is sometimes difficult to make an assessment of a year as there are some continuing projects at the point of assessment. In this sense, instead of making a year’s analysis, a periodical analysis would be better to see the whole trends of development assistance of a donor country. Therefore, although this article focuses on the developments in the year 2007, most of the analyses were actually carried out based on a certain period of time in order to demonstrate the trends in Turkish development assistance strategy.

It is obvious that the year 2007 brought some changes to TIKA. The scope and the number of its projects have been positively affected by these developments. With these progresses as well as with the activities of TIKA, Turkey’s emerging donor status and her role in the international arena have become much more visible.

References


FIRST AFRICAN CONFERENCE ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT – RABAT, 6th-7th APRIL

The Kingdom of Morocco organizes, in partnership with the United Nations Development Program, the first African Conference on Human Development under the title “Cooperation of Proximity: Stakes and Perspectives.”

Human development represents the major prerequisite for bridging the gap between the North and the South and fostering greater equity, justice and security. The commitment of the international community can be reflected in the adoption of the Millennium Declaration and its Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In Africa these MDGs have created new dynamics but, despite considerable efforts, it is on the African continent that progress has been slowest. The achievement of the MDGs calls not only for the involvement of North-South cooperation but also for South-South cooperation. The African Conference on Human development is conceived within this context as an opportunity to assess achievements and allow for exchanges and experience-sharing among the participants: all African countries, bilateral partners (France, Germany, Belgium, UK, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Japan, South Korea, China, India, Pakistan, Canada, USA and Mexico), some United Nations organizations (ECA and UNCTAD), the European Commission, regional and financial institutions. The objective of the conference is to establish concrete partnerships between African countries, with a series of South-South and triangular projects, and creating a follow-up and coordination mechanism.

The three main themes of the workshops are:

- Capacity building in the framework of the MDGs related to poverty reduction: presentation of national experiences, with a special emphasis on the local capacities to be strengthened to ensure a better planning and projects in accordance with MDGs.
- Gender equality: review of the initiatives for gender mainstreaming.
- Governance for an efficient allocation of resources.

In the final declaration of the Conference, Ministers recognise the crucial role played by regional groupings and institutions in realising the goals of regional integration and the optimum exploitation of resources in their respective areas. In pursuit of this objective, Ministers at the meeting encourage the creation of an African network of experts in human development and the establishment of national focal points in charge of coordinating the national networks of experts.

The second African Conference on Human Development will be held in 2009 in the Republic of Gabon.

For further information:
www.maec.gov.ma/cafdev/EN/cont.asp
Economic growth has been fairly robust over the past decade as, with the exception of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait, nearly all Arab countries were able to achieve positive average growth of GDP per capita over the period (1995-2005). This came in contrast to the declining record of the 1980-1995 period, when average living standards declined annually by 1%. However, it is obvious that in most Arab countries, economic growth could not catch up with the increasing unemployment rate (Lawrence, 2006). Savings and investment rates in the Arab countries are generally lower than in other areas, especially East Asia, excluding the oil-exporting countries. The relatively low savings rates in the region were accompanied by an insignificant increase in the average investment rate by 1.1% in the 1990s. This increase was concentrated in Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia and the UAE. Several studies showed that the collapse in investment was the reason for the low growth rates for the majority of countries in spite of the average increase of total factor productivity (TFP) growth by 1.3% annually during the 1980s (Nabli, 2002). Moreover, accumulation and productivity have proven to be in opposite directions. According to Nabli (2002), the 1970s pattern of growth was characterized by higher levels of accumulation accompanied by declining productivity in many of the economies within the region such as Egypt, which almost doubled its rate of physical capital accumulation and more than doubled its rate of human capital accumulation, but faced a decline in total factor productivity growth by about one-quarter. Morocco and Algeria also doubled their rate of accumulation, but TFP growth turned from positive (4.6% in Morocco, 1.4% in Algeria) to negative rates (Nassar, 2004).

However, economic activity among the MENA resource-rich economies had gathered substantial momentum by 2006, from the preceding years of escalating oil prices and heightened external revenue flows. To a degree, the accrual of further oil receipts in 2006 offered an opportunity to engage in shifting expenditure — from consumption to capital outlays — and to intensify efforts to encourage spillovers from the oil to the non-oil economy by involving the domestic private sector. Additional revenues also supported a move to pay off outstanding overseas or domestic debt, clearing financial overhang for several large economies. For the resource-poor economies, developments in the external environment offered the prospect of reviving growth in goods exports, as well as other critical revenue flows — including tourism and remittances. In broader terms, the “growth rotation” taking place in the context of the global economy — the engine of growth shifting from the United States toward Europe, Japan and East Asia — began to offer more support for growth among diversified economies.

For the MENA region as a whole, merchandise exports grew 28% in 2006, though falling below the growth boom of 2004-5, when exports achieved 38% gains on the back of the hydrocarbons market. For the MENA region as a whole, imports of goods advanced 23% in 2006. This, in combination with the export performance, yielded an aggregate trade surplus of 24.6% of regional GDP.

Growth of tourism revenues rose to 14.5% in 2006, up from a 12.6% growth rate in 2005. In retrospect, the 2006 results for MENA show strong performance, especially in light of heightened tensions associated with the ongoing conflict in Iraq, as well as the mid-July 2006 conflict in Lebanon, where promising prospects for tourism in 2006 came to a halt.
For the countries noted earlier, tourism revenues increased to 8.1% of the group’s GDP. For the MENA region as a whole, the current account of the balance of payments (BOP) improved to almost 21% of GDP, but changes in current account positions showed wide variation in 2006, with continued widening of surplus positions for the resource-rich countries, contrasting with a very small deterioration for the resource-poor economies. Dominated by the oil-exporting countries, the surplus position of the region increased from some $90 billion in 2006, to nearly $290 billion. Moreover the MENA Region experienced a sharp increase in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows in 2006 – to a record $24.4 billion – up almost 40% in the year, and triples the level of 2004. This is due in part to the completion of major privatization deals and increased investments in the energy sector. Intra-regional FDI flows increased not only in the energy sector, but also in sectors such as infrastructure, real estate and tourism.

In spite of the previous promising trends absorptive capacity of labour force in the MENA region is still limited and it is experiencing one of the highest unemployment rates.

The high youth unemployment rate in the MENA Region is strongly linked to the deteriorating conditions of education. Although the Arab Region was able to achieve considerable progress regarding quantitative aspects of education in terms of increased enrolment rates and reduced gender gaps, the education system in the Arab Region still faces many difficulties in terms of achieving high quality education. The majority of unemployed workers are relatively well-educated and first-time job seekers. Education and training systems in Arab countries do not provide the skills required in the labour market. In Tunisia, where the unemployment rate for 20 to 24-year-olds is more than three times higher than the rate for those over 40, it is more than 40% for youths with higher education compared to about 25% for those with primary education (World Development Report, 2007).

Labour absorptive capacity in the industrial sector in the Arab Region in general was limited to 12%-14% due to its high capital intensity. The limited share of the industrial sector in employment could be attributed to many factors among which is the lack of export diversification in the region in favour of the dominance of petroleum and fuel industries in most of the Arab region, the relatively low and limited extent of the industrialization process in the Region which mainly depended on import substitution strategies as well as the relatively little foreign direct investment in manufacturing in the Arab Region.

Moreover, the labour absorption capacity in the government and the public sector shrunk, while it is limited in the growing private sector in the Arab Region.

Migration, a Prospect for Unemployed Youth?

Arab migration is witnessing new demographic and socioeconomic trends. The demographic situation in the MENA region varies considerably among the countries of the Region and between the Region itself and the Northern Mediterranean European countries. Whereas Northern Mediterranean European countries have completed their demographic transition, those in the MENA Region are still encountering a lot of demographic changes. Northern Mediterranean European countries have a relatively elderly population, those of the MENA region a fairly young population.

In other words, the demographic features of the Southern Mediterranean MENA countries reveal a strong expected migratory pressure arising in those countries with a pessimistic view due to the high unemployment rates in the MENA Region.

In general the Arab Region is characterized by two distinctive migration patterns: intra-regional migration and extra-regional migration. In the context of intra-regional migration the complementarity of supply and demand of migrant Arab labour within the region is mostly perceived as a mutually beneficial mechanism. Despite the fact that migration provided an important safeguard for higher unemployment throughout the MENA Region during past decades, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, this option for employment abroad seems to be closing for many reasons.

With globalization there will be a decline in the demand for skilled workers. Most jobs created in the Arab Region in the 1970s and 1980s were concentrated on low-skill activities such as construction, retail, and traditional handicrafts. The decrease in the migration of unskilled workers in both extra- and intra-regional migration coupled with the increase in skilled workers’ migration, has triggered adverse implications for the competitive advantages in the Arab labour sending countries, both in their local and international markets. On the other hand the growing role of multinational companies led to a category of cul-
turally distinct employees that are compatible with all countries where the company operates. Different systems apply to these employees and they gradually become detached from their societies, and their travelling between countries is determined by their companies and not by traditional immigration laws. The role these multinational companies play in migration in Arab countries is greater than their role in other parts of the world because of the globalization nature of several sectors in the Arab Region such as trade, transportation, finance, and oil. Their demand on workers follow international standards and, consequently, the nature and sources of migration to these countries was divided into migration of costly qualified foreign skill and Arab/Asian migration of less skilled workers (Fares, 2003). Globalization will also lead to new distinct forms of migration. Among these forms is migration without departing the original country. Some companies resort to utilizing local labour in a climate that resembles work and life in the recipient countries. In doing so, they depend on communication means as is the case in India. Hence Arab labour faces less migration opportunities to the Gulf states not only due to the diminishing economic capabilities, the completion of the infrastructure stage and the replacement by a national labour force, but also because of the increasing orientation to the new economy in the areas of communication and information, which reduces the need for unskilled labour and increases the need for high specific skills usually unavailable among nationals or neighbouring countries' nationals (Fares, 2003). The Region has in recent years faced new forms of migration, including migration in place, where some companies would employ the local labour force in a work environment similar to that in receiving countries, through the use of communication. In addition, technology has helped create new types of work and there has been a need for more studies on what is so-called “E-Labour.” These standards reduce the advantages of hiring expatriate labour and also impose amendments to local laws that govern migration.

In Europe, high unemployment rates during the 1980s and 1990s, pressures arising from inflows from other regions and countries in the world (Turkey, Asia) and concerns about potential inflows from new EU accession countries have contributed to a tightening of restrictions on migration in European countries. Labour and migration policies in Europe are likely to focus first on the recent enlargement countries. Unemployment in Central and Eastern Europe and Baltic countries is to a large extent composed of young people, who are likely to compete for migration jobs in the future, further limiting the space for migration from the MENA Region into Europe. It is also expected that through enhancing trade opportunities for "sending" countries and increasing financial and capital flows through the Euro-Med Partnerships, more growth and jobs can be created in the sending countries which will accordingly reduce the migration pressure on the “receiving” countries that are incapable of absorbing such an increase in job seekers (Nassar & Ghoneim, 2003).

The question is to what extent the substitute relation between trade and migration can be achieved in the case of Egyptian migration to Europe.

The Partnership can be useful in generating investment by influencing expectations and enhancing the credibility of reform

An important argument is that granting free access for industrial products to the EU market as well as exposing MENA industry to more competition would enhance trade opportunities and increase MENA’s share in the EU and the international market and may be a substitute for migration as more employment opportunities will be generated in the sending countries. However, the practice shows that there are still various barriers that hinder the market access of several MENA products to the EU and thus lessen the opportunity of generating new employment opportunities as a substitute for migration, such as the procurement of equipment, services, and materials in the EU market. The effect of competition from the Central and Eastern Europe region affects the market access of the exports to the EU market (especially Bulgaria and Hungary), which became full members of the EU in May 2004, and were granted an extra competitive edge compared to MENA countries in the EU market. Thirdly, Turkey and Egypt were the two countries among the Mediterranean non-member (MNC) countries affected by EU anti-dumping actions out of the 12 MNCs. This affected the access of Egyptian products to the EU market through increasing the reluctance of exporters to export to the EU market.

Finally, the EU is considered an important source of FDI flows to MENA. The Partnership can be useful in gen-
erating investment by influencing expectations and enhancing the credibility of reform. Some negative aspects of the Partnership hinder the possibility of increasing FDI flows. The reduction in trade barriers reduces the incentives for inward FDI. As tariffs and other barriers to imports are eliminated, European firms no longer have a reason to produce in MENA countries. Locating in an EU member gives duty-free access to all countries with which the EU has concluded free trade agreements. Several MENA countries do not have comprehensive free trade agreements with all the countries in the region and there are the high transaction and transport costs that apply to intra-regional trade and firms that rely on imported inputs and exports.

To conclude, the Euromed Partnership’s success in achieving the EU goal of enhancing socio-economic conditions in its Southern neighbours, thus generating new employment opportunities, depends on two factors:

• First: the ability of the EU to facilitate the procedures and to fulfil its promises efficiently.
• Second: the ability of the MENA region to cope with the consequence of liberalization, to upgrade its industrial sector to produce competitive industrial products that can penetrate the EU market and the international market as a whole (Fahmy, 2003).

A first step consists of smoothing out the mismatch between job seeker profiles and market needs. Upgrading programmes must be introduced to achieve the necessary competitive retraining of labour. Strengthening the entrepreneurial spirit in the educational system is needed to allow the shift toward a more diversified specialized labour force. Achieving these goals should create a labour force that is capable of meeting the challenges faced domestically to produce the right type of products that can be exported and at the same time create the right skills needed by the hosting countries in case of migration (Nassar & Ghoneim, 2003).

Integrating youth employment in development plans and development strategies is essential to achieve a youth lens policy in education and employment. This will be achieved through the participation of young people themselves and youth organizations in the formulation of the development strategies. The incorporation of youth employment into development strategies must enhance the demand side policies to create new job opportunities for the young. The most important challenge for MENA is to create enough demand for labour for a steadily increasing young population (Nabli, 2002).

On the regional level, a better co-ordination of migration policies and industrial planning is needed within the MENA region. This will help to achieve a better allocation of resources. Hence, the Great Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA) project should address the migration issues and industrial planning. In the case of the North-South trade and migration relations, Southern countries should exert pressures to enact the movement of temporary labour to capitalize on their comparative advantage in trade in service issues even if with a temporary General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).

Equality of opportunity measures should be promoted with respect to secure residence, socio-economic, civil and political rights, and provision of work, education or political participation (Salt, 1998). Efficient return and readmission policies should be implemented in co-operation of countries of origin with the host countries to conduct suitable readmission agreements – if needed – whether on a bilateral or multilateral basis. Assisting return should include appropriate financial and organizational assistance, provision of necessary information, and measures to assist the re-integration of returning migrants such as vocational training (Salt, 1998). A permanent system of gathering data is necessary for observing and analyzing the phenomena of migration between Euro-Mediterranean countries by a regional project. Linking co-operation in return for development assistance is a required policy (OECD, SOPEMI, 2000).

Joint development projects in providing assistance to returning immigrants and bilateral readmission agreements will support the implementation of Association and Co-operation Agreements concluded between the European Community and other countries in the Region. These agreements aim, first, to strengthen regional economic integration and, second, to guaran-
tee the rights of immigrants resident in the host coun-
tries. However, this last objective needs to be intensi-
ified as, according to the European Council, pre-
vention of irregular entry is a priority for most states
while irregular migration may be a (unintended) side
effect of such policies (Salt, 1998). More control will
lead to more irregular migration while development
projects in the sending countries may be another ef-
fective means for combating irregular migration.
Finally, dialogue and co-operation with countries of
origin and transit countries should be the aim for
sustainable co-operation. Dialogue should place mi-
gration in a broader foreign and trade policy context,
linking it with discussions about trade and capital
flow aimed at creating a suitable environment for re-
geional cooperation. Dialogue should assure the co-
ordination within governments and consultation with
all social partners on labour, development and mi-
gration policies. Dialogue should address the so-
cioeconomic dimension together with legal migra-
tion and illegal migration which also includes transit
migration.

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The movements of people are a fundamental historical characteristic in the Middle East, and in the last sixty years – since the end of the Second World War, with the creation of Israel and the end of the protectorates – they have affected a considerable number of people. Moreover, the region holds the tragic record of having the greatest density of refugees in the world. A record that acquires especially notable dimensions when one considers the reduced space – basically in the Gaza area and in Jordan – which concentrates the nearly four million refugees protected by the United Nations in the region in 2007. The post-invasion situation in Iraq, the hostilities between Israel and Lebanon in 2006 or some of the actions of the latter country’s army confirm the importance of the phenomenon of forced migrations in the region. In general, the countries of the area have percentages of foreign population of 15%, and both in Jordan and in Lebanon and Syria more than half of this percentage corresponds to the refugee population.

In general, refugees and displaced people have been considered the “collateral” victims of conflicts that needed a solution that never came; on many occasions they have been treated as a bargaining chip to reach agreements and on others a discourse of support for them has been constructed which was more formal than real. In recent years, however, it has been seen how the refugee and especially the displaced person progressively became an instrument of political instability. In their own or neighbouring state, the actors in confrontation seem to have discovered the possibilities of using refugees and displaced people as factors of destabilisation, making them into victims of a migration conceived to be forced.

**Lebanon: The Recurrent Issue of Displaced People**

The bombings of south Lebanon in summer 2006 are an example of this use of the refugees and displaced people, as are the attacks that the Lebanese Government began in May 2007 against the Palestinian refugee camps. In the case of the displaced Iraqis it is clear that, in addition to being individual victims and victims of the ethnic relocation, they have been exploited as factors to deepen the political instability of the country.

During the so-called “July War” (or Second Lebanese War) of summer 2006, the Israeli army forewarned the Lebanese people of their bombing raids, with the objective of allowing the civilian population to abandon the villages before being attacked. With these manoeuvres, the Israeli army limited the number of civilian casualties, while generating a notable flow of refugees and, above all, internal displaced people which extended the harshness and brutality of the conflict beyond the bombed zones. At the end of the 33 days of military intervention, around 300,000 Israelis had abandoned their homes in border territory, and the United Nations estimated that around 700,000

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1 For its complexity and limitations of space, this article consciously leaves to one side other movements of refugees and displaced people existing in the Middle East. Despite their importance and interest, the cases of Israel, Iran or Palestine are not the object of this study.

2 Figures of refugees are always estimated, which means that, along with the refugees in camps or under the protection of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the number of people requiring international protection is not always known. The same happens, although in greater proportions, in the case of the displaced people, who in addition do not have the possibility of being protected by UNHCR, which increases even more their situation of defencelessness.
Lebanese had moved from their homes, seeking refuge in other areas of the country while another 200,000 Lebanese had gone to Syrian territory. The process of returning of these more than 900,000 displaced Lebanese was especially complicated and slow, as the bombings had severely affected the Lebanese infrastructures and the number of displaced people was 20% of the three and a half million Lebanese living in the country. Although a month later, in August 2006, the United Nations observed that most of the displaced Lebanese had returned home, the truth is that this return did not happen with the same swiftness in some regions of the country as in Beirut and its surroundings. The slow return of the displaced people made clear, in any case, the need for a profound process of national reconstruction, as most of them returned to destroyed towns, agricultural lands scattered with mines, uninhabitable houses and non-existent basic services such as electricity, drinking water or medication. Moreover, specific points of south Lebanon continued to be uninhabited because of fear of unexploded cluster bombs remaining from the conflict.

With the still visible consequences of 2006, in May 2007 the attacks of the Lebanese army on the Palestinian refugee camps once again made clear the vulnerability of the displaced people and their exploitation. With the objective of weakening the Islamist group Fatah al-Islam, which was held responsible for the attacks on the nearby city of Ain Alak with its Christian majority, the camp of Nahr al-Bared (and to a lesser extent that of Ain al-Hilweh) was bombed by the Lebanese army. Until September 2007, when hostilities officially ceased, the around 30,000 Palestinian refugees residing in these camps were used to pressure Fatah al-Islam and to try to weaken the supposed support that, from the refugee camps, was given to this organisation.

**Iraq: The Perpetuation of Instability**

Despite being one of the most recent cases, the Lebanese displaced people and refugees are only one more piece in the complex puzzle of the forced movements of population in the Middle East. Iraq is, at present, one of the clearest examples of how the political and social instability and the survival of a generalised violence provoke forced displacements of population, and how these are consolidated as instruments precisely for deepening this instability.

The existence of internal displaced people and refugees is not, in the case of Iraq, a novelty. During Saddam Hussein’s regime, in the Kurd regions of the north and in the Shiite south, the forced movements and the mass flights were usual (one only has to highlight the Anfal operations of 1987 and 1989), while the existence of Iraqi or Iranian refugees formed part of the policy of confrontation between the regimes of Iran and Iraq. But the truth is that the situation worsened considerably after the invasion of 2003. According to the United Nations, just before the military intervention led by the United States to remove the Baathist regime, in the north of Iraq there were around 800,000 people, most of them Kurds, around 100,000 Shiites, and a low number of Kurds displaced in the centre of the country, while around 600,000 people had sought refuge in neighbouring countries.

According to the United Nations, in November 2007, around four million Iraqi citizens had been forced to leave their homes

In today’s Iraq, the refugees and, mainly, the displaced people, have taken on a new and dramatic dimension. After the end of the war in 2003, many Iraqis have become victims, actively and passively, of their own government. Insecurity and defencelessness have obliged large numbers of population to move in search of safer and, in many cases, culturally similar surroundings. According to the United Nations, in November 2007, around four million Iraqi citizens had been forced to leave their homes, and the figure continued to grow with the 60,000 that, every month, felt obliged to do so, especially because of the continued violence in the regions of the centre and north of the country. Out of this huge figure, half had sought refuge in neighbouring countries (95%, while 4% had moved to Europe and the rest to North America and Australia), some of whom are establishing mechanisms to protect their borders and limit the number of refugees who enter their territories.

As indicated by the figures of the different international organisations who work in the field, the number of displaced people in Iraq almost doubled after the bombings of the Samarra Mosque in February 2006. This incident was a key turning point from where the attacks between Shiite and Sunni groups worsened, and the ethnic movements of displaced people were con-
solidated. The general trend shows that most of the Shiite population is moving from Baghdad, Anbar and Salah al Din to the southern regions of Najaf, Qadissya and Karbala, on a route that the displaced Sunnis set out on in the opposite direction. Other minority groups, such as the Christians or the Sabian/Mandaeans, are also fleeing the threats and intimidations, and many are heading to the Kurd regions of the north where the Kurd groups have autonomously established some minimum security lacked by the rest of the country.

Return, Stability and Peace

As can be seen, occasionally in the case of Lebanon and in a more structured way in the case of Iraq, in recent years it has been seen how the refugees and especially the displaced people have become involuntary actors, at the same time as victims and protagonists of the perpetuation of instability. The complicated circumstances that accompany any flow of refugees or displaced people in the Middle East takes on an especially dramatic character, as it becomes clear that the existence of these vulnerable populations is a desired result and is repeated with certain regularity.

In recent years it has been seen how the refugees and especially the displaced people have become involuntary actors, at the same time as victims and protagonists of the perpetuation of instability

Government actors, actively or passively, and opposing groups seem to have discovered in the displaced people a mechanism for generating insecurity and making the reconstruction difficult, given that their exploitation has more effect than the mortal attacks on the civilian population. The forced migrations affect a greater number of people without generating the same international condemnation that would be expressed if we were speaking of mortal victims (four million in the case of Iraq), and have some effects – of urban reconstruction but also social, economic and political – that are perpetuated beyond the peaceful resolution of the conflict. The slow process of the return of around one million citizens in Lebanon and the two million displaced people (in other words, homeless people, without guarantees of security and without access to basic services, to note a few effects) that currently exist in Iraq make clear the magnitude of a part of the humanitarian drama experienced today in the Middle East. The return of the refugees and the displaced people is a great pending challenge for the region, and is certainly the most complex to be resolved, as doing so involves bringing peace and stability to a region that, today, is still an unstable powder keg.

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Migration and the Mediterranean have more in common than just their initial letter. Some years ago, during excavations at Antis, a site in southern Sardinia, not far from where, since 2007, boats with irregular migrants, mostly young Algerians, have begun to arrive, archaeologists found a statue of the god “Sardus Pater.” It was later dated to the 9th century B.C.. According to legend, this god, so revered that even later civilizations kept worshipping him, had also arrived from North Africa. Thus the latest route of irregular migration in the Mediterranean might well be one of its oldest. In order to grasp and prepare for what is happening today it is indeed important to understand the history of a region with its thousands of years of conflicts, interaction and cultural exchanges.

Boats almost sinking under the weight of their human cargo en route to Europe make excellent material for press photographs and TV spots. These sad pictures fuel both fear and compassion but they only allow a very limited insight into the dramas unfolding around migration and the Mediterranean.

It is due as much to policies and conditions in the European destination countries as to push factors in the states of origin in Africa, Asia and Latin America that irregular migration is the main channel into Europe. And while the majority of these irregulars do not disembark on Lampedusa, Sicily, the Aegean Islands or the Canaries, these are the routes that take the largest toll in terms of human lives lost.

The large majority of migrants in an irregular situation actually arrive as tourists, overstay their visa or use forged documents. Some then live on the margins of economies and societies that offer just enough monetary or non-monetary benefits to survive. Many others, however, do find remunerated employment and manage to send money to their families back home. Channelling migration into legal avenues would thus appear to be the logical complement to combating smuggling, illegal stay and work in the underground economy.

Cooperation between South and North has indeed started to open opportunities. Senegal, Morocco, some Latin American countries and Spain are experimenting successfully with such schemes while Italy, Egypt, Tunisia and Sri Lanka have collected experience with pilot projects. This opening of regular channels for economic migration is a promising approach. It is nevertheless seriously challenged by push factors (among them: demography, economics, family links, networks, peer pressure as well as humanitarian concerns and persecution) that go beyond even the most generous reception arrangements.

A growing and very preoccupying phenomenon within the irregular migrant population directed at Europe, is the number of unaccompanied minors undertaking the perilous journey. Either pushed by their families or departing of their own accord, many face realities of exploitation and discrimination due to their dual vulnerability, as minors and as migrants.

Greece, Italy and Spain in particular experience this phenomenon and besides the high social cost, the economic repercussions for host communities can be serious. Italy reports expenses exceeding 200 million euros for 2007 for the care of more than 7,000 minors. Collaboration with origin countries and families is often difficult. Migrants try to hide their identities; families expect at least to be relieved of the financial burden and often for the youngsters to obtain a free

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1 This contribution reflects the personal view of the author and not necessarily those of the International Organization for Migration.
education or to support them through remittances. Thus and in spite of the often wide gap between the expected and real outcome of this migration effort, most attempts to return the minors to their families fail. This issue in particular risks impacting negatively on overall promising developments in international cooperation on migration management around the Mediterranean. A comprehensive and balanced approach to migration requires policies and measures addressing a broad range of challenges and opportunities including regular and irregular migration, human rights of migrants, migration and development, inter-state dialogue and cooperation, integration and return. It is necessary to include all relevant players at both the national and international levels. At the national level, that would involve all governmental Ministries whose work directly or indirectly involves or impacts migration – such as justice and home affairs, labour, trade and development. The business community, trade unions and civil society are key voices that need to be heard at grassroots levels. At the international level, organizations dealing with issues such as development, labour, human rights, trade, health and crime prevention need to be involved. Cooperation is key to bridging coherence gaps and achieving effective migration management. At the global level, dialogue on migration has experienced some progress. IOM’s International Dialogue on Migration brings together more than 130 states and partner organizations to share experiences and perspectives and create better understanding and cooperation in the management of migration. The UN has decided to make International Migration and Development a yearly agenda item, Belgium has hosted the first meeting of a global intergovernmental dialogue in Brussels. The Philippines and Greece have invited this forum to their capitals for 2008 and 2009. IOM is actively involved in promoting regional cooperation on migration including through the initiation and facilitation of regional dialogues. Regional and sub-regional processes, such as the 5+5 Dialogue on Migration in the Western Mediterranean can provide forums for informal contacts, exchange of information, analysis of migration-related topics and capacity building in the region. Africa-Europe debates at the governmental level have recently benefitted from the Rabat conference as well as African Union/European Union meetings in Libya and Portugal. These conferences have provided useful meeting points to discuss Africa/Europe migration issues, as does the “Across Sahara” project that promotes dialogue and technical cooperation between Italy, Libya and Niger. An IOM-led multi-regional dialogue between Africa, the Maghreb and Europe on irregular migration has helped establish cooperation at the technical level. After the events of 9/11 and in light of a sustained global terrorist threat, security concerns are necessarily high on national and international agendas, including in the context of the movement of people. In Europe and internationally, security remains one of the central considerations in migration management. While security is a necessary dimension of migration management it must however not become the principal focus of the debate – although there are close links between cross-border mobility and security. Irregular migration poses a threat to security and stability in a variety of ways:

- In its most corrosive forms of smuggling and trafficking, it is linked to transnational organized crime. Entry of migrants in an irregular manner undermines the capacity of states to ensure public order; trafficking and smuggling on a large scale can corrupt and undermine the institutions of the state. IOM estimates that some 200,000 people are trafficked into and within Europe every year, the majority of them women and girls for sexual exploitation.
- Moreover, irregular migration fuels corruption, informal economies and undermines social cohesion, which, at worst, may provoke xenophobia and racism.

The challenge that States face is how to protect society and reduce irregular migration without stifling legitimate and needed movement and without imposing serious constraints on personal rights and liberties. Besides the growing challenge of integration and the necessary dialogue across diverse cultures, a key issue to understand the underlying issues remains demographics – both in origin and destination societies; incidentally a distinction that is getting increasingly blurred. Demographic trends, increasing global economic integration and the gap in income levels between the developed and developing worlds ensure that migration to Europe will continue. Freedom, security and justice in the EU and its neighbouring countries and the aim of prosperity and stability in the region require that mobility will not take the form of more unregulated migration, with its associated adverse effects and security challenges, but will instead flow into safe, orderly, humane and productive avenues.
Among the issues that merit more profound understanding is the burden that origin and transit states face as a result of heavy migration pressures and flows. Very often these ill-equipped countries apprehend or readmit considerable numbers of irregular migrants en route to Europe. The same holds true for Eastern and Central European countries. There the heaviest burden of irregular migrants seeking to enter the EU is experienced by the countries on the Western Border of the Commonwealth of Independent States-CIS (Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova). Turkey too remains a major transit and destination country.

The influx of irregular migrants puts a considerable strain on the often under-resourced social and welfare services of transit countries when irregular migrants temporarily settle there while trying to reach their destination. Transit states often do not have the capacity to send these migrants back to their countries of origin or to accommodate them. In addition, irregular migrants typically take up informal jobs while in transit, fuelling growth of the informal economy – and corruption.

To respond more adequately to these new challenges the organization has recently opened offices in Libya, and on the islands of Sicily and Lampedusa. One of the projects implemented by IOM in Libya provides support to the Libyan government in responding to the growing challenges of increasing irregular and transit migration in a humane manner, including through bringing reception conditions available to irregular migrants up to international standards and offering such migrants voluntary return possibilities. By April 2008 more than 2,200 migrants have thus been assisted to return.

Effective migration management requires capacity building to help place all states on a more equal footing. Due to the complexity of migration management, capacity building must cover a range of intercrossing activities and sectors of policy making. Lack of migration management capacity in some countries can undermine the ability of the whole region to deal effectively with issues related to the movement of people. Therefore a partnership between countries with different levels of capacity is essential. While the EU plays a prominent role in providing financial and technical assistance (through such programmes as AENEAS, TACIS, CARDS, MEDA, AGIS and ARGO) more is needed to partner countries in developing their migration management capacities. While we do have many tools and forums at our disposal, all is not well when it comes to managing international migration in a humane and efficient manner. The deserts of Africa and the shores of the Mediterranean already hold too many graves of the often anonymous migrants who did not make it. Estimates speak of thousands of victims in recent years. As some of the survivors relate upon arrival in Lampedusa where IOM, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-UNHCR and the Italian Red Cross have established a permanent presence, many of them were unaware of the real risks linked to irregular migration or the (few) actual legal migration opportunities that their smugglers have no interest in promoting. Information – credible, from a neutral source, based on facts – is a key element in managing migration and preventing hardship. Still there is occasional reluctance from policy makers in origin countries to allow these realities to be presented to their young people when they can offer little in the way of alternatives. In the medium or long term, only sustainable development will reduce pressures to a level where migration becomes one option for bettering one’s economic prospects among several.

Migration also brings challenges to the societies where migrants have managed to arrive; among them are social tension, conflicted identity and the alienation caused by inadequate integration. With the numbers of migrants – and countries affected by migration – growing, integration has become a major focus for policy makers at all levels. In Europe we have seen different models succeed – or sometimes fail. Here too much more will have to be invested in order to avoid the centrifugal forces brought by many diverse nationalities, religions and cultures becoming stronger than the cohesion that still characterizes most European societies.

In the past, migratory trends were dominated by one-time, unidirectional movement resulting in permanent settlement in countries of destination. As a result, countries of destination traditionally focused on the integration of migrants with a view to putting them on the path to nationality. For this reason, some countries considered (and continue to consider) integration only in these terms.

Though permanent and long-term migration remains significant, international migration today is increasingly temporary, circular and multi-directional. As temporary and circular migration increases, more countries are seeing this phenomenon as a policy priority. Today, a typical migrant may well be born in one country, obtain an education in another, live part of their professional life in another, retire in yet another and pick up citizenship in any of these locations. At each stage, migrants establish roots, participate in community life, and leave a lasting imprint on the communities and persons with whom they have come.
in contact and who are themselves changed by the experience. This form of migration creates the possibility of having multiple identities and different notions of belonging (trans-nationalism). This changed sense of affiliation has direct implications for governmental policies in such areas as multiple nationality and voting rights for non-resident nationals, mostly at local level. While in the past, countries of destination traditionally focused on integrationist policies with a view to putting migrants on the path to nationality, some governments of countries of origin are now moving in the direction of facilitating multiple affiliations for the benefits these bring to investment and job creation in the country of origin (using remittances as a potential leverage with appropriate incentives) and links to migration and development.

Successful integration helps migrants become active members in the economic, social, cultural and political life of host states. This, in turn, can also be beneficial for their countries of origin, because migrants can then more easily mobilize their human and financial capital to support the development process. The relationship of migrants with the host society can be seen as taking place along a spectrum ranging from:

- Very little interaction where migrants are essentially segregated or excluded or segregate themselves from the society in which they live and work;
- An expectation that migrants shed their cultural identity by assimilating into the mainstream culture;
- Encouragement to migrants to take on a new national identity;
- Promotion of the retention and development of migrant cultures and languages in a multicultural context;
- The development of transnational and dual or multiple identities where migrants live in, have a sense of belonging to, and participate effectively in two or more societies, including those of destination and origin countries.

Key questions for reflection and discussion should include:

- What does it mean to be successfully integrated today?
- What level of integration is required for each category or type of migrant?
- What are the implications for the identity of a country or a society?
- What are the implications for government policies, for example, regarding language and access to social services, education, and health care?
- What should the core values of each society be and through what process or processes could they be better defined?
- Should diversity and transnational identity be viewed as inherent values to be promoted, or simply as realities that cannot be ignored, and how can they be harnessed to benefit communities in both host and origin countries?

While the transnational model is gaining relevance as a consequence of globalization and the interconnectedness it brings, other societies are opting for more demanding adaptation to the dominant culture. Even where migration is temporary, a certain level of integration is nonetheless necessary to ensure that the temporary stay is as productive and beneficial as possible. Where migrants have chosen a host society but not been chosen by it (i.e. either entered without permission or overstayed a lawful entry), questions of integration nonetheless are important for social stability, security and national identity. While migrants in an irregular situation are integrated de facto in some cases, particularly if they are employed and speak the local language, some countries have adopted measures enabling certain groups of irregular migrants to regularize their status, in recognition of their contribution to the national economy, or, conversely, to prevent their further exploitation and marginalization, and promote their fuller integration.

The consequences of failed economic integration of migrants are all too evident. Persistent unemployment among many second and third generation migrants, increasing alienation, isolation and frustration, often fuelled by a combination of relative poverty, limited educational opportunities and the absence of supportive networks, can result in social tension and disturbances. These issues often affect the local population in poorer and more deprived communities and not just migrants, and therefore require comprehensive economic and social strategies, involving governments at all levels as well as a wide range of other stakeholders, such as employers, local communities and civil society organizations. Acceptance of and respect for diversity is crucial and concerted efforts are required to create relationships between culturally distinct communities of migrants and nationals with a view to building social cohesion and harmony. Schools and the media have particularly important roles to play in promoting tolerance and mutual acceptance.
Migration can alter the cultural composition and economic landscape of whole regions, cities and communities in host countries, due to population increases or to the particular practices, skills sets and beliefs of individual migrants. Migrants and migration can bring vibrancy, increased productivity, cultural richness and diversity. But cultural and religious differences between migrants and the host society can also bring into focus competing values such as freedom of expression and freedom of religion and can result in intolerance, discrimination and xenophobia. Here as well the Mediterranean region continues to experience worrying manifestations, and politicians are at risk of taking seemingly easy approaches in reaction to immediate concerns rather than working towards long-term solutions. In the long term, however, there is no other peaceful option than dialogue and work. The goal remains that migration and migrants as well as the societies they reach, affirm their values of modern, open societies.

On 18th and 19th November 2007, the 1st Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Migration was held in the Algarve. The agreement approved embraces the principles and objectives established in previous forums, such as the 8th and 9th Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Tampere and Lisbon in 2006 and 2007 respectively, and that which resulted in the approval of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration. The agreement also recognises the contributions made by different international initiatives on migration and development, such as the Euro-African Ministerial Conference in Rabat and the EU-Africa Ministerial Conference in Tripoli, held in 2006, and the United Nations Dialogue in New York, also in 2006.

In the text, the group of ministers of the different states of the European Union and the southern Mediterranean established as a fundamental principle the recognition of the economic and social benefits that regular immigration can mean both for the countries of origin and the transit and host countries. Moreover, the agreement notes the need to strengthen joint management with shared responsibility and from a more global and balanced approach. As more specific objectives, the text highlights the need to speed up the bureaucracy of the migration process and promote regular immigration within the Euro-Mediterranean region bearing in mind the respective labour markets. The agreement recognises that in this process the protection of human rights of migrants is fundamental and points out the importance of aspects such as family reunification and social integration based on the participation of immigrants in civil, economic and cultural life of the receiving countries. In addition, the text makes clear the concern of the states over illegal immigration and notes the need to fight against this phenomenon from a multidimensional approach of strengthened cooperation.

To achieve these principles and objectives, the ministers committed themselves to implementing different specific measures and actions, which they divided into the following fields of work: legal migration; migration and development; illegal migration; funding and implementation structure; and monitoring. On the first point, the text reflects the commitment to promoting opportunities of regular migration, understanding that it is globally positive and has a positive impact on development, as long as one bears in mind the needs of the countries of origin, especially in matters such as the brain drain. The text covers different projects, such as the establishment of a taskforce dedicated to aspects related to the labour market, which would include representatives of all the Euro-Mediterranean partners and relevant social actors, and would be responsible for carrying out an explorative technical study on the needs of the migrant workforce. Other projects are the promotion of training courses for migrant workers to improve their skills, and vocational training and language courses which would be undertaken before departure. The commitment to holding informative campaigns aimed at potential emigrants on regular migration and the specific work opportunities in the receiving countries was also established, along with that of promoting activities for recent arrivals, including information on their rights and the importance of respecting values and national legislation.

With respect to irregular immigration, the Euro-Mediterranean partners committed themselves to promoting cooperation and capacity building through exchange of experiences, good practices and regular training, in relation to the control of migration flows on the borders and returns and readmissions. To this end, several projects will be carried out aimed at improving security standards in travel documents of the member states to strengthen confidence in their use while training courses will be promoted for the transit countries on aspects such as detection of false identity and travel documents, the outward flows and the strengthening of the relation between the fight against irregular immigration and respect for international instruments. The agreement envisages that funding of all these projects will be guaranteed through the institutional resources available for the support of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, other funding instruments of the European Union and the contributions of the member states who participate in the projects. Lastly, the ministers made a commitment to maintaining regular meetings between the Euro-Mediterranean partners, through the establishment of taskforces at the level of senior experts and officials to implement all the actions and supervise their progress.

For further information:

Ministerial Conclusions of the 1st Euro-Mediterranean Conference on Migration:
Circular Migrations in the Euro-Mediterranean Space, or When Migrant Workers Contribute to Prosperity without Reaping the Fruits of Integration

The conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of November 2007, devoted for the first time exclusively to the issue of migration, show that at this level a consensus has emerged on the partners’ mutual interest in facilitating legal migration, following temporary or circular patterns. Proposals were in the air since a communication by the European Commission dated May 2007 was delivered to the European Parliament and the Council as well as to the Economic and Social Committee and the Council of the Regions, and since the report by the Global Commission on International Migration – GCIM (2005). The European Commission formulated two circular migration plans from the perspective of opening up new ways for legal migration. It constructed its differentiation according to the principal or permanent place of residence of the migrant. The purpose would be for migrants to have the option to exercise a commercial activity, a liberal profession, an activity stemming from the voluntary sector or some other in their country of origin while keeping their principal residence in one of the member States of the Union. Under this hypothesis, according to the European Commission, this applies essentially to business people working within the EU and wishing to start up an activity in their country of origin (or in a third country) as well as doctors, academics and other professionals wanting to support the economy of their country of origin by carrying out part of their activity there. The other plan would offer those resident in a third country the opportunity to move temporarily to the EU to work, study or train there (or a combination of those three activities), on condition that they will take up their principal residence and principal activity once more in their country of origin at the end of the period for which they had been admitted. Such circularity could be reinforced following the return through some type of privileged mobility in leaving and entering the Member State where they were previously resident by, for example, simplified admittance/re-admittance procedures. (Communication relating to circular migration and to partnerships for mobility between the European Union and third countries dated May 2007). From this perspective, permanent establishment or residence for foreign workers or students is not encouraged. These proposals are in line with the GCIM report (2005), which advocates liberalisation of the global labour market stating that “there would appear to be an emerging convergence of interests between the richer and the poorer countries. In simple terms, the former are running short of working people, while the latter have such people to spare. Logic suggests that one outcome of this situation should be a growth in scale of authorized labour migration form developing to high-income countries. But that is not currently the case. Much of today’s migration taking place between poorer and richer regions is irregular in nature.” But “the public and political mood in many of the industrialized states is currently hesitant about the prospect of increased immigration, and such hesitance is likely to be especially strong in relation to permanent migration programmes”. At the same time, it appears that “countries in the developing world stand to make more gains from the temporary and circular migration of their citizens than from their permanent departure.”

Would these “new” approaches provide the final piece in the puzzle of migration? At what cost? This circularity, in the way it is envisaged, makes migrants’ return to their country of origin an essential condition for liberalisation; at the same time as migrant workers’ integration into the host society is not planned, eventual returns by migrant residents to their country in order to contribute to the development of the society of origin is also en-
encouraged. The plans that are envisaged are complex and must still withstand the test of reality. The benefits of return for the country of origin and for migrants themselves are frequently highlighted from the perspective of development and social cohesion. These proposals also show the real or perceived saturation of European societies’ capacity for integration. The European Commission presents these new migratory plans as “a credible alternative to illegal immigration” (European Commission, May 2007) and the European Council has stressed the need for “safeguards that will prevent unduly extended stays and guaranteeing return,” so that “as a general rule temporary stays do not become permanent.” (European Council December 2007).

Euro-Mediterranean Migration is Chiefly for Family Reunification or Illegal

The circulation of people remains one of the poor relations of the Barcelona Process that started in 1995. Liberalisation or facilitation measures are still awaited even while various European countries recognise (with varying degrees of coherence) their need for unskilled, low-skilled and skilled workers and that the wish to emigrate from the southern side of the Mediterranean is seen and even encouraged as a way to relieve the pressure on saturated employment markets. From the economic and demographic viewpoint many factors militate in favour of a policy of support for economic migration but security concerns dominate the European agenda. The European Union, or at least some of its member States, maintains strong relations on migration with the countries of the Mediterranean Basin, principally the Maghreb countries and Turkey. The so-called “thirty glorious years” (1945-1973) corresponded to a wave of high workforce immigration into northern European countries, sought and partially managed by means of specific governmental agreements. Emigration was at that time considered circumstantial and provisional by the Maghreb countries of origin. From the point of view of those in positions of public responsibility, it allowed to temporarily solve the problem of unemployment within the contexts of national independence, it allowed the transfer of currency, and it offered incidentally an opportunity for professional training that was of benefit to the country. What had not been anticipated, either by the country of origin or by the receiving country, was that workers might remain. Once in place, families came and children were born. The issue of integration then emerged, along with its well known difficulties. The major destination countries’ immigration policies have since then been characterised by the desire to prevent illegal immigration with a hardening of conditions for admittance, which more recently have brought about questions with regard to family reunification and integrating foreigners who are already in place. But emigration towards Europe has, de facto, taken place illegally if necessary. The years since 2000 have been ones of increasing migratory pressures originating from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa. At the same time, the media have relayed images of death at sea, arrests, people held in detention and violence at borders, linked to the use of clandestine routes and a security apparatus operating at Mediterranean frontiers. Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium and, more recently, Spain and Italy remain the most favoured destination countries: 95% of Algerian emigrants, around 85% of Moroccan emigrants, 80% of Tunisian emigrants, 87% of Turkish emigrants, some 25% of Lebanese emigrants and 15% of Egyptian emigrants (Fargues, 2005). Family reunification, insofar as it allows access to a long-term permit to remain for third-country nationals is, among all countries of origin taken together, the legal entry means most used for the destinations of Germany (40% of the reasons for entry as against less than 20% for economic reasons), France, Sweden, Denmark, Italy (57%) and Belgium. A comparison of figures invites reflection on the way used to select and match migrants admitted with the capacity to be integrated into the labour market and socially. That question is

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1 I am using here a legal category taken from the European Community’s jurisprudence to designate any person who is not a holder of the nationality of a member State and, as a consequence, is not a European citizen.
2 Where, according to recent OECD reports, immigration for family reunification constitutes 75% of permanent entries as against 17% of entries for economic reasons (10% for refugees), in Switzerland it represents 52% as against 44% for economic immigration, in Denmark 23% of immigration is economic as against 57% for family reunification, in Sweden immigration for economic reasons is practically non-existent while immigration for family reunification constitutes 60% of flows and refugees 40%. In Portugal the balance between economic migrations and those for family reunification has been better achieved with ± 48% for each. In the UK, immigration for work makes up close to 55% of flows, and for family reunification ± 33%. Changing continents, family reunification remains the cornerstone of the migration policy in the United States, being 69% of flows in 2002. Canada’s figure was 64% in 2002.
3 Calculating immigration for family reunification is not easy to the extent that Belgium does not grant rights to remain for the purpose of family reunification as in France. In order to know, the number of visas granted under the chapter of family reunification needs to be counted, but that does not mean that entitlement to stay is granted as cohabitation needs to be established.
today openly asked by various European governments, with France at their head, defending a rebalancing of the reasons for admittance. In 2007, President Sarkozy signalled his wish for economic immigration to account in due course for 50% of inflows from all countries of origin taken together (www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/information/actualites_20/ seminaire_gouvernemental_pour_premier-ministre_57085.html).

A Renewal of Temporary or Seasonal Migrant Worker Programmes

Countries such as France, Spain and Italy recruit seasonal or temporary workers from the Maghreb (from Egypt too as regards Italy), within frameworks that are more or less institutionalised. Italy has undertaken to increase seasonal migrant quotas from 33% in 2008 (serious criticisms have nevertheless been aired about the effectiveness of this agreement, see Bel Hadj Zekri 2008). Spain and Morocco have entered into a partnership relationship in respect of seasonal or temporary recruitment, by means of cooperation between the National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Skills (ANAPEC) and the Spanish Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs. In January 2007, an initial selection of agricultural workers for periods of 3 to 6 months was in operation and ANAPEC expects to send close to 12,000 workers to Spain in 2008. Mauritania and Spain agreed a workforce migration flow management pact on 25th July 2007 (only 40 workers were recruited). These bilateral agreements include undertakings given by the countries of origin to readmit their citizens once the work for which they had been authorised is finished. The January 2007 workforce agreement between Spain and Morocco was part of a programme that was partly financed by the European Union (AENEAS programme), one of its objectives being an enhancement of the agency’s capacity for placement. In the end the conditions placed on workforce recruitment drew criticism, priority having been given to married women and mothers. According to the director of the Moroccan agency this “public target” was chosen in consideration of “their needs”, meaning their economic needs, but the other motive was also that it could be guaranteed that migrants who were mothers would not take the risk of overstaying the authorised period and would return home of their own volition. In fact, according to the Spanish Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs (General Directorate for Immigration), at the start of the programme, in 2004/05, the rate of returns was 45% while in 2007 it reached 85%.

Dialogue at the Highest Level

The terms of the Barcelona Process signify a wish for the free circulation of people within “a space of peace, stability and prosperity.” In reality and in broad outline, for nearly 20 years legal migrations from the Mediterranean Basin are subject to visas and are essentially for family reunification or economic reasons but they are frequently illegal, being eventually regularised retrospectively. There is still need for an economic immigration policy, or at least consistent guidelines on a regional scale, taking into account the respective requirements and characteristics of the labour markets; but the matter is still under consideration and ongoing, and various national practices (regularisation – sanctioning – selection) are feeding into the European debate. The expected negotiations during the French Presidency (July – December 2008), surrounding the European Accord on migration, could result in common guidelines and/or a recognition of the need for varying practices. The conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Conference of November 2007 demonstrate that interest in the management of economic migration is only expressed by destination countries. It appears that political decision-makers take note of the migration potential identified in various studies in terms of demographic factors and the state of employment markets on the two opposite shores (Fargues, 2005). A firm intention to encourage legal means for migration by different categories of workers, under temporary or circular forms was expressed, and measures to be taken in this respect were agreed. These conclusions therefore echo positively the conclusions of the Council for general affairs that express a willingness to “cooperate more closely and pursue a political dialogue with third countries as regards migration management using as its basis, where appropriate, existing frameworks and options in order to take forward a global approach as regards migration.” It was decided to set up a working group made up of representatives of all Euromed countries and of social partners (including employers and trade unions), in the coming year, focusing its work on the requirements of labour markets in terms of migration. The creation in the region of workforce placement agencies according to the
ANAPEC model is envisaged with the financial support of the European Union. Other measures in respect of training and information for workers/recruitment intermediaries/employers are envisaged as well as an improvement in the methods of communication in terms of matching offers and requests.

An Outline Plan for Circularity?

These experiences of temporary or seasonal workforce recruitment of workers originating from the Maghreb remain marginal and contemplate unskilled or low-skilled workers. Access to the territory is legal and facilitated but conditions set for the stay are strict, non-discrimination in terms of wages is guaranteed but portability of social rights is not assured and workplace mobility is nonexistent. Workers are informed and sometimes even trained before their departure or once in place (the quality of follow-up varying from one agreement to another). Returning to their country and fulfilling the other conditions placed on the stay (not changing employers, place of residence and abiding by the law) condition opportunities for reemployment in the future. It is true that there is mobility but it is strictly contained by the public authorities under conditions that do not leave much latitude for integration in the host country. By way of comparison, laws recently adopted by various European countries with a view to recruiting skilled workers guarantee family reunification and facilitate access to staying indefinitely. The formulas for work migration programmes developed with the Maghreb thus foresee essentially a low-skilled workforce whose long-term integration into the labour market is not encouraged in principle.

It may be that through these formulas outline schemes could be found for circular migrations and for partnerships for mobility such as are encouraged by the European Union. On both sides of the Mediterranean, political leaders are looking to go beyond a purely utilitarian approach and enter into a practical partnership in which migratory flows would contribute to the development of the economies and societies of origin and destination, and would mitigate the negative effects of illegal migration.

Integration, Rights and Individual Liberty

Whatever the balance arrived at between workforce supply and demand in both partners’ labour markets, it will not be possible to completely ignore the needs and rights of migrants, such as the choice of stabilising their professional, social and family lives, in one of the shores, which in legal terms translates into respect for private and family life or indeed for an improvement in living conditions in the country of origin. The objectives pursued through the proposals for circular migration appear in principle to be in line with those of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which holds that security, promoting economic exchange and managing the circulation of people are linked. Thus, even if the matter of workers’ integration is laid aside, long-term settlement of unskilled labour is not encouraged, while in contrast circulation of settled “brains” towards their country of origin is. Developing countries have effectively made clear their wish for a return of their skilled citizens!

The objectives pursued through the proposals for circular migration appear in principle to be in line with those of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which holds that security, promoting economic exchange and managing the circulation of people are linked.

European directive 2003/109 relating to the status of third-country nationals who have been long-term residents of the European Union illustrates the absence of a common vision at the level of the Union about the fate to be reserved for new economic migrants (the fate of highly qualified workers will shortly be the subject of a specific directive). It harmonises the granting of long-term residence status to any foreign national who has resided legally and without interruption in the territory of a member State during the five years immediately preceding the application and opens up a limited facilitation of travel within Europe for economic ends (originally the European Commission had proposed a real régime of free circulation on which the Council did not manage to agree). Adoption of this instrument was greeted as recognition by all member States of the need to consolidate the rights of nationals from third countries, with a view to their integration, following a certain period of legal residence. However, stays for the purpose of study or profes-
2nd EU-AFRICA SUMMIT

On 8th and 9th December 2007 the 2nd European Union-Africa Summit took place in Lisbon, under the Portuguese Presidency of the European Union.

The relations between the EU and Africa traditionally developed in two regional groups: between the EU and the African countries that form part of the ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States) and those located around the Mediterranean. With the 1st EU-Africa Summit in Cairo, in April 2000, a new dialogue began between the EU and Africa as a whole continent with the aim of establishing links at both political and institutional level to find solutions to the common challenges. Since then the two parties have met regularly on different levels (Ministerial Troikas, meetings between the two EU-AU Commissions, Parliaments, etc.). However, at the level of heads of state and government this same Lisbon Summit was the first in seven years.

Apart from the leaders of the 27 EU member states and the 53 African states, divided into 52 member states of the African Union (AU) and the representative of Morocco (as the only country of the African continent still outside the AU), there were, on the one hand, the Presidents of the European Commission and the African Commission as participants and, on the other, as observers, the Presidents of the European Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the representatives of the EU candidate countries (Turkey, Croatia, Macedonia) as well as several countries interested in the events and, lastly, the representatives of different international organizations: the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the African Development Bank (AFDB), the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Arab League.

The aim of the Lisbon Summit was to take another step towards a new political partnership among equals by forging a strategic partnership between the EU and Africa that seeks to look beyond the antiquated and limited view of a primarily “beneficiary-donor” relationship and open the way to joint solutions to the common challenges.

To this end, three main documents were adopted as a global framework of reference during the Summit: in addition to the final declaration, the participating countries approved the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership document and a specific Action Plan during the period 2008-2010.

In the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership document, which has its origin in the “European Union Strategy for Africa” of the European Council, 2005, the participants set out their general objectives as well as the measures and the instruments for achieving them.

The first Action Plan for the implementation of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership represents the approach in eight priority partnerships during the initial period of 2008-2010, namely: peace and security; democratic governance and human rights; trade and regional integration; Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); energy; climate change; migrations, mobility and employment; science, information society and space.

The partnership “migrations, mobility and employment” seeks to provide holistic solutions to common challenges, with the particular ends of creating more and better employment in the African continent and improving the management of migratory flows. Moreover, this partnership ensures the incorporation of migration and employment issues as essential parts in the strategies for the reduction of poverty as well as in other strategies of national development and co-development in Africa.

The Tripoli Ministerial Conference Declaration and the Ouagadougou Declaration 2004 and the Action Plan on employment and reduction of poverty in Africa are the two declarations which the members specifically stressed in the introduction. In the EU-Africa Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development in Tripoli in 2006, the EU and Africa adopted for the first time a joint strategy in the form of the Tripoli Declaration to respond to the common challenges and increase the benefits of international migration. In the same conference, the EU-Africa Action Plan for the fight against human trafficking that forms an integral part of the joint strategy was formerly approved.

These three documents are manifested in the three priority actions of the seventh partnership: 1) the implementation of the Tripoli Ministerial Conference Declaration; 2) the implementation of the EU-Africa Action Plan for the fight against human trafficking; 3) the implementation and monitoring of the Ouagadougou Declaration in 2004 and the Action Plan on employment and the reduction of poverty in Africa.

Within the first priority action the participants mentioned the objectives, the results expected, the actions planned, the actors and the funding. As objectives they underlined the following aspects: facilitating mobility and the free movement of people in Africa and the EU as well as improving the management of legal migration between the two continents; dealing with the causes of migration and the flows of refugees; developing specific solutions for the problems provoked by the illegal or irregular migratory flows; and confronting the problems of the emigrants residing in the EU or in an African country.

In order to guarantee monitoring of the commitments agreed, evaluate the progress of their implementation and prepare successive Action Plans, the African and European leaders consolidated the institutional architecture and the instruments of dialogue. Thus, every three years a summit at the level of heads of state and government will be held alternately in Africa or in Europe, prepared at ministerial level. Moreover, the relations between the EU and the AU will be strengthened through regular meetings on different levels. Due to this the Ministerial Troikas will be held biannually, and the two commissions and the two parliaments as well as the Economic and Social Councils of the EU (EESC) and the AU (ECOSOCC) will strengthen their links. This focus on the AU, or rather on its institutional architecture, is because the AU evolved as the natural interlocutor of the EU with reference to continental questions and as the most important institutional member of the European Union. Moreover, the possibilities for the participation of non-state actors and civil society will be expanded.

The first monitoring of the Lisbon Summit was held in February 2008 in Addis Abeba, Ethiopia. Meanwhile, the Presidency of the EU announced that the next EU-AU Ministerial Troika will take place on 28th April in Luxembourg. At the level of Heads of State and Government, the next summit is planned for 2010.

For further information:

General information:
http://ec.europa.eu/development/services/events/eu-africa-summit-2007/index_en.cfm
EU-Africa Partnership on Migrations
http://ec.europa.eu/development/center/repository/EAS2007_action_plan_migration_en.pdf#zoom=100
AU-EU Meeting in Addis Abeba
sional training, or migrants whose stay is exclusively for reasons of a temporary nature, for example au pairs or seasonal workers, or paid workers on detachment from a provider of cross-border services, or cross-border service providers themselves, or those whose permission to stay has been formally limited, are excluded from the residence periods taken into account in calculating eligibility. At the same time, European law recognises the right to family reunification for any third-country nationals "holding a residence permit issued by a member State with a period of validity of one year or more, who has reasonable prospects of obtaining the right of permanent residence." (Directive 2003/86)

Accepting and Optimising Economic Migration Needs from a Perspective of Partnership

The debate over legal migration within the Euro-Mediterranean area has been officially reopened in order to guarantee its better management by public authorities. European labour markets, or at least some of them, have a need for skilled and unskilled workers. Recent experiences with regard to temporary work programmes show that specific agreements at a bilateral level can be mutually beneficial even if such programmes are susceptible to improvement. Are married women and mothers of young children proper candidates for emigration? Will their employment lead to a real reduction in migratory pressures? What about those of young professionals, still without family attachments? Does encouraging returns with a view to participating in the country’s economic development imply precluding progressive recognition of rights and integration in the host country? The reply accepted in respect of skilled migrants is that it should not, but what of others? Is it necessary to force the return of unskilled workers when they could participate in the labour market?

It is for Mediterranean countries to negotiate the best terms for their partnerships, to value the contribution of their migrants and advocate respect for their rights. They are in a favourable strategic position in order to do so. Their cooperation with regard to illegal migration and to readmission is essential in the eyes of their European neighbours. The readmission policy that the Union has attempted to develop with third countries of origin or transit has not met with any real success. The Union, in seeking to increase its negotiating power, has added a number of dimensions to its approach. It has offered its neighbours to the East (Moldavia, Ukraine, Russia, ex-Yugoslavia) certain facilities in respect of short-stay visas (fast-tracking procedures for some categories of people). In this regard, no agreement has been reached with the countries of the South. That may seem paradoxical to the extent that the need in terms of facilitation is without doubt greater in these countries. Furthermore, for southern countries bargaining within the framework of facilitating short-stay visas is unquestionably not enough. The stakes are much greater than that. Negotiation should also deal with longer term stays. Circular migration constitutes an interesting approach but, within the Euro-Mediterranean framework, it appears to us that it should also incorporate the needs pertaining to low or unskilled workers and the question of their rights and freedoms. At a European scale, up to now there has been no instrument negotiated as regards these, with the exception of the draft framework directive relating to the linking of work and residence permits whose objective is merely to facilitate the admittance procedures.

While waiting for such projects to emerge in the Mediterranean area, pilot projects involving Cape Verde and Moldavia being implemented by the European Commission, with the support of the Council, in respect of partnerships for mobility should yield some lessons.

Bibliography


The Strategic Proposal for the Candidacy of the Mediterranean Diet for Inclusion in the UNESCO List of Intangible Cultural Heritage

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2007 witnessed the launch, promoted by the Mediterranean Diet Foundation, of a strategic proposal for a multi-national effort driven by the governments of Spain, Italy, Greece and Morocco and open to all other Mediterranean countries, to put forward the Mediterranean diet as a candidate for inclusion on the UNESCO List of Intangible Cultural Heritage.

On 20th February 2007, in Ibiza, the Ministers of Agriculture from Italy and Spain presented a joint declaration to promote internationally the Mediterranean diet. On 16th July 2007, in a document presented by Spain to the European Union Council of Ministers of Agriculture and Fisheries, the Mediterranean diet was highlighted as “a very important component of the cultural, social, territorial, environmental and gastronomic heritage of the countries and peoples in the region, historically forming part of a way of life.” For the Spanish Minister Elena Espinosa the Mediterranean diet “is neither a recipe nor a recipe book, [but rather] an enormous capital enriched over thousands of years, in which tradition and innovation coexist in perfect harmony to create a healthier way of eating.”

Then, on 4th February 2008 in Zaragoza, the Spanish proposal to have the Mediterranean diet included on the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Intangible Cultural Heritage List received the full support of the 7th Conference of Mediterranean Ministers of Agriculture and Fisheries.

The Mediterranean Diet as a Lifestyle in Itself as Well as an Intangible Cultural Heritage

This strategic proposal to put forward the Mediterranean diet for inclusion on the UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage List is intended to identify and carry forward a set of common objectives and actions aimed at creating the critical mass of awareness, expertise, resources and political goodwill necessary for the development of joint activities to reduce the increasingly rapid erosion of the Mediterranean lifestyle by raising public understanding and awareness of the health, social and cultural benefits of the Mediterranean diet as an expression of a whole cultural system.

The Mediterranean diet as a lifestyle in itself makes our cultural identity and diversity visible, providing a direct measure of the vitality of the culture in which it is embedded.

The Mediterranean diet is an expression of a Mediterranean style of life that has undergone continuous evolution throughout history. The Mediterranean diet as an intangible cultural heritage is transmitted from generation to generation, and it is constantly recreated by communities and groups in response to changes in their environment and their history. It provides a sense of identity and continuity for the Mediterranean people.

Therefore, it was thought that the diversity of Mediterranean food cultures, expressed by the wide variety of food that makes up the Mediterranean diet, should be preserved and enhanced as a resource for effective, sustainable development in the entire Mediterranean region.
The Need to Preserve the Cultural Heritage of Mediterranean Food Cultures through Safeguarding the Mediterranean Diet as an Outstanding Sustainable Resource

The diversities of Mediterranean food cultures as well as many elements of the Mediterranean diet are currently at risk of extinction due to the effects of globalization, the homogenization of life styles, the loss of awareness, meanings, understanding and appreciation, which will lead to the erosion of the Mediterranean heritage and to a lack of interest among younger generations about their own heritage.

In the Mediterranean Basin there is a shared awareness of the social, cultural, health and economic dimension of ‘food’, shared by all Mediterranean people.

The Mediterranean Diet is an outstanding resource, not yet fully acknowledged and harnessed within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, for the achievement of an effective sustainable development in the Mediterranean. As it was pointed out in the report Mediterranean Strategy on Sustainable Development, issued in 2005 by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP): “Mediterranean agricultural and rural models, which are at the origins of Mediterranean identity, are under increasing threat from the predominance of imported consumption patterns. This trend is illustrated in particular by the decline of the Mediterranean dietary model despite the recognized positive effects on health. The prospective sce-

THE 2007 BARCELONA DECLARATION ON THE MEDITERRANEAN DIET AS INTANGIBLE CULTURAL HERITAGE

Reaffirming the 1996 Barcelona Declaration on the Mediterranean Diet that expresses both the consensus of the international scientific community on the health benefits of this diet, as well as the need to preserve its historical and cultural qualities for future generations;

Assuming its role as an independent and expert consulting body, for all those matters that require a scientific opinion, and reaffirming its intention to investigate and disseminate the values of the Mediterranean Diet and support all initiatives that contribute to its safeguarding and promotion;

Taking into account all the worldwide scientific contributions dedicated to the knowledge of the Mediterranean Diet, and reaffirming its importance for the health promotion of the population and its preventive properties against cardiovascular diseases, some types of cancer and other non communicable diseases;

Acknowledging that the traditional Mediterranean Diet has been recognized as a healthy and nutritionally balanced diet, based on a broad variety of locally produced and palatable foods;

Considering what the Mediterranean Diet represents for all Mediterranean countries’ culture and wellbeing;

Taking into account that the Mediterranean Diet promotes local production and consumption of traditional Mediterranean foods, and encourages sustainable agriculture and enables food security;

Considering the Mediterranean Diet’s contribution to intercultural dialogue, to the transfer of knowledge and technology and to the social and economic revitalization of Mediterranean communities;

Recognizing the role of the family, school, and the community in transmitting cultural values and practices surrounding food;

Considering that, despite its increasing popularity worldwide, the Mediterranean Diet is endangered in all countries of the Mediterranean region;

Recognizing that the Mediterranean Diet is an extraordinary cultural heritage, that is expressed in a diversity of food traditions, landscapes, culinary creativity, gatherings and celebrations;

Referring to the 2005 Rome Declaration, where the Mediterranean Diet was highlighted as a whole lifestyle pattern which urgently required preservation and promotion; and where it was also agreed to prepare a proposal for the inclusion of the Mediterranean Diet in the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity of the UNESCO, under the coordination of the Mediterranean Diet Foundation, in collaboration with most Mediterranean countries;

Considering the importance that surrounds the Intangible Cultural Heritage as emphasized in the UNESCO Recommendation on the Safeguarding of Traditional and Popular Culture in 1989, in the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity in 2001 and especially in the Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage, approved by the UNESCO General Conference in 2003;

The Scientific Committee, on the occasion of the World Food Day 2007, issues the following DECLARATION

1. That the Mediterranean Diet is a living heritage that is still being transmitted from generation to generation.

2. That the Mediterranean Diet is continuously recreated in response to the environment in the diverse communities of the area through their respective local shades, which surround them with a feeling of identity.

3. That the abandonment of traditional healthy habits and the emergence of new lifestyles associated with socioeconomic changes pose important threats to the preservation and transmission of the Mediterranean Diet to future generations.

4. That the Mediterranean Diet deserves and requires multiple and diverse scientific and cultural initiatives, focused on its preservation, promotion and transmission.

5. That it is unanimously agreed to give full support to the candidacy of the Mediterranean Diet to be included on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity of the UNESCO, understanding that this initiative will determine the safeguarding of the Mediterranean Diet, with its consequent benefits for the wellbeing of the population.

6. That Governments, Institutions, NGOs, Professional Associations, International Agencies and Organizations are urged to subscribe to the Declaration and to support our initiatives directed towards the UNESCO candidacy of the Mediterranean Diet.
nario for the expected impacts of trade liberalization, climate change and the lack of efficient rural policies offers a gloomy picture in some southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, with the prospect of aggravated regional imbalances, deeper ecological degradation and persistent or accrued social instability...[helping to create] a conducive regional environment to help countries develop policies and efficient procedures for the labelling and quality certification of Mediterranean food products and to promote the Mediterranean diet."

The proposal to include the Mediterranean diet on the UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage List could be useful in trying to reduce the increasing erosion of the Mediterranean food cultures under the pressure of the globalization process, and in particular with the upcoming creation of the EuroMediterranean Free Trade Area.

**The 2007 Barcelona Declaration on the Mediterranean Diet as Intangible Cultural Heritage**

On the occasion of World Food Day 2007, on 16th October 2007 in Barcelona, the Mediterranean Diet Foundation’s Scientific Committee issued the 2007 *Barcelona Declaration on the Mediterranean Diet as Intangible Cultural Heritage*.

**Towards a Common Definition of the “Mediterranean Diet” More Than as a Diet, as a Cultural System**

On 4th-5th December 2007 at the University of Tuscia, Italy, as part of Italy’s Official Celebration of World Food Day, the international Conference “New Frontiers in the Mediterranean for Food Security” was held. It was co-organized by the International Inter-University Centre for Mediterranean Food Cultures Studies (CIISCAM), and Department of Ecology and Sustainable Development of the University of Tuscia, in cooperation with National Research Institute on Food and Nutrition (INRAN), Forum on Mediterranean Food Cultures, Bioversity International and the Nutrition and Consumer Protection Division of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). The CIISCAM was established at the University of Rome “La Sapienza” by the University of Calabria, the University of Gran Canaria, the University of Parma, the University of Tuscia and “La Sapienza” itself, with the aim of studying and promoting Mediterranean food cultures, in all their manifold variety, as an outstanding cultural heritage to be recognized and enhanced as the essential resource for the achievement of balanced, nutritional wellbeing for everyone in the Mediterranean region. In addition CIISCAM aims to reduce the increasing erosion of the diverse heritage of Mediterranean food cultures.

At the CIISCAM conference, to reinforce support for the Mediterranean diet’s candidacy for inclusion in the UNESCO Intangible Heritage List, The 2005 *Rome Call for a Common Action on Food in the Mediterranean*, issued on 1st October 2005, was re-launched as the final document of the 3rd Forum on Mediterranean Food Cultures, “Dialogues between Civilizations and Peoples of the Mediterranean. The Food Cultures”, held from 29th September to 1st October at the University of Rome “La Sapienza.” On this occasion, a specific session was held on the possible recognition by UNESCO of the Mediterranean diet as an intangible cultural heritage, during which the Mediterranean diet was agreed by all participants to be understood as a cultural system and not just a diet. There was also progress towards a strategic consensus on a common definition of “Mediterranean Diet” and on the political need to share its “benefits” equally among all Mediterranean countries.

In the *Rome Call*, among other recommendations, the following key points were emphasised:

- To fully acknowledge “food” as a pivotal element in the development of the future actions of the EuroMed Partnership, for its central and strategic cross-cutting dimension through the Declaration of Barcelona, with particular regard on the three social, cultural and human dimensions of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.
- To fully acknowledge “food” as a vehicle for learning about diversity and transmitting knowledge of the other.
- To act together to revitalize local capacities to reduce the increasing erosion of the diversity of Mediterranean food cultures heritage as well as to reinforce the sustainability of the agro-food systems of all Mediterranean countries and the food security in the entire region.
- To remember that the ancient Greek word “diaita” means equilibrium, lifestyle. Therefore, the traditional Mediterranean diet is more than just a diet; it is a whole lifestyle pattern with physical activity playing an important role.
- To establish as a priority a cohesive definition of the traditional Mediterranean diet (so as to be
equivalent to Mediterranean food or food culture) in order for all Mediterranean countries to present a shared perspective and strategy. The definition should refer to the traditional Mediterranean diet as a means of preserving cultural heritage. Main foods included in the common food basket are: an abundance of olive oil and olives, fruits, vegetables, cereals (mostly unrefined), legumes, nuts and fish, moderate amounts of dairy products (preferably cheese and yoghurt) and low quantities of meat and meat products. Wine in moderation is acceptable when it is not contradictory to religious or social norms. But the idiosyncrasy of the pattern is not only a list of foods (some traditional) but that it also refers to sustainability (mostly fresh, seasonal and locally grown products) as well as preparation techniques following traditional recipes and the way and context of eating them, which are also key components of the Mediterranean diet. It is emphasised that the Mediterranean diet is complete and usually does not need any kind of supplement or enrichment unless recommended for health reasons and for a few nutrients (folic acid and iodine).

- To take into account that the traditional Mediterranean diet has health implications besides cultural and economic implications. Therefore, all Mediterranean countries need to agree and contribute to the process of preservation and promotion. To start the process, obtaining UNESCO backing for the recognition of the Mediterranean diet as a part of Food Cultural Heritage is an initial and shared common objective to be coordinated from the Barcelona counterpart as an extension of the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, in collaboration with all the Mediterranean country representatives.

- To consider that the global scenery in which is placed the complex reality of the Mediterranean, with its interdependent issues, requires an interdisciplinary and intercultural rethinking able to express a new paradigm of development for the Mediterranean.

### A Preservation Strategy at National and International Levels

The preservation strategy developed in this multi-national joint effort by Spain, Italy, Greece and Morocco, should take the measures necessary to ensure the safeguarding of the diversity of the Mediterranean food cultures’ heritage as a critical base for the safeguarding of the Mediterranean diet, understood as a whole, non-separable, cultural system. These safeguarding measures should have internal and external coherence and provide a permanent trans-sector and inter-cultural channel of open dialogue through which the Mediterranean diet’s benefit should be mutually shared by all people living in the Mediterranean region. It should encourage scientific and artistic studies and research for the effective safeguarding of the Mediterranean diet as an intangible cultural heritage. This preservation strategy should strengthen education initiatives, awareness-raising and capacity-building projects and training in the management of intangible cultural heritage, in order to preserve effectively and to promote the transmission of the Mediterranean diet heritage during the present, difficult, period and on into the future.

### References

Mediterranean Strategy for Sustainable Development:  
www.planbleu.org/publications/smdd_uk.pdf

The 2007 Barcelona Declaration on the Mediterranean Diet as Intangible Cultural Heritage:  

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www.ciiscam.org/materiali/02-PDF%20final%20Document%20Rome%20Call%202005.pdf

Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage:  
The worse the political situation gets, the more the talk of the dialogue of cultures flourishes! ... It is a curious paradox to see, ever since 11th September 2001, a build-up of tensions, of crises, sometimes even of wars, while at the same time a benevolent, if not *bien pensant*, discourse proliferates. As if the one were designed to make up for the other, or rather to respond to it in a false symmetry which sounds more and more hollow.

What is the point of these incantations on the dialogue of cultures and of civilisations? Isn’t it helping to create an illusion, to set up a theatre of good conscience which serves to create a stage-set at least, to give the impression that something is being done while nothing seriously unsettles the status quo and the established order? The dialogue of cultures has thus become a new magic potion, a nostrum, an assemblage of trite and empty words which are there to make a show. This dialogue depends on a kind of meta-language which permits the masking of reality, the averting of eyes from the harshness and brutality of forces seen at play in complete impunity on the political terrain. In fact, for many political and institutional leaders, it is a matter of taking a position and acting as though the dialogue of cultures were the miracle cure for all the evils that afflict societies and nourish the great collective passions.

The first need is to put an end to this politically correct word-play, which bolsters immobilism and justifies inertia. We need to reintroduce a little thought, debate and controversy about the relations between cultures, and especially between Europe and the Mediterranean, or to be more precise between Europe and Islam, because that is where the essential game is being played, the question of war and peace. In the last few years we have been witnessing a resort to extremes, with the multiplication of terrorist attacks, the crisis of the cartoons, the controversial remarks of the pope at Regensburg, and added to these the proliferation of anti-Muslim pronouncements and acts, with immigrants as their first victims, while on the other shore the language of violence and hatred penetrates deeper and deeper into the Arab and Muslim societies, for whom “the West,” seen as an undifferentiated bloc, is the pre-eminent target.

In the face of such an increasingly confused, indeed chaotic, situation, a second requirement arises: to achieve a better articulation of the spheres, or to use the words of the philosopher Gilles Deleuze the “stage sets,” between what belongs to the political world and what belongs to the cultural and artistic world. It is essential not to confound the two, which are distinct, to subordinate one to the other, or to make one the instrument of the other. Complexity and interactions are at play between the cultural and political fields, notably in the relations forged between Europe and the Mediterranean.

Obviously this does not mean having one’s head in the clouds and concerning oneself only with aesthetic and artistic questions, while political and military realities create *faits accomplis* on the spot, nourishing growing passions, misunderstandings and forces of mutual rejection. The best cultural projects in the world are not going to resolve the devastating effects produced by the war in Iraq, by the daily confrontations between Israel and Palestine or by the Is-

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1 Creator of the Averroes Meetings in Marseille. As a researcher, he is the scientific co-ordinator of the network of excellence Ramses2. As editor, he directs the Bleu collection of the Actes Sud publications.
raeli military intervention in Lebanon which has destroyed the most essential infrastructures of that country. In any case that is neither their raison d’être nor their objective. There is a great confusion prevailing nowadays among political actors and institutions on the subject of the dialogue of cultures and civilisations. As if it was a miracle cure, a spiritual supplement that would make it possible to forget the violence being practised on the ground.

Yet, once this distinction of orders is recognised between what belongs to the political, the cultural and the artistic, we need to understand what is at stake in the complex interactions between these different “stage sets,” because they are interconnected worlds. Political passions connect these different worlds and are fully at work in the “war-mongering” which is more and more evident on the international scene, especially between one shore of the Mediterranean and the other. The third requirement should therefore be to look this war-lust in the face so as to have, perhaps, a chance of overcoming it.

On the side of political and Jihadist Islam, the language of war with the West has been developed for a long time now. It is fed on references to the Western invasion, to the occupation of territories and to Western values widely regarded as decadent. To this Jihadist discourse against the new crusaders corresponds the militarist language, dear to American and European neo-conservatives, against “Fascism Islam,” which legitimises an unavoidable resort to force in the face of a civilisation which, according to Bernard Lewis, only understands that language. The martial virtues and the taste for war have to be re-discovered to confront the perils emerging from the rise of Islam and the immigrant “invasion.”

Language of this kind nourishes destructive passions on both sides and lays the ground for a fearsome transition to action.

Has the Islam/West confrontation become the only possible reading of the world? Between these two blocs, separated seemingly by everything, isn’t there an intermediate world that might be called the Mediterranean? As an area of contacts, neighbourhood and conflicts, can the Mediterranean reopen the field of what is possible and offer a new configuration of relations between the three continental masses of Africa, Europe and Asia? As a wide field of interactions on the intellectual and human, economic and political, symbolic and religious planes, can the Mediterranean be put forward as a ground for mediation and as the place where the coming confrontation might be averted?

If the dialogue of cultures and of civilisations has a reason for existing, it would be to give the Mediterranean a real consistency as a world of common meanings.

As an area of contacts, neighbourhood and conflicts, can the Mediterranean offer a new configuration of relations between Africa, Europe and Asia?

What does this imply?
An attempt to give the Mediterranean of today a certain consistency implies ensuring a number of conditions and multiplying well-conceived initiatives. The first of these conditions is mobility, which is to be distinguished from migration. The rules on the circulation of persons imposed nowadays between the southern and the northern shore of the Mediterranean are draconian and humiliating. It would be impossible to count how many projects, especially cultural projects, with official backing and finance, have failed dismally for failure to obtain visas for the partners concerned. Researchers, artists, academics and even institutional actors or students involved in projects or networks connecting one shore with the other are systematically blocked. Unless this lock is sprung, which can be achieved by simple solutions such as a cultural and research passport, or by projects of wider scope, such as an Averroes programme of student mobility for the two sides of the Mediterranean, nothing can be done. This is the first matter of urgency. Europeans, who have come to take for granted a veritable right to mobility, need to appreciate the devastating effects of this invisible wall raised on the southern frontier of Europe...

To give the Mediterranean a real consistency requires multiplying places and forms of mutual acquaintance. We need to encourage curiosity in the face of temptations to withdrawal inspired by fear.

A policy of mutual acquaintance through research, for example encouraging “Mediterranean studies” as a form of meeting transcending the Islam/West or Europe/Islam opposition. This is what is attempted for example by the network of excellence in human sciences, Ramses2. But we need to go considerably further and construct a true Mediterranean of research,
especially in the human and social sciences, in those places where the wounds of memory and the breaks of history can be addressed and perhaps overcome.

A policy of mutual acquaintance through translation. We need to re-connect, in a contemporary form, with what used to exist between the 16th and the 19th centuries, the lingua franca, that common Mediterranean language which did so much to promote exchanges.

The common language of today is translation! We need to make works and texts known, to provide foundations, landmarks and points of reference for a true mutual comprehension of the culture of the Other. The Mediterranean can be seen as a circle open to the beyond, and translation as a linking agent mutually connecting cultures! What would an immense programme of translation in all the languages of Europe and of the Mediterranean cost, compared with the cost of an assault vehicle or a fighter plane?

A policy of mutual acquaintance through images. This means support for diffusion of the kind of culture which has the greatest impact nowadays and which does not merely concern elites. A true community of images ought to be created therefore around the Mediterranean. This is what is being attempted for example by INA (French National Audiovisual Institute), through the project “Audio-visual memories of the Mediterranean” using images from television archives. But here too it is necessary to go considerably further, to create real stocks of co-production, to work on content and programmes, for example for children, in an area where the audio-visual industry is in a state of flux and where broadcasting channels multiply without concerning themselves with creative questions.

A policy of mutual acquaintance on the basis of places. The European Commission and the partner countries of the Barcelona Process have promoted the birth in Alexandria of the Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF), a first initiative whose meagre endowment is in inverse proportion to the readiness to invoke it shown by political leaders who want to give the impression that something has been done. Now this Foundation, which has so far had great difficulty in finding its place, ought to be the beacon project for promoting a whole network of trans-Mediterranean places, something that the different national networks do not yet constitute. There are major initiatives to be taken in the field of cultural exchanges and of training of actors in mediation, in places where the societies of the two shores of the Mediterranean are more and more deeply penetrated by forms of retreat and mutual rejection.

To give life, sense and zest to a creative Mediterranean, in music, design, architecture, research, literature, cinema or documentary... while a destructive and obscurantist Mediterranean raises its head on the horizon and asserts itself as an increasingly likely future. The forces and the actors of creativity are there, but they are more often than not paralysed by the weight of inertia or throttled by the stranglehold of dictatorships. It is high time to shake this security-minded discourse and open new spaces of words, debates, and controversies to invent the Mediterranean of the twenty-first century, far from the soft consensuses and façade complices of the dialogue of cultures and civilisations.
Morocco, known as a country of sun, is also a country of festivals. Since the late 1990s, the organisation of festivals has experienced a spectacular growth. Contributing to its international influence, the development of these events makes clear the changes that have occurred in this Mediterranean country. In 2007, more than eighty cultural and artistic events were organised, many of them celebrating the Mediterranean (*Festival des deux Rives, Festival de Volubilis, Les Nuits de la Méditerranée, Festival des Cultures Immaterielles Méditerranéennes*). Beyond the challenges and problems of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (free exchange area, security cooperation) and at a moment when projects of the "Union for the Mediterranean" are emerging from both sides, they are an expression of the dialogue and the intercultural exchanges between the peoples of the two shores. The new music scene initiated by Moroccan youth lies within this perspective.

**Overview of the Cultural Landscape in Morocco**

The Moroccan cultural field reflects the changes and aspirations of a country in full transition. The current cultural dynamic is linked to the processes of political, economic and social opening experienced by Morocco. During the former reign of King Hassan II, the number and importance of the annual festivals were limited. The only festive moments were mainly devoted to the celebration of national holidays (festival of the throne, green march) and ancestral popular ceremonies (the *Moussem*) encouraged by the authorities. The cultural policy of the early years of independence was marked by the exploitation of culture in a nationalist perspective. The newly independent state mainly focused on the consolidation of the "national constants"; i.e., Islam, the monarchy, Arabism and territorial unity. Nationalism was understood as a global identity favouring cultural standardisation to the exclusion of any cultural difference. Consequently, the cultural sphere was deprived of creativity. In fact, it was the result of a folklorised heritage at the service of tourism and the established order. And even if since the 1970s Moroccan society has seen the birth of a cultural movement whose pivot was the film clubs, music groups (*nass el ghiwane, Ouissmann, lmchaheb*) and journals (*lamalif, Anfass*), it goes without saying that "official" culture prevailed.

The State interest in festivals has notably increased in recent years, especially after the coronation of Mohamed VI. Some see in this profusion evidence of an opening linked to the new reign and others see it as prompted by tourism (10 million tourists are expected by 2010). In fact, the country is in full transformation (demographic, social and cultural) and the Moroccan cultural landscape has changed drastically. After the terrorist attacks of 16th May 2003 (perpetrated by 14 *Islamikazes* against civilian targets in Casablanca) the importance given to festivals grew. The civil and political actors have realised the importance of these artistic events as a wall against obscurantism and terrorism. Since then, the official investment in this domain has been in the context of a fierce battle between the authorities and the radical Islamists for the appropriation of the public space.

In function of their organisation, we can distinguish two types of festivals in Morocco: on the one hand, the official festivals organised by government departments (ministries) and institutional departments (local groups); and, on the other, the non-official festivals initiated by the fabric of associations with the support of patronage. Many of the festivals in Morocco are organised “under the high patronage of the King.”
The Official Actors in the Promotion of Festivals

The Ministry of Culture is the regulatory authority of the cultural and artistic sector in Morocco. According to the decree stipulating its powers, this department’s objective is “to produce and implement the policy of the government in the field of heritage and cultural and artistic development.” The promotion of festivals falls within the competence of the department responsible for “developing and promoting the fields of theatre, music, […] and defining initiatives of encouragement and support for artistic creation while guaranteeing dissemination and commercialisation.” The fields of action are several: music, dance, theatre, video art and comics.

Festivals are an important activity of the Ministry of Culture and it annually organises around twenty cultural and artistic festivals at a national or international level. It also gives subsidies to non-official festivals. The criteria of the Ministry in its policy of organisation and subsidy of festivals are the following: preserving and fostering cultural heritage, opening up to other cultures, and supporting Moroccan artists.

Along with the Ministry of Culture, several official actors are involved in the organisation of festivals. A large number of ministerial departments take part in this field through the support and organisation of these events (Ministry of Tourism, Ministry of Higher Education). In addition to the Wilayas and the prefectures, the local groups and the elective assemblies (region, town council, commune) have an active role in this field; each area has its own festival calendar. Other official institutions are associated with it: Moroccan National Board of Tourism, Regional Investment Centres, Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture.

The Contribution of Civil Society and Patronage

In Morocco, the summer festival season starts around May. The driving forces of many of these events are local NGOs and the private sector. Several associations have been especially created with the aim of initiating and promoting the festivals in their respective regions: Forum Casablanca, Esprit de Fès, Alexia Chamalia, Fondation des Festivals de Marrakech, etc. Cooperation between several local participating entities is another form of festival organisation (for example, the Group of Associations in Nador and the Association Contes’Act with the support of the Development Agency of L’Oriental for the first year of the Festival des Cultures Immatérielles Méditerranéennes). The famous festivals are supervised and promoted by figures close to the decision centres (advisors to the King or former ministers: A. Azoulay, H. Aourid, M. Kabbaj, M. Bennaisa).

Among the active structures at this level is the Fondation Esprit de Fès, created in 2006. Presided by M. Kabbaj, former advisor to the King and current governor of Casablanca, it is supported by a large network of institutional and private partners. This NGO participates in the development and the influence of the town of Fes through many festivals (Festival de Fès des Musiques Sacrées du Monde; Festival dans la Ville; Les Rencontres de Fès; Festival du Malhoun et de la Poésie Urbaine; Festival National de la Culture Amazighe...). The festival of holy music has enhanced the image of Fes and has made it a town known worldwide.

The sponsoring of the festivals also depends on the private sector. The posters of these events include the name of different commercial entities (banks, companies, media outlets…) as active parties in the organi-
Throughout the summer of 2007, the telephone companies have taken the initiative of organising activities on the beaches of several Moroccan towns: “beach concert of Méditel”; “beach festival of Maroc Télécom”; “urbayan fever tour de Wana.” Moreover, several embassies (France, Spain, Belgium, Great Britain) along with foreign cultural institutes and centres (Institut culturel français, Instituto Cervantes, British Council…) support the different events in Morocco.

**Importance and Achievements of the Festivals**

As vectors of human and economic development, the festivals contribute to the influence of Morocco at an international level and to the promotion of universal humanistic values. Several slogans created on the occasion of these festivals focus on the principles of dialogue, peace and tolerance. Bringing together Moroccan and foreign artists in these artistic events symbolises the importance of intercultural exchanges and the opening towards the other. Festivals form part of a cultural tourism strategy making visible the wealth and diversity of the local heritage (arts and crafts, culinary art, architecture). Simultaneously, conferences and public debates are organised to reflect on the future of the towns.

The Ministry of Culture strives to “make these events a means of cultural and artistic invigoration by defining their specific objectives: the opening towards other cultures; and the awareness-raising of the government and non-government actors about the need to favour the expression of the local and regional cultural potentialities.”

In their turn, the associations aim to celebrate their town and region, contribute to their development and promote their international influence. Through the creation of new jobs and infrastructures, the festivals prompt a socio-economic dynamic that sometimes revives the town as a whole. The example of the town of Essaouira is illustrative. Marginalised for a long time, Essaouira currently benefits from the positive effects of the Festival de Gnawa et Musiques du Monde which in 2007 was held for its tenth year. The success of the festival and its international prestige have encouraged the organisers to initiate other festivals with a view to guaranteeing annual activities in the town (Festival des Alizés, Festival des Musiques Andalouses). By defining itself as a promoter of the town and its lasting development, the association Essaouira Mogador, which organises these festivals, was created in 1992 and is presided by A. Azoulay (advisor to the King). It contributes, among other aspects, to resolving the shortcomings in infrastructure of the town and the rehabilitation of historical sites.

Moreover, one of the main achievements of these events is the involvement of the citizens in the affairs of their town. The organisers put forward notions of participation, ownership and citizenship. Moroccans are invited to go onto the street to attend the numerous festivals whereas in the past they just passively consumed the official cultural production offered by television. The festivals, organised in the open air and free, are attended by a public of all ages and different social classes. They therefore reveal the emergence of an urban culture and of new forms of sociability and ownership of the public spaces.

**Youth Festivals: Nayda or the Moroccan Movida**

Henceforth, young Moroccan artists have their own label: Nayda (literally, wake up; revival). In all Moroccan
A significant aspect of 2006 was the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on “Strengthening the role of women in society” held on 14-15 November in Istanbul. The Euro-Mediterranean partners, under the auspices of the European Union’s Finnish Presidency, based on their shared international, regional and national commitments, agreed to work within a common framework for action to strengthen women’s role in political, civil, social, economic and cultural spheres, as well as to fight against discrimination.

The Conference was held in accordance with the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 and the Five Year Work Programme agreed during the 10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit, held in Barcelona in 2005. It was then stated that partners would adopt “measures to achieve gender equality, preventing all forms of discrimination and ensuring protection of the rights of women,” while at the same time taking stock of the Rabat Preparatory Conference held on 14-16 June 2006. Prior to that, certain preparatory reports had been drafted by the Anna Lindh Foundation, Euromesco and Femise civil society networks under the aegis of the European Commission.

The Euro-Mediterranean ministers stressed that equal participation of men and women in all spheres of life is a crucial element of democracy and confirmed that only by the inclusion of all people and determined action will the region’s women be able to fulfil their ambitions and aspirations and, by extension, contribute towards the realisation of the underlying objectives of the Barcelona Declaration: the attainment of a common area of peace, stability and shared prosperity in the Mediterranean region. This goal, based inter alia on democracy, respect for human rights and sustainable development, can only be achieved by guaranteeing all women full enjoyment of their rights.

In the conclusions agreed by the Euro-Mediterranean partners they state that they will include women’s political, civil, social, economic and cultural rights in their dialogues, including in the framework of the Association Agreements, the European Neighbourhood Policy action plans and in the European Union programmes and projects. In this framework, the ministers recognise that a strengthened dialogue and cooperation between governmental and non-governmental actors across the whole Euro-Mediterranean region is necessary. This will include the promotion of dialogue among parliamentarians within the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly, as well as civil society organisations, women’s associations, youth, trade unions, and business and professional associations in accordance with national legislation as appropriate and cooperation between national, regional and local administrations.

In the declaration all the Euro-Mediterranean partners commit themselves to mobilise financial resources to support implementation of this Framework of Action. In addition to national funding, the European Union will provide adequate resources for its implementation at national and regional levels through technical and financial assistance provided through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), bilateral contributions from EU member states, FEMIP and other relevant financial instruments.

Recognising that international covenants on human rights include the obligation to ensure equal rights of men and women to enjoy all economic, social, cultural and political rights, the Euro-Mediterranean partners will embrace this holistic approach based on the following interdependent and interlinked priorities:

- Women’s political and civil rights;
- Women’s social and economic rights and sustainable development;
- Women’s rights in the cultural sphere and the role of communication and the mass media.

In this resolution the Euro-Mediterranean partners, according to the shared internationally agreed commitments, will pursue the objective of strengthening the role of women through mainstreaming of full enjoyment of human rights by women and their needs into all plans, projects and other relevant activities of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, and likewise supporting specific measures in favour of women.

One significant aspect at this Conference is the introduction of a review mechanism, since the Euro-Mediterranean partners have committed to work towards the objectives contained in the document over the next five years. In this regard, they invite the Euromed Committee to convene, at least once a year, a Euromed ad hoc meeting at expert senior official level, to review the implementation of the present measures contained in these conclusions and to inform the Annual Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Ministers Conference. A follow-up Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference to discuss the various issues related to the full enjoyment of all human rights by women and the progress made in the implementation of these measures will take place in 2009.

Summary prepared by Maria-Ángels Roque (IEMed)

towns, groups of young musicians are emerging and express a new form of identity through their artistic performances. Some of these music groups have acquired a fame that goes beyond national borders (Hoba Hoba Spirit, Darga, Amarg Fusion, H-Kayne, Bigg). Several observers equate this new cultural dynamic with the Spanish movida. More than a fashion, it is a movement of cultural renewal started by the new generation. Beyond the protest dimension of their intentions, the actors of the Moroccan movida have the aim of acting and participating in the creation of the Morocco of tomorrow. They appear as producers of a committed message related to the daily aspects of their society and the problems of their peers (social inequality, unemployment, illegal immigration, etc.). For them, artistic expression is a means of exhorting changes and a way of doing politics differently. Several songs deal with corruption, the drama
of terrorist attacks and terrorism. Coinciding with the legislative elections of September 2007, the music groups participated in the campaign of mobilisation to encourage the young to participate in the elections.

The premises of the Nayda movement go back to the late 1990s with the organisation of the Boulevard des Jeunes Musiciens. This festival, created in 1999 by the Association of Artistic and Cultural Education, annually brings together the fans and groups of the new music scene in Casablanca. It is one of the fastest growing music events in Africa and the Arab-Muslim world. In its last year, it collected more than 150,000 young people for four days. Following its success as a springboard for young artists, other festivals have been inspired by this experience. In 2007, we saw the birth of the Festival les Calèches in Marrakesh which was added to the Festival des Jeunes Talents Gnawa in Essaouira in its fourth year.

After an underground phase marked by stigmatisation and accusation (14 young musicians went to prison in 2003), the music scene in Morocco has reached a phase of normalisation. It currently enjoys notable official recognition (subsidies from the Ministry of Culture and access to public media). Also, the presence of young groups is increasingly more central to other festivals (Mawazine, Festival National des Arts Populaires, etc.). However, certain Islamists and conservatives attack the organisers of these events and disparage the young artists. These detractors suggest that the festivals encourage perversion and debauchery and accuse the young musicians of Westernisation and loss of identity.

In virtue of its context, its actors and its ambitions, Nayda is defined as a citizen movement, which emerged from the reality of Morocco and is in keeping with its time. Its initiators are part of processes of production of a new form of Moroccan identity which goes beyond the “classical” nationalist ideology. Moroccan-ness and patriotic feeling are clearly stressed (a famous album by Bigg, a star rapper, is entitled “Moroccans until death”). The reconstruction of this identity involves the reclaiming of national heritage, correlated to the opening towards the culture of the Other. The use of dialects (Darija, Amazigh) appears as an identity label which lends importance to these mother tongues spoken by the majority of Moroccans. The songs and names of the groups mix darija and foreign languages. As a result of the artistic and cultural mixing, “fusion” as a new composite music genre is notably appreciated by the young. Thus, this new cultural wave, Nayda, illustrates a pluralist Morocco which moves to the rhythm of festivals, creation and cultural interactions.
Map A.1 | World biodiversity, Mediterranean biodiversity and protected areas (2004)

Total of known species of mammals and birds
- 0-300
- 300-600
- 600-900
- 900-1,200
- 1,200-1,600
- 1,500-1,800
- 1,800-2,100
- 2,100-2,400

Protected national land areas* (% of the total of land)
(*) According to criteria I-V of the IUCN.
- 0-3
- 3-6
- 6-9
- 9-12
- 12-15
- 15-18
- >18
- No data.

Diversity of species of birds and mammals
- Mammals
- Birds

Number of threatened species on a world scale according to the IUCN categories: vulnerable, endangered and critically endangered. At a national scale these values can be quite distinct. For example, in Spain 25% of bird species are threatened.
Food consumption in the Mediterranean

Food consumption (grams/person/day)

- 1,250 - 1,500
- 1,500 - 1,750
- 1,750 - 2,000
- 2,000 - 2,250
- 2,250 - 2,500
- 2,500 - 2,750
- 2,750 - 3,000
- 3,000 - 3,250

Animal products: Meat, eggs, milk, fish
Sugar: Sugar and sweeteners
Cereals: Cereals and cereal products
Fruits and vegetables: Root starches, fruits and derived products, vegetables, nuts, tubers
Fat and oils: Vegetable oils, oleaginous crops, animal fats
Others: Alcoholic beverages, edible offal, spices, stimulants

(*)Latest data available for this period. Own production. Source: FAO.
Map A.3 | Iraqi refugees by country and internally displaced people in Iraq by region

Internally displaced people

- < 50,000
- 50,000 - 100,000
- 100,000 - 150,000
- 150,000 - 200,000
- > 200,000

Refugees

- < 50,000
- 50,000 - 100,000
- 100,000 - 500,000
- > 500,000

Other Iraqi refugee receiving countries

- Germany: 36,205
- Sweden: 23,852
- United Kingdom: 22,363
- Netherlands: 21,782
- Australia: 11,147
- Denmark: 9,902
- Norway: 8,668
- United States: 5,993
- Switzerland: 5,030

Own production. Source: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre: www.internal-displacement.org and UNHCR: www.unhcr.org
Map A.4 | Fishing: Catches in the Mediterranean (2005)

The charts do not include data on tuna catch.

Maps

Evolution of catches in the Mediterranean (situation in 2005 compared to 2000)

- > 20%
- From 10% to 20%
- From 5% to 10%
- From 0% to 5%
- From -5% to 0%
- From -10% to -5%
- From -20% to -10%
- < -20%

25,000 mt 75,000 mt 150,000 mt

Own production. Source: FAO, Fishstat

6.1MAPAS_EN.qxd:00 Med. en cifrasgraf 18/9/08 11:55 Página 304
Fires on the North Shore of the Mediterranean (Summer 2007)

Burnt surface area in the Peloponnese (30 August 2007)

Burnt surface area

Thousands of hectares

Type of surface area (%)

- Forest surface area
- Agricultural area
- Total surface area (unspecified type of surface area)
- Total surface area

Own production.
Source: Regional Service of Image Treatment and Remote Sensing (SERTIT)

Own production. Source: The European Forest Fire Information System (EFFIS)
Map A.6 | Main sources of income (2005)

- Main income (billions $)
  - > 500
  - 250 - 500
  - 100 - 250
  - 50 - 100
  - 25 - 50
  - 15 - 25
  - 10 - 15
  - < 10

- Sources of income (%)
  - Exports of goods
  - Tourism
  - Foreign Direct Investment
  - Official Development Assistance
  - Remittances

Own production. Source: UNCTAD and WB.
Hydrologists estimate that the amount of water necessary to produce food, support industries, maintain the environment and domestic consumption, is around 1,700 m³ of water per capita per year. Below this threshold countries are in a situation of water stress (around 745 million people worldwide, 41% of the Mediterranean population). When availability is below 1,000 m³ it is considered to be a situation of water scarcity (279 millions, 36%); and below 500 m³ it is one of absolute scarcity (125 millions; 13%).

**Map A.8** | **Surface water, groundwater and external water (2007)**

Total renewable water (km³) Renewable water according to origin (%)

- Internal surface water
- Internal common water**
- Internal groundwater
- External water

(*) Renewable internal resources of Bosnia and Herzegovina without specified origin.

(**) Part of the common renewable resources both in surface water and groundwater.

Own production. Source: FAO.
In 2007 a group of 15 countries (with a total population of 505 million inhabitants) received between 75% and 100% of the water they consumed after crossing the borders of other countries. Another 24 states (371 million inhabitants) depend on between 50% and 75%. This dependence can generate dangerous conflictive situations, but it can result in beneficial situations for all the countries that share the water basin when oriented correctly through cooperation between the different parties.

Countries with a water dependence of between 50% and 75%:
- Argentina, Azerbaijan, Benin, Bolivia, Cambodia, Chad, Congo, Croatia, Eritrea, Slovakia, Gambia, Iraq, Israel, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mozambique, Namibia, Paraguay, Syria, Somalia, Sudan, Ukraine, Uruguay and Vietnam.

Countries with a water dependence above 75%:
- Bahrain, Bangladesh, Botswana, Egypt, Hungary, Kuwait, Mauritania, Moldova, Niger, Nigeria, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia and Montenegro, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Water Dependency: The water consumption (with a total population of 505 million inhabitants) is shared between 75% and 100% of the water they consumed after crossing the borders of other countries.

Map A.9 | Shared basins (2007)


Water consumption by sectors (%):
- Agriculture
- Domestic
- Industrial

- Consumption by sectors (%)
  - < 5
  - 5-10
  - 10-20
  - 20-40
  - 40-60
  - > 60
  - No data

Own production. Source: Human Development Report 2006, UNDP and FAO.

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**Map A.11 | Water consumption and exploitation of resources (2000)**

Consumption of renewable resources

- Libya, Jordan, Malta, Egypt and Israel annually consume more than 100% of their renewable water resources. The deficit is covered with the overexploitation of aquifers and lakes beyond their refill capacity, and with water production based on desalination plants.

Own production. Source: FAO.
The Tourism Competitiveness Index is an index developed by the World Economic Forum (WEF) with the objective of measuring the factors and policies that make the development of the tourism and travel sector attractive. The index, whose scale goes from 0 (minimum competitiveness) to 7 (maximum competitiveness), comprises 71 indicators grouped into 14 pillars, which are then grouped into 3 sectorial subindexes: regulatory framework, business infrastructure and human, cultural and natural resources.
Map A.15  Civil nuclear energy in the Mediterranean

Portugal
- 1 research reactor (1 MW) in Sacavém (Instituto Tecnológico e Nuclear).

Spain
- 8 operational reactors (7.6 GW).

France
- 59 operational reactors (84 GW).
- 11 operational research reactors. Construction of a new reactor (1,630 MW) in Flamanville.

Morocco
- Process of evaluation of the possibility of constructing a power plant (600 MW). Agreement with France (2006) for the use of nuclear energy for the production of electricity or for desalination.

Algeria

Egypt
- Proposal for the construction of 1 power plant (1,000 MW) in Az-Dabah and studies for the construction of 3 power plants (600 MW).

Slovenia
- 1 operational joint power plant of Slovenia and Croatia operating in Krsko. Possible construction of an additional unit of 1,000 MW around 2020.
- 1 research reactor (250 KW) in Ljubljana (Josef Stefan Institute).

Croatia
- 1 operational joint power plant with Slovenia in Krsko (Slovenia).

Serbia and Montenegro
- 1 experimental reactor in Vinca (Institute of Nuclear Science).

Turkey
- In 2006 the government announced plans for the construction of 3 power plants (4,500 MW) operational in 2012-2016 whose location has not been decided. In 2008 the Turkish Atomic Energy Authority launched the call for tenders for the first power plant. 2 research reactors in Celenko (6 MW) and in Istanbul (250 KW).

Greece
- A power plant in Durres for the production of energy and desalination.

Albania
- A plant is expected to be operational in 2015 for the production of energy and desalination. Talks with Canada for the supply of a light water reactor. In September 2007, Israel bombed some alleged nuclear installations for military use in Dayr az-Zawr.

Jordan

Italy
- 4 power plants closed down after the 1987 referendum.
- 5 operational research reactors. The energy company ENEL participates in the construction of power plants in France and Slovakia. The nuclear energy debate reopens.

Libya

Syria

Israel
- The production of nuclear energy for civilian purposes is considered. Thus, the construction of a power plant is planned (1,200 MW), 2 research reactors: one (5 MW) under the supervision of the IAEA (Soreq Nuclear Research Center) and another (70 MW) supposedly for military use. Israel has not signed the non-proliferation treaty.
Map A.16 | Urban agglomerations in the Mediterranean

Urban agglomerations with more than 750,000 inhabitants (millions of inhabitants)

- Algiers
- Oran
- Casablanca
- Rabat
- Marrakech
- Fez
- Madrid
- Lisbon
- Porto
- Valencia
- Barcelona
- Lille
- Paris
- Lyon
- Nice-Cannes
- Marseille-Aix-en-Provence
- Toulouse
- Bordeaux
- Palermo
- Naples
- Rome
- Turin
- Milan
- Belgrade
- Thessaloniki
- Athens
- Istanbul
- Ankara
- Bursa
- Izmir
- Adana
- Antalya
- Gaziantep
- Konya
- Homs
- Aleppo
- Beirut
- Haifa
- Tel Aviv
- Amman
- Alexandria
- Cairo
- Benghazi
- Tripoli
- Damascus

Map A.17 | Foreigners from the MEDA-10 countries resident in the EU (2000-2007*)

The sector chart individually shows the nationalities that represent more than 10% of MEDA-10 foreigners in each country; the other nationalities are included in the category "others".

Residents from MEDA-10 countries out of the total of foreigners (%)

- < 2
- 2 - 5
- 5 - 15
- 15 - 25
- 25 - 35
- > 40

Distribution of residents of MEDA-10 countries by country of origin

The sector chart individually shows the nationalities that represent more than 10% of MEDA-10 foreigners in each country; the other nationalities are included in the category "others".

Own production. Source: For AT, BE, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SE, data from the national statistics offices. For BG, CY, CZ, HU, LT, LV, PL, SI, SK, UK and RO, data from Eurostat. For FR, INSEE estimates for 2005. For LU, estimates based on STATEC data 2002-2006. Latest data available for each source.

*Latest data available for this period.
January 2007

The Spanish government announces that the peace process with the organisation Euskadi and Freedom (ETA) is well and truly dead. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Nikola Spirić, a Bosnian Serb belonging to the Alliance of Independent Social-Democrats (SNSD), becomes the new Prime Minister, while in Serbia the ultra-nationalists of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) win the elections. The assassination of the Turkish journalist of Armenian origin and champion of human rights Hrant Dink stirs up the Turkish population, which comes out into the streets to demonstrate against excessive nationalism in Turkey. In Lebanon, confrontations between opponents and supporters of the government cause several deaths. For the first time since Algeria’s independence in 1962, a President of the French National Assembly goes to Algeria. In Europe, Romania and Bulgaria join the EU and Slovenia becomes the twelfth EU country to join the Eurozone. Germany takes over the EU’s rotating presidency for six months and Hans-Gert Pöttering, leader of the European Popular Party and of the European Democrats (PPE-DE) becomes the new President of the European Parliament for a term of two years and a half. A new party of the far right appears in the European parliament, the party Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty.

Spain

• On 2 January, José Blanco, secretary of the organisation of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) declares that the peace process with the terrorist organisation Euskadi and Freedom (ETA) is not only suspended but well and truly dead. On 8 January Arnaldo Otegi, leader of Batasuna, the illegal political wing of ETA, appeals to ETA to maintain its cease-fire. On 9 January ETA claims responsibility for the terrorist attack of 30 December 2006 at Barajas airport. On 13 January demonstrations for peace take place in various towns of the country, boycotted by the Popular Party (PP), the main opposition party, which had been very critical of the peace process with ETA. On 15 January Prime Minister Zapatero apologises to the whole of Spain for having announced an improvement in the peace process with ETA less than 24 hours before the Barajas attack of 30 December 2006.

• On 21 January there are confrontations between young people and police in the Basque Country and Navarre, following a court decision to reclassify three youth movements, Jarrai, Haika and Segi, as terrorist groups because of their links to ETA.

France

• On 3 January a Corsican separatist militant, Ange-Marie Tiberi, dies when his bomb goes off prematurely. Three men are arrested, including the President of the departmental Federation of farmers’ trade unions Joseph Colombani. On 5 January Sarkozy announces an investment programme for Corsica of one billion over 7 years.

• On 14 January the minister of the interior Nicolas Sarkozy is elected with 98% of the votes of members of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) as candidate for the country’s Presidential elections. Participation is only 69%.

• On 22 January the priest and social activist Abbé Pierre dies at the age of 94. He had founded the Companions of Emmaus to assist the most destitute and excluded.

Italy

• On 9 January a preliminary hearing begins on the co-operation between Italy and America in the abduction of Imam Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr (Abu Omar) in Milan in 2003.

• On 18 January the fragile government coalition of Prime Minister Romano Prodi suffers a setback when three of the coalition parties declare their opposition to Prodi’s plan to refinance Italy’s commitment in NATO operations in Afghanistan.

• On 24 January the European regulators cancel the charges against the Bank of Italy, accused of having impeded the acquisition of Italian banks by foreign ones, after the Bank of Italy modifies its rules in the matter of acquisitions.

• On 25 January the government announces new measures of economic liberalisation, including a reduction of the time required to open a business.

Slovenia

• On 1 January Slovenia adopts the Euro as the official currency, thus becoming the first of the ten countries that joined the EU in 2004 to adopt the single currency and the twelfth EU country to join the Eurozone.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

• On 3 January the tripartite presidency of the country appoints Nikola Spirić, a Bosnian Serb belonging to the Alliance of Independent Social-Democrats (SNSD), to the post of Prime Minister.

• On 11 January the trial of General Dragomir Milosevic, who in 1994 commanded the Romanija Corps of Sarajevo in the Serb Bosnian army, opens in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). He is charged
with crimes against humanity and violation of the laws and customs of war.

• On 24 January Christian Schwarz-Schilling announces his resignation as High Representative of the United Nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Serbia

• On 21 January the election of a new parliament takes place following the withdrawal of the liberal party G17+ from the government coalition in protest at the government’s failure to arrest General Ratko Mladic, a commander of the Serb Bosnian army wanted for genocide. This is the first parliamentary election since Montenegro became independent in May 2006. The Serb Radical Party (SRS), an ultra-nationalist party, is confirmed in its leadership with 81 seats, against 130 for the three democratic pro-European parties and blocs, the Democratic Party (DS), the Democratic Party of Serbia - New Serbia (DSS-NS) and G17+. The representatives of the EU had openly encouraged the electors to reject the ultra-nationalists of SRS and to vote for the pro-European parties.

• On 26 January the special envoy of the United Nations for Kosovo, Martii Ahtisaari, presents to the members of the contact group (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, United Kingdom and United States) assembled in Vienna his recommendations on the final status of the disputed province of Kosovo.

• On 29 January the government dismisses the inspector general of police and old advocate of human rights Vladimir Bozovic, who declares that his dismissal is due to pressures on the government to capture Ratko Mladic. He is replaced by Ljubinko Nikolic.

Montenegro

• On 18 January Montenegro becomes the 185th member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Albania

• On 12 January, after weeks of dispute between the government and the opposition on the preparation of municipal elections, 12 political parties sign an agreement to hold those elections on the following 18 February, thus putting an end to the crisis caused by the cancellation of those elections, which had originally been scheduled for 20 January. On 13 January the Albanian parliament amends the Constitution and the electoral law to bring those elections into line with European norms.

Greece

• On 10 January thousands of university teachers and civil servants go on strike to protest against the government’s plans to privatise the universities. On 15 January the doctors working in public hospitals go onto the streets to demand improvement of their conditions of work and a reduction in working hours.

• On 12 January, in protest against the presence of American and NATO bases on Greek territory, Revolutionary Struggle, a left-wing revolutionary group, throws a grenade at the United States embassy in Athens, causing no casualties.

Cyprus

• On 9 January the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) begin to dismantle the footbridge over Ledra Street in Nicosia, regarded by the Greek part of the island as an obstacle to efforts to reunify the commercial quarter of the town.

• On 22 January the ministers of foreign affairs of the EU decide to accelerate the establishment of direct trade relations with the TRNC.

Turkey

• On 19 January the Turkish journalist of Armenian origin and defender of human rights Hrant Dink, editor of the bilingual Turco-Armenian weekly Agos, is assassinated as he leaves his office in the centre of Istanbul. Hrant Dink had been prosecuted several times for insult to Turkish identity under Law 301 of the penal code, for criticising Turkey’s refusal to admit the Armenian genocide. He had already received death threats from Turkish nationalists. Thousands of demonstrators take to the streets to protest against what they perceive as excessive nationalism, and on 23 January 50,000 people attend the funeral of Hrant Dink, to which the Turkish authorities invited leading Armenian political and religious figures. On 25 January 5 people are arrested. On 26 and 31 January two other suspects are arrested.

Syria

• On 10 January the Syrian writer Akram Bounni is refused permission to go to Brussels to attend a sitting of the European Parliament devoted to human rights in Syria and the relations between Syria and the EU.

• On 27 January Syria adopts a series of laws to promote foreign investment.

Lebanon

• On 23 January thousands of opponents of the regime demonstrate in several towns at the call of the Shiite group Hezbollah and its Christian ally, Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement. During these demonstrations, clashes occur between opponents and supporters of the government, causing three deaths and some hundred injured. On 25 January clashes break out between supporters of the two groups in the Arab university of Beirut and spread to neighbouring institutions. These clashes result in three deaths. The secretary general of Hezbollah, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, calls for calm. On 31 January the Herald Tribune reports that Iran and Saudi Arabia are making diplomatic efforts to put an end to the political crisis in Lebanon.

• On 25 January an international conference of donors in Paris raises a total of 7.6 billion dollars to help reconstruction in Lebanon following the war between Hezbollah and Israel in July and August 2006.

Jordan

• On 24 January three men are condemned by the State Security Court to sentences of from 7 to 15 years’ imprisonment for planning attacks against American targets in Jordan.

Egypt

• On 1 January Ayman al-Zawahiri, the number two man in the organisation Al-Qaeda, accuses Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen of collaboration with the Americans and Israelis.

• On 13 January security officers arrest Huwaida Taha Mitwalli, a journalist of Al-Quds Al-Arabi, a London-based...
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newspaper, while he is making a documentary on the practice of torture in Egypt for the Al-Jazeera television network. The following day a State prosecutor accuses Mitwalli of injuring national interests and of possessing and distributing false images on the internal situation of the country liable to harm the dignity of the country. This arrest follows the publication of a video showing the torture of prisoners in Egyptian detention centres.

• On 14 and 24 January, in what looks like a growing campaign of repression against the Islamic organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood, the security forces arrest respectively 6 and 7 members of the organisation.

Libya

• On 23 January the General People’s Congress, Libya’s highest legislative and executive authority, proceeds to a major ministerial reshuffle and replaces the ministers of finance, economy and justice.

• On 31 January Libya’s minister of the interior Salah Rajab decides, following the session of the Council of Arab ministers of the interior assembled in Tunis, to demand a visa for entry to their territory from all Arab nationals, with the aim of fighting against the infiltration of terrorist elements and combating clandestine immigration.

Tunisia

• On 3 January 12 people suspected of belonging to an Islamist group die in clashes with the police in the town of Soliman. Fifteen people are arrested. On 12 January the minister of the interior and of local development Rafik Belhaj Kacem declares that these people are terrorists, suggesting that they have links with Islamist extremists in Algeria.

Algeria

• On 10 January France and Algeria declare that they will need an additional delay to sign a treaty of friendship, intended to strengthen their relations. From 19 to 22 January, for the first time since the country’s independence in 1962, a President of France’s National Assembly, Jean-Louis Debré, goes to Algeria. He makes a plea for rapprochement, compromised by the polemic over the colonisation.

• On 28 January the Algerian journal Liberté reports that the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) has changed its name to Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb.

Morocco

• On 4 January, the official press agency MAP reports that the police have broken up a terrorist network, which had international links and which sought to recruit and send volunteers to Iraq.

• On 15 January the High Court of Casablanca gives a three years’ suspended sentence to two journalists, Driss Ksikes and Sanaa Elaji, for making jokes about sexuality, Islam and politics in an article.

European Union

• On 1 January Germany assumes the rotating presidency of the EU for six months and is allocated the task of reaching an agreement on the content of the constitution of the European Union.

• On 1 January Romania and Bulgaria become members of the European Union, bringing the total number of members to 27. On 15 January 35 Romanian and 18 Bulgarian members of the European parliament are formally elected, raising the number of members of the European parliament from 732 to 785. Thanks to the new Romanian members from the right, a new party, Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty makes its appearance in the European Parliament, and the French member from the National Front, Bruno Gollnisch, is elected head of it.

• On 16 January Hans-Gert Pöttering, the leader of the European Popular Party and of the European Democrats (PPE-DE), is elected to the post of President of the European Parliament till the end of its term in 2009.

• On 26 January Spain and Luxembourg hold in Madrid a ministerial meeting assembling the 18 member states that have already ratified the European Constitution, together with Portugal and Poland. Under German pressure, there is no follow-up to this meeting.

February 2007

The Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb sets off 7 bombs near police stations around Algiers, with 6 victims. In Lebanon, on the eve of the second anniversary of the death of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, bombs go off in two buses in the Christian village of Ain Alaq, causing three deaths. The special envoy of the United Nations in charge of the negotiations on the final status for Kosovo presents his plan for the province of Kosovo, which is immediately rejected by the Serbian President. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) declares that the massacre in Srebrenica in 1995 should be classified as genocide. In Italy, the President refuses the resignation of the Italian Prime Minister, who has lost a vote in the Senate on an important question of foreign policy. At the end of February the government coalition carries a vote of confidence in the Senate. The campaign of repression carried on by the authorities for several months against the Muslim Brotherhood continues in Egypt and results in the arrest of 73 members in the month of February. In Europe the Ministers of the Environment of the EU commit themselves to reducing 20% of their greenhouse gas emissions by 2020.

Portugal

• On 11 February 59.25% of the electors vote in favour of de-criminalising abortion, permitting women to abort up to 10 weeks of pregnancy. Despite participation in the referendum below 50%, which was the minimum required for the vote to be binding, the Prime Minister José Sócrates declares that abortion will be legalised.

Spain

• On 12 February the Supreme Court reduces from twelve to three years the prison sentence on José Ignacio de Juan Chaos, former head of the “Comando Madrid” of the terrorist organisation ETA, who had been on a hunger strike for 98 days. On 24 February the Association of Victims of Terrorism (AVT), which is close to the opposition Popular Party (PP), organises a demonstration in Madrid
against the court’s decision and demands the resignation of the Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero for having begun peace negotiations with ETA.

- On 12 February the former prosecutor of the Supreme Court Mariano Fernández Bermejo is formally appointed to the post of minister of justice.
- On 15 February the trial opens of 29 persons, mostly of Moroccan nationality, accused of being implicated in the Madrid attacks of March 2004.

France

- On 8 February two police officers are accused of failing to assist persons in danger in the case of two young Muslims electrocuted in a Paris suburb in December 2005. Their deaths had led to riots all over the country and the declaration of a state of emergency.
- On 19 February the two legislative chambers adopt a series of constitutional amendments including the inclusion of the abolition of the death penalty in the French constitution and the possibility of removing the President of the Republic from his functions for derelictions of duty manifestly incompatible with the exercise of his mandate.

Italy

- On 7 February the judge Sante Spinaci orders that the American soldier Mario Lozano stand trial on 17 April over the killing of the Italian secret agent Nicola Calipari when the latter was engaged in a mission for the freeing of an Italian hostage in Iraq. The US Defence Department declares that the soldier will not be handed over.
- On 16 February the judge Caterina Interlandi orders that 26 Americans, mostly CIA agents, and 5 Italians stand trial on 8 June in connection with the affair of abduction and torture of the Egyptian imam Osama Mustafa Hassan Nasr in 2003. The latter was freed on 11 February after spending four years in prison. On 28 February the American government declares that it will oppose all demands for extradition of CIA agents.
- On 21 February the Prime Minister Romano Prodi resigns after his government coalition loses an important vote in the Senate over Italian support for NATO operations in Afghanistan and the expansion of the American military base located at Vicenza. On 24 February President Giorgio Napolitano opposes Prodi’s resignation and invites him to submit his government to a vote of confidence in the two legislative chambers. On 23 February Prodi obtains an agreement of the 9 parties of his coalition on a programme containing 12 points of non-negotiable policies, including the military presence in Afghanistan. To gain the support of the Union of Democrats for Europe (UDEUR), the government’s aim of legalising marriage between two persons of the same sex is abandoned. On 28 February Prodi’s coalition carries a vote of confidence in the Senate.

Malta

- On 27 February the Maltese government submits its official request to enter the Eurozone from 1 January 2008.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 9 February a new Council of Ministers is formed under the presidency of the Bosnian Serb Nikola Spiric, appointed to the post of Prime Minister by the tripartite presidency the previous 3 January.
- On 16 February Gojko Jankovic, leader of a military unit of the Foca brigade which was part of the Bosnian Serb army, is sentenced to 34 years’ imprisonment for crimes against humanity by a court of the country.
- On 26 February the International Court of Justice (ICJ) declares that the massacre of Muslims perpetrated in 1995 in the Bosnian town of Srebrenica fulfilled the criteria constituting genocide. This is the first time that a State is judged for genocide under the terms of the 1948 convention of the United Nations, adopted after the Nazi Holocaust.

Albania

- On 18 February the main opposition bloc, led by the Socialist Party of Albania (PSS), wins the majority of the 384 municipalities in the local elections.

Greece

- On 5 February the government of Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis survives a vote of no-confidence in the Vouli (single-chamber legislature).
- On 22 February 3 policemen are injured in demonstrations of students and teachers against the privatisation of universities.

Cyprus

- On 15 February the Greek Cypriot government makes an international call for tenders for oil and gas exploration along its coasts, against the opposition of Turkey, which is considering exploring the same areas and declares that the Greek part of the island has no right to sign agreements in the name of the Turk-
ish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

**Turkey**

- On 2 February a video showing some policemen treating as a hero the assassin of the journalist of Armenian origin Hrant Dink causes shock and consternation amid the Turkish population. Four policemen involved in this video are suspended. On 5 February the minister of the interior suspends the chief of intelligence police in Istanbul, Ahmet Ilhan Guler, for having failed to communicate essential information which he had received a year earlier on the planning of the assassination.

- On 13 and 18 February the Turkish army launches a raid against Kurdish insurgents in the town of Tunceli and the province of Bingol.

**Syria**

- On 8 February, at meetings with different representatives of the Syrian government, including Vice-President Farouk Shara, the minister of the interior Bassem Hamed, and the assistant minister of foreign affairs Faisal Mikdad, the High Commissioner of the United Nations for Refugees António Guterres makes acknowledgment of the support of Syria for the Iraqis who had fled the violence in their country of origin, and calls for greater international involvement to ease the humanitarian burden weighing on the region.

**Lebanon**

- On 8 February the Lebanese army seizes a cargo of arms near the port of Beirut, destined for Hezbollah.

- On 13 February three people lose their lives and another 21 are wounded in explosions in two buses in the Christian village of Ain Alaq, north of Beirut and a few kilometres from the birth-place of the former President Amijn Gemayel, whose son, Pierre Gemayel, was killed in November 2006 while minister for industry. In spite of the attack, nearly 300,000 people gather on 14 February in the centre of Beirut to commemorate the second anniversary of the death of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. At this demonstration, his son, Saad Hariri, leader of the 14 March Movement, appeals for the unity of the country.

**Jordan**

- On 21 February, for the first time, a Christian, Aziz Mossadeh, is appointed to the Administrative Council of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood and principal opposition group.

**Egypt**

- On 15 February, as part of a campaign of repression conducted by the authorities for the past months against the Muslim Brotherhood, the leading opposition force in Egypt, the authorities arrest 73 members of the organisation. On 28 February a court orders the freezing of the funds of 29 members of the organisation suspected of financing it.

- On 16 February the World Health Organisation (WHO) confirms that an Egyptian woman died of the H5N1 bird flu, bringing to three the number of people who died from the virus in 2007 in Egypt and to 13 since 2006.

- On 22 February Abdel-Karim Nabil Suleiman, arrested in November 2006, is sentenced to 4 years’ imprisonment for insulting Islam and President Hosni Mubarak, in several articles published in his blog. He is the first blogger to be condemned for his opinions expressed on the Internet. International human rights organisations denounce this serious blow to freedom of expression.

**Libya**

- On 10 February the European commissioner for immigration, Franco Frattini, announces that Libya has the intention of co-operating with the European Union in the fight against the influx of clandestine immigrants into Europe, and that it agrees to receive for the first time a delegation of experts of the EU to study conditions for reinforced surveillance on the southern frontier of the country. The commissioner adds that in return Tripoli will be a participant in co-operation in the Mediterranean.

- On 10 February the minister of foreign affairs Mohamed Abdel-Rahman Chalgham announces following a meeting of members of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) that Libya has no intention of imposing entry visas to its territory for nationals of Arab countries but will instead impose work and residence permits.

**Tunisia**

- On 17 February, in the context of a series of prosecutions of young people accused of being allied to the Salafist ideology, a court sentences 11 members of an Islamist group to three months and a half in prison for having held meetings without obtaining permission from the Tunisian authorities.

**Algeria**

- On 13 February 6 people, including two members of the security forces, die and 30 others are injured in the near-simultaneous explosion of seven bombs near police stations in towns to the east of Algiers. The Organisation of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSNPC), claims responsibility for these terrorist attacks.

**Morocco**

- On 26 February twelve ministries and government agencies, including the ministries of the interior and of justice, and nine independent organisations for the defence of human rights, adopt a five-year programme to promote respect for human rights among the population. It is based on cultural projects and awareness-raising campaigns aimed at changing mentalities, including those of the police and religious leaders. Once a year, a commission assembling representatives of the government and of associations for the defence of human rights is to meet to evaluate progress achieved.

**European Union**

- On 8 February, Joaquin Cortés is appointed first ambassador of the rights of the Roma. His task is to assist the member states of the EU in raising their economic and social status and combating discrimination against them.

- On 14 February the European Parliament adopts the report of Giovanni Claudio Fava on the alleged use of European countries by the CIA for the transport and illegal detention of prisoners. Fourteen member states of the EU, including Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, are
accused of being implicated closely or more distantly in this affair.

• On 15 February the ministers of justice and internal affairs of the EU adopt a series of rules to be put in place within three years regarding the transfer of prisoners within the EU, so that these may serve their sentences in their countries of origin.

• On 20 February the ministers of environment of the EU commit themselves to reducing 20% of their greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, with 1990 as the benchmark year, and by 30% if there is an international agreement.

• On 21 February the European Commission (EC) imposes a record fine of 992.2 million Euros on 5 lift-building companies, found guilty of having formed a cartel.

March 2007

Algeria and Morocco are hit by terrorist attacks. In Egypt constitutional amendments, criticised by the opposition and human-rights organisations, are approved by referendum. The trial of the former Prime Minister of the disputed province of Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj, opens before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Serbia appeals to the United Nations to reject the plan for a resolution for the province of Kosovo, composed by the mediator Martti Ahtisaari. In a positive step for the reunification of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot authorities demolish the separation wall in Ledra Street, in the centre of Nicosia. For the first time since the isolation of Syria, following the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005, a highly-placed representative of the EU visits Syria. On 25 March Europe celebrates the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaty of Rome. At the European summit in Brussels the EU member states adopt binding aims in the matter of reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.

Portugal

• On 8 March, following the referendum on the subject in February, the Assembly legalises abortion in the first ten weeks of pregnancy.

Spain

• On 1 March the government accepts that José Ignacio de Juana Chaos, former head of the “Comando Madrid” of the organisation Euskadi and Freedom (ETA), serve the end of his prison sentence under house arrest. On 10 March thousands of demonstrators take to the streets of Madrid, at the call of the opposition Popular Party (PP), to demand the resignation of Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. On 26 March Juan José Ibarretxe, President of the Basque General Assembly, is prosecuted for “contempt” in the High Court of the Basque Country for having held a meeting the previous January with Arnaldo Otegi, the leader of Batasuna, the political wing of the terrorist organisation ETA.

France

• On 1 March a new treatment for malaria is revealed, the product of a collaboration between Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the French pharmaceutical company Sanofi-Aventis within the project “Medicines for neglected diseases” launched in 2003 by MSF.

• On 11 March President Jacques Chirac announces that he will not stand for a third Presidential term. On 16 March 12 candidates are officially registered for the elections, all having obtained at least 500 signatures of national or local politicians. On 22 March Nicolas Sarkozy resigns as minister of the interior so as to enter the Presidential campaign.

• On 22 March a Paris court rejects the accusation of three Muslim organisations that the publication of the Danish caricatures of the Prophet Mahomet in the satirical journal Charlie Hebdo incited hatred towards Muslims.

Italy

• On 2 March the coalition government of Romano Prodi wins a vote of confidence in the Chamber of Deputies (lower house).

Slovenia

• On 31 March the mandate of Mitja Gaspari as governor of the Bank of Slovenia (central bank) comes to an end without any agreement being reached as to his successor. The Chamber of State (lower house) had not approved the candidates nominated by President Janez Drnovsek.

Croatia

• On 6 March 2007 the Stabilisation and Association Council (SAC) between the EU and Croatia holds its third session. The SAC states amongst other things that Croatia continues to fulfil the political criteria of Copenhagen, but those new and sustained efforts need to be made for reforms and their implementation in a certain number of important domains, such as the judicial system, public administration and the fight against corruption. The SAC welcomes the fact that full and complete co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is continuing, but declares that supplementary improvements are necessary as regards prosecution for war crimes in Croatia.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

• On 28 February the government of the Republika Srpska apologise for the crimes committed during the Bosnian war between 1992 and 1995 and appeals to the Croat-Muslim Federation to do the same.

• On 30 March the Chamber of Representatives of the Croat-Muslim Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina approves a new government, under the presidency of Nadzad Brankovic of the Party of Democratic Action (SDA).

Serbia

• On 5 March there begins in the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) the trial of the former Prime Minister of the disputed province of Kosovo, Ramush Haradinaj, accused of war crimes and of crimes against humanity for acts committed when he was commander of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during the separatist war in the province from 1997 to 1999.

• On 10 March, at the last meeting of the Serb leaders and the Albanian majority of Kosovo on the plan for a resolution for Kosovo, drawn up by the special envoy of the United Nations Martti Ahtisaari, Ser-
Serbia rejects the plan and appeals to the United Nations to do the same. At the closure of the meeting, Ahtisaari declares that there is no hope for the two parties to come to an agreement on the final status of the province. On 26 March he submits his plan to the United Nations Security Council. The United States and United Kingdom support his plan, against the opposition of Russia, which is Serbia’s ally.

Montenegro
• On 12 March the EU and Montenegro initial a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, an important step towards the accession of Montenegro to the EU. The EU requires Montenegro to adopt a new constitution before the agreement can be formally signed.

Albania
• On 12 March the Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha reshuffles his government, three weeks after the municipal elections in which the electors showed their discontent. Gazmend Oketa becomes deputy Prime Minister and Ilir Ruzmi, the former deputy Prime Minister, becomes minister of justice.

Greece
• On 8 March 31 women are arrested for having organised an illegal demonstration in support of Abdullah Ocalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) included on the European terrorist list. On 21 March the police arrest more than 200 persons at unauthorised rallies marking the celebrations for the Kurdish New Year (Newroz), at which the Kurds claimed independence.
• On 29 March the negotiations for Turkey’s accession to the EU resume with the opening of negotiations on the second chapter, relating to business and industry.

Syria
• On 12 March Ellen Sauerbrey, American Assistant Secretary of State for population, refugees and migrations, goes to Syria and meets the deputy Prime Minister Faisal Miqdad and representatives of the High Commissioner of the United Nations for Refugees, to discuss the question of Iraqi refugees in Syria. On 14 March, for the first time since the country’s isolation after the assassination of the Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, the participation of 19 people. There is a referendum the following day on the constitutional amendments to bring an end to the current political crisis.
• On 14 March security officers arrest 4 Syrians, members of a radical Palestinian group, in relation with the attack on two buses the previous 13 February in the Christian village of Ain Alaq, to the north of Beirut.


Jordan
• On 7 March the trial opens in the State Security Court of 3 Jordanians accused of having planned the assassination of American President George W. Bush during his visit to Jordan in late November 2006.

Egypt
• On 19 March the People’s Assembly approves constitutional orders which according to the government are intended to fight more effectively against sectarianism and terrorism. Among these amendments are the prohibition on forming political parties on a religious base, the end of supervision of elections by judges and new anti-terrorist measures giving large powers to the police to arrest suspects and keep their communications under surveillance. The opposition and human rights organisations accuse the government of seeking to undermine civil and political liberties and encouraging the violation of human rights. On 25 March a protest against the holding of a referendum the following day on the constitutional amendments takes place in Cairo and results in the arrest of 19 people. The referendum, boycotted by the opposition, takes place on 26 March, and on 27 March the minister of Justice Mamduh Mur’i announces that 75.9% of participants voted in favour of the amendments. The participation amounted to 27.1% of electors. The national council for human rights, a government body under the presidency of the former Secretary General of the United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali, reports numerous defects in the organisation
and holding of the referendum and criticises certain provisions of this reform.

**Tunisia**

• On 28 March some hundred North African and European businesses operating in the field of environmental management assemble in Tunis, within the framework of a partnership meeting on the subject “innovative opportunities for the conservation of the environment.” They plead for the putting in place of a common and effective environmental policy aimed at reducing the damaging effects of industrial waste and polluting emissions on the environment and ensuring a durable development in the region. They commit themselves to an exchange of expertise and the seizing of partnership opportunities offered in the region.

**Algeria**

• On 3 and 4 March the Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb carries out two terrorist attacks at Medea and in the province of Tizi Ouzou respectively. Ten Algerians and a Russian lose their lives in these attacks.
• On 22 March the most important fraud trial in Algeria’s history concludes with the sentencing in absentia of Rafiq Khalifa, the owner of the Khalifa Bank, to life imprisonment.

**Morocco**

• On 5 March Mohammed Ben El Hadi Messahel, of Tunisian origin, is sentenced to 15 years in prison for membership of a terrorist network recruiting persons in Morocco for attacks planned in Europe, particularly in France and Italy.
• On 6 March the Spanish Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero holds a meeting with his Moroccan opposite number to discuss the project to build a railway between Morocco and Spain passing under the Strait of Gibraltar.
• On 11 March a suicide attempt in a cybercafé in Casablanca injures 4 people. An accomplice of the bomber, who died in the attack, is arrested.

**European Union**

• On 1 March the Agency for Fundamental Rights, successor of the European Observatory for Racist and Xenophobic Phenomena (EUMC), is officially inaugurated in Vienna.

**Arab League**

• On 28 and 29 March the Arab League holds its 19th summit in Riyadh. The Arab leaders decide to renew the proposal of March 2002 of the Saudi King Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz to exchange “territories against peace” with the object of putting an end to the Israeli-Arab conflict. The Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi boycotts this meeting, and the President of Tunisia Zine El Abidine Ben Ali is represented by the Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi.

**April 2007**

*Three suicide attacks, claimed by the Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb, cause 33 deaths in Algiers while another attack is foiled in Morocco. In Syria the Baath Party and its allies of the National Progressive Front win the legislative elections. In Egypt human rights organisations denounce the frauds in the referendum in March and the trial of 40 leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood movement opens before a military court. The National Assembly of Kosovo approves by a majority the plan on the status of Kosovo presented by the United Nations special envoy in Kosovo Martii Ahtisaari. In Turkey mass demonstrations are organised against the election of an Islamist to the presidency of the country. Abdullah Gül, the candidate of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in power and the only candidate entered in the Presidential election, does not obtain enough votes to be elected in the first round, and the opposition demands early elections. In Lebanon tensions erupt in the National Assembly at the session intended to approve the establishment of an international tribunal to judge suspects in the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005. Nicolas Sarkozy of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) and Ségolène Royal of the Socialist Party (PS) win the first round of the Presidential elections in France. The ministries of the interior of the EU approve the creation of a rapid response force to aid member states confronted with a sudden influx of clandestine immigrants.*
**Appendices**

2008

Branimir Glavas, who had lost his parliamentary immunity in October 2006, is internationally Criminal Tribunal for the arrest, accused of war crimes by a murder of 10 civilians of Serb origin in court in Osijek for having ordered the paramilitary police unit “Scorpions” to prison terms up to 20 years, for the prosecution of 6 Muslim civilians of Bosnian origin in July 1995 near Trnovo. They had been arrested following the broadcasting in Serbian television in June 2005 of an amateur video showing the murders.

France

- On 22 April Nicolas Sarkozy, of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), wins the first round of the Presidential elections, with Ségolène Royalé, the candidate of the Socialist Party (PS), as runner-up.

Italy

- On 17 April the trial in absentia begins in Rome of Mario Lozano, an American soldier accused of murdering the Italian secret agent Nicola Calipari in Iraq in March 2005, when he had just liberated an Italian hostage. The trial is finally postponed to 14 May.

- On 20 April the Prime Minister Romano Prodi announces that he will not present himself for the legislative elections of 2011. On 21 and 22 April, on the initiative of Romano Prodi, the Democrats of the Left (DS) and Margherita, respectively the leading and second parties of the government coalition Union, amalgamate and form the new Democratic Party (PD). The purpose of this amalgamation is to stabilise the centre-left government coalition.

Croatia

- On 18 April the member of parliament Branimir Glavas, who had lost his parliamentary immunity in October 2006, is arrested, accused of war crimes by a court in Osijek for having ordered the murder of 10 civilians of Serb origin in 1991.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 3 April the Appeal Court of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) reduces from 32 to 30 years’ imprisonment the sentence of Radislav Brdjanin, the former deputy Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska.

- On 4 April the ICTY sentences Dragan Zelenovic, a former Bosnian Serb policeman, to 15 years’ imprisonment for raping and torturing Bosnian Muslim women in 1992 in the municipality of Foca, in eastern Bosnia.

Serbia

- On 15 April the Parliamentary Assembly of Kosovo approves by a majority the plan on the status of Kosovo presented by the United Nations Special Envoy in Kosovo, Martii Ahtisaari, who recommends independence under international supervision.

- On 10 April a Serbian court judging war crimes sentences 4 members of the paramilitary police unit “Scorpions” to prison terms up to 20 years, for the summary execution of 6 Muslim civilians of Bosnian origin in July 1995 near Trnovo. They had been arrested following the broadcasting in Serbian television in June 2005 of an amateur video showing the murders.

Macedonia

- On 16 April the trial opens of the former minister of the interior Ljube Boskovski and of Johan Tarculovski, a former police officer, before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). They are on trial for their role in the clashes that broke out in early August 2001 in the village of Ljuboten between the Macedonian security forces and rebels of Albanian origin, and which cost the lives of 10 Albanians.

- On 18 April a new political party, the National Albanian Movement for Illyria (LKSHI) is constituted. It has the aim of federalising Macedonia into two entities.

Albania

- On 24 April the Minister of Foreign Affairs Besnik Mustafaj resigns for health reasons. The Prime Minister Sali Berisha proposes the nomination to the vacant post of Luizim Basha, hitherto minister of public works, transport and telecommunications.

Greece

- On 7 April 2007 The Economist reports that the Vouli (single-chamber parliament) has rejected the government’s plans to reform the constitution to allow the creation of private universities.

- On 28 April the Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis dismisses the minister of employment and social security Savvas Tsitouridis for his responsibility in the scandal of state pension funds.

Turkey

- On 5 April the Turkish negotiators withdraw from negotiations with Gaz de France on the construction of a pipeline to transport the gas of the Caspian region to Europe, in protest at a proposed French law about the acknowledgment of the Armenian genocide between 1915 and 1923.

- On 14 April nearly 300,000 people take to the streets of Ankara to protest against the possible candidature of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whom they accuse of eroding secularism in Turkey, in the country’s Presidential elections. On 24 April the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in power decides to present the current deputy Prime Minister and minister of foreign affairs Abdullah Gül as candidate in the Presidential elections. Abdullah Gül, whose wife wears a veil, promises that he will defend the principles of secularism. On 29 April nearly 700,000 demonstrators in Istanbul accuse the government of wishing to set up an Islamic state and demand that the government withdraw its Presidential candidate. On 27 April, in the first round of Presidential elections, boycotted by the secularist parties, Abdullah Gül, the sole candidate contesting the Presidential election, does not obtain the two-thirds majority in the Grand National Assembly (GNA) assuring election in the first round. After the vote, the military supreme command warns the government that it will not hesitate to intervene if it considers that secularism is threatened. On 29 April the Council of Europe warns the army not to intervene. The opposition parties call for an early general election.

- In the course of the month, 32 Kurdish insurgents and at least 9 soldiers are killed in clashes.
Syria

- On 22 and 23 April, the Baath Party and its 6 allies in the National Progressive Front win the legislative elections with 172 seats out of 250. The 78 remaining seats are won by independent candidates.
- On 24 April a criminal court in Damascus sentences the advocate and defender of human rights Anwar al-Bunni, signatory of the Beirut-Damascus Declaration, to 5 years’ imprisonment for "dissemination of false reports injurious to the State" and to a fine of 2,000 dollars, for having conducted activities in the Centre for the Development of Civil Society without obtaining prior permission. He had been arrested in May 2006, with other signatories of the same declaration.

Lebanon

- On 3 April the President of the National Assembly Nabbi Berri prevents the pro-government members of the Assembly from entering it, so as to prevent the holding of a session to approve the formation of an international tribunal to judge the suspects in the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005. The government of Faoud Siniora, together with the parliamentary majority led by the son of Rafiq Hariri, Saad Hariri, the Sunni leader of the "14 March Movement", accuse Nabbi Berri of protecting Syria, suspected of being implicated in the assassination. The pro-government members write to the United Nations to demand the establishment of that tribunal.
- On 23 April the kidnap and murder of Ziad Qablan, aged 25, and of Ziad Ghandour, aged 12, both of them connected with the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) of Walid Jumblatt, arouse fears of a return to sectarian tensions in Lebanon.

Jordan

- On 2 April the State Security Court sentences to prison 6 persons, including 3 Iraqis, one Syrian and one Libyan, accused of having planned an attack on the Queen Alia international airport in Amman in 2006 in co-ordination with Al-Qaeda. Four of them are sentenced to life imprisonment.
- On 21 April Jordanian security agents confiscate the records of the interview of Prince Hassan bin Talal, uncle of King Abdullah II of Jordan, on Al-Jazeera. Al-Jazeera declares that these records were confiscated because they contained proposals that could injure relations between Jordan and friendly countries.

Egypt

- On 10 April the Egyptian Organisation for Human Rights and 5 other human rights organisations declare that participation in the referendum of 26 March was only 5% and not 27% as the government announced. They also denounce the frauds in the referendum.
- On 17 April the Egyptian authorities confirm the arrest of the Egyptian engineer Mohammed Sayed Saber Ali, an employee of the country’s nuclear agency. He is accused of spying for Israel.
- On 26 April the trial of 40 leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including the number 3 of the organisation Khayrat al-Shater, opens before a military court. They are accused of directing an illegal group, of terrorism and of money-laundering.

Tunisia

- On 12 April a report published on the Internet site of Al-Hayat, based in London, declares that in the past two years nearly 1,000 Tunisians have been detained as part of the fight against terrorism. The majority are young people, accused of wishing to enlist in the Iraqi resistance.

Algeria

- On 11 April three suicide attacks claimed by the Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb take place almost simultaneously in Algiers and cause 33 deaths and 220 injuries. The first attack was directed against the offices of the Prime Minister and the ministry of the interior, the second against a power station in the Bab Ezzouar district and the third against the police station of that district.
- On 18 April the Al-Jazeera television station reports that Algerian opposition members in exile in London, including members of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), illegal in Algeria, have announced the creation of a new political party called Rachad. The aim of the new party is to make a radical change of the political regime in Algeria.

Morocco

- On 10 and 14 April three suicide bombers attempting attacks blow themselves up in Casablanca. A fourth is brought down by the police before being able to set off his charge. On 14 April the official press agency MPA announces that the leader of the group has been arrested. On 24 April the minister of the interior Chakib Benmoussa announces that 2 terrorist groups, responsible for the attacks in Casablanca in March, have been broken up after the arrest of their leaders and of 13 future suicide bombers. On 25 April he announces that 25,000 more soldiers will be deployed in Casablanca.

European Union

- On 19 and 20 April the ministers of justice and internal affairs approve at their meeting in Luxembourg a framework decision for combating racism, defining incitement to radical or religious hatred and the denial of certain genocides, including the Holocaust, as European crimes punishable by a prison sentence of up to three years.
- On 20 April the ministers of the interior approve the creation of a rapid response force composed of 450 frontier guards to help member states facing a sudden influx of illegal immigrants.

May 2007

Nicolas Sarkozy becomes the new President of the French Republic, while in Syria President Bashar al-Assad is confirmed in office for 7 years. In Serbia a pro-European government takes the reins of power and in Algeria the pro-government Presidential Alliance wins the legislative elections. In Turkey the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announces the early calling of an election to put an end to the political crisis. Abdullah Gül for his part withdraws his Presidential candidacy as demonstrations continue against the islamisation of the country. The repression of defenders of human rights
continues in Syria. Italy and Syria become members of the new United Nations Council for Human Rights.

Portugal

- On 17 May the judge Rui Pereira succeeds Antonio Costa, who resigns, in the post of minister of the interior.

Spain

- On 2 May Batasuna, the illegal political wing of the organisation Euskadi and Freedom (ETA) declares that the exclusion of its supporters from the local elections would harm the peace process. On 16 May the Supreme Court forbids all the 246 candidates of the Basque Socialist Patriotic Union (ASB), to register as a political party in order to take part in the local elections of 27 May, on the grounds of their links with Batasuna. 133 candidates of Basque Nationalist Action (ANV) are likewise excluded from the elections. On 19 May 3,000 people demonstrate in Pamplona against the exclusion of the Basque separatist candidates. The elections are won in most of the towns by the Popular Party (PP) and the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE).
- Between 10 and 13 May, 815 illegal immigrants land on the Canary Islands.

France

- On 6 May Nicolas Sarkozy, of the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), wins the second round of the Presidential elections with 53.06% of the votes. At the ceremony of transfer of power at the Elysée on 16 May, the new President of the Republic declares that the revitalisation of the French economy will be one of his priorities. On 17 May Sarkozy appoints François Fillon as Prime Minister, in succession to Dominique de Villepin. The following day a new government is installed. The socialist Bernard Kouchner becomes minister of foreign affairs and European affairs and Rachida Dati, of North African origin, becomes minister of justice.
- On 30 May 14 members of the National Corsican Liberation Front of the Anonymous (FLNcDA), including its presumed leader Antoine Marchini, are sentenced to prison terms of up to 12 years, for attacks committed in Corsica between 2001 and 2002.

Italy

- On 12 May thousands of protesters rally against the government’s proposed law to legalise marriage between two persons of the same sex.
- On 17 May Italy is elected by the United Nations General Assembly to membership of the United Nations Human Rights Council for a period of 3 years.
- On 27 and 28 May, the House of Liberties, Silvio Berlusconi’s centre-right alliance, in opposition on the federal level, wins the local elections in 14 of the 19 main towns of the country. Berlusconi calls on the Prime Minister Romano Prodi to resign.

Malta

- On 16 May Malta obtains the support of the European Commission and the European Central Bank for its entry into the club of countries using the Euro.
- At the end of May, 27 would-be immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa survive for three days clinging to drifting fishing-cages, while the Maltese and Libyan authorities repudiated the responsibility for rescue. The victims of the shipwreck are finally rescued on 26 May by the Italian navy after a clamour from public opinion.

Croatia

- On 11 May the heads of state and of government of the countries of South Eastern Europe assemble on occasion of the 10th summit of the South Eastern Europe Co-operation Process (SEECP) to discuss how further to strengthen co-operation in the region. The President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso, the Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn and the German presidency of the EU are also present.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

- On 9 May the Appeal Court of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) confirms the sentence of the officers of the Serb Bosnian army Vidoje Blagojevic and Dragan Jokic for crimes against humanity and violation of the laws and customs of war for their acts committed in July 1995 against Muslim Bosnians in the region of Srebrenica. Nevertheless the Court dismisses the charges of complicity with genocide against Blagojevic and reduces his sentence from 18 to 15 years’ imprisonment. On 25 May the condemned war criminal Radovan Stankovic escapes from his prison situated in the town of Foca. His trial had been the first to be transferred to a national court to lighten the work of the ICTY. On 31 May the senior commander in the Serb Bosnian army Zdravko Tolimir, wanted for genocide and other crimes committed in Srebrenica in 1995, is arrested on the Bosnian-Serbian frontier.

Serbia

- On 15 May the National Assembly approves in extremis a new government, composed of the three democratic pro-European parties and blocs: G17+, the Democratic Party (DS) and the Democratic Party of Serbia-New Serbia (DSS-NS). On 23 May Oliver Dulic of the DS is appointed to the post of President of the National Assembly. On 16 May the European Commissioner for enlargement Olli Rehn declares that, once the programme of the new government for co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) is rigorously implemented, the negotiations on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, suspended in May 2006 after the Serbian government had failed to arrest General Ratko Mladic, will resume. On 16 May a spokesperson of the ICTY declares that according to its information Mladic is in Serbia. On 31 May a spokesperson of the ICTY announces that Zdravko Tolimir, a former Serb general of Bosnian origin and close to General Ratko Mladic, has been arrested on the Bosnian-Serbian frontier.
- On 23 May a special court for organised crime in Belgrade imposes prison sentences of up to 40 years on 12 persons implicated in the assassination in March 2003 of the former Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic.

Macedonia

- On 20 May the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP), the third-largest par-
ty of Albanian ethnicity, decides to join the government coalition. This decision puts an end to the boycott of the Sobranje (single-chamber parliament) initiated by the main Albanian party Democratic Union for Integration (BDI) in January. On 29 May, the BDI formally returns to opposition in the Sobranje after the government promises that certain laws would only come into force if they were supported by the Albanians.

- On 22 May the former Macedonian minister and diplomat Srčjan Kerim is elected President of the United Nations General Assembly for its 62nd annual session, which begins in September.

Albania

- On 4 May the Christian Democrat Party (PDK), which holds only 2 seats in the People’s Assembly, withdraws its support from the government coalition of Prime Minister Sali Berisha.

Greece

- On 7 May the European Commission announces that it is suspending its supervision over Greece’s budget, declaring that Greece has made important steps towards reducing its deficit.

Cyprus

- On 3 May the Greek Cypriot Minister of Defence Nikos Symeonides dies in a hospital in Nicosia. On 14 May President Tassos Papadopoulos appoints Christodoulos Pashiardis, former spokesman of the government and under-secretary of the presidency, to the vacant post.

- On 16 May Cyprus obtains the support of the European Commission and the European Central Bank for its entry into the club of countries using the Euro.

Turkey

- On 1 May the constitutional court annuls the results of the first round of Presidential elections on 27 April. On 2 May the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan announces the holding of early elections on 22 July, so as to put an end to the political crisis that developed with the nomination of the deputy Prime Minister and minister of foreign affairs Abdullah Gül as Presidential candidate of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). On 6 May Gül withdraws his Presidential candidature, after the main opposition party the People’s Republican Party (CHP) decides to boycott again the first round of Presidential elections. On the same day the Grand National Assembly (GNA) formally puts an end to the Presidential election process. On 13 May nearly one and a half million people demonstrate in Izmir in favour of secularism and call on the parties to unify. The current secularist President Ahmet Necdet Sezer, whose term of office comes to an end on 16 May, is continued in office until the legislative elections of 22 July. On 31 May a constitutional reform is voted for, in opposition to the current President, to allow the ordinary electors, not the legislature, to elect their President directly.

- On 5 May two secularist opposition parties, the Party of the Mother Country (ANAP) and the Party of the Just Way (DYP) decide to form a single party, the Democratic Party (DP), to strengthen their chances of winning 10% of the votes in the coming legislative elections, the minimum required for representation in the GNA. The CHP and the Democratic Party of the Left announce that they will form an alliance in the coming legislative elections so as to improve their chances of defeating the AKP.

- On 12 May, in a terrorist attack a bomb goes off in a market in Izmir, wounding 15 people. On 22 May 6 people die and some hundred people are injured in a suicide bombing in a shopping centre in Ankara. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) denies all responsibility.

Syria

- On 3 May, for the first time since the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in February 2005, the minister of foreign affairs Walid al-Muallim meets Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, on occasion of an international conference on security in Iraq taking place at Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt.

- On 10 May the physician and defender of human rights Kamal Labwani is sentenced by a Syrian court to 12 years in prison for having had contacts with a foreign power with a view to an aggression against Syria, an accusation which had only been subsequently added to his act of indictment. Dr Labwani had been arrested on 8 November 2005 on his return from the United States on the pretext that he had disseminated lying or erroneous information. On 13 May two signatories of the Beirut-Damascus Declaration, the writers Michel Kilo and Mahmoud Issa, arrested in May 2006, are sentenced to 3 years in prison, held guilty of spreading false information, of weakening the national feeling and of incitement to religious and racial dissension.

- On 27 May the current President Bashar al-Assad, the only candidate standing for the presidency of the country, is confirmed in his post for 7 years by a national referendum. He obtains 97.62% of the votes and participation amounts to 95.86% of voters.

Lebanon

- On 30 May the United Nations Security Council adopts, by a limited majority, resolution 1757 (2007), which declares the entry into force, from the following 10 June, of the agreement between the Lebanese government and the United Nations on the creation of an international tribunal to judge the authors of the attack which caused the death of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005, together with the authors of some fifteen other attacks in the country since 2004. Adopted by a majority of 10 votes, with the abstention of Qatar, Indonesia, South Africa, China and the Russian Federation, the resolution is placed within the framework of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.

Jordan

- On 13 May, some forty Nobel Prize winners and other personalities, including the former Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan and the Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres, meet at Petra for the forum “PetraxIII: building a better world”, the third to be organised jointly by the King Abdullah II Fund for Development and the Foundation for Humanity of Elie Wiesel, who received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1986. They discuss with Israeli, Palestinian and Jordanian students the challenges facing young people in this region beset with conflicts.
**Egypt**

- On 24 May the committee for the affairs of political parties in Majlis al-Shura (the upper chamber) approves the creation of the new party Hizb al-Gabha al-Democrati (Democratic Front Party), founded by Osama al-Ghazali Harb, a former member of the political secretariat of the ruling National Democratic Party (PDN) and editor-in-chief of the paper Al-Siyassa Al-Dawliya.

**Morocco**

- On 21 May King Mohammed VI appoints Ahmed Herzenni, a former political detainee, head of the Consultative Council on Human Rights (CCDH, public), replacing Driss Benzeki, also a former political detainee, who died the previous day. The King asks Ahmed Herzenni to work towards the realisation especially of the plan to promote human rights education, of the Citizenship Charter and medical cover for former victims of human rights violations in the Kingdom.

**Libya**

- On 29 May the British Prime Minister Tony Blair goes to Libya to discuss with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi a closer co-operation over intelligence and the anti-terrorist struggle.

**European Union**

- On 16 May Chancellor Angela Merkel, the current President of the EU, and President Nicolas Sarkozy meet in Berlin to discuss the future of the Constitutional Treaty of the EU. While they agree on ratification of the new treaty by the parliaments, Angela Merkel, in contrast to Nicolas Sarkozy, wishes to preserve as much as possible of the original text. The British Prime Minister Tony Blair aligns himself with Sarkozy’s position of having a simplified and cut-down treaty.
- On 16 May the European Commission publishes propositions to fight at the European level against the recruitment of illegal immigrants, accompanied by legal sanctions for companies and individuals who employ such staff.

**Tunisia**

- On 23 May the Al-Jazeera television network reports that 3 Tunisians have been sentenced by a court of first instance in Tunis to terms between 4 and 11 years of imprisonment for terrorism. At the same time 30 people, arrested in January in armed clashes between the security forces and Islamists that cost the lives of 12 militants and 8 policemen, are charged with terrorism and conspiracy against the internal security of the country.

**Morocco**

- On 21 May King Mohammed VI appoints Ahmed Herzenni, a former political detainee, head of the Consultative Council on Human Rights (CCDH, public), replacing Driss Benzeki, also a former political detainee, who died the previous day. The King asks Ahmed Herzenni to work towards the realisation especially of the plan to promote human rights education, of the Citizenship Charter and medical cover for former victims of human rights violations in the Kingdom.

**Algeria**

- On 17 May the pro-government Presidential Alliance, composed of the National Liberation Front (FLN), the National Democratic Rally (RND) and the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP) win the legislative elections with a total of 249 seats. The participation, at 36%, is the lowest since the country’s independence in 1962. Al-Qaeda and other groups and parties, such as the Front of Socialist Forces (FFS) and the banned leaders of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), had called for the boycott of the elections. The Islamists of the main opposition party of the previous parliament, the Movement for National Reform (MRN), lose 40 seats out of 43.

**Europe**

- On 10 and 17 June the elections for the National Assembly (lower chamber)
result in the keeping of a comfortable majority by the Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) and an increase in the number of seats won by the Socialist Party (PS). The Democratic Movement (MoDem), François Bayrou’s new centre party, is the great loser in the elections. On 19 June there is a government reshuffle. On 26 June Bernard Accoyer is elected President of the National Assembly.

• On 13 June a new proposed law on immigration is presented. This law requires that non-Europeans wishing to join their families in France should demonstrate a familiarity with French and with French values before leaving their countries. The family members in France will also need to sign a contract undertaking to integrate the new arrivals in French society.

Italy

• On 6 June the centre-left coalition of Prime Minister Romano Prodi, Union, narrowly survives a series of key votes in the Senate concerning the bad management of a banking scandal to which the minister of economy Vincenzo Visco is linked.

• On 9 June some tens of thousands of people demonstrate in the streets of Rome against the visit of the American President George W. Bush.

Malta

• On 1 June the bodies of 18 would-be immigrants are recovered from the sea around Malta.

• On 12 June, at a meeting of ministers of the interior of the EU in Luxembourg, the Maltese minister of the interior Tonio Borg calls for the study of a distribution between European countries of immigrants rescued along the Libyan coasts, in view of the multiplication of shipwrecks in that area of the Mediterranean. The European ministers of the interior show little enthusiasm for Malta’s request.

Croatia

• On 12 June the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sentences the former Croatian Serb leader Milan Martic to 35 years in prison for crimes against humanity and violation of the laws and customs of war, for acts committed in Croatia in the early nineties against Croats and other non-Serb civilians.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

• On 4 June nearly 240 relations of victims of the Srebrenica massacre in 1995 enter a suit before the Supreme Court of the Netherlands against the United Nations and the Dutch state for their incapacity to prevent the massacre of Srebrenica, which had been declared a “safe haven” for civilians by the United Nations and was under the protection of the Dutch blue-helms.


Serbia

• From 6 to 8 June, at their summit in Heiligendamm in Germany, the members of the G8 struggle with their disagreements over the future of the province of Kosovo. The proposal of the French President Nicolas Sarkozy to postpone by 6 months a resolution of the United Nations Security Council in favour of the independence of Kosovo is rejected by Russia. On 10 June the American President George W. Bush declares that the United States may recognise unilaterally the independence of Kosovo if Russia blocks the United Nations process. On 22 June the Serbian President Boris Tadic announces that Serbia is ready to commit itself to new negotiations on the future status of Kosovo.

• On 13 June, after the prosecutor general of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Carla del Ponte had welcomed the co-operation of Serbia with the Tribunal, the EU reopens the negotiations, suspended in May 2006, on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, with the new government of Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica. The EU’s commissioner for enlargement Olli Rehn declares that the negotiations will not be closed until there is a complete co-operation by Serbia with the ICTY, leading to the arrest and delivery of all those charged before the ICTY.

• On 24 June a new political party is created, the Democratic Union of Croats (DZH). The party represents the Croat minority in the country.

Macedonia

• On 5 June the Sobranje (single-chamber parliament) passes a law creating a legal framework for co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

• On 12 June, following the decision of the Albanian Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) to end its boycott to the Sobranje, Abdurrahman Memeti (PDP) is appointed to the post of minister for local government, in succession to Zoran Konjanovski.

Albania

• On 10 June the American President George W. Bush becomes the first American President to visit the country.

• On 20 and 27 June the People’s Assembly fails to reach an agreement on the appointment of a new President to succeed the current President, General Alfred Moisiu.

Greece

• During the month of June Greece is hit by a heat wave reaching record temperatures of up to 46 degrees in certain regions. At least 11 people lose their lives in consequence of this heat and forest fires kill 2 firemen.

Cyprus

• On 15 June the United Nations Security Council adopts resolution 1758 (2007), extending “the mandate of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)” till 15 December 2007 and encouraging the two parties to put in place other measures of confidence, like the recent opening of points of passage between the North and South of the island.

Turkey

• At the beginning of June 100,000 Turkish soldiers take up positions along the
frontier with Iraq, where insurgents of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), included on the European terrorist list, have installed their bases. On 3 June the American Defense Secretary appeals to Turkey not to invade northern Iraq.

- Between 4 and 13 June at least 8 paramilitary policemen and 8 soldiers die in orchestrated attacks in the southwest of the country. On 11 June the funeral of 3 soldiers killed in clashes with PKK, rebels turns into a demonstration against the government for its inability to tackle Kurdish violence. On 12 June the PKK announces that it will cease its attacks in Turkey if the latter puts an end to its fight against the insurrection.
- On 15 June the outgoing secularist President Ahmet Nacdet Sezer calls for the holding of a referendum on the government’s proposal to reform the system for electing the President. He had vetoed the proposal on the previous 26 May, before the proposal was passed again on 31 May by the Grand National Assembly (GNA).
- On 26 June the EU opens accession negotiations on two new chapters, one concerning statistics and the other financial control. The opening of negotiations on a third chapter, economic and monetary union, is blocked by French diplomats.

**Syria**

- On 6 June the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declares that he wishes to enter into direct peace negotiations without preconditions with the Syrians.

**Lebanon**

- On 1 June clashes between the army and the militant group Fatah al-Islam in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr el-Bared result in the deaths of one soldier and at least 8 militants. On 3 June clashes break out also in the Palestinian refugee camp of Ain el-Hilweh with members of the group of Jund al-Sham, and on 4 June 2 soldiers and 2 Jund al-Sham militants are killed. On 6 June 7 combatants of Fatah al-Islam surrender to the leaders of the Fatah at Nahr el-Bared. On 8 June the Lebanese army resumes its offensive against the Nahr el-Bared camp, after 2 days of calm. On 11 June two members of the Red Cross and a soldier are killed there. On 21 June the minister of the interior announces that Fatah al-Islam has been defeated and that the operation in the Nahr el-Bared camp is concluded. 172 people have lost their lives in the clashes in the course of the month.
- On 13 June the member of parliament Walid Eido, a member of the Future Movement, the ruling anti-Syrian party, is killed in a car-bomb attack in the Marna district of Beirut. His son and 8 other people likewise are killed in the attack. On 14 June the Syrian ministry of foreign affairs publishes a communiqué in which Syria denies all implication in the assassination.
- On 24 June 6 members of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (FINUL) are killed in a car-bomb attack between the towns of Marjayoun and Kham. No-one claims responsibility for the attack.

**Egypt**

- On 4 June Egyptian officials announce the liberation of 130 members of Islamic Jihad, who have signed agreements renouncing violence. These persons had been arrested for terrorist and anti-government activities and had been held in prison without charge.
- On 11 and 18 June the partial election of the Consultative Council (Majlis ash-Shoura), which has an advisory role towards the People’s Assembly, results in the victory of the ruling Democratic National Party (PDN), which wins 84 of the 88 seats contested. President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak also nomates 44 members of the Council. The participation in the election is 23%, while the participation in 2004 was only 3%. On 11 June the Muslim Brotherhood, the main opposition movement, denounces irregularities committed against its candidates, said to have been prevented from campaigning. On 16 June The Economist declares that the police encircled polling stations in districts where the Muslim Brotherhood had a chance of winning. Nearly 800 members of the Muslim Brotherhood had been arrested after a campaign of arrests was launched against them by the government in late 2006.
- On 26 June it is learnt that Mohammed Sayed Saber Ali, an engineer in the country’s nuclear agency, has been sentenced to life imprisonment for espionage on behalf of Israel.
- On 28 June the government imposes on the medical profession a ban, both in public and in private establishments, on practising female circumcision, after the death of a 12-year-old girl. This practice has been illegal in Egypt since 1997, but was tolerated.

**Tunisia**

- On 7 June 7 Tunisians, suspected of having given logistical and financial aid to the Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb and of being implicated in the attack in Algiers of the previous 11 April, are arrested in London and in Milan.

**Algeria**

- On 1 June Prime Minister Abdelaziz Belkhadem resigns after the legislative elections which took place in May. On 4 June President Abdelaziz Bouteflika appoints a new government, keeping Belkhadem in his post. On 3 June Abdelaziz Ziiari, belonging to the National Liberation Front (FLN), which forms a part of the Presidential Alliance, is appointed to the post of President of the National Assembly (lower house).

In the course of the month of June 19 rebels and 6 soldiers die in clashes between government forces and the rebels of the Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb.

**European Union**

- On 12 June the ministers of agriculture of the 27 member states decide that the general limit of 0.9% of accidental presence of authorised genetically modified organisms (GMO) will be applied to biological products. The authorised level was hitherto 0.1%.

From 21 to 23 June, at a summit in Brussels, the European Council agrees on a reformed treaty to replace the constitutional treaty, rejected in 2005 by the French and Dutch electors. While most of the member states support the position of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, current President of the EU, of preserving as far as possible the old treaty, the Czech Republic, Poland, France, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom aim at introducing significant modifications to it. The 27 agree on eliminating the constitutional symbols of the treaty, such as the European flag and anthem, and on the fact that the new treaty will have to be ratified by the parliaments rather than being submitted to a referendum. To satisfy Poland it is decided that double-majority voting will not be introduced before 2017.

July 2007

The 5 Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor accused of deliberately infecting some Libyan children with the AIDS virus are extradited to Bulgaria after spending 8 years in prison in Libya. They are pardoned on arrival by the Bulgarian President. In Turkey the party of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Justice and Development Party (AKP) wins a crushing victory in the legislative elections, which were held early. In Albania Bamir Topi becomes the new President. New clashes break out between the Lebanese army and militants of the group Fatah al-Islam in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr el-Bared. Negotiations between the main political factions of Lebanon fail to put an end to the political crisis in which the country has been since November 2006. As part of an amnesty to mark the 50th anniversary of the birth of the Republic of Tunis, the Tunisian advocate and defender of human rights Mohamed Abbou is set free. On 1 July Portugal takes over the rotating presidency of the EU.

Spain

• On 2 July the French police arrest on the Spanish frontier 3 persons suspected of being members of the terrorist organisation Euskadi and Liberty (ETA), in a truck carrying 140 kg of explosives. On 10 July the Spanish police arrests in Santander Aritz Arzini Zubiare, an alleged member of ETA. On 26 July the French police arrest three other alleged members of ETA, including the logistics chief Juan Cruz Maiza Artola.
• On 4 July the European Commission announces that the telecommunications giant Telefónica has been fined 152 million euros for abuse of a dominant position.
• On 6 July the Prime Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero announces a ministerial reshuffle. On 9 July 3 new ministers are appointed ministers of culture, of health and of housing.
• On 20 July the judge of the National Court Juan del Olmo orders the police to confiscate the 400,000 print-run of the satirical magazine El Jueves for the publication of a cartoon offensive to the royal family, in violation of Spanish law.
• On 31 July forest fires on Tenerife and Grand Canary destroy nearly 35,000 hectares of forest.

France

• On 27 July the former minister of foreign affairs Dominique de Villepin is interrogated over complicity in a libellous accusation in the Clearstream affair, which goes back to 2004 and whose aim was to discredit various figures including the current President Sarkozy, accused of having received kickbacks via the Luxembourg clearing agency Clearstream over the sale of French frigates to Taiwan.

Italy

• On 3 July the European Commission declares that Italy is not respecting the Stability Pact, by failing to reduce its budget deficit by 0.5% per annum.
• On 20 July the Union, the centre-left coalition of Prime Minister Romano Prodi, comes to an agreement with one of the leading trade unions on pension reform, amongst other things raising the retirement age from 57 to 61.
• On 21 July the Moroccan imam Mostapha El Korchi and two other Moroccans, suspected of having links with Al-Qaeda and of using the mosque for recruiting and training international terrorists, are arrested by the police in the town of Ponte Felcino, near Perugia.
• Between 22 and 23 July 500 illegal immigrants arrive on the island of Lampedusa.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

• On 1 July the Slovak diplomat Miroslav Lajčak formally takes over from Christian Schwarz-Schilling as High Representative of the international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 10 July Miroslav Lajčak dismisses 36 police officers of Serb origin, suspected of being implicated in the Srebrenica massacre of 1995, and confiscates their passports together with those of 57 others. On 12 July 30,000 people attend the funeral of 465 victims of the Srebrenica massacre, 12 years after the deed.
• On 9 July the trial of Rasim Selic, a former commander in the Muslim army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, opens before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). He is charged with violation of the laws and customs of war for the murder, torture and rape of civilian prisoners. On 17 July the criminal court of Sarajevo sentences to 30 years’ imprisonment Niset Ramic, a Bosnian Muslim, for crimes committed against the Serbs during the war of 1992-1995.

Serbia

• On 9 July the Prime Minister of Kosovo, Lieutenant General Agim Ceku, insists, in an interview for the Financial Times, that the independence of Kosovo will not be proclaimed unilaterally without the support of the European Union and the United States. On 10 July the Secretary General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon warns that delay in putting into effect the plan of Martti Ahtisaari, The United Nations special envoy in Kosovo, could have a negative impact on peace and security in Kosovo and in the rest of the Balkans. On 30 July the European Union’s high representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, appoints Wolfgang Ischinger to represent the European Union in the negotiations on the future status of Kosovo.

Albania

• On 20 July the People’s Assembly elects Bamir Topi of the Democratic Party of Albania to the country’s presidency, after 3 failed attempts in June to agree on a name. The Assembly thus avoids having to hold early legislative elections. Bamir Topi, who takes office on 24 July, succeeds General Alfred Moisiu.

Greece

• On 1 July the Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis announces that the thou-
sands of hectares of forest destroyed by the wildfires which have hit the country lately will be replanted.

Cyprus

- On 10 July the tripartite coalition in power in the Republic of Cyprus is formally dissolved, after the withdrawal of the main coalition party, the Progressive Workers’ Party (AKEL). Its successor follows the refusal of the other two parties of the government coalition to support the candidature of the secretary general of AKEL, Dhimis Christofias, for the country’s Presidential elections. On 14 July President Tassos Papadopoulos appoints 4 new ministers to replace the ministers of AKEL who have resigned.

Turkey

- On 2 July the trial opens of 18 persons, accused of being implicated in the assassination on the previous 19 January of the Turkish journalist of Armenian origin Hrant Dink, editor of the bilingual Turco-Armenian weekly Agos.
- On 5 July the international human rights organisation Amnesty International publishes a report on Turkey, welcoming the progress in its judicial system but deploiring the continued use of torture and the impunity of policemen who practise it. Amnesty International likewise accuses the courts of accepting confessions obtained under torture.
- On 5 July the constitutional court approves the constitutional reforms permitting electors, and no longer the legislators, to elect the President directly.
- On 22 July, in the advanced legislative elections, the party of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), wins 341 seats out of 550 contested in the Grand National Assembly (GNA, one-chamber parliament). AKP wins 46.58% of the votes, against 34.28% in the general election in 2002. The main secularist opposition party, the People’s Republican Party (CHP) wins 112 seats, losing 66 seats by comparison with 2002. The anti-European nationalist party, the National Action Party (MHP) enters the GNA for the first time with 70 seats. On 28 July MHP declares that it will not boycott the new Presidential elections.

Syria

- On 26 July an accidental explosion in an arms magazine in the north of the country kills 15 soldiers and injures 50 more.

Lebanon

- On 12 July fresh clashes break out in the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr el-Bared between the Lebanese army and militants of the Islamist group Fatah al-Islam, despite the government’s announcement in May that the militants had been defeated. After two days of fighting at least 10 soldiers have been killed and 2 civilians have been injured. On 15 July the Lebanese infantry enters the camp and recovers certain positions.
- In mid-July negotiations between the principal political factions of the country in France fail to end the political crisis existing in the country since November 2006.

Jordan

- On 30 July King Abdullah II accepts the resignation of the ministers for water and irrigation and for health, after the hospitalising of hundreds of people who had drunk infected tap-water at Mafraq.

Libya

- On 11 July the Supreme Court confirms the death sentence on 5 Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor, accused of deliberately infecting more than 400 Libyan children with the AIDS virus. On 12 July Cecilia Sarkozy, the wife of the French President Nicolas Sarkozy, goes to Libya to meet the six condemned people and the Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. On 17 July the High Judicial Council commutes their death sentence to one of life imprisonment, after the families of the victims had withdrawn their demand for the death sentence following the conclusion of a compensation agreement. The Benghazi International Fund, financed by the EU, the United States, Bulgaria and Libya will pay 460 million dollars to the families. On 13 July Cecilia Sarkozy and the European commissioner for foreign relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner go to Libya to try to set the nurses free. On 23 July Libya agrees to extradite the nurses to Bulgaria, on condition that the children be cared for in European hospitals and that the EU helps Libya to put in place a programme to fight AIDS. Ferrero-Waldner also promises access of Libyan agricultural products to European markets, a financial subsidy for the restoration of Libyan antiquities and the granting of visas to Libyan citizens for travel in Europe. On 24 July the nurses and the doctor arrive in Sofia, after spending 8 years in prison in Libya. On arrival they receive a pardon from the Bulgarian President Georgi Parvanov. On 25 July Nicolas Sarkozy goes to Libya, where he signs several co-operation agreements in the domains of defence, health, education and civil nuclear power.

Tunisia

- At the beginning of July, 20 people originating from sub-Saharan Africa die by drowning along the coasts of Tunisia, as they try to sail to the Italian island of Lampedusa in a small boat.
- On 2 July the Tunisian advocate and human rights defender Béchir Essid is easily elected for three years to the post of President of the Council of the National Order of Tunisian Advocates (CONA).
- On 24 July 2007, as part of an amnesty marking the 50th anniversary of the birth of the Republic of Tunisia, the Tunisian advocate and human rights defender Mohamed Abbou is freed from the El Kef prison, where he had been held since his arrest in March 2005. Abbou had been sentenced to three and a half years in prison for having denounced on the Internet the practice of torture in Tunisia.

Algeria

- On 10 July the French President Nicolas Sarkozy goes to Algeria where he meets his Algerian opposite number, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, before going to Tunisia. There he presents among other things his project for a “Mediterranean Union”, which aims to create in the Mediterranean “an area of solidarity and co-operation” whose pillars would be the fight against insecurity, durable development, energy integration, joint development and concerted management of immigration. This is the first journey he has made outside Europe since his election in May.
Morocco

- On 11 July a court in Paris sentences 8 persons to between one and ten years imprisonment for their support to 12 suicide bombers who blew themselves up in May 2003 in Casablanca, killing 45 persons. The majority are of French nationality and are suspected of links with the Islamic Group of Moroccan Combatants (GICM).

European Union

- On 1 July Portugal takes over the rotating presidency of the EU in succession to Germany. Its main priority will be to successfully conclude the Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC), which is to finalise the text of a reformed treaty to replace the constitutional treaty. The new Portuguese presidency also wishes to promote the Lisbon Agenda, whose aim is to make the EU the most competitive economic zone in the world, and to improve relations between the EU and Africa.

August 2007

Abdullah Gül becomes the first Islamist President in Turkey's modern history and Recep Tayyip Erdogan is confirmed in his post as Prime Minister, following the elections in July. In Greece the government declares a state of emergency in the face of widespread forest fires, while thousands of demonstrators demand the government's resignation. In Lebanon, following by-elections of the National Assembly to fill the seats left vacant by the assassination of 2 anti-Syrian members, the anti-Syrian government loses one seat to the pro-Syrian opposition. In Egypt the repression against the Muslim Brotherhood continues.

Spain

- Between 3 and 14 August a number of banks and court-houses are set on fire in the Basque Country. On 24 August 2 policemen are slightly wounded in a terrorist attack orchestrated by the organisation Euskadi and Liberty (ETA) in front of the barracks of the Civil Guard in the Basque town of Durango. On 26 August the minister of the interior Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba announces that he and his Portuguese opposite number have agreed to form a common investigation team composed of policemen, judges and prosecutors to arrest members of ETA who are operating more and more from Portugal.

France

- On 11 August President Nicolas Sarkozy meets the American President George W. Bush at his family home at Kennebunkport, Maine, in the United States.

Italy

- On the night of 5 to 6 August an Islamic centre at Segrate is partially damaged by an arson attack. On the night of 15 to 16 August three fire-bombs are thrown at a mosque at Abbiategrasso, the second attack on the mosque in a month. On 21 August a halal butcher’s shop is destroyed in Chiari.

On 16 August the Italian coastguard saves more than 400 African illegal immigrants off the island of Lampedusa.

Malta

- On 30 August 25 clandestine immigrants are drowned off Malta when their boat is wrecked, under the eyes of the crew of a Greek tug which was bringing them help and which was only able to rescue three survivors.

Slovenia

- On 30 August the ministers of health, transport and higher education, science and technology resign.

Croatia

- On 26 August Slovenia and Croatia agree to refer their frontier dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) based in The Hague.

Serbia

- From 10 to 12 August, following the stalemate of negotiations on the plan of the United Nations special envoy Martti Ahtisaari, who proposed a "supervised independence", the envoys of the EU, Russia and the United States (the Troika) renew their diplomatic efforts to forge a compromise agreement on the future status of the province of Kosovo.

On 30 August the Troika meets the Serb and Albanian leaders in Vienna, without reaching an agreement, the Albanians and Serbs standing fast on their positions.

Montenegro

- On 31 August Predrag Sekulic resigns as minister of culture, sports and media.

Macedonia

- On 6 August 2 grenades are thrown near a building of the Macedonian government, causing only minor damage. The authorities describe this incident as a terrorist attack.

Greece

- On 17 August the Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis announces an early election on 16 September, several months before the expiry of the parliament's term in April 2008, with the object of obtaining a strong mandate for the economic and social reforms that the government plans to implement.

On 25 August the Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis declares a state of emergency after the forest fires ravaging the country have killed at least 64 people and destroyed nearly 3,500 houses and 270,000 hectares of forests and fields. After an appeal for international help by Karamanlis, 21 countries respond, including 6 European countries and Israel. Most of the fires are thought to have been started deliberately, and on 26 August the government therefore offers a reward of one million euros for any information leading to the arrest of arsonists. Thirty-two suspects are arrested and 7 persons are prosecuted. On 29 August 10,000 people demonstrate in the streets of Athens to criticise the way the government has handled this emergency and for failure to keep proper surveillance of the forests, thus encouraging arsonists.

Cyprus

- On 14 August the leaders of the two Cypriot communities agree to resume
Talks to escape from the impasse over the process of reunification in the island.

**Turkey**

- On 6 August the outgoing President Ahmet Necdet Sezer confirms Recep Tayyip Erdogan, whose Justice and Development Party (AKP) has won the advanced legislative elections in July, in his post of Prime Minister and invites him to form a new government. On 9 August Koksal Toptan, a non-Islamist moderate of AKP, is elected President of the Grand National Assembly (GNA). On 28 August the deputy Prime Minister and minister of foreign affairs Abdullah Gül of AKP is elected to the country’s presidency in the third round of elections in the GNA, boycotted by the main opposition party the People’s Republican Party (CHP). Gül, who received 339 votes out of 550, becomes the first Islamist President of modern Turkey. In the first two rounds, which took place on 20 and 24 August, Gül did not receive the two-thirds of votes necessary for election. In the third round a simple majority was sufficient to win the Presidential election. On 29 August the new President approves the new government.

- During the month of August 12 soldiers and 36 insurgents die in clashes between the Turkish army and militants of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). On 7 August Prime Minister Erdogan and his Iraqi opposite number sign a memorandum of agreement to combat the positions of the PKK in northern Iraq, used as a rear base for the launching of attacks in Turkey.

- On 8 August, because of one of the worst droughts Turkey has ever experienced, the municipality of Ankara introduces a strict water-rationing plan.

**Lebanon**

- On 6 August by-elections for the National Assembly take place in the region of Metn and in Beirut to fill the seats left vacant by the minister and member of parliament Pierre Gemayel and by Walid Eid, a member of Saad Hariri’s party of the Future, both members of the anti-Syrian camp and assassinated respectively in November 2006 and June 2007. Pierre Gemayel’s seat – a seat ascribed to a Maronite (Catholic) – is won in the Metn region by Camille Khoury, a candidate of the pro-Syrian opposition, supported by General Michel Aoun and a member of the Patriotic Free Current (CPL). Mohammed Itani, the candidate of the majority, a member of Saad Hariri’s Current of the Future, wins Walid Eid’s seat in Beirut.


**Jordan**

- On 21 August the deputy Prime Minister and minister of finance Ziad Fareiz resigns following the rejection by the government of his proposal to raise the price of petrol to meet the budget deficit. On 26 August the minister of labour Basim al-Salim takes over the office provisionally.

**Egypt**

- On 20 August a state security court sentences to life imprisonment 4 Egyptians for their role in the suicide attack in a bazaar in Cairo, which killed 3 foreign tourists in April 2005. Five other people are sentenced to prison terms between one and 10 years while 4 people are acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence.

- On 28 August The Financial Times reports that the repression of the main opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood, has continued in the month of August.

**Libya**

- On 1 August, in an interview with the newspaper Le Monde, Saif al-Islam, the son of the Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, declares that the freeing of the 5 Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor had opened the way to the signing of an important arms agreement with France. On the same day the French President Nicolas Sarkozy declares that no arms agreement has been signed in exchange for the freeing of the nurses and the doctor. On 3 August the French minister of defence confirms that an agreement has been signed for the sale of Milan missiles to Libya. On the same day Bulgaria cancels Libya’s debt of 57 million dollars dating from the Soviet era by way of contributing to the Benghazi International Fund for aid to families of Libyan children infected with AIDS. On 7 August the lawyer for the Palestinian doctor Ashraf Gomaa affirms that the latter’s confession of the acts he was accused of was made under torture. On 9 August Saif al-Islam confirms the allegations of torture, declaring that electricity was used to torture the doctor.

**Tunisia**

- On 5 August Ahmed Ibrahim is elected to the post of secretary general of the opposition party Movement for Renewal, created in 1993.

**Morocco**

- On 15 August a criminal court in Casablanca sentences to 8 months’ imprisonment the journalist Mustapha Hormatallah for publishing confidential documents concerning anti-terrorist operations. Mustapha Hormatallah works for the weekly Al Watan Al An, whose publisher receives a suspended sentence of 6 months’ imprisonment.

**European Union**

- On 2 August the European Commission indicates that the patrols of Frontex, the European agency in charge of operational co-operation on the external frontiers of the member states of the European Union, fighting against illegal immigration movements in the Mediterranean, have been suspended for lack of funds.

- On 9 August the European Central Bank (ECB) injects a record amount of 94.8 billion euros into monetary circulation in the Eurozone to remedy a liquidity shortage on the money market, connected with the subprime loan crisis in the United States. On the following day the ECB injects a further 61 billion euros.

- On 27 August the EU’s agency for fundamental rights reports that violence and crimes with a racist connotation have increased in at least 8 countries of the 27 member states of the EU, including France. The reports also emphasises that unequal professional opportunities and ethnic discrimination are common problems in Europe.
September 2007

Some fifty people lose their lives in attacks in Algeria, claimed by the Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb. In Lebanon political assassinations continue with the murder of the Lebanese member of parliament of the anti-Syrian majority Antoine Ghanem, while the National Assembly postpones the Presidential election following a boycott by the opposition. The party of the Greek Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis, New Democracy (ND) wins the legislative elections for the Vouli, which for the first time since the end of the dictatorship of the colonels in 1974 sees the entry of an extremist party. In Morocco the Istiqia party wins the legislative elections and its leader Abbas el-Fassi is appointed Prime Minister. The first round of negotiations between the Serbs and Albanians of Kosovo on the status of the province of Kosovo takes place in New York. The President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Mehmet Ali Talat, and the President of the Greek part of Cyprus, Tassos Papadopoulos, meet in Nicosia to relaunch a peace initiative under the patronage of the United Nations. Spain is hit by a number of terrorist attacks claimed by the organisation Euskadi and Freedom (ETA).

Spain

• On 1 September the minister of the interior Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba declares that 4 suspected members of the organisation Euskadi and Freedom (ETA), including Luis Ignacio Iruretagoyena Lanz, suspected of being ETA’s explosives expert and of being implicated in the attack on the Barajas national airport in December 2006, have been arrested at Cahors, near Toulouse, in a joint operation of the French and Spanish police. The police likewise seized explosives, weapons and grenade-launchers. On 2 September ETA sets off a bomb on the N-232 near Fuenmayor. On 9 September the President of the Confederation of Businessmen in Navarre (CEN) declares that since the end of its cease-fire ETA has increased the number of its extortions in the Basque region and in Navarre. On 25 September a bomb explodes in front of a police station in Zarautz, causing no injuries.

• On 8 September the bodies of 10 illegal immigrants are found off Grand Canary.

• On 28 September Rosa Díez, who had resigned from the ruling Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE), creates a new political party called Union, Progress and Democracy (UPD). The UPD is a branch of the anti-ETA movement Basta Ya (“That’s Enough”) and advocates a strong central state to stand up against the regional movements on the rise in the country.

France

• On 18 September the mayors of Cherbourg, Calais and Dunkirk request help from the government to resist the tide of illegal immigrants wishing to enter the United Kingdom. On 20 September the National Assembly (lower chamber) passes a controversial amendment to the new immigration law providing that non-European foreigners wishing to join their family in France should submit to a DNA test in the event of doubt of their family relationship. This measure is to be introduced for a trial period of three months. On the same day President Nicolas Sarkozy calls for the imposition of yearly immigration quotas.

• On 18 and 19 September President Sarkozy presents detailed proposals to implement his electoral promises of making the French economy more competitive, of reducing the deficit in the matter of social security, and of cutting down the size of the public service. His controversial proposal of bringing uniformity to the retirement age and of ending the special treatment of those working in the fields of electricity, gas and the railways provoke lively protests.

Italy

• On 4 September the minister of health confirms the existence of an epidemic of infection in the country by the Chikungunya virus, after 151 cases are recorded between 4 July and 3 September near Ravenna, in the north-east of the country. Eleven patients are admitted to hospital and one person dies.

• On 13 September 1.3 million Italians boycott the purchase of pasta, to protest against what consumers’ organisations consider an unjustified rise in prices. The producers justify the rise by the disastrous cereal harvest following the summer’s droughts.

Croatia

• On 27 September the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sentences the Serb colonels Mile Mrksic and Veselin Sijvancanin, who belonged to the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) to 20 and 5 years’ imprisonment respectively, for war crimes committed in 1992 against Croats in the Vukovar region in Eastern Slavonia. The third accused person is acquitted. The sentence is condemned by the Prime Minister Ivo Sanader.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

• On 7 September, for the first time in its history, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) holds a session outside The Hague and goes to Sarajevo to hear the testimony of Ali Ahmed Ali Hamad, imprisoned since 1998, as part of the trial of Rasim Delicun, a former commander of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

• On 13 September The Guardian reports that the High Representative of the international community in Bosnia, Miroslav Lajcak, has warned Bosnia that the EU will terminate the negotiations for joining it if the country’s leaders do not reach an agreement on the creation of a single national police force. On 30 September the President of the Republika Srpska Milan Jelic succumbs to a heart attack at the age of 51.

Serbia

• On 6 September, in an interview for the Financial Times, the Serbian minister of foreign affairs, Vuk Jeremic, warns the international community that declaration of independence by the province of Kosovo would open a “Pandora’s Box” of security problems in the Balkans. He also
declares his opposition to any partition of the province.


- On 28 September the Serbian President Boris Tadic and his Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica meet President Fatmir Sejdiu of Kosovo and his Prime Minister Agim Ceku in New York for a first round of face-to-face negotiations on the status of Kosovo. In mid September the two parties had separately met with the Troika, set up during August and composed of envoys of the United States, the European Union and Russia.

**Montenegro**

- On 1 September 3 individuals attack the editor of the daily Vijesti, the biggest-selling newspaper in Montenegro, as he leaves a restaurant where the paper was celebrating its 10th anniversary. The Montenegrin journalists’ trade union denounces the aggression, in which it sees “a fresh proof that the freedom of the Press is in danger.”

**Macedonia**

- On 11 September President Branko Crvenkovski appoints Viktor Dimovski, currently ambassador in Serbia, to the post of director of the national agency for education.

**Albania**

- On 1 September the Albanian Prime Minister Sali Berisha announces that Albania has become the first country in the world without chemical weapons.

**Greece**

- On 16 September the conservative party of Kostas Karamanlis, New Democracy (ND) wins early general elections with 3 seats less than in the previous elections. For the first time since the end of the dictatorship of the colonels in 1974, an extremist party, the Orthodox People’s Rally (LAOS), enters the Vouli. On 19 September the new government takes office. The minister of public order Vyron Polydoras, criticised for his bad handling of the forest fires in July and August, in which some sixty people died, is not kept on in his post. On 20 September the former minister of development Dimitris Sioufas is elected President of the Vouli.

**Cyprus**

- On 5 September the Greek Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos and the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Mehmet Ali Talat, meet at Nicosia under the aegis of the United Nations, for the first time since the agreement of July 2006 by which the two parties commit themselves to discuss their bilateral differences so as to relaunch the negotiations for the reunification of the island.

**Turkey**

- On 5 September the Grand National Assembly (GNA, single-chamber parliament) gives its vote of confidence to the new government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

- On 5 and 25 September respectively the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs David Miliband and the Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi indicate their support for Turkey’s accession to the EU. On 24 September the French Secretary of State for European Affairs declares that the French President Nicolas Sarkozy supports a privileged partnership with Turkey rather than the integration of the latter in the European Union. He adds that Sarkozy will not oppose Turkey’s negotiations for entry provided that the two options are kept in mind.

- On 19 September Prime Minister Erdogan calls for a change of the constitution, currently under revision, to permit women to wear the veil in universities.

- On 28 September the minister of the interior Besir Ataly and his Iraqi opposite number sign an agreement of co-operation to combat the members of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), based in the north of Iraq. During the month of September 46 soldiers and 21 Kurdish insurgents are killed in clashes between the Turkish army and the PKK. On 30 September, after the killing of a leader of the PKK, 30 people are assassinated by the terrorist organisation PKK in the south-eastern province of Sirnak.

**Syria**


**Lebanon**

- On 2 September the Lebanese army announces that it has taken control of the Palestinian refugee camp of Nahr el-Bared. In clashes on 2 September, 5 soldiers and 31 combatants of Fatah al-Islam are killed, including the leader Shaker al-Abassi, while 24 combatants are taken prisoner.

- On 19 September the anti-Syrian member of parliament Antoine Ghanem, a member of the Christian Kataeb party, is killed when his car blows up in the mainly Christian district of Sin el-Fil. Five other persons lose their lives and at least 60 people are injured in the attack.

- On 25 September the pro-Syrian opposition, including Hezbollah, boycotts the Presidential election, obliging the National Assembly to defer the election, for lack of a quorum of two thirds of the deputies necessary for the first round. The purpose of the election was to appoint a successor to the current President, General Emile Lahoud, whose mandate expires on 23 November.

**Jordan**

- On 2 September King Abdullah II approves a government reshuffle by the Prime Minister Marouf Bakhet.

- On 12 September the State Security Court sentences 16 people to between 20 months’ and 5 years’ imprisonment for having recruited individuals to fight against the American army in Iraq.

**Egypt**

- On 13 September a court in Cairo sentences 4 newspaper publishers,
Ibrahim Issa of al-Dustur, Wail al-Abrashi of Sawt al-Ummah, Adil Hamuda of al-Fagr and Abd al-Halim Qandil of al-Karama, to one year’s imprisonment for libel against President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak and his son Gamal Mubarak.

**Libya**

- On 10 September Seif al-Islam, son of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, announces the launch of an ambitious project aiming to attract ecological tourism and create sustainable development in the coastal region of the “Green Mountain.”

**Morocco**

- On 7 September the Istiqlal party wins the elections to the Chamber of Representatives (lower house), narrowly beating the conservative and Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD). The main party of the outgoing coalition, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (SUPF) is the main loser in these elections with only 36 deputies, against the 50 elected five years before. The elections are marked by record absenteeism of 63%. On 19 September King Mohammed VI appoints Abbas el-Fassi, the leader of Istiqlal, to the office of Prime Minister.
- On 26 September demonstrations against the high price of bread leave some 300 people injured and oblige the government to abandon the rise in prices, connected with the explosion of grain prices.

**European Union**

- On 1 September, 9 of the 10 countries that joined the EU in 2004, including Malta and Slovenia, join the Schengen Information System (SIS).
- On 2 September the Belgian Gilles de Kerchove is appointed the European Union’s co-ordinator of the fight against terrorism.
- On 3 September the first ministerial conference of the European Neighbourhood Policy is held in Brussels.
- On 18 September the EU signs agreements with Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia to simplify the application procedure for visas for their nationals as from January 2008. In exchange the 5 countries commit themselves to reinforcing their frontier security and accept procedures for repatriation of their nationals.
- On 30 September 7 member states of the EU, including France, Italy, Portugal and Spain sign an agreement to set up a maritime operation and analysis centre to fight against drug-trafficking proceeding from Latin America and West Africa.

**Tunisia**

- On 13 September Tunisia’s first religious radio station, Ezzeitouna (the Olive Tree), under the patronage of the President’s brother-in-law Zine el Abidine ben Ali, begins broadcasting on the first day of Ramadan.
- On 20 September the secretary general of the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), Maya Jribi, and her predecessor Néjib Chebbi, editor of the weekly Al Mawkef, begin a hunger-strike to protest against a threat, emanating according to them from the government, to expel them from their premises.

**Algeria**

- On 6 September a suicide bomber blows himself up in front of the al-Atk mosque in Batna, 45 minutes before the arrival of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, killing 22 people and wounding about a hundred. On 9 September another attack, this time in the coastal town of Dellys, kills 30 coastguards. On 21 September a bomb explodes in the Kabylie district near a police convoy accompanying some foreign workers and injures 9 people, including 2 Frenchmen and an Italian. The Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb claims responsibility for these 3 terrorist attacks.

**Spain**

- On 4 October the police arrest 24 people who were attending a summit of Batasuna, the illegal political wing of the organisation Euskadi and Freedom (ETA), in the Basque town of Segura. They are accused of taking part in an illegal political meeting. In protest thousands of Basque nationalists take to the streets on 5 and 6 October. On 6 October Molotov cocktails are thrown in Pasaia against a building containing the office of the assistant mayor and the magistrates’ court. On 9 October a bomb explodes under a car in Bilbao, seriously injuring the bodyguard of José Carlos Domingo Galindez, a local councillor of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE). On 12 October Molotov cocktails are thrown against a law-court in Durango and on 18 October the car of the President of the committee of municipal management in Ondarroa is set on fire.

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**October 2007**

**Montenegro**

- Nearly a year and a half after its independence, Montenegro adopts its first constitution and a Stabilisation and Association Agreement is signed with the EU. The talks between the Serb and Albanian representatives of the province of Kosovo continue in Brussels and in Vienna. For the first time since the end of the war between Lebanon and Israel in 2006 an exchange of prisoners and of bodies takes place between Israel and the fundamentalist movement Hezbollah. Hareg Zoheir, the number two in the Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb, is killed by the Algerian army. In Morocco, a new government under the Prime Minister Abbas el-Fassi, leader of the Istiqlal Party, takes office. The Grand National Assembly (GNA) authorises incursions of the Turkish army into northern Iraq to get to grips with the insurgents of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). More than half the Turkish electorate approves the constitutional reforms permitting the electors to elect their President directly. In Spain 21 persons are sentenced for the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004. The European Council in Lisbon approves the text of the new EU treaty.

**Spain**

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- On 9 October the trial opens in Madrid of 30 men, mainly Moroccans and Algerians, accused of plotting a suicide attack against the National Court, which includes the office of Baltasar Garzón, a judge who has been investigating Islamic cells in Spain since the nineteen-nineties.
- On 16 October the government opposes the proposal, considered unconstitutional, by Juan José Ibarretxe, the President of the Basque regional government assembly, to hold a referendum on increased autonomy for the Basque country.
• On 31 October the National Court in Madrid sentences 21 persons for their implication in the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004, which killed 191 people and injured more than 1,800. Jamal Zougam, Othman el Gnaoui, both of Moroccan nationality, and the Spaniard Emilio Suárez Trashorras are sentenced respectively to 42,922, 42,924, and 34,715 years’ imprisonment. Seven of the 28 accused are acquitted, including the Egyptian Rabei Osman Sayed Ahmed, better known as “Mohamed the Egyptian.” He had been presented as one of the brains of the attacks and he is currently serving a prison sentence in Italy for membership of a terrorist group.

France

• On 1 October, for the first time, a French President takes part in the festivities marking the end of Ramadan. President Nicolas Sarkozy visits the grand mosque of Paris and declares that Islam is a part of France and that those who advocate violence in the name of Islam have no business in France’s territory.
• On 17 October France is hit by a 24-hour strike in transport and other sectors protesting against the government’s proposal to end the special regime of pensions in the public sector.
• On 23 October the Senate approves the new controversial law on immigration. It was approved by the National Assembly in September.
• On 29 October the commission on constitutional reform, set up by President Sarkozy and presided over by the former Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, presents its report, which contains 77 proposals for amendment to the Constitution of 1958, several of them aiming at strengthening the legislative power against the executive.

Italy

• From 8 to 10 October, in a national referendum organised by the leading trade unions, more than 5 million workers and pensioners approve the agreement on the reform of pensions and of work concluded between the trade unions and the government on 20 July. This agreement postpones the pensionable age from 57 to 61 years in the period from 2008 to 2013.
• On 14 October Walter Veltroni, mayor of Rome and a former minister, is elected leader of the new Democratic Party (PD), born from the fusion the previous April of the Margherita Alliance and the Democrats of the Left (DS), the two main parties of Prime Minister Romano Prodi’s government coalition Union.
• On 25 October a court in Rome drops the judicial prosecution of the American soldier Mario Lozano, wanted for the murder of the security agent Nicola Calipari in Iraq in March 2008, holding that it does not come within the court’s jurisdiction.

Malta

• On 1 October the advocate Katrine Camilleri receives in Geneva the Nansen Prize 2007 awarded by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), for her work on behalf of asylum seekers.

Slovenia

• On 21 October the conservative Lojze Peterle, a former Prime Minister, heads the first round of the Presidential election with 28% of the votes.

Croatia

• On 12 October the Sabor (single-chamber parliament) passes a resolution condemning the sentence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on the three men convicted on 27 September for the affair of Vukovar, judging that their prison sentence was too light. On 15 October, in a meeting of the United Nations general Assembly, the Prime Minister Ivo Sanader accuses the ICTY of not having respected the Geneva Conventions.

Bosnia and Herzegovina

• On 1 October, the day following the death of President Milan jelic, the government of the Republika Srpska appoints Igor Radojicic, President of the People’s Assembly, to the post of interim President of the Republic.
• On 7 October the new party of the Independent List of Bosnia-Herzegovina is created in Sarajevo.

Serbia

• On 12 October the minister of labour, employment and social policy, also in charge of Serbia’s co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), announces that a reward of one million euros will be given for any information leading to the arrest of General Ratko Mladic, a war criminal wanted by the ICTY.
• On 14 October the representatives of Serbia and the province of Kosovo take part in a second round of direct talks in Brussels under the auspices of the United Nations. On 22 October a third meeting takes place in Vienna, in which the Troika (Russia, United States and the EU) presents a 14-point plan which does not mention the possible independence of Kosovo, but promises the Albanians of Kosovo that Serbia will not re-establish a physical presence in the province.

Montenegro

• On 15 October, on occasion of a meeting of ministers of foreign affairs of the EU in Luxembourg, Montenegro and the EU sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, an important step on the road to Montenegro’s joining the EU.
• On 19 October, 17 months after the country’s declaration of independence, the Parliament (single-chamber) ratifies the new constitution. On 22 October the constitution is officially promulgated. The pro-Serbian parties in parliament voted against this new constitution.

Macedonia

• On 21 October the former President of the Sobranje (single-chamber parliament) announces the creation of a new party, the Party for the Free Democrats
(PSD). The PSD is the second party to break away from the Social-Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM). On 20 October three Roma parties fuse to form the Party of the Democratic Forces of the Roma in Macedonia.

**Greece**

- On 17 October the authorities present a raft of new measures aiming to curb illegal immigration, among them an increase in sea patrols.
- On 18 October the Hellenic Commission of Telecoms and Posts (EETT), the regulator in telecommunications matters, imposes on the mobile telephone company Vodafone Greece a fine of 19.1 million euros for its role in the affair of telephone-tapping of Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis and highly placed persons in the government, of the army and the business world, in connection with the Athens Olympic Games of 2004.

**Turkey**

- On 5 October the minister of foreign affairs Bernard Kouchner meets his Turkish opposite number with a view to improving bilateral relations, following the declarations of the French President preferring a privileged partnership with Turkey to its joining the EU.
- On 7 October 13 soldiers lose their lives in clashes with militants of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the province of Sirnak in the south-east of the country. Thousands of demonstrators take to the streets to denounce the escalation of violence. On 17 October the Grand National Assembly (GNA) approves a military incursion by Turkey into northern Iraq, from where the PKK insurges are launching their attacks. On 21 October, after Kurdish insurgents from Iraq ambush the Turkish army near Hakkari, killing 12 soldiers and taking 8 others hostage, the Turkish army bombs the PKK’s positions in northern Iraq and kills 32 rebels. On 24 October 30 insurgents are killed in Iraqi territory and on 28 October 20 Kurdish insurgents are killed. The talks with the Iraqi authorities on 24 and 25 October do not satisfy Turkey, which refuses to set a time-limit for its operations until the PKK leaders are extradited to Turkey and their camps closed down.
- On 11 October Turkey withdraws its ambassador from the United States following the adoption the previous day by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the American House of Representatives (lower house) of a non-binding resolution describing the massacres of one and a half million Armenians between 1915 and 1917, under the Ottoman Empire, as genocide. To avoid the breaking-off of relations with Turkey, the supporters of the resolution decide to hold over the vote in plenary session.
- On 11 October Aram Dink and Serkis Seropyan, both of them publishers of the Armenian-language newspaper Agos, receive suspended sentences of one year’s imprisonment for insult to the Turkish identity. This sentence follows the republication in Agos of the opinions of Hrant Dink, a journalist of the same paper, assassinated the previous January, on the Armenian genocide.
- On 21 October, in a national referendum, 68.95% of electors vote in favour of constitutional reforms – already approved by the GNA but blocked by the current President – permitting the electors, and no longer the legislative power, to elect the President of the country directly, reducing the President’s term of office from 7 to 5 years (renewable) and the parliamentary term from 5 to 4 years.

**Syria**

- On 1 October President Bachar al-Assad declares that the target hit by an Israeli air-raid on 6 September was a military building under construction and denies that the place was being used as part of a nuclear programme.

**Lebanon**

- On 12 October the Supreme Court of Brazil refuses to extradite Rana Abdel Rahim Koleilat, whom the Lebanese authorities wish to interrogate in connection with the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005.
- On 15 October, for the first time since the end of the war between Lebanon and Israel in 2006, Israel and the Hezbollah movement exchange a prisoner and a number of bodies. The exchange is thought to have been negotiated by German diplomats with the aid of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The two soldiers whose seizure by Hezbollah had led to the clashes are not included in the exchange.
- On 22 October Nabbī Berri, President of the National Assembly, postpones a session due to have been held the following day to elect a new President to succeed Emīl Lahoud, whose term of office ends the following 24 November.

**Jordan**

- On 7 October the State Security Court sentences 3 men to 5 years’ imprisonment for plotting an attack against an important meat concern of Israeli provenance.

**Egypt**

- On 8 October thousands of demonstrators protest at El Arish, a town in the north of Sinai, against the lack of security in their town against Bedouin attacks. In this demonstration the offices of the National Democratic Party (NDP) are ransacked and some forty demonstrators are arrested.

**Libya**

- On 16 October Libya is elected by the United Nations General Assembly to a seat on the Security Council from January 2008.

**Tunisia**

- On 20 October the two Tunisian opposition members, Maya Jribi, secretary general of the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), and Mohamed Néjib Chebbi, founder of the party and editor of its weekly newspaper Al-Mawqif, end their hunger strike, begun on 20 September in protest against a judicial procedure of expulsion from their party’s premises, ordered, according to them, by the government.

**Algeria**

- On 7 October the Algerian army kills Hareg Zoheir, the number two of the Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb, in clashes in the east of the country. He was considered the brain behind the majority of the suicide attacks committed in recent months in Algeria.
Morocco

• On 15 October King Mohammed VI appoints a new government under Prime Minister Abbas el-Fassi, the leader of the Istiqlal Party which has won the elections. On 18 October el-Fassi declares that his government’s priority will be to find international support for the resolution of the question of the Western Sahara, a resolution which must be based on the principle of the territorial integrity of Morocco. He also looks to an acceleration of political and institutional reforms.
• On 22 and 24 October the French President Nicolas Sarkozy makes an official visit to Morocco, accompanied by several ministers and business figures. An agreement is made, among others, that three French companies will take part in the building of a railway between Tangier and Marrakesh. The King also signifies his support for the French President’s project of a Mediterranean Union.

European Union

• On 18 and 19 October the heads of state and of government of the EU member states, meeting in an informal summit in Lisbon, approve the text of the new treaty, due to replace the European constitution rejected in referendum by the French and the Dutch. The new system of voting by double majority will not come into force until 2017, in accordance with the demand by Poland. With the exception of Ireland, the member states will submit the treaty to a process of legislative ratification.
• On 22 October Microsoft announces that it will not appeal against the decision of the European Court of first instance to uphold the fine against it, decided by the European Commission in March 2004 for abuse of a dominant position on the market. Microsoft also announces that it will communicate to competitors the necessary technical information to make their products compatible with the Microsoft software, and at the price approved by the European Commission.

November 2007

For the first time since the end of the civil war Lebanon is without a President. Morocco withdraws its ambassador from Spain following the visit by the King of Spain to Ceuta and Melilla. Kosovo rejects the proposal of Serbia to grant extensive autonomy to Kosovo within the Serbian frontiers. In Slovenia Danilo Turk wins the second round of the Presidential elections. In Croatia and Nader Dahabi in Jordan win the legislative elections, while in Bosnia-Herzegovina the Prime Minister Nikola Spiric presents his resignation in protest against the measures imposed by the High Representative of the international community in Bosnia. The European far-right party Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty is dissolved after the departure of 5 Romanian members. The EU calls on Turkey to repeal or amend article 301 of the penal code, which penalises insult to Turkish identity, to the Republic or to institutions or organs of state. France is hit by massive strikes in protest against the reform of the special retirement regimes.

Spain

• On 3 November it is learnt that 10 of the 20 people sentenced in the previous October for the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004 have begun a hunger strike to protest against the length of their prison sentences.
• On 13 November two caricaturists of the newspaper El Jueves are ordered to pay a fine of 3,000 euros for insulting the Spanish Crown in a drawing published in a previous edition. On 19 November two Catalan nationalists are ordered to pay a fine of 2,700 euros each for slandering the Spanish Royal Family after burning some pictures of the King and Queen of Spain in a separatist and anti-royalist rally in Girona in September.
• On 19 November, for the first time, the Catholic Church in Spain apologises for the role it played during the civil war of 1936-39.

France

• On 6 and 7 November President Nicolas Sarkozy makes an official visit to the United States with the aim of strengthening the co-operation between the two countries, after their disagreement over the Iraq war in 2003.
• On 13 November France is hit by a massive indefinite strike, organised by the main trade unions in protest against the reform of the special regimes for retirement in the public sector. On 23 November the leaders of the main trade unions agree to negotiate with the government and end their strike.
• On 15 November the constitutional council approves the controversial law on immigration, previously passed by the legislature. Nevertheless the council withdraws the provision concerning the compilation of population statistics on an ethnic basis, considering that practice unconstitutional.
• On 24 November the National Liberation Front of Corsica-Union of Combatants (FLNC-UC) claims responsibility in 16 recent attacks on public buildings and holiday houses in Corsica.
• From 25 to 27 November, following the deaths of two young people in controversial circumstances in the suburbs of Paris, a new wave of rioting hits the capital. 130 policemen are injured, some of them suffering gunshot wounds. Some cars are also set on fire in Toulouse.

Italy

• On 1 November, following a series of crimes committed by Romanians in Italy, President Giorgio Napolitano signs a decree authorising the prefects to expel from the country any European citizen considered a threat to public security. On 7 November the Prime Minister Romano Prodi and his Romanian counterpart decide to establish a joint police force. The leader of the opposition Silvio Berlusconi calls for the closure of the frontier to Romanians.
• On 18 November Silvio Berlusconi announces the dissolution of his party Forza Italia (FI), which is to be replaced by a wider movement.

Malta

• On 19 November, Médecins du Monde denounces in a report the inhumane and shameful reception, notably in terms of access to health, given to migrants in Malta and denounces the Maltese policy of systematic detention of migrants, which can extend up to 18 months.

Slovenia

• On 11 November Danilo Turk wins the second round of Presidential elections. He had stood in the election as an independent candidate, but benefiting
from the support of 3 centre-left parties in opposition.
• On 19 November the government of the Prime Minister Janez Jansa carries a motion of confidence in the Chamber of State (lower house).

Croatia
• On 25 November the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the party of the Prime Minister Ivo Sanader, wins the legislative elections with 66 seats out of the 153 in the Sabor (single-chamber parliament). The Croatian Social-Democratic Party (SPH), the main opposition party, wins 13 seats more than in the previous elections.

Bosnia and Herzegovina
• On 1 November the Bosnian Prime Minister Nikola Spiric presents his resignation in protest against the measures imposed by Miroslav Lajčák, the High Representative of the international community in Bosnia, to ease the functioning of Bosnia’s central government, undermined by ethnic rivalries. On 12 November the country’s collective presidency accepts his resignation.
• On 7 November the Bosnian authorities announce that General Novak Djućic, wanted for his role in the massacre of 71 civilians in Tuzla in May 1995, has been arrested near Banja Luka.
• On 21 November the United Nations Security Council approves resolution 1786 (2007), authorising the extension of the mandate of the EU peace-keeping force in Bosnia for 12 months.

Serbia
• On 5 November direct negotiations between the delegations of Serbia and of the province of Kosovo continue in Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations. On 22 November negotiations take place in Baden, in Austria. The delegation of Kosovo refuses the Serb proposal for extensive autonomy for Kosovo but within the frontiers of Serbia. On 28 November the international community recognises the stalemate of direct negotiations between the two parties to reach a common agreement on the final status of the province of Kosovo.
• On 7 November the EU initials a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia, an important step towards the latter’s joining the EU.
• On 17 November the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (DPK), wins 37 seats and becomes the main party in the Assembly of the province of Kosovo. Participation in the election is no more than 43%.
• On 28 November the United Nations Security Council, in its resolution 1786 (2007), appoints the Belgian Serge Brammertz as the new prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), for a term of 4 years from 1 January 2008.

Macedonia
• On 7 November the Macedonian police, in clashes near the town of Tetova, kill 6 people, including Ramadan Shiti, a Wahhabite extremist who had escaped from prison in the province of Kosovo, in Serbia. According to the police, these persons were members of a criminal group.

Albania
• On 14 November, Ilir Rusmajli resigns from his post as minister of justice following allegations of corruption in the prison services. On 9 November President Bamir Topi appoints Enkelejd Alibaaj to the post left vacant.
• On 22 November, on the recommendation of a commission of the People’s Assembly (legislature), President Topi dismisses the prosecutor general Theodhori Sollaku and appoints Ina Rama to replace him. Ina Rama is the first woman to occupy that post. The commission had concluded on 5 November that Sollaku had links with organised crime.

Greece
• On 1 November thousands of students and persons of the academic world demonstrate in the streets of Athens against the privatisation of universities and for better financing of public schools.
• On 18 November the authorities declare a state of emergency in the north-east of the country, hit by major floods.
Jordan

- On 15 November a new party is formed under the name of Unified Jordanian Front (UJF).
- On 20 November, in the legislative elections, the Islamic Action Front, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood movement and leading opposition party, is reduced from 17 to 6 seats, while pro-government independent candidates win the majority of seats. A new government takes office on 25 November, headed by the new Prime Minister Nader Dahabi. The Muslim Brotherhood movement rejects these election results.

Libya

- On 6 November the Financial Times publishes a recording in which the number two of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, announces that the Islamic Group of Libyan Combatants (IGLC) has joined the terrorist network.

Tunisia

- On 7 November Al-Jazeera announces that 7 political prisoners, including 4 leaders of the banned movement Ennahda, 2 members of the Ansar group and one Internet expert, have been set free on occasion of the 20th anniversary of the accession to power of President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali.

Morocco

- On 2 November, after Spain announces the visit of King Juan Carlos to Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish enclaves in the north of Morocco, Morocco withdraws its ambassador in Madrid for “an unlimited period” and calls on Spain to cancel that visit. On 5 and 6 November King Juan Carlos goes to Ceuta and Melilla.

European Union

- On 13 November the European Court of Auditors refuses for the thirteenth consecutive year to approve the annual accounts of the European Union. The Court notes a diminution of errors in the payments of subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
- On 14 November the far-right European party Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty is dissolved following the departure of 5 Romanian members of parliament because of remarks by the Italian MP Allessandra Mussolini, a member of the same group in the European Parliament, on Romanian immigrants in Italy.

December 2007

During December at least 72 people, including United Nations functionaries, are killed in two car-bomb terrorist attacks in Algiers, claimed by the Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb. The heads of state and of government of the 27 member states of the EU sign the Lisbon Treaty, which gives legal force to the EU’s Charter on fundamental rights. The direct negotiations between the Serbs and Albanians of Kosovo, begun under the aegis of the United Nations to reach a political solution to the future status of the province of Kosovo, reach stalemate. The EU decides to send a civil crisis-managing mission to Kosovo after its declaration of independence. Turkey launches the largest operation of recent years against the bases of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), included on the European terrorist list, located in northern Iraq. The negotiations for Turkey’s entry into the EU continue with the opening of negotiations on two new chapters. The tensions between the EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina over the creation of a single police force are dissipated, the Prime Minister resumes his functions and a Stabilisation and Association Agreement is initialled between the two countries. Syria arrests some thirty political opponents, members of the Damascus Declaration. France suspends diplomatic relations with Syria over the crisis in Lebanon. The list of political assassinations grows in Lebanon with a lethal attack on François al-Hajj. The Croatian Minister for the Interior Ivica Kirin resigns following the publication of photographs showing him hunting with a suspected of war crimes currently on parole.

Spain

- On 1 December 2 officers of the Civil Guard are killed in the French seaside resort of Capbreton by suspected members of the terrorist organisation Euskadi and Freedom (ETA). The 2 officers were carrying out a routine surveillance operation with their French counterparts. On 5 December two suspects are arrested. On 7 December thousands of people demonstrate in Madrid against ETA.
- On 19 December, after 8 years of investigation led by the judge Baltasar Garzón, the Supreme Court sentences 47 people to prison terms between 2 and 24 years for links with ETA. This is the largest trial against ETA in history. In response to the Court’s decision urban violence breaks out on 22 December in the province of Navarre. On 24 December a bomb explodes near the offices of the Socialist Party of the Basque Country at Balmaseda.

France

- On 12 December, on the occasion of the first council for modernisation of public policy, President Nicolas Sarkozy unveils nearly a hundred measures, intended in the long run to reduce the State’s payroll and deficit and to make France more competitive.
- On 13 December the Corsican nationalist Yvan Colona is sentenced to life imprisonment by a court in Paris for the murder in 1998 of the French prefect Claude Erignac.
- On 19 December Mourad Benchellali, Redouane Khalid, Khaled Ben Mustapha, Nizar Sassi and Brahim Yadel, five French citizens who had been imprisoned at the American military base of Guantánamo until their repatriation to France in 2004, are found guilty by a court in Paris of conspiracy for terrorist purposes. Imad Kanouni, the sixth accused, is acquitted.

Italy

- On 6 December Prime Minister Romano Prodi narrowly survives a vote of confidence in the Senate (the upper house) in connection with an urgent decree concerning the expulsion from Italy of European citizens who threaten public security. Some senators of the extreme left, forming part of the Union, the government coalition, opposed the measure, which they consider racist.
- From 10 to 12 December the roads, ports and frontiers are blocked by lorry-drivers in protest against their working
port of food and petrol in the country.

- On 15 December 20,000 people demonstrate at Vicenza against the plans to extend the American military base, located near the Dal Molin airport.

**Slovenia**

- On 22 December the new President Danilo Turk officially takes up his duties.

**Croatia**

- On 29 December the Minister for the Interior Ivica Kirin resigns following the publication in the Croatian media of photographs showing him hunting with General Mladen Markac, currently being prosecuted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for war crimes committed in 1995 in the Krajina region. General Mladen Markac has been on parole since December 2004. On the same say the ICTY declares that General Mladen Markac has violated the terms of his parole and requires Croatia to proceed to his arrest.

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

- On 4 December, after the government adopted a plan of action to integrate the two ethnically divided police forces, Bosnia and Herzegovina and the EU initial in Sarajevo a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, an important first step towards joining the EU. The reform of the police was one of the main obstacles to beginning the accession process. On 10 December Nikola Spirić is re-appointed to his post as Prime Minister. Nikola Spirić had resigned from his post in November in protest against the firm measures of the High Representative of the international community in Bosnia, Miroslav Lajčak, aiming at easing the functioning of Bosnia’s central government, undermined by ethnic rivalries. His appointment is confirmed on 27 December by the country’s collective presidency and on 28 December by the legislature.

- On 9 December Rajko Kuzmanovic, of the Party of Independent Social-Democrats (SNSD), is elected with nearly 42% of the votes to the post of President of the Republika Srpska. He succeeds Milan Jelić, who died in September.

- On 12 December the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) sentences Dragomir Milošević, a former commander of the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (SRK) of the Serb army in Bosnia, to 33 years’ imprisonment for a series of crimes committed against civilians during the last months of the siege of Sarajevo (1992-1995).

**Serbia**

- On 7 December, after 120 days of bilateral negotiations between the delegations of Serbia and Kosovo, the Troika, set up the previous August under a diplomatic initiative by the United Nations to reach a negotiated agreement over the future status of the Province of Kosovo by 10 December 2007, submits its final report to the Secretary General of the United Nations Ban Ki-moon, recognising the stalemate of the direct negotiations. On 10 December thousands of students of Albanian origin take to the streets of Pristina to demand an immediate declaration of independence by the province and to call on the international community to recognise the new state.

- On 14 December the member states of the EU meet in Brussels and agree to send to Kosovo a civil crisis-management mission, composed of 1,800 men, with the mandate of stabilising the province after its declaration of independence.

**Albania**

- On 2 December the government announces that families of victims of the Stalinist regime of Enver Hoxha between 1945 and 1985 will receive a compensation payment in 2008.

- On 27 December the People’s Assembly (single-chamber parliament) votes to lift the parliamentary immunity of the minister of foreign affairs Lulzim Basha, suspected of implication in a corruption affair. Basha had himself asked the members to lift his immunity.

**Greece**

- On 12 December Greece is hit by a strike in the sectors of transport, banking and public administration. Tens of thousands of people demonstrate in Athens and in Thessalonica against the government’s proposals to reform the pension system.

**Cyprus**


**Turkey**

- On 5 December the trial of the publisher Ragıp Zarakolu, prosecuted for insult to the Turkish identity under article 301 of the penal code, opens in Ankara. He is accused of publishing a Turkish translation of a book of George Jerjian titled *The Truth will Make Us Free*, which tackles the question of the Armenian genocide between 1915 and 1923 under the Ottoman Empire.

- On 16 December Turkey launches with the aid of the United States its largest operation of recent years against the bases of the terrorist organisation Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), in northern Iraq. Nearly 175 Kurdish insurgents are thought to have been killed in the operation. The Iraqi government, which was not consulted, condemns this attack, which cost the life of an Iraqi woman. On 18 December 300 Turkish soldiers cross the Iraqi frontier and engage two groups of the PKK over 24 hours. Fresh air attacks are launched in northern Iraq on 22, 23 and 26 December. In protest at the operations against the PKK 95 vehicles are set on fire in Turkey. 72 people, mainly PKK sympathisers, are arrested in connection with these fires.

- On 19 December the EU opens negotiations for Turkey’s accession in 2 new chapters: trans-European networks and consumers and health protection.

- On 29 December 19 people suspected of having links with the Al-Qaeda organisation are arrested in Aksaray, Ankara and Istanbul. Weapons, ammunition and false identity documents are also seized.

**Syria**

- At the beginning of December some thirty political opposition members, including Dr Ahmad Tohme, Jabir al-Shoufi, Akram al-Bunni, Dr Fida’al-Hurani and Ali al-Abdallah, are arrested by the au-
authorities. They had taken part in Damascus on the previous 1 December in the national council of the Damascus Declaration for national democratic change, a movement calling for democratic reforms in Syria.

- On 30 December the French President Nicolas Sarkozy, on a visit to Cairo, announces that Paris will no longer have contacts with Damascus “until we have proof of the will of the Syrians to allow Lebanon to designate a consensus President.” The Syrian authorities deny any involvement in the current crisis in Lebanon. The Egyptian President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak calls on Syria to intervene so that the Lebanese Assembly may meet to elect a new President.

Lebanon

- On 12 December the head of military operations, Brigadier General François al-Hajj, is assassinated in a bomb attack in the Christian district of Baabda in Beirut. Some anti-Syrian political leaders accuse Syria of responsibility for the assassination, while the latter condemns it, noting that this assassination benefits Syria.

Egypt

- On 5 December the 27th session of the Council of Arab ministers of social affairs is held in Cairo. They discuss development in the Arab countries, the dynamism of the Arab strategy for combating poverty and the monitoring of the implementation of the Arab declaration on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and of the Arab convention in the rights of handicapped people.
- On 5 December the 9th session of the Council of Arab Ministers of the Environment is held in Cairo, in presence of representatives of international organisations specialising in the domain of the environment. This session is devoted to the monitoring of the Arab strategy on land degradation, the fight against desertification and the preservation of natural resources.

Libya

- On 9 December the French President Nicolas Sarkozy announces the signing of a number of contracts with Libya to

a value of 10 billion euros, including in the domain of armaments and the construction of a civil nuclear reactor. From 10 to 15 December the Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi undertakes an official visit to France. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Human Rights denounces the human rights situation in Libya. From 17 to 18 December the Libyan leader visits Spain.
- On 31 December The Guardian reports that Libya has signed an agreement with Italy authorising 6 Italian patrols, composed of mixed Italian-Libyan crews, to patrol in Libyan waters to combat traffic in human beings and illegal immigration.

Tunisia

- On 4 December Tunisian justice sentences to one year’s imprisonment the journalist Slim Boukhdir, one of the most critical voices against the Tunisian government, for violent altercation with the police. The previous month Boukhdir had gone on hunger strike for more than a week to denounce the refusal of his application for a passport to enable him to travel abroad.
- On 29 December two Tunisian Islamists are sentenced to death for attempting a coup d’état. Eight other Islamists are sentenced to life imprisonment, seven to thirty years and 13 to prison terms between five and twenty years for membership of a terrorist group, disturbance to public order and paramilitary training. The accused declare that their confessions had been extracted by violence.

Algeria

- At the beginning of December the French President Nicolas Sarkozy makes an official visit to Algeria, where he signs a partnership agreement with Algeria to help it to develop its nuclear energy programme.
- On 11 December at least 72 people die in two car-bomb attacks in Algiers, claimed by the Al-Qaeda Organisation in the Islamic Maghreb. The second bomb goes off near the buildings of the United Nations in Hydra, a residential quarter, killing 17 United Nations functionaries.

Morocco

- On 28 December the anti-terrorist court in Sale sentences seven people to prison terms between one and 15 years for their role in the attacks in Casablanca in May 2003.

European Union

- On 8 and 9 December, seven years after a first summit in Cairo, Europeans and Africans meet in Lisbon to found a strategic partnership based on peace, security, governance, human rights, trade and development. The British Prime Minister Gordon Brown boycotts the summit to protest against the presence of the President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, strongly criticised for human rights violations in his country.
- On 12 December the Presidents of the European Parliament, Hans-Gert Pöttering, of the Council, the Portuguese Prime Minister José Socrates, and of the Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso, sign and solemnly proclaim the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in Strasbourg. This charter had been proclaimed on 7 December 2000 in Nice without having juridical force. On 13 December the heads of state and of government of the 27 member states sign the Treaty of Lisbon. The Treaty of Lisbon refers to the Charter, thus making it juridically binding.
- On 21 December the new countries which joined the EU in 2004, with the exception of Cyprus, become members of the Schengen Zone.

Gibraltar and Western Sahara

Gibraltar

- On 11 October the Gibraltar Social Democrat Party (GSD) wins with 49.33% of the votes a fourth consecutive term in legislative elections held early.

Western Sahara

- On 17 April the Financial Times reports that an unpublished report of the United Nations dating from 2006 declares that the human rights of the inhabitants of Western Sahara, administered by Morocco, are being systematically violated.
ern Sahara (MINURSO) until 31 October and calls on Morocco and the Polisario Front to open direct discussions, for the first time for 32 years, on the future of the territory disputed between them since 1975.

• On 18 and 19 June the representatives of the Polisario Front, Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania meet in New York for a first round of discussions, under the auspices of the United Nations, on the future of Western Sahara. The personal envoy of the Secretary General of the United Nations, Peter Van Walsum, presides over the discussions. Morocco is represented by the minister of the interior Chakib Benmoussa.

• On 10 and 11 August a second round of negotiations takes place in New York. Morocco and the Polisario Front agree in saying that the status quo has become unaccept able.


• From 14 to 20 December the Polisario Front holds its 12th congress at Tifariti, 370 km. east of Laayoune. At this congress the members re-elect Mohamed Abdelaziz, President of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, to the post of secretary general of Polisario, an office that he holds since 1976. On the same day Abdelaziz appoints the government proposed by the Prime Minister Abdelkader Taleb Oumar.

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Chronologies

Chronology Israel-Palestine

During 2007, the future of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s government is threatened, discredited on the one hand by the interim report of the Winograd commission published in April, which finds failings in the conduct of the war in Lebanon in 2006, and on the other hand by corruption scandals involving several members of the government including Ehud Olmert. Calls for the resignation of the Prime Minister Ehud Olmert intensify, both among Israeli public opinion and within his own Kadima party, and several Kadima members resign from their posts. To the political scandal affecting the government is added the scandal involving the Israeli President Moshe Katsav, charged under several counts including sexual harassment and rape. In January he is suspended temporarily, before resigning in July. Shimon Peres then becomes officially the ninth President of Israel.

In the occupied territories Palestinian in-fighting between the supporters of Fatah, the party of the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, and the supporters of Hamas, which won the legislative elections in January 2006, continues in 2007. In February President Abbas and the President of the political office of Hamas based in Damascus, Khaled Meshal, sign the Mecca agreement, which establishes a cease-fire and leads to the creation of a new government of national unity in March. The European governments and the United States declare that they will negotiate with members of the new cabinet who have no links to Hamas, while Israel refuses all dialogue with the new unity government. Norway alone announces that it will recognise the new government and will resume its financial aid. After a relative lull, violence between Palestinians intensifies again during May and June, causing hundreds of deaths, including those of numerous civilians. In mid June the war between the two rival factions results in the taking of control by Hamas of the Gaza Strip, thus de facto splitting the Palestinian territories into two blocs, the West Bank remaining under the control of Fatah. In reply, President Abbas dismisses the government of national unity, installs an emergency cabinet and outlaws the executive forces of Hamas and its militias. The EU and the United States immediately recognise the emergency government and announce in June the ending of the economic and political embargo against the Palestinian Authority, imposed in March 2006 following the victory of Hamas in the legislative elections. In July a new Palestinian government is constituted in the West Bank, with the support of the West. From July onward, talks between the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli government on an “agreement of principle” accelerate, and Israel takes a number of measures to strengthen President Mahmoud Abbas’s Fatah against Hamas, including the ending of its economic blockade against the Palestinian Authority and the freeing of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners and Fatah militants. At the international conference in Annapolis in November for peace in the Middle East, patronised by the American President George W. Bush, the two parties commit themselves to concluding a peace agreement by the end of 2008. A delegation of the Arab League takes part in this conference. In December a piloting committee composed of Palestinian and Israeli negotiators meets in Jerusalem to begin talks on the conclusion of a peace treaty. In December a meeting of international donors for Palestine promises to give 7.4 billion dollars to the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank.

Despite the internal political crisis in the occupied territories and the cease-fire between Israel and the Palestinian factions in November 2006, the violence between the Israeli army and the Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip continues throughout 2007. In March, for the first time since the cease-fire came into effect, the military arm of Hamas, Izz al-Din Al-Qassim, launches an attack against Israel, which retaliates against the firing of rockets. In February and in April, Israel arrests some wanted Palestinian militants in Nablus and Jenin. In April the Israeli army, for the first time since the cease-fire of November 2006 and its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, launches a military incursion in the Gaza Strip, near the town of Beit Hanoun. In May the Israeli army launches raids in the West Bank, detaining several political representatives of Hamas, including the minister of education Nasir al-Din al-Shair. In September, in view of the continual firing of rockets, Israel declares the Gaza Strip a “hostile territory” and formally adopts a policy intended to limit the circulation of goods into the Gaza Strip together with the supply of fuel and electricity, with the aim of throttling the Hamas government. The Israeli measures also aggravate the humanitarian crisis affecting the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip since the victory of Hamas in the legislative elections of January 2006.

January 2007

Israel

• On 9 January the Committees for Popular Resistance, one of the militant
Palestinian groups who had kidnapped the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in June 2005, announce that the latter is in good health and that he will be set free in return for the release of Palestinian prisoners.

- On 16 January the Ministry of Justice announces that a criminal enquiry is to be launched against the Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in connection with the affair of the privatisation of the Luemi Bank in 2006, when Olmert was Minister of Finance.
- On 17 January Lieutenant-General Dan Halutz, Chief of Staff of Tsahal (the Israeli defence forces), who for months has been the target of criticisms regarding the performance of the Israeli army in the war with Lebanon in 2006, resigns. On 22 January Lieutenant-General Gaby Ashkenazi, Director General of the Ministry of Defence, is appointed to replace him.
- On 25 January the Knesset votes President Moshe Katsav to be placed in "temporary incapacity" for three months, so that he may respond to accusations of rape, sexual harassment, abuse of power and corruption. The President of the Knesset Dalia Itzik becomes the interim occupant of the post.
- On 28 January Raleb Majadele, an Israeli Member of Parliament of Arab origin, belonging to the Labour Party, is appointed Minister without Portfolio. He is the first Muslim Arab to belong to an Israeli cabinet. The Minister of Defence and leader of the Labour Party Amir Peretz had declared on 10 January that he wished to see Majadele appointed Minister of Science and Technology, Culture and Sport.

Palestine

- On 3 January the inter-Palestinian violence between Hamas and Fatah supporters resumes in the Gaza Strip, killing 5 Palestinians. On the evening of 3 January representatives of the two factions meet at Khan Yunis and agree to withdraw their combatants from the streets and to free militants who have been seized. On the following day new violence erupts at Jabiliya in Gaza. Colonel Mohammed Ghayeb, a commander of the preventive security forces under Fatah's control, and 6 of his bodyguards are killed by the Executive Force, a parallel security force under the command of the Minister of Home Affairs and of National Security Said Siyam, a member of Hamas. On 4 January President Mahmoud Abbas, originally from Fatah, and the Hamas Prime Minister Ismael Haniyeh meet in the presence of Egyptian mediators. They agree to withdraw the rival armed groups from the streets of Gaza. On 6 January President Abbas announces that he will declare the Executive Force illegal if it is not immediately integrated into the other Palestinian security forces under his command. President Abbas appoints Mohammed Dahlan, the former head of the Preventive Security Forces, to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Palestinian security services. The talks of 21 and 22 January in Damascus, in Syria, between President Abbas and the President of Hamas' political office Khaled Meshal fail to put an end to the intra-Palestinian rivalries and to form a government of unity. On 25 January the clashes resume, despite the appeals for calm from President Abbas and Prime Minister Haniyeh. At least 30 Palestinians are killed, including several civilians. On 30 January the two factions agree on a truce.

Peace Negotiations

- On 11 January, in an interview granted to Reuters, the President of Hamas' political bureau Khaled Meshal declares that Israel is a "reality and that there will always be a state called Israel", before adding that Hamas will not formally recognise Israel until a Palestinian state has been created, consisting of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homes has been respected.
- On 14 January the American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice meets the Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, who proposes the creation of an interim Palestinian state with temporary frontiers. This proposal is rejected the following day by the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas at his meeting with Rice, where he adds that only a comprehensive peace agreement can resolve the conflict. During her visit, Rice promises a greater engagement of the United States in the Middle-East peace process.

- On 18 January Israel announces that it will unfreeze 100 million dollars of tax receipts due to the Palestinian Authority, so as to pay them to President Abbas.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 4 January the Israeli defence forces launch a raid on Ramallah, killing 4 Palestinians and kidnapping 4 others. On 29 January the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigade, affiliated to Fatah, and Islamic Jihad carry out a suicide attack in a bakery in Elat, killing 3 Israelis. This is the first suicide attack in Israel since April 2006. The spokesman of Hamas in Gaza Fawzi Barhoum declares that this attack is the natural response to Israel's military operations in the Gaza Strip. On 30 January the Israeli air force bombs a tunnel situated in the east of the Gaza Strip.

February 2007

Israel

- On 9 February, after Friday prayers in the Al-Aqsa mosque, worshippers demonstrate against the works taking place near the mosque. As the police try to disperse the demonstrators, clashes break out between Palestinians and Israelis. The works for the rebuilding of a bridge that fell in 2004 are considered a threat by many Palestinians, who think that Israel wants to demolish the Al-Aqsa mosque to rebuild the Jewish Temple. Fifteen policemen and 17 Palestinians are injured, while 17 Palestinians are arrested. On 12 February the Mayor of Jerusalem unexpectedly announces that the works have been suspended.

Palestine

- On 1 February the truce agreed on 30 January is broken when Hamas fighters attack a convoy of lorries transporting arms destined for the Presidential guard in the Gaza Strip. Five people die and thirty others are injured in the armed clashes that follow. On 2 February the fighting intensifies. Seventeen people, including 4 children, are killed when Fatah forces attack the Islamic University, affiliated to Hamas, and when Hamas
combatants attack a Fatah security post. President Mahmoud Abbas appeals for calm. On 4 February the streets of Gaza return to a certain peace, allowing the Palestinians to get supplies. On 6 February President Mahmoud Abbas and the President of Hamas’ Damascus-based political office Khaled Meshal meet in Mecca at the invitation of the King of Saudi Arabia. On 8 February they sign an agreement on the formation of a new national unity government. According to the agreement Hamas will always refuse to explicitly recognise Israel and will only agree to “respect” the previous peace accords, signed by the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO). For the first time Hamas commits itself to respecting and implementing the peace proposal “territories in exchange for peace” ratified by the Arab League in March 2002 to put an end to the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Peace Negotiations

- On 18 February Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has separate meetings with the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, prior to a joint meeting between the two parties in Jerusalem on 19 February. The two parties commit themselves to meeting again soon and call on the United States to involve itself more in the Middle East peace process.

Conflicts between the Parties

- From 24 to 27 February the Israeli army launches an operation in the town of Nablus with the aim of arresting wanted militants. On 25 February a curfew is imposed as Israeli soldiers proceed to a house-to-house search. On 26 February a man is killed and his son is wounded.

March 2007

Israel

- On 1 March the State Controller Micha Lindenstrauss orders a criminal investigation to be opened against the Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in a corruption affair going back to the time when he was Minister of Trade and Industry (2003-2005).

On 8 March the newspaper Haaretz publishes a secret report, submitted by the Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to the Winograd commission, set up in September 2006 to look into the government’s and army’s management of the war with Lebanon in July and August 2006. According to the report, the preparations for war with Hezbollah had begun 4 months before the latter kidnapped the 2 Israeli soldiers, the event which officially triggered the war.

Palestine

- On 12 March the BBC’s correspondent in the Gaza Strip Alan Johnston is abducted by armed men near the Egyptian embassy in the Gaza Strip. No responsibility is claimed for the abduction. On 16 March John Ging, director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), narrowly escapes an abduction attempt in Gaza.
- On 15 March Fatah and Hamas form a government of national unity to replace the government formed in March 2006 by Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, originally from Hamas. On 17 March the Palestinian Legislative Council gives its confidence to the new government by 83 votes to 3. The new government is composed mainly of ministers originating from Fatah and independent ministers. Haniyeh remains in his post as Prime Minister. Israel immediately declares that it will not negotiate with this new government, which does not respect the three international conditions established in January 2006 by the Quartet, i.e. the renunciation of violence, the recognition of the State of Israel and respect for the existing Israeli-Palestinian accords. The European governments for their part declare that they will be in contact with the members of the government who are not members of Hamas. On 18 March the United States declare that they will likewise meet certain members of the government but that they will not resume their direct financing of the government. Norway announces that it will recognise the new government and will resume its financial aid.

Peace Negotiations

- On 11 March the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert meet at Olmert’s residence in Jerusalem, in presence of the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Abbas and Olmert promise the American Secretary of state Condoleezza Rice to hold talks once a fortnight.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 7 March the Israeli army arrests 18 suspected Palestinian militants in a raid on the offices of the military intelligence services of the Palestinian Authority near Ramallah.
- On 19 March the military arm of Hamas, the Izz al-Din Al-Qassim Brigades, claims responsibility for the shots fired near the frontier between the Gaza Strip and Israel, which wounded an Israeli civilian. This is the first attack claimed by the group since the cease-fire which took effect in November 2006. On 28 March the Israeli army bombards the Gaza Strip, its targets being Palestinian militants suspected of preparing an attack. This is the first time since the cease-fire of November 2006 that Israel retaliates for the launching of rockets.

April 2007

Israel

- On 10 April the police interrogate the Prime Minister Ehud Olmert for 4 hours, as part of an investigation into corruption involving his personal assistant. On 22 April the Minister of Finance Abraham Hirchon suspends himself from office for three months as he awaits the results of the police investigation concerning allegations of malversation of funds.
- On 22 April the Knesset decides to prolong the temporary suspension from his functions of President Moshe Katsav until the end of his Presidential term on the coming 15 July. Moshe Katsav is the object of an investigation for rape, sexual harassment and abuse of power.
- On 30 April the Winograd commission, set up in September 2006 to analyse and draw lessons from the Israeli-Lebanese war in 2006, presents its interim report, which concludes that there were failings in the conduct of the
war in Lebanon and names the Prime Minister Ehud Olmert among others as responsible, accusing him of lack of judgment, of responsibility and of prudence. The report also points the finger at the Minister of Defence Amir Peretz and Lieutenant-General Dan Halutz, who resigned in January as Chief of Staff of the Israeli defence forces.

Palestine

▪ On 5 April the consul general of the United Kingdom in Jerusalem meets Prime Minister Ismail Haniye, a member of Hamas, to discuss the fate of Alan Johnston, the BBC correspondent abducted on 12 March in the Gaza Strip. This is the first meeting between a European official and a Hamas Minister since the formation of the new government of national unity the previous March.

▪ On 10 April the American State Department announces that the administration of the American President George W. Bush will make a contribution of nearly 80 million dollars to the security forces controlled by the President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas, after Congress decided against the blocking of these funds.

Peace Negotiations

▪ On 1 April, Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, in a public statement, invites the Saudi King Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz and the other Arab leaders to meet him. In March, at its 19th summit in Saudi Arabia, the Arab League had re-launched its peace proposal “territories in exchange for peace”. On 18 April the Arab Ministers of Foreign Affairs meet in Cairo and decide that Egypt and Jordan should meet Israel to discuss the possibility of a wider meeting.

▪ On 8 April Fawzi Barhoum, a spokesman of Hamas, announces that the Palestinian militant groups involved in the abduction of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in June 2006 have sent, through Egyptian mediators, a list with the names of about 450 Palestinian prisoners, whose release they demand in return for the freeing of the Israeli soldier.

▪ On 15 April the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert meet in Jerusalem, where they discuss amongst other things the lifting of restrictions on the freedom of movement of Palestinians and of goods as well as security questions.

Conflict between the Parties

▪ On 4 April, for the first time since the cease-fire of November 2006, Israeli troops enter the Gaza Strip, 500 m east of the town of Beit Hanoun. The purpose of the operation is to prevent the launch of rockets by Palestinian militants. One Palestinian is killed in the operation.

▪ On 10 April Shin Bet, the Israeli internal security service, announces that it has arrested in the town of Qalqilya 10 Hamas militants, suspected of being in the act of preparing an attack for the Jewish festivals in Tel Aviv.

▪ On 21 and 22 April Israeli forces enter Jenin and Nablus, in the West Bank, to arrest Palestinian militants. Nine Palestinians die in the fighting. In retaliation, on 24 April the Izz al-Din Al-Qassim Brigades, the armed branch of Hamas, launch several rockets from the Gaza Strip.

May 2007

Israel

▪ On 1 May, in response to the criticisms of the Winograd commission over the Israeli government’s and army’s management of the war with Lebanon in 2006, the Minister without Portfolio Eitan Cabel, a member of the Labour Party, resigns. He declares that he no longer wishes to belong to a government under the leadership of Olmert. On 2 May the Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni, a member of the Kadima party, announces that she has advised Olmert to resign. On 2 May the leader of Kadima in the Knesset, Avigdor Yotvashki, resigns, declaring that the Prime Minister no longer had the confidence of his party or of his country. On 3 May more than 100,000 demonstrators gathered in Rabin Square in Tel Aviv demand the resignation of Prime Minister Olmert.

▪ On 6 May B’Tselem and the Centre for the Defence of Individuals, two Israeli human-rights organisations, publish a joint report titled “Absolutely Forbidden,” in which they accuse members of Shin Bet of torturing Palestinian prisoners, violating a decision of the Supreme Court which forbids that practice.

▪ On 10 May, in violation of international law, the Jerusalem city council announces that 3 new colonies will be built at Atarot, Ramot Alon and Wala-jah, occupied by Israel in 1967. The object of those constructions is to link the Jerusalem colonies with those established in the West Bank.

▪ On 28 May, in the primary elections in the Labour Party, Amir Peretz, the Minister of Defence and current leader of the party, receives only 22% of the votes, against 35.6% for the former Prime Minister Ehud Barak and 30.1% for Ami Ayalon, a former head of Shin Bet. The second round will be held on 12 June.

Palestine

▪ On 9 May the Arab television station Al-Jazeera broadcasts a video emanating from the radical group Jash al-Islam (the Army of Islam) and showing the press card of the BBC correspondent Alan Johnston, abducted on 12 March in the Gaza Strip. The group demands that the United Kingdom set free the cleric Omar Mahmood Abu Omar, a Jordanian detained since 2002 and in danger of being extradited to Jordan, where he was sentenced for terrorism in absentia. The group is ready to pay for his release and that of other prisoners.

▪ On 11 May, following the deployment by Fatah of 3,000 security agents in the Gaza Strip without notifying Hamas, Hamas fighters respond by attacking the national security building and by firing on Fatah road-blocks. On 13 May Baha Abu Jarad, an important figure in the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, affiliated to Fatah, is assassinated, provoking clashes between the two rival factions. On 14 May the Minister of Home Affairs Han Talab Abd-al-Rahman al-Qawasimi, an independent member of the government, resigns. The same evening the two factions decree a cease-fire. On 15 and 16 May, 20 Palestinians are killed in the Gaza Strip, in spite of the cease-fire. The armed men of Hamas attack a camp of the Presidential guard near the terminal of Kari, killing 7 guards. On 16 May violence intensifies, killing at least 16 Palestinians. Hamas supporters attack the residence of General Rashid Abu Shbak, in charge of Fatah’s preventive security
unit, and kill 6 of his bodyguards. The talks between President Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah and the leader of Hamas’s Damascus-based political office Khaled Meshaal fail to put an end to the spiral of violence. On 18 May shots are exchanged between the Hamas militants quartered in the Islamic University in the town of Gaza and the forces of Fatah, entrenched in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs close by. On 19 May the Egyptians obtain a cease-fire. On the same day 22 members of Hamas and Fatah security members are killed. Six civilians are also killed.

Conflict between the Parties

▪ On 15 May Hamas militants fire several rockets at the Israeli town of Sderot, hitting a school and a house and injuring a dozen people. On 16 May, in retaliation, an Israeli helicopter attacks a Hamas training camp near Rafah and kills 4 Hamas fighters. On 17 and 18 May the Israeli army launches air attacks against Hamas targets in Gaza, killing 10 people and wounding a dozen more, while Israeli tanks and infantry enter the north of the Gaza Strip. On 20 May Israel launches an air attack on the house of Khalil al-Haya, a Hamas member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, in the Sajaiya district, and kills 7 members of his family. On 21 May, for the first time since November 2006, an Israeli woman is killed by a rocket fired at Sderot, where the EU High Representative/Secretary General for Foreign Policy and Common Security meets the Minister of Foreign Affairs Tzipi Livni. The Israeli response kills 5 Palestinians, including 4 members of Islamic Jihad. On 24 May the Israeli army launches several raids in the West Bank, where it arrests several Hamas politicians, including the Minister of Education Nasir al-Din al-Shair, some Hamas deputies and 4 mayors. On 27 May another Israeli civilian is killed by a rocket fired by Hamas. Israel responds with an air attack on the Gaza Strip.

June 2007

Israel

▪ On 12 June Ehud Barak, the former Prime Minister, wins the second round of leadership elections of the Labour Party with 51.2% of the votes against 47.7% for Ami Ayalon. On 18 June he succeeds the current Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Amir Peretz.

▪ On 13 June Shimon Peres, a member of the Kadima party, is elected President of Israel by the Knesset (single-chamber parliament). On 28 June the serving President Moshe Katsav, against whom there are judicial prosecutions, agrees to plead guilty to minor charges in exchange for the dropping of his prosecution for rape. Moshe Katsav also agrees to submit his resignation, which takes place on 29 June. His resignation will be effective on 2 July.


▪ On 25 June, for the first time since the abduction of the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit in June 2006 by the Izz al-Din Al-Qassim Brigades, the military wing of Hamas, the Army of Islam and the Committees of Popular Resistance, an audiotape of him is published. In this recording Shalit declares that his health is deteriorating.

Palestine

▪ On 1 June the web site al-Ekhlasa publishes a video of the Army of Islam showing Alan Johnston, the BBC correspondent abducted the previous March. It is the first concrete proof since his abduction that Johnston is alive. Johnston declares in the video that he is being well treated and calls on the United Kingdom to release the prisoners, in particular the cleric Omar Mahmoud Abu Omar, detained in the United Kingdom since 2002. On 25 June a new video shows him with a belt of explosives around his waist. Johnston declares that his captors will set it off if an attempt is made to free him by force.

▪ On 9 June new clashes break out between Hamas and Fatah supporters in the Gaza Strip. On 11 June, in spite of a new cease-fire, 9 people are killed. On 12 June members of the Fatah Presidential guard attack the house of the Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, a member of Hamas, in the Shati refugee camp near the town of Gaza. In retaliation Hamas attacks a certain number of security posts controlled by Fatah and declares the north of Gaza a “closed military zone.” On 13 June Hamas consolidates its seizure of a large part of the Gaza Strip, after among other things destroying the offices of Fatah at Khan Yunis. On the evening of 13 June Hamas controls the north of the Gaza Strip together with the town of Gaza, with the exception of the Presidential residence and the headquarters of the national security forces at Al Suraya. Fifteen people have been killed on this day. In the West Bank a dozen Hamas activists are arrested by the Palestinian security forces, loyal to President Mahmoud Abbas. On 14 June Abbas dismisses the national unity government formed the previous March and declare a state of emergency. The United States immediately approve Abbas’s decision. On 15 June Hamas definitively takes control of the Gaza Strip, thus splitting the Palestinian territories de facto into two blocs, the West Bank remaining under the control of Fatah. On 17 June Abbas institutes an emergency cabinet, under the Presidency of Salam Khaild Abbudallah Fayyad. By decree he makes Hamas’ executive forces and militias illegal. Hamas declares the emergency government illegal. On 18 June the United States announce the ending of the economic and political embargo on the Palestinian Authority imposed in March 2006 following the victory of Hamas in the legislative elections. On 24 June Israel agrees to unfreeze 350 million dollars of tax receipts and on 25 June Prime Minister Ehud Olmert meets President Abbas, the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and King Abdullah II of Jordan at Sharm-al-Sheikh. He announces that he will release 250 members of Fatah held in Israeli jails.

Conflicts between the Parties

▪ On 27 June, to put a stop to the firing of rockets into Israel from the Gaza Strip, the Israeli army launches a series of attacks on the Gaza Strip, killing at least 12 people.

Peace Negotiations

▪ On 27 June the Quartet for the Middle East, consisting of the United States, the EU, the United Nations and Russia, announces the appointment of the for-
mer British Prime Minister Tony Blair as the Quartet’s special emissary for the Middle East.

July 2007

Israel

- On 2 July the serving President of Israel, Moshe Katsav, under judicial prosecution for offences including rape and sexual harassment, resigns. On 15 July Shimon Peres officially becomes the 9th President of Israel. In his inauguration speech he declares that he will fight against discrimination against Israeli citizens who are not Jews.
- On 2 July the magistrates’ court in Jerusalem sentences Mordechai Vanunu to 6 months’ imprisonment for breaking the conditions of his parole. The court accuses him among other things of having been in contact with foreign journalists and having attempted to leave the country. Mordechai Vanunu had served a prison sentence of 18 years for disclosing Israeli nuclear secrets before being released in April 2004.
- On 4 July the Knesset approves a government reshuffle. Roni Bar-On, a member of the Kadima party, re-enters the cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister. Roni Bar-On, until then Minister of Home Affairs, becomes Minister of Finance, succeeding Abraham Hirchson, who was implicated in a corruption scandal and resigned in April.

Palestine

- On 4 July the BBC correspondent in the Gaza Strip, Alan Johnston, abducted on 12 March by the Army of Islam, is released after pressure by Hamas, which had arrested several members of the Army of Islam and encircled their offices in the town of Gaza.
- On 13 July the emergency cabinet of Salam Khalid Abdallah Fayyad, created on 14 June, resigns and is replaced by a new government, of almost identical composition to the emergency cabinet. Salam Khalid Abdallah Fayyad remains as Prime Minister.

Peace Negotiations

- On 1 July Israel transfers more than 100 million dollars to the moderate government of President Mahmoud Abbas in the West Bank, ending its economic blockade of the Palestinian Authority, which had lasted nearly a year and a half. On 3 July Israel and the government of President Abbas resume negotiations on security questions. On 8 July Israel agrees to release 250 Palestinian prisoners. On 20 July 255 prisoners are released, most of them members of Fatah. On 15 July Israel proclaims an amnesty for 190 militants, most of them members of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigade, affiliated to Fatah.
- On 16 July the American President George Bush praises the organisation this autumn of a Middle-East peace conference, under the Presidency of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in which representatives of the Palestinians, the Israelis and the neighbouring countries favourable to the creation of a Palestinian state are due to participate. He also promises a subsidy of 190 million dollars to the President of the Palestinian Authority.
- On 23 and 24 July the new representative of the Quartet Tony Blair makes his first visit in the region, passing through Jordan, Israel and the West Bank.
- On 25 July, according to the daily Haaretz, Ehud Olmert proposes to Mahmoud Abbas negotiations for an agreement in principle over the creation of a Palestinian state, covering 90% of the West Bank, the construction of a tunnel connecting the West Bank with Gaza and an arrangement for East Jerusalem permitting the Palestinians to present that part of the town as their capital.
- On 25 July a delegation of the Arab League, led by the Egyptian and Jordanian Foreign Ministers Ahmed About Ghet and Abdelelah al Khatib, makes a historic visit to Jerusalem, to promote the Arab League’s peace proposal “territories in exchange for peace.” The two ministers meet the Prime Minister Ehud Olmert and the Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and call for a precise calendar of negotiations with the Palestinians over the creation of their future State, requesting that Israel will not let this opportunity slip.

Conflict between the Parties

- During July the clashes between Hamas and Israel continue in the Gaza Strip, with almost daily Israeli raids. On 5 July Israeli tanks enter Gaza and kill at least 6 members of the Izz al-Din Al-Qassim Brigades, the military branch of Hamas.

August 2007

Israel

- On 7 August the police forcibly expel 30 Jewish colonists and about a hundred of their supporters from the town of Hebron, where they were illegally occupying a building abandoned since 2006, in violation of a decision of the Supreme Court. On 8 August The Times reports that the Israeli army has sentenced 12 soldiers to a month’s imprisonment for refusing to take part in the operation.
- On 14 August, with 73.2% of votes in the first round, Benyamin Netanyahu is re-elected leader of the opposition party Likud.
- On 16 August the American Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs Nicholas Burns signs an agreement with Israel allocating to it a military subsidy of 30 billion dollars over 10 years from 2008. This sum represents an increase of 25% in American military aid to Israel.

Palestine

- On 8 August President Mahmoud Abbas goes to Egypt where he meets the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. After the meeting he announces that he will not negotiate with Hamas until the latter gives up its occupation of the Gaza Strip. On 14 August, after criticism by the Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi and a Foreign Affairs Committee of the British Parliament of the policy of boycotting Hamas, the Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni declares that the international community would be committing a serious error in engaging in dialogue with Hamas.
- On 19 August thousands of Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip are plunged in the dark following the decision of the EU to suspend the financing of fuel deliveries, compelling the sole local electricity company to cut off power. The EU declares that it will resume payments once it has received assurances that the money is not being used by Hamas for other purposes. On 21 August the EU resumes its subsidy.
Peace Negotiations

▪ On 1 August the American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the American Defense Secretary Robert Gates visit Saudi Arabia, where they meet Prince Saud al-Faisal ibn Abdul Aziz, Minister of Foreign Affairs. After their meeting the Prince announces that Saudi Arabia does not exclude the possibility of attending the Middle-East peace conference proposed by the American President George W. Bush the previous April. On the same day Condoleezza Rice meets the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who declares himself willing to negotiate an agreement in principle on the creation of a Palestinian state, in preparation of the international conference initiated by the American President and due to take place before the end of the year. On the following day, for the first time since the armed take-over by the Islamists in Gaza, Condoleezza Rice goes to Ramallah, where the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas declares that he is ready to negotiate an agreement in principle with Israel as an intermediate step. On 6 August, for the first time for 7 years, the Palestinian and Israeli leaders meet in the Palestinian territories. After the meeting, which lasted for 3 hours in a hotel in Jericho, an Israeli spokesman declares that the meeting has been very constructive, without the essential questions of the conflict having been addressed. On 28 August the 2 leaders meet in Olmert’s official residence in Jerusalem, where they pursue their discussions on an agreement in principle.

Conflicts between the Parties

▪ On 20 August an Israeli missile kills 6 Hamas militants and injures another near the Bureij refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. On 21 August Israeli troops kill militants of Islamic Jihad in the south of the Gaza Strip, while 2 Palestinians children are killed in another operation of the Israeli armed forces.

September 2007

Israel

▪ On 5 September the Supreme Court rules unanimously that the line of the separation wall is harmful to the village of Bilin and must be modified. In the past 30 months protests had taken place every Friday near the wall, which separates the villagers from their field. The Court concludes that the position of the wall as it stood was not motivated by security purposes. But to the great regret of the inhabitants, all the lands in Bilin are not returned to their owner.

▪ On 6 September the organisation Human Rights Watch (HRW) publishes a report asserting that the indiscriminate Israeli air attacks in the war with Lebanon in 2006 were responsible for the majority of civilian casualties on the Lebanese side. HRW thus refutes the accusations that Hezbollah had been using the civilian population to protect itself. Nine hundred Lebanese civilians lost their lives during that war, which lasted 34 days. On the same day the Israeli defence forces declare that the report contains numerous inaccuracies and insists that the army had respected international rules and human rights.

▪ On 24 September the Prosecutor General Menachem Mazuz orders the police to begin a criminal enquiry against the Prime Minister Ehud Olmert over allegations of corruption concerning real estate.

Palestine

▪ On 7 September Hamas forces arrest 4 prominent leaders of Fatah in the Gaza Strip, following violent clashes with the supporters of Fatah, who were attempting to hold Friday prayers outside the Qatiba mosque. In August Hamas had forbidden prayers in the open air, regarded as politicised.

Peace Negotiations

▪ At the beginning of September the representative of the Quartet, Tony Blair, makes his second visit in the Middle East. On 23 September Blair and some representatives of the Quartet hold a meeting in New York, where they approve the prolongation of the EU’s urgency aid mechanism, put in place after Hamas came to power in March 2006.

▪ On 10 December the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert meet in Jerusalem. On 11 September The International Herald Tribune reports that Abbas and Olmert have agreed to set up a team of negotiators to create 8 joint ministerial committees to work on common subjects such as communications, security and economic co-operation.

▪ On 20 September the American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice meets President Abbas and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.

Conflicts between the Parties

▪ On 11 September Islamic Jihad and the Committees of Popular Resistance fire a rocket at the Israeli military base of Zikim, injuring 69 Israeli recruits and provoking an Israeli counter-attack. On 19 September, faced with the continuous launching of rockets, Israel declares the Gaza Strip a “hostile territory” and formally adopts a policy aimed at limiting the circulation of goods into the Gaza Strip, together with the supply of fuel and electricity, with the object of throttling the Hamas government. On 26 and 27 September the Israeli army carries out a series of air attacks, together with a land attack in the north of the Gaza Strip, killing 12 Palestinians, 2 of them civilians.

October 2007

Israel

▪ On 8 October the Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declares before the Knesset that he intends to devote the year 2008 to the search for peace with the Palestinians. He adds that he has developed a good working relationship with the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in their recent meetings.

▪ On 9 October the Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is interrogated for 5 hours by the police in his residence in Jerusalem, as part of an enquiry over the privatisation of the Leumi Bank in 2005 while he was Minister of Finance.

▪ On 15 October Olmert announces, following the publication of a very critical report, that the government is going to increase to 373 million dollars a year the public aid to the Holocaust survivors.

▪ On 18 October, two days after the Russian President Vladimir Putin went to Iran, where he declared that he would not permit a military attack on Iran, the Prime Minister Ehud Olmert makes a surprise visit to Russia to discuss with
the Russian President the Iranian nuclear programme.

- On 21 October Yuval Diskin, Chief of the Internal Security Force Shin Bet, tells the cabinet of ministers that Palestinian militants of Tanzim, a faction within the Fatah movement, had planned the assassination of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert the previous 6 June, when he was due to go to Jericho to meet Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas. The meeting was cancelled and the intelligence was passed on to the Palestinian Authority, which proceeded to arrest three suspects.

Palestine

- On 12 October the Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh declares that the administration of the Gaza Strip by Hamas is temporary and that reconciliation talks with Fatah will resume soon.

Peace Negotiations

- On 1 October the Israeli authorities release 57 Palestinian prisoners, all of them residents of the West Bank. On 2 October 29 prisoners from the Gaza Strip are released.
- On 3 October and 26 October the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert meet in Jerusalem. Olmert promises that Israel will not cause a humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip, although it intends to proceed to power cuts to counter the attacks from the Gaza Strip.
- From 14 to 17 October the American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visits Israel, the Palestinian Occupied Territories and Egypt to lay down the bases for a peace conference in the Middle East, sponsored by the United States and due to take place in late November or early December at Annapolis in the United States.
- On 15 October, in her meeting with President Mahmoud Abbas, Rice calls on the Palestinians to reduce their differences with Israel on a common declaration of principles in advance of the conference. On 17 October Abbas accuses Israel of impeding all progress towards achieving that common declaration.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 7 October the Committees of Popular Resistance fire a Katyusha rocket from the Gaza Strip into Israel, which lands at Netivot, 11 km east of Gaza. On 23 October the Israeli army launches a missile at the car of Mubarak al-Hasanat, a prominent member of the Committees of Popular Resistance who belongs to the Ministry of Home Affairs headed by Hamas, killing him instantly.
- On 28 October, in retaliation for the firing of rockets at Israel from the Gaza Strip, Israel announces that it has begun to reduce supplies to the Gaza Strip in fuel and that it has closed one of the two frontier posts where food and medicaments used to enter.

November 2007

Israel

- On 3 November more than 100,000 assemble in the centre of Tel Aviv in memory of the former Prime Minister Itzhak Rabin, assassinated in 1995.
- On 29 November the Israeli police announce that they have insufficient evidence to prosecute the Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in the affair of the privatization of the Leumi Bank in 2005, when he was Minister of Finance.

Palestine

- On 2 November, for the first time since Hamas took power in the Gaza Strip, Israel announces that it has begun to reduce supplies to the Gaza Strip in fuel and that it has closed one of the two frontier posts where food and medicaments used to enter.

Peace Negotiations

- On 27 November a conference to relaunch the Middle-East peace process and lay the foundations for a negotiation for a final peace accord and the constitution of a Palestinian State takes place at Annapolis in the United States, on the initiative of the American President George W. Bush. The conference produces a declaration of principles in which the two sides commit themselves to reaching a peace agreement by the end of 2008. In addition to the Palestinian and Israeli delegations, some fifty states and organisations are represented at this conference, including the representatives of the Quartet and those of the monitoring committee of the Arab League, created in March to relaunch the peace initiative of the Saudi king Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz “territories in exchange for peace,” which goes back to 2002. After the introduction of the question of the Golan Heights into the conference’s agenda, Syria agrees to send a low-level delegation, led by the Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Makdad. On 28 November Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announces the appointment of General James Jones as her special representative for security in the Middle East.

December 2007

Israel

- On 2 December a court in Jerusalem sentences Hamdi Quran, a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), to life imprisonment for the assassination of the Israeli Minister of Tourism Rehavam Ze’evi in October 2001.
- On 4 December the Minister for Housing and Construction publishes invitations to tender for the building of 307 dwellings at Har Homa, a district in the south-east of Jerusalem, which the Palestinians regard as a colony. On 7 December the American Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice warns the Israelis that these new constructions risk damaging the peace process relaunched at Annapolis in November.
- On 7 December The Guardian reports that the Ministry of Public Security Abraham Dichter has cancelled a journey to the United Kingdom planned for January 2008, because an arrest warrant for war crimes had been issued against him for his actions in an Israeli air raid in Gaza in July 2002, which killed a number of Palestinians including 9
children. Dicter was at the time the head of Shin Bet, the internal security forces.


Palestine

- On 14 December Hamas security officers arrest Omar al-Ghoul, an adviser of the Prime Minister Salam Khalid Abdallah Fayyad, as he travelled to the Gaza Strip to attend his mother’s funeral.
- On 17 December 68 states and organisations assemble in Paris where they commit themselves to contributing in financial aid to the Palestinians to the value of 7.4 billion dollars, well above what the government of Mahmoud Abbas had requested to finance a programme of reform over three years. Hamas describes this subsidy as a “declaration of war.”

Peace Negotiations

- On 2 December the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert tells his cabinet that Israel is not bound by the goal of Annapolis to reach a peace accord with the Palestinians by the end of 2008, and adds that any progress in the peace process will depend on the capacity of the Palestinians to rein in its militants. On 3 December Israel accepts the release of 429 Palestinian prisoners with a view to strengthening the political dialogue with the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and his government in the West Bank. The majority of the prisoners belong to Fatah and only 20 prisoners originate from the Gaza Strip. On 12 December a piloting committee composed of Palestinian and Israeli negotiators meets in Jerusalem to initiate talks on concluding a peace agreement before the end of 2008, as agreed in the Annapolis conference in November. On 27 December Mahmoud Abbas and Ehud Olmert hold a meeting in Jerusalem.

Conflicts between the Parties

- On 11 December Israeli soldiers and tanks enter the Gaza Strip and clash with Palestinian militants near the towns of Khan Yunis and Rafah. Six Palestinian militants, belonging to the Committees of Popular Resistance and Islamic Jihad, are killed. In response Palestinian militants fire 17 rockets and 4 mortar shells into Israel, injuring a woman near Sderot. On 17 and 18 December Israel conducts several air raids on the Gaza Strip, killing 17 Palestinians, nearly all of them members of Islamic Jihad. On 18 December the journalist Suleiman al-Shafi, of the Israeli television station Channel 2, announces that the Hamas Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh had declared that he had the power to bring an end to the firing of rockets on condition that Israel ended the blockade and the murder of Palestinians. On 23 December the Prime Minister rules out any negotiation on a ceasefire with Hamas, adding that Israel is at war with the militant factions in the Gaza Strip and that the anti-terrorist operations would continue for some months. On 28 December two Israeli soldiers on leave are killed by Islamic Jihad militants in the colony of Kiryat Arba, near the town of Hebron. Two Palestinians are also killed in the exchange of fire.

Sources:
- AFP
- Agence Europe
- All Africa
- Amnesty International
- Keesings
- Le Figaro
- Le Monde
- Les Echos
- News Press
- Press Releases of the European Commission
- Presse Canadienne
- Reporters sans Frontières
- Reuters
Chronology of the Barcelona Process

The chronology that follows includes the most notable events that took place during 2007 as regards the Barcelona Process.

January 2007

3 January 2007
German Presidency

Brussels: For the first time an 18-month programme has been prepared for the three successive German, Portuguese and Slovenian Presidencies for the period January 2007 to June 2008. The main themes of the programme are: the continuation of the EU reform and constitutional process; the implementation of the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs; and the further completion of the common area of freedom, security and justice. The EU’s German Presidency priorities are the fight against international terrorism and cross-border crime, joint management of migration, and cooperation with third countries on domestic affairs.


16 January 2007
Fishery

Rome: The European Commission welcomes the measures adopted by the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM) to promote sustainable fisheries and aquaculture in the region. The Commission improves the application of existing measures, enhances the development of reproductive aquaculture, continues to support the regional projects, and develops new initiatives to increase cooperation in fisheries management in the Black Sea.

www.gfcm.org/gfcm

18 January 2007
Libya

Strasbourg: In a resolution on the conviction and imprisonment by Libya of five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor, the European Parliament reiterates its radical opposition to the death penalty and recalls that the EU considers that its abolition contributes to the enhancement of human dignity. It invites Libyan authorities to take the necessary measures to review the death sentence, thus meeting the necessary prerequisites for the continuation of the common policy of engagement.

February 2007

10-11 February 2007
Euromed Audiovisual

Berlin: Euromed audiovisual programme holds its first networking conference. The 12 projects funded by the programme report on their first year of activity. With the attendance of representatives of the European Union and the national authorities in charge of the audiovisual sector in the 10 MEDA countries and territories, the conference offers a valuable opportunity to learn more about the financing of films from the southern Mediterranean and to discuss the creation of markets and locations for shooting films and technical industries in the south.


12 February 2007
Peace Process

Brussels: The agreement reached to form a Palestinian Government of National Unity and the situation in Lebanon are
among the issues discussed by EU foreign ministers during their latest meeting. The ministers welcome the agreement reached on the formation of a Palestinian National Unity government and reiterated that the EU is ready to work with a legitimate government that adopts a platform reflecting the Quartet principles. www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/92758.pdf

13 February 2007

Migration

Madrid: Europe is undergoing the greatest migratory emergency in its history and needs to provide urgent financial help for authorities facing the greatest strain, particularly those situated along the EU’s southern border, the Committee of the Regions (CoR) affirms in its report. The Committee recommends creating a specific financial instrument aimed at areas with the highest immigration levels, such as Ceuta, Melilla, the Canary Islands, Southern Italy, Lampedusa and Malta.

13 February 2007

Cultural Dialogue

Strasbourg: “Cultural and religious pluralism is a strong European value,” EC President Barroso tells the European Parliament. He also expresses the view that cultural diversity is a source of Europe’s strength and of its ability to promote its values and interests, adding that this dialogue has to be nurtured properly. “We intend to make next year’s Year of Inter-Cultural Dialogue the platform for this dialogue,” he affirms.

15 February 2007

Justice and Home Affairs

Brussels: Migration, racism and xenophobia, the strengthening of FRONTEX, as well as the establishment of the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, are among the issues on the agenda of the Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting. Home Affairs Ministers want in particular to further strengthen the European border management agency FRONTEX and to cooperate closely with countries of origin and transit on migration issues. www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/jha/92800.pdf

27 February

Anna Lindh Foundation

Alexandria: The Anna Lindh Foundation in the framework of its educational programmes is launching its first online multilingual teaching and learning resources on cultural and religious diversity. The database presents all the materials developed for the Euromed teacher training programme, together with selected materials from partners and results from school-to-school projects. Its aim is to improve mutual knowledge about cultural and religious diversity, promoting mutual respect, and to also be a platform for new ideas and new materials.

March 2007

1 March 2007

EU-Morocco Action Plan

Barcelona: External Relations and ENP Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner presents a proposed €654 million assistance package for Morocco, during the seminar on “Morocco and the EU: Towards an Advanced Statute in the Euro-Mediterranean Association,” organized by the IEMed. This bilateral aid will be used to support implementation of the EU-Morocco Action Plan. Morocco is engaged in a process of very ambitious reform stemming from its own vision of modernisation and development. www.iemed.org/activitats/2007/uemarroc.php

6 March 2007

EU-Morocco Fishery Agreement

Brussels: The EC welcomes the ratification of the Fisheries Partnership Agreement (FPA) by the Kingdom of Morocco. The EU/Morocco FPA is a mixed agreement which covers six categories of fisheries, providing fishing opportunities on pelagic species and small pelagic and demersal species, for vessels ranging in scale from artisan to industrial. http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/press_corner/press_releases/archives/com05/com_05_37_en.htm

6 March 2007

EU-Egypt Action Plan

Brussels: The EU-Egypt ENP Action Plan, setting the agenda for cooperation in the next 3-5 years, is adopted during the EU-Egypt Association Council. The Council establishes eight sub-committees and one working group to follow up the implementation of the Action Plan. Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner says that the adoption of the Action Plan places Egypt among the EU’s closest partners. www.delegy.ec.europa.eu/en/eu_and_country/Action%20Plan.doc

16 March 2007

Employment

Berlin: Employment-related and socio-political issues in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership are discussed for the first time at a conference organized by the German EU Presidency in conjunction with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. In the “Employment and Social Dialogue Within the Framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership” conference, representatives of union and employer associations in the Euro-Mediterranean countries and governments from both North and South join experts and EU Commission officials in the discussions.

17 March 2007

EMPA

Tunis: Intercultural dialogue between Europe and the Islamic world is on the agenda of the 3rd annual plenary session of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA). The Assembly discusses and adopts a report on the implementation of a code of conduct in the fight against terrorism. President Pöttering focuses his speech on the dialogue between the peoples of Mediterranean border countries. www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/empa/plenary_sessions/default_en.htm

22-23 March 2007

FEMIP


28 March

Euromed Central Banks

Valencia: The fourth Euro-Mediterranean
The seminar is attended by governors and high-level representatives of the entire Eurosystem, as well as by their counterparts from the central banks of Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian National Authority, Syria and Turkey. The seminar focuses on recent economic and financial developments in Mediterranean countries, fiscal policy in Mediterranean countries' macroeconomic frameworks and the recent developments and prospects for Euro-Mediterranean trade.

30-31 March 2007
EU Foreign Ministers

Bremen: An informal meeting of EU foreign ministers takes place but no formal decisions are taken at such meetings and the topics on the agenda are limited so as to allow plenty of time to examine issues in depth and in a relaxed atmosphere. The ministers discuss the future development of the ENP besides focusing in part on recent developments in the Middle East peace process, the new Palestinian coalition government and the Arab League peace initiative.

30-31 March 2007
Migration

Tunis: EuroMeSCo with the Association of International Studies (AEI) organize a seminar on “Migrants’ Rights – From Existing International Conventions to a Euro-Mediterranean Charter.” The three topics to be discussed during the Tunis meeting are the application of legislations to guarantee migrants’ rights, the role of the Partnership in their protection, and the preparation of a Migrants’ Charter.

April 2007

2 April 2007
Education

Tunis: A report by the European Training Foundation (ETF) entitled “Gender Mainstreaming in Education and Employment” provides a critical analysis of gender mainstreaming policies and their effectiveness in the EU, in international organizations and in the three partner countries of Morocco, Jordan and Turkey. The chapters on the three countries present detailed information on the position of women in education and work. They look at female participation, graduation rates, and female illiteracy rates.

www.etf.europa.eu

14 April 2007
Economy

Washington: High economic growth of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has been accompanied by strong job creation and declining unemployment in recent years. But this performance needs to be supported by deeper structural reforms, according to a report from the World Bank on the economic trends and prospects for the region. The theme of the publication is labour markets and employment. The report notes that the single most important transformation affecting MENA’s labour force in the past few years is the increasing presence of women workers.

19 April 2007
Energy

Athens: the second Photovoltaic Mediterranean Conference is taking place to review new trends and the potential for development of solar energy from the southern to the northern shores of the Mediterranean. Over 300 delegates from the EU countries discuss political, commercial, financial and technological development opportunities with their counterparts from the MEDA countries.

www.pvmed.org/index.php?id=152

19-20 April 2007
Justice and Home Affairs

Luxembourg: EU Justice and Home Affairs Ministers agree on a regulation to create rapid border intervention teams and legislation to combat racism and xenophobia. These teams will be composed of experts from EU member states and be made available by FRONTEX at short notice to any member state whose borders are under a particular threat from illegal migration.

19 April 2007
Energy

Berlin: Ministers, utilities, energy efficiency agencies, members of industry and NGOs from the EU’s southern and eastern neighbouring countries and the EU member states participate in the Ministerial Conference “Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency – Innovative Policies and Financing Instruments for the EU’s Southern and Eastern Neighbours.” The conference objectives are: to raise awareness of the opportunities and benefits of a wider use of renewable energies and increased energy efficiency among decision-makers, and contribute to a wider dissemination of information in the EU’s southern and eastern neighbouring countries.


24 April 2007
EU-Algeria Council

Luxembourg: Energy tops the agenda of the EU-Algeria Council meeting. Algeria is recognized as a viable energy supply partner and is ready to sign a memorandum on security of supply. The meeting also discusses immigration and how Algeria and the EU can cooperate in this area. Algeria is not just a transit country but also a destination country from Sub-Saharan Africa.

24 April 2007
EU-Lebanon Council

Luxembourg: At the EU-Lebanon Association Council meeting, the EU CFSP High Representative Solana says the EU would continue to cooperate in helping Lebanon recover economically and get out of the difficult political situation it finds itself in.

27-28 April 2007
Politics and Security

Malta: During the 22nd Training Seminar for Euromed Diplomats the issues examined are the prospects of negotiation in the Middle East and the Euromed Partnership after the Tampere Summit. The primary objective of the Euromed seminars is familiarization with the Euro-Mediterranean Process.

29 April 2007
Training

Rafah: The European Commission launches its first training programme for 40 Palestinian customs officers at the Rafah crossing. The programme objectives are to help improve the professionalism and working practices of Palestinian customs officers and enforce uniform application of customs procedures for passengers at the Rafah crossing.
Appendices

May 2007

13-14 May 2007
ECOFIN/FEMIP
Cyprus: Finance Ministers of the 27 EU member states and 9 Mediterranean partner countries meet to decide on the FEMIP strategic framework in the years ahead. The strategy is based on two pillars: supporting investment and job creation by broadening the range of financial instruments fostering private sector development, continuing the policy of dialogue and involvement of all economic players, thus enhancing the partner countries’ sense of ownership.

www.eib.org/projects/regions/med/

14 May 2007
Arab League
Brussels: Arab League and EU Foreign Ministers meet on the fringes of the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) in Brussels to discuss the Middle East peace process. This first meeting between the EU and the Arab League is attended by the Foreign Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Syria, the Palestinian Authority and Qatar, as well as an Egyptian representative. The Arab League delegation presents the Arab peace initiative to EU Foreign Ministers.


21 May 2007
Media
Dublin: Training, education and the exchange of journalists between the EU and the MEDA region are cited as important tools for preventing incitement to terrorism and radicalisation by participants at a media conference organized by the European Commission in the framework of the Euromed and the Media initiative. The conference entitled “Preventing Incitement to Terrorism and Radicalisation: What Role for the Media?” bring together 80-90 Euro-Mediterranean government officials, journalists, editors, media practitioners and academics.

24 May 2007
FRONTEX
Brussels: The European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) and the member states concerned launch the European Border Patrols Network with the aim of curbing illegal immigration across the Mediterranean Sea and along the South-West Atlantic coasts and to detect emergencies at sea.

25 May 2007
Palestinian Judicial Empowerment
Gaza: The EU is supporting the SEYADA judicial empowerment programme in the Palestinian Authority. The EU has since 2003 invested heavily to promote it because a fair, independent and efficient judiciary is a key pillar of any state. The programme also supports the compilation of a comprehensive database of Palestinian court judgments as an integral part of the Legal and Judicial Database, known as Al-Muqtafi.

26 May 2007
Euromed Youth Parliament
Berlin: More than 100 young people from all the European Union member states and 11 Mediterranean countries convene for the first Euro-Mediterranean Youth Parliament. The goal of the event is to promote dialogue between the EU member states and their partners to the south and east of the Mediterranean, overcome prejudices, and build intercultural bridges. It is designed to make the Barcelona Process more accessible for young people. The plenary session of the Euromed Youth Parliament identifies the Middle East conflict and illegal immigration as major challenges of the future. Other issues discussed during the session include fighting corruption, culture and education, and energy security.


30 May 2007
ANIMA
Marseilles: “Investing in the Mediterranean: Towards a Mature Market?” is the theme of the 5th and last ANIMA annual conference. The European Commission, MEDA and European Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs), international investors and media representatives attend the meeting.

www.euromedinfo.eu/site.169.news.en.1388.html

30-31 May 2007
EMPA
Warsaw: The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) Ad Hoc Committee on Women’s Rights in the Euro-Mediterranean Countries meets to discuss the situation of immigrant women in EU member states and women in science.

June 2007

5 June 2007
Energy
Istanbul: The Joint Conference Statement of the Turkey-EU Conference “Together for a European Energy Policy” emphasizes Turkey’s strategic importance and shows significant progress in integrating Turkey and EU energy policies. The EU gives strong support for Turkey’s role as an energy bridge to Europe and signals Turkey’s participation in the EU Energy Community. The EU also is urged to start negotiations with Turkey on Energy Chapter. The statement is given by Olli Rehn, European Commissioner for Enlargement, and the Commissioner for Energy, Andris Piebalgs.

www.foreignpolicy.org.tr/documents/050607.html

6-7 June 2007
Water
Amman: The EMPOWERS Partnership is holding a Regional Forum on Local Water Governance that brings together representatives of international and regional water networks, NGOs, academia and donor organizations. It focuses on enhancing policy support for local level ownership and involvement in sustainable local water governance in the MENA region. The Euromed Participa-
tory Water Resources Scenarios (EM-POWERS Partnership) is a four-year regional programme working in Egypt, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza. The objective is to improve long-term access and rights to water by vulnerable populations.

8 June 2007
EU-Morocco Action Plan
Rabat: Moroccan civil society organizations meet the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) to discuss their involvement in implementing the EU-Morocco Action Plan. The meeting brings together Moroccan unions, employer organizations, agricultural cooperatives, as well as consumer, human rights, environmental and development organizations. The Moroccan associations stress the contribution they could make because of their direct contact with the population and their knowledge of the situation on the ground. They support the rapid creation of a Moroccan economic and social committee stressing the need for a forum for dialogue, reflection and coordination among civil society organizations and between them and the Moroccan government.


11-12 June 2007
University Alexandria: The 4th Euro-Mediterranean University Forum takes place in Egypt and is organized by the University of Alexandria and the Euromed Permanent University Forum (EPUF) with the support of the Anna Lindh Foundation. The Forum has two objectives: to launch a comprehensive action plan for the promotion of Euromed academic and scientific cooperation to be submitted to the Euromed Ministerial Conference of Higher Education and Science, and to create partnerships and project proposals in the field of Euromed academic and scientific cooperation.

www.euromedalex.org/En/IV_Euro-Mediterranean_University_Forum.html

18-19 June 2007
Economy

This conference provides an informal forum for open debate on key economic policy issues under the Partnership. Government officials from the Mediterranean partner countries, civil society groups, academics, researchers and think tanks take part in the conference. The main theme of the discussion is how to better integrate environmental considerations (including climate change) into the overall Mediterranean economic analysis and the agenda of economic reforms.

http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/etn

18 June 2007
Higher Education
Cairo: The 1st Euromed Ministerial Conference on Higher Education and Scientific Research is attended by representatives of the Ministries of Higher Education and Research of the members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The conference aims at examining ways and means of developing co-operation in the field of scientific research, upgrading the quality of higher education and vocational training as well as standards of University Education. In the final declaration, "Towards the Creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education and Research Area," the Euromed ministers reaffirm the commitment to implementing the relevant objectives of the Five-Year Work programme of the Barcelona Summit, Association Agreements and ENP Action Plans.

www.euromed-enconf.org

18-21 June 2007
Justice
Barcelona: The seminar on "New Instruments of International Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters," of the Euromed Justice regional programme, brings together high level representatives of the MEDA countries (judges, magistrates, court registrars and lawyers), delegates from Belgium, France, Spain and Portugal, representing the EU and representatives from the Council of Europe, the European Judicial Network. During this seminar, participants examine the various challenges for the development of international judicial cooperation where organized crime has attained a trans-national dimension.

www.eipa.eu/en/pages/show/&tid=63

20 June 2007
Medibtkar
Tunis: An agreement for the implementation of the Euromed Innovation and Technology programme (Medibtkar) is signed. The aim of the programme is to strengthen the management skills and the technology transfer capacity of institutional authorities, intermediaries and SMEs of the MEDA countries and territories. It supports the creation of networks, the development of an innovation culture and the design of an enhanced innovation system to reinforce SME competitiveness in the region.

www.medibtikar.eu

20 June 2007
EU-Egypt
Cairo: Egypt and the EU hold the Joint Committee meeting on Science and Technology for the first time in Egypt. During the first EU/Egyptian Joint Committee, they approve the joint action plan for 2006-2007. This plan identifies common priorities and actions for a reinforced co-operation on research and technological development to promote the participation of Egyptian researchers in the 7th Framework Programme for RTD (FP7). This second meeting is scheduled to review the progress achieved and formulate actions for the future.

20-21 June 2007
Neighbourhood
Brussels: The European Council reaffirmed the high priority of the European Neighbourhood Policy, “which aims at consolidating a ring of prosperity, stability and security based on human rights, democracy and the rule of law, as well as supporting the process of reform and modernisation of partners in the Union’s neighbourhood.” The European Council endorsed the Council Conclusions on strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Presidency Progress Report, which includes a set of measures to further strengthen the ENP.


21 June 2007
European Parliament
Strasbourg: Aid to Mediterranean countries in discussion at the European Parliament. “The Barcelona Process continues to be the appropriate framework for
Mediterranean policy, in which changes and the necessary political will are needed to obtain better results,” according to a European Parliament report which analyses EU management of aid to Mediterranean countries. The report insists on the urgent need for direct financial support to the Palestinian Authority and for humanitarian support to Gaza.

22 June 2007
Energy
Vienna: Algerian gas supplies to the EU could increase by 23.5 billion cubic metres (bcm) per year by 2010 if joint infrastructure projects currently under construction are carried out according to plan. This is one of the conclusions of a bilateral meeting between the EU Energy Commissioner and his Algerian counterpart on the sidelines of the EU-OPEC Ministerial Meeting in Vienna.
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/algeria/index_en.htm

27 June 2007
EMPA
Brussels: the working group on financing the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) and revision of the EMPA’s ruling procedure meet in the European Parliament. The meeting discusses and possibly makes proposals on the allocation of EMPA seats to parliaments following the accession of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU and on assembly resources with a view to setting up an EMPA budget. The working group also follows up on the EMPA Bureau’s decision to set up an EMPA permanent secretariat.

27 June 2007
Politics and Security
Brussels: Senior officials gather to discuss some priority areas for reforms: improving business climate to enable firms to invest, further liberalizing trade, consolidating macroeconomic stability, presenting public finance strategies for growth and flexibility of labour market.

27-28 June 2007
Transport
Marrakech: The EU-funded Euromed Aviation Project is holding its first Air Traffic Management (ATM) workshop in Morocco. The €5 million project is launched in January 2007 in the framework of the MEDA regional programme “Promoting a Euro-Mediterranean Airspace” and addresses five main components: the aviation market, security, safety, the environment and Air Traffic Management (ATM).
www.euromedtransport.org/368.0.html

28-29 June 2007
Security
Lisbon: “Dealing with Security in the Euro-Mediterranean Area after Barcelonas 10” is the title of a two-day EuroMeSCO seminar. Topics for discussion include the impact of the ENP on security cooperation and conflict resolution, EU strategies on police reform in Palestine and in Turkey, and political and security cooperation.
www.euromesco.net/images/programme_29_juin.pdf

July 2007
1 July 2007
Portuguese Presidency
Lisbon: Setting out its priorities for the coming six months, the Portuguese Presidency of the EU has signalled its intention “to develop a fresh approach towards the entire Mediterranean region. It is necessary to intensify our political dialogue with partners on the southern and eastern borders to respond to challenges that require common solutions. Stability in both regions is interlinked.”
www.eu2007.pt/UE/vEN/

2 July 2007
Infrastructure
Cairo: The EU and the Egyptian Government sign a new grant financing agreement worth €20 million to support community infrastructure and social development activities in urban and rural areas. This new programme aims at contributing to poverty reduction and socio-economic development through activities supporting employment creation and income generation for the poor, thus enhancing the living standards of citizens in geographic areas with major concentrations of poverty.

2 July 2007
EMPA
Brussels: The situation in the Middle East and the Arab Peace Initiative is on the agenda of the next EMPA Committee on Political Affairs, Security and Human Rights. The Committee has an exchange of views on the programme of the Portuguese Presidency and on human rights. Representatives of the governments of the Palestinian Authority and Israel and of the Arab League attend the meeting.

2 July 2007
Education
Turin: Local experts from the 10 MEDA countries meet to discuss apprenticeships and enterprise-based learning systems in the MEDA region. The topic is highly relevant for MEDA countries since international studies have shown that apprenticeships can enhance employment prospects for young people. This meeting is part of the Education and Training for Employment (MEDA-ETE) project, set up to support the MEDA partners in the design and implementation of technical and vocational education and training policies.
www.meda-ete.net

2-4 July 2007
EU-Lebanon Cooperation
Beirut: In the context of the ENP, the European Commission and Lebanon held sub-committee meetings on (i) trade, industry and services, (ii) efforts to bring Lebanon closer to the EU’s internal market and (iii) social policies. The meetings facilitated the setting of priorities for the implementation of the EU/Lebanon ENP Action Plan.

3-4 July 2007
WIP)
Madrid: Experts of the Mediterranean Water Information Partnership (MedWIP) regional workshop meet with key stakeholders to review the preliminary findings of a feasibility study related to a Mediterranean Water Observatory Mechanism. Participants also discuss the draft content of a charter for the MedWIP.
www.semidnet/medwip/about/foil6687
5 July 2007
EU-Morocco

Rabat: The EU and the government of Morocco sign a €3 million financing agreement for community compensation action in regions affected by human rights violations. In the context of its support for human rights in Morocco, the European Union has been closely following the work of the Justice and Reconciliation Commission (IER) which represents Morocco's desire to build a better future by drawing lessons from its painful past.

5-6 July 2007
Politics and Security

Brussels: At the 70th Euromed Senior Officials and Committee Meeting, foreign ministers underline the need to further strengthen intercultural dialogue with the aim of ensuring better knowledge, mutual understanding, freedom and respect for all religions, beliefs and cultures among Euro-Mediterranean peoples, in their cultural diversity. The Euromed Committee approved the new organizational structure of the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between cultures.

6 July 2007
Middle East

Portoroz-Koper: The Peace Process in the Middle East, the ENP and migration are among the topics discussed at the 4th Informal Meeting of the Mediterranean Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The ministers also analyse the recent French initiative for the Mediterranean Union and agree that they should actively involve the Mediterranean and eastern European partners in the dialogue on issues of mutual concern, such as economic integration, energy, transport, migration, intercultural dialogue and strengthening of the human dimension.

9 July 2007
Energy Cooperation

Brussels: During the conference on the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline project to supply gas from Nigeria to Europe, European Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs emphasizes the importance of energy cooperation through the existing Euromed framework and the forthcoming EU-Africa Energy Partnership underlining the key importance of diversification of suppliers and routes as part of the EU's strategy for the security of energy supply.

12-15 July
Rehabimed

Barcelona: "Traditional Mediterranean Architecture: Present and Future" is the title of the 1st Euro-Mediterranean Regional Conference organized by the EU-funded project Rehabimed. Topics on the agenda include traditional architecture and its heritage value and rehabilitation as a factor of social cohesion. The aim of the Rehabimed project, which is part of the Euromed Heritage programme, is to promote the rehabilitation of traditional architecture in all Mediterranean countries.

14-15 July
Education

Turin: During the International Mediterranean Women’s Forum gender specialists report that women in many of the MEDA countries are becoming better educated. However, the transition from education to employment is still a challenge for women in many countries. The International Mediterranean Women’s Forum is a network founded to support interchange and cooperation between women from the different shores of the Mediterranean and to promote peace and human rights.

16 July 2007
Research

Jerusalem: Israeli researchers, universities and companies will get full access to the EU's 7th Research Framework Programme (FP7). This is the outcome of the science and technological cooperation renewed by the European Union and Israel. Under this agreement, Israeli researchers will be able to participate in all calls for proposals under FP7 on an equal footing with researchers from the EU member states. The EU is now Israel's second biggest source of research funding.

16-19 July 2007
Judicial Cooperation

Rabat: Members of the delegations of the Mediterranean partners and experts from the EU member states, representatives from the Council of Europe and The Hague Conference on Private International Law meet for a regional seminar on international judicial cooperation in the field of family law organized by the Euromed Justice Programme (MEDA funds). Discussions cover among other things: family law in the EU member states and the co-existence of different religious regimes among the Mediterranean partners, judicial cooperation, and the existing obstacles to the Euro-Mediterranean cooperation in this domain.

17 July 2007
Anna Lindh Foundation

Nicosia: The Mediterranean Institute of Gender Studies (MIGS) launches an innovative photo competition addressed to young women in Cyprus, Greece, Morocco and Spain under the theme “Violence against Women in the Mediterranean.” This competition is organized within the framework of the project “Intercultural Dialogue on Violence against Women” funded by the Anna Lindh Foundation. The project aims to improve the role and the concern of Mediterranean public institutions responsible for gender equality policy.

18 July 2007
EU-Libya

Lisbon: The EU Presidency welcomes the Libyan Higher Judicial Council’s decision to commute to life imprisonment the death sentences against six members of a Bulgarian medical team. The Presidency reiterates its solidarity with the Libyan children infected with the HIV virus in Benghazi and confirms the EU’s commitment to help provide them with high level medical treatment. The statement reiterates the EU’s commitment to work on the framework of future EU-Libya relations.

18 July 2007
EuroMeSCo
Paris: “The Role of Migrants in Euro-Mediterranean Relations” is the title of the third seminar in a series of preparatory meetings for the EuroMeSCo Annual Conference 2007. Among the topics for discussion are: How did migrants become a security issue?; The contribution of returning migrants to the development of their country of origin; and Migrants and their rights.
www.euromesco.net/images/programme_bis_eng.pdf

23 July 2007
EU-Morocco
Brussels: The EU-Morocco Association Council deals with the state of bilateral relations. The EC and Morocco also use the occasion to sign a joint declaration supporting energy cooperation to prepare for the eventual integration of the Moroccan energy market with the EU. The Commission and Morocco sign the Memorandum of Understanding on EU financial support for Morocco for the period 2007-10. This programme comprises some priority areas: social and economic development, human rights and governance, environment and institutional support.

25 July 2007
Media
Ramallah: EU launches a Palestinian media training programme. It is an €850,000 project to provide support and training for 220 Palestinian media professionals over the next two years. The project will be implemented by the BBC World Service Trust in partnership with the International Federation of Journalists and UNESCO.

August 2007
8 August 2007
Health
Damascus: The European Union is co-financing a pilot project in Damascus aimed at strengthening the capacity of Syrian Family Planning Association (SFPAs) clinics to serve as health counselling centres. The Project hopes to attain higher standards of physical, psychological and social well-being through the adoption of a holistic approach to reproductive health. It targets mainly underprivileged women, adolescents and men in Damascus, its suburbs and surrounding rural areas.
www.delsyr.ccc.eu.int/en/whatsnew/detail.asp?id=292

16 August 2007
Euromed Audiovisual II
Alexandria: The Caravan of the Euro-Arab Cinema is a project of the EU-funded regional programme Euromed Audiovisual II. The project organizes Euro-Arab film festivals in Arab and European cities, promoting cultural exchange and creating opportunities for dialogue. This time the venue of “Caravan Nights” is Alexandria where seven feature films and 23 shorts are shown.
www.cinemacaravan.com

September 2007
3 September 2007
European Neighbourhood Policy
Brussels: European Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner tells delegates to the ENP Conference that the ENP vision is a radical change in the way the EU relates to its closest friends; she stresses the Commission’s commitment to hearing ideas from the participating representatives of civil society and business, journalists, academics and government representatives. She proposes focusing discussion on the specific areas of economic integration, mobility and energy, and addresses the issue of increased financial and technical assistance. President Barroso explains that “the fundamental principle of ENP is differentiation. The ENP is not a one-size-fits-all policy.”

4 September 2007
Lebanon
Lisbon: The EU Presidency welcomes the end of the crisis caused by armed extremist militants in the Nahr el Bared Palestinian refugee camp in the north of Lebanon. In a statement, the EU reiterates its full support for the efforts of the Lebanese Armed Forces to ensure security and stability throughout the country.

6 September 2007
Human Rights
Strasbourg: European Parliament resolution on the functioning of human rights dialogues and consultations on human rights with third countries also takes into account the Dialogues based on a partnership and cooperation agreement under the ENP. The EP calls on the Council and the Commission to take advantage of the present situation whereby Association and Cooperation Agreements with several neighbourhood countries have expired, and to negotiate new agreements in order to mainstream human rights and effective dialogue on them into future agreements, including a follow-up mechanism.

6-7 September 2007
Politics and Security
Brussels: Euromed Senior Officials and Euromed Committee meetings take place in Brussels, bringing together representatives of the 27 EU member states and their 10 Mediterranean partners. Ambassador Sampaio, Presidency Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), gives a presentation to the meeting, followed by an open discussion on the possibility of making progress on the MEPP during the Portuguese Presidency.

6-7 September 2007
MEDSTAT
Brussels: Meeting of the General Directors of the Mediterranean Partner Countries’ National Statistics Institutes for a discussion about the results achieved and to start a dialogue on future statistical cooperation in the region. One of the main outcomes of the meeting is a general recognition of the need for sustainable data exchange in the region and a reinforced partnership between the European Commission and the national statistical institutes of the Mediterranean partner countries.
www.euromedinfo.eu/site.324.content.en.html
7 September 2007
Youth
Nablus: In cooperation with the Palestinian Mosaic Centre Committee for the Promotion of Tourism in the Jericho Governorate, the EC celebrates the completion of a project called “Youth Reads History over Old Stones” at the village of Nus Jbeil, near Nablus. The nine-month project enabled Palestinian youth to discover the art of mosaics.

7-11 September 2007
EU-Egypt Relations
Egypt: A delegation of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) visits Egypt where they meet with senior government and parliamentary officials, leading representatives of Egyptian civil society, the business community, the trade union federation, NGOs and academia. The purpose of the visit is to encourage dialogue between employers, chambers of commerce, trade unions and civil society, similar to the model which has proved effective in the European Union, and which is being gradually developed among the Mediterranean partner countries.

9-10 September 2007
EU-Syria
Damascus: The European Parliamentary delegation for relations with the Mashreq countries holds its 9th EU-Syria inter-parliamentary meeting. The European parliamentary delegation discusses the Iraqi refugee crisis in Syria. Other topics on the agenda are: the pending Association Agreement with the EU, political and economic reforms in the country, and the Middle East peace process.
www.ediweb.be/europeaid/forms/newsletterArchive.asp?idNewsletter=41

10-11 September 2007
EMWIS
Istanbul: The Euro-Mediterranean Information System on Know-how in the Water Sector (EMWIS) is holding its 7th National Focal Point (NFP) Coordination Seminar. It proposes a common methodological approach to allow NFPs to carry out an analysis of user expectations in their country and to consolidate the results at the Mediterranean level. The seminar also makes preparations for the December conference of water directors and the 2008 ministerial conference.
www.emwis.net/

10 September 2007
EMPA
Brussels: Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly Working Group meeting on financing the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) and revision of EMPA’s Rules of Procedure meets to exchange views on the financial resources of the Assembly and a discussion on the answers to the questionnaire on “possible financial resources for a future EMPA budget.”

10 September 2007
Elections in Morocco
Lisbon: The EU Presidency praises the government, political parties, civil society and people of Morocco for “their efforts aimed at ensuring the success and transparency of the electoral process.” The EU also welcomes steps taken to ensure a greater representation of women in parliament.

10-12 September 2007
Training
Turin: Mediterranean entrepreneurial learning experts from 10 EU partner countries meet for a workshop on the value of applying a more systematic approach to entrepreneurial learning in the MEDA region. The workshop is being coordinated by the European Training Foundation, whose mission is to assist the EU’s partner countries in developing quality education and training systems.
www.etf.europa.eu

14 September 2007
Media
Bizerte: the European Commission Technical Assistance Office for the West Bank and Gaza Strip announces the end of the first training programme for 12 civil society associations in the media sector. The Community Radio Station Project in the Bizerte area was launched in November 2006 with the aim of strengthening the democratic process in the Palestinian Territories, empowering young people and women and helping to transform attitudes towards dealing with conflict.
www.delwbg.cec.eu.int/en/whatsnew/first_training.htm

15 September 2007
Euromed ECOFIN
Porto: EU Finance Ministers meet with their Mediterranean counterparts to discuss ways of achieving higher sustainable growth and creating more jobs. Ministers focus on public finance and economic reforms and on building efficient financial markets. They agree to launch a Euro-Mediterranean Network of Public Finance Experts in an effort to share experiences in fiscal policy issues. The Mediterranean partners recognized that particular attention should be paid to budget deficits and public debt, increasing public sector accountability and fighting corruption.

18 September 2007
Justice and Home Affairs
Brussels: During the Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting, ministers agree to further reinforce the EU’s southern maritime borders, encouraging member states to provide support to individual member states facing a particular pressure and launching or reinforce concrete cooperation with third countries on border control, search, rescue and return.

19 September 2007
MED-PACT
Venice: The Archimedes Project sets out its objectives and describes its activities in three EU cities (Venice, Genoa, and Bordeaux) and four Mediterranean partner cities (Istanbul, Beirut, El Mina and Oran). Archimedes (Actions to Regenerate Cities and Help Innovative Mediterranean Economic Development Enhancing Sustainability) is dedicated to cooperation between local authorities on both shores of the Mediterranean to ensure a more balanced and durable local development.
21-22 September 2007
EuroMeSCo
Turin: EuroMeSCo seminar on “Emerging Actors and Changing Societies in the Southern Mediterranean Area.” Among the topics to be discussed are: the renewal of the Arab Elite; democratic transformation in Egypt: the issue of congruence between domestic reform actors inside and outside the Egyptian state apparatus; and domestic change and conflict in the Mediterranean: the cases of Hamas and Hezbollah.
www.euromesco.net

28-29 September 2007
Defence
Évora: Informal gathering of EU Defence ministers and five western Mediterranean countries (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia). The Portuguese Presidency notes that the stability of the Mediterranean is of common strategic interest. It is fundamental to include in the European agenda a greater involvement with Mediterranean countries, especially Maghreb, in order to develop and deepen the dialogue on security and defence matters. The objective of the “27+5” meeting is to discuss the possibility of reinforcing this cooperation.

28-29 September 2007
International Trade
Rome: Representatives of the 27 countries of the European Union and its 10 Mediterranean partners gather for a conference on “Preventing and Managing International Commercial Disputes: Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Alternative Dispute Resolution Infrastructure.” The conference is the concluding event of the three-year EU-funded MED-ADR regional project dedicated to facilitating foreign investment and international trade in the Mediterranean region.
www.adrmeda.org/romeconference07

October 2007

2 October 2007
Dialogue
Alexandria: Anna Lindh Foundation prepares for “1001 Actions” campaign in the countdown to 2008, the EU Year of Intercultural Dialogue. Building on the Foundation’s unique role as a network, the “1001 Actions” campaign intends to mobilise individuals and groups across the region to implement activities under a common banner for the promotion of dialogue.
www.1001actions.org

10-21 October 2007
Euromed Audiovisual
Fameck: The EU-funded Med-Screen project of the Euromed Audiovisual II Programme is supporting the screening of 18 recent Arab Mediterranean feature films during the 18th Fameck Arab Film Festival. The Med-Screen project promotes the cinema of the eight Arab countries in the MEDA region with the aim of making their films more visible in the partner countries.
www.med-screen.com

11 October 2007
Human Rights
Brussels: The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) Ad Hoc Committee on Women’s Rights in the Mediterranean Countries meets to discuss different topics: the Integration of Migrant Women in the EU – a Two-Way Process; and Migrant Women as Factors of Development: their Economic and Social Contribution to the Development of their Countries of Origin.
www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/empa

12 October 2007
MEDSTAT
Luxembourg: MEDSTAT II, the EU-funded regional Euro-Mediterranean Statistical Co-operation programme, has just announced that its new dedicated website is now online. The site provides information in English, French and German on MEDSTAT II, its background, organizational structure and partners, as well as on the programme’s activities, events and publications and statistical data.
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/medstat

15 October 2007
Peace Process
Luxembourg: During the External Rela-
Council Meeting, ministers encourage Palestinian President Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Olmert to take courageous steps in their political dialogue. The Council underlines the importance of the donors’ meeting in December. It notes that the re-engagement and expansion of EUPOL COPPS is an important element in the improvement of security. Finally, the Council reiterates its grave concern at the humanitarian situation in Gaza.


15-16 October 2007
EECS
**Athens**: Euro-Mediterranean Summit of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions brings together some 120 representatives of organized civil society from the ten Mediterranean partner countries and from many EU countries as well as networks such as the Trade Union Forum and the Euromed Youth Platform. They call for a strengthening of participatory structures in the southern partner countries and propose that civil society should be given an active role in the implementation of National Action Plans in the context of the strengthened ENP.


17-18 October 2007
**Transport**
**Amman**: The Euromed Aviation project is holding an Air Transport Workshop whose main objectives are to set out the EU market approach towards a common Euro-Mediterranean aviation area, to present the Euromed Aviation Project to the market community, and to identify the main current and future market issues in the MEDA region.

**www.euromedtransport.org/350.0.html**

20-21 October
**Trade**
**Lisbon**: The 6th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Trade Conference brings together the Trade Ministers of the 10 Mediterranean countries which are members of the Barcelona Process and EU member states. Besides tariff dismantling, progress has been achieved through the elimination of quantitative restrictions, removal of non-tariff barriers and greater transparency. It assesses the on-going negotiations for the liberalization of trade in services and the establishment of a dispute settlement mechanism. Ministers also consider the negotiation and implementation of South-South integration initiatives.


21-23 October
**Euromed Audiovisual**
**Bologna**: The Bologna Cinematheque is hosting a workshop on “The Restoration and Conservation of Film Heritage in the Mediterranean” in the framework of the programme Euromed Audiovisual II. The objective is to discuss the current state of film archives in Europe and in the Mediterranean. Participants discuss the importance of protecting cinema heritage from a historical, artistic and methodological perspective.

**www.euromedaudiovisuel.net**

23-24 October 2007
**Education**
**Brussels**: A two-day event to increase collaboration between the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries in the sectors of e-infrastructures and networking for research and education. The EU-MED event is hosted by three sponsoring projects that foster the creation of e-infrastructures in the Mediterranean region including the EU-funded EU-MEDCONNECT.

**www.eucomedconnect.net/**

24 October 2007
**ENPI**
**Brussels**: €97.4 million have been allocated to the Mediterranean region under the 2007 ENPI Regional Action Programme for the South. Eight regional projects and programmes will be financed in domains such as peace, disaster prevention, investment promotion, support to the private sector, intercultural dialogue, gender equality, and information and communication.

**http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighborhood/regional-cooperation/enpi-south/index_en.htm**

24 October 2007
**SMAP**
**Brussels**: Several events take place all around the Mediterranean in support of Coast Day, dedicated to promoting the vision of the future coast and sustainable coastal development. It is a key event that aims to raise the awareness of policy makers and public alike of the value of the coast and the necessity of using an integrated approach to managing coastal areas.

**www.coastday.org**

25-26 October 2007
**Civil Protection**
**Oporto**: The first joint informal meeting of Director-Generals for Civil Protection of the Euromed Programme and their counterparts from the European Union, the European Economic Area and the EU candidate countries is considered an important milestone in the Portuguese Presidency since it brings together Director-Generals for Civil Protection from both sides of the Mediterranean.


26-27 October 2007
**Politics and Security**
**Malta**: Second seminar of the semi-annual Information and Training Seminars for Euro-Mediterranean desk officers of the 35 partner countries. During the two-day meeting the main issues tackled are: the prospect for a Council of the Mediterranean, the Euromed Partnership after the Media Task Force meeting and the issue on Energy Security in the Euromed Region.

**www.euromed-seminars.org.mt**

29-30 October 2007
**EMPA**
**Rome**: The EMPA Committee on Improving the Quality of Life, Human Exchanges and Culture meets to discuss: the Impact of Climate Change and Desertification; Mediterranean Forest Policies and Fire Management; the Role of Satellite Television as a Bridge between Societies and Cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Region; the activities of the Anna Lindh Foundation; and relations with the EMPA and the results of the first Working Group on the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean University.

31 October 2007
**EU-Egypt Council**
**Cairo**: Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner commends the Egyptian government and the Arab League for their initiative
in trying to bridge the gap between the two sides in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. She adds that the EU acknowledges the position of Egypt as a strategic partner and a source of stability in the region. The Commissioner also notes that the EU is Egypt’s main trading partner and says that the ENP Action Plan now allows for Egypt’s deeper integration into the internal market of the EU. http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/egypt/index_en.htm

31 October 2007
FEMIP
Paris: FEMIP has granted its fifth loan to the company Autoroutes du Maroc. It will co-finance with the contributions of Arab lenders the construction of a 126km section of motorway between Fez and Taza. The motorway is expected to play an important role in the economic, tourist and agricultural development of the country’s northern region.

November

1 November
Energy
Sharm el Sheikh: The EU-Africa-Middle East Energy Conference provides an opportunity for participants from Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf to discuss with the EU cooperation in enhancing regional energy security, addressing climate change and improving access to energy services, the security and sustainability of energy supplies, energy efficiency, and sustainable exploitation of resources.

1 November
EU-Israel
Tel Aviv: Twenty business leaders from Europe and Israel launch the EU-Israel Business Dialogue. The goal of the dialogue is to strengthen EU-Israel economic relations, remove barriers to trade and investment, and enhance cooperation and joint ventures. In the first year of operations the dialogue will focus on the sectors of banking and finance, energy and clean technologies, life sciences, manufacturing, telecommunications, media, and Internet.

5–6 November 2007
Ministerial Meeting
Lisbon: Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership meet to provide an opportunity to assess the progress made in the cooperation during 2007 and to agree on priorities for the year to come. Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to pursuing their efforts to realise the objectives set out 12 years ago. They welcomed the fact that, despite the prevailing tension in the Middle East, the Euromed partners have succeeded in maintaining a constructive dialogue covering many key issues, and stress the importance of the ENP. In the same framework EU troika meets with four separate delegations: the countries of the Arab Maghreb Union, the Palestinian Authority, the Arab Group, and Israel. www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/96969.pdf

5 November 2007
EU Troika. Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) Lisbon: The main objective of this meeting was to stimulate the process of economic integration of the Arab Maghreb countries and to resume the direct dialogue process among these countries and the European Union. For Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and ENP, the Maghreb countries are closer to the European Union and their relation with Europe is a model to follow. The goal is now economic development, job creation, and investment. www.eu2007.pt/UE/vENDER/Noticias_Documentos/20071105amadouma.htm

7–8 November 2007
Medibtkar
Cairo: The aim of the Annual Conference of the Medibtkar programme is to present examples of existing initiatives which support the development of cooperative projects between technical centres, business supporting organizations or territory managers. The Medibtkar programme proposes to adapt these experiences according to the countries’ specific needs, strengthening the development of this type of network. www.medibtkar.eu/spip.php?article693

8 November 2007
Med.2007
Brussels: Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and ENP, presents Med.2007, the latest edition of the Mediterranean Yearbook at the European Parliament. According to the European Commissioner, the Med. 2007 yearbook, which presents the main political, economic, social and cultural keys to the Mediterranean agenda, is an indispensable publication for anyone interested in the Mediterranean and its future. It includes contributions by international authors who present their analyses from a pluralist perspective and features a wide selection of data and complementary information with tables, graphics, maps, information boxes and web links.

8–9 November 2007
EU-Tunisia Council
Brussels: Euro-Mediterranean agreement between the EU and Tunisia. The Council of the European Union has decided to create a subcommittee on human rights and democracy. This is the seventh subcommittee established under the Euro-Mediterranean agreement with Tunisia since it came into force in March 1998 providing an institutional framework for implementing and enhancing cooperation.

16 November 2007
EU-Morocco
Brussels: Morocco and the European Union launch five additional institutional twinning projects in the sectors of agriculture, consumer protection, competition, decentralisation and the fight against money laundering. The projects will be carried out in the framework of the second phase of the Association Agreement Support programme. These twinning projects have shown that they not only assist with the implementation of the Association Agreement and the Action Plan but also contribute to the creation of close and lasting ties between the various branches of the Moroccan administration and their counterparts in the EU member states.

18–19 November 2007
Migration
Algarve: At the close of the first Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Migration, ministers agree to take a number of “appropriate and concrete measures” concerning legal and illegal migration. Legal migration should be facilitated as one of the key elements of
Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. Efforts would focus on different categories of legal workers and could also include different forms of mobility such as circular and temporary migration. One proposal is the setting up of a working group with the aim of carrying out an in-depth study of the labour situation and labour market needs for migrants. Ministers agree on the need to address the root causes of migration (poverty, unemployment, and the development gap) and commit themselves to encouraging and promoting foreign direct investment to generate employment and reduce migration outflows.

19-24 November 2007
Economy
Marseille: Mediterranean Economic Week actors from Euro-Mediterranean relations, Marseilles City Council and Provence-Alpes-Côte-d’Azur Regional Council have joined with the Euro-Mediterranean public development agency to host the first “Mediterranean Economic Week.” About fifteen major events provide a basis on which economists, experts, business people, politicians and the heads of local and national authorities from various countries will discuss the major issues paving the way for a consolidation of the Mediterranean Partnership and regional economic integration.

www.semaine-eco-med.com

21-22 November 2007
Economy
Marseille: Economist Conferences and the ANIMA Investment Network, with the support of several regional partners, are organizing the 3rd Euro-Mediterranean Business Summit in Marseilles, on “The Steady Rise of Euro-Mediterranean Partnerships.” Topics for discussion at the Business Summit include interaction between the private and public sectors; the regulatory framework for Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in the region; the financing of partnerships; investment experiences; the future of information, telecommunications and innovation in the region; and sharing best practices. ANIMA was an EU-funded regional project until June 2007. It continues its work as the ANIMA Investment Network which brings together over twenty investment promotion agencies (IPA) and territorial development players across the Mediterranean.

20 November 2007
Transport
Brussels: The European Commission proposes to open negotiations with Israel on a comprehensive aviation agreement. As part of the process of creating a common Aviation Area with its eastern and southern neighbours by 2010, the Commission’s aim is to establish an open aviation area between the EU and Israel, to lift market restrictions and to achieve a high level of regulatory convergence. The agreement with Israel would establish an ambitious framework integrating wider aviation issues such as regulatory co-operation in the fields of aviation safety, security, air traffic management, technology, research and industrial cooperation.

22-23 November 2007
FEMISE
Marseille: Annual Conference of the FEMISE Network. Among the topics scheduled for discussion are: the nature of Euromed integration, growth and poverty; financial and monetary development in the Mediterranean partner countries; the effect of liberalization on labour markets in the Mediterranean partner countries; south-south integration; the liberalization of agriculture and services; enterprises and transparency; and education and training systems in the Mediterranean partner countries. The 70-member FEMISE network of economic research institutes is responsible for implementing the EU-funded €4.9 million regional programme entitled “Study and Dialogue on Euro-Mediterranean Economic Questions.” It advises the Mediterranean partners on how to reform their economic, social and administrative structures to adopt common measures that promote the creation of a Free Trade Area.


23 November 2007
Lebanon
Lisbon: A few hours before the end of the mandate of the Lebanese President, the EU Presidency issues a statement of regret that it has not been possible to elect a new President, in accordance with the constitution. The EU Presidency appeals to all political parties to continue dialogue with a view to electing a new President as soon as possible. The EU Presidency, more than ever, is attached to the independence and sovereignty of Lebanon and recalls the importance of stability in Lebanon for the whole region.

26 November 2007
EMPA
Brussels: the situation in Lebanon is one of the main items for discussion by the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) Committee on Political Affairs, Security and Human Rights.

29-30 November 2007
Neighbourhood
Madrid: At the OSCE Ministerial Council in Madrid on 29th and 30th November, Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner recalls that the OSCE and the EU cooperate closely in the Union’s neighbourhood since they share a common interest in fostering stability: by countering terrorism, organized crime, environmental degradation and by pursuing a positive agenda of economic reforms, good governance, respect for the rule of law and democracy. The Commissioner adds that the EU will continue to work closely with all the OSCE bodies to support local reforms and foster stability and prosperity in the EU’s neighbourhood.

www.osce.org/conferences/mc_2007.html

30 November 2007
Transport
Brussels: The Transport, Telecommunications and Energy Council authorises the Commission to open negotiations with Jordan for establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Aviation Agreement. The agreement will aim at creating reciprocal economic growth in the aviation sector. A comprehensive aviation agreement with Jordan is expected to cover a number of issues focused essentially on market opening between the European Community and Jordan.


December 2007

4 December
Medibitkar
Amman: The Euromed Innovation and
Technology Programme (Medibtkar) holds its second workshop in Amman. The four-day workshop, organized in collaboration with the Jordan Enterprise Development Corporation, is designed to illustrate the necessity of developing comprehensive business models for innovative projects and positioning them so as to maximise the possibility of attracting the necessary investment and expertise to further develop the business.

4 December
Intercultural Dialogue
Brussels: The European Commission launches the communication campaign for the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008 with the slogan “Together in Diversity.” The European Year aims to contribute to mutual understanding. It will explore the benefits of cultural diversity and active civic participation in European affairs and foster a sense of European belonging. The Year has been allocated a €10 million budget, supporting the information campaign, surveys and studies on intercultural dialogue, the co-financing of the seven flagship European projects and 27 national projects on intercultural dialogue across the EU.
www.dialogue2008.eu/

4 December
Immigration
Brussels: At the meeting of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council, migration policies are discussed. The Council states that migration is relevant to increase growth potential and facilitate adjustment. In a number of countries, immigration has also contributed to dealing with bottlenecks in labour markets, helping to contain inflationary pressures and improve competitiveness. Migration has become an important factor in population growth in the EU and is the most dynamic source of population change.

4 December
Lebanon
Brussels: The EU today approves €80 million in macro-financial assistance to support Lebanon’s economic and social programme for reconstruction and development. It will also facilitate and encourage progress in the implementation of the EU-Lebanon European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plan. ENP Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner says it is now crucial for the Lebanese to come to an agreement and elect a President, and reiterates EU support for the political reform process in Lebanon, especially through the ENP.

5 December
Neighbourhood
Brussels: The actions and efforts required in order to further strengthen the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) are outlined in a new communication presented today by the External Relations and ENP Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner. The communication tackles a number of objectives, including greater political commitment for economic integration, managed migration and more engagement to tackle frozen conflicts. The Commission has decided on its first €50 million allocation to the Neighbourhood Investment Facility to be committed by the end of this year.

9 December
UE-Africa Summit
Lisbon: During the 2nd EU-Africa Summit of Heads of State and Government, José Sócrates, Portuguese Prime Minister and current President of the European Union, declares that this EU-Africa Summit will go down in history because it approved a strategy and an action plan between the two continents, and it has created a new spirit of cooperation, loyalty and equality among states. Sócrates also declares that the 2nd EU-Africa Summit has placed the human rights issue at the centre of the agenda, due to the common wish of European and African leaders. The current President of the African Union, John Kufuor, affirms that the 2nd EU-Africa meeting changed relations between the two continents. “The success of this summit reflects the interest and willingness of these states and creates great expectations of Africa and Europe.”

10 December
Energy
Brussels: Speaking in a Meeting of the Observatoire Méditerranéen de l’Energie, EU Energy Commissioner, Andris Piebalgs, calls on the leading energy companies operating in the Mediterranean to play an active role in supporting the EU Priority Action Plan for 2008-2013 in the field of Euro-Mediterranean energy cooperation. The Commissioner presents the main guidelines of this Action Plan in his speech on the “Future of Euro-Mediterranean Energy Relations” at the OME General Assembly. He says that over the last three years there has been a significant change in the energy landscape, while noting that the Maghreb and Mashreq regions have a crucial energy supply potential with major oil and gas reserves but also with a huge potential for renewable energy: solar, wind and biomass.
www.euromedinfo.eu/site.168.news.en.2711.html?PHPSESSID=79480f26550e6ad6a38b8675a507f60b

10 December
Human Rights
Brussels: In the General Affairs and External Relations Council conclusions on the implementation of the EU policy on human rights and democratisation in third countries, EU foreign ministers describe the various agreement-based, ad hoc and local human rights dialogues with third countries as “an important channel to promote human rights, rule of law and democracy and to express concerns.”

10-11 December
Water
Bled: During the 4th Conference of the Water Directors of the Euro-Mediterranean and South-Eastern European Countries, the Water Directors propose the elaboration of a renewed long-term strategy for water in the region. They recognize the need for greater policy coherence at the national and regional levels, and the need to explore further how financial resources could be used and coordinated more effectively.
www.semide.net/media_server/files/2ef/.8.pdf
12 December
Refugees
Brussels: The EC grants €50 million in humanitarian and structural support for the provision of basic health and education services for Iraqi refugees in Syria and Jordan. Commenting on the decision, Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner affirms that Iraqi refugees deserve access to education and health services and she also notes the tremendous efforts made by Syria and Jordan to welcome displaced Iraqi families.

14 December
European Council
Lisbon: In their conclusions at the European Council, EU leaders reiterate their support for the negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis while expressing concern over the delay in electing the President of the Lebanese Republic; they also refer to external relations issues such as the ENP and relations with the Mediterranean partner countries, as well as migration and terrorism. The European Council also welcomes Albania and Mauritania into the Barcelona Process. On migration they say that further developing a comprehensive European policy complementing member states’ policies remains a fundamental priority, and describe cooperation with third countries as vital for well-managed migration flows and the fight against illegal immigration.

17 December
EuroMed Ministerial Conference
Cyprus: The important role of energy in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is recognized in the Declaration adopted by the 5th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Energy. In the Declaration, the ministers reaffirm their collective commitment to enhancing reciprocal energy security, competitiveness and sustainability for the Euro-Mediterranean region. The ministers endorse a detailed Priority Action Plan on Euromed Energy Cooperation, 2008-2013, focusing on three priority areas: ensuring the improved harmonization of energy markets and legislations and the integration of energy markets in the Euro-Mediterranean region; promoting sustainable development in the energy sector; developing initiatives of common interest in key areas, such as infrastructure extension, investment, financing, and research and development.

19 December
FEMIP
Paris: A long-term loan of nearly TND 3.6 million (EUR 2 million) has been granted by FEMIP to the Tunisian microfinance association ENDA Inter-Arabe to finance its expansion. This loan will enable ENDA to provide over 50,000 micro-credits, fostering the creation of small businesses and jobs. FEMIP’s renewed vote of confidence in ENDA Inter-Arabe is also expected to have an additional catalytic effect on local investors, so helping the association to achieve its growth objectives.

28-30 December
FEMISE
Cairo: The theme of the plenary sessions of the 14th Annual Conference of the Economic Research Forum (ERF) is “Institutions and Economic Development.” The parallel sessions cover 5 themes: macroeconomics and finance; labour and human development; international economics; microeconomics; and institutional economics. The conference is expected to host 250 participants, representing ERF and non-ERF affiliates, regional and international development institutions, policy makers and civil society. The event forms part of the framework of the FEMISE programme.

31 December
Human Rights
Brussels: Human rights defenders in Syria should be able to operate free of harassment. The EU Presidency declares that the EU is deeply concerned about the recent detention of members of a pro-democracy grouping in support of the Damascus Declaration. The EU recalls Syria’s international commitments, namely the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which Syria has signed and ratified. The EU urges the Syrian authorities to immediately release all of those detained while peacefully expressing their opinions.

Chronologies

Other Cooperation Initiatives in the Mediterranean

1. NATO Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative

The Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) is considered an integral part of the North Atlantic Alliance’s cooperative approach to security and it reflects the Alliance’s views that security in Europe is deeply linked to stability in the Mediterranean region. The MD indeed aims at: contributing to regional security and stability, achieving better mutual understanding between NATO and its Mediterranean Partners and dispelling misconceptions about the Alliance among participating countries. It complements other initiatives in the region such as the Barcelona Process, the OSCE Mediterranean Partner Countries for Cooperation, and the 5+5 Dialogue. The MD has its origins in the Brussels Summit Declaration in 1994, when, after the positive developments in the Middle East Peace process, the Heads of State and Government declared their readiness to establish contacts between the Alliance and Mediterranean non-member countries on a case-by-case basis. During 1995, Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, and Jordan were invited to participate in a dialogue with NATO. In 2000 Algeria also joined the MD. During the 1997 Madrid Summit the Mediterranean Cooperation group was established: all NATO members are represented in it and it is the steering body for all questions related to the dialogue and its development. The MD consists of a political dialogue combined with participation on specific and practical activities. These meetings are normally chaired by NATO’s Secretary General and are conducted between the North Atlantic Council and the ambassador of each Mediterranean country. They represent a privileged opportunity to share views on security matters and discuss the current status of the MD. The structure of the MD can be conducted on a bilateral level (that is to say 26 NATO countries and the MD country interested), on a multilateral level (involving the 26 NATO countries and the 7 MD countries) or, finally, on a regional level (involving two or more countries in the cooperation). The dialogue is progressive in terms of participation and substance, thus allowing the number of partners and the content of the Dialogue to evolve over time. Besides, all the Mediterranean partners are offered the same basis for cooperation within a non-discriminatory framework. On the practical dimension, activities such as civil emergency planning, science, information and also military exercises are held. This programme includes: observation of NATO/PfP (Partnership for Peace) military exercises, attending courses and seminars at NATO schools and visiting NATO military bodies. All these activities are included in the Annual Work Programme together with seminars, workshops and other practical activities in areas such as the environment, information, crisis management, defence policy and strategy, small arms and light weapons, global humanitarian mine action and non-proliferation. Mediterranean countries contribute to NATO-led peacekeeping operations: Jordan, Egypt and Morocco participated in the NATO mission of the Balkans.

During the Istanbul Summit in 2004, NATO’s Heads of State and Government decided to enhance the practical dimension of the Mediterranean Dialogue. A number of principles guided the Alliance’s work: the need for close consultation with the MD countries, the importance of being responsive to their interests and needs, the possibility of self-differentiation while preserving unity and the non-discriminatory character of the MD. This improvement in the practical field of the MD consisted in: promoting military-to-military cooperation, combating terrorism through effective intelligence sharing and maritime cooperation, promoting democratic control of armed forces and enhancing cooperation in the area of civil emergency planning. At the same Summit, the Alliance, considering itself ready for new challenges, decided to undertake a new initiative. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) aims at contributing to long-term global and regional security by offering practical bilateral cooperation with NATO to countries of the broader Middle East region starting with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates). The initiative is open to all interested countries of the above region who subscribe to its contents, including fighting against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the present moment Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have joined the initiative. Within the framework of the initiative NATO countries decided to establish the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative Group composed of political counsellors from the 26 delegations of member countries to NATO. The group defines the procedures for the development of practical activities with interested countries and engages countries participating in the Initiative on a “26+1” basis for developing individual work plans and their implementation. The Mediterranean Dialogue is a forum for political consultations and practical cooperation which is addressed to countries involved in Mediterranean-related process-
meet legislators and senior government officials from the two Gulf countries. NATO parliamentarians also meet with media and civil society representatives. The most important outcome of the visit is that parliamentarians of the two countries are invited as observers in selected NATO PA activities;

- 5-6 June, Manama (Bahrain): NATO-Bahrain Public Diplomacy Conference on "Media in a Changing World: Perspectives from GCC and NATO." Participants include academics, elected and government officials, civil society and diplomatic representatives from the Kingdom of Bahrain and other countries taking part in the ICI;

- 18-19 June, Tunis (Tunisia): Seminar organised by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division and the Diplomatic Institute for Formation and Studies of the Tunisian Foreign Ministry on the NATO Mediterranean Dialogue. The main themes dealt with are: the transformation of the Mediterranean Dialogue and its implementation especially regarding Tunisia, Security and Environmental Challenges in the Mediterranean Region;

- 1-2 July, Naples (Italy): Fourth Naples Seminar organised in co-operation with the Italian delegation of the NATO PA and the Mediterranean Special Group (GSM). 40 members from NATO and NATO PA and Mediterranean Associates (Algeria, Israel and Jordan) meet to discuss security issues in the MENA region. The final session is focused on recent NATO developments regarding the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: the creation of a Middle East faculty at the NATO Defence College in Rome;

- 5 September, Kuwait City (Kuwait): The NATO Deputy Secretary General, Ambassador Minuto Rizzo, delivers a speech during the Public Diplomacy Symposium at the Kuwait News Agency (KUNA) discussing NATO-Kuwait relations in the framework of NATO’s transformation. He underlines the growing practical cooperation particularly in the promising area of training and education: the Training Cooperative Initiative aims at making available to MD and ICI interested partners, the Alliance’s expertise in the field of training military forces;

- 10 September, Doha (Qatar): NATO Deputy Secretary General meets the Crown Prince of Qatar. The talks focus on the future prospects of NATO-Qatar relations: how to enhance political consultations and how to develop a 2008 menu of practical cooperation between NATO and Qatar;

- 9 October, Egypt: NATO and Egypt finalise their Individual Cooperation Programme (ICP) under the enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue. During Istanbul Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government offered the MD partner countries the possibility to agree with NATO Individual Cooperation Programmes. The ICP helps to frame NATO’s cooperation with Egypt in a more strategic way than is currently done with the Mediterranean Dialogue Work programme;

- 21 October, Amman (Jordan): First official visit to Jordan of the new Deputy Secretary General of NATO, Ambassador Bisogniero. Talks focus on NATO-Jordan relations in the framework of the MD and on the way to forward the implementation of practical cooperation;

- 22-23 October, Herzliya (Israel): Two-day Symposium on “NATO-Israel Relations and the Mediterranean Dialogue” co-sponsored by the NATO Public Diplomacy Division and the Atlantic Forum of Israel. The symposium brings together high level opinion leaders and policy makers from Israel and officials from NATO;

- 17 November Brussels (Belgium): The Emir of the State of Qatar pays an historic visit to NATO headquarters. This is the first visit of this kind by a Head of State of a member country of the ICI.

- 3 December, Brussels (Belgium): NATO launches the first ever Mediterranean Dialogue Trust Fund with Jordan to assist the country with the elimination of explosive remnants of war. It marks the start of a new kind of cooperation where civilian and military expertise is combined;

- 4-5 December, Brussels (Belgium): NATO Public Diplomacy Division organises a two-day press tour at NATO Headquarters for senior media representatives from MD and ICI countries, as well as Oman and Saudi Arabia. Topics covered are: the agenda of NATO Ministerial meetings, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, NATO’s relations with Russia and the Ukraine, NATO’s role in security and stabilisation from the Balkans to Afghanistan;
7 December, Brussels (Belgium): Foreign Affairs Ministers and their counterparts from the MD countries meet for the second time since the Istanbul Summit in 2004. Ministers agree that political dialogue and practical cooperation must go hand in hand.

For further information:
- Mediterranean Dialogue: www.nato.int/med-dial/home.htm
- Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: www.nato.int/ici/home.htm

2. Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation in OSCE

The relationship between the OSCE and the Mediterranean Partners for Cooperation (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia) goes back to the Helsinki Process. In the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 it was affirmed with conviction that security in Europe was to be considered in the broader context of world security and closely linked with security in the Mediterranean area as a whole. In 1992, during the Helsinki Summit, it was considered essential to maintain closer contact with Mediterranean Partners. From this moment on, the Partners have been regularly invited to meetings of the OSCE Council of Ministers, conferences and to the yearly Mediterranean Seminars. These latter together with the Parliamentary forum on the Mediterranean, are privileged moments for the exchange of ideas and experiences. At the Budapest Summit of 1994, another key moment took place: the creation of an informal Contact Group under the permanent Council. At present, the Contact Group represents the main channel for ongoing political dialogue with the Mediterranean Partners besides facilitating the interchange of information and generation of ideas. At the Ministerial Council Meeting in Maastricht in 2003, the adoption of the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century represented another turning point. It was a chance to strengthen interaction especially identifying areas of common interest for co-ordinated action. This expanding range of co-operation now includes different aspects of the Organization’s work – confidence-building, political dialogue, more specific collaboration in tackling specific issues: intolerance, discrimination, terrorism, linkage between economic and environmental well-being and security, migration management. The broad framework for regular contact is represented by: the participation as observers of the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation, high-level meetings with the OSCE Ministerial Troika and Secretary General, the Annual Security Review Conference, the Economic Forum, the Annual and Winter Sessions of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and finally the annual OSCE Mediterranean Seminar which is normally attended also by international organizations, parliamentarians and NGOs.

The Spanish Chairmanship organized an informal meeting between the personal Representatives of the Chairman-in-Office on Tolerance and the Mediterranean Partners. Promoting tolerance and non-discrimination was one of the priorities of the Spanish Chairmanship of the OSCE during 2007; the other priorities were: combating terrorism, human trafficking and protecting the rights of national minorities. As per tolerance and non-discrimination, they were at the core of some important meetings during 2007: the 13th Mediterranean Seminar and the Conference on Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims held in Cordoba and the Bucharest Conference on Combating Discrimination.

**Mediterranean Seminar 2006**

17-18 December, Tel Aviv (Israel): the 13th Mediterranean Seminar is hosted by the Israeli Government and it is attended by OSCE’s participating states and its Mediterranean partner countries. On the eve of the seminar non-governmental organisations from the Mediterranean take part in a discussion on the role of NGOs in combating intolerance and discrimination. Topics on the agenda of the Seminar include promoting respect for cultural and religious diversity and facilitating dialogue; combating discrimination against women, migrants and other groups; the role of women, educators and the media in countering intolerance and OSCE tolerance-related commitments as well as OSCE tools to implement them. Spanish Ambassador Carlos Sanchez de Boado, who chairs the Permanent Council, states that the OSCE promotes en-counters to help avoid the erosion of democratic legitimacy, plurality and coexistence. Encouraging participation in pluralistic societies and combating intolerance are priorities for the 2007 Spanish OSCE Chairmanship and these aims were reaffirmed at the Madrid Ministerial Council in late November when a decision on tolerance and non-discrimination was adopted.

**OSCE Parliamentary Assembly**

29 September–1 October, Portoroz (Slovenia): parliamentarians from around the OSCE countries and Mediterranean Partners meet for the annual meetings which consist in a meeting of the standing committee and a forum on the Mediterranean. Especially on 1 October, parliamentarians’ attention is focused on the Mediterranean dimension of the OSCE and particularly on minority protection and non-discrimination in the Mediterranean.

**OSCE International Conference**

9–10 October, Cordoba (Spain): “Countering intolerance and discrimination against Muslims” is the title of the OSCE International Conference. The goal of the Cordoba conference is to introduce the phenomenon of intolerance and discrimination against Muslim communities into the political realm within the OSCE, and to approach the issue with the objective of proposing a solution to this specific form of discrimination. Two Mediterranean Partners, Algeria and Egypt, make statements during plenary sessions on the role of education and the media in countering discrimination against Muslims.

**OSCE Workshops**

13–15 November, Madrid (Spain): the workshop on “Travel Document Security in the Mediterranean Region” is designed to help OSCE participating states and Mediterranean Partners to comply with a decision taken in 2003 that called for improved passports: travel documents need to be machine-readable, have digitized photos and biometric data when possible.

10-11 December, Valencia (Spain): the theme of the workshop is “Water Scarcity, Land Degradation and Desertification in the Mediterranean Region” the purpose is to assess links between these
three elements on the one hand and security on the other.

For further information:
Mediterranean Seminar: www.osce.org/item/27874.html
Conference of Cordoba: www.osce.org/conferences/tnd_muslim_2007.html

3. Mediterranean Forum (Foromed)

Since its founding in 1994, the Mediterranean Forum has represented an informal framework for cooperation between six Mediterranean EU countries and five Mediterranean partners: Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, Greece, Malta, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt and Turkey. It is an informal forum of dialogue and confrontation amongst the participating countries and it acts as a testing ground of ideas and a promoter of initiatives within the general framework of the Barcelona Process. It has no founding charter or any permanent structural basis or financial resources of its own, which is to say that all of its activities are funded by the states that want to take part in the activities. The Chairmanship rotates annually and the coordinator of each Chairmanship carries out the secretariat’s functions. At the end of each Chairmanship a Ministerial meeting takes place and this is considered the Forum’s main body. Every year there are three or four expert-level meetings, as well as seminars and workshops. Extraordinary ad-hoc meeting were also held in special circumstances such as in October 2001, following the events of September 11, and in April 2006 to address the cartoons crisis. The Mediterranean Forum is the realization of a Franco-Egyptian initiative providing for multilateral cooperation between Mediterranean EU member states and other Mediterranean countries. It is composed of three working groups: political, economic and cultural. With the launching of the Barcelona Process in November 1995, the usefulness of the Mediterranean Forum was called into question and it became less active mainly due to its lack of financial support. It was decided to maintain it as a support instrument for the Barcelona Process due to its flexible nature. In recent years it has worked basically as a forum for informal consultations and exchange of views in preparation for the ministerial meetings of the Barcelona Process. At the 2nd Ministerial Meeting, the two criteria to admit a new member to the Forum were decided on: any potential member has to have a Mediterranean coastline, thus being a Mediterranean state, and there must be consensus among the existing members regarding admission of a new member.

This year’s main event was the 14th regular Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Mediterranean Forum held in Rethymno (Crete), on 1 and 2 June 2007, under the Chairmanship of Greece. Besides the delegations from the 11 founding members of the Mediterranean Forum, a Libyan delegation was also invited by the Presidency. Ministers restated their conviction that the Mediterranean Forum constituted a useful tribune of reflection and deeper of the Euro Mediterranean Partnership and they recalled the ultimate goal to contribute to the consolidation of peace, security, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean. Ministers focused their discussion on topics of outmost importance for the region: the situation in the Middle East, migration and energy. Despite recent outbursts of violence in the Middle East, new prospects for the promotion of the peace process are emerging thanks to some political developments: the renewal of the Arab peace initiative, the promotion of the Palestinian government for national unity and the activation of the international community. The situation of the Euro Mediterranean Partnership in the energy sector was reviewed and the need to promote the gradual integration of Euro-Mediterranean energy markets was underlined. Energy Ministers agreed that they could further deliberate on the feasibility of creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Energy Community. On migration, they stressed the importance of addressing the phenomenon with a comprehensive and integrated approach. Ministers also reconfirmed the threefold dimension of the issue i.e. legal migration, migration and development, illegal immigration. They underlined the need for closer cooperation and a regular exchange of information between the different institutions of the Barcelona Process especially with the Euro Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly whose role should be enhanced. Finally they agreed that Algeria will hold the next Presidency of the Mediterranean Forum for 2008.

For further information: www.maec.es/SiteCollectionDocuments/Pa%C3%ADses%20y%20regiones/Mediterraneo/COMUNICA-DOS_CONJUNTO.pdf

4. Adriatic-Ionian Initiative (AlI)

Adriatic-Ionian Initiative was officially promoted during the summit on development and security of the Adriatic and Ionian Sea, in Ancona in 2000. At the end of the summit the Ancona Declaration was approved, thus establishing political enactment of this Initiative. It has eight European member countries that have an exit to the Adriatic and Ionian Sea: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. The Initiative is supported by the European Union. The goal of this initiative is to develop and strengthen security in the Adriatic-Ionian region, to intensify co-operation between countries of the region and stimulate the process of integration with the EU for those countries (Albania, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina) that are not currently members of the EU but which are all candidates for EU accession. The initiative is a forum to exchange political opinions and at the same time to enable multilateral co-operation in different fields: the fight against organised crime, economy-tourism-cooperation among and between small and medium sized enterprises, environmental protection and sustainable development, transport and shipping cooperation and cultural and inter-university cooperation with the Virtual University of the Adriatic-Ionian Basin (www.uniadrion.net). The AlI does not have a permanent body but it does have an organisational structure: the Adriatic-Ionian Council, the Committee of Senior Officials and the six thematic Round Tables. The Adriatic Ionian Council is the major body in the AlI decision-making process. It gathers at Foreign Minister level and it meets regularly once a year. It is chaired on a rotation basis with a new chair every year; during 2007, Bosnia-Herzegovina presided over the Initiative until May, while Croatia will chair the AlI until May 2008. The Committee of Senior Officials is a body responsible for the coordination of activities, preparation of ministerial meetings.
and for the implementation of ideas and conclusions of the Round Tables; these latter are divided into six thematic units through which the Initiative’s activities unfold. The Round Tables are convened at least twice a year. There is a great flexibility in scheduling the meetings and it sometimes leads to inefficiency and interrupted work continuity.

One of the round tables scheduled during the Bosnian Presidency concerned security. On 2 April in Sarajevo, representatives of security institutions and law enforcement agencies from Bosnia, Albania, Croatia, Italy, Slovenia, Serbia and Greece presented their operational plans to combat organized crime and discussed improving regional cooperation in breaking up organized crime networks. During the ministerial meeting, held in Sarajevo on 1 June, the Sarajevo Declaration was approved as the final document of the Bosnia-Herzegovina chairmanship of the All. It highlighted the decision to establish a permanent operational Secretariat, probably to be based in Ancona (Italy), that will help to better coordinate and implement activities. Another important decision was to reduce the number of topics that the Initiative will discuss in the future in order to increase efficiency: environmental protection, transport and communication networking, and the protection of valuable and cultural heritage in the region. At the Adriatic-Ionian Council of Sarajevo, Serbia and Montenegro participated for the first time as independent countries.

5. 3rd and 4th Informal Meetings of Foreign Ministers of European Mediterranean States

During 2007 two informal meetings of Foreign Ministers of the eight EU Member States which form the southern border of the European Union were held. The meetings’ objectives were to ensure a constant Mediterranean perspective in the EU’s policies and actions. They were an opportunity for a frank and open exchange of views on a number of issues considered of primary importance for the EU and its Mediterranean and Southern dimension agenda. The participating countries were: Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Slovenia, Spain and Portugal, the so called “Olive Tree Group.” Although not having a particular Mediterranean character geographically, Bulgaria and Romania, the two new EU member states were accepted and will take part in the fourth meeting.

- 1-2 February, Valletta (Malta): At the core of the third informal meeting is the discussion on enhancing relations with Mediterranean partners within the ENP. In this regard, emphasis is also placed on improved visa mechanisms as an essential tool for an effective neighbourhood policy. The project of a so-called Malta Initiative is also discussed: this would be a new framework of dialogue between the Union and the Arab League within a more visible, structured and engaged format such as meetings of Foreign Ministers of the member states of both organizations. The Middle East and illegal migration are also special discussion items together with a debate on the future of Europe and its strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy supplies;
- 5-6 July Koper (Slovenia): Middle East, migration and ENP are central items of the fourth informal meeting of Foreign Ministers of Mediterranean EU Member States. Ministers send an open letter to the newly-appointed Quartet Special Envoy Tony Blair, in which they propose the establishment of an international force to promote the resolution of the conflict. The document also calls on Israel to take concrete steps such as the payment of taxes Israel owes to Palestinians. Regarding the ENP, Ministers agree to more actively involve Mediterranean and Eastern European partners on issues of mutual concern: energy, transport, migration, etc.. Ministers also agree to further develop the Black Sea Synergy initiative. The Foreign Ministers also stress that EU migration policies must take account of all aspects of migration: EU internal security and respect for human rights. They also call for an intensified partnership between EU and countries of origin/transit of migratory flows. Ministers also discuss the future of Kosovo, agreeing that it is an EU responsibility and reiterating that the unity of the EU on this subject is crucial. The Slovenian side presents an initiative concerning the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean University located on the Slovenian coast. For the first time, Bulgaria and Romania take part in the meeting.

For further information: Minister of Foreign Affairs (Malta): www2.mfa.gov.mt/pages/news.asp?sec =9&id=359

6. 5+5 Dialogue

The 5+5 Dialogue was set up on 10 October 1990 during a ministerial meeting of the ten countries of the Western Mediterranean Basin: Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta – representing the Northern shore and Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania – representing the Southern. Initially set up as a meeting of Foreign Ministers, since 1990 there have been 7 meetings with a ten-year interval between the first two and the five following, due to the international sanctions imposed on Libya. The 5+5 Dialogue has a flexible and informal character, over the years its character has changed from the merely political, becoming a forum for a strengthened regional and multidisciplinary cooperation in the Western Mediterranean. Foreign Affairs ministerial meetings are held at an informal level, as well as Defence, Home Affairs, Labour and Social Affairs, Interparliamentary relations, and Tourism, and Transport meetings. Considering that there is no specific forum of dialogue between the EU and the Maghreb, the 5+5 Dialogue stands out as the unique framework in relations between European and Maghreb countries. Due to its practical and operative character it is a privileged forum for the interchange of ideas and launching of new initiatives besides taking advantage of the restricted geographical field limited to the Western Mediterranean. This initiative has encouraged the insertion of Libya and Mauritania in the regional context.

Main Meetings during 2007
- 1-2 March, Tunis (Tunisia): 4th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Transport (GTMO 5+5). Present at the conference are the Transport Ministers of Algeria, Spain, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and senior representatives of the French, Italian and Mauritanian ministries. Also present
in their capacity as observers were representatives of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and the EC. The Group of Transport Ministers of the Western Mediterranean (GTMO) has been in existence since 1995. Since its creation, it has promoted cooperation in the Western Mediterranean transport industry and contributed towards strengthening Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements. The 4th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Transport is a result of close collaboration between Tunisia and Spain (incoming and outgoing Presidents, respectively). At the Conference, the GTMO Presidency passes to Tunisia, which will hold the position for the next two years. The GTMO Euro-Mediterranean cooperation group now has three new members (Libya, Malta and Mauritania), thereby obtaining the 5+5 structure (5 Maghreb countries and 5 EU countries) that exists in other sectors. Other important milestones at the Conference are the adoption and signing of a Protocol of Cooperation that institutionalizes and confirms GTMO cooperation in the area of transport. According to the protocol, priority areas for work include: defining a multimodal transport network in the region, improving transport conditions to facilitate trade in the region, developing R&D on transport in the Mediterranean area;

- 10-11 September, Madrid (Spain): meeting of the follow-up group of the ministerial conference on migration. During the meeting the issues tackled are: global and cooperative governance of mobility, reception and integration processes in the host society, economic and human benefits for the country of origin and destination. The Presidency of the Conference on Migration passes from Spain to Portugal;
- 9-10 December, Cagliari (Italy): The “5+5 Initiative” is a forum of cooperation where defence and security matters are discussed. First launched in 2004, it counts on the participation of ten Western Mediterranean nations. Through practical activities and a permanent exchange of ideas and experience, the “5+5 Initiative” aims at enhancing mutual understanding and trust in order to cope with security-challenging issues in the region. In just three years, studies about requirements have evolved into a set of specific activities and joint air and naval exercises. Three major cooperation fields have been identified so far: maritime security, which includes prevention and the fight against illegal trafficking and the fight against marine pollution; Civil Protection, with special reference to responding to serious, man-made disasters; air security through the exchange of information among the military about air traffic to be suitably prepared in case of improper use of air spaces. “Education” is becoming the fourth cooperation field through the French Tunisian proposal to create a 5+5 Defence College. On 29 September, in Évora (Portugal) EU Defence Ministers meet the Defence Ministers of the five North African countries participating in the “5+5 Initiative”, thus reaffirming the importance of the latter as a model of cooperation and test bench for new experiences. The rotating chairmanship passes from Italy to Libya for 2008.

For further information:
General Information: http://www.maec.es
Group of Transport:
www.cetmo.org/s_gtm0.htm
5+5 Initiative: www.difesa.it/ministro/compiti+e+attivita/dettaglio+agenda.htm?detailid=4177

7. Euro-Arab Relations

During the first Euro-Arab Dialogue Forum, which took place in Paris in 2006, participants agreed on the need to reactivate and reinforce this strategic partnership, particularly trying to connect with citizens, thus shifting the focus from economic partnership towards partnership with people. In its origins, which date back to the early seventies, the Euro-Arab Dialogue (DEA), a discussion forum between the member countries of the European Community and the League of Arab States, sought to respond to a double necessity: on the one hand, Arab countries were interested in European support for their stand on the Arab Israeli conflict; on the other, Europe was concerned with the oil supplies that Arab countries could grant.

In 1973, five delegations from Arab countries took part in the European summit of Copenhagen and the idea of a special Euro-Arab Dialogue was presented. One of the first questions to face was the status of the PLO as observer in the General Commission of the Dialogue and legal representative of the Palestinian people. Since Europe did not recognize the PLO, the Dialogue remained blocked until the Dublin compromise resolved the situation: the General Commission would gather not on a state-basis but as a European and an Arab delegation. The main objectives of the cooperation focused on issues of economy, trade, technology and culture. In the course of time, the Dialogue suffered setbacks which slowed down the initiative, but, equally, the Dialogue has always been resumed. During 2007, cooperation between Europe and the Arab League has been testified by to meetings at different levels. On 22 January, the European Commission President Barroso meets the Arab League Secretary General, Amr Moussa, to exchange views on current regional issues: the situation of Lebanon, the Israel-Palestine conflict and Iraq, as well as EC cooperation with the Arab League. The framework of the Barcelona Process is considered a valuable diplomatic channel to address issues of common interest for both parties. The Secretary General’s participation in the plenary session of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly on 16/17 March should be viewed in this way. The main topics tackled are: the Middle-East situation, dialogue between civilizations, religions, cultures, migration, women’s rights in the Mediterranean and the results achieved by the Barcelona Process. During the same month the Summit Conference of the Arab League Council was celebrated in Riyadh and it is worth mentioning the participation of the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, as a further demonstration of good cooperation between the parties. A delegation of the Arab League also took part in the OSCE Ministerial Meeting on 30 November in Madrid and Secretary General Amr Moussa participated in the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting of Foreign Affairs in Lisbon on 6 November.

For further information:
This chapter provides details of the results of presidential and legislative elections that took place in 2007 in independent states presented in circum-Mediterranean order. The list also includes referenda and those elections held in autonomous entities or in any other relevant territory that are of particular political significance.

**France**

**Presidential Elections**

22 April and 6 May 2007

Previous elections: 21 April and 5 May 2002

Semi-presidential Republic. Two-round elections for a five-year presidential term, renewable once only.

**Legislative Elections**

10 and 17 June 2007

Previous elections: 9 and 16 June 2002

Bicameral Legislature. The Senate has 331 seats chosen by indirect vote for a nine-year term, a third of which are renewed every three years. The 577 seats of the National Assembly (Assemblée Nationale) are elected for a five-year term, each from a single-seat constituency. The election consisted of two rounds: the total number of seats is provided after both rounds.

**Slovenia**

**Presidential Elections**

21 October and 11 November 2007

Previous elections: 10 November and 1 December 2002

Parliamentary Republic. Two-round elections are held to choose a President for a five-year term.

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### Percentage Vote by Candidate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>1st Round</th>
<th>2nd Round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nicolas Sarkozy (Union for a Popular Movement, UMP)</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ségolène Royal (Socialist Party, PS)</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>47.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>François Bayrou (Union for French Democracy, UDF)</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Marie Le Pen (National Front, FN)</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olivier Besancenot (Revolutionary Communist League, LCR)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippe de Villiers (Movement for France, MPF)</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marie-George Buffet (French Communist Party, PCF)</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominique Voynet (The Greens)</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arlette Laguiller (Workers’ Struggle)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Bové (After Globalisation)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frédéric Nihous (Hunting, Fishing, Nature, Tradition)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gérard Schivardi (Workers’ Party)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 83.8% (1st round) and 84.0% (2nd round)

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### Percentage Vote by Party

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1st Round</th>
<th>2nd Round</th>
<th>Total Seats Won</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>46.3</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party (PS, social democrat)</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>42.2</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Centre-Presidental Majority (MAJ)</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Communist Party (PCF)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other left-wing parties</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other right-wing parties</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Radical Party (PRG, social-liberal)</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Greens (Les Verts, ecologist)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Movement (McDem)</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for France (MPF)</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 60.4% (1st round) and 60.0% (2nd round)

---

### Percentage of Vote per Candidate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>1st Round</th>
<th>2nd Round</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Danilo Turk (Independent)</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lojze Peterle (Independent)</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitja Gaspari (Independent)</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zmago Jelincic Plemeniti (Slovene National Party, SNS, nationalist)</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Darko Krajnc (Youth Party of Slovenia, SMS)</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 57.7% (1st round) and 58.5% (2nd round)
Croatia
Legislative Elections

25 November 2007
Previous elections: 23 November 2003
Unicameral Parliamentary Republic. Elections are held to elect members to the Croatian Parliament (Zastupnicki Dom), for a four-year term. Of the total of 153 members of the legislature, 140 are chosen by proportional representation from electoral districts choosing a number of members and five are representatives of ethnic or national communities or minorities. Additionally, an indeterminate number of members are chosen by Croats residing abroad by means of proportional representation. The OSCE electoral mission described the process as transparent, free and fair.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ, conservative)</td>
<td>36.6 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SDP)</td>
<td>31.2 56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Peasant Party (HSS, agricultural)/Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSSL, liberal)/Alliance of Primorje-Gorski/PGS, regionalist)</td>
<td>6.5 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian People’s Party (HNS, centrist)</td>
<td>6.8 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Assembly of Slavonija and Baranja (HDSSB)</td>
<td>1.8 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Istrian Democratic Assembly (IDS, regionalist-centrist)</td>
<td>1.5 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Party of Pensioners (HSU)</td>
<td>4.1 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Party of Rights (HSP, far-right)</td>
<td>3.5 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>8.0 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives of minorities</td>
<td>- 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives of Croats abroad</td>
<td>- 6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 63.5%

Kosovo
Legislative Elections

17 November 2007
Previous elections: 23 October 1999, which held elections to the Assembly (Kuvendi/Skupstina) of 120 representatives, for a three-year term.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Kosovo (LKD)</td>
<td>34.3 37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic League of Kosovo (PDK)</td>
<td>22.6 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for a New Kosovo (AKR)</td>
<td>12.3 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic League of Dardania – Albanian Christian Democratic Party of Kosovo (LDD-PShKD)</td>
<td>10.0 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance for the Future of Kosovo</td>
<td>9.6 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>11.2 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 63.5%

Serbia
Legislative Elections

21 January 2007
Previous elections: 28 December 2003
Parliamentary Republic. The legislative body (the Serbian National Assembly or Narodna Skupstina Srbije) is unicameral. Early elections were held to elect the 250 members of parliament by means of proportional representation for a four-year term. These were the first elections since the dissolution of the state of Serbia and Montenegro and the declaration of independence by the latter republic in May 2006. The OSCE electoral observation mission concluded that the electoral process was clean, fair and in accordance with the standards set by the Council of Europe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Serbia (DS, centrist)</td>
<td>28.7 31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party of Serbia-New Serbia (DSS-NS, conservative)</td>
<td>16.5 47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G17 Plus (G17+, centrist)</td>
<td>6.8 19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS, authoritarian)</td>
<td>5.6 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party (LDP, coalition)</td>
<td>5.3 15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Alliance of Serbia (Social Democratic Union League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina)</td>
<td>2.5 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians</td>
<td>1.3 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalition List of Sandzak</td>
<td>0.8 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma Union of Serbia</td>
<td>0.4 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albanian Coalition from the Preševo Valley</td>
<td>0.4 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roma Party</td>
<td>0.3 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 60.5%

Turkey
Legislative Elections

22 July 2007
Previous elections: 3 November 2002
Parliamentary Republic with unicameral legislature. Elections were called, based on proportional representation and a 10% vote threshold requirement to fill the 550 seats of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi). Five-year term. The country’s system of civil and political rights is partly free, according to Freedom House.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Development Party (AKP, democratic Islamist)</td>
<td>46.5 341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican People’s Party (CHP, social democrats)</td>
<td>20.9 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nationalist Movement Party (MHP, nationalist)</td>
<td>14.2 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>5.2 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Party (DP)</td>
<td>5.4 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Party (GP, populist)</td>
<td>3.0 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felicity Party (SP, Islamist)</td>
<td>2.3 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 84.1%
Syria
Legislative Elections

22 April 2007
Previous elections: 2 March 2003
Dictatorial Republic with unicameral legislature, the People’s Council of Syria (Majlis Al-Shaab), with 250 seats. The Members of the Council are chosen for a four-year term by means of proportional representation from 15 multi-seat constituencies. Two-thirds (170) of seats are reserved for the National Progressive Front. All participating parties are members of the coalition, and political parties are banned. The country’s system of civil and political rights is partly free, according to Freedom House.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Progressive Front (JWW)</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Socialist Baath Party (dictatorial socialist)</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Socialist Union (controlled by the government)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Unions (controlled by the government)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of Syria (controlled by the government)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Socialist Union Party</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab Socialist Movement (controlled by the government)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party of Syria</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Vow Movement</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syrian Social Nationalist Party (controlled by the government)</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arabic Democratic Union Party</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 56.1%

Referendum

27 May 2007
A referendum was held to confirm the country’s presidential candidate Bashar al-Assad for a seven-year period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Options</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>97.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 95.8%

Jordan
Legislative Elections

22 November 2007
Previous elections: 17 June 2003
Parliamentary Monarchy with bicameral legislature. The National Assembly (Majlis al-Umma) consists of two houses, the Chamber of Deputies (Majlis al-Nuwaab) and the Assembly of Senators (Majlis al-Aayan). The latter has 55 members appointed by the king. 110 members of the Chamber of Deputies are chosen as follows: 104 seats are filled from single-members constituencies and 6 are set aside for women by means of a special electoral college. Additionally nine seats are reserved for Christians and three for Chechens and Circassians. The country’s system of civil and political rights is partly free, according to Freedom House.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pro-government parties</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Action Front (IAF)</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserved seats</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 54.0%

Algeria
Legislative Elections

17 May 2007
Previous elections: 30 May 2002
Semi-presidential Republic. Bicameral legislature. 389 seats to be filled in the National Assembly (al-Majlis al-Sha’abi al-Watani/Assemblée Nationale) for five years by means of proportional representation from multi-seat constituencies. 7 seats are reserved for those residing abroad. The elections were boycotted by the Socialist Forces Front (FFS, Berbers social democrats). According to Freedom House, the country’s system of civil and political rights is not free.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Liberation Front (FLN, socialist)</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Rally for Democracy (RND, authoritarian)</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement of Society for Peace (MSP)</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers’ Party (PT, socialist)</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian National Front (FNA)</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Movement for Nature and Development (MNND)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Renaissance Movement</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for Youth</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 35.5%

Morocco
Legislative Elections

7 September 2007
Previous elections: 27 September 2002
Parliamentary Monarchy with bicameral legislature. The Assembly of Councillors or Senate (Majlis al-Mustasharin) is elected every nine years and has 270 members, 162 of whom are chosen by local councils, 91 by professional chambers and 27 by salaried workers. On this occasion, the 325 members of the Assembly of Representatives (Majlis al-Nuwaab/Assemblée des Représentants) were chosen for a five-year term. 295 of these are chosen from multi-seat constituencies, whilst the remaining 30 members are taken from the women’s list. The country’s civil and political rights system is partly free, according to Freedom House.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independence Party (PI, social-democrats)</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Development Party (PJD, Islamist)</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Movement (MP, conservative)</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Rally of Independents (RNI, conservative)</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Union of People’s Forces (USFP)</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitutional Union (UC, centrist)</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS, communist)</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Party (PND, conservative) - Al Ahd Party</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Party (PND, conservative) - Al Ahd Party</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Party (PND, conservative) - Al Ahd Party</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front of Democratic Forces (FFD)</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic and Social Movement (MDS, centrist)</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Socialist</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 35.5%
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Seats</th>
<th>Votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avant-garde Party (PADS)/National Congress Party (CNI)/United Socialist Party (PSU)</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party (PT)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment and Development Party (PED)</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Renewal and Equity (PRE)</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan Union for Democracy (UMD)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party (PS)</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship and Development Initiative (ICD)</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance of Liberties (ADL)</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Renaissance and Virtue (PRV)</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens’ Forces (FC)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Turnout: 37.0%

**Sources**

- Adam Carr’s Electoral Archive
  [http://psephos.adam-carr.net](http://psephos.adam-carr.net)
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  [http://africanelections.tripod.com](http://africanelections.tripod.com)
- CIA World Factbook
- CNN
- Elections around the World
  [www.electionworld.org](http://www.electionworld.org)
- Freedom House
  [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org)
- IFES Electionguide
- Keesing’s World Record of Events
  [www.keesings.com](http://www.keesings.com)
- Parline Database
  [www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinsearch.asp](http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinsearch.asp)
### TABLE A1
Official Aid to Mediterranean Countries Financed by the European Commission Budget and the European Development Fund (EDF) in 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Commitments (in millions of euros)</th>
<th>Payments (in millions of euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian National Authority</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>263</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### CHART A1
Cooperation of EU 2006

### TABLE A2  MEDA Programme. 2006, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Commitments under MEDA 2006</th>
<th>Commitments under ENPI 2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank and Gaza</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total MEDA Bilateral</strong></td>
<td><strong>649</strong></td>
<td><strong>1076</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDA Regional</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>817</strong></td>
<td><strong>1254</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE A3  Mediterranean Candidate Countries for Accession to EU

**PHARE programme and pre-accession financial assistance 2006**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Millions of Euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Turkey</strong> Pre-accession financial assistance (Part I and II)</td>
<td><strong>369.2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obj. 1: Copenhagen criteria and justice, freedom and security issues</td>
<td>33.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obj.2: Social and economic cohesion</td>
<td>177.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obj.3: Harmonisation with the acquis communitaire</td>
<td>125.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obj.4: Civil Society Dialogue and support for European integration</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE A4  Provisions for 2007 under IPA (Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance), the New Instrument for Pre-accession from 1 January 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>(in millions of euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo (R. 1244 of the CSNU)</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programme of various beneficiaries</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE A5  
Loans of the European Investment Bank to Mediterranean Countries in 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loans by Sector</th>
<th>Millions of Euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of 52 sections of trunk road with total length of 678 km</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of final section of Rijeka-Zagreb motorway (Pan-European Corridor Vb)</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of railway lines on Corridor X and upgrading of rolling stock</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation of roads and bridges</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehabilitation and construction of municipal water and sanitation infrastructures</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modernisation, redevelopment and extension of four tertiary care hospital in Serbia</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale infrastructures schemes</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of new passenger ferry terminal and ancillary facilities at port of Dürres</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First phase of national plan for improving quality of educational results, expanding secondary education coverage and preparing for tertiary education reform</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading and extension of national electricity distribution networks</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of high-speed railway line between Istanbul and Ankara</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of first line of rail-based rapid transit system in conurbation of Samsun on Black Sea</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extension of Istanbul’s mass transport system through expansion of Ferry Fleet</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchase of trains to operate commuter services on Bosphorus tunnel and commuter rail system in metropolitan area of Istanbul</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fleet renewal and expansion</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overhaul and capacity increase of mobile telephone network of second-largest Turkish operator</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development and production in Bursa of small, light commercial vehicle for European market</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creation of 6,800 IT classroom in around 5,100 primary schools throughout Turkey</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of small and medium-scale projects</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase II of final part of rural electrification programme in Morocco</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of wastewater collection and treatment facilities</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity and quasi-equity investments in infrastructure sector</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renovation and modernisation of healthcare services and medical equipment</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and operation of dual-fired combined-cycle power plant in Gannouch</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upgrading and extension of wastewater collection networks and treatment plants in various cities</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of gas transmission pipeline between Abu Qurqas and Asyut in south of Egypt</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing of industrial pollution abatement schemes, mainly in Greater Alexandria and Greater Cairo</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of two natural gas-fired combined cycle-power generation units in El Atf and Sidi Krir</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Design, construction and commissioning of world-scale methanol plant on Greenfield site at industrial port of Damietta on Mediterranean coast</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water and sanitation networks in 14 municipalities</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


CHART A2  
Evolution of Loans from the European Investment Bank (2003-2006) (in millions of euros)
### TABLE A6: European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in the Mediterranean Countries. Funds Allocated for the Execution of Macro-Projects (2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign 2</th>
<th>Campaign 3</th>
<th>Campaign 4</th>
<th>Total allocation of funds in 2006 (in euros)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(in euros)</td>
<td>Fostering a culture of human rights</td>
<td>Promoting the democratic process</td>
<td>Advancing equality, tolerance and peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Western Balkans and Candidate Countries</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>152,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>235,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>235,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>235,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mediterranean and Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>515,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>515,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>235,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>515,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>105,000</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>650,000</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Authority</td>
<td>380,000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### TABLE A7: European Agency for Reconstruction

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projects 2006 (in millions of €)</th>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Contracts</th>
<th>Payments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>33.4</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: [www.ear.eu.int](http://www.ear.eu.int)

### TABLE A8: EU Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas</th>
<th>Millions of Euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria (Western Sahara)</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon (not including Palestinian refugees)</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East (Palestinian refugees)</td>
<td>84.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>144.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean

### TABLE B1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maghreb and Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>14,491,643</td>
<td>22,368,790</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>14,733,777</td>
<td>26,238,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>6,263,162</td>
<td>7,690,377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>3,021,158</td>
<td>4,426,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>1,976,359</td>
<td>4,268,102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahrawi Refugees</td>
<td>5,948,724</td>
<td>8,607,237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2,164,592</td>
<td>3,501,135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1,280,442</td>
<td>3,395,702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>982,493</td>
<td>4,694,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>266,485</td>
<td>1,876,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>3,334,130</td>
<td>1,479,392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Prog. and others</td>
<td>2,343,001</td>
<td>8,200,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Total</strong></td>
<td>56,805,963</td>
<td>96,747,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Central and Eastern Europe</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>3,621,228</td>
<td>4,891,492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1,237,651</td>
<td>2,511,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia and Montenegro</td>
<td>1,529,316</td>
<td>1,937,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1,937,911</td>
<td>17.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>120,461</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Prog. and others</td>
<td>2,948,790</td>
<td>1,917,892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Regional Total</strong></td>
<td>9,336,985</td>
<td>11,379,177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AECI, Deputy Director-General of Cooperation in Mediterranean and Eastern European Countries.

### CHART B1

Distribution of Spanish Cooperation in the Maghreb and the Middle East by Sector (2006)

Source: AECI, Deputy Director-General of Cooperation in Mediterranean and Eastern European Countries.
### CHART B2
**Distribution of Spanish Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe by Sector (2008)**

- **Food security**: 0%
- **Food and emergency aid**: 0%
- **Multisectorial**: 11%
- **Productive sectors**: 6%
- **Economic and services infrastructure**: 5%
- **Social services**: 2%
- **Government and society**: 40%
- **Health**: 0%
- **Water supply and purification**: 4%

Source: AECI, Deputy Director-General of Cooperation in Mediterranean and Eastern European Countries.

---

### TABLE B2
**Distribution of Spanish Cooperation in the Mediterranean by Instrument (2007)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Projects / Programmes</th>
<th>NGDOs</th>
<th>Food and Emergency Aid</th>
<th>Budgetary Support/ SWAP/Global Funds</th>
<th>Multilateral</th>
<th>Cultural DGs</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maghreb and Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>9,129,690</td>
<td>8,145,469</td>
<td>41,000</td>
<td>1,377,000</td>
<td>3,675,631</td>
<td>22,368,790</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>5,950,042</td>
<td>4,415,373</td>
<td>9,281,045</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>1,127,724</td>
<td>463,986</td>
<td>26,238,170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>4,112,949</td>
<td>2,360,821</td>
<td></td>
<td>935,000</td>
<td>281,606</td>
<td>7,690,377</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>1,407,935</td>
<td>1,016,061</td>
<td></td>
<td>175,000</td>
<td>1,827,870</td>
<td>4,426,666</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2,273,006</td>
<td>877,375</td>
<td></td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>1,017,721</td>
<td>4,268,102</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sahrawi Refugees</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>3,102,262</td>
<td>5,287,410</td>
<td></td>
<td>127,565</td>
<td>8,607,237</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>1,550,016</td>
<td>759,715</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,191,405</td>
<td>3,501,135</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1,704,970</td>
<td>973,926</td>
<td></td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>416,806</td>
<td>3,395,702</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>1,262,290</td>
<td>1,766,305</td>
<td>1,543,786</td>
<td></td>
<td>122,507</td>
<td>4,694,869</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>641,385</td>
<td>617,185</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>118,154</td>
<td>1,876,724</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>700,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>279,392</td>
<td>1,479,392</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Prog. and others</td>
<td>3,481,336</td>
<td>166,380</td>
<td></td>
<td>924,000</td>
<td>3,626,836</td>
<td>8,200,552</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Maghreb/Middle East</strong></td>
<td>32,303,620</td>
<td>24,034,492</td>
<td>16,821,601</td>
<td>5,000,000</td>
<td>5,438,724</td>
<td>13,149,279</td>
<td>96,747,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>33.39%</td>
<td>24.84%</td>
<td>17.39%</td>
<td>5.17%</td>
<td>5.62%</td>
<td>13.59%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

### Central and Eastern Europe

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Projects / Programmes</th>
<th>NGDOs</th>
<th>Food and Emergency Aid</th>
<th>Budgetary Support/ SWAP/Global Funds</th>
<th>Multilateral</th>
<th>Cultural DGs</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>2,304,030</td>
<td>2,060,743</td>
<td></td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>156,719</td>
<td>4,891,492</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Albania</td>
<td>751,570</td>
<td>1,240,120</td>
<td></td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>19,731</td>
<td>2,511,421</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>225,000</td>
<td>1,597,248</td>
<td></td>
<td>115,663</td>
<td>1,937,911</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montenegro</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35,461</td>
<td>120,461</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Prog. and others</td>
<td>408,248</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1,509,644</td>
<td>1,917,892</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3,773,848</td>
<td>4,918,111</td>
<td></td>
<td>850,000</td>
<td>1,837,218</td>
<td>11,379,177</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>33.16%</td>
<td>43.22%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>0.00%</td>
<td>7.47%</td>
<td>16.15%</td>
<td>100.00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AECI, Deputy Director-General of Cooperation in Mediterranean and Eastern European Countries.
### Migrations in the Mediterranean

#### TABLE C1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Algeria</th>
<th>Morocco</th>
<th>Tunisia</th>
<th>Egypt</th>
<th>Syria</th>
<th>Jordan</th>
<th>Lebanon</th>
<th>Palestine</th>
<th>Israel</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Total EuroMed</th>
<th>Total Foreigners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium (2007)</td>
<td>9,157</td>
<td>80,588</td>
<td>3,656</td>
<td>1,103</td>
<td>2,297</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>2,156</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>1,661</td>
<td>42,014</td>
<td>143,162</td>
<td>1,046,839</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria (2001)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>1,015</td>
<td>2,357</td>
<td>25,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark (2007)</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>2,991</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>1,097</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>4,537</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>681</td>
<td>29,160</td>
<td>40,642</td>
<td>298,490</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany (2007)</td>
<td>13,217</td>
<td>67,989</td>
<td>23,228</td>
<td>11,217</td>
<td>28,161</td>
<td>7,840</td>
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*Own production. Source: for DE, AT, BE, DK, FI, FR, GR, ES, NL, IE, IT, PT and SE, data from the national statistics offices; for BG, SI, HU, LV, LT, PL, CZ, UK, CY and RO, Eurostat data; for FR, INSEE estimates for 2005; for LU, estimates based on STATEC data 2002-2006. Last data available for each source.*
| Country of residence    | Education level | Algeria | Egypt | Lebanon | Morocco | Syria | Tunisia | Turkey | Other countries of origin
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**TABLE C2**

Level of Education of MPC Foreigners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin (south/east Mediterranean)</th>
<th>Other countries of origin</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>L: low (ISCED 0/1/2: up to lower secondary or second stage of basic education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>M: medium (ISCED 3/4: upper secondary education and superior post-secondary non-tertiary education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>H: high (ISCED 5A: academic; ISCED 5B: vocational; ISCED 6: research)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>UNK: unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Education level according to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED)
L: low (ISCED 0/1/2: up to lower secondary or second stage of basic education)
H: high (ISCED 5A: academic; ISCED 5B: vocational; ISCED 6: research)
UNK: unknown
Source: document “Foreign Residents of the MED-12 in the EU (various years)” and the documents of the European Union.
For the Association Agreements to come into force they must be ratified by the European Parliament, the Parliament of the partner country and by the parliaments of the twenty-five member states of the European Union.

Turkey is governed by the customs union which came into force in January 1996, based on the first generation agreement 1963, until its accession to the EU.

The relations of the EU with the countries of the Western Balkans take place within the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). The SAP is the framework in which several instruments are developed and it assists countries to implement the political and economic transition that prepares them for a new contractual relation with the EU: the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) to advance towards a stronger association with the EU.

The negotiations with Serbia were interrupted in May 2006 due to lack of advances in cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In early 2007 the new Belgrade gov-

### TABLE D1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start of Negotiations</th>
<th>Conclusion of Agreement</th>
<th>Signing of Agreement</th>
<th>Coming into Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>May 1996</td>
<td>December 1996</td>
<td>February 1997</td>
<td>July 1997*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>March 1995</td>
<td>June 1999</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>June 2004</td>
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<td>Algeria</td>
<td>June 1997</td>
<td>December 2001</td>
<td>April 2002</td>
<td>September 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>March 1998</td>
<td>October 2004</td>
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</table>

*Interim agreement signed between the EU and the PLO (in benefit of the Palestinian National Authority)

### TABLE D2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Start of Negotiations</th>
<th>Conclusion of Agreement</th>
<th>Signing of Agreement</th>
<th>Coming into Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>January 2003</td>
<td>June 2006</td>
<td>December 2006</td>
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<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>November 2005</td>
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<td>Croatia</td>
<td>November 2000</td>
<td>October 2001</td>
<td>March 2002</td>
<td>February 2005</td>
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<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>October 2005</td>
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</table>

*A referendum was held on 21st May 2006 that approved the independence of Montenegro from the Federation it formed with Serbia*
ernment implemented a plan and a National Council for Cooperation with the ICTY, which opened the door to resumption of negotiations on 13 June 2007.

- After its declaration and recognition as a sovereign and independent state, the EU has developed relations with Montenegro as an independent state. Once the negotiation guidelines for a SAA with Montenegro were approved in July 2006, the negotiations were concluded in April and signed on 15 October 2007. Completion of the national ratification procedures is pending.

- In October 2005, the European Council approved the start of negotiations for the accession of Croatia to the EU. Croatia adopted its national programme for adhesion to the EU in January 2007, and ministerial meetings took place in June and July 2007 to continue the political and economic dialogue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE D3</th>
<th>Action Plans of the European Neighbourhood Policy</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- The action plans allow the European Union to have a progressive and differentiated policy towards its neighbouring countries, through the different levels of cooperation they permit.

- The plan, prepared after the signing of Association Agreements, establishes the priorities of the political and economic reforms and a calendar. The action plans are the operational tools of the legal framework represented by the Association Agreements.

- Annually, assessment reports analyse the progress made. In function of the advances, expansion of cooperation and greater access to the European market will be decided upon.
### Signature of Multilateral Treaties and Conventions

#### TABLE E1  
**Multilateral Treaties on Human Rights and Penal Matters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of adoption</th>
<th>Racial discrimination</th>
<th>Civil and political rights</th>
<th>Economic, social and cultural rights</th>
<th>Discrimination against women</th>
<th>Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment</th>
<th>Rights of the child</th>
<th>Crime of genocide</th>
<th>International Criminal Court</th>
<th>Financing of terrorism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Source: UN, ILO, OHCHR

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### TABLE E2  
**Multilateral Treaties on Labour Rights (year of ratification)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Convention</th>
<th>Freedom of association and collective bargaining</th>
<th>Elimination of forced or obligatory labour</th>
<th>Elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation</th>
<th>Abolition of child labour</th>
<th>Rights of migrant workers</th>
<th>Date of adoption</th>
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<td>1951</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1951</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: ILO, OECD, OHCHR
Multilateral Treaties in the Field of Enviromenth

Kyoto
Protocolb

Biological
Diversityc

Biosecurity
Protocold

CITESe Desertificationf

Persistent
Organic
Pollutantsg

Date of adoption

1992

1997

1992

2000

1973

1994

2001

2007k

2001k

Portugal
Spain
France
Italy
Malta
Slovenia
Croatia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Serbia
Montenegro
Macedonia
Albania
Greece
Cyprus
Turkey
Syria
Lebanon
Jordan
Israel
Palestine
Egypt
Libya
Tunisia
Algeria
Morocco

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implemented
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429
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implemented
implemented
in process

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Appendices

Climate
Changea

Agenda 21 process
Number of
National
Strategy for
municipalities
Sustainable
involved in
Developmentj
Agenda 21

Med. 2008

TABLE E3

TABLE E4

392

Source:
UN
UN
UN
UN
CITES
UN
UN
UN
WRI
h. Ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or succession. i. Signature. j. The National Strategy for Sustainable Development can be found in different stages that go, from smallest to greatest commitment, from
the absence of data, to the progress of the strategy, and culminates in its implementation. k. Year of update. (..). Unavailable information

Multilateral Disarmament Treatiesa
Geneva
Protocolc

Nuclear
weaponsd

Bacteriologic
al weaponse

Conventional
weaponsf

Chemical
weaponsg

Nuclear
testingh

Antipersonnel
minesi

Date of adoption

1925

1968

1972

1980

1992

1996

1997

Portugal
Spain
France
Italy
Malta
Slovenia
Croatia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Serbia
Montenegro
Macedonia
Albania
Greece
Cyprus
Turkey
Syria
Lebanon
Jordan
Israel
Palestine
Egypt
Libya
Tunisia
Algeria
Morocco

1930
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1996b
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2001
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2006

1989
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1966
1929
1968
1969
1977
1969
1928
1971
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1987
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2001

Source:
UN
UN
UN
UN
UN
UN
UN
a. Ratification, acceptance, approval, accession or succession. b. Signature. c. Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.
f. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. g. Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. h. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. i. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction.


**The Mediterranean in Brief**

**TABLE F1** Human development index (HDI)

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<tr>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Adult literacy rate ≥ age 15</th>
<th>Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio</th>
<th>GDP per capita</th>
<th>Human development index</th>
<th>Position in HDI ranking</th>
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<td>%</td>
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**CHART F1** Health, economy and population (2005)

- 10 countries have a life expectancy greater than 80 years

Own production. Source: UNDP and UNPOP.
### TABLE F2  Population: demography

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Total population for 2005</th>
<th>Estimated population for 2050</th>
<th>Crude birth rate per 1,000 people</th>
<th>Crude death rate per 1,000 people</th>
<th>Average annual population growth rate %</th>
<th>Fertility rate per woman</th>
<th>Fertility rate</th>
<th>Immigrants thousands</th>
<th>% of total population</th>
<th>Net number of migrants thousands</th>
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Own production. Source: UN POP, WB. a. UNICEF. b. WHO. c. Net annual average of migrants: the annual number of immigrants minus the annual number of emigrants. d. Net number of migrants divided by the average of the population of the receiving country for the period.

### CHART F2  Evolution of fertility rate (1980-2005)*

![Evolution of fertility rate chart]

(*) Data for Palestine not available for 1980.

- 1980
- 1990
- 2005
### TABLE F3  
Population: structure and distribution

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<th>Population age composition&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Rural population</th>
<th>Population in urban agglomerations of more than 750,000 inhabitants</th>
<th>Population within 100 km of the coast</th>
<th>Urban population living in slums</th>
<th>Population density</th>
<th>people per km&lt;sup&gt;2&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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 Own production. Source: WB WB WB UNPOP UNPOP WRI WRI WB
<sup>a</sup> Data for Cyprus and Malta are from the UNDP, 2007. (*) Data not available.

### CHART F3  
Evolution of urban agglomerations of more than 750,000 inhabitants (1950-2005)

(*) In the same period the urban agglomerations that have decreased or have grown less are Haifa (Israel), Oran (Algeria), Lille (France), Valencia (Spain) and Palermo (Italy).

Elaboración propia. Font: BM i PNUD.
### TABLE F4  Education and training of human capital

#### Public expenditure on education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>pupils per teacher</th>
<th>Duration of compulsory education</th>
<th>Scientists and technicians in R&amp;D</th>
<th>R&amp;D expenditures</th>
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### CHART F4  Public expenditure on education (1999-2005)

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<th>Countries that invest more than 33% in tertiary education (1999-2005)</th>
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(*) Latest data available for this period.

Own production. Source: UNESCO and UNDP.
**TABLE F5  Health and survival**

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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Maternal mortality ratio &lt;5 years</th>
<th>Maternal mortality ratio per 100,000 born alive</th>
<th>People living with HIV/AIDS (15-49 years) low estimate</th>
<th>Prevalence of smoking men</th>
<th>Prevalence of smoking women</th>
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(Own production. Source: WHO, UNFPA and UNAIDS, UNAIDS, WB, WB)

**CHART F5  Health care and maternal mortality (1997-2005)**

(*) Latest data available for this period.

For the graphic representation, percentages of assisted birth of 99% have been assumed in the cases of CS, ES, GR and IT.
## Table F6: Nutrition and Food Security

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dietary Energy Consumption kcal/person/day</th>
<th>Cereal Trade imports</th>
<th>Cereal Trade exports</th>
<th>Children under Weight for Age % under age 5</th>
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<td>1,569,358</td>
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Own production. Source: FAO.  

(*) Latest data available for this period. (..) Data not available.

## Chart F6: Consumption of Alcoholic Beverages (g/person/day) (2001/03)*

The ten biggest consumers of alcohol:
- Ireland: 47.6
g. Person/day
- Austria: 40.1
g. Person/day
- Germany: 37.5
g. Person/day
- Uganda: 36.4
g. Person/day
- Denmark: 33.7
g. Person/day
- Croatia: 33.6
g. Person/day
- Portugal: 33.1
g. Person/day
- United Kingdom: 31.1
g. Person/day

(*) Latest data available for this period.
### Access to health resources

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Population per physician</th>
<th>Population with sustainable access to an improved water source</th>
<th>Population with access to improved sanitation</th>
<th>Births attended by skilled health personnel</th>
<th>Contraceptive prevalence rate</th>
<th>Adolescent fertility rate</th>
<th>Public health expenditure</th>
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<sup>a</sup> Latest data available for this period.  <sup>b</sup> Mainly women aged 15-49.  <sup>c</sup> UNDP, 2007/08.  <sup>d</sup> Including all methods.  <sup>e</sup> Data from 2005.  <sup>f</sup> Includes the contributions of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA).  <sup>g</sup> Excluding Kosovo.  <sup>h</sup> Data not available.

### Adolescent fertility rate (births per 1,000 women ages 15-19) (2005)

![Adolescent fertility rate chart](chart.png)

- **Sub-Saharan Africa**
- **Latin America and the Caribbean**
- **Southern Asia**
- **Near East and North Africa**
- **Eastern Europe and Central Asia**
- **Eastern Asia and the Pacific**
- **European Monetary Union**

Own production. Source: WB.
TABLE F8  Gender: social development

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Life expectancy at birth</th>
<th>Adult literacy rate ≥ age 15</th>
<th>Combined primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratio</th>
<th>Year women received right to vote</th>
<th>Year women received right to stand for election</th>
<th>Year first woman elected or appointed to Parliament</th>
<th>Seats in Parliament held by women*</th>
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Own production. Source: UNDP UNESCO UNESCOPU

- Referring to the first year appointed in the current parliamentary system.
- The date refers to the first year in which a woman was nominated in Parliament.
- First partial recognition of the right to vote or stand for election.
- Situation on 31 December, 2007.
- In the case of bicameral parliaments the values shown are averages for both chambers.
- Latest data available for this period.
- a) Data not available.

1997 data for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Libya not available.

CHART F8  Female participation in the national parliaments (% seats in Parliament held by women) (1997-2007)

- 2007
- 1997

The 10 parliaments with greatest equality between sexes (2007)

- Sweden
- Rwanda
- Finland
- Costa Rica
- Denmark
- Norway
- Belgium
- Mozambique
- New Zealand

Women: 47.3
Men: 52.7
Women: 49.0
Men: 51.0
Women: 42.5
Men: 57.5
Women: 38.5
Men: 61.4
Women: 38.0
Men: 62.0
Women: 37.5
Men: 62.1
Women: 36.0
Men: 64.0
Women: 35.7
Men: 64.3
Women: 34.8
Men: 65.2
Women: 32.2
Men: 67.8

Own production. Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)
### TABLE F9  Technology and communication

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<th>Telephone mainlines</th>
<th>Outgoing international calls</th>
<th>Incoming international calls</th>
<th>Mobile phones</th>
<th>Personal computers</th>
<th>Internet users</th>
<th>Annual investment in telecommunications technology expenditures</th>
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<td>per 1,000 people</td>
<td>per 1,000 people</td>
<td>per 1,000 people</td>
<td>per 1,000 people</td>
<td>minutes per capita</td>
<td>minutes per capita</td>
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Own production. Source: WB/ITU, UNCTAD. (a) Latest data available for this period. (b) Data not available.

### CHART F9  Internet access and quality (2005)

**Countries with the highest proportion of Internet users (per 1,000 people) (2005)**
- Sweden: 764
- Netherlands: 735
- Norway: 698
- Australia: 689
- New Zealand: 672
- United States: 630
- Singapore: 571
- Finland: 534

**Countries with the highest Internet access quality (per capita) (2005)**
- France (FR): 1,980
- Italy (IT): 1,630
- Japan (JP): 1,540
- South Korea (KO): 1,420
- Switzerland (CH): 1,390

**Internet users (per 1,000 people)**
- 500: Sweden, Netherlands, Norway
- 250: Australia, New Zealand, Japan
- 100: United States, Singapore, Finland

Own production. Source: WB and International Telecommunication Union (ITU).
### TABLE F10  Security and military expenditure

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<th>Refugees</th>
<th>Conventional arms transfer</th>
<th>Military expenditure</th>
<th>% of GDP</th>
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**Note:** What is included as military spending differs, in some cases, between countries. The comparison between them should be conducted prudently.

**Source:** SIPRI and UNPOP.

---

### CHART F10  Military expenditure ($ per capita) (2006)

<table>
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<th>Region</th>
<th>Military expenditure per region (thousands of millions of $) (1997-2006)</th>
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What is included as military spending differs, in some cases, between countries. The comparison between them should be conducted prudently.

**Source:** SIPRI and UNPOP.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2005 GDP (millions $)</th>
<th>2000/05 GDP growth rate (%)</th>
<th>2005 GDP structure of output (%)</th>
<th>2005 Consumer price index</th>
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* Own production. Source: WB.

---

**CHART F11**  
GDP growth (2004-2005)
TABLE F12

Agriculture

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Land area</th>
<th>Agricultural area¹</th>
<th>Arable and permanent crops</th>
<th>Permanent pasture</th>
<th>Irrigated land</th>
<th>Land under cereal production</th>
<th>Cereal production</th>
<th>Cereal yield</th>
<th>Fertilizer consumption</th>
<th>Agricultural population</th>
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</table>

¹ Agricultural area is divided in “arable land and permanent crops” and “pastures and permanent pasture”.

Own production. Source: FAO.

CHART F12

Agricultural population in the Mediterranean (2005)

Agricultural population by agricultural surface area
(no. of people per 100 ha)

Agricultural population (%)

Own production. Source: FAO.
### TABLE F13: Livestock

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<th>Live animals trade</th>
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**Own production, Source:** FAO

* a. Includes bovine, caprine and ovine livestock and buffalos.  
* b. Includes chickens, ducks, turkeys, guinea fowls and geese.  
* c. Includes horses, donkeys, mules, hinnies and camels.  
* d. The data on live animal stock is for 2005. (..) Data not available.

### CHART F13: Evolution of pigs (1961-2006) (selection of Mediterranean countries with more than one million units)

**Countries with greatest density of pigs (heads/1,000 ha) (countries with more than one million units)**

- Netherlands
- Denmark
- Belgium
- South Korea
- Vietnam
- Germany
- Poland
- China
- Spain
- Philippines

**Evolution of pigs (1961-2006)**

- Spain
- France
- Greece
- Italy
- Portugal

**Own production, Source:** FAO.
### TABLE F14: Fisheries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total Marine Production (mt)</th>
<th>Mediterranean and Black Sea Catches (mt)</th>
<th>Aquaculture Production (mt)</th>
<th>Trade in Fish and Derivative Products (millions $)</th>
<th>Average Annual Supply of Fish and Fish Derivatives (kg per capita)</th>
<th>Number of Fishers</th>
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<tr>
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### CHART F14: Importance of aquaculture in the Mediterranean (selection of countries with aquaculture production higher than 100,000 mt) (2005)

**Egypt**
- Total production: 889,302 mt
- 4.5% Freshwater aquaculture
- 56.2% Marine aquaculture
- 39.3% Brackish water aquaculture

**Spain**
- Total production: 1,071,186 mt
- 2.5% Freshwater aquaculture
- 17.8% Marine aquaculture
- 79.3% Brackish water aquaculture

**France**
- Total production: 909,622 mt
- 4.7% Freshwater aquaculture
- 23.8% Marine aquaculture
- 71.6% Brackish water aquaculture

Own production. Source: FAO
### TABLE F15: Employment and unemployment

**Employment by economic sector**

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<th>Services</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Women</th>
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**Unemployment rate**

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### CHART F15: Employment rate, >15 years, by genders (%) (2005)

- Men
- Women

*Own production. Source: ILO.*
### TABLE F16  
**Distribution of income or consumption**

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<th>second 20%</th>
<th>third 20%</th>
<th>fourth 20%</th>
<th>highest 20%</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>5.7</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>1999/2000</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>20.4</td>
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<td>8.0</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.0</td>
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<td>21.7</td>
<td>47.2</td>
<td>13.7</td>
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<td>10.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: WB

(*) Data not available.

---

### CHART F16  
**Distribution of income among the richest 20% and poorest 20% (1995-2004*) (arranged from least to greatest inequality)**

The five countries with the fewest differences

- Japan: 36.7%
- Czech Republic: 35.9%
- Slovakia: 34.8%
- Bosnia and Herzegovina: 35.8%
- Slovenia: 36.7%

(*) Latest data available for this period. The data does not allow precise comparisons between countries.

Own production. Source: WB.
### TABLE F17

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender: economic activity</th>
<th>Female economic activity rate (≥15 years)</th>
<th>Employment by economic activity</th>
<th>Estimated earned income¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>women</td>
<td>men</td>
<td>men</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of male rate</td>
<td>% of male employment</td>
<td>% of male employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2000/05ª</td>
<td>2005ª</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>74</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>20</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>41</td>
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<td>Israel</td>
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<td>81</td>
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<td>34</td>
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<td>40</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>33</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Own production. Source:</th>
<th>UNDP</th>
<th>WB</th>
<th>WB</th>
<th>WB</th>
<th>WB</th>
<th>WB</th>
<th>WB</th>
<th>UNDP</th>
<th>UNDP</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Latest data available for this period.</td>
<td>b. Estimate based on latest data available for the period 1991-2004.</td>
<td>c. Malta data correspond to the period 1995-2003 (UNDP, 2006) and are therefore not comparable to the rest.</td>
<td>(..) Data not available.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### CHART F17

**Estimated earned income (thousands PPP $) (2005)**

Countries with the best GDI²:

- Iceland
- Australia
- Norway
- Canada
- Sweden
- Netherlands
- France
- Switzerland
- United Kingdom

(*) The Gender-related Development Index (GDI) is a composite index that measures average inequality between men and women in three basic dimensions that make up the Human Development Index (long and healthy life, knowledge and adequate standard of living), adjusted to reflect inequalities between men and women.
### TABLE F18  
**Energy production and consumption**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Energy production</th>
<th>Energy use</th>
<th>Energy use per capita</th>
<th>GDP per unit of energy use</th>
<th>Net energy imports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>millions mt oil eq</td>
<td>millions mt oil eq</td>
<td>kg oil eq</td>
<td>PPP $ per kg oil eq</td>
<td>% of energy use</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Portugal                 | 3.9               | 26.5       | 2,528                 | 7.1                       | 85                |
| Spain                    | 32.5              | 142.2      | 3,331                 | 6.9                       | 77                |
| France                   | 137.4             | 275.2      | 4,547                 | 5.9                       | 50                |
| Italy                    | 30.1              | 184.5      | 3,171                 | 8.2                       | 84                |
| Malta                    | 0                 | 892        | 2,242                 | -                         | -                 |
| Slovenia                 | 3.4               | 7.2        | 3,591                 | 5.4                       | 52                |
| Croatia                  | 3.9               | 8.8        | 1,985                 | 5.6                       | 56                |
| Bosnia and Herzegovina   | 3.2               | 4.7        | 1,203                 | 5.3                       | 31                |
| Serbia / Montenegro      | 11.5              | 16.2       | 2,004                 | -                         | 29                |
| Macedonia                | 1.5               | 2.7        | 1,328                 | 4.6                       | 43                |
| Albania                  | 1.0               | 2.4        | 760                   | 5.9                       | 59                |
| Greece                   | 10.3              | 30.5       | 2,755                 | 7.4                       | 66                |
| Cyprus                   | 42                | 2.677      | 3,281                 | -                         | -                 |
| Turkey                   | 24.1              | 81.9       | 1,151                 | 6.2                       | 71                |
| Syria                    | 29.5              | 18.4       | 993                   | 3.4                       | -60               |
| Lebanon                  | 0.2               | 5.4        | 1,525                 | 3.5                       | 96                |
| Jordan                   | 0.3               | 6.5        | 1,219                 | 3.6                       | 96                |
| Israel                   | 1.7               | 20.7       | 3,049                 | 7.3                       | 92                |
| Palestine                | -                 | -          | -                     | -                         | -                 |
| Egypt                    | 64.7              | 56.9       | 783                   | 4.9                       | -14               |
| Libya                    | 85.4              | 18.2       | 3,169                 | -                         | -369              |
| Tunisia                  | 6.8               | 8.7        | 876                   | 8.2                       | 22                |
| Algeria                  | 165.7             | 32.9       | 1,017                 | 6.0                       | -404              |
| Morocco                  | 0.7               | 11.5       | 384                   | 10.3                      | 94                |

**Energy consumption by source**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>fossil fuels</th>
<th>nuclear power</th>
<th>hydro-electric</th>
<th>renewables</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>2003</td>
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<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>11.0</td>
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<td>81.4</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>52.7</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
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<tr>
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<td>19.4</td>
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<td>6.6</td>
</tr>
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<td>4.0</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>8.9</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
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<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: WB

a. Data from 2003, WRI. b. The negative values indicate that the country is a net exporter. (...) Data not available.

### CHART F18  
**Energy efficiency (1990-2004)**

The most efficient territories and countries (2004)

- **Hong Kong (China)**
- **Peru**
- **Colombia**
- **Bangladesh**
- **Uruguay**
- **Morocco**

- **0**
- **2**
- **4**
- **6**
- **8**
- **10**
- **12**

<table>
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<th>Country</th>
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<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
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<td>Syria</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>11.5</td>
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</table>

Own production. Source: WB
### TABLE F19  
Production, consumption and access to electricity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population with access to electricity</th>
<th>Electricity production</th>
<th>Electricity consumption per capita</th>
<th>Sources of electricitya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>billion kWh</td>
<td>kWh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>44.8</td>
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<td>277.1</td>
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<td>6,803</td>
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<td>19.3</td>
<td>595</td>
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</table>

Own production. Source: WRI WB WB WB WB WB WB WB WB WB WB WB WB WB WB.

a. Percentages do not always add up to total 100% as some sources of electricity are not included.
b. Data from 2003. WRI. (..) Data not available.

### CHART F19  
Electricity consumption and production sources (kWh per capita) (2004)
### TABLE F20: CO₂ emissions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2004 millions mt</th>
<th>2003 mt per capita</th>
<th>2003 share of total</th>
<th>2003 CO₂ intensity per GDP million mt $</th>
<th>2003 industry %</th>
<th>2003 transportation %</th>
<th>2003 electricity %</th>
<th>2003 per 1,000 people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>58.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>316.2</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>30.5</td>
<td>35.5</td>
<td>459*</td>
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<td>7.6</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>327.3</td>
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<td>32.3</td>
<td>32.5</td>
<td>611</td>
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<td>241.9</td>
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<td>12.0</td>
<td>652</td>
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<td>7.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>304.5</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>32.1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.1</td>
<td>(.)</td>
<td>370.4</td>
<td>(.)</td>
<td>(.)</td>
<td>(.)</td>
<td>(.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>417.9</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>500</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
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<td>20.5</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>324</td>
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<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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Source: UNDP/UNPOP, UNDP, WRI, Blue Plan

a. Latest data available for the period 1999-2002, WB.
b. Not including motorbikes.
c. Data from 1999.
d. Data from 2000.

### CHART F20: Evolution of per capita CO₂ emissions (mt) (1990-2004)

[Diagram showing CO₂ emissions evolution for various countries and regions from 1990 to 2004.]
## TABLE F21  Water

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Own production. Source: FAO. a. Own production with data from FAO. b. Latest data available for this period. c. The data corresponds only to the Gaza Strip and is prior to 2007. (..) Data not available.

## CHART F21  Water consumption by sectors (2000)

[Diagram showing water consumption by sectors]

Own production. Source: FAO and WRB.
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**Notes:**
- a. Includes 200-meter deep continental shelf.
- b. According to categories I-V of the IUCN.
- c. Includes only mammals and birds.
- (..) Data not available.

### CHART F22

**Ecological footprint (2003)**

- **Near East and Central Asia (6.5%)**
- **Latin America and the Caribbean (7.7%)**
- **United States and Canada (22.4%)**
- **Eastern Asia, Southern Asia and the Pacific (34.4%)**
- **Europe (23.5%)**

In brackets, percentage of world population.

**Average productive biocapacity of the planet**

[Graph showing the ecological footprint per capita for different countries and regions, with Italy, Portugal, Spain, France, and other countries labeled.]
### TABLE F23  International trade

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 Own production. Source: UNCTAD. Including workers’ remittances, salary income and transfer of capital. Of goods and services. Data from 2005. Data from 2004. Own production with data from UNCTAD. (..) Data not available.

### CHART F23  Evolution of Foreign Direct Investment (1980-2005)

**FDI in the Mediterranean in relation to the FDI worldwide**

**1980** 13.8% 17.1% 8.4% 16.0% **1990** 150,000 100,000 50,000 150,000 0

**2000** 146,357 118,211 34,421 7,832

**2005** 146,357 118,211 34,421 7,832

Own production. Source: UNCTAD.
### TABLE F24

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<th>Country</th>
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<th>ores and metals</th>
<th>manufactured goods</th>
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<td>%</td>
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Own production. Source: UNCTAD. (..) Data not available.

### CHART F24

**Importance of food products and agricultural raw materials in exports** (percentage of total exports) (2005)

* According to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) these categories include exports of live animals, beverages and tobacco, animal or vegetable oils, fats and waxes, as well as non-edible raw materials, excluding fuel, minerals and fertilizers.

Own production. Source: UNCTAD.
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<th>Ores and metals</th>
<th>Manufactured goods</th>
<th>Others</th>
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Own production. Source: UNCTAD. (..) Data not available.

* According to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) these categories include imports of live animals, beverages and tobacco, animal or vegetable oils, fats and waxes, as well as non-edible raw materials, excluding fuel, minerals and fertilizers.

CHART F25 Importance of food products and agricultural raw materials in imports* (percentage of total imports) (2005)

**Countries or territories whose imports of food products and agricultural raw materials represent more than 25% of the total of their imports.
### TABLE F26  
Tourism in the Mediterranean

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<th>Outbound tourists</th>
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<td>% in the Med</td>
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<td>4.1</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>190</td>
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<td>725</td>
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<td>1,759</td>
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<td>3.2</td>
<td>8,244</td>
<td>7,206</td>
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<td>1,443</td>
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<td>6,558</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>5,843</td>
<td>20,951</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Own production. Source: UNWTO UNWTO UNWTO WB UNCTAD WB WB WB WB

a. Latest data available for this period.
b. Data from UNWTO. (..) Data not available

### CHART F26  
Evolution of tourism (1990-2005)*

* There is no 1990 data for SI, CS, MK, BA, HR, LB and PS. **Latest data available for this period.

Own production. Source: UNWTO
For practical questions Palestine has not been included, which in 2006 received $1,449 million as ODA, which represented $387 per capita and 35% of its GNI.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Official development assistance by donor</th>
<th>Official development assistance in recipient countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>millions $</td>
<td>% of GNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>0.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3,814</td>
<td>0.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>10,601</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>3,641</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia / Montenegro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: OECD.

* Own production with data from OECD.

For practical questions Palestine has not been included, which in 2006 received $1,449 million as ODA, which represented $387 per capita and 35% of its GNI.

Own production. Source: OECD.
TABLE F28  External debt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Total external debt</th>
<th>Debt service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>millions $</td>
<td>% of GNI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>30,169</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>5,564</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia / Montenegro</td>
<td>16,295</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>2,243</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1,839</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>171,059</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>6,508</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>22,373</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>7,896</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>34,114</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>17,789</td>
<td>69</td>
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<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
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<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>16,846</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Own production. Source: WB and UNPOP. \(^a\) Own production with data from WB and UNPOP. \(^b\) The remittances of emigrant workers are included. (...) Data not available.

CHART F28  Debt service effort (2005)

Debt service (% of GNI)

- Eastern Europe and Central Asia
- Latin America and the Caribbean
- Near East and North Africa
- Sub-Saharan Africa
- Eastern Asia and the Pacific
- Southern Asia

Debt service (thousands of millions $)

- TR
- LB
- HR
- SY
- AL
- BA
- EG
- MK
- JO
- DZ
- MA
- TN
- EG

Own production. Source: WB and UNPOP.
Definitions

**Adolescent fertility rate**
Number of births per thousand women aged between fifteen and nineteen.

**Adult literacy rate**
Percentage of people over fifteen years of age who can read, write and understand a short, simple text about their daily life.

**Agricultural land area**
Land surface area made up of arable and permanently cultivated lands and by permanent meadows and pastures.

**Agricultural population**
Persons who depend on agriculture, hunting, fishing or forestry for their subsistence. This category includes all those who carry out an agricultural activity and all this entails without official employment.

**Annual population growth rate**
Exponential change in the growth of the population during the period indicated.

**Aquaculture production**
Includes marine, freshwater and diadromous fish, molluscs and crustaceans cultivated in marine, inland or brackish environments.

**Arable lands and permanent crops**
Agricultural surface area that groups the data on arable or farm land and land used for permanent crops. Arable and farm land is land given over to temporary crops (those giving two yields are only counted once), temporal meadows for cutting or grazing, land dedicated to commercial vegetable gardens or orchards and land temporarily fallow for a period of less than five years. The term does not include land that has been abandoned as a result of migratory cultivation. Land destined for permanent crops refers to land dedicated to crops that occupy the terrain during long periods and that do not need to be replanted after each harvest, such as cacao, coffee and rubber. It includes land occupied by bushes destined to flower production, fruit trees, walnut trees and vineyards, but excludes land planted with trees destined to the production of firewood or wood.

**Armed forces**
Strategic, land, naval, aerial, command and support forces. It also includes paramilitary forces, such as the gendarmerie, the customs services and the border guard if they are trained in military strategy.

**Average annual supply of fish and fish derivatives**
Calculated from the disposability of fish and its derivatives for human consumption, divided by the total population within the geographical borders of any given country. Nationals living in other countries are excluded, although foreigners living in the country are included.

**Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions**
The emissions of carbon dioxide produced in the burning of all fossil fuels used by a country.

**Carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions by sector**
Shows the proportion of carbon dioxide emissions produced by the burning of fossil fuels in the sectors of transport, industry and electricity production. The transport sector includes emissions produced by all forms of transport by road, rail and air, including agricultural vehicles travelling by road. International journeys by boat or aeroplane are excluded. The industrial and construction sector includes emissions produced by all types of industry and construction. The electricity sector includes emissions produced by the generation of electricity for public use, including thermal power stations.

**Cereal production**
The figures for cereal production only refer to harvests of dry grain. Crops harvested for hay, unripe foodstuffs, forage and silage, or are used for grazing, are therefore excluded.

**Cereal production yield**
The outputs per hectare have been calculated using the data on surface area and production.

**Births attended by skilled health personnel**
Percentage of births attended by health personnel (physicians, nurses and midwives) that are trained in the care, supervision and counselling of women during pregnancy, birthgiving and puerperium, and who can also deliver babies and assist them on their own.
The figures obtained by the FAO, have been supplied by the respective governments in the questionnaires sent out by the FAO.

**Children underweight for their age**

Percentage of children under five who are underweight and height, for their age, is less than twice the standard deviation in comparison with the average for the relevant age group. The population of reference is the child population of the USA, which is assumed to be well nourished.

**CO2 emissions intensity by GDP**

Average quantity of CO2 emitted per unit of income generated by a particular economy.

**Combined gross enrolment ratio for primary, secondary and tertiary schools**

Number of students registered in the primary, secondary and tertiary levels of education, regardless of age, as a percentage of the population of the relevant age group. The population of reference is the child population of the USA, which is assumed to be well nourished.

**Contraceptive prevalence rate**

Percentage of married women (including couples living together) between fifteen and forty-five years of age, who use, or whose partners use, contraception of any type, modern or traditional.

**Crude birth rate**

Number of births per year per thousand inhabitants. An estimate is made in the middle of the current year.

**Crude death rate**

Number of deaths per year per thousand inhabitants. An estimate is made in the middle of the current year.

**Current account balance**

The sum of the net exports – exports minus imports – of goods and services, incomes and net transfers.

**Debt service**

The sum of the main payments and repayments (redemption and charges) to the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

**Daily newspaper circulation**

Refers to those newspapers published at least four times a week.

**Desalinated water production**

Amount of water produced by eliminating salt from saltwater using a variety of techniques, including reverse osmosis. Most of this water is used for domestic purposes.

**Deserts and drylands area**

Total area of semiarid land (drylands), barren and hyperborean (desert) that make up a country.

**Dietary energy consumption**

Disposability of food for human consumption, expressed in kilocalories per person and per day. A national level of food for human consumption is calculated, after deducting all nonfood consumption (exports, fodder, industrial use, seeds and waste).

**Duration of compulsory education**

Number of years within a determined age group that children and young people are legally obliged to attend school.

**Earned income**

Approximate calculation based on the ratio of male non-agricultural salaries in respect to female non-agricultural salaries, the proportion of women to men in the economically active population, the total of the female and male population and the GDP per capita (PPP in USD).

**Ecological footprint**

Measurement of the use of renewable resources by humanity. For a given population, it is defined as the terrestrial area of biologically productive space, on land and sea, that would be required to produce the net primary production consumed by the population to maintain energy sources consumed, to make way for infrastructures, to absorb the waste generated by the population. The unit used to measure the ecological footprint is a global hectare.

**Economic activity rate**

The proportion of the population over fifteen years of age that contributes, or is able to contribute, labour in the production of goods and services.

**Electricity consumption per capita**

Electricity consumption per inhabitant and includes the consumption of auxiliary stations and the losses in the transformers considered as integral part of the central station. It also includes the total electricity produced by pumping stations, without deducting the electricity absorbed by the pumps.
**Electricity production**
Measured in the alternating equipment terminals of electric power stations. Also includes hydroelectric, coal, oil, gas and nuclear energy sources and generation by geothermal, solar, wind, tidal and marine energy, as well as renewable residues and fuels.

**Electricity sources**
Refers to the energy sources used to generate electricity: hydroelectric, coal, oil, gas and nuclear.

**Employed population**
Proportion of the economically active population that is employed. When adding the employed population to the unemployed the result is the whole economically active population or labour force.

**Employment by sector**
According to the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC), the Agriculture category also includes hunting, fishing and forest exploitation; the Industry category includes mining, extraction activities (including oil production), manufacturing, construction and public services (electricity, water and gas); the Services category includes the wholesale and retail trades, restaurants and hotels, transport, storage services, communications, financial services, insurance, real estate, business services, as well as community, social and personal services.

**Employment rate**
Percentage of population in work relative to the total population of working age.

**Energy consumption**
Consumption equals the local production plus imports and changes in stock levels, less exports and fuel destined to boats and aeroplanes used for international transport. Shown is the consumption per inhabitant, as well as the origin of the source. By origin, the fossil fuels include the power consumption of petroleum, natural gas, coal and its derivatives. In the case of nuclear energy, an efficiency of 33% is assumed (European average). Hydroelectricity excludes consumption from pumping. The modern renewable sources include (wind, tidal, waves, photovoltaic and thermal solar, biogas and geothermal and fuels coming from the biomass, such as ethanol) and traditional ones (solid biomass, including wood, vegetable and animal waste, among others).

**Energy production**
Primary energy forms – oil, natural gas, coal and its derivatives and renewable fuels and residues – and primary electricity, all converted into equivalents of oil. The renewable fuels and residues refer to solid and liquid biomass, biogas and industrial and municipal residues.

**Export/Import concentration index**
The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index is used, in a normalised version, to obtain values between zero and one (maximum concentration). It measures the degree of market concentration and the calculation takes into account the different product groups exported, according to the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC).

**Exports**
The value of all goods supplied by an economy to the rest of the world. It excludes labour and income in concept of property, as well as transfer payments.

**External debt**
The sum of the national debt, with public guarantee, private unsecured long term debt, credit from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and short term debt.

**Fertility rate**
Number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to live to the end of her childbearing years and bear children in accordance with current age specific fertility rates.

**Fertilizer consumption**
Amount of vegetable nutrients used per unit of cultivable land. The fertilisers considered are nitrogen, phosphorous and potassium. Consumption is calculated as production plus imports minus exports, and traditional nutrients (animal and vegetable fertilisers) are not included. The data obtained is the result of dividing the consumption of fertiliser of each country by the surface area of arable and permanently cultivated land.

**Fishermen**
Includes the number of people employed in commercial and subsistence fishing (both personnel on land and at sea), who work in fresh water, brackish water, marine area or in aquaculture activities.

**Foreign direct investment**
Net direct investment that is made in order to achieve a lasting participation in the management of a business company operating in a country other than that of the investor. It is equal to the sum of the equity capital, the reinvestment of earnings and other long term and short term capital.

**Forest area**
Understood as all land with natural or artificial plots of trees, whether productive or not.

**GDP (see Gross Domestic Product)**

**GDP growth rate**
Measurement of growth of an economy, obtained through the change in GDP over a period of time, calculated at constant prices.

**GDP per unit of energy use**
Indicator of energy efficiency. The temporary differences and entire countries partly reflect, structural economic changes, changes in the efficiency of particular sectors and differences in the use of fuels.

**Gini index**
Measure of greater or lesser inequality in the distribution of income and consumption, considering a state of perfectly equal distribution. A value of zero
represents perfect equality and a value of one hundred total inequality.

**GNI (see Gross National Income)**

**Gross Domestic Product (GDP)**

The sum of the added value by all the resident producers in an economy, plus any tax on the product (without taking into account the subsidies). The added value is the net profit of an industry after adding together all the profits and subtracting the intermediate contributions.

**Gross Domestic Product by sector**

The contribution of the distinct economic sectors in the GDP is determined according to the added value determined by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC).

**Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita)**

Using the official exchange rates to convert the figures in national currency into USA dollars does not measure the relative internal acquisition powers of each currency in each country. The International Comparison Project (ICP) of the United Nations and the World Bank develop measures of the GDP on an internationally comparable scale using as conversion factors, the Purchase Power Parities (PPP) in respect to each country.

**Gross National Income (GNI)**

The sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of employees and property income) from abroad. The added value if the net profit of an industry after having summed up all profits and deducted international contributions.

**HDI (see Human Development Index)**

**Households with television**

Percentage of homes with a TV set. Data provided for some countries refer only to homes with colour television so values shown may be lower than actual figures.

**Human Development Index (HDI)**

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) prepares the Human Development Index (HDI) by relating three indicators: level of incomes (GDP per capita), health (life expectancy at birth) and level of education (literacy rate and a combination of registration in primary, secondary and higher education).

**Imports**

Value of all goods received by an economy from the rest of the world. It excludes labour and income in concept of property, as well as transfer payments.

**Inbound tourists by destination country**

Number of tourists who travel to a country other than that in which they have their usual residence, for a period no exceeding 12 months and whose main purpose in visiting is other than an activity remunerated from within the country visited.

**Infant mortality rate**

Shows the number of deaths of infants under one year of age per thousand live births.

**Information and communications technology expenditures**

Includes internal and external spending on information technology, as well as telecommunications and other office infrastructures.

**Internally displaced people**

As a result of armed conflicts or human rights abuses, some 25 million people live as internally displaced population. These people were forced to flee from their homes for fear of losing their lives, but unlike refugees, they were displaced within their country's borders. Even though internally displaced people are twice as many as refugees, their situation receives less international attention.

**International tourism receipts**

Income received in a given country from visitors, including payments made to national freight companies for international freight. It also includes the prepayment of goods and services received in the destination country. It can include the income from single day visitors. The percentage it represents in respect to exports is calculated as a ratio of the exports of goods and services.

**Internet users**

Defined as the computers within an economy that are directly linked to the worldwide Internet. These statistics are based on the country codes of the addresses of the users and do not always correspond to the physical location of the computer.

**Investment in telecommunications**

Includes expenses associated with the acquisition of telecommunications equipment and infrastructures (including land, buildings, intellectual property and others). These expenses refer both to the initial installations and to all the reforms undertaken in the existing installations.

**Irrigated lands**

Irrigation data refers to the areas equipped with hydraulic infrastructure to supply water to crops. Areas with partial or total control of the distribution, surface areas irrigated by diversion of rises in level and low and flood- ed areas where available water is controlled are included.

**Known species**

Refers to the total number of species in a given country. Only mammals and birds have been taken into account.

**Land area**

Refers to the total surface area minus the surface covered by inland waters. Inland waters are defined in general as rivers and principle lakes.
Land under cereal production
The figures related to cultivated crop surface areas generally refer to the area harvested, although those corresponding to permanent crops can refer to the total planted area. The figures for the cultivated cereal area only refer to harvests of dry grain. Crops harvested for hay, unripe foodstuffs, forage and silage, or are used for grazing, are therefore excluded.

Life expectancy at birth
The number of years that a new-born infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.

Live animal stock
The data on stock covers all domestic animals regardless of age, location or final purpose. Estimates have been made for countries that have not supplied data, as well as for countries supplying partial statistics.

Live animal trade
Enormous quantities of unregistered animals cross the borders of some countries. In order to obtain more representative international trade figures of live animals, the FAO has incorporated estimates of the unregistered trade.

Maternal mortality ratio
Annual number of deaths of women owing to causes related to pregnancy, for every 100,000 live births.

Mediterranean and Black Sea catches
Fishing catches for commerce, industry or subsistence (including recreational catches where the data is available). The data refers to the catch by the fleet of a country in the Mediterranean and/or in the Black Sea.

Military expenditure
Total of expenses effected by the Ministry of Defence and other ministries on the recruitment and training of military personnel, as well as the manufacture and acquisition of military supplies and equipment. Military assistance is included in the expenses of the donor country.

Mobile phones
Mobile telephone users subscribed to a public, mobile and automatic service providing access to the public telephone network using cellular technology.

Motor vehicles
Includes cars, buses and loading vehicles, but not mopeds or motorcycles.

National protected areas
Areas of land or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of the biodiversity, the natural and associated cultural resources and managed through legal and other instruments. According to The World Conservation Union (IUCN) it includes the total area of all natural reserves, virgin areas, national parks, natural monuments, management areas of habitats and species, as well as protected land and sea areas in each country.

Net energy import
Shows the degree of energy use by an economy and to what extent it exceeds its domestic production.

Net enrolment ratio
Number of students enrolled in a level of education who are of the official school age for that level, as a percentage of the total of the population of official school age for that level. The figures are shown for primary and secondary education.

Net migration rate
Net number of migrants divided by the average population of the receiving country within the period considered.

Net number of migrants
The entry of immigrants into a given country minus the outgoing emigrants of the same country.

Official Development Assistance (ODA)
The net payment of donations and loans granted under advantageous financial terms by official boards of partner countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), as well as international organisations, with a view to promoting economic development and wellbeing, including co-operation and technical assistance.

Oil equivalent
All the values of energy production and consumption presented in this classification are calculated and published by the International Energy Agency (IEA) which uses the equivalent metric tonne of oil based on the calorific content of the energy products as the unit of measurement. An equivalent metric tonne of oil is defined as 107 kilo calories or 11,628 gigawatts per hour (GWh). This amount of energy is practically equal to the amount of energy contained in a tonne of crude oil.

Outbound tourists by country of origin
Number of trips that travellers make to a given country from their normal country of residence, for a period of less than one year, for any other reason than to undertake a paid activity in the country visited.

Permanent pasture
Refers to land used permanently (five years or more) for herbaceous fodder, whether cultivated or uncultivated (meadows or uncultivated land for grazing).

Personal computers
Independent computers in use, intended for use by one single user at a time.

Population density
The result of dividing the average annual population of a country by its land surface area expressed in square kilometres.
**Population in urban agglomerations of more than 750,000 inhabitants**
Percentage of the population of a country living in metropolitan areas, that in 2005 had a population of more than 750,000 people.

**Population living with with HIV/AIDS**
Estimated number of people of any age infected with HIV or AIDS. Includes the whole living infected population at the end of 2003, regardless of whether or not they have developed the disease. It shows the actual figure and the percentage in respect of the population of the country.

**Population per physician**
The figure is obtained by dividing the number of inhabitants of a country by the number of physicians in its health system.

**Population with access to electricity**
Refers to the number of people with access to electricity as a percentage of the total population.

**Population with access to improved sanitation**
Percentage of the population with access to adequate installations for the elimination of excrement, such as connection to drains or systems of septic tanks, flush latrines, pour flush latrines or ventilated improved pit latrines. A system of elimination of excrement is considered adequate if it is private or shared (but not public) and if it allows the efficient avoidance of people or animals entering into contact with the excrement.

**Population with sustainable access to an improved water source**
The percentage of the population that has reasonable access to any of the following sources of drinking water: household water connections, public standpipes, bore holes, protected dug wells, protected springs and rainwater deposits. Reasonable access is defined as the availability of at least twenty litres per person per day, from a source located within a radius of one kilometre from the home of the user.

**Population within 100 km of the coast**
Refers to the estimations of the percentage of the population that lives in the coastal area, based on the 1995 population data.

**Prevalence of smoking**
The percentage of men and women who smoke cigarettes. The age range varies between countries, but in general it is fifteen years of age or above.

**Primary pupil-teacher ratio**
Number of pupils registered in primary schools divided by the number of teachers in primary schools.

**Public expenditure on education**
Composed of capital expenses (construction, renovation, major repairs and purchase of heavy equipment or vehicles) and running costs (goods and services consumed during the current year and need to be renewed the following year). It covers expenses such as salaries and rendering of services, contracted or acquired services, books and didactic material, social welfare services, furniture and equipment, minor repairs, fuel, insurance, rent, telecommunications and travel.

**Public health expenditure**
Refers to the recurring and capital expenses in government budgets (central and local), loans and external concessions (including donations by international agencies and non-governmental organisations) and social or compulsory medical insurance funds.

**R & D expenditures**
The current and capital expenses of creative and systematic activities that increase the stock of knowledge. Includes basic and applied research and experimental development work that leads to new devices, products or processes.

**Refugees**
People who have been forced to flee their country for fear of persecution owing to reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinions or membership of determined social groups and who are unable or unwilling to return. The asylum country is the country in which the refugee has requested asylum, but has not yet received a response, or where he or she has been registered as an asylum seeker. The country of origin refers to the nationality of the seeker or to the country in which he or she is a citizen.

**Rural population**
The estimated population at the mid point of the year in areas defined as rural, as a percentage of the total population of the country.

**Scientists and technicians in R&D**
Professionals that have received further training to work in any scientific field.

**Sectorial distribution of the active population**
Shown by the percentages of the workforce employed in the different economic sectors: agriculture, industry and services.

**Share of income or consumption**
In the questionnaires carried out in homes in diverse countries to determine the distribution of income, they make five divisions (or quintiles) from the lowest to the greatest incomes. The two lower quintiles (40%) are considered the poorest. A relation is also made between the richest 10% and the poorest 10%, in order to establish the degree of inequality in incomes.

**Surface area**
Refers to the extension of the country in its totality, including the surface area occupied by inland waters.
Telephone mainlines
Telephone lines that connect the client’s telephone equipment with the public telephone network exchange.

Threatened species
Includes all the species classified by The World Conservation Union (IUCN), as “vulnerable, in danger, or in critical danger”, but excludes all introduced species, species whose status is not sufficiently known, extinguished species and those still without an assigned status. Only mammals and birds have been taken into account.

Trade in fish and derivative products
Expresses the value associated to the exports and imports of live, fresh, frozen, chilled, dried, salted, smoked and tinned fish and derivative products. Includes fresh and salt water and aquaculture fish, molluscs and crustaceans.

Women in parliamentary seats
Refers to the percentage of seats occupied by women in a lower or single chamber, or in a higher or senate, according to each case. In the case where there are two chambers, the data refers to the weighted average of the participation of women in both chambers.

Total catches
Fishing catches for commerce, industry or subsistence (including recreational catches where the data is available). The data refers to the catch by the fleet of a country in any part of the world. Marine fishing is practiced in seas or oceans, while freshwater fishing takes place in rivers, wetlands and inland lakes.

Unemployment rate
Percentage of the active population without work, but available for and seeking employment.

Wood fuel production
Includes wood from trunks and branches, used as fuel for cooking, heating or producing energy.

Total population
Includes all of the residents of a country or territory with the legal status of citizen, except refugees settled in a country of asylum, who are generally considered as part of the population of their country of origin. Values for 2005 and projections for 2050 are shown.

Urban population living in slums
A place of precarious settlement is a group of individuals who live under the same roof and lack one or more of the following conditions: secure tenure (State protection against illegale eviction), access to drinking water, access to basic healthcare, structural dwelling quality, sufficient vital space. In accordance with the situation of the city in which the precarious settlement is found, this concept can be locally adapted.

Year when women obtained the right to stand for election
The dates refer to the year when the universal and equal right to stand for election was recognised. In the cases when two years appear, the first refers to the first partial recognition of the right to stand for election.

Tourism expenditure in other countries
The expenditure in other countries of travellers from a given country, including the payments to national freight companies for international freight. It can include the expenses of single day travellers. The percentage it represents in respect of the exports, is calculated as a ratio of the exports of goods and services.

Year when women obtained the right to vote
The dates refer to the year when the universal and equal right to vote was recognised. In the cases when two years appear, the first refers to the first partial recognition of the right to vote.

Trade balance
Account that holds the imports and exports of an economy during a certain period of time with the purpose of reflecting the corresponding balance. The negative values indicate a deficit in the trade balance.

Water consumption
Total water used by humans in a year, without taking into account the losses due to evaporation in reservoirs. Includes water from non renewable underground sources, from rivers coming from other countries and from desalinated plants.

Water dependency
Percentage of water available in one country, coming from another.

Year when women obtained the right to vote
The dates refer to the year when the universal and equal right to vote was recognised. In the cases when two years appear, the first refers to the first partial recognition of the right to vote.

Water resources
Refers to the total renewable resources, covering the watercourses of the country (rivers and underground rain water resources) and the watercourses originating in other countries.

Wood fuel production
Includes wood from trunks and branches, used as fuel for cooking, heating or producing energy.

Under-five mortality rate
Probability of death between birth and becoming five years old, expressed per thousand live births.

Workers’ remittances
According to the definition of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Balance of Payments Manual, workers’ remittances are goods and financial assets transferred by immigrants living and working in an economy (where they are considered residents) in favour of the residents of their former country of residence. An immigrant must live and work in the new economy for more than one year to be considered a resident there. The transfers made to the immigrants own accounts abroad are not considered transfers. Moreover, all those derived from the possession of a business by an immigrant are only considered to be normal transfers to the country of origin.

Under-five mortality rate
Probability of death between birth and becoming five years old, expressed per thousand live births.

Urban population living in slums
A place of precarious settlement is a group of individuals who live under the same roof and lack one or more of the following conditions: secure tenure (State protection against illegale eviction), access to drinking water, access to basic healthcare, structural dwelling quality, sufficient vital space. In accordance with the situation of the city in which the precarious settlement is found, this concept can be locally adapted.

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Year when women obtained the right to stand for election
The dates refer to the year when the universal and equal right to stand for election was recognised. In the cases when two years appear, the first refers to the first partial recognition of the right to stand for election.
List of the Organisms Consulted for Drawing Up Tables, Charts and Maps

Atlas of International Freshwater Agreements
www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/atlas/

CITES, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
www.cites.org

EFFIS, European Forest Fire Information System
effis.jrc.ec.europa.eu

EUROSTAT, Statistical Office of the European Commission
europa.eu.int/comm/eurostat

FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
www.fao.org

IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency
www.iaea.org

IDMC, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
www.internal-displacement.org

ILO, International Labour Organization
www.ilo.org

IPU, Inter-Parliamentary Union
www.ipu.org

ITU, International Telecommunication Union
www.itu.int

IUCN, World Conservation Union
www.iucn.org

NEA, Nuclear Energy Agency
www.nea.fr

Nile Basin Initiative
www.nilebasin.org

NTI, Nuclear Threat Initiative
www.nti.org

OECD, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
www.oecd.org
Plan Bleu
www.planbleu.org

SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
www.sipri.org

UNAIDS, Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS
www.unaids.org

UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
www.unctad.org

UNDP, United Nations Development Program
www.undp.org

United Nations Environment Programme
www.unep.org

UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
www.unesco.org

UNFPA, United Nations Population Fund
www.unfpa.org

UNHCR, United Nations Refugee Agency
www.unhcr.ch

UNICEF, United Nations Children’s Fund
www.unicef.org

United Nations Treaty Collection
untreaty.un.org

UNPOP, United Nations Population Division
www.un.org/esa/population/unpop.htm

UNSTAT, United Nations Statistics Division
unstats.un.org

UNWTO, World Tourism Organization
www.unwto.org

WB, World Bank
www.worldbank.org

WEF, World Economic Forum, Travel & Tourism Competitiveness Report 2008

WHO, World Health Organization
www.who.int

WNA, World Nuclear Association
www.world-nuclear.org

WRI, World Resources Institute
www.wri.org

WWF
www.wwf.org
Country Abbreviations Used in Tables, Charts and Maps

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<td>AAK</td>
<td>Alliance for the Future of Kosovo</td>
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<td>ACP</td>
<td>Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States</td>
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<td>Arms Control and Regional Security working group</td>
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<td>Arab Centre for the Study of Arid Zones and Dry Lands (SY)</td>
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<td>FTA</td>
<td>Free Trade Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAERC</td>
<td>General Affairs and External Relations Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAFTA</td>
<td>Greater Arab Free Trade Area</td>
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<tr>
<td>GATS</td>
<td>General Agreement on Trade in Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>Cooperation Council for Arab States of the Gulf</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCIM</td>
<td>Global Commission on International Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GECF</td>
<td>Gas Exporting Countries Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>GG</td>
<td>Greenhouse Gases</td>
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<tr>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>Armed Islamic Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNI</td>
<td>Gross National Income</td>
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<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
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<td>GPRA</td>
<td>Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic</td>
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<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat</td>
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<tr>
<td>GTMO</td>
<td>Transport Group of the Western Mediterranean</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWP</td>
<td>Global Water Partnership</td>
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<tr>
<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAEA</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAF</td>
<td>Islamic Action Front</td>
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<td>IAH</td>
<td>International Association of Hydrogeologists</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICJ</td>
<td>International Court of Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICO/EUSR</td>
<td>International Civilian Office/ European Union Special Representative Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICOLD</td>
<td>World register of dams (International Commission of Large Dams)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICTY</td>
<td>International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced People</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IEA</td>
<td>International Energy Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>IEEI</td>
<td>Institute for Strategic and International Studies (PT)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHP</td>
<td>International Hydrological Programme</td>
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<td>IIP</td>
<td>Iraqi Islamic Party</td>
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<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Strategic Studies (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
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<td>IME</td>
<td>Institut Méditerranéen de l'Eau</td>
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<td>IMED</td>
<td>Mediterranean Institute (IT)</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INA</td>
<td>National Audiovisual Institute (FR)</td>
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<td>INRAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>INSEE</td>
<td>National Institute for Statistics and Economic Studies (FR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>INWEB</td>
<td>International Network of Water-Environment Centres in the Balkans</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance</td>
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<td>IPCC</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPU</td>
<td>Inter-Parliamentary Union</td>
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<td>IREMAM</td>
<td>Institut de Recherches et d’Études sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISARM</td>
<td>International Shared Aquifer Resource Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISCI</td>
<td>Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq</td>
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<tr>
<td>IsDB</td>
<td>Islamic Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITU</td>
<td>International Telecommunication Union</td>
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<td>IUCN</td>
<td>The World Conservation Union</td>
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<td>JDAM</td>
<td>Joint Direct Attack Munition</td>
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<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KKE</td>
<td>Communist Party (GR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>LAOS</td>
<td>Popular Orthodox Rally (GR)</td>
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</table>
LDK  Democratic League of Kosovo
LDP  Least Developed Countries
LIFG  Libyan Islamic Fighting Group
LNG  Liquefied Natural Gas
MAP  Mediterranean Action Plan
MB  Muslim Brotherhood
MCSD  Mediterranean Commission on Sustainable Development
MDGs  Millennium Development Goals
MEDiES  Mediterranean Education Initiative for Environment & Sustainability
MENA  Middle East & North Africa
MENBO  Mediterranean Network of Basin Organisations
MFA  Multi-Fibre Arrangement (Agreement on Textiles and Clothing)
MI  El-Islah Movement party (DZ)
MIC  Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) of the EU Environment DG
MINURSO  United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MIO-ECSDE  Mediterranean Information Office for Environment, Culture and Sustainable Development
MIPO  Mediterranean Investment Project Observatory
MNC  Mediterranean Non-member Countries
MOTAP  Turkish Monuments Project in Mongolia
MPC  Mediterranean Partner Countries
MSP  Movement of Society for Peace (DZ)
MSSD  Mediterranean Strategy for Sustainable Development
MYP  MEDA Youth Parliament
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NBI  Nile Basin Initiative
ND  New Democracy (GR)
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization
NIP  National Indicative Programme
NOC  Libyan National Oil Corporation
NPT  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NWFWZ  Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone
ODA  Official Development Assistance
OECD  Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OIOS  UN Office of Internal Oversight Services
ONCF  Office National des Chemins de Fer (MA)
OPEC  Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
OSCE  Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OUP  Organizations of the Urban Poor
PA  Palestinian Authority
PAP  Pan-African Parliament
PASOK  Panhellenic Socialist Movement
PDK  Democratic Party of Kosovo
PFLP  Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PHARE  Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy (EU)
PIR  Independent Romanian Party
PJD  Justice and Development Party (MA)
PKK  Kurdistan Workers’ Party
PLO  Palestine Liberation Organization
PM  Prime Minister
PPP  Purchasing Power Parity
PSF  Preventive Security Force
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>PWA</td>
<td>Palestinian Water Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>QMV</td>
<td>Qualified Majority Voting</td>
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<td>R &amp; D</td>
<td>Research and Development</td>
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<td>RCD</td>
<td>Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique (TN)</td>
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<td>RDI</td>
<td>Research, Development and Innovation</td>
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<td>REACH</td>
<td>Reaching Sustainable Management of Chemicals in the Euro-Mediterranean Region</td>
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<td>RELEX</td>
<td>Commission for External Relations (EU)</td>
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<td>RND</td>
<td>National Rally for Democracy (DZ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAA</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAM</td>
<td>Surface-to-Air Missile</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>Stabilisation and Association Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEE</td>
<td>South East Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEMC</td>
<td>Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Countries</td>
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<td>SIPRI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Peace Research Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIWI</td>
<td>Stockholm International Water Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMAP</td>
<td>Short and Medium-Term Priority Environmental Action Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise</td>
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<td>SNSD</td>
<td>Independent Social-Democrat PARTY (BA)</td>
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<td>SOPEMI</td>
<td>Continuous Reporting System on Migrations (OECD)</td>
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<td>Serbian Radical Party (CS)</td>
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<td>SYN</td>
<td>Synapismos (Coalition of the Left) (GR)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACIS</td>
<td>Technical Assistance to the Community of Independent States (EU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAIEX</td>
<td>Technical Assistance Information Exchange</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAIEX</td>
<td>Technical Assistance and Information Exchange Instrument</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEC</td>
<td>Transtech Engineering Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>TEU</td>
<td>Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit</td>
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<td>TFEU</td>
<td>Treaty on European Union</td>
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<td>TFEU</td>
<td>Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFP</td>
<td>Total Factor Productivity</td>
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<td>TIIKA</td>
<td>Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency</td>
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<td>TMK</td>
<td>Kosovo Protection Corps</td>
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<td>TRNC</td>
<td>Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus</td>
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<td>TUBITAK</td>
<td>Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>Unmanned Aerial Vehicles</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNEP</td>
<td>United Nations Environment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Population Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL</td>
<td>Unites Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNWTO</td>
<td>World Tourism Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>WDM</td>
<td>Water Demand Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEF</td>
<td>World Economic Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFD</td>
<td>Water Framework Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWC</td>
<td>World Water Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZTE</td>
<td>Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment Corporation</td>
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